



# LIBRARIES

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

## **Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Guatemala. 1952/1954**

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952/1954

<https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/G5OAT7XT7HRHX84>


As a work of the United States government, this material is in the public domain.

For information on re-use see:

<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright>


The libraries provide public access to a wide range of material, including online exhibits, digitized collections, archival finding aids, our catalog, online articles, and a growing range of materials in many media.

When possible, we provide rights information in catalog records, finding aids, and other metadata that accompanies collections or items. However, it is always the user's obligation to evaluate copyright and rights issues in light of their own use.



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
1911



ALBION COLLEGE  
  
**WITHDRAWN**  
FROM  
STOCKWELL-MUNDY  
**ALBION COLLEGE LIBRARY**  
LIBRARIES  
ALBION, MI 49224-1879

UX  
233  
.A3  
1952-54  
Guatemala  
STORAGE

ALBION COLLEGE  
LIBRARY

JUN 10 2003

U.S. GOVERNMENT  
DEPOSITORY







**Foreign Relations of the  
United States, 1952–1954**

---

**Guatemala**

*Editor*

Susan K. Holly

*General Editor*

David S. Patterson



DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 11026

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN  
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

JX  
283  
A3  
1952-54  
Guatemala  
STORAGE

---

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: Toll Free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800  
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001  
ISBN 0-16-051304-9

# Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The General Editor and the staff of the Office of the Historian, plan, research, select, and edit the volumes in the series. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, *et seq.*).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

## *Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, Guatemala*

This volume is part of a sub-series of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the foreign policy of the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. It is a supplement to the 1983 publication of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume IV, American Republics*. Volume IV covered both multilateral relations as well as bilateral relations for 20 American Republics, including Guatemala.



The historian who collected and prepared the volume knew that the compilation on Guatemala as published was incomplete and flawed. The role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the ouster of Guatemala's elected president, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, was not documented in the volume.

The historian responsible for the volume gained some access to CIA records of the operation. He inserted references to the covert operation into the Guatemala compilation, but they were denied in the declassification process. Despite internal debate, the Office of the Historian published the volume without the inclusion of a disclaimer indicating that the published documentation on Guatemala provided an incomplete and distorted history. Critical reviews of the compilation appeared in academic journals and major newspapers.

Partly in response to these criticisms, in 1991 Congress passed legislation that the President signed affirming that the *Foreign Relations* series "shall be a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity" and requiring U.S. Government departments and agencies to provide Department of State historians with "full and complete access to the records pertinent to United States foreign policy decisions and actions." To help ensure that future volumes meet these legislative standards, the same law also gave the Department of State's Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, consisting of six academic historians as well as a political scientist, an archivist, and an international lawyer, authority to advise and make recommendations to The Historian of the Department on "all aspects of preparation and publication of the FRUS series."

In the early 1990s, Directors of Central Intelligence officially acknowledged eleven covert actions during the early cold war years, including Guatemala. At the same time, Department of State historians gained fuller access to the CIA's files on Guatemala. This volume is a product of improved access. The Central Intelligence Agency has reviewed the volume for declassification in coordination with its review of documents on the Guatemala operation being released to the National Archives.

This volume fills in many details about the role of the United States in Guatemala in the early 1950s. The CIA operation in Guatemala is an important instance of the use of covert action to implement U.S. foreign policy, and this volume provides a detailed account of that action. Because the focus of this volume is on a covert program, the documents published in the 1952–1954 American Republics volume are not reprinted here, but footnotes and editorial notes refer back to the more significant overt aspects covered in the volume published in 1983. The two

volumes complement each other and should be read together for a full and comprehensive account. To facilitate research the Guatemala compilation from *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, Volume IV*, is available on the Office of the Historian website.

The Office of the Historian is convinced that the Central Intelligence Agency has made all relevant documents available for this publication. Bracketed insertions in italic type are used to indicate omitted text that remains classified after declassification review in accordance with E.O. 12958.

### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were excised. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and



policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs, other first-hand accounts, and monographs has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

### *Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation*

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not attempt to review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on problems that come to its attention. The Committee reviews volumes when it considers a review necessary to fulfill its obligations under the statute.

The Advisory Committee has reviewed this volume.

### *Declassification Review*

The Information Response Branch of the Office of Information Resources Management Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

The final declassification review of this volume, which began in 1999 and was completed in 2002, resulted in the decision to withhold 2

documents in full; excise a paragraph or more from 9 documents and make minor excisions, mostly names and places, in 190 of the 287 documents published. The editor is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide an accurate account of U.S. policy toward Guatemala.

### *Acknowledgments*

The editors would like to acknowledge the valuable assistance of the Historical Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence who assisted Gerald Monroe and William Marsh in the collection of the materials for this volume. Susan K. Holly selected and annotated the documentation, under the supervision of David S. Patterson, the then General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Douglas W. Trefzger provided invaluable historical assistance in the final stages of production. Rita M. Baker and Vicki E. Futscher did the copy and technical editing, and Susan C. Weetman and Steven Glenn coordinated the declassification review. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

**Marc J. Susser**

*The Historian*  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*

April 2003



# Contents

Preface.....	III
Sources.....	XI
Abbreviations and Cryptonyms.....	XV
Persons and Pseudonyms.....	XIX
Introduction.....	XXIII
Guatemala, 1952–1954.....	1
Index.....	451





# Sources

## *Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Almost all of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified in full or in part and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department's indexed central files for these years have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). The Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series also have full access to the papers of President Eisenhower and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

## *Sources for Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, Guatemala*

This retrospective volume on Guatemala, 1952–1954, is a documentary history of PBSUCCESS, the Central Intelligence Agency operation

leading to the 1954 coup that removed President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán from power. As such, this volume relies primarily on documents of the Directorate of Operations (DO) at the Central Intelligence Agency. Most of the DO documentation is in Job 79-01025A, a collection that includes extensive records for PBFORTUNE, an initial plan first considered in 1951 to oust Arbenz; PBSUCCESS, the plan as implemented; and PBHISTORY, the project to analyze and utilize documents of the Arbenz government. The majority of the documentation in Job 79-01025A is comprised of internal memoranda and cable traffic, especially telegrams to and from Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters (DIR cables), CIA Stations including Guatemala (GUAT cables), and PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida (LINC cables). Additionally Job 79-01025A contains many Agency-generated internal memoranda and intelligence studies, most of it originating in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division.

Job 79-01025A also includes correspondence, memoranda, and cables to and from Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters, the Department of State, and the United States Embassy in Guatemala. The volume includes a few documents from the John Foster Dulles Papers at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, in addition to several reprints of documents published in the Guatemala compilation in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, Volume IV, American Republics* (1983). This retrospective volume supplements the earlier compilation on Guatemala for the Eisenhower administration and together the two volumes provide a comprehensive view of U.S. foreign policy toward Guatemala during 1952-1954, both as it was agreed upon in Washington and as it was implemented in Central America.

### **Unpublished Sources**

#### **Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia**

Guatemala Collection, Job 79-01025A

Executive Registry, Job 80-R1731R

#### **Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas**

John Foster Dulles Papers  
Telephone Conversations

Ann Whitman File  
NSC Series

James C. Hagerty Papers

### Published Sources

- Cullather, Nicholas. *Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952–1954* (Washington, D.C.: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994)
- Gleijeses, Piero. *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991)
- Handy, Jim. *Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994)
- Immerman, Richard. *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982)
- U.S. Department of State *Bulletin*, 1952–1959
- U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1952, 1953, 1954* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953, 1954, 1955)



# Abbreviations and Cryptonyms

**AA**, American Airlines; anti-aircraft

**A/C**, aircraft

**AC/WH**, Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency

**Adam**, Guatemala City

**AFL, AFOL**, American Federation of Labor

**AP**, Associated Press

**BGGYPSY**, Russia; Russian

**BOND**, Puerto Barrios

**C/WH**, Chief, Western Hemisphere, Central Intelligence Agency

**CAB**, Civil Aeronautics Board

**Caesar**, Quetzaltenango

**CEUA**, Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas (Committee of Anti-Communist University Students)

**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency

**CNC**, Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Confederation of Campesinos)

**CNO**, Chief of Naval Operations

**CP**, Communist Party

**CTAL**, Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (Confederation of Latin American Workers)

**DCI**, Director of Central Intelligence

**DD/A**, Deputy Director for Administration, Central Intelligence Agency

**DD/P**, Deputy Director, Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

**DDCI**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

**DIR**, Director of Central Intelligence

**Doc**, Mazatenango

**DTFROGS**, El Salvador

**Eddie**, El Quiché

**EDT**, estimated time of departure

**ENE**, east northeast

**ESCOBILLA**, Guatemalan national

**ESMERALDITE**, labor informant affiliated with AFL-sponsored labor movement

**ESSENCE**, Guatemalan anti-Communist leader

**ETA**, estimated time of arrival

**FAN**, National Anti-Communist Front

**FAO**, Foreign Agriculture Organization of the United Nations



## XVI Abbreviations and Cryptonyms

---

- FJHOPEFUL**, military base  
**FOA**, Foreign Operations Administration  
**Frank**, Jutiapa, Guatemala  
**Goss**, Cobán, Guatemala  
**Hank**, Zacapa (Guatemalan base)  
**HTKEEPER**, Mexico City  
**HTPLUME**, Panama  
**iden**, identity  
**Ike**, San Jose  
**Jack**, Florida, Honduras  
**JMBLUG**, John S. Peurifoy, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala  
**Kent**, Carias Viejas, Honduras  
**KMFLUSH**, Nicaragua  
**KMPAJAMA**, Mexico  
**KMPLEBE**, Peru  
**K-Program**, operations aimed at intelligence and defection of Guatemalan military; after May 11, 1954, redirected at military defections  
**KUBARK**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**KUCLUB**, Office of Communications  
**KUFIRE**, intelligence  
**KUGOWN**, propaganda  
**Larry**, Entre Ríos, Guatemala  
**LCFLUTTER**, polygraph  
**LCI**, landing craft  
**LCPANGS**, Costa Rica  
**LINC**, LINCOLN, PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida  
**LIONIZER**, Guatemalan refugee group in Mexico  
**MA**, military attaché  
**Mike**, Asunción Mita, Guatemala  
**Nick**, Gualán, Guatemala  
**N.O.**, New Orleans  
**o/a**, on or about  
**ODACID**, U.S. Embassy  
**ODUNIT**, U.S. Air Force  
**ODYOKE**, U.S. Government  
**OIR**, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
**OPIM**, Operational Immediate  
**ops**, operations  
**ORIT**, Organización Regional Inter-Americana de Trabajadores (AFL-sponsored anti-Communist labor federation)  
**P/A**, political asset  
**PAA**, Pan American Airlines  
**PANCHO**, Carlos Castillo Armas

- PBFORTUNE**, CIA project to supply anti-Arbenz forces with weapons, supplies, and funding; predecessor to PBSUCCESS
- PBHISTORY**, Central Intelligence Agency project to gather and analyze documents from the Arbenz government in Guatemala that would incriminate Arbenz as a Communist
- PBPRIME**, United States
- PBS, PBSUCCESS**, Central Intelligence Agency covert operation to overthrow Arbenz government in Guatemala
- PSB**, Psychological Strategy Board
- PW**, psychological warfare
- QKFLOWAGE**, United States Information Agency
- RUFUS**, Carlos Castillo Armas
- sab**, sabotage
- SARANAC**, training site in Nicaragua
- SCRANTON**, training base for radio operators near Nicaragua
- SGUAT**, CIA Station in Guatemala
- SHERWOOD**, CIA radio broadcasting program based in Nicaragua begun on May 1, 1954
- SKILLET**, Whiting Willauer, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras
- SKIMMER**, The "Group" CIA cover organization supporting Castillo Armas
- SLINC**, telegram indicator for PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida
- SSE**, south southeast
- STANDEL**, Jacobo Arbenz, President of Guatemala
- svcd**, serviced
- SYNCARP**, the "Junta," Castillo Armas' political organization headed by Córdova Cerna
- T/O**, table of organization
- UFCO, UNFC, UNIFRUIT**, United Fruit Company
- WASHTUB**, operation to plant Soviet arms in Nicaragua
- WFTU**, World Federation of Trade Unions
- WH**, Western Hemisphere
- WSBURNT**, Guatemala
- WSHOOFS**, Honduras



# Persons and Pseudonyms

**Note:** Pseudonyms are in parentheses following real names. Pseudonyms whose identities have not been released are so indicated.

- Acheson, Dean G.**, Secretary of State January 19, 1949–January 20, 1953
- Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo**, President of Guatemala March 15, 1951–June 27, 1954
- Ascham, Robert A.**, pseudonym for Allen Dulles
- Bannister, Earl D.**, (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Barnes, Tracy** (Playdon, William D.), Chief of the Political and Psychological Staff, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
- Berry, Lampton J.**, Deputy Operations Coordinator, Department of State
- Bissell, Richard M.** (Lynade, Pinckney E.), Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- Bruce, David K.E.**, Under Secretary of State April 1952–January 1953
- Burnette, Cyrus E.** (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Cabell, General Charles P.** (Ordway), Deputy Director of Central Intelligence after April 1953
- Cabot, John M.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs February 27, 1953–April 1954
- Cadick, Irving G.**, (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Calligeris, John H.**, pseudonym for Carlos Castillo Armas
- Castillo Armas, Colonel Carlos**, President of the Guatemalan Junta from July 8, 1954; President of Guatemala September 2, 1954–July 26, 1957
- Clower, Wilfred O.** (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Córdova Cerna, Juan**, lawyer for United Fruit Company in Guatemala; supporter of Castillo Armas
- Díaz, Colonel Carlos Enrique**, Guatemalan Army Chief of Staff; President of Guatemala June 27–28, 1954; member of military junta June 28–29, 1954
- Dulles, Allen** (Ascham, Robert A.), Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until February 26, 1953; thereafter Director of Central Intelligence
- Dulles, John Foster**, consultant to the Secretary of State until April 1952; Secretary of State after January 21, 1953
- Dunbar, Jerome C.** (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Earman, J.S.**, senior assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence
- Edwards, Colonel Sheffield** (USA), Assistant Deputy Director of Administration for Inspection and Security, Central Intelligence Agency, after March 1952
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.**, President of the United States
- Esterline, Jacob D.**, Western Hemisphere Division, PBSUCCESS
- Fortuny, José Manuel**, leader of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo until June 1954

## XX Persons and Pseudonyms

---

- Galbond, Oliver G.**, pseudonym for Colonel J.C. King
- Gutiérrez, Víctor Manuel**, leader of the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala
- Hedden, Stuart**, Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, until April 1953
- Hediger, Donald** (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Helms, Richard**, Chief of Operations, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
- Holland, Henry F.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs March 2, 1954–September 13, 1956
- Hunt, E. Howard** (Walter C. Twicker), case officer and Chief, Propaganda Branch, Central Intelligence Agency
- King, Colonel J.C.** (Oliver G. Galbond), Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
- Langevin, Paul D.**, pseudonym for David Atlee Phillips
- Leddy, Raymond G.**, Officer in Charge of Central American and Panama Affairs, Office of Middle American Affairs, Department of State, from January 1953
- Lynade, Pinckney E.**, pseudonym for Richard M. Bissell
- Magoffin, Francis D.** (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Mann, Thomas C.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs November 1950–July 1953
- Martínez, Major Alfonso** (retired), Director of the National Agrarian Department in the Arbenz government 1952–1954
- Miller, Edward G., Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs June 1949–December 1952
- Monzón, Colonel Elfego**, member of military junta of Guatemala June 28–29, July 3–September 1, 1954; leader of military junta June 29–July 3, 1954
- Ontrich, Matthew H.** (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Ordway**, pseudonym for General Charles P. Cabell
- Page, Graham L.** (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Peurifoy, John E.**, Ambassador to Guatemala November 1953–October 1954
- Phillips, David Atlee** (Paul D. Langevin), Field Director, Operation SHERWOOD
- Pivall, Vincent C.** (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Plydon, William D.**, pseudonym for Tracy Barnes
- Princep, Stirling D.** (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Reelfoot, Allen N.** (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Restrepo, Julio** (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Roosevelt, Kermit**, senior official, Central Intelligence Agency
- Schoenfeld, Rudolf E.**, Ambassador to Guatemala until October 19, 1953
- Seekford, Jacob R.** (pseudonym, identity not released)
- Smith, General Walter Bedell** (Starke), Director of Central Intelligence from October 7, 1950; Under Secretary of State February 9, 1953–October 1, 1954

**Somoza García, Anastasio**, President of Nicaragua May 1951–September 1956  
**Starke**, pseudonym for General Walter Bedell Smith

**Tofte, Major Hans V.**, member of the Psychological and Paramilitary  
Operations Staff, Deputy Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

**Toriello Garrido, Guillermo**, Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States  
September 1952–May 1954; Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs  
January–July 1954

**Trujillo, Molina Rafael L.**, President of the Dominican Republic until August  
1952; Secretary of State for Foreign Relations March–August 1953

**Truman, Harry S.**, President of the United States until January 1953

**Twicker, Walter C.**, pseudonym for E. Howard Hunt

**Wellbank, Clayton S.** (pseudonym, identity not released)

**Whiting, Harold S.**, pseudonym for Frank Wisner

**Willauer, Whiting**, Ambassador to Honduras from March 5, 1954

**Wisner, Frank** (Harold S. Whiting), Deputy Director for Plans, Central  
Intelligence Agency

**Ydígoras Fuentes, General Miguel**, Guatemalan presidential candidate dur-  
ing 1950 elections





# Introduction

By the beginning of the 20th century, Guatemala had evolved into a highly stratified society in which a tiny minority of elite coffee growers, linked to the country's ruling Liberal regime, gained increasing control over land and labor. Almost completely dependent on the production of a single export commodity, coffee, and subject to the vicissitudes of international markets, Guatemala's economy nearly collapsed with the onset of the Great Depression. Economic instability led to social and political unrest, particularly in Guatemala City, where bankruptcies and unemployment began to spiral out of control. In 1931 Guatemala's elite united to restore order and turned to the rule of a strongman or caudillo, Jorge Ubico Castañeda, to restore social stability and economic growth.

Ubico was given virtually unchecked powers, and upon assuming office he suspended constitutional guarantees and crushed all opposition, particularly from organized labor. To restore order he mandated rigid and summary enforcement of the law. Utilizing forced labor, often drafted from among the ranks of prisoners, he constructed public buildings, expanded road networks, and carried out public projects. To stabilize the economy, Ubico staunchly defended private property and landowners' legal rights to a guaranteed labor supply. He ensured this labor supply through new vagrancy laws which, while officially outlawing debt peonage, effectively reinforced it. In the public sector, he rooted out corruption, drastically cut government spending, and balanced the national budget; middle class bureaucrats bore the brunt of such austerity measures.

Ubico proved to be a staunch political and economic ally of the United States. When Pearl Harbor was attacked in December 1941, he declared war on Japan, Italy, and Germany. In support of the war effort, he eagerly welcomed the stationing of American troops in Guatemala and moved to dispossess German immigrants of their lands. Ubico was also a friend to American businesses in Guatemala. In particular he maintained amicable relations with the United Fruit Company, honoring contracts made with the company during the previous 30 years, while allowing the company to bow out of a contractual obligation to build a Pacific coast port.

By the mid-1940s the economy had fully stabilized and the country enjoyed substantial economic growth, which in turn contributed to the increasing emergence of a small, but clearly identifiable and upwardly mobile middle class. Inspired by Franklin D. Roosevelt's Four

Freedoms and the war against fascism and dictatorship in Europe and the Pacific, Guatemala's emergent middle class increasingly demanded political change within the country. When Ubico announced that he would remain in office until at least 1949, both the middle and upper classes protested. Students, bureaucrats and even junior military officers began to openly demand that the dictator step down. On July 1, 1944, Ubico yielded to this pressure and surrendered power to a junta led by General Federico Ponce Vaides. However, Ponce lasted only 3 months.

On October 19, 1944, a group of junior army officers, led by Captain Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán and Major Francisco Javier Arana, led a coup d'état, ousting Ponce and sending Ubico into exile. With both Ubico and Ponce out of the picture, Arbenz and Arana joined with a civilian businessman, Jorge Toriello Garrido, to form a revolutionary junta, then scheduled presidential elections for December 1944. Although several candidates initially entered the race, by December most of them had stepped aside, leaving Juan José Arévalo Bermejo and Adrián Recinos (Ubico's former ambassador to the United States). Almost alone in the field, Arévalo won the election, receiving 85 percent of the vote.

When he assumed the presidency in March 1945, Arévalo espoused what he termed "spiritual socialism," a philosophy that promoted nationalism and "freedom of spirit," while stressing the importance of the "dignity of man." The new president sought to reinforce this lofty, yet ambiguous philosophy, through the creation of a new constitution, which would protect basic rights, while allowing for moderate reform. Two of the document's articles had particular significance. Article 91 recognized the right to private property, except under circumstances in which that right might impinge upon the national interest. Article 92 narrowed Article 91's interpretation by indicating that the government would be legally empowered to expropriate land at any time to fulfill the needs of society at large. Although Arévalo never invoked Articles 91 and 92, Guatemala's landed elite were alarmed at such a possible threat to private property and accused Arévalo of succumbing to Communist influence. Even after the president purged his government of rightwing and leftwing extremists in July 1945, the allegations continued. In addition to calling him a Communist, opponents alternately labeled Arévalo a fascist or "Communist-fascist."

Initial positive U.S. perceptions of the Guatemalan president changed drastically in 1947, when he signed a labor protection law that implicitly targeted the United Fruit Company. Cables from the American Embassy in Guatemala City increasingly sounded the alarming message that Arévalo was allowing Communists to organize and had reputedly provided known Communists with support. Claims of

Arévalo's affiliation with Communists gained even greater credence in view of his apparently increasing tolerance of Communist activities in Guatemala and his sponsorship of the Caribbean Legion, a group of ostensibly reformist Latin Americans who plotted to overthrow dictatorships in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. A 1949 Central Intelligence Agency analysis described the Caribbean Legion as a destabilizing force capable of undermining "democratic" regimes, such as those in Nicaragua and El Salvador.<sup>1</sup> Notwithstanding an increasingly unfavorable regional and domestic climate, Arévalo completed his full term of office.

When elections finally came in 1950, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, one of the members of the revolutionary junta of 1944, ran almost unopposed on a platform that advocated agrarian reform. When he assumed office in early 1951, Arbenz inherited a country that had changed little during Arévalo's tenure and remained a seeming economic paradox. Compared with its Central American neighbors, Guatemala was a rich country. It enjoyed the region's highest gross domestic product (GDP), a per capita GDP second only to Costa Rica, and the strongest currency (stable and at par with the United States dollar) in the region. By 1945 Guatemala had established regional economic dominance in export agriculture, mining and quarrying, and manufacturing. However, in spite of its impressive economic performance, the country suffered from a highly skewed distribution of resources, which contributed to widespread indigence. A mere 2 percent of the population controlled more than 72 percent of Guatemala's arable land. Of all privately held land, less than 12 percent was being cultivated. In a country dedicated primarily to agriculture, this translated into sweeping poverty and malnutrition.

From the outset of his presidency, Arbenz attempted to tackle Guatemala's socioeconomic ills through a major agrarian reform. Guatemalan Communists—members of the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT)—were quick to support the new president's efforts. While Arévalo had been hesitant to work with the Communists, Arbenz welcomed their participation, and in late 1951 he secretly met with them to draw up an agrarian reform law. By May 1952 a draft bill for the reform had been submitted to Guatemala's National Assembly. The next month, on June 17, 1952, the bill was passed and President Arbenz promulgated Decree 900, the Agrarian Reform Law. Central to the PGT's revolutionary agenda, the 1952 law mandated the redistribution of idle lands in excess of 223 acres. Compensation for expropriated

---

<sup>1</sup> Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary File, Central Intelligence Agency, "The Caribbean Legion," ORE 11-49, March 17, 1949.

lands was provided in the form of 25 year bonds with 3 percent interest paid at the declared tax value of the lands in question.

The landed elite vehemently opposed any measure that would challenge their right to private property and immediately began publishing anti-reform pamphlets in which they complained that Communists had infiltrated the government. Complicating the situation, the United Fruit Company immediately recognized that, given its massive land holdings, it would feel the impact of the agrarian reform more than any other entity in the country. In stark contrast to the country's large landholders, Guatemalan peasants responded exuberantly to the reform. Indeed, for some the land redistribution did not move quickly enough; they resorted to land seizure and the occupation of large plantations.

As early as 1951—well before an agrarian reform law could be written, much less passed—the Central Intelligence Agency was already drawing up a contingency plan (code-named PBFORTUNE) to oust Arbenz. In the Agency's view, Arbenz's toleration for known Communists made him at best a "fellow traveler," and at worst a Communist himself. The social unrest that accompanied the passage and implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law supplied critics in Guatemala and Washington with confirmation that a Communist beachhead had been established in the Americas. Agrarian reform was not the issue—communism was. Action had to be taken before it was too late. Under orders from the State Department, PBFORTUNE and related contingency planning were supplanted by PBSUCCESS, an active plot to oust Jacobo Arbenz and free the hemisphere from the perceived dangers of Soviet-inspired international communism.

# Guatemala, 1952–1954

## 1. Editorial Note

In April 1952 Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza visited Washington unofficially and told aides to President Harry Truman that he and Carlos Castillo Armas would be able to take care of the Guatemalan problem if they were furnished with military weapons. The prospective rebels had financial backing from Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, as well as the United Fruit Company. (Nicholas Cullather, *Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952–1954*, pages 16–19; available on the Internet at <http://www.cia.gov>) A May 1 briefing memorandum from Secretary of State Acheson to President Truman on the Somoza visit without any reference to his proposal on Guatemala is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, volume IV, pages 1369–1371.

A Central Intelligence Agency draft paper of September 4, 1953, provides a history of the early days of the Guatemalan operation. It states: “In November 1951 the first of many meetings was held between Agency officials and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to discuss Guatemala.” The memorandum goes on to recount that in early 1952, after a careful survey of anti-Communist Guatemalan revolutionary leaders, “RUFUS,” an early cryptonym for Castillo Armas, was judged to be the only one with “sufficient prestige, character, and ability to organize and lead a successful revolution.” The plan was reviewed and approved; a D-day of November 15, 1952, was selected, and other states in the region offered assistance. “All went well until the shipment had actually left the warehouse en route to New Orleans. The Department of State refused an export license and at a meeting attended by the Under Secretary of State, his Deputy, the Assistant Secretary for Latin America, and representatives of this Agency, refusal of permit was sustained and a directive given that we were not to spark any revolutionary movement.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 151, Folder 4)

Action was rescheduled for April 1953, but an unconnected group led by Carlos Simmons attempted a revolt at Salamá, which “led to disaster for those involved” and the arrest of one of Castillo Armas’ key supporters. After the incident at Salamá, the CIA briefing paper indicated, a general apathy and fear apparently weakened the “spirit of resistance and willingness to fight of the 10,000 five-man cells” reportedly organized within Guatemala. The paper admitted that the original military plan “would have little or no chance of success if launched immediately,” but

argued that it would be possible to increase the odds to 80 percent in 4 to 6 months. It was recommended that “the trigger only be pulled if and when this prerequisite of 80% has been achieved.” (Ibid.)

---

2. **Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King) to the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 11, 1952.

SUBJECT

Estimate of Situation in Guatemala

*Communist Activities*

The Communists continue to be very active in Guatemala and continue to receive government support. Since the anti-Communist rioting in July 1951 the Communists have softened their overt campaign for immediate action in the political field, but they have forged ahead in the labor movement, succeeding in forming, under the guidance of Vicente Lombardo Toledano and Louis Saillant, a central labor organization comprising almost all the unions in the country. The Communist newspaper *Octubre* is published regularly and circulates freely. It has devoted its columns to anti-United States propaganda and to trying to aggravate the United Fruit Company's labor troubles. The Guatemalan Communists are small in number, but their influence in both government and labor is substantial.

*Anti-Communist Activities*

The Anti-Communist Party of Guatemala has been formed since the July rioting and has received strong support from the Catholic middle class and from Indians. The university students have furnished leadership to form a substantial bloc in the Party. They have requested

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 151, Folder 4. Secret. This memorandum is attached to a January 14 memorandum from J.S. Earman, Assistant to the Director, to Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Naval Aide to the President, that reads: “The Director of Central Intelligence has requested that the subject memorandum be shown to the President. It is to be noted that the information contained therein has not been coordinated with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.”

President Arbenz to dismiss the Communists holding positions in the Government, and to expel all foreign Communists. The movement continues to develop in all sections of the country.

### *Political Situation*

President Arbenz has shown no sign of changing the policy set by Arevalo as regards Communism. He has stated his opposition to the anti-Communist movement. Ramiro Ordonez Paniagua, leftist Minister of Government, has recently resigned and been replaced by Ricardo Chavez Nackman. Chavez is generally regarded as an anti-Communist. However, on 4 January 1952 he announced that the government had decided to ban all anti-Communist demonstrations. Colonel Paz Tejada, who had studiously avoided attending all Communist rallies, but who was forced to attend the last one as the representative of President Arbenz, has been replaced as Minister of Communications by Colonel Carlos Aldana Sandoval, an Arbenz supporter. Paz Tejada has been placed in charge of the construction of the highway to the Atlantic.

### *Economic Situation*

Arbenz inherited a very black economic picture, and the labor trouble and subsequent threat to withdraw from Guatemala by the United Fruit Company has made the outlook even darker.

### *Activity of Political Exiles*

At least three Guatemalan exile groups are plotting against the Arbenz regime. They are, in probable order of strength:

a) a group headed by Colonel Castillo Armas, former Comandante of the Escuela Militar, and now in Costa Rica, who originally planned a January 1952 uprising. It has been reported that Castillo Armas has been offered aid by the United Fruit Company and a Peruvian group, possibly the government;<sup>2</sup>

b) a group in Mexico headed by Colonel Arturo Ramirez who has been in exile since an attempted revolt in 1948. This group may be financed in part by American oil promoters;

c) supporters of General Ydigoras Fuentes, unsuccessful presidential candidate of the 1950 elections who is now in El Salvador.

The Castillo Armas and Ramirez groups have been in contact, but so far no agreement has been reached. If the two groups were to unite, a successful revolution might result.

<sup>2</sup> Some secondary sources describe Castillo Armas as the protégé of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza. See Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-54* (Princeton, 1991), p. 230.

*Conclusions*

Communist influence in the Guatemalan government continues to be serious. Rumors persist in Guatemala that President Arbenz is ill with leukemia. Efforts to verify these rumors are being made. In the event that Arbenz were forced to leave his office, Roberto Alvenado Fuentes, president of the Guatemalan congress, could constitutionally assume presidency. Such an eventuality would further aggravate the situation in Guatemala because Alvenado Fuentes is a strong Communist supporter having recently attended a Communist sponsored pro-peace meeting in Vienna.

J. Caldwell King<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

3. **Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 22, 1952, 2322Z.

23889. Re: TLB-1589.

1. It is requested that JULEP locate but not contact Carlos Castillo Armas if in Salvador or Honduras. If located, headquarters should be continually advised of major movements. Reference gives reported permanent [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] address in Honduras.

2. Authorization given for JULEP travel Honduras during investigation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 1. Secret; Priority.



4. Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

[place not declassified], January 25, 1952, 0859Z.

526. Ref [telegram indicator not declassified] 525.<sup>2</sup>

1. An army captain came Guatemala City 24 Jan from Jutiapa and stated Castillo Armas succeeded in delaying revolt, one of his reasons being few more days would make fall of Zacapa easier; also that Castillo Armas is on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] farm located both sides Guatemalan-Salvadoran border near Jutiapa.

2. Present indications governing triumvirate will be (1) Castillo Armas (2) Juan Cordova Cerna, see TGG 1359 (3) Oscar Mendoza, Guatemalan Military Attaché in Costa Rica, presently in Guatemala for appendectomy, or Colonel Elfego Monzon, minister without portfolio, or Colonel Marciano Casado who was forced leave country 29 Nov 51 at Tapachula Mexico.

3. Major Carlos Paz Tejada, recently removed as Minister of Communications and assigned Atlantic Highway Works, and Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz considered by students as pro-government. Latter but not former is liked by some army officers who support movement.

4. Colonel Monzon, although possible choice for triumvirate may be aware generally of planned revolt but not known to be taking part. Colonel Francisco Oliva, ex-chief of Coban (also RCVD, Toban) military establishment and ex-chief of staff for deceased Colonel Arana supporting movement.

5. Military Air Attaché report dated 22 Jan 52 and evaluated C 3 reports Carlos Enrique Diaz has created junta of self, Lt. Col. Jose Angel Sanchez Barillas and Col. Carlos Aldana Sandoval to take over government if president becomes too ill, or for other reason, to prevent occupation president's office by Alvarado Fuentes. *Comment:* This appears logical move of pro-government officers and could be used to dissipate support to Castillo Armas if his revolt shows indication of success. Source: Same as source 1 of ref cable. Distr: chargé d'affairs *only*.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 10, Folder 1. Secret; Routine.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid.)

5. **Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 26, 1952, 1938Z.

24629. 1. Hq. desires firm list top flight Communists whom new government would desire to eliminate immediately in event of successful anti-Communist coup.<sup>2</sup>

2. Request you verify following list and recommend additions or deletions: [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 145, Folder 12. Secret; Priority; [codeword not declassified]. A similar telegram was dispatched on January 29. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In a January 29 response the Chief of Station suggested additional names and noted: "Cannot say all on list are commies but their leanings are such that considered dangerous our interests. . . . Minimum action of arrest and deportation all on [text not declassified] list should be a new government's desire. Consider doubtful new govt. could long control without deportation majority on list." (Telegram to CIA Station in [place not declassified] January 29; *ibid.*, Box 7, Folder 1)

---

6. **National Intelligence Estimate**<sup>1</sup>

NIE-62

Washington, March 11, 1952.

PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA AND  
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1952

The Problem

To analyze the present political situation in Guatemala and possible developments during 1952.

Conclusions

1. The Communists already exercise in Guatemala a political influence far out of proportion to their small numerical strength. This influence will probably continue to grow during 1952. The political situation

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files. Secret. Another copy of this NIE is in Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1031-1037.

in Guatemala adversely affects US interests and constitutes a potential threat to US security.

2. Communist political success derives in general from the ability of individual Communists and fellow travelers to identify themselves with the nationalist and social aspirations of the Revolution of 1944.<sup>2</sup> In this manner, they have been successful in infiltrating the Administration and the pro-Administration political parties and have gained control of organized labor upon which the Administration has become increasingly dependent.

3. The political alliance between the Administration and the Communists is likely to continue. The opposition to Communism in Guatemala is potentially powerful, but at present it lacks leadership and organization. So far Communist-inspired Administration propaganda has succeeded in stigmatizing all criticism of Communism as opposition to the Administration and to the principles of the still popular Revolution of 1944.

4. Future political developments will depend in large measure on the outcome of the conflict between Guatemala and the United Fruit Company. This conflict is a natural consequence of the Revolution of 1944, but has been exacerbated by the Communists for their own purposes.

5. If the Company should submit to Guatemalan demands the political position of the Arbenz Administration would be greatly strengthened. It is probable that in this case the Government and the unions, under Communist influence and supported by national sentiment, would exert increasing pressure on other US interests, notably the Railway.<sup>3</sup>

6. If the Company should withdraw from Guatemala a worsening economic situation would probably result. It is unlikely, however, that the economic consequences during 1952 would be such as to threaten political stability unless there were a coincident and unrelated decline in coffee production, prices, or markets.

---

<sup>2</sup> A populist uprising in June 1944 ousted President Jorge Ubico from office. After several months of unrest, a group of young army officers, led by Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, forced Ubico's military successor General Ponce to resign. Democratic elections were held in December 1944, and Juan José Arévalo assumed the Presidency on March 15, 1945. For more information on the uprising, see Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*.

<sup>3</sup> International Railways of Central America (IRCA) was owned by United Fruit Company. The railway union, SAMEF, was one of the largest and best organized in Guatemala. Its attitude has been described as "extremely belligerent" and the union struck in 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1949, and 1950. See Jim Handy, *Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 1944-54* (Chapel Hill and London, 1994).

7. Any deterioration in the economic and political situations would tend to increase the Administration's dependence on and favor toward organized labor, with a consequent increase in Communist influence. However, it is unlikely that the Communists could come directly to power during 1952, even though, in case of the incapacitation of President Arbenz, his present legal successor would be a pro-Communist.<sup>4</sup>

8. In present circumstances the Army is loyal to President Arbenz, although increasingly disturbed by the growth of Communist influence. If it appeared that the Communists were about to come to power in Guatemala, the Army would probably prevent that development.

9. In the longer view, continued Communist influence and action in Guatemala will gradually reduce the capabilities of the potentially powerful anti-Communist forces to produce a change. The Communists will also attempt to subvert or neutralize the Army in order to reduce its capability to prevent them from eventually taking full control of the Government.

## Discussion

### *The Arbenz Administration*

10. The present political situation in Guatemala is the outgrowth of the Revolution of 1944. That Revolution was something more than a routine military coup. From it there has developed a strong national movement to free Guatemala from the military dictatorship, social backwardness, and "economic colonialism" which had been the pattern of the past. These aspirations command the emotional loyalty of most politically conscious Guatemalans and the administration of President Arbenz derives corresponding strength from its claim to leadership of the continuing national Revolution.

11. President Arbenz himself is essentially an opportunist whose politics are largely a matter of historical accident. Francisco Arana, the principal military leader of the Revolution of 1944, became Chief of the Armed Forces under President Arévalo and Arbenz, a lesser member of the military junta, became Minister of Defense. As the Arévalo Administration turned increasingly leftward in its policies Arana

---

<sup>4</sup> The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, would substitute the following paragraph: "Any deterioration in the economic and political situation would probably at first tend to increase the Administration's dependence on and favor toward organized labor, with a consequent increase in Communist influence. However, an economic crisis might force the Government to turn against the Communists in order to save its political position. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the Communists could come directly to power during 1952, even though the incapacitation of President Arbenz would bring a pro-Communist as his legal successor." [Footnote in the source text.]

opposed that trend. His possible election to the Presidency in 1951 became the one hope of moderate and conservative elements in Guatemala. In view of Arana's political position, Arbenz, his personal rival for military leadership, became the more closely associated with Arévalo and the leftist position in Guatemalan politics. The assassination of Arana in 1949 cleared the way for Arbenz' succession to the Presidency in 1951.

12. By 1951 the toleration of Communist activity which had characterized the early years of the Arévalo Administration had developed into an effective working alliance between Arévalo and the Communists. Arbenz, to attain the Presidency, made with the Communists commitments of mutual support which importantly affect the present situation. He did not, however, surrender himself completely to Communist control.

#### *Communist Strength and Influence*

13. The Communist Party of Guatemala has no more than 500 members, of whom perhaps one-third are militants. The Party, however, has recently reorganized and is actively recruiting, especially in Guatemala City, on the government-owned coffee plantations, and among United Fruit Company workers. It is in open communication with international Communism, chiefly through the Communist-controlled international labor organizations, the Latin American CTAL and the world-wide WFTU.

14. The Communists have achieved their present influence in Guatemala, not as a political party, but through the coordinated activity of individual Communists in the leftist political parties and labor unions which emerged from the Revolution of 1944. The extension of their influence has been facilitated by the applicability of Marxist clichés to the "anti-colonial" and social aims of the Guatemalan Revolution.

15. With the assistance of the Government, Communist and Communist-influenced labor leaders have been the most successful organizers of Guatemalan labor, especially among the United Fruit Company and government plantation workers.<sup>5</sup> Their formation of the General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers in 1951 and Government pressure for labor unity have facilitated the extension of their control over all organized labor. They have been less successful in converting to political Communism the mass of labor, which is illiterate

---

<sup>5</sup> For information on rural unionization and the almost constant labor union unrest from March 1945 throughout the Arévalo administration see Handy, *Revolution in the Countryside*, p. 28.

and politically inert. In the important railway workers' and teachers' unions there is opposition to association with Communism.

16. Through their control of organized labor and their influence within the pro-Administration political parties the Communists have been successful in gaining influential positions within the Government: in Congress, the National Electoral Board, the Institute of Social Security, the labor courts, the propaganda office, and the official press and radio. Their influence is extended by the presence of an indefinite number of Communist sympathizers in similar positions. The Communists do not fully control the Administration, however. Over their protests President Arbenz has recently dismissed a pro-Communist Minister of Education and appointed a non-Communist Minister of Communications.

17. If President Arbenz should become incapacitated his legal successor would be Julio Estrada de la Hoz, the President of Congress, an ardent nationalist but a Communist sympathizer. In this event, however, the Army would probably seize power itself in order to prevent the Communists from gaining direct control of the Government.

#### *The Anti-Communist Potential in Guatemala*

18. Various elements in Guatemala, including many loyal adherents of the Revolution of 1944, view with misgiving the rapid growth of Communist influence in that country. The principal elements of this latent anti-Communist potential are:

a. The Catholic hierarchy, implacably opposed to Communism. While its influence has been considerable, the Church has been handicapped by the small number of priests and by a lack of a constructive social program.

b. Guatemalan landholding and business interests. These interests, which are now enjoying prosperity, resent increasing taxes and labor costs, but so far have not been subjected to direct attack, as have corresponding foreign interests. They may shortsightedly hope for advantage at the expense of these foreign interests.

c. The strong railway workers' union, which has repudiated its adherence to the Communist-controlled Confederation and has ousted its former leaders.

d. A large proportion of university students and an important segment of leadership in the teachers' union.

e. The Army, which has shown some concern over the growth of Communist influence. The Army command is loyal to President Arbenz and to the Revolution of 1944, but is probably prepared to prevent a Communist accession to power.

19. So far, Communist-inspired Administration propaganda has been successful in stigmatizing all criticism of the Administration as opposition to the principles of the Revolution of 1944. So long as it remains possible to discredit opposition to Communism by identifying it with opposition to the Revolution of 1944 and with support of foreign "colonialism," it is unlikely that a coherent, sustained, and effective opposition to Communism will develop. Moreover, political dissatisfaction in Guatemala has been strong enough to unify the pro-Administration parties, and to prevent members of these parties from openly opposing the Communists. For the period of this estimate, therefore, it is likely that the alliance between the Administration and the Communists will continue, and that the potentially powerful opposition to Communism will remain ineffective.

#### *The United Fruit Company Crisis*

20. The United Fruit Company, which conducts extensive operations in nine Latin American countries, dominates Guatemalan banana production. The Company controls the only effective system of internal transportation, the International Railways of Central America. Through its merchant fleet the Company has a virtual monopoly of Guatemalan overseas shipping. It owns or leases large tracts of land in Guatemala and is second only to the Government as an employer of Guatemalan labor.

21. The important position of the United Fruit Company in their economy has long been resented by Guatemalan nationalists, regardless of the fact that the wages and workers' benefits provided by the Company were superior to any others in the country. When the Revolutionists of 1944 undertook to "liberate" Guatemala from "economic colonialism" they had the Company specifically in mind. The Government can therefore count on the support of Guatemalan national sentiment in its conflict with the Company.

22. The present crisis had its origin in the virtual destruction of the Company's principal Guatemalan plantation by wind storms in September 1951. In view of previous Communist-inspired labor troubles, the Company unsuccessfully demanded Government assurances against future increased labor costs before it would undertake to rehabilitate the plantation. Meanwhile the Company suspended some 4,000 out of the 7,000 workers at that plantation. With Government support, the Communist-led union demanded that these workers be reinstated with pay for the period of suspension and the labor court ruled in favor of the union. The Company refused to comply with the court's decision and in consequence certain of its properties have been attached to satisfy the workers' claim for back pay. The scheduled sale of these proper-

ties has been postponed, however, in circumstances which suggest the possibility of a compromise settlement of the dispute.

23. The Communists have an obvious ulterior purpose in forcing the issue with the Company. The Government, however, probably does not desire to drive the Company from Guatemala at this time, preferring that it remain in the country on the Government's terms. The Company's employees also have an interest in the continuation of its operations. For its part, the Company has an interest in preserving its investment in Guatemala.

*Possible Future Developments*

24. Future developments will depend in large measure on the outcome of the struggle between the United Fruit Company and the Guatemalan Government.

25. If the Company should submit to Guatemalan demands the political position of the Arbenz Administration would be greatly strengthened. The result, even if it were a compromise agreement, would be presented as a national triumph over "colonialism" and would arouse popular enthusiasm. At the same time the Company would continue its operations, paying taxes and wages. The Government and the unions, under Communist influence and supported by national sentiment, would probably proceed to exert increasing pressure against other US interests in Guatemala, notably the Railway.

26. If the Company were to abandon its investment in Guatemala there would also be a moment of national triumph, but it would soon be tempered by realization of the economic consequences of a cessation of the Company's operations. It is unlikely, however, that these consequences during 1952 would be severe enough to threaten the stability of the regime unless there were a coincident and unrelated decline in coffee production, prices, or markets.

27. Any deterioration in the economic and political situations would tend to increase the Administration's dependence on and favor toward organized labor, with a consequent increase in Communist influence. However, it is unlikely that the Communists could come directly to power during 1952, even though, in case of the incapacitation of President Arbenz, his present legal successor would be a pro-Communist.<sup>6</sup>

28. If during 1952 it did appear that the Communists were about to come to power by any means, the anti-Communist forces in Guatemala would probably move to prevent that development. In particular, the Army command would probably withdraw its support from the Administration and seize power itself.

---

<sup>6</sup> The footnote in the source text at this point is the same as footnote 4 above.



29. In the longer view, continued Communist influence and action in Guatemala will gradually reduce the capabilities of the potentially powerful anti-Communist forces to produce a change. The Communists will also attempt to subvert or neutralize the Army in order to reduce its capability to prevent them from eventually taking full control of the Government.

---

7. **Memorandum From the Acting Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (*[name not declassified]*) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 17, 1952.

SUBJECT

Guatemalan Situation

1. Conversations between Mr. *[name not declassified]* and *[name not declassified]* in New Orleans on 13 March 1952 revealed that Col. Castillo Armas is unable to leave Tegucigalpa, Honduras, and *[name not declassified]* is unable to leave Guatemala, at this time. *[name not declassified]* verified that only he and Mr. *[name not declassified]* are aware of U.S. Government interest in this matter. He indicated his belief that Castillo Armas and *[name not declassified]* have a good chance of succeeding, but also indicated uncertainty as to their plans, resources, requirements, and opposition. *[name not declassified]* cooperation was complete to the extent of *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* in order to complete the conversations. His orders to *[name not declassified]* in Mexico City directed full cooperation.

2. Conversations between Mr. *[2 names not declassified]* in Mexico City on 14 March 1952 confirmed that *[name not declassified]* is not fully informed on present opposition plans, resources, requirements, and their opposition although he is in communication with and has the full confidence of Castillo Armas and *[name not declassified]* Castillo has the moral, and possibly some material, support of ex-President Carias of Honduras and the good will of President Galvez. He has been promised the support of President Somoza of Nicaragua who has offered to send

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 1. Secret.

a personal representative with him to ask aid of President Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. [name not declassified] indicated that he is not certain of the chances for success of any movement at this time, but expressed confidence that sufficient opposition to the present Guatemalan regime exists or can be generated and mobilized to insure the success of a well organized movement. He verified that Castillo Armas can not leave Tegucigalpa at present because of pressure by Guatemala on President Galvez of Honduras. (Galvez has promised [name not declassified] that in an emergency Castillo can leave Tegucigalpa.) [name not declassified] feels that Guatemalan refusal to allow [name not declassified] to leave that country resulted from suspicion cast on [name not declassified] by [name not declassified], who has been working for the Assistant U.S. Air Attaché, Major Chavez, and is doubtless in Guatemalan Government pay. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Although [name not declassified] would not commit himself, he has been refused permission to leave Guatemala.

3. The lack of intelligence available at this time makes it imperative that this deficiency be corrected before final plans can be made.

4. In consultation with the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Mexico City, and [name not declassified] on 15 March 1952, and later with Mr. [name not declassified] on the same date, the following course of action was evolved:

a) [name not declassified] will return to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in La Lima, Honduras, the week of 18 March 1952. At his suggestion Castillo Armas will prepare a complete Order to Battle to include all details of Guatemalan Government and opposition strength. From his other sources [name not declassified] will fill in all possible missing details.

b) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], San Salvador, will contact [name not declassified] in Tegucigalpa during the week of 25 March 1952 to receive the first report and arrange for the transmission of weekly reports [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Reports will be forwarded to Headquarters with copies to [place not declassified].

c) A prominent Mexican anti-Communist [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] leader will visit Guatemala the week of 18 March 1952 to establish contact with Guatemalan anti-Communist [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] leaders for the purpose of gaining intelligence and providing support.

d) A prominent Mexican anti-Communist leader has been refused admittance to Guatemala because of his anti-Communist activities. His exclusion from Guatemala will be widely publicized, but his group will receive intelligence from and render support to the organized anti-Communist group in Guatemala headed by Carlos Simmons.

e) The formation of a Free Guatemalan Committee in [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] will be expedited.

f) As the required intelligence becomes available the PW campaign against the present Guatemalan Government will be intensified. All PW weapons will be utilized under the direction of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

g) As the PW campaign develops, parallel efforts to swing the balance of power to the opposition will utilize all resources to unite and strengthen the opposition and weaken the present government. If the Guatemalan Government does not fall of its own weight it is conceivable that more direct measures may eventually become necessary, and planning for such an emergency will proceed. However, at this time, the primary effort in this field must be directed toward forestalling any premature attempt to take over the government by force.

[*2 paragraphs (16 lines of source text) not declassified*]

[*name not declassified*]

## Attachment

### CARLOS CASTILLO ARMAS

Born: 1914

5' 5", 135 lbs., slender, black hair, dark brown eyes

Strong personality; soft and slow speaking; serious, hard worker; intelligent, amenable to ideas; analytical mind; studious; light drinker.

Education:

6 years of primary school

2 years Industrial Technical School of Guatemala

3 years basic military studies at the Military Academy

6 months specialized in Artillery at the Military Academy

1 year basic course in School of Applied Tactics, Guatemala

3 months, General Staff course (Ground) Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas

4-1/2 months, Service Course at Ft. Leavenworth.

Career:

Entered the Military Academy—June 1933

Graduated—June 1936

Captain—June 1939

Major—June 1944

Lt. Colonel—

Commander of Artillery Unit, Ft. Matamoros—1936–1937.

Instructor of Artillery, Ft. Matamoros—1937–1942.  
Chief of Artillery of the Atlantic Sector—1942–1944.  
First Chief of Expeditionary Force for the Defense of the Atlantic Sector—July 1944.

Instructor of Artillery, Ft. San Jose—Sept. to Oct., 1944.  
Chief, G-4 Section, General Staff, Oct. 1944–June 1945.  
Chief, G-3 Section, General Staff, June 1945–November 1945.  
Sub-Director of Military Academy, Nov. 1945 to March 1947.  
Professor of Tactics, Second Course, Military Academy, May 1946–Mar. 1947.

Director of Military Academy—March 1947 until early 1949. Then transferred to become chief of garrison at Mazatenango, a secondary post.

Detailed to visit USMA in Sept. 1947.

Definitely pro-American. Cooperated with U.S. missions and the Military Attaché.

On Saturday, 27 August 1949, the government police arrested Castillo Armas, Chief of Mazatenango garrison. Castillo was an Aranista. When the government called for him to send troops to the capital on 18 July 1949, he arranged to have his soldiers miss the train which stopped in Mazatenango for them. Following the 18th, he was naturally very much out of favor with the government, and he resigned his army commission and became a civilian. As a civilian he appears to have started organizing a revolutionary movement immediately.

Castillo Armas is well-known for his integrity and patriotism. He has made no secret of his opposition to the present moral corruption of those in power. He has steadfastly refused to accept any position offered by Arbenz, apparently not wishing to compromise his reputation by being associated with the regime.

Castillo Armas led an armed attack on the Military Base the 5th of November 1950. In the attempt, he was wounded. The movement failed, and he was imprisoned.

(According to the Air/Attaché—reports say that Castillo Armas is a very close personal friend of Arbenz—but the law had to be complied with regarding such revolutionary acts by an officer in the Guatemalan army.)

The evening of 11 June 1951, Castillo Armas escaped from the National Prison, took refuge in one of the embassies, and was granted salvo conducto to El Salvador.

8. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in *[place not declassified]*<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 22, 1952, 1753Z.

32567. Re: *[telegram indicator not declassified]*113.<sup>2</sup>

1. Agree Castillo must be contacted. Hope *[name not declassified]* can handle.

2. *[name not declassified]* will contact you probably 25 March. With you he should ascertain: (1) opposing forces, (2) opportunity for buying support, particularly Army Guardia Civil and key gov't figures, for immobilizing forces not buyable through student *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* or labor inspired action, (3) all details required for estimating success of proposed movement and how we can assist.

3. *[name not declassified]*, not witting at present of our intent to aid but is fully cleared.

4. Submit full report of conversations.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 1. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

---

9. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 16, 1952.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Mr. Thomas Corcoran on 15 April re *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*

Mr. Corcoran had a talk with Monsignor Carroll, the purpose of which was to induce the Monsignor to assign to Central America, and particularly to Guatemala, a group of teacher-missionaries who are active young Americans and who have been recalled from China. Much to Mr. Corcoran's surprise, the Monsignor took the position that he had

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 1. Secret. Drafted by Hedden. A handwritten note by Stuart Hedden at the bottom of the page reads: "Apr 28—Gen. Smith approved *[name not declassified]* and asked me to have *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*."

very little interest in dissipating his strength in Central America; that he needed these men as teachers and administrators here and that he was going to keep them here. Mr. Corcoran told him that he had no doubt of the useful purpose that could be served by these men in this country but that, in his opinion, the Church had one major enemy today—Communism; that this country was in no immediate danger from that enemy, but that the entire position of the Church in Central and South America was in great danger from that enemy. He asked the Monsignor if he knew General Smith and suggested that it might be worthwhile for him to have a talk with General Smith to get an appraisal of the seriousness of the situation in Central and South America and he referred to the Argentine. Mgr. Carroll replied that he was planning to telephone General Smith and ask for an appointment, but that he did not know him although his brother knew him well in North Africa. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[4 paragraphs (17 lines of source text) not declassified]

SH

---

10. **Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], June 25, 1952.

600. Re: [telegram indicator not declassified] 596.<sup>2</sup>

Following is detailed summary information furnished by [name not declassified] 24 June and language used which indicates opinions are his.

1. Group has opportunity buy for \$50,000 enough arms and ammunition to arm 650 men with sufficient strength to start armed revolt with good results. Arms consist of 500 hand grenades, 180 machine guns, 500 automatic rifles and about 600,000 rounds ammunition. Arms and ammo are already within the city limits and can get them in 24 hours after group

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 10, Folder 1. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid.)

has the money. Person with whom dealing is of utmost confidence and giving property valued at more than \$50,000 as security. As further security group could keep under control for 48 hours the men who receive the money until merchandise received and determined to be satisfactory. Important have tear gas bombs and request we secure some.

2. As to flying boats would have an airport in control of group and location could be told at right moment. (Indicates) Flying boats should carry flame throwers, automatic arms and machine guns. Use would be to support movement after fighting starts. (Claims) Air force presently has only four old planes which can operate.

3. Revolt to take place in Guatemala City in daring coup involving several important military and government points. Detailed manner (of operation) already prepared. Could have govt disorganized in about six hours of fighting. Once [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] high officials eliminated and no govt to obey knows can get some army officers give help. Have enough men not presently in army who know arms well and previously in armed forces. Preparations already made for use about 400 men who are ready to act within short notice. They only know they are about to enter action.

4. Already has prepared group of professional gunmen to eliminate communists and control the unions which are well armed. Action by them to be timed with overall movement.

5. Can produce some revolts in interior if desire attract attention of govt. No pledges received from military (active) officers but think possible get pledges last minute. Cannot trust any inactive service now.

6. Would be best to have junta including civilians and military men but this not definitely discussed yet (within group).

7. Have no assistance of men or material in neighboring countries but know of group working on that subject and could get their support if could interest that group at precise moment.

8. Funds to be used are 50,000 for mentioned arms and ammo, 20,000 representing 2,000 for each gunman in the elimination of the important communist, the latter to be paid in U.S. dollars after job done. Remainder for other expenses including salaries, foodstuffs and other emergencies such as bribing army officers at last moment.

9. Cannot be sure of success but if operate within short period have chance "maybe as good as 50-50". Intend operate if possible within two weeks. Comments: Am most doubtful plan will succeed in view absence any pledged army support. Statements do not indicate [*name not declassified*] actually has adequate confidence. Attempt should definitely be timed with Castillo Armas efforts of which presume you informed and can judge whether [*name not declassified*] not willing take such revelation.

**11. Editorial Note**

According to the recollections of several U.S. officials, Nicaraguan President Somoza approached Colonel Neil Mara, Assistant Military Aide to President Truman, in early July 1952 with a plan to overthrow Arbenz. Mara's report convinced Truman, who immediately authorized CIA action without informing the Department of State. See Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, pages 239–240, and Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, pages 120 ff. See also *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, volume IV, pages 1041–1043.

Little documentation on the beginning of the operation was found. See Documents 13, 21, and 22.

---

**12. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 9, 1952.

SUBJECT

Guatemalan Situation

*Summary:*

The growing Communist tendencies of the present Guatemalan Government have alienated the majority of Guatemalans to such an extent that a popular uprising to overthrow the government is to be expected as a normal reaction. Forces supporting the government are confined to the Communists and fellow-travelers and to those members of the Armed Forces and labor who have benefited materially under the present regime. The recent passage of the Agrarian Reform Act, which makes land available to all Guatemalans in the Communist pattern, is expected to win further adherents to the government although it is opposed to the landowning class whose influence will wane as the Act takes effect.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 69, Folder 1. Secret; Eyes Only.



Armed action against the government has been planned and pending since early this year and is now imminent. Details of the plan for such action, which follows through to the establishment of a democratic government, are known to us. [name not declassified] considers that if proper support can be provided the plan is feasible and practical and has a good chance of succeeding if it is put in effect by 1 September 1952.

Col. Castillo Armas, now resident in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, is the leader of the movement which is supported by organized groups in Honduras, El Salvador, Mexico and Guatemala. Cordova Cerna, resident in Guatemala City, is Castillo's man in Guatemala. Carlos Simons, resident in Guatemala City, is the leader of another large anti-government group in Guatemala which is planning armed action, but which is not as yet working in coordination with Castillo. Coordination is being effected. These three are of exceptional ability and character and are fast friends of the U.S.

Castillo's movement has the moral support of President Somoza of Nicaragua and of President Galves of Honduras, and it is believed that material support from these two men would be forthcoming if they could be assured of U.S. approval.

Castillo's plan envisages moving against the government with clandestine armed forces from the borders of Mexico, El Salvador and Honduras and from the sea on Puerto Barrios in conjunction with internal revolt. He can arm the group in Mexico through purchase of matériel in that country and his other forces have some arms available. However, he will require assistance with matériel from some sources outside the area. His requests for combat air support are not considered to be necessary, but his request for air transport support should be met. His requests for shipping support can be met through procurement in the area. Simons can procure arms locally for his part in the action. Considerable local financial support has already been obtained by both Castillo and Simons, but further support is indicated. Castillo's additional financial needs are estimated at \$175,000 and Simons' at \$50,000, to include purchase of arms available in the area.

#### *Conclusions:*

1. Armed action in Guatemala is imminent.
2. The success of any action undertaken without further outside support is questionable and may well result in the elimination of all effective anti-Communist opposition in Guatemala.
3. Support in the form of direction, arms and equipment, enlisting the aid of area chiefs of state, finances, and air transport and shipping support can guarantee a good chance of success.

*Recommendations:*

1. That two more men from WHD be sent to [place not declassified] to assist the men now there in advising on operations.
2. That support with arms and equipment be provided. (These to be returnable upon successful conclusion of the operation.)
3. That Somoza and Galvez be informed that any assistance they give to Castillo will not reflect to their discredit.
4. That financial support in the amount of \$225,000 be provided. (This amount to be reimbursable upon the successful conclusion of the operation.)
5. That air transport and ocean shipping support be arranged by the other parties interested in the operation.<sup>2</sup>

[name not declassified]

---

<sup>2</sup> A July 22 memorandum for the record by Stuart Hedden set the support in motion: "At 10:45 a.m. today, Mr. Dulles gave Mr. Wisner, and Mr. Wisner accepted, complete responsibility for providing immediately a cover story, a place on the Eastern Seaboard available to freighters and manifest clearings for the inventory to be made available in this matter." (Ibid., Box 7, Folder 1)

---

**13. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 15, 1952.

SUBJECT

Western Hemisphere Division

1. Mr. Dulles and I had a talk this noon with T. We assured him that, the pros and cons having been weighed, we looked with favor upon a change of management. We told him that we thought his clients, however, should pay the bill as the clients' interests were materially involved. We stated that we could not be of any help in providing either leadership or manpower because we did not have the people available, but we thought we could be helpful in pointing out where the principals might buy the goods they needed. We further stated that if time were of the essence, we had friends who had inventory which we could induce them to turn over

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 2. Drafted by Stuart Hedden.

on the assurance of his clients that it would be repaid in money or in kind when the business became established. He raised the question of money and indicated several legal impedimenta which made it very difficult for his clients to put up any money in advance. He asked whether we would advance the money upon the assurance of his clients that it would be repaid. We told him we would not cross that bridge until it was the only one left, and pointed out that there were other possible clients who might go into a syndicate with his clients. He said he knew of one such group which already had enough money to provide the cash working capital if the inventory could be acquired on credit as above and asked whether we were in a position to bring this syndicate together with his clients. We told him we thought his clients were in a better position to do this.

2. After Mr. Dulles left, I learned that the head of the syndicate in question will be in New York Wednesday and T arranged to bring his clients to New York to see if their interests could be joined.

S.H.

---

#### 14. Memorandum of Conference<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 21, 1952.

##### MEMORANDA OF CONFERENCE, MONDAY, JULY 21st WITH MESSRS. M, M, AND J

I showed the draft of the cable we proposed to send and, with the deletion of the reference to DYMAROON, the cable was approved, after explanations on my part as to the identity of the pseudonyms and as to what we had been doing with KMEGGCUP in the field of psychological warfare. The second M spoke very highly of the effectiveness of this P.W. work which he said had been handled quite largely from the country to the North. He felt that these activities might well be stepped up.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 2. Secret. An attached routing slip addressed to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division from Richard Helms (DD/P) dated February 5, 1962, reads: "I received this file today from Mr. Allen Dulles. I am sending it to you for appropriate disposition. Please insure that any important memoranda in this file are incorporated in the basic PBSUCCESS for the record."

I then referred to the three questions which had been put to the second M and which BS later had put to B. There was general agreement as to the desired result. The only question was whether we could play any part in achieving it without alerting anyone as to the source of possible aid. I said that the purpose of the cable was to remove any local people from any direct or indirect contact with the activities. I also said we were calling back an undercover contact man we had in the country to the South. He might return but we would decide that after a conference.

In reply to any inquiry I said that no cash had been made available and that I had some doubt as to whether this was needed in view of the intervention of certain rich parties, whom I identified. However, it was possible that we might lead Calligeris' men or cutouts to certain hardware which was available. All activities, with respect to the hardware, would be restricted as far as we were concerned to this country and handled through cutouts.

I pointed out that whatever happened in the country in question, people up here would be blamed and that the important thing was that the operation should be successful, if there was to be one. On this point I said that most of the experts seemed to feel that this was most likely. I recognize that for every hundred rumors of this nature, only one materialized; in this case, however, it looked as though something were likely to happen.

I emphasized that we realized the very sensitive nature of this activity and that it would be handled with the utmost care.

The first M then referred to the activities of a certain Col. Mara, his relations with S, and how he had flown to N with S and had apparently come back with a report on the situation in the country of our interest, which was in the hands of the Boss.<sup>2</sup> Whether this was prepared by the good Colonel or by S was not known. All this had come about after S had boasted at a luncheon with the Boss that with 600 pieces of hardware he would "knock off" A. Among others who were present and who knew all about this was S's man here in Washington. I suggested that this again was evidence that if anything happened, there would be plenty of other persons to blame for it.

---

<sup>2</sup> See Document 11. No record was found of Mara's trip to Nicaragua with Somoza.

**15. Editorial Note**

In late August 1952 the Central Intelligence Agency informed Castillo Armas that the Guatemalan Government had intercepted his letters to supporters in Mexico. Castillo Armas reported, however, that he knew about the government's paid agent and had instructed his supporters to avoid him, but he acknowledged that the agent had likely received information from conversations with his men. (Memorandum from [name not declassified] to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, September 18, 1952; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 73, Folder 3)

---

**16. Intermediate Report on Military Plans for Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 1, 1952.

**SUBJECT**

Calligeris' visit to General Somoza

1. On 30 September 1952 Calligeris returned from a visit with General Somoza.<sup>2</sup> He was well received and assured by Somoza that he would be given all the support necessary. Calligeris was very pleased with the results of the visit.

2. Specifically, General Somoza promised the following:

a. That he would agree to and assist in the movement of arms into and through Nicaragua.

b. That he would provide the assembly area, the embarkation point, and the landing craft necessary to assemble and embark Calligeris' force scheduled to capture Puerto Barrios in a water-borne operation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 134, Folder 6. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the cover page reads: "Un-numbered Report, 1 Sept. '52." This memorandum is the first part of the report. The other six parts, none printed, are entitled: 2. Carl Simmons; 3. Movement of Arms From the U.S. to Nicaragua; 4. Movement of Arms by Truck from Managua, Nicaragua to Guatemala; 5. Schedule for Advancing Funds to Calligeris; 6. Time Schedule for Operations; and 7. Suspension of Gasoline Deliveries to Guatemala by United States Oil Companies.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably the date of the meeting should be July 30, 1952, soon after Somoza's meeting with Colonel Mara; see Document 14.

c. That he would furnish some personnel. (Calligeris has asked for about 40 men, including radio operators and mortar men.)

d. That he would provide bomber aircraft.

e. That he had talked to General Trujillo and the latter would give all aid possible. General Somoza will maintain liaison with General Trujillo and see to it that all help asked for is forthcoming.

3. General Somoza stated that no transport planes are available.

4. He stated that Calligeris will have to pay all expenses for his men while they are in Nicaragua, i.e. travel, food, and maintenance.

5. Within the next few days Calligeris proposes to place one or more of his officers in Managua to make the detailed arrangements. Calligeris has requested, and most strongly so, that our group place a man there in a liaison capacity to work with General Somoza.

6. The General was extremely busy during Calligeris' visit because he had just returned from his trip. As a result he had his son go over the plan with Calligeris. The General's son spent most of his time cutting down the list of arms and equipment that Calligeris had presented.

7. On the matter of transport aircraft, when Calligeris was told that none were available (by Somoza's son), he stated, as instructed by us, that all equipment provided would [be] replaced in kind. Calligeris states that the aircraft are available but that the matter will have to be taken to the General. It is for that reason particularly that he would like one of our people there. Calligeris expects to get everything he asks for except aircraft (transport). On that matter he frankly feels he needs our help.

---

17. **Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], September 12, 1952, 1632Z.

[telegram indicator not declassified] 605. Ref: DIR 18338.<sup>2</sup>

Somoza advised Ambassador Whelan that he and Trujillo have agreed on Guatemala and would take care of situation. Venezuela apparently has agreed to cooperate. Details of Somoza-Trujillo agreement and plans not presently available. Source TNN 560 not yet

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 14, Folder 1. Top Secret; Routine.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

advised of plans but will furnish on receipt. Due to illness and preoccupation with other matters Somoza has not yet briefed DYMAROON on plans but has advised that he will do so. Advise if hqs desirous of receiving information obtained from DYMAROON by cable.

---

18. **Memorandum From Jacob R. Seekford to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 18, 1952.

SUBJECT

Liaison Between Calligeris and General Trujillo of Santo Domingo

1. On 12 September 1952 an agent from General Trujillo, one Félix W. Bernardino, arrived in Honduras for a conference with Calligeris.<sup>2</sup>

2. Bernardino stated that General Trujillo desired and was prepared to aid Calligeris with arms, aircraft, men, and money.

3. In return for this help General Trujillo asked that four (4) Santo Dominicanos, at present residing in Guatemala, be killed a few days prior to D-Day. (Names of the four men are not at present available.)

4. Calligeris stated that he would be glad to carry out the executive action, but that it could not be done prior to D-Day for security reasons. He pointed out that his own plans included similar action and that special squads were being designated. Bernardino was assured that the action could and would be carried out on D-Day.

5. Calligeris is confident that this matter can be resolved between him and General Trujillo.

6. Further conferences are scheduled.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 134, Folder 6. No classification marking. A typed note at the top of the page reads: "Report # 3."

<sup>2</sup> Source comment—Félix Bernardino is one of General Trujillo's most trusted men. He is employed at present in the Dominican Consulate, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, Suite 1235, New York City. [Footnote in the source text.]

## 19. Editorial Note

On September 26, 1952, Nicaraguan Ambassador Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas C. Mann discussed briefly Nicaragua's plans for organizing a group of Central American states to overthrow Arbenz. Mann invited the Ambassador to return a few days later to discuss the matter in more detail.

They met again on September 29. Assuring the Ambassador that he was speaking officially, Mann said that the United States thought it unwise to talk about such a "military adventure." He explained: "The United States has subscribed to principles in the UN and the OAS which are inconsistent with military adventures of this kind, and we would find it difficult to fight aggression in Korea and be a party to it in this hemisphere. . . . Furthermore, the proposal was, as a practical matter, reckless since it would not be possible to maintain secrecy as is illustrated by the fact that the Department already has received vague press inquiries concerning the plan." The full text of the September 29 memorandum of conversation, including a reference to the September 26 conversation, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, volume IV, pages 1372–1375.

On October 3 Deputy Assistant Secretary Mann informed Secretary of State Acheson of information the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs had received from foreign government sources, in the event the subject was raised at the UN General Assembly session scheduled to open on October 4. The memorandum noted: "President Somoza of Nicaragua apparently has gained the impression, however mistakenly, that a military venture directed at the overthrow of the present Guatemalan Government would have the blessing of the United States." The Ambassador of the Dominican Republic reported that Rafael Trujillo had learned from President Somoza in August of "understandings" arrived at "between himself and President Truman in Washington with regard to anti-communist activities in the Caribbean and particularly in Guatemala."

The memorandum concluded that "it has been adduced that (1) A military plan against Guatemala had already been formulated; (2) only a leader is required to put the plan in action; (3) it is hoped to carry out the plan this year; and (4) all elements concerned would like to have a 'green light' from the U.S. and tangible support in arms." Mann assured the Secretary that Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa had been told that the United States would not condone military intervention by one American state against another. For the complete text of the memorandum, see *ibid.*, pages 1041–1043.



When Secretary of State Dean Acheson learned that arms were being shipped illegally from New Orleans to Nicaragua for the Guatemalan coup, he immediately discussed the matter with Truman who forbade the vessel to proceed. (See Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, pages 239–240 and Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala*, pages 120 ff.)

## 20. Report<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 8, 1952.

Project started prior to 12 Mar 52 with approach to Dir through Mr. Hedden by Tom Corcoran and [name not declassified], who asked for assistance to Castillo Armas and Cordova Cerna movement.

Dir much interested in movement and sent [name not declassified] to find out particulars. Only Dulles, King and [name not declassified] informed at this time.

[name not declassified] talked to [name not declassified] in N.O. 12 Mar 52 and to [name not declassified] in Mexico on 13 Mar 52. [name not declassified] and Hunt brought in on 14 Mar 52 and later talked to [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] in Mexico to get details of plan.

Details of plan received in May 52 and Gen. Edson brought in as military advisor. Edson reviewed plans and asked for further details 10 May 52.

[name not declassified] sent to Honduras [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in May 52 to contact Castillo Armas, advise, and get answers. His first reports left Salvador 23 Jun 52.

14 Jul 52 decision to aid with matériel made and Wisner, [name not declassified], Tofte, [3 names not declassified] briefed. It was necessary to spring matériel assigned to FE & WE.<sup>2</sup>

24 Jul 52 [name not declassified] to Raritan with Maj. Burkett to pass on matériel and packing.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 69, Folder 1. Top Secret. Attached but not printed are a list of involved CIA personnel with their contact addresses and telephone numbers; a handwritten tally sheet of monetary disbursements to Castillo Armas, [name not declassified], and various CIA Stations; and handwritten notes on preliminary planning.

<sup>2</sup> The last sentence was added by hand.

1 Aug 52 [2 *names not declassified*] met with [*name not declassified*] in N.Y. Aid with matériel in abeyance, but probable. No financial aid indicated.

12 Aug 52 Dir through Hedden says matériel aid will be given.

16 Aug 52 [2 *names not declassified*] met with [*name not declassified*] in Baltimore. Aid will be forthcoming and arrangements for moving and receiving matériel to be made at other end.

18 Aug Dir tells [*name not declassified*] in presence of Dulles and Adm. Sauer to submit recommendations.

9 Sep 52 Dir approved [*name not declassified*] recommendations to aid Castillo Armas.

10 Sep 52 [*name not declassified*] wants to crack Guats in Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador before going further since entry in Mexico indicates they know something.

11 Sep 52 [*name not declassified*] in N.Y. to talk to [*name not declassified*] and Dominican consul. King and Hedden talked to [*name not declassified*] in N.Y., later King and [*name not declassified*] to [*name not declassified*] in Washington. [*name not declassified*] has raised \$38,000 and is pinning hopes on [*name not declassified*]. Says Dominicans will help.

4 Oct 52 Dir tells [*name not declassified*] in presence of Wisner to get the show on the road.

8 Oct 52 State stops the show.

Gen Edson has complete plans and has been alerted to assist with cover and deception plan. He has talked to [*name not declassified*] in Mexico.

[*name not declassified*] is in Honduras [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] & has propaganda plans for cover & deception.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> The final sentence was added by hand.

21. **Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 8, 1952.

SUBJECT

Guatemala

1. Early in July<sup>2</sup> Mr. Dulles, Mr. Hedden, [name not declassified] and myself visited the State Department where we had a conference at which were present Assistant Secretary of State Miller, his Deputy, Mr. Mann, and Mr. Robert P. Joyce. The CIA delegation posed the following three questions: (as well as I can remember)

1. Would the State Department like to see a different government in Guatemala?

2. Would the State Department oppose a government established by the use of force?

3. Does the State Department wish CIA to take steps to bring about a change of government?

2. The first question was answered positively. The second question was answered negatively. The third question was not answered clearly but by implication, positively.

3. Mr. Dulles asked me to make a Memorandum of Conversation in long-hand and deliver the one copy to him. I did this and waited in his office while he showed it to the Director. In a few minutes I was called into the Director's office, and it was soon clear that the Director was dissatisfied with the lack of a direct answer to the third question. He then telephoned to Mr. Bruce to make arrangements for a meeting.

4. I later gathered from Mr. Dulles that the Director had received a satisfactory answer from Mr. Bruce.

[name not declassified]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 69, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> According to Document 22, the meeting was held on July 10.

22. Chronology Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 8, 1952.

CHRONOLOGY OF MEETINGS LEADING TO  
APPROVAL OF PROJECT A

1. 10 July 1952

A meeting was held in the office of Assistant Secretary of State Miller to discuss Project A. Those present: Mr. Miller, Mr. Mann, Mr. Joyce, Mr. Spalding, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Hedden, Mr. [name not declassified] and [name not declassified]. Project was approved by inference. Details of the meeting are covered in memorandum of Mr. [name not declassified]'s dated 8 October.<sup>2</sup> Original paper is believed to be in Mr. Dulles' files.

2. 11 July 1952

A meeting was held in the Director's office. Those present: the Director, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Hedden, Mr. [name not declassified]. A report was made of the previous day's meeting with State. The Director was dissatisfied with the inconclusive position taken by Mr. Miller and Mr. Mann. He telephoned to make an appointment to discuss Project A with Under Secretary of State Bruce.

3. 12 August 1952

A meeting was held in Mr. Hedden's office. Those present: Mr. Hedden, Mr. [name not declassified] and [name not declassified]. Mr. Hedden stated that authority to furnish matériel was given.

4. 13–14 August 1952

A meeting was held in Mr. Dulles' office. Those present: Mr. Dulles, Mr. Hedden, and Mr. [name not declassified]. Conversation seemed to be carried on on the assumption that action was being taken. Mr. [name not declassified] specifically asked Mr. Dulles whether we had the "green light" and Mr. Dulles replied affirmatively, stating that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had been told that they could have the matériel if and when they would indicate where they wished to pick it up. (At this or at a previous conference, Mr. Dulles mentioned that the Director had had conversations with Under Secretary of State Bruce.)

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 69, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Document 21.

5. 18 August 1952

A meeting was held in the Director's office. Those present: The Director, Admiral Sauer, Mr. Dulles and [name not declassified]. The Director called [name not declassified] and instructed him to make recommendations as to future action. He requested that a memorandum be prepared and presented to him. On 19 August the memorandum was prepared for the signature of Colonel King, was discussed with Mr. Dulles by Colonel King, and forwarded to the Director. It was approved by the Director on 9 September.

---

### 23. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 8, 1952, 4 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

Central American Situation

1. At four p.m. on 8 October 1952, a meeting was held in the State Department. Present were: DB, HFM, EGM, and TCM of State<sup>2</sup> and FGW, JCK,<sup>3</sup> [initials not declassified], and [initials not declassified] of CIA. FGW on behalf of the Director stated that it had been the understanding of the Agency that the State Department had approved of the Agency's project to provide certain hardware to a group planning violence against a certain government; that some question had apparently arisen as to whether State does approve; that the fact of the Agency's not having kept the Department informed of the developments in the project was not considered by the Agency to be any reason for doubting that the Department still approved because it had been understood that the Department did not wish to be kept informed of the detailed plans. In the Director's view, the Agency is purely an executive organization of the Government which carries out missions and conducts activities in support of the foreign policy objectives of the Government. The State Department has the primary responsibility in the field of foreign policy

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 4. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> David K.E. Bruce, H. Freeman Matthews, Edward G. Miller, and Thomas C. Mann.

<sup>3</sup> Frank G. Wisner and J.C. King.

and accordingly, the Agency would do nothing that is considered by the State Department to be contrary to its policy determinations. If the State Department disapproves of this particular project, the Agency will take immediate steps to bring to a halt its participation in all phases of the matter deemed objectionable by the State Department.

2. In a discussion regarding the basis for the Agency's having understood that the Department approved the project, FGW referred to the Agency's records of conversations between AD<sup>4</sup> and EGM. The latter recalled his statements to AD and SH<sup>5</sup> on July tenth in which he had said that he felt the risk of providing arms was too great but that he had no objection to monetary contributions. He recalled that he had also stated that a large American company must be protected almost as strongly as the United States Government because South Americans do not make any distinction between the two in their political thinking and because trouble for the company involves the Department in getting it out of trouble. FGW stated that AD had told [*initials not declassified*] on or about August thirteenth that the Agency had the green light to go ahead on the project but in the absence of AD he did not know what was the basis of this statement. DB stated that although he had some telephone conversations with the Director he did not recall having said anything that could be interpreted as approval.

3. Messrs. DB, HFM, and EGM pointed to the remarks of General S to the effect that he had the approval of the United States Government to go ahead with a plan. JCK and [*initials not declassified*] gave assurances that General S had gotten no such approval from representatives of the Agency, and it was agreed that General S's statements could be based only upon remarks made to him by members of the White House staff. The CIA officials pointed out that large quantities of arms have been acquired by the target government and other leftist groups in the Caribbean; that a revolutionary movement against the target is likely whether we support it or not, and that if it fails, American policy will be seriously prejudiced. The State Department officials made clear their feeling that if anything occurred there must be no question of any part of the American Government having had a hand in it, and they were not convinced that the plan for supplying the arms, insofar as they know the details, could be carried out without a breach of security.

4. In conclusion DB stated that the Department approves of many of the activities which the Agency is carrying out throughout the world and does not like to be called obstructionist, but in the present case, as it has been called upon to approve an export permit, it is forced to state

---

<sup>4</sup> Allen Dulles.

<sup>5</sup> Stuart Hedden.

that it disapproves of the entire deal. He stated that the Department can raise no objection to any monetary contribution which the Agency might make as it knows that the Agency is constantly passing money for purposes which the Department could not approve of and must do this in order to operate, but it feels that money can be passed securely. The State Department officials present, however, expressed their surprise that [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] should be again mixing up in a Central American revolution and cautioned against using it as a go-between.

[*name not declassified*]

---

#### 24. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 8, 1952, 10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Central American Situation

1. At 10 p.m. on 8 October 1952, a meeting was held in the offices of [*initials not declassified*]. Present were [*3 initials not declassified*], K<sup>2</sup> and [*initials not declassified*].

2. K informed the group that as a result of a policy decision by State yesterday opposing the shipment of machinery as planned, this decision being precipitated by indiscretions of Somoza, all of the action planned in support of the opposition was off. K explained that Tachito Somoza had indiscreetly approached Assistant Secretary Miller in Panama and asked him where was the machinery, and both the Nicaraguan and Dominican Ambassadors had called on Mr. Mann at the Department of State to discuss the same matter. This confirmed our general belief that no Latin American can be trusted to keep his mouth shut. [*initials not declassified*] raised the question of the feeding of the men who are already mobilized, and pointed out that even though no further action is taken, RUFUS must have money to liquidate his forces if he is not completely to lose face; that approximately \$3,000 per week

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 69, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only, Drafted on October 9.

<sup>2</sup> J.C. King.

are RUFUS' present requirements. The possibility was discussed of using the ship arriving in New Orleans on Monday for shipment of machinery to our own place. [initials not declassified] said this could be done without difficulty if there were no trouble in getting the machinery on board. He was sure he could re-route his ship and have it go direct to our own place.

J.C. King<sup>3</sup>  
CWH

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

## 25. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 9, 1952, 9 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Central American Situation

1. At 9 a.m. on 9 October 1952, a meeting was held in the office of the Director. Present were the Director, [initials not declassified], and K.

