CRAFTING IMAGES: CRITICAL AND AESTHETIC DISCOURSE IN POST-CLASSICAL GREEK LITERATURE

By

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…but we might remind ourselves that criticism is as inevitable as breathing, and that we should be none the worse for articulating what passes in our minds when we read a book and feel an emotion about it, for criticizing our own minds in their work of criticism.

T.S. Eliot, *The Sacred Wood*

PREFACE

Were I to reduce my dissertation to a paper and deliver it at a conference, I would be afforded an opportunity that the page denies. My allotted fifteen minutes inevitably swelling to twenty or twenty-five, I would sit patiently through the presentations of my fellow panelists, reflecting all the while on the possible lapses in my argument and articulationn min, and return to the present in time for audience questions. I would smirk inwardly, and smile outwardly, at the inevitable irony to ensue: my dissertation is on a particular form of self-presentation in post-Classical literature. In it, I adopt Bourdieu's sociological theories to argue that critical evaluation of aesthetic objects shares both a discourse and an aim with critical evaluation of erotic objects. When speakers evaluate and criticize, they draw from a stock of normative terms and rhetorical strategies which can be applied to a range of objects; the validity and force of evaluation and criticism depend on the ability to distinguish between terms and strategies and appropriately deploy them; the successful outcome of evaluation and criticism distinguishes a speaker, raising his or her status in the eyes of the audience. As anyone who has attended an academic conference knows, the question and answer portion of a panel is a stage for intellectuals to show off their capacity to make distinctions, apply terms, and gain status among their peers. The status-seeking self-presentation that I call "image-crafting" is not a vice; it is an essential process in the economy of social, cultural, and economic capital. Most academics who ask pompously rambling questions at conferences know what they are doing, do it anyway, and have good reasons for doing it: they want to show off what they know and what they know how to do. When we encounter the same phenomenon in literature, however, we can appreciate it as we do not appreciate the voice of the long-winded professorial exhibitionist: it contributes to the dynamic

and intelligence of the literary work; it is the aim of my dissertation to explore some of the ways it does so in post-Classical literature.

My dissertation consists of four chapters and a brief conclusion. The first chapter outlines the methodological approach, the critical terminology, and the scope of the project. It then offers a holistic reading of Theocritus' *Idylls* as a space for competing evaluative discourses. In particular, the chapter elaborates on the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, arguing that much of post-Classical literature can be understood as self-consciously staging exchanges and displays of symbolic and cultural capital in the first-person. It introduces a key term, image-crafting, referring chiefly to the self-presentation of first-person narrators in the pursuit of cultural capital. Image-crafting in turn derives from the exercise of rhetorical mastery over objects, aesthetic or erotic, as first-person narrators evaluate them; such evaluations depend on properly deploying terms of praise and censure, and making distinctions in judgments and observation. As a further consequence, image-crafting may refer also to the image that is summoned before the reader by descriptive evaluations, especially when the first-person narrator encounters works of art. Read holistically, the *Idylls* of Theocritus show the fields of evaluative discourse overlapping and colliding, as various speakers engage in contests of sophisticated image-crafting in a pastoral setting, which sets off the exchange of cultural capital in its most elementary and essential form.

The second chapter examines image-crafting in erotic discourse. While some erotic poetry is covertly evaluative, many poems contain explicit judgments of love objects. The chapter discusses a variety of post-Classical epigrams from the *Greek Anthology* in which a first-person narrator expresses erotic desire and evaluative judgment of a love-object. At greater length, it examines Theocritus' *Idylls* 6 and 11 which present the Cyclops' first-person accounts of his desire for Galatea. The Cyclops' *Idylls* and *Idyll* 3, which is discussed in the first chapter,

have important similarities, most apparent in the rustic *paraklausithyron* motif and the evaluations of the love-objects, but diverge in that the Cyclops' image-crafting is more obviously explicative of his unsophisticated, "low-brow" character. That is to say, the Cyclops' evaluative discourse of Galatea misses the mark; when he describes Galatea as "whiter than cream cheese, softer than a lamb, more playful than a calf, sleeker than an unripe grape" (11.19-20), Polyphemus attempts to fashion himself as worthy admirer, but instead makes himself look foolish. In this, I shall argue, Theocritus further takes the measure of the cultural capital inherent in evaluative discourse.

The third chapter addresses the relationship between textual criticism and the first-person narrators in the post-Classical texts. My aim is to demonstrate both the subjective discourse of criticism, explained in the introductory chapter, and the way it is a function of a speaker's positioning within a cultural field through inclusionary or exclusionary processes. I will focus mostly on how this criticism operates in poetry, but will examine also literary treatises such as Philodemus' *De Poematis,* and Aristotle's *Poetics* as examples of the way explicit literary evaluation happens in prose. Mostly, however, I examine poetic presentations of first-person critical moments and the ways in which literary aesthetics operate more covertly through meta-poetics in the work of Lycophron's *Alexandra,* in which Cassandra's speech (1346-1370) represents an aesthetic struggle between form and content, Meleager's epigrams in the *Anthology,* Lucian's *True Histories,* Pseudo-Moschus *Lament for Bion,* Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe,* and other epigrams from the *Anthology*.

The moment when the evaluative discourses of erotic and aesthetic criticism converge explicitly is in the evaluation in literature of statues or artistic representations of bodies, which is the subject of my fourth chapter. This chapter looks at examples of poetic descriptions of statues

and art that are evaluative in terms of "erotics." The examples in the chapter supplement Chapters 1 and 2's notion that erotic discourse and literary critical discourse are analogous and serve as a similar function of the narrative "I." But, they also show that the status and ambitions of a first-person speaker are strained and even undone by the obligation of projecting judgments onto the erotic and aesthetic realms at the same time. In encountering and evaluating works of art, the first-person speaker frequently finds him or herself positing an erotic subject behind or within the work; the terms of critical judgment do double duty as the speaker attempts to validate himself both in respect to the aesthetic object materially present before him and the absent, but imagined, erotically-charged body that it represents. Some of these examples will concern descriptions of implied statues, such as Meleager's imagined statue or body in the air in *AP* 12.84. Others will concern explicit descriptions of "real" statues, including Herodas' *Mimiambus* 4, in which Cynno and Phile react to statues and paintings in the temple of Aesclepius, thus revealing their aesthetic criteria, Theocritus' *Idyll* 15, in which Praxinoa is amazed at the accurate painting of Aphrodite and Adonis (81-3), Posidippus's epigrams on statue making, and Meleager's epigrams about Praxiteles' statue of Eros (*AP* 12. 56, 57).

The conclusion looks beyond the post-Classical world to two modern English poets and major works that would not have been written were it not for the example of post-Classical poetry, Theocritus specifically. Keats and Tennyson provide an opportunity for demonstrating the range of my critical approach, while also suggesting that their engagement with Theocritus can be better understood if post-Classical literature is read in terms of image-crafting and cultural captial. Readings of "Ode on a Grecian Urn," and "Audley Court" reorient the critical reception of these poems, asking what it means for their authors to have announced their indebtedness to Theocritus.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCING THE CRITIC

> Social subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves by the distinctions they make, between the beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished and the vulgar, in which their position in the objective classifications is expressed or betrayed. (Bourdieu, *Distinctions* 1984)

In Theocritus' third *Idyll,* the narrator leaves his flocks in the care of a friend and goes off to serenade his love object, Amaryllis (1-5). The narrator directly addresses Amaryllis in the next lines, asking why she no longer peeps out from her cave and invites him in. In the rest of the poem he attempts to convince her to reciprocate his desire by threatening suicide, saying he brought apples and promising more, expressing his frustrated misery, comparing his situation to mythological exempla, and praising her form. Amaryllis, however, never responds and never emerges from her cave, thereby raising the question of whether she is "real" or a product of the narrator's imagination and fantasy. Much of the scholarship on *Idyll* 3 finds the poem to be some kind of investigation of the tensions between what is "real" and what is imaginary, constructed, or artificial. Gutzwiller sees this poem as an interaction between the mimetic and the analogical, where the realms of divine and animal, real and ideal intersect.[1] Payne approaches this poem through the lens of theatricality and the speaker's performative role-playing. He concludes that, since the speaker only narrates and does not actually impersonate the archetypes of his performance at the end of the *Idyll,* the overall effect is that of an exploration between a fictional world and the "real" world of the reader.[2]

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[1] Gutzwiller 1991: 115-23
[2] Payne 2007: 60-67.

The questions this poem raises about "fiction" versus "reality" apply also to Amaryllis' mode of existence. Although we assume her to be a human being, she seems "little more than a disembodied figure—the essence of a flashing glance," or she seems to be the cave itself, or a statue of a nymph in a grotto.[3] As the following passage demonstrates, the figure of Amaryllis bridges a gap between the literal and the metaphorical, living and statue:

> …αἴθε γενοίμαν
> ἀ βομβεῦσα μέλισσα καὶ ἐς τεὸν ἄντρον ἰκοίμαν,
> τὸν κισσὸν διαδὺς καὶ τὰν πτέριν ἅ τυ πυκάσδει.
> ….
> ὦ τὸ καλὸν ποθορεῦσα, τὸ πᾶν λίθος, ὦ κυάνοφρυ
> νύμφα, πρόσπτυξαί με τὸν αἰπόλον, ὥς τυ φιλήσω
> ἔστι καὶ ἐν κενεοῖσι φιλήμασιν ἀδέα τέρψις.[4] (*Idyll* 3.12-14, 18-20)
>
> If only I could be a buzzing bee and fly into your cave,
> Passing through the ivy and the fern you hide behind.
> …
> O dark-browed nymph with the lovely glance, but entirely stony
> Come into your goatherd's arms so that I might kiss you.
> There is sweet delight even in empty kisses.

By calling Amaryllis τὸ πᾶν λίθος, the goatherd associates her directly with the cave or a statue in a cave; Gutzwiller explains that the word κυάνοφρυ meaning "dark-browed" ties together Amaryllis' glancing and stone since ὀφρῦς can mean "mountain ridge" or "eyebrow." Further, she explains that there were many caves sacred to Nymphs in the Greek countryside and that there were stone statues of deities inside many of them, and, in the Hellenistic period, statues of nymphs were set in natural and artificial grottos. Hence, the association among Amyrillis, caves, and statues would have been more evident to a Greek audience; but, there is not enough evidence

[3] Gutzwiller 1991: 119-20 explains that this is in part because the name "Amaryllis" is etymologically related to the verb ἀμαρύσσειν ("to sparkle") which was associated with the gaze in early Greek poetry.
[4] All Theocritus text from Hunter 1999.

to say concretely what Amaryllis ultimately is since the stony unresponsiveness of a cave might simply metaphorically symbolize Amaryllis' response or lack thereof.[5]

Two features of the poem contribute to the blurring of the line between "reality" and "fiction" as it relates to Amaryllis. The first is that this poem is one of two *Idylls* in the extant corpus of Theocritus presented entirely in the first-person. Told in the third-person, one character's perception of an object and the object itself co-inhabit a common ground of narration; in the first-person, the reader's access to what is perceived is filtered through the perceiving consciousness. The first-person claims that he or she stands apart from the matter he or she perceives, but the narration never lets us forget that the reality external to the first-person is dependent upon his or her subjective position and ideology, as in the case of *Idyll* 3. In the mind of an extreme skeptic, the reality asserted by the first-person might always be a fiction; in the mind of a theoretically-informed reader, one's perception of an object is a function of the subjectivity one inhabits. What is more, the subject that controls the descriptive language of the object also, then, has a degree of mastery over that object, limited only by the potential agreement or disagreement of other subjects. Spoken from the first-person in the absence of other subjects, this extended monologue offers an entirely subjective view of the world- the descriptions are the perceptions and representations of the narrator alone, an expression of desire and personal tastes, and a product of image-crafting, purposeful or not. Thus, according to some readings, while Theocritus presents us with a "real" subjective perception, it takes us a step away from an objective account of reality.

But the binary between objective and subjective is a difficult one to sustain: who has purchase on what is objectively there, if every account of the world is ultimately a first-person

[5] See Gutzwiller 1991: 120 for explanation. Lauter 1972: 56-57 explains that the natural rocks were used as statue bases for nymphs in Hellenistic Rhodes.

account? The binary takes new form in the terms of ideology: who has purchase on an ideologically-free account of reality, if every first-person account of the world is ideologically situated? To escape from the binds of these binaries, while remaining faithful to their premises—that there is some tension between a person's situatedness and the world they purport to describe—I turn in this dissertation to the work of Pierre Bourdieu.[6] In his theoretical work, Bourdieu rejects the binaries between agent and structure, and subjective and objective.[7] "Subjectivism" bestows an essentialist creativity on individuals who gather knowledge about the world based on subjective perceptions; "objectivism," on the other hand, concerns the conditions that structure practices independent of consciousness. Bourdieu, finding neither one of these approaches satisfactory, refers to the "objectivity of the subjective." While subjectivism ignores the social ground that shapes and determines consciousness, objectivism does the opposite, ignoring individuals' conceptions and representations of the world.[8]

Central to Bourdieu's argument are his concepts of *habitus* and *field*. The concept of *habitus* answers his "theoretical intentions…to get out from under the philosophy of consciousness without doing away with the agent, in its truth of a practical operator of constructions."[9] *Habitus* is a durable disposition, inculcated from birth, and infiltrating practices in multiple areas; it is the subject's disposition towards others and objects in a larger social *field*. While it incorporates objective social conditions, it does not negate the possibility of strategic calculation on the part of agents. *Fields* are a kind of social formation that operate as structured spaces with their own social laws and hierarchical positions independent of economy or politics. Within a *field*, agents engage in competition and control of resources specific to the field in

[6] For an overview of Bourdieu's work see Brubaker 1985 and Garnham and Williams 1980.
[7] See especially *Distinctions* 1984 and *The FIeld of Cultural Production* 1993.
[8] Explained in Bourdieu 1984, Part 1.
[9] Bourdieu 1985: 14.

question. These "resources" may be material, as in the case of economic capital, or they might be otherwise, as in the case of symbolic capital. "Symbolic capital" represents accumulated prestige, honor, knowledge, or recognition. In some cases, symbolic capital may translate to, or be exchanged for, economic capital, but in other cases it may not. Of especial pertinence to my discussion is a third category, "cultural capital," which is a form of knowledge equipping a social agent with the ability to appreciate cultural artifacts, such as art or poetry.[10] Typically, it is gained through processes of formal and social education.

The focus of my project is literary image-crafting understood as a mining of symbolic and cultural capital. I concentrate primarily on the discourses of two fields (as Bourdieu understands the term) for my investigation. The simultaneous presence of the two discourses in the poem is the second feature that contributes to the ambiguous status of Amaryllis' existence: whether she is living or carved. This ambiguity is due to the fact that, as I shall argue, the evaluative discourse of art and the evaluative discourse of love objects are two sides of the same coin. A subject's judgment of both erotically-desired others and aesthetic objects are essential parts of that subject's negotiation of his or her own position and cultural capital. This dissertation hopes to contribute to the study of the subjective evaluative experience in post-Classical literature (the major periods labeled typically as "Hellenistic" and "Second Sophistic") by looking specifically at the way in which the evaluative process manifests itself in two literary discourses: namely, the expression of erotic desire, and the criticism of literature. In both discourses, to borrow Bourdieu's phrase, distinctions distinguish: the first-person judges both erotic and aesthetic objects in a common discourse, following similar rules, which then allow

[10] Bourdieu states, "..the person with the cultural capital of eloquence, intelligence, knowledge is spontaneously perceived as holding a legitmate authority" (192). For Bourdieu's most lucid explanation of types of capital see Bourdieu 2014: 191-92.

that person to gain status and prestige. I find these two discourses to be particularly valuable representations of subjectivity in that they both ostensibly concern a subject's relationship to an object that is "subject" to aesthetic judgment. I aim to prove that, in the literature of the post-Classical Period (and beyond), these two discourses are analogous--they both allow the narrators to interrogate meta-critically and negotiate their social positions. I go on to consider a third category of evaluation: that of statues and works of two-dimensional visual art that depict bodies. Here the two discourses—of erotic and aesthetic judgment—are brought into play simultaneously, presenting a distinct challenge to the status and stability of the first-person subject, but also a distinct chance to show off one's ability to form distinctions of judgment is thereby doubled.

Given that my focus lies in the intersection of poetic image-crafting and evaluative discourse in post-Classical poetry, I primarily examine the ways the first-person narrator (i.e. the presentation of a subjective evaluative perception) operates and the ways the literature of this period conceptualizes and constructs the notion of the evaluating self. It does so, I suggest, by means of an evaluatively-charged description of an object, be it visual, plastic, textual, or erotic; I refer to the process of evaluative discourse as "image-crafting." The term refers to a narrator's self-fashioning *in a field of cultural production*: in acts of evaluation, a narrator projects or constructs an image of him or herself and authority. I coin a new term because "self-fashioning" is not adequate for the phenomenon I analyze. First, it is associated with Stephen Greenblatt and New Historicism, the theoretical roots of which are in Foucault; it suggests that any self, and any account of the self, is produced under and through regimes of power, but it does not suggest, as my term does, that a certain image of the self is being projected for purposes of social

approbation or distinction. It signals my orientation towards Bourdieu, rather than Foucault.[11] Second, and more relevant to my argument, "image-crafting" can also refer to something similar to ekphrasis: the image of a love-object or aesthetic object that is conjured for a reader through sustained evaluation; my term can refer, therefore, not only to to an act akin to self-fashioning but to the simultaneous fashioning of an image for a reader, which will confirm or reward a narrator's cultural capital. When evaluating literary texts, narrators tend to effect image-crafting in only the first sense; when evaluating bodies of love-objects, both senses are relevant; when evaluating works of art, both senses are relevant, but with further complications.

While image-crafting can and does happen in the third and second persons, I limit my scope to the first-person simply because it is a grammatical choice that grants a degree of legitimacy to the narrator beyond what is offered by a "he" or "she" character. Previous scholarship in specifically Hellenistic poetry has been concerned largely with allusion and intertextual studies, such as the study of the redeployment of the Archaic lyric "I" in Hellenistic epigram.[12] Scholarship in the Second Sophistic period has also been concerned with subjectivity, especially what it means in the construction of Greek identity.[13] My dissertation, however, goes beyond these studies by examining the subjective experience in any constructed moment of self-presentation. That is to say, this project addresses not only the lyric "I" found in the epigrams of the *Anthology*, but also, for example, any first-person speaker (i.e. an authorial voice, a persona, or a character). Other examples I use include Theocritus' *Idylls*, Pseudo-Moschus' *Lament for Bion,* Lycophron's *Alexandra,* Callimachus' *Aetia,* Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe,* Lucian's *True Histories,* and prose works of criticism such as Longinus' *On the Sublime*, Aristotle's *Poetics,* and Philodemus' *On Poems.* Throughout the dissertation, I acknowledge the ways that genre and

[11] See Greenblatt 1980.
[12] Notably Acosta-Hughes 2010 and Morriston 2007.
[13] See Whitmarsh 2001 and 2005.

historical context may bear on the presentation by and of a narrator, but I am interested in establishing that the construction of first-person subjectivity plays out according to rules and within a discourse that transcends genre and holds true under diverse contextual pressures. I, therefore, allow myself freedom from these somewhat arbitrary limitations in order to demonstrate that the processes of evaluation and image-crafting transcend the limits of genre and that, in some regard, first-person characters, personas, narrators, and voices are equivalent. This vantage point permits a broader consideration of self-presentation and the ways the post-Classical period negotiates and problematizes the first-person narrator.

While the aim of this project is not to make a broad historical claim about the Hellenistic period or the Second Sophistic period, I do propose that the historical conditions of these periods mark the literature of the time as uniquely valuable for considering aesthetic and erotic criticism. I have selected texts from the Hellenistic period because I find them particularly fruitful for discussion of my topic due to this period's more explicit exploration of evaluation in the literary and artistic field. The Hellenistic period is often characterized as a period in which criticism flourishes.[14] Literary culture thrived and the Library at Alexandria became the center for textual criticism and "Alexandrian poetics" that married artistic craftsmanship with learning. In addition to the learned allusions and overt statements about aesthetics in poetry (i.e. Callimachus' "slender muse" in *Aetia* 1.24), part of Alexandrian literary culture included the process of cataloging; Callimachus produced the *Pinakes,* or catalogues, of the material at Alexandria in 120 volumes, organizing Greek literature according to generic classes: rhetoric, law, epic, lyric, tragedy, comedy, history, philosophy.[15] This process of asserting the priority and privilege of certain texts over others through inclusion and exclusion (what we call "canonization") is an

[14] Kennedy 1989.
[15] Pfeiffer 1968: 128-9.

explicit form of the way that critical assessment operated in the Hellenistic period and beyond. Any subjective critical evaluation is exclusionary and is linked not only to the notion of a literary canon, but to matters of community, class, and social status. Consequently, critical evaluation is a valuable inroad to assessing the evaluating subject's negotiation of his or her authorial position in a cultural field, and poetry and literature provide an area in which critical evaluation is represented and scrutinized. What we know of Alexandrian elitism and its class system is reflected physically in the canonization process at the Library and ideologically in the representation of judgments of art and erotic desire in literature.

Roman Imperial Greek literature, often referred to as the literature of the "Second Sophistic," (which Whitmarsh defines as the period from the middle of the first century to the early third century CE) is likewise pertinent for this project. During this period there was a revival of interest in Greek literature of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE and an interest, generally, in interpretation. As they do with the Hellenistic period, scholars align the Second Sophistic period with allusiveness and literary self-consciousness.[16] Whitmarsh, in his recent book, *The Second Sophistic,* states: "…theatricality, performance, playfulness, and elusiveness have become indicators not of debased values [in Second Sophistic texts] but of a flourishing, energized culture reflecting actively, if giddily, on its own heritage."[17] It is possible, then, to view Second Sophistic texts as a "playing-out" or consequence of the canonization of "good" literature (and, subsequently, "good" or appropriate ideologies) that occurred in the early Hellenistic period. While education and learning of the "right" texts could not completely overcome one's social status, it allowed an individual to reach the top of the social hierarchy.[18]

[16] See Gleason 1995; Goldhill 2001; Whitmarsh 2001.
[17] Whitmarsh 2005: 9.
[18] Whitmarsh 2001: 98.

By learning the texts fundamental to the Greek tradition, people could negotiate their positions positively.[19] As I will show, authors "image-craft" by displaying their learning and expressing their ideological values, and, in turn, position themselves within cultural fields.

The Greek authors of the Hellenistic period and the Second Sophistic period are analogous in their hyper literary self-consciousness and general interest in evaluation of literature, but they also share similar political circumstances. In the Hellenistic period, "Greek" authors were primarily in or, at the very least influenced by, Egyptian Alexandria and the rule of the Ptolemies. They experienced an amalgamation of different religions, customs, and practices under a rule not entirely Greek. Being "Greek" in Alexandria, then, was distinct from being Greek in 5th century Athens, and cultural and social identity had different stakes than in the Classical period. The authors of Hellenistic literature were displaced, traveling, half, or Hellenized non-Greeks, and the crossing of cultures created a complex crisis of "Greek" identity.[20] Similarly, Second Sophistic authors, after the Roman annexation of Greece, faced the problem of establishing a Greek identity under Roman rule. Indeed, the central focus of Whitmarsh's 2001 book concerns the methods with which literature itself asserted and fashioned a Hellenic identity vis-à-vis the Classical past.

While the texts I examine are from the Hellenistic and Second Sophistic periods, the conceptual and methodological insights of my work are not limited to these literary-historical movements, but rather applicable to a variety of other periods and genres in Classical studies and literary studies generally.

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[19] Whitmarsh 2001: 91 explains that "education seeks to anchor identity in the various polar matrices that are so fundamental to the Greek tradition"; in other words, by becoming educated one finds one's (positive) place in a world of oppositions: human/bestial, Greek/barbarian, free/enslaved, philosopher/non-philosopher, elite/sub-elite, male/female.

[20] Stephens 2002.

Methodological Approach

To explain my approach more fully, the next section addresses three relatively recent pieces that have influenced my thesis with their respective methodologies, time periods, and application.

1. Porter and Aesthetic Thought

James Porter's 2010 book, *The Origins of Aesthetic Thought in Ancient Greece,* aims to redefine how aesthetics should be understood in antiquity, proclaiming Plato and Aristotle responsible for skewing approaches to aesthetics as a result of a "formalism" that demonstrates little interest in the materiality of art. Placing "materialism" and "formalism" at odds and tracing materialism back to the Presocratics, Porter, striving to open aesthetic thinking to any treatment of sensation and perception, is also interested in connecting cultural life and experience to aesthetics. Porter aims to reclaim some of the ground that aesthetic materialism has lost in scholarship to ideology criticism, and his approach is more useful for my argument than Martindale's 2007 *Latin Poetry and the Judgment of Taste.*[21] Using Kant's *Critique of Judgment,* Martindale polemically responds to Habinek's *The Politics of Latin Literature* and Too's *The Idea of Ancient Literary Criticism* (both of which he believes exemplify the "ideology critics") and argues for aesthetic judgment divorced from any political or social interest.[22] Porter, on the other hand, is interested in creating a theoretical framework for understanding a subjective aesthetic experience, but does not claim it is entirely unmediated by cultural experience.

This book is an expansion of and complement to Porter's earlier piece on Longinus and Pausanius which is particularly relevant to this project in that it deals with the Second

[21] Martindale 2007.
[22] Habinek 1998; Too 1998.

Sophistic.[23] To justify his unconventional authorial pairing he states, "each in his own way writes a guidebook to the great monuments of Greece. In doing so, they exhibit a cultural imaginary that is typical of Greek writers in the Imperial period who are conventionally grouped under the rubric of the 'Second Sophistic."[24] That is to say, in Porter's view, a fundamental characteristic of Second Sophistic authors (and particularly of Longinus and Pausanius) is their interest in the great monuments of the past and their ostensible displacement from the present. In this article Porter considers the concepts of visualizations (*phantasi*a*)* and vividness of description (*enargeia*) in conjunction with the experience of the sublime which he describes as the range of responses one has when confronted with a material object that is both fascinating and fearful. That range of responses, though, is contingent upon the individual's personal framework which, in turn, is contingent upon the effects of history, knowledge of that history, and cultural ideology. He argues that the experience of Longinian sublimity, of which a necessary condition is that it makes a lasting impression on the mind, "captures the intensity of *the experience of canonicity itself,* and as such it is a purely ideological effect."[25] *Phantasia,* for example, "that place where the dimensions of the imaginary begin to overtake those of vision and where vision simultaneously leaves a trace and becomes a material deposit in the mind," is a consequence of visual culture but simultaneously is an embodied physical and subjective sensory experience.[26] In both his book and his chapter, Porter outlines the philological methods that ancient authors use to reconstruct for their readers what it would be to physically experience a material composition. Although these aesthetic experiences are filtered through Greek culture, description of embodied physical sensation of art provides a valid matrix of terms and helps readers to interpret first-

[23] Porter 2001.
[24] Porter 2001: 63.
[25] Porter 2001: 79.
[26] Porter 2001: 68.

person perception and association (and in some way (re)live it) and to understand how individuals make meaning out of material compositions.

If we return to the example of *Idyll* 3, we can see how this approach to the subjective experience (i.e. first-person (un)mediated experience of art and sublimity) operates. The opening lines of the poem emphasize the solitude of the first-person narrator. He goes off by himself to serenade Amaryllis and has left his goats on the mountain in the care of his "wonderfully dear friend," Tityrus:

> Κωμάσδω ποτὶ τὰν Ἀμαρυλλίδα, ταὶ δέ μοι αἶγες
> βόσκονται κατ' ὄρος, καὶ ὁ Τίτυρος αὐτὰς ἐλαύνει.
> Τίτυρ', ἐμὶν τὸ καλὸν πεφιλημένε, βόσκε τὰς αἶγας,
> καὶ ποτὶ τὰν κράναν ἄγε, Τίτυρε· καὶ τὸν ἐνόρχαν,
> τὸν Λιβυκὸν κνάκωνα, φυλάσσεο μή τυ κορύψῃ. (3.1-5)
>
> I'm off to serenade Amaryllis, and my goats are grazing on the hill, and Tityrus drives them. Tityrus, my wonderfully dear friend, feed my she-goats, and lead them to the spring, Tityrus. And the he-goat, the tawny Libyan, watch out for him lest he butt you.

Just as Porter says of Longinus and Pausanius, the narrator is partially disengaged with the present; as readers we experience a reconstruction happening in our narrator's mind. When he states in the present tense in line 1 that he is singing and that his goats are grazing on the hill, he leaves open to the readers the possibility that he is in the same setting as his goats. He excludes this possibility, however, and removes himself entirely from the described landscape in line 2, when he states that Tityrus drives them. His removal from the scene indicates that the next lines, in which the speaker addresses Tityrus three times in the vocative and with second-person imperatives, are the speaker's instructions to an imagined mental image of Tityrus. Payne's reading suggests that the key to understanding that the speaker is alone in these first lines is the lack of deictic markers; we get no indication of a specified setting for the narrator. Instead of occupying a "real" setting, "he occupies a transitional space…. The theatrical illusion is empty; it

is as if the speaker emerged from an entrance marked 'Hill,' pointed to an exit marked 'Cave,' and now lingered on a stage devoid of all fictional characteristics." Thus, from the start, *Idyll* 3's empty setting pulls the narrator out of the realm of the "real" world of his goat-herding duties while simultaneously pushing the reader into the imagination of the narrator, his *phantasia* and subjective visual construction.[27]

When the narrator directly addresses Amaryllis in the next lines, his imagination completely leaves behind the constructed world of Tityrus and the goats and he never returns to it. It is evident that the narrative is firmly situated in the speaker's mind because, although he describes Amaryllis' environment and implies that he shares it with her, he still does not explicitly state his physical location:

> Ὦ χαρίεσσ' Ἀμαρυλλί, τί μ' οὐκέτι τοῦτο κατ' ἄντρον
> παρκύπτοισα καλεῖς, τὸν ἐρωτύλον; ἦ ῥά με μισεῖς;
> ἦ ῥά γέ τοι σιμὸς καταφαίνομαι ἐγγύθεν ἦμεν,
> νύμφα, καὶ προγένειος; ἀπάγξασθαί με ποησεῖς.
> ἠνίδε τοι δέκα μᾶλα φέρω· τηνῶθε καθεῖλον
> ὦ μ' ἐκέλευ καθελεῖν τύ· καὶ αὔριον ἄλλα τοι οἰσῶ.
> θᾶσαι μάν. θυμαλγὲς ἐμὶν ἄχος. αἴθε γενοίμαν
> ἁ βομβεῦσα μέλισσα καὶ ἐς τεὸν ἄντρον ἰκοίμαν,
> τὸν κισσὸν διαδὺς καὶ τὰν πτέριν ἅ τυ πυκάσδει. (3. 6-14)
>
> Lovely Amaryllis, why do you no longer invite me into your cave, peeping out, me your sweetheart? Do you hate me? Do I seem snub-nosed up-close, my nymph, with a chin that sticks out? You'll make me hang myself. See, I bear 10 apples. I took them from that place where you ordered me to. Tomorrow, I will bring others. Look at me. I have heart-grieving pain. If only I were a buzzing bee and I might fly into your cave, having passed through the ivy and the fern which covers you.

The phrase τηνῶθε καθεῖλον (I took [apples] from that place) in line 10 only implies that he removed himself from a concrete location where Amaryllis told him to go, but it does not describe his current physical location. We know that the speaker shares the same setting as Amaryllis, but the details are hazy. These lines also imply the speaker's previous history with

[27] Payne 2007:60-61.

Amaryllis since he says that she "no longer" invites him in. Therefore, we do not expect what follows to be a successful erotic encounter, but rather an iteration of a memory or visualization of a once successful event or perhaps even a previous *phantasia*. While on the surface the speaker will attempt in vain to persuade Amaryllis to come out of her cave, paradoxically he subtly imagines erotic fulfillment. This reaffirms our position in the mind of the narrator; since when we know the "reality" of an encounter is no longer valid, fantasy can begin. This fantasy is further confirmed by the speaker's speculation that Amaryllis might hate him or find him unattractive (8-9). Since there is no confirmation or denial of these conjectures, they are to be understood as the speaker's imagined projections of Amaryllis' thoughts.

Recreation in literature of an aesthetic experience (which in this project I apply not only to art and literature but also to love-objects) is one way that I evaluate how narrators craft their images and present themselves to an audience. Consciously or unconsciously narrators filter sublimity and other aesthetic reactions through their socially embedded experiences, position, and aspirations. Doubling down on the cultural approach to aesthetics, in this project I examine authors' presentations of aesthetic responses as social techniques.

2. Whitmarsh and Self-Making.

A second scholarly influence on my project is Whitmarsh's 2001 book on the Second Sophistic, *Self-Making: Greek Literature and the Roman Empire*. In this work Whitmarsh endeavors to explore the cultural and political value of Greek literature under/over/in tandem with the Roman Empire in relation to the construction of Greek identity. Whitmarsh discusses literature as a "process of self-making."[28] He acknowledges the inevitability of the elitism of literature, the limits of which, demarcated through formalist, aesthetic, or sociocultural criteria, are always bound up with ideas about cultural "value" and the definition of the collective group.

[28] Whitmarsh 2001: 2.

Instead of merely reflecting the governing social, political, and ideological forces, however, Whitmarsh suggests that Second Sophistic texts actually participate in constructing them.[29]

While my project concentrates on the discourses of literary/artistic criticism and the evaluation of love-objects to interpret self-making, Whitmarsh focuses the first half of his book on the concepts of *mimesis* and *paideia* in the construction of Greek identity. During the Second Sophistic, "education seeks to anchor identity in the various polar matrices that are so fundamental to the Greek tradition."[30] That is to say, by becoming educated one finds one's (positive) place in a world of oppositions: human/bestial, Greek/barbarian, free/enslaved, philosopher/non-philosopher, elite/sub-elite, male/female. To illustrate this, Whitmarsh cites Plutarch's "On the Education of Children" in which he states that birth status does not necessary determine ethical status. Even a child of 'lowly' birth – though this is not ideal – can overcome natural deficiencies and rise to a higher status through education and hard work- low *physis* can be overcome by *logos/mathesis* and *ethos/askesis.*[31] While education does not break down or change social hierarchy, it can allow one to participate in and reach the top of that hierarchy. *Paideia*, then, provides social empowerment to elite males and consolidates their Hellenic identity. One does not have to be *Greek* to be 'Hellenic;' rather one's education in the proper behavior, ethics, and moral values constructs a Hellenic identity. Whitmarsh's approach to the notion of the subject seems to be a middle ground of cultural determinism- through education and copying others, a subject could actively participate in the creation of social forces rather than being mere projections of them, just as Bourdieu granted some objectivity to the subject within the framework of radical social and cultural contextualization.[32] The category of critical

[29] Whitmarsh 2001: 4-5.
[30] Whitmarsh 2001: 91.
[31] Whitmarsh 2001: 98.
[32] Bourdieu 1993.

discourse is an inevitable consequence of the *paideia* described by Whitmarsh and one primary way of constructing a self-image, whether the purpose/result be to construct a Greek identity, position oneself in a particular *habitus,* or woo a love-object.

Turning back to *Idyll* 3, we can see some of the ways that a subject constructs a self-image/identity through display of cultural knowledge (his *paideia*) and desire to imitate (*mimesis*). The goatherd begins a new song at the end of the *Idyll* consisting of mythological exempla that metaphorically parallel the circumstances of his relationship with Amaryllis:

> Ἱππομένης, ὅκα δὴ τὰν παρθένον ἤθελε γᾶμαι,
> μᾶλ' ἐν χερσὶν ἐλὼν δρόμον ἄνυεν· ἁ δ' Ἀταλάντα
> ὡς ἴδεν, ὡς ἐμάνη, ὡς ἐς βαθὺν ἅλατ' ἔρωτα.
> τὰν ἀγέλαν χὠ μάντις ἀπ' Ὄθρυος ἆγε Μελάμπους
> ἐς Πύλον· ἁ δὲ Βίαντος ἐν ἀγκοίναισιν ἐκλίνθη
> μάτηρ ἁ χαρίεσσα περίφρονος Ἀλφεσιβοίας.
> τὰν δὲ καλὰν Κυθέρειαν ἐν ὤρεσι μῆλα νομεύων
> οὐχ οὕτως Ὥδωνις ἐπὶ πλέον ἄγαγε λύσσας,
> ὥστ' οὐδὲ φθίμενόν νιν ἄτερ μαζοῖο τίθητι;
> ζαλωτὸς μὲν ἐμὶν ὁ τὸν ἄτροπον ὕπνον ἰαύων
> Ἐνδυμίων· ζαλῶ δέ, φίλα γύναι, Ἰασίωνα,
> ὃς τόσσων ἐκύρησεν, ὅσ' οὐ πευσεῖσθε, βέβαλοι. (3.40-51)
>
> Hippomenes, when he wished to marry the maiden,
> having taken the apples in his hands, completed the race. And Atalanta,
> when she saw them, she was driven mad, and she leapt into deep desire.
> And the seer Melampus led the herd from Othrys
> to Pylus. And in the embrace of Bias, he rested,
> the lovely mother of very wise Alphesiboea.
> Pasturing sheep in the mountains, did Adonis
> not drive beautiful Cytheria to such a degree of madness
> so that wasting away she does not put him away from her breast?
> Envied by me is Endymion, the one sleeping eternal sleep.
> I envy, dear woman, Iasion, who has meet with
> such things as you will not learn, uninitiated.

Scholarly interpretations of these examples are rather extensive. In many of the goatherd's examples, the love between the goddess and mortal was brief. In light of this, Dover proposes

that his choices are humorous or ignorant.[33] Stanzel and Whitaker, on the other hand, find the examples appropriate or therapeutic since, in all the myths, what looks hopeful, turns out to be disappointing.[34] Payne notes that the traditional function of mythological exempla is to persuade. (Phoenix, for example, in the *Iliad,* attempts to persuade Achilles with the story of Meleager and Cleopatra.) In the goatherd's song, though, he observes that Amaryllis does not seem to be the desired target of persuasion: "Amaryllis figures only obliquely, as the object of their quests. If the goatherd is trying to persuade anyone with these examples, it can only be himself."[35] In citing examples of successful love, the goatherd not only displays cultural learning, but also positions himself within a specific cultural context in which he stands on the cusp of inclusion and exclusion; he could either be included in the group of love stories if things go his way or excluded if they do not.

To further complicate and construct an identity, the goatherd also blurs the boundary between the desired object and the desiring subject through his mythological examples. For example, the first protagonist is Hippomenes who drove Atalanta to madness with the golden apples. The narrator is parallel to the desiring subject, Hippomenes, since both use apples to attempt to win their beloved (*cf.* 10-11). We can also, however, see him as corollary to Atalanta. Although Atalanta is, at first, the object of desire, she becomes a frustrated desiring subject. The speaker states that when Atalanta saw the apples she was driven mad and "leapt into deep desire" (βαθὺν ἅλατ' ἔρωτα) (42). Particularly because the word βαθὺν is used metonymically to mean "sea," this phrase is reminiscent of the narrator stating earlier that he will leap into the sea in a suicide threat: ἐς κύματα τηνῶ ἁλεῦμαι (I will leap into the sea) (25). Leaping into water because

[33] Dover 1971 ad 3.40-51. Gow 1951 ad 3.40, 3.50 similarly finds the examples odd in that the mortals profited little. See also Fantuzzi 1995: 16-35; Lawall 1967: 40; Rosenmeyer 1969: 174.
[34] Stanzel 1995: 137, 202. Whitaker 1983: 52.
[35] Payne 2007: 66.

of *eros* has many traditionally literary parallels, and Hunter observes that it was "a typical lover's death."[36] Most famously, Anacreon *PMG* 376 describes leaping from a cliff into water "drunk with *eros*." Consequently, when Atalanta leaps into deep desire, she resembles not only the goatherd but also a conventional subjective lover. She also resembles the goatherd because she is actually the apple-collector in the myth. This confuses who the goatherd intends to be his example.

A similar phenomenon occurs in the Adonis and Aphrodite example. Since Adonis is identified as a herdsman, it seems that he should be analogous to the narrator but, again, it is Aphrodite who is driven to madness. Endymion, too, is a shepherd figure that we can align with the goatherd. The narrator does not explain the details of his envy of Endymion with the implication being that the myth is well-known. Endymion's lover was Selene, who visited him in the "Latmian cave." Although the goatherd says he wants to be in the position of Endymion, he actually imagines himself in the role of Selene, who enters a cave. In the last line of the song, the goatherd actually draws a sharp division between himself and Amaryllis. He says, ὅσ' οὐ πευσεῖσθε, βέβαλοι, (You will not learn, uninitiated) (51). Payne states that the narrator "excludes her…from seeing herself as a participant in the kind of love story that he imagines for himself."[37] We see that the goatherd actually does not require Amaryllis and, in fact, rejects her from his fiction. He is truly alone, with only his own subjective perception and identity. With these mythological exempla, the goatherd demonstrates his *paideia* and desire to imitation, both of which contribute to his image-crafting.

[36] Hunter 1999 ad 25-7.
[37] Payne 2007: 66.

3. *Criticism and Judgment:* Wright and Bourdieu

The final book that informs my methodology is Wright's 2012 book, *The Comedian as Critic,* that suggests that Aristophanic comedy contains a literary critical subtext or a coded literary criticism often imperceptible to the watching audience and discernible only to an elite and learned group.[38] In this way, Wright grants the privileged position often applied to the literature of Hellenistic Alexandria (namely that it is aimed at a highly learned and critical group in a bookish culture) to 5th century Athens and Attic Old Comedy. In a Bourdieu-inflected reading, Wright suggests that the actual comic prize and audience reception was of less interest to the comic poets than metaphorical cultural capital and the reception of other educated readers. Whether one accepts it in its entirety or not, Wright's thesis is relevant to this project in that it argues for an interest in the subtle ways that literature expresses judgments. While I leave space in my thesis for both conscious and unconscious image-crafting impulses in literature, Wright suggests that criticism in Aristophanic comedy is done with full authorial intent.