2. The Director explained to [initials not declassified] that all plans for action were canceled. [initials not declassified] then pointed out the responsibilities we have towards the people who are already in the field and who have committed themselves, and the dangers to the entire Caribbean area of the decision reached yesterday. The Director replied that he was fully aware of the dangers inherent in such a decision, but that this Agency is merely an executive agency to carry out the policies of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, and if they instruct us not to engage in a certain operation, we shall not engage in that operation. [initials not declassified] then commented that the Department of State might very well change its position in the near future because of the explosive situation in the Caribbean. To this the Director agreed. K then stated that there had been developments since FW's report last evening to the Director, and that it appeared we had

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 69, Folder 2. No classification marking.



received all the necessary clearances for the shipment of machinery from New Orleans in spite of the questions raised yesterday by State. K stated that he was not even suggesting action in violation of the position taken by State yesterday, but that this shipment could go out as planned except that it would be to a new consignee and to a secure place under our absolute control [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. The General asked what place did K have in mind—was it our own? When the answer was in the affirmative, the Director telephoned DB<sup>2</sup> and informed him that while we were not shipping the machinery to the country for which it was originally destined, apparently we had all the necessary clearances and would ship it to a place of our own [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Although DB expressed himself as surprised that we had such clearances, apparently no objection was interposed. The Director authorized K to proceed with this shipment to our place if it could be securely arranged and if it were true that necessary authorizations did exist.

3. K and [*initials not declassified*] described the situation of RUFUS, with a number of men already mobilized, and the need of supplying RUFUS with cash at once for a liquidation action if we were not to be even more embarrassed with our Central American friends. The Director asked how much was needed. K replied \$3,000 a week. The Director said he would go along for four weeks and would approve \$15,000.

J.C. King<sup>3</sup>  
CWH

---

<sup>2</sup> David Bruce.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**26. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 10, 1952.

SUBJECT

Central American Situation

1. The following message is to be delivered by KARL to RUFUS:

Because of the indiscretions of Somoza, the approach made by his son to a member of the State Department<sup>2</sup> in Panama, and the visit of his Ambassador and the Dominican Ambassador to the State Department, the United States Government was alerted to the shipment of hardware that was being arranged and has consequently taken steps to prevent the export of this material. We know that many Government officials in positions of importance are sympathetic with your movement, but Government policy is based on international agreements which force the Government to take this action. Our group is now considering the next step.

**J.C. King<sup>3</sup>**  
CWH

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 69, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G. Miller.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**27. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report<sup>1</sup>**

No. 00-B-57327

Guatemala City, October 10, 1952.

COUNTRY

Guatemala

SUBJECT

Personal Political Orientation of President Arbenz/Possibility of a Left-Wing Coup

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 139, Folder 6. Confidential; U.S. Officials Only.

PLACE ACQUIRED (BY SOURCE)

Guatemala

DATE ACQUIRED (BY SOURCE)

Sep 52 and earlier

DATE (OF INFO.)

Sep 52

SOURCE

[1 paragraph (11-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

### *Summary*

1. Although President Arbenz appears to collaborate with the Communists and extremists to the detriment of Guatemala's relations with the US, I am quite certain that he personally does not agree with the economic and political ideas of the Guatemalan or Soviet Communists, and I am equally certain that he is not now in a position where they can force him to make decisions in their favor. The reasons for my opinion are as follows:

(a) The President's social reform ideas stem from the US New Deal rather than from Soviet Communism.

(b) President Arbenz is still convinced that he is "using" Communists and Communism to further his own ends.

(c) He is fully aware of Guatemala's economic dependence on the US.

(d) Arbenz has no fear of a conservative coup and has taken no active steps to guard against one.

(e) The "opposition" of business groups and conservatives (with the exception of a few landowners) has been greatly exaggerated. This is evidenced by the "surprising" lack of serious concern in most business circles about the effects of the new land reform bill.

It is my personal fear that the chief threat to the Arbenz regime is a coup by rank opportunists within the "palace clique" who have sold out to Communist penetration. Such a coup would first assassinate the popular Arbenz, blame the reactionaries for his death, and then proceed to violently wipe out all conservative opposition.

2. Rather than setting up a Communist state, Arbenz desires to establish a "modern democracy" which would improve the lot of its people through paternalistic social reforms. Arbenz' personal idol is FDR and his reforms are patterned after New Deal reforms and adjusted to the backward economy and social structure of Guatemala. None of the reforms is substantially extreme as compared to many of those in the US, Europe, and even in other Latin American countries. The

extremities are relative and seem radical in Guatemala only because of the backward feudal situation they are meant to remedy. Also they seem extreme compared to the ineffective piecemeal measures of his predecessor, Arevalo. During Arevalo's term, Arbenz often became angry at his weakness as a chief-of-state and realized that no effective social measures could be implemented while Arevalo was president. Satisfying his ambition to become president himself, and also with a sincere desire to fulfill his promises to his people, Arbenz went to work immediately and impatiently to implement his reforms and, as he put it, "to jar Guatemala out of the Middle Ages".

3. President Arbenz is still convinced that he is "using" Communism to further his own ends and in no sense is he dictated to by Communist elements although he often plays into their hands in his attempts to use them and the Party line of world Communism.

(a) When Arbenz came to power he feared a popular revolt more than anything else. He pictured himself as FDR in 1932 and followed what he thought was a similar course, that is, he achieved popular support by relieving some of the immediate economic and social pressure on the very poor at the expense of the very rich. The reactionary group, in which Arbenz had many personal friends, fully expected him to reverse his field once his presidency was assured and forget his reform promises. When it became evident that he was serious about reform, the landowners became quite bitter and opposed him at every turn. The reactionaries immediately turned the Communist spotlight on all reform measures regardless of merit.

(b) Sincere about reform and unable to get support for his program from any other source, he found the Party line of international Communism a ready-made tool with which he could organize the proletariat and control the country. Harping on US financial imperialism and on Guatemala's oppressive land system, Arbenz became a popular hero at the calculated price of arousing US indignation. His best emotional appeal to the people was a platform that was anti-US and defiant of US corporate imperialism. Meanwhile the Communist organization which lined up and manifested popular support for Arbenz succeeded in penetrating his government. I am not aware of the extent of this penetration and I doubt that Arbenz is aware of it.

(c) The President deals with his subordinates as individuals rather than thinking of them as organized groups. Roberto Fanjul, Minister of Economy and a close friend of Arbenz, told me several weeks ago that he was certain that the President's sources of information were always "filtered through a Communist screen". (Fanjul is loyal to Arbenz, I am convinced, but under pressure could not be expected to act effectively in his behalf.) Fanjul feels that Arbenz does not believe the Communists

have penetrated far enough to harm him and that he does not realize the extent that the Communists claim his reforms as their own. Arbenz still feels he can carry out his objective of using the Communists without being controlled by them. Meanwhile I would say that eight out of ten of the government officials would swear they are not in favor of Communism but that they are using it for their own purposes.

(d) Incidentally the President's wife, Maria Cristina Vilanova Arbenz, daughter of a wealthy family of El Salvador, has far more radically leftist ideas than her husband and expresses these ideas at will. This lady was educated in the US and was raised and spoiled in the luxurious style of wealthy inbred aristocrats. Her socialistic, left-wing ideas are, in my opinion, a definite reaction to this background. So far the President has not appeared to have been influenced by his wife's ideas. One exception to this is the case of relations with El Salvador. These have been and will remain quite cordial on the top governmental level as long as Arbenz is president.

4. Arbenz realizes that Guatemala is economically dependent on the US but intends to bluff through his defiance of US corporations to any length short of national suicide. An integral part of his program is the removal of Guatemala from the category of a "subsidiary of United Fruit". He is a stubborn idealist who is willing to risk his own wealth and who is able to enlist the support of others to risk their wealth on the gamble of getting national control of Guatemala's fruit, coffee and chicle industries and its mineral and petroleum potential. Sacrifices are to be expected under this program and Arbenz is willing to make them. He feels that any hardships on his people resulting from defiance of US imperialism would be politically offset by its nationalistic appeal so as not to effect the perpetuity of the regime.

5. His goal is to assert the rights of the Guatemalan Government to dictate the terms under which foreign firms shall operate in the country, especially where the exploitation of natural resources is concerned. Knowing that his country will never be a large industrial nation and yet needing a sound economy to carry out his reform programs, Arbenz sees the only answer is expanding production and keeping a larger share of what is produced. Yet he realizes this is not possible without US markets and US capital. He realizes that if prices fell in the US or if US import restrictions barred Guatemala's goods, his country would go bankrupt. Arbenz is determined this will not happen. He can only bluff because he has no place to turn. The one possibility would be the Soviet bloc, which might conceivably finance the country in order to maintain a western hemisphere subversion base. This is the one thing Arbenz does not want. He definitely would prefer US domination to Soviet domination. The best example of this is the fact that throughout his

bluffing of US interests he has never used the potential weapon of proposed trade treaties with Soviet bloc countries, although it seems logical to assume that such commercial overtures have been made to him. It is my belief that Arbenz will not go that far in bluffing the US. He may, however, bluff too long for the good of his regime.

6. Right now the entire economy is propped up by the price of coffee. A close friend of mine who has been a resident buyer for a US coffee firm for several years told me that if the price of coffee dropped five cents he would get out of Guatemala immediately. The price of coffee is high but the government depends on it to offset some of the losses of the other branches of the economy. Aviateca is bankrupt, several public works projects are in the red, there is trouble in the mining industry and Wrigley stopped buying chicle in the Peten. Despite these reverses, if the price of coffee holds up the regime will stand financially and still carry out most of its social reforms. Yet most of the growers feel that it will take five more years of today's high prices to reach a point where they can withstand a substantial drop in coffee prices. Once the price goes down, only the large growers will be able to hold their land. These will also be able to buy up other lands merely to keep them idle in an attempt to cut down the supply until the prices rise. These tactics would centralize the wealth and starve the workers. These deserted fincas would become overgrown immediately in this climate and if a finca is idle just one year it takes at least five years to put one back into production. In such a situation it would be impossible for the present regime to stay in power.

7. In case of a drop in prices Arbenz still has his oil lands to fall back on, although his use of them as a last resort might come too late politically. He has held up their exploitation so far on nationalistic grounds, holding out for his right to dictate terms for oil exploitation. The government owns most of the oil lands outright and also owns the rights to all underground minerals as only surface rights are included in private titles.

8. Arbenz does not fear overthrow from reactionary groups. When I left Guatemala two weeks ago the President's wife and three children had flown to Washington and from there to Switzerland where the children will be put in school. Someone asked the President if this household evacuation indicated that he anticipated any trouble. He denied it emphatically, stating the family had planned the move some time ago (Arbenz' father was a Swiss immigrant). There is little real worry around Arbenz about an anti-Communist or reactionary coup. Arbenz and Fanjul both feel that there are just not enough large landholders who are interested in or capable of accomplishing a coup and that they could not line up the other dissident elements. The President has several very close friends in the reactionary ranks, all of whom are wealthy and would have less personal gain from Arbenz' overthrow than some

of the left-wing government officials. I believe the President is better informed on activities in the rightist opposition camp than within his leftist support groups.

9. The President has not taken the obvious precautions to guard against reactionary revolt. No arms have been distributed to Communist cells or labor groups (at least with his knowledge).

10. Many conservatives have come to view Arbenz as a "moderate" man. Paz Tejada, a staunch reactionary who had once threatened to kill Arbenz, is now on very friendly terms with him. The Communist-inspired agrarian reform bill which was to have met with fierce opposition from all conservative elements has actually been received with surprising calm by business interests and a great part of the landowners. One reason for the relaxing of their fears is the retention of the "last word" power by the President and by the appointment of his private secretary as administrator.

11. President Arbenz, who is constantly aware of the danger of administrative corruption in all reform legislation, has reserved the final authority on reform measures to rest with himself. This relieved the business interests and landholders as it was an indication of a "realistic" approach to land reform. There is confidence that the President himself would veto any attempt to expropriate land which is in active cultivation.

12. This reservation of authority in the case of new land reform law is viewed as unconstitutional by several elements. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] opinion is that the President's act definitely was unconstitutional. When I advised him of this fact he passed it off to expediency. No one else seemed to take it too seriously.

13. As most landowners are not too worried about having their cultivated land taken away they have also calmed their fears that the opening of new land would diminish their coffee labor force. It is pretty well agreed among the landowners that the Indians will not take on the extra labor and risk involved in leaving their communities and a steady source of food to take the chances involved in clearing and planting uncultivated, inaccessible land.

14. There may be a slight temporary shortage of auxiliary part-time help, but those that work and live on the fincas will probably not leave. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] there are 35 families living there permanently. During coffee harvest about 80 more workers are recruited in the hills. These hill people are more or less independent but all envy the life of the workers on our finca, for whom we provide shelter and a year-round source of food. The finca dwellers feel they would be fools to leave and try working a strange plot of land. They would lose their place on the finca and risk crop failure on the government land, which

would mean they would have to give it up. There is no entrepreneurial spirit among the native workers.

*Possibility of a Left-Wing Coup Against Arbenz*

15. I believe that the regime is in no danger from a conservative coup but may possibly be in danger of a plot to send Guatemala violently to the left. This will not be possible while Arbenz is President, but there are many opportunists around Arbenz whose personal ambitions outweigh any political convictions. I personally am afraid of a "palace coup" which would accomplish the assassination of the popular Arbenz by the plotters who would blame the killing on reactionary elements. They would use this "outrage" as an excuse to violently "suppress a rightist's revolution" and inaugurate a "peoples' democracy" in Guatemala with themselves at the head.

16. These opportunists of whom I speak are such that they could be, and may already have been, approached by the Communist organization in Guatemala. The man I feel would be most capable of this is Alfonso Martinez, recently appointed by Arbenz to head the government department charged with administering the new land reform law. He is a fat, jovial, extrovert who has succeeded in gaining the complete confidence of Arbenz and who has acted as the President's personal secretary. It was the President's desire for direct personal supervision that prompted him to appoint Martinez to head this important department rather than a tendency to repudiate the known left-wing advocates of the bill, such as Charnaud MacDonald. This appointment was viewed with relief by the business and coffee growing interests. This view is correct as long as Arbenz is President, but the reform machinery has now been set up and with someone else as president who is of more leftist orientation or under actual Communist control, the situation would be radically different. Martinez' recent, though nominal, promotion, his position close to Arbenz, and his greed for power make him an ideal target for Communist penetration. Another opportunist is Charnaud MacDonald, of whose political activities I know very little. It is my opinion that he does not enjoy the President's complete trust.

17. Incidentally, the health of the President is excellent, although he has lost about 20 lbs in the past few years. He is quite robust and active. He enjoys recreational sports, especially swimming and horseback. His morale is also excellent.



28. **Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 11, 1952.

SUBJECT

Central American Situation

1. I have read the two memoranda dated 9 October and the memoranda dated 10 October by Colonel King, also Mr. [*name not declassified*]'s memorandum dated 8 October—these memoranda are returned herewith.<sup>2</sup> Colonel King's memoranda appear to be adequate for the purposes intended. Mr. [*name not declassified*]'s memorandum appears to be an accurate report of the conversation but I feel that it should be rewritten for the purpose of sterilization and that all copies of the existing memorandum should be burned as too revealing. Further concerning Mr. [*name not declassified*]'s memorandum, I recommend a slight modification in the language of the last sentence on page 1. Instead of saying that "the Agency is purely an executive organization of the Government which carries out the *orders* of the State Department . . .", I think it would be much better to express these thoughts as follows:

"In the Director's view, the Agency is purely an executive organization of the Government which carries out missions and conducts activities in support of the foreign policy objectives of the Government. The State Department has the primary responsibility in the field of foreign policy and accordingly, the Agency would do nothing that is considered by the State Department to be contrary to its policy determinations. If the State Department disapproves of this particular project, the Agency will take immediate steps to bring to a halt its participation in all phases of the matter deemed objectionable by the State Department."

Frank G. Wisner

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 4. Secret; Eyes Only. Also addressed to the Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.

<sup>2</sup> Documents 24-26 and 21.

29. **Memorandum From Jacob R. Seekford to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)**<sup>1</sup>

Report No. 10

Washington, October 28, 1952.

SUBJECT

New Plans of Calligeris as Result of Loss of Arms Support by the Group

1. On 27 October Seekford again outlined for Calligeris the reasons why the Group was forced to withdraw its arms support, namely, that the U.S. State Department had withdrawn the export permit as a result of the indiscrete approaches to the Department by Generals Somoza and Trujillo.

2. Calligeris replied to this essentially as follows:

a. The actions of Generals Somoza and Trujillo were ill-considered. I can appreciate the reaction of the U.S. government on this matter in view of its commitments and agreements with other governments. The U.S. government could follow no other course of action.

b. I cannot, at this time, visit Somoza or Trujillo because of security reasons, however I shall send a letter to each by one of my most trusted officers. In my letter I shall request an explanation of their action and ask each to indicate his degree of willingness to support me under these new circumstances.

c. At this moment we are watching many months of hard work vanish. We shall be forced to rebuild almost from the beginning. As strongly as I feel about this I must say that I have suffered defeat before. We must continue fighting.

d. Before embarking on a new course of action it will be necessary to review the entire problem. My most immediate concern is my existing organization and the means by which I can maintain it intact. It is going to be a serious problem and will require more than money.

e. A series of conferences among the leaders in my organization will be necessary. I would appreciate it greatly if you (Seekford) and Hindmarsh could meet with [*name not declassified*] in Mexico City within the next week or so in order to begin the laying of new plans.

f. In considering new sources of arms and money I cannot, at this time, say what course of action I will take, other than write the Generals, until I have had a chance to study the matter.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 134, Folder 6. No classification marking. A typed note at the top of the page reads: "Date of Info: 27 October 1952."

I would prefer to continue working with the two Generals as they are already aware of my general plans and for security reasons I prefer not to bring new persons in unless absolutely necessary. If however they will not help to the degree necessary then I shall be obliged to develop other contacts, i.e. Venezuela, Cuba, and Mexico, in that order.

g. Last week the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Military Attaché in Mexico visited me here. He expressed interest in my cause. He stated that he believed arms were available in Mexico and that he would aid me in getting them.<sup>2</sup> He asked if I would have one of my officers call on him in Mexico City in the near future.

h. A few days ago the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Ambassador called on me and asked if I would outline for him my general financial and arms requirements in a report which he could carry back to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He stated that he believed the report would be well received. The ambassador is due to return to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] about the 1st of November.

---

<sup>2</sup> Field Comment:

Calligeris did not go into too great detail on this. I gathered however that the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] MA would be instrumental in helping him locate and secure arms and nothing more. [Footnote in the source text.]

---

### 30. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 1, 1952, 1550Z.

26337. Re: GUAT 687.<sup>2</sup>

1. Sincerely regret delay and present inability to assist because of failure of factions to unite and other complications. Can only counsel continued caution and hope for improved situation.

2. Some propaganda funds may be available soon and material aid from other quarters is possibility. Impossible to be more specific now but will keep you informed.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 10, Folder 1. Secret; Priority; PBFORTUNE.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid.)

3. Unity of factions to extent of coordination of timing of any military action is absolute minimum requirement but now consider it not feasible that details of proposed operations be divulged by one faction to other. We cannot furnish channel for coordination but Calligeris is aware of necessity for coordinated timing.

---

### 31. Memorandum of Interview<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 13, 1952.

Welch, interviewed at Bethesda Naval Hospital where he is awaiting an operation, passed on the following story:

About three months ago he was approached in Managua by a Guatemalan with a Nicaraguan passport who presented himself as a representative of Somoza. This man asked what help the U.S. was going to provide in the attempt on Guatemala and was apparently on a fishing expedition. Welch knew of no such plan and could therefore not commit himself on anything. Later Somoza and his sons in conversations with Welch and the Ambassador among others indicated that they were expecting help from the U.S.

When Somoza came to the U.S. he brought the matter up with Miller who stalled and passed him on to Acheson, who suggested that Somoza pass his story on to Truman. Truman professed to find the story very interesting, but he did not commit himself. On the return trip to Managua, Col. Mora indicated to Somoza that U.S. was definitely interested. Somoza and Mora, in Managua, talked rather openly of the attempt on Guatemala to be made with Nicaraguan and U.S. backing.

When Whelan came to the U.S., he was told by Miller to inform Somoza that the State Department was not interested in sponsoring a "covert" aggression on any American State, to call his attention to mutual obligations of the two countries under the OAS and UN, and to state that any request for U.S. arms should be made through normal diplomatic channels. However, Miller indicated to Whelan that he thought some support for Somoza might be coming from the Army.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 73, Folder 6. No classification marking.

Somoza has said that he has an alliance with the Dominican Republic, Panama and Venezuela, but Welch doubts it. The Dominican Ambassador is away at the moment, Somoza is irked with Ramon because of a slight to Nicaragua with reference to the Panamanian inauguration, and Welch believes that Somoza is relying on Ramon's word as regards Venezuelan backing. However, Welch says that when the Nicaraguan press indicated last month that the U.S. was supporting Somoza, and at the same time announced that a revolution was about to take place in Guatemala, all the countries mentioned plus Haiti, Colombia, and Cuba, appeared anxious to get into the act, or at least it seemed so to one in Managua at the time.

Welch feels that Somoza would aid any attempt on Guatemala only to the extent that he was benefiting more than he was aiding. He might provide a training area and obsolete arms in exchange for new arms. Welch feels that Somoza is much more concerned with Jose Figueres' possible election to the Presidency in Costa Rica than he is with any developments in Guatemala, and says that there is little doubt that Somoza will move against Figueres should it appear that the latter will win the election.

## 32. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

No. 20

Washington, December 1, 1952.

### *Section I—Current Activities of the Guatemalan Government*

#### *1. Military.*

a. The Guatemalan government has, during the last few weeks, shifted three or four of its garrison commanders. This of course is one measure taken to prevent anti-government forces from becoming established in the army. In two instances this shifting of commanders has worked against us and we have been obliged to select new leaders within the garrisons concerned. We anticipate further moves of this nature and expect to counteract it by having at least two of the superior officers in our organization.

b. Recently, we learned of the government's plan to make Quetzaltenango its headquarters in the event of revolution. The government expects any invasion to start from across the Salvadoran frontier and believes its best chances for defense are to fall back on Quetzaltenango and establish a defensive line roughly north and south through that city. Terrain favors such a defense and, by so doing, the government will have in its rear, i.e. the area between Quetzaltenango and the Mexican frontier, the wealthiest and most productive section of Guatemala from which to draw support. The government recently transferred one of its best officers to command Quetzaltenango and has re-enforced the area with troops and arms. Fortunately at the same time the government transferred to the garrison as [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] in command one of our best officers. Thus, as long as he is there we will be fully informed on all government plans for the area. In this instance shifting of commanders has worked in our favor.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 134, Folder 6. Top Secret. A cover memorandum, not printed, indicates that the report is a record of a conference held November 27–December 1; the participants' names and the location of the conference were not declassified.

Also on December 1 Secretary of State Acheson met with Guatemalan Ambassador Guillermo Toriello to discuss U.S.–Guatemalan relations, especially pro-Communist propaganda and activities in the Guatemalan Congress. Ambassador Toriello attempted to justify Guatemala's attitude toward Communist influence in the country. "Once or twice during the conversation, Toriello urged us not to be taken in by the denunciations of the Government by the opposition. By innuendo, he seemed to allege that our estimate of the situation had been unduly influenced by wild stories and rumors circulated by the subversive opposition, disguised and cloaked by anti-communism. The anti-communist movement in Guatemala is dangerous, he argued, since it does conveniently serve as a cloak for the irreconcilable opposition." The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IV, pages 1052–1055.

*Comment:* This information, i.e. that the government is thinking defensively instead of offensively in the event of revolution is of considerable importance and supports Calligeris' plan for heavy initial shock action and rapid concentration around the Capitol.

c. Because the government no longer completely trusts the army it has begun the development of a secret force of non-military personnel. Though full details are not available the force numbers approximately 1500 men all of which are handpicked for their experience and toughness. The total force breaks down into three separate organizations. These are:

(1) *Caribbean Legion*. About 200 men mostly Central Americans, commanded by General \_\_\_<sup>2</sup> Ramirez, a Santo Domingoan; the second in command is Col. Rivas Montes, a Honduran. General Ramirez at present owns and operates a sawmill on the outskirts of Jalapa where he has the 200 men supposedly working. We believe it is a training area for the Legion. Col. Montes is living in Guatemala City where he heads Aviatega for the Guatemalan government.

(2) *Secret Communist Organization*. Composed of roughly 500 men scattered throughout Guatemala. Commander of this organization is a closely guarded secret. The function of this group is to act as "shock" troops in the event of trouble and to liquidate any communist leaders who get out of line. President Arbenz and the other top communist leaders are well aware of this latter function.

(3) ?. No known name for this organization. Its leader is one \_\_\_ Fernandez, a Cuban of Spanish origin(?). The group is composed of Cubans and Spanish republicans. Size of organization is unknown. We do know that Fernandez is in close contact with Carlos Prios Socorates, a Cuban. I believe this organization more dangerous than the Legion.

d. The Guatemalan government has been purchasing arms from El Salvador, Czechoslovakia, and probably Mexico. We do not know the extent of these purchases. Interestingly enough we do know that none of the arms purchased are going to Guatemalan army. We have reason to believe the arms are going to labor organizations and communist groups.

*Comment:* Calligeris reports that Czech arms purchases to date have consisted only of six (6) AA MG .50 Cal.

2. *Political*. Present political activity of the government centers around the following:

a. Communist infiltration of all legal political parties in Guatemala. For this purpose the government is not using men well known as communists but men known to it, the government, as communists or communist sympathizers. During 16-18 January 1953 deputies to the National Congress are to be elected. Though the communists now control the National Congress they hope to dominate it completely by placing their men through the other parties.

<sup>2</sup> The underlining in paragraphs (1) and (3) is in the source text.

b. In March 1953 all judgeships in the supreme and lower courts come up for re-appointment. The deputies elected in January take office on 1 March and they will make the appointments to the courts. These appointments will carry down to the city magistrate level. Thus if the communists completely dominate the National Congress through the election of their deputies in January, and I assure you they will, they will in turn appoint their own men to the courts and will, by 15 March, completely dominate the three branches of the government, i.e., Executive, Legislative, and Judicial.

c. The government has embarked on a campaign to sell communism to the people. The usual propaganda outlets are being employed. Recently they have begun the publication of pamphlets, copies of three which I have given you. The booklet on the Agrarian Law is being widely distributed in Honduras and Salvador.

*Comment:* Copies of the pamphlets referred to are enclosed.<sup>3</sup>

d. *Honduras.* Guatemalan political activity is on the increase.

(1) We have information that in northern Honduras there are more than forty (40) communist cells in existence.

(2) [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] is on the Guatemalan payroll. As far as we can determine he is receiving \$2000.00 a month from the Guatemalan government. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]

(3) [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] we believe the man the government really intends to support is Francisco Morazan, a Honduran, at present private secretary to President Arbenz of Guatemala.

e. *Costa Rica.*

3. *Economic.* Economic conditions in Guatemala are very grave and are becoming worse every day. Capital is leaving the country. It is going to Mexico and the United States.

a. On 21 November last I was told by [*1 line of source text not declassified*] that President Arbenz is preparing to invoke the Economic Emergency Law (*La Ley de Emergencia Economia*). Under this law all capital in the country, local and foreign, will be frozen.

b. The Guatemalan government is preparing to impose a 6% tax on all imports and exports.

### *Section II—Activities of the Calligeris Organization in Guatemala*

I am not fully informed on every phase of our military preparation in Guatemala, that being primarily Calligeris' responsibility, however I can say that we have reached a high degree of organization

---

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.



and have never been in a better state of readiness than we are at this moment.

1. *Troop Organization.*

a. *Jutiapa.* The Guatemalan [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] here is with us as are his three (300) hundred soldiers. Our initial striking force in this area consists of three (300) hundred armed civilians. In addition we have fifteen (1500) hundred men ready but without arms. We have sufficient trucks to move this entire force.

b. *Jalapa.* The officers and one (100) hundred men stationed here are with us. We have eight (800) hundred civilians ready but without arms.

c. *Santa Rosa.* No army garrison here. We have one (1000) thousand men ready here but without arms.

d. *Zacapa.* The garrison here has six (600) hundred soldiers well armed. They have four (4) 75 mm canon and four (4) AA MG .50 Cal. We are not sure of this garrison but hope they will join us.

e. *Gualan.* No garrison here. We have two (200) hundred men here unarmed.

f. *Coban.* Army garrison here of about fifteen (1500) hundred men. The post has four (4) 75 mm canon (Pack How.). The second and third in command plus a nucleus in the ranks are with us. We have two (2000) thousand men ready here as an initial force. More than an adequate number of trucks.

g. *Salama.* No garrison here. We have a force of six (600) hundred men ready without arms.

h. *Quetzaltenango.* There is a garrison of eight (800) hundred men in this area. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in command are with us. In this area we have organized a group of fifty (50) comandos in sub-units of five (5) men each. Their mission will be to kill all political and military leaders in the city. In the general area we have three (3000) thousand men. They need arms. The city has an excellent airport which we plan to capture and use.

i. *San Jose* (port on the Pacific ocean). No garrison. The city has an excellent military airfield built by the Americans. The field is not used by the military there being no Guatemalan air force units here.

j. *Mazatenango.* Garrison of three hundred and fifty (350) soldiers. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in command are with us. We have eight hundred (800) men organized here but without arms.

k. *Chimaltenango.* No garrison. We have one thousand (1000) men here without arms. We have sixty trucks (60) ready. We are building an airfield here.

l. *Sanarate.* (SW of El Progreso) No garrison. We have five hundred (500) men ready without arms.

m. *El Progreso*. No garrison. We have five hundred (500) men without arms.

n. *Puerto Barrios*. Garrison of one hundred and fifty (150) men. The garrison recently received four (4) AA MG .50 Cal. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in command is with us. I do not know the size of our civilian force.

o. *Guatemala City*. The government here has about five thousand (5000) men including soldiers and police. Within the city we [have] six hundred (600) men organized in commando units each with a specific mission.

"K" *Groups*. Mission to kill all leading political and military leaders. The list has already been drawn up. I have in my home a city map showing the location of the homes and offices of all targets.

*Saboteurs*. We have teams ready to sabotage communications, utilities, all headquarters, transportation, military installation and equipment. For these teams we have selected men whose civilian employment is at or near the targets assigned. We do not plan permanent but only disruptive sabotage.

*Documents teams*. These teams will capture and impound all documents in government offices, party headquarters, and labor unions.

p. *Liberation Committees*. Independent of our fighting organization we have organized in each town a liberation committee. The function of these committees will be to assume political and police control in each town as it is liberated and thus re-establish and assure public order and welfare until the new government is prepared to assume these functions.

q. *Identity Cards*. To protect our personnel and prevent enemy personnel from changing sides during and after the action I have prepared and issued 40,000 identity cards.

2. *Intelligence Service*. We have developed an intelligence organization. It exists in the government, police, and the army. The head of this service is [name not declassified] a man we trust implicitly and a man who has over 20 years intelligence experience. At present he is seeking to penetrate the labor unions.

3. *Airfields*. We are selecting and developing airfields all over Guatemala, and in particular around the Capital. Our major field in the Capital area is near the town of Dolores (SSE of Guatemala City and ENE of Esquintla) a particularly isolated area. Here we expect to bring in by air arms and equipment and assemble 3000 men which force will comprise one column for the march on the Capital. We already have the necessary trucks earmarked. In selecting our airfield sites we have enlisted the aid of [name not declassified] an American living in

Guatemala. He served as a pilot in WW II and has agreed to fly for us. He states that he can buy us four (4) DC-3s and get us three more American pilots.

*Comment:* Seekford has asked that this man be sent to visit Calligeris.

4. *Psychological Warfare.* We have prepared a psychological warfare program.

(a) The farmers of Guatemala have collected money to carry out a press and radio campaign. This is being developed.

(b) We are prepared to carry out Calligeris' 30 day campaign.

(c) We have arranged with the Archbishop of Guatemala for a series of special Masses covering an 8 day period in which the clergy will outline the dangers of communism to Guatemala and ask that the people resist and fight these dangers. In most of the churches throughout Guatemala the women have formed committees to aid in this campaign. What we hope to do through this program is to bring the people to a high emotional pitch. What the Archbishop does not know is that we intend to tie this 8 day campaign to our D-day. He is unaware of our military plans.

5. *Current Plans of the Organization.* Calligeris recently asked me to visit General Trujillo and ask for help. I believe such a trip would be profitless because neither General Trujillo or General Somoza will give us material help without being properly assured by [*that*] the United States government approves of such help. Without this approval both of these men stand to lose too much.

We have been building our organization before March of this year. We counted heavily upon your help. Unfortunately that help has now been withdrawn. We used that promise of help as a restraint upon our people from impatient action. Now we can restrain them no longer. Secondly, the Guatemalan government is now proceeding on a plan of action which, if successful, will give that government complete domination of every phase of Guatemalan life. If we permit the government to succeed in its present plan then our chances of eventually overthrowing that government will be very considerably reduced. It has therefore been the decision of the group controlling our organization to strike not later than the first of February 1953 with whatever means we have at our disposal.

33. **Intelligence Report Prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 1, 1953.

COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:  
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, GUATEMALA

Foreword

This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a compilation of the specific "assets" of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and present performance.

The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on "Assets" should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time.

Communism in Guatemala: Objectives, Tactics, and Capabilities

*I. Objectives*

The immediate objectives of the Communist Party of Guatemala, now the Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, PGT), are to extend the party's control over labor, to increase its influence in and infiltration of the leftist-nationalist government, and to dominate the more radical intellectual circles of the country. The Communists push "progressive" Guatemalan political groups toward extreme labor, agrarian, and educational reform, intensify nationalist dissatisfaction with US private interests in Guatemala, and portray US foreign policy as the instrument of "imperialistic warmongers".

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 78, Folder 1. Secret.

Communist objectives during the comparatively short period of three years of open existence have remained constant. Such alterations and diversions as have occurred were essentially related to the will of an administration which, in the final analysis, has the real power to determine the Communist Party's life or death. Thus, with government support, Communists played a key role in whipping up and organizing popular feeling against the United Fruit Company during the Company-labor disputes of 1951. Subsequently, however, Communist labor leaders silently accepted a government rejection of radical labor code revision. And presently, Communist propagandists in key positions have sharply reduced their attacks upon the United States, apparently because the Guatemalan Government does not wish to prejudice negotiations for assistance from the United States.

## *II. Tactics*

Among groups in Guatemalan society to which the Communists especially direct themselves are urban and rural labor. Intellectuals and the "progressive bourgeoisie" are also high on the list of targets, although the appeal to the latter is mixed with distrust and is, in part, inspired by reason of political necessity because of the middle class core of the national revolutionary movement which has inspired Guatemalan political life since 1944. Since they are few in numbers the Communists concentrate upon infiltrating and capturing existing organizational leadership, or, they may bring into existence their own front organization, especially with respect to peace, youth, and women's groups.

The Communists, with the assistance of the government, have successfully directed the unification of labor and have joined the national General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala (Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala, CGTG) with the regional Communist Confederation of Workers of Latin America (Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina, CTAL) and the international Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The Communists now seek to expand their control over labor by ousting non-Communist leadership from important railway and rural unions, but especially by leading the government-supported agrarian reform program from which they may expect to realize thousands of recruits among the unorganized peasantry. Thus, the Communists can hope to extend their influence among the electorate and, therefore, over the government by control of voters and by their ability to organize mob demonstrations, while at the same time they strengthen Communist international labor organizations and a variety of front groups.

Among the intellectuals the Communists have successfully concentrated their attention upon educators and writers. They and their sympathizers control the principal teachers' union and the most vigorous profes-

sional artists' and writers' union, and have strongly penetrated the official and semi-official press and the government propaganda agencies. From these positions they may hope more effectively to accelerate the government's leftist and nationalist programs, while they cover the nation with propaganda in line with Soviet objectives.

The political tactics of the Communists are adjusted to international Communist strategy and the local environment. From the time of its public emergence in mid-1951 until very recently, the Communists, without legal status, have encouraged and supported the dominant leftist government parties and have sought to work through them, as well as through friends in the executive branch of the government. The Communists have consistently taken a proprietary interest in the activities of the government parties, admonishing and criticizing in detail and urging a united "democratic front" against "reaction". Four admitted Communists have won seats in the national legislature as candidates of the government parties. There also are probably several crypto-Communists seated in this body of 58 delegates which, on the whole, is either sympathetic toward or tolerant of Communism. Within the legislature the Communists successfully work for assignment to labor and agrarian committees and will be found in the vanguard of legislative support for nationalistic measures. This is in addition to the promotion of more direct Soviet objectives as represented, for example, by the "Korean solidarity" manifesto signed by 19 members of Congress in June 1952. The recent registration of the Communist Party as the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT) now gives this group legal status for the first time. The maneuver in all probability does not, however, indicate alteration of Communist political tactics.

In the executive they also seek out positions which best enable them to promote their program. Thus, they have heavily infiltrated the Social Security System, the Agrarian Department and the propaganda agencies. It is apparent also that Fortuny, PGT's General Secretary, has access to the inner circle of politicians who surround the President. He is credited with drafting the recently passed Agrarian Reform Law which subsequently was steered through Congress under Communist leadership.

### *III. Capabilities*

Communist success in Guatemala is strongly conditioned by the superficially democratic, leftist, and nationalistic environment brought about by the Revolution of 1944. The social and economic backwardness of the country and the powerful role played by US business interest in the Guatemalan life provide the Communists with obvious ammunition. Nor is there any question about the relatively high efficiency of Communist leadership in Guatemala. So far, it has demonstrated an ability to lead groups heretofore outside of the nation's political life, as well as strongly to influence politicians who either cannot comprehend

or who refuse to comprehend the significance of the tie between local and international Communism. Finally, the traditional ruling groups in Guatemala, particularly the landholders, are so demoralized and divided, that they have been unable to offer serious opposition to Communist development.

At the same time, there are serious limitations to the Communist position. Although the Communists have enjoyed considerable success in capturing key positions among important groups in Guatemalan society, they have not yet gained a substantial consistent popular following. They must continually contend with an essentially inarticulate and conservative mass. On higher levels they must face the fact that the economic groups which subscribe to the principles of the Revolution of 1944 are not extremists and that many seeming pro-Communist political allies are, in fact, primarily opportunists.

The real answer to Communist success in Guatemala lies with the attitude of the administrations of Juan José Arévalo (1945–1951) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951– ), for, despite democratic overtones, Guatemalan political life is still largely run by the executive. Arbenz, in particular, has favored Communist development because he has found its leadership cooperative and capable. Whether or not he fully appreciates the dangers of Communism, he apparently believes that he controls the Communist organization. He has the power to check or break the Communist organization at will. In the last analysis the Communists are dependent upon the executive's pleasure for their positions and probably the great bulk of their financial support. In themselves they lack the economic resources and popular following to contest determined opposition from the President.

### Communism in Guatemala: Assets

#### *I. Numerical Strength*

There are probably less than 1,000 members of the Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, PGT). PGT's petition for registration in December 1952 carried 532 signatures. Cell organization may be found in predominantly rural areas, but Communist strength is centered in the capital, Guatemala City. PGT membership is drawn from the middle class and labor and its leadership has come largely from among intellectuals and bureaucrats. On the whole, while there are opportunists and dilettantes in PGT, its membership is militant and well-disciplined. Leaders such as José Manuel Fortuny and Victor Manuel Gutiérrez are judged particularly capable. Short of engaging in violence against heavy odds, considerable personal sacrifice may be expected from members of this small group as long as they have backing within the government.

## *II. Electoral Strength*

Until the registration of PGT (December 1952) Communist Party members gained a limited number of elected positions—primarily in the National Congress—as candidates sponsored by the dominant government parties. In addition, some crypto-Communists have attained office as members of the progovernment parties. The present strategy of the newly registered PGT is continued reliance upon the “democratic front” support of other parties to provide electoral success. There are four acknowledged Communists presently in Congress. PGT can probably poll its largest vote in Guatemala City, but there it also faces the strongest opposition. In the mayoralty contests of 1951, the independent candidate in Guatemala City, with unusually well-unified, anti-Communist support, won over the progovernment and Communist-backed candidate by 5,000 votes (24,000–19,000). In the most recent congressional election (January 1953), Fortuny, Secretary General of PGT, was defeated as the progovernment candidate in the capital, while another coalition-sponsored Communist was winning in an outlying province. Independent Communist electoral strength in rural areas probably is not great.

## *III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action*

As an ally of a friendly government, PGT has had little cause to organize and plan for violent insurrection and no such plans are known to exist. PGT has threatened violence against the government’s opposition for alleged revolutionary plots, however, and there have been some reports of Communist-controlled unions possessing firearms. Communist resort to force has been confined largely to rural areas where they have had some success in promoting mob intimidation of local landowners. Should the Communists have to face official opposition, it is doubtful that they could rally more than a few hundred willing to risk violence.

## *IV. Government Policy Toward Communism*

Communist freedom of action is essentially geared to the will of the present administration which has the capabilities, but not the inclination, to wipe out the small Communist organization. The Communists, in fact, receive from the government strategic political appointments and benefit from propaganda and indirect financial assistance. PGT operations are favored by a leftist, nationalist, and “democratic” climate, but the Party lacks a popular following and must work with a generally nonpolitical, apathetic mass.

## *V. Communist Influence in Labor*

The rank and file of Guatemalan union members, who are centered in plantations, farms, transport, communications, and small urban industrial



enterprises, although susceptible to demagogic leadership, are essentially non-Communist. Exceptions to this may exist in professional unions, as in the case of the left-wing press guild. At the same time, except for a few groups, such as the railway union, the rank-and-file membership cannot be considered anti-Communist. It is largely undisciplined and, especially in the rural areas, is likely to be apathetic or conservative. Communist control of Guatemalan labor is centered in the leadership of the General Confederation of Guatemalan Labor (Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala, CGTG), a CTAL-WFTU associate, to which the principal labor unions in the country belong. The CGTG's total claimed membership is 50,000. Possibly the largest union in the CGTG, and one of the most consistently pro-Communist, is the teachers' union which has a claimed membership of 10,000. Certain unions in the CGTG, such as the United Fruit Company and the Pan American Airways organizations, have shown clear-cut Communist direction in recent labor disputes. Rural labor, other than United Fruit Company workers and those on the national coffee fincas, which are affiliated with the CGTG, is nominally controlled by the National Farm Workers Confederation (Confederación Nacional de Campesinos de Guatemala, CNCG), an associate of the CGTG, whose exaggerated claim of 200,000 members represents only a potential at best. CNCG apparently has recently fallen more definitely under pro-Communist leadership. It is currently engaged in exploiting the political advantages to be gained through the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law.

Local union leadership probably is less consistently in Communist hands. One important United Fruit Company union, at least, has sharply vacillated between Communists and opportunists. Anti-Communists or opportunists have offered especially strong resistance to Communist infiltration in the railway union which has a membership of 4,400 and which, by US standards, most closely approximates a trade union.

#### *VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional Organizations*

Communist front groups are represented in the familiar realms of "peace", youth, women's, and intellectual activities. Their activities center primarily in Guatemala City. A tolerant, often sympathetic, government provides not only protection, but also frequent official recognition, favorable propaganda, and indirect financial assistance.

One of the oldest and most consistently prominent of the front groups is Grupo Saker-Ti, an organization formed by militant young intellectuals associated with the leftist-nationalist Revolution of 1944. Communist infiltration of this group has been heavy and its policies have been strongly pro-Communist, including advocacy of the "peace" movement. The organization publishes a locally well-known journal of the same name. Grupo Saker-Ti probably receives Government financial assistance, a fac-

tor which, together with its historical national prestige, guarantees its future under present political circumstances.

The National Committee of Peace Partisans (Comité Nacional de Partidarios de la Paz), the local organization of the international Communist peace front, with a reported membership of 88, under excellent leadership, has been an active “peace” organization. It has held local congresses and has strongly supported international meetings. Under present political circumstances, with the support of the administration’s propaganda machinery and the dominant progovernment political parties, the “peace” committee is in a favorable position.

The Democratic University Front (Frente Universitaria Democrática) is a small organization in the humanities division of the University of San Carlos. Despite the aggressive character of its leadership, this group has not been successful in either capturing or weakening the anti-Communist student organization, the Association of University Students (Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios).

The Guatemalan Alliance of Democratic Youth (Alianza de la Juventud Democrática Guatemalteca) is a front group dating from June 1950; it is affiliated with the Communist World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students. It has worked closely with the Communist Party for the promotion of Communism in Central America and has been active in the promotion of international Communist youth meetings and local and international “peace” organizations. It has assisted in the dissemination of strong anti-US propaganda.

The Guatemalan Feminine Alliance (Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca), with probably less than 100 active members, is an affiliate of the Women’s International Democratic Federation. It has joined with other front groups in pushing the local Communist “peace” campaign.

The National Conference for the Protection of Children, which first met in December 1951, not only involved a number of Communist front groups, but its laudable aims initially attracted prominent non-Communists. It also received generous Government support; public buildings were donated for use by the Conference and sessions were addressed by the President’s wife and a member of the cabinet.

There are several small refugee groups in Guatemala, some of which may be considered front organizations. One of these is the Spanish Republican Center (Centro Republicano Español), which has, perhaps, 50 members.

### *VII. Communist Infiltration Into Government*

There are four known Communists, including the second ranking party member, Victor Manuel Gutiérrez, in the National Congress which has 58 seats. The majority of the 43 members of the dominant govern-

ment parties in Congress are either pro-Communist or tolerant of PGT and there are probably a number of crypto-Communists among them. PGT members control three important congressional committees: labor, agrarian reform, and that dealing with revision of public contracts, a factor of particular concern to US companies operating in the country. Communists and their sympathizers heavily infiltrate the executive. At the top, José Manuel Fortuny, Secretary General of PGT, is believed to be a member of the President's inner circle of advisers. Communists are strategically located in the Secretariat of Propaganda from which they disseminate the Communist line through official and semiofficial press and radio and through an extensive poster campaign. They occupy key positions from top to bottom in the Social Security System. They not only were instrumental in pushing through the Agrarian Reform program but now dominate much of its present field administration, particularly at the lower levels which afford direct contact with the landless peasantry and where confiscatory cases are initiated. The national coffee fincas, now administered by the Agrarian Department, have been major centers of Communist-dominated labor organization in the rural areas.

There are possibly a few Communists at lower levels of the armed forces and police. If the recent appeal to soldiers in terms of the Agrarian Reform program is successful, the Communists will have improved leverage in this direction. None are believed to be among the higher ranking officers, even though these have been willing to go along with the government's policy of cooperation with the Communists.

#### *VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation*

Communists strongly influence public educational circles, especially through their leadership in the teachers' union and through their infiltration of traveling cultural missions in the interior. They are, however, strongly resisted in the University. As noted, the Communists have obtained strategic positions from which they disseminate propaganda through press, radio, and posters to large segments of the population. This is countered, to some extent, by the fact that the largest newspaper circulation is in the hands of the anti-Communist press. The Communists are actively resisted by the Catholic Church insofar as its resources permit, but that institution is relatively weak in Guatemala.

#### *IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties*

Forty-seven of 58 seats in the National Congress, including the four occupied by known Communists, are held by government-backed political parties. Most of these are either tolerant of, or sympathetic toward, PGT and a number are probably crypto-Communists. The largest and most influential of the progovernment parties is the Party of Revolutionary Action (Partido de Acción Revolucionaria, PAR), which is also the most pro-Com-

munist. These parties have invited the numerically weak PGT to participate in national electoral "democratic fronts" and have successfully sponsored admitted Communist candidates. Except in Guatemala City, opposition parties are badly split and are handicapped by the government-controlled electoral machinery. As already noted, of the two coalition-sponsored Communist candidates running in the most recent congressional elections (January 1953), Fortuny was defeated in Guatemala City, while another Communist was winning in an outlying province.

#### X. Communist Propaganda Machinery

The PGT newspaper is *Octubre*, a weekly with an estimated circulation of 3,000. A recently established labor paper, which reportedly receives government subsidies, is *Unidad*, founded by Victor Manuel Gutiérrez and directed by Carlos Manuel Pellecer, who are probably the second and third ranking Communists in Guatemala, respectively. Pro-Communist newspapers are the official daily *Diario de Centro América* with a circulation of 5,000 and the semiofficial daily *Nuestro Diario* with 3,000. Among the cultural periodicals, the most prominent is probably *Revista de Guatemala*, edited by Luis Cardoza y Aragón, chairman of the local "peace" committee. The well-known *Saker-Ti* has been noted. Other front publications with small circulation include: *Infancia*, organ of the Protection of Children group, the *Boletín de la Paz, Mujeres, Orientación*, paper of the Dominican exiles, and *Nuestra Lucha*, organ of the Democratic University Front.

TGW the government-owned radio station in the capital, is the most powerful in Guatemala and reaches an estimated 500,000. It is fed the Communist line from a number of sources, including the Secretariat of Propaganda. Radio *Nuestro Mundo* in Guatemala City is also pro-Communist in its policy. Communist-controlled and influenced organizations have easy access to time on these two stations.

General Soviet broadcasts beamed to Latin America are poorly received and a wide audience is unlikely. Some Soviet-Satellite propaganda literature and film comes in, principally by way of Mexico and Cuba, and from travellers returning from the Russian orbit.

#### XI. Financial Condition

The estimated financial condition of PGT is poor. It probably receives little from membership dues, nor are the labor unions or front groups able to contribute substantially. Some assistance to Communist operations has probably come through CTAL, and the expenses of delegates abroad have probably been paid by foreign sources. The principal source of support comes from the Government through patronage, free propaganda, meeting facilities and some subsidies given to front group activities.

## *XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets*

There is no official diplomatic representation between Guatemala and Russia. Czech and Polish ministers, resident in Mexico, are accredited to Guatemala, along with other Central American Republics, but their visits to this area are rare.

## *XIII. Communist International Organizations*

The Conference of Land and Air Transport Workers of Latin America, sponsored by the international Communist labor front, WFTU, and by the regional front, CTAL, was held in Guatemala City in May 1951. CTAL-WFTU officials, including Lombardo Toledano and Louis Saillant, attended and prominent Guatemalan Government officials were also present at the meeting.

International meetings in 1951 and 1952 to which Guatemala sent representatives were:

<u>Meeting</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Size of local representation</u>
1. Regional Conference of Latin American Agriculture (Mexico City)	May 1951	1
2. Third World Youth Festival (Berlin)	August 1951	6 or 7
3. World Peace Council (Vienna)	November 1951	1
4. WFTU General Council Meeting (Berlin)	November 1951	1
5. American Continental Congress of Peace Partisans (Montevideo)	March 1952	6
6. International Conference on Defense of Children (Vienna)	April 1952	2
7. Council of International Union of Students (Bucharest)	September 1952	n a
8. CTAL Central Committee Meeting (Mexico)	September 1952	1

9. Asian and Pacific Regions Peace Conference (Peiping)	October 1952	5
10. Continental Congress of Democratic Jurists of America (Rio de Janeiro)	Nov.–Dec. 1952	1
11. World Congress of Peoples for Peace (Vienna)	December 1952	10–11

Although no definite information is available, it is probable that the Guatemalan labor affiliate of the CTAL and WFTU has received financial assistance from the parent organizations. It is also probable that the expenses of Guatemalan delegates to Communist-sponsored international conferences have been paid from foreign sources.

#### *XIV. Communist Communication Network*

Guatemala maintains closest relations with the Middle American area. Ties with Mexico and Cuba have been particularly close and these two countries are among the principal American focal points for international Communist activity. Guatemala has also been a haven for small groups of political exiles, some of whom have strong Communist leanings, from neighboring countries.

Many Guatemalans, Communists and fellow-travellers, have visited the Soviet orbit, usually to attend international meetings. It is certain that the Communists among these have been couriers for Soviet instructions. The best example of this was the visit which Gutiérrez made to Moscow in 1951. It probably was no coincidence that his small Communist labor party was merged with the main Communist group shortly after Gutiérrez' return to Guatemala. The most recent demonstration of the sensitivity of the Guatemalan party to Moscow came with the alteration of the party's name in December 1952 to the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), a maneuver traceable to the policies expressed at the Nineteenth Soviet Congress of 1952.

34. **Letter From the Ambassador to Guatemala (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong)<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, February 13, 1953.

Dear Mr. Armstrong:

With respect to the request in your letter of December 18, 1952<sup>2</sup> for comments on the National Intelligence Estimate "Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security" (NIE-70, December 12, 1952),<sup>3</sup> I desire to draw attention to and comment on this document's conclusion in Paragraph 53 that "It is improbable that the Communists will gain direct control over the policy of any Latin American state, at least during the next several years", an appreciation which, in my opinion, may somewhat gloss over the Communist potential, at least in Guatemala, for achieving results just as injurious to the security of the United States by clever and effective concentration on influencing events by indirect means as by concentration on achieving direct control of the Government's policy-making apparatus.

In Guatemala, our observation has been that the Communists have thus far dedicated rather minor efforts towards obtaining control of the openly established policy-making positions but have rather aimed at installing their people in positions which will give leverage over influential groups in order to achieve their aims. Thus they have achieved control of the Executive Committee of the Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG), the national labor federation; a large measure of influence over the Confederacion Nacional Campesina de Guatemala (CNCG), the agricultural federation; leadership of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de Educacion de Guatemala (STEG), the teachers' union; key positions in the Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social (IGSS), the wealthy Government social security agency; close to a policy-making role in the official and pro-Government press and radio; and substantial influence over the actions of the major nationalist "revolutionary" parties on which the Administration bases its organized political support. Additionally, in the current Congress they chose the Special Committees on Agrarian

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025, Box 78, Folder 001. Secret. According to a March 4 cover memorandum, the letter was circulated to OIR and military intelligence officials.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R-01012A, DDI Registry of NIEs and SNIEs)

Reform and Labor Code Revision as the committees to dominate and, principally through the CGTG and CNCG, are now attempting to establish their ascendancy over the administrative machinery created to carry out the Agrarian Reform Law of June 17, 1952. On the other hand, so far as can be determined, the Communists have concentrated little or no effort to obtain control of the Armed or Police Forces, the Foreign Office or other such key policy-making bodies which would be along a shorter route to gaining direct control over the policy of Guatemala.

This pattern of penetration, while it does reflect the probable Communist realization that their domestic and foreign support is presently insufficient to hope for the early establishment of a "People's Democracy" in Guatemala, is illuminating of the real Communist objective here. This is clearly to so disrupt the country's internal structure and foreign relations that its integration into the common efforts of the Western world will be at a minimum, particularly with respect to those efforts designed to safeguard this community against eventual domination by the Soviet homeland of Communism. The Communists themselves have said as much, for instance, in defining the end of their local "Peace" campaign as assuring that "imperialism" will not be able to exploit the country for its "war preparations". To achieve this aim, the Communists have used the leverage of the organizations they have penetrated to mobilize a wide front which upsets the tranquility of Guatemala's relationship to the Western community. Thus they have played up such measures as labor and social security legislation and Agrarian Reform both as a means for capturing leadership of the ill-defined desire for progress of liberal groups and, more importantly, as a means of fomenting debilitating internal strife and dislocations. They have also, however, exploited every tendency to nationalism and autarchy which might serve to break down the ties and good relations of Guatemala with the United States and its friends. (For instance, in the recent Congressional campaign, Sr. Jose Manuel Fortuny, Secretary General of the Communist Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, warmly endorsed the demand for higher tariffs of the General Association of Industrialists, a manufacturers' and businessmen's organization normally considered "reactionary" by the Communists.) The exploitation of these dynamic and potentially anti-American factors is the cardinal reason for the "Patriotic Front" which the Communists announced as their tactic in their Party Congress last December (my despatch No. 586, January 5, 1953).<sup>4</sup>

To view the situation here in perspective, then, it is necessary to consider that the neutralizing of Guatemala as a Western nation is the

---

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.



immediate<sup>5</sup> Communist objective and that whether this is done by gaining direct control over national policy or by indirect but wider exercise of influence is a question of means to achieve that objective, not the objective itself. Thus if the degree to which Communists have gained direct control of the Government is used as the scale for measuring their success and potential, there is danger of a mistaken estimate for the evidence appears to be that the Communists themselves use the degree to which they can achieve the neutralization of the country as their own scale for measuring success.

The most recent developments in Guatemala, concerning the removal of the Supreme Court for opposing the Arbenz administration in an Agrarian Reform decision, provide an excellent example of the degree of success that the Communists already have in stimulating and exploiting events indirectly through its interlocking machinery (my telegram No. 319, February 11<sup>6</sup> and previous). Here the Communist Party, barely eighteen months after it came into the open and fifteen months after it established control of the CGTG, set itself an immediate goal—the rapid breaking up of large farms and liquidation of the power potential of the landlords by unrelenting application of the Agrarian Reform Law which was guided through Congress by means of Sr. Gutierrez' Special Committee on Agrarian Reform. To carry out this policy it seemed necessary that the Executive Branch Agrarian Reform authorities act without check from the courts lest the landlords slow up or block the Agrarian Reform through protracted legal proceedings, but on February 2 the Supreme Court in the case of Sr. Ernesto Leal Perez in effect ruled that appeals could be made to the courts when the authorities exceeded their legal limits. The Communists then mobilized the CGTG and CNCG in a campaign to have the Supreme Court Justices who made this ruling ousted and, acting in harmony with President Arbenz, the Communist and pro-Communist Administration leaders in the "revolutionary" parties led a successful floor fight in Congress with the galleries packed with CGTG workers to have the Justices removed for "incapacity". In so doing, the Congress swept aside the independence of the judiciary and exposed the flimsiness of Guatemalan democracy, an accomplishment which illuminates what the Communists can already do by manipulation and indirect control and raises a substantial question whether in the next several years they may not be able to perfect and extend their machinery to such an extent that

---

<sup>5</sup> The word "immediate" is underlined and a handwritten note in the margin reads: "no doubt in my mind that the Guat reds have a longer range objective, i.e. a truly 'popularly based' overt control of govt—evidenced by the drive to control the Agrarian Reform machinery and its access to the masses. FW"

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

they will be able to achieve their ends without risking an effort to obtain direct control.

The foregoing is, of course, a presentation to draw attention to the possibilities which the Communists have of realizing their objective through indirect, rather than direct, means and does not outline the anti-Communist counterweights which are present and potentially important in the current mixed Guatemalan situation. What the actual result will be during the next several years will depend in part on the outcome of the interplay of pro-Communist and anti-Communist factors in Guatemala and, to a large extent, on the ability of the United States to align its policy to advantage in the shifting scene that those years will doubtlessly present.

Sincerely yours,

**Rudolf E. Schoenfeld<sup>7</sup>**

---

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Schoenfeld signed the original.

---

**35. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

No. 6001

Washington, March 5, 1953.

**ABSTRACT**

On June 17, 1952, a comprehensive agrarian reform program became law in Guatemala.<sup>2</sup> Its professed objective is the development of a capitalistic agricultural economy through the abolition of semi-feudal owner-worker relationships, the redistribution of land, and the improvement with state assistance of cultivation methods. The implications of the legislation, however, go beyond agrarian reform inasmuch

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 1. Confidential. According to a typed note, this report was prepared by the Division of Research for American Republics. A cover sheet and table of contents are not printed.

<sup>2</sup> On February 26 President Arbenz signed an order issued by the Guatemalan National Agrarian Council calling for the expropriation, under provisions of the Agrarian Reform Law of June 17, 1952, of approximately 234,000 acres of United Fruit Company property near Tiquisate on the Pacific side of Guatemala, and offering the company government bonds as compensation. See *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1056-1057.

as its provisions furnish a basis for the strengthening of political and Communist control over the rural population.

Full implementation of the law would free thousands of agrarian workers from a centuries-old dependence upon the privileged landholding class, but would subject the majority, in all probability, to close control by the state. This would be exercised through a virtually autonomous National Agrarian Department. Certain limitations, also, would be incumbent upon those using redistributed land. Since the great bulk of the land expropriated would be incorporated into the imprescriptible public domain, holdings could be acquired only on the basis of a life grant or by rental. Private title, however, would be possible by the direct transfer to the peasant of land expropriated from private estates. Another feature of the law facilitating state control is provision for the concentration of agrarian workers on each private plantation into a single village.

Administration forces undoubtedly envisage political benefits from the legislation. They are presumably anxious to break the control of the conservative anti-administration large landholders over the farm labor force in order to organize it behind the government. Advantages to the Communists are likely to be enhanced by the opportunity to extend the influence in farm areas through infiltration of the National Agrarian Department, through their expanded control over Guatemalan labor organization, and through greater opportunities to attack the United Fruit Company. The deepening cleavage between moderates and left caused by government sponsorship of the agrarian program will benefit the Communists.

Full and rapid implementation of the land distribution program would be likely to produce serious economic repercussions. Already nervousness has depressed business activity. Thus far, however, agricultural production, which provides the basis of Guatemala's economy, apparently has not been affected.

Implementation of the law will be difficult and politically dangerous. Although an abundance of land is made available for redistribution, only a small part of it is desirably located. The extent to which land controlled by foreign agricultural corporations—the greater part of United Fruit Company holdings are possibly subject to expropriation—may be made available for redistribution is largely a matter of speculation. As far as can be ascertained, these enterprises have no special protection under their operating concessions. While they may appeal decisions affecting their interests to the National Agrarian Department, this agency and the civil courts, which probably could not be utilized, are closely subjected to the will of an administration determined to accelerate the agrarian program. Also difficult for the administration to overcome will be the long-standing living habits and prejudices of the largely Indian agrarian population. Most significant of all will be the perfecting of a competent administrative

organization. The strong probability exists that too rapid acceleration of the agrarian program coupled with increasing Communist strength and influence may lead to violence difficult for the Arbenz administration to contain.

### AGRARIAN REFORM IN GUATEMALA

1. *Background.* The Agrarian Reform Law which was adopted on June 17, 1952, is rooted in the Guatemalan revolutionary program which since 1944 has been a vital force in the formulation of governmental policy. As groundwork for such legislation, the framers of the Constitution adopted in 1945 provided for state direction of the national economy, for the expropriation of unused private lands with prior compensation, for the incorporation of such lands into the national patrimony, for both the rental and granting of nationalized lands, for the formation of agricultural communities, for collective farming, for the protection of ejido and communal lands, and for state technical and other assistance to agricultural communities. These provisions were the product of several influences. Probably foremost was the socialistic and nationalistic philosophy of Juan José Arévalo, spiritual leader of the Revolution, whose ideas paralleled but apparently owed little to Marxist ideology. Also evident was the Mexican experience in land reform, implanted in the Constitution in all probability chiefly by Jorge García Granados, President of the Constituent Assembly, who for many years prior to the Revolution had been resident in Mexico.

During the seven-year interval between the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law a number of land reform proposals were advanced. Some of these were quite radical and several Communist-sponsored. Almost all advocated the expropriation and division of large privately-owned estates. Except for the passage of compulsory land rental legislation in 1950, no positive action was taken by the Arévalo Administration (1945-51). President Jacobo Arbenz, however, firmly committed himself to agrarian reform and in repeated speeches stressed the inequity of land ownership, the semi-feudal nature of tenancy and laboring arrangements, and the antiquated cultivation methods employed on small holdings. On May 10, 1952, he submitted to the National Congress the draft legislation which became law the following month. In the final preparation and enactment of this program Communists played a prominent role.

2. *Redistribution of Land.* Under the provisions of the law certain land is specifically designated for redistribution. This includes uncultivated land, land not cultivated directly by or for the owner, land rented in any form, land needed to establish rural farm settlements, state farms and certain other national lands, certain municipal lands, and excesses resulting from new surveys prior to expropriation. Excluded, however, are farms of less than 221 acres whether or not cultivated, farms of from 221 to 664

acres if a least two-thirds of this land is cultivated, land belonging to Indian or farm communities, land of agricultural enterprises producing essential crops except land not directly used by the enterprise or exploited by systems established by this law, lands used for cattle raising, lands in the immediate vicinity of Guatemala City and other municipalities, and all legal forest reserves.

Of the land available for redistribution under the law, only a small part is desirably located. In the most productive and populous sections of the country, principally the highlands, the privately-owned farms are generally small and exempt from expropriation. Those that are larger are situated almost entirely in the undesirable lowland regions or in inaccessible parts of the highlands. Much of the suitably located and available land is that comprised in the state farms. This situation and the reluctance of the largely Indian agrarian population to migrate to the unhealthy lowlands probably influenced the administration during August and September 1952, in accordance with a previously announced policy, to make the first actual distributions of land from a national plantation and other holdings. In November 1952 arrangements were being completed for the breakup of 110 state farms, and several have since been distributed. Effective December 29, 1952, the Department of National Farms was legally dissolved and its affairs and properties transferred to a liquidating commission pending distribution of the land under the Agrarian Reform Law.

The extent to which land controlled by foreign agriculture corporations may be made available for redistribution is largely a matter of speculation. Largest of these enterprises is the United Fruit Company which owns or leases some 450,000 acres possibly subject to expropriation. As far as can be ascertained, special protection to property of the Company appears not to be afforded either by the Agrarian Law or by the clauses of contracts, including land lease arrangements, between the Company and the Guatemalan Government. Article 12 of the Agrarian Reform Law provides that "there will be no difference between natural and juridical persons who own or rent land in this country, even though they may have signed contracts with the state prior to the date of promulgation of this law insofar as the lands affected are concerned." This article indicates clearly that the Communist-guided framers of the Agrarian Law intended to apply its provisions to foreign enterprises such as the United Fruit Company.

The first moves to apply the law to United Fruit Company holdings were made in December 1952 when workers at both the Tiquisate and Bananera subsidiaries filed expropriation applications with the National Agrarian Department. In protesting these proceedings before the Departmental Agrarian Commissions, representatives of the Company pointed out what they regarded as irregularities in the petitions, presented evidence that much of its acreage was exempt from expropriation because it was forested, was pasture, or was producing "technical crops",

and contended that uncultivated lands were needed as a reserve for replacing acreage in bananas forced out of production by plant diseases. The Company also argued that such compensation as might be made would be inadequate if it were based as prescribed by this law upon the tax book value, especially in view of the fact that the Company had sought from 1948 to 1951 to have its land revalued. Moreover, payment in agrarian bonds would be unsatisfactory since they were subject to heavy discounting if cashed soon after issue. Both commissions overruled these arguments and approved the expropriation of the Company's uncultivated lands. In the Tiquisate case, the commission based its decision on the Company's inability to show that it was financially able to increase its cultivated acreage, and its failure to sustain with testimony by technical experts the contentions that all uncultivated holdings were required for agricultural purposes. Appeals in both cases were immediately filed by the Company with the National Agrarian Council. This body, in January, reversed the decision of the commission which had handled the Tiquisate case on the grounds that it had failed to specify the right of the Company to contest the commission's ruling within five days. The ruling, however, gave the Company only a temporary respite, for new petitions were immediately filed which have been approved by the National Agrarian Department and President Arbenz. This action, which would expropriate approximately two-thirds of the Company's Tiquisate holdings, has been appealed to the Guatemalan Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, the Company is faced with problem of numerous persons entering its Tiquisate property, staking out claims to unused lands, and making preparations for settling without legal authorization. In that part of the company subsidiary lying in the Department of Suchitepéquez, the Governor witnessed the "invasion" and sent soldiers to protect the intruders. On the other hand, the Governor of the Department of Escuintla ordered squatters off the Company's lands.

In view of the proceedings involving the United Fruit Company which have already taken place and the stipulation in the Agrarian Law that no difference exists between "natural and juridical persons", the Company and other foreign enterprises would appear to be entitled to some legal recourse in case of expropriation. The value of this privilege, however, would be limited by two factors. In the first place, the Agrarian Law provides the cases arising as a result of its implementation may be appealed through the various divisions of the National Agrarian Department to the President, but may not be taken to the civil courts. This limitation, therefore, bars full legal recourse. Secondly, were a constitutional or other loophole to be found for using the civil courts, the appeal, if it reached the Supreme Court, would stand little chance at present of being favorably reviewed since that tribunal is packed with pro-administration judges. Moreover, a Supreme Court decision would be subject to congress-

sional review. The packing of the Court took place in February 1953 when four of the five former justices were replaced after ruling against the expropriation of uncultivated lands belonging to a private landowner who had unsuccessfully appealed his case through the National Agrarian Department to the President of the Republic. The Supreme Court had accepted the case under a constitutional provision which grants a person the right to ask protection or aid (*amparo*) in a case where he believes the "law, regulation or other order by an authority is not applicable."

If the Agrarian Law is fully implemented, the impact upon private landholders would be borne chiefly by a minority group. The Guatemalan General Directorate of Statistics estimates that of 341,191 private agricultural holdings only 1,710 would be affected. These 1,710 holdings, however, comprise more than half of the total private acreage. Their owners would not suffer a drastic loss of cultivated land, but would be prevented from expanding future operations were their uncultivated acreage expropriated. For owners whose property is condemned provision exists for indemnification based upon the generally low tax valuations as of May 9, 1952. Compensation, for which the administration has made initial provision, is to be in bonds bearing 3 percent interest redeemable in 25 years or less. Although the National Agrarian Department planned in late 1952 to begin distributions from private farms, this phase of the agrarian program was not placed in operation until January 1953 when President Arbenz signed a resolution ordering the first expropriation of four farms in various parts of the country. Financial arrangements for such expropriations had been completed the preceding month with the deposit by the National Agrarian Department in the Bank of Guatemala of \$2,500,000 in Agrarian bonds to reimburse landowners.

Meanwhile, the failure of the Government to proceed more rapidly with private expropriations led to increasing pressure, part of it Communist-inspired, to bring this about. Petitions were sent to the agrarian authorities and to the President, and after the beginning of 1953 the seizure of private lands by farm workers gained impetus throughout the country. The official press warned that only the state could apply the law, but the Administration showed signs of yielding to the pressure by moving to authorize squatters to stay on the land under the compulsory rental laws, by refusing generally to use the police power to protect the private properties involved, and by accelerating the rate of private expropriations.

3. *Social and Political Implications.* Envisaged by the law is the far-reaching social change of freeing thousands of agrarian workers from a centuries-old dependence upon the privileged large landholding class. Prohibited are existing forms of servitude such as the lending by one landowner to another of the personal services of farm laborers, the forced distribution of Indians, and the payment of rental for land in labor. A provision for the placing of land rental on an almost exclusively cash basis,

and the limiting of payment whether in cash or kind to 5 percent of the value of the crop produced is one designed to free the Indian peasant from his dependent economic status.

Under the agrarian program, however, the rural classes would be subjected to rather close control by the state. This would be exercised through a virtually autonomous National Agrarian Department—headed nominally by the President of the Republic and having national, departmental and local subdivisions—whose influence is enhanced by its responsibility for rendering technical and other assistance. Certain limitations would be incumbent upon those using redistributed land. If the holding were acquired from the imprescriptible public domain, use would be on the basis of a life grant or by rental as long as adequate cultivation were maintained. Private title would be possibly only by the direct transfer to the applicant of land expropriated from private estates. Such holdings would be restricted to 43 acres and would not be transferable to another owner for 25 years. Another feature of the law facilitating state control is provision for the concentration of agrarian workers on each private plantation into a single village and for the nationalization of private roads connecting such communities with other centers of population.

4. *Communist Participation.* Although the Agrarian Law does not provide for the complete breakup of large privately-owned estates, it otherwise harmonizes generally with the program of the Guatemalan Communist Party, which purports to favor “peasant-middle-class agrarian reforms” bringing “the destruction of feudalism and the opening of the way to capitalism, or rather, industrialization.” The Party has accepted the law as “the least that can be done” and with the admission that it is not feasible to go further at the present time. Rapid implementation of the law, however, was urged at a Party Congress held in December 1952.

Under the law the Communists have an excellent opportunity to extend their influence over the rural population. One method of accomplishing this is through the representation in the various subdivisions of the National Agrarian Department to which the two major labor confederations are entitled. The Communist-controlled General Confederation of Workers (Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala, CGTG) and the Communist-influenced National Confederation of Farm Workers (Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala, CNCG) have 60 percent of the seats in the local agrarian commissions, 40 percent in the departmental commissions, and one-third in the national commission. Already Communists and their sympathizers have infiltrated the National Agrarian Department so extensively that they exert an important voice in both policy making and in the implementation of the law.

At the same time, the Communists are tightening their grip on the rural classes by using the law in other ways. Working chiefly through the CGTG and the CNCG, they are propagandizing in behalf of the law, are



stimulating farm workers to petition for the redistribution of land, and are helping applicants in their negotiations with the National Agrarian Department. Communist leaders also are taking the initiative resisting the efforts of private landowners to appeal their cases from the National Agrarian Department to the civil courts. Virtually no opposition exists to these activities. A basic reason for this is that the Agrarian Law provides severe penalties for interference with its implementation. Other factors redounding to the advantage of the Communists are an expansion of organizational activities in farm areas by both the CGTG and the CNCG, and the deepened cleavage between moderates and left produced by government sponsorship of the law.

5. *Implementation.* President Arbenz and his leftist administration forces, particularly the Communists, envisage political benefits from the legislation. They are presumably anxious to eliminate all control of the conservative, anti-administration large landholders over the farm labor force. With this accomplished, agrarian workers could be unionized under auspices and with benefits which would virtually assure their support of the administration. Aside from these broad political advantages, administration leaders will find in the agrarian reform program a greatly enlarged field for graft and patronage. Already the President has moved to keep implementation of the law in his hands by appointing as Chief of the National Agrarian Department the unscrupulous, corrupt, and shrewd Major Alfonso Martínez Estévez, his confidant and former private secretary. Next to the presidency, direction of the agrarian program is potentially the most important civilian position in the Guatemalan Government. To finance the operations of the National Agrarian Department, a budget of \$404,470 for fiscal 1952-53 was approved in November 1952 by the National Congress.

During 1952, implementation of the Agrarian Law proceeded slowly and produced some confusion and controversy. Many misinformed rural workers evidenced keen disappointment when informed that lands exempt from expropriation could not be distributed to them. Under Communist inspiration, pressure mounted for more rapid distribution. The acceleration of the program became the central issue of the 1952-53 congressional electoral campaign and has been officially marked as the primary government objective for 1953. In the course of the accelerated land distribution program, "squatting" and forced seizures by the peasantry have taken place and have been upheld by the government.

6. *Economic Repercussions.* Thus far, a serious business recession, particularly affecting Guatemala City, has been the major economic repercussion of the implementation of the reform program. The government has been forced to deny reports that private property in general will come under attack. Rapid and immoderate implementation of the law may well affect agricultural production, the basis of Guatemala's economy, but this

has not yet taken place. Dangers predicted locally include labor shortages, loss of land, the depreciation of land values, and a decline in credit.

### *Conclusion*

The adoption on June 17, 1952 of a comprehensive agrarian reform program presages significant sociological, economic and political changes in Guatemala. Full implementation of the law would free thousands of agrarian workers from a centuries-old dependence upon the privileged landholding class, but would subject the majority, in all probability, to close control by the state through supervision by a virtually autonomous National Agrarian Department, through limitation upon land usage, through population concentrations, and through the extension of technical and other assistance.

Full and rapid implementation of the land distribution program would be likely to produce serious economic repercussions. Already nervousness has depressed business activity. Thus far, however, agricultural production, which provides the basis of Guatemala's economy, apparently has not been affected.

Administration forces in all probability will use the law to eliminate all control of the conservative, large landholding classes over farm workers. With the assistance of the Communists, who will take advantage of the opportunity to extend their influence over the rural classes, a stronger backing for the government should result. Advantages to the Communists also are likely to be enhanced by greater opportunities to attack the United Fruit Company, and by the deepening cleavage between moderates and left resulting from government sponsorship of the reform program.

Foreign agricultural enterprises, especially the United Fruit Company, will probably have their uncultivated holdings expropriated since they appear to have no special protection under their operating concessions. While they may appeal decisions affecting their interests to the National Agrarian Department, this agency and the civil courts, which probably could not be utilized, are so closely subjected to the will of the administration that such recourse would avail little.

Implementation of the law will be difficult because of the unavailability of suitably located land, because of the long-standing living habits and prejudices of the largely Indian agrarian population, and because of the likelihood that a competent administrative organization cannot be perfected. The strong probability exists that too rapid acceleration of the agrarian program coupled with increasing Communist strength and influence may lead to violence difficult for the Arbenz Administration to contain.

36. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 8, 1953.

## MEMORANDUM RE P.B. FORTUNE

We now expect to be in a position to proceed with our phase of the project if desired.<sup>2</sup> However, the chances of success would be greatly enhanced if there were a coordinated effort in the political field. The country in question is thoroughly dependent on its trade relations with us and has discounted the fact that we would do nothing. In effect they have flaunted us and consistently got away with it. It is time they were brought to realize that this could not continue.

While the exact steps which might be politically feasible are matters beyond our competence here, we have a legitimate interest, it seems to me, in seeing that the climate is right for the types of action in which we may be engaged.

Here are some of the measures which might be considered.

1. Recalling our ambassador for consultation and sending a two-fisted guy to the general area on a trip of inspection and to report to the President.

Our ambassador is timid and never recovered from his treatment at the hands of Anna Pauker. Further the whole Embassy should be given a look over. I just received the visit of two American citizens highly recommended who have large interests in the country. They indicated that they did not feel they could get anything whatever out of the Embassy in the way of protection of American interests and hinted at darker things. They came to me after talking with Herbert Hoover and Lewis Strauss, and the latter urged that I see them. Harman Pflieger knows about them through Herbert Hoover.

Bill Pawley or someone of his type might be considered. I recognize that Pawley is hard to control, but he is fearless and gets things done even though he may break a little crockery in doing it. I would suggest

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 2. Top Secret. A handwritten note by Allen Dulles at the top of the page reads: "Copy left with W.B.S. on a personal basis—with understanding there would be no circulation."

<sup>2</sup> Presumably reference is to the adoption on March 4 of NSC 144, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Latin America." One of the objectives of the NSC directive was the "reduction and elimination of the menace of internal Communist or other anti-U.S. subversion." For text of NSC 144/1, March 18, 1953, as well as records of discussion in the NSC of the paper and progress reports, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1-65.

that he might also spend a little time in the countries bordering on the one of our chief concern.

2. In connection with the mission described in 1, the President in a press conference might express his concern at the Soviet Communist penetration and his desire to consult, in the spirit of the Rio Pact, with other Latin American countries affected thereby.

3. Appropriate speeches might be made by a couple of members of Congress. You may recall that this was done a year or so ago and had a substantial effect. Vice-President Nixon has been fully briefed by the two Americans who saw me and undoubtedly he would cooperate.

4. Anything affecting coffee exportations to the U.S. would be nearly a knockout blow. We might consider the possibility of having some legislation introduced authorizing, upon a finding by the President that a country was taking American property without provision for due compensation, the imposition, within prescribed limits, of some countervailing duties on the imports of such country with the view to providing a base for compensation. The mere threat of such legislation might have a profound effect.

I don't know whether any of these measures are feasible, but I merely wish to raise the issue that the type of action we contemplate is likely to be *inadequate* unless supplemented along some such lines.

**Allen W. Dulles<sup>3</sup>**

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typewritten signature.

37. **Special Paper Prepared in the Division of Research for Latin America, Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

No. 21

Washington, May 26, 1953.

EFFECT UPON GUATEMALA OF ARMS PROCUREMENT BY  
EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA

Problem

To determine the effect of overt procurement of arms from the US by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua upon the Guatemalan military, political leaders and public opinion.

1. Assuming an effectively initiated and sustained program of military assistance to El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, together with an equally effective isolation of Guatemala in the hemisphere, it is likely that the opposition to Arbenz will become more critical and militant and that important Army and political leaders now supporting Arbenz will calculate that the present regime is not in the best interests of either the nation or themselves. Under these conditions, Arbenz would probably eventually fall. However, a substantial rise of anti-US feeling in Latin America and some Latin American resistance to US leadership in the OAS and UN are likely consequences of US military assistance to Guatemala's neighbors. Unless successfully countered, such support would provide Arbenz with effective propaganda with which to sustain national patriotism and to prolong indefinitely the life and present course of his government.

2. The Army is the key to the stability of the Arbenz regime and could effect a rapid and decisive change in the Guatemalan political sit-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 4. Secret. An attached Memorandum for the Record, dated June 5 and drafted by J.C. King summarizes a meeting held with officers from the Division of Research; it reads in part: "Attached paper was reviewed, paragraph by paragraph, and serious objections taken by CIA representatives to the estimate that a substantial rise in anti-U.S. feeling in Latin America might be created by supplying of arms to El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. It was pointed out to representatives of the Department of State that only the adverse effects of such an action were mentioned in the paper, and none of the beneficial effects. It was also indicated that an armed action by these three countries against Guatemala would result in a unification of the Guatemalan people behind Arbenz only if there were prolonged fighting, say for a period of months. This would be highly improbable because an attack by the three countries would be launched only if they were convinced that they had the means to bring about rapid military success. Numerous other minor points were objected to in the paper, and the conclusion was, at the end of the meeting, that a new draft would have to be made by the State Department."

uation if it were to take concerted action.<sup>2</sup> Although a quick change of attitude is always possible, there is no present reason to doubt the continued loyalty of the Army high command and of most of the Army officer corps to Arbenz.<sup>3</sup> The Army would be unlikely to take revolutionary action unless the high command or a substantial body of unit commanders became convinced that their personal security and well-being were threatened by Communist control of the Government, or unless there were widespread social disorder and protracted deterioration of the economy.

3. An agreement for overt procurement of arms from the United States by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, especially if arrived at in confidence and if followed by rapid and sustained implementation, probably would seriously affect the Guatemalan Army. It would cause concern among the high command and would stimulate conspiratorial activity on the part of small, already disaffected army elements.

4. Although the concern of the Guatemalan Army leaders probably will involve initial resentment against the United States and a preference to go along with Arbenz, the military are eventually likely to recognize that military aid to neighboring countries is an expression of US determination to eliminate Communist leadership and influence in Guatemala. In this circumstance—and barring effective external sympathy and support—the Army high command is likely to calculate in terms of increased disaffection among lower echelon officer personnel, emboldened action by elements of the political opposition, an increase in the number of revolutionary attempts against the government, the loss of military position and political leadership in Central America, and new defensive requirements along Guatemala's borders.

5. It is probable that these calculations would ultimately cause at least a split among top Army leaders, some of whom would be willing to attempt deals with overt and covert oppositionist elements. Groups with which some present army leaders could negotiate successfully include elements of the urban opposition who, although anti-Communist, are also strongly nationalistic and who would favor continuance of many aspects of the revolutionary program. The present military leaders neither would nor could negotiate with opposition contained in the pre-revolutionary landholder-military elite. Without the united support of the Army, the Arbenz government could not be expected to survive.

---

<sup>2</sup> NIE-84, "Probable Developments in Guatemala," May 19, 1953, noted: "The Army (6,000 men) is the only organized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering the political situation." The full text is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1061–1071.

<sup>3</sup> NIE-84 estimated that the Guatemalan senior officer corps owed their personal advancement, and loyalty to Arbenz. "Any possible disaffection in the Army would be likely to occur at the junior officer level."

6. Arbenz does not at present have a good position in which to maneuver. Under the pressure here envisaged he is not likely to alter his present course but would appeal to the people in patriotic terms while taking strong measures to control the opposition.

7. Arbenz probably could rally considerable initial support at home, not only among Communist-led labor and the radical fringe of professional and intellectual groups, but also among many anti-Communist nationalists in urban areas, especially Guatemala City. Under circumstances of continued internal tension and national isolation, however, blind emotion will tend to give way to a critical estimate of Arbenz' policies and their consequences. Particularly if the Army's loyalty to Arbenz falters, it is likely that substantial groups among the present opposition will be embodied to take action and that the many political opportunities around Arbenz will seek deals with prospective new leadership.<sup>4</sup>

8. The Communists will strongly support Arbenz as long as he controls the situation and will be able to make considerable local and international capital of the "imperialist attack" upon Guatemala. At the outset, their position in government and labor is likely to be strengthened and they will be able to use labor for effective mass demonstration purposes. The Communists have little power of their own, however, and if the military and larger political support around Arbenz weakens, the Communists will become progressively isolated and their leadership impotent. In time of crisis labor's capacity for effective unified support of Arbenz, if deprived of its present leadership, would be very limited.<sup>5</sup>

9. The course of developments estimated in 3 through 8 are contingent upon what degree of success the United States may have in countering or neutralizing unfavorable Latin American reaction to the supplying of arms to Guatemala's neighbors. Most governments, with the exception of Argentina, Bolivia, and Costa Rica (especially if Figueres wins the July presidential election) will probably seek initially to ignore the issue. Argentina will certainly take advantage of the situation propagandawise and probably will use it to further an ambition to create a Latin American bloc, seeking particularly the cooperation of Chile and Bolivia. In other Latin American nations—Uruguay, Brazil, and especially Mexico, public opinion is very likely to be sharply critical of the United States and will deplore what will appear to them to be a blow against the inter-American system. The respective governments will be

---

<sup>4</sup> Another State Department analysis of the domestic political situation in Guatemala and its implications for U.S. policy is in a May 21 memorandum from Raymond Leddy to John Cabot, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1071-1073.

<sup>5</sup> NIE-84 noted: "The Guatemala Labor (Communist) Party is estimated to have no more than 1,000 members, of whom perhaps less than one-half are militants."

under increasing pressure to express officially the national dissatisfaction. While the procurement of arms by Guatemala's neighbors would provide no legal basis for international action against the United States, Latin American cooperation with the United States on other issues in the OAS and the UN would be under an increased strain.

10. Under present circumstances, the procurement of arms from the United States by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua will increase the possibility of military attack by those countries on Guatemala. Such an attack will enable Guatemala to put a case before the OAS.

11. Such external possibilities may well provide sufficient psychological support and diplomatic assistance to prolong indefinitely the life of the Arbenz government.<sup>6</sup> The effectiveness of the Government-Communist propaganda will be greatly increased; for many elements of the opposition the anti-Communist issue and other opposition grievances are likely to be subordinated to a sustained, intense national feeling; these developments are likely to encourage the Army to continue its support of the government.

---

<sup>6</sup> The word "indefinitely" was inserted in an unidentified hand.

---

### 38. **Report Summary Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 18, 1953.

#### *Former Guatemalan Officer Reported Planning Revolution*

The United States Army Attaché in Honduras reports as of 8 June that Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, former Guatemalan Army Officer who has been implicated in anti-Government activities and is now a resident in Honduras, is planning to oust President Arbenz of Guatemala. The source of the Army Attaché's information, whose nationality is not known, claims to be one of Castillo's "Lieutenants". The report is summarized as follows: The attempt is to be made within 90 days. The organization has purchased half a million dollars worth of military equip-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 77, Folder 15. Secret. An attached cover memorandum from the Department of the Army, dated June 25, describes this paper as a summary of a report received from the U.S. Army Attaché in Honduras together with Department of the Army comments.



ment including arms and ammunition sufficient to equip 3,000 men. The plan is to land 1,000 men at Puerto Barrios to establish a beachhead and then move by rail to Guatemala City. In the meantime Guatemala City will be "softened up" by air. Sympathizers will join the force en route to Guatemala City and a motor column will cross the Guatemala border from El Salvador. All forces will converge on Guatemala City. Army units except those in Guatemala City are expected to back the move.

G-2 Comment: An attempted revolt by Castillo Armas is quite possible but its success is unlikely. There is no information available to corroborate the various details given by the Attaché's source, and it is quite probable that there is considerable exaggeration and wishful thinking in the report. Castillo is not believed to have much, if any, support within the Guatemalan Army, and support from Army units is unlikely, at least until the movement shows a good chance of success. Movement by rail from Barrios to Guatemala City could be easily blocked. Furthermore, a movement on the scale indicated would require considerably more logistic support than it is believed Colonel Castillo possesses.

---

### 39. **Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, August 12, 1953, 6 p.m.

35. Greenberg, Acting Manager United Fruit Company, says Guatemalan Agrarian authorities have now turned their attention from company's Pacific coast properties (my telegram 386, March 26)<sup>2</sup> to those on Atlantic side and National Agrarian Department notified company on August 12 of order for expropriation of 174,000 acres of company's bananera division. Affected area embraces 138,000 acres in forest; 25,000 in abandoned banana lands; 158 leased to independent banana growers; and 10,000 occupied by squatters under nominal leases. According to Greenberg, company is left with 89,000 acres, including 4,000 in bananas, 5,000 abaca, 59,000 forests and 6,000 pastures.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 65, Folder 8. Restricted Security Information.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 814.20/3-2653)

He adds that forest land left company is too rugged for banana cultivation and in general other acreages left company are too scattered for future large-scale development.

Company plans file appeal to President Arbenz.

Schoenfeld

---

#### 40. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 12, 1953.

At its Informal Meeting on August 12,<sup>2</sup> the Psychological Strategy Board authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to proceed on a basis of high priority with the implementation of project [*name not*

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 147, Folder 5. Top Secret. A cover memorandum from the Deputy Director (Plans) to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, September 30, labeled "Eyes Only," reads: "Will you please arrange for the filing and recording of the attached Minute of the authorizing action taken at the PSB meeting of 12 August as a part of the file on PBSUCCESS? Our internal records should be so prepared as to show that Project [*name not declassified*] (as shown on the books of PSB) is one and the same as PBSUCCESS—formerly PBFORTUNE."

<sup>2</sup> On September 16 Frank Wisner sent a memorandum to the Director discussing this meeting at which PBSUCCESS was accorded "an extremely high operational priority." Wisner wrote: "It is my understanding that this was the meeting which flashed the 'green light' to us and—pursuant to your suggestion—I have already taken up with George Morgan the matter of having a suitably sterilized entry made in the records of that particular meeting." According to an oral report received by Wisner, the PSB decision covered these principal elements:

"a. CIA is to have the principal responsibility and is to call upon other departments and agencies for such supporting actions as CIA may deem necessary or desirable to the success of the plan.

"b. The operation is to be directed and controlled by CIA [*text not declassified*].

"c. It was recognized that this is an extremely difficult operation and that it will require a considerable period of build-up during the course of which the atmosphere must be thoroughly prepared and numerous actions must be taken in order to shake, and hopefully dislodge, the very firm grip which the regime now holds upon the situation.

"d. This is to be an unusually closely-held operation within State and the other departments concerned. (For your *personal* information, General Smith has directed us to have no direct dealings with the State Department area division; but rather to deal either directly with him or with two specific individuals whom he has named.)" (Ibid.)

An initial estimate placed the cost of the operation at \$2.735 million, but "General Cabell, with whom I have discussed this aspect of the matter, has suggested that we allow ourselves a little leeway and put in for the round sum of three million."

declassified],<sup>3</sup> calling on the Departments of State and Defense for necessary support.

**George A. Morgan**  
*Acting Director*

---

<sup>3</sup> A draft policy paper for the NSC, drafted in ARA, August 19, argued against covert intervention: "Our secret stimulation and material support of the overthrow of the Arbenz Government would subject us to serious hazards. Experience has shown that no such operation could be carried on secretly without great risk of its leadership and backers being fully known. Were it to become evident that the United States has tried a Czechoslovakia in reverse in Guatemala, the effects on our relations in this hemisphere, and probably in the world at large, could be as disastrous as those produced by open intervention." For full text of the paper, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1074-1086.

---

**41. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 17, 1953.

SUBJECT

Guatemala

1. During the past year the Government of Guatemala and Communist elements within that country have strengthened their position. Army officers have been treated as a privileged class and every effort has been made to insure the assignment of reliable men to key positions. Implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law has further ingratiated the Government with the lower classes. Conversely, the position of opposition elements has deteriorated. Obvious inability to organize an effective program discouraged some previously militant and caused others to avoid risking revolutionary associations. Further, the abortive Salama uprising forces a number of key opposition figures to flee the country and may have reduced their organizations to relative ineffectiveness. Many diverse and potentially powerful elements opposed to the present regime do remain, however, and would welcome the opportunity to act. It is, none the less, improbable that the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent through Wisner.

Arbenz Government can be successfully countered without direct military action in which revolutionary forces must have outside aid.

2. RUFUS is considered to be the most effective potential leader for a revolutionary effort. Necessary contacts with him have been made and extensive groundwork laid. Detailed plans, however, require review to determine their soundness in view of conditions altered during the past year and, particularly, to ascertain whether RUFUS still has the personnel essential for a successful operation.

3. Until July of this year it appeared possible that certain anti-Communist governments of the Caribbean would lend sufficient support in arms, planes and money to RUFUS to permit action. Strong interest was expressed, promises actually made, but broken at the last minute. Our clear instructions, since October 1952, have been to avoid any act which could be considered as "sparking" the revolutionary movement, but to be prepared to assist. It is now evident that insufficient help will be forthcoming from the Caribbean for RUFUS to move. We are therefore faced with two alternatives:

a. Accept the present situation, withdraw the financial support so far given to RUFUS and liquidate the mechanisms which have been set up to assist him.

b. Through *covert* channels, supply RUFUS with all the arms, planes and money required for a successful operation, providing the review of his assets is positive.

4. Experience with reconnaissance runs of our LCI have demonstrated that this craft is not suitable for the purpose intended. Further, resentment engendered in CINCARIB and 15th Naval District by consequences of the most recent trip makes further activity of this nature inadvisable.

5. Governments of anti-Communist Central American countries bordering on Guatemala require reassurance that the United States is prepared to back them effectively in maintaining a friendly attitude toward our interests and in defending themselves against aggression or self-styled retaliation on the part of Guatemala.

6. In view of the above factors, it is recommended:

a. That detailed plans for RUFUS' field operations be reviewed to ascertain their soundness in the light of existing conditions and to determine whether he still has adequate personnel to support the operation.

b. That a decision be reached as to whether the additional arms and aircraft requested by RUFUS are to be purchased and eventually concentrated at Puerto Cabezas for deployment.

c. That, unless additional arms are made available to RUFUS, material now at DTROBALO not be turned over to him. This recommenda-

tion is made to avoid sparking an inadequate effort that might well result in disaster.

d. That, if the answer to b above is affirmative, consideration be given to transporting the material now at DTROBALO to the Free Trade Zone, Port of New York, by [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] ship. Arms purchased for RUFUS may be delivered from points of origin to the Free Trade Zone there to be picked up by RUFUS shipping for movement to Puerto Cabezas. Material from DTROBALO could be handled in the same manner with operational facility and sound security. Mr. Cummings states that he is prepared to handle the licensing aspects of these transactions.

e. That the LCI be disposed of through existing cover by returning it to the ostensible Panamanian owner for sale at the best terms obtainable.

f. That military assistance agreements be negotiated between this country and El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. Further, that these agreements include aid in the form of arms for the governments mentioned and that they be implemented with expedition.

J.C. King

---

## 42. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 19, 1953.

### SUBJECT

PBFORTUNE—Meeting with DD/P at 1300 on 19 August

1. Tom Mann called DD/P subsequent to meeting in my apartment on 17 August to say he had seen General Smith and informed him of our meeting. General Smith was favorably inclined to positive and constructive suggestions made for softening up. Since Mann is leaving for Greece today, he recommended a substitute to General Smith—Ray Leddy, in charge of Central American Republics. Leddy was approved by General Smith. Mann said he had briefed Leddy with the General's

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret. Prepared on August 20.

approval, including the fact that only General Smith and Leddy will be cut in. No other echelons or personalities of ARA will be informed.

2. DD/P said the Acting Director wanted a quick check with Col. Edwards on Leddy. I called Colonel Edwards, who checked Leddy's file and at 1520 gave full and unqualified clearance. He said that Leddy's record was highly favorable, in fact, outstanding. I informed DD/P's secretary, who in turn called me at 1650 with the following message from DD/P—"Fine. Go ahead."

J.C. King  
CWH

---

43. **Letter From Colonel Castillo Armas to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

August 22, 1953.

Translation of a letter received from RUFUS, 25 August 1953

1. [*initials not declassified*] will leave Tegucigalpa on Monday, 31 August. He will be in Washington about 15 September. Yesterday he returned from a visit with our friends in El Salvador.

2. I have complete confidence in Somoza and in our plan to put a base there. The reasons for my confidence are:

a. Somoza has shown himself very enthusiastic and desirous of cooperating with us. For example he sent at his own expense (\$4000.00) one of his pilots to the U.S.A. to inspect planes for us.

b. He has promised us one of his big bombers (B-24) completely equipped. I offered to pay for it. He said no we could have it for nothing.

c. Somoza has placed at our disposal his military base at Puerto Cabezas.

d. At the proper moment Somoza is prepared to bring about any necessary agreement for joint action between Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. This he has assured me.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 73, Folder 3. No classification marking.

e. He knows moreover that he cannot deceive you and your friends.

f. Lastly, it serves his own interest to help us because he realizes that the threat to Nicaragua is greater than ever before. This he told me personally the last time I saw him.

3. Yesterday WT gave me \$10,000.00. I need another \$10,000 immediately if I am to meet heavy commitments coming up at the end of the month. I am very sorry to have to raise this subject again but, I beg you to please send me some money as soon as possible.

4. A friend in Panama has offered to sell me an LCI<sup>2</sup> properly equipped for the operation we have in mind. He asks \$10,000.00. This ship is more suitable than the *Bali Hai* as the *Bali Hai* has been modified for commercial use. (Note: the *Bali Hai* has not yet been bought by RUFUS.)

---

<sup>2</sup> The Central Intelligence Agency had already determined that this ship was inappropriate for the operation; see Document 41.

---

**44. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King) to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 27, 1953.

SUBJECT

Instructions for DD/P re Guatemala  
Meeting of 27 August 1953

PRESENT

Mr. Wisner, Mr. Barnes, Colonel King

1. Mr. Peurifoy will be appointed Ambassador to Guatemala. There will be a briefing for him in Mr. Wisner's office Tuesday, 1 September, at 11 a.m.

2. General Smith has clarified the roles of Ray Leddy and Dick Berry. Leddy will be the lead man in State and will keep General Smith informed as we progress. Berry will be handled with loose harness.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only.

3. At the PSB luncheon of 26 August the following conclusion was reached. Guatemala will have number one priority. It was confirmed at the luncheon that we will handle Guatemala in our chain of command. Others will play a supporting role only, to the extent *we* see fit.

4. General Smith told General Cabell that Mr. Tom Mann had briefed him on the meeting with us in apartment of J.C. King and made the following points, with which General Smith agreed:

a. There should be reduced outside participation—this referring particularly to [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. All should be informed only on a strictly need-to-know basis.

b. Mr. Mann thought the atmosphere of the meeting showed too much concern on our part with the security angle. General Smith expressed the opinion to General Cabell that we should not be so worried and should not show too much concern. Mr. Wisner, however, emphasized to Colonel King that this does not mean any relaxation in measures to be taken to protect the security of the operation and the U.S. role in it.

5. Future papers will not refer to “diplomatic preparation”, but will use the expression “other actions in support of CIA action”.

6. Mr. Wisner emphasized to Colonel King that Guatemala is now number one priority in the Agency, and that Colonel King is to be responsible for getting the show on the road.

J.C. King<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.



45. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 1, 1953.

## SUBJECT

Briefing of Ambassador John E. Peurifoy re Guatemala

1. Ambassador John E. Peurifoy was briefed regarding the present situation in Guatemala by Mr. Frank Wisner on 1 September 1953. Present were Mr. J. Lampton Berry, Colonel J.C. King, and [*name not declassified*]. Mr. Wisner pointed out that conditions in Guatemala are obviously adverse to U.S. interests in view of the close working alliance between the administration of President Jacobo Arbenz and the Communist Party. It was noted that this alliance, through formation of a Communist affiliated labor confederation, persecution of foreign economic interests, enactment and implementation of a confiscatory agrarian reform law, court packing and conduct of an aggressively anti-American, pro-Communist publicity campaign, has achieved virtual dominance over national political and economic life. Further, it was observed that the four Communist controlled political parties which comprise the administration coalition hold 51 of the 56 seats in congress, while Communists dominate the National Electoral Board, the Agrarian Department, the Institute of Social Security, the Labor Courts, the Ministry of Education, the Secretariat of Propaganda and the official press and radio. Mentioned, among effects of this alliance upon Guatemalan foreign relations, were the active support of leftist elements in other Central American countries through provision of bases, press and communication facilities, cash, transportation, agents and assassins.

2. Mr. Peurifoy was advised that this Agency has now been authorized to take strong action against the government of President Arbenz in the hope of facilitating a change to a more democratically oriented regime. Some of the past preliminary planning and activity toward this end was reviewed and the point clearly established that success might depend, to a great extent, upon support of our activities by the American Ambassador to Guatemala within the limitations of the "need to know" policy. It was particularly noted that excessive security measures on the part of an ambassador which result in hampering agent activity through unusual limitations of communication and the imposition of time consuming burdens of cover activity are plainly not appropriate. It was also stressed that no aspect of this operation is cleared for discussion with any save specifically designated individuals.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret. Prepared on September 8.

3. Mr. Peurifoy stated that he understood the situation in general terms, appreciated the need for positive action and would be prepared to support the program as American Ambassador to Guatemala. For planning purposes he gave 15 October 1953 as a possible date for his arrival in that country.<sup>2</sup> In discussing station personnel he expressed the hope that among the qualifications of the Chief would be complete facility with the Spanish language.

[name not declassified]

---

<sup>2</sup> Peurifoy was appointed on October 5 and presented his credentials on November 4.

---

#### 46. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 3, 1953.

##### SUBJECT

PBFORTUNE—Meeting with Principal Agent (KS),<sup>2</sup> 3 September 1953

1. At noon, 3 September 1953, Col. King, [name not declassified] and the undersigned met the principal Agency field case officer assigned to PBFORTUNE who has spent 15 months with principal indigenous agent (R).<sup>3</sup>

2. KS gave his personal impressions of the circumstances surrounding PBFORTUNE and commented on a variety of interesting aspects relative to the proposed operation including the military action plan. This was done primarily for the benefit of [name not declassified] and Tofte who have just been assigned to some special work on the project.

3. It was evident that KS's thinking, planning and liaison with the P/A, (R), have so far been based on estimates of relatively limited support primarily on the part of "the Company." Hence his points of view up to now are somewhat restricted. Furthermore, it should be noted for the sake of order that KS's views are somewhat colored by the fact that he has had to identify himself very closely with the P/A and his cause over a period of time.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret. Prepared on September 4.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>3</sup> RUFUS, i.e. Castillo Armas.

4. There is no doubt that KS believes strongly in PBFORTUNE, the principal agent (R) and his overt as well as covert organization. KS admits, however, that there is no tangible proof to date as to the scope and potential of the covert setup inside the country. This is partly due to the fact that KS has avoided any kind of pressure on R to "test" internal capabilities or deliver "proof" in the form of names, locations and numbers of covert elements and their leaders.

Considering that the operation now will be Government (U.S.) sponsored rather than supported by "the Company" as heretofore, KS would assist in devising means of evaluating, at least to a degree, the P/A's capabilities particularly inside the target country.

5. It is interesting to note that the entire available striking force of R in the neighboring country (H)<sup>4</sup> is 250-300 men. Some of these are reportedly good troops including a number of officers with professional military background.

It is further noteworthy that another neighbor country (N)<sup>5</sup> has promised to place a military installation at the disposal of R for training and staging of his force. KS believes that R should take advantage of this offer without delay for reasons of morale and expediency.

6. KS pointed out with some emphasis that he (and his indigenous associates) were considerably worried about the *time element!*

According to KS, the population of the target country was showing "increasing soft spots"—meaning that the spirit of opposition to the Government as well as possibly available active resistance potential were rapidly dwindling. KS stated, as his personal conviction: . . . "that unless the operation was implemented and completed within 90 to 120 days, it would be too late!"<sup>6</sup>

(It should again be noted that KS's frame of mind is based on close association abroad with the indigenous P/A and the military plan calling for militant border crossings, a landing from the sea, and a cross-country advance towards the capital.)

7. After a general discussion, Col. King and KS agreed on plans for a visit with Mr. [initials not declassified]<sup>7</sup> who is due to arrive in New York over Labor Day weekend. [initials not declassified] is the alleged leader of the present underground movement inside the target country from where he was expelled not too long ago.

---

<sup>4</sup> Honduras.

<sup>5</sup> Nicaragua.

<sup>6</sup> The following phrase was added by hand: "Sounds like RUFUS himself talking".

<sup>7</sup> Regarding this meeting, see Document 48.

The presence of KS and [*initials not declassified*] here at this particular time is very significant in connection with reviewing and evaluating the current status and possibilities of PBFORTUNE.

Hans V. Tofte<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

#### 47. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 4, 1953.

##### SUBJECT

Impressions of PBFORTUNE

1. The following initial observations are made on the basis of:

Two briefings by Col. King and [*name not declassified*], 27 and 28 August 1953;

One meeting with CWH and CPP in DD/P's office, 2 September 1953;

Study of basic paper of P/A (CCN #73844-a 5/6 1952);

Study of NIE-84, dated 19 May 1953;<sup>2</sup>

Study of sundry papers for "background";

Debriefing of chief field case officer (KS);<sup>3</sup>

Sundry conferences with King and [*name not declassified*].

2. The current situation in the target country would have to undergo a considerable change before it would be favorable and suitable for the implementation of PBFORTUNE.

3. Certain changes in the balance of military power in the general central area in question would have to be established prior to the activation of any kind of revolutionary activity in the target country.

A series of support measures planned for the three neighboring countries recognize this.<sup>4</sup> These preparatory moves in themselves are of very considerable interest in the over-all anti-Communist effort of the Agency and could well pave the way for a number of important covert

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1061-1071.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> For the type of measures considered, see Document 37.

activities even if the presently contemplated revolutionary climax of PBFORTUNE would have to be cancelled or delayed indefinitely due to lack of internal covert support assets.

4. The position of the indigenous P/A is weak. His available assets outside the target country are negligible. His plan of action is based entirely on expected popular support. There is no evidence that such popular support would be forthcoming. There are no actual proofs of any effective covert mechanism of any consequence inside the target country.

The military plan of action visualized by the P/A is highly questionable in view of the fact that the main forces would consist of untrained irregulars. It appears that the P/A's military plan grossly underestimates the attitude and defensive capabilities of the regular army. According to NIE-84, this army "can defeat any force which the three neighboring countries could deploy against it—so long as it remains united." In this connection, it is noteworthy that there is no evidence to indicate that the regular army is susceptible to defection or revolt.

5. According to the chief field case officer and others at WH headquarters, there is a definite time element involved in the PBFORTUNE operation. Time limits of 60, 90 and 120 days from 1 September 1953 have been indicated as desirable or ultimate. These time limits are mentioned partly for reasons of climate and partly for reasons of expediency relative to the deteriorating situation within the target country where active opposition and resistance against the present regime is fast disappearing.

6. At this stage, it is the personal opinion of the undersigned that:

a. The present concept of PBFORTUNE with an operational climax centered on a revolutionary effort on the part of the P/A as currently planned is impracticable;

b. Preliminary measures involving the three neighboring countries aimed at offsetting the balance of power, especially military strength, in the over-all central area could be of very considerable importance.

Followed by well-timed covert operations of the PP-type and some well-planned PM activities, it is possible that the target country and its Government could be greatly harassed and placed in an untenable position in due course.

In this connection, it is possible that the present P/A and his assets could be brought into play on a proper, limited scale.

7. CWH is meeting with the leader of the alleged underground movement within the target country in New York this weekend.<sup>5</sup> It is possible that up-to-date reports from this leader may change to a degree the thinking outlined in the above.

**Hans V. Tofte**

<sup>5</sup> See Document 48.

**48. Editorial Note**

In early September 1953 CIA officers met with the man known to be Castillo Armas' main ally inside of Guatemala City. The information received by the CIA in New York on September 6-7 differed from the assessment of internal support described in Document 47. According to the source, there already were 53,000 anti-Communist Guatemalans organized in cells of 315 men inside the country, approximately 8,000 supporters within 1 hour of the capital, and two functional intelligence nets. Other assets listed by the source included five clandestine radio stations and ample supplies for the manufacture of bombs. He noted, however: "Capture of Guatemala City at the outset of the movement will require the immobilization or assassination of the key civilian members of the Government as well as immobilization of a majority of the officers."

At the conclusion of the meeting, the source agreed that his organization would prepare a detailed plan and timetable while the CIA would provide 8-10 tons of arms for training purposes. (Memorandum for the Record, September 8; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 7)

49. **Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King) to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 10, 1953.

SUBJECT

Statements Critical of the U.S. Attributed to Guatemalan Ambassador

1. Meeting held in office of CWH on 9 September.

Present:

Mr. Lampton Berry  
Mr. Ray Leddy  
Mr. Hans V. Tofte  
Mr. Tracy Barnes  
Colonel J.C. King  
*[name not declassified]*

The critical remarks attributed to Guatemalan Ambassador Toriello and the action to be taken re them were discussed. Mr. Leddy reported that:

At a meeting held in ARA on the morning of 9 September, where twenty-three officers were present, he was the only one favoring action. The other twenty-two voted to do nothing for fear of "rocking the boat". They explained their position by saying that nothing should be done to divert attention from the main issue.

2. Both Mr. Leddy and Mr. Berry expressed themselves as strongly in favor of positive action and all present agreed that this was an excellent opportunity to initiate our PW campaign.

3. Mr. Berry will speak to General Smith, but explained that any action taken by the General which might be attributable to Berry could embarrass and adversely affect Berry's relations with the ARA side of State. His position would be more protected if an approach could be made to General Smith by Mr. Dulles or Mr. Wisner. If Mr. Wisner does not approve, then Mr. Berry will handle the matter directly.

4. Action recommended is as follows:

a. A note from the Department of State quoting the remarks attributed to Ambassador Toriello at his press conference in

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-010125A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only. A memorandum for the record of this discussion is printed as Document 50.

Guatemala City on 3 September<sup>2</sup> and inquiring if said statements are true.

b. If he denies having made these remarks, wide publicity should be given to his reply. If he confirms them, a strong note of protest should be presented and our action played up prominently in the press, particularly in Central America.

c. There should not be a threat to declare the Ambassador persona non grata because the Guatemalan Government in retaliation might refuse an Agreement for Ambassador Peurifoy.

5. Attached is a factual summary of events prepared by Mr. Leddy.<sup>3</sup>

J.C. King<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Toriello's remarks may have been in response to the Department's aide-mémoire of August 27 on the expropriation of United Fruit Company property. See the editorial note in *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1056–1057. The text of the aide-mémoire is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 14, 1953, pp. 357–360. Toriello's remarks have not been found.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached to the source text.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

## 50. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 9, 1953, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

PBFORTUNE

The following points were noted at meeting of Messrs. Berry, Leddy, Barnes, Tofte, and Colonels King and [name not declassified], 9 September 1953 at 1600 hrs.

### 1. Nicaragua

Mr. Leddy reported that a working group of Defense was to have presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval on 8 September, the agreement with Nicaragua for military assistance. If this were approved, action may be expected by the first week in October.

### 2. El Salvador

Mr. Leddy stated that both the Pentagon and the Government of El Salvador were delaying re certain specifications of equipment. He believes

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret. Prepared on September 10.



that a list is in the hands of the Pentagon now and that something might be done at this end to expedite the Salvadoran request. He will find out the exact situation and inform me.

### 3. Honduras

Both the present Ambassador, Irwin, and the Counselor of Embassy, are rated unreliable by Leddy. The Embassy building is also insecure. Until there is a change, and no new Ambassador has been selected to replace Irwin, Leddy questions the advisability of sending an Agency representative [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. The U.S. Army Attaché is considered the best man in the Embassy and his quarters and office, which are separate, much more secure than the Political Section. [*3 lines of source text not declassified*] When necessary, Berry will go to Park Armstrong to get action. I am to speak to the Director regarding the need of a new Ambassador. Leddy explained that the situation in State at the moment is complex because of an effort being made to save such posts for career officers. There is a battle between career and political appointees.

### 4. Guatemala<sup>2</sup>

The critical remarks attributed to Guatemalan Ambassador to the U.S., Toriello, and action to be taken regarding them, was discussed. Leddy reported that at a meeting held on the morning of 9 September in ARA, where twenty-three officers were present, he was the only one favoring action. The other twenty-two voted to do nothing in order not to "rock the boat". Their position was that nothing should be done to divert attention from the main issue, which is the expropriation of Fruit Company property. Leddy feels strongly that action by us is necessary. Berry is willing to speak to General Smith but believes any action taken by General Smith attributable to Berry would embarrass and adversely affect Berry's relations with the ARA side of State. Therefore, his position would be more protected if an approach could be made by Mr. Dulles or Mr. Wisner. Mr. Leddy will prepare and deliver to me a statement of the position which he recommends. All present agreed that positive action was in order, and this was an excellent opportunity to get publicity and begin our PW campaign. I am to deliver to Leddy today a copy of an opinion on the Toriello statement prepared by [*name not declassified*]. Assistant Secretary of State Cabot is away until Friday, and consequently did not participate in the ARA meeting on the Toriello matter.

J.C. King  
CWH

---

<sup>2</sup> For another account of this discussion, see Document 49.

51. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 11, 1953.

SUBJECT

Guatemala

During the past few years Guatemala has become the leading base of operations for Moscow influenced communism in Central America.

Ruled by powerful, anti-US President Arbenz supported by a leftist coalition government, with all key positions below cabinet level thoroughly controlled by a Communist dominated bureaucracy,<sup>2</sup> Guatemala now represents a serious threat to hemispheric solidarity and to our security in the Caribbean area.

Essentially a primitive, rural country the size of Louisiana with a population of 3-1/2 million, Guatemala is currently engaged in an intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the touchy, anti-foreign inferiority complex of the "Banana Republic".

With labor to a large degree organized according to communistic methods, and a land reform plan benefiting the peasantry,<sup>3</sup> the present Arbenz government commands substantial popular support in spite of evidence of opposition in the capital, Guatemala City (Population 180,000).

With an army of 7000, the well-trained, and quite well equipped, hard core of which is stationed in the capital city, Guatemala maintains the balance of military power in Central America. This, coupled with Communist subversive activities extending across the Guatemalan borders, is a matter of increasing concern to nearby States including Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 3. Top Secret. A cover memorandum routed the document through Wisner to DCI Smith and states that the attached plan had been given provisional approval and submitted to the PBSUCCESS working group. A handwritten note by King, dated September 12, attached to a September 2 paper entitled "The Communist Situation in Guatemala," reads: "Underscored parts of attached Intelligence Summary, according to instructions received from Mr. Wisner 11 Sept., are to be included in the next draft of plan." (Ibid., Box 69, Folder 2) For some of the additional text that Wisner wanted to add, see footnotes 2, 3, and 6 below.

<sup>2</sup> The following text was underscored in the paper attached to King's note: "the Communists have penetrated the local agrarian committees which are now virtual political machines through which they hope to mobilize the mass support they have heretofore been lacking."

<sup>3</sup> The following text was underscored in the paper attached to King's note: "Anti-Communists are considered enemies of the state."

The disturbing and subversive influence of Communist dominated Guatemala within the Pan-American orbit, as well as an aggressively hardening anti-US policy targeted directly against American interests in the country, has recently caused the United States Government to adopt a somewhat firmer attitude towards Guatemala than heretofore. Based on NSC 144/1<sup>4</sup> and up-to-date PSB policy guidance, CIA has placed top operational priority on an effort to reduce and possibly eliminate Communist power in Guatemala. Appropriate authorization has been issued to permit close and prompt cooperation with the Departments of Defense, State and other Government agencies in order to support CIA in this task.

A study of available intelligence estimates (most recently NIE-84)<sup>5</sup> reveals no internal conditions that could be developed into a vital threat to the present Arbenz administration without determined support from the outside.

Though it is pointed out that the main political opposition to the government is located in the capital city, it is also stated that, although the dissatisfaction of important urban elements will probably increase, effective political unity among these elements is not likely to be achieved. The political union of urban and rural interests is even less likely.

Additional information appears to indicate that previously available active resistance to the government is decreasing rapidly due to general discouragement, especially after an abortive uprising earlier this year, which resulted in the imprisonment and/or exile of important opposition leaders.

It is further estimated that the army is the only organized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering the political situation and that there is no reason to doubt the continued loyalty of the army high command and most of the army to the President, who in turn is under the direct and indirect influence of Communist officials in key government posts and firmly entrenched within pro-Administration political parties.

Military units outside the capital are reported to have little potential for effective revolutionary action due to poor equipment, lack of training and the vigilance and security measures of trusted area commanders.

The police force (3500) could neither defeat an army coup nor itself overthrow the government without army support.

---

<sup>4</sup> NSC 144/1, March 18, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 6-10.

<sup>5</sup> Printed *ibid.*, pp. 1061-1071.

Another of the few organized elements of any consequence, the Catholic Church, is reportedly handicapped by the meagerness of its resources, the small number of priests in proportion to population, the fact that most priests are aliens subject to deportation, and the lack of a program capable of competing with the Communist-led labor movement or with agrarian reform.

A study of a recent evaluation of CIA's political and psychological warfare operations indicates that past efforts by the Agency to combat communism in Guatemala have been hampered by a policy of extreme caution adhered to by State Department representatives in the field. As a result of this, existing CIA assets personnelwise and otherwise in respect to psychological warfare and political action within Guatemala are negligible.

The main operational asset immediately available to CIA is a group of revolutionary activists numbering a few hundred, led by an exiled Guatemalan army officer (RUFUS) and located in Honduras. More than a year ago, some planning within the Agency contemplated the implementation of an ambitious militant plan of revolutionary action on the part of RUFUS and his group. For a variety of reasons this operation was indefinitely postponed; meanwhile RUFUS has received financial aid from private American interests. He allegedly controls considerable clandestine elements and contacts within Guatemala; in fact the above-mentioned operation would have depended for its success on immediate popular support of RUFUS and his revolutionaries, backed by active assistance of an extensive underground resistance organization and certain outlying army garrisons, as soon as RUFUS and his men entered the country.

*[1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]*

In light of existing conditions in Guatemala, with the government steadily strengthening its position, and active opposition deteriorating, the original RUFUS plan is now considered substantially obsolete. It is disturbing that reports from the CIA case officer indicate that unless the RUFUS asset is operationally activated within a very short time (maximum 120 days), it will be subjected to a serious morale problem, and RUFUS' alleged clandestine support organization within Guatemala is likely to disintegrate along with other government opposition.

Undoubtedly there are means and ways of maintaining the RUFUS group on a stand-by basis, *[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*. The RUFUS plan would in any case have to be radically readjusted to meet a more adverse situation. Also, any major action on the part of RUFUS and his supporters would have to be preceded by elaborate covert psywar, political action, sabotage and similar operations that would require a time-consuming build-up of Agency assets of various kinds, including the placement of qualified personnel in the field.

In this connection, it would be the primary concern of CIA to ascertain the existence, scope and potential of alleged Guatemalan covert resistance elements, and alleged clandestine contacts suitable for psychological warfare and political action purposes, as well as for possible active support of a para-military effort at a later date.

There is a general feeling of urgency in respect to action against Guatemala on the part of State and Agency officials connected with this priority task, but also a growing realization of the fact that existing operational assets do not permit any optimistic viewpoints relative to speedy success within a relatively short period of time.

It is recognized that the task headed by CIA calls for a general, over-all plan of combined overt and covert action of major proportions. Some steps have already been taken to initiate certain preparatory measures in regard to supporting overt action and other US Government sponsored pressure aimed at off-setting the leading position of Guatemalan military strength in Central America.

A general outline of a contemplated course of action follows:

(a) *Military Aid to other Central American States*: In order to isolate the target country (Guatemala), military aid agreements will be concluded with Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. Implementation of such aid programs will be expedited on a priority basis and US military missions will proceed to the countries in question to supervise deliveries of military equipment and offer technical assistance. Negotiations with Nicaragua are progressing (Action: State and Defense), and it is expected that arms shipments will commence shortly (Action: Defense and FOA). Preliminary steps to encourage Honduras to follow suit are in progress (Action: CIA, subsequently State and Defense), and El Salvador is expected to join up without delay (Action: State and Defense).<sup>6</sup>

(b) *Cessation of Military Aid to Guatemala*: US military missions will be withdrawn from Guatemala at an appropriate time. Deliveries of arms, heavy equipment and other industrial products of military use have been stopped (Action: Defense and State). Efforts should be made to curtail or stop similar deliveries from foreign sources wherever possible (Action: State).

---

<sup>6</sup> The following text was underscored in the paper attached to King's note: "The governments of El Salvador and Nicaragua are strongly anti-Communist, recognize that the trend in Guatemala threatens them with Communist subversion and social upheaval, and may attempt through the Organization of American States to set up machinery for controlling the movements of Communists and exchanging intelligence about their activities. These countries were reportedly ready last spring to give active support to any revolutionary movement in Guatemala which appeared to be succeeding."

(c) *Supporting Official Pressure*: The US Government must from here in adopt a strong, critical attitude towards the Guatemalan Arbenz Government. Every opportunity to crack down hard on Guatemala in response to official correspondence or statements must be fully exploited and subsequently followed up by active measures wherever feasible (Action: State).

(d) *Official Discrediting of Guatemala*: The threat of a conference of OAS or of Foreign Ministers should be made and reiterated in due course. The objective of the conference is to consider evidence that Guatemala constitutes a menace to Hemispheric solidarity and the internal security of friendly nations through aggressive Communist subversion (Action: State). Collection of evidence, or fabrication of same, will be attended to accordingly (Action: CIA and State).

(e) *Economic Pressure*: Considering that Guatemalan Government economy is susceptible to pressures, covert economic warfare methods targeted against oil supplies, shipping and vital exports and imports, where feasible, will be applied. In this connection, an already cleared group [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] with extensive experience in Latin American banking, shipping, publicity, general investments and oil, will be assigned the task of preparing a plan of covert action. This will be augmented by advice from [*name not declassified*] aided by three of his most trusted advisers in economic affairs who have just arrived from Guatemala for consultation. These men occupy high positions in Guatemalan business and industrial life.

Real, or when necessary fabricated evidence re. aggression and subversion, will be used at an OAS conference to obtain approval of the American States for multilateral economic action against Guatemala, particularly in respect to coffee. A study is under way to determine what phases of the coffee industry may be attacked which will damage the Arbenz government and its supporters without seriously affecting anti-Communist elements (Action: CIA and State).

(f) *Psychological Warfare*: Psywar activities based in other Latin American countries, but targeted against Guatemala, will be stepped up forthwith through the exploitation of exile groups and internal anti-Communist organizations presently engaged in active operations (Action: CIA). A complete psychological warfare campaign for internal implementation in Guatemala is in the planning stage. [*name not declassified*], the Chief organizer of an extensive clandestine resistance movement, recently joined RUFUS in Honduras after being exiled from Guatemala. Contrary to current intelligence reports, [*name not declassified*] claims control over substantial assets that would be capable of covert Psywar activities and black operations using contacts within the press, radio, church, army and other organized elements susceptible to

rumor, pamphleteering, poster campaigns and other subversive action. [name not declassified] is presently in Washington assisting in preparations for Psywar activity and political action. It will be necessary to strengthen the CIA field station in Guatemala forthwith in order to supervise the launching of a sustained Psywar program and verify the capabilities of the [name not declassified]/RUFUS clandestine organization in Guatemala City and elsewhere (Action: CIA).

(g) *Political Action*: Preparations for subversion and defection of Army leaders as well as government officials and political personalities are in progress. Here again, [name not declassified] is assisting and offering capabilities for operational exploitation (Action: CIA).

(h) *Para-Military Action*: As described in the foregoing, RUFUS and his small revolutionary group in Honduras (300) is the revolutionary nucleus around which last year's operational plan was formulated. Success depended entirely on immediate popular support inside Guatemala and a month-long military campaign gaining momentum through a series of complicated maneuvers and rendezvous climaxing in an irregular assault on Guatemala City. This plan is now considered obsolete; however, it is still contemplated to make proper use of the RUFUS asset in appropriate coordination with an overt and covert "softening-up" effort described in the foregoing.

Current thinking singles out Guatemala City as the key target upon which all efforts must be concentrated including a swift, climactic military action sparked by a reinforced RUFUS group with essential support from defected elements of the City garrison and active civilian resistance groups backed by a series of well-prepared unconventional warfare operations. This must include the neutralization of key military figures and control of power and communication centers.

Much preparatory work has already been completed to ensure logistical support of RUFUS. He and his group should take early advantage of the offered use of a military base in Nicaragua. President Somoza of Nicaragua made this offer as a result of several conferences with RUFUS and [name not declassified] in which the US was in no way involved. Supplies now available in the Caribbean should be sent forward without delay to support an extensive covert training program. RUFUS and [name not declassified] must at once take steps to strengthen their force by arranging for exfiltration of additional revolutionary personnel from Guatemala; leader and organizer types should be selected initially for intensive training, and some of these should be re-infiltrated to resistance elements within Guatemala. RUFUS' basic nucleus should eventually be built up to match as closely as practicable the numerical strength of the garrison of Guatemala City (approximately 3000).

The proposed expansion of the RUFUS group would in itself provide some measure of evidence as to RUFUS/[*name not declassified*] estimates and claims of control of resistance elements currently dependable in Guatemala.

Further proof of the existence of organized clandestine resistance should be obtained by the gradual activation of one selected group after another within Guatemala commensurate with the development and increasing momentum of the psychological warfare and political action campaign. Some subversive operations should likewise be carried out to further testify to the existence of the alleged RUFUS/[*name not declassified*] capabilities inside the target country, and in order to stimulate popular interest and support. (Suitable target for one of these operations: disruption of a 15-man Communist delegation scheduled to leave Guatemala City on 10 October '53 by commercial air carrier for a Communist Labor Congress in Vienna.)

Steps will immediately be taken to review the RUFUS plan according to concepts set forth in the above and progressively geared to take advantage of operational developments resulting from the before-mentioned overt and covert course of action (Action: CIA supported by State and Defense as appropriate).

(i) *Strengthening of CIA Station in Guatemala*: As previously indicated, CIA assets in the field personnelwise and otherwise are negligible. No time should be lost in order to reinforce the station with a senior FI operator and an experienced senior PP operator. The current PP and FI effort is considered far short of even beginning to tackle the task at hand. Expert leadership is required to supervise the clandestine build-up in Guatemala without which no RUFUS plan involving revolutionary action sparked from the outside can be implemented with a reasonable chance of success. (Action: CIA—Priority.)

It is estimated that the contemplated operation can be mounted and completed over a period of not less than eight months. A provisional estimate of expenditure aggregates \$3,000,000<sup>7</sup> as per attached specification.

---

<sup>7</sup> The figure "2,735,000" is crossed out on the source text and "3,000,000" written in by hand.



---

**Attachment**

BUDGET SUMMARY  
(PBFORTUNE)

Psychological Warfare and Political Action	\$270,000
Subversion	260,000
Intelligence Operations	150,000
Maintenance of present cadre (8 months)	160,000
Expansion of cadre to 500	60,000
Arms and Equipment	400,000
Operation of [ <i>less than 1 line of source text not declassified</i> ] training center	100,000
Support of internal organization (estimate)	150,000
Transportation, storage and travel (estimate)	85,000
Transport Aircraft and maintenance	600,000
Current liabilities	[illegible]
Contingencies	<u>300,000</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$2,735,000</u>

---

**52. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 15, 1953, 12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

PBSUCCESS

A meeting was held in Mr. Wisner's office at 12:15. Present were Messrs. Wisner, Tofte and King.

1. Mr. Wisner stated that both Gen. Cabell and Mr. Dulles had read the Guatemalan plan for action<sup>2</sup> and had approved. A meeting is sched-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret. Drafted by King.

<sup>2</sup> Document 51.

uled for discussion of details at 3:00 p.m. in the Director's office on Friday 18 September.

2. The Director had two suggestions:

a. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

b. The creation of a real or notional society of international character for freeing Guatemala from Communism. This society would have agents and representatives in various Latin American countries who would write letters, put out bulletins, and issue warnings to diplomatic representatives of the Guatemalan Government, and who would threaten them with a day of reckoning if they did not alter their present position of supporting the Guatemalan Government and join with the forces of liberation. They are to be told that a day of reckoning is coming.

3. Mr. Wisner called the Secretary of the PSB to inquire if any written record existed of their authorization to CIA to undertake action against Guatemala. Apparently no record was made of the meeting at which a decision was arrived at to give CIA the green light and with other Agencies and Departments of the Government giving full support. A brief paragraph will be prepared by PSB for the record.<sup>3</sup> At the next meeting of PSB their approval will be requested of a budget for the operation so that the Bureau of the Budget may be approached to allocate the necessary amount from the CIA reserve fund.

4. Mr. Wisner said that Col. King could handle directly with Col. Edwards any questions of clearances for special consultants in New York.<sup>4</sup>

5. Project for access to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Managua may be discussed with Mr. Helms.

6. Col. King should mention to Mr. Dulles on Friday the need for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] if a decision is reached to delay or to deny oil to Guatemala.

**J.C. King**  
Chief, WHD

---

<sup>3</sup> Possibly Document 40.

<sup>4</sup> Possibly a reference to a group of individuals who met with King the previous day in New York City. According to a September 15 memorandum by King, he had approached a group of executives the previous day, and "explained that we were in need of the best business brains of the country for planning purposes and possibly subsequent action against Guatemala in the economic field; that we wished to explore all possible covert means of embarrassing the present Government by economic pressures." Several executives were willing to help, but said that King would need to get the approval of their Boards of Directors. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2)

53. **Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 17, 1953.

SUBJECT

Conversation with General Smith

1. The conversation which Mr. Berry and I had with General Smith this afternoon, and which I discussed with you before going over to see the General, was of only about fifteen minutes duration. I was able to bring up all of your points but did not get satisfactory answers on one or two of them.

2. General Smith indicated his strong agreement with our recommendation that some form of State Department rejoinder or rebuttal be dealt out to the Guatemalans. He held on to my memorandum which he promised not to show to Mr. Cabot, and he said that he was going to instruct Cabot to get cracking and do something about this. Mr. Berry presented a brief memorandum proposing a planted question and an answer for the Secretary to make at his next press conference. General Smith accepted this but said that he wished to do more. He rang for Cabot to come to his office, but Cabot had apparently gone home.

3. I raised the subject of Honduras and said that our point here was that greater strength was needed in the Embassy since there will be an important role for Honduras to play. Mr. Berry spoke up saying that the present Ambassador is "an old fuddyduddy" who has served out his period of usefulness and who should be replaced by a younger and more vigorous man. General Smith appeared to be interested in this, and said that he would ask Mr. Lourie to take the appropriate action. He rang for Mr. Lourie who had apparently gone home. Mr. Berry undertook to remind General Smith to speak with Mr. Lourie tomorrow morning.

4. I asked General Smith what he proposed to do about Mr. Willauer. General Smith said that he had repeatedly stated that Willauer will have to scratch his own gravel and ring his own doorbells; that he (General Smith) did not make diplomatic appointments; and that he did not propose to sponsor or push for the appointment of Willauer to any particular diplomatic post. In line with my previous discussions with

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

you on this subject, I took no position at all concerning Willauer and confined myself to the question above-indicated.

[3 paragraphs not declassified]

Frank G. Wisner<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.

---

#### 54. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 18, 1953, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

PBSUCCESS

1. At 1500, 18 September 1953, a meeting was held at the office of DCI to discuss the present status of PBSUCCESS and to consider future plans for this operation. Present were DCI, DDCI, DD/P, COP, CPP, CNE, C/OPS/PP, CWH and CWH-III. DCI opened the discussion by stating that he felt the General Plan of Action, submitted on 11 September to be sound.<sup>2</sup> He added that several detailed suggestions of his own regarding implementation had already been discussed with several of those present.

2. General Cabell stated that he concurred in approval of the General Plan but felt that the budget estimate should be increased to \$3,000,000 to provide more adequately for contingencies. Mr. Dulles agreed.

3. Colonel King gave a detailed report on progress to date including action to strengthen Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador, joint planning with [name not declassified], planning for economic and psychological warfare, redeployment of Agency personnel, planned changes in State Department personnel, and advisable diplomatic action vis-à-vis the Guatemalan Government. In reply to the Director's query as to money required for immediate needs, he stated that \$50,000 was adequate. Mr. Dulles decided that this would be made available at once.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret. Prepared on September 24. The memorandum is unsigned.

<sup>2</sup> Document 51.

4. In general discussion Messrs. Wisner, Tofte and Roosevelt pointed out that PBSUCCESS is an extremely difficult and sensitive operation requiring the utmost care in preparation and execution. It was agreed that any ultimate military action must be preceded by thorough exploitation of all other capabilities and that a preparatory campaign of eight months' duration, or more, is deemed advisable.

---

55.      **Memorandum<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 25, 1953.

SUBJECT

Tasks for Chief of Station, Guatemala

1. Your priorities for development of KUFIRE assets are as follows:
  - a. Controlled penetration of the Communist Party.
  - b. Controlled penetrations of the major labor unions.
  - c. Controlled penetrations in the major anti-Communist organizations.
  - d. Controlled penetrations in the armed forces, or controlled agents with access to current planning both in senior and junior officer groups.
  - e. Controlled agents with access to high-level Guatemalan Government political propaganda planning.
2. The Station will *transmit* any *rumors* re: Arbenz government officials, actions taken or to be taken by the Army, government-army relationships, revolutionary activities, relationships among the Communists and any bad morale factors among the ruling clique to Headquarters. The rumors will be accompanied by Station comments re plausibility, where rumor was overheard and any suggested restrictions on re-use in other countries throughout the Hemisphere. (Weekly report, unless no rumors are overheard.)
3. The Station will clip and send, with appropriate comments, the column, "Boqueras" to Headquarters whenever it contains rumors of value to the anti-Guatemalan campaign.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 5. Secret. The memorandum appears to be a draft prepared for King's signature; it includes several handwritten revisions. No final copy was found.

4. ESCONSON I will write a "psychological barometer" report on local conditions, PW activities.<sup>2</sup> This report will be sent Headquarters each week.

5. The Station will make a continuing study of *morale factors* (complaints, desires, etc.) among the following groups:

- a. Students
- b. Laborers (farm & industrial)<sup>3</sup>
- c. Army Officers
- d. Enlisted Men
- e. Government Officials
- f. Farm owners & operators<sup>4</sup>
- g. Business and professional men<sup>5</sup>

As complete a report as possible on each group should be in Headquarters o/a 15 November 1953. Thereafter Morale Factors should be included with the Rumor Report.

6. The Station will prepare a list of the 25 *most dangerous Communists* and pro-Communists<sup>6</sup> and attempt to gather data re these targets which could be used for character assassination (either within or outside Guatemala). This study should be as carefully done as possible, but should be in Headquarters possession o/a 1 December 1953.

7. When Mexican and/or other exile anti-Communist propaganda is found in Guatemala, it should be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible with a covering dispatch describing details of distribution, where found, any reactions, etc.

8. A bi-weekly flow of negatives, with captions, re conditions in Guatemala will be sent to Headquarters. More pictures of comparisons of living conditions of the top Commies and the peons will be of special value.

9. Chief of Station will prepare an operation designed to attack the October *Feria*, sending copy to [*place not declassified*] and original dispatch to Headquarters.

10. Headquarters is relying upon Station Guatemala for the checking of propaganda issued by exile groups and will expect all reports to be forthcoming as requested above.

---

<sup>2</sup> The final phrase "and give ideas on possible PW actions" was deleted by hand.

<sup>3</sup> The parenthetical phrase was added by hand.

<sup>4</sup> This item originally read "Farmers" it was revised by hand.

<sup>5</sup> The last item was added by hand.

<sup>6</sup> The phrase "and pro-Communists" was inserted by hand.

11. Any propaganda to be placed through Hediger will be forwarded to Headquarters to prevent any crossing of objectives within Guatemala.<sup>7</sup>

J.C. King<sup>8</sup>  
Chief, WHD

Seen and Approved by:  
[name not declassified]

---

<sup>7</sup> The sentence originally read: "Any propaganda placed through Hediger will be cleared through Headquarters (Excepting that already in the mill) to prevent any crossing of objectives within Guatemala." It was changed by hand to read as printed here.

<sup>8</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

---

## 56. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 3, 1953, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

PBSUCCESS

1. [name not declassified] met with General Cabell at 1730 3 October 1953, at which time General Cabell raised the following points for consideration:

a. Mr. [name not declassified] and Mr. [name not declassified] stated at a meeting with him earlier in the day that the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] could move 10 to 20 tons of hardware from Panama to New York as suggested, but felt that it might be wiser to move the entire 80 tons in one haul. This should be considered.

b. Negotiations with Nicaragua for a military assistance agreement must be expedited with high priority. Could not Somoza be asked to pad his arms request to include the shipment for RUFUS? Ambassador Whelan is now in North Dakota and plans to return to Nicaragua next week. Mr. [name not declassified] knows how to reach him. In the normal course of events Whelan would not first return to Washington. He could, however, carry any necessary messages to Somoza. [name not declassified] pointed out that the plans for negotiation with Nicaragua

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 72, Folder 5. No classification marking. Prepared on October 5.

have bogged down in Defense, as outlined by Mr. Leddy on 2 October. General Cabell stated that he would be glad to do anything desirable to correct this situation and requested that [name not declassified] advise him further in this regard on 5 or 6 October. [name not declassified] then mentioned that despite Somoza's cooperation being essential to the operation, it was desirable to maintain the fiction of RUFUS' having acquired his arms abroad without official U.S. assistance—a story which it would be difficult to sustain were Somoza asked to include RUFUS' arms with a U.S. arms aid shipment. General Cabell agreed that overt U.S. intervention should be eliminated if at all possible. He mentioned that Somoza is now expected back in Nicaragua from his South American trip on approximately 10 November but that an earlier return is desirable to expedite both treaty negotiations and hardware shipment. Senator Capehart's Committee is expected to arrive in Managua on approximately 25 October in connection with Export-Import Bank business. The Committee must first complete its business in Mexico. This might be used as a lever to get Somoza back to Nicaragua at that time. [name not declassified] feels that some arms for training and/or operational use should be in Nicaragua or Honduras now.

c. [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] stated that Guatemala is now attempting to divide the Honduran Conservative Party while Jose Figueres, who has adopted Peronista ideas, is advocating and promoting expropriation as a Latin American policy. In view of these political factors we should be prepared to trigger PBSUCCESS earlier than planned should the course of events so indicate. We must also remember that Barrios Pena may seize the initiative, in which case we may have to ride in with him.

d. After consultation with Mr. Leddy, [name not declassified] called General Cabell on 5 October and told him that contacts with Defense in connection with PBSUCCESS have been handled through Messrs. Kyes and Nash. Both of these gentlemen are expected to be out of town until 7 October. At the request of General Smith, Mr. Berry will contact Mr. Allen Dulles to request that this matter be taken up with Mr. Kyes at the OCB meeting scheduled for 7 October. General Cabell agreed that this would be the most effective manner of handling the problem.

[name not declassified]



57. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 8, 1953.

## SUBJECT

Alleged Support of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, Guatemalan Oppositionist, by United Fruit Company

## PARTICIPANTS

Colonel Roberto Barrios Peña  
Lic. Victor Ramiro Flores  
MID—Mr. Fisher

Colonel Barrios Peña said that on August 31 a military and political committee met in San Salvador to unify the opposition forces against the Arbenz Government. All leading Guatemalan oppositionists attended except Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who sent a letter declining to affiliate on the ground of having other commitments. In a later meeting between Castillo Armas and General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, a member of the military and political committee, Castillo Armas renewed his refusal to join the group.

Barrios Peña said it was notorious throughout Central America that Castillo Armas received large sums of money from the United Fruit Company. In Tegucigalpa he had several limousines, numerous body guards, 34 exiled Guatemalan students; and he had a large body of spies and agents engaged elsewhere; the total monthly expenditures amounting to about \$30,000. Castillo Armas was known to be entirely without resources of his own. Despite the absurd ostentation of Castillo Armas' heavily financed activities in Honduras, the Guatemalan Government has never said a word about him, but when the United States Government merely asked for just compensation for expropriated property, a storm of insults broke out against the U.S. on the theme of "intervention". This raised the suspicion that there was some kind of understanding with Arbenz, but the worst, according to Barrios Peña, was that Castillo Armas was actively spying on and working against honest oppositionists who were using their own sources<sup>2</sup> and making great personal sacrifices for a patriotic cause. Castillo Armas' refusal to join in a united front divided the opposition to the Arbenz Government and this, coupled with his sabotage of other people's efforts, assured continued success of the Communist cause. Barrios Peña said he had come

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 80, Folder 2. Secret. Drafted by Fisher.

<sup>2</sup> A handwritten note in the margin reads "Trujillo?".

to the United States to tell the heads of the United Fruit Company of the great damage which their support of the deceitful Castillo Armas was doing to the anti-Communist cause, to the company itself, and to the United States Government, which was being linked to the United Fruit Company through effective Communist propaganda. All his group wanted was to be left alone and not stabbed in the back by the United Fruit Company and its man, Castillo Armas. However, he said, Mr. Montgomery and other United Fruit Company officials had foolishly refused even to see him. He had therefore determined to give his information to the Department and to the McCarthy Committee.

Barrios Peña said his organization had prepared an uprising in Guatemala for March 28, 1953, execution of which was dependent on arrival in San Salvador of a coordinating emissary from a secure outside source of assistance. The emissary failed to arrive when expected and Barrios Peña accordingly cancelled the operation. His subordinate, Carlos Simons, nevertheless set off the abortive Salamá uprising on his own responsibility and thus needlessly sacrificed lives and brought about complete suppression of oppositionist leadership in Guatemala. Barrios Peña later went to the outside source of assistance and asked why the emissary failed to arrive.<sup>3</sup> He was told that Castillo Armas had sent word that Barrios Peña was a spy for Arbenz, and that the emissary was therefore withheld.

I questioned the credibility of reports that any American interest was financing revolutionary forces in Central America. Barrios Peña said that although he had no documentary evidence, there was no shadow of doubt in his mind that the United Fruit Company was in fact contributing heavily to Castillo Armas. He thought the company had already invested about \$2 million in him. He attributed the company's confidence in Castillo Armas to Juan Cordoba Cerna, who was retained by the United Fruit Company as counsel for several years. Cordoba Cerna had such faith in Castillo Armas that he sent his own 20-year-old son with him in the attempt to seize the *Base Militar* in Guatemala City in November 1950. The boy was killed in the terrible ambush which resulted. According to Lic. Flores, over 100 men were shot down by Arbenz' forces, only Castillo Armas and two others escaping. Most were mowed down by machine guns inside the *Base Militar*. Castillo Armas had brought them there in an incredibly stupid attempt to seize the internal arsenal and take over the fort. After the machine gunning, Army officers finished off everyone with pistol shots except, strangely enough, Castillo Armas and the other two. Furthermore, after only six weeks in the penitentiary Castillo Armas recovered from his superficial

---

<sup>3</sup> A handwritten marginal note reads "Trujillo."

leg wound and escaped. He was said to have tunneled through a stone court under an enormous stone wall and up through the pavement of the street outside, all with his bare hands.

Barrios Peña reiterated that he was asking for nothing except that the Department use its influence to stop the company from supporting Castillo Armas in his activity against other oppositionists. Lic. Flores added that he and other anti-Communist leaders of long-standing were growing discouraged and resentful over the unnecessary obstacles put in their way, citing the Castillo Armas situation and adding that the United States was still supporting the Arbenz Government through military missions, etc. They also complained of the U.S. Immigration rules, which they thought should be relaxed in favor of Latin American anti-Communists.

Colonel Barrios Peña handed me a sheaf of documents (in Spanish) which he said were copies of those supplied to Senator McCarthy's committee. I said the paper he left with me would be carefully studied.

*Comment:* The documents left by Colonel Barrios Peña include the following:

1. A memorandum dated Washington, October 8, signed by Colonel Barrios Peña setting forth the complaint against Castillo Armas substantially as given above. The memorandum contains the following statement: "It is public knowledge that for more than two years the financial agent of Colonel Castillo Armas in Honduras has been the United Fruit Company of Boston, Massachusetts, and that thanks to its influence Castillo Armas enjoys every kind of prerogative and consideration in that country".

2. Copies of three letters purportedly sent by Castillo Armas to other opposition leaders on the question of unification.

3. Copies of a unification pact of the "Guatemalan forces of liberation" signed at San Salvador, August 31, by the following: Military Committee, Colonel Jorge Barrios Solares, Colonel Julio Pablo Garcia, General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, Colonel Roberto Barrios Peña; Political Committee, Carlos A. Luna, Manuel José Ares y Valladares, Guillermo Putzeys, Raul Enriquez G., and Carlos Samayoá Chinchilla.

4. A purported memorandum of conversation between General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes and Colonel Castillo Armas at the Salvador-Honduran border on September 13. The memorandum supposedly records Castillo Armas' refusal to join the other oppositionist leaders despite energetic representations by Ydigoras Fuentes.

Colonel Barrios Peña has called at the Department on several previous occasions, the latest being on April 28 when we spoke freely of Salamá uprising of March 29 as having been carried out by his organization (although without his authorization).

**58. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 22, 1953.

SUBJECT

PBSUCCESS

1. Mr. Leddy called [*name not declassified*] to state that he had been told at the OCB meeting of 21 October,<sup>2</sup> General Smith raised the question of arms aid to Nicaragua very forcibly, and that word had been passed on to the Joint Chiefs requiring immediate positive action. Mr. Leddy was informed that Mr. Kyes is following this matter up personally.

[*name not declassified*]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 143, Folder 3. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Minutes of this meeting are in the Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Files, OCB Secretariat, OCB Minutes 1, Folder 1.

---

**59. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 23, 1953.

SUBJECT

PBSUCCESS

1. Mr. Leddy called [*name not declassified*] this date to advise him that the OCB Directive to the JCS resulting from the meeting of 21 October, included El Salvador and Honduras as well as Nicaragua. It was directed that authorization be given for negotiations to be conducted with all three countries, with the details regarding form and amount of aid to be worked out later in a normal manner.

[*name not declassified*]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 143, Folder 3. Secret.

60. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 28, 1953.

## SUBJECT

Debriefing of Ambassador Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, October 28, 1953

Of the various comments made by Ambassador Schoenfeld on the communist situation in Guatemala, the following are most relevant to OCB interests:

1. The communist power-drive in Guatemala has reached an advanced state of infiltration, they hold key positions in (a) the agrarian movement, (b) the labor movement, (c) government administration short of cabinet level.

2. President Arbenz, who is half Swiss, has a granite streak of stubbornness in addition to his volatility and is firmly convinced that he can deal with the communists whenever he has to. This optimism is not shared by Ambassador Schoenfeld, who feels that Arbenz has not even begun to appreciate the real purposes and techniques of communism as a power-seeking movement, not a social reform.

3. On the anti-communist side, there are very few positions of strength. The church is extremely weak, all of its property having been confiscated, and a strong anti-clerical attitude exists. The intellectuals are either bemused by the appeals of communism, or are hypersensitive to the U.S. The land-owners are strictly apolitical and will not permit themselves, or their sons, to engage in political activity. They feel that Guatemalan politics has three unattractive destinations: the palace, the jail, or the cemetery. The independent press, however, is very alert to the communist danger.

4. Guatemala represents in miniature all of the social cleavages, tensions, and dilemmas of modern Western society under attack by the communist virus. Conditions will worsen considerably before we can improve them, and we should regard Guatemala as a prototype area for testing means and methods of combatting communism.

5. It will be of primary importance for U.S. labor organizations to encourage the growth of free trade unions in Guatemala, for U.S. corporations to adopt enlightened labor policy in the area, and for the U.S. Government to develop information activities along non-attributable lines.

Richard Hirsch<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Jackson Records. Confidential. Prepared on October 29. Previously printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IV, p. 1087.

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

61. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 29, 1953.

SUBJECT

Status of PBSUCCESS

1. The present status of PBSUCCESS is as noted below:

a. Personnel.

Present planning calls for utilization of the following field personnel:

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], Guatemala

Chief of Station [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]—[*name not declassified*] GS-15 vice [*name not declassified*] GS-14

Operations Officer [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] PP—[*name not declassified*] GS-14

Operations Officer [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] FI—[*name not declassified*] GS-13

Operations Officer [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] FI—[*name not declassified*] GS-13

Reports Officer [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] PP—[*name not declassified*] GS-9

Admin. Asst.—[*name not declassified*] GS-7

Secty. Steno—[*name not declassified*] GS-5

Secty. Steno—[*name not declassified*] GS-5

Commo.—[*name not declassified*] GS-7

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], Guatemala

Operations officer, PP [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]—Donald O. Hediger GS-7

Operations Officer PP [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]—Eliot P. Razmara GS-9

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], Honduras

Operations Officer FI [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]—[*name not declassified*] GS-7

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], Honduras

Operations officer PP [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]—Jacob R. Seekford GS-12

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]—Vincent C. Pivall

[*4 names not declassified*], TDY replacement for [*name not declassified*], Heddiger and Razmara are in place and operating.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret.

Seekford is on operational TDY in the United States now but is expected to return to Honduras shortly.

[*name not declassified*] is now at Headquarters but has not yet been released.

[*name not declassified*] is now at Headquarters with WH studying language and background. [1 line of source text not declassified]

[*name not declassified*] is scheduled to leave Caracas 28 October. [1 line of source text not declassified]

[*name not declassified*] is on duty in Panama. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[*name not declassified*] is at Headquarters on duty with WH. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[*name not declassified*] is at Headquarters on duty with WH. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

Slots for [2 names not declassified], Pivall, [*name not declassified*] and [*name not declassified*] are all awaiting CIA internal approval of T/O for Project PBSUCCESS.

*b. Military Assistance to Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras.*

Action to provide assistance as outlined in the Guatemala General Plan of Action was delayed by lack of approval on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Leddy, ARA State, advises, however, that at the OCB meeting of 21 October<sup>2</sup> action was taken to obtain JCS approval, that the JCS later reported favorably and that official notification from Defense to State is expected very shortly. Upon receipt of notification, State will initiate negotiations with Nicaragua. Negotiations with El Salvador and Honduras are expected to follow.

*c. Official U.S. Pressure on Guatemala.*

One aspect of the stronger, more critical attitude which the United States Government is taking toward Guatemala was manifested in Assistant Secretary Cabot's speech of 14 October.<sup>3</sup> This has received extensive press and radio publicity in Latin America and will continue to be stressed through PP field outlets.

---

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 58 and 59.

<sup>3</sup> Cabot spoke before the General Federation of Women's Clubs on "Inter-American Cooperation and Hemisphere Solidarity." While applauding moves toward social reform in the country, he added: "But when we are resisting Communist aggression and subversion all over the world, no regime which is openly playing the Communist game can expect from us the positive cooperation we normally seek to extend to all of our sister Republics. We know indeed that despite its hypocritical appeals on behalf of the underprivileged, communism does not give a snap of the fingers for the welfare of the masses. It will liquidate them or send them to slave labor camps by the millions to advance its tyrannical power." For the full text of his speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 26, 1953, pp. 554-559.

Newly appointed Ambassador John Peurifoy is expected to arrive in Guatemala on 29 October.

*d. Economic Warfare.*

As decided by DD/P and CWH, the Director of Security was requested to obtain background information on a group of key figures in business and industry who are judged to be in the most advantageous positions to provide technical guidance and operational support for EW operations directed against Guatemala. Completed reports from I&S are acted on as operational clearances for the purposes of PBSUCCESS. Studies have been completed on [14-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

*e. Psychological Warfare.*

Operations in the field of psychological warfare have been developed in close coordination with the principal agent in this country, [name not declassified], who has been established in a safe house near Headquarters. Detailed planning has been materially advanced and developmental operations initiated both here and in the field. An initial sum of \$30,000. has been provided [name not declassified] for operations during the months of October and November. Of this, \$15,000. has been transmitted to RUFUS and the second \$15,000. will be forwarded early in November. Expenditures are being based on the following breakdown:

Development of Intelligence Nets	\$ 8,000.
Development of Rumor Nets	4,000.
Subversion	10,000.
Production of Propaganda	5,500.
Contingencies	<u>1,900.</u>
	\$30,000.

Intelligence and rumor nets are now being expanded within Guatemala and in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras.

An intensive study of opposition personalities has been initiated to determine their potential value to the RUFUS organization. In addition, key pro-government figures are being investigated with a view toward possible subversion.

The RUFUS controlled student bulletin *Ceuage* continues to be published in Honduras and distributed clandestinely in Guatemala. Production is 5,000 copies bi-weekly. Guatemalan government reaction has been marked by press denunciation and efforts toward suppression and confiscation.

A RUFUS controlled radio station in El Salvador has initiated broadcasting. Apolitical material is being used for the present while RUFUS agents check reception in various parts of the country.



RUFUS controlled "committees" are being developed in Mexico, El Salvador and Nicaragua to serve the following purposes:

1. Preparation of propaganda and its introduction into Guatemala.
2. Provision of overt, controlled media for purchase of newspaper advertising space and radio time throughout Latin America.
3. Encouragement of Mexican and Central American support for the RUFUS campaign.
4. Diversion of Guatemalan government attention from the RUFUS group.

The RUFUS symbol-slogan, "God, Country, Liberty" is at present being publicized throughout Guatemala through the *Ceuage* bulletin. In preparation for the more intensive campaigning to come, 600,000 symbol-slogan colored stickers and 1,000,000 smaller stamps have been prepared and are ready for shipment to RUFUS.

A book, "I Accuse", written by RUFUS to present his aims and plans for the future is ready for printing. As advance propaganda, 600,000 colored stickers have been prepared for distribution at the appropriate time.

In Mexico, the non-RUFUS controlled Committee for the Liberation of Guatemala continues to produce its bi-weekly bulletin for distribution within Guatemala and to a selected mailing list in other countries. It has also prepared and distributed 30,000 comic books. Since it appears that distribution of both bulletin and comic books has been faulty and since the material contained therein has been criticized for obvious falsehoods and inaccuracies, [name not declassified] plans to visit Mexico in an effort to arrange improved coordination, distribution and editorial effort. [name not declassified] intends to offer the Mexican group a part in his overall plan and, if proper control can be established, will provide financial support. If not, support will be withheld from this group.

A staff agent in Guatemala under unofficial cover has contacted an officer of the RUFUS affiliated (CEUA-Comite Estudiante Universitario Anticomunista) and through him had distributed 106,000 window displays, handbills and stickers in Guatemala City and in 123 outlying towns. He plans to continue this distribution on a bi-weekly basis.

A staff agent from Mexico has completed a fact finding tour through Guatemala, British Honduras, Honduras and El Salvador and reports that RUFUS is highly regarded as a potential liberator, that various potential support groups exist in Guatemala and in neighboring countries. He reports strong evidence of RUFUS' internal organizations being intact but seriously discouraged and in danger of premature action motivated by desperation. [name not declassified] is aware of this condition.

A field memorandum has gone to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reemphasizing the importance of the anti-Guatemalan cam-

paign and offering supplementary financial support, news articles, photographs, cartoons and themes to encourage through our covert media, hemisphere wide KUGOWN support of the objectives of PBSUCCESS.

As an aid to RUFUS production of propaganda in the field, procurement of three Gestetner machines (simple, rugged, multilith type devices), three mimeographs and three tape recorders has been initiated. One tape recorder has been turned over to [name not declassified].

In order to check on RUFUS' activities and on the activities of other anti-Communists, Station Guatemala has been directed to take the following actions:

1. Transmit all rumors re Arbenz officials, the Guatemalan Army, revolutionary activities and Communist activities.

2. Prepare a weekly "psychological barometer" report on local conditions.

3. Make a continuing study of morale factors among students, laborers, army officers, enlisted men, government officials, farm owners, and business and professional men.

4. Prepare a list of the 25 most dangerous Communists and pro-Communists with information appropriate for use in character assassination.

5. Forward copies of all anti-Communist propaganda to Headquarters with details of distribution and reaction.

6. Provide Headquarters bi-weekly with negatives and captions illustrative of miserable living conditions in Guatemala.

7. Prepare an operation designed to ridicule the October National Fair.

*f. Intelligence.*

FI activity on the part of Station Guatemala has continued on a normal basis while production on the part of the RUFUS group has increased materially. Significant data has been received regarding Guatemalan Communist and pro-Communist activity both internally and externally. Stress is being laid on obtaining factual material suitable for use as evidence of Kremlin intervention in the internal affairs of Guatemala and of Guatemalan intervention in the affairs of friendly nations.

*g. Paramilitary Action.*

An initial shipment of approximately 15 tons of arms and ammunition is now ready for shipment from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and subsequent transshipment to RUFUS at [place not declassified] Nicaragua. Requisite arrangements with the Munitions Control Board and Customs have been completed. Necessary maintenance can be performed conveniently and legally [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This material is intended for use by RUFUS in his Nicaraguan training center and to test facilities for clandestine introduction of arms into Guatemala.

2. WH has not yet been advised of the essential appropriation for PBSUCCESS having been obtained from the Bureau of the Budget.

[name not declassified]

---

62. **Stage One Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 22, 1953.

**Annex B**

FRIENDLY ASSETS AND POTENTIAL

Part I

Political Leadership

[5-1/2 pages of source text not declassified]

**Attachment A**

[1-1/2 pages of source text not declassified]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 145, Folder 3. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Part II, "KUFIRE," Part III, "KUGOWN," Part IV, "KUHOOK," and Part V, "KUCLUB" are not printed.

## Annex B

### Part I

#### Political Leadership

##### B. RUFUS

###### *Synopsis of Favorable Factors:*

1. Subject's military record reflects he is an above the average officer who has had sufficient ability to inspire confidence of his exile military associates so that they will follow him in an eventual military attack against the current Guatemalan government.

2. Subject is anti-Communist, pro-United States, and apparently has no excessively militaristic or dictatorial ambitions.

3. Subject possesses an inadequately organized and trained FI apparatus, which, however, could be used as a basis for mounting larger FI operations against the current Guatemalan regime.

4. Subject's PP apparatus, although now relatively ineffective, can serve as framework for a larger PP effort against the current Guatemalan regime.

5. Subject has the confidence and support of the Honduran Government, which provides the movement with an FI and PP Headquarters and distribution base.

6. Subject seems prepared to cooperate with PBSUCCESS officials. He indicated readiness to take fullest advantage of future CIA aid and assistance.

###### *Synopsis of Unfavorable Factors:*

1. No method is now available to determine effectiveness of Subject's PP organization.

2. No method is now available to determine the exact extent and effectiveness of Subject's FI nets or informants.

3. Because of lack of experience and necessity, security practices of Subject's group need to be tightened up to control any possible Communist infiltration.

4. [2 lines of source text not declassified] His same contacts may resent accounting for funds paid for carrying out future PP or FI assignments.

5. Subject lacks experience to organize, direct, and coordinate an operation of the magnitude now planned.

6. The general popularity of Subject in Guatemala and the actual number of his hard-core supporters is uncertain. In 1950, Subject's at-

tempted coup was foiled by a Communist penetration. According to [name not declassified], on three later efforts in 1952-53, Subject promised success for his movement but was unable to launch a successful coup against the government because of lack of support within the country.

8. Use of Subject must proceed without a CIA operational clearance.

9. Subject has little military field experience and naturally no unconventional warfare experience.

10. No control can be exercised over Subject at the present time.

1. *Biography*—See Attachment A.

2. *Personality*—Subject, primarily a military leader, commands respect and discipline from his followers by his sincere and reasonable manner. Subject does not possess a hard, driving, fiery personality, but his orders are obeyed without question, despite his quiet and reserved attitude. His associates in Honduras clearly indicate that Subject is the absolute leader. He, however, is flexible in considering problems and has demonstrated an ability to compromise.

Subject appears to be deliberate in his manner of thinking and speaking. He is not one who would be considered to commit rash acts or launch into a military operation without being fully prepared.

Subject is of average physical appearance, and in contrast to certain Latin American military officials, is meticulous in his dress and personal habits.

3. *Ideology*—Subject is regarded as being a sincere anti-Communist and pro-United States. He abandoned a promising military career in 1949 to protest against the Communist influence in the Arevalo Government. He constantly has remained active in plotting against the Communist dominated Guatemalan Governments. No information exists regarding his particular feelings as to new social reforms or methods of governing a Guatemalan administration which he might head.

4. *Motivation*—No information is available to indicate specifically what Subject's primary motivations are. From the record it is believed his dislike of Communism in the Guatemalan Government prompted his activities against Arevalo, but subsequent events which included the payment of large sums to him for his group's activities, undoubtedly must be considered. In conversations, undesirable personal ambition and motives of financial gain were not revealed.

5. *Financial*—No information is available regarding source of Subject's income, other than amounts which are being paid him by CIA. There is no information to indicate whether he possesses property or securities inside or outside Guatemala. Subject is not a member of a wealthy Guatemalan family.

Subject has only made demands from CIA to sustain his organization and not for his personal reimbursement. A request has been made for the accounting of money paid to him by CIA. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

6. *Area Background*—Has lived in Central America, with brief exceptions of visits to United States and exile periods in Colombia and Honduras. Subject is currently residing in Honduras.

7. *Control*—No control now exists over Subject. Possibly in the future, financial control can be exerted, since he is responsible for funding various PP and FI organizations under his control.

8. *Security*—A covert name check has been initiated on Subject, but no results have been received at current date. According to instructions from the DCI this project is authorized to proceed without compliance with normal operational procedures because of the urgency and sensitivity of the PBSUCCESS operation.

Subject personally is discreet and security conscious. However, lacking formal security training and adequate resources, certain operating practices have not been sufficiently secure. He has indicated willingness to initiate new methods which will tighten up the security of his operations.

His immediate family, who live with him, are cognizant of many of his operational undertakings.

The physical security of his Honduras Headquarters is considered adequate.

9. *Contacts*—No specific information is available regarding Subject's military or political contacts who could assure him military support in a revolutionary effort.

Subject has stated he has general support in Guatemala, but to date has not supplied the details of this claimed support. He is reputed to be aided by approximately 200 Guatemalan exiles.

The Honduran Government has permitted Subject to organize his group in Honduras. The nature of the personal and political relationship between [name not declassified] and Subject is confused.

10. *Political Ability*—Subject has held no political offices and has not been active in any Guatemalan political party. No information is available regarding the attitudes of prominent anti-Government political parties toward him. Subject claims general support, particularly among the anti-Communist University students.

No information is available regarding a statement of his political ambitions for the future. His precise political ambitions are not known.

11. *PP Ability*—There is no information that Subject has had PP experience, although currently his propaganda groups do coordinate their activities with his Headquarters. Subject has indicated, however, he expects to

turn this particular activity over to a qualified assistant, who possesses adequate training and background. He has written an anti-Communist book, *Yo Acuso*, of doubtful PP value.

12. *Military Ability*—Subject's military record, (see Attachment A), indicates a rapid rise. Although reasons for this advancement are not spelled out, Subject's capacity for command must be considered as a responsible factor. No information exists regarding the opinion which other Guatemalan officers have for Subject. There is no information available regarding U.S. military officials' opinion of Subject's military judgment and command capacity.

13. *Intelligence Ability*—There is no information that Subject has worked with any intelligence service, except CIA. He is, however, acquainted with FI procedures as a result of his anti-government activities while in exile. He is in contact with numerous sources in Guatemala [and] with Central American Military Attachés stationed in Honduras.

Subject admits lack of background in conducting well-organized FI activities, but is convinced of their importance and is willing to cooperate with CIA representatives in improving his FI nets.

14. *Replacement*—Subject appears to be far above the level of his staff assistants, none of whom apparently are being considered as an eventual replacement for RUFUS.