Each of the critical works discussed above (by Wright, Porter, and Whitmarsh) provide a different way of thinking about subjectivity. In this dissertation, I combine elements of their methodological approaches and the theories of Bourdieu to form a new methodology that examines the methods that poetic narrators employ to negotiate their positions in a cultural field and (meta?) critically interrogate their public images. That is to say, I look at how subjects manipulate their images as they relate to the collection of symbolic power and capital and negotiate how, why, and when they participate in competition in their *fields*. In the next chapters, I hope to demonstrate how this methodology works more specifically in the spheres of *eros*, literary criticism, and art. First, however, I will demonstrate the potential payoff of this

[38] Wright 2012.

methodology (i.e. reading with an eye to the narrative image-crafting through critical discourse and Bourdieu-influenced cultural theory) by roaming through the fields of discourse in Theocritus' *Idylls*.

Theocritus' Criticism Laboratory

Though individual *Idylls* and excerpts from them will feature in each chapter, reading the *Idylls* as a collection offers a chance to survey a scene in which all of the discourses and fields of image-crafting play into and off with one another. Rather than cull readings from any one particular discourse and field of image-crafting, as I will in subsequent chapters, here I will read freely, opening avenues and vistas that will be explored and returned to later. What follows, then, serves as an exercise in uninhibited readings following the critical methodologies I have outlined above; from it, a lay of the land, and a display of potential.

In the *Idylls*, we find subjects that seem to act out and perhaps parody the operations of critical and aesthetic judgments among the Alexandrian cultural elite and ancient literary criticism more generally. The *Idylls* then become a literal cultural field in a coded way. Aesthetic and critical judgments in antiquity, formal or material, are generally a form of inclusion/exclusion and thus, a reflection of cultural-historical hierarchical values and ideology. Hence, the world of the *Idylls* operates as sociological laboratory for the criticism of criticism and the narrators become "covert" critics (a concept I explain and explore in other texts in Chapter 3). This meta-criticism happens through form (stylistic register, meter, diction) and content (moments of sublimity, competition, poetic inspiration, and judgment).

Theocritus constructs this laboratory through construction of a fictional space. Explicit internal references in the *Idylls,* such as allusions to Asclepiades of Samos and Philitas of Cos in

Idyll 7 and praise of Ptolemy Philadelphus (*Idylls* 14, 15, 17), place Theocritus in the flourishing intellectual culture of Alexandria and the Eastern Aegean. The world of his poetry, however, filled with humble herdsmen and rustic landscapes, is far removed from the urbane and educated Alexandrian audience. The distance emphasizes the fictionality of the *Idylls,* especially through self-conscious moments of their performativity, pointing to construction of a space for Theocritus to examine the process of criticism. While there are many ways this distancing effect occurs, *Idyll* 3, discussed at the beginning of this chapter, is a good example; this poem is commonly read as a rustic *komos* (made clear with the first word of the poem κωμάσδω) with a highly dramatic structure that includes elements of parody.[39] Payne, whose primary thesis in his book *Theocritus and the Invention of Fiction* is the fictionality of the *Idylls,* approaches this poem through a lens of its theatricality: he interprets the speaker's performative role playing as an exploration between a fictional world and the world of the reader.[40] As I have argued in this chapter, the narrator is distanced from the fictional world of the *Idylls* by being in his own imaginary fictional world in the same way that the audience is distanced from the fictional world of the *Idylls.* Isenberg and Konstan, in a discussion of *Idyll* 3 and pastoral desire, examine the overall effect of how the distance between these two worlds functions:

> The isolation, as though under glass, of the pastoral lover, in relation to the world of the poet and reader, the transmitter and receiver of the poetic message, is mirrored within the poem in the lover's loneliness and frustration, his or her incapacity to win the beloved and bridge the rift between their subjectivities.[41]

Additionally, Theocritus' presentation of multiple poet-figures in multiple narrative layers with song within song (within song) techniques, notably in *Idylls* 1 and 7, further distances the

[39] For the poem as a parody of *paraklausithyron/exclusus amator* see Lawall 1967: 34-41; Walker 1980: 43-48; Hunter 1999: 107-110. See Hunter 1999 also for discussion of this poem as a mimetic performance.
[40] Payne 2007: 60-67.
[41] Isenberg and Konstan 1984: 303.

world of the herdsmen from concrete reality.[42] For example, in Theocritus' seventh *Idyll,* the narrator Simichidas, in the frame song, tells of his meeting with the goatherd, Lycidas, and the two exchange songs. Lycidas, in the first embedded song, sings of his desire for Ageanax and about Tityrus, who sings the second embedded song about the founders of bucolic song, Daphnis and Comatas. With multiple embedded narratives and poets, the *Idylls* raise the question of the ontological stability of a character in a fictional world that creates another fictional character in another fictional world. Pastoral poetry is a particularly appropriate place to explore the relationship between a poet and his work since it mainly concerns a fictional world in which a fictional poet engages in song and impersonates another poet. It is difficult, then, *not* to see the characters as doubles of the poet. If a poet creates a fictionalized poet analogous to himself, and that fictionalized poet, in turn, creates another fictionalized poet analogous to *him*self, can we still identify the fictional projection of an already fictional projection all the way back to the poet? If we do, is the stability of that character as the authorial voice compromised in some way? I argue that Theocritus explored these questions in the *Idylls*: a fictional poet's impersonation of another fictional poet is a meta-poetic reflection of the inherent mimesis in authorship. All of the alternative realities limit our ability to separate reality from fiction.

By creating a fictional space for criticism to happen and deploying an army of first-person poet figures, Theocritus can then use formal means to engage in criticism. Part of the Alexandrian aesthetic was elevating typically "low" literary forms, such as short hexameter poems, to a new status through sophisticated allusiveness and novelty.[43] The *Idylls* take this notion a step farther, exploiting juxtapostions of "high" and "low" at every turn. The "low" subject matter and verbal style in the poems clash with their use of hexameter, a meter associated

[42] The implications of narrative framing and polyphony are covered well by Goldhill 1991.
[43] Hunter 1999.

with the heroic. In the *Poetics* (1449a27-8, 1459b34-7), Aristotle calls hexameter the weightiest of the meters and the one most receptive to rare words and metaphor. The language of Theocritus, however, is free from the arcane vocabulary of Homer and is instead full of "humble" words sitting alongside botanical and also pastoral vocabulary. The botanical vocabulary, however, is ironically not "humble" but sophisticated technical vocabulary, marking it as an elite discourse. The blend of a high poetic meter and poeticizing morphology with humble vocabulary displays the *Idylls'* self-conscious literariness.

The distinction between "high" and "low" style and subject matter dominates critical discourse in antiquity. Since styles and class distinction share a vocabulary, any discussion of style is a particularly fruitful way to understand the ideological backdrop behind aesthetic judgment. Hunter suggests that Aristophanes' *Frogs* bestows on criticism sociopolitical vocabulary that describes stylistic registers through the radically democratic figure of Euripides.[44] Euripides, who Hunter argues is democratic in that his audience takes an active role in examination, lowers his stylistic register as well (18-19). Likewise, Demetrius in his *On Style,* rejecting the view that there are two styles, the plain and the grand, defines four styles: the grand, the elegant, the plain, and the forceful. He states that the subject matter appropriate to the plain and simple style (ἰσχνόν) should be reserved for trivial subjects, and cites the example of Lysias describing his modest home (chap 190).

Criticism of *content* is also present in the world of the *Idylls.* In the case of *Idyll* 3 we can see a potential comment on the notion of *mimesis,* an important concept in ancient literary criticism. Typically considered by scholars to be parody of a *komos, Idyll* 3 can also be read as a meta-comment on poetic performance and *mimesis* generally. The narrator's performativity is

[44] Hunter 2009: 18.

suggested by a fictionalized and theatrical space. The opening lines of the poem emphasize the solitude of the first- person narrator, as discussed above (3.1-5) The detachment of the poet from his subject matter and from reality is important to the notion of *mimesis,* (*cf.* Republic 3. 393c5-6).[45] The poet who engages in mimetic narrative impersonates and performs the words of someone other than himself, becoming another person in speech or appearance. This, then, suggests that mimetic recitation of poetry has ethical implications in that one can present multiple discourses, identities, and character.[46] This seems to be what is happening here.

Further, Theocritus' famous 7th *Idyll* provides an example of poetic inspiration. The narrator, Simichidas, states that he and his travel companions came across Lycidas at the half-way point of his journey, and he proceeds to describe him:

> οὔνομα μὲν Λυκίδαν, ἦς δ' αἰπόλος, οὐδέ κέ τίς νιν
> ἠγνοίησεν ἰδών, ἐπεὶ αἰπόλῳ ἔξοχ' ἐώκει. (7.13-14)
>
> His name was Lycidas, and he was a goatherd, and no one
> seeing him would not recognize it, since he seemed just like a goatherd.

Payne argues that these lines give the impression that Lycidas is only dressed as a goatherd for a disguise, since they echo the standard Homeric phrasing for when a god adopts a disguise.[47] Segal tracks Lycidas' mysterious and supernatural qualities which are evident from "his sudden appearance, his smile, the noon hour, [and] the sudden disappearance," also noting that it looks like an encounter between a god and a mortal; this in combination with the fact that Lycidas gives Simichidas a staff at the end of his song, just as the Muses give a staff to Hesiod in the *Works and Days,* makes the encounter between Lycidas and Simichidas resemble a poetic

[45] Murray 1995.
[46] Ferrari 1989.
[47] Payne 2007: 120-21. Also Gow 1952 ad 7.14 and Hunter 1999 ad 7.13.

inspiration scene.[48] Divine inspiration is a persistent notion in discussion and criticism of poetry and is the subject of Plato's *Ion.* In this dialogue, poetic inspiration calls into question the knowledge and status of poets since they do not compose through wisdom, but through instinct and inspiration. This inspiration scene in *Idyll* 7, then, seems to evoke specifically Platonic ideas about inspiration.

Later in *Idyll* 7, Simichidas describes a vivid idealized *locus amoenus* that Payne reads as a fulfillment of the inspiration since Lycidas described a similar occasion earler in the poem. Payne states:

> The poem shows the transformation of the young poet Simichidas from the composer of erotic poetry with a superficial pastoral flavor into a poet capable of projecting his inner life into imagined dramatic characters whose fictional experiences are themselves capable of inspiring emulation in others.[49]

This suggests Platonic ideas further in that the *Phaedrus,* another dialogue that ends up being literary-critical after two speeches on *eros*, begins in a *locus amoenus* setting; Phaedrus and Socrates have their discussion under the shade of a plane in a landscape with cool water, statues of nymph, and cicada songs.[50] This resembles closely *Idyll* 7's *locus amoenus* which also contains a shady tree, cool waters, presence of Nymphs, and cicada songs (7.132-144).[51] At the end of the *Phaedrus,* as in the *Ion,* Socrates indicates that poets do not understand the truth of what they say and are only manipulators of words.[52] Thus, with scene of poetic inspiration, Theocritus hits upon an important subject in literary criticism with implicit social implications.

The *locus amoenus* scene in this *Idyll* can also be read as a moment of sublimity, a topic discussed most notably by "Longinus." Although dated to the early Empire and thus later than

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[48] Segal 1981: 121.
[49] Payne 2007: 118.
[50] See Ferrari 1987 for the significance of the *locus amoenus* in Plato's *Phaedrus.*
[51] Hunter 1999:145 argues as well that Plato's dialogues are analogous to *Idyll* 7.
[52] Murray 1995.

Theocritus, we can assume that the views expressed in the treatise are consistent, at least to some extent, with previous views on the subject. The concept of ὕψος, after all, appears even in the *Odyssey* in connection with the words of Telemachus.[53] We can find many characteristics of the sublime according to "Longinus" in Theocritus' description of the *locus amoenus*, especially φαντασία, which Longinus discusses in section 15, that involves the conjuring of a scene through vivid description to produce an overall impressive effect.

Russell observes that before ὕψος is applied to λόγοι, it is applied to moral character and social status.[54] Throughout the treatise, "Longinus" presents the sublime in opposition to the humble or the low. He connects this most explicitly with class in chapter 9.3, where he states that the small thoughts of slaves cannot produce sublime material. Porter states, "Plainly, nothing is more determined culturally, politically, or socially, than this [canonical] use of sublimity. Sublimity, meanwhile, is the momentary illusion that the opposite is the case."[55] Porter argues that the sublime has a canonical function because it is only achieved by the "best" literature; in turn, cultivation of the appreciation of the sublime is how culture enforces the canon. Thus, Theocritus' presentation of a sublime *locus amoenus*, achieved through the description of the poetically inspired Simichidas, brings together two important concepts from literary criticism with social implications. The meta-critical aspect lies in the irony of rustic, low characters creating and living these esteemed literary moments in a distant, artificial world.

Similar to the contest in the *Frogs,* at the beginning of the treatise, "Longinus" presents a contest between Caecilius' work on the sublime and his own. It becomes evident that Longinus privileges his own work over Caecilius', and this comparison is cast in the language of class distinctions. This brings me to the final literary-critical aspect of the *Idylls* I will discuss:

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[53] 1. 385, 2.85, 303, 17.406.
[54] Russell 1964: xxxi.
[55] Porter 2001: 78.

competition. Bourdieu explains in the *Field of Cultural Production* that, unlike the economic field in which competition awards actual capital, in the cultural field, competition awards cultural capital, i.e. accumulated prestige.[56] Amoebic (alternating) songs that can be competitive among poets are a prominent feature in the *Idylls* and reflect the Alexandrian reality of earning symbolic and cultural capital that could translate to economic capital through patronage or a position in the Library. In *Idyll* 5, Lakon challenges Komatas to a singing contest and they ask the woodsman Morson to judge the contest. Lakon tells him, "we are competing to see who is better at bucolicising" (ἄμμες γὰρ ἐρίσδομες ὅστις ἀρείων /βουκολιαστάς ἐστι, 67-68) and asks him to act as an impartial judge. At the end, Morson awards Komatas a lamb and asks for a cut of the meat after it has been sacrificed. The humble woodsman, imbued with the cultural capital to make an appropriate aesthetic choice, exercises critical literary judgment and through the award of economic capital (the lamb) demonstrates through his hopes for a future cut of meat the symbiotic relationship between patron and client. Komatas revels in his victory and laughs at Lakon, asserting his symbolic power over him.

Other amoebic exchanges occur in *Idylls* 1, 4, 6, 7, and 10. In *Idyll* 1, the goatherd urges Thyrsis to entertain him with a song in exchange for a cup, elaborately described ekphrastically in the poem. One scene on the cup depicts an erotic rivalry in which men on either side of a elegantly dressed woman exchange songs in a bucolic *agon.* The woman glances at both men but their songs to do touch her heart and the men continue their useless toil (32-35). The capital to be gained in this scene is the affection of a woman, who is acting as the judge but could represent generally poetic efforts that fall short of the aesthetic standard. Importantly for my argument,

[56] Bourdieu 1993.

evaluative erotic discourse metaphorically represents evaluative aesthetic criticism. In contrast, outside the ekphrasis, Thyris' song successfully attains capital in the form of the cup.[57]

As I have argued, Theocritus' pastoral world functions as a fictional space for examination of the ideological values that govern literary culture and the exchange of capital. The constructed place turns out to express the reality of the ethos of the cultured elite; the rules of social relations figure in both. By providing his audience with method for enjoying the "low" and offering a vantage point for viewing how methods of criticism play out in a fictional world, Theocritus reveals the ideological suppositions inherent in literary criticism. It is unclear and unknowable, however, whether Theocritus reinforced the exclusionary aesthetic values for the Alexandrians. Reading him through the lens of Bourdieu's theory, however, demands that we remain aware that his language is charged by those values to undertake and undergo the labors of social distinction.

[57] The ekphrasis in *Idyll* 1 is discussed further in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 2

IMAGE-CRAFTING THROUGH EROTIC POETRY

Online dating sites, not unlike personal ads found in print publications such as the *London Review of Books* or *New York Review of Books*, provide denizens of the twenty-first century the opportunity to present themselves to potential romantic partners through a manipulation of text and image. Setting aside those who search solely on the basis of looks, users pore over and scrutinize the minutiae of online profile texts in hopes of finding the real personality contained within them; and, in turn, those same users carefully craft, exploit, and manipulate the language on their own profiles, selecting only certain information for presentation, privileging some parts of their personalities over others, and vying for attention as much by style as by substance.[58] In addition to providing an avenue for self-presentation, online dating sites match people through a questionnaire in which people can explicitly select attributes that they desire or do not desire.

This selection process exemplifies and intensifies the sociological trend that suggests that people, in general, tend to associate with those who are similar to them, finding partners near the same age, having a comparable level of education, identifying as the same race or religion, and having similar socio-economic backgrounds.[59] This occurs not only through the obvious method of simply indicating, for example, unwillingness to date someone without a college-level education, but also through indicating aesthetic preference. For example, the site, OkCupid.com, asks prospective daters, "Does smoking disgust you?" and then prompts the dater to indicate

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[58] Goffman 1959 discusses self-presentation in face-to-face encounters in his seminal sociological study, arguing that individuals attempt to guide through appearance, manner, and setting the impressions that others might make. For a more recent work on the sense of self that is exploited and sustained by online dating, see Illouz 2013.

[59] Brehm et al.; Sautter 2010. There are many socio-demographic variables that influence single-status and the likelihood that someone will participate in online dating, e.g. regular access to a computer.

what answer is acceptable in a potential match and to what degree they find this question is important. While the phrasing of the question suggests that a material quality, i.e., the distaste for the odor of cigarettes, is the basis for preferring a non-smoker, there is a socio-economic repercussion; since a person is statistically more likely to smoke if he or she is from a "blue-collar" background, the elimination of smokers simultaneously eliminates many people from the lower class and lower middle-class.[60] As online daters craft an image of their ideal others through indicating their preferences, they simultaneously reveal and/or craft their own image.

The phenomenon of online dating provides a helpful modern touchstone by which to understand many components of image-crafting and its potential social implication, found in erotic literature of the post-Classical period. First, both authors of online dating profiles and narrators of some erotic poetry present their readers with a text-based self-image, often constructed through self-promotion and self-criticism, for the ostensible purpose of attracting a love-object. Second, both indicate their personal preferences in a desired love-object, judging and praising, imagining and constructing, real or imagined "others" on the basis of social and aesthetic criteria.[61]

This chapter examines the role played by critical and aesthetic judgments and the negotiation of an authoritative position in image-crafting by the narrators of ancient Greek erotic poetry. The first section uses Theocritus' *Idyll* 11 to show why criticism of erotic objects demonstrates narrative image-crafting and how self-presentation occurs generally in love poetry

[60] For a study on the demographics of smoking see Cavelaars A, Kunst A, Geurts J, et al. 2000.
[61] OkCupid.com poses a variety of other questions with potential sociological implications. For example, the site asks preference in the categories of body type ("If one of your potential matches were overweight, would that be a deal breaker?"), grooming practices ("Do you think women have an obligation to keep their legs shaved?"), race ("Would you date someone of a different race?"), dietary habits ("Are you vegetarian or vegan?"), and basis of education ("Is the Earth bigger than the Sun?"), all of which could and tend to indicate economic demographic. For the connection between aesthetics and ideology see my discussion in Chapter 1.

through description and judgment of the self and the other.[62] Sections 2-5 examine specific methods that narrators use to craft their images and position themselves in cultural fields. I examine several reoccurring "judgment" motifs in erotic poetry of the *Greek Anthology*, analyzing in detail image-crafting techniques that narrators use in their description of potential love-objects, such as their methods for constructing themselves as social, intellectual, and ethical authorities and deploying language that suggests inclusion and exclusion.

1. *Mirror, Mirror*

In *Idyll* 11, which embeds the Cyclops' song for the nymph, Galatea, (19-79) as an example of the only *pharmakon* for painful desire, Polyphemus sings the song, from a high rock while gazing out to the sea (17-18).[63] He attempts to entice Galatea out of the sea by praising her form and presenting himself as worthy:

> Ὦ λευκὰ Γαλάτεια, τί τὸν φιλέοντ' ἀποβάλλῃ,
> λευκοτέρα πακτᾶς ποτιδεῖν, ἁπαλωτέρα ἀρνός,
> μόσχω γαυροτέρα, φιαρωτέρα ὄμφακος ὠμᾶς;
> ….
> γινώσκω, χαρίεσσα κόρα, τίνος οὕνεκα φεύγεις·
> οὕνεκά μοι λασία μὲν ὀφρὺς ἐπὶ παντὶ μετώπῳ
> ἐξ ὠτὸς τέταται ποτὶ θώτερον ὧς μία μακρά,
> εἷς δ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὕπεστι, πλατεῖα δὲ ῥὶς ἐπὶ χείλει.
> ἀλλ' οὗτος τοιοῦτος ἐὼν βοτὰ χίλια βόσκω,
> κἠκ τούτων τὸ κράτιστον ἀμελγόμενος γάλα πίνω·
> τυρὸς δ' οὐ λείπει μ' οὔτ' ἐν θέρει οὔτ' ἐν ὀπώρᾳ,
> οὐ χειμῶνος ἄκρω· ταρσοὶ δ' ὑπεραχθέες αἰεί.
> συρίσδεν δ' ὡς οὔτις ἐπίσταμαι ὧδε Κυκλώπων,
> τίν, τὸ φίλον γλυκύμαλον, ἀμᾶ κἠμαυτὸν ἀείδων
> πολλάκι νυκτὸς ἀωρί. τράφω δέ τοι ἔνδεκα νεβρώς,
> πάσας μαννοφόρως, καὶ σκύμνως τέσσαρας ἄρκτων.[64] (19-21; 30-41)
>
> Oh white Galatea, why do you spurn your lover,
> Whiter to look upon than cream cheese, softer than a lamb,

[62] Internal references tie Theocritus securely to the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus (c. 283-246 BCE). See Hunter 1999 Introduction for more detail.
[63] The poem is a kind of *paraklausithyron* and gazing out to sea is a standard motif for a lover whose beloved is absent, e.g. Odysseus on Calypso's island (*Od* 5.84, 158), Meleager *AP* 12.53.
[64] All Theocritus texts are from Hunter 1999.

> More skittish than a calf, sleeker than an unripe grape?
> ….
> I know, beautiful girl, the reason you run from me:
> It's because a shaggy brow spreads across my face
> From ear to ear in an unbroken line. Below is
> One eye, and there is a broad flat nose above my lip.
> Although I look the way I do, I pasture a thousand beasts,
> And I drink the best of their milk.
> I am not lacking in cheese- not in summer nor in autumn.
> Not at the end of winter either. My racks are always laden.
> No one of the Cyclops is a better piper than I am
> when I sing about you, my sweet apple,
> in the dead of night. I raise 11 fawns for you,
> with neck markings, and four bear cubs as well.[65]

In lines 30-34 Polyphemus deems himself visually unappealing—he has a shaggy unibrow, one eye, and a flat nose—and, in doing so, he demonstrates his knowledge of visual aesthetic standards, and presents himself as someone with enough cultural wherewithal to critique such things.[66] Moreover, his critique of himself validates his initial praise of Galatea that may have originally seemed uncivilized based on the "low" or rustic points of comparison such as cheese, grapes, and sheep; that is to say, by recognizing that he himself does not meet visual aesthetic standards, he has more authority when he states that Galatea does—he has good taste. As it turns out, however, Polyphemus does not only indicate that Galatea is visually beautiful, but he also suggests that she is tactilely appealing (λευκοτέρα πακτᾶς), and possibly good tasting and smelling as suggested by the food comparisons, "cheese" and "grapes."[67] The "height" of visual and aural aesthetics is juxtaposed with the "lower" aesthetic categories of smell and taste.

Although Polyphemus is himself lacking in aesthetic value, he crafts his image as appealing in other ways; he has other forms of capital that he uses to present himself positively—

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[65] All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.
[66] Gutzwiller 1991 states that one possible analogical reading of this *Idyll* is "Polyphemus' animality as an emblem of man's bestial core and his longing for the beauteous nymph as representative of man's aesthetic aspirations" (113). While this reading and statement seem to support my suggestions that Polyphemus is concerned with his reputation and image, I am not sure exactly what Gutzwiller means by "aesthetic aspirations."
[67] The comparison of Galatea to food is also humorous because the *Odyssey* later depicts Polyphemus as a cannibal who devours Odyseeus' men (9.290-91).

what Goldhill identifies as "the classic line of ugly but wealthy."[68] Polyphemus has his own versions of wealth—he is rich in flocks and in food. Hopkinson observes that "the Cyclops sees himself and his own attractions in a much more favorable light than we do" through the limited view his single eye affords him; however, perhaps Polyphemus is not as humorously off-base as it first appears.[69] Abundant crops and flocks as a sign of wealth, power, and a good reputation have a long literary tradition. For example, in Hesiod's *Works and Days* the narrator explains the positive reputation that a person can achieve in the eyes of the immortals through hard work that results in resources: "Through work men become rich in flocks and wealthy and, working, they are loved more by the immortals" (ἐξ ἔργων δ' ἄνδρες πολύμηλοί τ' ἀφνειοί τε,/ καί τ' ἐργαζόμενος πολὺ φίλτερος ἀθανάτοισιν, 308-9). Throughout the *Works and Days* there is virtually no distinction between wealth and abundant flocks and crops, demonstrated here with the correlative τε… τε. Additionally, Hesiod teaches Perses and the external audience the importance of proper management over resources to guarantee this livelihood during the winter months. Thus, when Polyphemus indicates that he has abundant cheese even in winter (37) he suggests that his work ethic and management skills meet a Hesiodic standard.

There are similar associations made among good management, abundant flocks/resources, and wealth in the *Odyssey*. In *Odyssey* 19, Odysseus tells Penelope:

> ‘ὦ γύναι, οὐκ ἄν τίς σε βροτῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν
> νεικέοι: ἦ γάρ σευ κλέος οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἱκάνει,
> ὥς τέ τευ ἢ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος, ὅς τε θεουδὴς
> ἀνδράσιν ἐν πολλοῖσι καὶ ἰφθίμοισιν ἀνάσσων
> εὐδικίας ἀνέχῃσι, φέρῃσι δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα
> πυροὺς καὶ κριθάς, βρίθῃσι δὲ δένδρεα καρπῷ,
> τίκτῃ δ᾽ ἔμπεδα μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχῃ ἰχθῦς
> ἐξ εὐηγεσίης, ἀρετῶσι δὲ λαοὶ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ.[70] (19.107-14)

[68] Goldhill 1991: 249.
[69] Hopkinson 1988: 149.
[70] All Greek text from the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae unless otherwise stated.

> Lady, no mortal on the boundless earth would scold you:
> For indeed your fame reaches broad heaven,
> As does that of a noble and god-fearing king
> Who rules over many powerful men
> And upholds justice. Then the black earth bears
> Wheat and barley, and the trees are heavy with fruit,
> sheep bear young steadily and the sea provides fish
> From his good leadership, and the people prosper under him.

Additionally, Eumaeus, a positive and upstanding figure in the *Odyssey,* shares these views, citing many of the same characteristics in his explanation to Odysseus as the beggar (14.100-8). Howe notes that the connection between abundant crops and flocks and a favorable reputation persists at least into the Classical period, and explains that in the Homeric texts, herd-owning and agriculture were "'proper' sources of gentlemanly wealth," and conveyed virtue upon aristocrats (2008:29).[71] When the Cyclops indicates his abundant resources, then, although indicating his rusticness, he demonstrates a vested interest in his reputation and image.

While the Cyclops crafts his image as one worthy of Galatea, the text also plays with the idea that he might actually *be* an image. When Polyphemus expresses his critical judgment of his appearance (30-33) it is the opposite sentiment that he expresses in *Idyll* 6 (in the voice of Damoetas):

> καὶ γάρ θην οὐδ' εἶδος ἔχω κακὸν ὥς με λέγοντι.
> ἦ γὰρ πρᾶν ἐς πόντον ἐσέβλεπον, ἦς δὲ γαλάνα,
> καὶ καλὰ μὲν τὰ γένεια, καλὰ δέ μοι ἀ μία κώρα,
> ὡς παρ' ἐμὶν κέκριται, κατεφαίνετο, τῶν δέ τ' ὀδόντων
> λευκοτέραν αὐγὰν Παρίας ὑπέφαινε λίθοιο. (34-38)
>
> For actually, I am not as ugly as they say I am.
> Just now I saw myself in the sea, it was calm,
> And two lovely cheeks appeared, and my one lovely eye,
> As I judged myself, and it reflected the sheen
> of my teeth, whiter than Parian marble.

[71] Howe 2008: 29. Howe also conducts a lengthy review of scholarship on the topic of animal management.

In this passage, instead of agreeing with the aesthetic cultural consensus that he is unattractive, indicated through the unspecified third persons in the phrase ὥς με λέγοντι, Polyphemus pits himself against it. Whereas in *Idyll* 11 he brings up the unattractive features of his broad nose and shaggy unibrow (11. 30-33), in *Idyll* 6 (6. 34-38), as if directly responding to himself, he acknowledges his attractive features.[72] In *Idyll* 6, as in *Idyll* 11, Polyphemus is on the shoreline at a vantage point that allows him to see and reflect on his own reflection, and in his mirror image he indeed sees the opposite. Through his conflicting judgments and different appropriations of his own image, the figure of Polyphemus collapses into just that—a mere image constructed and interpreted as he sees fit, features privileged or downplayed depending on the circumstance.[73]

Polyphemus crafts his own image through description of himself, but also does so through (re)construction of the ever-absent Galatea. This parallels the phenomenon of online daters who image-craft through self-description, but also by imagining and constructing their idealized others who may or may not really exist.[74] Just as, then, imagined "others" in the online-dating world are projections of the dater's desire, *Idyll* 11 plays with the possibility that Galatea is, in fact, just an image and a projection of Polyphemus' mind. One way this is manifest is through the *paraklausithyron* motif that makes literal the concept of unrequited or unattainable love. Traditionally, the boundary that excludes the lover is a door or a guard in an urban setting; and, while doors can open and guards can be swayed, the boundary between the land and the sea

[72] I am unconcerned with the order that these two poems were written but there is a strong case for the composition of *Idyll* 6 being after *Idyll* 11. See Hunter 1999: 244-45 for details.

[73] In addition to being a reflected image in the water, I wonder whether Polyphemus could be an actual image—a vivid and contextualizing description of a piece of art, perhaps an image carved or painted on a cup akin to the cup featured in *Idyll* 1. Given that the frame-narrative is nowhere explicitly pastoral and brings to the fore the ironic distance between the world of the narrator and Nicias, two friends discussing *eros*, and the pastoral world of the Cyclops, the frame suggests a symposium-like setting. Perhaps the narrator points to the Cyclops depicted on a drinking cup and begins a story similar to the way in which Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* begins. On the frame narrative as more "real world" see Payne 2007: 72.

[74] Goldhill 1991 suggests a similar sentiment stating that there is "uncertainty whether the song shows the Cyclops as cured or maintaining, even creating his love (258)."

seems truly impassible.[75] Payne describes Polyphemus as "absorbed in his own imaginary experience" citing the evidence of the Cyclops' attempt to summon a more tangible image of Galatea through comparisons to objects from his surroundings (11.19-21). Because the terms of the comparison are so hyperbolic, he argues, they become impossible and are unpersuasive.[76] Polyphemus does, however, seem to recall a memory of a "real" encounter with Galatea when he narrates the moment he fell in love with her, suggesting that she "exists" outside of his imagination:

> ἠράσθην μὲν ἔγωγε τεοῦς, κόρα, ἀνίκα πρᾶτον
> ἦνθες ἐμᾷ σὺν ματρὶ θέλοισ' ὑακίνθινα φύλλα
> ἐξ ὄρεος δρέψασθαι, ἐγὼ δ' ὁδὸν ἀγεμόνευον. (25-27)
>
> I desired you, girl, when first you came
> With my mother, wanting to pick hyacinth
> Flowers on the mountain, and I was leading the way.

This evidence of Galatea's existence, though, is compromised by the fact that Polyphemus seems to not understand the difference between his "real" world and a dream world: "Why do you only come when sweet sleep holds me and why do you leave right after sweet sleep releases me?" (φοιτῇς δ' αὖθ' οὕτως ὅκκα γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἔχῃ με, /οἴχῃ δ' εὐθὺς ἰοῖσ' ὅκκα γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἀνῇ με, 22-23).[77] That the circumstance of the memory—the picking of flowers on a mountain—harkens back to a common literary trope for successful erotic encounters further suggests an invented

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[75] Polyphemus does not seem to understand the boundary. He states that he could learn to swim (60) or that Galatea could come live on land. After starting to investigate whether it was really possible for sea nymph to live on land, I realized I had, in fact, become as ridiculous as Polyphemus, losing my grip on reality and caught in the web of fictionality.

[76] Payne 2007: 73. Payne refers to Demetrius' discussion of hyperbole in *On Style* 125 as comparanda.

[77] Hunter 1999 states: "[The Cyclops] does not understand dreaming, and imagines that she comes ashore the moment he falls asleep and retreats to the water as soon as he wakes up" (231). Hunter also notes the parallel with Lucretius' discussion of the connection between dreaming and desire in that both use *simulacra* (4.1097-1104). While I like Hunter's interpretation of Polyphemus' dream, I think it is possible to interpret Polyphemus as understanding the difference between dreams and reality and commenting poetically on Galatea's "dream-like" qualities. Regardless, the point of Galatea's vague "existence" stands.

dream/fantasy.[78] Since the unrequited love situation is juxtaposed with the landscape of fulfilled desire that Polyphemus "remembers," the scenario starts to look like an erotic fantasy.

While all erotic fantasy is "autoerotic," *Idyll* 11 plays with the idea of an "actual" autoerotic experience with the multitude of potential double entendres throughout the text. The Cyclops emphasizes Galatea's "milky whiteness" in his initial description of her, playing around with the etymology of her name, which literally means "milky" (19-20). "Whiteness" and "milking" had associations with semen, exemplarily in the last lines of Archilochus' Cologne epode, in which the speaker of the poem says:

> λευκ]ὸν ἀφῆκα μένος
> ξανθῆς ἐπιψαύ[ων τριχός[79]
>
> I released white vigor,
> touching her blond hair.

This association between the whiteness of milk and semen, then, creates erotic potential in the line in which Polyphemus tells himself essentially, if you cannot be with the one you love, "milk the ewe you're with" (τὰν παρεοῖσαν ἄμελγε, 76) or, perhaps, masturbate.[80] There is additional eroticism when Polyphemus states that his head and his feet are throbbing (70); there is a general association with feet and the phallus in Greek literature and otherwise. (You know what they say about a man with big feet…)[81] The auto-eroticism suggested by these elements of the *Idyll* plant us firmly in the mind of Polyphemus.

Polyphemus' interest in his reputation and his deliberate self-presentation through his aesthetic judgments in *Idyll* 11 are examples of what narrative personas do in order to negotiate

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[78] For erotic encounters in fields cf. *the Homeric Hymn to Demeter.*
[79] Text and emendation from Campbell 1979.
[80] Additionally, in Aristophanes' *Peace* there is a reference to Datis, who sang a song while he masturbated (291-3). This demonstrates a potential connection between singing certain types of song and autoeroticism.
[81] Henderson 1991:44. Cf. Philostratus' *Epistle* 18, addressed to a boy whose new sandals are pinching his feet. The letter aims to persuade the boy to go barefoot and ends with a panegyric of naked feet. Hodkinson 2007 explains the foot-fetishism of this epistle.

their positions in a cultural field. The remainder of this chapter will deal with poems in which the narrator judges and criticizes the bodies of erotic love-objects, concentrating mostly on the erotic epigrams of the *Greek Anthology.* There are several recurring themes in the erotic epigrams that involve critical judgment of the bodies of erotic love-objects. These themes include a narrator expressing preference for a particular type of body over another, explaining the decline of an erotic love-object's beauty through aging, describing a beauty contest, and praising an erotic love-object's form. As in the case of *Idyll* 11, I am interested in these "judgment themes" as they relate to poetic presentation of subjective image-crafting. Through close readings of epigrams representative of the aforementioned "judgment themes," I demonstrate that criticism of bodies is an essential way that narrators distinguish and attempt to position themselves in social and cultural fields.

2. *"She's not my type:" Expression of Preference for a Particular Type*

The following poem, the most well-known of the 37 epigrams ascribed to Marcus Argentarius, serves to introduce the judgment epigrams:[82]

> Οὐκ ἔσθ' οὗτος ἔρως, εἴ τις καλὸν εἶδος ἔχουσαν
> βούλετ' ἔχειν, φρονίμοις ὄμμασι πειθόμενος·
> ἀλλ' ὅστις κακόμορφον ἰδών, πεφορημένος οἴοτρωι,
> στέργει, μαινομένης ἐκ φρενὸς αἰθόμενος,
> οὗτος ἔρως, πῦρ τοῦτο. τὰ γὰρ καλὰ πάντας ὁμοίως
> τέρπει τοὺς κρίνειν εἶδος ἐπισταμένους.[83] (*AP* 5.89)
>
> It is not desire if someone wishes to have
> A girl with a beautiful form, trusting his prudent eyes.
> But rather one who, seeing an ugly face, driven by a gadfly,
> Falls in love, kindled by a raging heart,
> This is desire, that is fire. For beauty delights equally
> all those who are good judges of form.

.

[82] Nothing is known of Marcus Argentarius' dates. His Roman name, however, places him in the Imperial period.
[83] Text from Gow and Page 1968:148.

In this poem, a priamel of sorts, the narrator seems to be correcting a generalization that beauty is what inspires passion.[84] Instead, he suggests that reason and societal standards play a role in desire for a beautiful girl but do not bear on "true" passion.[85] By expressing his correction in a didactic tone of what seems to be popular thought or opinion, the narrator places himself in a position of authority.[86] Having presented himself in the opening lines as someone who knows better, he crafts himself as a credible judge of, simultaneously, the bodies of others and other judges. In his judgments of bodies he presents "forms" in two categories: beautiful (καλὸν) and not beautiful, for which he cites, as an example, the extreme opposite of beautiful, the *hapax legomenon* "κακόμορφον." [87] His judgments of other judgers are riddled with sociologically loaded words such as φρόνιμος, (which I have translated as "prudent," but for which definitions such as "sagacious" or "sensible" would also be suitable), and ἐπιστάμενος, which means "knowing expertly." Both of these words imply that proper evaluation of bodies is associated with some degree of learnedness and culture. This sentiment is emphasized in the final line that states that all those who are expert judges of form will be delighted by beauty.

This poem only narrowly fits into the category of preference for a particular form because the narrator does not explicitly state his personal preference for an "ugly face." This poem does, however, introduce well the relationship between the "judgment epigrams" and self-presentation. The narrator crafts his image through presenting himself as a wise authority on "real" desire and as someone who is in the crowd of "all those people" (πάντας) who understand beauty. The diction asserts the narrator's cultural capital (i.e. negotiates his position among a group who

[84] The bibliography for this poem is limited. See Gow and Page's 1968 commentary on this poem.
[85] I use the pronoun "he" to refer to the speaker although, as with many epigrams, the narrative persona is not specifically gendered outside of the author's name. I think, in the case of a male author, it is safe to assume a "male" voice unless otherwise specified.
[86] For discussion of didactic authority generally see Hardie and Haskell 1999.
[87] Gow and Page 1968 call this word "the only innovation" of the poem (1968:169).

conduct proper aesthetic judgment), suggests that he has experienced a range of desires from a "true" bodily experience to a culturally constructed one, and, through his "correction," permits himself and others to desire an "ugly" girl while claiming to know true beauty.[88]

In most of the poems in this "preference" category, the narrator states outright his personal preference for a particular "type." Image-crafting in this category happens generally through the construction of an artificial other; the narrators define and project themselves by expressing what they find erotically appealing, similar to the way that Galatea is a manifestation of Polyphemus' constructed image and the way that potential "matches" are manifestations of online-daters' self-presentation. In the following poem, a humorous *paraprosdokion* by Nicharchus, the speaker expresses his preference for a tall and beautiful woman but states that he has no age preference:[89]

> Εὐμεγέθης πείθει με καλὴ γυνή, ἄν τε καὶ ἀκμῆς
> ἅπτητ', ἄν τε καὶ ᾖ, Σιμύλε, πρεσβυτέρη.
> ἡ μὲν γάρ με νέα περιλήψεται· ἢν δὲ παλαιή,
> γραῖά με καὶ ῥυσή, Σιμύλε, λειχάσεται.[90] (*AP* 5.38)
>
> A tall and beautiful woman wins me over, whether she
> Has reached her prime or whether, Similus, she is older.
> For a young girl will grasp me, but an aged woman,
> Being old and wrinkly, Similus, she'll go down on me.

The narrator makes himself the object of all the verbs in the poem; the right type of woman wins him over in the first line and performs a range a sexual favors for him depending on her age. He states that the young version of his type "grasps" him (περιλαμβάνω). The appropriate translation for this verb and thus the interpretation of this poem ranges; the narrator could mean that a young woman embraces him and dotes on him in contrast to an old woman who is done with romance

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[88] Cf. Jimmy Soul's 1963 song "If you Wanna Be Happy" that encourages people to marry an ugly woman "if you wanna be happy for the rest of your life." He states, "Don't let your friends say you have no taste/Go ahead and marry anyway/Though her face is ugly, her eyes don't match/Take it from me, she's a better catch."
[89] Gow and Page 1965: 425 suggest a 1st century date for Nicarchus, but nothing is firmly known.
[90] All epigram texts from the Loeb edition of the *Greek Anthology* 1916 unless otherwise stated.

and simply has a sexual relationship, or that a young woman performs one kind of sexual act (most likely, I think, is a hand job) while an old woman performs another. The final word of the poem λειχάσεται that means "to perform fellatio" is sometimes emended on the grounds that such a word is "too blunt" for Nicarchus; however, not only is that argument baseless, the proposed emendations also make little stylistic or temporal sense.[91] Additionally, Horace's eighth epode expresses a similar sentiment: the only way that a physically unappealing old woman can please her lover is by performing oral sex, *allaborandum* (20). This parallel suggests the possibility of a traditional humorous association between old woman and fellatio.