### Attachment A

Full Name: RUFUS

Alias: Julio Restrepo—pseudonym

Date and Place of Birth: 1914 in Guatemala

Present Citizenship: Guatemalan

Relatives and friends in the United States: Peter Woolson, San Antonio, Texas

Wife: Odilia

Brother: Julio Federico Paiz, brother-in-law also known as Federico Paiz Herrera, leader of anti-Communist student group.

Political affiliations: An Aranista. Opposed to the moral corruption of the Arbenz regime. At present, anti-Communitic.

Travel outside Guatemala: On 8 November 1951, left Bogota, Colombia for Panama. Reportedly made a trip through the Central American Republics, thence to the U.S. and in January, 1952, reported to be either in Mexico or Salvador.

Education:

Six years of primary school

Two years Industrial Technical School of Guatemala  
Three years basic military studies at the Military Academy  
Six mos. specialized training in Artillery at the Military Academy  
One year basic course in School of Applied Tactics, Guatemala  
Three months at General Staff course (Ground), Ft. Leavenworth,

Kansas

Four and a half mos., Service Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Military Service:

Entered Military Academy in 1933 and graduated in 1936

Captain in June, 1939

Major in June, 1944

Lt. Colonel in ?

Arrested on 27 August 1949 for failure to send troops to the capital  
on 18 July

Employment history:

Entered Military Academy in June, 1933 and graduated in June, 1936

Captain in June, 1939

Major in June, 1944

Lt. Colonel in ?

Commander of Artillery Unit, Ft. Matamoros, 1936–1937

Instructor of Artillery, Ft. Matamoros, 1937–1942

Chief of Artillery of the Atlantic Sector, 1942–1944

First Chief of Expeditionary Force of the Defense of the Atlantic  
Sector, July 1944

Instructor of Artillery, Ft. San Jose, Sept–Oct 1944

Chief, G–4 Section, General Staff, Oct 1944–June 1945

Chief, G–3 Section, General Staff, June–Nov 1945

Sub-Director of Military Academy, Nov 1947–March 1947

Professor of Tactics, Second Course, Military Academy, May  
1946–March 1947

Director of Military Academy, March 1947 until early 1949

Transferred to Chief of Garrison at Mazatenango, a secondary post

Detailed to visit USMA in September 1947

Arrested August 1949 by government police

In November 1950 led an armed attack on the Military Base in  
Guatemala City, wounded and imprisoned

On 11 June 1951 escaped from National Prison and granted safe  
conduct to El Salvador

Publications: Wrote a book *Yo Acuso* in 1951

Court Record: Arrested by Guatemalan Government in 1953 for  
political activities

Description:

Age—39

Height—5 feet, 5 inches

Eyes—Dark brown

Sex—Male

Weight—135 lbs.

Hair—Black

Build—Slender



63. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 5, 1953.

SUBJECT

Summary of Directives and Instructions on PBSUCCESS

1. Pursuant to your verbal instructions of 4 November, there are listed below the principal directives, instructions and sources of instructions for Project PBSUCCESS.

2. General (in "Policy" folder)

- a. "Guatemala—General Plan of Action" TS #, dated 11 Sept 1953<sup>2</sup>
- b. PBSUCCESS Status Report, dated 29 October 1953<sup>3</sup>

3. US Military Assistance (in "Policy" folder)

a. Various memos of conversations between Ray Leddy and [name not declassified]. JCS have approved arms assistance negotiations with Nicaragua, and formal Defense Department notification to State is expected momentarily. JCS have not yet approved negotiations with Honduras or El Salvador.

b. The Guatemalan Government has requested several additional US Army personnel on a TDY basis, to be added to the US Military Mission. State (Leddy) has forwarded the request to Defense without comment. If necessary, State is prepared to ask Defense not to make the personnel available.

4. Economic Warfare

a. The Director of Security has been requested to obtain biographical data on proposed EW consultants. ("Policy" Folder).

b. In discussions between [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] in New York on 2 November, it was agreed that there should be an approach to [name not declassified] to decide on EW methods directed toward cutting off petroleum and other supplies of the Guatemalan government. (For further details, see contact report written by [name not declassified], in "EW" folder.)

5. FI

a. Attached Memorandum from C/WHC to Chief of Station, Guatemala, (Attachment No. 1) outlines priorities for development of KUFIRE assets.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 2. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 51.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 61.

## 6. PP

a. WHD Field Memoranda 50-53 (Attachment No. 2) and 138-53 (Attachment No. 3) instruct all WHD stations on how to support the anti-Guatemala KUGOWN campaign throughout the hemisphere.

b. WHD Field Memorandum 81-53 (available from [*name not declassified*]) also deals with hemisphere-wide support of the above campaign.

c. Attachment No. 1 outlines PP tasks of Guatemala Station.

d. Mr. Frank Wisner has ordered [*name not declassified*] to use all WHD covert media to disseminate the Cabot speech and an Arthur Krock column which urges the US government to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in fighting Communism in the Western Hemisphere. ([*name not declassified*] files.)

e. In discussions between C/PP/Ops, DD/P, etc. there has been talk of attempting to base various PP activities in [*place not declassified*] and of organizing some sort of "International Organization for the Liberation of Guatemala from Communism". (Memos in "Policy" folder.)

f. The \$30,000 given to [*name not declassified*] in late September 1953 must last RUFUS through November. (Contact Report of [*name not declassified*], dated 6 October 1953, in "Policy" folder.)

7. Instructions from WHD to Guatemala Station during 1953 (material extracted from Guatemala Chrono File).

a. 5 January, instructed Station to have Hediger continue writing articles about Guatemala for planting elsewhere in hemisphere. (According to [*name not declassified*]. ESCONSIN 1 now writes such articles.)

b. 26 February, Station was requested to furnish PO Box numbers used by Guatemalan Communists.

c. 6 April, Station was requested to furnish information of religious persecution in Guatemala for use elsewhere in hemisphere.

d. 2 April, Station was instructed to mail "mourning cards" for 30 successive days to Arbenz and top Communist leaders. Cards were to mourn the purge or execution of various Communists in the world and to hint forthcoming doom to recipients.

e. 17 June, Station was requested to collect the following material for hemisphere-wide propaganda:

- (1) evidence of worsening economic conditions
- (2) photos and facts on failure of land reform
- (3) evidence that only Communists were profiting

f. 19 June, Station was requested to report:

- (1) Its facilities for placing material in press and on radio
- (2) Its facilities for preparing material, printing and distributing it
- (3) Its capabilities to initiate strikes, etc.
- (4) Its access to Communist or official Guatemalan letterheads, signatures, seals and to information useful for character assassination.
- (5) Suggestions as to what action taken by the Guatemalan government would make it most unpopular at home; what the best

targets for defamation are; which character assassinations could be most readily and profitably performed.

f. [sic] 1 July, implied and direct criticism of Station performance was made by dispatch. Station was told that:

(1) It had perhaps too willingly agreed to limitations imposed by the US Ambassador

(2) It did not seem to be using security techniques

(3) It had objected to the use of propaganda within Guatemala prepared outside the country, and had not made any alternate suggestions

(4) It had been slow in answering dispatches or had not answered at all

(5) Action and reporting on the labor situation were deficient.

[name not declassified]

---

#### 64. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 11, 1953.

SUBJECT

PBSUCCESS

1. With reference to my recent memorandum<sup>2</sup> regarding the PBSUCCESS budget I have now been informed by CPP that the DCI has secured the \$3,000,000<sup>3</sup> in question from the Bureau of the Budget. (I have been given to understand that Mr. Dulles, General Smith, and Mr. Dodge had a conference and that minutes of this meeting were written to serve as authorization for the above.)

2. I was further given to understand that DCI had instructed DDA (Mr. White) to handle the necessary details in respect to securing the funds without undue delay.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Dated October 31. (Ibid., Box 72, Folder 5)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 40, and Document 54.

3. Confirming our yesterday's conversation I would recommend:

a. That a PBSUCCESS working group have a meeting before the end of this week in order to ascertain the current status of the project as well as plans for the immediate future, and

b. That a general briefing on PBSUCCESS be prepared for DCI, DDCI, DDP and COP. This briefing should be scheduled for the week of 16 November 1953.

Hans V. Tofte  
Chief, PP/OPS

---

65. Draft Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 12, 1953.

SUBJECT

Program for PBSUCCESS

REFERENCES

A. "Guatemala—General Plan of Action", TS# dated 11 September 1953<sup>2</sup>

B. Project PBSUCCESS Status Report, dated 29 October 1953<sup>3</sup>

A. Objectives

1. To remove covertly, and without bloodshed if possible, the menace of the present Communist-controlled government of Guatemala.

2. To install and sustain, covertly, a pro-US government in Guatemala.

B. Statement of the Problem

1. The Communists have become strongly entrenched in Guatemala and in the Guatemalan government, thus constituting a threat to United States welfare in the Western Hemisphere.

2. The Guatemalan non-Communist opposition has become disillusioned and disunited. However, a latent anti-Communist resistance potential is believed to exist.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Document 51.

<sup>3</sup> Document 61.

3. The resistance potential must be built up to the point where it can contribute materially to the accomplishment of the objectives of PBSUCCESS.

4. In view of growing Communist strength and declining non-Communist cohesion in Guatemala, the implementation and successful completion of the objectives of PBSUCCESS must proceed without delay.

5. It must be recognized that any major effort to dislodge the Communist-controlled government of Guatemala will probably be credited to the United States, and possibly on CIA. Covert accomplishment of the objectives of PBSUCCESS is therefore defined as meaning accomplishment with plausible denial of United States or CIA participation.

### C. *Plan of Operations*

#### 1. *Stage One—Staffing and Assessment—*

- a. Assignment of Project Personnel.
- b. Field Survey by Communications Adviser.
- c. Briefing and despatch of Project field personnel.
- d. Assessment and analysis of friendly assets.
- e. Assessment and analysis of enemy assets.
- f. Preparation of detailed operational plans for Headquarters approval.

#### 2. *Stage Two—Preliminary Conditioning (D-?)*

- a. Project Headquarters moves to the field.
- b. Create dissension and defection within the target.
- c. Discredit target at home and abroad.
- d. Demonstrate inability of target regime to represent best interests of the people.
- e. Create hope and encourage patience among non-Communists.
- f. Complete military agreements with Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador.
- g. Withdraw US military personnel from target at appropriate time.
- h. Begin economic pressure.
- i. Begin formation and training of a para-military force in exile.
- j. Assess accomplishments.
- k. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.

#### 3. *Stage Three—Build-Up (D-75)*

- a. Create maximum antagonism to target regime.
- b. Fan passive will to resist.

c. Apply internal and external economic pressure to create serious difficulties.

d. In concert with majority of OAS members, apply diplomatic pressures.

e. Demonstrate urgency by speeding military build-up of neighboring countries (not including Mexico).

f. Accentuate para-military preparation.

g. Initiate passive sabotage program.

h. Assess accomplishments.

i. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.

4. *Stage Four*—Critical Period (D–25)

a. Apply maximum economic pressure.

b. Accentuate divisionist activity within target.

c. Intensive rumor campaign stimulating fear of war for the purpose of drawing enemy forces away from capital.

d. Constitutional revolutionary forces claim support of people.

e. Para-military force in readiness.

f. Passive sabotage evident.

g. Assess accomplishments.

h. Obtain Headquarters approval before proceeding to next stage.

5. *Stage Five*—Showdown (D–5)

a. Implement aggressive sabotage plan against key targets.

b. Constitutional leader claims capability to seize power by force and issues ultimatum to target regime to capitulate in order to avoid needless bloodshed.

c. Populace is told to await target regime's reply and further instructions from constitutional leader.

d. If ultimatum fails, popular uprising begins; para-military force enters target country, proclaims authority, declares target regime null and void.

e. Secure position and restore order.

6. *Stage Six*—Consolidation (D–?)

a. Roll-up of Communists and collaborators.

b. Dramatic initial proclamations and edicts.

c. Formation of government.

d. Announcement of long-range domestic and foreign policy.

e. OAS countries announce immediate recognition and support of new regime.

f. United States offers aid.

g. PBSUCCESS terminated.

*D. Organization and Authority*

*1. Priority*

a. "Top Operational Priority" given PBSUCCESS.

*2. Authority and Responsibility*

a. Primary field authority and responsibility is vested in the Officer in Charge, PBSUCCESS.

b. This officer is designated "Special Deputy for PBSUCCESS, WHD."

c. The command channel will be direct from Special Deputy to CWH.

*3. Staff Requirements*

a. The following staff requirements for PBSUCCESS are believed to be the minimum for adequate implementation and control of the Plan of Operations envisaged herein. Additional personnel may be required for varying periods of TDY.

b. The T/O outlined below is exclusive of WHD's current T/O.

[Omitted here is a proposed Table of Organization with position titles and grades.]

*7. Finance*

a. Upon arrival of this program, financial accountability will be vested in CWH, under whose direction CWH/Ad will be the accountable disbursing officer for Headquarters expenditures. Under the general direction of the CWH, the Special Deputy for PBSUCCESS will be the accountable disbursing officer for Field expenditures.

b. Procedures for allocation, disbursement, and accounting of funds will be in a manner acceptable to the DD/A, and as shall be arranged between him and the CWH/Ad.

[name not declassified]<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. The approval lines at the end for CC, CWH, and CD/P are all blank.

**66. Contact Report<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 16, 1953, 4 p.m.

PLACE: DCI's Office

PERSONS PRESENT: DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, DD/P/COps, CWH, [2  
*names not declassified*]

COVER USED: None

*Discussion:*

1. The conference was opened by the DCI with the statement: "This is a top priority operation for the whole agency and is the most important thing we are doing. I am under pressure by others to get on with this." The DCI then discussed the procedures involved in applying economic pressure through the coffee buyers in the U.S., suggesting that perhaps through the proper agencies in the U.S. a rumor could be circulated that current Guatemalan coffee contained harmful fungi and therefore would have to be barred from the U.S. [*name not declassified*] commented that although the idea would be excellent, the danger existed that the coffee buyers, already having been approached and cognizant of our interest would "smell a rat," and possibly embarrass us through the press as certain buyers have already evidenced a lack of cooperation. Further, such action as denying shipment of coffee already paid for would constitute heavy financial losses to these buyers who, lacking proper motivation, might set up hue and cry, thus injuring the program. Based upon these latter comments, the DCI telephoned an unidentified person and informed him to "lay off that coffee idea until further notice." [*name not declassified*] further commented that perhaps more effective economic measures could be brought about through economic sabotage rather than through direct participation by American businessmen and that such action was contemplated within the proposed program.

2. The DCI reiterated the importance of this project and requested that the briefing proceed, at which time [*name not declassified*] led off by reviewing briefly the situation report prepared on 29 October 1953.<sup>2</sup> Upon conclusion of the latter, [*name not declassified*] presented his concept of how the program should be conceived, as embodying the economic, psychological, political warfare and para-military aspects with-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 151, Folder 8. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on November 17 by [*name not declassified*].

<sup>2</sup> Document 61.



in a concerted, well-integrated, operational plan, proceeding to explain the program of 9 November.<sup>3</sup> The DCI stated that no instructions or other information should be sent to the field on this project which would reveal details of the program—this included official stations. He asked whether the FBI should be informed of our plans for [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and was told that it should be. Accordingly, the DCI said that he would handle the matter personally with the Director, FBI, at the proper time. Regarding the status of the military negotiations in the three neighboring countries it was explained that the State Dept. could take no further action until a certain letter, requesting such action, had been received from the Dept. of Defense. The DCI then telephoned Mr. Kyes, Under Secretary of Defense, and asked him if he would be kind enough to expedite the dispatch of this letter to the Dept. of State. The question of T/O was discussed and it was explained that more personnel were required than had originally been contemplated in view of the enlargement of the program. DCI said that he did not want any red tape to interfere with this project and he wanted to make certain that we had the best brains, ability and technical assets of the agency employed on this project to ensure its success.

*Decisions:* The DCI took the draft of the projected program of 9 November 1953 and gave it to the DD/P for his review and consideration with approval to be announced after it has been studied.

*Comments:* It was the impression of the writer that the DCI, D/DCI DD/P and DDP/COPs were favorably impressed with the program and voiced no objection on any phase except one. The DCI questioned whether or not an ultimatum should be issued to the incumbent regime as he thought that might tip our hand to our disadvantage while he was assured that that matter would be given carefully worked out in subsequent plans and that he would be given an opportunity to review same before such action would be taken.

*Recommendations:* That the foregoing be followed closely for approval of the program of 9 November in order to serve as a basic Letter of Authority for the conduct of this operation and the assignment of personnel requested therein.

---

<sup>3</sup> Presumably a reference to the program described in the November 12 draft memorandum for the record, Document 65.

67. **Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 16, 1953.

SUBJECT

Program for PBSUCCESS

1. Following our briefing and conversation of this afternoon, I have read over the attached program which has been prepared by [*name not declassified*] and the others working on this project,<sup>2</sup> and I recommend that you approve it for planning purposes and for the further purpose of authorizing Stage One at this time.

2. Actually the plan is stated in such broad terms that it is not possible to know exactly what it contemplates, particularly in the latter phases. However, I do not regard this as a particular drawback since a vastly-detailed plan prepared at this time would have to be modified in any case. Moreover, the approach specified in this paper calls for the preparation of a detailed operational plan for top level approval at the conclusion of Stage One (the assessment phase).

3. Regarding the “ultimatum” specified under Stage Five, it was understood in our discussion that this was not agreed to and would be given further consideration.

4. The proposed T/O does not seem to me to be excessive, given the importance of this project and the degree of priority attached to it. It is my understanding that this T/O does not take into account the Headquarters personnel who will continue to be used to backstop the operation from Washington. It may even develop that some additional personnel will be required as events develop. (For example, I see no provision for the necessary communications personnel and radio technicians, who I am sure will be needed.)

5. I recommend also the concept of assigning to the operational field chief [*name not declassified*] the central operational responsibility and I further recommend the command channel outlined in Paragraph D on Page 4.

**Frank G. Wisner<sup>3</sup>**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 83–00739R, Box 5, Folder 8. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached. According to a typed notation at the bottom of the page, the enclosure was the November 12 draft memorandum for the record, Document 65.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.

68. Contact Report<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 17, 1953, 3:45 p.m.

PLACE: Mr. Helms Office

PERSONS PRESENT: Mr. Helms, Cols. King and [name not declassified], later Mr. Shannon

COVER USED: None

*Discussion:*

1. Mr. Helms opened the conference by asking the whereabouts of the program of 12 November given to Mr. Dulles (16 November).<sup>2</sup> He was informed that the paper was undoubtedly in the hands of the DD/P. However, an extra copy was available and was given to Mr. Helms to review. This having been done, his comment was that all emphasis should be placed at this time on Stage I, the period of assessment and that only after a very careful objective assessment of all assets would we be able to determine the future course of the project or even if it should be undertaken. This was agreed upon by all present.

2. With regard to the T/O, Helms stated that in view of the DCI's approval, he felt he could go ahead and sign off on this T/O in order to expedite its establishment and would instruct Shannon to set it up. [name not declassified] presented a paper prepared on the subject of the pros and cons of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in which was included the fact that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should be arranged. This paper was shown to Col. King and then to Mr. Helms. The latter agreed that it should be [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and suggested we use [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and acquire physical space on the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It was his suggestion that this could be accomplished through Gen. Cabell, who would be able to lay it on through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. With this agreed upon, Shannon was called into the conference and informed about the T/O and was told by Helms that it was the DCI's request that all red tape be cut on this project and that he, Shannon, therefore, should give his personal attention to expediting the implementation with maximum security re the question of establishing a contact in CAA for preliminary negotiations regarding Syracuse. Shannon volunteered that he could

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 8. Secret. Drafted by [name not declassified] on November 18.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 65.

arrange it through his official and personal friend who is the Chairman of CAB. Thus it was agreed that [name not declassified] would work with him on this matter.

*Decisions:*

A. Final decision and approval of this project would rest upon the review of the assessment prepared in Stage I.

B. The T/O was approved by Helms and Shannon was told to establish same.

C. [1 line of source text not declassified]

D. Contact with CAA will be established through Shannon.

*Comments:* It was the writer's impression that Helms agreed in general with the program paper as presented and his comments regarding assessments were provided for within said program. It also appeared evident that hereafter all administrative matters above or outside the division should be handled personally and directly with Mr. Shannon.

---

**69. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 19, 1953.

SUBJECT

Status of U.S. Military Mission in Guatemala

1. With reference to the question which mentioned to me after lunch today as having been raised with you by the Secretary of State, I have given further consideration to this matter and have discussed it with Colonel J.C. King and [name not declassified]. The following is a brief statement of our conclusions and recommendations.

2. It would be undesirable for the U.S. military mission presently in Guatemala to be withdrawn from there<sup>2</sup>—and preferable that this mission in either its present or a slightly reconstituted form remain—pro-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> at this time. [Footnote in the source text.]

vided that it should prove possible for this mission to carry out the following assignments:

a. By the maintenance of daily contact with top-ranking officers of the Guatemalan military forces, and without resorting to any covert activities of a compromising character, to observe and report at regular and frequent intervals on the general morale and attitude of the Guatemalan armed forces toward the present Guatemalan regime. [The channel for such reporting could be determined after further study, but it might be desirable for this information to be reported to the Ambassador, and by him made available for "his own information and guidance," but actually to be forwarded via our channels of communication.]<sup>3</sup>

b. By taking advantage of normal contacts and associations with ranking representatives of the Guatemalan armed forces, to pass on to them selected statements and observations best calculated to weaken the morale and shake the faith of the Guatemalan armed forces in the present Guatemalan regime. [It should be relatively simple to devise the type and kind of statement and observation to be passed on in this manner and for this purpose in such a way as to avoid or at least minimize the risk of charges that the military mission was engaging in improper activities. For example, the U.S. military personnel might strike a sympathetic and regretful note in their conversations—pointing out that while programs of military assistance are being authorized for neighboring states, it has been impossible for them to obtain any Washington support for their requests and suggestions. They could speculate that the explanation for this difficult matter might result from high level Washington resentment over the policies and official declarations of the Guatemalan government which are seemingly hostile to the United States.] One of the most important types of information which we require is information concerning the morale and attitude of the Guatemalan armed forces and this would be the most natural and ready source of such information. If the contacts between the members of the U.S. military mission and their opposite numbers were as close as they could and should be, it should be possible to observe from time to time the results of other activities and efforts contemplated under the project upon the thinking and feeling of the Guatemalan military, including particularly the degree of firmness and loyalty of the armed forces. In no other way would it be as easy to observe and follow this vital aspect of the entire matter.

3. J.C. King has underscored the point that if the U.S. military mission is to be withdrawn, this is the wrong time to do so. Its withdrawal

---

<sup>3</sup> Brackets in this paragraph and the one below are in the source text.

at the present time would be a substantially empty gesture and would create no particular reverberation. (It would be an almost insignificant tap on the wrist if done now.) The impact of the withdrawal would be much greater if this were done at a later time and after the other aspects of the psychological build-up had gained momentum and begun to have effect.

4. In order to gain the benefits above referred to, two or three steps would probably be required, viz:

a. The present personnel of the mission should be carefully assessed with a view to determining their competence and qualifications to engage in the two lines of activity recommended. Our Station Chief is expected here toward the end of the week and we can get a run-down from him on the characteristics and qualifications of the present members of the military mission. It might be desirable to substitute certain more qualified officers for present members of the mission in certain instances.

b. In any case, it would be necessary for the Chief of the mission to be recalled to Washington for a thorough briefing and cut-in to the extent necessary (which would not have to be too much) to enable him to give direction to the efforts of his staff. Presumably this briefing would be given by the appropriate military authorities, possibly by General Erskine or under his aegis.

**Frank G. Wisner<sup>4</sup>**

---

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.

70. **Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 20, 1953.

SUBJECT

Status of US Military Mission in Guatemala; conversation with Under Secretary of State

REFERENCE

Memo to DDCI dtd 19 Nov 53, fr DD/P; subject: "Status of US Military Mission in Guatemala"<sup>2</sup>

1. Pursuant to my conversations of yesterday afternoon and this morning with the Director and Deputy Director, I talked with General Smith and gave him our recommendations in response to his question concerning the advisability of withdrawing the US Military Mission from Guatemala. After listening to a brief summary of the reasoning contained in the reference memorandum, General Smith stated that he agreed with our recommendation and commented that this also seems to be the point of view of Ambassador Peurifoy.

2. General Smith went on to say that we should move promptly to examine the composition of the present military mission, which he surmises may include individuals who may be neither disposed nor qualified to function in the manner required. He thought that we should take steps with the appropriate authorities in the Pentagon to see to it that the mission is strengthened by the substitution of a limited number of officers having real competence and background, giving as an example Colonel Hank Mueller who was formerly a personal assistant to General Smith during the time the latter was serving as Director of this Agency.

3. General Smith concluded with the statement that if we require any assistance from him in getting this whole matter laid on and straightened out with the Pentagon, he would be only too glad to give a hand.

**Frank G. Wisner<sup>3</sup>**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 2. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent through the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Document 69.

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.

71. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

New York, November 20, 1953.

SUBJECT

PBSUCCESS—[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

1. A meeting was held with Mr. [name not declassified], Special Assistant to Mr. [name not declassified], President of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], in his office at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], New York City, at 1615 on 20 November 1953. Present were Mr. [name not declassified] and Col. King.

2. The meeting was arranged by Mr. [name not declassified] as the result of information received from Mr. [name not declassified] to the effect that our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Mr. [name not declassified], although a distinguished member of the company and a loyal American, has been [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and should no longer be relied upon. After Mr. [name not declassified] had promised to disclose to no one except President [name not declassified], without prior authorization, the matters to be discussed, he was asked if it were practical to reduce their oil stocks in Guatemala within a period of a few months from the present level of 30–40 days, to 15 days, and if so, who, in his company, would need to be informed. Also, if for a period of approximately three weeks all shipments could be stopped so as to reduce the Company's Guatamalan stocks to zero.

3. Mr. [name not declassified] replied that the first step was possible providing the other oil companies<sup>2</sup> doing business in Guatemala also went along, and that it could be done through normal channels without arousing undue suspicion, if two other officers of the Company in addition to himself were informed—the President, Mr. [name not declassified], and the officer in charge of all marketing arrangements, Mr. [name not declassified], of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; with a week-end residence at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Mr. [name not declassified] said that Mr. [name not declassified] had served with the U.S. Navy in England during World War II and that he was a discreet, thoroughly loyal and absolutely trustworthy individual; and that [name not declassified] would vouch for him in this instance. The operation would have to be laid on through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], under the direction of their local man, [name not declassified], who

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 77, Folder 7. Secret. Prepared on November 23 in Washington.

<sup>2</sup> A handwritten note in the margin was not declassified.



is in charge of their supply and transportation. However, to [name not declassified], no explanation other than orders as to what to do would have to be given.

4. It was agreed that as soon as I had obtained permission to cut in Mr. [name not declassified], a second meeting would be held, this time including Mr. [name not declassified] and Mr. [name not declassified].<sup>3</sup>

5. My impression of Mr. [name not declassified] was most favorable. He impressed me as a man who would be discreet, trustworthy and who thoroughly understood the problem as presented.

**J.C. King**  
Chief, WHD

---

<sup>3</sup> A handwritten note in the margin reads: "Memo has gone forward to Col. Edwards." This memorandum has not been found.

---

## 72. Contact Report<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 25, 1953, 9:30 a.m.

PLACE: King's office

PERSONS PRESENT: JCKing, [2 names not declassified]

COVER USED: None

### *Discussions:*

1. A serious impasse was described by JC as having developed within the State Dept. as a result of the Under [Assistant] Secretary of State Cabot having been kept out of the PBSUCCESS picture. Apparently Cabot, desiring to see that something is done in Guatemala, has demanded a briefing from CIA as to what its plans are and what its current activities are, as Cabot wanted to organize a program to attack the problem. In particular, he planned to call a

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 8. Secret.

meeting of all coffee buyers to determine what could be done in this direction.<sup>2</sup> As Cabot has not been cut in, he has never been officially informed of CIA's activities but he did evidence knowledge of certain things going on of which he had not been informed. Allen Dulles, in a discussion with JC, agreed to talk to Bedell Smith at noon today regarding the possibility of cutting Cabot in, at least to a limited degree, recognizing that Smith has neither confidence nor personal liking for Cabot. Further, Allen Dulles was to speak to his brother, John Foster Dulles, in an effort to resolve this matter as Cabot insisted upon this briefing taking place on Monday, 30 November, by J.C. King. Accordingly, an effort must be made by Allan Dulles to offset Cabot's intentions or to obtain approval to cut him in on PBSUCCESS to avoid a clash and possible serious compromise of PBSUCCESS to date.

2. JC stated he wanted to ship 15 tons of arms now in New York to Nicaragua at once in order to test Somoza's alleged agreement to cooperate. [name not declassified] took strong exception to this proposal, pointing out that the entire subject of handling arms was fraught with peril from the security point of view and great danger as to control, owing to the possibility once the arms were in the hands of certain people they might go off on their own, thus aborting the program. It was explained that the new concept does not necessarily involve a very large shipment of arms to Nicaragua but, contrarily, only that those actually required for training of the cadre classes at Pto. Cabezas be shipped. Further, that the arms would be compartmented and would be delivered to various places in order to achieve maximum control and secrecy. The problem of getting arms from Nicaragua to jump-off points in Honduras and Salvador is in itself a serious problem of logistics and sufficiently disadvantageous to warrant holding such arms in Nicaragua to a minimum. [name not declassified] said that there are various ways in which the arms could be distributed to specific teams, both by clandestine entry through Nicaragua overland and by black air-drop. JC weighed these objections and withdrew his decision to ship arms at once to Nicaragua. Another important factor involved in this discussion—it was pointed out by [name not declassified] that the shipment of arms should not proceed in advance of the military negotiations with Nicaragua as we must first be sure that Somoza has a carrot well within reach before we come along with the stick. JC agreed to this.

---

<sup>2</sup> Cabot met with the coffee importers the same day, November 25. For the memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1088–1091.

3. The question of initiating an energetic foreign currency procurement program was discussed with JC and he was informed that further details would be available Monday on the subject. JC seemed to realize that this matter of obtaining necessary large quantities of foreign currencies would not be easily resolved and concurred with [name not declassified] pushing a procurement program utilizing all sources for the acquisition of the necessary funds.

4. Regarding the security clearances for [name not declassified] and RUFUS, JC informed that there was no objection to going directly to Staff C, providing the request was handled in a normal manner without attracting any attention to the possibility that these individuals would be used for operational purposes. This was agreed to. The matter of safehouses, according to JC, should be handled directly with Mr. [name not declassified] who has been alerted to expect [name not declassified] to lay on specific requirements. HC was informed that this would not be done until the subject matter was studied more thoroughly.

5. [name not declassified] was presented to JC for his approval as the candidate to fill the Administrative Assistant slot. Mentioning her qualifications as having been Ray Leddy's secretary, serving a tour of duty in Guatemala, generally professing knowledge of administrative procedures at both Hqs. and in the field and a knowledge of the language. JC said that he preferred to use the girl from [place not declassified] who was expected in 1 December as he had no slot for her and wanted to recommend her very highly for this position although they had no knowledge of her administrative abilities aside from her handling of work requirements [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. [name not declassified] agreed to wait her arrival on 1 December before making his own decision.

73. **Memorandum for the Record**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 27, 1953, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Guatemala; Conversation at State Department

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State

John M. Cabot, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Central Intelligence Agency

[name not declassified]

1. I called on Mr. Cabot at his request at 4:00 p.m. today. He stated that he is going to talk to a group of coffee importers tomorrow,<sup>2</sup> the assembly being arranged by Mr. Alborn<sup>3</sup> (phonetics), one of their leaders. Mr. Cabot wants to ask them about the possibilities of stopping imports of coffee from Guatemala. He will not request them to do it, but will only inquire as to the possibilities.

2. Mr. Cabot requested that CIA, in some way, make it known to the highest Guatemalan government officials that he has been carrying on such conversations.

3. Mr. Cabot stated that he had heard that President Arbenz is in a tantrum about the situation into which he has gotten his country. There is even a report that he has offered to turn the government over to General Diaz. Mr. Cabot believes that the President and other high officials of the government may realize that the country can not stand up against the enmity of the United States and may want to change the regime to be more friendly to us.

4. Mr. Cabot thinks that this is the moment to start any operations that would make them worry. In addition to letting them know that he is talking with the coffee importers about cutting off their market for their principal product, he thinks that we might start some "poison pen" letters and other things to disrupt the morale of the higher officials.

[name not declassified]<sup>4</sup>

WH/CP

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 8. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably Cabot is in error; he met with the importers on November 25; see footnote 2, Document 72.

<sup>3</sup> Possibly Harry H. Allen, Vice President of the Otis McAllister Coffee Corporation.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

74. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 28, 1953.

## ATTENTION

Chief, WH Division and [name not declassified]

## SUBJECT

Exploitation of Military Missions

## REFERENCE

DD/P's Memos to DDCI and DCI dtd 19 Nov and 20 Nov 53 Respectively<sup>2</sup>

1. At a recent meeting in DD/P's office<sup>3</sup> (a record of which is in your files) General Balmer was asked to make necessary arrangements with Col. Brad Smith in Gen. Erskine's office for a briefing of the chiefs of the Army mission and Air Force mission in Guatemala City for PBSUCCESS purposes.

2. Gen. Balmer informed me yesterday "that he had run up against opposition on the working level in the Pentagon". This opposition was particularly on the part of Army, whereas Air Force appeared more cooperative. According to Gen. Balmer "there was a marked reluctance on the part of certain Army officers in the Pentagon to have their military missions, or the heads of same, engaged in intelligence activities". Gen. Balmer emphasized that this was strictly a "working level attitude" on the part of Army and suggested that we think the matter over and discuss the issue with DD/P without undue delay.

3. I told Gen. Balmer that it was my off-hand impression that the Army perhaps was making too much of our intentions for the military missions in Guatemala as outlined in referenced DD/P memos. It is my belief that we are not trying to levy a heavy reporting responsibility on the missions in addition to their routine duties. But rather that we were asking members of the military missions to pay specific attention to information that they would in any case accumulate during their day-to-day liaison within Guatemalan military circles; the only difference being that they would make some relatively minor but perhaps exceedingly interesting contributions to the PBSUCCESS effort through (a) processing their local know-how to a certain degree, and by (b) assisting the American Ambassador in gauging the current attitudes of lead-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 8. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Documents 69 and 70.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

ing personalities as well as the rank and file within the Guatemalan Army at a time when relations between Guatemala and the United States were particularly sensitive.

4. In any case Gen. Balmer wants PBSUCCESS officers to give some thought to this matter and have another discussion with DD/P before he (Gen. Balmer) did anything further regarding this issue.

5. Gen. Balmer further stated that he had ascertained that both chiefs of Army and Air Force missions were due to be replaced in March, 1954. Their successors were already or would be shortly in preparatory training in Washington, D.C. or nearby military installations.

6. I suggest that we discuss this thoroughly at our Monday morning staff meeting, 30 November 1953, and brief DD/P immediately thereafter.<sup>4</sup>

**Hans V. Tofte**<sup>5</sup>  
*Chief, PP/OPS*

---

<sup>4</sup> A handwritten notation reads: "Handled with [initial not declassified]" and an arrow points to Tofte's typed signature.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

75. **Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the Deputy Director for Plans (Wisner) and the Acting Deputy Director of Administration of the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 9, 1953.

SUBJECT

Project PBSUCCESS

1. I have approved Project PBSUCCESS and the allocation of not to exceed \$3,000,000 of funds available to the Agency for its support. The Comptroller is directed to make the necessary adjustments to charge any prior or current expenditures for this Project to this allocation and to credit back any withdrawals made from other allocations.

2. In view of the security aspects of this Project, I hereby authorize the Comptroller to make funds, within the above limitations, available to the Chief, WH Division, at his request and with the prior approval in writing of the DD/P or COP, in such amounts and to such persons as he may desire. The Chief, WH Division, will be the accountable officer for all funds so advanced and will be responsible for assuring that all expenditures are reasonable and necessary for the support of the Project

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 167, Folder 6. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A series of memoranda attached to this memorandum track the PBSUCCESS planning process, including Documents 51, 65, and 67. Also attached is a "Report on Stage One," dated December 15, drafted by [name not declassified] and approved by King. The report noted that the element of surprise had been lost and that the opposition consisted of 100 "top-flight" Communists who had been to the Soviet Union. In comparison the pro-Western forces included only two "more or less" untested leaders with liabilities: "Neither man is effectively controlled by PBSUCCESS to date, and achievement of control may be complicated by past financial largess on the part of CIA." In addition, "Past security practices of both men have been poor." The report also noted that the CIA had only limited capabilities in Guatemala: "The Station has no penetrations of the PGT, government agencies, armed forces, or labor unions." Nevertheless, based on information from the Station in Guatemala, the "possible pool of passive supporters of anti-Communism" might total "perhaps 90%" of the politically active population, and that "there is recent evidence of widespread, if still latent, officer dissatisfaction with President Arbenz and the Communists." The report concluded that it was "normal for revolution" to start with a few men, however, and posited four recommendations: "A. That the concept of proceeding on the basis of potential assets, rather than on the basis of existing assets, be approved; B. That, keeping in mind that the U.S. national interest, as defined by the National Security Council, requires a change of government in Guatemala, the TOP Operational Priority of PBSUCCESS be formally assured for at least six months; C. That definite, high-level accord be maintained that any Guatemalan or other charges of U.S. intervention will be met with positive U.S. denial based on factual or notional plausibility; D. That in view of the urgency and magnitude of the problem, early approval be granted to implement Stage Two, Plan of Operations, including the organizational concept and financial requirements."

and for obtaining such documentation and receipts for expenditures for these operations shall remain with the WH Division, and the Certifying Officers may accept the certification of the Chief, WH Division, that he has evidence to support the propriety and reasonableness of the expenditures and that they have been made for the official purposes of the Project.

3. The Auditor-in-Chief shall provide for periodic audits, not less than semiannually, under arrangements mutually satisfactory to himself and to the Chief, WH Division.

Allen W. Dulles<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

---

**76. Memorandum From Jacob R. Seekford to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King) for Jerome C. Dunbar<sup>1</sup>**

Report No. AL-1

Washington, December 15, 1953.

SUBJECT

Seekford, Calligeris Visit With General A. Somoza and Gen. Somoza's son, Colonel Somoza

1. General Somoza reaffirmed all previous commitments to support the Calligeris operation.

*[4 paragraphs (18 lines of source text) not declassified]*

6. General Somoza has delegated his son, Colonel Somoza, as liaison officer to work personally with Seekford.

*[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]*

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 76, Folder 8. No classification marking. A typed notation on the memorandum indicates the date of information was December 9.



77. Contact Report<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 22, 1953, 3 p.m.

PLACE: Col. King's Office

PERSONS PRESENT: Col King, [name not declassified], Mr Leddy, [name not declassified]

*Discussion:*

1. Mr Leddy brought along Ambassador Peurifoy's cable on his six-hour meeting with President Arbenz.<sup>2</sup>

2. Mr Leddy mentioned that the US Ambassadors to Central America were to be recalled to Washington for a briefing in early January. He mentioned this so that CIA could indicate whether this briefing would seem inopportune, or whether CIA wished any specific points to be covered.

3. Ambassador Toriello has asked to see President Eisenhower and will probably get the appointment. The President will be asked to "really pour it on".

4. Secretary Cabot has already told the Ambassadors of the three countries concerned that military pact negotiations are in the offing. This may compel State to make the matter public much sooner than previously intended.

5. Ambassador Whelan is coming up. It was agreed that he should be allowed to know enough so that, if asked by President Somoza, he could give a quiet nod to Somoza's support of RUFUS.

6. Two Guatemalans, anti-Communist politicians, have been to see Mr Leddy, offering to stage anti-Communist demonstrations at the appropriate time. It was agreed that clearances on the two should be started. Col King is having their written proposal copied for SD/WHD.

7. Mr Leddy was briefed on the three Nicaraguan bases.

8. Mr Leddy reported that State and Defense had agreed not to send to Guatemala the two added non-coms that Guatemala had requested.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 9. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 154 from Guatemala City, December 17, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1091-1093. A memorandum of conversation dated December 17, prepared by Ambassador Peurifoy, provided more detail of the discussion, including names of Guatemalan Communists and suspected Communists. According to this record of the meeting, President Arbenz' wife, María Vilanova de Arbenz, was an active participant. (Attachment to dispatch HGG-A-532 from the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, CIA, December 21; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 1)

9. It was agreed that the US military missions would not be pulled out when the three military pacts were announced, but only when some striking progress was made on the pacts.

---

**78. Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the Chiefs of Certain CIA Stations in Central America<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 23, 1953, 2220Z.

32044. 1. Effective this date all addressee Stations will constitute component elements of PBSUCCESS regional command with project headquarters at LINCOLN under Jerome C. Dunbar, Special Deputy, WHD for this project.

2. Hereafter until further notice subject Stations will devote top operational priority to this project receiving their guidance and instructions direct from LINCOLN.

3. Prior to 1 Jan 1954 all cables will be directed to Dir as heretofore with info LINCOLN (SLINC).

4. Effective 1 Jan all cables will be directed to LINCOLN info Dir.

5. Separate instructions to follow for revised pouching procedures.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 7, Folder 2. Secret; Routine; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by [*name not declassified*], coordinated by Helms, and approved by King. Sent to Guatemala City, [*2 places not declassified*] and repeated to LINCOLN.

79. **Letter From the Ambassador to Guatemala (Peurifoy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Cabot)<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, December 28, 1953.

Dear Jack:

You will have seen my Secret Telegram No. 163 of December 23<sup>2</sup> in which I recommended certain policies which we believe would create a climate favorable for a change in the Guatemalan Government. In this supplementary letter I want to round out those recommendations by stressing the need for the U.S. Government to work actively and quickly to assure that the Guatemalan Government is taken over by elements willing and strong enough to eliminate Communist influence from the Guatemalan political scene when the time comes. When the pressures suggested in my telegram become effective here, the Communists as well as the potential opposition to the regime may be expected to seek to exploit the situation and we must then be as sure as possible that elements favorable to our objectives are in the winning position.

As a result of my conversation with President Arbenz and general evaluation of the situation since my arrival here two months ago I am fully convinced that continuance of his administration until its term expires in 1957 will result in a further and dangerous advance of Communism in this country, with all the attendant peril to our security and economic interests in this area. It might well then be too late to root it out without an internal clash of the type that occurred in Greece and elsewhere. I believe further that the internal opposition to the Arbenz regime is unlikely to act inde-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 98, Folder 7. Secret. A cover memorandum from the Station Chief in Guatemala to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division reads: "(1) Attached is a copy of a letter which was drafted by Second Secretary John C. Hill and concurred in by Counselor of Embassy William L. Krieg and First Secretary Andrew B. Wardlaw. (2) A copy of this letter fell into the hands of the writer, and I am taking steps to forward it, inasmuch as it is possible that a copy thereof might not be received by Headquarters through other channels. (3) The letter serves to indicate the attitude of the three officers mentioned, and in view of the recommendations made therein, they, of course, will be in a state of expectancy during the coming months as to what is actually being done concerning this situation. Events of the future will be interpreted by them in the light of the recommendations made. (4) Unless Headquarters receives a copy of this letter through Assistant Secretary Cabot, it is considered important from a point of view of our local relationships with Embassy personnel that no one at Headquarters give the slightest indication that Headquarters is knowledgeable of the contents thereof." A handwritten note in the margin reads: "Note from Nutting—Galbond saw letter, but no copy was made at that time, at request of addressee."

<sup>2</sup> Printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1093-1095.

pendently and that the U.S. Government must accept the risks inherent in helping to bring about a change of government here.

The principal problem now is selecting a force, which should if possible be a Guatemalan force, capable of taking control of the government with our aid and of besting the Communists in the troubled times which will almost certainly surround any change-over. If a change is to be achieved in the near future, the most promising organization which meets the requirements for such a force is the Guatemalan Armed Forces, possibly acting in conjunction with such exiled military and political figures and domestic groups as will cooperate. The internal "anti-Communist" opposition now is badly divided and without a workable political program or an organization immediately available. It would, I believe, take many months of effort and failures to get the "anti-Communist" factions together behind a plan with any chance of success; there would be continual high risks of exposure; and in any case it is doubtful whether even in the event that they win they could stick together on a program which would satisfactorily reduce the chances of a Communist-influenced counter-revolution.

I would therefore recommend that the Department select the Guatemalan Armed Forces as the primary area in which any effort to stimulate anti-government action is most likely to be fruitful. Though now loyal to this government they are basically opportunistic. Efforts to win over key military personnel must be done, as I know the Department is fully aware, so as to take the minimum risk of exposing our hand, by using a judicious mixture of our clandestine channels, our influence with neighboring anti-Communist governments and our contacts with Guatemalan exile groups together with such other contacts with the Military as we can maintain locally. It, of course, will mean expenditure and some risk of charges of intervention which could be serious if the matter is clumsily handled. But this risk must be accepted or we must be prepared to abandon this field to Communism.

The approach to subverting the Armed Forces should of course be flexible and we should attempt simultaneously to develop the other groups, such as dissatisfied and opportunistic elements within the Administration and the "anti-Communist" opposition. While our effort should be concentrated for effectiveness on one group, we must be prepared to shift quickly if our first approaches fail, and to work out combinations of forces if opportunity offers. In this connection, military personnel with government connections such as Colonel Elfego Monzon,<sup>3</sup> as well as the "anti-Communist" movement, should be closely studied for any role they might usefully play.

---

<sup>3</sup> The name is underlined and a notation in the margin reads "check."

The measures recommended in my telegram are intended to be closely coordinated with the forging of a non-Communist force to take over here, for of themselves they do not guarantee that a change favorable to us would occur. What I expect is that the program outlined in the telegram would (a) prepare hemispheric and Guatemalan opinion for a change and dull the charges of intervention which may be expected to be leveled at us, and (b) to create here a climate in which important segments of the population and especially the Armed Forces and propertied class felt their interests sufficiently threatened to be stirred from their present lethargy into a better disposition to take the risks necessary to cooperate actively in bringing a new government into power.

We must be as certain as possible, however, that a non-Communist force is prepared to step in at the proper moment. The actual application of economic sanctions would probably hit the propertied classes here harder and more quickly than it would the government, and if long-drawn-out it might well damage irreparably the propertied class and prevent it from retarding the advance of Communism. The Communists, of course, could then be expected to exploit the situation with confiscatory taxes and measures, economic sabotage laws, etc., in order to complete the ruin of the conservative segment that they have begun by their application of the Agrarian Reform Law.

What I suggest, in short, has two complementary aspects: the measures to create a climate favorable for a change recommended in my telegram, and coordinated measures to win over and support a non-Communist force capable of controlling the situation as urged in this letter. I see the risks of exposure and recognize that the program would have to be carefully worked out in Washington and here, for a misfired attempt to change the present Guatemalan Government would most probably greatly strengthen the Communists here and damage our standing everywhere if our part in a failure became generally accepted. However, as I see it, Communism is slowly strangling this country, and delay will only face us with a more difficult problem later.

Sincerely yours,

**John E. Peurifoy<sup>4</sup>**

---

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

80. **Memorandum for the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 6, 1954.

SUBJECT

PBSUCCESS

1. At the time [*name not declassified*] was introduced into the PBSUCCESS Operation, WH/PW and [*name not declassified*] had prepared a basic general paper on the PW aspects of the anticipated RUFUS campaign. In addition, [*name not declassified*] had prepared a general outline paper on his views as to what he would do after PBSUCCESS became a success. Moreover, more than two million items of propaganda were shipped to RUFUS. Tape recorders and three mimeograph machines were on their way to RUFUS, three other reproduction machines (Gestetners) were up for immediate procurement, CEUAGE was in operation, CEUA (in Guatemala) was putting out over 100,000 pieces of propaganda every two weeks and organizing a newspaper. FAGE was being organized in San Salvador and plans were being made to put [*name not declassified*] in contact with LIONIZER group in Mexico. Furthermore, financial commitments, approved by the DCI had been made to [*name not declassified*]. WH/PW had already outlined to all WH Field Stations the general aims re Guatemala, sent them support materials, outlined future possible support and provided them with more than 20 initial themes.

2. [*name not declassified*] ordered his staff to come up with a new PW program, though this officer tried to impress him with the fact that there was nothing in the plans which had not been coordinated with both RUFUS and [*name not declassified*], the only two people in the PBSUCCESS Operation who intimately know the psychology of the Guatemalan people, and that through bitter experience WH/PW had more or less of an idea as to what [*name not declassified*] and RUFUS would or would not buy. This advice was ignored and [*name not declassified*] proceeded without consulting [*name not declassified*].

3. In a conversation with Seekford, this officer was told that [*name not declassified*] had told Seekford that Col. King, [*name not declassified*] and myself were no longer in the picture, and that he, [*name not declassified*], was directly responsible to the DCI. This information was passed on to [*name not declassified*], who then reassured Seekford that such was not the case.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 4. Secret; Eyes Only. There is no indication on the memorandum of a drafting or originating officer.

4. When [name not declassified] moved his office into Bldg. T-32, the PW file was broken up into numerous files, making it impossible for the PBSUCCESS PP Case Officer, Mr. [name not declassified], to read the background of PW planning.

5. The three Gestetner machines promised to RUFUS before [name not declassified] arrived, were delayed for two months through confusion or oversight on the part of [name not declassified] and his staff.

6. WH/PW took Mr. [name not declassified], WH/ CPP over to T-32 to meet the PBSUCCESS group. He was told of a PW program prepared by [name not declassified] and his staff. I had never seen such a program and queried Mr. [name not declassified] re this after Mr. [name not declassified] had left, stating that I would like to see what they had come up with. Mr. [name not declassified] informed me that such a program was non-existent.

7. [name not declassified] informed this officer that he would be in charge of activities in a regional area surrounding Guatemala, however, when action dispatches from that area were referred to him they were returned without comment or no action was taken. When questioned re this, no answer was forthcoming. WH/PW, Mr. [name not declassified], [name not declassified] and the regular country desk officers generally had to resolve whatever problems arose.

8. Since this officer and [name not declassified] had been planning re control of the Mexican exile group, this officer repeatedly, through Mr. [name not declassified], asked for some sort of decision so that action could be taken. Such a decision has never been transmitted to Mr. [name not declassified] or this officer.

9. This attitude of [name not declassified] toward [name not declassified] was one of, I am going to run this show my way and if it happens to coincide with that of [name not declassified], fine, if it doesn't then . . . I'm running the show and we'll control RUFUS and [name not declassified]. He also felt that [name not declassified] planning was dream material and too general. This officer felt and still feels that [name not declassified] knows what the people of Guatemala will accept in the way of propaganda and what they won't. [name not declassified] is also smart enough to know that propaganda is going to have to be played by ear—to a large extent—during and after the PBSUCCESS Operation—thus has avoided too specific planning, but has evidenced every desire to cooperate with our wishes and has shown nothing but the completest ideological accord. In addition, every present PW mechanism (CEUA, CEUAGE,<sup>2</sup> FAGE and their

---

<sup>2</sup> The Embassies in Guatemala City and Tegucigalpa reported on the anti-Communist activities of the CEUA and its publication CEUAGE in despatch 516 from Guatemala City and 240 from Tegucigalpa, December 16 and 4, respectively. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 714.00/12-1653 and 714.00/12-453)

newspapers) was build by RUFUS and [name not declassified] (before [name not declassified] arrived) thus evidencing ability to produce smoothly without dictation. We should *aid* not *drive*.

10. [name not declassified] has never told WH/PW what support it should try to give him other than that [name not declassified] must approve everything going to any WH station re Guatemala.

---

**81. Memorandum for the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 6, 1954.

SUBJECT

PBSUCCESS

1. On the afternoon of 27 November 1953 Mr. [name not declassified] and Mr. [name not declassified] of WHD stated to me that they expected to travel to [place not declassified], on the following Monday to confer with [name not declassified] in connection with Project PBSUCCESS, but were seriously confused and concerned regarding their orders for the interview. Mr. [name not declassified] stated that, although definite commitments had been made to [name not declassified] regarding financial support due on 1 December for operations already initiated in Guatemala, Mr. [name not declassified] had told him that no funds were to be provided until he had so decided at an undetermined future date, possibly 1 January. Mr. [name not declassified], on the other hand, stated that he had been instructed that funds would be forthcoming in increments as required for specific operational use. [name not declassified] had rechecked with [name not declassified] and was told that his orders held.

2. In order to avoid confusion as well as a possible breach of faith with [name not declassified] the matter was referred to Col. J.C. King, who decided to discuss the question with [3 names not declassified] and the undersigned. The meeting was held in Mr. [name not declassified] office. Although [name not declassified] appeared reluctant to discuss the problem he eventually agreed to honor the commitments made to [name not declassified].

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 4. Secret; Eyes Only. There is no indication on the memorandum of a drafting or originating officer.



3. Following the meeting, after Col. King, [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] had departed, [name not declassified] stated to me that he wished to make several points very plain: first, that he strongly resented Col. King's having attended the meeting or having been brought into the discussion; second, that he had no intention of being "pushed into a corner" or confronted with a "power play" involving operational matters which were exclusively subject to his, [name not declassified], jurisdiction.

---

82. **Dispatch From the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala (Givloch) to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)<sup>1</sup>**

HGG-A-634

Guatemala City, January 11, 1954.

SUBJECT

General—PBSUCCESS

Specific—Stephen R. Lugton

1. In accordance with instructions received from Lugton, material received from him for forwarding is being placed in envelopes marked "To Lincoln, for Jerome C. Dunbar only" and included in Station Guatemala pouches for Washington. As per his request, only one copy of such material has been made and therefore station files will contain no record of information submitted by him. This station will therefore not be held responsible for being knowledgeable of information submitted by him.

2. It is assumed that the policy of handling his material and the principle expressed is in accord with the wishes of Lincoln and Headquarters. If not, this station would appreciate being advised.

**Kenneth S. Givloch**

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 98, Folder 7. Secret; RYBAT. Sent for information to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida (LINCOLN).

83. **Memorandum by the Counselor of the Embassy in Guatemala (Krieg)<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, January 14, 1954.

SUBJECT

Views of Colonel Elfego Monzon on Current Political Situation

The same American citizen who recently reported to Mr. Wardlaw<sup>2</sup> that Colonel Elfego Monzon, Minister without Portfolio, had told a group near Brito, Department of Escuintla, that the time was not ripe for a move against the Government, called at my office today and said that his friend, who is also a close friend of Monzon, had had a three-hour talk with him and obtained the impression that Monzon thought conditions had to become worse here before the Army would act against the Arbenz Government and that if a revolt were attempted by opposition elements, the Government would bring thousands of Indians into Guatemala City and that a massacre of white and middle class elements would result.

According to the friend, he approached Colonel Monzon with an officer of substantial financial backing if Colonel Monzon would lead a movement against the Government. Monzon had replied by reiterating that the time was not ripe but that he believed that in four or five months if things continued their present course, the leaders of the Army would go to Arbenz and tell him he was "out." The friend had pressed Monzon for his view on what combination of circumstances would cause the Army officers to act, and Colonel Monzon had replied, "Let us hope that there is a strong economic pressure on Guatemala." Monzon had repeatedly emphasized that the Army was anti-Communist and that it was deeply concerned over the growth of Communist power.

In the course of the conversation Colonel Monzon had said he understood that Guatemalan exiles and others were planning a revolt and that he feared it would result in a tremendous amount of bloodshed. He had referred in this connection to the fact that during the revolt which followed the assassination of Colonel Arana in 1949, President Arevalo had started to have thousands of Indians from the Patzun-Patzicia area brought into the City; that Monzon, who was directing the Government forces, had been able to stop this attempt, but that he believed the Government would, if faced with a serious situation, resort to the same device with possibly disastrous results which would leave a scar on the Guatemalan body politic for years to come.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 65, Folder 5. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> First Secretary of the Embassy.

My informant's friend was impressed by the circumstance that up to a year ago Colonel Monzon had been a stout defender of the Arbenz administration. Now he received the impression that Monzon would do nothing to save the Government should it be threatened.

The informant went on to say that he had begun to reconsider his earlier opposition to some sort of U.S. embargo on Guatemalan coffee in the light of Colonel Monzon's remark about economic pressure. As he did not think an Act of Congress or a voluntary agreement among coffee importers feasible, he suggested that "red worms" (gusanos rojos) might be found in Guatemalan coffee by the sanitary inspectors. In reply to questions he said title to coffee passes to the U.S. purchaser when coffee is delivered at a railroad station in Guatemala and that the export tax (\$8.00 per sack) became due when the coffee passed through the Guatemalan port. Hence the initial impact of finding gusanos in the coffee would fall on the U.S. purchaser rather than on the grower or the Guatemalan Government. Eventually, of course, such measures would discourage importers from buying Guatemalan coffee. If some way could be found to stop buying Guatemalan Government coffee, this would be even more effective, but neither of us could think of a practical way of doing this.

---

#### 84. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 23, 1954.

##### SUBJECT

General Concept of Discussions With [name not declassified] Preparing Him for Forthcoming Calligeris Meeting

I. This memo is prepared for approval C/P PBSUCCESS prior to subject conference, as being the general basis of planning now being conducted within the project in the KUHOOK field. It is slanted toward setting [name not declassified] in an advantageous position insofar as his forthcoming meeting with Calligeris is concerned and will be followed up in [name not declassified]—Calligeris meeting and Calligeris—Seekford—Cadick discussions to follow.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 5. No classification marking.

*II. Factors Determining the Considered Plan of Action:*

A. Former Calligeris planning has been considered carefully, and with the following exceptions the main context of PBSUCCESS thinking adheres as nearly as possible to Calligeris' prior concept:

1. It is considered that extreme care must be taken to avoid putting all our assets into any situation, the compromise of which would seriously deplete the forces of the movement. For that reason an attempt is being made to make the entry of outside forces nearer to an infiltration type entry than that of regular forces grouped along main communication routes. Compartmentation of units is sought, also.

2. For the same reason, the approach to Puerto Barrios is being considered land-approach to prevent the obvious containment and easy destruction of Calligeris forces in the event recent notification of "leaks" to the opposition are more complete than realized (an entirely possible situation).

3. With a realization that to allow this movement to become a prolonged civil war would present *major* complications in addition to allowing opposition to strengthen its tactical situation while ours bogged down, it is considered that *each* possible strongpoint of the opposition should be accounted for simultaneously rather than piecemeal.

4. Utility of bombing tactics to neutralize any strongpoint has been eliminated, even as a psychological factor, in view of the fact that the very concept of the movement is that of *release* of persons from oppression and all actions must allow this discontented element to participate in the overthrow of oppression or at least aid by sympathy. Our tactics must veer away from terrorism of this faction and veer towards inviting participation.

5. Techniques of partisan warfare will be applied in the tested and proven manner to best support more conventional military tactics. This technique of combining the two types of tactics has proven itself in reducing the number of personnel and the magnitude of support necessary to overwhelm superior forces many times in history.

6. Techniques in logistics are being applied to eliminate the massive logistical problem and its limitations to mobility and actions of normal military tactics.

7. Communications has been brought to a maximum of dependability.

8. Utilization of *all* potential personnel, some of which though now unknown, will through organization become "the thousand bee-stings which kill the tiger" which Mao Tse Tung so successfully utilized to overthrow superior forces.

B. Realization that there can be no failure, both from [*name not declassified*]-Calligeris' standpoint and ours, and that aside from known opposition tactics and precautionary measures the third factor of being up against trained Communist tacticians in the field of security, stay-behind, subversion, intrigue, etc., all of us involved must *overplan, over-prepare*, and be prepared to "drive the tack with the sledge-hammer" in the event the tack turns out to be a railroad spike.

## II. [*sic*] Framework of General Planning:

A. The key targets under consideration, those felt necessarily to be controlled to completely insure total success are:

Guatemala garrisons, air facilities, commo, (Guatemala City)  
 Puerto Barrios port, air facilities, commo, and garrison  
 Jutiapa garrison, commo, and air facilities  
 Zacapa garrison, commo, and air facilities  
 Mazatenango, Quezaltenango and Quiche garrisons, commo and air facilities  
 Coban air facilities, commo and garrison  
 San Jose garrison and port facilities and commo

B. The ideal would be simultaneous containment and seizure of control of each key target using known and physically directed shock troops with supporting partisans in each instance.

C. In all actuality, once the entire assets of Calligeris are brought to the surface and evaluated and assigned missions, the approach to each target will be different but will follow one of the following patterns:

1. Strike the feasible targets with shock troops and inner organization, while having pre-developed the others to a point of self-seizure and eventual pre-planned assembly with shock troops and resulting recruits from other targets.

2. Strike the feasible targets as above, and develop the feasible targets to a point of self-seizure, and *block* the remaining targets through spotting of saboteur teams along routes of egress from the remaining targets, and through organization of *block* areas in which small equipped and directed units harass and retard any desired military movement until effective consolidation can be attained at our strong points.

3. In all eventualities target sab teams at commo at each target, existing military air facilities, and at any possible transportation tie-up situation. In all eventualities utilize all partisan units possible to be formed at any point in Guatemala where a single Calligeris man can be located.

## III. Existing Basis of Planning:

A. The key to the country's survival is Guatemala City. The lifeline (so long as Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico remain reluctant to support the present Guatemalan regime) is the port at Puerto Barrios.

Jutiapa, Zacapa, and Coban should be controlled before penetration beyond them to prevent reorganization behind our movement and eventual entrapment. San Jose should be controlled as a possible substitute for Puerto Barrios, an encirclement of Guatemala City, and as a port of entry for our movement in eventual employment of prolonged hostilities. Mazatenango, Quezaltenango, and Quiche pose distance and logistical problems plus a personnel drain, plus remoteness which calls for possibilities of the *block* manner of containment, that causes us to search for self-seizure and *block* procedures which will control the situation until consolidation of other gains is completed.

C. [*sic*] Roughly, pending receipt of intelligence expected as a result of Cadick-Seekford-Calligeris meetings (it should be brought out constantly that all planning at this stage is based on rumor and that total KUHOOK known assets, the reliability of which is unknown, consists of eleven trainees for KUHOOK plus four trainees for KUCLUB) it is felt that inner organization of the Guatemala complex will be the main source for immediate, physical seizure of control. It is estimated that sufficient shock troops could not be assembled outside the country to accomplish the job. If discussion with Calligeris proves that the inner assets in the Guatemala City area are sufficient to attempt (with high percentage of success chance) striking at Guatemala City instantaneously and in concurrence with seizure of Puerto Barrios, Zacapa, Jutiapa and San Jose, the major portion of available forces will be directed at Guatemala City, utilizing the organization of inner assets and surrounding areas at the other sites to obtain control (control here means *physical* control, without assurance of which, Guatemala City should be put on a secondary basis chronologically speaking and men released in our planning to insure this physical control).

D. Preliminary reports on our assets plus distance and element-of-surprise factors may well dictate a course which calls for setting up Guatemala City inner organization to the point where if a move is made by the Guatemala Central Command to move a partial force toward Zacapa, Jutiapa, Puerto Barrios, or Coban or San Jose, the inner organization would make its bid while partisan organization around Guatemala City retarded, harassed and generally set up the partial force for annihilation by the Zacapa, Jutiapa, Puerto Barrios, Coban, and San Jose forces. The idea of being capable of taking over if Guatemala City forces are depleted can be promoted to the point where the Guatemala City Command will be detained, at least partially. Sab action against air facilities and commo will be executed simultaneous with D-day, with possible K-team action at the same time against key figures. All other assets within the inner organization would remain covert, their plan calling for action on depletion of Central Command forces designed to take control or recall the committed troops, or for action once Calligeris'

Zacapa, Jutiapa, Coban, and Puerto Barrios and San Jose forces were consolidated.

E. It is contemplated that the terrain and distance situation along with professed Calligeris assets and reported opposition OB, would allow shock troops to be applied against Jutiapa, Zacapa, and Puerto Barrios. These shock troops would travel in small compact units utilizing back trails and prohibitive terrain to maintain non-detection insomuch as possible, and relying on mobility and concealment to disguise location if detection unavoidable. On D-Day these three forces would be in respective positions, the exact nature of which to be determined following more extensive terrain and intelligence studies. Present figures available, unevaluated, report the following situation, personnel-wise, some of which will be cleared up following a discussion with Calligeris:

Zacapa . . . opposition consists of 6 officers, 94 enlisted Guardia; 38 officers, 601 enlisted Military  
 111 Calligeris assets—200 within Zacapa (no indication Military status), 500 various localities approx  
 Jutiapa . . . opposition consists of 14 officers, 199 enlisted Guardia  
 Calligeris assets—300 within Jutiapa; 300 various localities approx  
 Puerto Barrios opposition—28 Officers, 283 enlisted Military  
 Calligeris assets—450 overall vicinity  
 Coban . . . Opposition (not extracting Calligeris assets reportedly strong) 4 Officers, 64 enlisted Guardia; 23 Officers, 295 men Military  
 Calligeris assets—2000 reported combination Military and surrounding populace  
 San Jose . . . Opposition—2 Officers, 28 enlisted Guardia; 15 Officers, 208 enlisted Mil.  
 Calligeris assets—2000 (reported by Seekford in preliminary discussions)

F. While the above does not in any way constitute a reliable estimate of the situation it does give us a basis for planning and confirmation or rejection of portions of the knowledge should be possible following the forthcoming meetings. Tentatively, the basis of thinking allows for Zacapa shock troops to seize control and move out to approx 14°53' long 90° lat. to form assembly with Coban forces moving down parallel to the Coban-Salama-Morazan highway. It is tentatively planned to seize control of Coban through reported Calligeris' assets within the Garrison and augment that force with pledged populace (reported) moving through Salama on the journey to the assembly. On assembly, and in line with the existing situation a movement towards Guatemala by this force could be commenced.

Jutiapa seizure would be affected in the same manner from a compartmented staging base just across the Salvador border. Upon completion of this seizure it would turn parallel to the main highway to a point

some five miles east of Laguna de Amatitlan to join with forces from San Jose and turn towards Guatemala City. The seizure of San Jose would be dependent on the facts learned from the coming Calligeris meeting as to the true identity of the 2,000 reported personnel in the area.

G. Due to distance, logistical problems and need to utilize personnel at the foregoing projects the ideal will be to organize Mazatenango, Quezaltenango and Quiche to the point of self-seizure. A study of personnel of those garrisons may disclose gimmicks with which we can force key military figures to employ a Latin-type retardation, insuring that these forces do not enter into the tactical picture in time to alter it. The probable situation will be a series of retardation events set up by organization of the area between these three sites and Guatemala City designed to delay reinforcement from these three sites until consolidation of the other targets as completed.

H. Contingency plans should account for 1. employment of Guatemala forces to the aid of our initial targets (which contingency has been generally considered in the above paragraphs). 2. Retirement of Guatemalan forces to Quezaltenango as has been reported to be the Guatemalan plan. In this latter event it is now being considered most feasible to complete the capitulation of Guatemala City set up against returned activities from the Quezaltenango area and complete solid reorganization before turning to the Quezaltenango problem. After solid organization it would be considered within our capabilities to take the forces at Quezaltenango by straight attack. 3. Another contingency would be for Guatemala City to prepare for a state of siege in which case reorganization following seizure of the initial targets could be carried out while insuring isolation of Guatemala City from re-supply or reinforcement.

#### *IV. Communication:*

A. Communications men now commencing training will produce two types of radio operators. One type is to be called resident R/Os and will be placed in the vicinity of target sites, as yet unselected points, for the purpose of reporting last minute changes in OB. Once the tactical situation opens up, we will revert to tactical R/Os who have previously been married to specific shock troop units. Until the tactical situation opens up Commo will be processed through outside (LINC). It is expected agent-to-Calligeris service will be a 6-hour process. Once the tactical situation opens up arrangements have been made for unit-to-Calligeris-to-unit-info LINC service. The messages will be sent in code due to the dependability of the RS-1 set to be used on this operation. Resident R/Os will have their radios delivered to them once they are in



position. Tactical R/Os are expected to be paired and will carry RS-1s in packs.

*V. Logistics:*

A. The logistical support has been broken down into three categories: 1. Weather-proofed kits of approximately 50 lbs. weight, the contents of which are grouped to service partisans, saboteurs and R/Os. Approximately 12 March the total of these kits will arrive by plane at fields near the staging areas for distribution as needed. The sum total of equipment to be packaged is outlined.

---

**85. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], January 25, 1954, 0543Z.

225. Ref: LINC 159; GUAT 015; DIR 222.<sup>2</sup> From Mylkes. [*name not declassified*] advised report [*name not declassified*] arrested on charges illegal possession arms. [*name not declassified*] extremely worried since [*name not declassified*] is principal link between Calligeris and WSBURNT Army officers who support his group. [*name not declassified*] according [*name not declassified*] has considerable information re personalities, plans, and organization Call-[*name not declassified*] Group, and from personal experience considers [*name not declassified*] will be tortured and confession his knowledge entirely possible.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 75, Folder 7. Secret; Routine; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to Guatemala.

<sup>2</sup> GUAT 15, January 24, is *ibid.*, Box 10, Folder 3; LINC 159 and DIR 222 were not found.

**86. Memorandum From the First Secretary of the Embassy in Guatemala (Wardlaw) to the Counselor of the Embassy in Guatemala (Krieg)<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, January 26, 1954.

A finquero who has on previous occasions supplied me certain information recently told me that he had learned from the Czech Kubes who is a next-door neighbor of Colonel Elfego Monzon that the Colonel seems to be prepared psychologically for joining the opposition. Colonel Monzon reportedly stated that he had 300 officers on his side, but my informant did not know whether this meant they were merely well disposed towards Monzon or actually had come to some sort of understanding with him. Colonel Monzon is quoted as having stated that it would be too bad to have the uprising occur just at this time when things were not quite ready.

A few days ago Colonel Monzon was shocked to learn that the Guardia Civil had recently received 500 sub-machine guns from Belgium and he was particularly annoyed that despite his position in the Guatemalan Army this delivery had been effected without his having been informed. He arranged to inspect one of these guns and reported it to be a very fine weapon. The guns fire clips of 30 cartridges. He is reported to have said that the delivery of these guns to the police was an affront to the Army.

My informant was of the opinion that the police are now better equipped for fighting inside the city than is the Army. Supporting his view that the Army's weapons are in a very poor state, he remarked that an individual by the name of Julio Gaitan, whom he knows slightly, told him that he had recently visited the barracks at Guardia de Honor where he observed 150 soldiers working away at rifle cartridges with files. He asked an officer what the soldiers were doing and was informed that they were filing down Czech cartridges which did not quite fit the 7 mm. rifles used by the Guatemalan Army. My informant took this as evidence that the Guatemalan Army is suffering a desperate shortage of ammunition.

My informant also reported that it is said by many people in Guatemala that the opposition has a large store of arms in Ahuachapan, El Salvador, which is not far from the Guatemalan border. He had no further information on this.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 98, Folder 8. Secret. This memorandum is marked as a copy and is the first enclosure to a memorandum from the Chief of Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida, February 1.

I am convinced of the reliability of my informant but I have no opinion about the reliability of Kubes or Gaitan.

---

**87. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to  
PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 27, 1954, 2137Z.

35910. Ref: DIR 21969.<sup>2</sup> For purposes PBSUCCESS program and to help support ODYROKE position forthcoming OAS Conference Caracas, urge all stations your jurisdiction give top priority obtention solid evidence of Guatemalan support of subversion or interventionist activities neighboring countries as requested ref.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 2. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Folder 1)

---

**88. Contact Report<sup>1</sup>**

No. 16 [place not declassified], January 29-30, 1954.

PLACE: Safe House B, LINCOLN

PERSONS PRESENT: RUFUS, [name not declassified], Mylkes

*Discussion:*

1. Following concerns only matters taken up after Galbond's departure. Mylkes began discussion of PP organization as it pertained to LINC and to various organizations in the field. A general picture was developed as to how the PP program fitted into the overall picture and how important it was. At Galbond's advice, particular stress was laid

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 10. Secret; RYBAT. Drafted on January 31 by Francis T. Mylkes, a pseudonym [text not declassified].

on how the military could be defected or neutralized. The current installations and future capabilities were discussed. Personnel to perform work at LINC were discussed and letters have been prepared by [name not declassified] and introduction to RUFUS to our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] case officer has been arranged. Matter of financial control brought up difficulties. Neither is in favor of having funds come from [name not declassified]. Previously [name not declassified] was in agreement with this arrangement. Their idea was that they could not justify funds coming from the U.S. I pointed out that our case officers would indicate that they were coming direct from [name not declassified] or RUFUS. No decision was reached.

2. Before any further items of PP, or any of FI and/or PM matters could be discussed, the White Paper hit the press.<sup>2</sup> After Mylkes was furnished with known facts (GUAT 046),<sup>3</sup> he was directed to check with RUFUS as to whom the possible source of this info was. LINC 3214 gave briefly that info which was gathered from RUFUS. His attitude toward Mylkes' insistence for facts to back up statements which indicated info leak would be Somozas or Pablo or acceptance of fact that it could be his men Delgado or Capt. Sierra was one of indignation.

3. This conversation (para 2) brought up subject of security. Mylkes indicated that he was personally certain that the group would want to study all of the security considerations before continuing as scheduled. He advised that on two previous efforts the RUFUS-[name not declassified] group had been compromised at last moment, causing long delay and costly re-financing. For this reason Mylkes stated that it was his *Personal* opinion that RUFUS be prepared to either explain the fact with the info that his group had been penetrated on a high level from the beginning and/or current method of security and FI practices were not adequate. RUFUS defended his position strongly by saying that his men should not be judged too severely and that he, personally, was responsible since he could not establish such a system of checks and investigations with his sensitive Latin assistants.

4. Later the same day (30 Jan.), Mylkes returned to the house and the matter of security was again brought up. At this point RUFUS, without any prompting, advised that he had learned now that Delgado had betrayed him and that he was willing to accept the ideas of the group re: security and FI Ops. Mylkes pointed out that although RUFUS would lose some authority and responsibility he would receive the benefits of better

---

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 89.

<sup>3</sup> Dated January 29. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 10, Folder 3)

<sup>4</sup> Document 93.

intelligence and security. He agreed and said that immediately upon his return he would issue a general order which would necessitate compliance with all measures deemed necessary by our FI officer. He said that all of those sensitive people would have to accept a general law which arose as a result of this Delgado betrayal or be removed to less sensitive jobs out of his general Headquarters. RUFUS agreed that all elements of his organization would be advised to adhere strictly to all new security regulations as suggested by our FI rep and issued by RUFUS' command.

*Comment:*

Let's get our fee while the tears are hot. Remains to be seen to what degree RUFUS will comply with these promises once he is in the field and is in full possession of our aid and equipment.

**Mylkes**

---

**89. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Stations in Guatemala and [place not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], January 30, 1954, 0907Z.

296. Re: LINC 276.<sup>2</sup>

1. Following is KUGOWN guidance for immediate use amplifying ref in connection with WSBURNT govt White Paper.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 3. Secret; Routine; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT. Sent for information to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Dated January 28. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> According to a January 30 *New York Times* article found in Central Intelligence Agency files, the Guatemalan Government charged in a "White Paper" that it had learned of a heavily-financed plot involving Nicaraguan President Somoza plus the Governments of El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela to overthrow the Arbenz regime. "In an apparent allusion to the United States, Guatemala listed the 'Government of the North' among those it accused of endorsing the plot. The Government charged further that the United Fruit Company, a United States-owned concern with large banana plantation holdings in Guatemala, had supplied arms to the plotters." According to the article, the claims were backed by "photostatic copies of correspondence," although the Department of State refused to "dignify" the charges. A spokesman said "that the charges were 'in line with the usual Communist charges against the United States.'" (Ibid., Job 79-01025A, Box 82, Folder 2) The text of the Department of State press release on January 30 is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 15, 1954, pp. 251-252.

2. Ridicule:

A. Link White Paper to WSBURNT October fair fiasco. Now we have January Fair. October, bulls didn't show up. Where is the January bull, this American colonel? He hasn't shown up either. That makes it easy for the govt toreadors. In October, tickets were all fouled up. Could it be the same with photo-stated "tickets" attached to White Paper? Anyway, always some excitement in WSBURNT.

B. WSBURNT people being victimized by too much propaganda. Plot exposé too stereotyped, with familiar U.S. United Fruit Co., Nicaraguan scapegoats. WSBURNT govt cries wolf too often.<sup>4</sup>

C. Paper just sign same fear, panic in WSBURNT govt and Red ranks that led to recent arrests.

3. De-emphasis:

A. Attempt obtain bigger play for recent stories of WSBURNT refugees than for paper.

B. Paper must be read in light recent WSBURNT razzle dazzle preceding OAS. New Foreign Minister named; PRG party suggests hauling Arevalo out of ashcan to make dramatic stand of OAS; *Pravda* lends big hand; Toledano drums up followers against "intervention" from hemisphere Reds; WSBURNT makes arrests. Whole orchestra playing and now White Paper supposed to be cymbal crash. Only, cymbal is cracked.

C. If possible, fabricate big human interest story, like flying saucers, birth sextuplets in remote area to take play away.

D. WSBURNT in last minute tried withdraw paper, but it already in press hands.

4. Diversionary:

A. Paper attempts intimidate neighboring countries so WSBURNT can more easily take pressure off recent repressive measures.

B. Paper covers up for domestic terror in WSBURNT. What kind of justice first arrests and exiles innocent people, then publishes charges? What do charges mean since people released? Plans for Red coup.

C. Paper is cover up for aggressive plans. WSBURNT training new Caribbean legion. Leaders Miguel Angel Ramirez, Jorge Rivas Montes.

---

<sup>4</sup> Dispatch No. [telegram indicator not declassified] 429–29 to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida, February 9, reported: "Prevailing popular WSBURNT view is that John H. Calligeris, himself, furnished the WSBURNT Government data for the white paper . . . Calligeris has since that time [i.e., the time of his escape in 1951] not been too greatly trusted nor held in high regard by the opposition to the present WSBURNT regime." Ydígoras Fuentes agreed, and explained, "he did not trust Calligeris and it could well be true. Ydígoras further stated to Source he often wondered precisely how Calligeris escaped since he had never been able to ascertain from whom the assistance came." (Ibid., Box 55, Folder 2)

Made heavy arms purchases recent months, financed by Soviets. Now secret Soviet military mission headed by unidentified Soviet partisan warfare expert, in WSBURNT. Is WSBURNT plotting invasion Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, seizure Panama Canal for Soviets? 300 man 5th column already hiding in Salvador. Guat Commies taking over bldgs on Salvador border.

D. Banking circles Berne, Switzerland refute Arbenz denials of forthcoming Soviet loan of 20 million Swiss francs. Swiss and Iron Curtain suppliers already approached to furnish flamethrowers, napalm and other aggressive weapons. To be financed from loan.

E. Big split in WSBURNT army and govt over present course. Arbenz letting army friends down, listening to Pelleger. Pelleger overextending himself.

F. Soviet sub sighted landing arms on WSBURNT Pacific coast. Get WSBURNT spokesman to deny report, or claim denial.

#### 5. Positive Stand:

A. Talk of plot from outside nonsense. Real opposition inside WSBURNT. Some leaders in entourages Arbenz, Fortuny.

B. Govt panic augurs well for future. If govt so panicked by false evidence, wait till it meets real forces of opposition. Paper attempts avert this inevitable development. Futile attempt to get people to oppose inevitable.

C. Paper is fabrication, but one thing true: anti-communism in WSBURNT strong and growing. Will be real plots until defeat of present govt. Resistance thrives on repression, as did Christianity.

6. Foregoing may or may not be related to fact but is pertinent to situation.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 349 from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the DCI, February 3, reported that the details of the operation had been compromised: "Enemy attacked with 7-page 'White Paper' exposing numerous operational details of PBSUCCESS, including Seekford, Calligeris documentation, Calligeris-KMFLUSH relations, location KUHOOK and KUCLUB TNG sites, old Calligeris military plans etc. Enemy also neutralized and partly rolled up Calligeris military intelligence net controlled by SECANT." (Ibid., Box 1, Folder 4)

**90. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 30, 1954, 1931Z.

36511. 1. Persons with ultimate KUBARK authority have agreed that decision re future of PBSUCCESS will be made on Monday 1 February 1954. Between now and Monday forward all available information in detail re status of operation regardless of how unimportant it may seem. Include with information the following:

- A. Exact location SCRANTON and SARAMAC.
- B. Details of current cover situation Seekford, Lugton, Merton, and Middlecott.
- C. Estimate of extent of compromise and disclosure of KUBARK interest from Delgado's intercepts while acting as courier.
- D. Any other information of value not covered in A, B, and C.

2. Urge that Calligeris write up an appreciation of the situation to include the extent and details that may be in hands of the Arbenz forces.

3. Recall Iden A to LINC immediately. Imperative he not travel through WSBURNT or even chance flying over country. He should proceed direct from KMFLUSH to Iden B and thence directly to LINCOLN. No exception may be taken to that pattern of travel.

4. Consider seriously the advisability of withdrawing Iden C from WSBURNT if his position appears to be in any danger of compromise.

5. Telecon 30 January 1954 will serve no purpose. Decisions cannot be made. Will advise you 1 February 1954 as to future actions.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 2. Secret; Operational Immediate; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by J.D. Esterline.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 94.



91. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

[*place not declassified*], January 30, 1954, 1023Z.

297. 1. Following views are presented for HQS consideration:

A. White Paper<sup>2</sup> has effectively exposed certain aspects of PBSUCCESS, probably more to come. Stage One report clearly recognized this possibility (cover page and page 2). Stage Two was implemented to explore and probe potential assets, testing while developing.<sup>3</sup>

2. Aside from KUHOOK camps and limited KUFIRE progress, other operations not even implemented to date. Assessment thus far has been favorable to good.<sup>4</sup> Losses sustained by arrests and exposé not believed irreparable providing no lessening in determination develops.

C. Believe remaining assets will deteriorate rapidly if any doubts or evidence of abandonment permitted, thus effectively destroying what appears to be only known substance to resistance.<sup>5</sup> Our pressure, once applied, should not be released but intensified. Nothing is more demoralizing than on-again, off-again.