Range of interpretation aside, the narrator formulates his image in this poem through his aesthetic descriptions of his imagined "type" and negotiation of agency. First, although his epigram is only four lines long, in a standard didactic maneuver, he addresses Similus in the vocative twice.[92] While there is no direct language of teaching or learning, by indicating the presence of a(nother) reader or listener, he makes himself the "explainer" and ostensibly legitimizes his authority. As I mentioned above, the narrator is the object of all the verbs and the recipient of the imagined (or remembered) sexual act(s). His "object-ness," however, is paradoxical to his actual dominant position in the poem. In the opening line, he states that his "type" of woman—tall and beautiful—"wins him over" (πείθει) placing him in a position of the judging authority whose approval is a prize. It is the narrator who determines what woman meets the criteria for "beautiful" (καλή) and who is appropriately "tall" or "of large stature" (εὐμεγέθη). If she fulfills both of these criteria to his standards she "persuades" him. When he states that it is of no consequence whether she is "at her prime" or "older," this too puts the

[91] See Jocelyn 1980:27 and Bain 1991:75.
[92] Generally in didactic texts there is an internal addressee. Hesiod in the *Works and Days* instructs Perses on estate management, Lucretius in *De Rerun Natura* addresses Memmius on Epicurean philosophy, etc. For more on elements of didactism see Volk 2002.

narrator in a position of authority, making the judgment of when this acme occurs and when someone has passed it. Also, while he is also on the receiving end of the girls' advances he also receives all the satisfaction; there is no indication or concern for shared pleasure. Through his paradoxical "object-ness" and his critical "subject" position in describing his "type" of woman (εὐμεγέθης, καλὴ, ἀκμῆς, πρεσβυτέρη, παλαιή, γραῖά, ῥυσή), the narrator crafts himself as dominant and a worthy judge of bodily aesthetics. Additionally, despite the descriptive adjectives, the women are not present in the poem and exist only theoretically for the purpose of the narrator's construction of his self-image.

Some of the "preference" epigrams focus on the social rank of the love-object. In the following Rufinus poem, the narrator prefers a slave girl to a noble woman: [93]

> Μᾶλλον τῶν σοβαρῶν τὰς δουλίδας ἐκλεγόμεσθα,
> οἱ μὴ τοῖς σπαταλοῖς κλέμμασι τερπόμενοι.
> ταῖς μὲν χρὼς ἀπόδωδε μύρου, σοβαρόν τε φρύαγμα
> καὶ μέχρι †κινδύνου ἑσπομένη σύνοδος·
> ταῖς δὲ χάρις καὶ χρὼς ἴδιος καὶ λέκτρον ἑτοῖμον,
> †δώροι' ἐκ σπατάλης οὐκ †ἀλεγιζόμενον.
> μιμοῦμαι Πύρρον τὸν Ἀχιλλέος, ὃς προέκρινεν
> Ἑρμιόνης ἀλόχου τὴν λάτριν Ἀνδρομάχην.[94] (*AP* 5.18)
>
> We pick slave girls over noble women,
> We who do not delight in wanton and clandestine meetings.
> The noble women's skin smells of perfume and arrogant haughtiness
> [And are attended as far as the danger?]
> The slave girl's charm and skin is her own and her bed is ready,
> Not troubling herself with luxury.
> I imitate Pyrrhus, son of Achilles, who chose
> the slave, Andromache, over his wife Hermione.

The narrator gives the impression of being progressive—uninterested in a high social position for his love object and repulsed by deceit or artificiality—while simultaneously asserting his social, intellectual, and sexual dominance. While it may seem that the narrator suggests that women

[93] Rufinus' dates are disputed. Page 1978:49 suggests a date as late as the fourth century CE, but Cameron 1993: 80 suggests the first century CE.
[94] Text from Page 1978.

need not alter their appearances to be sexually appealing, commenting on and judging women's appearances in terms of what (he assumes to be) male benefit and what he himself prefers actually reinforce the idea that woman's bodies are subject to the interests of men. Hence, his judgments further assert his position as a dominant male. This authoritative image is also constructed in the narrator's appeal to material aesthetics in his explanation for his preference for a woman of a lower class; he is more attracted to a girl's true smell than artificial perfume. This is similar to the Platonic rejection of the "spurious arts" in favor of the "true" arts as explained in the *Gorgias* (463e5-466a3). In the dialogue, there are four genuine arts that govern the mind and the body, each with a counterfeit version (εἴδωλον) that is a form of "flattery" (κολακεία); Socrates explains to Gorgias that rhetoric is "flattery" disguised as philosophy in the same way that cookery is a spurious imitation of medicine and cosmetics is a spurious imitation of gymnastics. Thus, the narrator's statement of preference for a slave girl because she is "natural" constructs his image by appealing to the intellectual interest in what is genuine; the girl's social station matters less than her "authenticity."

In addition to constructing himself as one interested in authenticity, he also appeals to a power dynamic and his own social position. Because the narrator presents himself as having a choice between a noble lady and a slave girl, he suggests that he is noble himself. Either type of woman is at his disposal—something assumed by all the "preference" poems—and he selects on aesthetic criteria (i.e. a genuine scent) whomever he wishes. The image of the narrator we get, then, is of someone in power because he is of higher or equal social rank to both types of women and who has the luxury and the "sense" to select a woman based on aesthetic criteria (i.e. "genuine" scent).

The final lines of the poem in which the narrator states that he imitates Achilles' son, Pyrrhus, in his preference for a slave also contribute to the narrator's image-crafting. First, in his imitation, he reinforces the constructed image of himself as a person of nobility, power, and influence, worthy of a great prize.[95] The narrator actually admits this crafted image when he says "I imitate" (μιμοῦμαι), a word that has poetic and philosophical/social implications. Important to the notion of *mimesis* is the detachment of the poet from his subject matter (cf. *Republic* 3. 393c5-6).[96] The poet who engages in mimetic narrative impersonates and performs the words of someone other than himself and becomes another person in speech or appearance. This, then, suggests that mimetic activity has ethical implications in society in that a person can present multiple discourses, identities, and characters.[97] By stating outright that he imitates Pyrrhus, the narrator hits upon an important subject in literary criticism with implicit social implications. Paradoxically, then, the narrator hints that perhaps his image is itself a constructed imitation while expressing desire for authenticity in his love-object.

Employing some of the same image-crafting techniques but expressing the opposite sentiment, the narrator in an epigram by Philodemus prefers a maiden over a courtesan: [98]

> Δημώ με κτείνει καὶ Θέρμιον· ἡ μὲν ἑταίρη
> †δήμῳ, ἡ †δ' οὔπω Κύπριν ἐπισταμένη·
> καὶ τῆς μὲν ψαύω, τῆς δ' οὐ θέμις. οὐ μὰ σέ, Κύπρι,
> οὐκ οἶδ', ἣν εἰπεῖν δεῖ με ποθεινοτέρην.
> Δημάριον λέξω τὴν παρθένον· οὐ γὰρ ἕτοιμα
> βούλομαι, ἀλλὰ ποθῶ πᾶν τὸ φυλασσόμενον. (12.173)
>
> Demo and Thermion are killing me. The latter is a courtesan
> < >, the former does not yet know Cypris.
> One of them I touch, the other one I'm not allowed to touch. By you, Cypris,

[95] Gantz 1993 notes that the *Little Iliad* and the *Iliou Persis* both contain the myth that Neoptolemus received Hector's wife, Andromache, as a prize after the Trojan War, but the conflict between Hermione and Andromache first appears in Euripides' *Andromache* (687, 692).
[96] Murray 1995.
[97] Ferrari 1989.
[98] Text from Gow and Page 1968: 360. See Sider 1997:101 ff. for commentary and bibliography.

I do not know which one I should call more desirable.
I will say it's the maiden, Demo; for I do not want one who's
Ready to go, but I desire everything that's guarded.

Before settling on his preference for a maiden, the narrator weighs the two women against each other and juxtaposes them in every line as if there is a tipping scale in his mind. It seems that there is no real necessity for stating his preference and no particular reason to make the call as far as it concerns him personally. In lines 3-4 the narrator calls upon Aphrodite to help him decide since he "does not know which one he *should call* more desirable." By stating that he is not sure what he should *say* is better, and by finally deciding that he *will* say (implying "if asked") that he prefers the maiden, the narrator suggests that he is concerned with the impression his preference will give to others. While the poem gives us no description of the two women outside of their social status, the narrator's selection of the maiden is the most advantageous for his social position. By preferring the maiden, the narrator states that he prefers to be in a position of power; since the maiden "does not yet know Cypris," he is in a position to be the teacher. A man who desires to teach a virgin the ways of sex is a poetic motif as early as lyric poetry. In Anacreon's "Thracian filly" poem (417), for example, the narrator allegorically describes a maiden as a horse that is in need of an experienced trainer (like him).[99] Additionally, a girl that he is not allowed to touch becomes a place onto which he can project his aesthetic desires and erotic fantasies. Wanting what he cannot have allows the narrator to project his self-centric desires onto the other. Thus, the narrator in this poem crafts his image through his desire for authority over a maiden through his "teacher" position and as the "projector" of qualities onto an object, but also subtly suggests that his decision is the product of social pressure.

[99] See Campbell 1978 for text and commentary. Also, in Archilochus' *Cologne Epode,* Neoboule is an overripe courtesan, but her sister is a virgin.

Another common motif in the "preference poems" that also demonstrates preoccupation with social position is the choice between boys or women.[100] Notably, in some of Meleager's poems the narrator prefers a male beloved while in others the narrator prefers a female.[101] In poem *AP* 12.86, the narrator (and Aphrodite) prefers boys:

> Ἀ Κύπρις θήλεια γυναικομανῆ φλόγα βάλλει,
> ἄρσενα δ' αὐτὸς Ἔρως ἵμερον ἀνιοχεῖ.
> ποῖ ῥέψω; ποτὶ παῖδ' ἢ ματέρα; φαμὶ δὲ καὐτὰν
> Κύπριν ἐρεῖν· "Νικᾷ τὸ θρασὺ παιδάριον."[102] (*AP* 12.86)
>
> The woman, Cypris, casts fiery desire for women,
> But Eros himself hold the reins for desire for men.
> To which am I inclined? To the boy or to his mother? I say that
> Cypris herself says, "The bold little boy prevails."

In this poem Aphrodite yields to Eros. The narrator expresses his preference by deferring to the fact that even the goddess is subject to the power of Eros. With the allegorical image of Eros "holding the reins," the narrator expresses that he is governed by his desire for boys. The image of himself the narrator presents, then, is one that explains his homosexual desire.[103] In another of Meleager's epigrams, however, the narrator rejects homosexual relationships:

> Οὔ μοι παιδομανὴς κραδία. τί δὲ τερπνόν, Ἔρωτες,
> ἀνδροβατεῖν, εἰ μὴ δούς τι λαβεῖν ἐθέλοι;
> ἁ χεὶρ γὰρ τὰν χεῖρα· †καλά με μένοι παράκοιτις.
> ειν† πᾶς ἄρσην ἀρσενικαῖς λαβίσιν. [104](*AP* 5.208)
>
> My heart is not crazy over boys. What joy is there, Eros,
> In man-mounting, unless he is willing to get some after having given it?
> One hand washes the other. < A beautiful wife awaits me
> …..>with your masculine forcep![105]

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[100] *Cf.* also *AP* 5.77.
[101] See Gutzwiller 1998 for how context and sequence affect the view point of the speaker: "The polyphony of voices was to present a variety of points of view, which yet together suggest the uniformity and universality of erotic experience" (301).
[102] Text in Gow and Page 1965.
[103] Gutzwiller 1998:297 observes that this poem programmatically ends the section on women.
[104] Text from Gow and Page 1965.
[105] The last line of this translation is suggested by Gow and Page 1965: 613.

This second poem is likely tongue-in-cheek since Meleager was noted for his love poetry to boys. What is most notable about this poem, however, is the strong suggestion of complex reciprocity issues in male-male sexual relationships. The second line could alternatively be translated as, "if he is willing to get it without having given it"—a simple reversal of the active/passive role. I think, however, that the distinction matters not or perhaps is purposefully ambiguous; the point is that there is not an even exchange of pleasure. Given the corrupted text in lines 3 and 4, the final phrase is also problematic, but it seems likely that it is a humorous statement that refers back to penetrative "man-mounting" (ἀνδροβατεῖν). I translated the word λαβίς above as "forceps," but according to the *LSJ* it can also mean "clamp."[106] Thus, similar to the second line, there is ambiguity in whether the narrator rejects the forceps of the penetrator or whether he rejects the clamp of the penetrated. Regardless, the narrator presents himself as in a passive position either way. Problematic or ambiguous interpretability aside, this poem's narrator fashions himself as one who rejects a complex power dynamic more than he rejects homosexual relationships in general.[107] Both these Meleager poems present a narrator who is preoccupied with the reputation that stems from his desire for boys. In the first, the narrator explains his desire, appealing metaphorically to divinities and to inevitability, and in the second, the narrator rejects homosexual relations because of the potential to be put in a vulnerable, passive, and asymmetrical relationship. Both these poems, then, present a narrator's image manipulation that seems to stem from social pressure.

In the "preference" poems presented so far, the narrators have taken a strong stance; however, there are a number of poems that fall into a sub-category of the preference poems that

[106] Many English renditions of this poem translate the final phrase as "masculine embraces," but λαβίς simply does not mean "embrace;" it is much more vivid.

[107] The inequality and asymmetry in pederastic relationships was a problem acknowledged by Aristotle notably in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1164a.2-8); he explains the potential for lack of reciprocation that arises when the *erastes* seeks the *eromenos* for pleasure while the *eromenos* seeks the *erastes* for personal advantage.

present a "Goldilocks" motif in which a narrator's type is the middle of two extremes.[108] In the following Rufinus poem, the narrator prefers someone neither too fat nor too thin:

> Μήτ' ἰσχνὴν λίην περιλάμβανε μήτε παχεῖαν,
> τούτων δ' ἀμφοτέρων τὴν μεσότητα θέλε.
> τῇ μὲν γὰρ λείπει σαρκῶν χύσις, ἡ δὲ περισσὴν
> κέκτηται· λεῖπον μὴ θέλε μηδὲ πλέον (5.37)
>
> Don't take a girl who's too thin or too thick,
> But choose a middle ground between the two.
> The former has not enough flesh, and the latter has
> Too much. Do not choose deficiency or excess.

Again in this poem we see the narrator in an "instructor" position manipulating and giving advice to the external audience or an unnamed addressee. There are negative imperatives that frame the poem in first and last lines, a positive imperative in the second line, and a brief explanation in lines 3-4. Further validating his body-type preference is the language of "excess" and "deficiency" that is associated with ethical concept of the golden mean, a tenet of Aristotelian, Platonic, and pre-Socratic philosophy. Thus, in expressing his preference for an erotic object, the narrator strongly suggests his own ethical principles (or at least the principles he would like to appear to have).

Aside from bodily aesthetic preference, the principle of the golden mean is also employed by narrators to explain behavioral preference. In the following Strato (c. 335-269BCE) poem, the narrator expresses his desire for a not-fully-consensual erotic encounter:

> Μισῶ δυσπερίληπτα φιλήματα καὶ μαχιμώδεις
> φωνὰς καὶ σθεναρὴν ἐκ χερὸς ἀντίθεσιν·
> καὶ μὴν καὶ τόν, ὅτ' ἐστὶν ἐν ἀγκάσιν, εὐθὺ θέλοντα
> καὶ παρέχοντα χύδην οὐ πάνυ δή τι θέλω,
> ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐκ τούτων ἀμφοῖν μέσον, οἷον ἐκεῖνον
> τὸν καὶ μὴ παρέχειν εἰδότα καὶ παρέχειν. [109](12.200)
>
> I hate hard-to-get kisses and quarrelsome

[108] For other epigrams representing the "Goldilocks" motif cf. *AP* 5.20 (Honestus) and 12.173 (Philodemus).
[109] Text from the Loeb 1918.

Sounds and violent opposition with hands.
But I also don't particularly like one who, when he is in
My embrace, is immediately willing and yields himself entirely.
I'd rather have someone part way between the two, someone who
Knows how to give himself and not give himself.

The narrator states that he "hates" violent resistance to his advances but also does not desire someone who submits too easily.[110] While he does not *want* to rape the object of his desire, the expression of desire for partial resistance (or "blurred lines") presents the narrator as someone in a position of power. The narrator implies that there are many partners ready to eagerly accept him as a sexual partner and that, while he hates the frustration of opposition, those who are not too eager could be subdued. In addition to desiring the "golden mean" in sexual consent he states that he wants someone who "knows" (εἰδότα) that aiming for the mean is the best way to conduct himself. Thus, he desires in a love object the "ethical" behavior that he himself practices.

Although done in a multitude of different ways, when narrators express their preference for a particular "type," regardless of what that type may be, they employ techniques that position them as aesthetic, ethical, and intellectual authorities. Whatever they desire, they are the "good judges of form" to which Argentarius referred.

3. *"You're too Old for Me": Judgments on Declining Appearances*

Another motif in the "judgment poems" is a narrator's evaluations of appearances as they relate to the object's age. Given that the biological category of age, marked primarily by appearance, also implies a social and cultural category, aesthetic judgment of bodies that centers on age markers contributes significantly to the image and reputation of the judge. For example, evaluation of the bodies of old women allows the narrative judge to express both some of his cultural values, such as youth and purity, and, as a point of comparison, to construct a desired other through expression of aesthetic preferences. In the following Rufinus poem, the narrator

[110] Nicharchus *AP* 5.42 expresses the same sentiment.

delights in the old age that has fallen upon a previously arrogant beauty, a motif relatively common in later love poetry:

> Οὐκ ἔλεγον, Προδίκη, "Γηράσκομεν"; οὐ προεφώνουν·
> "Ἥξουσιν ταχέως αἱ διαλυσίφιλοι";
> νῦν ῥυτίδες καὶ θρὶξ πολιὴ καὶ σῶμα ῥακῶδες,
> καὶ στόμα τὰς προτέρας οὐκέτ' ἔχον χάριτας.
> Μή τις σοι, μετέωρε, προσέρχεται ἢ κολακεύων
> λίσσεται; ὡς δὲ τάφον νῦν σε παρερχόμεθα.[111] (*AP* 5.21)
>
> Did I not tell you, Prodice, "We are getting old"? Did I not predict,
> "The love-dissolvers are coming soon"?
> Now the wrinkles and the grey hair and the ragged body are here,
> And the mouth that no longer holds its prior charm.
> Does anyone approach you now, proud one, or beseech you with
> Flattery? Just like a tomb, we pass right by you.

The narrator specifically names some of Prodice's more offensive aesthetic features—wrinkles, hair, and her mouth—all of which, while describing her current state, also construct the "other" that is her previous self.[112] The aesthetic qualities that she used to have are those our narrator values, namely lovely hair, a charming mouth, and smooth, youthful skin. The narrator crafts an authoritative and instructive image with his patronizing "I-told-you-so" rhetorical questions; he suggests that, in contrast to Prodice, he has wisdom and understanding enough to allow him foresight. Additionally, he subtly contrasts his own appearance with hers; in the first line he uses the first person plural—"we are growing old"—that proffers that he, too, is now afflicted by old age. Despite the fact that they are both old, when he states in the last line that "we pass right by you," the "we" is now a group that excludes and judges her, suggesting that old age has not taken the same toll on him as it has on her and that he is not (as) aesthetically unappealing as she is. In comparing her to a tomb, he not only exaggerates her age, but also alludes to the common epigrammatic motif that mimics tombstone inscriptions. In these epigrams, often the narrator is a

[111] Text from Page 1978.
[112] See Richlin 1983: 109-116 for invective against old ladies.

persona of the dead person who solicits the attention of the passerby. This motif is most famously represented by Simonides' epitaph for the dead at Thermopylae, but was, in the Hellenistic period, inventively redeployed by literary epigrammatists.[113] Livingstone and Nisbet explain that when an epigram addresses the passerby, the audience extends beyond an imagined reader of the tomb and includes us, the external audience.[114] Since the last line harkens to these tombstone epigrams, the "we" in the final line that that walks right past and gives no heed to the "tomb" includes the external readers. Because we are now, willing or unwilling, included in the narrator's exclusive group of judges, perhaps we are more inclined to grant the narrator cultural capital. Thus, the narrator positions and fashions his image through the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion.

The language of inclusion and exclusion occurs also in the following epigram by Macedonius the Consul:[115]

> Τήν ποτε βακχεύουσαν ἐν εἴδεϊ θηλυτεράων,
> τὴν χρυσέῳ κροτάλῳ σειομένην σπατάλην
> γῆρας ἔχει καὶ νοῦσος ἀμείλιχος· οἱ δὲ φιληταί,
> οἵ ποτε τριλλίστως ἀντίον ἐρχόμενοι,
> νῦν μέγα πεφρίκασι· τὸ δ' αὐξοσέληνον ἐκεῖνο
> ἐξέλιπεν συνόδου μηκέτι γινομένης. (*AP* 5.271)
>
> The girl who previously celebrated among the female beauties,
> And danced with golden castanets, decorated,
> Old age and relentless sickness hold her. Lovers,
> Who previously came to meet her eagerly,
> Now shudder greatly. That waxing moon
> Has left, no longer bringing her visitors.

More explicitly in this poem than in the previous, we see vocabulary of categories and classes, but the narrator seems to omit his personal position, and comments only on the dynamics he observes. He states that the girl was previously included in an exclusive group of only attractive

[113] *Cf.* for example, *AP* 12.85, 151, 7.718, 9.588.
[114] Livingstone and Nisbet 2010:65. *Cf.* also Gutzwiller 2002: 96.
[115] Macedonius belonged to the court of Justinian at Constantinople.

women with the genitive of the whole, θηλυτεράων; but that was ποτε, this is νῦν. Her previous exclusive group of beauties was marked not only by their aesthetic features, but also, as he explains in the next line, by dancing, musical ability, and finery, all of which indicate they are part of the upper class or at least well-paid courtesans consorting with wealthy men. The narrator also observes the behavior of another group, the "lovers" (οἱ φιληταί), who are now so repulsed by her old age that they "shudder greatly," a rather vivid image. What we can gather then, is that this is a young woman who, having the aesthetic features and cultural qualities of a "beauty," appealed to a number of people. What image does this paint of the narrator, though? Unlike most of the other narrators we have seen, he does not comment on any specific aesthetic qualities or indicate in any way whether he is part of the group of lovers who now shudder at her or whether he is compassionate towards the girl upon whom such harsh judgment is cast. The image he crafts is flexible and attempts to avoid any potential judgment on *his* judgments; the external audience can adopt and include whatever image of him suits their own ideology.

Agathias Scholasticus's narrative persona, however, does cast judgments, delighting in old age that has set upon a woman who was previously cruel to him:[116]

> Ἡ πάρος ἀγλαΐῃσι μετάρσιος, ἡ πλοκαμῖδας
> σειομένη πλεκτὰς καὶ σοβαρευομένη,
> ἡ μεγαλαυχήσασα καθ' ἡμετέρης μελεδώνης
> γήραϊ ῥικνώδης τὴν πρὶν ἀφῆκε χάριν.
> μαζὸς ὑπεκλίνθη, πέσον ὀφρύες, ὄμμα τέτηκται,
> χείλεα βαμβαίνει φθέγματι γηραλέῳ.
> τὴν πολιὴν καλέω Νέμεσιν πόθου, ὅττι δικάζει
> ἔννομα ταῖς σοβαραῖς θᾶσσον ἐπερχομένη.[117] (*AP* 5.273)
>
> She who was previously proud of her beauty, and tossed
> Her braided locks pompously,
> She who bragged about my sorrow,
> She is now old and wrinkled and her charm is gone.
> Her breasts sag, her eyebrows are fallen, her eyes have melted,

[116] Agathias also wrote under the reign of Justinian I.
[117] Text from Loeb 1916.

And she babbles her speech with an aged voice.
I call grey hair the nemesis of love, because it judges
Justly, coming soonest to those who are proud.

Just as in the previous poem, the narrator here expresses the societal standards of beauty and, it seems, his own aesthetic preferences by his criticism of the old woman; appealing to visual and aural aesthetic categories, he values long and well-kept hair, smooth and tight skin, perky breasts, and clear speech.[118] What makes this poem particularly interesting, though, is that at the end of the poem the narrator equates the aesthetics of agedness with ethical depravity, stating that the old age that the woman suffers is punishment for her vice of being proud. Thus, he connects, outright, the character and societal judgment that lurks behind all aesthetic judgment. Although perhaps rejected by her in the past, by criticizing the old woman's morals, the narrator positions himself as ethically superior to her and, at least now, aesthetically superior as well. In addition to this outright equation between the visual aesthetics of age and morality, the narrator also positions himself and the old woman in relation to esteemed cultural values in his criticism of her. "Charm" (χάρις), for example, while it refers to external beauty, also means "kindness," "gratitude," and generally suggests good will towards another person.[119] Stating her charm is gone, then, indicates that she is now no longer a benefit or source of positivity for others.[120] When he criticizes her voice and the way she talks, in addition to revealing his preference for a particular material sound quality, he indicates a cultural value of coherent speech and mental aptness—her aged voice or perhaps her senility make her virtually incomprehensible. By the end of the poem, the image of the narrator that coalesces through the critical judgments is one of a person that surpasses the judged object ethically, aesthetically, and mentally.

[118] Another parallel is found in *AP* 5.76 (Rufinus).
[119] *L and S.*
[120] For erotic χάρις see MacLachlan 1993.

While most evaluation of appearance in old age is negative, occasionally narrators praise someone who "looks good for her age," such as the following Philodemus poem:[121]

> Ἑξήκοντα τελεῖ Χαριτὼ λυκαβαντίδας ὥρας,
> ἀλλ' ἔτι κυανέων σύρμα μένει πλοκάμων,
> κὴν στέρνοις ἔτι κεῖνα τὰ λύγδινα κώνια μαστῶν
> ἕστηκεν, μίτρης γυμνὰ περιδρομάδος,
> καὶ χρὼς ἀρρυτίδωτος ἔτ' ἀμβροσίην, ἔτι πειθὼ
> πᾶσαν, ἔτι στάζει μυριάδας χαρίτων.
> ἀλλὰ πόθους ὀργῶντας ὅσοι μὴ φεύγετ', ἐρασταί,
> δεῦρ' ἴτε, τῆς ἐτέων ληθόμενοι δεκάδος.[122] (*AP* 5.13)
>
> Charito completed 60 years
> But still the trail of her dark hair remains,
> And on her chest the marble-white cones of her breasts
> still stand up, free from an encircling girdle.
> Her wrinkle-free skin still drips ambrosia, still drips charms,
> and still drips ten thousand graces.
> But whatever lovers do not flee from raging desire,
> Come here, forgetful of her decades.

Although the narrator in this poem *seems* to go against the cultural norm that prefers young girls, Charito meets the cultural aesthetic standard and properly performs femininity. The narrator is attracted to her *despite* her age not because of it, and his aesthetic evaluation of her presents him as part of a group of good aesthetic judges. The name "Charito" is an appropriate name for this woman. Unlike the woman of the previous poem whose mouth no longer holds the same "charm," Charito is so full of charm that she drips it.[123] In addition to suggesting an internal, ethical quality, as discussed above, χάρις is also associated with youth; so, even though she is 60, Charito lives up to her namesake and looks (and perhaps acts) like a young girl. Indeed, none of the old age markers are present—her hair is still dark, not grey, her skin is free from wrinkles,

[121] Philodemus was born in Gadara in 110 BCE. See Sider 1997's introduction for more biographical details.
[122] Text from Gow and Page 1968. Motif also found in *AP* 5.26 (Anon.), 5.48 (Rufinus 19), 5.62 (Rufinus 23), 5.258 (Paulus Sil.), 5.282 (Agathias), 7.217 (Asklepiades)
[123] Many puns on χάρις appear in the *Anthology,* e.g. 5.140, 5.149 (Meleager). This is observed by Sider 1997: 98.

and her breasts are "marble-white" (λύγδινα).[124] This final quality refers not only to the color of her breasts but also, it seems, to their smoothness and firmness, a fleeting quality of youth.[125] The narrator evaluates Charito as if he is judging the craftsmanship and technique of a statue of a woman and, in fact, his description of this "old woman" seems so unrealistic it may actually be a 60-year-old statue he describes, not a flesh and blood person. The convergence of the discourse of evaluation of bodies and evaluation of art is the subject of Chapter 4 so I will save explanation primarily for that chapter; however, the potential ambiguity in this poem is significant for two reasons. First, it is demonstrative of the degree to which qualities, such as χάρις, are constructions of narrative subjectivity, and second, it directly connects the judgment of human bodies and the performance of sexuality with the sophistication that "proper" art criticism demands. The narrator has positioned himself to gain cultural capital by crafting himself as a good critic of art.

Philodemus also manipulates the narrator's image through the language of inclusion and exclusion. In the final couplet, he beseeches all the "lovers" (ἐρασταί) to join him (δεῦρ' ἴτε) in his admiration of Charito, including them in a group of "whoever does not flee from raging desire." The sentiment is that Charito is so lovely that, unless you purposefully resist desire (perhaps on philosophical grounds), you will desire her. Since the narrator has presented himself as a good aesthetic judge, in-line with cultural values, someone who does *not* admire Charito would miss out on the cultural capital to be gained in this *field* through admiration. This poem, summarizes the techniques of image-crafting when narrators judge old women; namely the ways in which the narrators contrast the judged other with themselves, the construction of an idealized

[124] Occasionally, older women are still attractive despite wrinkles, e.g *AP* 5.258 (Paulus Sil.) and *AP* 7.217 (Asklepiades), and *AP* 5.26 (Anon.).
[125] Gerber 1978: 203ff.

version of the judged other's former body (and subsequent revelation of cultural values), and the language of inclusion and exclusion.

4. *"There She Is, Miss America": Judging a Beauty Contest*

In 1968 feminists protested the Miss America beauty pageant on the Atlantic City boardwalk on the grounds of troubling racial politics (many of the contestants at the time were in favor of segregation), the exploitation of women, and the ways in which such a contest perpetuates outrageous standards of female beauty. The pageant today is quite different than it was in 1968, as the women are often more than "just a pretty face." Not only are they beautiful, they are alumnae of ivy-league schools, with advanced degrees, showcasing extraordinary talent. The most recent Indian-American winner even progressively aims to promote "cultural competency" in America.[126] What woman is beautiful enough, "diverse" enough, intelligent enough, philanthropic enough, and talented enough to represent the United States? The woman whom the judges select as the female representative of the ideal American woman crafts their images and reflects the changing ideologies of the judges or, at least, the changing ideologies they want to *appear* to have. Descriptions of "beauty contests" in antiquity have the same outcome—whatever woman the narrative judge selects and the ways in which he evaluates her construct that narrator's image.[127] In the following Rufinus poem, the narrator describes his judgments of the bodies of three women:

> ἤρισαν ἀλλήλαις Ῥοδόπη, Μελίτη, Ῥοδόκλεια,
> τῶν τρισσῶν τίς ἔχει κρείσσονα μηριόνην,
> καί με κριτὴν εἵλοντο: καὶ ὡς θεαὶ αἱ περίβλεπτοι
> ἔστησαν γυμναί, νέκταρι λειβόμεναι.
> καὶ Ῥοδόπης μὲν ἔλαμπε μέσος μηρῶν πολύτιμος
> < >

[126] For an interesting study of pageant culture in the US in general see Roberts 2014.
[127] Historically, real beauty contests in the ancient world happened in the context of religious festivals. We know of competitions at Lesbos, Tenedos, and Arcadia. See Pomeroy 1984: 77 for more detail.

< >
οἷα ῥοδὼν †πολίῳ† σχιζόμενος ζεφύρῳ ...
τῆς δὲ Ῥοδοκλείης ὑάλῳ ἴσος, ὑγρομέτωπος,
οἷα καὶ ἐν νηῷ πρωτογλυφὲς ξόανον.
ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἃ πέπονθε Πάρις διὰ τὴν κρίσιν εἰδὼς,
τὰς τρεῖς ἀθανάτας εὐθὺ συνεστεφάνουν. (*AP* 5. 36)[128]

Rhodope, Melita, and Rhodoclea quarreled with each other
Over who of the three had the better genitalia,
and they chose me as their judge. And just as those famous goddesses,
they stood naked, dipped in nectar.
And very famous Rhodope was shining between her thighs
< >
< >
Just as if being cleaved by the grey wind of roses….
…of Rhodoclea was equal to glass, a smooth front,
Just as a newly carved statue in a temple.
But I knew what Paris suffered on account of his judgment,
And right away I crowned all three goddesses.

That the woman are judged on such a specific feature is not necessarily out of the ordinary in ancient literature; in many of the epigrams discussed in this chapter, for example, the narrator comments on a particular feature or features for criticism (e.g. 5.13 above).[129] This motif is exaggerated by Cicero in the *De Inventione* when he recounts a story about the 4th century painter Zeuxis who could not find a good enough model for Helen and thus, chose five women and painted the best parts of all of them (2.1.1).[130] In the judgment of specifically genitalia, though, the poem seems tongue-in-cheek, and Rufinus seems to mock the motif of criticizing particular features and/or the practice of beauty contests. Thus, despite what seems to be an oppressive standpoint, this epigram may be more radical than the narrative image-crafting suggests.

[128] Text from Page 1978.
[129] Philodemus 5.132 discussed below addresses various parts of a body and Meleager 5.192 singles out a woman's hips.
[130] Pomeroy 1984:77.

The narrator states that he is the designated judge of these women's genitalia, granted a position of power over the women as a subjective critic. By stating that the women *selected* him as their judge, he makes explicit the authority that underlies first-person descriptions of bodies that we have seen so far. That is to say, the narrative "I" is in a dominant position simply by expressing judgment over their forms, but this authoritative position is spelled out when the objects of judgment themselves deem him a worthy critic. Although much of narrator's description of the genitalia is corrupted, we can tell that his judgments are positive praises of form because of the comparison to the goddesses, because he does not select a winner, and because of the positive imagery in the surviving lines—words such as "shiny," "smooth," and "roses." Additionally, just as in the above discussed Philodemus poem, there is overlap here between the evaluative discourse of erotic criticism and aesthetic criticism in that the narrator compares Rhodoclea to a statue; he states that her smoothness is "just like a newly carved statue." Given that it is a contest of genitalia, this must refer to her lack of pubic hair which, for a real person and not a statue, requires depilation.[131] Based on this line, the narrator's aesthetic criteria are based on the proper performance of femininity and the social practices, such as bodily grooming, that create and reinforce the hierarchical categories of masculinity and femininity that societies are accustomed to conceive of as natural.[132] These "natural" characteristics of gender acquired through self-grooming turn out to stand in a problematic relation to authenticity—why does nature fall short of pressing its claim, and why must it fall upon people to turn their bodies into instruments for active or passive social mastery? The narrator, then, judges the woman's

[131] We know from artistic and literary sources that at least some women of the ancient world practiced genital depilation. Kilmer 1982 examining evidence from Old Comedy and vase paintings concludes that women often either plucked or singed their pubic hair to increase sexual attractiveness.
[132] See Butler 1990 for this idea.

performance of her femininity on the same terms that he judges an artist's technique of construction of a beautiful woman, revealing his standards for the ideal.

What makes this poem of particular interest is the narrator's refusal to select just one winner, and, in turn, his acknowledgment of his awareness of the implications of criticism; he alludes to the judgment of Paris for which, he states, Paris suffered *because of his judgment.* In Lucian's dramatization of Paris' judgment in the *Dialogues of the Gods* (which may date from a similar period to this epigram), Paris expresses a remarkably similar sentiment to the epigrammatic narrator when he states: "I think I should reward the apple to all three. For one is the wife and sister of Zeus; the others are his daughters. Being as it is, it is such a difficult matter to judge" (δοκῶ δ' ἄν μοι καλῶς δικάσαι πάσαις ἀποδοὺς τὸ μῆλον. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τόδε, ταύτην μὲν εἶναι συμβέβηκεν τοῦ Διὸς ἀδελφὴν καὶ γυναῖκα, ταύτας δὲ θυγατέρας· πῶς οὖν οὐ χαλεπὴ καὶ οὕτως ἡ κρίσις, 8). Despite the fact that Paris is uncomfortable with the task, we know how the story ends, and the epigrammatic narrator will not make the same mistake. Additionally, the narrator presents himself as a significantly more qualified judge than Paris presents himself. In the dialogue, Paris states that he is not an appropriate judge. When Hermes tells him of the task and gives him the apple, Paris replies:

> Φέρ' ἴδω τί καὶ βούλεται. "Ἡ καλή," φησίν, λαβέτω." πῶς ἂν οὖν, ὦ δέσποτα Ἑρμῆ, δυνηθείην ἐγὼ θνητὸς αὐτὸς καὶ ἀγροῖκος ὢν δικαστὴς γενέσθαι παραδόξου θέας καὶ μείζονος ἢ κατὰ βουκόλον; τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα κρίνειν τῶν ἀβρῶν μᾶλλον καὶ ἀστικῶν· τὸ δὲ ἐμόν, αἶγα μὲν αἰγὸς ὁποτέρα ἡ καλλίων καὶ δάμαλιν ἄλλης δαμάλεως, τάχ' ἂν δικάσαιμι κατὰ τὴν τέχνην· αὗται δὲ πᾶσαί τε ὁμοίως καλαὶ καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἄν τις ἀπὸ τῆς ἑτέρας ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν μεταγάγοι τὴν ὄψιν ἀποσπάσας· (7-8)
>
> Let me see what this is all about. It says, "For the beautiful." But, lord Hermes, how will I, a mortal and a rustic be able to judge these incredible goddesses? To judge these things is no business of the herdsman, but rather a matter for the city folk. As for me, I can judge according to my trade—I can tell you which of two goats is the fairer or choose between heifer and heifer. But all these are equally beautiful and I do not know how someone could transfer his gaze from one to the other.

What is pertinent here is that Paris implies that judging beauty is a learned trade and something that would be better left to the cultured city-folk. The skills that Paris brings to the table are in shepherding; he can determine a better goat or heifer because that is his trade—he can judge only κατὰ τὴν τέχνην. Thus, Paris suggests that he lacks the ability both to "transfer his gaze" from beauty to beauty, and to judge beauty critically because he has not learned or cultivated that skill. The narrator in the Rufinus epigram, then, positions himself as a cultured and educated authority when he states that he *does* have the skill and that he is so expert that they chose *him*. While the Trojan War is a hyperbolic example, the narrator in the epigram hints of his awareness of the social repercussions of his selection and the way that it will reflect on him. Thus, the narrator crafts his image as an authority on genitalia and gender performance, but suggests at the end that perhaps he, too, is performing and judging in accordance with a social role he plays. While critical expression is an authoritative role, the "I" in this poem concedes that one can be judged, in turn, by one's judgments.

There is a second "beauty contest" poem by Rufinus that works as a pair with the previous one, this one a contest of the backside instead of the front. As in the case of the previous poem, the women select the narrator as their judge, the judgment is concerned with a specific body part, the narrator describes the features of each one positively, and there is an allusion to the judgment of Paris in the final lines:

> Πυγὰς αὐτὸς ἔκρινα τριῶν· εἵλοντο γὰρ αὐταὶ
> δείξασαι γυμνὴν ἀστεροπὴν μελέων.
> καί ῥ᾽ ἡ μὲν τροχαλοῖς σφραγιζομένη γελασίνοις
> λευκῇ ἀπὸ γλουτῶν ἤνθεεν εὐαφίῃ·
> τῆς δὲ διαιρομένης φοινίσσετο χιονέη σὰρξ
> πορφυρέοιο ῥόδου μᾶλλον ἐρυθροτέρη·
> ἡ δὲ γαληνιόωσα χαράσσετο κύματι κωφῷ,
> αὐτομάτη τρυφερῷ χρωτὶ σαλευομένη.
> εἰ ταύτας ὁ κριτὴς ὁ θεῶν ἐθεήσατο πυγάς,

οὐκέτ᾽ ἂν οὐδ᾽ ἐσιδεῖν ἤθελε τὰς προτέρας.[133] (*AP* 5.35)

I judged the butts of three girls. They themselves chose me,
Showing me the bare splendor of their limbs.
The first, marked with round dimples,
Flourished with the white softness of her butt.
The white flesh of the second one, being different, grew red
More ruddy than purple rose.
And the third butt stirs up the calmness with a gentle wave
Rolling of its own accord with tender flesh,[134]
If the judge of the goddesses had seen these butts,
He would not have wished to see the former ones.

The narrator judges the rear ends on the aesthetic grounds of color, softness, shape, and movement and all of them hit the mark albeit in different ways. Although some of the aesthetic qualities the narrator describes may seem unusual or incomprehensible to a modern audience, it seems the narrator knows what he is doing. His crafted authority is illuminated by one of Alciphron's *Letters to Courtesans*. In letter 4.14, the first-person narrator, a courtesan named Megara, reports to her friend, another courtesan named Bacchis, about the events of a female drinking party that Bacchis missed.[135] One highlight of the party is a quarrel that occurred between Thryallis and Myrrhine concerning which of them had the most beautiful buttocks and a *philoneikia* ensues.[136] Megara reports that, after Myrrhine displayed her butt-quivering abilities, Thryallis outdid her:

ἀπεδύσατο τὸ χιτώνιον καὶ μικρὸν ὑποσιμώσασα τὴν ὀσφῦν ‘ἰδού, σκόπει τὸ χρῶμα’ φησίν ‘ὡς ἄκρηβες, Μυρρίνη, ὡς ἀκήρατον, ὡς καθαρόν, τὰ παραπόρφυρα τῶν ἰσχίων ταυτί, [τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς μηροὺς ἔγκλισιν,] τὸ μήτε ὑπέρογκον αὐτῶν μήτε ἄσαρκον, (6) τοὺς γελασίνους ἐπ᾽ ἄκρων. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τρέμει νὴ Δία’<φησὶν> ἅμ᾽ ὑπομειδιῶσα ‘ὥσπερ ἡ Μυρρίνης’. καὶ τοσοῦτον παλμὸν ἐξειργάσατο τῆς πυγῆς, καὶ ἅπασαν αὐτὴν ὑπὲρ τὴν

[133] Text from Page 1978.
[134] Perhaps "twerking of its own accord" would be a more fitting translating for the contemporary audience.
[135] Alciphron's dates are disputed, but most scholars place him in the Second Sophistic. See Granholm 2012: 13-14 for summary bibliography of debate.
[136] τὸ δ᾽ οὖν πλείστην ἡμῖν παρασκευάσαν τέρψιν, δεινή τις φιλονεικία κατέσχε Θρυαλλίδα καὶ Μυρρίνην ὑπὲρ τῆς πυγῆς ποτέρα κρείττω καὶ ἁπαλωτέραν ἐπιδείξει (4) (But what gave us the most delight was that terrible competition that arose between Thryallis and Myrrhine over which of them displayed the more beautiful and smooth buttocks.)

> ὀσφῦν τῇδε καὶ τῇδε ὥσπερ ῥέουσαν περιεδίνησεν, ὥστε ἀνακροτῆσαι πάσας καὶ νικᾶν ἀποφήνασθαι τὴν Θρυαλλίδα (5-6).
>
> [Thryallis] took off her dress, and sticking her butt out a little said, "Look, examine the skin, Myrrhine, how youthful, how pure, how spotless, look at the purple lining of the hips, how it slopes toward the thighs, which are neither to0 fat nor too lean, and the dimples at the sides." Smiling, she said, "But, by Zeus, it doesn't jiggle like Myrrhine's!" Then she made her butt quiver so much and she bounced the whole thing around, to and fro, over her loins, like it was flowing, so that we all applauded and said the victory belonged to Thryallis.

There are two levels of image-crafting in this letter, one on the part of Thryallis, who acts as her own judge, and one on the part of Megara, who writes the letter reporting the contest. Thryallis (reportedly) crafts herself through instructive authority; she presents her backside's outstanding features—it is the right color, size, and shape—as she advocates for herself and positions herself as aesthetically superior to Myrrhine. She invites her competitor to inspect closely and educates her and the audience (internal and external) in the qualities that contribute to the perfect rear end. The only negative criticism she expresses about herself turns out not to be about herself at all, but rather a humorously sarcastic and misleading criticism of Myrrhine; Thryallis' backside does not jiggle like Myrrhine's because it jiggles significantly better. In this way, Thryallis' image-crafting parallels Rufinus' narrator in *AP* 5.35 in that they both present themselves as a critical authorities. Additionally, not only do they both point out many of the same aesthetic features, but they also are bestowed (or bestow themselves) with cultural capital through appeal to consensus.[137] In Alciphron's letter, the audience, including the narrator, Megara, agrees that Thryallis is the winner; everyone (πάσας) applauded and agreed the victory belonged to her. In *AP* 5.35, the narrator was chosen by the women and states, through the mythological exemplum, that even Paris, the most famous critic of all time, would find these women's backsides beautiful.

[137] Richlin 1983: 49 states that Rufinus is the only poet to describe the buttocks in such detail and thus, they may be idiosyncrasies; however, the parallel with Alciphron seems to suggest that is not the case.

The idea of consensus in the letter and in the epigram also contributes to the narrators' image-crafting in that they appeal to the notion of inclusion discussed previously in part 2. In the second level of self-presentation in Alciphron's letter, Megara presents herself as part of an exclusive group and makes the letter's reader (Bacchis or otherwise) feel excluded, one of Megara's stated goals. At the beginning of the letter she chides Bacchis for being absent from the party, preoccupied with her lover: "We were all there!" (πᾶσαι παρῆμεν) she states (4.14.2). She later describes the party in such a way as to make Bacchis jealous, regretful, and most importantly, left out: "Such a drinking party we had—why shouldn't I make you jealous?—full of such joy!" (οἷον ἡμῶν ἐγένετο τὸ συμπόσιον — τί γὰρ οὐχ ἅψομαί σου τῆς καρδίας; — ὅσων χαρίτων πλῆρες). Megara admits to purposefully provoking Bacchis and making her, and simultaneously the external reader, feel excluded. Recently, Haynes has observed the tension between the internal female audience and the external, presumably male, reading audience in Alciphron 4.13 and 4.14. She argues that the epistolary format restricts male voyeurism of female sexuality since the letters depict a female-only fantasy.[138] The readers of the letter, then, whether it is the imaginary courtesan or the actual readers, desire to be included in a group from which they are made to feel excluded. Thus, Megara crafts her image by making her experience desirable and exclusive and Thryallis crafts her image as an aesthetic expert. Rufinus' narrator uses both these image-crafting techniques; when he imagines Paris responding to the women in the same way that he does, he crafts an imaginative group of good and experienced judges and enhances his critical authority.

5. *"She's Out of my League": Praise of form*

Although much of this chapter has concentrated on negative criticism of erotic objects, often narrators have nothing but (seemingly) good things to say about their objects of affection.

[138] Haynes 2013. For more on epistolary fiction see Rosenmeyer 2001and König 2007.

Unlike the case of *Idyll* 11, the poems I present in this section do not address praise towards the desired object or attempt to gain the beloved's approval. Instead, the narrators seem to address a wider audience, explaining their desire to the readers. The difference in implied audience means a difference in image-crafting technique. In the following Philodemus poem, the narrator singles out and addresses a woman's particular body part for comment in a similar vein to the beauty contest poems above:

> ὢ ποδός, ὢ κνήμης, ὢ τῶν (ἀπόλωλα δικαίως)
> μηρῶν, ὢ γλουτῶν, ὢ κτενός, ὢ λαγόνων,
> ὤμοιν, ὢ μαστῶν, ὢ τοῦ ῥαδινοῖο τραχήλου,
> ὢ χειρῶν, ὢ τῶν (μαίνομαι) ὀμματίων,
> ὢ κατατεχνοτάτου κινήματος, ὢ περιάλλων
> γλωττισμῶν, ὢ τῶν (θῦ' ἐμὲ) φωναρίων.
> εἰ δ' Ὀπικὴ καὶ Φλῶρα καὶ οὐκ ἄδουσα τὰ Σαπφοῦς,
> καὶ Περσεὺς Ἰνδῆς ἠράσατ' Ἀνδρομέδης.[139] (5.132)
>
> Oh foot, oh leg, oh thighs (I am justly done for)
> Oh buttocks, oh bush, oh flanks
> Oh shoulders, oh breasts, oh delicate neck,
> Oh hands, oh eyes (I'm crazy over them),
> Oh skillful movement, oh wonderful
> Kisses, oh her voice (kill me).
> If she is Oscan and a Flora and one who does not sing Sappho's verses,
> Perses also desired an Indian Andromeda.

The narrator constructs his image using at this point familiar techniques, namely, discourse of inclusion and appeal to consensus and construction of ethical authority. He states in the first line that he is "justly" (δικαίως) attracted to Flora; although he cannot control his desire and his Epicurean *ataraxia* is disrupted, he indicates with "δικαίως" that it is all for good reason. This presents him not only as an ethical authority who understands law and morality, but also makes him inclusive in that the concept of "justice" is *just*ifiable to the majority. Additionally, he appeals to the idea of inclusion and consensus through a mythological exemplum in the same way that the narrator of Rufinus' beauty contest poems (5.35, 5.36) does when he states that

[139] Text from Sider 1997.

Perses, too, desired a girl like Flora when he fell in love with Andromeda. He needs this qualification because he has just indicated that, while she is beautiful, she is also (perhaps?) "Oscan."[140] The narrator addresses all the specific features of Flora from bottom to top that he likes, but offers little aesthetic description of those features beyond a few vague adjectives.[141] This makes the readers mentally construct their own version of Flora and "fill in the blanks," predisposing them to accept, at the end of the poem, that she is Oscan. While it is contextually difficult to reconstruct what the ramifications of being "Oscan" are to the narrator, it seems to indicate "rustic-ness" and a general lack of culture.[142] Thus, the narrator has indicated his *awareness* that being "Oscan" is not desirable while also indicating that her beauty is so outstanding that he is "justifiably" smitten.

Another poem by Philodemus (c. 110-40 BCE) contains a similar technique—the narrator acknowledges his awareness of the desired object's flaws and explains his desire in spite of them:

> Μικκὴ καὶ μελανεῦσα Φιλαίνιον, ἀλλὰ σελίνων
> οὐλοτέρη καὶ μνοῦ χρῶτα τερεινοτέρη
> καὶ κεστοῦ φωνεῦσα μαγώτερα καὶ παρέχουσα
> πάντα καὶ αἰτῆσαι πολλάκι φειδομένη.
> τοιαύτην στέργοιμι Φιλαίνιον, ἄχρις ἂν εὕρω
> ἄλλην, ὦ χρυσέη Κύπρι, τελειοτέρην.[143] (5.121)
>
> Philainion is small and dark, but her hair is
> More curly than celery and her skin is more tender than down;
> And she speaks with more magic than in the cestus of Aphrodite and
> She offers everything and she often she refrains from asking for anything.
> I will love such a Philainion until I find,
> O golden Cypris, a more perfect one.

[140] This is part of what Sider 1997: 33 calls the "dark-but-comely" epigrams of Philodemus.
[141] Parallels for this kind of description include *AP* 5.56 (Dioscorides) and Ovid's *Amores* 1.5.19-23.
[142] See Sider 1997:108 for justification.
[143] Text from Sider 1997.

The strong adversative in the first line (ἀλλά) suggests that the first two characteristics of Philainion that he mentions, namely that she is "small" (μικκή) and "dark" (μελανεῦσα), fall outside of what is typically considered beautiful.[144] Of this poem Livingstone and Nisbet say that it "could be seen as a development of the tension between Love and Reason that we have seen explored by Callimachus: the scholar-poet is too realistic to imagine his beloved to be perfection—but he is attracted to her nonetheless."[145] The narrator, then, constructs his image as someone who knows what the standard criteria for beauty are and, although in a couple of ways Philainion does not meet them physically, in many ways she does; her hair is curly and her skin is soft, and her way of speaking is magical—which could refer to the aesthetic quality or form of her voice or to the *content* of what she says.[146] The narrator has, thus, justified his aesthetic attraction to her. Additionally, he comments on her behavior in line 4; she acquiesces to everything sexual and forgets to charge.[147] That one of the advantages of a sexual encounter with Philainion is that she is "free" contributes to the overall sense of the narrator's detachment and lack of personal investment. In the last line the narrator states that Philainion will do until someone better comes along, distancing himself from true avowal of his passion. This "distancing" technique functions in a similar way to doing things "ironically"; individuals interpret their own behavior and contextualize it, dodging potential criticism by removing passion and interest. Thus, the narrator of this poem avoids external judgment for his interest in a "small" and "dark" girl through his lack of investment in her, and crafts himself as culturally aware through acknowledgment of her flaws.

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[144] Cf. also 5.13 (Philodemus) on the 60 year old Charito, discussed above.
[145] Livingstone and Nisbett 2010: 79.
[146] See Sider 1997:124 for curly hair and soft skin as signs of beauty in antiquity.
[147] Cf. Ovid *Amores* 1.10 and Martial 9.32 for women who do not charge or charge little. For the phrase παρέχουσα πάντα see Henderson 1991: 161.

Rufinus employs a similar technique is his description of a woman.[148] While this poem also fits into the "age" category, I discuss it here because the narrator, in praising the good things about her that outweigh the "bad," demonstrates cultural awareness of her aesthetic shortcomings:

> Ὄμματα μὲν χρύσεια καὶ ὑαλόεσσα παρειὴ
> καὶ στόμα πορφυρέης τερπνότερον κάλυκος,
> δειρὴ λυγδινέη καὶ στήθεα μαρμαίροντα
> καὶ πόδες ἀργυρέης λευκότεροι Θέτιδος·
> εἰ δέ τι καὶ πλοκαμῖσι διαστίλβουσιν ἄκανθαι,
> τῆς λευκῆς καλάμης οὐδὲν ἐπιστρέφομαι.[149] (5.48)
>
> Her eyes are golden and her cheeks are crystal
> And her mouth is more delightful than a purple flower,
> Her neck is marble and her chest is shiny
> And her feet are whiter than silver Thetis.
> If the thistle gleams through her locks
> I do not pay attention to the white remains.

The narrator praises her form from head to toe—the reverse of the description in Philodemus *AP* 5.132 that praises the woman from the ground up. He comments on the quality of her eyes, face, and mouth, but again in this poem the adjectives are relatively nondescript. "Golden" eyes could refer to a light-gold color, but may also just mean that they are bright and shining or as valuable as gold.[150] "Crystal" or "gleaming" (ὑαλόεσσα) cheeks are equally vague. This vagueness allows the readers (just as the reader of the Philodemus poem) to construct their own versions of the ideal other. The narrator does seem to indicate the paleness of the girl's skin when he states that her feet are "whiter than silver Thetis" and that her neck is "marble" (λυγδινέη)—a word that refers specifically to a variety of Parian marble known for being white.[151] The narrator reveals with these descriptions more than simply her skin tone; the love object is similar to a divinity and

[148] For this theme, as noted by Page 1978: 90 cf. 7.217 (Asclepiades), 5.13 (Philodemus), 5.258 (Paulus), 5.282 (Agathias).
[149] Text from Page 1978.
[150] Page 1978: 91.
[151] Page 1978: 81.

an idealized statue, fading away from a real person.[152] By the time the narrator reveals that his love object is aging in the final two lines, the narrator has made clear that the things he values about her are her maiden-like qualities and her youthful features and has admitted his awareness of the flaws of age. He constructs himself as dominant over her and, in overlapping the discourse of art criticism and praise of the love-object and in indicating his awareness of her less than desirable features, indicates his good and cultured taste.

As the examples in the section have demonstrated, the discourse of praise functions similarly to the discourse of criticism when it comes to narrative image-crafting. Whether lauding a love-object or observing the love-object's shortcomings, narrators often position themselves as dominant authorities cued in to the social repercussions their evaluative statements may have. Erotic poetry is a particularly fruitful area for exploring subjective presentation due to its inherent auto-erotic quality and the projection of the self through mental construction of the erotic other. When a narrator describes and judges an erotic "other," that "other" bleeds into the subject, as explained by the examples of online dating profiles and Theocritus' *Idyll* 11. As I have argued in this chapter, narrators, through judgment of objects, reveal, manipulate, and negotiate their social image using methods such as didactic-authoritative tones, revelation of their aesthetic-cultural values, and inclusive or exclusive rhetoric. The way that narrators in erotic poetry "image-craft," demonstrating interest in their reputations and negotiating their

[152] Although the word for "flower" is different, when he states that her mouth is "more delightful than a purple flower," again not suggesting any specific aesthetic quality, he evokes a famous image from Sappho 105c. Although interpretation of the fragment is difficult since it exists without context, it is likely part of an *epithalamium* (Campbell 1978: 283). This seems to be a plausible assumption based on its resemblance in meter and structure to fragment 105a, and the similarities to the wedding song of Catullus (62.39-47) in which virgin girls are compared to a cared-for flower (see Garrison 1989:131 and Quinn 1972: 280). In the context of a wedding song, the lines seem to suggest that a young bride's virginity is crushed by a man like a flower on a mountain. Winkler 1990 has gone as far as to detail the way in which natural vocabulary is suggestive of female genitalia (180-87), and Catullus 11's allusion to Sappho 105c also suggests a highly sexualized reading of the flower image. Thus, through the allusion, the narrator suggests both the youthful and maiden-like qualities of his love object, and his sexual dominance over her.

authoritative positions, map on to the way that narrators of literary and artistic criticism "image-craft." In fact, the erotic "judgment themes" explored in this chapter thematically parallel "judgment themes" in literary criticism. For instance, the "preference" poems discussed in section 2 look similar to expressions of preference for one type of poetry over another, such as Callimachus' famous epigram on literary aesthetics which may have introduced a section on *eros*.[153]

> ἐχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κυκλικόν, οὐδὲ κελεύθῳ
> χαίρω τίς πολλοὺς ὧδε καὶ ὧδε φέρει:
> μισέω καὶ περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον, οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ κρήνης
> πίνω: σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια.
> Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλὸς καλός: ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν
> τοῦτο σαφῶς, ἠχὼ φησί τις ‘ἄλλος ἔχει.’[154] (AP 12.43)
>
> I hate the cyclic poem, and I do not like
> the road that carries many here and there.
> I also hate the wandering beloved, and I do not drink
> from the fountain: I loathe everything common.
> Lysanias, you are beautiful, beautiful. But before I say this,
> an echo clearly says, "He's another's."

This poem blends literary criticism and erotic criticism as the first-person speaker expresses his preferences in literature and in *eros*, championing selectivity in both realms; he hates the road that many people choose and the beloved who is not picky with his partners. Callimachus projects a social world shaped by the conceptions and representations that his "I" makes. The narrator negotiates his symbolic power in relation to a literary aesthetic and to a beloved, suggesting that power in the cultural field is closely related to one's position in a social field, and that both evaluative discourses aid in determining that position.

Similarly, the judgment theme of aging women discussed in section 3 maps on to the literary-critical theme of the decline of literature. Callimachus' explicit and notorious

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[153] Gutzwiller 1998:218.
[154] Text from Gow and Page 1965. On this poem see Henrichs 1979: 208-11; Fantuzzi 2011: 430ff.

descriptions of literary aesthetics in the *Aetia* in his reply to the Telchines is a response to what he sees as a general shortcoming in new epic by Hellenistic authors:[155]

> καὶ γὰρ ὅτ]ε πρ[ώ]τιστον ἐμοῖς ἐπὶ δέλτον ἔθηκα
> γούνασι]ν, Ἀ[πό]λλων εἶπεν ὅ μοι Λύκιος·
> ’.....]...ἀοιδέ, τὸ μὲν θύος ὅττι πάχιστον
> θρέψαι, τὴ]ν Μοῦσαν δ' ὠγαθὲ λεπταλέην·
> πρὸς δέ σε] καὶ τόδ' ἄνωγα, τὰ μὴ πατέουσιν ἅμαξαι
> τὰ στείβε]ιν, ἑτέρων ἴχνια μὴ καθ' ὁμά
> δίφρον ἐλ]ᾶν μηδ' οἶμον ἀνὰ πλατύν, ἀλλὰ κελεύθους
> ἀτρίπτο]υς, εἰ καὶ στε[ι]νοτέρην ἐλάσεις.’ (*Aetia* 1. 21-28)
>
> and when I first place a tablet on my knees, Lycian Apollo said to me,
> “… poet, feed the victim to be as fast as possible,
> But keep the Muse slender.
> This too I bid you: tread a path which carriages do not trample;
> Do not drive your chariot upon the common tracks of other,
> Nor along a wide road, but on unworn paths, though your course
> Be more narrow.

With this inspiration scene, an adaption from Hesiod, Callimachus defines the Hellenistic aesthetic, reacting against a burgeoning revival of heroic poetry at the time; namely, do something unique using brevity of expression, careful and polished structure, and erudite allusion. Through his endorsement of a new poetic style, Callimachus implicitly criticizes what has become of literature: Apollo himself recommends that he *not* do what other poets are doing. In the same way that poets critique an older woman, once beautiful, but now “used up,” in these lines the narrator alludes to poets who have over-worked the genre of epic, driving on the same path over and over and wearing it down; it is time for something new, younger, and untouched. The “beauty contest” theme likewise parallels the literary critical phenomenon of privileging certain specific poems or songs over another. Theocritus’ *Idylls* exemplarily demonstrate a literary “contest” and a “judge” situation in the motif of amoebic exchanges, as discussed in Chapter 1. Just as a judge is chosen to evaluate the bodies of women in the beauty contests, the

[155] See Acosta-Hughes and Stephens 2002. For a full discussion of the “Reply” see Asper 1997.

Idylls contain a multitude of examples of shepherds and goatherds competing in songs. Outside the world of the poems, literary works (especially drama) competed against each other at festivals such as the *Dionysia.* Aristophanes meta-literarily dramatizes this in the contest between Euripides and Aeschylus in the *Frogs*, judged by Dionysus himself.

Finally, praising women in an erotic context parallels most obviously with praise of literature or poetry. In the most well-known passage of *On the Sublime*, "Longinus" discusses the five sources of sublimity; he suggests that one of the sources is choosing the right details and working them into a cohesive whole. After quoting Sappho 31 in its entirety, he states:

> οὐ θαυμάζεις, ὡς ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ σῶμα τὰς ἀκοὰς τὴν γλῶσσαν τὰς ὄψεις τὴν χρόαν, πάνθ' ὡς ἀλλότρια διοιχόμενα ἐπιζητεῖκαὶ καθ' ὑπεναντιώσεις ἅμα ψύχεται κάεται, ἀλογιστεῖ φρονεῖ; ἢ γὰρφοβεῖται ἢ παῤ ὀλίγον τέθνηκεν: ἵνα μὴ ἕν τι περὶ αὐτὴν πάθος φαίνηται, παθῶν δὲ σύνοδος. (10)
>
> Are you now amazed how she collects together at once, as if they were all different from herself and spread out, the soul, the body, the ears, the tongue, eyes, and color? And bringing together contradictions she freezes and burns at the same time, how she raves and reasons? And this is to show that she is afflicted, not by one passion, but by a multitude of different emotions.

"Longinus" asks a rhetorical questions to his addressee, Postumius Terentianus, and the external audience that expects that he (and we) agree with his wonder over Sappho's skill. "Longinus" does his own version of a close-reading, pulling out from the poem the features that work to achieve the effect of sublimity. Although he is talking about the way the *poem* works, when he lists out all the parts that Sappho mentions (body, ears, eyes, tongue, coloring), he could easily be talking about the features of a love-object that combine to yield an impression of beauty. In the next chapter, I will discuss image-crafting as a product of the evaluation of literary texts in isolation from the field of the erotic.

CHAPTER 3

IMAGE-CRAFTING THROUGH LITERARY CRITICISM

Ἀχήεις τέττιξ, δροσεραῖς σταγόνεσσι μεθυσθείς,
ἀγρονόμαν μέλπεις μοῦσαν ἐρημολάλον
ἄκρα δ᾽ ἐφεζόμενος πετάλοις, πριονώδεσι κώλοις
αἰθίοπι κλάζεις χρωτὶ μέλισμα λύρας.
ἀλλά, φίλος, φθέγγου τι νέον δενδρώδεσι Νύμφαις
παίγνιον, ἀντῳδὸν Πανὶ κρέκων κέλαδον,
ὄφρα φυγὼν τὸν Ἔρωτα, μεσημβρινὸν ὕπνον ἀγρεύσω
ἐνθάδ᾽ ὑπὸ σκιερῇ κεκλιμένος πλατάνῳ.

Shrilling cicada, drunk on drops of dew, you sing
The country song that makes the wildwood talk,
And, perches on petals, your legs like little saws,
You rub your sunburnt skin, ringing music like the lyre.
But sing some new delight for woodland nymphs,
Striking up a song antiphonal to Pan
That I may have relief from Eros and
Catch a noonday nap beneath the plane tree's shade.

Meleager *AP* 7. 196

The 2013 Nobel Prize in Literature was awarded to Canadian author Alice Munro for her short stories. Although she has received many accolades in her long literary career, the Nobel Prize is her most widely recognized award outside of the literary community. Munro's paucity of readership in the United States, despite a wide readership in Canada, is what prompted American author and critic Jonathan Franzen's 2004 article in the *New York Times Book Review*. While praising Munro as "the best fiction writer now working in North America," Franzen explicates in a list the reasons Americans underappreciate her work.[156] Franzen, himself an acclaimed novelist and Pulitzer Prize finalist for his novel *Corrections,* is a somewhat controversial figure. When *Corrections* was selected for Oprah's book club in 2001, Franzen expressed some discomfort at being chosen; "she's picked some good books," Franzen said of Oprah in an interview " but she's picked enough schmaltzy, one-dimensional ones that I cringe." Franzen also said he feared

[156]Franzen, J. 2004.

Oprah's label would limit his readership to women only.[157] Because Franzen openly admitted his concern about his image when he received a certain *kind* of literary merit (what some would call "snobbery"), his techniques for image-crafting through criticism make him relevant for this study.

From his review of Munro, we can see the ways Franzen positions himself vis-à-vis what he claims to value in Munro's work and what he cites as the reasons she is not well known in the States. One of these reasons is:

> As long as you're reading Munro, you're failing to multitask by absorbing civics lessons or historical data**.** Her subject is people. People people people. If you read fiction about some enriching subject like Renaissance art or an important chapter in our nation's history, you can be assured of feeling productive. But if the story is set in the modern world, and if the characters' concerns are familiar to you, and if you become so involved with a book that you can't put it down at bedtime, there exists a risk that you're merely being entertained.

Franzen's tone is authoritative and didactic as he states that most people are more interested in reading as a means to an end rather than as a way of of appreciating a pure literary aesthetic. He recognizes what are generally considered "enriching" subjects (art history and American history), but disparages "multitasking." When he says that people are assured of *feeling* productive, he indicates that their "feelings" of being productive may be off-base; in suggesting that there is a risk that one is *only* being entertained, he also suggests that Munro's subject of people is not *merely* entertainment and aesthetic, but also a civic lesson obscure to most people (but, of course, not to him). With these sentiments he creates a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion, separating himself from the masses and making those masses seem so incorrect in their judgments that the readers of this piece would hopefully want to include themselves with him. Another reason Franzen cites as responsible for her lack of fame is that, "Munro writes

[157] See Macy Halford 2010 article in the New Yorker "The Passion of the Oprah." Retrieved from URL http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/the-passion-of-the-oprah. Franzen and Oprah later worked out their differences and his 2010 novel, *Freedom,* was selected for the book club.

fiction, and fiction is harder to review than nonfiction." As the reviewer of this fiction, himself, Franzen spells out the difficultly of his task and outlines his own qualifications. He continues:

> Because, worse yet, Munro is a pure short-story writer. And with short stories the challenge to reviewers is even more extreme. Is there a story in all of world literature whose appeal can survive the typical synopsis?... Oprah Winfrey will not touch story collections. Discussing them is so challenging, indeed…

Franzen states outright his challenging task and positions himself in opposition to the less ambitious and less qualified Oprah Winfrey again. He also notes further that Munro's stories are more difficult to review than short stories by most other authors:

> More than any writer since Chekhov, Munro strives for and achieves, in each of her stories, a gestaltlike completeness in the representation of a life. She always had a genius for developing and unpacking moments of epiphany.

With the comparison to Chekhov, Franzen not only praises Munro but suggests that those who would most enjoy Munro are educated and well-read, as he is. Thus Franzen's recognition of literary genius reiterates the inclusion/exclusion dynamic. Those who are up for the task of reviewing and reading, and can appreciate the literary aesthetic and more subtle civic lessons are included in small group of literati and excluded from the *polloi*. The focus of this chapter is the sort of rhetoric we find in Franzen's review, and the image-crafting it serves, intentionally or unintentionally. The techniques for image-crafting we find in modern book and movie reviews, including Franzen's *New York Times* article, parallel many of the techniques in the post-Classical period.

My aim is to demonstrate both the subjective discourse of criticism and the way it is a function of a speaker's self-positioning within a cultural field through inclusionary or exclusionary processes. I suggest that, much as in the case of the evaluation of bodies, image-crafting techniques and the criticism of literature work in a feedback loop: as narrators express their sentiments and opinions about literature, they may inadvertently construct their self-images,

and they may seek out further critical engagements with, and debates over, literary works to sustain or improve the images they have crafted. Much of Franzen's public image, for example, has been gleaned from his role as a literary critic who expresses his opinions and thoughts about other authors' works. The first part of the chapter looks at overt literary evaluation, i.e. texts that make it known that the goal or subject of the opus is to evaluate literature. I use Philodemus and Aristotle as examples of "overt" critics, and as a point of contact for the second part of the chapter that focuses on the implicit criticism in poetry by Lycophron, Meleager, Moschus, Lucian, and Longus.

Image-Crafting in Overt Criticism

Plato is the first of the major extant critics, but his critical approach serves as a foil rather than an exemplar for many of the major critics who follow. In his philosophy, Plato works through the anxiety about the moral value and social effects of poetry—what Plato identified as "the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy" (*Republic* 607b)—that dominated Greek literary criticism from as early as 500 BCE, beginning with the poetry of Xenophanes and Heraclitus attacking Homer for his untrue stories about the gods.[158] Such criticism was not uninterested in what we would consider criticism on the grounds of aesthetics, but it subordinated aesthetic principles to social consequences, or else conflated aesthetic and moral criteria. Take, for example, the contest between Aeschylus and Euripides in Aristophanes' *Frogs*; Euripides argues that his plays are superior because they are more realistic, while Aeschylus argues that his plays are superior because his characters are idealized models for virtue. At the same time, while the debate centers on the plays' moral benefit, many of the objections to Euripidean tragedy are purely artistic in nature. Aeschylus mocks Euripides' verse

[158] Xenophanes, frag. 11 and Heraclites, frag 42.

as too formulaic, for example (1325ff.). Their debate pivots on both moral and aesthetic judgments.

Plato likewise evaluates literature by both moral and aesthetic criteria. He may have been one of the first to overtly distinguish between criticism of form and criticism of content (*Phaedrus* 236a). He also seems to the be the first to have developed, or at least articulated, literary critical ideas such as organic unity (every part in proper relation to other parts and the whole (*Phaedrus* 264b-d)), the difference between art and technique (*Phaedrus* 268a-269d), and criteria for "good" art (namely, its moral effect, the pleasure it gives, and the correctness of imitation (*Laws* 667b-669b)).[159] But Plato constantly considers literature's function within the framework of other socially binding and contested values: a correct evaluation of a work of literature will depend, ultimately, on a proper evaluation of society. He crafts his image by equating the beautiful with the good, the just, and the true.

1. Aristotle

Aristotle presents an alternative, explaining how literature can be evaluated on its own terms: he opens up the space for an aesthetic field of critical judgment. In his literary critical works, the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric*, he brackets questions of the good, the just, and the true, but only in so far as they relate to works of literature. In his philosophy as a whole, however, he does not bracket literature from morality and social import. At the end of the *Politics* (8.5-7), he discusses the moral value of poetry and its specific function within society: similar to Plato, he states that rulers should exercise censorship over poetry and art, and that stories told to children should be morally beneficial. More pertinently, in the first book of the *Politics* (2) , Aristotle offers grounds for understanding how the evaluation of literature, even on aesthetic grounds, is a

[159] See Heath 1989 for a full study of the idea of organic unity in antiquity. For an overview of Plato's contributions to poetic criticism see Murray 1995.

political activity: man has the gift of speech, and through speech man can discern and debate the just and unjust, the good and the bad:

> διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴουμᾶλλον, δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ: λόγον [10] δὲ μόνονἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων: ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸκαὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζῴοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειναἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις) , ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷδηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον: τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶδικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν: ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίανκαὶ πόλιν. καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστιν.
>
> And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to indicate those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state.

In other words, normative concepts are essential to politics, and define political man as opposed to man the natural living creature. It is not difficult to see how, for Aristotle, the normative concepts of literary criticism might be an extension and appropriation of the normative concepts of political debate: the field of aesthetic evaluation is distinct but not discontinuous from the field of political evaluation. Hence, although topics of the moral good and social utility are not discussed directly in the *Poetics,* given Aristotle's expressed view in the *Politics* and the general pervasiveness of interest in literature's societal role, they filter into the language. The criticism of literature, then, was another, more subtle, inroad to social commentary.

Although I am chiefly interested in Aristotle as a critic of literature, it is worth noting the implications of what he says about language: it permits normative debates in a number of connected fields; because all of those debates are essentially political (occurring within the

political community that a language sustains and demarcates), they structure and restructure hierarchies of power and status. Critical and evaluative debates are not an exception; any normative utterance is ultimately a political utterance. Seemingly subjective judgments are always situated in the objective relations of the political order; we can only speak from a first-person evaluative position because we exist in relations that extend beyond the position of any one subject. Though Aristotle does not anticipate Bourdieu, his above characterization of language, and discourse, as fundamentally political (of a bound *polis* and inseparable from its balance of power) can reinforce and even contribute to his arguments. Moreover, we can hold Aristotle to his own claims about the social nature of language. His first-person arguments and evaluations position him within a cultural field. Concerning himself as he does with specific literary texts as well as generalized arguments, Aristotle competes for authority not only with philosophers but with critics of literature. He exceeds them in setting his judgments within a body of works that accounts for the nature and implications of judgment itself. But since he image-crafts through an evaluative discourse, Aristotle shares with his competitors a common store of strategies and terms, critiquing and assessing works and parts of literature just as the narrators I dealt with in Chapter 2 judged and evaluated love-objects. In the selection and deployment of these, Aristotle too might accrue or lose status.

Aristotle writes what I call "overt criticism." This is criticism that announces its critical intent either by direct statement or by the expectations established by generic convention; it is what we would mean when we say "literary criticism." I mention it now to set the ground for a contrast with "covert criticism" that I will draw later in the chapter. So far, I have mostly discussed the theoretical groundwork of Aristotle's criticism, situating it within the context of his philosophical project. Here, I will demonstrate how Aristotle draws distinctions between, and

reorients, key critical terms that he inherits from other critics; doing so, I show that Aristotle, like all overt critics, is engaged in image-crafting, establishing his own authority as a critic.

In the *Rhetoric,* Aristotle discusses different kinds of metaphors. When discussing the "active metaphor" he says the following (1411b21-25):[160]

> Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τε τῆς ἀνάλογον λέγεται καὶ τῷ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, εἴρηται· λεκτέον δὲ τί λέγομεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων, καὶ τί ποιοῦσι γίγνεται τοῦτο. λέγωδὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει…
>
> We have seen that felicitous sayings result from the use of a proportional metaphor and from bringing things vividly before the eyes of the audience. We must now say what we mean by "before the eyes" and how this is achieved. It is an effect produced by words which refer to things in action.

Aristotle uses this passage to explain that "happy" (ἀστεῖος) and successful phrases originate, in part, from bringing things "before the eyes" (πρὸ ὀμμάτων) of the audience (1411b) and that metaphorical action words produce this "vividness." The idea of visualization is one that Aristotle addresses in the *Poetics* as well (1455a22-26):

> Δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα [ὁ] ὁρῶν ὥσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις εὑρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λανθάνοι [τὸ] τὰ ὑπεναντία
>
> It is necessary that a dramatist construct his plot and elaborate it by putting it into words, and he must visualize the incidents as much as he can; he will then realize them vividly as if they were being enacted before his eyes, discover what fits the situation, and be most aware of possible inconsistencies.

Lucas notes that Aristotle's tone in this passage "carries the pattern of instruction" and that this section "is more admonitory than earlier sections and closer in tone to Horace's *Ars Poetica."*[161] Aristotle's didactic tone, achieved with δεῖ and the hortatory εὑρίσκοι and λανθάνοι, positions him as an authority figure—a technique we saw frequently with the narrators from Chapter 2—and suggests the importance of visualization as a literary critical topic. It is likely that Plato's

[160] For *enargeia* translated as "active metaphor" see van Eck 2012: 47.
[161] Lucas 1968:173.

ideas on visualization influenced Aristotle's; in Plato's *Ion,* Ion assures Socrates that he is transported outside of himself when he delivers a particularly good Homeric recitation and states: ὡς ἐναργές μοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες ("How vivid this proof is to me, Socrates") (535c). This is an early example of the word ἐναργές in the context of visualization of narrative, but one that surfaces again and again in works of literary criticism hence forth.[162] In "How the Young Man Should Study Poetry," for example, Plutarch warns that, when listening to Homer, the young man might be swept away in imagining the images he hears as truth (16b) and advises that one keep in mind (ἐναργῶς) the deceptive power of poetry (16d). "Longinus" also discusses the visualization of Homeric narrative as an example of sublimity (9.6).[163]

In the *Ion,* Socrates explains that Ion's ability depends on inspiration derived from the Muses as opposed to skill or knowledge (*techne*), and that this divine inspiration extends from poet to rhapsode to audience just as a magnet exerts power over a chain of iron rings.[164] He then builds a picture of the poet who can compose only when he is devoid of reason and filled with divine enthusiasm. In other dialogues, Plato also disparages of the idea of inspiration. In the *Apology,* Socrates is amazed that poets cannot explain the meaning of their poetry (22b-c), and in the *Phaedrus,* the poet who relies on skill is compared with the poet inspired with the frenzy of the Muses (245a). While the inspired poet is superior, Socrates ranks the life of the poet in sixth place after the philosopher, king, etc., suggesting still a relatively negative view. Plato's most hostile view of poets, however, is in the *Republic,* in which Plato banishes the poets from his ideal state because they have the power to corrupt even the best of men, thus threatening the

[162] Murray 1995.
[163] Hunter 2009 observes that there is a difference in the audience of Plutarch and Longinus; however; while Plutarch fears the young might be unable to distinguish truth and fiction, Longinus believes that being carried away by the images of poetry is the proper effect for a mature audience (6).
[164] For a study of poetic inspiration in the *Ion* see Gadamer 1980: 41-43, Murray 1981 and 1995.

stability of the *polis.* There is a similar disparaging view of rhetoric in the *Gorgias;* Socrates reveals rhetoric to be a spurious art.

Thus, when Aristotle argues that a "good" metaphor is produced through visualization in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle touches on a variety of ethical issues connected with previous Platonic discussions of visualization and inspiration. In the passage above from the *Rhetoric,* Aristotle discusses visualization in the audience, while in the passage from the *Poetics,* he discusses visualization by the author. When we read these passages side by side, the message seems to be that, once a poet has mastered his own visualization, he is able to produce the same effect in the audience. Aristotle bestows a great deal of power on the poet and, despite not stating the moral effect of this power outright as Plato does, it is implicit in the context of the literary critical ideas. Aristotle constructs his own image much like Plato; with the employment of a particularly instructive tone in reference to these topics, Aristotle puts himself in the position of a moral authority.

Aristotle goes on to give examples of "active metaphor" and how a poet achieves audience visualization. He states:

> καὶ ὡς κέχρηται πολλαχοῦ Ὅμηρος, τὸ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα ποιεῖν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ, οἷον ἐν τοῖσδε, "αὖτις ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής", καὶ"ἔπτατ' ὀιστός", καὶ "ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεαίνων", καὶ "ἐν γαίῃ ἵσταντο λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἆσαι", καὶ "αἰχμὴ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσσυτο μαιμώωσα". ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἔμψυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα φαίνεται· τὸ ἀναισχυντεῖν γὰρ καὶ μαιμᾶν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐνέργεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσῆψε διὰ τῆς κατ' ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς· ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀναισχυντούμενον. ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐδοκιμούσαις εἰκόσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ταὐτά· (1411b30 -1412a5)
>
> Homer frequently uses this device when he speaks metaphorically of inanimate things as animated; these expressions are attractive because they represent things as acting. He says: "once more the shameless rock rolled down into the plain," he speaks of an arrow "flying" or "eager to fly," of spears "standing fast in the ground, though longing to feed on his flesh," and "the spear point eagerly piercing his chest." In these cases, things are represented as alive and in action. Shamelessness, eagerness, and the rest imply living and acting, and he joins these attributes to the nouns by means of proportional metaphor.

To illustrate the best way to accomplish the method of representation of metaphor, Aristotle uses textual examples, a different method of representation. From the corpus of Homer, Aristotle selects phrases that he deems the most suitable for his argument, then proceeds to analyze and interpret the phrases. There are two interesting things at play in this passage, the first of which is Aristotle's interpretation of metaphor. Aristotle defines metaphor in the *Poetics* as "the application of a name belonging to something else" (1457b6-7). This definition hierarchizes domains to which certain words "properly" belong; he implies, for example, that "shamelessness" and "eagerness" belong not to the realm of rocks and weaponry but to people. Aristotle, in a position of power as a reader and interpreter of literature for the audience of the *Poetics,* manipulates Homer's metaphorical words, and privileges them as evidence of being "good" because the words lie outside their proper sphere. While Aristotle does not proceed to analyze Homer's expressions for contextual meaning, his suggestion that words "literally" signify one thing means that metaphorical language is open for appropriation by a variety of metaphorical interpretations. The hierarchizing of proper spheres for languages and what metaphorical language signifies come into play more when we look at "covert" criticism in poetry, as metaphors often contain judgments and subsequent narrative image-crafting.

The second relevant aspect of this passage is Aristotle's privileging of agency; he says that things "seem good" (εὐδοκιμεῖ) when they are represented as active. While Aristotle is only discussing diction, his insistence that bestowing agency to inanimate objects improves expression suggests a dynamic of power in which the poet is the primary agent with the authority to grant agency to words (and, by implication, ideas and people) at will. At another point in the *Poetics* Aristotle says:

> ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστι μιμητὴς ὁ ποιητὴς ὡσπερανεὶ ζωγράφος ἤ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός, ἀνάγκη μιμεῖσθαι τριῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἕν τι ἀεί, ἢ γὰρ οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, ἢ οἷα εἶναι δεῖ. 1460b 8-11
>
> Since the poet is an imitator just like the painter and other makers of images, it is necessary that the object of his imitation always be represented in one of three ways: as it was or is, as it is said or thought to be, or as it ought to be.

If we use this didactic passage to inform the previous one, then making an inanimate object "active" can fall into the category of representing something as how "it ought to be"—one of the three ways a (good) poet *must* represent images. To synthesize the aforementioned passages, Aristotle suggests that, in order to achieve audience visualization, the poet must himself visualize narrative and expressions, and represent metaphorical images as active. Despite not being a poet himself, this discussion of agency places Aristotle at the top of a literary hierarchy. Just as the poet should grant agency to an object to give it life, Aristotle imparts the knowledge the audience needs to understand poetry and to judge it.