2. Current situation however requires careful consideration. The enemy has played a strong card which we must be prepared to counter and exploit or withdraw.

3. Exploitable factors:

A. By admitting a plot of sufficient gravity to demand a white paper, the enemy has actually given to the anti-Communist forces a stature and publicity they have never before had.

B. The enemy has confessed to a deep division within the country, thus sharpening the issue in everyone's mind.<sup>6</sup>

C. The enemy has publicized outside aid to the opposition, thus raising the opposition's hope.

4. Counter-action:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> Handwritten marginal note: "[illegible]—'White paper' only thing to be carded."

<sup>3</sup> Handwritten marginal note: "quite agree." The Stage One report is Document 62.

<sup>4</sup> Handwritten marginal note: "Question fair to good aspect of assessment."

<sup>5</sup> Handwritten marginal note: "fluff."

<sup>6</sup> Handwritten marginal note: "??"

A. Have Calligeris make radio reply confirming his intention to devote himself to the freedom of his people, thus converting him to a public stand on issues and overt status.

B. Endeavor obtain similar statement from Somoza. Of course he is anti-Communist and all refugees from tyranny are welcomed and assisted in his country. His is a free country, unlike WSBURNT.

C. Once Calligeris in overt status, PBSUCCESS would continue build-up, utilizing most covert/ clandestine procedures possible.<sup>7</sup>

D. ODYOKE officials could evidence attitude that history repeats itself in WSBURNT. Oppressed people are struggling for freedom midst wild Communist charges. This will go on as elsewhere until liberty is restored.

E. Other anti-Communist countries in Caribbean area should be encouraged to support Somoza stand.

F. Establish committee for freedom of WSBURNT overtly to counteract Communist blasts and to provide courage to resist, faith and hope. (Present time, enemy has both initiative and advantage.)

5. Steps in furtherance of para 4 above:

A. LINCOLN has requested Calligeris and [*name not declassified*] to prepare radio address for Calligeris. Being [*Bring*] cable for HQS approval.

B. LINCOLN ready prepare suggested Somoza stand for transmittal via Calligeris after HQS approval.

C. LINCOLN would proceed securely, using full clandestine techniques,<sup>8</sup> insisting upon controls throughout. No departure from present plans.<sup>9</sup>

D. This is HQS action and in keeping present ODYOKE stand from which retirement would be difficult.

E. HQS action with LINC through Calligeris / [*name not declassified*].

F. LINCOLN would submit proposal to HQS for approval before implementation.

6. Advise soonest. Meanwhile Calligeris and Seekford being kept separated and in safe lodging for cooling off period or re-direction.

---

<sup>7</sup> Handwritten marginal note: "?"

<sup>8</sup> Handwritten marginal note: "Do they have that capability."

<sup>9</sup> Handwritten marginal note: "good if poss."

92. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], January 31, 1954, 0357Z.

311. Re: DIR 36511.<sup>2</sup>

1. In full discussion with Mylkes re possible sources White Paper info, Calligeris named in order: Somoza, Somoza's son, Delgado, Captain Raul Sierra, and Seekford. He devoted considerable time to speculation that Somozas could be witting or unwitting sources, but could give no motives for such action on their part. When directly questioned why he had named Seekford, C replied Somoza Jr. had once told him Seekford security risk. C then added he himself had fullest confidence in Seekford. C extremely reluctant to consider Delgado or Sierra as sources, despite his own admission that both knew virtually all his plans, including most sensitive items of White Paper.

2. Calligeris obliquely declined to divulge Sierra's true name to Mylkes. (Note Sierra action re KUCLUB TNG site reported SCRANTON 002 (IN 14032). Note also Seekford request POC on Sierra in alias per [*telegram indicator not declassified*] 0858.

3. Calligeris indicated to Mylkes his dislike of Lugton's requests for bio data on personnel in his intelligence nets.

4. When Mylkes pointed out that Delgado and Sierra were also on staff for two previous attempts which were compromised at crucial junctures, Calligeris failed to respond directly. He replied that group must also consider both Somozas and Seekford as definitely possible sources of White Paper.

5. Above would perhaps not ordinarily raise doubts Calligeris loyalty or motivation and might be interpreted as pride or reticence. However, in present situation, fullest objectivity, candor and straight talk are required of all concerned. Above Calligeris replies either fail to meet such standards or suggest inability of Calligeris to face situation realistically.

6. In addition, there are the objective considerations that:

A. Calligeris himself has not been engaged in three compromised attempts.

B. KUBARK has invested heavily, financially and otherwise, in Calligeris.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 4. Secret; Operational Immediate; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT.

<sup>2</sup> Document 90.

C. KUBARK needs fullest information on events leading to present situation.

7. In the light of all the foregoing, LINCOLN considers it imperative that HQS give most serious consideration to LCFLUTTER for Calligeris and [name not declassified] soonest. LINCOLN believes it virtually unfeasible to take the basic decisions scheduled for 1 Feb 54 without the evidence obtainable though LCFLUTTER on the integrity of [name not declassified] and Calligeris.

8. LINCOLN is well aware of significance of LCFLUTTER at this point. [name not declassified] and Calligeris may refuse, thus terminating their participation in operation, since to keep them on after such refusal would eliminate any chance of control. LINCOLN considers this risk much less weighty than the danger of making KUBARK decisions on less than maximum available evidence.

9. In order minimize possibility affronting [name not declassified] and Calligeris pride, LINCOLN recommends following approach:

A. Discuss with [name not declassified] first, as individual less involved operational details.

B. Explain to [name not declassified] need to apply every precaution prior to new start, precautions beginning at top.

C. Explain to [name not declassified] that many PBPRIME commercial firms use LCFLUTTER.

D. Explain to [name not declassified] LCFLUTTER had been used on all key American personnel and it therefore consistent for him and Calligeris to do so.

E. If [name not declassified] persuaded, have him persuade Calligeris.

10. If LCFLUTTER approved, Mylkes will attempt obtain acquiescence [name not declassified] and Calligeris.

11. Recommend LCFLUTTER team be dispatched LINCOLN immediately. Operator should be most competent, and, if possible, speak Spanish. Upon receipt ETA, LINCOLN will provide contact instructions.

12. FYI: Although request in early December, no security clearances have been received on either [initial not declassified] or C to date.

93. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], January 31, 1954, 1928Z.

321. Re: DIR 36511, para 1C; GUAT 022, 043, 046.<sup>2</sup>

1. KUFIRE estimates compromise from Delgado's intercepts while acting as courier may be considerable judging from foll items which appeared in White Paper.

2. Delgado and others as indicated fully aware of foll items according to debriefing of Seekford and Calligeris:

A. Shipment of arms known by Delgado, Col Somoza, Pres Somoza and Capt Sierra.

B. Letter from Calligeris to Pres Somoza known by Delgado, Capt Sierra. Seekford did not have knowledge letter.

C. Calligeris' Nicaraguan passport in name of Carlos Centeno know by Delgado, Pres Somoza, Capt Sierra.

D. Calligeris military plan known by Delgado, Sierra, SECANT: Plan same as 1949, 1951 plan. Seekford claims this is not Calligeris' plan but is plan belonging to Ydigoras Fuentes. This plan probably given to WSBURNT police by SECANT as cover story per previous agreement with Calligeris.

E. KUHOOK TRG on [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], code name El Diablo; [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], code name Taptap; airfield near Puerto Cabezas known by Delgado, Pres Somoza, Col Somoza, Sierra, and Penny Rogers who flew Seekford in plane for recon of sites.

F. Seekford photo and passport known by many, surely known by Delgado, according to Calligeris.

G. Location of established ham, semi-clandestine radio stations, frequencies, call letters known by Delgado, Sierra, commo commission Honduras and a certain Fernando Conterras, according to Calligeris.

H. Archie Baldocchi allegedly offered "sea fire" planes \$20,000 each. Known only by Delgado. This info from both Calligeris and Seekford [(*telegram indicator not declassified*) 0852 (IN 45599)].

I. SEQUIN known by Delgado, SECANT, most of group in WSBURNT. Calligeris knows nothing of \$2,000 paid Ticas by Rubion.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 4. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> DIR 36511 is Document 90; telegrams 22, 43, and 46 are dated January 27, 30, and 29, respectively. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 10, Folder 3)

J. Calligeris knew nothing about 15 radio operators whom an identified Salvadoran requested Sinicaldi to obtain.

3. Other info that may be in hands Arbenz forces but has not yet appeared in press:

A. Black flight known by Delgado, Col Somoza, Pres Somoza, Sierra, people who unloaded plane and army personnel at airfield.

B. With SECANT's capture it very possible that through torture WSBURNT possesses info on military net directly under SECANT.

C. American group financially supporting movement known to most of Calligeris' immediate staff; undoubtedly known by Delgado.

D. Whereabouts of Calligeris can be easily ascertained by anyone checking airlines.

4. Because of GUAT 022, GUAT 043, Delgado's extensive knowledge of all that appeared in White Paper and oral report from Seekford that source in WSBURNT G-2 reported on 27 Jan that he had seen photostats of two documents carried by Delgado in WSBURNT G-2 office. LINCOLN must presently consider Delgado as double agent.

---

**94. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Stations in Guatemala and [2 places not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], February 2, 1954, 1845Z.

340. From Dunbar.

1. Desire to assure all concerned that recent exposé of alleged activities pertaining PBSUCCESS although unfortunate some respects fortunate in others. Further this incident has not affected PBSUCCESS objective any way aside from importance recognizing need for employment appropriate techniques throughout. Keynote must be positive thinking, determination, demonstration professionalism, balancing security with effectiveness, in order meet challenge which confronted.

2. I have just returned from HQS where above fully evidenced by all concerned. Ascham and Galbond particularly expressed confidence in ability all concerned to fulfill requirements PBSUCCESS.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 4. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and [*place not declassified*].

95. **Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Communications, Central Intelligence Agency (*name not declassified*) to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 9, 1954.

SUBJECT

Establishment of Radio Station to Handle Tactical Communications for PBSUCCESS

1. At such time as operation PBSUCCESS enters the para-military phase, or begins the utilization of agent type communications to service intelligence nets, there will be a requirement for a small semi-clandestine radio station to handle these communications.

2. There are two major reasons why KUBARK should establish and operate such a radio station rather than support a station to be handled by Calligeris. By controlling and operating the base radio station, KUBARK has control of PBSUCCESS tactical communications and thus maintains control over the operation itself. The second major reason is that the operation of such a semi-clandestine radio base is a specialized skill not available except through KUCLUB. There is not sufficient time available to train Calligeris' men to handle base station communications.

3. Technically the existing KUCLUB radio station in [*place not declassified*] could be utilized for this operation. However, communications originating in WSBURNT during the para-military phase and traceable as working into a U.S. Government radio station prohibits the use of this station.

4. The SHERWOOD installation and the base radio station could be combined into one installation thus making the most economical use of communications personnel available. The strong possibility that SHERWOOD could be compromised and lost before the para-military is entered into must be considered, thus making it unwise to combine the two installations.

5. Therefore, it is recommended that the Chief, WHD approve the establishment of the radio base station in KMFLUSH. The equipment necessary for the installation is not great and could be installed in an isolated safehouse anywhere in KMFLUSH, preferably north of the capitol city. The installation would be made by KUCLUB radio opera-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 77, Folder 2. Secret. The date of the memorandum most probably is February 4, 1954.

tors who would remain with the equipment until the station was activated.

6. The station could be operated on a limited basis handling PBSUCCESS communications with the Calligeris group without attracting any attention or being in any danger of location through DFing.

7. The station would become fully operational only for a few days during the para-military phase of the operation. At that time it would probably be necessary to assign two additional KUCLUB radio operators to handle the rapidly expanding communications. If desirable this station could also serve as an advanced operations base for the PBSUCCESS case officer during this phase.

8. At the completion of PBSUCCESS, the radio station would be deactivated at the earliest possible date, thus making the risks of operating the station relatively small.

9. If the establishment of the radio station is approved, implementation will proceed as follows:

a. Request Somoza approval for establishment, stressing that station to handle Calligeris tactical communications and that danger of disclosure through DFing, etc., negligible.

b. Obtain necessary site through Somoza.

c. Ship equipment KFLUSH next black flight.

d. Send two KUCLUB radio operators to KMFLUSH to set up station and to handle necessary communications until para-military phase.

e. Assign additional radio operators as necessary.

10. If at all possible, KUCLUB radio operators should be processed using passports under alias.

*[name not declassified]*



96. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], February 9, 1954, 1853Z.

451. Re: LINC 399.<sup>2</sup>

1. In accordance with ref, request ETA Givloch soonest.

2. Prior to trip, request Givloch confer with FMBLUG to obtain JMBLUG's personal views on following:

A. What political platform should an anti-Commie group, seeking to overthrow WSBURNT Govt, espouse? What should be announced position of such group on agrarian reform, foreign capital, role of army, labor unions, nationalism, etc.?

B. What political actions must an anti-Commie group, once it has seized power, carry out to remain in power? What should it actually do on the planks contained in its pre-coup platform?

3. Above is for LINCOLN guidance prior to shaping up [*name not declassified*]/Calligeris positive political program.

4. Dir FYI: Believe foregoing guidance helpful and easily obtainable but not to be construed as any effort to bypass ODACID.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 1, Folder 5. Secret; Priority; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Box 1001, Folder 4)

97. Contact Report<sup>1</sup>

No. 23

[*place not declassified*], February 10, 1954.

PLACE: Safehouse "A"

PERSONS PRESENT: [2 *names not declassified*]

COVER USED: Roberto Ford

SUBJECT: Discussion of Political Matters with [*name not declassified*]

*Discussion:*

1. On 9 February 1954 I advised [*name not declassified*] that within a very short time the Group would need a very concise report on his political platform; we would need this, I explained, to help summarize our future propaganda activities (which I restated for him). I advised [*name not declassified*] to put himself in the position of an individual facing a group of newspapermen who could within 10 or 15 minutes briefly outline his political program. He said that he would be very happy to do so and immediately started to prepare this report; after working on this matter for one day, he said that he was almost finished. In addition to writing the general points, [*name not declassified*] said that he was attempting when possible to put on a separate paper the specific steps of his program which would fall under each general heading; this, he said, would be extremely necessary in order to make our propaganda campaign more effective.

2. We developed the discussion of how [*name not declassified*] would implement this political program, discussing the great difficulties of re-orienting certain political trends in his country. At this point [*name not declassified*] made the following observation: "If the Group gives me freedom of administration—" I immediately assured him that there would be no interference by the Group in Guatemalan administrative affairs once his Junta in power. He continued, "Well, if that is true, and if RUFUS provides me with the sufficient military security which he has indicated, then I will provide him with a sufficient strong administration." He added, "You will see that we will make this work."

3. He indicated very forcibly that he himself would take the responsibility for administering the political and economic program. He

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 147, Folder 1. No classification marking. Drafted by [*name not declassified*] on February 13.

implied RUFUS would be relegated to the more or less secondary position of holding a military club in the background in order that [name not declassified] could achieve the administrative and political aims with which he has stated he will comply.

4. I asked [name not declassified] if he had thought about the matter of resolving the need to obtain military security while at the same time maintaining a certain balance within the army to enable him to secure liberty of action. He said, "Ah yes, I have not forgotten that. I hope that if plans progress it will be possible to have the army neutralized in a certain form so that certain elements will not be powerful enough to wreck the program which I expect will be necessary to carry out." He indicated again that his complete dependence on full cooperation with RUFUS and the maintenance of a balance among the various army elements would evolve into a successful dual military-political operation for his new government.

5. In this discussion [name not declassified] further indicated clearly that with circumstances as they are today, government of and by the people of Guatemala would be virtually impossible, that as he saw it his new government had certain long range targets and certain short range targets. He implied that absolutely free elections and other such lofty principles as greatly expanded educational facilities and certain technical advances would certainly be the long range type of planning. Specifically, the agrarian reform issue would fall into this category.

6. Speaking on the agrarian reform issue, [name not declassified] indicated that he hoped to achieve an equitable set-up where ever possible. I asked him at this point what would be his position with regard to the demands of United Fruit and how he would handle their obvious claims for repayment of the land which had been taken from them. While there was no direct statement on this point by [name not declassified], the inference was that that which had already been taken from United Fruit would be almost impossible to return and his solution would be the possibility of opening up to them new tracks of land and making available other land enterprises which had heretofore been denied them. The possibility of offering United Fruit other undeveloped lands for their technical exploitation would constitute [name not declassified] reply to the demands of United Fruit for retribution or repayment for lands taken from them.

7. [name not declassified] was advised that immediately upon his return from his home in [place not declassified], I would have prepared for him a group of ideas of a propaganda nature which could be very closely dovetailed in with some of the political ideas which he has espoused. However I stated that while the ideas which he would give me would be carefully considered, they would not necessarily be incor-

porated immediately into any propaganda programs. I also mentioned to [name not declassified] that he could use some of these propaganda ideas in radio broadcast programs which he could cut here in [place not declassified] and which he would do on an anonymous basis. He agreed wholeheartedly that such programs, based on the specific points of propaganda upon which both the Junta and the Group were in agreement, could be done upon his return from his home in [place not declassified].

[name not declassified]

---

**98. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation  
PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, February 10, 1954, 1109Z.

079. Re: GUAT 015.<sup>2</sup>

1. Major Enrique Trinidad Oliva released 6 Feb due lack of evidence supporting charge ([illegible] 9 Feb).

2. Lic Manuel Oreliano Cardona expressed belief Oliva may have been forced to reveal details local opposition movement (source: JMBUG 7). Station has no evidence supporting this belief.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 126, Folder 4. Secret; Routine; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Dated January 24. (Ibid., Box 10, Folder 3)

99. **Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to CIA Stations in [2 places not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 12, 1954, 2054Z.

38175. 1. Major Alfonso Martinez (Estevez), Director Guatemalan National Agrarian Dept, believed now in Switzerland. Subj was scheduled arrive Amsterdam from Montreal 20 Jan 54 on KLM flight 650. Travelled alone.

2. Subj aged 30 formerly private secretary to Guat President Jacobo Arbenz. Purpose subject's trip variously reported for:

- A. Deposit funds for leading Guat officials
- B. Purchase arms for Guat Govt.

3. For [place not declassified]: Request confirmation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Amsterdam arrival and check on further planned itinerary. For [place not declassified]: Request check on subject's movements, contacts, etc., which would substantiate or disprove either 2A or 2B para 2.<sup>2</sup>

4. For [2 places not declassified]: If para 3 checks negative, please institute similar checks your areas, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] if necessary.

5. Request priority handling.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 2. Secret; Routine. Approved by King. Repeated to [2 places not declassified].

<sup>2</sup> Telegram DIR 38178, sent less than 1 hour later, transmitted instructions to plant a story that Martínez had not fled the country but was in Switzerland depositing money in the name of Guatemalan Government leaders, in case Switzerland had to become a safe-haven in the event that Arbenz and other leaders had to flee. In addition, Martínez was to be portrayed as an arms buyer, purchasing aircraft and arms for Arbenz. (DIR 38178 [place not declassified], February 12, 2150Z; *ibid.*)

100. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency**<sup>1</sup>

[*place not declassified*], February 18, 1954, 0032Z.

579. 1. Suggest one shot KUGOWN operation to effect rapid distribution propaganda WSBURNT Church circles, continuing during PBSUCCESS.

2. Assuming [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] still available [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], suggest he be sent two week visit WSBURNT bearing letter introduction to MSGR Rossell Arellano.

3. At Guat's discretion [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] would reveal intentions to Rossell, or would work directly through persons like [2 *names not declassified*] ([*document indicator not declassified*]-1438) and [*name not declassified*] ([*document indicator not declassified*]-649).

4. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] would carry to WSBURNT basic material for producing several series pamphlets and posters; also funds paying local creative, production, distribution services.

5. Estimate that above program would be effective despite lack usual controls, owing Church motivation and rapport within clergy. Proposal has additional merit if carried out immediately; vis, that of assessing PBSUCCESS assets within clergy.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 1, Folder 6. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to Guatemala City.

101. **Dispatch From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)<sup>1</sup>**

HUL-A-75

[*place not declassified*], February 19, 1954.

SUBJECT

Security Matters  
Compromise Cable Traffic, PBSUCCESS

REFERENCES

[*telegram indicator not declassified*] 846, 847  
LINC 611, 612<sup>2</sup>

1. Foregoing references and statement from Pivall clearly establish that:

A. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], failed to properly paraphrase and/or substitute official cryptonyms and pseudonyms for field counterparts on messages involved, which had been passed to Seekford.

B. Case Officer, Seekford, failed to properly safeguard above messages received from [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

C. Messages in question, according to intermediary, had been brought to personal attention of President Somoza.

2. Pending Headquarters' action as per LINC 612, LINCOLN's initial reaction aside from the compromise of communications security, was more or less to the effect that President Somoza is simply more witting of PBSUCCESS than heretofore known. In this regard a verbal comment was made to one of LINCOLN's officers in November 1953 to the effect that shortly after President Somoza's visit to President Truman, and while en route back to Managua, the escorting U.S. officer had spoken quite openly to Somoza regarding his cooperation against Guatemala. Upon making the assessment of PBSUCCESS no record of the latter was found in the files of WHD. LINCOLN is only slightly informed as to the true extent of Seekford's personal negotiations with Somoza. As an indication of the extent of this relationship, a reference is made to [*telegram indicator not declassified*] 775. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was queried as to the identity of this American on the occasion of the Regional Conference of 12-13 February and admit-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 147, Folder 1. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. A typed note indicates that the dispatch was hand carried by Cowden.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

ted that, unquestionably, the person referred to was Seekford. However, he was reluctant to so state it in a cable until he could quote some reliable source.

3. From the security aspect, LINCOLN urges fullest Headquarters investigation and the change of all pertinent cryptonyms. From the overall operational standpoint, LINCOLN assumes that, as in the case of the White Paper incident, all concerned are fully agreed to press PBSUCCESS to a successful conclusion, with complete attainment of the objectives set for the Project.

Jerome C. Dunbar

---

**102. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], February 19, 1954, 1857Z.

616. Suggest KUGOWN black diversionary operation:

1. DIR 38984<sup>2</sup> indicates Martinez going Czechoslovakia.
2. *Miami Herald* 19 Feb reprints *La Prensa* 18 Feb Mexico U.P. stating WSBURNT getting Soviet arms thru medium Czech Finca owner and that arms to be landed from Soviet submarines.
3. Suggest HQs arrange with RQM search graphics register for photo Soviet sub (or what could pass for Soviet sub) lying close inshore: photo should be poor lacking detail and credibly taken by amateur with box camera from KMFLUSH Pacific coast.
4. Pivall would give photo to [*name not declassified*] suggesting following course:
  - A. Pivall and one trusted aid take truckload blackflight arms and cache on Pacific coast;
  - B. [*name not declassified*] "discover" submarine photo and public press;
  - C. [*name not declassified*] order investigation coastal areas thus leading to discovery Soviet arms cache and further press publicity.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 52, Folder 3. Confidential; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.



5. After photo in hands [*name not declassified*] and arms cached, operation could be frozen for utmost use. One use would be to complete operation in advance of enemy strategem to embarrass PBPRIME. Another use would be to complete operation within few hours after enemy propaganda victory. Further value is that once completed, operation would give pretext for [*name not declassified*] possession satellite arms delivered by black-flight.

---

103. **Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King) to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 20, 1954.

SUBJECT

Compromise of Cable Traffic—PBSUCCESS

1. The LINCOLN station advised headquarters on 19 February 1954 that a major compromise of Commo and project security was discovered on or about 17 February 1954 by [2 *names not declassified*] replacement with the Castillo Armas group. The following is a chronological report of the compromise as received by WHD from LINCOLN:

a. During the week of 15 February 1954, Mr. [*name not declassified*] met [*name not declassified*], owner of an apartment in [*place not declassified*] formerly occupied by [*name not declassified*], and settled his account. During this meeting, Mr. [*name not declassified*] handed to [*name not declassified*] the original copies of all messages which have been passed by the Chief of Station, [*place not declassified*], to [*name not declassified*]. [*name not declassified*] advised that [*name not declassified*] left these messages in the apartment when he left the country. [*name not declassified*] further stated that because of the apparent importance of the information contained in the messages, he had made said messages immediately available to his good friend, President Somoza. When [*name not declassified*] examined the messages in question, he immediately realized that a serious exposure of Agency cryptonyms and PBSUCCESS organizational methods and procedures had been revealed to at least

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 70, Folder 2. Secret.

two known unauthorized persons and probably an indeterminable number of others. He immediately cabled Station LINCOLN advising them of the compromise in general terms and indicated that he was departing for LINCOLN immediately with the documents in question.

b. Station LINCOLN alerted headquarters at 1300 hours, 19 February 1954, by telephone and advised that a courier would arrive at headquarters at 2200 hours, 19 February 1954, with the compromised documents. Lincoln followed the telephone call with cable 612 which indicated that fact that the compromise consisted of 5 pages of slightly paraphrased text containing all basic cryptonyms and pseudonyms applying not only to PBSUCCESS but to the Agency at large. The PBSUCCESS desk made a preliminary examination upon receipt of cable 612<sup>2</sup> and determined that the compromise involved roughly six cables. It was not possible at that time, however, to determine exactly which cryptonyms had been exposed. When the courier arrived with the compromised messages, Mr. [name not declassified] of Commo was called and he and Mr. Esterline, desk officer PBSUCCESS, examined the documents together and compiled an accurate list of exposed indicators. Mr. [name not declassified] of the Security Office was advised of this list the morning of 20 February and a copy of the list was hand-carried to his office at 1020 hours that date.

c. The following is a list of those cryptonyms and pseudonyms which were exposed to President Somoza, [name not declassified] and an indeterminable number of others:

LINCOLN (LINC)	[not declassified]	
[not declassified]	KUGOWN	
Seekford	KUFIRE	
PBSUCCESS	Cadick	
LUGTON	GUAT	
KUHOOK	[not declassified]	
Calligeris	[not declassified]	
WSHOOFS	ODYOKE	
SARAMAC	SROBA	
SCRANTON	LINCOLN Security Officer	} Compromising phrases
KMFLUSH	Customs at New Orleans	
MT/1	Pivall	
MT/3	[not declassified]	

---

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

2. A preliminary analysis of the exposed messages has been performed, and based on that analysis and assessment, the following assumptions have been made:

a. That President Somoza, [name not declassified], and an indeterminate number of others now know that a powerful, well organized, official United States organization is backing the Castillo Armas group.

b. That a definite possibility exists that the information contained in subject messages may have gotten into the hands of Raul Saqueda, chief of personnel for the Castillo Armas group, and [name not declassified], pilot, soldier of fortune and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. If this happened, it could well be that any or all of the information may have gotten into the hands of the Guatemalan government through agents in the Castillo Armas organization.

c. If [name not declassified] is less than he purports to be, the information may have been passed to any one of a number of other intelligence services. As regards [name not declassified], however, a preliminary investigation gives indication that he is pro-American and that he probably has handled the messages in the manner he indicated.

3. A preliminary analysis of the report by [name not declassified] (attached hereto), otherwise known as Pivall, re the circumstances under which he procured Mr. [name not declassified]'s messages in [place not declassified] clearly indicates the following about Mr. [name not declassified]:

a. Specifically as regards the copies of paraphrased cables, he apparently intentionally withheld from the Agency information of what was known to him to constitute a major breach of security directly affecting the security of the project and the security of the Agency. The fact that this was known to him is clearly indicated by his having arranged, while in Washington, without notifying the Agency, the mailing of a letter to [name not declassified], who is not yet cleared, in [place not declassified], the expressed aim of which was the recovery of the papers.

b. [name not declassified] is completely unreliable, professionally and personally.

4. Mr. [name not declassified] has been recalled to headquarters from his home in [place not declassified]. He will be given a very thorough and detailed interrogation. The situation cited in paragraph 3a above clearly and painfully indicates that PBSUCCESS may be compromised to a degree heretofore considered beyond the realm of possibility, and further, a large amount of information yet unrevealed may be in the hands of the Arbenz government.

5. It must be kept in mind that the foregoing report is at best a cursory examination of the situation and that a more detailed analysis can-

not be presented formally until LINCOLN and headquarters have had time to collect and collate all information re this specific incident and Mr. [name not declassified]'s general pattern of action since October 1953.

J.C. King<sup>3</sup>  
CWH

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

#### 104. Contact Report<sup>1</sup>

No. 33 [place not declassified], February 21, 1954.

PLACE: Safe House "A"

PERSONS PRESENT: B. Ford and [name not declassified]

COVER USED: Pseudonyms

*Discussion:* Discussion Topic: Don Pedro

1. In accordance with instructions which I had received, I went over in detail the memorandum<sup>2</sup> regarding the possible use, or exploitation, of Don Pedro. [name not declassified] attitude was completely negative. Even before I had finished the complete discussion of the points contained in the memorandum, he had attempted to interrupt me with strong objections. The complete list of objections is to be found in attached memorandum typewritten.<sup>3</sup>

2. The most outstanding thing which I gathered from this discussion was [name not declassified] intense dislike of Don Pedro, and any possible collaboration with him on the part of the Junta or the Group to him appeared as a grave error. He summarized this attitude in stating that even if we discover that it is necessary to place Don Pedro in a position of use—that is to secure his help in having San Salvador as a base of operations, or in some manner to assist us in that country—whatev-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 125, Folder 4. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. In part, [name not declassified] objected to Ydígoras because he represented "conservative elements and if a part of the new govt., would give Commies chance for come-back, since he would have little real desire in a positive program."

er small part he plays will not be worth the trouble which will be created later on by incorporating him into the movement. He pointed out that, in weighing this, it would be his opinion, and he was certain that RUFUS would share this opinion, that no use could be made of Don Pedro.

3. I then explained several points which had been made in the initial discussion, of the written memorandum which had been given to me. However, [name not declassified] did not give in an inch and appeared to be adamant regarding the matter of doing any business at all with Don Pedro.

4. I advised him that, of course, they would be kept in constant knowledge of what was taking place with Don Pedro, and furthermore, the results of the conversations which might ensue.

5. At this time I returned to the Base and, after conveying the initial reaction of [name not declassified] to Jerry,<sup>4</sup> I was advised that possibly this attitude should be changed slightly to the one that it would be possible to utilize him after his true assets had been obtained and reviewed by RUFUS and [name not declassified], an isolation process would have to take place; that I should advise [name not declassified] definitely that this consideration certainly would be thought of, if his assets did not appear actually to be real. I advised Jerry that I had not brought this matter up because it had not been in the memorandum, although Jerry advised me such information had been contained in the FT Task. I, in brief, outlined the information and reaction and objections of [name not declassified] to him and then advised him that I would return with this additional information for [name not declassified] benefit. Also, I advised that I wished to clarify the matter regarding Mr. Smith's<sup>4</sup> obtaining an approval of approach to Pedro, and as to what reaction there had been at the time.

6. Checking again with [name not declassified] a short bit later, I advised him that I had been thinking about this matter while I had been gone and that I was extremely interested in finding out further his reaction on this thing. [name not declassified] said that he principally had absolutely no confidence in Don Pedro and that RUFUS shared this view also. I then advised [name not declassified] that, actually, if we discovered that no real assets or real use could be made of Don Pedro, certainly we wished to get him out of the way, either by neutralization, isolation, or, at last risk or cost, elimination. I said we could not allow this man to continue in his present state, in as much as he was actually

---

<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

doing harm to the Junta, and that we must find some way to fit him in or take him out of the picture.

7. [name not declassified] again stated his views as to the risks of taking him in and gave to me at this time a list of objections which he had verbally told me earlier in the afternoon. He again counselled extreme caution on any dealings with Don Pedro, stating that, at any time and at any place, Don Pedro would be willing to betray anyone for his own personal interests. I advised him that the utmost discretion would be used and that immediately after we had obtained from Pedro a list of his assets, we would make these facts known to RUFUS and [name not declassified], for their private investigation or survey of them.

8. I asked [name not declassified] if this whole subject of Pedro had not been approached previously by Mr. Smith, and [name not declassified] had advised that it had been and that RUFUS said that if the Group dictated that Pedro should be the leader of this, if it meant success for the movement, he, RUFUS, would become a soldier in the ranks to comply. [name not declassified] said if this eventuation should come to pass, he, although he would continue along with the movement, would be the first one to oppose him once he was established as the new leader of Guatemala.

[initials not declassified]

---

**105. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], February 24, 1954, 0409Z.

711. 1. HDQs considering pros and con of establishing covert official relationship with [name not declassified] to ensure full support PBSUCCESS objectives.

2. LINC desires your views soonest whether:

- A. High ranking KUBARK official necessary or
- B. Mature personable individual not necessarily top echelon;

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 2, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

- C. Civilian or
- D. Military status;
- E. General approach adequate or
- F. Specific knowledgeable approach required.

3. Appreciate your candid views receptivity [*name not declassified*] such proposition assuming properly laid on by HDQs.

---

## 106. Contact Report<sup>1</sup>

No. 37 [*place not declassified*], February 27, 1954.

PLACE: Safe House "A"

PERSONS PRESENT: [*name not declassified*] and Robert Ford

SUBJECT: RUFUS' Letters Received from the Field For Delivery to [*name not declassified*]

I delivered three letters to [*name not declassified*] from RUFUS on 27 February. Having read them, he came back and advised me of the contents.

1. Letter dated 18 February.

A. President Galvez of Honduras himself instigated a request through his foreign minister to RUFUS that he be given some indication that RUFUS was receiving aid from individuals in the United States.

B. He sent Fournier (first name unknown), a Costa Rican, to intercede for him in Panama. RUFUS himself had not been able to go to Panama because he is now under a stop-order from President Remon which prevents him from entering Panama.

C. RUFUS says that twenty men were sent to training camps on 19 February: six of them were radio men and 14 of them were saboteurs.

D. Good relations are now in existence between his Group and elements in the Salvadoran and Honduran governments.

E. More latitude is needed in the propaganda work. [*name not declassified*] interprets this to mean that wider use of funds with less control being placed on RUFUS is desired.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 143, Folder 4. No classification marking.

F. The record which RUFUS made in LINCOLN has been played in Salvador and Honduras.

G. RUFUS advised that Ydigoras has asked for back pay from the Guatemalan Government; he says that this mercenary move has had a poor effect in El Salvador and in Honduras.

H. Arenas visited RUFUS but on this occasion RUFUS was not in Honduras.

I. RUFUS has sent Lopez (first name unknown) to Mexico. The purposes for sending him have been covered in a previous cable traffic. RUFUS' letter gave no further amplification of these reasons.

J. End of letter dated 18 February 1954.

2. A second letter dated 20 February 1954.

A. *[name not declassified]* has not received *[name not declassified]* instructions; RUFUS is wondering what has happened.

B. *[name not declassified]* has not received money in Guatemala City as of 20 February; RUFUS wonders what is happening.

C. *[name not declassified]* has been instructed not to leave Guatemala before he sets up contact again with those individuals who were loyal to him, which is what *[name not declassified]* wishes to do; RUFUS advised that once *[name not declassified]* has re-established his contacts he will advise them that he is leaving the country.

D. Jose Luis Arenas visited him again on 20 February. This time RUFUS was in Honduras. Arenas, according to RUFUS, was completely willing to listen to all criticism and has accepted it with complete humbleness. RUFUS said that Arenas is willing to do whatever RUFUS orders. RUFUS claims that he advised Arenas to return to Guatemala clandestinely and then to seek asylum in the Salvadoran Embassy in Guatemala City. Subsequent information indicates that Arenas followed this course of action since it is now known publicly that has Arenas has requested refuge or exile in the Salvadoran embassy in Guatemala City.

E. RUFUS asked *[name not declassified]* to answer a letter from Roberto Barrios Pena; he asks *[name not declassified]* to tell Barrios Pena that he must realize that RUFUS has to answer the charges made against him by the Guatemalan Government. RUFUS did not wish in any way to implicate Barrios Pena; he replied to the charges of the Guatemalan Government only for the purposes thoroughly clearing the atmosphere. Barrios Pena, in his cable to RUFUS, complained that he, Barrios Pena, had been implicated in RUFUS' reply to the Guatemalan Government.

3. Second letter dated 20 February (the third letter which *[name not declassified]* received).

A. RUFUS claims that he has received 20,900 dollars and another payment of 5000 dollars; he states that Manuel has the rest.



B. [*name not declassified*] is ready to come to LINCOLN.

C. RUFUS has sent money to the propaganda group in Guatemala City; he did not indicate where, how, or in what quantity.

4. Postscript to second letter written on 20 February.

A. Manuel must stay in Nicaragua. RUFUS needs a military man in Honduras; he advises that he needs someone with more experience and more stature than Andres has.

B. No transmitter for the radio station in Salvador has arrived. This transmitter is necessary for successful radio operations.

---

107. **Memorandum to Robert Ford of the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

February 27, 1954.

SUBJECT

Brief for [*name not declassified*] so that he can include the information in his next letter to RUFUS

The Group is much disturbed over the relationship, and RUFUS' lack of cooperation with Andres. Andres has been able to see RUFUS but once since 4 February and then only for a short period of time.

RUFUS must co-operate fully, remembering that Andres is the Group's representative in the field. In order for the Group and [*name not declassified*] to keep informed on what is going on, it is imperative for RUFUS to keep Andres fully informed so that he in turn can notify [*name not declassified*] and the Group, of any and all new developments.

The Group and [*name not declassified*] will not be able to coordinate any aspect of the operation if RUFUS is acting on his own without notifying [*name not declassified*] and the Group.

Only this week RUFUS sent sensitive material to [*name not declassified*] via his own courier. This is exactly one of the things security-wise the Group is trying to correct. Three failures in the past were probably

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 143, Folder 4. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "Passed to [*name not declassified*] on 27 Feb 54. R.F." The memorandum was presumably prepared at PBSUC-CESS Headquarters in Florida.

caused by insecure methods of operation, and definitely the recent “White Paper” was the result of an insecure courier.

If the Group is going to continue lending aid to the Junta, the Group will definitely not permit what has caused failure in the past to continue in the future. The Group wants to aid the operation but does not want to see it fail again because of the same old reasons of insecure means of operation and lack of coordination between the Junta and the Group.

The Group realizes that RUFUS has a tremendous job and is extremely busy, but he can never allow himself to be so busy as to be insecure and not to keep [name not declassified] and the Group, who are trying to help him, and supporting him, fully informed of all his actions and developments in the field. Because RUFUS is so busy, it is impossible for him to devote necessary time to details; and that is exactly where Andres, [name not declassified] and the Group can help him and advise him, provided they are kept fully informed.

---

#### 108. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 2, 1954.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Seekford

1. At 1910 on 28 February, I picked Seekford up in my car at the corner of Massachusetts and Wisconsin. We drove for about an hour out River Road and I am certain were not observed.

2. Seekford expressed his regrets for the compromise of the five paraphrased cables, and in a manner which appeared to be entirely sincere. I asked him how it was possible, with all of the security indoctrination which he had had, plus the great emphasis on secrecy based on all phases of PBSUCCESS, to have done such an unpardonable thing as to leave sensitive papers in a hotel room. He replied that he had no explanation, that it was a stupid, unpardonable thing to do, but that it was an act of thoughtlessness and carelessness. He expressed himself as

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 151, Folder 4. Secret.

---

most concerned over the effects on the operation and the OAS Conference.<sup>2</sup>

3. I told Seekford that while it was impossible to undo the past, it was his obligation and duty to remain under [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] for a long while to come. He said that he realized how important this was during the OAS Conference. I told him it was equally important for a much longer period, because the enemy might time their disclosures to coincide with expected paramilitary action on our part, and that this might be many months in the future. To this he agreed.

4. It was agreed that for the next month Seekford will remain in Chicago. We discussed two general areas where he could bury himself after that date—Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. While he is willing to go to Alaska, he prefers the Northwest [*2 lines of source text not declassified*]. He has never been in the Northwest and suggested as a possibility that he get a job until Fall as a fire watcher on a mountain top where he would meet very few people. Another possibility would be to get him a job as an engineer on one of the many construction projects that must be under way in that region. He believes that the Northwest would be more secure than Alaska, [*2 lines of source text not declassified*].

5. It is my impression that Seekford will be amenable and cooperative to any reasonable request on our part.

**J.C. King**  
Chief, WHD

---

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Tenth Inter-American Conference held in Caracas, Venezuela, March 1–28, 1954; see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IV, pp. 264 ff.

109. Letter From [*name not declassified*] to Carlos Castillo Armas<sup>1</sup>

March 1, 1954.

1. As the work progresses and grows more complex, we have to be extremely careful to adhere to the divisions of responsibility and agreements previously laid down, both in matters of political practice and finances.

2. I have no wish to cry over spilled milk and I get the impression that the Group does not either. However, there are factors from the past which are seriously disturbing. One of the principal ones is a discrepancy between the amount of money that Pablo says he passed you in January and the amount you acknowledged receiving in January. (Note to Ford: Details of the discrepancy should be available this evening from Pablo's side.)

3. During February there have been other problems of a serious nature. I feel completely bound by the Gentlemen's Agreement which we signed with the Group and I have every indication from the Group that it is abiding and will abide scrupulously by the Agreement. There are several points of the Agreement that I feel I must call to your attention again:

a. It was agreed that you and I would use only the Group's secure channels of communication. This has not been scrupulously observed.

b. It was agreed that the overall responsibility for propaganda was mine. The dispatch of your Secretary of Propaganda to Mexico does not reflect the spirit of this Agreement. It was further agreed that the propaganda budgets would be submitted, after full consultation with you, from the advisors in the field to me. This has not been done.

c. It was agreed that the overall intelligence function would be mine. On at least one very important occasion the qualified advisor was specifically excluded from a sensitive operation. In the preparation of the intelligence budget, the advisor was not consulted so that I do not have the benefit of his expert and professional advice.

d. The political field, as you know it was agreed, was also my responsibility. However, budgeting for that field has not been left to me.

e. It was further understood that I was to represent the Junta before the Group, yet communications have been sent directly to the Group. This is impractical since it puts us in a bad light before the Group and since the Group refers such communications to me anyway.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 143, Folder 4. No classification marking.

3. [sic] Apart from these specifics, the whole magnitude of the March budget forecast has somewhat appalled me, since I can see no justification for the tremendous increase from \$65,000 to \$111,000, without a corresponding expansion in actual operations.

4. Under the circumstances we must now proceed as follows:

a. The propaganda responsibility being mine, I am asking Juan Jose to consult with the propaganda advisors in the field and to secure from them their estimate of the funds needed for propaganda in March. Juan Jose has been asked by me to solicit your views on propaganda and on the propaganda budget in greater detail. Out of the information that Juan Jose brings back I will prepare the proposed budget and negotiate it with the Group.

b. Similarly, the budget estimates for political work, especially inside our target area, will also be provided by my sources and by the advisors. On this point, too, please give your full advice to Juan Jose. I will inform you of the final sum allotted.

c. On intelligence, I have asked Juan Jose to secure Andres' estimate and to bring back to me a proposal which I shall review and present to the Group.

d. On the military matters which are your sphere of responsibility and competence, I have solicited the views of Don Ricardo. He has given me his recommendations, which I have reviewed, in some cases changed, and in some cases accepted as they stood. I have negotiated for you the military budget with the Group and I have secured the approval of certain sums. These sums are being explained to you in a separate letter.

5. As soon as the political, intelligence, and propaganda budgets are complete and I have negotiated the necessary funds for them from the Group I shall let you know. Meanwhile, I have secured the Group's approval to maintain these activities on an interim basis until I can clarify the budgetary procedure.

6. If we both keep the foregoing in mind and remain on the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement, I am sure that these difficulties will not again arise. In the future, the military budget will of course be your responsibility. Your advice on intelligence, propaganda, and political matters will be extremely valuable and I will make up the final budget based on the information I received from you and the advisors, plus my own considered review of the situation.

**110. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], March 2, 1954, 0648Z.

SLINC 828. LINCOLN SitRep Week 22 Feb–1 March 54, for Coordination Mtg.

*1. Enemy:*

While KUFIRE reporting from WSBURNT continues unsatisfactory, sufficient overt and semi-overt manifestations of govt and Commie intent have accumulated to justify assumption that WSBURNT moving into status of denied area. Such indications include:

A. Steadily mounting propaganda, including signature campaigns, against “intervention,” a familiar pretext for internal repression and militancy.

B. Organization of local committees for defense of regime, coupled with proposal that large-scale military TNG be instituted.

C. Continuing expropriation landowners and demagogic stirring-up of squatters against current land system.

D. CGTG letter to AGIG (Assn of Industrialists) tacitly accusing industrialists of failure to push development of country and requesting reduction of electric and rail rates. This significant initial assault on free enterprise and preview of state-run, Communist-type industrialization.

E. Mounting threats to free press, including jamming anti-Red programs, arrest of anti-Red broadcaster Oscar Conde, etc.

F. Concurrent intensive deception and provocation campaign, with deception theme that Arbenz about to break with Reds and with frequent provocation rumors of imminent revolt, designed to flush out opposition.

Pace of above developments, if continued unabated, opens possibility of tacit conversion WSBURNT to denied area status by late summer or early fall 1954.

*2. Friendly:*

A. Due to internal and external obstacles, it has hitherto been impossible set approximate D-day based on reasonable assurances. Progress of events now indicates necessity, despite many imponderables still remaining and still to come, of fixing tentative date.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 144, Folder 002. Routine; Immediate Action; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

B. After thorough review of all aspects of the program, LINC believes best estimate of earliest possible D-day to be in first two weeks of June. Final date to be determined with HQs approval. This estimate based on considerations in following paras.

C. KUFIRE: Systematic exploitation SYNCARP KUFIRE assets and development independent assets, if vigorously pursued, can be accomplished next 90 days.

D. KUGOWN: Flow of guidance and materials to controlled assets is presently increasing and will continue. Proposed hemisphere-wide anti-Red conf scheduled for 15 Apr and exile labor mtg May 1 (being developed by Nebecker) should provide outside KUGOWN impetus. Key to KUGOWN effort inside WSBURNT is SHERWOOD siting and initiation of programs. These must go into effect not later than 1 April to provide 60-day KUGOWN buildup.

E. KUHOOK:

1) Firming up SYNCARP/SKIMMER relationship to insure reliability of Calligeris. Ontrich will undertake this week.

2) Based on Ontrich preparations, Cadick is to examine staging sites, staging preparation, transport facilities, etc., to insure Calligeris capability implement logistics plans. Cadick trip to be completed approx 10 March.

3) SCRANTON trainees will graduate approx 25 May, according present plans.

4) Twenty-seven sabotage trainees will graduate 15 March. Leader trainees will graduate SARANAC approx 1 May allowing thirty days implement organization inside target area.

F. Above proposed scheduling necessitates following immediate actions:

*First:* Immediate implementation SHERWOOD on Santa Fe, to be in operation 1 April at latest. Santa Fe is only solution, since negotiations with [name not declassified] now appear postponed, [name not declassified] consent on basis experience is doubtful and KMFLUSH site does not fully assure permanence. Full effort must be made minimize security drawbacks Santa Fe site to provide vital KUGOWN facility.

*Second:* Expedite and fulfill objective ensuring [name not declassified] complete support as contemplated.

*Third:* Postpone all black flights two weeks.

### 3. Significant Operational Details:

A. General: Separate program underway to locate, develop and expand operational assets completely independent known SYNCARP assets for purposes seeking objectivity in KUFIRE reporting and acquiring outside support for PBSUCCESS. Foregoing need highlighted due recent evidence Calligeris freewheeling and still unresolved security of SYNCARP. [name not declassified] fully cognizant and attempting bring Calligeris into line.

[Omitted here are 2 pages of specific operational details.]

111. Memorandum From [name not declassified] to DC/P, C/CE,  
and C/PP, Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 8, 1954.

SUBJECT

Agrarian Reform<sup>2</sup>

1. It is my firm opinion, based upon everything I have read to date upon agrarian reform, that it is imperative we examine this matter closely and be prepared to accept it as originally conceived as part of our political program. I believe it is essential that we do so and that the gains so made and the progress under this reform not be lost while changing governments. If we are able to adopt this quickly in our program and propagate rapidly, it is believed that we will obtain considerable support from the campesinos wherein lies the strength of the enemy. In this regard we would then be able to provide for support within the CNC, attempting to subsidize and defect this organization as much as possible.

2. As a corollary to the above effort I believe we should concentrate soonest on mounting an operation to defect Major Martinez, assuring him that the agrarian reform would be fully accepted by the new government and that he would be the director to insure that it is properly carried out in the best interests of the people. This could be a very important defection target and, if successful, could largely contribute to our ultimate success.

[initials not declassified]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 65, Folder 8. Secret; RYBAT.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 35.



112. Dispatch From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)<sup>1</sup>

HUL-A-176

[*place not declassified*], March 9, 1954.

SUBJECT

Calligeris' Status in Honduras

1. In an informal memorandum dated 1 March 1954,<sup>2</sup> Stephen R. Lugton reported that Calligeris had been in contact with the Minister of Foreign Relations in Honduras. The Minister told Calligeris that President Galvez would be much more willing to support Calligeris as far as freedom of movement, black flights, etc., are concerned if Galvez would receive confirmation of the sensitivity and authenticity of the Calligeris movement from a third party.<sup>3</sup> Calligeris told Lugton that until the "Group" makes the necessary gestures to Galvez via whatever channels they may choose, he will be limited in what he can accomplish.

2. The above is submitted for your information and possible guidance in levying an appropriate request on ODACID.

Jerome C. Dunbar<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 101, Folder 4. Secret; RYBAT.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> The same information was reported to [*name not declassified*] on February 27; see Document 106.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates another officer initialed for Dunbar.

113. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 9, 1954.

WEEKLY PBSUCCESS MEETING WITH DD/P

PRESENT

Mr. Lampton Berry, Mr. Ray Leddy (Department of State); [5 names not declassified]

1. Mr. [name not declassified] opened the meeting with comments on a paper entitled "Points for consideration concerning informant". It was agreed that the identity of Mr. X, who is in contact with Mr. Leddy, should not be disclosed at this time except on a strictly need-to-know basis. Mr. [name not declassified] said that this contact fell in a vague and shadowy field where it is not clear when does such a case come into the zone of being a Bureau matter. Mr. [name not declassified] suggested getting in touch with Mr. Dennis Flinn, Deputy Director for Security of the Department of State because X comes from a hostile Embassy and has begun to talk. It is suggested that the Bureau be notified of this development for the protection of Mr. Leddy and in order to prevent them from wasting time running after false scents. If by any chance the Bureau has a case, the Department of State would not want to cross wires. It is our hope that the Bureau would not wish to assert total jurisdiction. Information received from informant X is extremely interesting. Details are covered in memorandum referred to. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] (Action: [name not declassified])

2. Mr. Berry then stated that he and Mr. Leddy were there to take stock of the present situation, to determine where we stand now and what are the future prospects. Are things going downhill so fast in Guatemala that PBSUCCESS as it now stands may not be enough. Consideration must be given to the much greater pressure which may come from Congress and public opinion on the present Administration if the situation in Guatemala does deteriorate. It may be necessary to take more calculated risks than before. At the end of the Caracas Conference we should have a clearer view of our position and a re-assessment of the situation should be made at a briefing and discussion with the new Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Holland,<sup>2</sup> General Smith and Mr. Dulles. Mr. [name not declassified] replied "Let

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 154, Folder 1. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Henry F. Holland replaced John M. Cabot as Assistant Secretary of Inter-American Affairs on March 1, 1954.

Caracas run its course and see what comes out of it." We agree to the need of making progress reports to policy chiefs of this Government so that we may obtain additional reassurances that the rug will not be pulled from under us in the future as occurred in the Li Mi case. Mr. [name not declassified] then asked Mr. Berry exactly what was meant by possible additional calculated risks. Messrs Berry and Leddy replied: (a) We might reconsider exploiting the conclusion arrived at by Trujillo last year and transmitted to Perez Jimenez that the best way to bring about the fall of the Arbenz government would be to eliminate 15-20 of its leaders with Trujillo's trained pistoleros. (b) State might consider overt action along the lines of no more shipping to Guatemala, no more oil, no more air passengers or transport. (c) PBSUCCESS program through Phase IV appears insufficient to do the job and it is feared that Phase V shows the U.S. hand. Mr. Berry then said that in his opinion the "gut point" of the operation is where does the Guatemala City garrison stand, and asked [name not declassified] if he could answer that question. [name not declassified] replied that he thought the operation could be brought to a conclusion by 15 June; that the program was complex but that we believe the Agency has the capability of doing the job. The radio program is to begin on 1 April and the last part of it, at D-Day, a terror program, is based on Orson Welles and is most effective. [name not declassified]—the build-up by training, equipment, etc.—is like a boiler under steam pressure; it cannot be stopped once it gets to a certain point. Mr. Berry repeated that the important question is where does the Guatemala City garrison stand, and asked [name not declassified] if he knew. [name not declassified] replied that PBSUCCESS is a complex, top secret program which includes ghost voicing, deception, mines, bazookas, and fire power. It is difficult to explain without the wall map and charts available at LINCOLN. There remains a lot to be done but it is believed it can be done by June. While it is fine to talk about the OAS Conference and the need for a re-assessment of its conclusion, once we get beyond a certain point we do not believe that we can stop the operation. Mr. Berry—"This is a much more optimistic résumé than we had any reason to believe based on reports so far".

Mr. [name not declassified]—"We have not yet come to the point of any reasonable assurance of success".

Mr. Leddy—"What is the chance of U.S. exposure?"

Mr. [name not declassified]—"There is no official estimate yet. We have been concerned from the very beginning about keeping so much activity under a basket. There has already been one flap, although not the fault of anyone at this table. We have to be concerned and would like to know what is the position of high government authority if things go wrong."

[*name not declassified*]"—“Once arms are in the forward area, and according to present plans this will be in 30-40 days, we are practically committed. All the controls we have are not adequate to assure complete control from that point on. After 1 April we will be too far committed to call off the operation.”

Mr. [*name not declassified*] to [*name not declassified*]"—“Don't worry”.

Mr. [*name not declassified*] to [*name not declassified*]"—“Your job is to carry out instructions. You are to get the job done”.

[*name not declassified*] to Mr. Berry—"Everything we do may be plausibly denied if uncovered”.

Mr. Berry—"We must bring our top-level people up to date one month from now.”

Mr. [*name not declassified*] to [*name not declassified*]"—“Watch out for compromising pieces of paper.”

Mr. Leddy—"Because of disclosures by the Guatemalan Government and the appointment of a new Assistant Secretary of State, we must consider the 'broad' approach to PBSUCCESS from the viewpoint of the Department. We need a general go-around with consideration being given to (a) is PBSUCCESS the way to handle this operation (b) if it is the way to handle it are we using all possible means not attributable to the United States to carry the operation to a successful conclusion. If attributable to the United States, it should not be done. High level State thinking is that an act which can be pinned on the United States will set us back in our relations with Latin American countries by fifty years.”

[*name not declassified*] then expressed himself as opposed to the elimination of 15-20 Guatemalan leaders as a possible solution to the problem, although stating that such elimination was part of the plan and could be done. Mr. Berry then said that knocking off the leaders might make it possible for the Army to take over. [*name not declassified*] replied that it is an illusion to believe the Army has control. The Army is losing control to organized and armed labor and police. The 1952 revolution in Bolivia could be repeated, where for the first time in Latin American history armed labor defeated the Army. Mr. [*name not declassified*] stated that it is not certain that the Army has lost control. Mr. Leddy said that he was much surprised at [*name not declassified*]'s statement about the armed strength of labor because according to an Embassy report of two weeks ago there is no known training of labor groups and it must be that the Embassy needs jacking up in its reporting. [*name not declassified*] said that our information came via RUFUS' nets and was a third country operation. Mr. Leddy then asked is it feasible to buy up the top Army command. [*name not declassified*] replied he did not know but we are prepared to launch an operation towards the defection and recruitment of [*name*

---

*not declassified*] and [*name not declassified*] and possibly Arbenz. Mr. Leddy replied this merits going into, but in his opinion the chances of defecting Arbenz are much less than 50-50. A discussion followed of using [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] as a one-man team on high-level defections, and Mr. Berry raised the question what would happen to RUFUS forces who already have arms if through successful defections inside Guatemala Arbenz was overthrown. Mr. Leddy said he opposed [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] it was U.S. Government, but [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. He reiterated—"When we get to the point of making a decision where our action will successfully attribute to the United States Government the support of a revolution, it is our thinking at this time that we should not get on with it." He asked—"Is it possible to provoke an incident where OAS will intervene?"

[*name not declassified*]

---

**114. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation  
PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 10, 1954, 2051Z.

41591. 1. Toriello stated today Caracas he would present documentary proof intervention. Not known what information he may divulge. You are directed prepare for possible descent by press representatives seeking confirmation allegations Toriello may make. Prepare take appropriate evasive action or be ready with cover story protecting Base LINCOLN and all Safe-Houses.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 42, Folder 3. Secret; Immediate Action; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by King.

115. Contact Report<sup>1</sup>

No. 48 [place not declassified], March 12, 1954, 9:40 a.m.-12:10 p.m.

PLACE: War Room

STAFF PRESENT: [2 names not declassified], W. Robertson, [8 names not declassified]

*Discussion:*

[name not declassified] spoke first, indicating this would be a quick review since there was a Telecon being set up for 11 a.m. for a discussion of all matters to be taken up at the meeting.

On arrival at HQs he was briefed by J. Esterline that evening on the situation as JE saw it. Tuesday<sup>2</sup> [initials not declassified] attended a policy conference which included two representatives (R. Leddy and L. Berry) from State Dept. in addition to the normal coordinating committee.<sup>3</sup> He stated that the State Dept. has become apprehensive over PBSUCCESS and that a statement was made in official language at this meeting that the official view of the State Dept. would be that they would not under any circumstances support PBSUCCESS if it meant that the U.S. government would become involved in any way; that the State Dept. was not willing to sacrifice its principles of non-intervention for the Guatemalan cause. [initials not declassified] said he insisted that it be read in the record that the statement be qualified that the U.S. government would not be involved beyond notional or plausible denial. [name not declassified] stated his feelings on the subject and his attitude toward the problem since it was laid on by NSC. He said that we made no commitments that the U.S. could not be pulled out of and if we do pull out now we lose face among the anti-Communists and we would never be able to mount an operation of this kind in Guatemala again. [name not declassified] stated that in approximately 10 days the situation would be such that whereas we may desire to pull out, it would not alter the course of events; we could not pull out. In 10 days the movement would be beyond recall.

[name not declassified] was asked if we felt that we would be able to carry this off satisfactorily. He answered "yes" and he gave the first part of June as the date of readiness at which they seemed surprised.

He insisted that he had to have a vote of confidence, that there would be no change in PBSUCCESS. Mr. Wisner said that all discussions on a pol-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 12. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> March 9.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 113.

icy level were to be heard by [initials not declassified] but as far as [initials not declassified] was concerned we were to continue with the operation and as far as CIA was concerned there was not any thought whatever of pulling back. We were to pull for the earliest date of readiness.

Mr. Leddy was informed that [name not declassified] was being made available to exploit all defection possibilities. Mr. [name not declassified] is at HQs now working with personnel there on a defection plan.

Pessimism exhibited by State Dept. made the meeting most unsatisfactory from that angle.

J.C. King is going to bring Leddy and Berry to LINCOLN in the near future, perhaps the early part of next week and we must be prepared for a critical attitude from them.

[initials not declassified] asked that Gen. Cabell be requested to modify his order closing FJHOPEFUL and this is being extended for the duration of PBSUCCESS.

The question of someone to speak to Somoza came up. Maj. Gen. Charles Mullen, who has had extensive experience in Latin America and who founded the Military Academy in Nicaragua, was named but he had not been approached. [initials not declassified] was authorized to go talk to Gen. Mullen and it was planned that the general would go to visit Somoza and utilize Pres. Galvez in Honduras and to Salvador to acquire unofficial assurance from them of cooperation. Exact plans for Gen. Mullen have not been formulated. [initials not declassified] went to Arizona and talked to Gen. Mullen who was fully alert to the problem and in a very short time was able to discuss the problem with [initials not declassified] from M's point of view, with suggestions which were very much in line. Gen. Mullen agreed to undertake the job.

Gen. Mullen was to try to proceed to Washington on 12 March or, if not able to go on the 12th would go on Sunday.<sup>4</sup> (A phone call from JCKing during the meeting provided the information that Gen. Mullen had arrived in Washington on the 11th.) He will be in Washington on Monday and will then proceed to LINCOLN. He will spend one day or evening in [place not declassified].

Jake Esterline had prepared a paper pointing out the maximum danger for SHERWOOD. Tracey Barnes now has the paper and is going to try to get State Dept.'s concurrence on this establishment. SHERWOOD represents the maximum danger, the closest that they can come to proof of U.S. participation. We must push for a Nicaraguan site for SHERWOOD. It must be tested, ready to go, so it can be used for black broadcasts. A Nicaraguan site for SHERWOOD is vital.

<sup>4</sup> March 14.

Hediger's return was arranged and he will be discharged upon his return to Washington. The man Hediger recommended is to be acquired. Hediger is not to cut in on anything else.

It was requested that the [name not declassified] case be expedited.

[initials not declassified]—Re the OAS conference, the Dulles speech was moderate and support was obtained.

[initials not declassified] said that Wisner told him that the long cable which we sent on the 9th was sent directly to [place not declassified] after being read at HQs.

JCKing phoned at this point.

JCKing—[initials not declassified] phone message contained following items of information:

Statement was made that [name not declassified] is in charge at Guatemala Station and [name not declassified] is coming out.

Gen. Mullen arrived in Washington Tuesday night and is now being briefed. His passport and visas won't be ready till Monday. Gen. Mullen is seeing Allen Dulles this morning at 11 a.m.

State Dept. still has not endorsed the recommendation that Gen. Mullen go to visit all 3 countries.

[initials not declassified] said that at present Washington is forced to obtain approval on every cent they spend for PBSUCCESS. Until otherwise informed, we will continue to charge expenditures to specific tasks. We have no authority for expenditures other than those against specific tasks. There is a finance officer assigned to the PBSUCCESS support staff at HQs in Washington. His name is [name not declassified] and he is coming down early next week. We must anticipate our task requirements for the next 30 days so that we will have no problems financially.

The next portion of the meeting is covered by Contact Reports of WRobertson and [name not declassified].

Meeting adjourned at 1210 hrs. Prior to the close of the meeting there was another phone call from Washington (from Esterline) in which [initials not declassified] was informed that the Chief, FED, had withdrawn approval on the availability of [name not declassified]. Esterline was told that the boss said to have the best men and that [name not declassified] was the best so they were requested to re-open the subject. [name not declassified] is qualified and is needed right away. A cable will be sent (LINC 1032)<sup>5</sup> on that after the meeting. There are no other capable candidates to replace [name not declassified].

---

<sup>5</sup> Dated March 12. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 2, Folder 5)



116. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 14, 1954.

## SUBJECT

Conference Between the DCI and Secretary of State on 14 March 1954

1. Mr. Wisner informed Mr. Barnes and Col. King that at a meeting between the Director and the Secretary of State yesterday the following decisions and/or actions were arrived at:

A. The Secretary believes that there should be at an early date a review of the PBSUCCESS operation.

B. The Secretary's conclusion, after two weeks of observation at the Caracas Conference, is that he sees no reason to change the tempo of PBSUCCESS, but "don't get caught".

C. Will we give careful thought and study to the establishment of an overt liberation committee consisting of refugees from Guatemala who are not actively engaged or tied into PBSUCCESS. The objectives are two: 1. To divert attention from covert activities; 2. To use as a sounding board for propaganda. The danger of producing confusion is realized. This is a request for study, not an instruction to set up a new committee. The study should include location of already active overt liberation committees, the existence of any prominent Guatemalans in exile who are not members of such committees, the most suitable country in which to set up such a committee. Mr. Wisner suggests consideration of a notional committee. *Action: [name not declassified]*.

D. Toriello. The Secretary gained the impression from his observation of Toriello during the Caracas Conference that Toriello may be an opportunist and a possible subject for defection. We are requested to prepare a memo for the DD/P containing what is immediately available of background information on Toriello. In this should be included whatever information *[name not declassified]* and *[name not declassified]* may have. A thorough study, including CE aspects, is to be immediately initiated. *Action: Esterline.*

[Omitted here is a paragraph unrelated to Guatemala.]

J.C. King  
Chief, WH

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 6. Secret. Prepared on March 15.

**117. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida, to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], March 23, 1954.

SLINC 1229. 1. Although recognize difficulty your taking effective counteraction nevertheless ERRATIC must demonstrate soon real qualities of being able work in harness or else.

2. SYNCARP sources inside WSBURNT reporting ERRATIC spreading word he and Calligeris now in close accord inferring latter is his junior and takes orders from him.

3. This could be very injurious all around and cannot be tolerated. Obviously PBSUCCESS is and will build up Calligeris thus para 1 above becomes mandatory.

4. Appears ERRATIC has swung from mudslinging to subordinating Calligeris. Use theme of all anti-Commies working together and cut out the personal buildup as above as many would-be followers would rebel against ERRATIC.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 3. Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

---

**118. Memorandum From [name not declassified] to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)<sup>1</sup>**

March 26, 1954.

SUBJECT

K-Program Plan

*1. Background*

Within the purview of PBSUCCESS and designed to further the attainment of its immediate ends, it is planned to assign Page for a period of approximately 90 days to Guatemala, where he will be charged with the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 134, Folder 1. Secret; Eyes Only.

execution of a defection program, targeted to bring important segments of the Guatemalan executive apparatus under American control.

### 2. Relation to PBSUCCESS

K-Program is not conceived as a practicable alternative to the basic plan, envisaging the overthrow of the Arbenz regime through the instigation of an internal uprising engineered by the indigenous resistance organization from the outside. Rather, the program is designed to render a material contribution to the accomplishment of PBSUCCESS by a harnessing to its purpose important elements of the Army command and of the executive branch of the Guatemalan government.

### 3. Labor Program

Under K-Program it is contemplated to defect leading trade union officials and to activate those elements in the Guatemalan trade union movement not yet under Communist sway. For the purpose of this program Page will be provided with the services of an operational assistant who has bona fide labor organization and cover.

### 4. Personnel

[name not declassified] will be assigned to Guatemala as Page's field assistant. He will serve as communications clerk, interpreter, body-guard, and discharge all housekeeping chores incidental to K-Program.

### 5. Schedule

Page and [name not declassified] will proceed to Guatemala on or about 15 April 1954. The labor assistant should become available not later than 20 April.

### 6. Official Position

For the duration of the program, Page will be stationed in Guatemala as a senior official of the Central Intell. Agency serving as the personal representative of [name not declassified] in his capacity as Chief of the Project. Although Page will operate independently of the Guatemala station, it is understood that the station's overt and covert assets will be committed to the support of K-Program. This arrangement is not meant to derogate from [name not declassified]'s status as Chief of Station. It is anticipated that he and Page will work in closest harmony toward the implementation of the program.

### 7. Accreditation

Ambassador Peurifoy will be apprised of Page's mission in broad outline and be requested to render him the necessary support within bounds of diplomatic propriety. It will be intimated to Peurifoy that Page is a ranking and responsible official of the C.I.A. and that he is operating independently of the local station. Mr. Frank Wisner has offered to write Amb. Peurifoy a personal letter along those lines. (This letter should refer to Page under his assumed identity.)

### 8. *Personal Cover*

Page will represent himself and live the cover of an American of independent means, spending a prolonged period of time as a tourist recuperating from the rigors of idleness. His standing will be backed by a New York investment counselor, Mr. [name not declassified] notionally entrusted with the administration of Page's account. In Page's name Mr. [name not declassified] will open a checking account with the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] New York, with an initial deposit of approximately \$30,000. The foregoing arrangement has been designed to protect Page against untoward leakage as the result of perfunctory checks, but is unlikely to stand up to severe scrutiny. It may lend surface credence to Page's disassociation from any official connection with the United States Govt.

### 9. *Operational Cover*

Inducement approaches and contacts of an operational nature will be executed in a manner adaptable to the over-all cover of PBSUCCESS. The foregoing notwithstanding, it may in some instances become necessary to imply that the United States Govt. does not disapprove of the underlying purpose of this program and that, even without official cognizance, all commitments will be met. Where success or failure of the whole program may hinge upon a "plausible admission" of government backing, the circumstances will be presented to higher headquarters for their decision. In a case of overriding importance, the legitimization of Page should require official backstopping, and since time is of the essence, Page will be authorized to attempt at resolving the issue locally in consultation with Ambassador Peurifoy.

### 10. *Personal Security*

According to Mr. [name not declassified], acting chief of the Guatemala Station, the Guatemalan authorities, in case of compromise, are unlikely to go beyond expelling Page. This, however, should not be taken for granted and their resort to more drastic means, such as interrogation under duress, should not be ruled out altogether. All reasonable precautions will be taken to prevent surreptitious detention unbeknownst to the American Embassy.

### 11. *Communications*

In order to communicate with LINCOLN, Page will be authorized to avail himself of the pouching and cabling facilities of Guatemala Station. In addition Page will be authorized the use of one-time pads for the encipherment and decipherment of communications whose contents he wishes to withhold from local station personnel. For emergency purposes, such as a breakdown of communications via [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Page and his field assistant have been trained.

### 12. Equipment

In addition to one-time pads and carbon system, Page will be issued a Leica camera with a document reproduction attachment. He will further be provided with strip film and a few of the elementary concealment devices in which to hide strip film. (*[name not declassified]*) will be trained in document photography and the developing of strip film.) If operationally necessary, the equipment may be loaned out to indigenous agents and a replacement will be provided upon request.

### 13. Transportation

For the duration of his stay in Guatemala, Page and the labor assistant, will each be authorized the full-time use of an American-make car to be purchased locally. Locally available means of transportation, including commercial aircraft, railway, ships and taxis are authorized.

### 14. Entertainment

A representation allowance not to exceed \$1,000 during a period of thirty days will be provided for purposes set forth in AFR 30-6, paragraph 2. The style of entertainment will be dictated by local standards and by the nature of Page's cover.

### 15. Operational Expenditures

Page will be authorized to expend without prior approval up to and including \$1,000 for developmental purposes in each case, with a maximum of \$10,000 per month set aside to cover such expenditures. One-time expenditures over and beyond \$1,000, and any expenditures in fulfillment of a commitment providing for recurrent payments extending over a period of more than one month shall require prior headquarters approval.

### 16. Finances

Expenses other than those directly related to the conduct of clandestine operations (e.g. payment of agents) will be paid by draft against Page's account with the *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* whenever this is considered appropriate. In addition, a letter of credit will be opened with a Guatemalan Bank, preferably a *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* correspondent in that country, in the amount of \$5,000. Other expenditures will be defrayed from funds made available by Guatemala Station.

### 17. Accounting

All operational expenditures will be accounted for by voucher, setting forth the nature of the transaction in as much detail as compatible with local security conditions. Whenever possible receipts will be submitted, but in lieu thereof a written statement to the effect that a receipt was not obtainable will be accepted. Personal expenditures incurred by personnel connected with K-Program, if Agency funds are involved,

will be accounted for as soon as possible, and reimbursement will be effected as soon as compatible with local security.

[name not declassified]

---

**119. Memorandum From C/[title not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency, to All Staff Officers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 31, 1954.

SUBJECT

Selection of individuals for disposal by Junta Group

C/[title not declassified] has requested a list of names be compiled for study by Staff Officers to determine if they meet the latest criteria for inclusion on the Junta's disposal list.

Consideration for inclusion on the final list should positively establish that the individual falls into one or more of the following groups:

1) High government and organizational leaders whose outward position has not disclosed the fact they are motivated and directed by the Cominform and who are irrevocably implicated in Communist doctrine and policy.

2) Out-and-out proven Communist leaders whose removal from the political scene is required for the immediate and future success of the new government.

3) Those few individuals in key government and military positions of tactical importance whose removal for psychological, organizational or other reasons is mandatory for the success of military action.

This document is routed to Staff Officers for deletions, additions, and/or comments. It is requested that a final list of disposeses be approved promptly to permit P.M. planning to proceed on schedule.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 145, Folder 12. No classification marking. Marked "Hand Carry." A handwritten note at the bottom of the page reads: "Elimination List. April [illegible]—Rip is taking a copy of list of names for checking with the Junta. April 7—Original Memo with attached Biographic data has been passed to [title not declassified]. Returned by [title not declassified] on 1 June 1954."

The following list of individuals for consideration has been assembled from old lists supplied by the Junta and from recent intelligence available at LINCOLN. Your careful consideration is requested in making additions or deletions.<sup>2</sup>

Each officer is to indicate his concurrence by placing his initials after each name on the attached list which he believes should remain on this list. Exceptions, additions or deletions are to be noted on the pages following the attachment.

---

<sup>2</sup> The phrase "recent intelligence available" is underlined and a marginal note reads: "no, not done." The list is attached but not printed

---

**120. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1954, 2256Z.

45322. To: [place not declassified] (for SKILLET from Whiting). Re: [telegram indicator not declassified] 071; LINC 1585.<sup>2</sup>

1. Approached Air Force headquarters in effort obtain approval and assistance for implementation your recommendation. Air Force points out that probable reason for local inability take action is existence of clause in basic contractual agreement forbidding U.S. military mission engage any intelligence activities. This clause likewise inserted similar military assistance agreements numerous other countries with result that any action WSHOOFS which could be construed as violating this clause would prejudice position and standing military missions in other areas as well as WSHOOFS.

2. In view these circumstances, Air Force disinclined instruct ref identity A this matter and in addition there may be problem of providing properly qualified expert to do job.

3. Our best recommendation is that you endeavor deal with negative reply in manner best calculated gain some credit by pointing out

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 8. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner. Repeated to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

<sup>2</sup> Neither printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 13, Folder 1 and Box 142, Folder 4, respectively)

that inability comply with request is measure of our good faith, living up to strict terms contractual agreement. You might also request that if some other method of meeting problem could be suggested by WSHOOFS authorities this would receive most favorable consideration possible. For your own information, a request coming from head of WSHOOFS government would, to some extent, mitigate possibility damaging consequences of affirmative response to request. However, technical problem of effect on status military missions other countries would remain.

4. Greatly regret our inability help you solve Air Force angle this problem. Concerning para 5–B of reference, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] hereby requested submit on urgent basis any plan or proposal which it considers feasible to this end, including possible utilization some KUBARK agent assets. This point not to be discussed with WSHOOFS officials pending Headquarters consideration.

---

**121. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division (King)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 8, 1954.

SUBJECT

Guatemalan acquisition of Iron Curtain arms

1. The addressees of the original and copies of this memorandum have been alerted to the extreme importance of the subject matter, and [*name not declassified*] has been requested to get on top of this matter and give it highest priority attention during the forthcoming days and until we have pressed the matter to conclusion. Each of the other addressees has a role to play in connection with the matter, and while contributions of ideas and recommendations are solicited from them—it is most important that the handling of this matter be coordinated in one place, viz. [*name not declassified*]. This would apply in particular to any propagandistic exploitation of this matter and no directives should be given about it without prior clearance as indicated.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 158, Folder 5. Secret; Eyes Only.



2. Toward the close of our briefing session with Assistant Secretary Holland this development was the subject of extensive discussion. Everyone present, including the Director and Deputy Director, was impressed with the significance of the opportunity afforded to us if this matter is properly handled and dealt with. The obvious first phase is a concentration on the intelligence aspect of the matter and until we have firmed up the intelligence concerning the shipment and its time and method of delivery, including the identification of the vessel or other means of transport, no other action of any kind should be taken. If we are able to pin this one down and develop intelligence concerning the shipment, there are a number of means of exploitation which will have to be considered at a very high policy level, and the possibility exists that strong measures may be taken.

3. It is our current thinking that we should take no action at this stage to deter or interfere with the shipment, but rather allow events to take their course at least to the point when exposure would be most compromising to the Guatemalans.

4. In a conversation with Admiral Espe yesterday afternoon, I called his attention to this matter and underscored its importance. I proposed to him and he agreed to an "intelligence partnership" with regard to this shipment. More specifically, I suggested that we keep each other fully informed of whatever might come to our attention respectively about the shipment and that our joint resources be concentrated upon the obtainment—through secret means—of all possible information about it. I have recommended to [name not declassified] that he follow up on this opening conversation with Admiral Espe or his Deputy, and I think that it is important that this be done at an early date. In this follow-up [name not declassified] should emphasize the importance of avoiding any showing of our (US) knowledge or interest so as to avoid a premature flushing of the covey.

Frank C. Wisner<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

122. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]**<sup>1</sup>

[place not declassified], April 8, 1954, 0847Z.

1690. 1. Important emphasis be placed on all evidence connecting WSBURNT with recent attempt against [name not declassified].<sup>2</sup> Desire to know true sponsors of movement; where and how trained; origin of weapons and supplies plus any documentary evidence implicating WSBURNT.

2. Understand Diplomatic Corps invited to inspect weapons. Could you obtain photos and description including markings?

3. Jose Maria Tercero Lacayo in hands local authorities allegedly stated group trained in WSBURNT and sent [name not declassified] for this mission. Can you obtain details of interrogation?

4. Alberto Baez Bone allegedly former member WSBURNT army, a Luis Baez Bone, KMFLUSH exile in WSBURNT was connected with Communist front organizations. Are they identical? Where is Baez now? If captured, attempt obtain full details of interrogation.

5. Jorge Rivas Montes, Honduran, known leader of Caribbean Legion reportedly in charge WSBURNT Carib/Legion Training Program. Whereabouts unknown.

6. Francisco Ibarra Mayorga, Lt. Guillermo Duarte and Guillermo Suarez Rivas reportedly took asylum in WSBURNT Embassy. These plus Adolfo Alfaro and Hernan Robleto reported in [name not declassified] Embassy may become available for interrogation if [name not declassified] criminal law decision invalidates political asylum.

7. Juan Martinez Reyes, known KMFLUSH arms dealer.

8. Rifles and MG's reported by Pivall as Mexican make; FBIS reports arms bore [name not declassified] marks.

9. Cable info priority as received.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 3, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA Station in [place not declassified].

<sup>2</sup> The Nicaraguan Government announced on April 5 the capture of an armed group allegedly planning an attack on Somoza; see Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, pp. 293–294.

123. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 10, 1954, 0111Z.

45998. To: [place not declassified] (for SKILLET from Whiting). Refs: A. [telegram indicator not declassified] 109; B. [telegram indicator not declassified] 111; C. [telegram indicator not declassified] 108; D. [telegram indicator not declassified] 091.<sup>2</sup>

1. Ref A: Double Uncle.

2. Both ODACID and KUBARK seriously concerned about extent of SKILLET's<sup>3</sup> personal involvement as revealed by above references. We had never contemplated that SKILLET would be projected into first-hand discussion of details this operation with such persons as Pres. WSHOOFS and Chief of Air Staff. Unable to state at present time what effect this exposure will have on ODACID judgment re continuation operation in present form, but we already on notice very strong feelings of doubt re advisability trying maintain present timetable. At high level meeting scheduled for tomorrow we hope obtain some clarification ODACID position and will communicate results this discussion.

3. Will also raise at this meeting your question Ref C re what assurances, guarantees SKILLET authorized give Pres. WSHOOFS if this subject raised by him. However, should point out that SKILLET's giving of special and additional official guarantees as quid pro quo for his cooperation this matter would be clear indication if not acknowledgment ODYOKE official responsibility. This would remove last vestiges of carefully erected and tediously maintained basis for denial official responsibility.

4. Re request arrangement invitation WSHOOFS Defense Minister (Ref B) and also timing deliveries and arrangements storage matériel (Ref C), more time will be required before any approval can be given these proposals let alone action taken thereon. At present we much prefer hold matériel in place rather than send it forward and hand it over to tender mercies WSHOOFS who might refuse release it at critical moment or even use this possession as bargaining or evidentiary weapon against us.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 4. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> None printed; telegrams 109, 111, and 108 are dated April 8, April 9, and April 8, respectively. (Ibid., Box 13, Folder 2) Telegram 91 is dated April 7. (Ibid., Folder 1)

<sup>3</sup> A handwritten marginal note reads: "Amb to Honduras, Whiting Willauer," and an arrow points to "SKILLET."

5. Concerning para 3 (Ref D) Whiting understands that instructions have already gone forward from ODACID authorizing delay of brief but unspecified period of action re military treaty. We continue to feel negotiation this treaty and any news releases which could be made concerning it of great impact upon WSBURNT military thinking. Therefore extremely important progress this as rapidly as conditions permit. Your judgment as to timing requested in light of foregoing.

6. SKILLET may rest assured all his messages being closely followed by Whiting personally and that Whiting fully aware of pressures under which everyone connected this matter laboring.

---

**124. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 10, 1954, 1637Z.

46015. Re: DIR 45998.<sup>2</sup> For SKILLET from Whiting.

1. High level meeting referred to in ref scheduled for this afternoon following which SKILLET will receive further guidance.<sup>3</sup> However in meanwhile Whiting requested by Starke convey to SKILLET following personal message.

"SKILLET should not have any further direct contact with local authorities or other non ODYOKE individuals with regard to any aspect of SUCCESS except pursuant to and within limits of specific instructions and authorization from HQs ODACID and KUBARK. Starke very concerned with regard present extent official exposure and considers that this raises serious question desirability continuing operation as previously planned."

2. In light of the foregoing and without in any way purporting to prejudge outcome of basic policy decision re continuation and timing SUCCESS Whiting suggests SKILLET may wish consider and offer recommendations concerning best means softening impact local authorities SKILLET's withdrawal from direct contact. Realize possibility they

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 8, Folder 9. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wisner. Repeated to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

<sup>2</sup> Document 123.

<sup>3</sup> On April 10 Wisner briefed Assistant Secretary Holland on PBSUCCESS and Holland, shocked by security lapses, demanded a top-level review of the project. (Cullather, *Operation PBSUCCESS* p. 101) See Document 127 for CIA's response.

may interpret such breakoff as evidence complete reversal ODYOKE position regarding all aspects this matter. Also on assumption policy decision may favor continuation project in something like present form recommendations SKILLET and Princep for re-establishment indirect channels communication will be needed for consideration here.