Additionally, the ideas about visualization, stated outright by Aristotle, are remarkably similar to the ideas the Theocritean narrators suggest about visualization in the passages discussed at the beginning of Chapters 1 and 2; Polyphemus' idealized construction or mental representation of Galatea in *Idyll* 11, and the narrator from *Idyll* 3's description of Amaryllis reflect the same poetic process Aristotle describes. Each narrator (re)presents his desire for his love-object just as Aristotle says a poet should (re)present narrative or descriptions of images. Similar to the way that the descriptions and praise of the love objects are entrenched in the narrator's image-crafting, so too is literary criticism is indicative of cultural theory and reveals a critic's positioning of him or herself within that culture.

In the section in the *Poetics* on diction, Aristotle proposes that "good" diction should be a mix of unusual, metaphorical, and ornamental words with current vocabulary for clarity; poets

should use ornamental words in moderation. To demonstrate the power of word choice, Aristotle cites examples from Aeschylus and Euripides (1458b17-31):

> καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεταφορῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν μετατιθεὶς ἄν τις τὰ κύρια ὀνόματα κατίδοι ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγομεν· οἷον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσαντος ἰαμβεῖον Αἰσχύλου καὶ Εὐριπίδου, ἓν δὲ μόνον ὄνομα μεταθέντος, ἀντὶ κυρίου εἰωθότος γλῶτταν, τὸ μὲν φαίνεται καλὸν τὸ δ' εὐτελές. Αἰσχύλος μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ ἐποίησε φαγέδαιναν ἥ μου σάρκας ἐσθίει ποδός,ὁ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐσθίει τὸ θοινᾶται μετέθηκεν. καὶ νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς καὶ ἀεικής, εἴ τις λέγοι τὰ κύρια μετατιθεὶς νῦν δέ μ' ἐὼν μικρός τε καὶ ἀσθενικὸς καὶ ἀειδής·καὶ δίφρον ἀεικέλιον καταθεὶς ὀλίγην τε τράπεζαν, δίφρον μοχθηρὸν καταθεὶς μικράν τε τράπεζαν·καὶ τὸ "ἠιόνες βοόωσιν", ἠιόνες κράζουσιν.
>
> And also with rare words, metaphors and some other modes of expression, someone would see this is true, exchanging it for a common word. For example, we have the same iambic line in Aeschylus and Euripides with one word exchanged, a rare word replacing a common one, and the result is that one line is beautiful, the other cheap. The line of Aeschylus is in the *Philoctetes:* "This tumor is eating up the flesh of my foot"; but Euripides wrote "feasting on" instead of "eating up." Then again, take the line: "a small one, unseemly, and unnoted," and replace this by current words: "feeble and ugly, and quite small." Or take: "He set a meager table and couch unseemly," and replace it by: "He set a little table and an ugly stool"; or if one changed": "the shores resound" into "the shores make a noise."

Aristotle's ideas about language in a way anticipate the Russian Formalist idea of defamiliarization; rather than using words as media to convey subject matter and facilitate communication in what the Russian Formalists called "automatization," poetic language acts against automatization and makes us aware of the value and quality of the linguistic material.[165] Aristotle presents his examples with the assumption that lines distinguished by their beauty will be self-evident to his readers, so that he need not direct the audience to which line he means. Similarly, his approach takes for granted that he shares the social and linguistic world of his audience; in that community of language-users, he can trust that his judgments of

[165] For Formalism in antiquity see Porter 2010 and Silk 2003. For Russain formalism generally see Jakobson 1987 and Shklovsky 1990.

rare and common words (γλῶσσα and κύριος) and beautiful and cheap (καλὸν τὸ δ' εὐτελές) will meet with assent. Implicit in the latter is an underlying socio-cultural evaluation; εὐτελές, "cheap" or "paid for easily," is a socio-economic term turned, in this case, into an aesthetic judgment about word selection. Building on an assumed consensus about the register of words and the standards of beauty, Aristotle indicates his aesthetic preferences and suggests that these preferences are agreed upon universally—though he might mean the universal to refer only to those who share a linguistic universe in which normative concepts can be debated (our word "universal" has a heritage that might confuse us in translations). "Beauty," in such a universe, is more than aesthetic word; as we saw in the previous chapter, it is often entangled with underlying judgments about morality and social life.[166]

Beyond just juxtaposing selections from poets, Aristotle also juxtaposes the poets, Aeschylus and Euripides themselves, as if staging his own poetic contest. In fact, the amphibolic examples from the poetry of Euripides and Aeschylus are reminiscent of the scene in Aristophanes' *Frogs* in which Dionysus stages a contest between the two in the underworld and Euripides criticizes Aeschylus' obscure language:

> Εὐριπίδης:
> σαφὲς δ᾽ ἂν εἶπεν οὐδὲ ἕν—
> Διόνυσος
> μὴ πρῖε τοὺς ὀδόντας.
> Εὐριπίδης
> ἀλλ᾽ ἢ Σκαμάνδρους ἢ τάφρους ἢ 'π᾽ ἀσπίδων ἐπόντας
> γρυπαιέτους χαλκηλάτους καὶ ῥήμαθ᾽ ἱππόκρημνα,
> ἃ ξυμβαλεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδι᾽ ἦν.
> Διόνυσος
> νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐγὼ γοῦν

[166] Earlier in the text than the passage in question, Aristotle discusses his ideas about beauty, claiming beauty is a matter of "size and order:" ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν (1450b34-37) (An animal or indeed anything which has parts must, to be beautiful, not only have these parts in order but also must be of a definite size. Beauty is a matter of size and order."

ἤδη ποτ᾽ ἐν μακρῷ χρόνῳ νυκτὸς διηγρύπνησα
τὸν ξουθὸν ἱππαλεκτρυόνα ζητῶν τίς ἐστιν ὄρνις. 929-33

Euripides:
But he never said one clear thing-
Dionysus:
Don't saw your teeth
Euripides:
But Scamanders, or ditches, or shield-adorning
Bronze beaten griffin-eagles and horse-cliffed phrases
Which were not easy to interpret.
Dionysus:
Yes, by the gods:
I have previously lain awake through long watches of the night
Wondering what kind of bird a yellow horse-rooster was.

Euripides criticizes Aeschylus for his general lack of clarity and overly adorned language, and Dionysus validates this criticism. In his discussion of this passage, Hunter observes that, in this scene, Dionysus, beyond being just a judge, acts as an interpreter of literature and a scholar; the god states that he has stayed up all night mulling over a philological problem, a commonplace in later scholarship.[167] Hunter also notes that, in the *Cratylus*, Plato uses the word ξυμβαλεῖν in reference to the interpretation of words.[168] In the passage about diction, then, Aristotle conducts a re-match and casts himself as the interpreter, the judge, and the god-figure. Further, the results of the new contest are different; Aristotle *corrects* Dionysus' judgment (albeit with a more limited scope).

Whether or not they recognize his authority, critics who write overt criticism after Aristotle are indebted to his language and approach. I will now discuss one of Aristotle's heirs, Philodemus. As was the case with Aristotle, Philodemus' image-crafting depends not only on the veracity or persuasiveness of the final evaluation, but on the proper use of abstract and freighted terms of evaluation. In other words, his aspiration to cultural distinction often hangs on his

[167] See Hunter 2009: 24 for parallels.
[168] Hunter 2009: 24.

capacity to make philosophical and semantic distinctions. In particular, he grapples with the binary of form and content, the location of the border between aesthetics and morality, and the categories into which the aesthetic can be analyzed.

2. Philodemus

Writing in the late Hellenistic period, Philodemus of Gadara (c.110-35 BCE), the poet, Epicurean philosopher, and contemporary of Lucretius and Horace, is one of our primary sources for Hellenistic literary theory.[169] This is largely due to the fact that he spends much of *On Poems* summarizing and reviewing earlier critical theories that suggest that sound is the source of great poetry and that the ear does the judging. Philodemus' own views are complex, and the *On Poems* is a superb example of an author crafting his image and presenting his own views through criticism of others. In fact, from what we can gather from the fragmentary text, overtly evaluating other critics, as opposed to directly engaging with literary texts, is the primary way in which Philodemus constructs his own views of literature.

In contrast to his opponents' theories, Philodemus argues that a work's content, in addition to aural aesthetics, contributes to good poetry, and that content and form are interrelated. In her article on moralism and formalism in Philodemus, Asmis develops this point, clarifying that Philodemus disagrees with Plato's emphasis on a poem's moral utility as opposed to formal excellence (*Rep* 607d-e).[170] In the following passage (which comes from a different papyrus than the rest of the passages in this section, but is either continuous or, at the very least, contextually related to the ones of *On Poems*) Philodemus explains that, while he does not think

[169] Janko 1995. See Janko also for further information about the reconstruction of the text to compile *On Poems.*
[170] Asmis 1995.

that a judge should ignore poem's context, the moral utility of the poem should not be the only deciding factor.[171]

> ἔ]τι δ' [ἐν ἄλ]λοις φησὶ τά| γε] χ[ρηστὰ παρε]σχηκέναι| ῥήσεις καὶ δ[ι]ανοίας | κατεσκευασμένας περὶ| πονη[ρῶ]ν τινῶν, μ[η]δ' ἂν | ὠφελεῖν τὸ χρηστὸν δι|ανόημα καὶ | βλάπτειν |τὸ πονηρὸν εἰ λαμβάνοι|θ' ὡς ποήματος καὶ ποη|τοῦ. τάχα γὰρ τὸ διὰ τῆς| ἐπαινετῆς ἐξ[εργα]σίας |ἐπιφαν[έστατον πόη]μα|χρηστόν, τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς ψεκ|τῆς πονηρὸν| ἀνακαλεῖ |τις. [ἐ]κεῖνο γὰρ ὑπό τι|νων ἀναιδῶς λέγεται.[172]
>
> Further, elsewhere he says [decent poems] provided sayings and thoughts that were elaborated in connection with certain base [characters], nor would a decent thought benefit and a base thought harm if it were taken as belonging to a poem and the poet. Perhaps someone will call a poem that is highly illustrious because of praiseworthy execution "decent," and a poem that has blameworthy execution "base." For that is said shamelessly by some people.

In this passage, Philodemus describes his opponent's view; he believes that a poem will not benefit or harm the reader if that reader understands the views presented to be that of the poem or the poet. Philodemus points out that others have "shamelessly" (ἀναιδῶς) used the same terms "decent" and "base" to refer to a poem's execution. While Philodemus only calls an unspecified group of "others" (τινων) "shameless"—not the opponent himself—he suggests a likeness between the two ideas. The word τάχα, rightly translated by Asmis above as "perhaps," is indicative of an "ellipsed" thought, the nature of which may be something like the following: "if someone thinks something like *that,* then perhaps he might *even* think something like *this*." Philodemus presents the audience with a summary of his opponent's ideas, offers a plausible consequence of the idea, and, without *actually* stating his own ideas, forces the reader to construct and piece together his views. Because Philodemus' careful critique of the views of another expert contributes to the impression that he is qualified to make those critiques in the

[171] Asmis 1995, 175ff.
[172] *P. Herc.* 1081 fr. h 13-26. Translation from Asmis 1995.

first place, the reader's instinct is likely to give him more authority automatically.[173] If a critic first provides a summary of the critiqued material, the audience is inclined to be generous to the critic. It seems an integral part of Philodemus' overall image-crafting process is to construct his authority in this way.

Another pointed example of Philodemus' method of criticism is his discussion of the theories of Neoptolemus:

> ἀτόπως δ[ὲ] κα[ὶ τὸν] τὴν | τέχνην κα[ὶ τήν] δ[ύν]α|μιν ἔχοντα τὴ[ν ποι]ητι|κὴν ε[ἶ]δος [π]αρί|στησι τῆ[ς] τέ[χ]νη[ς μ]ετὰ τοῦ | ποήματος καὶ τῆς πο|ήσεως.[174]
>
> He absurdly juxtaposes [or represents] the person who possesses the art of writing poetry and has the power to do so [i.e., the 'poet'] as an *eidos* along with the *poema* and the *poesis*.

In this passage, Philodemus refers to Neoptolemus' critical discussion of the three *eide* of poetic *techne*: poet, *poema* (ποίημα), and *poesis* (ποίησις). It seems that, to Neoptolemus, *poema* means verbal arrangement (form), that *poesis* means subject matter (content), and that the poet is, bizarrely, his own separate *eidos.*[175] While presenting Neoptolemus' analysis, Philodemus includes the adverb "absurdly" (ἀτόπως). While this word could have a negative connotation and suggest that Neoptolemus is wrong, it can be interpreted more generously as meaning "out of the ordinary." Even if we should favor the latter interpretation, the choice of diction still contributes to Philodemus' reputation as an expert, just as my use of the word "bizarre" above, while not being necessarily disparaging towards Neoptolemus' views, informs my audience of its uniqueness as a literary critical idea and, of course, simultaneously means that I know that it is.

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[173] Consider the similarity to scholarly review. Experts reinforce and construct their positions as experts through the process of reviewing the work of other scholars. The struggle to position oneself as an expert and appropriate intellectual capital also seems to happen at public talks and presentations. An audience member-with or without a reputation of an "expert"- affords him or herself an opportunity to construct or reinforce a reputation by asking questions or problematizing the presentation.

[174]Philodemus *On Poems* 5 cols. x (xiii) 33-xi (xiv) 1. Quotation from Mangoni's 1993 revision of Jensen's edition, *Philodemus űber die Gedichte.* Translation of Philodemus throughout is taken from Porter 1995.

[175] For further analysis and explication of what Neoptolemus means by each of these, see Porter 1995: 104 ff.

Philodemus claims for himself the authority to assess the distinctions that Neoptolemus makes in his terminology.

In addition to his criticisms of Neoptolemus, in the fifth book of *On Poems,* Philodemus discusses two other critics (Heraclides and Aristo) who also believe that a poem should be morally beneficial to its readers.[176] His objection to Heraclides' assertion that a poem should be both pleasant and beneficial centers on the fact that Heraclides does not define "pleasantness" or "benefit." Philodemus also seems critical of Heraclides' tendency to censure as exemplified in the following passage:[177]

> ...διότι τὰ κά[λ|λιστ[α] ποιήματα τῶν [δο|κιμ[ω]τάτων ποητῶ[ν |διὰ τὸ μηδ' ἠντινοῦν |ὠφελίαν παρασκευ[ά|ζειν, ἐνίων δὲ καὶ [τὰ | πλ[εῖ]στα, τινῶν δὲ πά[ν|τα [τ]ῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκρ[απ]ί|ζει.[178]
>
> [Heraclides] banishes (literally, expells with a rod) from goodness the most beautiful poems of the most famous poets because they provide no benefit whatsoever-in the case of some poets, most poems, in the case of other, all poems.

Philodemus distinguishes himself from Heraclides. The harshness of the verb ἐκραπίζει, reveals Philodemus' condemnation of the idea of banishment on moral grounds and allows him to position himself as more qualified than Heraclides. By critiquing his violent close-mindedness, Philodemus suggests that his own criticism comes from a broader, more educated point of view. Philodemus also constructs credibility with the superlatives κά[λ|λιστ[α and [δο|κιμ[ω]τάτων. When he declares a group of poems to be the most beautiful, he suggests his familiarity with a

[176] Jensen identified Philodemus' opponent as Heraclides in 1936.
[177] Asmis 1995 discusses this passage in connection with censorship in Philodemus. I use her translation and notes.
[178] Col. iv 10-18.

large corpus of poetry, and when he declares a group of poets to be the most famous, he suggests his cultural awareness of a wide range of poets from different levels of fame.[179]

In another passage from *On Poems*, again through criticism of another critic, Philodemus advocates for a relationship or interconnectedness between form and content:

> καταξι|[ῶ]ν δὲ τὸν ποητήν, ἐὰν μ[ὴ] | δια]νοήματ' οἰκεῖα λάβη[ι]| καὶ λέξεις προσηκούσας, [ἴ|δι]όν τι ποητικὸν ἀπ[ο|τελε]ῖν, κἂν παρίδη<ι> τ [...]ἐστι [1.5 lines] τυφλώττον | [τος.[180]
>
> He [sc. an opponent] maintains that the poet can realize a certain poetic in the absence of appropriate ("fitting") thoughts and expressions to match them (literally, appropriate *lexeis*), even if (the poet?) overlooks [...] [1.5 lines] (but this view) is (that) of a blind man.

Porter observes the similarity of the language in this passage to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 3.7 1408a10-11 in which he states that what is "fitting" in expression is what is analogous to the subject matter (τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον). This similarity in thought and diction is one of many indications in the text that Philodemus relies on an established canon of criticism.[181] Philodemus is able to restate the established idea because someone denied it, and is able to avoid redundancy by delivering the idea through criticism. By reiterating Aristotelean ideas, Philodemus employs an exclusionary tactic, placing his opponent in opposition not only to himself, but to an entire group of literary critics; simultaneously, he positions himself as a poetic authority in the tradition of Aristotle. The opponent maintains that poetic craft is possible even in the absence of fitting or appropriately selected content. This notion, Philodemus states, is that of a blind man. Philodemus uses the comparison to a literal blind person to metaphorically assert the opponent's lack of understanding, insight, and general misguided thoughts about poetry. The

[179] Sappho, frag. 16 sets up this form of thought when she declares that the most beautiful thing is "whatever you love best" (Οἰ μὲν ἰππήων στρότον, οἰ δὲ πέσδων,/οἰ δὲ νάων φαῖσ' ἐπὶ γᾶν μέλαιναν/ἔμμεναι κάλλιστον, ἐγὼ δὲ κῆν' ὄτ-/τω τις ἔραται (16.1-4).
[180] Porter 1995: 125.
[181] Acknowledged long ago by Jensen 1923: 96 and Greenberg 1961:281.

implication of the metaphor is that anyone with all their sensory and mental faculties intact would realize that poetry must be of "appropriate" thought and expression. With the harsh exclusionary tactic and the underlying ethical and cultural implication of "appropriateness," Philodemus constructs an intellectually and morally authoritative image.

Philodemus addresses literary critical ideas such as poetic arrangement, interconnectedness of form and content, and morality by picking apart the ideas of other critics, and, in doing so, fashions his self-image through criticism of the "other" (critic)'s ideas on these topics. It is not a huge leap to equate Philodemus' criticism of another critic with Chapter 2's narrators criticizing other people for their erotic proclivities. Less obvious perhaps is the similarity between the criticism of text and ideas and the narrators from Chapter 2's criticism of bodies. The reason for the similarity should be clear by now: the discourses of evaluation in the fields of the erotic and the aesthetic are continuous, with many terms passing to and fro between; an overt critic of a love-object may learn from, but also instruct, an overt critic of a text. Both, in turn, might learn from the criticism to which I will now turn: "covert criticism" of literature.

Image-Crafting in Covert Criticism

Despite the loss of many important texts from this period, it has becoming increasingly possible, thanks to new discoveries, to trace the critical trends of the Hellenistic period from overtly critical works; however, literary and poetic texts can similarly provide evidence of what ancient audiences, theorists, and authors valued in literature.[182] In the Hellenistic period and beyond there is a remarkable overlap between poetry and the language of ancient criticism that this section will address.

[182] New editions of texts (such as Janko 2000 and Mangoni 1993 on Philodemus) have made the study of "overt" criticism easier.

The word "covert" could imply that someone (e.g., the author) is actively attempting to conceal an activity (e.g., literary criticism). While I do think that in many cases authors try to express literary criticism through their works of literature, I intend for this analysis to include criticism that happens covertly even to the authors themselves. With that said, I acknowledge the complete unknowability of authorial intent. By "covert" what I really mean is the way in which criticism operates in texts *when it is not the generic or expressed purpose* of the text (such as a poem or a play). In other words, by overt criticism I refer to criticism that is expected by readers owing to the conventions an author follows, and by covert criticism I refer to critical evaluation that makes its way into texts whose conventions do not lead readers to expect or look for it. As a consequence, the intentions and awareness of the author are not relevant to my claims; what matters is what a text announces either explicitly or in the conventions it follows. However, image-crafting will change depending on whether criticism is overt or covert: in writing that announces itself as chiefly critical in aim, the entire bid for status will depend on the distinctions and rhetoric of evaluation; writing that announces itself as something other than critical (as mimetic, expressive, or didactic, or whatever combination of modes) exists almost always in actual literary practice. Readers of covert criticism will not only judge evaluative claims on their own merits, but also as they exist in relation to other claims and in their setting within works as a whole.

A further difference lies in the ways overt and covert criticism handle the terms of evaluative discourse: in overt criticism, we find energy devoted to theoretically delineating, defining, and distinguishing terms prior to application, whereas in covert criticism, evaluative terms are fleshed out, distinguished from one another, and oriented in the practical evaluation of particular instances. Often, in covert criticism, key terms are allowed to (or made to) remain

suggestively open as they are not, usually, in overt. While respecting these differences between overt and covert criticism, in what follows I demonstrate that image-crafting is present in both, dependent on a shared evaluative discourse that draws from a common store of rhetorical moves and terminology. At the same time, I will argue that covert criticism is shaped not only by evaluative rhetoric and critical terms but by genre. Set within literary works whose generic conventions do not announce critical intentions, the nature of those conventions will set distinct limits on and create distinct possibilities for critical discourse.

To initiate my discussion of covert criticism, I start with what seems like the least covert of my examples. The *Alexandra* is the only extant piece attributed to Lycophron and a rare example of surviving tragedy from the Hellenistic period.[183] In the play, a messenger relays Cassandra's nearly incomprehensible prophecies, full of obscure mythology, that tell the fate of Troy and the future of Greek and Trojan heroes. The play is full of *hapax legomena*, uncommon words, complex syntax, and unusual allusions, making it extremely difficult to read and understand. Given the play's difficulty and Alexandrian provenance, this work seems to be more a showpiece of literary prowess than a performable and plot driven play.[184]

The entirety of the play seems to enact the binary of the literary critical notion of form and content; the erudite and highly crafted *form* of the text makes it difficult to access the *content.*[185] Hence what would be discursively elaborated on in overt criticism is dramatized in this instance of covert criticism. The dynamic between form and content mirrors the dynamic of authority in the play; while Cassandra's words are infallible, the complexity of the speech's

[183] Some scholars have questioned the attribution to Lycophron, e.g. Hurst 1976 and West 1983, 1984. Some propose an alternative second century dating, e.g Gigante Lanzara 2000; Stirpe 2002.
[184] West 2000: 155. Cameron 1995: 81 suggests the possibility that at least sections were read aloud to an elite, private audience. See Sharrock 2009 for reading as a performance in and of itself.
[185] The connection between critical discourse about form and content and ethics was perhaps initiated by Plato. In the *Republic,* the *Gorgias,* and the *Ion,* Plato expresses anxiety about the ethical implications of poetry that is all form and no content. Grube characterizes Plato as the first "to develop a theory of literature and its place in society" 1965: 45.

content problematizes the messenger's assertion of its veracity (1, 1471). Lycophron presents a first-person messenger in the opening 15 lines, a brief section when the messenger is not directly quoting Cassandra, who explains the drama's expository material to the δέσποτα, the internal addressee:

> Λέξω τὰ πάντα νητρεκῶς, ἅ μ' ἱστορεῖς,
> ἀρχῆς ἀπ᾽ ἄκρας· ἢν δὲ μηκυνθῇ λόγος,
> σύγγνωθι, δέσποτ᾽· οὐ γὰρ ἥσυχος κόρη
> ἔλυσε χρησμῶν, ὡς πρίν, αἰόλον στόμα·
> ἀλλ' ἄσπετον χέασα παμμιγῆ βοὴν
> δαφνηφάγων φοίβαζεν ἐκ λαιμῶν ὄπα,
> Σφιγγὸς κελαινῆς γῆρυν ἐκμιμουμένη.
> τῶν ἅσσα θυμῷ καὶ διὰ μνήμης ἔχω,
> κλύοις ἄν, ὦναξ, κἀναπεμπάζων φρενὶ
> πυκνῇ διοίχνει δυσφάτους αἰνιγμάτων
> οἴμας τυλίσσων, ᾗπερ εὐμαθὴς τρίβος
> ὀρθῇ κελεύθῳ τἀν σκότῳ ποδηγετεῖ.
> ἐγὼ δ' ἄκραν βαλβῖδα μηρίνθου σχάσας
> ἄνειμι λοξῶν ἐς διεξόδους ἐπῶν,
> πρώτην ἀράξας νύσσαν, ὡς πτηνὸς δρομεύς. (1-15)

> I will tell everything truthfully that you ask,
> From the very beginning, and if the story is long,
> Forgive me, master. For not quietly as of old did the maiden
> Loosen the varied voice of her oracles,
> but pouring forth a mixed up cry,
> she prophesied unending words from her bay-chewing mouth,
> imitating the speech of the dark Sphinx.
> Of those things in heart and memory I hold,
> Listen, king, and pondering with wise mind,
> Winding, pursue the obscure paths of her riddles,
> whereso a clear track guides by a straight way through what is obscure.
> And I, cutting the bounding thread,
> will trace her paths of devious speech,
> striking the starting-point like winged runner.

The messenger raises many literary critical issues in these opening lines with his introduction and evaluation of Cassandra's words and, in doing so, fashions a self-image. Perhaps the most obvious critical issue is the speaker's reference to a feature of the Hellenistic aesthetic. When he beseeches the *despota* to forgive him if the story is long, he suggests awareness of cultural

preference for shorter poetry (cf. Callimachus' *Aetia* 1. 21-28). The narrator presents his awareness of the more favorable shorter poetic form by distancing himself from it and associating himself with the Hellenistic aesthetic; he apologizes for the length of the tale and places the responsibility for it on Cassandra and her unending words (ἄσπετον). The narrator claims he is imitating Cassandra, who is herself, in turn, imitating (ἐκμιμουμένη) the Sphinx.

The concept of *mimesis* concerns the nature of the relation between a poet and his subject matter. For Plato, the ethical implications of *mimesis* lie in fact that style is an expression of character (*Republic* 400d6-7) and *mimesis* is the adoption of the style of another person. As the *Republic* establishes, the unjust person does not know his proper place in the community. The inspired person and the poet who engages in mimetic narrative impersonate and perform the words of someone other than him- or herself, becoming another person in speech or appearance. This, then, suggests that mimetic recitation of poetry has ethical implications in that one speaker could present multiple discourses, identities, and characters.[186] *Mimesis* is also a way that the narrator raises the issue of poetic authority, already questionable because of Cassandra's paradoxical condition in which her words are divinely sanctioned but believed by no one. When the messenger states in the first line that he will speak truthfully (νητρεκῶς) about the words of someone assumed to be lying, he paradoxically (just like Cassandra) becomes less believable. We can see a term defined and debated in overt criticism subsumed into the dramatic architecture of the play.

Working from Plato's distinction between "mimetic" and "non-mimetic" poetry in book three of the *Republic*,[187] Aristotle's *Poetics* proposes that the differences in poetic genres lie not

[186] For documentation and discussion see Ferrari 1989 and Naddaff 2002, especially 145.
[187] *Rep* 3.392c-398b.

with meter but rather in the medium of imitation (1447b),[188]specifically whether poets represent men as either better or worse than in real life or worse. The play and the above passage are further connected with the literary-ethical aspects of *mimesis* in that the genre in the *Alexandra* is questionable and that the Callimachean aesthetic aims favor much shorter poetry.[189] It seems that the narrator, by constructing for the audience an unstable self-image, positions himself within a complex mimetic matrix of ethics and literary aesthetics, character and identity, better or worse, and form and content.

In addition to image-crafting by maneuvering within the binary of form and content, the narrator also constructs an authoritative image through metapoetics; here too the critical awareness is covert, since the reflection on literature must be teased out from the text by interpretation. The messenger guarantees the *despota* that he will trace the path through the complex tale. Traveling, journeys, and paths are strong meta-literary images, especially in the Hellenistic period. Most famous is Callimachus *Aetia* 1. 21-28, discussed in Chapter 2, but another example occurs in Apollonius' *Argonautica* in which the entirety of Jason's journey can be read as retracing the steps of the *Odyssey* and reinventing the genre of epic.[190] In another innovative epic form, Lucretius' *de Rerum Natura* make numerous references to following the path of Epicurus in the proems. When the narrator does it here in the *Alexandra*, he not only consolidates his authority as the intellectual and literary "leader" of the *despota,* who is himself a political leader, but also suggests (based on the examples of Callimachus and Apollonius) that he is the founder of a new genre. The narrator builds intellectual authority when he states that he will "cut the bounding thread" and "trace the path of her devious speech." He also warns the *despota* and, simultaneously, the external reader, that in order to make sense of Cassandra's

[188] i.e. See Gale 1994, 100 for a more detailed explanation of ancient take on genre.
[189] See Fowler 1989 for discussion for the Hellenistic aesthetic.
[190] For Homer in Apollonius generally see Knight 1995.

riddles, he will need to ponder with a wise mind. This suggests that the narrator, himself, has a wise, perhaps even wiser, mind for being the one to relay Cassandra's prophesies.

Since opening lines of a work are in a powerful and marked position and thus likely to be programmatic in some capacity, let us return to the first line and the narrator's claim to speak everything "truthfully" (νητρεκῶς) and from the very beginning (ἀρχῆς ἀπ' ἄκρας). The latter statement is reminiscent of the Aristolean literary-critical concept of organic unity; in the *Poetics,* Aristotle argues that a work should have a beginning, middle, and end (1450b20ff). Thus, by claiming that he is starting from the beginning, the narrator aligns himself with the Aristotelean thought: ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ' ἄλλο ἐστίν, μετ' ἐκεῖνο δ' ἔτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι· ("The beginning, while not necessarily following something else, is, by definition, followed by something else,"1450b27-28). Further, Aristotle's definition of "beauty" is entrenched in the proper use of the three parts of plot, namely that they are of the appropriate size and order. He states: "Beauty is a matter of size and order" (τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν, 1450b36).[191] Thus, the narrator's metapoetic claim that he will start from the beginning (metapoetic because he states this *at the beginning of play itself*) indicates his compliance or ostensible compliance with Aristotelean "good" and "beautiful" literature.

The narrator's claim to truth also situates him in a literary-critical tradition that stretches from Homer to well beyond the Hellenistic period: for example, the aforementioned Archaic poets Xenophanes and Heraclites criticize Homer for telling lies about the gods; in the

[191] It is worth noting that this concept of beauty is applicable to human bodies as well as literature and plot structure, as Chapter 2 demonstrated. Aristotle himself cites the example of a "living thing" as an example of this: ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν· (Still, in the things that are beautiful, whether it is a living creature or whether it is a thing made up of parts, it is necessary that these parts be arranged in orderly fashion and that they have a magnitude appropriate to its identity.") 1450b34-36.

programmatic poetic inspiration scene in Hesiod's *Theogony,* the Muses speak to the narrator on Mt. Helicon and say, ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, / ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι ("We know how to speak many false things as if they were true, but we know, when we wish, to speak truthfully," 27-28); the Homeric narrator makes a similar claim about the way Odysseus speaks in *Odyssey* 19, ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα ("he said many things as if they were true," 203).[192] Situated within this tradition, then, the narrator subtly refers to his own Hesiodic moment of poetic inspiration and, in turn, hearkens to all that Plato and Aristotle had to say about it.

The categories of truth and falsehood, as they pertain to works of literature, are put under intense pressure by Lucian (c. 120-180 CE) in his satiric science-fiction prose narrative, *True History*. In a work that departs from conventional commitments to genre and mimetic fidelity, he begins with a virtuoso discussion of truth and falsehood, demonstrating mastery over the critical terms by manipulating them with ease. After stating that the minds of serious readers need rest just like the bodies of serious athletes, he proclaims that he will tell a story of lies as a humorous reprieve for his readers from "serious" works. He explains how many authors, including Ctesias and Iambulus, tell lies and says:

> τούτοις οὖν ἐντυχὼν ἅπασιν, τοῦ ψεύσασθαι μὲν οὐ σφόδρα τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐμεμψάμην, ὁρῶν ἤδη σύνηθες ὂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπισχνουμένοις· ἐκεῖνο δὲ αὐτῶν ἐθαύμασα, εἰ ἐνόμιζον λήσειν οὐκ ἀληθῆ συγγράφοντες. διόπερ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ κενοδοξίας ἀπολιπεῖν τι σπουδάσας τοῖς μεθ' ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μὴ μόνος ἄμοιρος ὦ τῆς ἐν τῷ μυθολογεῖν ἐλευθερίας, ἐπεὶ μηδὲν ἀληθὲς ἱστορεῖν εἶχον – οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπεπόνθειν ἀξιόλογον – ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐτραπόμην πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων εὐγνωμονέστερον· κἂν ἓν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο ἀληθεύσω λέγων ὅτι ψεύδομαι. (1.4)
>
> On reading these authors, I did not find much fault with them for their lying, seeing that this was already a common habit even among men who profess philosophy. I did wonder, though, that they thought that they could write untruths and get away with it. Therefore, I myself, because my vanity, was eager to hand something down to posterity, that I might

[192] See Clay 2003 for truth and falsehood in Hesiod and Pratt 1993 for lying in Homer.

> not be the only one excluded from the privileges of poetic license, and as I had nothing true to tell, not having had any adventures of significance I look to lying. But my lying is far more honest than theirs, for though I tell the truth in nothing else, I shall at least be truthful in saying I'm a liar.

This passage may seem as if it does not belong in a section on "covert" criticism since the preface of this work is its own miniature work of criticism in its judgment of previous authors; however, being a work of satire, it may be more "covert" than it seems. The narrator indicates how well read he is by his proclaimed ability to know what a "common" habit is among philosophers and authors. This knowledge informs his judgments of the authors—because falsehoods are *so* common, he knows better than to criticize other authors for that alone. This image-crafting technique of subtly stating one's breadth of knowledge, now familiar, contributes to Lucian's authoritative voice.

In addition to the discussion of truth and falsehood, Lucian also situates himself within another literary tradition when he states he wants to pass something down to posterity. Perhaps the most notable example of this is from a previous "true" history—Herodotus similarly wants to record history so that "the things done by men will not be forgotten in time" (ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, 1.1). In contrast to Herodotus, Lucian does not have any lofty aims for his writing, but states that his desire to write this history stems from "his own vanity," subtly poking fun at authors who claim otherwise by giving an "honest" portrayal of his motivations. In the last sentence of the passage above, Lucian sets himself in opposition to other authors by stating that his work is an improvement over previous authors in its truthfulness in admitting that it's false. The "covert" criticism of this passage lies in this statement; the humor in Lucian's claim to be better than other authors suggests that Lucian is poking fun at/criticizing authors who *say* they are better (and mean it). Georgiadou and Larmour argue that the *True History* is a parody not just of other storytellers, but also of philosophers;

they suggest that the "voyage" is an allegory for the search for philosophical truth and the strange peoples encountered on the journey represent various philosophical schools of thought.[193] Ultimately, they conclude that Lucian does not parody just one philosopher or one philosophical school, but rather the entire existence of philosophers and their interactions with one another.[194] I would add that in the passage in question, Lucian also parodies the way in which philosophers, critics, and storytellers present themselves and construct their narrative voices; by satirically crafting his own image, Lucian targets literary image-crafting itself.[195] He covertly criticizes the aims of overt criticism, and in so doing, ironically furthers his own critical authority.

The meta-criticism and meta-image-crafting displayed in Lucian's preface to the *True Histories* is present also in the pastoral tradition. In pastoral the challenges to truth and falsehood, mimesis, and the relation of narrator to imagined world are the obverse of those faced by Lucian: the landscape of the world in the pastorals is familiar rather than other-worldly, the experiences and characters rustic and low, and local and provincial, rather than sophisticated and cosmopolitan (or cosmological). I will look here at several passages from Pseudo-Moschus' *Lament for Bion* to demonstrate the way in which critical ideas emerge in pastoral poetry and narrative image-crafting. The *Lament for Bion,* previously attributed to Moschus but now widely thought to be the work of unknown pupil of Bion, seems to be post-Theocritean with the author's dates being *c.* 100 BCE.[196] While the themes, structure, and language of the poem suggest that Bion's *Lament for Adonis* and Theocritus' *Idyll* 1 were influential, I will look at the passages from this work mostly for their own sake.[197] The narrator of this poem only reminds the audience

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[193] Plato uses the motif of the sea voyage in this way in the Myth of Er at the end of the *Republic* 614b-621d, *cf. Phaed.* 80c-82c.
[194] Georgiadou and Larmour 1998.
[195] Satire is a form of covert criticism in its indirectness, and, in this case, Lucian's target seems to be other authors.
[196] See Fantuzzi 1985: 139-146 for the dates of Bion.
[197] Fantuzzi 1985: 139. For discussion of this poem's place in the pastoral tradition see Halperin 1983 *passim*, and Gutzwiller 1991: 178.

of his existence a few times throughout the poem, (that is to say, the narrator only says "I" a few times) marking them as important moments for literary image-crafting.[198] The singer calls upon the Muses in a refrain to begin the dirge, and accounts for plants, animals, and gods that mourn for the singer. He interrupts this catalogue of sorts and says:

> τίς ποτε σᾷ σύριγγι μελίξεται ὦ τριπόθητε;
> τίς δ' ἐπὶ σοῖς καλάμοις θήσει στόμα; τίς θρασὺς οὕτως;
> εἰσέτι γὰρ πνείει τὰ σὰ χείλεα καὶ τὸ σὸν ἆσθμα,
> ἀχὰ δ' ἐν δονάκεσσι τεᾶς ἔτι βόσκετ' ἀοιδᾶς.
> Πανὶ φέρω τὸ μέλισμα; τάχ' ἂν καὶ κεῖνος ἐρεῖσαι
> τὸ στόμα δειμαίνοι, μὴ δεύτερα σεῖο φέρηται.(53-57)
>
> Who will make music upon your pipe, O thrice-desired?
> Who will place lips upon your reeds?
> Who will be so bold, for your lips and your breath live yet,
> And the sound of your song is pasturing still in those stalks.
> Shall I give your pipe to Pan? Perhaps even he will fear to press
> His lips to it lest he come in second place after you.

The narrator asks rhetorical questions about who will play Bion's pipe now that he is gone and then proposes a potential solution: "Shall *I* give your pipe to Pan?" Bequeathing a pipe to Pan at the moment of death has a literary precedent: in Theocritus' *Idyll* 1, Thyrsis relays the song of Daphnis, who gives his pipe to Pan: ἔνθ', ὦναξ, καὶ τάνδε φέρευ πακτοῖο μελίπνουν /ἐκ κηρῶ σύριγγα καλὸν περὶ χεῖλος ἑλικτάν ("Come, Master, and take this pretty pipe, this honey-breathed pipe of beeswax wrought around lips to fit, 178-79). What makes this part unique is the sudden entrance of the narrative-ego and the way in which the narrator inserts himself into the pastoral world. In this world, the narrator is a mediator of a sort of gift-exchange, and in a position of judge or critic of pipe-playing. Prizes are often awarded to herdsmen who win song-contests (*cf.* the cup promised to Thyrsis also in Theocrtius' *Idyll* 1), and the narrator's offer to be the judge suggests his authority in praising Bion in the first place. His position as judge is

[198] The only other emergence of the narrative "I" is at the end of the poem when as the narrator describes his own feelings about Bion's death and his desire to go to Tartarus to see Bion and hear him sing again (114-26).

reinforced by his speculation that Pan may not want to play lest he come in second place (δεύτερα); the business of placing first or second in a contest confirms that there must be a person or a group who determines which is which; the narrator here has made it clear he is a worthy and available critic.

Immediately after the discussion of the fate of Bion's pipe, the narrator returns to the catalogue of people mourning Bion's death. Next on the list is a familiar pastoral figure:

> κλαίει καὶ Γαλάτεια τὸ σὸν μέλος, ἄν ποκ᾽ ἔτερπες
> ἑζομέναν μετὰ σεῖο παῤ ἀϊόνεσσι θαλάσσας.
> οὐ γὰρ ἴσον Κύκλωπι μελίσδεο: τὸν μὲν ἔφευγεν
> ἁ καλὰ Γαλάτεια, σὲ δ᾽ ἄδιον ἔβλεπεν ἄλμας.
> καὶ νῦν λασαμένα τῶ κύματος ἐν ψαμάθοισιν
> ἕζετ᾽ ἐρημαίαισι, βόας δ᾽ ἔτι σεῖο νομεύει.58-63
>
> Galatea laments your song. You once delighted
> Her when she sat with you upon the shore of the sea.
> You didn't sing like the Cyclops. Lovely Galatea rejected him, but
> You she looked upon more sweetly than upon the sea.
> Now she's forgotten the wave and sits on the lonely sand
> And pastures your cows still.

Recall the discussion of Theocritus' *Idyll* 11 in Chapter 2: Polyphemus sings a song attempting to entice Galatea out of the sea by constructing an image of himself that is worthy of her affections. Partly because of the impassibility of the barrier between land and sea, his memories and descriptions of her seem a contrived representation of her. The story in the *Lament*, however, is different. The narrator suggests that Bion's *song* was so amazing, Galatea *actually did* leave the ocean and join him on the shore. But Galatea did not join Bion only once; rather she seems to have left the sea permanently and even taken over Bion's herding duties in his absence. Just in case there was any confusion about which Galatea this is, the narrator makes sure to inform us that the Cyclops was never able to accomplish this, alluding to Theocritus' *Idyll* 11 and 6. In this passage, Galatea is simultaneously a symbolic literary judge and a symbolic prize. In the pseudo-

agon between Bion and Polyphemus, Galatea has heard both songs and awarded herself to the winner. The narrator thus becomes conflated with Galatea; he is actually the one making the comparison between the Cyclops' singing and Bion's—he states outright that Bion did not sing like (the sub-par way) the Cyclops' did—and he awards Bion the prize of himself or, at least, his song. The narrator crafts his image as a worthy judge and a worthy prize by performing covert criticism in his comparison of the quality of songs.

Idle hours of herding and sheep-guarding allow for the convincing fiction that pastoral characters have little to do except craft poems, sing songs, whittle, and barter; in pastoral, the basic forms of capital, symbolic, cultural, and economic, can be represented in their simplest forms, criticized, and exchanged for one another. As a consquence, pastoral is a rich place for poetic images and meta-criticism.[199] Even where criticism in pastoral takes overt form in the mouths of shepherds and narrators in the scenes, it is nonetheless covert in the literature in so far as it is subservient to a larger design that is not explicitly oriented towards critical ends. The criticism in a pastoral work looks always to the structure of the work itself, as well as to its purported object in the pastoral world.

The pastoral landscape literally and figuratively recurs in second-century Greek novels, most notably Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*. The novel takes place on the island of Lesbos and tells the love story of Daphnis and Chloe, whose true identities are unknown until the end of the story. Eros commands them, as adolescents, to tend his flocks and they spend their time playing pipes, making cages for grasshoppers, picking flowers, and weaving garlands, all of which are meta-literary images from Theocritus and the pastoral genre.[200] After Chloe sees Daphnis nude, and Daphnis wins a contest in which the prize is a kiss from Chloe, they begin to learn about

[199] See Halperin 1983 for meta-poetics in pastoral poetry.
[200] The genre of *Daphnis and Chloe* is well documented. See especially Hunter 1983: 59-83, Zeitlin 1990: 421-30, and Pattoni 2004.

love. The narrator tells us in the preface that the story is an interpretation of a beautiful painting he saw in a grove, making the entire story ekphrastic. This is the only interjection of the narrator in the novel as he does not close the frame at the end of the story. The novel begins:

> Ἐν Λέσβῳ θηρῶν ἐν ἄλσει Νυμφῶν θέαμα εἶδον κάλλιστον ὧν εἶδον· εἰκόνα γραπτήν, ἱστορίαν ἔρωτος. Καλὸν μὲν καὶ τὸ ἄλσος, πολύδενδρον, ἀνθηρόν, κατάρρυτον· μία πηγὴ πάντα ἔτρεφε, καὶ τὰ ἄνθη καὶ τὰ δένδρα· ἀλλ' ἡ γραφὴ τερπνοτέρα καὶ τέχνην ἔχουσα περιττὴν καὶ τύχην ἐρωτικήν· ὥστε πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ξένων κατὰ φήμην ᾔεσαν, τῶν μὲν Νυμφῶν ἱκέται, τῆς δὲ εἰκόνος θεαταί.
> ---
> Πολλὰ ἄλλα καὶ πάντα ἐρωτικὰ ἰδόντα με καὶ θαυμάσαντα πόθος ἔσχεν ἀντιγράψαι τῇ γραφῇ· καὶ ἀναζητησάμενος ἐξηγητὴν τῆς εἰκόνος τέτταρας βίβλους ἐξεπονησάμην, ἀνάθημα μὲν Ἔρωτι καὶ Νύμφαις καὶ Πανί, κτῆμα δὲ τερπνὸν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὃ καὶ νοσοῦντα ἰάσεται, καὶ λυπούμενον παραμυθήσεται, τὸν ἐρασθέντα ἀναμνήσει, τὸν οὐκ ἐρασθέντα προπαιδεύσει. Πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἔρωτα ἔφυγεν ἢ φεύξεται, μέχρις ἂν κάλλος ᾖ καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ βλέπωσιν.Ἡμῖν δ' ὁ θεὸς παράσχοι σωφρονοῦσι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων γράφειν.
>
> On Lesbos, while hunting, in a grove of the Nymphs, I saw the most beautiful sight I have ever seen, a depiction of an image, a history of love. The grove was beautiful too, thick with trees, brilliant with flowers, irrigated by running water; a single spring sustained everything, flowers and trees alike. But the picture was more delightful still, combining outstanding technique with amorous adventure, so that many people, including visitors, drawn by its renown, came to pray to the Nymphs and look at the image.
> ….
> I looked and I wondered, and a desire seized me to respond to the painting in writing. I found someone to interpret the picture, and have labored hard to create four books, an offering to Love, the Nymphs and Pan, a possession to delight all mankind, which will heal the sick and comfort the distressed, stir the memory of those who have been in love, and give preparatory instruction to those who have not. For certainly no one has ever escaped Love, nor shall ever, so long as beauty exists and eyes can see. For ourselves, may the god grant us to remain chaste in writing the story of others.

That a painting is the inspiration for a story about love suggests the degree to which the discourses of love and art are interconnected; on this topic Zeitlan suggests “the text brings to the fore those traditional associations of pleasure and persuasive charm (*terpis, thelxis, peitho*) that from Homer on through the genre of romance unite erotic and aesthetic concerns about the seductive nature and emotional effects of the beautiful (*to kalon*) upon the beholder (and listener

or perceiver)."[201] In this passage art and text are indeed conflated. Whitmarsh observes that the Greek word, *graphe,* which the narrator uses when he states he desires to "respond to the painting in writing" (πόθος ἔσχεν ἀντιγράψαι τῇ γραφῇ), plays on this conflation since the word can mean both "painting" and "written text."[202] Whitmarsh elaborates, stating that the narrator also presents painting and writing as different; the word ἀντιγράψαι (which I translated as "respond to") can also connote an exchange or competition, thus calling out the distinct identities of each form of media.[203] When the narrator conflates the two media, all the aesthetic praise he bestows upon the painting is subsequently bestowed upon his own narrative. When the narrator draws a distinction, he stages a contest of sorts in which he has the opportunity to surpass the painting aesthetically through words. The narrator's ability to respond in speech at all contributes to his image-crafting and social and cultural positioning. Lucian (*De dom.* 2) states that the difference between an ordinary person and an educated person is that former stands amazed in stunned silence while the latter can respond with speech.[204] Not only does the narrator present himself as educated, then, but also presents himself as an elite in that the ability to speak is associated with elite behavior in imperial Greek literature.[205] Instead of being disempowered by his wonder for the painting (an effect of art descripted by Longinus in *On the Sublime* 1.4) and standing passively silent, the narrator actively emulates and responds to the text. Arguing about this passage what I have argued about others, Whitmarsh observes that the narrator's written response to the painting is a power play of sorts with consequences for the narrator's social positioning: the narrator displays his intellectual and social power over his source material (the

[201] Zeitlin 1990: 419.
[202] Whitmarsh 2011: 94.
[203] Whitmash 2011: 94.
[204] "But when a man of culture beholds beautiful things, he will not be content… to harvest their charm with his eyes alone, and will not endure to be a silent spectator of their beauty; he will do all he can to linger there and make some return for the spectacle in speech." Zeitlin 1990: 432-33 n. 47.
[205] Whitmarsh 2011: 95. See also Schmitz 1997: 91-8 for how speech is associated with the elite in imperial Greek literature.

painting), suggests his elite position by stating that he was hunting (an activity of the wealthy), and demarcates the cultural gap between himself and the rustic, uneducated subjects of the narrative.[206]

Zeitlin notes that in Second Sophistic rhetoric, authors of ekphrases have two different aims: "the first is mimetic—to compete with the power of pictorial images through verbal means, while the second is didactic—to use description in order to make some moral (or aesthetic) point."[207] The narrator presents both of these as his objectives outright while simultaneously presenting himself as accomplishing them. In regard to the mimetic, in his description of the *locus amoenus* he not only imitates and surpasses the source material before him (the painting) but also imitates his predecessors, Theocritus in particular. He surpasses Theocritus' descriptions of landscapes, however, in that his description extends for four books, through different seasons and time, rather than standing in an isolated set of lines. In regard to the didactic, the narrator states that he worked hard to write the books that give instruction in love for those who need it, paralleling the internal narrative in which Daphnis and Chloe learn about love. The narrator also constructs an instructive and authoritative tone when he states the story *will* be a delight, *will* heal (as the Cyclops' song was a *pharmakon* in *Idyll* 11), and *will* be instructive. This preface is important for my argument; the narrator's critical ideas about aesthetics of art and literature presented through metapoetics, allusions to previous authors, and praise of the painting are interconnected with his narrative image-crafting.

Literary-critical moments in *Daphnis and Chloe* extend beyond the preface into the novel. Outside the opening passage, the passage most often cited for its relationship to literature is the description of Lamon's garden in Book 4 (2-3), another ekphrasis. The garden, which

[206] Whitmarsh 2011: 96.
[207] Zeitlin 1990: 432.

Lamon cultivates for no reason other than aesthetics – that is, for its own sake – is four meters long and divided into four sections, which correspond to the four books of the work on a meta-literary level.[208]

The clearest precedent for this is in the Hellenistic period with Meleager's garland. The epigrammatist's proem to his collection (*AP* 4.1) metaphorically identifies the forthcoming collection of poems with a garland of flowers narrated as a Muse, and the last poem (*AP* 12. 257), narrated as a *coronis,* metaphorically "crowns" the end of the collection. There are two additional poems in the collection that refer to the "weaving" of the garland—Meleager weaves one for his girlfriend Zenophilia (5.144) and one for Heliodora (5.147).[209] About Heliodora, he writes:

> Πλέξω λευκόιον, πλέξω δ' ἀπαλὴν ἅμα μύρτοις
> νάρκισσον, πλέξω καὶ τὰ γελῶντα κρίνα,
> πλέξω καὶ κρόκον ἡδὺν ἐπιπλέξω δ' ὑάκινθον
> πορφυρέην, πλέξω καὶ φιλέραστα ῥόδα,
> ὡς ἂν ἐπὶ κροτάφοις μυροβοστρύχου Ἡλιοδώρας
> εὐπλόκαμον χαίτην ἀνθοβολῇ στέφανος.
>
> I'll weave in the white violet. I'll weave in the tender
> Narcissus with myrtle berries and leaves.
> I'll weave in the laughing lilies too and the sweet crocus,
> And the purple hyacinth, and the rose, that lover
> Of love, so that the wreath on Heliodora's brow
> Will scatter its buds on her lovely fragrant curls.

In the first line, the narrative "I" mentions white violets, the very flower with which the Muse identifies Meleager's poems in the proem (56). Gutzwiller observes that, while the Muse speaks for Meleager as author and about him as an editor in the proem, he develops his own narrative voice in the collection.[210] This poem about Heliodora is one of these instances of Meleager's

[208] Observed by Zeitlin 1990:451. See Rosenmeyer 1969 and Berg 1974 for text metapoetically connected to their settings.
[209] See Gutzwiller 1998: 276-322 for the structure of Meleager's anthology and metapoetic signposting.
[210] Gutzwiller 1998: 280.

more prominent narrative "I." Here, Meleager's "I" states for himself his ability to combine or weave together a variety of different flowers, all different colors, with berries and leaves, representing the cohesive variety of his collection of poems and his creativity. "Weaving" as a meta-literary image of poetic production is an established literary trope; most notably Helen weaves and lies in the *Odyssey*.[211] Here, as the narrator explains his poetic process through a metaphor, he conducts subtle literary criticism; beyond promoting his own abilities as a poet and editor of a collection, Meleager indicates that his literary girlfriends are literary constructions. In his poem about weaving for Zenophilia, Zenophilia herself actually *is* a rose in the garland. In this epigram, Meleager states that a rose is a "lover of love" (φιλέραστα ῥόδα), directly associating roses with the literary trope of love. Read together, then, Meleager reduces Zenophila's existence to a literary expression/representation of love. Heliodora's presentation, though, is a bit more complex. When the narrator states that the variegated wreath will scatter *many different* buds on her brow, he suggests that she is more than one literary trope; instead of being one bud on the garland, many buds/poetic tropes adorn her and/or construct her.[212]

The concision of epigram offers the opportunity for the most concentrated metapoetic commentary, and because the moves of rhetoric in epigram must turn so rapidly, in so tight a space, its criticism is most covert; within its confines, the terminology cannot be explicitly argued over and distinctions between terms cannot be carefully spelled out. An epigram has few opportunities for justifying its deployment of critical terms or evaluative discourse; the grounds for accuracy and validity must often be left to suggestion. As we have seen with the poems of Meleager and others from the *Anthology* in Chapter 2, towards the end of the fourth century and

[211] Circe weaves while Aeneas' fleet passes her in the *Aeneid;* Arachne spins/weaves the tapestry in Ovid. The Cyclops in Idyll 11 also weaves for Galatea. See Blondell 2013 for further discussion of Helen's weaving in the *Odyssey.*

[212] Meleager also borrowed from pastoral images for metapoetic/critical purposes. See 7.196 (quoted in the epigraph at the beginning of the chapter)

the beginning of the third, poets composed epigrams not only for inscriptional purposes, but also as vehicles for literary expression and as sort of playground for poetic personas. When epitaphs became imagined as literary constructions, so too did the narrative "I."[213] In addition to love poetry, epigrammatists played with the inscriptional origins of the epigrams in a few poems, offering a different avenue for literary commentary and experimentation with narrative image-crafting.

In the following epigram, by Leonidas, for example, the narrative "I" is the deceased Alcander:

> ἀρκεῖ μοι γαίης μικρὴ κόνις, ἡ δὲ περισσή
> ἄλλον ἐπιθλίβοι πλούσια κεκλιμένον
> στήλη, τὸ σκληρὸν νεκρῶν βάρος. εἴ με θανόντα
> γνώσοντ' Ἀλκάνδρῳ τοῦτο τί Καλλιτέλευς; (7.655)
>
> I am happy with a bit of dust from the earth; let a costly
> Ostentatious grave marker, a burdensome weight for corpses,
> Crush some other man in his rest. What is it to Calliteles' son,
> Alcander, whether they know me, now that I'm dead?

In this poem, the cultural commentary Alcander expresses with his last words also symbolically comments on literature. Alcander is disparaging towards those who select expensive grave markers because, once you are dead, he says, it matters little who knows your name. He presents himself as humble person, satisfied with his station—he needs nothing more than a bit of dust for a grave. While we may assume that Alcander is poor, he does not suggest any kind of marginalizing oppression from his social station other than his general disparaging attitude. Instead, those who feel the need and anxiety to purchase a costly and over-done tombstone are the ones oppressed, "burdened by the weight" of such a marker. At first glance, Alcander impresses his freedom on the readers. The humor of this poem, however, lies in its fictional

[213] See Gutzwiller 1998 Chapter 3 for discussion of poetic persona in Hellenistic epigram.

irony, which Gutzwiller states is "especially choice, for there the deceased names himself in a poem that protests any need for the naming or for an inscribed context where the name may be read."[214] That is, while Alcander *says* he does not needs a tombstone, the only context that this thought *could* "really" exist is on the very grave marker he says he does not need. One step further, though, reveals that the tombstone need not exist after all, since Alcander's thoughts and name *are* (fictionally) preserved with poetry. The narrator's comments about ostentation of others' tombs transform, like genre of epigram itself, from the materiality of a physical tombstone into the literary: a poem need not be ostentatious and full of "rich" flowery language to achieve "real" immortality. The rhetorical question in the final line, then, also perhaps does more than just indicate Alcander's apathy about whether or not he is rememberd, but actually engages a literary-critical question about poetic immortality. By Leonidas' time authors stating their desire for posthumous recognition of their poetry is an established literary tradition; already in 6th c. BCE the archaic lyric poet Theognis writes about his name as a *sphragis* or "seal" on his verses lest they be forgotten.[215] Although Leonidas vis-à-vis Alcander suggests it does not matter if anyone remembers him, he paradoxically states his own name, observing that perhaps authors cannot help but be invested in their own fame.

Thus far, this section has addressed covert literary criticism in pastoral poetry, epigram, the novel, satire, and drama, examining how this criticism informs narrative image-crafting and vise versa. These same techniques also happen in Apollonius' unique Hellenistic epic, the *Argonautica.* Once again genre determines the shape and dynamic of covert criticism. We have seen the clash of terms played out in drama, the self-conscious discursive mode of prose

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[214] Gutzwiller 1998: 101.

[215] Theognis 19-31: Κύρνε, σοφιζομένωι μὲν ἐμοὶ σφρηγὶς ἐπικείσθω /τοῖσδ' ἔπεσιν, λήσει δ' οὔποτε κλεπτόμενα, /οὐδέ τις ἀλλάξει κάκιον τοὐσθλοῦ παρεόντος· / ὧδε δὲ πᾶς τις ἐρεῖ· 'Θεύγνιδός ἐστιν ἔπη /τοῦ Μεγαρέως· πάντας δὲ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ὀνομαστός.'

narrative, the meta-poetic fields of pastoral, and the inward turning rhetoric of epigram. In epic, covert criticism passes through the inescapable shadow of Homer, with the narrator metapoetically reflecting on himself as a an epic hero engaged in adapting and remodeling the conventions established by Homer.

Like the *Odyssey,* Apollonius' epic is a seafaring tale that tells the story of Jason's journey from Greece to Colchis to retrieve the golden fleece. Throughout the narrative, Apollonius consistently reacts against and adapts the Homeric model paving his own Alexandrian path. Barchiesi, in his article "The Future Reflective," discusses this concept of Homeric renovation, arguing that Apollonius reverses the direction of literary creation; chronologically the story of the Argonauts is before Homer's stories, but throughout the narrative he alludes to a previous tradition.[216] This gives the author the opportunity to explore characters as they "become" who they are in the literary tradition. Apollonius' portrait of Medea, for example, lets us see her as a young girl in love before she is a dangerous witch in Euripides' play, but still gives a depiction consistent with the woman who will eventually murder her own children. Another example of the *Argonautica's* interaction with Homer is when the Argonauts select a leader in book 1 after the Argo has been fitted for journey; they select Heracles, but he forfeits the command to Jason because he organized the quest. Gutzwiller calls Jason "a new kind of hero for a new kind of world," demonstrating how Jason differs from Homeric heroes—he does not fight Homeric style battles, for example, and achieves his *kleos* through leadership rather than physical strength. Eventually, Heracles disappears looking for Hylas, symbolizing Apollonius' separation from the Homeric model. The Argonauts, however, never stop looking for Heracles, just as Apollonius never loses sight of Homer.

[216] Barchiesi 1993.

The point here is that the *Argonautica* as a whole is a highly self-conscious text that conducts literary criticism by constantly interacting with Homer and other authors. There are several first-person moments within the text that bring critical ideas to the fore, one of which is the invocation to the Muse at the beginning of the fourth book:

> Αὐτὴ νῦν κάματόν γε θεὰ καὶ δήνεα κούρης
> Κολχίδος ἔννεπε Μοῦσα, Διὸς τέκος· ἦ γὰρ ἔμοιγε
> ἀμφασίῃ νόος ἔνδον ἑλίσσεται, ὁρμαίνοντι
> ἠὲ τόγ' ἄτης πῆμα δυσιμέρου ἦ μιν ἐνίσπω
> φύζαν ἀεικελίην ᾗ κάλλιπεν ἔθνεα Κόλχων. 4.1-5
>
> Tell the suffering and artful plans of the
> Colchian girl yourself, goddess Muse, child of Zeus.
> For my mind reels within and I am speechless when
> I wonder whether to call it lovesick anguish of madness
> Or disgraceful flight by which she left the Colchian tribes.

This invocation is different from the first two invocations in book 1 and book 3. In book 1 the narrator states that he will take his start from the Muse and in book 3 he asks Erato to stand beside him. In this invocation, however, the narrator does not ask for assistance, but relinquishes his narrative control entirely and grants it to the Muse. Hunter argues that this is a "retreat" from the more modern confidence the narrator demonstrates in earlier invocations to the archaic tradition.[217] Despite relying more heavily on the Muse in an Archaic manner, the narrator still separates himself from previous tradition by displaying his struggles with the narrative. He provides a picture of his mental effort over the composition of the poem when he describes his mind winding (ἑλίσσεται). The narrator presents himself as a self-aware poet, critical of his own text and able to see his his own shortcomings. Under the guise of humility he displays by putting the narrative in the hands of the gods, the narrative voice is more present than ever and demands our attention.

[217] Hunter 1993: 105. See Chapter 5 generally for Hunter's interpretation of the poet's voice in the *Argonautica* which he suggests is indebted, in particular, to Pindar.

This description of the narrator's winding mind is reminiscent of Medea's mental turmoil and her wavering between loyalty to Jason and her father that dominates Book 3. Just before she makes her final decision, the narrator proffers a vivid description of her turmoil, comparing her fluttering heart and vacillating mind to sunlight darting around on water (744-70). Medea then gives her final anguished monologue at the end of which she decides to commit suicide. In a manner similar to this striking psychologizing treatment of Medea, in the fourth book's invocation, the narrator similarly presents himself grappling with two different moral judgments of Medea: should he label her behavior as lovesick madness or a disgraceful flight? The narrator's description of his wavering over how to portray Medea addresses the issue of poetic inspiration. Athough he says he needs to rely more on the Muse to proceed, the narrator's similararity to Medea presents him as a real participant in the text, making decisions and guiding the action just as Medea does. On the other hand, though, Medea's behavior is ultimately the result of interference from the gods, so perhaps the narrator suggests that he is handing the narrative over to a god because he is ultimately subject to divine will. That he says he is "silent" further suggests the latter point, as that often indicates passivity as discussed above. The poet, then, while he deliberates over how to label Medea, also deliberates over the concept of poetic inspiration.

Hunter observes that, in contrast to the *Iliad, Odyssey,* and *Aeneid,* the *Argonautica* has significantly fewer speeches.[218] In a rather un-Aristotelean approach (Aristotle states in the *Poetics* that poetry is mimetic and, thus, the poet should speak as little as possible and let the characters "speak for themselves," 1460a5ff), the narrator emphasizes his own presence often

[218] Hunter 1993: 45% of the *Iliad,* 67% of the *Odyssey,* and 47% of the *Aeneid* are speeches in comparison to 29% of the *Argonautica.*

using indirect speech in lieu of direct speech.[219] One particularly relevant example of indirect speech is the description of the song of Orpheus; it is not only demonstrative of the poet's narrative control but also of meta-critical image-crafting since it is about a poet. The first song of Orpheus occurs in book 1 just after Jason settles a quarrel between Idmon and Idas. The narrator presents the content entirely in indirect speech: "He sang how…" The narrator futher explains that the song soothed everyone:

> ῞Η, καὶ ὁ μὲν φόρμιγγα σὺν ἀμβροσίῃ σχέθεν αὐδῇ·
> τοὶ δ' ἄμοτον λήξαντος ἔτι προύχοντο κάρηνα,
> πάντες ὁμῶς ὀρθοῖσιν ἐπ' οὔασιν ἠρεμέοντες
> κηληθμῷ· τοῖόν σφιν ἐνέλλιπε θέλκτρον ἀοιδῆς. (1.512-15)
>
> He sang and stayed his lyre and his ambrosial voice,
> But though he stopped, they all, insatiate, inclined
> Their heads, quietly, to catch in listening ears
> Enchantment still. Such charm of song he left in them.

Knox has suggested that Orpheus is such a phenomenal singer and poet that the narrator could not possibly recreate such an ideal and thus presents the poem in indirect speech.[220] Hunter, on the other hand, argues that, given the poet's earlier identification with Orpheus in the catalogue,[221] and the way in which Orpheus' second song (2.705-13) is similar to the song of Demodocus (who is aligned with Homer) in *Odyssey* 8 (268-367), Apollonius here, too, aligns himself with Orpheus.[222] Hunter suggests that the form of the indirect speech when the poet describes Orpheus' song is not only a familiar didactic marker, but also "stresses the poet's control of Orpheus' song: Orpheus can only utter through our poet."[223] This passage—which directly follows the indirect speech about the hymn—is a sort of critical response to the poem that also works on a meta-literary level to characterize the *Argonautica* as a whole. The narrator

[219] Hunter 1993: 140ff.
[220] Knox 1986: 12.
[221] Hunter 1993: 127 for how Orpheus is aligned with the narrator in the catalogue.
[222] Hunter 1993: 149.
[223] Hunter 1993: 148. See Brown 1990: 316-20 for marks of didacticism.

reports the reaction of the audience and sprinkes in his own positive evaluation of the song by describing his voice as "ambrosial." He tells us that the entire group responds in the same way—they are all charmed and strain to hear more despite the fact that the song is over. This description suggests that Orpheus has achieved the "visualization" and "inspiration" in his audience described by Plato, Aristotle, and Longinus (9.6) as discussed above in the section on "overt" criticism. I mentioned earlier that in the *Ion,* Socrates states that poetic ability comes from the Muse and resembles a chain of iron rings that extends from Muse to poet to audience. It is worth taking a closer look at that passage now (535d-e):

> καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἡ λίθος οὐ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς δακτυλίους ἄγει τοὺς σιδηροῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ἐντίθησι τοῖς δακτυλίοις ὥστ᾽ αὖ δύνασθαι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἡ λίθος, ἄλλους ἄγειν δακτυλίους, ὥστ᾽ ἐνίοτε ὁρμαθὸς μακρὸς πάνυ σιδηρίων καὶ δακτυλίων ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἤρτηται: πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς λίθου ἡ δύναμις ἀνήρτηται. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ Μοῦσα ἐνθέους μὲν ποιεῖ αὐτή, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἐνθέων τούτων ἄλλων ἐνθουσιαζόντων ὁρμαθὸς ἐξαρτᾶται.
>
> For this stone not only attracts these iron rings, but also imparts to them a power whereby they in turn are able to do the very same thing as the stone, and attract other rings; so that sometimes there is formed quite a long chain of bits of iron and rings, suspended one from another; and they all depend on that one stone for this power. In the same manner also the Muse inspires men herself, and then by means of these inspired persons the inspiration spreads to others, and holds them in a connected chain.

This chain of inspiration reflects what seems to be happening in Apollonius' description of the audience's reaction to the song. The image of them "inclining their heads" (προύχοντο κάρηνα) even after the music has ended indicates that some invisible force (similar to a magnet attracting an iron ring) draws the listeners in and actually gets them to physically move. At the same time, the *Argonaticia* draws up the next ring in the chain, the external audience who is likewise enchanted.

Conclusion

This chapter began by investigating the early history of literary criticism in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. In both, criticism proceeds from initial opposition between the social and

the aesthetic (with the more abstract form-content division lying beneath). For Plato, the oppositions are seemingly overcome by subordinating the aesthetic to the social. For Aristotle, the opposition is softened so that the two domains are recognizably distinct, without being opposed; I suggested that Aristotle's account of the relation between the social and the aesthetic might be set in harmony with Bourdieu's. I then argued that Aristotle's central procedure, carefully distinguishing between key terms, is itself a hallmark of overt literary criticism of the post-Classical world, and that for Aristotle and those critics, such distinctions are opportunities for image-crafting. In so arguing, I made a distinction of my own, between overt and covert criticism: though they can be distinguished from one another, I showed that both draw on common terms and strategies of image-crafting, with covert criticism itself manifesting variously depending on generic conventions.

I would like to end by returning to the beginning, to Plato, suggesting, without much controversy, that his criticism is simultaneously overt as well as covert. In the form of dialogues, characters, and in the evolving body of work, his critical statements are positioned both to demand assent from a reader (when they are attributed to the more powerful or persuasive of two speakers), and to invite suspicions of irony (the other speaker has been manipulated or misunderstood; the literariness of the works suggests an implicit, ungraspable design). We do not need to decide whether Plato's image-crafting occurs by overt or covert criticism; instead, we can see that he, perhaps alone, manages both at once, and in so doing he manages to do what he does best: leads us to the limits of the grammar of thought. He makes us doubt the currency of claims on which cultural capital is built. And, as a consequence, he establishes himself as an arbiter over arbitration, crafting his image as an authority by pulling out the rug on which critical authority must rest.

Rather than double overt and covert criticism, the authors I consider in the next chapter double down on their claims to cultural capital by simultaneously image-crafting in the fields of aesthetic and the erotic.

CHAPTER 4

IMAGE-CRAFTING THROUGH EVALUATION OF ART

> "Absence persists--I must endure it. Hence I will *manipulate* it."--Roland Barthes, *A Lover's Discourse*

Chapter 2 examined narrative evaluation of bodies and human love-objects, arguing that the expressions of preference and judgment implicit in narratorial image-crafting positions narrators within a cultural field. Chapter 3 argued that the discourse of judgment extends from evaluation of love-objects and bodies to evaluation and criticism of literature: in both cases, image-crafting achieves and is founded upon social positioning. The current chapter will bring the findings of the earlier two chapters to bear on a central tradition of post-Classical literature: poetry and texts that recount first-person descriptions and judgments of statues and visual representations of the human form. As we would expect, the discourse of judgment of such works of art and statuary is similar to the evaluation of works of literature examined in Chapter 3: the terms of appraisal are common to aesthetic and erotic experience. But statues and visual representations of the human form provide the evaluative speaker an occasion to make judgments in the aesthetic and erotic domains simultaneously, as he or she attends both to the aesthetic form and to the body it represents.

In works of visual art and sculpture, the represented body is absent but implied by the present object; as speakers cast judgments both on that present object and on the absent body it records or traces, they face a distinct challenge, but also a distinctly rewarding opportunity for making distinctions that might bring them cultural capital. As works of visual art are described in both erotic and aesthetic terms, narratorial image-crafting both projects an image of a narrator's authority and status and also makes objects present for a reader, sometimes imbuing that

aesthetic object with the properties of a love-object. As speakers exercise rhetorical control over the sculpture or work of art, their image-crafting reaches beyond it, summoning also the image of the absent eroticized body for a reader. The process of image-crafting is doubled as speakers appeal to both aesthetic and erotic grounds for admiration and judgment; they show their mastery in both fields at once, and in so doing, they establish their mastery in a third realm: ekphrasis. This chapter, then, is about ekphrasis, arguing that it be understood as a practice by which cultural capital is accrued for a speaker by a simultaneous judgment of the aesthetic and erotic fields.[224] Occasionally, of course, the balancing act may prove too much; virtuosity might fail and a speaker might lose grasp of either the aesthetic or the erotic, losing a great deal of social distinction as a result.

Before turning to instances of ekphrasis in its pure form, it is helpful to take an example of first-person evaluation that illuminates the challenge of evaluating the present trace of an absent object. The logic of such evaluation underlies all of the first-person engagements with works of art that will be considered later in the chapter. Stepping back in order to step forward, I consider one more instance of erotic poetry, which often examines the conditions of desire for the ever-absent object by poetically conjuring the beloved. Oftentimes, in other words, a poet expresses desire for the absent-beloved by figuring a mental image, a replication, or a poetically-manufactured replacement for the missing original. Occasionally, the motif plays out when the speaker is confronted not only with absence, but with a presence that recalls the shape or form of the original.

In one of Meleager's epigrams, a love-sick sailor finds himself on land after being saved from shipwreck. Arriving on shore, the speaker immediately finds himself the victim of Eros

[224] For Hellenistic ekphrasis see Goldhill 1994.

who forces him to look at an attractive boy, and to follow him hopelessly, treading in his footprints, grasping and kissing an image left in the air:

> Ὤνθρωποι, βωθεῖτε· τὸν ἐκ πελάγευς ἐπὶ γαῖαν
> ἄρτι με πρωτόπλουν ἴχνος ἐρειδόμενον
> ἕλκει τῇδ’ ὁ βίαιος Ἔρως· φλόγα δ’ οἷα προφαίνων
> παιδὸς ἀπαστράπτει κάλλος ἐραστὸν ἰδεῖν.
> βαίνω δ’ ἴχνος ἐπ’ ἴχνος, ἐν ἀέρι δ’ ἡδὺ τυπωθὲν
> εἶδος ἀφαρπάζων χείλεσιν ἡδὺ φιλῶ.
> ἆρά γε τὴν πικρὰν προφυγὼν ἅλα πουλύ τι κείνης
> πικρότερον χέρσῳ κῦμα περῶ Κύπριδος; (12.84)
>
> O men, come to my rescue. Violent Eros drags me here just finishing my voyage and setting my foot on land. And, and as if shining forth a torch, turns me to look at the beautiful loveliness of a boy. I walk, my footprint in his footprint, and grasping the sweet image formed in the air, I kiss it sweetly with my lips. Escaping the bitter sea, do I cross on land the wave of Cypris more bitter by far?

In the two couplets at the center of the epigram, as the speaker walks in the footprints of the desired object and kisses his image left in the air, Meleager offers a paradigm for what it means to recall a beloved body by means of a physical imprint or trace. As the speaker yearns for the absent beloved by conjuring his image in the air, the poem self-consciously blurs the distinction between the representation of the object and the object itself. The poem itself may be implicated in the blurring: the poem is a representation of the absent first-person speaker, itself a footprint on the page. But the relevant logic is played out within the poem’s representative space. As the lover, in his desire for what is absent, fashions a representation of the beloved, the beloved object is made subject to the imagined projections and representations of the lover’s desires and distinctions.

The lover is, in effect, image-crafting, and as he does so he summons a picture of his beloved that is akin to an aesthetic object. Meleager refers to the image left in the air as an

"εἶδος," which Liddell and Scott define as "that which is seen, a form, shape, or figure."[225] This is the only instance in the extant poems attributed to Meleager that this word appears, marking it as a unique experience. There are, however, two instances of the word εἴδωλα in the extant corpus of Meleager, (one in poem 12.125 and one in 12.127). The only difference between the two words according to Liddell and Scott is that "εἴδωλα" encompasses the idea of a "phantom" or an "image in the mind."[226] Consistent with the definition provided by Liddell and Scott, in both instances in Meleager the εἴδωλα refer to a dream image of the beloved. In poem 12.125 the speaker describes how Eros brought "under his mantle" a dream about a boy (Ἡδύ τί μοι διὰ νυκτὸς ἐνύπνιον ἁβρὰ γελῶντος/ ὀκτωκαιδεκέτους παιδὸς ἔτ' ἐν χλαμύδι/ἤγαγ' Ἔρως ὑπὸ χλαῖναν). In the final couplet, Meleager advises his desperate soul to cease from being warmed by the images of beauty (ὦ δύσερως ψυχή, παῦσαί ποτε καὶ δι' ὀνείρων/ εἰδώλοις κάλλευς κωφὰ χλιαινομένη). Meleager makes a point in this poem of noting the falsity of the image and emphasizing the true absence of the real beloved: in line 4 he "gathers empty hopes" (κενεὰς ἐλπίδας ἐδρεπόμαν), in line 6 he calls the memory a "phantom" (φάσματος), and in the final couplet he observes that the "warming" satisfaction he experiences is "in vain." Similarly in 12.127, Meleager describes how, after seeing a boy walking on the road at noon, he is later plagued during sleep with an εἴδωλον of the boy which he describes as toilsome.

Images of the beloved in dreams have a long literary tradition, symbolizing and "standing for" the unattainable, absent object. Often there is little, if any, distinction made between dream images and ghost images. In book 23 (62ff.) of the *Iliad,* for example, the shade (ψυχή) of Patroclus appears to Achilles while he is sleeping. Patroclus asks Achilles to bury their bones together because the "souls, the images (εἴδωλα) of the dead, hold him at a distance" (*Iliad* 23.

[225] L and S.
[226] L and S.

71-72). The word Meleager uses for dream images is the same word Homer uses for the dead souls in the Underworld. When Achilles responds to Patroclus, his words and actions express his desire to embrace him (*Il.* 23.97-98). Achilles then acts on his desire to embrace Patroclus as he reaches for his shade in vain: ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας ὠρέξατο χερσὶ φίλῃσιν/ οὐδ᾽ ἔλαβε /"thus, having spoken, he reached his hands out to his beloved, but could not seize him" (23.99-100). Attempting to embrace ghosts is a familiar motif; in the same way, for instance, in *Odyssey* 11.204-22, Odysseus tries to embrace his mother's ghost, but she slips through his hands. When he asks her why he cannot touch her, she explains that the soul is like a dream-image (ψυχὴ δ' ἠΰτ' ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται./"the soul just like a dream, flies about and flies away.") Similarly, in the *Iliad,* Achilles contemplates the insubstantial nature of Patroclus' image in line 104, when he says: πόποι ἦ ῥά τίς ἐστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι/ ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν ("Alas, even in the house of Hades there is something, a soul and an image, but there is no substance in it at all."

Although in Meleager 12.84 the image is (at least to some degree (but not actually)) substantial, the poet cultivates the connection to ghost/dream images with the word εἶδος, in that it is closely related to the εἴδωλα he uses to talk about dreams. Meleager also promotes this connection to ghost/dream images with undertones of sepulchral epigram. Gow and Page's commentary on this poem suggests that Meleager combines amatory epigram with "the type of sepulchral epigram which describes the death on land of a sailor saved from shipwreck."[227] For example, a poem in the *Anthology* by Statyllius Flaccus describes a sailor who survives a shipwreck only to be killed by a snake bite on land (*AP* 7. 290). Similarly, poem 7.289 by Antipater concerns a shipwreck survivor who is killed by a wolf as soon as he steps on the shore.

[227] Gow and Page 1965: 667.

In this Meleager poem, instead of being attacked by an animal, the narrator is attacked by a violent Eros.

In 12.84 Meleager emphasizes the relationship to sepulchral epigram with the first line of the poem which reads, "Oh men, come to my rescue." A second person address, such as this one, evoking the idea of an implied reader or passerby is common in sepulchral epigram, and the rhetorical question posed in the final couplet in 12.84 recalls the rhetorical question at the end of Statyllius' sepulchral epigram "Why did he struggle with the waves in vain, fleeing the fate due on land?"[228] By combining elements of sepulchral epigram with this amatory poem, Meleager further suggests that the image formed in the air is the motif of the unattainable dream/ghost image.[229] As much as Meleager may associate the image with ghost/dream images, though, he just as much *dis*associates it. For, unlike Achilles and Patroclus and the εἴδωλα of 12.125 and 127, this image *does* have substance; it leaves footprints and is able to be kissed. Meleager thus evokes the motif of an artistic, physical representation of the beloved as demonstrative of the narrator's desire.

In another of Meleager's epigrams, 5.166, the narrator laments the desire for Heliodora that is keeping him awake and he wonders if she, too, is tormented by desire for him:

> ὦ Νύξ, ὦ φιλάγρυπνος ἐμοὶ πόθος Ἡλιοδώρας,
> καὶ σκολιῶν ὄρθρων κνίσματα δακρυχαρῆ,
> ἆρα μένει στοργῆς ἐμὰ λείψανα, καί τι φίλημα
> μνημόσυνον ψυχρᾷ θάλπετ' ἐν εἰκασίᾳ;
> ἆρά γ' ἔχει σύγκοιτα τὰ δάκρυα κἀμὸν ὄνειρον
> ψυχαπάτην στέρνοις ἀμφιβαλοῦσα φιλεῖ;
> ἢ νέος ἄλλος ἔρως, νέα παίγνια; μήποτε, λύχνε,
> ταῦτ' ἐσίδῃς, εἴης δ' ἧς παρέδωκα φύλαξ.

O Night, O desire for Heliodora keeping me awake,

[228] The rhetorical question could be another way in which Meleager explores the concept of "present absentness" since a question desires a response knowing it will be unfulfilled.
[229] This is not the only place Meleager combines sepulchral epigram with amatory. See also *AP* 12.74.

> O itching, welcoming tears of tortuous dawn,
> is there any relic of her love for me remaining,
> and does any kiss, as a remembrance, warm my cold picture?
> Does she have tears as a bedmate? Does she, clasping to her breast,
> kiss the deluding dream of me? Or is there a new lover,
> a new plaything? O flame, may you never look upon
> such a thing, and guard the one whom I entrust to you.

The poet hopes that, in his absence, Heliodora is kissing some unspecified thing "left behind" (λείψανα) and a "dream." A note by Borthwick on this poem argues that what the narrator wants her to be kissing is the εἰκασία, or picture, next to her bed. He notes that it is "a common place of love poetry…that such likenesses, from the ancient portrait to the modern photographs, may be kissed *in absentia.*"[230] In addition to kissing a physical picture or likeness of him, Meleager wonders whether Heliodora kisses the dream image. Hence, he overlays the kissing of a physical statue with the kissing of the intangible dream image. Similarly, in poem 12.84, Meleager conflates the kissing of a dream/ghost image with the kissing of a physical likeness. This physical and tangible quality of the image in 84 is expressed by the verb τυπωθὲν in line 5, which means to "form, mold, or model" and often concerns the actual making of art.[231] Another example from the *Anthology* of physical likenesses of a beloved is a humorous epigram by Strato in which he refers to kissing a wax sculpture he has at home (*AP* 12.183).

Meleager combines two motifs of love poetry that express desire for the absent object through representation of some kind, namely dream/ghost images and more tangible likenesses, such as a statue or a portrait. Although these representations serve to "make present" the absent beloved, since they are expressions of the absence itself, ultimately they only pronounce that

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[230] Borthwick 1969. Other examples include Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 416-419: Menelaus looks to the *kolossi* in his palace to appease his longing for the departed Helen; Euripides' *Alcestis* (Admetus proposes having a statue made (348-54). Euripides *Helen* 31-36 (Paris embraces the simulacrum of Helen made by Hera).
[231] For statues and images as doubles in the Archaic and Classical period see Steiner 2002, particularly the first chapter.

absence further. Despite the fact that you can kiss a statue or likeness, there is a disjunction between the model and the living object of desire—the model cannot kiss back or reciprocate affection. However, the poem's image-making depends upon a physical presence in the poem: the footprints in which the speaker steps. The footprints provide a negative counterpart to the image, since they are the physical reminder of an absence which is recovered by the projection of that image in the air.