---

**125. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 10, 1954, 1828Z.

46048. From Whiting.

1. FYI. High level meeting this afternoon being held at request identity A who has expressed strong doubts and reservations and purpose is to give him basic intelligence briefing and outline general concept of Success. Discussion of operational details will be held to minimum.

2. Plan generally take following positions:

A. Basic reason for PBSUCCESS in first instance was top level direction to accomplish planned result.

B. ODACID still primarily in charge basic policy decision and having approved our present plan at highest level we propose proceeding as scheduled unless directed otherwise by ODACID or unless operational considerations dictate modification plan and timing.

C. Regarding situation WSHOOFS believe no decision should be made before we obtain full knowledge all facts which LINCOLN obtaining from ONTRICH today.

D. Believe despite SKILLET exceeding authority situation may not prove irreparable operationally.

E. Any substantial delay present plan by ODACID would be serious and might mean any new effort thereafter would require starting from scratch or worse.

3. Will advise soonest outcome meeting which we feel certain will not produce any final decisions.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 8, Folder 1. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wisner.

126. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency**<sup>1</sup>

[*place not declassified*], April 11, 1954, 0935Z.

1776. Ref: A. DIR 44842; B. LINC 1777; C. [*telegram indicator not declassified*] 126, para 4; D. LINC 1778.<sup>2</sup>

1. Following summation situation represents LINC's views based upon debriefing Ontrich who arrived 0000 April 11:

A. Galvez weakened and equivocated [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to degree that required firm action to establish definite cooperation. Latter action taken by SKILLET who, while keeping SKIMMER version and stressing ODYOKE non-intervention, kept Galvez in line while using Iden A and Ontrich to press for firm operational details.

B. SKILLET demonstrated exceptional political skill in keeping Vice Pres from resigning thus holding govt together for PBSUCCESS. This action endeared SKILLET to Galvez. Latter apparently now leaning on SKILLET as source of strength during current politically unstable period preceding elections.

C. Excellent security appears present despite above maneuvering. Only Galvez, Vice Pres, ForMin and Chief Air Force cut in within WSHOOFS. No documentary evidence nor witnesses to SKILLET talks. Plausible denial remains intact.

D. Galvez has general understanding with Osorio<sup>3</sup> to act against WSBURNT together. SAFFRON-1, firm Calligeris supporter, due see Osorio next few days. More Galvez becomes committed in interim, stronger will SAFFRON-1's pressure on Osorio be. Osorio's support also requires ODACID approach in manner believed in progress at HQs level.

E. Removal MinDefense is essential earliest but is not a prerequisite for running initial flights. Time factor important as security weakens with every day's delay once flights initiated. Need HQs action.

F. LINC withdraws objections to intermediate storage at [*name not declassified*] as recent reports indicate increased enemy activity both sides of border. Thus gear would be moved from [*name not declassified*] direct with minimum delay into target areas.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 3, Folder 4. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> References A and B are *ibid.*, Box 142, Folder 4. Reference C is *ibid.*, Box 13, Folder 2. Reference D has not been found.

<sup>3</sup> President of El Salvador.

G. Objectives re evidence of ODYOKE participation withdrawn view above clarification as now evident WSHOOFS would be thoroughly implicated once permitting arms enter country. Re-affirmation SKILLET's role would prove extremely important to sustain Galvez's courage follow through. Believe Galvez's position too unstable vis-à-vis Carias to double-cross Calligeris. Thus conclusion is that Galvez will be most anxious move gear into target country rapidly as possible.

H. Test flight already laid on for 1730 April 11, per ref C. LINC strongly believes that Galvez must not be allowed to falter now that he has authorized flights and once gear arrives he has little choice but to follow through. He very anti-Communist and desires elimination WSBURNT but recognizes his own weakness to act, PBSUCCESS provides his answer.

2. Certain essential factors appear more firmly established than ever, namely:

A. Situation developing rapidly and favorably in WSBURNT. Archbishop's call for national crusade against Communism. Friction, distrust and uneasiness apparent in govt. People fully expecting change in government. Thus greatest time problem is to hold off abortive action and real action must not be delayed beyond present schedule.

B. Political instability in WSHOOFS dictates adherence to schedule as any delay will only jeopardize this ally. Loss of WSHOOFS could mean loss of DTFROGS as above.

C. Failure continue maximum effort to meet present ops plans which still intact and capable fulfillment unquestionably means loss of current year and possibly last chance overthrow Communists short direct military intervention.

3. View above factors and ref C LINC acting within authority ref A has determined to run a test black flight on schedule 11 April per ref D.

4. If HQs desires further explanation of foregoing, it is requested Dunbar be contacted by telephone soonest.

127. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 15, 1954.

SUBJECT

Disadvantages and damages resulting from a decision to discontinue or *substantially* modify PBSUCCESS

a. Pulling the plug on Calligeris and his organization with attendant possibilities of open recrimination as well as probable collapse of internal and external Calligeris organization. Difficulty, if not impossibility of reviving and revitalizing this organization and these individuals.

b. The possibility that there might be an attempted and abortive coup on the part of elements of the Calligeris organization; the results of such a fiasco both in terms of wiping out elements of potential resistance against the regime and charges and recriminations, are believed to be sufficiently evident to avoid the necessity for a fuller spelling-out here.

c. Sudden letting-down of Somoza which, coming on the heels of recent strong reassurances of continuing support and at a time of great pressure upon Somoza, might also result in open recriminations and great difficulties in obtaining his future "cooperation" with any form of covert venture which he might have reason to believe was stimulated or backed by us. If he chose to be very tough about the matter he has within his direct or potential control a lot of people and a lot of hardware which could be "worked on" or used by him to our considerable embarrassment.

d. Pulling the plug on the situation in Honduras which has been carefully built up to the point of our apparent ability to obtain the cooperation from Galvez and Co., which we need. According to the local estimate of the situation, the key members of the Honduran Government are currently not only committed to the support of the operation but are anxious to proceed vigorously. A reversal of direction at this time might have the effect of driving Gomez into a state of neutralist funk and would, in any case, make it extremely difficult to obtain his cooperation in the future.

e. The killing-off of this operation at the present time, if not accompanied almost simultaneously by a substantial new program of similar

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 143, Folder 1. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten note at the top of the page reads: "Presented by Wisner to State Dept. (Holland). File Policy folder."



nature, would soon be known to the Guatemalan Communist regime and would tend to reassure that regime and strengthen its position. Doubtless the collapse of the Calligeris organization would be seized upon by the Guatemalan regime and widely heralded within the country—as well as outside—as proof of the “strength and rectitude” of Arbenz and Co.

f. Both State and this Agency would be immediately faced with the \$64 question: “What are we going to do about Guatemala, and what can we do that would be effective?” We are on notice of the fact that in the upper echelons of the Administration it is expected that something will be done—of a drastic nature—to remove the menace of Communist-controlled Guatemala. Moreover, there seems to exist a considerable degree of expectation in certain quarters of the Congress that something is brewing, and in any case, that something must be done. These are real factors in the problem which must be taken seriously into account. There is also the question of public opinion, with noticeable indications of a rising feeling of concern about Guatemala and the ever-present possibility that this will crystallize in terms of a demand for action. The significance of this last point is not that it is or would become a partisan political issue domestically, but rather that an accumulation of pressures of the kind referred to could have the effect of forcing action on a too-hasty basis and possibly with fewer assets than are believed to be available at present. Any action taken after a public clamor would be much more demonstrably attributable to us than action taken prior to such public debate and demand.

g. It remains our estimate that there has been a continuing and increasing disintegration in the political situation in Guatemala and in surrounding countries, and that if the present trend is unchecked, it is entirely possible that governments in addition to that of Guatemala’s may fall prey to Communist infiltration, subversion and ultimate take-over.

h. Finally, there would be a serious adverse effect upon the morale of our own personnel if the operation were to be abruptly called off. This is, of course, not vital inasmuch as our people are professionals and are supposed to take their orders in good part and carry them out conscientiously. However, there would be an inevitable, intangible loss of heart and taste for an attempted subsequent resumption of an operation of this character, and this would be understandable

The foregoing points are not submitted by way of argumentation. They simply represent our best efforts to outline the principal deterrents and difficulties which would result from a decision to jettison the operation at the present time. Some, if not most, of these difficulties and detriments would tend to be the greater as we proceed further into the operation and become even more engaged than we now are.

**128. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 17, 1954, 2043Z.

47076. On 14 April, ODACID informed all West European Stations<sup>2</sup> (summary follows):

A. ODACID increasingly concerned WSBURNT frantic efforts obtain arms and evade ODYOKE embargo by purchasing European market. Such arms may be used to counterbalance anti-Communist elements WSBURNT army or against neighbors. Current tension from KMFLUSH developments may create opportunity for above.

B. To define ODYOKE position to all govts and supplement previous statements to various govts, notify appropriate govt officials of ODACID concern this situation for free world and ask for their views what prompt measures necessary to control export and transit of arms to check clandestine delivery to WSBURNT. But stress on ODACID desire for "active cooperation" in view danger of undue WSBURNT strength in currently unstable area if such arms obtained.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 8, Folder 10. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by [name not declassified], cleared by King, and approved by J. D. Esterline.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 323, April 14; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1098–1099.

---

**129. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], April 18, 1954, 0238Z.

1959. 1. HQs states ODACID reluctant involve any their people operational aspects PBSUCCESS; therefore, you will instruct Page that until notified otherwise, he should *not* request assistance of JMBUG. Whiting letter re Page trip to WSBURNT being held HQs pending complete clarification foregoing with ODACID.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 3, Folder 6. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Page should be advised that present ODACID position re participation ODYOKE persons in PBSUCCESS makes it even more necessary that he:

- A. Contact SOCCER only under maximum security conditions.
- B. Absolutely avoid SOCCER participation in operations.

---

**130. Paper Prepared in Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], April 21, 1954.

COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The Communist movement in Guatemala and Central America is part of the world movement of Communist Parties. All Communist Parties, acting under the direction of the Soviet Union, follow the same general pattern in seeking to capture free social institutions and democratic governments. Some operate openly and others clandestinely, but all are integral parts of the world wide Communist effort. Communism as an ideology, in Guatemala as in other countries, is only a creed for a small militant and power-hungry group. Communist successes are largely the result of an effective use of operational techniques designed to effect the greatest possible degree of control over the most important elements of the local political structure.

In Guatemala these elements are infiltrated at top levels by Communists with the result that the government and economy are effectively controlled by the Party. President Jacobo Arbenz and other prominent government and military officials are not members of the Communist Party. However, Arbenz has used the Communists to further his own political ambitions, and to a great extent he is now dependent upon them for the support which he needs to stay in power. For all practical purposes he and his chief aides follow the Communist line in their speeches and actions, and they have relied in an increasing measure upon the advice of Communist leaders. The latter constitute the real government of Guatemala in the sense that they have a decisive influ-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 231677/1, Box 102, Folder 2. Secret. Transmitted to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division under cover of a memorandum from Jerome C. Dunbar.

ence on all important moves, either directly through government officials or through pressure tactics on the part of controlled organizations. As long as the Army, few officials of which are under Communist influence, continues to support Arbenz, it is likely that Communist power will grow.

The most influential Communists and pro-Communists in Guatemala at the present time are the following:

Jose Manuel Fortuny  
Secretary General of the Communist Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT).

Carlos Manuel Pellecer  
Secretary of Disputes of the General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (CGTG). Deputy in National Congress.

Augusto Charnaud MacDonal  
Secretary General of the Party of the Guatemalan Revolution (PRG). Minister of Government.

Victor Manuel Gutierrez  
Secretary General of the CGTG. Deputy National Congress.

Leonardo Castillo Flores  
Secretary General of the National Farm Workers of Guatemala (CNCG).

Julio Estrada de la Hoz  
Secretary General of the Party of Revolutionary Action (PAR).  
Deputy National Congress.

Dora Franco y Franco  
Secretary General of Alliance of Guatemalan Women (AFG).

Humberto Alvarado  
Head of PGT Youth Commission which controls AJDG.

Cesar Augusto Cazali Avila  
Secretary General of Democratic University Front (FUD).

Waldemar Barrios Klee  
Chief of Lands Section of National Agrarian Department and  
Assistant to Director.

All of the above occupy positions in which they can wield considerable influence over the attitudes and activities of the government. It will be noted that aside from the three deputies only two hold government positions. The majority are directors of mass organizations which have been formed as centers for Communist propaganda and agitation.

One of the principal Communist objectives in Guatemala, as elsewhere, has been to gain control of propaganda media. The government radio station TGW is under the direction of Carlos Alvarado Jerez, a Communist, and the official government paper, *Diario de Centro*

*America*, gives considerable favorable publicity to Communist-front activities. In addition, there are three other Communist-line papers. The leading Communist-front groups are the National Peace Committee, the AJDG and the FUD. In the case of virtually all front organizations a PGT member will be found in a key post, usually Secretary General or Organizational Secretary.

Guatemala has become the focal point of Communism in Central America, and during recent years it has encouraged the growth of Marxist ideas in the neighboring countries of Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Guatemalan Communists have also been actively engaged in the development of intelligence nets, not only in Guatemala itself, but in the bordering countries. The most active centers of Communist activity in Honduras have been along the border in the area near San Pedro Sula. The Guatemalan Consul in that town directs this activity, and Col. Jose Luis Morales, Guatemalan Military Attaché in Tegucigalpa, is in charge of Guatemalan Communist activities for Honduras as a whole. During recent months there has been a noticeable expansion of Communist efforts in Honduras, and the number of Guatemalan agents crossing the frontier has increased. Several agents have been sent into Honduras as ostensible exiles with instructions to join opposition groups, especially that headed by Lt. Col. Carlos Castillo Armas. The most recent group of such agents included Capt. Marco Antonio Garcia, Francisco Pereira and Francisco Contreras.

In El Salvador the best organized Communist movement is in the railway workers' union. Communists have planned the assassination of several Salvadoran officials, and Communist plots against the government have been discovered and prevented. During 1953 many Communists were picked up by the police and deported. One such group was suspected of being implicated in an assassination plot against Foreign Minister Roberto Canessa. All of these Communist exiles found a safe haven in Guatemala. Miguel Marmol and Virgilio Guerra, Salvadoran Communists, are active in the Guatemalan labor movement, and there is a group of young Salvadoran leftists under leadership of Manuel Otilio Hasbun, formerly President of the General Association of Salvadoran University Students. The latter were warmly welcomed by Gutierrez.

Exiles from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic have committees in Guatemala, which work in conjunction with the PGT. The Salvadoran Democratic Association meets in the PGT's Tribuna Popular. Leftist exiles from many other Latin American countries are also present in Guatemala.<sup>2</sup> They are given jobs or other-

---

<sup>2</sup> A handwritten marginal note reads: "2 offices, I presume!"

wise provided for by the PGT or its affiliated organizations. The Nicaraguan group is headed by Edelberto Torres Rivas, Secretary General of the AJDG, and Armando Flores Amador. Some of the Nicaraguan exiles were involved in the abortive coup in Nicaragua in April 1954, and there are indications that the PGT and the Guatemalan government may have given some support to the preparations for that revolutionary attempt.

Over the past five years many prominent Guatemalan Communists and Party sympathizers have travelled to the Soviet Union and the satellite countries. Four Guatemalans attended the Peking Peace Conference in October 1952. In November of that year four delegates were named to the Vienna Peace Congress, and in the following month thirteen Guatemalans attended the WFTU Social Security Conference in Vienna. The Guatemalan delegation to the Budapest World Peace Council in June 1953 included Lt. Col. Carlos Paz Tejada and Major Marco Antonio Franco. During the period from June to December 1953 a total of 48 Guatemalans visited the Russian orbit and eleven of these went to Moscow. In December 1953 Gutierrez returned from Moscow at the head of a delegation which had toured the Soviet Union after attending the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) Congress in Vienna. Fortuny departed for Moscow in November 1953 and returned to Guatemala on 8 January 1954.

Communists have gained control of the Guatemalan labor movement principally by means of a drive to create strong organizations under Party control. Guatemalan labor unions were consolidated into a single main federation, the CGTG, in 1951 under the close supervision of Confederation of Latin American Workers advisers (CTAL). Affiliation of the CGTG with the CTAL and the WFTU followed in 1953. Today organized labor is a militant and significant force in Guatemala. The CGTG has more than 500 affiliated unions, and a total of approximately 300,000 members. The Secretary General is Gutierrez, member of the Political Committee of the PGT, and every other key office of the CGTG is held by a Communist Party member. Gutierrez, Pellecer and Victor A. Leal were elected to the General Council of the WFTU in November 1953. At the Second National Congress of the CGTG in January 1954 it was proposed that Guatemala resume relations with the Soviet Union and "foreign intervention" was protested. At CGTG headquarters in Guatemala City the red Communist flag flew beside the Guatemalan emblem. The principal foreign delegate to this congress was Giuseppe Casadei, member of the permanent staff of the WFTU Secretariat in Vienna. This is the first instance in which a permanent WFTU staff member has attended a national meeting in any Latin American country.

Guatemalan Communists adopted Agrarian Reform as their central theme in 1952, and Communists took an active part in committee hearings on the Agrarian Law in Congress. This law created the National Agrarian Department, which is the central administrative agency, and Communists have heavily infiltrated this organization. The head of the Lands Section is Barrios,<sup>3</sup> who assumes charge in the absence of the director, Major Alfonso Martinez. The Secretary General is Maria Jerez de Fortuny, wife of the PGT chief. Seven of the twenty Agrarian Inspectors are PGT members and another eight are believed to be affiliated with that Party. In addition, another twelve employees are known PGT members.

Martinez has steadily lost ground in his efforts to have agrarian changes carried out in an orderly manner. In pressing Martinez for rapid implementation of the law the PGT leaders have clearly demonstrated that they regard the present situation as transitory and merely the foundation for the eventual transformation of Guatemala into a Socialist state. The Agrarian Reform program has provided the Communists with weapons which may be useful as their struggle for domination continues. The State has now become by far the country's largest landholder, since the private lands expropriated under the law have been turned over to the peasants only in life use. The PGT has been successful in identifying itself with the changes being made under Agrarian Reform, and is counting on this situation to break the power of the landowners and United Fruit and bring about its domination of the government. Of late the Party has inspired illegal land seizures which have led to violence in some sections. Pellecer, the most aggressive of the PGT leaders, has been assigned the task of inciting the peasants to invade private property. Arbenz himself has described Agrarian Reform as the "most transcendental force in our economic and political life."

In manners such as these, given sufficient freedom in which to operate and faced with ineffective opposition, the Communist organizational and operational techniques tend to confuse and corrupt a country until it can be brought under effective control. The penetration of Communists into selected agencies enables the Party to force policy and personnel changes, nullify opposition and strengthen its capabilities. Communists seek power through the exploitation of any issue and the discontented elements of any group.

---

<sup>3</sup> A handwritten marginal note reads: "Waldemar Barrios Klee—was acting chief during Major Martinez' absence—The listing on page 2 of this document is correct."

131. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 21, 1954.

SUBJECT

Synthesis of Ambassador Peurifoy's Remarks Relevant to PBSUCCESS Made at a Meeting 21 April 1954

PRESENT

Ambassador Peurifoy; [5 names not declassified]

1. Ambassador Peurifoy described the general situation as having worsened beyond that described in his February report.<sup>2</sup> As an example of this, he cited his belief that the Guatemalan Government is leading up to suppression of the independent press. He concluded that the usual diplomatic methods did not suffice to correct the situation and inferred that more drastic and definitive steps to overthrow the government must be taken.

2. Ambassador Peurifoy commented that despite the poor situation, there were some events such as the Archbishop's letter<sup>3</sup> that are definitely encouraging. He said this letter has reached the man in the street and is well received. He suggested that our propaganda not fail and to continue to exploit the letter and tie it into other opportunities.

3. The government, he said, is absolutely under control of a small Communist group and the government as a whole is moving in the direction of Communism. Such things as withdrawal of military pacts and other economic sanctions may irritate these people but will not stop them.

4. It was the Ambassador's opinion that the country is now in a receptive mood and that various groups, particularly the students, are believed to be ready to act. As an example of the atmosphere in Guatemala City, he said that most people are armed when they go to social functions and that all Latin American diplomats are armed wherever they go. The Ambassador saw little to be gained from economic sanctions and from OAS action and agreed with the view expressed that the United States would face less of an outcry if it achieved a successful coup than it would during a long trying period of sanctions which, in

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 1. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on April 22.

<sup>2</sup> Neither the report nor a more detailed reference to the report has been found.

<sup>3</sup> On April 4 Guatemalan Archbishop Mariano Rossell Arellano issued an anti-Communist pastoral letter, the text of which has not been found. The Embassy in Guatemala City provided an overview of the letter and its impact in dispatches 852, 856, and 871, April 12, 14, and 23, respectively. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 814.413/4-1254, 714.00(w)/4-1454, and 714.00(w)/4-2354)



any case, will possibly not be effective. He did not think, moreover, that Latin American countries, with the possible exception of Mexico and the Argentine, would go after the United States following a reasonably secure coup. In connection with the consideration of economic sanctions he pointed out that in Guatemala time is running against us.

5. He expressed the opinion that Pellecer has not split with Arbenz and doubts that Pellecer will get an overseas assignment since he and Gutierrez, who are in fact running the country, are too important to Arbenz. As an example of Pellecer's current political thinking, he recommended we consult Pellecer's speech made recently at Chimaltenango. In reply to a question as to Diaz' present position, Ambassador Peurifoy stated that he had been advised that Diaz is "out" as a result of a disagreement with Arbenz over the choice of the president of congress. Ambassador Peurifoy is inclined to doubt this as he believes that if it were true Diaz would have made an attempt while he was still in command.

6. With regard to the arming of labor elements Ambassador Peurifoy said he did not doubt that some arms have reached the campesinos.

7. As to the attitude of the army, Ambassador noted that there are all sorts of reports but that it is his view that the army is opportunistic and would move against the government if they thought it to be to their advantage. He said that the army is in a vulnerable position because Arbenz could gradually remove suspected officers from key positions and replace them with others. Ambassador concluded that time is running against us, particularly with regard to the army. The political situation is worsening he believes as the other parties of the national front, while they are not Communist, are falling more and more under the influence of Communist leadership.

8. In speaking of the need for action in Guatemala, the Ambassador said, "If we maintain the status quo, we shall in the end have to use 'those gallant marines.'"

9. He stated the belief that hard hitting speeches against Guatemala by personages in the United States Government could be counterproductive and would particularly alienate those non-Communists whose actions are influenced by nationalist emotions.

10. He expressed doubt as to the feasibility of the "cotton plan" and believed that the alternative plan to blow up cotton gins owned by the Arbenz coterie would be desirable. He stated occasional sabotage of pipelines, one or two bridges and installations in the Puerto Barrios area would cause great commotion in the country.

11. He specifically recommended a leaflet air drop on Guatemala City on May Day and suggested the leaflet material should include some reference to the Archbishop's letter.

12. In reply to the question as to whether Toriello is salvageable, the Ambassador replied in the negative and he suggested he be eliminated.

13. He pointed out that some of the project's buildup phases could in themselves precipitate the fall of government.

14. Mr. [name not declassified] asked the Ambassador whether he thought the project is exerting pressure on the government. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative and added that one hears about RUFUS coming back and the rumor has even set dates for such a coup such as Holy Week and now May Day. He concluded that there is in this connection considerable nervousness on the part of the government.

---

**132. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Director for National Estimates (Bull) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 22, 1954.

SUBJECT

Review of NIE-84: "Probable Developments in Guatemala"

The Board of National Estimates has reviewed the conclusions of NIE-84, "Probable Developments in Guatemala", which was adopted by the IAC on 12 May 1953.<sup>2</sup> In the course of this review the Board consulted with Ambassador Peurifoy, DD/P/WH (Col. King), OIR (Mr. Burgin), and G-2 (Col. Hennig), but the present memorandum has not been formally coordinated. Discussion of critical aspects of the problem is contained in the Enclosure.

Conclusions

1. We consider that the conclusions of NIE-84 remain essentially valid. In particular, we reaffirm the first conclusion, as follows:

The current political situation in Guatemala is adverse to US interests. The Guatemalan Communists exercise a political influence far out of proportion to their small numerical strength. Their influence will probably continue to grow as long as President Arbenz remains in power.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 143, Folder 1. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1061–1071.

2. The Communists now effectively control the political life of Guatemala. Arbenz' decisions on domestic and foreign policy are reached, not in the official cabinet, but in a kitchen cabinet composed of Communists and pro-Communists. There is no prospect of a break between Arbenz and the Communists.

3. There has probably been an increase in popular disillusionment with the Arbenz regime. There is certainly increased desperation among opposition elements.<sup>3</sup> In present circumstances, however, the possibility of effective internal political action to alter the situation does not exist. We believe that effective revolutionary action would require the active support of a major portion of the Army.

4. The disposition of the Army toward the regime is therefore crucial. We note indications of unrest, even of disaffection, within the Army and consider that a revolutionary potential now exists there. We do not believe, however, that the Guatemalan Army is likely to take spontaneous action against the Arbenz regime.

5. The Communists will be concerned to neutralize the revolution potential in the Army, and, with the passage of time, may succeed in doing so.

6. The solidarity of the other Central American states in opposition to Guatemala has weakened during the past year and may further decrease.

7. In view of the foregoing considerations, we believe that time is on the side of the Communists in Guatemala.

**Harold R. Bull<sup>4</sup>**  
Lt. Gen. USA (Ret.)

### Enclosure

#### *The Growth of Communist Political Influence*

1. The first conclusion of NIE-84 reads as follows:

The current political situation in Guatemala is adverse to US interests. The Guatemalan Communists exercise a political influence far out of proportion to their small numerical strength. Their influence will

<sup>3</sup> In an April 19 briefing memorandum for Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Holland, John W. Fisher of the Office of Middle American Affairs agreed: "The Guatemalan political opposition, both at home and in exile, is numerous but hopelessly disorganized and demoralized." For text of the memorandum, see *ibid.*, pp. 1099-1100.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Bull signed the original.

probably continue to grow as long as President Arbenz remains in power.

2. This conclusion remains valid. Under the patronage of Arbenz, Communist influence in Guatemala has grown during the past year and will probably continue to grow. This growth is not the result of any innovation, but of a year's further development along the lines previously established. For example:

a. There has been further development in the organization of rural workers as a political force under Communist influence and control (as was anticipated in the sixth conclusion of NIE-84). The Communists have demonstrated a capability for the rapid mobilization and assembly of considerable numbers of these workers for political demonstrations.

b. The Communists are probably also capable of mobilizing up to 20,000 of these workers as an armed militia available to support the regime in an emergency. We cannot confirm reports of the existence of such a para-military force, but would consider it a logical development in the circumstances. There is good reason to believe that the required quantities of small arms have been distributed and cached under the control of the Communist agrarian organizers. It is not apparent that this putative militia has received any appreciable military training. Even without such training, however, a substantial number of rural workers, armed and organized, could exert considerable political and military force.

c. The Communists have strengthened their control of the pro-Arbenz political parties. The Communist Party itself is small, but crypto-Communists control the other parties in the pro-Arbenz coalition and through them effectively control the political life of the country.

d. There is good reason to believe that Arbenz' decisions on Guatemalan domestic and foreign policy are reached, not in the official cabinet, but in a kitchen cabinet composed of four Communists and six pro-Communists.

#### *Arbenz' Commitment to the Communists*

3. The third conclusion of NIE-84 reads as follows:

President Arbenz still exercises personal control of the Administration and of the Army and the Police. It is still possible for him to break his ties with the Communists and to moderate the policies of his Administration, but it is highly unlikely that he will do so.

4. This conclusion remains valid, but the likelihood of a break between Arbenz and the Communists is even more remote than it was a year ago. He is too deeply committed, emotionally and politically, to extricate himself.

*The Absence of Effective Political Opposition*

5. The key sentences of the seventh conclusion of NIE-84 read as follows:

There is no likelihood that [internal]<sup>5</sup> opposition could alter the course of the Government by political action. It could not succeed in a revolutionary attempt opposed by the Army.

6. We believe that this conclusion remains valid. There has probably been an increase of popular disillusionment with the Arbenz regime. There is certainly increased desperation among opposition elements. In present circumstances, however, the possibility of effective political action does not exist. We continue to believe that effective revolutionary action would require the active support of a major portion of the Army.

*The Position of the Guatemalan Army*

7. The eighth conclusion of NIE-84 reads as follows:

The Army is the only organized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering the political situation. Although a quick change of attitude is always possible, there is no present reason to doubt the continued loyalty of the Army high command and of most of the Army to Arbenz. The Army under its present leaders could not be expected to take revolutionary action unless they became convinced that their personal security and well-being were threatened by Communist infiltration and domination of the Government . . .

8. We consider the probable action of the Army to be the critical factor in the situation. In modification of the second sentence of the quoted paragraph, we note certain indications of unrest, even of disaffection, among Army officers which suggest that the precondition for revolutionary action specified in the third sentence may be approaching fulfillment. G-2 (Colonel Hennig), however, would reaffirm the second sentence, stressing the watchful control which Arbenz exercises over the Army command, the considerations of personal advantage which bind key officers to the regime, and the disposition of the rank-and-file to follow their leaders. This difference is a matter of emphasis rather than of essential substance. All would agree that a revolutionary potential now exists in the Guatemalan Army, but that the Guatemalan Army is not likely to take spontaneous action against the Arbenz regime.

9. The Communists will be concerned to neutralize the revolutionary potential in the Army. With the passage of time they may succeed in

<sup>5</sup> Brackets in the source text.

doing so by: (a) a gradual purge of disaffected officers; (b) subversion of the enlisted personnel; (c) a gradual reduction of the military capabilities of the Army by the government's failure to replace used weapons, equipment, and ammunition; and (d) development of a Communist-controlled workers' militia as a counter-balancing force. There are current indications of action along these several lines.

*The Position of Other Central American Republics*

10. The ninth conclusion of NIE-84 reads as follows:

. . . The Governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua . . . are fearful that the trend in Guatemala will lead to Communist subversion and social upheaval in their own territories. They are probably giving serious consideration to the possibility of effecting a political change in Guatemala through clandestine support of revolutionary action there. It is highly unlikely, however, that they would or could mount an open military intervention in Guatemala.

11. This conclusion remains valid. Prospective US military aid to these countries will take time to become effective and is not likely to alter the situation substantially. To the extent that it reassures them regarding their security against Guatemalan retaliation, it may embolden these countries to render clandestine support to revolutionary activities in Guatemala. Open military intervention would be a doubtful adventure at best, all the more so in view of Latin American sensitivity on the subject of intervention as recently demonstrated anew at the Caracas Conference.

12. The current imbroglio between Nicaragua and Costa Rica has weakened Central America solidarity in relation to Guatemala. If long continued, it may cause Costa Rica to look to Guatemala for support. The approaching election in Honduras presents opportunities for Guatemalan intrigue in that country and the possibility of an adverse change there.

133. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 24, 1954.

SUBJECT

Position Paper on PBSUCCESS

I. Appreciation of the Situation

*A. Conclusions of the Board of National Estimates*

The following estimate of the situation in Guatemala and adjoining countries is taken from a special estimate prepared during the past week by the Board of National Estimates. General Bull headed the Special Panel and the views of State (OIR) and the service intelligence agencies were solicited in the preparation of the estimate. The terms of reference of the estimating panel included the following questions:

What is the present strength of the Communists in Guatemala?

What are the current strengths and attitudes of Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador and what are the effects upon them of a continued march of Communism in Guatemala?

On whose side is time?

The conclusions of the Board of National Estimates as of 22 April 1954, are as follows:

[Omitted here are the Conclusions from Document 132.]

*B. Assets Available to PBSUCCESS*

*1. Inside the Country*

*a. General*

Before listing specific assets, the population of Guatemala should be mentioned as a strong, potential asset. Predominantly anti-Communist the people, once aroused from their normal political inertia, could play a powerful role against the Arbenz regime. Increasing government repression and Communist brutality are having their effect evidenced in numerous instances of popular unrest throughout the country. A few typical examples taken at random are the signature of an anti-Communist petition by 50 people in Communist Escuintla; a new

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 6. Top Secret.

vigorously anti-Communist newspaper in Chiquimula; large pockets of avowed anti-Communists at numerous points in the Mazatenango area; public meetings attended by several hundred people at Puerto Barrios; and the denial to the Communists of the local labor organization at Quezaltenango.

Though only tied together informally at present, considerable focus has been given to the large Catholic group by the extremely effective pastoral letter of April 4 issued by the Archbishop of Guatemala urging all Catholics to combat Communism. This letter, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], can, and it is believed will, have continuing effect if its message is continuously replayed.

Additional unity of purpose is provided by the psychological assets available in Guatemala as well as the encouragement generated by the vague but growing recognition that "something is in the air"—a well-backed movement is around the corner. Calligeris' announced leadership and well-received political manifesto of late February have contributed to this. It has also been a consequence of the paramilitary program, not presently military and formidable, but psychologically persuasive. A consciousness of the stick behind the carrot is considered a prerequisite to creating any effective opposition in Guatemala, Communist-dominated as it is today.

b. *Psychological*

Psychological assets include many newspapers and radio stations, not controlled or influenced by CIA, which are still independent. "El Espectador", for example, is strongly anti-Communist. So is Clemente Marroquin Rojas, the most influential journalist in Guatemala City. Admittedly these independents must move with caution and their days of independence may well be numbered but for the moment they survive.

A controlled group in Guatemala City publishes a weekly, "El Rebelde", directs poster and leaflet teams, a telephone provocation team, "goon" squads and runs intermittent radio broadcasts. It also operates a political organization consisting of a coalition of numerous political groups known as the National Anti-Communist Front (FAN), which provides coverage of the entire country. This is supplemented by a special group, "Inspectors", who periodically travel throughout the country contacting numerous agents.

Several other small anti-Communist publications in various parts of Guatemala receive financial aid and guidance.

c. *Military and Paramilitary*

As stated above the Board of National Estimates concludes that a revolutionary potential exists in the Guatemalan Army. Specific data may be added to confirm this estimate.



Disaffection and dissatisfaction are evident throughout all echelons. The high command is particularly vulnerable to defection and in some instances defection in place is practically assured. The Minister of National Defense, Jose Angel Sanchez, is opposed to Communist control over Arbenz and is considered inclined towards supporting any well-organized opposition movement. The Chief of the Armed Forces, Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz, is probably discredited and considered no longer loyal to Arbenz. The Chief of Staff, Colonel Enrique Parinello de Leon, has repeatedly indicated his desire to see the end of the Communist-controlled regime. The Chief of the Air Force, Colonel Luis A. Giron, is believed disaffected. The Minister without Portfolio, Colonel Elfego Monzon, is actively, covertly organizing within the Army for a coup [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Plans are under way to incorporate his assets with those of the Junta and a meeting is being planned to effect this union. Thus, within the high command a definite capability exists to defect in place sufficient numbers of influential military leaders to ensure control over the Armed Forces before any overt action is undertaken.

In furtherance of the objective to defect the Army, two distinct operations are in progress; the Junta, through its military contacts and an independent effort by CIA targeted at key personnel. The Junta leadership, being primarily composed of Guatemalan Army officers in exile, has achieved certain success to date. The leaders of this organizational effort have been examined by polygraph and cleared as to the validity of their statements. The independent effort is now being carried out by a case officer in the field following 60 days of intensive study of the most promising targets of importance.

In addition, a military organization of younger officers positively pledged to Calligeris is in existence. They have been organized and contacted by Calligeris' military representative in Guatemala. The Calligeris organization presently has four trusted military leaders in the four sectors of Guatemala City and a leader in each of the nine target garrisons. These leaders estimate that, on D-Day, they can capture from within all the garrisons except Quiche, Mazatenango and San Jose, where added efforts to prepare capitulation are in progress.

At best, the apparently "safe" garrisons will be taken without firing a shot. Where this does not work, correct disposition of friendly elements plus the denial of weapons and ammunition to enemy forces should quell opposition. If necessary, civilian paramilitary units will step in to provide overwhelming force.

As regards this civilian paramilitary organization, substantial numbers of men in each of the nine garrison areas in Guatemala are already pledged. The number of men available in each garrison area are listed

below. Three columns are given to show the various estimates, ranging from the most conservative to the optimistic. Column I figures cannot, of course, be guaranteed but are the result of checking Calligeris' figures with individual leaders who have been exfiltrated from Guatemala. These figures have been sufficiently confirmed by questioning, where possible, that it is the belief of the LINCOLN staff that they are accurate. Moreover, in no instance has questioning shown initial estimates to be seriously erroneous.

	I Total Positive Pledges	II Total Which There is Reason to Believe Exist in Area & Are Anti-Govt to Point of Taking Action	III Calligeris Claimed Support. Presently Unconfirmed but not Disproved
Guatemala City	1725	4225	9125
Coban	920	1750	4850
Quezaltenango	415	1915	8490
Mazatenango	195	2095	4000
Quiche	187	1887	4000
Puerto Barrios	471	671	1485
Jutiapa	660	2060	6000
Zacapa	565	1175	1200
San Jose	<u>4</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>150</u>
Total target, garrison vicinity	5142	15,928	39,300

In addition to the above civilians available in the garrison areas, four other civilian organizations in important tactical areas, ringing Guatemala City, are envisaged. Strength figures in these areas computed in the same manner as above are as follows:

	I	II	III
Area I	70	70	70
Area II	350	1300	3520
Area III			
Area IV	<u>150</u>	<u>1350</u>	<u>9420</u>
Total Tactical outer org.	570	2720	13,010

The entire complex of friendly military and paramilitary assets will be firmly organized, finally trained and led on D-Day, by the paramilitary assets developed and existing outside Guatemala. These assets are discussed under 2c below.

#### d. Intelligence

Intelligence from within Guatemala is provided mainly by the Junta Intelligence Service located in Honduras and discussed in the next section below. In addition the Guatemala City Station is providing good intelligence on political and psychological subjects as well as from sources on the Government, Army and Communist Party. In addition intelligence is provided by the propaganda organizations mentioned above as well as by the State Department and the service attachés.

#### 2. Outside the Country

##### a. General

One of the major assets of the Group outside of Guatemala is the backing provided by other countries.<sup>2</sup>

[5 paragraphs (31 lines of source text) not declassified]

##### b. Psychological

In addition to independent media, the following controlled external PW assets are available:

#### Publications and Radio

<i>Boletin del Ceuage</i>	5000 copies (3000 smuggled into Guatemala)	Published weekly in Honduras by controlled anti-Communist group of Guatemalan exiles.
Radio Programs	Honduras	Same group.
Leaflets and Bulletins	Honduras (smuggled into Guatemala)	Same group.
<i>El Combate</i>	5000 copies (3000 smuggled into Guatemala)	Published weekly in Salvador by anti-Communist front group (FAGE).
Radio Broadcasts (Cristal YSY)	Reaches about 50 miles beyond Guatemalan border	Same group.
<i>Pronto</i>	Newspaper, just begun. Distribution in Guatemala being developed, if possible	Published in Mexico by anti-Communist Guatemalan group (FEGAM).
<i>Bulletin for the Liberation of Guatemala</i>	Newspaper, anti-Junta but also anti-Communist	Published in Mexico (a few reach Guatemala) by Comm. for the Liberation of Guatemala (LIONIZER).

<sup>2</sup> Regarding the activity of other countries, see Documents 126 and 127.

A principal, if not *the* principal, psychological asset is a clandestine radio [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] which is expected to go on the air April 26. Broadcasting tapes are and will be prepared at LINCOLN. This station will be beamed at Guatemala from where it will be purportedly broadcasting. Programs are planned for the next thirty to forty days and two weeks of tapes are now ready for use. This radio will also provide the radio support needed immediately prior to the uprising unless it is inoperative or its use is undesirable in which case a contingency station fully under our control will be used. Preparations for this installation are substantially completed.

A writing staff of Guatemalans has been installed in safe houses near LINCOLN to provide the support needed for the above assets as well as preparing additional propaganda material for field distribution. A reporting system has been devised for psychological purposes which is providing substantial raw material for the writers. This is supplemented by hourly FBIS service and the receipt within 18 hours of publication of daily newspapers from Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Mexico, Salvador and Honduras.

To buttress the effects of the Caracas anti-Communist resolution two conferences in Mexico City have been arranged. The first scheduled for May 1 will be sponsored by the "Latin American Laborers in Exile" largely under the auspices of ORIT. Though not directly targeted at Guatemala, it is anticipated that considerable propaganda against the target will be generated. The second to be convened 27-30 May will be called the "Congress Against Soviet Intervention in Latin America". It will be attended by many prominent anti-Communists from every country in Latin America and will have as its main object the focusing of the attention of Latin Americans on the Communist situation in Guatemala thereby constituting a call for all anti-Communists to aid in the struggle.

*c. Paramilitary*

In the paramilitary field Calligeris is, of course, the leader and has with him an Executive, a senior Colonel, plus four ex-officer personnel as a staff. In addition there are 67 trainee graduates of one of our schools; 9 radio operators and crypto clerks in training plus 5 more on the way, who are already experienced. Recently about 40 more men arrived from Guatemala as sub-unit leaders or special task personnel while some 212 men with varying degrees of experience and different capabilities are available on a stand-by basis and will provide the nucleus for various shock forces. Adequate provision has been made for logistical support.

*d. Intelligence*

The primary intelligence assets are those initially provided by the Junta (Headquarters in Honduras) but now sufficiently reformed, compartmented and polygraphed to be legitimately considered the equivalent

of a direct PBSUCCESS asset. This separate but controlled service has penetrations in the major Guatemalan Government departments, all military garrisons, the Communist Party (PGT), [1 line of source text not declassified]. A CE Section has been developed giving exclusive attention to Communist penetrations of the Junta, conducting investigations and developing safeguards. Moreover, radio operators will soon be deployed within Guatemalan target areas to provide W/T communications for intelligence and EEI's.

[3 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

### C. Security

Ever since the work was first started on the preparation of a plan for PBSUCCESS it has been fully recognized that the U.S. would be accused of being the main sponsor of most if not all activities directed against the Arbenz regime. Written statements to this effect were included in the report on Stage One written in December 1953;<sup>3</sup> in a paper written in March 1954 and presented to the Secretary of State,<sup>4</sup> and, in addition, there have been numerous oral reports to the same effect. Moreover it has been consistently assumed that in an operation of this scope some evidence supporting the accusations would unavoidably be available to unfriendly powers or individuals. Nevertheless it was concluded that there was sufficient likelihood that no irrefutable evidence of a legal nature would be discovered to justify the undertaking particularly when the risks were weighed against the importance of the project.

A careful review of all known factors bearing on security now in existence including [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the U.S. Embassies in Guatemala and Honduras indicates that so far the estimates have been accurate and that security has been as well maintained in this project as could reasonably be expected. Consequently it is fair to assume that no irrefutable evidence tying the project to the U.S. Government is in the hands of the enemy. It would of course be as impossible in this case as in all others to guarantee this last statement but it can be asserted that the risks of U.S. involvement today are not such as to warrant, in our opinion, a termination or modification of the project on security grounds, if it is otherwise desirable.

Added support in cloaking the U.S. hand exists in the number of other countries which both have good reasons for wanting to see the replacement of the Arbenz Government and have the means for backing a coup of the size planned. The following facts are known to many:

---

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1, Document 75.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Second Interim Report, March 15, not found.

[4 paragraphs (25 lines of source text) not declassified]

The known hostility of the above countries to Arbenz was useful in cloaking the U.S. hand at the time of the January 1954 White Paper.<sup>5</sup> This paper directly accused Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, as well as private U.S. interests, of attempting to intervene in Guatemalan affairs with the acquiescence of “the government of the North”. Much of the “evidence” appended to the White Paper was quickly established as spurious and the Guatemalan Government itself hedged on whether “the government of the North” was intended to mean Mexico or the United States. Consequently nothing in the White Paper established official U.S. involvement. Continued study of the after effects of the White Paper indicates that it somewhat reinforced suspicions among all those previously inclined to suspect the U.S. but was roundly disbelieved by the majority of anti-Communists in Central America.

In conclusion the following observations on the question of U.S. involvement seem appropriate:

a. Although a number of individuals in both the Nicaraguan and Honduran Governments are personally convinced that the U.S. is favorably disposed toward this operation and although the Guatemalan regime may and probably does have indications to this effect, plausible denial by the U.S. in response to any charges could still be sustained. This would be especially true if the Guatemalan regime had been effectively overthrown and its leaders scattered.

b. There is not the slightest doubt that if the operation is carried through many Latin Americans will see in it the hand of the U.S. But it is equally true that they would see the hand of the U.S. in any uprising whether or not sponsored by the U.S., particularly since the U.S. has made it clear in many overt ways that it heartily disapproves of the Arbenz regime. In short it might be said that the only way to forestall such a belief is for the U.S. to make sure that there is no revolution, which we are in no position to do since there is good reason to believe that some one of the other potential sponsors will in all probability press for the revolution which under such circumstances (a) would in all likelihood abort and (b) would be laid at our door anyhow.

c. Assuming that in this instance a decision is taken to terminate or substantially to modify the present project for security reasons or at least on the grounds that the hand of the U.S. is too clearly shown, a serious question is raised as to whether any operation of this kind can appropriately be included as one of the U.S. cold war weapons, no matter how great the provocation or how favorable the auspices, as far as the entire area of Latin America is concerned.

---

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3, Document 89.

## II. Possible Courses of Action

A. Continue the plan in substantially its present form, bending every effort toward the earliest feasible conclusion. Some adjustment of the present target date would probably be necessary in view of the delays thus far encountered in the timetable of scheduled accomplishments and developments. There would, of course, be an understanding that the final phase would not be authorized unless and until the Director had satisfied himself that conditions were favorable for the success of the operation.

B. Adopt a substantially modified form of the plan, accentuating the intelligence, propaganda, political action, and defection aspects thereof, and postponing paramilitary action until October or later. This would have to assume that there could be a vigorous and coordinated program of official and overt action and covert operations.

C. Abandon the present plan and rely upon overt diplomatic action and relatively minor political and psychological warfare activities to overthrow the present regime. What is specifically proposed is to begin with a strong official statement of the United States position toward the present regime in Guatemala, followed by an attempt to secure the support of the Caracas majority at an OAS meeting in September for the application against Guatemala of the sanctions envisaged in the Rio Pact. Essentially this would involve an economic and communications blockade of Guatemala by OAS members or at least by those members willing to support and join in the action.

## III. Conclusions

A. The best chance of removing the Arbenz regime is to proceed as energetically as possible along the lines of the present plan. There is evidence of political and psychological unrest within Guatemala and of growing hostility to the regime. A revolutionary potential exists in the Army. Continued application of planned and integrated pressures should force progressively greater unrest and defection while removal of such pressures will greatly strengthen the opposition and discourage or disaffect allies and potential allies.

B. It is fair to assume that no irrefutable evidence tying the project to the U.S. Government is in the hands of the enemy. The security of the project is as good as can be expected and fully in keeping with the estimates made and reported on numerous occasions starting with the beginning of the project. Any action against the Arbenz regime will be charged against the United States whether or not it has any responsibility for it.

C. Alternative IIB which would substantially postpone the target date offers few advantages but has numerous disadvantages, among them: possible loss of assets through disaffection or insecurity (time and exposure

being in direct ratio); loss of support from other nations, almost surely Honduras which would hesitate to support near its elections, even assuming it still has a stable and friendly government; and Nicaraguan support would diminish if it could be counted on at all; disruption of the present defection program, both military and civilian, which is geared to early action; loss of intelligence as a result of the effect of further evidence of inability to act on the part of Calligeris; similar reduction in the effectiveness of propaganda; danger of an early, abortive coup by impatient elements; and strengthening of the Arbenz team since time is on its side particularly if pressures are relaxed.

D. Alternative IIC is outside the jurisdiction of CIA but presents difficult questions requiring answers not presently available. Some of these are:

1. Will evidence of Communist domination in Guatemala be available in such convincing form as to make it difficult, if not impossible, for a Latin American politician, not wishing to recognize the fact, to avoid doing so?

2. How many of the countries that voted for the Caracas resolution would vote in the same fashion, if such vote involved taking action against Guatemala?

3. Assuming an embargo is voted, when will it be possible and will it be effective in denying (a) access to Guatemala of non-Western Hemisphere shipping adequate for its trade, (b) access to imports of Mexican petroleum, (c) access to imports of Argentinean grain and (d) access to European sources of supply for industrial goods? Would such an embargo close European, Asiatic and Soviet bloc markets for Guatemalan coffee?

4. Assuming failure before the OAS, will it be possible to undertake any action along the lines presently contemplated or will our hands be tied?

5. Is it contemplated that our NATO allies would be asked to recognize that the Guatemalan regime presents a serious military threat and therefore to join in the imposition of economic sanctions?

**Frank G. Wisner**



134. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], April 28, 1954, 0150Z.

2179. Re: HGGA 936.<sup>2</sup>

1. Increasing Catholic activities in WSBURNT, noted in ref, make supporting action by Catholic Church dignitaries, lay groups, publications elsewhere in SGRANGER highly desirable for effect in WSBURNT and internationally.

2. Suggest that [2 *codewords not declassified*] committee in [*place not declassified*] and contacts in [3 *places not declassified*] and anywhere else in SGRANGER might be contacted through stations concerned on via PBPRIME Catholic channels.

3. Action might be tied to pastoral letter already publicized and could aim at:

- A. Warning against spread atheistic communism
- B. Prayer, assistance for endangered faithful in WSBURNT, defense of their Catholic schools, youth activities, other church assets
- C. Faithful to avoid spiritual contamination from Commie-controlled WSBURNT government agencies, fronts, propaganda media.

4. LINC answering ref by dispatch.

5. Advise.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 3, Folder 8. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Box 53, Folder 6)

135. Contact Report<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 28, 1954, 10 a.m.

PLACE: War Room

PERSONS PRESENT: Mr. Wisner, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Barnes, [9 names not declassified]

*Discussion:*

Mr. Wisner spoke first, saying that “we have the full green light and the go ahead.” This was in regard to policy and he indicated that he was not addressing himself to operational considerations. With regard to flights, approach, etc.—it is all in the affirmative. He mentioned there may be operational consideration requiring that the program be shifted forward from the present date or other changes and the staff should bear in mind constantly the importance of maintaining a sufficient degree of flexibility in their approach to this thing so that the program can be adjusted to fit the need.

It was strongly recommended that none of this relieved us of the responsibility we owe to our government and ourselves to so conduct this operation that there will be a minimum possible chance of it being pinned on the U.S. officially and conclusively and so as to maximize the possibility that when the blame gets around to being placed, such confusion will exist as to who did it that it can't be sorted out.

Mr. Wisner did not think false trails had been sufficiently developed.

Mr. Barnes stated that he considered himself here largely in the capacity of a Headquarters representative. He brings some of the Headquarters thinking here and will take back there from time to time the thinking here. He stated that [name not declassified] had been chief of operations and will continue to be but that he, Barnes, will help in any way that he can.

[name not declassified] then started a very general briefing covering most of the aspects of PBSUCCESS in general, reserving for various individuals directly concerned the more specific aspects of KUHOOK, KUFIRE and KUGOWN situation.

Mr. Wisner stated that the Director is always going to reserve the final judgment as to when to pull the last switch. He has to be satisfied that we have sufficient elements of strength and status of readiness. He

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 142, Folder 4. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted on April 28 by [name not declassified].

is interested only in the success of the operation. He is not interested policy-wise. There is no operation regarded as being so important as this one and no operation on which the reputation of the Agency is more at stake.

The boss has to be satisfied that we have what it takes. Mr. Wisner stated that he did not anticipate lengthy delays but there might be operational considerations which LINCOLN would know more about than Washington which would temporarily alter plans. He suggested that when LINCOLN has something really good, Headquarters should be told about it, slug it for the boss' attention.

Mr. Wisner requested documents which are available at LINCOLN showing the internal strength and what the opposition is. He stated that Headquarters had never received a clear and concise statement of what the plans are with respect to what takes place on D-day. He had thought that Headquarters had this but apparently if they do no one can find it. He asked for about 2 pages on this subject.

[*name not declassified*] said that no detailed tactical plan had been contemplated till it was known what we had. Now we were concerned with the development of assets. [*name not declassified*] then proceeded with the general briefing, touching briefly on Regional Command, LINCOLN set-up, etc. and stated the fact that Security is here being used operationally.

Mr. Wisner asked for information about SCRANTON-SHERWOOD. The question of being sure about communications between [*name not declassified*], the Calligeris' Command Post and station was raised and discussed at length. Statement was made that two lines of communications will be available—through the CP (indigenous) and through the station.

PT/16 discussion was reserved for afternoon discussion.

Intelligence breakdown of RUFUS net was discussed. Development chart was displayed (and explanations given re progress marked on same).

Mr. Wisner questioned what should be told the Chargé in Guatemala about reporting on SHERWOOD when it goes on the air.

It is felt that we have the capability of reaching operational readiness during the month of June. Lots of factors have bearing on that and certain operations may not develop as planned but we are aware of that. Though we have a plan laid out, we know there can be changes and are prepared to be flexible.

[*name not declassified*] asked that the KUHOOK briefing be left till last in order that it could be properly seen in focus.

[*name not declassified*] was asked to explain the PP operations. He stated that their main asset is SHERWOOD and that 6 days programs are already taped.

Issue was raised about possibility of substituting tapes in order to provide current coverage of any developments of interest. Mr. [*name not declassified*] mentioned that RUFUS had a man with a good radio voice whom they proposed to bring up and train and then send back for use in just such instances. [*name not declassified*] disapproved this plan because it is planned that no indigenous personnel from the Calligeris group will be used at the site. Mr. Wisner felt that the use of the radio was a very important point and its effectiveness and impact is proportionate to the speed with which it acts. He cited as an example Radio Free Europe. A discussion on this subject between Mr. Wisner, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Barnes and [*name not declassified*] followed.

Mr. Wisner was informed by [*name not declassified*] of the possibility of using Marine Air Force for special flights to Panama. Mr. Wisner said he would go to work on this when he and Mr. Bissell returned to Headquarters, and that he would not need a follow-up cable on this.

SHERWOOD is to be on the air two hours a day as of 1 May and this will be lengthened to 4 hours a day. There is a possibility of plugging this station's program in on a government-sponsored program eventually.

[*name not declassified*] discussed the military paper now being published. The articles in this are being prepared by army officers on RUFUS' staff. Mr. Leddy (ODACID) was concerned with the possibility that, if the tone of this paper were not sufficiently modulated and if the paper should be believed by the people to be published by an underground group within the existing Guatemalan army, it might cause an early purge of the Guatemalan army.

[*name not declassified*] said that this could not happen because the army paper started in the exiles' paper and the articles are signed by the true names of the people writing them. Texts have so far been restricted. Tempo has been gauged to the time and now articles are moderate.

Cruz Wer was brought up and the program against him, with its results, was discussed.

*El Rebelde* is being published again. The "32" program is in action. Mr. Wisner suggested that Headquarters should propagandize the "32" campaign and Arbenz' reaction to it and tell what the "32" means. This should be circulated. "Arbenz is arresting patriots who are in favor of keeping out foreign intervention."

[*name not declassified*] stated that currently rumors are being circulated. Presently there is a rumor in the rural areas that government lead-

ers have prepared for flight abroad. On the other side, there is a rumor that Castillo Armas is on the way.

Mr. [name not declassified] stated that RUFUS is encouraged now. Our reasons for delays have been kept from him. The political plan "Cruz y Quetzal" was reviewed with RUFUS during [name not declassified] visit with him. They (RUFUS) favor it but feel it is a bit flowery. They feel that the idea of "Cruz y Quetzal" should be retained but want to include the Plan of Tegucigalpa and the joint result would be "Cruz y Quetzal". They played down the Indian thing and also read out the part about the U.S. having a commercial influence there.

RUFUS had three questions troubling him: 1. What would be the Group's attitude if a group of anti-Arbenz and anti-Communist officers grab the ball and prematurely take over the government? What would the Group's attitude be in such an event? (Mr. Wisner said we will stay on his side. "He is our hero.") 2. RUFUS is worried about the approaching elections in Honduras since Galvez' position weakens daily. (Mr. Wisner said that SKILLET had briefed them on this and he is worried about the local situation.) 3. RUFUS is worried about his 80-100 trained men now in Tegucigalpa over whom he virtually has no control until he gives the battle cry. The town is full of Guatemalan agents. He is worried about getting them out of Tegucigalpa. (Mr. Wisner agreed that he had a problem there.)

Mr. Wisner suggested to Mr. Bissell that with help from Mr. Barnes a paper be prepared to show Holland which points out to him the things done and being done which are exclusive of the PM aspect. He (Mr. Holland) has been told about certain things. The paper we have talks about assets and he wants to talk about action. The manner of building up the stories on the police chief is colorful—this shows results.

Mr. Wisner said we have to make this thing stick. ODACID admits they are at fault in not having a program for making this thing sure and making it stick once we have done it. Mr. Wisner spoke of economic assistance, being prepared to recognize the new government, making statements about it once it has been accomplished. We should get credit for what we are doing. Mr. Wisner stated he was not sure ODACID would be kept up-to-date at all; but they needed to be given something to tide this over. It is a privilege for ODACID to be kept informed, not a right.

It was suggested that the Pastoral Letter be included in the paper for ODACID.

[name not declassified] was asked to give 5 minutes information on EEIs gathered.

Mr. [name not declassified] was asked to give a short briefing on [name not declassified] mission. He stated we gather intelligence from SEMANTIC and SECANT who are now back in Guatemala.

Mr. Wisner questioned if we were getting anything from the military missions in the target country. If we wait till the last minute to ask that they be withdrawn, they won't do it. He requested that LINCOLN advise what was desired to do about the mission. Is it desirable that steps be taken now to prepare for its withdrawal? (about 15 May). The withdrawal should be so designed that it can be played up for propaganda purposes. Mr. Peurifoy said that the Air Mission has not been doing what was requested of it.

[name not declassified] stated that we are over 18 days behind on black flights. We feel that we should have an extra aircraft added in order to make up this deficit. AMD, last week, assured him they were able to provide this aircraft within a maximum of 7–8 days. This would be plane and crew. Crew would have to use the same cover story as the others have. Mr. Wisner was concerned with the security angle with regard to extra crew rather than the plane. He said he would take this matter up on his return to Headquarters. He would favor an extra plane rather than the crew. It was requested that at least the plane be procured since we are pressing luck in using only 2 aircraft.

There followed a general discussion of the labor situation. The Labor Board wants to know everything. There is friction between the unions. This would be a cold approach to the head of the Steel Workers Union. [name not declassified] brought up the fact that we have spotted and cleared an Aprista down there. He will work operationally through [name not declassified]. The man who was chosen was chosen because he knows the field and has the necessary qualifications. Originally this approach was to be most informal—not to be a firm proposition.

Mr. Wisner requested information on the deception program with the New Orleans angle. [name not declassified] had prepared a follow-up on this and would brief him after lunch.

Mr. Wisner said he thought everyone would agree that it was very important for [name not declassified] to have the talk with [name not declassified], find out what is motivating him (is he abandoning the ship or is it that he feels he has done all that he can usefully do?). [name not declassified] was requested to assess his reasons. Find out what it is that has caused him to take this move. If he is getting out because he has lost confidence, find out why. If his answer is negative, don't accept it as a final answer; keep the issue open. Tell [name not declassified] that you ([name not declassified]) will have to come back

and talk to the Group. He has had his feelings hurt. [name not declassified] was instructed not to let [name not declassified] break the conversation finally. Mr. Bissell suggested that [name not declassified] attempt to get [name not declassified] to postpone the date he had given for severance. [name not declassified] said [name not declassified] had put on paper several incidents which happened after his trip to Mexico—but chiefly the fact of his poor health prompted this move.

Meeting adjourned at 1230, with Mr. Robertson scheduled to give a briefing at 1400.

---

**136. Memorandum From the Senior Representative, Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida (Dunbar) to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], April 28, 1954.

SUBJECT

General—KUGOWN

Specific—Catholic Church Activities

1. We are very pleased with your report in ref., since we, too, consider it highly important to mobilize anti-communist activities of the Catholic Church dignitaries and of Catholic lay organizations and indications on a continuous and rapidly increasing scale.

2. We suggest that ESSENCE (or any other contacts which you might be able to utilize for this purpose) may make use of some or all of the following arguments when dealing with either Church dignitaries and leaders of Catholic lay groups or publications:

a. Express gratitude for the pastoral letter, stress both its domestic and its international effect and emphasize the urgent need for more such active, spiritual guidance in the face of the growing communist threat.

b. Underscore fear that commies will interfere with religious instruction in schools, with Catholic youth activities and other aspects of church life, as they did wherever their power increased.

c. Suggest that the Church might warn the faithful against inevitable spiritual contamination through the commie-led fronts (which should be

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 46. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

listed by name, indicating each group's affiliation with international communist organizations, such as WFDF, WIDE, FUS, IFC, etc.)

d. Lay organizations and publications might warn the people that Guatemala will isolate itself from all Latin America (politically, economically and spiritually) if it continues to be springboard for the international communist conspiracy.

3. In your dealings with Catholic publications and radio programs, you might—in addition to the above general arguments—suggest that it might not be sufficient merely to tell what the communists did to the Church and to people in general in far-away countries such as Russia (for whose fate the average Guatemalan may not care) in order to awaken popular revulsion against communism, it appears necessary to tie these experiences in other countries closely to the personal lives and interests of your local audience. This could be done, for instance, by describing graphically how the local church would be turned into a meeting hall for the “Fighting Godless”, how the reader's children would have to spend their time with the “Red Pioneers”, how the pictures of Lenin, Stalin and Malenkov would replace the pictures of the Saints in every home, and the like.

4. We are suggesting to HQs to initiate parallel action in other Latin American countries.

5. Please keep us informed about the progress of your activities along the above lines and send us copies of all materials which might result from these activities.

Jerome C. Dunbar<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

### 137. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 28, 1954.

SUBJECT

Meeting of 28 April 1954

PRESENT

Ambassador Peurifoy, Ambassador Willauer, Mr. Roosevelt, and Mr. [name not declassified]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 151, Folder 1. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by [name not declassified] on April 29.



1. Ambassador Peurifoy recommended that both he and Ambassador Willauer be advised as to D-Day and that they be sounded out approximately 10 days before. Mr. [name not declassified] noted the difficulty of such change of views by cable and suggested that it might be more effective to accomplish the Ambassador's objectives by sending down at that time an individual [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to consult directly with the Ambassadors. Mr. [name not declassified] suggested that Mr. Leddy was best suited for such a task.

2. With regard to the problem of sabotaging Honduranian aircraft, Ambassador Willauer proposed [name not declassified] as a person qualified and experienced for the assignment. He suggested that [name not declassified] availability could be ascertained through [name not declassified]. Mr. [name not declassified] suggested that it was unfortunate that Col. Acosta himself was unable to do anything to stop the sabotage especially since he had a suspect in view and that this gave little basis for hoping that a lone American could do better. Mr. [name not declassified] raised the question as to whether RUFUS could not supply an individual. Ambassador Willauer observed that RUFUS is in direct contact with Acosta through Flores.

3. Both Ambassadors were questioned re view of emergency communication links available to them in their respective countries.

4. Ambassador Peurifoy proposed again leaflet drops and sabotage prior to D-Day. The necessity was pointed out that of decided security in such actions would be premature and precipitate an opportunity for our readiness to exploit it. Mr. [name not declassified] advised Ambassador Peurifoy that railroad and Polwel targets had been pin-pointed by LINCOLN following the Ambassador's recommendation of last week.

5. Ambassador Willauer asked what are the alternates to [place not declassified].

6. Ambassador Peurifoy was briefed on the oral report received with regard to the reported entry by unknown persons of a letter addressed to him. He was advised that this oral report was not conducive and that the written report would be passed to him in due course. Mr. [name not declassified] proposed that we be permitted to consider for recommendation to Ambassador Peurifoy the use of this channel for deception purposes which would have as their primary objective the disinvolvement of the embassy from revolutions rumored to be afoot.

7. Ambassador Willauer proposed that gasoline tank trucks [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] could transport the arms to their points of disbursement. Messrs. Roosevelt and [name not declassified] raised a number of practical and security barriers to such a program.

8. With regard to PBSUCCESS in his area, Ambassador Willauer made the following observations:

a. That RUFUS' safehouse is across the street from the Ambassador's first secretary's residence. He asked whether RUFUS' location could be changed.

b. Operating difficulties in Tegucigalpa are most severe because of the size of the town and the small number of visiting Americans. Tourists' cover is not adequate for our people; in any case that cover has been used up by them and moreover they are not behaving as tourists.

c. Mr. [name not declassified] is too young and inexperienced and while doing a fine job considering his capabilities, another senior individual should serve as [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and contact to Willauer.

d. Ontrich while active and imaginative is not appropriate by age or background to deal with the president. The president had raised to Willauer some objection to dealing with Ontrich whom he described as a "boy."

e. The need for the plane which he had proposed to the agency several months ago still exists. In addition to the craft he can supply a CAT pilot and crew chief. We could supply the co-pilot and radio operator through his gaining excellent cover and an opportunity to have frequent contact with him.

f. He requested arms for 20 persons including his four marines, and \$5,000 for emergency use in connection with the safety of U.S. official persons.

9. With regard to the operation in his area, Ambassador Peurifoy requested the following:

a. A check on the status of the 3 additional people proposed for his embassy.

b. Heavy and light weapons for his staff in addition to the 30 revolvers already dispatched.

c. \$10,000 into his hands for use in connection with protection of American lives.

d. Ambassador Willauer noted that Eric W. Watts, the Director of Jardine Mathisson and Company and Manager of their Japanese office will visit him beginning mid-May. Ambassador Willauer said this could probably not be put off. A May trip is requested.

10. With regard to the possibility that [name not declassified] may sever diplomatic relations over the Duarte affair, it was Ambassador Peurifoy's view that it could not be undesirable at this time, although he had some months ago recommended against such a sever of relations. Mr. [name not declassified] pointed out that such an action by [name not declassified] would increase our own security because subsequent disturbances would probably in many people's minds be credited to him.

Mr. [name not declassified] raised again with Ambassador Peurifoy the delicate and complex problems involved in the post operational period, and repeated Mr. Wisner's statements to the effect that department advice and assistance is needed. The Ambassador stated he would have recommendations forwarded to us. He noted that the main problem had to do with the difficulty security wise of making an assessment of RUFUS' acceptability and viability in the area.

E. The above notes do not pretend to cover the entire discussion, the nature of which was not conducive to usual reporting.

[name not declassified]

---

**138. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 30, 1954, 2211Z.

48833. (From Whiting). Re: LINC 2261.<sup>2</sup>

1. While we appreciate there may be need for proposed leaflet drops and recognize validity your supporting arguments, any use our own aircraft for this purpose presents both policy and practical difficulties. It would be direct involvement ODYOKE assets and in event of mishap would be most spectacular and conclusive proof implication. Moreover we have no available planes suitable for purpose since C-47 or other slow-flying aircraft would be too vulnerable.

2. Believe possibility use either [name not declassified] or Identity A owned and crewed aircraft safer and better for many reasons if it possible arrange this. Would consider it desirable have Calligeris explore this possibility with Identity A as part his proposed discussion and request for assistance. If Identity A amenable then details might be worked out between [name not declassified] and Identity A providing for staging or basing of one or two Identity A aircraft on [name not declassified] field.

3. As a general commentary upon this or any other proposed use of aircraft, request that you consider the impression which will be created

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 8, Folder 3. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted and cleared by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

by and the conclusions which will be drawn from, the obviously integrated use of aircraft in conjunction with D-day operations. It seems to HQs that the addition of this mechanistic refinement coming on top of the use of radio and other intricate features of the plan will almost inevitably set upon this operation the seal of a non-Latin product. This is entirely apart from the strict question of security, the point being that even if we were able to do this without security leaks and without any mishap, the conclusion would nevertheless be drawn by our friends and foes alike in the United Nations, etc. that this could not be anything other than what it in fact is, and certainly could not be an indigenous uprising.

---

**139. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 1, 1954, 1947Z.

48937. 1. After intensive study HQs re withdrawal military mission WSBURNT tentative decision reached in consultation JMBLUG that on balance preferable mission remain because:

A. Withdrawal would convince army hopelessness receiving help from mission and might discourage those who opposed to govt.

B. Presence of mission serves as channel for pressing idea that arms not now available because of nature of govt.

C. As situation deteriorates some army officers may turn to mission with info or for advice. Doubt they would feel close enough to approach non military Embassy people.

2. JMBLUG will advise his appreciation of situation on return and make final recommendation. Consider mission can be more effective para 1B than in past.

3. Request your comment prior proposed meeting with appropriate military authority early next week.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 4, Folder 2. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by [name not declassified] on April 30, cleared by Wisner, and approved by Kermit Roosevelt.

140. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 1, 1954, 1948Z.

48933. Ref: A. LINC 230,<sup>2</sup> B. LINC 2294.<sup>3</sup>

1. In discussion ODACID tentative thinking pending meeting following ODACID's review of LCPANGS situation with Ambassador is:

A. No approach whatever should be made Somoza either by Magoffin or local ODACID chief as outlined ref A paras 3 and 4. ODACID reaffirms ruling against such representations on matters related to PBSUCCESS by its representatives to any foreign government.

B. ODACID concurs re in ref B action which might interpreted to be for info intell purposes only.

C. FYI: ODACID plans instruct local chiefs KMFLUSH and LCPANGS to renew efforts pacific settlement present tension in line with ODACID parallel action in OAS but such efforts will in no way be related to PBSUCCESS nor will any reference be made to revelations described in ref B.

2. Complexities of LCPANGS situation and best course to follow in observing PBSUCCESS needs will be discussed Tuesday. Request at that time LINC appreciation of possibility [*name not declassified*] may be using PBSUCCESS also as cloak for move against LCPANGS. If we conclude that such possibility exists we shall have to decide what position to take vis-à-vis [*name not declassified*].

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 8, Folder 11. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by [*name not declassified*] on May 1 and approved by J.D. Esterline.

<sup>2</sup> Dated January 25. (Ibid., Box 1001, Folder 3)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

**141. Paper Prepared in Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], undated.

1. During the next few weeks, beginning not later than the second week of May, we ought to aim with increasing intensity and urgency at provoking first distrust and finally, open disaffection against the present regime among the armed forces of the Target Country. We ought to use all available outlets for this purpose, in particular (a) Radio, (b) *La Voz*, (c) rumors which ought to be initiated through radio and press, but also passed on by direct word of mouth. We suggest that you tell this plan, as explained in more detail below, to Manuel in installment form—that is, tell him every week only what you expect him to do in the following week or so. This would be not only good security, but it would also make it easier for us (and for you) to change details in the later phases of the plan, if the need for such changes should arise. However, we leave it to you to decide how much you may tell Manuel at any given time and to elaborate on our ideas as you will find suitable.

2. As a first step, the general themes of propaganda against the Arbenz regime should be sharply focused upon the military audience (details to be worked out with the advice of Manuel and of the military men writing for *La Voz*, etc.), based on the fundamental argument that the honor and the personal as well as the professional future of a soldier or officer depends upon the deeds (and misdeeds) of the regime under which he serves. Such general themes will include, for instance:

Guatemala is being turned into the beachhead of international communism in the Western Hemisphere (Radio Moscow applauds every speech by Toriello, every step taken by Arbenz);

Taxpayers funds are being spent for communist propaganda (see press items on propaganda exhibit about Caracas conference in Guatemala City) and for extensive travels of communist leaders to Moscow and elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain, while the government is less and less able to pay even its own employees, let alone to fulfill its other obligations;

Freedom is being suppressed, censorship tightened, independent newspapers and radio stations terrorized;

And so forth.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 103, Folder 1. No classification marking. This paper is Attachment B to a May 2 memorandum from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters to the Acting Chief of the CIA Station in [*place not declassified*]. The first enclosure comprising two letters was not attached, and the second enclosure, Attachment A, is not printed. The covering memorandum describes this paper as a “plan for KUGOWN campaign directed against the Armed Forces of the Target Country.”

3. As a next step, members of the armed forces ought to be made increasingly aware that they are about to be misused for aggressive communist purposes. One way of starting this might be to assert that Arbenz and Diaz have consented to have the Caribbean Legion supplemented not only by arms and equipment from the regular Guatemalan Army but by regular army personnel as well. One of Manuel's sources inside the army (or inside some suitable government office) may have come across evidence—a secret document, or the record of conversation between Arbenz and a likely communist leader, presumably Fortuny. According to that document (it might also be presented as an interview), Moscow is very dissatisfied with the failure of the attempt against Somoza, feels that the Caribbean Legion will never fulfill its purpose unless it is bolstered by regular, trained military personnel and demands therefore that selected groups of officers and EM of the regular Army be assigned to Legion "commando"-type enterprises, naturally not openly, but under appropriate cover. (This theme lends itself primarily to dissemination by rumors.)

4. The next step might be a direct, formal warning to all military personnel against penetration of the Army by the Communist Party and against political snooping by these cells. Based on the fact that all Communist Parties anywhere, since the very foundation of the Communist International, have been under the strictest orders to penetrate the armed forces of their respective countries, it is only natural that the Guatemalan CP follows the same pattern. You might mention in this connection that Communist Parties have been known to use the charms of the female members of their youth groups to make contacts with military personnel (if you and Manuel assume that such a charge against the AJDG will be believed, you might put this very specifically, quoting actual incidents). He might also broadcast or print an interview with a CP defector who discloses party activities in forming cells inside the armed forces.

5. This campaign should reach its climax around 1 June with the disclosure that Arbenz has concluded a secret pact with the CP (perhaps directly with an emissary from Moscow or at least in his presence) about the bolshevization of the armed forces, providing for the appointment of political commissars in all units and for the arrival of a Red Army (possibly: Czechoslovak Army) training and the indoctrination mission—perhaps to be disguised as a trade or "cultural exchange" mission, but conceivably also quite openly. This development would correspond to the changes which the armed forces underwent in all countries in which the communists have seized power. You might add that the pact also provides for an extension of military conscription and that those conscripts for whom there will be no arms immediately available (especially since the Caribbean Legion and other aggressive, revo-

lutionary enterprises will have priority—see para 3 above) will be organized into labor battalions for the construction of military airfields, border fortifications and other work resulting from a communist foreign policy for Guatemala. This announcement should be made in a spectacular manner, based on either an intercepted official document, the letter of a high CP official or the statement of a defector from either the CP, the armed forces High Command or from Arbenz' own office (whatever your local experts may consider more effective and more likely to be believed). It should be publicized in a special broadcast, interrupting all regular programs and to be repeated several times, as well as in a special edition of *La Voz*—possibly with an additional number of reprints of that special item, provided distribution inside the armed forces can be assured.

6. You are aware that this is a highly sensitive proposition: its black character must under no circumstances become known beyond Manuel and, if technically unavoidable, one or two of his closest and most trustworthy associates. All other personnel involved in producing and distributing the items required for the campaign outlined above must be made to believe in the general character of these disclosures, in order to avoid any possible leaks or "backfiring".

7. Please advise us soonest what you think about the chances of implementing the above program, how Manuel reacts to it and keep us currently informed about the progress made along these lines. If you feel it essential, call on us for any additional background information (experience with communist impact upon the armed forces in other countries, etc.) which we might be able to give you within the limited time left—but we are not sure whether many details of that sort will be really needed.



## 142. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Certain CIA Chiefs of Station<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 5, 1954, 2003Z.

49462. 1. Background: During past month Guat Govt overtly and covertly eliminated all vestige free radio. Radio Voz de la Capital ceased broadcasting after personnel attacked by masked persons. 5 April, Oscar Conde, opposition radio commentator, was arrested on return from Caracas. April reports from inside Guat indicated all anti-Commie programs were clandestinely jammed by Guat police. Roberto Vizcaino, owner of Radio Continental, which also broadcast anti-Commie news, was forced out of Guat and station turned over to Commies for use. (Disposition to "Tribuna Popular" Commies rumored.) On 21 April, Radio Internacional was invaded by five masked, armed men and all staff was tied, one brutally beaten and all equipment destroyed. Station had been broadcasting "anti-Commie hour" sponsored by "student anti-Commie assn." Last week, Radio Telefunken canceled news program on grounds program contained "political thoughts". On 1 May, Guat Govt openly informed all Guat stations that Article 37 of Congressional Decree 372 requires all privately owned radio stations to record and submit all broadcasts re national or international politics to Guat Min of Communications within 24 hours prior to broadcast. Recordings be reviewed by Guat Minister Charnaud MacDonald and be returned in "due course".

2. Brief of May 5 special to *New York Times* by Paul Kennedy follows:

Guat Government has officially acknowledged existence clandestine radio station broadcasting anti Communist material. Matter was brought to attention of government by Commie controlled Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala which claimed it had learned station located in San Marcos Department of Guatemala near Mexican border. Police, however, subsequently stated belief it behind Honduran border, according government statement station called "voice of liberation". This given in context of reference to many Guat Govt acts suppressing freedom of speech, e.g., actions censoring and suppressing radios and newspapers.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job-01025A, Box 8, Folder 12. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; JMSWAG. Drafted by [name not declassified], cleared by King and [name not declassified], and approved by Wisner. Sent to [8 places not declassified] and repeated to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

3. Request implement and sustain above story. Emphasize station came up soon after repression free speech by government and speculate it may be manned by Guat radio personnel who joined forces opposing government when they received advance warning of government repression.

4. Play following variations. Original information re location station within Guat altered by police for following reasons. (1) They cannot stand admit strength of opposition within country. (2) Government desires mount provocation against Honduras to cloak possible overt acts against Honduras.

5. Suggest LINC require regular reports from PBSUCCESS stations in order enable WH stations sustain story. Since story will probably be self generating to some extent, WH stations authorized interpret along lines: (1) Station within Guat. (2) Represents first indication strength of groups opposing Communist controlled government. (3) Government reported planning confiscate private radio receivers; people buying up spare receivers to have one in hiding.

6. Request weekly cable summaries info LINC describing coverage, interpretations, and local reactions.

---

### 143. Editorial Note

On May 6, 1954, President Somoza called a press conference to announce that a large arms cache had been discovered on Nicaragua's Pacific Coast after an unidentified submarine had been seen. According to Piero Gleijeses in *Shattered Hope*:

"For anyone who couldn't divine the source of the weapons and the nationality of the submarine, a clue was obligingly provided: the arms 'were stamped with a hammer and sickle.' The weapons had, in fact, been planted by the CIA, with Somoza's enthusiastic complicity. The ploy, however, was too crude to have much value as propaganda and received only limited attention at the time." (page 294)

144. Telegram From the CIA Station in *[place not declassified]* to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>

*[place not declassified]*, May 7, 1954, 0228Z.

984. 1. WASHTUB at this moment appears to be complete success. *[name not declassified]* called press conference of entire press and diplomatic corps. All were completely sold including PBPRIME Ambassador, First Secretary and military attaché. Latter identified country of origin of weapons, as he has spent some time in Far East. French Minister who has served in Greece pointed out how cache completely fits pattern used in Greece, explaining that men for whom arms intended could arrive at cache either by land or sea and if apprehended have no arms, but once fully loaded weapons are dug up, men are ready to go into action immediately. British Ambassador *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* read markings on rifles and dates of manufacture; *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* he is sending cable to his govt advising of gravity of situation. WSHOOFS Ambassador wanted to telephoto markings to PBPRIME for destroyer and search planes to locate submarine. New reports of sub sightings coming in from coastal residents who believe their own stories.

2. *[name not declassified]* again asked Magoffin for negative requested in *[telegram indicator not declassified]* 950.<sup>2</sup> Believe it absolutely imperative he be furnished this. He can stall for a period of time by saying he has turned it over to PBPRIME for amplification in hope of identifying sub, but sooner or later may have to produce it if credibility of story to be maintained.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 52, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

**145. Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], May 11, 1954, 1052Z.

991. 1. WASHTUB on breaking was accepted completely by press, public, and diplomatic corps. However at present time approximately 70 per cent of public with whom discovery discussed discounting story and believe [name not declassified] made plant himself to gain sympathy of PBPRIME and expedite implementation of Mutual Assistance pact. Believe discovery of new cache in another country followed by second discovery in KMFLUSH would be of greatest value in consolidating credibility of WASHTUB.

2. Jules Dubois of *Chicago Tribune* cabled [name not declassified] requesting negative of submarine photo. [name not declassified] stalled by advising he has turned negative over to ODACID for study. Am briefing ODACID chief so he will not deny. Urgent that developed negative 620 size be furnished soonest.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 52, Folder 2. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

---

**146. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], May 11, 1954.

2622. Re: [telegram indicator not declassified] 991.<sup>2</sup> WASHTUB.

1. LINC has made every effort to produce foolproof negative. It is LINC's opinion however that no negative made here at this stage would survive careful scrutiny of trained investigator. No one can prove print not actually made with camera LINC provided but very easy disprove negative due to individual camera characteristics. Believe further that if such negative given newsman whole story might blow up with serious results. Following is suggested: As [name not declassified] has informed newsmen

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 52, Folder 2. Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by [name not declassified] and approved by [name not declassified].

<sup>2</sup> Document 145.

negative now in ODACID hands for study lay on private transmission by Ambassador of negative to Washington where negative will become classified and no longer available. [name not declassified] should indicate willingness to have experts in ODACID investigate it further, and release it to them permanently.

2. Although we concur in some need for other confirmation of WASHTUB we do not believe same story should be repeated even different country. However for your info only LINC as sequel to WASH-TUB plans soon to expose cache similar arms in WSBURNT city then publicize to effect arms were identical to those found by [name not declassified] and belonged to BGGYPSIES. Meanwhile hope [name not declassified] will stand firm as above.