Oddly, the speaker does not just follow the trail of footsteps: he walks in them. One explanation for this oddity may be found by a comparison with Philostratus' *Epistle* 18, addressed to a boy whose new sandals are pinching his feet. The letter aims to persuade the boy to go barefoot and ends with a panegyric of naked feet. Hodkinson explains the foot-fetishism of this epistle in a recent article. Although this is possibly the "first example we have in Western erotic narrative of a foot-fetishist," Hodkinson explains that feet are commonly considered beautiful in ancient literature, and there is a general association with feet and the phallus in Greek literature and otherwise. Because of these established erotic associations and because the scene in Meleager 12.84 is charged with erotic desire, it is possible to read the narrator's walking in the footprints of his beloved as erotic enticement or even fulfillment of some kind.[232]

But a more tantalizing possibility suggests itself: that the poet represents himself walking in the footsteps in order to remind the reader that, through his image-crafting, he is filling them in with his imaginative projection predicated on the terms and requirements of his own evaluative discourse. To walk in the footsteps is to exercise rhetorical control over them and over the object that they record, and that rhetorical control substitutes for the body that made them, inserting the body of the poet's language in its place. When the speaker of the epigram physically takes the

[232] Hodkinson 2007. Feet are also markers of identity in the *Libation Bearers, Oedipus Rex, Philoctetes*, and the *Odyssey* with Odysseus and the scar.

place of the beloved and embodies him, he is offering a model for rhetorical control over an absent object. The speaking subject and the object of his desires are muddled; the poem registers the confusion by the repetition of the word ἡδύ that Gow and Page call "uncharacteristic and unworthy of him": he says that the image in the air is sweet and that he kisses it sweetly.[233] Rather than being "unworthy of him" and "inelegant," this anaphora blurs the distinction between desired object and desiring subject further. The blurring takes place in the first-person discourse of the poem because is it by way of that discourse that rhetorical control extends itself to fill in for an absent object. At the start of the poem, the speaker had remarked on the footstep that he left when he stepped onto the solid earth; by the end, the footsteps of the love object have become his own, as the language of the poem comes to assert the presence and status of the speaker through his evaluation for another.

The relation of speaker to footprint and to image in the poem runs parallel to the relation of speaker to statue and visual art to a represented body. A work of visual art, like a footprint, is a formal reminder of an absent body; ekphrasis works to summon that body, as the speaker in Meleager's epigram summons the image of the beloved. But the speaker in the epigram does not engage with the formal and aesthetic properties of the footprint, and the speaker in an ekphrasis poem does. The rhetorical control represented in Meleager's epigram by the speaker's walking in the footsteps is purely rhetorical in poems that encounter works of visual art and sculpture. The first-person speaker begins with an evaluation of an aesthetic object (the sculpture or work of art), and, as a consequence, sometimes consciously and sometimes not, extends his evaluation to the subject that the work of art represents. The opportunity to make distinctions in the aesthetic field opens up the opportunity to make distinctions in the erotic field.

[233] Gow and Page 1965: 196.

An Outline of Ekphrasis as Rhetorical Control

Ekphrasis (i.e. a description of a visual work of art) already had an extensive tradition in a variety of poetic genres as early as the archaic period (e.g. the description of Achilles' shield in *Iliad* 18); by the Hellenistic period, the feature was pervasive in poetry.[234] The more famous Hellenistic examples include the description of the basket in Moschus' *Europa*, the goatherd's cup in Theocritus' *Idyll 1,* the description of Jason's cloak in the *Argonautica* (1.721-67), and a plethora of ekphrastic epigrams in the *Greek Anthology*.[235] All of the aforementioned examples confront the intersection between visual and verbal art, particularly epigrams as Hellenistic authors transformed inscriptional poems into purely literary expressions.[236]Additionally, ekphrastic description offers a valuable inroad into subjective image-crafting since it is the narrator's representation of his or her own visual experience and process of interpretation. Goldhill states of ekphrastic epigrams that they "represent not merely a work of art but *the poet as seeing subject.*"[237] Since the reader's only way of experiencing the art is through the constructed visual experience of the narrator, the reader's interpretation is consequently at the mercy of narrator's craft. Whether or not an actual reader experiences the feeling of subjugation, the narrator recognizes his power in selecting and ordering details and in making the image that he will also judge.

Image-crafting depends on rhetorical control, and skill in rhetorically controlling a work of art can itself be subject to evaluative criteria. But what are the rhetorical techniques and maneuvers by which image-crafting proceeds? How do narrators summon the presence behind or within the footprint that is the work of art and fashion their own authority in the process? These

[234] On the meaning of the term "ekphrases" in antiquity and in scholarship see Gutzwiller 2002: 85, n. 1.
[235] On the history of Greek epigram see Livingstone and Nisbet 2010.
[236] On the link between art and poetry in the Hellenistic period see Webster 1965:156-77 and Zanker 1987:39-112.
[237] Goldhill 1994: 205.

questions are raised and addressed by post-Classical authors. Before examining the clash and conflation of aesthetic and erotic evaluations in reactions to art, it is worth examining what literary texts have to say about the style and terms of reaction in the first place; we can better appreciate what rhetorical control contains if we can appreciate the form poets felt it ought to take.

Philostratus demonstrates authorial power to construct his readers interpretation in the *Imagines,* a collection of ekphrases that describe paintings which decorated the porticos of a villa in Naples.[238] Although much scholarship has focused on whether or not Philostratus described real paintings, more recently scholars have been interested in Philostratus as a sophist.[239] As the narrator describes the paintings, he simultaneously reveals his literary and cultural knowledge and instructs the reader on how to look at art; this suggests that the narrator is more invested in the work as a rhetorical showpiece than the veracity of his descriptions.[240] This attitude can be inferred from the way in which the narrator of the *Imagines* image-crafts; in the proem (3) he constructs himself as a didactic authority stating that the purpose of the text is for the young to learn: ὁ λόγος δὲ οὐ περὶ ζωγράφίας ἀπαγγέλλομεν ὁμιλίας αὐτὰ τοῖς νέοις ξυντιθέντες, ἀφ' ὧν ἑρμηνεύσουσί τε καὶ τοῦ δο κίμου ἐπιμελήσονται ("This text is not about painters or about their lives, but instead we propose to describe narrations of paintings as instructions for the young from which they will interpret the painting and appreciate what is esteemed in them"). The narrator states that there are two educational benefits in the work: to learn the proper way to understand and view the painting and to learn the culturally established aesthetic criteria. He sets himself up as an expert on the topic—one who is both familiar with the works themselves and

[238] Another set of *Imagines* was later written by another Philostratus who said he was the grandson of the first.
[239] For the reality of the paintings see Lehmann-Hartleben 1941, Blanchard 1986, and Boeder 1996. For scholarship on the *Imagines* as a sophistic text see Webb 2006. For a recent study on the *Imagines* and ekphrasis see Roby 2016.
[240] See Elsner 2000 and Leach 2000.

with artistic interpretation.[241] The narrator further establishes this tone and persona in other interactions with the young interlocutor. Philostratus begins his series of ecphrases with *Scamander:*

> ἐγνως, ὦ παῖ, ταῦτα Ὁμήρου ὄντα ἢ οὐ πώποτε ἔγνωκας δηλαδὴ θαῦμα ἡγούμενος, ὅπως δήποτε ἔζη τό πῦρ ἐν τῶι ὕδατι; συμβάλωμεν οὖν ὅ τι νοεῖ, σύ δὲ ἀπόβλεψον αὐτῶν, ὅσον ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν, ἀφ' ὧν ἡ γραφή. *Imag* 1.1.1.
>
> Do you realize, boy, that the subject is from Homer, or did you fail to recognize this clearly, being carried away with wonder at how fire can live in water? Let us consider what it means and you, turn away from these things to look at where the picture comes from.

When the narrator suggests that the boy cannot interpret the painting properly because he is so absorbed in it, he praises the image's aesthetics and demonstrates his own ability to interpret through a detached intellectualism. Through this didactic interaction with the boy, the narrator also educates the external reader on what the image looks like and the poetry on which it is based: the subject is Homeric, the image is marvelous, and a body of water is burning. Later, Philostratus paraphrases Homer, describing the way in which the painting visualizes the textual scene and where it departs from it.[242] The narrator suggests that the boy look away from the image and look, instead, at the passage in Homer on which the image is based, setting the boy's "wonder" in opposition to productive intellectual understanding.[243]

A similar sentiment is expressed in Lucian's *De Domo*—a debate over whether beautiful art makes an orator better by instilling a desire to equal the visual beauty in words or whether the art is a distraction from the words.[244] The speakers in *De Domo* also discuss the differences in viewing art between the educated and uneducated; while uneducated people become entranced with the artistic beauty and are speechless, educated people speak about the image and gain

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[241] Newby 2009 argues that Philostratus is more concerned with sophistic rhetoric than the actual painting.
[242] *Imagines* 1.1.2
[243] See Elsner 1995:29-30 and Bartsch 1989:20.
[244] *De Domo* 2, 20. The connection between these two passages is observed by Newby 2009: 324ff.

control over the image. The narrators in Lucian and the narrator in Philostratus share the philosophy that visual aesthetics can have a powerful effect on and control over a viewer but that an educated viewer can overcome this wonder and achieve rhetorical control over the image. Philostratus recognizes his pupil's absorption in the image and instead urges a detached intellectual understanding. Throughout the text, then, each description or ekphrasis (which here we may consider to be either a verbal or written response to image) is demonstrative of reclaiming rhetorical control over that image.

In the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana,* Philostratus further explores the idea that narrators can achieve rhetorical control over an image (this time over a body) by suggesting that, in fact, someone describing an image completely dictates the ostensible "reality" of that image. In this text, Philostratus tells the story of the Pythagorean, Apollonius, who was a teacher and magician. The narrator tells us that Apollonius meets Damis who becomes his companion for the remainder of his life. At the beginning of book 6, Apollonius and his companions cross into Ethiopia and find the colossus of Memnon, a popular attraction for travelers on a pilgrimage to Egypt largely because of Memnon's ability to "speak." When the upper body of the statue was destroyed, the heat of the sun, as it came into contact with the cool interior, expanded the base of the statue and produced a groaning sound.[245] Visitors would then "reply" to Memnon, inscribing their names and short phrases on the statue's base. Platt suggests that, in the *Life,* the encounter with Memnon serves a programmatic function as its description is at the geographical transition between Egypt and Ethiopia and also a textual marker between book 5 and 6.[246] The narrator tells us the following:

[245] The colossus of Memnon is mentioned in Strabo 17.1.46, Tacitus' *Annals* 2.61, Pausanius 1.42.3,and Lucian's *On Friendship* 27.12.
[246] Platt 2011: 301.

περὶ δὲ τοῦ Μέμνονος τάδε ἀναγράφει Δάμις (6.4)…
τὸ δὲ ἄγαλμα τετράφθαι πρὸς ἀκτῖνα μήπω γενειάσκον, λίθου δὲ 6.4.15 εἶναι μέλανος, ξυμβεβηκέναι δὲ τὼ πόδε ἄμφω κατὰ τὴν ἀγαλματοποιίαν τὴν ἐπὶ Δαιδάλου καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀπερείδειν ὀρθὰς ἐς τὸν θᾶκον, καθῆσθαι γὰρ ἐν ὁρμῇ τοῦ ὑπανίστασθαι. τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τοῦτο καὶ τὸν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν νοῦν καὶ ὁπόσα τοῦ στόματος 6.4.20 ὡς φθεγξομένου ἄδουσι, τὸν μὲν ἄλλον χρόνον ἧττον θαυμάσαι φασίν, οὔπω γὰρ ἐνεργὰ φαίνεσθαι, προσβαλούσης δὲ τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς ἀκτῖνος, τουτὶ δὲ γίγνεσθαι περὶ ἡλίου ἐπιτολάς, μὴ κατασχεῖν τὸ θαῦμα, φθέγξασθαι μὲν γὰρ παραχρῆμα τῆς ἀκτῖνος 6.4.25 ἐλθούσης αὐτῷ ἐπὶ στόμα, φαιδροὺς δὲ ἱστάναι τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς δόξαι πρὸς τὸ φῶς, οἷα τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ εὐήλιοι. τότε ξυνεῖναι λέγουσιν, ὅτι τῷ Ἡλίῳ δοκεῖ ὑπανίστασθαι, καθάπερ οἱ τὸ κρεῖττον ὀρθοὶ θεραπεύοντες. θύσαντες οὖν Ἡλίῳ τε Αἰθίοπι καὶ 6.4.30 Ἠῴῳ Μέμνονι, τουτὶ γὰρ ἔφραζον οἱ ἱερεῖς, τὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἴθειν τε καὶ θάλπειν, τὸν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἐπονομάζοντες, ἐπορεύοντο ἐπὶ καμήλων ἐς τὰ τῶν Γυμνῶν ἤθη.

Damis gives this account about Memnon…
The agalma itself faces the sun, and is still beardless. It is of black stone, with both its feet together, according to the style of agalmata in Daedalus' time and presses its arms straight down on its throne, in the position of a sitter just getting up. This position, the expression of its eyes, and the celebrated look of its lips, as if it were about to speak, did not seem particularly wonderful to them at first, they say, because the statue did not appear clearly. But when the sun's rays struck the statue, as it did at sunrise, they could not withstand their amazement. It immediately spoke as the ray touched its lips, and fixed its eyes cheerfully upon the light, as men do who are found basking in the sun. It was then, they say, that they realized that it seemed to be rising in honor of the Sun, like those who stand to worship powers above. So they sacrificed to the Ethiopian Sun and Memnon of the Dawn, as the priests instructed them (they give these titles to the sun because he "heats" and "glows" to Memnon because of this mother). The party then traveled on camels to the region of the Naked Ones.

Several things are amiss in Damis' description; because there are other descriptions of the colossus as well as archaeological evidence, we know that Damis is wrong about several details of the statue. The colossus is made of a greyish quartz, but Damis states that the statue is black. Additionally, he fails to mention the presence of a second figure and says that Memnon's arms are straight down, although we know his hands are actually on his knees. Damis also states that the utterance comes from Memnon's lips and that the sun reflected in his eyes, although we know Memnon's head at this time was in ruins on the ground and that there was never a time when the statue both had a head and groaned.

Whereas Philostratus instructs his pupil in *Imagines* the "proper" way to view art and how to achieve rhetorical control over an image, this "mis-viewing" of the Memnon statue exhibits the power of that rhetorical control. Philostratus focalizes this account through Damis and the description is entirely in reported speech, separating the narrator somewhat from Damis' account and citing his source. In stating that "Damis gives this account," he draws attention to Damis' possible unreliability and outlines the text's fictionality.[247] Platt wonders, "Why, rather than giving us a scenario in which Apollonius explains the *thauma* that is Memnon to his confused followers, emphasizing his knowledge and pious attitude towards ancient cults and Homeric heroes, does Philostratus' narrative parade a *mis*-viewing of the colossus, ostentatiously attributed to an unreliable source?"[248] Philostratus' image-crafting techniques are complex in this passage; the didactic narrator we see in the *Imagines* is, here, detached through the indirect speech; the reader must rely on the misguided Damis. As Platt explains, however, the specific details on which Damis is incorrect are significant for the viewing of a sacred statue and that these details enhance an epiphanic viewing process. That is to say, Damis' account is a creative approach to statue-description that fills in blanks and focuses on details that achieve an epiphanic end. Damis imports previous knowledge of Memnon onto the image; Platt says, "Memnon's image can be viewed in a Greek context only through the prism of his epic identity as a dark-skinned hero."[249] Additionally, the "mistake" in the description of Memnon's posture (that he presses his arms down) mimics the behavior of sun worshippers.[250] Thus, this false description in fact contains the detached intellectualism proposed in the *Imagines* and highlights the creative process in artistic description and evaluation. Previously in the *Life,* Apollonius stated that

[247] See Miles 2009 for more on Damis' interpretations elsewhere in the text.
[248] Platt 2011: 305-6.
[249] Platt 2011:310.
[250] Platt 2011: 309.

mimesis was a creative process in which the viewers needed to make an εἴδωλον in their minds first (2.22). Damis seems to have internalized this lesson and presents the audience with his mental representation rather than an actual representation. Here, then, is another way that Philostratus demonstrates how narrators can achieve rhetorical control, presenting their own mental pictures to an audience.

Image-crafting and evaluation of (bodies in) art

Rhetorical control over a work of art does not only present a mental picture to an audience; it also animates/vivifies the work. In the most intense scenes of ekphrastic description, the first-person narrator crafts the image of a visual representation of a body, such that the represented body he or she crafts takes on life of its own. The implicit claim in a work of ekphrastic description is that the work ought to be perceived as both an object dependent on an act of artistic creation, as well as a life-form capable of acting on its own. Posidippus *AP* 16.275 dramatizes the dynamic of ekphrasis in a dialogue between a first-person narrator and Lysippus' sculpture of *Kairos*:

> Τίς πόθεν ὁ πλαστής; -Σικυώνιος.-Οὔνομα δὴ τίς;
> -Λύσιππος. -Σὺ δὲ τίς; - Καιπὸς ὁ πανδαμάτωρ.
> - Τίπτε δ' ἐπ' ἄκρα βέβηκας; -᾽Αεὶ τροχάω. -Τί δὲ ταρσούς
> ποσσὶν ἔχεις διφυεῖς; - Ἵπταμ' ὑπηνέμιος.
> -Χειρὶ δὲ δεξιτέρηι τί φέρεις ξυφόν; -᾽Ανδράσι δεῖγμα
> ὡς ἀκμῆς πάσης ὀξύτερος τελέθω.
> -Ἡ δὲ κόμη τί κατ' ὄψιν; - Ὑπαντιάσαντι λαβέσθαι
> νὴ Δία. -Τὰξόπιθεν δ' εἰς τί φαλακρὰ πέλει;
> -Τὸν γὰρ ἅπαξ πτηνοῖσι παραθρέξαντά με ποσσίν
> οὔτις ἔθ' ἱμείρων δράξεται ἐξόπιθεν.
> -Τοὔνεκ' ὁ τεχνίτης σε διέπλασεν; -Εἵνεκεν ὑμέων,
> ξεῖνε, καὶ ἐν προθύροις θῆκε διδασκαλίην. (AP 16. 275)

> Who is your sculptor, and where is he from? – From Sikyon. – And his name?
> -Lysippus. – And who are you? –All-conquering Kairos.

> -Why do you stand on your tip toes? – I'm always on the run. –Why do you have
> A pair of wings at your feet? –I'm flying, borne by the wind.
> --Why are you holding a razor in your right hand? –As a sign to men that I am more
> Acute than any blade
> -Why do you have hair over your face? –For anyone who meets me to grab me by,
> By Zeus. –And why is the back of your head bald?
> -Because once I have run past on my winged feet
> No-one, however much he wants to, can then seize me from behind.
> -What did the artist make you for? –For people like you,
> Stranger, and he put me up as a lesson, here in the portico.[251]

The statue comes to life and speaks, responding to the narrator's questions about its origin, appearance, and, finally, purpose. In the questions, the narrator demonstrates his keen eye, noticing details and features such as his stance, his accoutrements, and his hair.[252] In the statue's response, the sculptural features are explained in reference to a living body: he is always on the run, he is sharp, and his hair can be grabbed. The evaluation of the statue is implicit: the narrator can ask the questions because the statue is so life-like as to be able to answer. What is more, we can see the transition from the aesthetic to the erotic, as the initial questions inquire into the sculptor responsible for the work, and in response to the later questions the statute explains a lack of hair and winged feet in reference to the men that desire its body; it seems that the statue is fleeing forced sexual intercourse when it states that his baldness prevents people from grabbing him from behind in from their desire (ἔθ' ἱμείρων δράξεται ἐξόπιθεν). Where rhetorical control takes hold of aesthetic accomplishment and praises the visual representation of a body, it will invoke and summon a living body also, and when the terms of aesthetic evaluation of the work of art are transferred to that living body (as they easily will be), those terms become reoriented towards the possibilities of erotic interaction that any living body supposes.

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[251] Translation from Livingstone and Nisbett 2010: 64.
[252] For interpretations of this poem see Gutzwiller 2002: 95-6, Livingstone and Nisbet 2010: 64-5, Mannlein-Robert 2007, 260-2, and Tueller 2008:196-7.

The ekphrasis in the poem does not spring from the first-person speaker, but instead emerges from the dialogue between viewer and art object. Strikingly, the speaker is near-ignorant about the statue (though some readers would not have been); he can see and describe but does not possess enough knowledge to evaluate or comprehend it, and so he never articulates distinctions that would gain him social status. Alternatively, his seeming ignorance about the statue might result from misplaced knowledge, either because he, like many readers, will have been informed about the statue, or else because he has encountered other statues, which have primed his expectations incorrectly. But whatever the case, the statue comes alive for and speaks to him. The poem closes with the statue explaining to the speaker that it was put up "as a lesson" (διδασκαλίην) "for people like you" (ὑμέων). As poetic-closure, this is very open-ended: what is the lesson it provides? what sort of person is the speaker?

Gutzwiller provides a compelling answer: that "Lysippus' statue, which freezes in permanence the concept of time's swiftness, is in fact an artistic self-contradiction: Right Time as a purely visual image is a puzzle, not recognizably mimetic and so devoid of meaning."[253] Though she goes too far in supposing that a sculpture cannot offer a mimetic representation of "right time" (Rodin's "The Kiss" or Bernini's "Daphne and Apollo" come to mind), and that what is "not recognizably mimetic" is "devoid of meaning," Gutzwiller is convincing when she asserts that there is something fundamentally puzzling about an art form that freezes in permanence time's swiftness. The statue is exemplary for showing that the puzzle can be artistically mastered, and the lesson it teaches may be that in order for that mastery to be appreciated, a viewer must subject it to rhetorical control whereby it is made to live and speak as a life-form in time, with a sense of its past and projection of the future. The statue provides a lesson in what sort of rhetorical control is required for proper ekphrasis when time's movement

[253] Gutzwiller 2002: 96.

is rendered static. But perhaps there is no need to settle the questions and find closure. What matters might be less the nature of the exact lesson, or the identity of the speaker, and instead that the speaker is made to feel that the statue has distinguished him as a worthy recipient for enlightenment. At the last moment, then, the speaker gains something of status and stature from his interaction with the statue, not because he possesses the proper knowledge and taste for successful ekphrasis, but because he is awarded the opportunity for ekphrasis, as the statue speaks to him and provides him with the knowledge that true ekphrasis requires.[254]

Posidippus' dialogue plays on the Classical tradition of epigram, which were often included on the base of statues, as if in response to the imagined questions of a passerby. Posidippus recognizes that an epigram always supposes, and sometimes includes, questions about a statue, as well as answers to those questions, and he dramatically cleaves the two. In most epigrams, the questions are rhetorical, acts of knowing admiration and evaluation. But in his poem, the questions are real, demanding responses. His poem contributes to a broader Hellenistic response to the Classical epigram, removing them from statues and placing them in books and collections, while retaining their styles and motifs.[255] Self-consciously, then, these epigrams invite the reader to consider whether they are ontologically complete, or whether they exist only in relation to works of art that can only be imagined. Whether the statues to which they refer actually existed or not, because of the separation of epigram and object, the epigrams perform a new function, crafting the image of the statue for the reader. Ekphrasis exists only in the absence of an object for a reader, even though it supposes that the object is present alongside the text.

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[254] Livingstone and Nisbett 2010 (65) and Gutzwiller 2002 (96) suggest that the plural pronoun in the penultimate line (ὑμέων) signals that the lesson extends to a wider audience than just the imagined interlocutor and includes the reader.

[255] Bettenworth 2007: 80-5.

Ekphrastic epigrams are characterized by a first-person response to visual art and statues that merges the two voices of Posidippus' dialogue: in the act of image-crafting, the first-person speaks both from without the object, admiring its aesthetic properties, and from within it, imagining it as possessing not only a body, but life and spirit of its own. The possibility of erotic judgment rests on the latter: an object can only be desired when it contains the potential for desire. It would be incorrect, in other words, to read poems in which art-objects become love-objects as simple fetishization of the aesthetic: the speakers of such poems are led to longing by the discourse of sustained aesthetic appraisal, which lends alluring inner reality to the alluring outer forms of art. In an epigram by an unknown author, the famous statue of Cnidian Aphrodite is praised:

> Τίς λίθον ἐψύχωσε; τίς ἐν χθονὶ Κύπριν ἐσεῖδεν;
> ἵμερον ἐν πέτρῃ τίς τόσον εἰργάσατο;
> Πραξιτέλους χειρῶν ὅδε που πόνος, ἢ τάχ' Ὄλυμπος
> χηρεύει Παφίης εἰς Κνίδον ἐρχομένης.
>
> Who gave life to stone? Who gazed upon Cypris here on Earth?
> Who wrought so much desire within this rock?
> I suppose this is the toil of Praxiteles' hands – or else Olympus
> Is bereft, for Paphian Aphrodite has gone off to Cnidus. (AP 16.159)

The questions of this poem are rhetorical, since the speaker is in possession of potential answers; they are intended to signal a learned and cultivated astonishment. The first-person narrator praises the skill of the artist when he asks who gave life to the stone (Τίς λίθον ἐψύχωσε) and also indicates knowledge of the art world when he states that he "supposes" (που) it is the work of Praxiteles, the implication being that (from his experience) this kind of skill could only be the work of Praxiteles. In and of themselves, his questions are not remarkable, except for the question in the second line: ἵμερον ἐν πέτρῃ τίς τόσον εἰργάσατο/ "wrought so much desire within this rock." This question implies that the high aesthetic achievement of the sculptor could

not but realize an erotic life in the statue also. The poem ends in a performance of confusion over whether it is work of a talented artist or the goddess herself. It also shows a marked balance: the recognition of the statue as an art-object and the recognition of the statue as a living form are given equal weight in the final two lines, though we may read a slight eagerness for the latter, as the enjambment of the word χηρεύει carries the fantasy of Olympus bereft of Aphrodite into and all the way through the final line.

The epigram knits together the discourses of aesthetic and erotic evaluation in a tight space. Its concision makes the movement from one to the other rapid and forceful, as terms are asked to serve now in one field and now in another. But the epigram is not the only form that can take advantage of the overlap of aesthetic and erotic. In the open form of a dialogue in *Eikones*, Lucian does the same.[256] The entire work is a speculation on ideal beauty and the relevant dialogue is a panegyric to the Emperor's mistress, Panthea.[257] The dialogue begins with Lycinus, the surrogate figure adopted by the poet, speaking of his debilitating, strong attraction to a woman he has just seen:

> Lycinus: ἀλλ᾽ ἦ Ἰθίούτόν τι βττασγον οι τὴν Γοργὼ ἰδόντες οἷον ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἔπαθον, ὦ Πολύστρατε, παγκάλην τινὰ γυναῖκα ἰδών αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ μύθου ἐκεῖνο, μικροῦ δέω λίθος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου σοι γεγονέναι πεπηγὼς ὑπὸ τοῦ θαύματος.
>
> *Ly*. Polystratus, I know now what men must have felt like when they saw the Gorgon's head. I have just experienced the same sensation, at the sight of a most lovely woman. A little more, and I should have realized the legend, by being turned to stone; I am fixed with admiration.

He struggles to describe her, explaining that to do justice to her beauty is "not in the power of language, least of all in my language" (οὐ κατὰ λόγων δύναμιν, καὶ μάλιστά γε τῶνἐμῶν, 3). Instead, he explains, it would take the craft of a great artist, a Phidias or Alcamenes, to bring

[256] For studies on the *Eikones* see Maffei 1986, Goldhill 2001: 184-93, Zeitlan 2001: 224-33, Mheallaigh 2014.
[257] The name "Panthea" evokes "Pandora" the quintessential example of a woman crafted from different parts. Hesiod describes her creation in the *Works and Days* 59-82.

home her beauty (3). Polystratus urges him on, assuaging his doubts of faltering by assuring him that he will not be judged by his friend: οὐ γὰρ ἐπισφαλὲς τὸ τόλμημα, εἰ φίλῳἀνδρὶ ἐπιδείξαις τὴν εἰκόνα, ὅπως ἂν τῆς γραμμῆς ἔχῃ (The risk is not great, if you said it to friends, let it be whatever it is of a drawing, 3). With this statement, Polystratus acknowledges that, by describing the woman, Lycinus leaves himself open to judgment of both his artistic ability and his taste in women. Polystratus indicates that Lycinus has no cultural capital to gain or lose with him because he is a friend. This interaction, though, is staged, and Lycinus (and by extension Lucian) are subject to the criticism of the external audience where cultural capital is at stake.

Lycinus decides to proceed with his description and lands on the idea of calling "in the aid of some of the old masters:" (καὶ μὴν ἀσφαλέστερον αὐτὸς ποιήσειν μοι δοκῶ τῶν παλαιῶν τινας ἐκείνωντεχνιτῶν παρακαλέσας ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον/Truly it seems to me the safest things by far is to call upon the aid of the old masters, 3). They will "re-form the woman for him" (ὡς ἀναπλάσειάν μοι τὴν γυναῖκα, 3), he explains, putting the burden of image-crafting on their shoulders. But it is he who will perform the rhetorical labor, bringing them back to life with his words (Πολύστρατος: πῶς τοῦτο φής ; ἢ πῶς ἂν ἀφίκοιντό σοι πρὸ τοσούτων ἐτῶν ἀποθανόντες; Λυκῖνος: ῥᾳδίως/ Polystratus: What do you mean? How will they appear to you having been dead for many years? Lycinus: Easily, 3). Through describing their works, he will arrive at a better description of the woman. Lycinus, therefore, begins with an erotic impulse, seeks and fails to find the proper descriptive terms for adequately praising of the love-object, and so turns to aesthetic objects, trusting that his ability to describe their best traits will serve him also in describing the woman's.

The remainder of the dialogue—and the bulk of it—is devoted to gathering together the best qualities from the best works of art (and eventually philosophy). To craft the love-object, the

poet must raid an imaginary museum and use what he finds there. But before he does so, there is a further intriguing wrinkle in the dialogue, as Lycinus asks Polystratus whether he has seen first-hand some statues to which he will refer.

> Λυκῖνος: ἐπεδήμησάς ποτε, ὦ Πολύστρατε, τῇ Κνιδίων ;
> Πολύστρατος: καὶ μάλα.
> Λυκῖνος: οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην εἶδες πάντως αὐτῶν;
> Πολύστρατος: νὴ Δία, τῶν Πραξιτέλους ποιημάτων τὸ κάλλιστον.
> …
> Λυκῖνος: ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἱκανῶς. τῶν δὲ Φειδίου ἔργων τί μάλιστα ἐπῄνεσας ;
> Πολύστρατος: τί δ᾽ ἄλλο ἢ τὴν Λημνίαν, ᾗ καὶ ἐπιγράψαι τοὔνομα ὁ Φειδίας ἠξίωσε; καὶ νὴ Δία τὴν Ἀμαζόνα τὴν ἐπερειδομένην τῷ δορατίῳ. (4)
>
> Lycinus: Have you, Polystratus, ever been to Cnidus?
> Polystratus: Indeed.
> Lycinus: Then surely you saw the statue of Aphrodite?
> Polystratus: By Zeus, it's Praxiteles best work!
> ....
> Lycinus: That is sufficient. What do you consider the best work of Phidias?
> Polystratus: Certainly the Lemnian, which Phidias thought worthy of writing his name. And, by Zeus, after that, the Amazonian leaning on her spear.

Lycinus wants for the statues to be present before Polystratus' mind's eye. In the fiction of the dialogue, this is because he does not trust to his descriptive powers; he can speak in shorthand if Polystratus knows the right statues. When Lycinus asks Polystratus what he considers Phidias' best work, he sets himself up as a judge of Polystratus' judgments and fashions himself as an aesthetic authority and provides a platform to rhetorically control for the external audience.[258] In a supra-literary context, the dialogue reminds the reader of what is absent from their experience also (the image), demands and asserts a greater confidence in its powers of description (in the descriptive outcome of its image-crafting), and draws attention to the rhetorical game it is playing: the absent love-object can only be summoned by asserting rhetorical mastery over absent aesthetic objects, which in turn will take on erotic life commensurate to the task. The

[258] Goldhill 2001 192-92 addresses the "cultured exchange" that occurs between Lycinus and Polystratus and issues how to to view art properly.

procedure depends on the interchangeability of aesthetic and erotic evaluation, and will gain the speaker additional cultural capital through a display of his taste and knowledge.

To commence his labor, Lycinus cedes control to "reason" (λόγος) personified; it is λόγος that does the work of selecting and uniting the parts of body (and, later, mind) from various works of art. He merely describes what λόγος selects. Once again, a game is afoot: yet another figure has been summoned, standing in for Lycinus, who accepts and performs only the burden of ekphrasis:

> Λυκῖνος: Καὶ μὴν ἤδη σοι ὁρᾶν παρέχει γιγνομένην τὴν εἰκόνα, ᾧδε συναρμόζων, τῆς ἐκ Κνίδου ἡκούσης μόνον τὴν κεφαλὴν λαβών· οὐδὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος γυμνοῦ ὄντος δεήσεται· τὰ μὲν ἀμφὶ τὴν κόμην καὶ μέτωπον ὀφρύων τε τὸ εὔγραμμον ἐάσει ἔχειν ὥσπερ ὁ Πραξιτέλης ἐποίησεν, καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δὲ τὸ ὑγρὸν ἅμα τῷ φαιδρῷ καὶ κεχαρισμένῳ, καὶ τοῦτο διαφυλάξει κατὰ τὸ Πραξιτέλει δοκοῦν· τὰ μῆλα δὲ καὶ ὅσα τῆς ὄψεως ἀντωπὰ παρ' Ἀλκαμένους καὶ τῆς ἐν κήποις λήψεται, καὶ προσέτι χειρῶν ἄκρα καὶ καρπῶν τὸ εὔρυθμον καὶ δακτύλων τὸ εὐάγωγον εἰς λεπτὸν ἀπολῆγον παρὰ τῆς ἐν κήποις καὶ ταῦτα. τὴν δὲ τοῦ παντὸς προσώπου περιγραφὴν καὶ παρειῶν τὸ ἁπαλὸν καὶ ῥῖνα σύμμετρον ἡ Λημνία παρέξει καὶ Φειδίας· ἔτι καὶ στόματος ἁρμογὴν αὐτὸς καὶ τὸν αὐχένα, παρὰ τῆς Ἀμαζόνος λαβών· ἡ Σωσάνδρα δὲ καὶ Κάλαμις αἰδοῖ κοσμήσουσιν αὐτήν, καὶ τὸ μειδίαμα σεμνὸν καὶ λεληθὸς ὥσπερ τὸ ἐκείνης ἔσται· καὶ τὸ εὐσταλὲς δὲ καὶ κόσμιον τῆς ἀναβολῆς παρὰ τῆς Σωσάνδρας, πλὴν ὅτι ἀκατακάλυπτος αὕτη ἔσται τὴν κεφαλήν. τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἡλίκον ἂν γένοιτο, κατὰ τὴν ἐν Κνίδῳ ἐκείνην μάλιστα. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν Πραξιτέλη μεμετρήσθω. Τί σοι, ὦ Πολύστρατε, δοκεῖ; καλὴ γενήσεσθαι ἡ εἰκών; (6)
>
> *Ly*. Observes, then, how an image growing before you comes together, taking from the Cnidian nothing except the head. There is nothing of use from the rest of the body since it's nude. The forehead, the hair, the eyelids, the nice curve of the eyebrows, will be as Praxiteles made them, and the eyes, too, yet bright-glancing eyes, is left unaltered. But the cheeks and the front of the face are taken from the 'Garden' Goddess; and so are the lines of the hands, the shapely wrists, the delicately-tapering fingers. Phidias and the Lemnian *Athene* will give the outline of the face, and the well-proportioned nose, and lend new softness to the cheeks; and the same artist may shape her neck and closed lips, to resemble those of his *Amazon*. Calamis adorns her with Sosandra's modesty, Sosandra's grave half-smile; the decent seemly dress is Sosandra's too, save that the head

> must not be veiled. For her stature, let it be that of Cnidian *Aphrodite*; once more we have recourse to Praxiteles.--What think you, Polystratus? Is it a lovely portrait?[259]

The performance is less about the woman and more about the depth and cultivation of Lycinus' knowledge and taste. Though "λόγος" does the selecting, he knows exactly why it has chosen what it has, and he can describe the parts of each statue from memory, as if they were classified and boxed in his mind. The unity of the aesthetic objects are broken to conjure the image of the love-object. But the real outcome is an ostentatious accounting of capital; the best quality of each statue is rhetorically wrenched from its proper context and possessed by Lycinus, or already has been, since they are so close at hand, as are examples from painting later in the poem, and works of philosophy later still, when Polystratus decides to imagine how virtuous a soul such a woman must have (15). As they continue their exchange, Lycinus and Polystratus move further from their fascination with the woman who set them in motion. But though the actual woman ceases to matter, the field of erotic evaluation does not; it has been transferred, however, and grafted onto the discourse of aesthetic appraisal. The rhetorical control of objects of art has crafted an image to exceed and eclipse the love object; he asks of the image he has crafted: "who of womankind shall be compared to her?" (22). The attainment of that image through his exercise of erudition and taste has won him more status than the attainment of the love-object would have.

Lucian's *Eikones* carried sufficient symbolic capital to inspire pseudonymous imitation. In Pseudo-Lucian's satirical *Erotes*, the dialogue between Lycinus and Polystratus provides several points of reference for another dialogue featuring Lycinus. We have now seen the Cnidian Aphrodite as the subject of an epigram and a touchstone for the beauty of a woman in Lucian's dialogue; in the *Erotes* it inspires both first-person descriptive evaluations in the erotic and aesthetic fields, as well as a debate over erotic taste. The poem depicts what it looks like to

[259] Translation adapted slightly from Fowler 1905.

bid for social distinction by way of evaluative distinctions. The description of the famous Cnidian Aphrodite in Pseudo-Lucian's satirical *Erotes* is mostly accurate. The narrator reports his response to the Aphrodite while he catalogues the features of the her body. The *Erotes* is a dialogue between Lycinus and Theomnestes that frames a philosophical debate between two other characters, Charicles and Callicratides, over whether men or women make preferable love-objects; Charicles prefers women, while Callicratidas prefers boys.[260] Lycinus, who later judges the debate, first recounts to Theomnestes the story of his journey with Charicles and Callicratidas to Italy. Lycinus tells Theomenestes (and us) that they stopped in Cnidus in order to sight-see and visit Praxiteles' famous statue. Lycinus states that they stopped because of the positive reputation of the statue and the beautiful sights in the town: καὶ δόξαν ἡμῖν Κνίδῳ προσορμῆσαι κατὰ θέαν καὶ τοῦ Ἀφροδίτης ἱεροῦ – ὑμνεῖται δὲ τούτου τὸ τῆς Πραξιτέλους εὐχερείας ὄντως ἐπαφρόδιτον/"It seemed good to us to visit Cnidus, where there is much to see, especially the temple of Aphrodite which houses the statue by Praxiteles, praised for its beauty." Lycinus describes the statue as the "skill (εὐχερείας) of Praxiteles," acknowledging that an artist crafted the work, leaving it open to judgment on aesthetic terms despite the representation being a divinity.

After looking around the city for a while, the group enters the temple to see the statue. Lycinus describes both the statue and his companions' reactions to it:

> ἐπεὶ δ' ἱκανῶς τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐτέρφθημεν, εἴσω τοῦ νεὼ παρῄειμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν θεὸς ἐν μέσῳ καθίδρυται – Παρίας δὲ λίθου δαίδαλμα κάλλιστον – ὑπερήφανον καὶ σεσηρότι γέλωτι μικρὸν ὑπομειδιῶσα. πᾶν δὲ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῆς ἀκάλυπτον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐσθῆτος ἀμπεχούσης γεγύμνωται, πλὴν ὅσα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ χειρὶ τὴν αἰδῶ λεληθότως ἐπικρύπτειν. τοσοῦτόν γε μὴν ἡ δημιουργὸς ἴσχυσε τέχνη, ὥστε τὴν ἀντίτυπον οὕτω καὶ καρτερὰν τοῦ λίθου φύσιν ἑκάστοις μέλεσιν ἐπιπρέπειν. ὁ γοῦν Χαρικλῆς ἐμμανές τι καὶ παράφορον ἀναβοήσας, Εὐτυχέστατος, εἶπεν, θεῶν ὁ διὰ ταύτην δεθεὶς Ἄρης, καὶ ἅμα

[260] See Jope 2011 for an interpretation of the debate.

προσδραμὼν λιπαρέσι τοῖς χείλεσιν ἐφ' ὅσον ἦν δυνατὸν ἐκτείνων τὸν αὐχένα κατεφίλει· σιγῇ δ' ἐφεστὼς ὁ Καλλικρατίδας κατὰ νοῦν ἀπεθαύμαζεν.

When we had sufficiently enjoyed the surrounding nature, we proceeded to the temple. The goddess stands in the middle, the art made from Parian marble her lips slightly parted by a proud smile. Nothing hides her beauty, covered by no clothes except a hand secretly veiling her modesty. The sculptor is so powerful in skill that it seems the resistant and difficult nature of the stone is suitable for her limbs. Charícles, dazed by this spectacle, crying out said," Ares is fortunate to have been chained by such a goddess!" He rushed forward as he spoke, lips pursed, neck stretched to give her a kiss. Standing in silence, Callicratídas marveled.

Lycinus gives us a relatively basic overview of what the statue looks like; he tells us of what material it is made, describes the expression and how the hand is positioned. He offers only one evaluative statement stating that the sculptor's skill is so great that the hard and resistant qualities of stone seem fitting. Praxiteles has gone beyond just representing Aphrodite well in stone; owing to his skill, the most inhuman qualities of the stone seem germane to the represented human body. With this statement, Lycinus acknowledges the tension that usually exists in representations of bodies; namely, that the medium of representations is at odds with the flesh, driving apart the capacity to praise the former in terms of the latter. His high praise of the statue is safe— he has already told us that the piece is widely praised and well-known for its beauty. It does not award him any significant cultural capital or cost him any. However, in contrast to his companions, Lycinus distinguishes himself.

Charicles, whom we know is enthusiastically fond of women, is completely carried away and frantic over the statue (ἐμμανές, παράφορον). He responds to the statue with erotic desire, as if it were flesh, rushing forward to kiss it. Despite the brilliance of Praxiteles' skills of representation, Charicles' confusion and frenzy over the statue make him seem ridiculous. On the other hand, Callicratides stands silently amazed (ἀπεθαύμαζεν). The entranced reaction suggests the kind of viewing in art that Lucian states uneducated people do in *De Domo*

(discussed above). When Callicratides does become verbal, it is because he responds to it erotically:

> ὁ γοῦν Ἀθηναῖος ἡσυχῇ πρὸ μικροῦ βλέπων ἐπεὶ τὰ παιδικὰ μέρη τῆς θεοῦ κατώπτευσεν, ἀθρόως πολὺ τοῦ Χαρικλέους ἐμμανέστερον ἀνεβόησεν, Ἡράκλεις, ὅση μὲν τῶν μεταφρένων εὐρυθμία, πῶς δ᾽ ἀμφιλαφεῖς αἱ λαγόνες, ἀγκάλισμα χειροπληθές· ὡς δ᾽ εὐπερίγραφοι τῶν γλουτῶν αἱ σάρκες ἐπικυρτοῦνται μήτ᾽ ἄγαν ἐλλιπεῖς αὐτοῖς ὀστέοις προσεσταλμέναι μήτε εἰς ὑπέρογκον ἐκκεχυμέναι πιότητα. τῶν δὲ τοῖς ἰσχίοις ἐνεσφραγισμένων ἐξ ἑκατέρων τύπων οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις ὡς ἡδὺς ὁ γέλως· μηροῦ τε καὶ κνήμης ἐπ᾽ εὐθὺ τεταμένης ἄχρι ποδὸς ἠκριβωμένοι ῥυθμοί (14).
>
> As soon as the Athenian, up to this point silent, glimpsed this side of the goddess which reminded him of boys, suddenly he exclaimed with even greater enthusiasm than that of Charicles, "By Hercules, what a harmonious back. What rounded thighs, begging for both hands! How well-defined flesh of her backside arches, neither too skinny, showing the bones, nor so voluminous as to droop! How inexpressible the tenderness of that smile pressed into her dimpled loins! How precise that line running from thigh, to leg, to foot.

Lycinus tells us that Callicratides' silence is broken only when the back side of the statue erotically stimulates him. Callicratides' erotic response is evident in his description, as reported by Lycinus, that contains no indication that he is talking about a statue at all. Callicratides only comments on the statue's weight and various body parts, going so far as to mention the statue's bones (ὀστέοις). His description looks far more like some of the poems discussed in Chapter 2, such as Rufinus' "beauty contest" poem in which the narrator evaluates the rear ends of three women, and Philodemus' epigram (5.132) that singles out a woman's particular body parts for comment. In an influential reading of the poem, David Halperin, following Foucault, suggests that the argument between Charicles and Callicratides is a matter of preference or "taste" for different body parts, rather than a matter of hetero or homosexuality.[261] What Halperin does not adequately recognize is that the terms of erotic appreciation and evaluation, as my second

[261] Halperin 1992.

chapter argued, share the terms and rhetoric of aesthetic appreciation. Nonetheless, the poem recognizes that the two fields of evaluation are distinct. Lycinus positions himself so as to provide an alternative framework for judging the statues, suggesting that although all three speakers evaluate in terms of taste, there is a difference in whether those terms operate on aesthetic or erotic grounds.

Lycinus distinguishes himself from the responses of his companions, who err in going too far in their reactions. He does not reveal whether he found the statue erotically enticing or not, and instead only reports his positive reactions to Praxiteles' skill. The companions ultimately respond to the object solely on erotic grounds, losing sight of the aesthetic principles which guard Lycinus from their absurdity. Setting his own voice in contrast to theirs, he improves his position in the eyes of readers, as well as his two companions. After they have left the temple, Charicles and Callicratides continue to debate, but they no longer discuss the statue. Their erotic reaction to its form has propelled them into a debate over the nature of erotic taste, and whether it is more appropriate to love a male or female body. They turn to Lycinus to serve as a judge, implying that they view him as a superior in his capacity to make distinctions. Although he may have gained their trust by virtue of his age or other qualities, the poem suggests that his judgment of the statue reflects the qualities that make him suitable to serve to adjudicate the debate over erotic taste. He takes his duties seriously; it is a position of genuine import in his eyes as he compares his role to an actual judge in an Athenian court: ἐν μέσῳ πάνυ δικαστικῶς καθεζόμην αὐτὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς ὀφρύσιν τὴν Ἡλιαίαν ἔχων/I sat between the two as a judge, having the weight of the Athenian courts on my brow (18). Reading back, we can conclude that Lycinus was not blind to the erotic qualities of the statues—after all, he is qualified to weigh arguments about erotic

life—but his ability to balance those qualities against its aesthetic characteristics, and to detach himself in his evaluation, have given him authority in the eyes of his companions.

Just after Callicratides' exclamation, Lycinus reports that Charicles notices a stain on the statue. At first, Lycinas reports that he believed it to be a natural defect in the stone. He says: μέλαιναν οὖν ἐσπιλῶσθαι φυσικήν τινα κηλῖδα νομίζων καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ Πραξιτέλους ἐθαύμαζον, ὅτι τοῦ λίθου τὸ δύσμορφον ἐν τοῖς ἧττον ἐλέγχεσθαι δυναμένοις μέρεσιν ἀπέκρυψεν/ I, thinking that such a dark stain was natural, marveled more at Praxiteles since he had hidden the stain on the stone where it would be noticed least (15). In this passage the narrator image-crafts by indicating his prior knowledge about marble—he did not think anything of the dark mark because he knows them to be common—and by, again, reacting to the statue in terms of the artistic skill he assumes it demonstrates. A temple attendant then tells the three that the stain is, in fact, a sperm stain left by a man named Makarios in a failed attempt at intercourse. Although Makairos started out only admiring the statue's artistic beauty, he was eventually overcome by it, falling in love and sneaking into the temple at night to attempt intercourse with it. The stain testifies to so extreme an erotic response to the statue that it had not crossed Lycinas' mind that it could be semen. Acknowledging that it is, Lycinas and the reader are invited to imagine the man-marble copulating act itself. Thus, the stain on the sculpture is analogous to the footprint in the sand in Meleager's epigram: a present reminder of an absent figure. Here, however, the absent figure is a lover rather than beloved, and repulses rather than attracts. The semen stain repels the narrator from further image-crafting, and simultaneously reminds the reader that any erotic image-crafting in response to the statue finds its limit in the statue's essence: it cannot be easily rinsed from the exterior, and could not penetrate into its interior during the act of attempted copulation. Ekphrasis can summon the image of a real body

behind a statue, but it cannot efface the physical properties of the art or statue that inspire it; rhetorical control cannot follow the terms of the erotic alone. A simultaneous recognition of the aesthetic realm, such as Lycinas possesses, is essential for its success.

We might wonder whether the dynamic of speaker and object of art changes when the speakers are women, rather than men. Is the simultaneous erotic and aesthetic judgment of art a function of the male gaze?[262] Theocritus' *Idyll* 15 and Herondas' *Mime* 4 suggest that it is not, at least in the minds of the men who wrote the poems. The dialogues, frequently examined together because of their similarities, show that the subjective aesthetic and erotic evaluation of visual art is to be found in the first-person response of women as well as men.[263] However, there are gendered accents in each. In both poems, two women walk into a sanctuary in order to view a work of art which one of the women then describes. In *Idyll* 15, Gorgo draws Praxinoa's attention to the tapestries that depict Aphrodite and Adonis. Praxinoa is amazed at the labor that must have gone into it and how life-like the figures are:

> {ΓΟ.} Πραξινόα, πόταγ' ὦδε. τὰ ποικίλα πρᾶτον ἄθρησον,
> λεπτὰ καὶ ὡς χαρίεντα· θεῶν περονάματα φασεῖς.
> {ΠΡ.} πότνι' Ἀθαναία, ποῖαί σφ' ἐπόνασαν ἔριθοι,
> ποῖοι ζωογράφοι τἀκριβέα γράμματ' ἔγραψαν.
> ὡς ἔτυμ' ἐστάκαντι καὶ ὡς ἔτυμ' ἐνδινεῦντι,
> ἔμψυχ', οὐκ ἐνυφαντά. σοφόν τι χρῆμ' ἄνθρωπος.
> αὐτὸς δ' ὡς θαητὸς ἐπ' ἀργυρέας κατάκειται
> κλισμῶ, πρᾶτον ἴουλον ἀπὸ κροτάφων καταβάλλων,
> ὁ τριφίλητος Ἄδωνις, ὁ κὴν Ἀχέροντι φιληθείς. (78-86)
>
> Gorgo: Praxinoa, come over here and look at these beautiful tapestries,
> So delicate and pretty—clothes fit for the gods, you'd say
> Praxinoa: Lady Athena, to think of the weaving that went into them!
> Such artists, to make their designs appear so true to life.
> How naturally the figures stand, how naturally they move!

[262] The "male gaze" is a term coined by Laura Mulvey the feminist film critic. See Mulvey 1975. For a recent piece on the male gaze in the *Greek Anthology* see Fountoulakis 2013.
[263] For scholarship that considers these pieces as a pair see Goldhill 1994 and Burton 1995.

> They seem alive, not woven. Ah, what a clever creature man is!
> How marvelous Adonis is, reclining on a silver couch
> His first down spreading before his temples
> Thrice-loved Adonis, loved even beside Acheron.

Gorgo didactically instructs her friend what art in the sanctuary is worth her attention, displaying her superior knowledge of the conventions by which art is to be judged by those in the know. In her evaluation of the tapestries, she calls them both "λεπτά" and "χαρίεντα" or "light" and "charming." With this description, she alludes to *Odyssey* 10 when Odysseus' men enter the Circe's lair and see tapestries, also described as λεπτὰ καὶ ὡς χαρίεντα (10.223).[264] By borrowing language from Homer, Gorgo sets her cultural capital on display. She is familiar with Greek literature and learned. Because her vocabulary is not simply borrowed from Homer, but borrowed from a scene in Homer that describes weaving, however, she could risk seeming inauthentic, too rehearsed and self-conscious in her evaluation. Her self-consciousness is reflected in the word λεπτός, a Hellenistic buzzword in discussions of literary merit.[265] The artifice in her learned allusion stands in contrast with the terms of Praxinoa's praise. She admires the tapestry for moving naturally (ἔτυμος) even repeating the line twice in line 82. The contrast is between two forms of aesthetic response: one (Praxinoa) that responds to the image itself, and in so doing, perceives the physical and erotic dimension of the human bodies it represents, and the other (Gorgo) that responds to the image through the lens of another work of art, and sees them only as something external to the body, the aesthetically pleasing "clothes fit for the gods."

Though the terms of erotic and aesthetic evaluation are accessible to women, Gorgo's praise of the "clothes fit for the gods" might be understood in the context of the *Odyssean* women's work of weaving. Her feminine gaze, as Theocritus describes it, leads her to notice an

[264] Burton 1995: 102 explicates this allusion.
[265] E.g. Callimachus *Ep.* 27.3-4, *Aet.* 1, fr. 1.11. See Pfeiffer 137-8 for the term as representative of Hellenistic poetics.

aesthetic object from the feminine space of the home. Similarly, in Herondas' Mime 4, the praise is given a gendered inflection.[266] Visiting the statues and paintings in the temple of Aesclepius, Phile and Kynno reveal aesthetic criteria that yield to the erotic, as the rhetorical control over the object makes the bodies in it seem to come alive:

> {<ΦΙ.>} οὐκ ὀρῆις, φίλη Κυννοῖ;
> οἷ' ἔργα κεῖ 'νῆν· ταῦτ' ἐρεῖς Ἀθηναίην
> γλύψαι τὰ καλά – χαιρέτω δὲ δέσποινα.
> τὸν παῖδα δὴ <τὸν> γυμνὸν ἢν κνίσω τοῦτον
> οὐκ ἕλκος ἕξει, Κύννα; πρὸς γάρ οἱ κεῖνται 60
> αἱ σάρκες οἷα θερμὰ θερμὰ πηδῶσαι
> ἐν τῆι σανίσκηι. τὠργύρευν δὲ πύραυστρον
> οὐκ ἢν ἴδη<σι> Μύλλος ἢ Παταικίσκος
> ὁ Λαμπρίωνος, ἐκβαλεῦσι τὰς κούρας
> δοκεῦντες ὄντως ἀργύρευν πεποιῆσθαι; 65
> ὁ βοῦς δὲ κὠ ἄγων αὐτὸν ἥ τ' ὀμαρτεῦσα
> κὠ γρυπὸς οὗτος κὠ [ἀν]άσιλλος ἄνθρωπος
> οὐχὶ ζοὴν βλέπουσι κἠμέρην πάντες;
> εἰ μὴ ἐδόκευν τι μέζον ἢ γυνὴ πρήσσειν,
> ἀνηλάλαξ' ἄν, μή μ' ὁ βοῦς τι πημήνηι· 70
> οὕτω ἐπιλοξοῖ, Κυννί, τῆι ἐτέρηι κούρηι. 4.56-71

> Don't you see, Kynno dear,
> what works of art they are? You'd say Athena
> had carved these lovely things; bless the Lady.
> This naked boy, if I scratch him,
> Kynno dear, won't I leave a welt? For his flesh
> lies upon him, pulsing like warm water
> in the picture. As for his silver fire tongs
> wouldn't Myllos or Pataikiskos, the son
> of Lamprion, pop out their eyes,
> supposing them really made of genuine silver?
> The ox and the man leading it
> and the girl and this hook-nosed man with the bristly hair;
> don't they look as real as the living day?
> If I didn't think it unbecoming a woman,
> I'd have screamed for fear -that the bull harm;
> the way he looks, Kynno, out of the side of his eye.

[266] Bruton 1995 looks at the women's responses to the tapestries in terms of a ceremonial context 97-114.

She does not scream for fear because she does not want to act in a manner unbecoming for woman. The question is whether it would be unbecoming for a woman to scream for fear at a bull or whether it would be unbecoming a woman to scream in fear at a work of art. We cannot be sure, in other words, whether they are speaking in response to an aesthetic or evaluative judgment of the paintings and statues; both judgments are occurring at once, feeding into one another, and both are potentially conditioned by the norms of gender.

Rhetorical control takes hold of the work of art, the represented body, and the reader, but is likewise beholden to social standards and conventions. When it goes wrong, it is not simply failing to adequately summon the life behind or within the work of art; it is failing to meet the standards of a first-person speaker's social world, the field of discourse determined by his relation to fellow-critics and friends (as well as, potentially, readers). The first-person speakers assume that their judgments will be judged; they are conditioned by that prospect even where it is not represented in the poem, and they look forward to receiving cultural capital as a consequence. But, as we have seen, evaluation of a work of art in the erotic field can go wrong in a manner that evaluation in the aesthetic field cannot: because of the nature of desire, inspired praise of an art object as a love-object might propel a speaker to make a fool of himself, making an attempt at an absurd sexual interaction with the work of art. Owing to this possibility, it might be thought that evaluation of a work of art in erotic terms is always suspect, if not flagrantly cracked.

Although some authors play on the threats and absurdities inherent in erotic appraisal of works of art, Meleager offers a vision of a salutary relationship between the erotic and the aesthetic. His epigram on a statue by Praxiteles (perhaps a real statue, Praxiteles' statue of Eros at Thespiae, commemorated by Antipater (*A. Pl.* 167)) praises the work for not only inspiring

desire, but for correctly shaping and strengthening the capacity for erotic evaluation. The first-person speaker does not respond to the statue as if it were a love-object, but the aesthetic properties of the statues, which he describes as "delicate" (ἁβρός), are judged to be so great that they mold within him, as if by magic, a better faculty of desiring (and consequently a better faculty of assessing love-objects) than he had before viewing it. Rather than praise a love-object represented by the statue, he is inspired to praise his own character, which has learned a "lesson" in desire through his appreciation of the work of art. In effect, the first-person speaker bestows status on himself:

> Πραξιτέλης ὁ πάλαι ζωογλύφος ἁβρὸν ἄγαλμα
> ἄψυχον, μορφᾶς κωφὸν ἔτευξε τύπον,
> πέτρον ἐνειδοφορῶν: ὁ δὲ νῦν, ἔμψυχα μαγεύων,
> τὸν τριπανοῦργον Ἔρωτ᾽ ἔπλασεν ἐν κραδίᾳ.
> ἦ τάχα τοὔνομ᾽ ἔχει ταὐτὸν μόνον, ἔργα δὲ κρέσδω,
> οὐ λίθον, ἀλλὰ φρενῶν πνεῦμα μεταρρυθμίσας.
> ἵλαος πλάσσοι τὸν ἐμὸν τρόπον, ὄφρα τυπώσας
> ἐντὸς ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ναὸν Ἔρωτος ἔχῃ. (*AP* 12.57)
>
> The old sculptor Praxiteles made a delicate and lifeless
> image, a mute model of beauty,
> working the stone into shape: but now he, using magic, made a living one,
> and he molded in my heart Eros, the rogue.
> Perhaps he only has the same name, but the works are better,
> fashioning not stone, but the spirit of the mind.
> Graciously let him mold my character, so that having formed it
> He might have within my soul a temple of Eros.

The poem turns on the phrase "now" (νῦν) as the present instant, "now," is that of the first-person narrator's encounter with the statue. In admiring the statue as he does, the narrator crafts an image, not of the life that the statue represents but of the life responsible for the statue: the sculptor whom he imagines to be at work on his own heart at that moment. The praise shifts from the object of art to the skill represented by that object and then from that skill to the speaker himself, who presents the fiction of submitting to that skill by subjecting the statue to his

rhetorical control. "Let him mold my character" beseeches in the jussive, but the illocutionary force is that of a boast. His character is worthy to be molded, and his own heart has become the raw material for an achievement that surpasses even the statue. With Eros brilliantly sculpted and housed, the narrator has gained an authoritative status in judging love-objects.

Meleager's poem breaks down the barriers between object and subject and inverts the relations between the two. It does not need to work hard to do so; the overlap between a discourse of aesthetic evaluation that tends towards detachment and separation and a discourse of erotic evaluation that aspires to attachment and penetration provides ample opportunities for a poet. The same terms are potentially oriented in either direction, and might even be ambiguously suspended between the two. With the poles in place, and the route clear to and from each, a poet can alternate the movement of current, and even run currents two ways at the same time. Such self-conscious play along the circuits of rhetoric is characteristic of post-Classical literature, but the engagement of first-person narrators with works of arts opens another surface for the circuitry to run along: the works of art.

Theocritus elaborates his rhetoric with intricacy in his first *Idyll*, the amoebic exchange between Thyrsis and the goatherd that I discuss in my first chapter. The goatherd offers a decorated cup in exchange for a song; in order to make the offer more appealing, in an ekphrasis the goatherd describes the cup.[267] It is (purposefully) unclear whether the readers are meant to imagine the cup as an object right in front of him or whether he describes it from memory.[268] On the cup is a woman:

> ἔντοσθεν δὲ γυνά, τι θεῶν δαίδαλμα τέτυκται,
> ἀσκητὰ πέπλῳ τε καὶ ἄμπυκι· πὰρ δέ οἱ ἄνδρες
> καλὸν ἐθειράζοντες ἀμοιβαδὶς ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος

[267] For studies on the cup see Lawall 27-30, Segal 29-33, and Halperin 1983:161-89.
[268] Payne 2002: 268: "Perhaps the τι reflects the fact that the goatherd does not have the bowl in front of him, and dramatizes a momentary engagement with the figure in his imagination."

νεικείουσ' ἐπέεσσι· τὰ δ' οὐ φρενὸς ἅπτεται αὐτᾶς·
ἀλλ' ὅκα μὲν τῆνον ποτιδέρκεται ἄνδρα γέλαισα,
ἄλλοκα δ' αὖ ποτὶ τὸν ῥιπτεῖ νόον· οἳ δ' ὑπ' ἔρωτος
δηθὰ κυλοιδιόωντες ἐτώσια μοχθίζοντι. (32-38)

On it is a woman, a sort of work of art fashioned by the gods
Wearing a robe and a diadem. Beside her are men
With beautiful locks alternately from either side
Contest with words. But these things do not touch her heart.
But at one time she turns to one man smiling
And at another time she turns her mind to the other. And they
Hollow-eyed from desire work in vain.

The evaluative discourses of the description turn in on themselves, rounding with the shape of the cup itself. The goatherd's aesthetic appraisal of the cup lauds the figure of the woman, stating that she is a "sort of work of art (δαίδαλμα) fashioned by the gods." In so doing, he conflates the cup and the woman. The word δαίδαλμα—the first extant use of the word—contains within it an ambiguity, observed by Payne: "...is the woman a fabrication of the gods, or is she, more concretely, a "statue of the gods"?[269] The phrase might refer the excellence of artistry, or else impute life to her figure, since the gods could breathe life into inanimate matter. The men with beautiful locks are praised not as decorative features on the cup, but as real beings, and the image-crafting has shifted clearly into the field of the erotic with the word "alternately." The word is temporal, granting to the static representation the movement of time, and affording the figures of the men a living presence before the speaker; the woman too exists in time, turning from one man to the other. They perform for her, and behind their words is a recognition of her beauty that is shared by the goatherd. "But these things do not touch her heart" and they "work in vain." She stands to them as a statue elsewhere might stand to an admiring critic; and their desire is stymied as his would be perhaps because she is herself evaluating their words, standing with the detachment of purely aesthetic assessment that precludes the erotic. At the same time,

[269] Payne 2002: 265.

being out of their reach, she takes on, for the goatherd as well as for the men by her side, the status of an art object rather than love object. With the poem's close, it might be that the two men on the cup similarly shed some of their independent vitality; the image-crafting pulls them back to the realm of the aesthetic when it describes them as "hollow-eyed," a term apt for both the despair of hopeless lovers and the carved-out eyes in the figures on the side of the cup. Because their desire for the woman can find no adequate consummation, they once more harden into art objects.

But Theocritus' poetical games do not stop with the cup. We have already seen that the goatherd joins in with the men on the cup in his praise of the woman; his world extends into theirs as he crafts their image. At another remove, the two men on the cup are reflected by the two men outside the cup, a goatherd and Thyrsis, debating; though they do not debate, they stand to the cup as the two men stand to the woman in it. The goatherd is 'selling' his idea of the cup through his description of it, and also proving that he is a worthy critic of its artistry. The confirmation of his skill cannot come from the cup, or the woman on it, though; it must come from the shepherd's song. The value of that song is not determined by the economic value of the cup or the cultural value that the goatherd's description adds to it; the song itself awards it value. Since the shepherd is of a higher social status than the goatherd, moreover, his recognition of the goatherd's efforts would be a mark of distinction for the goatherd. To some Alexandrian readers, the contrast of pastoral setting and critical posturing might clash comedically; to others, the juxtaposition might possess a satirical edge, mocking the pretensions of urbane art critics by suggesting their powers of taste are possessed by unrefined rustics; other still might find the setting a comforting reminder that the exercise of critical judgment, and the striving for distinction, is natural, and not the product of a decadently mannered civility.

In this chapter, I have argued that ekphrasis in post-Classical literature is an especially sophisticated form of image-crafting. All ekphrasis conjures an image before the reader's mind, and perhaps draws on two fields of discourse, erotic and aesthetic; but in post-Classical literature, the two fields are consciously manipulated to do equal justice to both the image of the work of art and the image of the narrator. Under the double pressure, the fields are alternately set into harmony and tension, configured and reconfigured in simultaneous contests over fidelity of description and the authority to describe. But the contests do not end within the works of literature: they extend beyond, to the external audience, who are left to assess the validity of the narrators' image-crafting, and the judgments to which they are subjected in the literature's worlds. In their assessments in turn, readers are granted the opportunity to perform an act of image-crafting, though they do so in terms of judgment and devices of rhetorical control that have been anticipated by the literature they encounter. Evaluation begets evaluation, image-crafting inspires image-crafting, and the search for status sustains and is sustained by works of art.

CONCLUSION

IMAGE-CRAFTING POST POST-CLASSICAL

Bourdieu's sociology has explicitly guided this dissertation. As an elixir for dissolving the opposition between social structure and individual agency, his theoretical framework allows us to transcend the artificial divide between subjective evaluation and objective description. All "objective" descriptions proceed on grounds of "subjective" impressions and motivations; but this does not reduce the objective to the subjective since the subjective impressions and motivations can only exist in relation to a pattern of "objective" relationships, a nexus of interactions and judgments, within which an individual is held. The tradition of post-Classical literature that I have examined can be read with rich results without any knowledge of Bourdieu; and it reductive to say that post-Classical literature simply anticipates what he says. The framework that Bourdieu provides, however, allows us to more accurately describe the play of rhetoric and the tensions of discourse in the literature, and in doing so account for its power. This dissertation goes beyond establishing that discourses in several fields overlap; it shows that these poems capitalize upon that reality, making poetic hay of it.

In my introduction, I argued that the process of image-crafting is not limited to any one genre or any one narrowly defined historical moment. It can be found in any genre, and examples can likely be found from any era. But the concentration of literary works invested in the potential overlap of the aesthetic and erotic discourses sets the post-Classical period apart. It is little stretch to see that these works do all share a loosely characterized context of production: a sense of cultural belatedness that has refined a critical discourse for distinguishing between the classics of earlier generations in the shadow of which contemporary artists and authors create. The post-

Classical world was an era of the critic and the dilettante, but rather than making for a derivative poetry, hopelessly aspiring to lost glories, the best authors of that world were able to mine the discourses of the critic for poetic innovation. In their works, they reveal that the seemingly natural and universal impulses of *eros* are characterized by the same discourse as the cultivated performances of aesthetic criticism, and also that the refined and cultivated performances of aesthetic criticism are charged with an intensity of desire. Their baroquely involved wheels of rhetoric do not set their works at an aesthetic distance from life, but instead harness and explore movements of language and social feeling that are essential to the life-world in which they were written. Bourdieu can help us see how.

Critical attention to image-crafting in post-Classical literature does not demand or announce a sociological cast of mind; image-crafting, trucking for social status, and critical discourse are so crucial to these works of literature that sociology provides invaluable concepts for formalist descriptions and readings. But it is not only overt critics who attest to the central preoccupation post-Classical authors and works have with status and authority. We can look to later poets writing in English also, reading them too as covert critics. No post-Classical poet has mattered as much for English poetry as Theocritus. He was not the only Greek poet to be read, but his influence is repeatedly announced over the waxing and waning of his critical reputation. Though my dissertation has taken in a great many authors, my approach has repeatedly paid dividends when applied to Theocritus' work. Here I hope to show how the same approach can lead to a deeper understanding of the English poetry where he is most present.

The nineteenth century saw a revival in the fortunes of Theocritus, not least among poets.[270] In the case of several major English poets of the century, he is a distinct influence. Among these, Keats and Tennyson tower.[271] The former experienced Theocritus only in translation whereas the latter admired him in the original. For both, however, Theocritus provides a resource for the exploration of image-crafting; what is more, both Keats and Tennyson find in his belated relation to Classical antiquity a model for their own belated relation to his poetry. Their poems not only imitate and mirror Theocritus' concerns; they enter into and extend the experiments he conducts in the pastoral landscape.

Keats' love of ancient Greek literature came first through Chapman's translation of Homer, and later, it seems likely, through a 1792 translation of Theocritus by Richard Polwhele.[272] In a letter composed to his brother George and his wife Georgiana, over the course of the 14th to 31st of October 1818, he expresses intense joy in reading the latter: "According to my state of mind I am with Achilles shouting in the Trenches or with Theocritus in the Vales of Sicily."[273] Haynes writes that Keats "repudiated Milton's repudiation and sought to restore a pagan religious sense, to insist on the truth of beauty."[274] The infamous statement in which Keats insists ("Beauty is truth, truth beauty--that is all | Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know") comes at the end of "Ode on a Grecian Urn," a poem that is in part a reimagining of the description of the cup in Theocritus' *Idyll* 1.[275] "Ode on a Grecian Urn" represents Keats' highest achievement in the art of ekphrasis: in it, Keats distinguishes himself for his capacity to respond

[270] On the revival of Theocritus as a major poet in the nineteenth century, and the proliferation of translations, see Talbot 2015 (especially page 67).
[271] For Keats' relationship to Theocritus see Kelley 2001 and Thornton 1987. For Tennyson and Theocritus see Markley 2004; Alpers 1996: 290.
[272] Kelley 2001: n.12.
[273] John Keats, *Selected Letters*, 159.
[274] Haynes 2003: 119.
[275] Thornton 1987.

to Greek art. In his descriptive praise of the urn, he endows the object itself with life, making it speak, and also animates the images on it, so that, as in the poems discussed in Chapter 4, they become love-objects as well as aesthetic objects:

> Ah, happy, happy boughs! that cannot shed
> Your leaves, nor ever bid the Spring adieu;
> And, happy melodist, unwearied,
> For ever piping songs for ever new;
> More happy love! More happy, happy love!
> For ever warm and still to be enjoy'd,
> For ever panting, and for ever young;
> All breathing human passion far above,
> That leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloy'd,
> A burning forehead, and a parching tongue.[276]

In the terms of my discussion, Keats' description of the urn does not only balance the field of aesthetic and the field of the erotic, but it reconciles them, lauding the urn for finding aesthetic stasis in erotic movement and erotic movement in aesthetic stasis. We can read the Ode as a philosophical statement, but we can also see it as an instance of Keats' own image-crafting: in the poem, he finds a way of taking the measure of Greek art as none before him had done.

Yet to fully understand Keats' image-crafting in the Ode, we need to take into account the status of Greek art and culture in Britain in 1819. In his devotion to Greek culture, Keats was influenced by the poet and critic Leigh Hunt, who was the subject of savage critical attacks that would soon take Keats as a target too. In a review for *Blackwood's Magazine* that launched the classist term, "The Cockney School," John Gibson Lockhart, writing under the pseudonym 'Z,' described Hunt: "He is a man of little education. He knows absolutely nothing of Greek, almost

[276] All Keats text from Stillinger 1982.

nothing of Latin."[277] Keats was soon savaged by 'Z' in the same pages, on the same line of attack:

> His Endymion is not a Greek shepherd, loved by a Grecian goddess; he is merely a young Cockney rhymester, dreaming a phantastic dream at the full of the moon. Costume, were it worth while to notice such a trifle, is violated in every page of this goodly octavo. From his prototype Hunt, John Keats has acquired a sort of vague idea, that the Greeks were a most tasteful people, and that no mythology can be so finely adapted for the purposes of poetry as theirs. It is amusing to see what a hand the two Cockneys make of this mythology; the one confesses that he never read the Greek Tragedians, and the other knows Homer only from Chapman, and both of them write about Apollo, Pan, Nymphs, Muses, and Mysteries, as might be expected from persons of their education. We shall not, however, enlarge at present upon this subject, as we mean to dedicate an entire paper to the classical attainments and attempts of the Cockney poets.
>
> As for Mr Keats' Endymion, it has just as much to do with Greece as it has with 'old Tartary the fierce;' no man, whose mind has ever been imbued with the smallest knowledge or feeling of classical poetry or classical history, could have stooped to profane and vulgarise every association in the manner which has been adopted by this 'son of promise.'[278]

Lockhart's vicious snobbery is predicated on the cultural capital of a gentleman's education, which would have included (at least in principle) Greek. By writing on Greek subjects without an education in the Greek language, Keats reaches above his proper standing in the social order, and leaves himself open to criticism. Even Byron, who recognized Keats' genius, especially in the uncompleted epic *Hyperion*, could sneer in admiration:

> John Keats, who was kill'd off by one critique,
> Just as he really promis'd something great,
> If not intelligible, without Greek
> Contriv'd to talk about the gods of late,
> Much as they might have been suppos'd to speak.
> Poor fellow! His was an untoward fate;
> 'Tis strange the mind, that very fiery particle,
> Should let itself be snuff'd out by an article.[279]
>
> (*Don Juan*, Canto 11, section LX)

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[277] For a fuller discussion of Lockhart, "The Cockney School," and the Classics, see Wallace 2015: 415-417. The review is *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, 2 (October 1817), 38.
[278] *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, 3 (August 1818) 522.
[279] Text from McGann 2000 edition.

Byron's phrase "without Greek" manages to parody the snobbery of the reviews, while also granting some legitimacy to their terms; similarly, he exhibits his lordly contempt for articles and reviews, while also perpetuating the myth that Keats, a less lordly man that he, took them too much to heart. The explosion of popular literary reviews and magazines in a society whose deep class divisions were coming under democratic threats made the prospects of image-crafting distinctly hazardous for Keats.

But if we allow that Keats was a careful reader, we might ask whether "Ode on a Grecian Urn" does not anticipate some of these attacks; after all, it is modeled after one speaker in an *Idyll* that is a dialogue in the pastoral theater. Although Keats' poem is a lyric rather than a dialogue, and without any discernible setting, it perhaps implies the setting that Theocritus provides: Keats stands in for the rustic praising the cup, and the *Idyll*'s clash between social status and critical sophistication is transferred onto him also. His critics doubt him for the same reason an Alexandrian snob might have doubted whether shepherds could talk the way Theocritus shows them talking: the low are assuming the cultural capital and gaining the distinction associated with the high. Read as a dialogue with Theocritus, Keats' Ode carries on the game staged in and by *Idyll* 1.

Less than a decade after Keats' death, Tennyson carried on and refined his adoption of Greek literature into English; at the heart of his work, and near to his heart as a poet, was the poetry of Theocritus. Tennyson, Markley tells us, owned three volumes of the poet, two of which included the poetry of Bion and Moschus.[280] His depth of admiration for the Greek is evident in an anecdote recalled by his friend Francis Palgrave:

> We were sitting (1857 or so) late at night in the Farringford attic-room already mentioned: and Tennyson read over to me the little Theocritan Idyll "Hylas"; eminent for beauty in a treasure-house where all are beautiful. He dwelt particularly on the tender

[280] Markley 2004: 29.

> loveliness which describe how the fairy youth, carried to the depths of a fountain by the enamoured Nymphs, faintly answered the call of his companion Herakles … [He quotes and translates]…Tennsyson, if I remember rightly, ended with that involuntary half-sigh of delight which breaks forth when a sympathetic spirit closes, or turns from, some masterpiece of perfect art, in words or colours. "I should be content to die," said the author of "Locksley Hall" and "Maud" and "In Memoriam" "if I had written anything equal to this." The scene need not be spoiled by any comments.[281]

In order to fully grasp the relevance of Theocritus to Tennyson's poetic oeuve, critics would have to take Theocritus more seriously than as merely the founder of the pastoral tradition, and grant that Tennyson may have found profundities in him that twentieth-century critics of English literature have generally not. In particular, critical responses to Tennyson's re-conception of the *locus amoenus* and his return to the pastoral stage would benefit from a more ambitious account of Theocritus; though mine is hardly the only one possible, it opens up a new way of assessing and interpreting Tennyson's work.

Tennyson, and perhaps his fellow Victorian Swinburne, also an avid reader of Greek, suffer still from the Modernist readjustment of sensibility, which can be registered by a reorientation towards the Classics. For the Modernist generation of Pound, H.D., and Joyce, the reception of the Classics centers on a reappraisal of the Archaic; coincident with their investment in the Primitive, the Archaic offered them models of poetic rejuvenation. Their ambivalence towards Tennyson, the Poet Laureate of Victoria's reign, manifests in an unease in those elements of Tennyson's verse that are most obviously indebted to Theocritus, especially his construction of the idealized landscape of pastoral. Joyce famously has fun at Tennyson's expense in *Ulysses*, riffing on one of the lordly laureate's favorite words when he refers to Tennyson as "Lawn Tennyson, gentleman poet."[282] "Lawn" appears often when Tennyson evokes a falsely polished landscape; "Lawn tennis" echoes in the name too, with the implication

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[281] Hallam Tennyson, *Alfred Tennsyon: A Memoir by His Son, vol. 2* (London: Macmillan, 1897) 495.
[282] Chapter 3, Proteus (the sneer is Stephen's)

of poetry reduced to frivolous pastime, though it recalls also the game of Theocritus' pastoral exchange.

If we allow, however, that Tennyson was a serious reader of Theocritus, and that his reading afforded him some insights corresponding to my own, then his artifice and decorum are not concessions to Victorian prudishness and poesy, but attempts at doing for his age what Theocritus had done for his own. Perhaps Tennyson felt a special affinity for the post-Classical poets for their belatedness; he arrived too late to be a Romantic, and the poetry of Wordsworth, Keats, and Shelley casts striking shadows across his own.[283]

His debt to Theocritus is announced forcefully in the poems that were collected under a section titled "English Idylls": these included "Audley Court," "Edwin Morris, or the Lake," "The Gardener's Daughter, or the Pictures," "The Golden Year"; critics are divided over whether to include others, such as "Morte D'Arthur." The influence of Theocritus is also evident elsewhere: he echoes through "Oenone" and one reader of the song in *The Princess*, "Come down, O Maid, from yonder mountain height" and ending in "The moan of doves in immemorial elms | And murmur of innumerable bees" was "as felicitous as Theocritus" (the touchstone had been recovered since Jonathan Richardson's remark on Milton, owing to the Romantic rediscover, and re-invention, of Greece). In many of these poems, and self-consciously in the "English Idylls," Tennyson follows the speaker of "Audley Court": "I set the words, and added names I knew." That speaker refers, in the fiction of the poem, to an old English song; but looking beyond the poem, Tennyson refers to his own recasting of Theocritus.

"Audley Court" is perhaps a less obvious poem than others for showing how my dissertation's approach illuminates Tennyson's work: "Edwin Morris" includes competing, and criticized descriptions of women as love-objects; "The Gardener's Daughter" overlaps evaluation

[283] Tucker 1988. Tucker reads Tennyson as a late Romantic.

of love-objects with evaluation of aesthetic objects. "Audley Court" is the account of two friends on a picnic, each of whom sings a song to the other; there is no judgment of either song, and there is no presumption that the songs are sung in contest. The poem ends with a scene of idyllic peace:

> ...but ere the night we rose
> And sauntered home beneath a moon, that, just
> In crescent, dimly rained about the leaf
> Twilights of airy silver, till we reached
> The limits of the hills; and as we sank
> From rock to rock upon the glooming quay,
> The town was hushed beneath us: lower down
> The bay was oily calm; the harbour-buoy.
> Sole start of phosphorescence in the calm,
> With one green sparkle ever and anon
> Dipt by itself, and we were glad at heart[284] (ll. 78-88)

But in light of a reading of Theocritus in which we recognize that a performance of songs represents an exchange of cultural capital, and that the songs are efforts at image-crafting by the speakers, we can read this description of a *locus amoenus* as an implicit criticism of the exchange: it is not only peaceful, but a reconciliation, a balancing of accounts, admitting, if not that the songs were equally worthy, that the singers accepted them as such. The ending is, "for the first time in Tennyson," Ricks notes, "not a curtailment or an expectation but a fully contented pause."[285]

Curiously, the songs do not seem to be equal. The speaker of the poem, a surrogate of Tennyson, passes his days "in the fallow leisure of my life," whereas his friend, Francis Hale, "the farmer's son, who lives across the bay," would seem to spring from humbler origins. And it is the speaker's poem that feels the slenderer of the two:

Sleep, Ellen Aubrey, sleep, and dream of me:

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[284] All Tennyson from Ricks' 1989 edition.
[285] Ricks 1989: 154.

Sleep, Ellen, folded in thy sister's arm,
And sleeping, haply dream her arm is mine.
Sleep, Ellen, folded in Emilia's arm;
Emilia, fairer than all else but thou,
For thou art fairer than all else that is.
Sleep, breathing health and peace upon her breast:
Sleep, breathing love and trust against her lip:
I go tonight: I come tomorrow morn.
I go, but I return: I would I were
The pilot of the darkness and the dream.
Sleep, Ellen Aubrey, love, and dream of me.

Compare to Francis Hale's:

Oh! who would fight and march and countermarch,
Be shot for sixpence in a battle-field,
And shovelled up into some bloody trench
Where no one knows? but let me live my life.
Oh! who would cast and balance at a desk,
Perched like a crow upon a three-legged stool,
Till all his juice is dried, and all his joints
Are full of chalk? but let me live my life.
Who'd serve the state? for if I carved my name
Upon the cliffs that guard my native land,
I might as well have traced it in the sands;
The sea wastes all: but let me live my life.
Oh! who would love? I wooed a woman once,
But she was sharper than an eastern wind,
And all my heart turned from her, as a thorn
Turns from the sea; but let me live my life.

Hale's is not only more ambitious in reach, a criticism of life, but it possesses lines that possess a reader: "The sea wastes all; but let me live my life"; "But she was sharper than an eastern wind." Ricks, in a moment of distinguishing image-crafting, calls it a "tenderly cynical song, altogether without bitterness," and his description reflects its magnanimity; he also argues that, compared to the narrator's song, Francis' "tells the most, both as a poem and as a document," asserting that "its manner is one that Tennyson was seldom to command" in part because "its freedom from

anything like morbidity argues a deep, albeit temporary, release,"[286] Although Tennyson does not openly urge or request evaluation from his readers, the pastoral tradition and the situation within the poem imply that evaluation is expected; we are given space to step in as the narrator does not.

Accepting that one of the efforts is patently superior to the other, the question arises: why would Tennyson give one singer a more impressive performance in a poem whose original asks that we read the exchange as a contest of image-crafting, and then suggest that the two end with their accounts balanced? It may be that Tennyson wished to comment on friendship itself, suggesting that it superseded the concerns of image-crafting. However, it may be that we are asked to see the image-crafting of the singers as properly understood within the broader context of capital and status the poem implies. Francis Hale is left on an equal footing with the narrator not only because of friendship, but because in friendship, he can compensate for his reduced economic capital by offering more valuable cultural capital. The consequence is a leveling of social distinction. On such a reading, the poem offers a defense of what good the aesthetic can bring to the social: it can reconcile and harmonize classes, without abolishing their economic differences. My approach to pastoral suggests how the concern for image-crafting in the aesthetic and erotic fields throughout Tennyson's idylls can establish their place in the social and political arena, where Tennyson yearned to conserve a threatened social order.

Finally, the competition in Tennyson's verse may reflect his own sought-after relationship to the precedent of Theocritus: inferior, but reconciled. If we read Theocritus' pastoral landscape as the laboratory of poetics, a *locus amoenus* in which the social value of poetry is confirmed and tested by image-crafting and exchange, then we may better understood why later poets were so comfortable inhabiting it also.

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[286] Ricks 1989: 154.

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