---

**147. Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], May 14, 1954, 0913Z.

997. Re: LINC 2622.<sup>2</sup> [name not declassified] advised Dubois that negative turned over to ODACID. ODACID chief confirmed to Dubois that negative has been forwarded to PBPRIME. Dubois satisfied and asked no further questions. To offset considerable opinion that there was no submarine and story was a plant by [name not declassified] Magoffin leaking to known gossips fact that he has seen negative and that it appears to be genuine. Whispering campaign underway only 3 days but having moderate success.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 52, Folder 2. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Document 146.

148. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 14, 1954.

SUBJECT

Calligeris

1. The following comments and opinions regarding Calligeris are being submitted for the record to assist in any possible future evaluation of his personality. The basis for these remarks is the following: a ten day personal association in January 1954, a six day personal association in April 1954, a review of Subject's correspondence with [*name not declassified*] during the period January–May 1954, and a résumé of [*name not declassified*]'s remarks during the above noted period.

2. Calligeris, initially an unknown, undistinguished Lt. Col. in the Guatemalan army, became involved in the Junta when [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] the military leader of the anti-communist Guatemalan forces in exile.

3. Prior to this time Calligeris' most overt act against the regime had been an abortive revolutionary movement which was triggered by the assassination of Col. Arana, a close friend of Calligeris. Calligeris' coup against the government became known before any action could be taken and resulted in his imprisonment. His subsequent "heroic" escape from prison was arranged entirely [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Safehouse personnel have testified that outside forces even knew the exact hour when Calligeris would be sprung and were waiting for him in a car outside of the prison area.

4. It was not long after this that [*name not declassified*], in search of an army leader who was willing to join an anti-government movement, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Calligeris as the battle leader of the anti-communist forces with headquarters in Honduras. That this group, with Calligeris as its military leader, left much to be desired, is clearly evidenced by three separate, costly abortive attempts by the Calligeris forces to succeed in a coup against the Guatemalan Government: all of these attempts failed at the 11th hour because the promised military elements inside the country did not fulfill their reported promises to support Calligeris.

5. [*2 lines of source text not declassified*] determined to assure all possible controls and support be given to Calligeris since he was no longer certain that Calligeris possessed sufficient background to command

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 8, Folder 5. Secret. Drafted by [*name not declassified*] on May 14 for C/P and DC/P.

such a technical, military-political operation. For these reasons [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that Calligeris follow the orders of the Group's advisers, whether they be military, intelligence, or propaganda.

a. This brings to light a Calligeris personality trait which is now clearly recognizable. He is a firmly stubborn man who in the face of indisputable evidence is prone to maintain his own point of view. The manner in which he defends his own decisions is interesting. Personal experience has shown that Calligeris will yield readily on general points and appear to be most willing to conciliate, promising that changes as suggested will be carried out. However, his execution of the details of any agreement will be as he sees fit. This completely modifies his original agreement with general plans. His geographical position plus the lack of a group contact with him who can effectively assure his completion of activities, has given him reason to believe that he can modify to suit his own desires any orders or instructions from [*name not declassified*] or the Group. It should be pointed out that Calligeris has not developed this line of thinking with an altogether malicious intent. Delays, lack of decisions, reversal of decisions by the Group have tended to increase his necessity to take the initiative when he, from his Honduran outpost, saw the necessity for some course of action.

b. The undersigned now realizes that Calligeris, when shorn of intelligence and propaganda responsibilities in January 1954,<sup>2</sup> keenly resented this decision to which he agreed without any undue enthusiasm. His subsequent actions soon abrogated the agreement in such a direct manner that his excuses of a lack of adequate communication [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] only made the case more obvious. In the end the Group yielded to Calligeris' wishes, thus giving him a clear idea that if he persisted his ideas would be accepted.

c. This same trait of stubbornness has carried over into his defense of his subordinates: in many cases he has selected well [*1 line of source text not declassified*] but in other outstanding cases his closest advisers have proved to be outright traitors or at best dubious recipients of the high confidence he has placed in them. In the two known cases of Delgado and Secaira, Calligeris—under the increasing pressure of the Group or subordinates in his group to examine more closely their loyalty—has become proportionately more loyal in defending the suspects, or at least he was in no way willing to sever his connections with them. An explanation for this perverse loyalty is the fact that both men in the past made many open and also fervent pledges of loyalty to Calligeris. These demonstrations apparently have a great deal of influence with Calligeris and have clouded his logic. The important lesson to be gained

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 89, 91, and 92.

from these examples by the Group is that if in the future Calligeris is elevated to high responsibilities, selfish and cunning men will soon grasp this key of obtaining and maintaining favor with Calligeris. By their constant demonstration of loyalty, they can maintain positions with little or no real talent. It will behoove the Group to aid in every manner in order to see that Calligeris is surrounded by sincere men.

6. The undersigned believes that Calligeris has the mentality and sufficient personal ambition to aspire to the job of being the new Guatemalan strong man. He has previously insisted that the temporary government last two years, preferring the three years period. Steps to simmer down such desires should be initiated at once. He should be confronted as soon as possible, with the outline of the temporary government which will indicate his limited authority. *[name not declassified]* is in the process of preparing this. *[name not declassified]* is fully aware that strong personalities will be needed to surround Calligeris and simultaneously *[name not declassified]* is in the midst of recruiting capable individuals. The Group should maintain at Calligeris' Headquarters a Senior Representative who in effect would be the "stern" man who is primarily concerned with the political and diplomatic activities of the Calligeris Headquarters.<sup>3</sup> Remembering that Calligeris operates on the principle of extending where there is no barrier, the submission of the temporary government organization, with solid backing from Group to support such a government and nothing else, should be hammered home by a capable representative of the Group who would be stationed at his Headquarters. This action constitutes one effective step which can be taken now, before D-Day. Also, the immediate inclusion of other Guatemalan military men of stature as may result from the K-Program in the Junta Headquarters will tend to reduce Calligeris' stature.

a. The above suggestions are no guarantee that Calligeris will remain bounded by any agreement reached before D-Day but it will considerably increase the moral force which can be brought to bear upon him after he is installed.

7. Calligeris, in the undersigned's opinion, could not last too long in the rough and tumble of Guatemalan politics without the support of the men *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*. From the visible support which he has received to date, he counts on not too many military men. He could expect no support from the elements of the present regime. Any alienation of the *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* would estrange him immediately with individuals more conservative than the *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*. Calligeris would

---

<sup>3</sup> A handwritten marginal note reads: "Worth considering & if good man available. *[initial not declassified]* could try to work it out with C. given some support for us."



therefore be dependent on a very small base of people who have resided with him in exile. It is not logical that such a small element of people, few of whom have had political experience, could long survive the ordeal of righting the "mess" made by the communists. A representative from Group, properly installed, could easily in the course of a few weeks, make the above points painfully clear to Calligeris.

[name not declassified]

---

**149. Memorandum for the Record**

Washington, May 14, 1954.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 80, Folder 5. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

---

**150. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, May 16, 1954, 0925Z.

567. 1. [name and less than 1 line of source text not declassified], obtained following info from one [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] employee and confidant: ship named *Althem* not listed in Lloyds Registry and flag and port of origin unknown, arrived Puerto Barrios 1500 hours 15 May. Was met by Minister Defense Sanchez who managed get ship docked and unloaded by 18 hours.<sup>2</sup> Shipment consigned

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 4, Folder 6. Secret; Priority; Immediate Action; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT; INTEL. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 570 from Guatemala City, May 17, corrected this sentence to "Ship docked and unloading by 1800 hours." (Ibid., Box 11, Folder 1)

to WSBURNT government and allegedly is 2,000 tons armament types unknown.

2. Investigation continues. Shall advise.<sup>3</sup> Possibility provocative effort.

3. Request priority any information you may have.

4. Alerting SEMANTIC but doubt we or he could do anything even if armament shipment.

5. If arms, could [*place not declassified*] send sab team in time?<sup>4</sup> Shall try delay through [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] shipment to capital if story proves true.

6. Evaluated F-3.

---

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 568, May 16, the Station in Guatemala reported that the ship was believed to be Swedish and that the shipment might possibly be "arms purchased by Martinez on European trip." The Station believed action was necessary: "JMBLUG also considers imperative large quantity arms not arrive safely. We do not have necessary sabotage elements. Can trained sab [*sabotage*] team be sent from [*place not declassified*]? Does possibility exist use frogmen or other type attack against ship before unloading accomplished? If not recommend consideration be given sab train enroute capital." (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 2793 from PBSUCCESS Headquarters to Guatemala City, May 17, reads: "1. Instruct first and second rail teams to act against first freight train from Puerto Barrios. 2. This constitutes go." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 4, Folder 6)

---

151. **Memorandum for DC/P and CIP, Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 16, 1954.

SUBJECT

Acts of Force Before D-Day

1. In view of repeated observations by Guatemalans to the effect that the anti-Communist forces must prove their strength by deeds as well as words, as well as the need for accelerating the psychological pressure on Guatemalans, certain limited, specific acts of violence prior to D-Day are hereby proposed.

2. The acts are as follows:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 4. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

a. D-12. Raid on Arbenz' Finca, "El Cajon." This raid should be a combination of arson and demolitions work, but should not attack personnel. It should be conducted in the absence of Arbenz from the finca. The purpose of this raid would be to focus public attention on the fact that Arbenz is the enemy of the anti-Communists and that more dire things are in store for him later.

b. D-10. Disposal of [*name and less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. This would be the first anti-personnel action. Its purpose, beyond that of helping to paralyze [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], is to show the public that the anti-Communists resent the Soviet-style [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] system and consider [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] a prime symbol of oppression.

c. D-8. Disposal of [*name and less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], for the same reasons as the disposal of [*name not declassified*]. The disposal of [*name not declassified*] and [*name not declassified*] would make the anti-Communist protest against the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] character of the Arbenz regime perfectly clear.

d. D-6. Disposal of [*name and 1 line of source text not declassified*]. This action documents the anti-Communist character of the revolution and leaves [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] leaderless.

e. D-4. Disposal of [*name not declassified*]. With this, opposition to both the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] character and the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] regime will have been effectively displayed.

f. D-1 or D-Day before H-hour. Disposal of [*name not declassified*]. It is apparent, from Page's debriefing of [*name not declassified*]<sup>2</sup> and many other indications, that the fate of [*name not declassified*] may well be the key to the entire D-Day situation. With [*name not declassified*] still on the scene, he would undoubtedly be able to command certain support which would render the task of friendly forces more difficult. If the issue were in doubt, his personal ability and prestige could tip the scales unfavorably. An attempt should therefore be made to have victory grow out of the disposal of [*name not declassified*], rather than reckoning with [*name not declassified*] after victory. This action must be carried out as close to D-Day as possible; otherwise members [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] or non PBSUCCESS forces might fill the vacuum before Calligeris could.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cryptonym for a high-ranking military officer.

<sup>3</sup> A handwritten marginal note next to this sentence reads: "True—but perhaps good."

3. In any program of this sort, the possibilities of reprisals and their damaging effect on the D-Day objective must be considered. The above actions would undoubtedly invite some reprisals and lead to an attempt on the part of the government to tighten security. However, such government actions in the period D-14 to D-Day must be expected anyway. On the other hand, successful accomplishment of the above actions should cause panic among the government sympathizers and possibly negate their increased vigilance. At the same time, friendly forces should be greatly heartened and mobilized. The program as described above would give enough time for both enemy disintegration and friendly mobilization prior to D-Day. On balance, it is believed that these shows of friendly strength and these efforts to “soften up” the enemy would be beneficial and would decrease the risk of putting all PBSUCCESS eggs in the D-Day basket. It may also be that the government reaction to one or the other proposed acts of violence would provide significant guidance to existing friendly D-Day plans.

4. It should be emphasized that the success of only one or two of the proposed actions would be insufficient and would give a “flash-in-the-pan” impression to the public. Execution of the whole program, with proper KUGOWN exploitation, would be not only physically impressive but psychologically most explicit and significant.

5. If the foregoing program is approved, C/FI should be immediately requested to obtain, under the direction of C/PM, the requisite information relative to the personal habits, movements, etc., of the target personalities and appropriate data on Arbenz’s finca. Chief of Station, Guatemala, has indicated his ability to procure such information on short notice. The first three proposed actions have been suggested by him, either orally or by dispatch.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> A handwritten marginal note next to this paragraph reads: “Should work up some questions for submission on this point—”

152. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 16, 1954, 2135Z.

839. Pass to SKILLET from ODACID and Whiting.

1. We have received report from JMBLUG to following effect. [name and less than 1 line of source text not declassified], was told by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that ship *Alfhem* arrived Puerto Barrios 1500 hours 15 May carrying shipment consigned Guatemalan Government and allegedly consisting of 2000 tons armament, types unknown. Further reported that vessel met by Sanchez, Minister of Defense, and unloaded by 1800 hours.

2. Information available here indicates *Alfhem* is Swedish flag vessel of 4850 gross tons owned by Angbats A.B. Bohrslavska Kusten. Lloyds loading list of 11 May gives last sighting off Brest, France, reportedly enroute from Stettin, Poland, to Dakar.

3. You requested to do following: utilizing the services of the naval attaché, KUBARK personnel, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Embassy personnel, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and your own best judgment, get for us the fullest evidence regarding this shipment which if necessary can be used to prove Guatemalan efforts to import clandestinely arms from behind Iron Curtain. Such evidence would include the originals or photostats of the ship's documents showing origin of shipment, consignor, consignee, description, tonnage, also photographs of ship plus recognizable pictures its captain and crew. Also aerial and ground photos of unloading operation and of the units of cargo. Make every effort to obtain specimens of the cargo by purchase, theft, loss overboard and subsequent clandestine recovery.

4. Exercise your resourceful judgment as to any additional item of evidence obtainable. Report urgently your plans and steps taken to accomplish them. First item of info required is positive identification and location of vessel which should be possible by aerial recce and preferably photos.

5. This action given SKILLET because he believed have more facilities and greater freedom of action than JMBLUG, who also being requested provide such info as he can obtain through his own resources. You are authorized coordinate your actions with JMBLUG to extent you deem desirable.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 8, Folder 5. Top Secret; Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner. Repeated to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida and the CIA Station in Guatemala.

6. Note for Princep: this is top priority matter and you requested provide fullest support to SKILLET.

---

153. **Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, May 18, 1954, 0159Z.

574. Ref: GUAT 573.<sup>2</sup>

1. Seamen aboard *Althem* told [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Puerto Barrios that another ship due here within two days and a third due as soon as the second ship leaves. Names date these ships not known.

2. High ranking military officers including Min Def Sanchez, Alfonso Martinez, Colonel Barzanallana, were in Puerto Barrios awaiting arrival ship and still there. Sanchez others at Hotel del Norte, Puerto Barrios accompanied by aides and at least five body guards.

3. Crates unloaded<sup>3</sup> on seven flat cars and now enroute capital have following shape and size; 9 feet high, base 3 feet by 3 feet, top round with diameter approximately 18 inches, one side crate perpendicular and other side sloping like pyramid. Weight 785 lbs each. Triangular marking on side of crates. Could be mortars.

4. Three box cars unknown contents also enroute capital. Should arrive around mid-night. Due abundance empties Puerto Barrios impossible deny military their use. Apparently military intends forward to capital as unloaded which direct from ship to train cars.

5. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Puerto Barrios estimates that government will need minimum seven days to unload ship at present speed although Minister Sanchez trying hurry.

6. No signs ammo unloaded as yet but probable such aboard although crew members did not take any precautions usually associat-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 65, Folder 1. Secret; Immediate; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT; INTEL. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 11, Folder 1)

<sup>3</sup> The Department of State approached the Swedish Government in an attempt to prevent the cargo from being unloaded. See the memorandum from Assistant Secretary Holland to Secretary Dulles, May 18, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1111-1112.

ed with ammo shipments. TRCA officials will attempt prevent ammo shipments coming capital attached to regular trains. Have promised advise upon learning about ammo.

7. Due congestion port as result strike New York, trains leaving every three or four hours. To these trains government apparently intends hitch cars containing *Alfhem* material. Impossible obtain ETD since trains departing as loaded. Impossible obtain that material be forwarded in one train. Under normal conditions *Alfhem* cargo would take minimum of five double header trains and government has made no request for such.

8. Meanwhile public kept away from pier and no visitors allowed aboard.

9. Since relatively small amount total cargo unloaded strongly suggest action taken soonest against ship. Request attention be given other ships mentioned para 1, which evaluated F-3, rest 2.

---

**154. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], May 18, 1954, 0102Z.

2798. Re: A. DIR 00858; B. LINC 2766; C. LINC 2767; D. LINC 2774.<sup>2</sup>

1. Proceeding as indicated in previous msgs this subject. Simple rail cuts not contemplated but as stated blowing tracks while train passing at bridges previously selected for later targets. Also second charge before bridge with third charge further back to completely block and or destroy train. Same method will be employed by second team further up track in event first should fail.

2. Map will show all relevant sab targets selected in areas where highways either do not exist or are extremely poor.

3. Can assure you that will make use of all KUHOOK experience available in LINCOLN and field.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 4, Folder 6. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> Telegrams LINC 2766, 2767, and 2774, May 17, are *ibid.* Telegram DIR 858, May 17, is *ibid.*, Box 8, Folder 5.

4. Appreciate HQs actions re delaying tactics and keeping LINC well informed.

---

**155. Airgram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Chief of the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

HUL-A-827

[*place not declassified*], May 19, 1954.

SUBJECT

General—KUGOWN/WASHTUB

Specific—Publicity in Guatemalan Press

1. We understand that the story of the unidentified submarine which landed in Nicaragua, caching arms of Communist origin at the shore, did not receive much, if any, publicity in the Guatemalan press. This story however should not only interest Guatemalan newspapers because it concerns a rather ominous event in a neighboring country, but most specifically since certain communications implicate Guatemala directly. The most specific of these clues were the cigarettes of Guatemalan origin found together with the weapons: this has received ample publicity in Nicaragua as shown by the attached masthead of *Novedades*, Managua, 7 May, which carries a headline referring to those cigarettes, even above the masthead, across the entire page.

2. We suggest therefore that you make a cautious effort to obtain added publicity for this story in the Guatemalan press and public opinion. We would consider it particularly apt if you could induce one of the oppositional members of the Guatemalan congress to address a letter to the President, expressing concern about these clues, pointing at Guatemalan complicity in this arms smuggling affair and demanding a full, public investigation. He might add (if you consider that feasible) that he is greatly concerned by the fact that the Guatemalan Army has been receiving recently its arms and equipment in more or less clandestine and illegal ways which are unworthy of the honor and proud traditions of the Army. He might demand that the President make a full report to congress on this matter, especially since a peaceful foreign pol-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 52, Folder 2. Confidential; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Dunbar on May 18.



icy of the country makes it obviously easy to speak frankly about the very modest state of national armament.

3. If you should find it impossible to utilize a member of congress for the above purpose, we suggest that you try using any of your available press contacts. It might perhaps be possible to arrange for an interview of any suitable traveler who happened to have been in Managua on the day of President's Somoza's press conference on the subject and to tie the questions relative to the Guatemalan cigarettes to that interview. Or, if any of the newspapers with whom you are in contact, has a correspondent in Managua, they might ask him (preferably by telephone) to send a special report on the finding of those cigarettes and any other clues which might point, directly or indirectly, to Guatemala.

4. Please advise as soon as you have been able to take actions along either of the above lines.

Jerome C. Dunbar<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**156. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, May 20, 1954, 1309Z.

605. Re: DIR 01050.<sup>2</sup>

1. Available sources tending indicate many WSBURNT army officers, though as soldiers glad receive arms, have grave misgivings about recent shipment. Among reasons for misgivings are:

A. Has dramatically demonstrated closeness of govt to Soviet.

B. Fear that present mission will be replaced by hordes of Soviet or satellite instructors who might do anything including displacing even the WSBURNT officers.

C. That shipment is shocking evidence that Soviet and Commies intend completely take over WSBURNT.

D. That ODYOKE cannot tolerate situation and will be forced take drastic action with terrible consequences to WSBURNT.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 2. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS; INTEL. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 8, Folder 6)

2. We will try exploit uneasiness by rumor, black propaganda, etc.

3. Indications are many officers would turn against govt if strong dramatic anti govt action starts.

4. [name not declassified] told ESQUIRE night 18 May that SMILAX now approachable. B-2. Sources para 1 and 3 ESPERANCE, ESPERANCE-1, ESPERANCE-3. Eval: B-3.

---

**157. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], May 20, 1954.

2890. Ref: GUAT 602.<sup>2</sup>

1. Inadvisable disclose our relationship with ESQUIRE to Calligeris, especially in view [name not declassified]—Calligeris hostility. Basic compartmentation between Calligeris and K-Program must be kept.

2. Assure ESQUIRE we will keep him out of Calligeris black book at proper time.

3. LINC not contacting Calligeris on this matter. Will inform you if Calligeris volunteers anything.

4. ESQUIRE not to disclose any operational details to [name not declassified].

5. Keep ESQUIRE in WSBURNT as long as operationally necessary and feasible.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 4. Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. No time of transmittal appears on the telegram. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 11, Folder 2)

158. **Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, May 21, 1954, 1003Z.

621. Following for Whiting from JMBLUG:

1. Am sure you aware of type of equipment landed in WSBURNT. We also have reports at least 1 more ship with ammo is approaching these shores. It seems to me that time has come for drastic action. The psychological situation is such here that it hard put into words. Everyone is expecting something to be done. At same time everyone believes, whether rightly or wrongly, that OAS will not be our solution. I have no objection to this step which might be taken simultaneously but I should like to renew with all the power I have the suggestion and the urgent plea that sabotage teams be immediately dispatched with orders to create hell.

2. Should this ammo ship arrive and its cargo be dispatched nothing short of direct military intervention will succeed.

3. I want you to know above is written not in panic but with cool deadly determination that freedom shall not perish in this country.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 8, Folder 6. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS; INTEL. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

---

159. **Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 21, 1954, 2128Z.

01705. SGUAT (for JMBLUG from Whiting).

Please read following message to ODUNIT senior member of Mil/Mis in WSBURNT:

"This is to emphasize and reaffirm the verbal instruction given to you personally that it is in the national interest to furnish the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 8, Folder 6. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

Ambassador with whatever information you may have or can procure, which reveals the attitude of the military toward to regime.

During your normal and personal contacts with members of the WSBURNT armed forces it is desired that you stimulate conversation toward obtaining an expression of attitude without engaging in clandestine or other irregular contacts or practices.

This message has the concurrence of ODACID, ODEARL (ODUNIT) and KUBARK. ODIBEX transmitting substance direct to their member."<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> The last sentence was added by hand.

---

**160. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 21, 1954, 1708Z.

01610. Re: LINC 2949.<sup>2</sup>

1. Whereas HQs agrees need for evidence active opposition we are unable approve use this plane from this base with this crew for this purpose.

2. The impact of leaflets does not appear to warrant the serious risks and possibilities of total ODYOKE compromise. If leaflets are the answer and we regard them as of marginal value under present circumstances why not let the Calligeris controlled internal propaganda organizations distribute or disburse them. A much more solid showing of internal resistance would be some success sabotage effort which we trust you are souping up.

3. Use of Calligeris internal propaganda organization this purpose at this time would provide useful test strength and capability that organization.

4. Possibly [*name not declassified*] or Calligeris other friend further south would be willing send over a plane at night for purpose of leaflet drop.<sup>3</sup> Why not try this.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 8, Folder 6. Secret; Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 4, Folder 8)

<sup>3</sup> Although no additional details on the delivery have been found, dispatch HUL-A-893 from PBSUCCESS Headquarters to Guatemala, May 23, informed the Station that "we intend to arrange an airdrop of the attached leaflet on/about Wednesday 26 May." A copy of the leaflet was attached. (Ibid., Box 103, Folder 3)

---

**161. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], May 21, 1954, 2128Z.

2957. 1. To show friendly strength, LINC considering action on idens.<sup>2</sup>

2. Advise if you consider hitting these targets currently feasible, psychologically beneficial. Effect should not be so great as to touch off full revolt. Request your list of alternate or added pre-D-day targets, with eye to KUGOWN rather than KUHOOK utility.

3. Submit operational data and suggestions you and LINC targets, i.e., locations, vulnerabilities, routes of movement, guards, etc.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 4, Folder 8. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2958 from Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters to Guatemala, May 21, listed the five proposed targets. (Ibid., Box 4, Folder 4)

---

**162. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, May 22, 1954, 5 p.m.

759. Up to this morning, 69 carloads of material unloaded from *Alfhem* had arrived in Guatemala City and unloading and shipments were continuing regularly. Ship may finish unloading Monday.

Charnaud MacDonald, Minister of Interior, revealed last night that attempt to blow up train morning of May 19 had cost lives of one Guatemalan soldier and one saboteur. Three other soldiers were wounded in battle described as lasting half hour between soldiers armed with rifles and saboteurs armed with submachine guns. Latter then retired toward Honduras frontier and escaped.

Press this morning carried photographs nitroglycerine cartridges which failed to explode and were used to connect charge with detonator. Minister reportedly emphasized this type explosives not used by

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 84, Folder 3. Official Use Only; Priority.

any branch of Guatemalan Government and “possibly not in any Central American country”.

Peurifoy

---

**163. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Chief of Plans and the Chief of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 24, 1954.

SUBJECT

Consolidation of New Guatemalan Regime

1. The task of consolidating the new Guatemalan regime falls into two parts:

a. Duties devolving on the Guatemalans. This is currently being discussed with [name not declassified] and will be covered in a later memorandum.

b. Duties devolving upon ODYOKE. These form the subject of the present memorandum.

2. The duties devolving upon ODYOKE are:

a. *Diplomatic recognition of the new government.* ODACID must clearly take the lead in recognizing the new government, not only because other Hemisphere nations expect it, but also because such early recognition will capitalize most effectively on the *overt* moves that ODYOKE has made against the Guatemalan Communists. Early recognition by ODACID could do much to re-affirm ODYOKE leadership in the Hemisphere. (The cover and deception requirements of *covert* action should be satisfied by other means and should not be allowed to hamper early *overt* recognition.) Action: ODACID.

b. *Economic and technical assistance.* There should not be extension of American economic aid and technical assistance to Guatemala alone; this could be interpreted by other Central American and Hemisphere countries as “rewarding” a recently Communist and aggressive nation,

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 54, Folder 5. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

without corresponding help to nations that never were Communist. There should be an overall economic aid and technical assistance program for all Central America, as recommended in LINC 2885.<sup>2</sup> Action: ODACID and FOA.

c. *Coordination of UFCO Action.* Immediate conversations should be initiated with the UFCO, with a view toward coordinating ODACID and UFCO action in the consolidation period. Specifically, UFCO should be advised that ODACID will not support UFCO requests with diplomatic notes during the early months of the new government; while it was necessary and proper for ODACID to support UFCO against a Communist government, it will be improper for ODACID to make the same demands of an anti-Communist government. Likewise, UFCO should be asked not to mortgage the political viability of the new regime by pressing its claims too soon. Rather, as JMBLUG has recommended, UFCO should await the call of the new government to a joint parley in view of the influence that pro-UFCO elements and individuals will have in the new government ([*name not declassified*], SUPERIOR, etc.) the UFCO should be able to await and join in such a parley with equanimity. It may be advisable for the parley to agree to turn over the Guatemalan-UFCO dispute to an impartial commission, chosen by the parties to the dispute. It may also be advisable for the new government to levy promptly the increased taxes that the UFCO has declared itself willing to pay; then the issue of compensation for expropriated land can be masked by the tax "victory" of the new government; compensation might actually be made in the form of taxes lower than they would be otherwise. Action: ODACID.

d. *Labor leadership.* The AFL, either acting through the ORIT or independently, should be urged to send immediately a highly qualified team of labor instructors to assist anti-Communist Guatemalan labor leaders in the purging and re-organization of both urban and rural unions. These instructors should be men willing and able to cooperate with the Catholic Church in Guatemala. Action: ODACID-KUBARK.

e. *Special Security Commission.* A special team of qualified personnel should be dispatched to Guatemala, on request from the new government, to assist the new government in the detection and elimination of all Communists and pro-Communists from positions of influence in Guatemala. This mission should have its costs shared between the two governments. Action: ODACID to secure the request from the new Guatemalan government, KUBARK to prepare and dispatch the team.

[*name not declassified*]

---

<sup>2</sup> Dated May 20. (*Ibid.*, Box 4, Folder 7)

164. **Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], May 30, 1954, 1833Z.

382. From Cadick.

Request identities and available info on four persons discussed with [name not declassified] for early eradication. Confirm early date.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 13, Folder 4. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

---

165. **Memorandum by Graham L. Page<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 1, 1954.

SUBJECT

K-Program

Notes

1. Your letter, dated 30 May 1954,<sup>2</sup> prompts me to line up once more my premises and conclusions. If you should detect any inconsistencies put that down to a situation in flux.

2. The recruitment of [name not declassified] was effected under PBSUCCESS auspices. He has become reconciled to Calligeris' role, but there are no indications of subservience.<sup>3</sup> Nor has he waived his stipulation that Calligeris be kept uninformed. [name not declassified] realizes that the underlying concept of PBSUCCESS is a workable one and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 134, Folder 1. No classification marking. Transmitted on June 4 via courier from the Chief of Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida. Sent for information to the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Less than 1 week later, however, [name not declassified] wrote: "I personally feel that it would be destructive to the concept of Army unity which underlies our planning, were he to be allowed to come in here. Whether you wish to believe it or not, there are some very important officers in the higher ranks who are actively hostile to Calligeris. Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the injection of Calligeris would disrupt the kind of effort I have been outlining to you." (Memorandum, June 7; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 134, Folder 1)



that—at least at the time of his recruitment—there existed no workable alternative.

3. [name not declassified]'s sole asset is a personal following among ranking Army officers. He is our channel to Colonel [initials not declassified], an officer who—according to [name not declassified]—is fully committed to our cause. He is working on SMILAX. He is turning over in his mind ways and means of defecting Colonel [initials not declassified]. Regarding the latter he has provided us with a frame of reference that makes sense to me.

4. I have increasing doubts whether additional recruitments can be effected under PBSUCCESS auspices. I know for certain that in the cases of SMILAX, Colonel [initials not declassified], and Colonel [initials not declassified], the involvement of Calligeris is likely to stiffen their resolve to protect the regime at all cost. They detest Calligeris and his enterprise to them holds connotations of a "foreign invasion", calling forth a strictly emotional reaction (see SMILAX broadcast).

5. Now this is where the inconsistency comes in: I maintain—so far a priori—that the manifest threat of United States intervention is *the sole lever* that might conceivably unhinge the allegiance of the "Anti Calligeris faction" to the Arbenz regime. Of course, they wouldn't cotton to the prospect of landing marines any more than to that of invading revolutionaries. But—I maintain—the certain prospect of a unilateral United States move would give them ample food for thought. In an atmosphere of reflection, my message conveying to them an "Easy way out" formula, would be bound to make an impact. In effect they would be offered an opportunity to stave off intervention by the simple expedient of overthrowing the regime and usurping power for themselves. Of course, there would be some weighty political strings attached to our countenancing this shift, but nothing that could possibly be construed as an abridgment of Guatemala's sovereignty.

6. You of course realize that I am not advocating that we scrap PBSUCCESS or modify its objectives. I am discussing defection techniques and approaches. By a process of elimination I believe to have isolated the one motivating factor that may lead to significant defections in the Army High Command. If those defections come off, it may conceivably provide the spark setting off Calligeris' effort, because there will undoubtedly ensue a period of turmoil during which [lots] of things can happen. But the "crucial spark" has to be generated by heat—United States heat.

7. Speaking of "overt thunder", I am most concerned that our initial clarion [call] which scared the dickens out of Arbenz and his gang may turn out to have been little more than amplified Bronx cheers. I trust no one up the line is taking umbrage at my Alsopian outbursts.

Without anything factual to go by, I can just feel in my bones what is going on in “foggy bottom”. Let me tell you some time—with the radio turned full blast—what I think about good neighbor policy and hemispheric solidarity. But promise to tell only your closest friends.

8. Pinning [*name not declassified*] down to facts is a slow and arduous process. He is endowed with a meandering and reminiscing mind. His interest in Calligeris’ plans is not un[*text missing*]. He hardly ever asks direct questions.

Graham L Page<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

## 166. Note for the Files<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 1, 1954.

### SUBJECT

Disposal List Prepared by C/EW

1. A cursory check of Subject list reveals that the biographic data is not up-to-date and that even the information available at LINCOLN is not included; that in some cases, doubt certainly exists as to whether or not the person in question is a Communist; that the list is by no means complete, as it excludes such prominent Communists as Julio Estrada de la Hoz.

2. In short, no real analysis has been made to date to determine who is “to be” or “not to be.” It is recommended that before any disposal action is taken, all available personality data be compiled and careful study be made of all “candidates” for said list.

3. Please note that Mr. [*name not declassified*] has prepared a memorandum recommending five key persons, about whom little doubt exists. (Copy not available at the moment, but Mr. [*name not declassified*] has one on file.) Also note that there has been some cable traffic regarding this Subject.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 145, Folder 12. No classification marking. The name of the drafting officer is not declassified.

167. Draft Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 1, 1954.

## SUBJECT

Present status and possible future course of PBSUCCESS

1. Mr. [name not declassified] has reported his very tentative view—which is his own estimate of the situation and which lacks the benefit of a report from [name not declassified] (who will return to LINCOLN Monday night),<sup>2</sup> that in case the originally conceived, carefully-timed paramilitary action should prove difficult of fulfillment, an alternative approach might will be considered. Nothing but tentative conclusions are possible with careful review of all available facts resulting from the SEMANTIC action and from [name not declassified] are studied.

2. The main premise for any plan from now on should be the build-up of pressures both internal and external on WSBURNT both because the internal situation is such that anti-government action should result in continued tension and uncertainty and because there should be fairly quick counter action to avoid any inference that the SEMANTIC episode has caused any problem.

3. The basic concept for any successful result is that the WSBURNT army must move against the regime—consequently the major issue is what action is necessary to persuade the appropriate officers to move. It is felt that a carefully integrated large scale action, as originally planned, would clearly produce the result. Due, however, to unforeseen problems in material movement, uncertainties as to the leadership of Calligeris and possible internal losses via the SEMANTIC episode, the capacity for achieving the integrated plan may have to be unduly delayed or actually substantially changed. Therefore, a different stimulus to produce Army reaction should be planned at least as a contingency alternative.

4. The most promising alternative would seem to be the despatching of organizers and RRUS as soon as the effects of the SEMANTIC episode establish the proper method for doing it. Concurrently leaflet drops, specific sabotage and possibly political assassination should be carefully worked out and effected. Moreover, material should be moved into WSBURNT and cached in all ways possible. The hope would be that this approach might persuade the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 145, Folder 12. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> June 7.

WSBURNT Army to take anti-Arbenz action on its own. If not, the results of the organizers' efforts, accentuated by the affirmative steps just mentioned, could be assessed. If resistance potential develops, material could be distributed either from internal caches, if developed, or dropped by night flights and action comparable to the original plan undertaken. If early action proves unwise, then a classical longer range resistance build-up can be adopted with a view to action at the first propitious movement.

5. It is obvious that this alternative in the first instance would mean a different use of existing assets than presently contemplated. On the other hand, the possibility of successful pressure on the Army for independent action, and the alternative of longer range build-up of earlier solutions do not occur.

---

**168. Dispatch From the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala to  
Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

HGG-A-1195

Guatemala City, June 2, 1954.

SUBJECT

General—K-Program  
Specific—JMBLUG

1. This is to advise you that Page paid JMBLUG a personal call on the evening of 1 June 1954. The meeting took place in JMBLUG's private residence.

2. In view of certain anticipated ramifications of the SWALLOW operation, it was deemed necessary to apprise JMBLUG of what had transpired and what we are trying to accomplish. Page gave JMBLUG a general briefing on the scope and purpose of K-Program and explained that he is operating independently of the Station so as to preclude any conceivable compromise to our diplomatic representation should the Guatemalan authorities uncover his true status.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 100, Folder 1. Secret; PBSUCCESS, RYBAT. Drafted by Graham L. Page and delivered by courier. Sent for information to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.

3. JMBUG fully approved of our endeavor to enlist the support of SWALLOW in the defection of members of the Army High Command and promised to continue backstopping to the extent of vouching for his bona fides. Page advised JMBUG that Whiting had decided against formally introducing Page to him to so as to rule out any possibility of embarrassment should there be an unpleasantness.

4. Page disavowed detailed knowledge of the progress of PBSUCCESS and of the nature of Calligeris' operations in Guatemala, stressing the limited and strictly compartmentalized nature of the program in which he is engaged.

5. It should be pointed out that the call on JMBUG was a move decided upon by Page acting on his own responsibility. The Station introduced Page and crowded the necessary security safeguards. Further meetings, if required, will be held in a secure, neutral place.

**Graham L. Page<sup>2</sup>**

---

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**169. Dispatch From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to PBSUCCESS Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

HUL-A-1052

[*place not declassified*], June 2, 1954.

SUBJECT

Guatemalan efforts to link U.S. action regarding arms shipment to UFCO claims; recommendations for diplomatic and related actions

1. In several statements during the last few days made by Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello, by other Guatemalan government officials and by the pro-Government Guatemalan press as well as in leftist comment on the arms incident (in broadcasts and articles in other countries), a persistent effort is being made to link the energetic protest of the U.S. State Department against the arms shipment to the

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 104, Folder 1. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Playdon.

claim of UFCO for compensation of its expropriated lands, upheld officially by the State Department a few weeks ago.<sup>2</sup>

2. From the viewpoint of PBSUCCESS, that State Department intervention on behalf of UFCO was unfortunately timed since (whatever the merits of the case may be) it lent some credence to the Guatemalan communist-government claim that U.S. policy is being conducted in the interest of the “big capitalists.” Their latest effort, as noted above, to imply that the U.S. would never take such strong actions because of a paltry arms shipment if it were not to exert pressure in the interest of UFCO’s claim for \$15 million (or so), is a rather shrewd diversionary maneuver—far superior to the obvious confusion in which the Guatemalan government’s first statements concerning the arms shipment were made—well designed to improve Guatemala’s case on the arms question in the eyes not only of Guatemalan public opinion, but of a major section of world public opinion as well.

3. We therefore, suggest that steps be considered to spike this Guatemalan propaganda line as quickly and as effectively as possible. Such steps should notably include (but do not have to be limited to) the following:

a. A statement by State, possibly directly addressed to the Guatemalan Ambassador in Washington, strongly protesting in terms of moral indignation the attempt to confuse the U.S. Government’s concern about hemispheric security and peace with its routine legal aid to the interests of U.S. citizens abroad, terming this attempt an insult likely to exacerbate relations between the two countries.

b. An offer, to be made either by UFCO or by State, to have UFCO’s claim settled either in the World Court or by some other form of international arbitration, in order to remove this claim from the sphere of US-Guatemalan diplomatic relations (if the Guatemalan Government rejects this, as it may be likely to do, the blame will fall on them).<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> References are to a Department of State formal claim on behalf of a subsidiary of the United Fruit Company against the Guatemalan Government for its expropriation of the company’s land, and announcement of the arms shipment to Guatemala from Eastern Europe. Texts of press releases of April 20 and May 17 are in Department of State *Bulletin*, May 3, 1954, pp. 678–679, and May 31, 1954, p. 835. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles also discussed the arms shipment at a meeting on May 19 (*Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1116–1117), and the President responded to a question on the shipment during his May 19 press conference. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 489–497) Secretary Dulles made news conference statements on the arms shipment on May 25. (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 7, 1954, pp. 873–874)

<sup>3</sup> A May 24 memorandum from the Government of Guatemala handed to Ambassador Peurifoy rejected the United Fruit Company’s claim for damages and denied that expropriation was a subject for international discussion; see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1127–1128.

c. Publication of a White Paper, enumerating all cases in which Guatemalan diplomats were involved in communist propaganda, assistance to strikes in other countries and other incidents of "undiplomatic activity", listing all complaints by other Central American governments against such activities, etc., as a strong means and discrediting the Guatemalan Government in general and its Foreign Minister and diplomatic missions in particular. (We submit that RQM/OIS could assist State in preparing such a document, thereby obtaining more rapid action.)

4. Fast and impressive action in this direction—whether or not it follows exactly the specific lines suggested in the preceding paragraph—appears urgently necessary not only in the general interest of U.S. foreign policy with regard to Guatemala, but also in the specific interest of PBSUCCESS and of our efforts to frustrate the "anti-imperialist" line of communist political warfare and to protect the U.S. Government against being reproached for attacking Guatemala in the interest of UFCO or of "Wall Street" in general.

5. We therefore request that you take up the above matter with State as quickly as practicable and press for immediate action—which, in this case, appears to be even more in their interest than in ours. Please keep us informed as the action taken and progress achieved.

William D. Playdon<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

## 170. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 3, 1954.

### SUBJECT

Points Covered in H/W<sup>2</sup> Discussions of June 1 and 2

1. The following is a list of the points which were discussed in the above mentioned conversations, together with an indication of the extent of agreement reached and/or the policy guidance provided to each.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 5. Secret. Drafted by Wisner. A copy was sent to Assistant Secretary of State Holland.

<sup>2</sup> Holland-Wisner.

2. Concerning further airborne leaflet drops W advised H we were considering the desirability and timing of additional leaflet drops. He explained we might wish to do this at any time and moreover that there might be occasion to use [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] (who have been recruited on an unwitting basis) for certain of these flights. But that the use of such pilots would be reserved for flights involving the use of particularly significant and important pamphlets and where accuracy of delivery is a special requirement. W further stated that the operating headquarters had been directed to explore fully and carefully the possibility of using indigenously procured planes and indigenous pilots for certain of the leaflet drops viz. those of lesser importance and of shorter length, not requiring such deep penetration. H stated that he saw no objection from a policy standpoint. [H recommended that we give further consideration to the use of leaflet rocket bombs especially for the area of the capital city. These are simple devices the release of which is both easy and capable of accomplishment with little risk.]<sup>3</sup>

3.<sup>4</sup> The evidence of an additional and very substantial purchase of arms [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was also discussed with H who requested that we do everything we can to procure documentary evidence of the purchase and application for export license. Considered and rejected was the thought of letting the shipment go through and then attempting to waylay it shortly before arrival at destination. This course of action was considered too risky and as involving unnecessary operational difficulties as well as raising more policy problems than the course of action calculated to prevent shipment of arms [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Moreover it was considered that documentary evidence of the purchase and application for export license should make a sufficiently valuable contribution to the Department's "case" against Guatemala. It was understood that the possibilities of obtaining the documents would be explored by KUBARK, and that if it should prove to be necessary to employ Embassy approach to the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], H would wish to be advised so that he can clear this with EUR. An important unresolved question in this regard is whether the original documents are required for presentation at the OAS meeting. If the method of obtainment is to be clandestine then it would probably be an embarrassment to present the originals at the meeting, since it would be more

---

<sup>3</sup> Brackets in the source text.

<sup>4</sup> This subject covered and disposed of on basis H/W telephone conversation of Saturday morning, June 5, *unless* after examination of available documents and photostats H would still desire the original or a copy of the application for export license, in which case Embassy Rome could probably obtain special request. [Footnote in the source text.]



difficult to explain how they were come by in original form than would be the case if photostats were used (photostats can be obtained in various ways, but official original documents would have to be obtained officially if it were not to appear clearly that they had been stolen).

4. The problem of shaking loose our [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] in order to dispatch him promptly to [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was brought to the attention of H, and he agreed to provide his full support in the Department and with the Embassy in [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] if this is necessary.

5. Concerning one very sensitive type of treatment, which was raised directly for the first time by TB in his memo prepared here, H considered this and ruled it out, at least for the immediate future, on the ground that it would probably prove to be counter-productive. This decision was not conclusive and H suggested that he come up with more plans both concerning the individual targets, the timing and the statement of the purpose sought to be achieved with respect to each. This would require a fairly solid showing of the advantage to be gained by this type of activity.

6. The petroleum supply situation was discussed at some length and H reaffirmed his decision against efforts prior to the OAS conference to prevail upon the suppliers by means of direct approach to them to delay, slowdown and interrupt shipments. At the same time he approved of and encouraged us to embark upon a carefully selected series of attempts against certain installations. The hope was expressed that if results can be achieved of the right kind, these results might in themselves cause more general benefit by engendering disinclination on the part of suppliers to ship the goods.

7. It was agreed by H that we might establish direct liaison with Mr. Wieland for the purpose of exchanging ideas and information with him regarding statements and other forms of policy and propaganda output. H was to speak to Wieland and W was to pass the word to Mr. [*name not declassified*].

**171. Dispatch From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to PBSUCCESS Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

HUL-A-1039

[*place not declassified*], June 4, 1954.

SUBJECT

General—KUGOWN

Specific—Further counter-measures to repudiate communist attacks on U.S. “imperialism” in Guatemala (and in Latin America, in general)

REF

HUL-A-1052

1. Apart from the immediate need for “tactical” counter-action, as suggested in reference, we continue to be faced with the basic or “strategic” problem of countering the communist claim that U.S. anti-communism is merely a disguise for the “imperialist” interests of U.S. “capitalistic monopolies.” This claim is not only raised in all communist and government media in Guatemala but in communist propaganda everywhere, including virtual daily comments by radio Moscow. The problem is particularly difficult for two major reasons:

a. Said communist claim is obviously believed by a substantial part of the people in Guatemala and throughout Latin America which explains also to a large extent why a mere handful of communists is able to exert predominant influence on government policies and on public opinion in Guatemala (and elsewhere);

b. PBSUCCESS has hardly a positive program with which to counter that claim, the few positive statements by Calligeris and [*name not declassified*] being very general and not at all forceful enough to undo the rather substantial effects of communist propaganda.

2. It cannot be LINCOLN’s task to speculate what ODYOKE policy in general might do to undermine and outflank the above described communist “position of strength.” But even for the immediate KUGOWN needs of PBSUCCESS, a more coherent and vigorous counter-effort is obviously needed. Such a counter-effort should be based, we believe, on the following propositions:

a. The only imperialism operating today—i.e. at least since 1939—is that of the Soviet Union. Imperialism is the use of government power for the exploitation of foreign territories and peoples. Only the USSR

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 104, Folder 1. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Playdon on June 2.

has annexed foreign countries since 1939 and is exploiting satellite territories for its own political and economic benefit.

b. The economic structure of the Soviet Union, including its foreign trade, is truly monopolistic and completely government-controlled, thereby putting the political and military power of the USSR at the disposal of Russia's economic interests. This puts any country dealing with the Soviet Union (or any other communist state) at a grave disadvantage.

c. No such monopolies and no such close links between economy and government exist either in the U.S. or in Britain, France or any other "capitalist" country. Proof: the Sherman Act and the many anti-trust law suits undertaken by the U.S. Government; the SEC legislation; the duty of high government officials to divest themselves of "incompatible" business properties before accepting high public office, etc.

d. U.S.-owned and operated enterprises in foreign countries treat their personnel much better than similar communist enterprises.

e. Social security and other labor legislation in "capitalist" countries is much more advantageous to the workers than the corresponding institutions in the Soviet orbit.

3. All the above themes lend themselves to overt as well as to clandestine treatment. Point 2-c above can be best argued by overt U.S. Government and private U.S. sources and media, while Point 2-d might be the point of departure for a well-integrated public relations program to be undertaken (long overdue) by UFCO and the other corporations concerned. We suggest that you address appropriate recommendations to ODACID, QKFLOWAGE and—if possible and advisable—directly to UFCO and other interested corporations as well.

4. In the interest of PBSUCCESS and particularly in view of the present state of mail, press and radio censorship in Guatemala, it will be necessary to take action along the lines suggested in para 2 above through KUBARK-controlled and influenced media as well, especially via SHERWOOD and the publication outlets in the LINCOLN area. We therefore request that you furnish us continuously with pertinent material, especially with articles, radio scripts, background material, statistics, pictures on the following subjects:

a. Soviet territorial conquests

b. Atrocities committed by Soviet troops in occupied and annexed areas (Latin American audiences might be more impressed if such stories come from Asia rather than from Europe—not excluding the latter, however)

c. Soviet economic exploitation of occupied and satellite areas, including both direct plunder and forcible "adjustment" of the respective economies to serve Russian interests

d. Experiences of countries and enterprises which did business with the Soviet Union and other communist countries

e. Comparisons between labor conditions, labor legislation and general standards of living in the Soviet orbit, on the one hand, and in democratic countries, on the other hand (using, for obvious reasons, less the U.S. than other Western countries, including free Asian countries, for comparison purposes)

f. Labor conditions and treatment of indigenous workers in Soviet enterprises abroad, e.g. in the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria, in Manchuria and North Korea, etc.

5. We further recommend that an official ODACID study be published along the lines of para 2-c above (or, perhaps better, that a well reputed economist or professor of political science from a Latin American country be invited to undertake such a study, perhaps on a grant from one of the major foundations) and that the findings be given maximum publicity.

6. In view of the close interrelationship in public opinion between Guatemala and other Latin American, especially Central American countries, we suggest that similar materials be furnished to KUBARK stations outside the LINCOLN area as well.

7. Much of the material requested in para 4 above is undoubtedly in your files and should reach us within the next few days. Other aspects of the proposals made in the present dispatch may require more time-consuming preparations and may not be completed before PBSUCCESS has reached its climax: this is, however, a task which undoubtedly goes well beyond the limits of PBSUCCESS, in time as well as in geographic applicability, and we urge you therefore to initiate action on a sufficiently broad and effective scale in any case. Please keep us advised on your decisions made and action taken, including coordination with ODACID, QKFLOWAGE and with the business enterprises concerned.

**William D. Playdon**

172. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 7, 1954.

## SUBJECT

Meeting with Mr. Holland—7 June 1954

1. Mr. Holland reported the prepared press conference with the Secretary scheduled for June 8<sup>2</sup> at which time the Secretary will answer a question on the UFCO which will permit him to say that the Government had endeavored to see that the UFCO-Guatemala financial dispute should be negotiated, but that it was the Guatemalans who did not want the matter to be settled; thus claims that the dispute with Guatemala is based on UFCO matters are false—the dispute in fact is one with communism and nothing else. Mr. Holland stated that a similar line would be taken in the Secretary's Seattle speech June 9.<sup>3</sup>

2. Mr. Leddy confirmed that he was coordinating the matter of the cables describing documentation on the *Genar* arms shipment.

3. Ecuador, it was reported, is likely to oppose the OAS meeting. Means for influencing Ecuador's position were discussed.

4. Mr. Holland discussed the probabilities that the Guatemalan government might, at some time in the near future, attempt to present a case to the Security Council. It was concluded that such an action on their part would not necessarily be damaging because (a) our strength at the UN is sufficient so that on this issue the Guatemalans would find themselves isolated with only Soviet and satellite support, and (b) such a move would enable us to point out that this is a by-passing of and an affront to the inter-American system.

5. Mr. Leddy reported that the Department is at this moment working toward action which will result in the separation of Jorge Toriello from his U.S. financial affiliation, particularly Westinghouse.

6. The desirability of Mrs. Roosevelt making a statement on communism in Guatemala was discussed, and it was concluded that a move in this direction should be taken only with the Secretary's foreknowledge and approval.

7. The lack of precise information on the nature of the *Alfhem* arms shipment was considered in light of the continuance of the Military Mission to Guatemala. Mr. Holland decided that again a telegram

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 152, Folder 3. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Extracts from Secretary Dulles' June 8 press conference on Guatemala are in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 21, 1954, pp. 950-951.

<sup>3</sup> The speech was made on June 10; see *ibid.*, pp. 935-939.

should be sent to Ambassador Peurifoy requesting him to report definitively whether the Military Mission can or cannot supply information on the nature of the arms.

8. Possible confusions which it was thought could result from the standing CNO directive on the interception of arms-bearing surface traffic were reviewed, and it was concluded that the intention of the language would be enforced and general efficiency improved if it were arranged with the Navy that the Department, rather than CNO, is to designate which ships are "suspect".

9. Mr. Holland, after reviewing a proposed telegram to Bonn, asked Mr. [name not declassified] whether we would still pick up the check on German flag ships delayed during arms inspection and found to be carrying arms. Mr. [name not declassified] replied in principle yes, and since it was not appropriate to discuss this matter before the group, conferred with Mr. Leddy, who was advised that he preferred to ascertain whether the Director still favors such support from us before the release of the cable. Mr. Leddy replied that he had discussed the matter with DD/P last week and that DD/P had said all right but that he would prefer to discuss it with the Director. Mr. Leddy and Mr. [name not declassified] agreed that the cost is likely to become considerable and far beyond the liability resulting from the single case of the *Wulfsbrook*. It was concluded that before the Agency should agree to be liable for such claims, an understanding should be formalized between the Agency and the Department.

10. With regard to the effecting of the blockade after the OAS Agreement, Mr. Holland pointed out that if we are to interfere with Guatemalan foreign trade, the stopping of American flag vessels will prove more important than interrupting European traffic, and that we shall use as an excuse a search for Communist agents and courier systems. Mr. Holland asked the group to consider developing a formula for this. Subsequently Mr. [name not declassified] discussed this matter with Mr. Leddy and offered to undertake some research which may produce a factual basis or grounds for laying on such a story.

11. Mr. Holland requested Mr. [name not declassified] to initiate action vis-à-vis American domestic groups to publicize against the purchase of Guatemalan bananas and coffee. Mr. Holland would use this in connection with his attempts to persuade those countries who are so far reluctant to support the OAS meeting—he would point to a growing pressure for unilateral action and urge the reluctant countries to collaborate with the United States before the domestic pressure should become too heavy. Subsequently Mr. [name not declassified] urged Mr. Leddy to handle this as an overt measure with American civil groups and suggested that Mr. Holland has ample proof of domestic pressure

existing today. It was concluded that Mr. Leddy would only call on the Agency in the event the Department could not make the necessary arrangements.

[name not declassified]

---

173. **Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 8, 1954, 0845Z

773. Following from Page.

1. K-Program likely remain stalemated until further pattern of PBSUCCESS clearly emerging.

2. Not a ghost of a chance to sway army high command as long as Arbenz regime going through impressive phase of consolidation with oppositional elements fragmentized and subdued.<sup>2</sup> Government firmly convinced U.S. has abandoned all thought of going it alone and effective collective intervention discounted (Toriello to SWALLOW).

3. Recommend K-Program be brought under Station control soonest and Page be authorized return to ZI. [name not declassified] complex can be handled through ESQUIRE. Contact with SWALLOW will be maintained by Burnett.

4. If at any future time, high command members should indicate desire talk terms with U.S. representative and if situation of manifest strength then favoring our cause, dispatch of PBSUCCESS representative would pose no problem security or otherwise.

5. Request approval for Page return to HQ not later than 10 June. ESQUIRE leaving for U.S. o/a 9 June on short visit and most appropriate effect turn over at that time.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 3. Secret; Routine. Drafted by Page. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> At 4 a.m. on June 8, the Guatemalan Government suspended constitutional guarantees and moved against its internal opposition; see Document 174. Earlier the government had raided the home of a key supporter of Castillo Armas and confiscated incriminating papers.

6. Report on Page/SWALLOW meeting in 8 June pouch.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Reference is presumably to a June 7 memorandum from Burnette to Bannister. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 100, Folder 1) In a June 8 memorandum, Bannister reported that Page had mentioned his name to a Guatemalan contact, thereby linking the Embassy to Page's efforts to defect high-ranking members of the Guatemalan military: "I consider this a violation of Station security, since he directly implicated the Station in an operation over which we had no control and with which this Station certainly did not wish to be identified at least to an unauthorized person." (Memorandum from Bannister to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters, June 8; *ibid.*)

---

174. **Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 8, 1954, 2328Z.

780. 1. Govt declared suspension constitutional guarantees at 4 a.m. 8 June.

2. This most drastic step taken in recent times by WSBURNT govt.

3. Morning edition *Impacto* seized.

4. Declaration curfew possible.

5. Plane reported dropped leaflets over Quetzaltenango night 7 June.

6. Fear panic spreading in government circles and offices. Constant meetings govt high command with Fortuny ranking Commies attending. Fortuny allegedly successfully recommending policy appeasement toward ODYOKE. Bannister comment: Believe govt becoming desperate attempting shore up position. Suspension guarantees and subsequent activities repression may rebound govt detriment rather than benefit. Consider army key situation and believe army situation again becoming fluid. Flight ESODICS caused sensation showed army not whole heartedly supporting govt. Individual army officers griping at constant state alert and believed dissatisfaction could mount to point action if govt makes foolish moves in attempting keep afloat. Sources: ESPARTO, ESCHEL, ESPERANCE, ESCONSON–2.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.



175. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 8, 1954, 2328Z.

3631. Re: GUAT 773.<sup>2</sup>

1. Despite compromise PBSUCCESS moving forward apace. Compromise cost only top echelon and plans that events have invalidated anyway. But mass of organization remains intact and in state of near-readiness.

2. RO's, organizers, sab leaders presently being launched. They will contact unburned second, third echelon and proceed as planned.

3. Numerous 5-man harassment teams being readied for launching, with mission attack Commies and Commie property, but not attack army.

4. Capacity to air supply friendly internal forces should exist soon.

5. Shock troops moving to WSHOOFS staging sites. High degrees of readiness, both in proficiency and spirit.

6. More leaflet drops, intensified SHERWOOD programs contemplated.

7. It would therefore be regrettable if, by your departure, you would tend confirm apparent impression of setback to PBSUCCESS. On contrary, your mission now to counteract [*name not declassified*] depression and destroy whatever smugness/fatalism has arisen among army through SEMANTIC compromise.

8. If SWALLOW your sole channel after ESQUIRE departure, make maximum use to convey "You ain't seen nothing yet" theme to SMI-LAX, SUMAC-2, etc. This might begin soonest. Events in next week may make you appear as prophet and man worth doing business with.

9. Would be unfortunate you leave on eve of authentication you have been requesting.

10. Request you weigh foregoing in light security and operational factors and advise your considered conclusions for LINC decision.

11. Also request you attempt retain ESQUIRE in place during forthcoming period.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 5, Folder 7. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Box 11, Folder 3)

**176. Memorandum From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Chief of Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 9, 1954.

SUBJECT

Operational  
KMHOOK Plans

1. As you have no doubt surmised the recent SEMANTIC flap<sup>2</sup> has occasioned a great deal of soul-searching and assessment within PBSUCCESS in LINCOLN and the field stations. The conclusions arrived at were inevitable and logical. The compromise of SEMANTIC and portions of his organization is regrettable, especially at this point, but the damage done is not irreparable. We have no alternative but to proceed altering our course of action only enough to by-pass tainted portions of the internal organization.

2. Every effort is being made to bring all PBSUCCESS paramilitary assets to a point of readiness by 12 June 1954. There are two main contingencies for which we are preparing. One is that all assets will be in position and ready to go at our signal. Two is that through some action, spontaneous and un contemplated, within WSBURNT the time is right for a revolutionary attempt and PBSUCCESS has no alternative but to capitalize on this spark and use it to our advantage.

3. In preparation for contingency our organizers, sab leaders and radio operators are being dispatched, pre-D-day DZ's have been selected, shock troops are being positioned, arms are moving forward and five man HORNET teams (duties are harassment and general hell-raising) are being launched.

4. Should contingency two occur, meaning that PBSUCCESS does not initiate the revolutionary attempt, we are readying all our assets to the point where we can throw all our effort into the fight within hours. All organizations have selected DZ's to be used on D-day or shortly thereafter and our air section is ready to fly the supplies which are already prepared. Since the organizers and radio operators are departing shortly it is expected that they will be in position prior to any unexpected revolutionary attempt.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 75, Folder 6. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Dunbar.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 175.

5. Rest assured that action will ensue and probably in the very near future. Especially since during the time of this writing the word has gone out to launch the HORNET teams. There is the possibility that the actions of these teams may be enough to bring already strained atmosphere to a breaking point.

6. In order to broaden our perspective somewhat it would be appreciated if you would keep LINCOLN informed as to the atmosphere and sentiment within WSBURNT city during the forthcoming days and, of course, tell us of any restrictions and military police movements within the city and the surrounding area which have a bearing on the tactical situation.

7. When the revolution begins we would like to know when the time has arrived that Calligeris could, with a reasonable degree of safety (50-50 chance) fly into the main airport: in effect, make a triumphal entry which would sway any recalcitrant oppositionists to our point of view. We expect to get reports on the tactical situation through our radio operators but feel that it is necessary to get your viewpoint also.

**Jerome C. Dunbar<sup>3</sup>**

---

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

177. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>

Guatemala City, June 9, 1954, 2308Z.

791. Re: LINC 3631.<sup>2</sup>

1. King Program.<sup>3</sup> Following from Page ETD Guat City 10 June 1200 hours on PAA flight 444. ETA Miami same day.

2. Ref LINC 3631 (IN 15716). Your message very heartening, but developments make imperative Page proceed LINC at least for consultation. No reason why can not return WSBURNT soonest if operational and security considerations warrant. Recent correspondence re [*name not declassified*] suggests LINCOLN/King Program gears no longer mesh.<sup>4</sup> Either Page at fault in not clearly conveying substance [*name not declassified*] plans or LINCOLN unwilling consider any suggestions not strictly in line original PBSUCCESS concept. Due lack specific instructions [*name not declassified*] operation has deteriorated into academic exercise.

3. ESQUIRE ETD 9 June. ETD New Orleans for WSBURNT 15 June. Visiting dying father in Chicago. Suggest ESQUIRE, Nutting and Page have joint discussion o/a 15 June.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Document 175.

<sup>3</sup> K-Program.

<sup>4</sup> Page reported a June 7 conversation with ESQUIRE as follows: "The consistency of our sponsoring on the one hand Calligeris and on the other hand wooing the High Command via [*name not declassified*] has not escaped him. I explained to him that the 'consejo' is anxious to have a second string to its bow. Furthermore the hope has not been given up entirely that at some future juncture it may be possible to phase together both efforts. I assured him that the consejo was giving continuous thought to this problem." (Memorandum, June 7; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 134, Folder 1)

178. Record of Decisions<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 9, 1954.

## DECISIONS TAKEN AT PBSUCCESS MEETING OF 9 JUNE 1954

1. It is understood that LINCOLN will give prior notice to Headquarters of the proposed departure of any senior members of LINC Station to the field, indicating where they are going and for what purposes. (Action: LINCOLN) (In this connection, LINC is to be advised which countries require the visa applicant to appear in person.) (Action: Mr. [name not declassified] and Mr. Preston)

2. Discussion was had of the latest Corcoran attacks against the Agency and his efforts to penetrate PBSUCCESS and bring pressures to bear, using only slightly veiled threats of stirring up trouble for CIA on the Hill. Messrs. Barnes and [name not declassified] were requested to pass the word down the line at LINC to the effect that *no one* should have any conversation with or pass any word to Corcoran without prior approval of DCI. This is the Agency line as a whole. (Messrs. [name not declassified] and Barnes said that they know of no one at or connected with LINC who had had any contact with or passed any word to Corcoran.) (Action: Messrs. Barnes and [name not declassified])

3. Cable is to be sent to [place not declassified] in an effort to get [name not declassified] (correspondent there) to write the Perez Asturias story. (Action: Mr. [name not declassified])

4. After the 5:00 meeting with Mr. Dulles today, the problem of the additional radio operators, to be procured from General McClellan's shop, is to be re-examined. (Action: Mr. Wisner)

5. A cable is to be sent to [name not declassified] requesting that he cable Hqs at least a preliminary report of the [name not declassified]/Perez Jimenez meeting. Hqs is planning to leak a story re this meeting and it is important that we get the information developed on this meeting. (Action: Mr. Esterline)

6. The FOA plan to be handled with Mr. Weiland of USIA. (Action: Mr. Bissell)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 71, Folder 6. Secret.

179. **Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 10, 1954, 0629Z.

799. Re: GUAT 791.<sup>2</sup>

1. Though clearly understood that this Station has no responsibility for the K-Program and in fact is limited to being a commo channel and backstopper for Page nevertheless information obtained by us and made available to Page plus that obtained by Page from [*name not declassified*] (see GUAT 785 (IN 15812))<sup>3</sup> leads us to believe that Page's departure at this time is unfortunate since indications army discontent mounting and may result in conditions favorable to defection efforts either through [*name not declassified*] or others.

2. Since information contained LINC 3631 (IN 15716)<sup>4</sup> and obtained from [*name not declassified*] as reported GUAT 790 (IN 16092)<sup>5</sup> indicates SEMANTIC compromise is an inconvenience rather than disaster, we perturbed by fact no one will be on scene to handle defection possibilities which may shortly arise as friendly pressure and govt tension mount.

3. We wish point out we have no contact with any Page people and that K-Program automatically suspended with Page departure.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Document 177.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 9. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 3)

<sup>4</sup> Document 175.

<sup>5</sup> Dated June 11. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 3)

180. **Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation  
PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 12, 1954, 1739Z.

04681. Ref: A. SHERWOOD 200;<sup>2</sup> B. LINCOLN 3711.<sup>3</sup>

1. KMFLUSH Ambassador has closed deal with ODACID for three F-47. Down payment will be made and title transferred 14 or 15 June.

2. Planes will be "processed" prior delivery which we take to mean bringing maintenance completely up to date. On this basis delivery possible by 22 or 23 June. If completely rehabilitated with engines rebuilt would require considerably longer.

3. KMFLUSH Ambassador here insisting on having planes in "perfect condition". ODACID urging him accept "processed" planes with understanding they will be rehabilitated if any difficulties develop within 90 days.

4. Arrangement presently being worked out between KMFLUSH Ambassador and ODACID calls for delivery by ODUNIT in Miami and KMFLUSH to fly from there with "American pilots under contract." We are not attempting alter this arrangement. Planes originate Puerto Rico and could probably be turned over there if preferable.

5. Realize delivery 23 June later than you desire but believe the machinery cannot be made to turn over any faster.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 1. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Bissell on June 12 and approved by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 12, Folder 3)

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 11. (Ibid., Box 5, Folder 8)

**181. Dispatch From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to All PBSUCCESS Stations<sup>1</sup>**

HUL–A–1045

[*place not declassified*], June 13, 1954.

SUBJECT

General—KUGOWN

Specific—Policy Guidance for Final Phase of PBSUCCESS

1. We are forwarding herewith copy of our Policy Guidance which is a general outline of the KUGOWN effort desired in support of the final phase of PBSUCCESS which has just started.

2. In view of the continuous changes of the situation and the necessary flexibility of the KUGOWN effort in line with the progress of our KUHOOK action, our policy guidance had to be confined to a fairly general plan the implementation of which we must leave to you.

3. We shall supplement this general guidance by cable or dispatch, as the situation may warrant, but we expect you to take all possible steps for the implementation of this program without delay and without expecting separate directives for every single step from us. We reiterate, however, that all KUGOWN action must be coordinated with, and subordinated to, KUHOOK action on the spot.

JCD

**Attachment**

POLICY GUIDANCE

1. Our enterprise has now entered its final, decisive phase. We cannot expect any more to change fundamentally the political opinions and attitudes of large groups of the population during this necessarily short period, but Psychological Warfare has nevertheless a very significant role to play during this final stage.

2. The government has been trying frantically during the last two weeks to recover the initiative which it had virtually lost before—as had been indicated by the profound effect of Archbishop Arellano's pastoral letter, the impression made by the opening of a powerful clandestine

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 104, Folder 1. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Dunbar on June 13. Sent to Guatemala City, [*4 places not declassified*], and Washington.



radio station, the highly successful "32" campaign, the indignation provoked by the arrival of Soviet arms and finally the distribution of oppositional leaflets by an unidentified plane which swooped low over the roof of the National Palace.

3. The government's initiative consisted primarily of mass arrests and house searches, climaxed by the formal suspension of constitutional liberties—which had been practically disregarded already before (arrests without warrants, people held incommunicado, etc.). At the same time, the communists issued publicly orders for the arming of labor and peasants' groups, thus admitting their uncertainty as regards the political attitude of the army. In the diplomatic field, the government tried to seize the initiative by offering Honduras a non-aggression pact (an offer which has been turned down in the meantime), by offering direct talks between Arbenz and Eisenhower (also rejected) and by a world-wide propaganda campaign—supported by communists everywhere, notably by Radio Moscow—which tries to denounce the opposition movement as a "tool of foreign imperialists," while at the same time linking the U.S. State Department's protest against the Soviet arms shipment to the United Fruit Company's financial claims (the old "amalgam" technique which Stalin used already in the beginning of his fratricidal fight against Trotsky and his followers).

4. The government—or rather the leaders of the Communist Party manipulating the figureheads in the government—obviously pursue a triple goal:

a. deprive the opposition movement of its heads through arrests and of its voices through rigorous censorship

b. intimidate and confuse the rank-and-file of the opposition by a show of strength, while at the same time impugning the motives of the opposition

c. defend their position diplomatically by presenting Guatemala as the victim of U.S. imperialist intervention, mainly in the interest of UFCO and other "monopolies," thus preparing for the OAS conference and gaining time for the consolidation of their internal position.

5. Our Psychological Warfare effort in combatting this government-communist policy must be focused on the following objectives:

a. Explaining to the people that the apparent "show of strength" is actually a show of weakness, confusion and hysteria and that the few smart moves of the government (especially in the diplomatic field) have most obviously not originated in Guatemala, but in Moscow and in Moscow-trained minds;

b. Weakening the enemy's potential by showing them the hopelessness of their stand, their increasing isolation, the true motives behind the government's actions and inviting them to change sides—or

at least to leave the government's side—while there is still time (but very little time left);

c. Giving as much direct, on-the-spot support to all moves connected with the actual uprising against the government—discouraging premature local actions as well as panic, reducing the need for violence in persuading enemy forces to surrender or to withdraw and mobilizing popular support on the broadest possible scale.

6. Inside the target area, the above objectives will have to be reached under the present circumstances primarily by clandestine means, especially—though by no means exclusively—by the activities of mobile Tactical Psywar Teams (for which special, detailed instructions have already been issued before) which ought to include (but do not have to be confined to)

Issuance of clandestine bulletins and leaflets  
Nerve war action against enemy key personnel  
Rumor (whispering) campaigns  
Wall paintings etc.

7. The enemy relies especially on mass support through communist-led labor and peasants unions and through front organizations of youth, students, women, peace committees, etc. Enemy public mass meetings and parades ought to be attacked by hecklers, spreading of sudden panic rumors (e.g. telling people gathering for an open-air meeting that an air raid is imminent or that store of explosives in a nearby building is about to blow up), use of stink bombs, setting inflammable displays, posters, banners, etc. afire, or the like. Wherever arms are issued to communist-led groups, our friends and sympathizers ought to try to get their share: if this is impossible, we ought to start at least rumors that these weapons are getting largely into the “wrong” hands.

8. Our main psychological efforts should be concentrated on the following groups:

a. *Most Important*—upon the members of the Armed Forces, influencing them to side with the opposition, or where this proves impossible, at least inducing them to stand aside and not give any support to the government;

b. All other armed groups, police, armed workers and peasant troops, etc. To the extent to which these groups are composed of irredeemable enemies, they should be at least weakened and so far as possible eliminated from the struggle, by intimidating or confusing them, etc.;

c. Workers in key enterprises, railroad, dockers, electrical power plants, printing shops, etc. (to prevent them from carrying out communist orders);

d. Students and other young people who can possibly be mobilized for active participation in the fighting on our side;

e. Housewives and other women who can (i) influence their men, husbands, sons etc. in the armed forces, and so forth (ii) undertake demonstrations before prisons, police stations, government buildings, etc., asking for the release of political prisoners, demonstrate against the use of force, perhaps even physically impede the move of the government forces, by crowding the streets, lying down on railroad tracks, etc.

9. Rumors, combining fact and fiction, which ought to be circulated, may include the following (not every rumor is applicable to every group of people and to every situation; select from the following suggestions whatever is suitable for given moment and audience):

(i) A group of Soviet commissars, officers and political advisers, led by a member of the Moscow Politbureau, have landed (at the airfield, in Puerto Barrios, etc.);

(ii) The government has issued an order devaluating the Quetzal at the rate of 1:10. Use your money immediately to buy food and durable goods;

(iii) The government is about to change. Fortuny will take Arbenz' place, Pellecer Foreign Minister, Gutierrez will be made Minister of Government (Interior), Monzon propaganda minister, etc. Fortuny, Toriello and Fanjul are being flown to Argentina in a two-engined Soviet jet plane.

(iv) In addition to military conscription, the communists will introduce labor conscription. A decree is already being printed. All boys and girls 16 years old will be called for one year of labor duty in special camps, mainly for political indoctrination and to break the influence of family and church on the young people. These labor troops will also be used for special missions in other countries.

(v) Food rationing is about to be introduced and the money which people can no longer spend on food stuffs and other consumer goods is to be made available to the government by means of a compulsory loan.

(vi) Arbenz has already left the country. His announcements from the National Palace are actually made by a double, provided by Soviet intelligence.

(vii) An educational reform is being prepared. There will be no longer any religious instruction at state expense, but on the contrary lessons in atheism, Soviet style.

Add rumors of your own, following the day-by-day changes in the situation.

10. The efforts of our friends inside the target area must be supported to the utmost from outside, by radio, newspapers, leaflets, teams of border crossers, etc. This outside effort must be subordinated to the program outlined above. All outside groups, by listening to our own

radio station as well as the other news broadcasts, must adapt their activities on a day-to-day basis to the developments inside the target area.

11. An all-out effort on a 24-hour basis, using all human and material resources within reach, must be started immediately to implement the above program in support of the decisive last steps of our enterprise.

---

**182. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 14, 1954.

SUBJECT

Guatemalan Friendship Societies—Gruson<sup>2</sup> piece of 14 June 1954, *New York Times*

1. In line with our conversation of this morning about the Gruson piece in today's *Times*, I believe you have already received by now a copy of the piece that we have worked up and given to *Time Magazine*, entitled "The Friends of Guatemala."

2. This piece of Gruson reporting is about as harmful as anything he has done. It places the entire emphasis upon the line taken by the (known) Communist-inspired and Communist-organized so-called Guatemalan Friendship Society in Mexico—giving the impression that there is tremendous Mexican sentiment against the US position with respect to Guatemala and implying that the Mexican Government had better watch out if it is thinking about shifting its position in the direction of what the United States wishes.

3. I don't know whether you plan to have any further conversations with your friend on the *Times*, but it has occurred to me that if you do plan any further conversation—or if he should contact you again—you might call his attention to this Gruson piece and tell him how much we know about the Communist origin of this whole friendship society charade. You could then make the obvious conclusion that Gruson, by his

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 151, Folder 2. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> *New York Times* reporter Sidney Gruson.

writing, is putting a lot of heavy water on the wheels of this Communist operation and that he must be pretty naive if he is not aware of the significance of his action.<sup>3</sup> I don't think you should provide the actual text of the piece entitled "The Friends of Guatemala" to your friend on the *Times*—since we have already given this to *Time Magazine* in this precise form and since this would make it all too apparent from where *Time* got its poop.

Frank G. Wisner<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Because of Agency complaints about Gruson's reporting, DCI Dulles went to Arthur Hays Sulzberger, who soon had Gruson reassigned elsewhere. (Cullather, *Operation PBSUCCESS History*, pp. 71-72)

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

**183. Telegram From [*place not declassified*] to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 14, 1954, 2233Z.

583. 1. SECANT and all others adamant that 1 bomb, placed on presidential palace would be convincer to army on-the-fencers and cause mass hiding of key opposition.

2. Pilots convinced palace can be hit on 1 shot. SECANT convinced people would understand 1 bomb only not meant for them and would be convinced we holding back on bombing to prevent harming them. Field convinced.

3. Request SOMERSET be advised in accord with LINCOLN decision. If used, should be timed hours after clandestine broadcast announces go.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 13, Folder 6. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

**184. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in [place not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 15, 1954, 1951Z.

04884. To: [name not declassified]. For [name not declassified] CS-40544. Guatemala, Guatemala City, 11 June 1954. Former Guatemalan army officer with many contacts among leading gov't officials.

1. During 3 hour talk with leading civilian gov't officials on 11 June, President Arbenz stated army trying persuade him get rid of Communists and change gov't policy, but said present policy his and unchangeable with or without Communists, added would, if necessary, arm workers and peasants who would "fight to last man" against any attempt overthrow gov't.

(Washington comment: Anti-Communist sentiment of army has until now been balanced by personal loyalty of officers to Arbenz as fellow officer. However, officer's reaction to Communist arms shipments together with growing concern that Arbenz firmly committed to present pro-Communist policies indicates possibility major split in army on whether to continue support to Arbenz. Army reaction to any Arbenz attempt to arm peasants as counterforce to wavering army is expected to be indication their intentions to initiate or support any anti-government movement.)

2. Arbenz also stated he was trying to send Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello to Salvador to talk with President Osorio but has been informed by Salvadorans that "our minds made up and we not interested becoming friends of Communist gov't".

(Washington comment: Stiffening attitude of Salvador toward Guatemala may be result of Guat receipt Communist arms and recent Communist-inspired strikes northern Honduras.)

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 1. Secret; Routine. Drafted by [name not declassified] on June 14 and cleared by [name not declassified].

185. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

[*place not declassified*], June 14, 1954.

3829. 1. After thorough review of all aspects of K Program LINC has reached following conclusions:

A. Opposition to regime had and should have two strings to its bow, one Calligeris and plan now approved and being followed by his assets; the other [*name not declassified*] working independently through high army officers. Both efforts should be tried since they do not become mutually exclusive until possibly after deposition present regime and even then conflict not unavoidable or even necessary.

B. As already approved the Calligeris effort will proceed without abatement.

C. [*name not declassified*] possibility had developed to point where it is believed he will not make affirmative move provided some internal WSBURNT turmoil develops and provided he can be given reasonably certain assurance that if he in fact overthrows Arbenz and is the first to establish a de facto government in the capital he will be officially recognized by PBPRIME.

D. Calligeris movement should provide needed internal turmoil. Assume then that [*name not declassified*] can provide capability to establish himself as de facto regime in capital, can he be given assurance of PBPRIME recognition realizing that at same moment Calligeris may be pursuing successful campaign in numerous areas outside capital? Assuming Calligeris defeat or assuming [*name not declassified*] failure there is no problem.

2. LINC recommends that PBPRIME should take advantage all possible movements capable achieving major target namely overthrow present regime and elimination Communists. Consequently should urge [*name not declassified*] take action. If authority given, LINC can through Page ESQUIRE get word to [*name not declassified*] which believe he will accept regarding recognition provided on his own he gets control govt in capital first. Such assurance however should not be given unless recognition in fact given immediately provided conditions met.

3. What might occur thereafter between [*name not declassified*] and Calligeris is an internal WSBURNT affair.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 5. Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Chief of the CIA Station in Guatemala.

4. This is matter in LINC. Opinion of utmost importance so appreciate advise soonest. Request your concurrence.

---

**186. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 15, 1954.

3838. 1. Entirely possible situation rapidly developing which could very well become critical turning point in PBSUCCESS. Imperative we seek and apply maximum measures at this moment and force the issue.

2. [*name not declassified*] from your cables appears to be assuming leadership within army. Accordingly you should endeavor to impress upon him through ESQUIRE (per below) the following points which should be clarified and/or reiterated:

A. He is covertly assured of fullest ODYOKE backing.

B. SCOMBER<sup>2</sup> assures him of fullest support within its capabilities including all its assets.

C. SCOMBER practically certain its control over SYNCARP to almost guarantee its fullest support

D. The moral issue of avoiding bloodshed at this moment—practically zero hour—is so overwhelming that he must impress upon his followers within the army action must be taken at once to avoid the most terrible bloodshed in WSBURNT history. Anti-Communist forces are now well organized and rapidly gaining in power—both externally and internally—and are completely dedicated to gaining control and will not be dissuaded regardless of the price in blood or treasure until success is obtained.

3. The forces of anti-communism are tremendous and are now planning every conceivable measure in stages which may be necessary to eliminate the Communist beachhead from this area. Remind him again that Calligeris is but a symbol because he is the leading anti-Communist exilee. Aircraft, armaments, technical equipment, economic pressures,

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 142, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Joint Council of “The Group” and Castillo Armas’ political organization that was used to signal joint decisions.



and every possible weapon is being marshalled behind the Calligeris symbol to insure success and on behalf of the anti-Communists of WSBURNT.

4. ODYOKE presently desirous to make above maximum effort to preserve integrity and pride of WSBURNT to overthrow Soviet yoke by their own means. There is absolutely no question regarding the ultimate outcome. Communism will not be tolerated: if present methods of aiding WSBURNT to resolve their own problems prove inadequate then unquestionable ODYOKE and other Latin American powers will intervene by force. The expulsion of Soviet control of WSBURNT is now underway and will not stop until freedom is restored.

5. The foregoing guidance should be adequate and enable Guat to seize initiative and exploit every opportunity. In event circumstances are as described above inform OPIM any problem or propositions in connection with foregoing guidance, as time is also a vital factor.

6. ESQUIRE due WSBURNT about 0600 15 June and scheduled see [name not declassified] during day.

7. Page scheduled arrive WSBURNT noon 16 June via Mexico City. Arrange contact and brief him before he contacts ESQUIRE.

8. Request you contact ESQUIRE soonest briefing him on your info re [name not declassified] alleged activities asking him to confirm same. Based upon results this verification proceed to guide ESQUIRE on basis above guidance consistent with your best judgment: attempting to ascertain in what way SCOMBER may be of greatest assistance to him if in fact this is a critical moment. If unconfirmed and [name not declassified] not in fact assuming leadership of opposition officer corps and no urgency present then await return of Page on 16 June to resume handling of K-Program.

187. **Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 15, 1954, 2039Z.

04904. 1. Referring in general to the developments of the past 48 hours including subject matter Playdon/Ascham telephone conversation last night, will you please provide to us your very best estimate, as of today, of the date by which you expect to achieve readiness (which we assume to be equivalent to your kickoff date).

2. For your information Hqs going full out to provide or stimulate various forms additional pressure on regime, many of which actions responsive to or in line with recommendations of LINC and field. Yesterday and today following steps have been taken here:

A. Ascham personally arranged leak to AP last night of story which was on morning broadcasts although too late for most morning papers. UP following up with questions and claims to have independent rumor to same effect although we not sure whether ultimate source is same.

B. At least two of major oil companies have been requested take some form of action or make some statement which will be open to interpretation they considering slowdown or temporary stoppage oil shipments. First reaction favorable and one or more may comply.<sup>2</sup>

C. Statements have been prepared for both President and Sec/State generally along lines your recommendations, and Sec/State orally briefed this morning before his press conference.<sup>3</sup> President's press conference<sup>4</sup> comes tomorrow and we hope for best.

D. Other news media provided with bits and pieces which they have accepted avidly.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 9, Folder 1. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> No additional information has been found.

<sup>3</sup> Secretary of State Dulles told the press that the Department did not have any information from a "clearly dependable source." He continued: "No doubt there is going on somewhat of a reign of terror in Guatemala. There is no doubt in my opinion but what the great majority of the Guatemalan people have both the desire and the capability of cleaning their own house. But, of course, those things are difficult to do in face of the Communist type of terrorism which is manifesting itself in Guatemala and which is perhaps most dramatically expressed by the statement of one Communist member of the Guatemalan Congress that if there was a disturbance, that would mark the beginning of a beheading of all anti-Communist elements in Guatemala." (Press Release 323, June 15; printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 28, 1954, p. 981)

<sup>4</sup> For information on the press conference, including the draft press statement and an excerpt from Press Secretary James Hagerty's diary, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1168–1169.

E. Guidances to non-PBSUCCESS Stations with which you familiar.

3. We assume both LINC and field will continue forwarding recommendations and suggestions for action here.

---

**188. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 16, 1954, 0617Z.

3895. RE: GUAT 848.<sup>2</sup>

1. Appreciate fully your apprehensions behalf Page however he is fully briefed by LINC on how to proceed upon his arrival.

2. With exception change in residence status all points were recognized and anticipated in above briefing. Page despite healthy desire to be cautious is fully prepared for expulsion, denial of entry and at worst apprehension by local authorities. Important point is to permit him opportunity to materialize K Program in manner originally contemplated. FYI LINC 3838 (IN 17978)<sup>3</sup> was prepared with his assistance and Hqs general concurrence in principle. Moreover LINC convinced that more than "issuing marching orders" left to do.

3. Accordingly however tenuous Page's position may be he should attempt finalization his program with fullest support your Station: In event situation denies him opportunity then Station should be prepared to pick up and follow through with [*name not declassified*].

4. Therefore arrange to meet and brief Page on developments since his departure setting up usual emergency and alternate procedures in event of his forced withdrawal from operation. Resolve his residence situation soonest. Inform him of DIR 04858 (OUT 53908).<sup>4</sup>

5. Imperative your Station provide LINC fullest details these developments by OPIM cable as many other factors hinge upon your progress. Page has been requested to do same.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 5, Folder 9. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 16. (Ibid., Box 11, Folder 4)

<sup>3</sup> Document 186.

<sup>4</sup> Dated June 15. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 1)

**189. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 16, 1954, 11:20 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. ALLEN DULLES

The Sec. asked if there is any news from his front, and AWD said no. Things are moving along. Neither had heard what the President said about Guatemala this a.m.

The Sec. said he is seeing him this p.m. and will mention the question of tankers on the other side of the world. The Sec. asked if AWD had any particular views. AWD said he is not at all sure that he would do it. It is not confirmed yet, and he doesn't think we have picked up vessels. Will try to get word to the Sec. by 2:30. They agreed it does not affect policy. The Sec. said he thought the information from AWD was pretty explicit. There was communication with Geneva. AWD said it would be helpful to get guidance. If it doesn't happen now, it will. It is a very ticklish point.

AWD said he is seeing this morning men from Standard of NJ and they will lay before him their position with regard to the small country down south. AWD besides finding out their position will possibly slow things up without formalized action.

The Sec. asked AWD if he thought Hickenlooper might introduce some kind of a sanctions bill in the Senate. AWD said it is a good idea, but will have to be phrased very carefully. The Sec. said we have a draft drawn up, but he was not satisfied with it. AWD said it would help their phase, though it would create problems here.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles Papers, Dulles Telephone Calls, Box 2, A67–28. No classification marking. Transcribed by Phyllis Bernau, Secretary of State Dulles' secretary.

**190. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 16, 1954, 2050Z.

05142. Refs: A. LINC 3908; B. LINC 3909.<sup>2</sup>

1. Guidance provided ref A makes excellent sense to us even though<sup>3</sup> it appears from here you may be overly optimistic specifying 18 June as date completion pre-D-day air supply and activation mini-commo capability.

2. We agree generally with your analysis of situation as set forth ref B and have no policy objection to scheduled timing. Agree specifically that crux whole issue continues to be position WSBURNT armed forces concerning which we must have clearer favorable indications before kick-off.<sup>4</sup> This supersedes all other reasons for additional delay although achievement some degree operational readiness would appear essential prerequisite for action.

3. If evidence concerning position of military indicates it solidly behind regime there is no doubt in our mind that Calligeris' forces in exterior and if possible in interior must be restrained from mounting attack since attack under these circumstances would result in certain defeat accompanied by most harmful consequences affecting all aspects WSBURNT problem. This is one thing we must avoid and all efforts must be devoted to this end including imposition of specially devised restraints upon Calligeris, etc. For use in arguments to convince Calligeris and associates it should be brought home to him that his own inability to produce reception parties, etc. reveal great weakness and possibly non-existence his claimed internal organization and he should be told that all support will be withdrawn if he persists. At same time the alternative course envisioned in Lynade's paper<sup>5</sup> should be forcibly

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 12. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> Neither printed. (Both *ibid.*, Box 6, Folder 1)

<sup>3</sup> The words "even though" were inserted by hand and Wisner's handwritten initials appear next to the line in the margin.

<sup>4</sup> Influencing the army leadership was considered so critical that field officers were instructed in radio broadcasts to "Emphasize in above broadcast in every program that army our friend, on side of people and Christianity, against communism. Even if a few officers or men, temporarily obeying orders from their commie superiors, should turn against liberation movement, do not consider entire army our enemy, appeal to soldiers honor, common sense, love of fatherland, Christian faith." (Telegram from PBSUCCESS Headquarters to Broadcasting Unit, June 16; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 92, Folder 2)

<sup>5</sup> The paper was not found.

advanced as the only conceivable course of action under the circumstances. Calligeris should be assured of continuing support on this basis and no other.

4. Meaning of paras 4 and 5 ref B not clear to us, and in present form seem somewhat inconsistent with para 3. Para 5 could be read as meaning that failures of adequate readiness preparations and other foul-ups are justification for committing all resources to action. Please clarify.

---

**191. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 16, 1954, 2118Z.

05145. Ref: A. GUAT 848;<sup>2</sup> B. LINC 3895.<sup>3</sup>

1. As indicated Whiting/Playdon telephone conversation, we believe LINC made correct decision in return of Page to WSBURNT.<sup>4</sup> Whereas we recognize validity and serious import of certain points in reference A message, this appears time for calculated risk taken with eyes open in order obtain maximum results from Page knowledge, ability and relationship with [*name not declassified*]. The overriding importance of what could be produced as a result success this line of effort is clear to everyone here, especially in light of developing difficulties and increasing uncertainties Calligeris effort.

2. Our only suggestion is that you may wish instruct Station to prepare plan for Embassy action in event Page arrest or disappearance. Do not believe Page should remain WSBURNT more than minimum time enable him establish contact and deliver final exhortation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–010125A, Box 9, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 188.

<sup>3</sup> Document 188.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 186.

192. **Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 16, 1954, 2118Z.

05144. Ref: GUAT 857.<sup>2</sup>

We question strongly proposal para 1 reference that Campesinos be enjoined kill Guardia Civil, etc. This amounts to incitement civil war and large-scale blood letting thus fouling Calligeris pitch and discrediting his movement as terrorist and irresponsible outfit willing sacrifice innocent lives. An acceptable line would be enjoin Campesinos and others defend and protect themselves and other anti-Communists who are being hunted down in frantic Communist effort save tottering regime.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 11, Folder 4)

---

193. **Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 17, 1954, 0131Z.

566. Ref: LINC 3838.<sup>2</sup>

In view critical situation, ripe psychological moment and in compliance requests made reference, and since did not know when ESQUIRE would arrive, Bannister made cold approach [*name not declassified*] on morning 15 June. [*name not declassified*] convinced Bannister pilot who had come with special instructions from Consejo for fast action part of [*name not declassified*]. Knows Bannister only by true first name.

2. [*name not declassified*] firmly told that time is come, that he get moving, take over army, and that time last opportunity for army to salvage its honor and even existence.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-010125A, Box 75, Folder 2. No classification marking; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> Document 186.

3. He agreed. Added he and SUMAC-2 fully working together and would draw up plan of action. Wanted STANDEL-1 eliminated by Consejo or Calligeris people. Was told that this his problem and he expected to handle. If impossible take care one man what percentage have army.

4. Second meeting with ESQUIRE and Bannister morning 16 June. Said he and SUMAC-2 sure they can take over army but will need show of strength on part of opposition. Requested that P-38 drop bomb directly in center hippodrome located just west of La Aurora airport. Also requested that planes buzz 15 June demonstration and if possible drop tear gas. He told the bomb could be dropped and possibly tear gas as well.

5. Vitally important this be done. Suggest at least one loud bomb on hippodrome. They plan seize control from Diaz and Dove.

6. *[name not declassified]* said all gear dropped Guatelon was turned over by campesinos to Guardia Civil who handed it to army. Army very frightened sight these weapons. Was told this was psychological drop for that purpose but that real drops also being made. Told he better move fast. He agreed. Said he would put guards around all Embassies as soon as they move so that foe cannot escape. Said Arbenz, Commies, and enemies will be executed.

7. After meeting he departed to meet SUMAC-2 and then proceed line up regimental commanders in capital.

8. Next meeting morning 17 June at 0900.

9. In view change from negotiations to action you will appreciate impossibility reinserting Page in contact chain.

---

**194. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in *[place not declassified]*<sup>1</sup>**

*[place not declassified]*, June 17, 1954, 0942Z.

3953. Ref: *[telegram indicator not declassified]* 265.<sup>2</sup> For Page.

1. Regret PAA stoppage and problems your return WSBURNT.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-010125A, Box 6, Folder 1. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA Station in Guatemala.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.



2. Speed with which events moving plus increased vigilance, tensions and general unrest now such that your return inadvisable.

3. Appreciate your disappointment which we share in losing opportunity close in for kill but unavoidable bad break.

4. If you can get documented for DTFROGS, proceed there soonest to stay through 19 June when SWALLOW expected. Try arrange Wellbank solidly placed as local consejo rep. With high DTFROGS rep possibly Jurant. Wellbank met SWALLOW 14 June but believe you can help consolidate his position.

5. Advise if can make arrangements and ETA. LINC will notify [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. If you unable go DTFROGS return LINC.

---

**195. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland) and Secretary of State Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 17, 1954, 5:15 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. HOLLAND

He said Sec. Anderson just told him that he has a military telegram from Honduras that Armas(?) "is moving". The Sec. said he didn't know what that means, but he supposes it means something. H. said A. is a revolutionary individual lurking in the forest.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles Papers, J.F. Dulles Telephone Conversations, Box 2, A 67-28. No classification marking. Transcribed by Phyllis Bernau.

---

**196. Editorial Note**

On June 17, 1954, at its 202nd meeting, the National Security Council discussed a proposed anti-trust suit against the United Fruit Company, and whether or not to proceed with the suit at the present

time. The Justice Department proposed a settlement but United Fruit continued to insist that the company had done nothing wrong and refused to consider a settlement “unless the Government revealed in advance” its evidence of violations.

Both Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower saw no reason not to proceed. Dulles added: “on balance it might be positively advantageous to U.S. policy in Latin America if the suit were instituted. Many of the Central American countries were convinced that the sole objective of United States foreign policy was to protect the fruit company. It might be a good idea to go ahead and show them that this was not the case, by instituting the suit.” The Secretary was, however, concerned that the suit might interfere “with certain activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.”

Allen Dulles responded that “given a little more time, the Central American states would do Justice’s job for it.” He also advised a delay of one month “by which time the situation in Guatemala would have been clarified.” (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

---

**197. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 17, 1954, 1907Z.

3965. 1. Evidence available convinces us of following:

A. Internal Calligeris org has been demoralized, frightened into inactivity or badly disorganized by Commie police efforts and arrests.

B. Consequently opposition left with Calligeris external assets plus possibility [*name not declassified*] move.

C. External assets now in position where will probably move regardless what we do. Only action available to us is either withdraw support or attempt delay move without certainty effective for very brief period, possibly day or two at most.

D. Delay of such brief period would gain nothing as too short for reorganization and would just give additional time for Commies bru-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 10. Secret; Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

talize opposition and pick up few remaining assets such as sab leaders, organizers, ROS and teams from KMPAJAMA.

E. [*name not declassified*] move will either occur momentarily or in our opinion he will be arrested or otherwise eliminated.

F. Shock troops sufficiently large to create considerable impact particularly when supported by air drops. Fighters over capital also will have substantial effect. Tros with shock troops now been received will provide some information as to progress.

2. Have decided therefore that should move as planned night of 18 June on theory that resulting activities will force [*name not declassified*] and army hand if has not already acted. Also Calligeris units may overcome one or two garrisons on initial impact which reported (without confirmation) as weak from morale point of view. This could provide beachhead for rallying opposition.

3. If above fails we are still better off than pulling out and having Calligeris move on his own or assuming most unlikely that he too pulls out. In any case long term effort will become essential and in no case will present assets be any value over long haul. It is thus calculated risk but consciously undertaken as providing only present hope of success while if unsuccessful losing nothing of future value.

4. Moreover the move will provide evidence of active opposition regime and its inability to maintain its position merely through unopposed police methods.

---

**198. Telegram From Operation PBUSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 17, 1954, 2231Z.

3977. 1. All planning heretofore predicated upon basic premise that armed Communist workmen would be denied ability merge on Adam. Blockading forces were designed serve this purpose.

2. Govt action in organizing mass public demonstration 1700 June 18 now believed to be their counter-measure to ensure maximum strength inside city before D-day.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 1. Secret; Immediate; RYBAT; PBUSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. Imperative you transmit following soonest to [*name not declassified*] after explaining above.

A. Army must be made known to recognize that this move constitutes Communist threat to launch Bogotazo and overwhelm army.

B. Practically impossible forestall liberation movement from attacking 2020 June 18. Therefore army must be urged to take immediate measures allegedly against subversive forces, erecting street blockades throughout center of city and searching all civilians for firearms. Armed patrols must be in readiness to prevent disorders. Army must be prepared to fire on rioters and take strong measures without equivocation.

C. Imperative [*name not declassified*] be impressed with fact that our intelligence indicates this is a Communist maneuver to sack the city and seize control over army which it distrusts. If preventive measures are not taken soonest army will pass to Communist control on this date.

D. Do everything in your power to cancel meeting. Disperse crowds. Deny assembly of all groups. These measures must be taken at once.

4. FYI: Above predicated on deduction only from available info, however, important you realize this capability exists and exercise every means to counteract it. If successful in convincing army of foregoing any action which it would take would be against Communists and therefore a step in direction of supporting anti-Communists. This then could be [*name not declassified*] first test.

---

## 199. Editorial Note

Simultaneous action on the part of the Guatemalan army was key to every Castillo Armas scenario that U.S. planners developed. In the early days of the operation, it was believed that Castillo Armas had a strong organization inside the Guatemalan military, but that belief gradually eroded and faith was placed in the K-Program's ability to persuade the officers themselves to take action against communism. On the eve of operational D-day, June 17, 1954, however, the CIA Station in Guatemala informed PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida:

"[*name not declassified*] says he must wait for emergency. He pled for bomb drop on racetrack etc. Begged for show of force. Vigorously urged

tear gas drop and breaking up of 18 June demonstration which govt. busily trying stage on mammoth scale. Says army and government do not believe anything can or will happen. All pure talk. Nothing but psychological stunt.

"[*name not declassified*] assured him bomb would be dropped, that planes would fly over, that tracers would be fired, that spectacle force would be provided. [*name not declassified*] pleaded that this be done soonest, that planes zoom city, [*name not declassified*] home, [*name not declassified*] home, Guardia Civil etc.

"He categorically stated that bomb drop and impressive show of strength would swing army over. He insisted with obvious sincerity that show of strength will give him and friends opportunity which they will seize. He convinced they can gain control. He reiterates that time for showing strength is here."

The operatives in Guatemala agreed: "We urgently request that bomb be dropped, show strength be made, that all available planes be sent over, that army and capital be shown that time for decision is here." (Telegram 864 from Guatemala City to PBSUCCESS Headquarters, June 17; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 4) Telegram 866 from Guatemala City to PBSUCCESS Headquarters, June 17, reiterated this message. (Ibid.)

## 200. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>

[*place not declassified*], June 17, 1954, 0720Z.

3946. Ref: GUAT 866.<sup>2</sup>

1. Keep pressure on as per ref. You have tremendous opportunity solving whole situation if you succeed with [*name not declassified*].

2. Emphasize speed essential as Calligeris move imminent and avoidance bloody showdown only possible if [*name not declassified*] successful immediately.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 1. Secret; Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 199.

3. FYI Will not drop bomb 18 June but will do all possible have three fighters buzz capital. At least one fighter will be there 18 June and three noon 19 June.

4. Tell [*name not declassified*] Consejo too conscientiously in favor bloodless take over to risk misplaced bomb now. Strength if necessary will not be withheld. Point out that fighters plus evidence which he must have heard of day and night drops covering all parts country should be sufficient to convince him without taking chance unnecessary deaths and damage at this time.

5. Also PBPRIME Pres in 16 June press statement has evidenced his concern WSBURNT backing SecState (DIR 04858 (OUT 53908)<sup>3</sup> so PBPRIME conviction can hardly be in doubt.

6. Essential you keep us informed as fully and currently possible as move may occur momentarily and picture your end vital our decision.

7. Bear down and good luck.

---

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 188.

---

**201. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in [*place not declassified*]<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 17, 1954, 1941Z.

3966. Command msg for Cadick:

1. You hereby assigned full field command all KUBARK controlled PBSUCCESS assets less GUAT Station.

2. Your mission is to create maximum impact on enemy govt with forces at your disposal. With objective of persuading army to join friendly cause.

3. You will be guided by existing directives and/or policies.

4. You will be directly responsible to LINCOLN for requesting further guidance. LINCOLN will provide command directives as required which must be strictly adhered to in every instance.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 1. Secret; Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence, SHERWOOD, and to Stations in [*place not declassified*], Guatemala City, and [*place not declassified*].

5. You will hereafter direct all air operational support activities through SOMERSET less fire. Fighter aircraft will be armed for defense only. Air fire support authority must be obtained from LINCOLN regardless of urgency existing.

6. You will utilize and employ SHERWOOD broadcast and KUGOWN teams as required.

7. You will direct tactical intelligence activities keeping LINC informed at all times.

8. You will submit operational situation report by OPIM cable every 12 hours until further notice.

---

## 202. Editorial Note

Castillo Armas launched his attack on June 18, 1954, at 8:20 p.m. after the "National Liberation Committee" had consulted with the "Assembly of the People" the previous evening, according to text prepared by the CIA for broadcast. In the radio broadcast the people of Guatemala were told: "At this moment, armed groups of our liberation movement are advancing everywhere throughout the country. . . . The hour of decision has struck." The message stressed the indigenous nature of the "uprising": "This is not a foreign intervention, but an uprising of the honest, Christian, freedom-loving people of Guat (*sic*) to liberate our homeland from the foreign intervention which has already taken place, from control by the Soviet Union which has made Guat an advanced outpost of international commie aggression, from rule by Soviet puppets." (Telegram from PBSUCCESS Headquarters to the Broadcasting Unit, June 18; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 2)

The attack, however, did not surprise the Guatemalan Government. At a meeting of military and political officials on June 15 Minister of Government Augusto Charnaud MacDonald "announced that government informed by 'most reliable source' that Col. Carlos Castillo Armas plans uprising to overthrow Guatemalan government between 18-19 June." (Telegram from the CIA to the Station Chief in [*place not declassified*], June 18; *ibid.*, Box 9, Folder 2)

**203. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 18, 1954, 1414Z.

885. Ref: GUAT 874;<sup>2</sup> LINC 3970;<sup>3</sup> LINC 3966 para 5.<sup>4</sup>

1. As stated, success largely depends on letting [*name not declassified*] and army take action.

2. If ref A fully complied with, [*name not declassified*] will have opportunity to carry out his agreement and fulfill ref B request.

3. We consider imperative fighter planes drop bombs, fire tracers, buzz city, break up demonstration through tear gas or other drops.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 91, Folder 6. Secret; Immediate; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 11, Folder 4)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 6, Folder 1)

<sup>4</sup> Document 201.

---

**204. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 18, 1954, 1504Z.

887. Re LINC 3966 para 5.<sup>2</sup>

1. Assume from ref all air potentially at Calligeris disposal.

2. Trust you realize this completely incompatible with role you contemplated for [*name not declassified*]. Appears you intending give [*name not declassified*] (the hope for swinging army) only Station “persuasion”, while Calligeris gets all the muscle.

3. As repeatedly stated, [*name not declassified*] needs all available air 18 June to create emergency on which he can capitalize.

4. [*name not declassified*] also must be able call on air 19 June to follow up his coup if successful.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 91, Folder 6. No classification marking; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Document 201.



5. Evident Calligeris shock troops do not need air protection where no air opposition exists. Shock troops also bring own gear, so have not priority need for resupply.

6. Please confirm that air available to [*name not declassified*] as requested.

---

**205. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 19, 1954, 0414Z.

4046. 1. If [*name not declassified*] reaches any good result which we most fervently hope believe an almost immediate cautious statement by ODACID would do wonders to bring possible chaos to a halt.

2. By cautious we mean that regardless of [*name not declassified*] (or one of his army allies) possible success in capital ODACID statement should not be too flatly in favor [*name not declassified*]. Assuming that [*name not declassified*] or his boy gets in, it must not be overlooked that spark which touched it off belonged to Calligeris—also on a national wide hoop-up—PBPRIME must therefore recognize demise of regime but avoid too hasty position on successor.

3. You have probably been thinking of all this and maybe it won't even happen. Our belief in its importance however prompted this message and effort to anticipate.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-010125A, Box 6, Folder 2. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

**206. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 19, 1954, 0934Z.

4062. Ref: [*telegram indicator not declassified*] 650.<sup>2</sup>

1. No authority to bomb at present, also army may swing our side soon.

2. Avoid attack and bypass Hank while having air show by fighters for benefit garrison.

3. If fear or dislike regime does not bring army over in day more forceful air support will have to be provided.

4. Try one day guerrilla tactics with air show. Meanwhile we are requesting authority for real air support to be ready if necessary. In meantime can assure you have realistic hope that army may turn against regime. Cannot afford risk this opportunity by bomb or other attack until make effort find out.

5. SHERWOOD: Order supply bombs moved to SOMERSET to be ready by dawn 20 June.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 6, Folder 2. Secret. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and to SHERWOOD.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Box 13, Folder 7)

---

**207. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 19, 1954, 1557Z.

05670. Refs A. [*telegram indicator not declassified*] 650;<sup>2</sup> B. LINC 4061.<sup>3</sup>

1. Regret that we cannot at this time authorize the forms of air to ground action requested by ref A and recommended by ref B. This matter has been reconsidered in detail as of this morning with Ascham and

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 93, Folder 21. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 206.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 6, Folder 2)

Ordway full participation, and following is gist of reasoning as well as statement of certain conditions under which this decision might be relaxed or modified.

2. The use of air to ground action against WSBURNT military personnel and/or military vehicles would in our judgment have effect of engaging their honor and prestige and causing them to consolidate in opposition to Calligeris forces. We recognize possibility that through use of bombing against one or more garrisons, assaults with respect to these could be successful but call your attention to fact that these victories could be pyrrhic and illusory if they were to result in "loss of war" due to utter alienation and antagonizing of WSBURNT military. This is entirely apart from the extremely damaging effect which such action would have upon world including US domestic public opinion and the confirmation which it would give to main Toriello lines, viz "bombing" and "invasion".

3. Hence unless and until it becomes considerably more apparent than it now is as to what the position of WSBURNT army will be and whether or not there is any likelihood of its shifting over to Calligeris' side, these measures of attack must be avoided.

4. We are particularly anxious to make it clear to LINC that this is not an arbitrary or final judgment on the part of Hqs nor is it any evidence of cautious or negative attitude here. We are and will continue to be open minded with regard to this matter and will be receptive to renewals of recommendations from the field and LINC after enough time has passed to enable all of us to judge better the true situation with respect to the armed forces. It seems to us that it should be possible to determine with fair or approximate accuracy what move they will make, if any, within period of next 24 to 36 hours.

5. We repeat that neither you nor field should gain impression that Hqs is otherwise than in full and complete support of this operation and entirely prepared to take and/or authorize any actions necessary to the success of the venture and which appear to be reasonably calculated to achieve that end.

6. Recommend that in your instruction to the field you reflect the sense and flavor of the foregoing.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> A Department of State statement on June 19 indicated, among other things, that Ambassador Peurifoy had reported serious uprisings in Guatemalan cities and three overflights (one each on June 17, 18, and 19) but no bombings or strafings in the Guatemala City area. The Guatemalan Foreign Minister told Peurifoy, however, that two planes had bombed a house in Guatemala City and also strafed the National Palace. (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 28, 1954, pp. 981-982)

208. **Telegram From the CIA Chief of Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 19, 1954, 2042Z.

906. From JMBLUG to Ascham.

1. There is no further use moralizing about or with [*name not declassified*]. We have gone as far as we can with talk. [*name not declassified*] is what he is. He has said what he needs. We may regret or dislike or disagree with his request but if we refuse it, we are abandoning what ever potential [*name not declassified*] may have and we can not afford that since Calligeris assets are too small.

2. [*name not declassified*] knows what effect bombs will have on the Latin temperament including his own. Aerial acrobatics are not the same thing.

3. Meanwhile the govt and Commies are arresting and killing. Martinez del Rosal got a bullet in the center of his forehead. They shot Perfecto Villegas and then ran a truck over him. Kaufman had his feet carbonized before he died.

4. While this goes on, we fail to bomb. This is what William James called "atrocious harmlessness".

5. If we bomb, that does not guarantee [*name not declassified*] will act but then we will have done our utmost. And there is no danger of a boomerang. At this stage, both friend and foe respect force alone.

6. We have already missed the moment to bomb, mainly last night. We still have a chance today and tomorrow.

7. Many people have been to see me saying one bomb on palace would do the job.

8. Bomb repeat Bomb.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 91, Folder 6. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

209. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

[place not declassified], June 19, 1954, 2220Z.

4078. Re: GUAT 906.<sup>2</sup>

1. We believe issue is clear: are we going to stand by and see last hope of free people in WSBURNT submerged to depths of Communist oppression and atrocity until we send PBPRIME armed force against enemy as we surely must do sooner or later or are we going to authorize maximum use of our assets to take calculated risk of defection WSBURNT army?

2. Is it not more serious to fail to win having already gone so far than it is to win even though our enemies may try to tar US with intervention? Is not our intervention now under these circumstances far more palatable than by Marines? This is the same enemy we fought in Korea and may fight tomorrow in Indo-China. He knows no quarters and gives none. He is hiding behind Guats on his side and we on ours. He sent the *Alfhem* arms we sent token gear.

3. Our plans called for internal strength, the enemy ruthlessly eliminated or suppressed this hope. We tried forcing defection by propaganda and token force of armed irregulars. Unless we revert now to real determination to win, our clandestine propaganda effort of pretended strength will if not already become known for what it is. We have 300 men, some already deserting, the enemy's strength remains unimpaired.

4. Our basic plan although altered still remains feasible providing we use our one asset over the enemy—air power. Unless we show real strength within 24 hours we run great risk of Galvez turning against SYNCARP or WSBURNT attacking WSHOOFS. Osorio is still fence sitting because he has not received assurance ODYOKE is determined to see Calligeris succeed. [name not declassified] is facing the enemy's charges alone and offers his air force to bomb WSBURNT. He is willing go all the way to victory.

5. View above and ref msg LINCOLN respectfully requests Hqs move soonest to authorize following specific course of action:

A. Authority to conduct flak suppression attacks on AA in Adam or elsewhere where obstructing ground progress.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 2. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> Document 208.

B. Authority to bomb Hank and other garrisons later if necessary as example of strength and determination of anti-Communists.

C. Authority to tell army that all who oppose anti-Communists and shoot at them to defend communism will be shot or bombed.

6. Must emphasize again decision must come soon before our mythical strength becomes known to enemy and air remains our only power.

---

## 210. Telegram From the CIA Chief Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Guatemala City, June 19, 1954, 2345Z.

909. Re DIR 05547.<sup>2</sup> For Ascham from Page.

1. Effective 12 June K Program taken over by Guat Station. Page no longer in touch with either [*name not declassified*] or ESQUIRE. Bannister in direct contact [*name not declassified*] as of 15 June. Page not familiar contents GUAT 886.<sup>3</sup>

2. My estimate of situation, no longer based on controlled sources or access to official reports, is following: PBSUCCESS capabilities inside WSBURNT exceedingly limited and no match for combined strength law enforcement agencies, army and armed campesinos. Validity assumption underlying PBSUCCESS that local civilian insurrections will sweep garrisons into open revolt questionable, even if you take Calligeris claims regarding controlled inside assets at face value. Other intangible factors that may determine developments in provinces simply defy assessment.

3. I have on repeated occasions reported that this resolution will be won or lost in WSBURNT city and that the one determinant factor is the attitude of the Army High Command. If the Army High Command can be won over to our side ultimate success is a foregone conclusion. If it decides to back Arbenz, PBSUCCESS will not prevail. This is the principal consideration underlying K Program.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 91, Folder 6. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 18. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 4)

4. Our sole key to the Army High Command is [*name not declassified*]. I have the very greatest respect for him as a human being, an officer and a patriotic servant of his country. It is on his authority mainly that I originally proposed an air strike against military targets in the WSBURNT city area. I refuse to believe that [*name not declassified*] would be so swayed by self-seeking motives as to ignore counter productive effects with respect to the attitude of people WSBURNT. Although I specifically and repeatedly questioned him on that score he could not conceive of "adequate other forms of exhibiting strengths". Nor could SWALLOW with whom I raised that point.

5. It would be presumptuous to stake my judgment against yours in matters as portentous as those involved here. You of course know what is at stake for the U.S. if this endeavor fails. I can not assay the prospects of collecting backing for future unilateral intervention in WSBURNT. I am deeply perturbed by what failure will do not only to the many brave people who have staked their lives on American good faith and strength but also how it will affect our prestige in other Latin American countries.

6. I am convinced that the Guat Station in strict compliance with your directions will do its utmost to wrest success from a situation that to me looks serious. I am deeply impressed their utter dedication to that task.

---

**211. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 20, 1954, 0155Z.

05705. Refs: A. LINC 4071; B. LINC 4078; C. DIR 05706; D. DIR 05707; E. GUAT 906.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 2. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to SHERWOOD for SOMERSET. Drafted by Bissell and cleared by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> Reference A is not printed. (*Ibid.*, Box 6, Folder 2) References B, D, and E are printed as Documents 209, 213, and 208, respectively. Reference C, telegram 5706 from the CIA to the Station in Guatemala, June 20, requested additional information, in light of various proposals to bomb targets in Guatemala, "for realistic assessment abilities of SYNCARP pilots. Specifically ascertain extent their bombing experience and date most recent actual experience." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 2)

1. Refs C and D give reasons why we unwilling authorize bombing on 20 June on basis all info now available to us as well as considerations urged refs A, B, and E.

2. Ref B suggests you now inclined place main reliance not on inducing defection WSBURNT army but upon its intimidation or actual defeat through air to ground action supported by shock forces. If so you presumably have in mind attacks on number of military installations. This still seems to us more likely to consolidate army's loyalty to regime and we still believe defection of army is best chance.

3. In ref E, JMBUG clearly has in mind different kind of target selected with view to intimidation and creation sense of crisis, but we are unclear as stated ref D what specific targets would meet this specification and avoid other objections.

4. In view of widely differing views on appropriate and effective targets request your recommendations this point after receipt reply to ref D.

5. Apologize direct dispatch refs C and D to field. Believe necessary in view extreme urgency final decision.

---

**212. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

*[place not declassified]*, June 20, 1954, 0555Z.

4093. Re: DIR 5706.<sup>2</sup>

1. Ref msg forwarded to SOMERSET as directed, however, owing to possible delay in reply and fact information requested is largely available at LINCOLN, the following is hereby provided.

2. Ref para 1: As to targets, LINCOLN does not contemplate employment of tactics requiring instrument controlled or guided bombing, on contrary, from outset of air support plan only low level skip or dive bombing with attendant pinpoint accuracy considered feasible to fulfill all foreseeable requirements. LINCOLN has at no time supported

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 2. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 211.



or even considered favorably field (including JMBLUG) requests for bombing national palace, racetrack or other non military targets. Only military garrisons and storage tanks are presently considered primary essential targets and of these only Hank is desired for immediate action in event ultimatum to commander is ineffective.

3. Ref para 2:

A. When air support plan drawn up every emphasis was placed upon selection of combat experienced ODYOKE service trained pilots. In other words, only best and most combat proven pilots were to be selected of the 32 or more candidates interviewed by Brodfrost.

B. Lead pilot, *[name not declassified]*, CMDR, USNR; flew with *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*, became an ace during *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*; joined us, became an ace with 12 kills in Pacific, wing CMDR on *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*; considered one of the finest tactical naval air planners. All verified from naval records.

C. *[name not declassified]* selected *[name not declassified]* as his wingman. His qualifications are: LT (SG) USN active reserve, combat experience with navy in Pacific WW 2; completed advanced naval pilots course on night target pinpointing day before reporting to SYNCARP. Highly recommended by *[name not declassified]*.

D. *[name not declassified]* USAF, flew 50 missions over Japan from Iwo Jima. Has over 1560 hours in F 47 and over 5,000 hrs in total. Checked out by Brodfrost who rated him tops.

E. Re bombsights, ODUNIT provided combat ready A/C.

F. Flak only reported light to accurate over Adam 20 and possibly 40 mm. Minor damage sustained one A/C. See following SHERWOOD cables for specific details: 286 (IN 19798), 291 (IN 19939), and 295 (IN 20028).<sup>3</sup> Sufficient flak encountered over Adam to warrant consideration as hazardous to dangerous but not serious thus far.

---

<sup>3</sup> None printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 93, Folder 17; Box 12, Folder 3; and Box 93, Folder 14, respectively)

213. **Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 20, 1954, 0156Z.

05707. Refs A. GUAT 906;<sup>2</sup> B. GUAT 908.<sup>3</sup>

1. We are ready authorize use of bombs moment we are convinced would substantially increase likelihood of success without disastrous damage interests of PBPRIME.

2. You already familiar our views concerning damage likely to be done our cause by ill directed or premature attacks. We fear bombing of military installations more likely to solidify army against the rebellion than to induce defection and we are convinced attacks against civilian targets, which would shed blood of innocent people, would fit perfectly into Communist propaganda line and tend to alienate all elements of population.

3. As to effect of bombing on [*name not declassified*] decision, we will not repeat argument that his plea for bombing is irrational now that capability to deliver has been convincingly demonstrated. Agree question is not whether his request is rational or moral but whether granting it will actually induce him to move. Must rely heavily your judgment on this point but disturbed report ref B that you have had no contact [*name not declassified*] since 1500 hours 18 June.

4. Ref A does not recommend any specific target. Implies palace might be decisive target but this seems to us open to second objection para 2 above. Earlier suggestion of racetrack might avoid both objections para 2 above but by same token bombing would not directly affect capabilities of regime. Would facilitate our further consideration final decision this issue if you would recommend specific targets.

5. Pending receipt your recommendations and further assessment capabilities for accurate bombing must withhold authorization.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 9, Folder 2. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Bissell and cleared by Wisner. Repeated to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

<sup>2</sup> Document 208.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 5)

---

**214. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 20, 1954.

1. As of the morning of 20 June the outcome of the efforts to overthrow the regime of President Arbenz of Guatemala remains very much in doubt. The controlling factor in the situation is still considered to be the position of the Guatemalan armed forces, and thus far this group has not given any clear indication of whether it will move, and if so, in which way. If the Guatemalan army should move within the next few days against the Arbenz regime, it is considered to have the capacity to overthrow it. On the other hand if it remains loyal and if most of the military elements commit themselves to vigorous action against the forces of Castillo Armas the latter will be defeated and a probability of uprisings from among other elements of the population is considered highly unlikely.

2. The position of the top-ranking officers is constantly shifting with daily rises and falls in their attitudes. This group has long proclaimed its strong anti-Communist feelings and its ultimate intention of doing anything to rid the government of Communist influences. Various officers have declared themselves as willing to take action against the regime given just a little more time or just a little more encouragement.<sup>2</sup> It is probable that the rising pressure of events will compel this group to declare its position, one way or the other, at any time from now on—although the possible result could be split in the ranks. There are unconfirmed reports<sup>3</sup> as of Saturday night<sup>4</sup> to the effect that Colonel Diaz, the Chief of Staff, and some 40 officers had applied for asylum in various foreign embassies in Guatemala City, but these embassies have not yet confirmed this report.

3. There were new defections on Saturday from the Guatemalan Airforce, one pilot flying out with his plane and several others obtaining asylum in the Salvadorian Embassy. The Guatemalan Airforce has thus far failed to produce any interception effort against the overflights against the Armas planes. However very heavy anti-aircraft fire is reported.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 154, Folder 1. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information or addressee, but according to a June 29 note, it was a memorandum from Bissell to Allen Dulles. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> A hand-drawn box surrounds the word "encouragement" and "justification" is written in the margin.

<sup>3</sup> A line drawn from the word "reports" points to the word "rumors" written in the margin.

<sup>4</sup> June 19.

4. There is thus far no evidence to confirm the charges and propaganda of the Guatemalan regime of bombing attacks upon Guatemala. On the contrary there are eyewitness accounts of clumsy efforts to fabricate evidence of aerial bombardment (the home of Colonel Mendoza—one of the defecting airforce officers, was set on fire by the police). It is probable that some of the damage to oil storage facilities and other installations, attributed by the Guatemalan Government as well as by Castillo Armas, to bombing attacks is in fact the result of sabotage efforts on the part of Armas agents or other resistance elements.

5. There is considerable evidence of a determination on the part of the Guatemalan Government to mobilize and arm Communist-controlled student youth and labor (agriculture) organizations. At the same time there is evidence of a hasty attempt to mobilize additional strength for the army.

6. There are strong indications of mounting tension between the army and the Guardia Civil—the Communist-influenced police organization.

7. We cannot confirm that either Puerto Barrios or San Jose has fallen to the Armas forces, but it is clear that there have been uprisings in these and other cities. A bridge on the key railroad line between Guatemala City and Puerto Barrios is reliably reported to have been damaged near Gualan.

#### *Description of the Armas Movement*

8. The action of Colonel Castillo Armas is not in any sense a conventional military operation. He is dependent for his success not upon the size and strength of the military forces at his disposal but rather upon the possibility that his entry into action will touch off a general uprising against the Guatemalan regime. The forces of Armas entering Guatemala from Honduras are estimated to number about 300 men. These have now been joined by others from inside the country to make a total in excess of 600 armed men. (The majority of this number is equipped with rifles, sub-machine guns and 50 mm mortars. These weapons are non-U.S. manufacture.) Armas himself is expected to leave his command post in Honduras today and join one element of his forces near Jutiapa by plane, but thus far there is no word that an airfield has become available. From the command post which he proposes to establish at this location, he will endeavor to coordinate the activities of his other scattered groups throughout the country.

9. The entire effort is thus more dependent upon psychological impact rather than actual military strength, although it is upon the ability of the Armas effort to create and maintain for a short time the *impression* of very substantial military strength that the success of this partic-

ular effort primarily depends. The use of a small number of airplanes and the massive use of radio broadcasting are designed to build up and give main support to the impression of Armas' strength as well as to spread the impression of the regime's weakness.

10. From the foregoing description of the effort it will be seen how important are the aspects of deception and timing. If the effort does not succeed in arousing the other latent forces of resistance within the next period of approximately twenty-four hours, it will probably begin to lose strength.

---

**215. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 20, 1954, 0626Z.

05712. 1. This will confirm Whiting/Playdon/Lynade conversation of 0140 20 June. The authorization granted is as follows:

A. Authority to conduct flak suppression attacks on AA in Adam. It is understood in this connection that the positions to be attacked will be those most removed from barracks, buildings and any large concentrations of personnel.

B. Authority to bomb Hank. It is understood that this will not be done until after fullest warnings possible have been given, and adequate opportunity provided for garrison to evacuate.

A and B above constitute the full extent of authorization granted and you must be explicitly specific in your instructions to SHERWOOD in order that there is no opportunity for misunderstanding and no chance that your instructions will be given any broader interpretation. Essential to be avoided that your authorization will be construed by either command personnel or pilots as permitting any air-ground action against other types of targets or other localities.

2. DIR 05706 (OUT 55618),<sup>2</sup> para 5: we understand that you will comply and that you consider this can be done with minimum delay and distraction.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 211.

216. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 21, 1954, 0648Z.

4131. 1. Feel may be useful to provide our general views:

A. Conflict still in two parts, first, strict military Calligeris phase, second, hope of army defection prompted by high level take over from regime.

B. First phase as yet wholly untested. Regime has chosen to permit initial movement unopposed. Small towns therefore have been taken without shot. Some volunteers have joined Calligeris but he has also suffered some defections so his forces are pitifully small.

C. Regime planning soon to start active opposition with Hank probably representing a significant moment in this phase. Calligeris victory which can only occur with authorized air action plus poor opposition or failure to defend prove great incentive both to Calligeris forces and for defection and internal resistance support. Chances of success are however slight considering small attacking forces plus prepared defenses.

D. Meanwhile *no* evidence of army take over in capital has appeared though there is still circumstantial evidence that army is split and *not* solidly behind regime.

E. Assuming either victory or defeat at Hank without substantial army defection or take over we will be faced with the necessity of providing Calligeris with all possible support.

2. In light above we believe:

A. Must be in position give all possible support military action not only to aid its success but to prove to army that a foe of some power is involved. This includes the authority to give such air support as the military requirements demand.

B. Make air strikes against important targets such as POL storage at Adam and Bond as well as such possibilities as rail bridges, ammo dumps, etc. These have dual purpose of weakening opposition as well as possibly providing the proof allegedly required by [*name not declassified*] and army.

3. To extent that WSBURNT territory is taken by Calligeris possibility of controlling air strips increases and landing arms or taking off

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 3. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

for missions though something of a formality due lack fuel, matériel, etc, can occur.

A. Conclusion. A strictly military type situation has materialized and it must be treated as such or complete defeat accepted. We urge former and request authority on a broad rather than piecemeal basis to take actions set forth in paras 2 A and B above as situation requires. Such authority may *not* achieve success but lack of same in our opinion will probably mean total defeat in about 48 hours. This conclusion has been forced on us by refusal to date of army to act against regime.

5. Above request *not* based on feeling that LINC views differ from those of Hqs but on inevitable time lags resulting from communications. Reversals once they begin will only be prevented if at all by quickest possible counter action.

---

## 217. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 21, 1954, 0657Z.

05726. For JMBLUG from Ascham and Whiting. Refs: A. GUAT 919; B. LINC 4197 [4097]; C. GUAT 906.<sup>2</sup>

1. We should have informed you last night of important revision in thinking here which was reflected briefly but completely in ref B message to Station. This represented the best judgment of all concerned here after most exhaustive examination of matter and this positive shift was strongly influenced by your views.

2. We have just finished further extensive review of matter following receipt your ref A and after discussion with LINC which agrees completely with our conclusions, we have decided authorize strafing attack against major petroleum storage facilities Adam but no bombs for Adam area. Also you should know our decision authorizing bombing of Hank matter scheduled for tomorrow afternoon still stands and Station should be fully prepared to make best possible exploitation with [*name not declassified*] of flak suppression at Adam air field, strafing

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> Reference A was not found; reference B is *ibid.*, Box 6, Folder 2; reference C is printed as Document 208.

attack on Adam oil tanks, and bombing of Hank. Surely combination of these three items should provide sufficient persuasion to anyone who says that he must have show of aerial force (bomb) to make him move.

3. We trust you will not think we have taken lightly or acted in disregard of your most serious injunctions to us. We have given this our very best thought and have of course been forced to take into account broader considerations as seen from ZRMETAL including the terrible press our side is getting, plus the intensive interest focused on WSBURNT situation, culminating in proceedings of this afternoon. (For one thing we have been partially but only partially influenced by desirability of avoiding making honest man out of your pal Willie before eyes of so many correspondents and foreign diplomats. With respect to latter would any of these be willing support your true version of facts on bombings with their respective home press and UN representatives?)

4. For Station: Have you yet seen or heard tell of [*name not declassified*] since Friday?<sup>3</sup> If not do you have any prospects of another meeting?

---

<sup>3</sup> June 18.

---

## 218. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

[*place not declassified*], June 21, 1954, 1655Z.

4140. 1. International politics are not for us but perhaps the following thoughts from our position close to some of the facts may be helpful. Also issues concern PBSUCCESS.

A. The international explosion touched off by WSBURNT can be of tremendous value in crystallizing Commie/noncommie issue particularly if noncommie elements hold firm.

B. As record now stands noncommies are in good shape whether before UN or OAS. WSBURNT has made probable false charges

- (1) U.S. pilots shot down in Mexico.
- (2) Airlifted MDAP arms used.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 3. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.



- (3) Foreign invasion.
- (4) Numerous bombings and strafings.

This issue in addition to being false when made is irrelevant since granting Calligeris the weapons his use of them should be debated with him.

C. Despite noncommie strength on above issues there are others which in our opinion need strengthening or might weaken or even destroy fabric noncommie position.

(1) Probable aspects of support extraterritorial to WSBURNT. Obviously WSHOOFS and KMFLUSH are the major issues. Sooner or later the Commie attack will begin fixing on known details.

(2) President WSHOOFS appears weak man beset by turbulent political situation in which untrustworthy friends and hungry foes are present. Should he fail to stand firm he is in a position to do serious damage.

(3) KMFLUSH also presents problems. President is involved to eye-balls but we believe for perfectly practical reasons. Being called names is of no moment to him. To be in a position to negotiate benefits from PBPRIME is of great moment to him.

(4) Being aircraft base [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] we think can and will refuse entry investigating group without better supported charges than now exist and will aggressively support all other delaying actions. In return he will however expect what he considers reasonable PBPRIME backing and aid. Failing that he might turn on PBPRIME which would be serious.

2. [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] Believe preliminary steps could and should start now on an official basis maintaining fiction of no PBPRIME connection PBSUCCESS. Ambassadorial approaches could be made to Presidents in KMFLUSH and WSHOOFS to discuss UN/OAS issues. At same time KMFLUSH/WSHOOFS Ambassadors PBPRIME could be called for *high* level interview to discuss same issues.

3. This treatment we believe would be recognized as evidence of backing and what is necessary to obtain joint positions should be discoverable without any need for discussing relations to PBSUCCESS. Joint positions *must* be achieved both for UN/OAS as well as basis continued support PBSUCCESS.

4. In addition to above essential that for diplomatic battle the hole created by non-participation DTFROGS should be filled. Do not know what can be done with present ODACID team but every effort to gain support would be justified. If considered useful Reelfoot can be sent to Hqs to be available for any action this connection.

5. Finally should fight WSBURNT in UN exclusively and solely on issues now drawn without permitting other problems to be introduced.

A. Preference WSBURNT for UN over OAS jurisdictionally improper and clear proof of own weakness and need for aid outside hemisphere from Soviet.

B. Soviet position direct confirmation of A.

6. Die is cast and events may move fast. Thus feel lining up team essential and real chance to win victory over WSBURNT regardless failure Calligeris. While a failure to stay united with present allies in diplomatic battle can effectively destroy Calligeris victory.

---

**219. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 22, 1954, 0004Z.

05853. Refs: A. LINC 4131; B. SGUATRES 001; C. DIR 05712; D. LINC 4143; E. SHERWOOD 315.<sup>2</sup>

1. We sympathetic your desire ref A para 3A for authority on broad rather than piecemeal basis within limits approved policy but broad authority must rest on clear agreed strategic concept.

2. We agree as argued ref A para 2A and ref B para 8 that it is necessary demonstrate reality of airpower controlled by Calligeris but capabilities wholly inadequate actually to defeat WSBURNT army all over the country. Accordingly purpose must be to demonstrate power in manner best calculated to impress army and impair its morale. Since impossible inflict crippling damage, little point trying cause large number casualties which might only foreclose defection. With this purpose in mind we do not agree with ref A para 3A that "a strictly military type situation has materialized."

3. In accordance foregoing strategic concept we have now authorized following air-ground action:

A. Flak suppression in Adam (ref C para 1A) and wherever required for defense of aircraft operating in support of ground forces.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> References A and C are printed as Documents 216 and 215, respectively. References B and D have not been found. Reference E is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 12, Folder 4.

B. Strafing of oil tanks in Adam.

C. (In response to ref D) fullest air support of attack on Hank including bombing.

4. Assume operation against Hank given highest priority today. Believe successful outcome here could be decisive importance and convinced news of effective air-ground action will quickly become known [*name not declassified*] and other WSBURNT military leaders in Adam and will serve as demonstration to them of power and determination.

5. With bulk of WSBURNT forces apparently moved out of capital we inclined to believe most effective targets from standpoint morale of army will also be away from Adam. Moreover UN cease-fire resolution, proposal for OAS or UN peace observation commission, and presence of press and diplomatic corps all lead us to conclude heavy political price would be paid for any bombing of Adam. According unwilling authorize at present despite ref E.

6. In order enable us give you broad enough authorization to permit forward planning and avoid delays request you supply list of possible targets (which need not be in great detail) with indication types of air-ground action contemplated, within strategic concept para 2 above. We will endeavor give you maximum authority.

---

## 220. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 22, 1954, 0315Z.

05857. For JMBLUG from Ascham.

1. Whiting and I have given most careful attention to your messages, particularly GUAT 906 (IN 19969) and GUAT 919 (IN 20161).<sup>2</sup> We have sincere respect for your judgment and our failure to act on specific recommendation was due to overriding considerations. In the type of operations which we conduct there are certain limitations. We do not take action with grave foreign policy implications except as agent for the policy makers.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 2. Top Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Allen Dulles and cleared by Frank Wisner. Repeated to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 906 is Document 208; telegram 919 was not found.

2. We share your appraisal of Calligeris' assets and we recognized this from the beginning. The purpose of the Calligeris action was primarily to make a show of strength which would give army the opportunity which [name not declassified] and others indicated they needed. We feel this has been done. In fact the repercussions of Calligeris' action to date have been greater than we had anticipated. We felt particular action recommended would play into hands of Arbenz and co. and be merely another stunt. The fact that the Guat case has been largely developed in the UN and through the press on the false basis of bombing and strafing at Guat city, which clearly disprovable, tends to bear this out.

3. We cannot put the foreign posture of the country at the mercy of the demand of one army officer who refuses to accept other evidence which should be far more persuasive than one bomb for which follow-up potential did not exist. Here our judgment may or may not have been correct but circumstances of situation left us little alternative.

4. The developing situation, however, may create future opportunities where bombing of oil storage tanks or some clear military objective at Adam could be considered, although have some doubts as to over-all wisdom of this step. We will be glad to get your views.

5. Unless substantial elements of the army show signs of coming over the Calligeris effort may well be crushed although we do not propose to discount this effort as yet or fail to give him all practical aid within our power. For some time we have been apprehensive that high army leaders did not look upon Calligeris with great favor as a potential future leader and may prefer someone within their own ranks now in the country. If so, our next move should be to exert all possible influence to persuade the army that their next target must be Arbenz himself if they are themselves to survive and not be reduced to the status of an organization controlled by Communist commissars while more "trustworthy" Communist elements obtain the arms and favors of the Arbenz government: and that if the army acts it, not Calligeris, will rule the country. Please give us your thoughts on this.

6. For Chief of Station: Please pass your comments along with those of JMBLUG.

---

221. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 22, 1954, 1937Z.

05920. JMBLUG from Whiting.

1. US press which for first three days was upside down and giving unbelievable support to the two Toriello principal themes, viz. "bombing" and "invasion", has begun to report more objectively and factually. World press, including certain very influential British papers, still giving out very damaging and inaccurate lines. Situation not helped by reporting of British Chargé Guat, one of whose telegrams to Foreign Office I saw yesterday quoting Toriello at length and then giving his own independent confirmation of bombing Guat City. He did not indicate your presence at meeting or any part your challenge to Toriello re bombing evidence. I remonstrated with Embassy about this and perhaps something will result.

2. In view of new Toriello appeal for UN action today,<sup>2</sup> consider it would be helpful if you could encourage your diplomatic colleagues report factually about absence bombing and especially fabrication of evidence and other Toriello lies. This of particular importance concerning your Latin American colleagues but also French and British, latter of whom you might remind of our generous and costly (to US) support of British on their recent trouble British Guiana.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner. Repeated to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

<sup>2</sup> On June 19 the Guatemalan Government requested both the UN Security Council and the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC), an organ of the Organization of American States, to convene emergency meetings and take necessary measures to stop alleged aggression against Guatemalan territory by Honduras and Nicaragua. See *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IV, p. 1174. On June 22 Toriello sent a message to the UN Secretary General requesting that the United Nations carry out its resolution urging all members to refrain from aiding rebels in Guatemala. The text was printed in *The New York Times*, June 23, 1954, p. 2.

**222. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation  
PBUSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 22, 1954, 2004Z.

929. Ref LINC 4165.<sup>2</sup>

1. No indication ref true at this moment.

2. Reports from ESCONSON 2 and 7 indicated Commies and Commie dominated workers claim they intend attack embassies of unfriendly govts and especially PBPRIME embassy where expect seize documentation proving ODYOKE–Calligeris collaboration.

3. Strafing attack morning 22 June described by competent PBPRIME observer as pathetic. One small oil tank on outskirts of city hit but fire out in 20 minutes. Flak not suppressed. Plane apparently did not come lower than thousand feet at anytime. ESAGE, ESPERANCE.

4. Public impression is that attacks show incredible weakness, lack of decision, and fainthearted effort. Calligeris efforts widely described as farce. Anti Commie anti govt morale near vanishing point. ESPERANCE, ESQUIRE, ESTIMATOR, ESCONSON.

5. One lone plane attacking half heartedly at this stage of game gives impression weakness. If Adam targets to be attacked, suggest some show real strength. Display this morning far more damaging our cause than to govt and Commies. Govt widely accusing ODYOKE of being involved in this insurrection and the people believe this to be so. Weakness and lack of decision is attributed to ODYOKE and will be reflected in attitude of people and especially of Commies and pro govt irregulars toward lives and property of PBPRIME residents in WSBURNT. Only force and decision will be respected. Words are useless.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 22. (Ibid., Box 6, Folder 3)

223. Dispatch From the CIA Chief of Station in [*place not declassified*] to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>

[*document indicator not declassified*]-673

[*place not declassified*], June 22, 1954.

SUBJECT

General—Operational

Specific—Memo by ODACID Chief in re: General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes

1. The text below represents a memorandum dated 18 June 1954 from the local ODACID Chief:

"The Honduran Ambassador told me President Osorio is somewhat cold to General Ydigoras Fuentes. He said that nevertheless, he and the Foreign Minister, Robert Canessa, are working on the President to obtain his backing for Ydigoras as they believe the latter to have sufficient popular support within Guatemala to head a possible government and to be the legal successor to the Presidency because Ydigoras polled a large number of votes despite the fact that he had to make a presidential campaign while in hiding.

"The Chief of Protocol, Ambassador Alvarez Vidaurre, said he personally believed Ydigoras to be intelligent and enterprising but that there were many people here who felt that he was more of a talker than a doer."

Franklin D. Mallek

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-010125A, Box 125, Folder 4. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Received June 24. Repeated to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.

**224. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to CIA Stations in [3 places not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 23, 1954, 0152Z.

06043. RE: PULL 8203.<sup>2</sup>

1. Following is KUGOWN line as per ref request:

A. Guillermo Toriello, Guat Forn Min, has lied repeatedly in claims of aerial bombardment of Guat. It is positively established that no bombs have fallen upon Guatemala City nor have any bombs fallen elsewhere in Guat according to all our info through 21 June. Hence in his announcements 18–19 June he has made up story out of whole cloth and in addition Guat Government has in clumsy fashion tried to fabricate evidence and has been caught setting fire to houses.

B. Toriello also lied about invasion. Guat struggle no invasion. Liberation forces are made up of small group Guat patriots who have resisted communism and who organized themselves and have entered the nation to participate in and aid nation-wide revolt against Soviet foreign aggression personified by Commie take over in Guat. Official Guat Radio (TGW) itself stated, 19 June, "We call foreigners those who up to yesterday called themselves Guats." Radio, "Voice of Liberation" stated, "We are ones who carry true banner national sovereignty. As on 15 September 1821, we freed ourselves from Spanish throne, today we consummating independence—freedom from hammer and sickle."

C. Guat Govt continues reign terror as indicated DIR 05067 (OUT 54341)<sup>3</sup> para 1 and Carlos Montenegro Paniagua stated 3 June that Guat "needs no concentration camps since we (Commie farmers group—Confederacion Nacional Campesinos de Guat) will chop off heads all anti-Commies" when trouble arises. Arbenz when challenged about his statement declined repudiate and has thus adopted as own. Farmers and Indians continue be armed by Commie govt and being incited acts of terror throughout Guat countryside.

D. Guat wanted hearing in U.N. due Soviet support and opportunity get out prop to peoples not familiar with Guat situation. Cite USSR recent support Guat.

2. Is suggested that attribution above can be based on wire service stories or "overheard on shortwave."

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 9, Folder 3. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; JMSWAG. Drafted by [name not declassified] and cleared by Wisner. Repeated to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 21. (Ibid., Box 16, Folder 24)

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 16. (Ibid., Box 9, Folder 2)



225. **Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 23, 1954, 0302Z.

933. 1. Morning 22 June air attack against Shell Co gas tank caused some 30 holes and loss of approx 60,000 gallons. Salvaged gas being transferred other tanks. Repairs will take two weeks. Source says attack on other tanks would eliminate capital gas supply. Source JMBLUG-2 from [name not declassified], Shell manager.

2. Do not use above figures on SHERWOOD.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

---

226. **Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 23, 1954, 0302Z.

932. 1. Bannister talked 1530 hours afternoon 22 June with sergeant WSBURNT army who stationed with 150 men and 2 camouflaged tanks along old aqueduct located 13 Avenue and Calle de las Conchas in south of city. They had 8 mgs.

2. Sergeant said he and men were terrified at possibility air bombardment and added that his commander, whose name he could not give though saying he a jefe rather than an officer, had stated army might have to turn against Arbenz. (Jefe is applied to officers of major up in rank).

3. Sergeant stated communications from Base Militar to palace now cut, that many soldiers were injured in strafing attack and that he "can not take more of that". He refused to give his name, unit, or other information except that he from Base Militar.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. Also stated troops stationed along Barranca around cemetery and along Barranca to north of Matamoros.

5. Impression given by sergeant and two soldiers that they scared to death and would welcome opportunity to fold up.

---

**227. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 23, 1954, 0749Z.

935. From JMBLUG to Whiting. Re: DIR 05857.<sup>2</sup>

1. I restate for perspective that a real show of force on 18 June could have tumbled govt.

2. Events over the weekend have left two alternatives:

A. Protracted struggle, which we eventually win.

B. Defeat.

3. I fear that concern for saving face in the UN, press and elsewhere may lead to the infinitely graver loss of face attendant on defeat. The "foreign posture of the country" in Latin America will be irreparably damaged by defeat in WSBURNT. If we win, nobody will listen to the Communist orders.

4. The issue now is how to wage the protracted struggle:

A. Give all support to Calligeris. We cannot afford destruction of his forces; better that they evade the enemy than be beaten. Calligeris still has three possibilities: at a maximum, he will win; or, he may trigger the army to revolt; at a minimum, he will simply keep tension alive. SUMAC has stated to me that the govt cannot stand prolonged tension. He repeated this one hour ago.

B. Step up the air offensive against the army, to induce defection or else crush it.

C. Step up the air offensive against the capital, to stir [*name not declassified*] remaining troops, encourage friends, frighten foes.

D. Replace the lost F-47 and procure as many other fighters as possible.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

<sup>2</sup> Document 220.

E. If neither Calligeris nor the army win, continue air attack on the capital until STANDEL cracks.

5. The question between STANDEL and us is only this: who will capitulate last?

---

**228. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 23, 1954, 2324Z.

941. For Whiting from JMBLUG.

Would you please discuss with Holland and advise through your channels or instruct through Department, depending on decision reached, the following problem:

1. I cannot conscientiously order the evacuation of Americans from this post at the present time since, while I feel the situation is dangerous, it has not reached the point of chaos or disorder in the city.

2. However, it is generally agreed here that if Americans were evacuated it would be the greatest blow which the government could receive in the psychological field. At my last two meetings with Toreillo, he has become greatly upset each time I have mentioned evacuation.<sup>2</sup>

3. Not so important but a factor to be considered is that I am being criticized by civilians for not doing anything about their welfare. It might be that Department will wish to instruct me to evacuate those Americans who wish to go and those in official family who are not essential. I would appreciate guidance.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1088 from Guatemala City, June 23, Peurifoy reported on a meeting with Toriello: "Toriello looked startled and, as previously, urged me not to take such a step which, he said, 'would do us great harm.'" See *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. IV, pp. 1180-1182.

**229. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 24, 1954, 0845Z.

944. 1. May be only our own emotional pendulum, but believe govt, which panicked 18 June, recovered 21 June, getting groggy again. PBPRIME newsmen say govt reps they deal with show renewed fear, jumpiness. SUMAC Chief of Protocol told press “there is too much fighting going on at Zacapa”, echoing SUMAC view govt cannot stand prolonged tension. Newsmen beginning feel anti-govt forces will win if they combine hanging on in north with dramatic acts in capital.

2. Govt not telling people anything. Army communiqués mostly propaganda, contain few facts, political not military in style.

3. Feel it significant govt has not tried stage mass rallies. STANDEL, Commies apparently fear take any action precisely among the masses whose support they claim. Also no real evidence workers being armed.

4. Have searched without result for signs Commies might be planning desperate, last-ditch stand. Possibility remains, but at present appears more likely alleged die hards will claim they never red when tide has turned.

5. General impression is one of spongy, shapeless, gutless govt people. Among these blind, myopic one-eyed man can be boss.

6. Where as dramatic strike against capital would have been less useful in last few days, believe time for it, in view forgoing, rapidly coming again. With wounded returning, rumors about front will thrive. If favorable to us, we should reinforce them with air strikes; if unfavorable, we should counter them. Suggest 24 or 25 June.

7. Know this hard to believe, but people sitting here like kids watching for 4th July firecrackers to go off. The popular imagination is fascinated by the idea of bombs. To people, bombs will signify force majeure, turn of tide they do not understand PBPRIME sophistication, humane concern. Recommend we speak to these kids in kids language—with a big bang.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 91, Folder 6. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

---

230. **Telegram From the CIA Station in [place not declassified] to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], June 24, 1954, 1059Z.

1100. Re: DIR 02987.<sup>2</sup>

Osorio told Ambassador following 23 June:

A. Does not trust ERRATIC and has never seen him although ERRATIC has claimed Osorio support.

B. ERRATIC attempted on several occasions to arrange interview with him.

C. Osorio not supporting Calligeris.

D. Calligeris and ERRATIC individually too ambitious and ERRATIC should throw in his support with Calligeris.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-010125A, Box 148, Folder 2. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 8, Folder 7)

---

231. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], June 24, 1954, 1700Z.

4275. 1. Apart from claim U.S. hostility against Arbenz regime mainly caused UFCO (see para 1, a LINC 4176 IN 20869)<sup>2</sup> Commie argument that "invaders" and "Yankee imperialists" anxious to wipe out agrarian reform appears to be most dangerous not only for Guat consumption, but for effect wherever in world agrarian reform questions vitally important, including Latin America, Asia, Africa, even certain European countries (Italy). Black treatment agrarian question by SHERWOOD reported HULA 983.<sup>3</sup>

2. Recommend therefore you suggest to State Dept immediate countermeasures, starting with solemn U.S. Govt statement (perhaps

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 45, Folder 3. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 22. (Ibid., Box 6, Folder 3)

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 13. (Ibid., Box 140, Folder 13)

joint declaration Sec State, Sec Agriculture) endorsing principles agrarian reform movements everywhere, in line with U.S. farm policy, traditional desire to see underdeveloped countries becoming self-supporting.

3. Such policy statement to be followed quickly by State Dept release summarizing past, current U.S. support granted agrarian reforms many foreign countries, including Marshall Plan, Point Four Program, FAO, training foreign farm specialists in U.S., etc.

4. Simultaneously U.S. delegate U.N. Security Council, or other well placed govt spokesman, possibly with reference to documents suggested paras 2 and 3 above, but without delay, to present criticism of Arbenz reforms, drawing parallel to Chinese "agrarian reformers", emphasizing reform itself internal affair Guat people, we exclusively concerned with safeguarding Western Hemisphere against Communist conspiracy.

5. Criticism of Guat reforms considered essential to alienate liberal sympathies for Arbenz reform regime abroad, experts should be able furnish supporting facts. Off hand suggestions (true, not black):

A. Campaign against illiteracy bogged down since "cultural missions" sent countryside made Commie propaganda instead,

B. Penniless recipients of land must become indebted govt-controlled agrarian bank to buy farm implements, have to join Commie organizations (CNCG) to become eligible,

C. Roadbuilding essential to utilize land: building program slow since govt spends money propaganda, armaments (Atlantic highway workers recently eight weeks without pay, had to strike to be paid).

6. State Dept might consider above recommendations, consulting area experts countries enumerated para 1 above, for more precise evaluation impact Guat agrarian reform story there and appropriate adjustment U.S. counteraction.

**232. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 24, 1954, 1807Z.

06271. Ref: LINC 4262.<sup>2</sup>

1. Considering authorization bomb Matamoros Fortress or Adam petroleum storage on basis LINC recommendation and previously expressed views of JMBLUG and KUBARK reps. Wish to be sure JMBLUG still believes bombing of selected targets Adam area would be highly effective as contribution to overthrow of Arbenz regime and desirable move taking into account obvious political risks and current appeal by WSBURNT government to UN Security Council alleging threat of bombing of "open cities".

2. Reply Oper Immediate.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 23. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Bissell.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 24. (Ibid., Box 6, Folder 4)

---

**233. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 24, 1954, 2330Z.

06395. Ref: A. LINCOLN 4263;<sup>2</sup> B. LINCOLN 4262.<sup>3</sup>

1. We now prepared authorize bombing specific targets in Adam area<sup>4</sup> since you and JMBLUG feel this now the most effective move to achieve success. Targets should be selected with a view to having

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 23. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Bissell.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 6, Folder 4)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 232.

<sup>4</sup> Targets had already been bombed in other parts of the country earlier on June 24; this authorization was specifically for Guatemala City. (Telegram 951 from Guatemala City to PBSUCCESS Headquarters, June 24; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 91, Folder 6)

desired effect on army and regime morale with minimum political cost to PBPRIME.<sup>5</sup>

2. In order meet this condition targets must be:

- A. Recognized as legitimate military objectives;
- B. So located and of such a character that attack would involve absolute minimum risk numerous civilian casualties, and minimum risk large scale casualties to troops not currently engaged in active operation against rebels;
- C. Clearly identifiable.

3. Your proposed target Fortress Matamoros would seem to meet these conditions if [*name not declassified*] information is correct and reliable that this structure now used for storage arms and ammo and if large number of troops not quartered there.

4. Other appropriate target for your consideration: Petroleum storage in Adam. Judging from air photo, tanks are fairly remote from residential areas. Direct hit would produce spectacular results. Destruction petroleum reserves in Adam combined with subsequent attacks storage at Bond and Ike would have paralyzing effect on economic and military activities in WSBURNT.

5. As between the two targets, our preference is for Matamoros if sure about its use as arsenal since this is clearly military target and destruction would have minimum effect on civilians. If information about utilization doubtful, recommend petroleum storage.

6. You are hereby granted authority attack either target or both. Whichever selected, vitally important avoid wide miss resulting in heavy civilian casualties. Accordingly, pilot should be ordered take no chances if visibility poor.

7. Believe will be desirable, if attacks successful and effective, to follow up with leaflet drop emphasizing:

- A. That only military targets were attacked;
- B. Targets chosen to minimize even military casualties;
- C. Usual line that liberation forces opposing regime, not army and that army can prevent regrettable damage to military installations by helping to liberate the country.

---

<sup>5</sup> At the same time the CIA authorized the use of fighters with non-Guatemalan fighter pilots for tactical support missions: "We give this approval reluctantly in view grave security risks inevitably involved and attach greatest importance to phasing out these pilots just as soon as others can be recruited." (Telegram 06394 to PBSUCCESS Headquarters, June 24; *ibid.*)



234. **Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 24, 1954, 2330Z.

06396. Ref: A. LINCOLN 4161; B. LINCOLN 4164;<sup>2</sup> C. Director 05857.<sup>3</sup>

1. We have been working with ODACID on plans for consolidation phase to determine circumstances under which PBPRIME would recognize a rebel government or would offer military or economic aid to a new regime. No authoritative conclusions yet reached and none likely to be until there is firmer indication revolt sufficiently successful at least produce situation in which rebels control considerable territory and sufficient forces to give them at least an even chance of overthrowing regime. In view fluid and preliminary nature ODACID views believe no useful guidance can be given you and understand no present ODACID plans for communicating on this matter with JMBLUG or SKILLET.

2. As to immediate decisions, generally concur your instructions ref A on question desirability establishment new regime and announcement names of government members, believe must weigh two opposing considerations:

A. Early action desirable in order increase air of legitimacy of rebellion and make semi-official support possible sooner if movement successful.

B. Main danger this action that it will alienate army officers who either dislike Calligeris or simply prefer themselves control new regime.

3. On balance we conclude unwise announce provisional government now for reason given ref A par 1A and because effect of such action on army unevaluated. Meanwhile if traffic can stand it suggest message to Bannister, Page, and JMBLUG inquiring if they believe establishment provisional government now would reduce chances of action against Arbenz by army officers.

4. Regardless action by Calligeris believe desirable if contact re-established [*name not declassified*] by Page or Bannister to point out that if army moves decisively against Arbenz it rather than Calligeris will

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; Immediate. Drafted by Bissell.

<sup>2</sup> References A and B both dated June 22. (Ibid., Box 6, Folder 3)

<sup>3</sup> Document 220.

rule the country and to state that SKIMMER would support regime established by army even if it excluded Calligeris entirely. Well aware danger playing both groups simultaneously and naturally would greatly prefer outcome in which [*name not declassified*] and Calligeris combined forces. Nevertheless if sizable part of the army will really move it will be a stronger force than anything Calligeris has, except air power which we could control in a pinch. Line here proposed was suggested last sentence par 5 ref C.

5. If you agree para 4 above you may wish send appropriate instructions WSBURNT.

---

**235. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in [*place not declassified*]<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 25, 1954, 0802Z.

4309. Ref: [*telegram indicator not declassified*] 1102.<sup>2</sup>

1. Through whatever source you consider most appropriate request you get word to ERRATIC if he has any sincere desire to rid WSBURNT of communism the best thing he can do is to encourage his people to infiltrate into Esquipulas and report to Calligeris for combat duty.

ERRATIC himself should be encouraged publicly to offer his services to Calligeris putting aside all past grievances, chips are down. Now is the moment for all anti-Communists to fight shoulder to shoulder. If he willing fine. If only half hearted or still personally ambitious tell him to keep to his hamburger stand.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 6, Folder 5. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

236. **Circular Telegram From the United States Information Agency to Certain Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 25, 1954, 6:31 p.m.

389. The following is intended for placement in radio or press without attribution to USIS.

Title: *Kremlin Coordination of Guatemalan Moves*

Evidence that the Guatemalan incident is a carefully considered and precisely coordinated Communist thrust at the Americas continues to mount.

The evidence that top-flight agents of the Kremlin are guiding all acts both in the field and on the diplomatic front can be found in the fact that events have a way of waiting on other events before they occur, plus the fact that this interlocking of a grand design is not local, but coordinated in all the Republics. This kind of an operation is beyond the scope of any national Communist group.

Here are some examples:

Not only do the Communists form and finance the Societies of the Friends of Guatemala, they work them like the pawns on a chess board. The entire lecture circuit from Santiago to Mexico City is coordinated; a vote in one society is instantly echoed in another; the wording of resolutions, although seemingly sponsored by men and people thousands of miles away from each other, is often absolutely identical. All these things are the mark of the experienced agent, rather than the political amateur.

The same skilled hand can be found on still a higher level, the diplomatic level. Guatemala's insistence on bringing an American problem before the United Nations' Security Council is the right of any nation with any problem, but the skill she has displayed in keeping the problem away from the body most capable of handling it—the Organization of American States—shows that there is an overall plan in this department too. Despite the carefully laid plan, it was forced into the open when the Soviet delegate Tsarapkin cast the Soviet veto against transferring the Guatemalan charge to the OAS.

Yesterday, Americans were treated to a view of the apparatus at work from top to bottom:

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 82, Folder 5. Confidential. Drafted by Stephen Baldanza (IOP/A), cleared by Edmund Murphy (IOP/A), and approved by Ralph Hinton (IOP/A). Sent to Mexico City, Havana, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Quito, and Panama.

Guatemala bypassed the OAS.

The Soviet Union approved her bypassing.

The Security Council wanted the OAS.

The Soviet Union cast a veto to see that OAS did not get the problem.

That's only in the past; now look at the pattern working yesterday:

Guatemala presses for still another meeting of the Security Council.

Even as she presses, pickets are marching in front of the UN headquarters, carrying placards for Guatemala. The pickets organized by the American Peace Crusade, a Communist-front organization.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge agrees that Guatemala should have another meeting of the Security Council.

Then comes the one slip of the day—the one which displays the coordination behind all these Communist moves:

After—a few minutes after—Ambassador Lodge had sent out the call for the new meeting of the Security Council, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin put in his own demand for a Council meeting “without delay.”

Just a few minutes time and there would have been no need of the Tsarapkin demand; just a few minutes time and the world would not have got this first-hand picture of how closely-knit the overall plan is.

The hand within the glove had peeped out for just a second, and for a second time—first the veto, and now the demand that the situation be kept within reach of further Soviet vetoes.

**Streibert**

---

**237. Telegram From the United States Information Agency to Certain Posts<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 26, 1954, 6:39 p.m.

**392. *Infoguide: Developments Guatemala Situation***

Fast developing events on Guatemalan problem provide opportunity seize psychological offensive which urgent in view Commie massive propa-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 8, Folder 5. Secret. Drafted by E. Murphy (IOP/A); cleared by Allen Haden (IOP), Charles Hurtado (IPS), and Philip Raine (ARA/P); and approved by R. Hinton (IOP/A). Sent to London, Rome, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, Cairo, New Delhi, Manila, Tokyo, Oslo, Rangoon, Stockholm, Madrid, and all missions in the American Republics.

ganda campaign this issue world-wide. Posts urged promote fullest exploitation OAS actions reflecting insistence action within OAS Charter and Rio Treaty to settle Western Hemisphere disputes, in accordance Art 52 of UN Charter which specifically recognizes authority regional organizations. Show this action as countering recent Russian tactics designed to weaken both OAS and UN and maintain Commie foothold in Western Hemisphere. Appeal by Guatemala to UNSC members and Molotov's reply of June 25 can be used as further evidence role of Arbenz Govt which is pawn in Moscow's game. OAS letter, released to press today, is signed by ten members of OAS and expresses recognition of problem of Commie penetration for what it is, and announces intent to call hurried meeting of the OAS to settle once and for all, not only immediate problem of "threat to peace" but also more basic Commie problem alluded to. This letter should be heavily played as indication member States of OAS are in exactly same frame of mind as US Senate in its Resolution of June 25 ref to Caracas Declaration Solidarity and Reaffirming US support for action by OAS. Interpretation should be that Soviet has failed in attempt to pin rebellion of Guatemalans on US as act of aggression, and conduct of U.S. Govt in negotiations with Guatemala on expropriation UNIFRUIT properties may be reviewed in low key to show U.S. actions as proper and limited to aspect of compensation perfectly appropriate for Govt negotiation under international law, with emphasis on fact that Soviet veto on proposed constructive action by OAS not only revealed mailed fist under glove manipulating Guatemalan affairs, but also rallied peoples of Western Hemisphere to repulse most sinister imperialism and most overt intervention in Western Hemisphere in recorded history.

Refer to USIA CA-852 of June 21, 1954, and Joint Circtel 507 of June 25 (not sent all posts).<sup>2</sup> Wireless File continues carry suitable materials with built-in guidance and some background materials will be repeated for areas other than Latam.

**Streibert**

---

<sup>2</sup> Neither printed; circular airgram 852 is *ibid.*, Box 72, Folder 8; circular telegram 507 was not found.

**238. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 26, 1954, 2353Z.

06731. Ascham sends congratulations all hands PBSUCCESS with regard to heartening gains and improvement in situation of last forty-eight hours. He particularly wishes that SHERWOOD team be commended and also that SOMERSET take action commend in the name of Calligeris the pilots whose professional performance and careful attention to requirements have been outstanding.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 9, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

---

**239. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 26, 1954, 2358Z.

06734. JMBLUG from Whiting.

1. From defector WSBURNT Embassy here we are advised that govt appears very shaky and that there is great confusion. He strongly recommends early announcement of evacuation US citizens from Guatemala as measure having profound adverse effect on regime stability.

2. In light of this information which supports your original views, we feel you should make statement re evacuation plans soonest advising us when this done and also text your statement so can be released to press here. We doubt censorship will let pass text of statement you make. We do not know precise terms your instructions or guidance from ODACID this subject but understand initiative left with you. However, it remains our view this should be done on basis you stating that govt is arranging facilities and will assist those depart who wish go now. The actual working out of details of departures and arrangements less important than shock effect of announcement so no reason delay

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 9, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner. Repeated to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

announcement to this effect. And if ODACID wants order general evacuation later let that come on in due course.

3. Because of operational difficulties and extra load on communications which it would create, we recommend against massive airlift evacuation operation.

---

**240. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 27, 1954, 0027Z.

06737. Recommend one more adverse reference to UFCO by SHERWOOD. Reports arriving here that since UFCO not attacked by RUFUS he must be UFCO man. Believe you have proper line for this already; viz. new regime will not put up with UFCO if it persists reactionary outmoded tactics and unsatisfactory labor relations.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by [name not declassified] and released by [name not declassified] at Wisner's direction.

---

**241. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 27, 1954, 0314Z.

977. Re: GUAT 973 (IN 22611) para 1E.<sup>2</sup>

1. As situation stands, STANDEL seems dominate army friends and opportunists and paralyze anti-red officers. Doubtful ref petition, if materializes, will stir army leaders or impress STANDEL.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 10, Folder 2)

2. Army capacity to act vs STANDEL much diminished by move to field.

3. STANDEL apparently planning hold out at least till army defeated, possibly longer. But indications are good part of army would quit fighting if no longer bound by STANDEL authority.

4. If foregoing true, would appear leave us two alternatives:

A. Destroy army in field and march on capital.

B. [1 line of source text not declassified] possibly follow up with airborne invasion of capital while army away.

5. Do not know front situation or Calligeris capabilities, [2 lines of source text not declassified].

---

**242. Telegram From PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

[place not declassified], June 27, 1954, 0907Z.

4421. For Ontrich. Following received from [place not declassified]:

“ERRATIC refuses join Calligeris as he states invasion plan being followed contrary his recommendations and convictions. Further, does not see how he could help at Esquipulas at present.

Is recommending to followers in DTFROGS they proceed via WSHOOFS to aid Calligeris.

Is sending [name not declassified] to WSHOOFS soon to contact Calligeris organization. [name not declassified] just arrived from WSBURNT with intel info. [1 line of source text not declassified]”

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 148, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.



243. **Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to J.C. Esterline of the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 27, 1954.

SUBJECT

Proposal to Burn [name not declassified]

GUAT 973<sup>2</sup> indicates that [name not declassified] will not be of any advantage to PBS since he apparently is willing to move only when Calligeris has already won. It also increases my personal suspicion that he may be playing us for suckers and really be helping Arbenz.

2. In view of his small value and of the possibility that he may be using us, I recommend that an operation be run against [name not declassified] to make him desperate. This can be accomplished by having someone—not known to him to be connected with PBS or US—tell him he knows about some recent meeting or meetings [name not declassified] has had with PBS representatives and threaten to expose him to Arbenz if he does not deliver \$50,000 within 24 hours.

3. The above recommendation is made in ignorance of possible station capabilities in this regard, and of course, other possibilities would probably suggest themselves to Guat Station.

4. The result should be beneficial to PBS by clarifying whether [name not declassified] is on our side or not by seeing who he goes to. If he is unconcerned by the threat, he is not really our man. If he is made desperate he may act where previously he has waited for someone else. He may make a bold bid to move the army to his control, assassinate Arbenz, or take asylum. Any of these courses would be good, because in the last case he would not be in a position to complicate things when the Callegeris forces are successful.

[name not declassified]

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 154, Folder 2. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 241.

**244. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 27, 1954, 2131Z.

981. 1. JMBLUG enroute at this moment 1245 hours local time for conference with STANDEL 1 and general staff following telephone call from STANDEL 1 and SUMAC who have intimated they wish to turn govt over to Junta. Obvious govt situation desperate despite commu-  
niqué to effect that govt will fight house by house until end.

2. Since army has shown no guts in past do not believe they can be expected to show courage now.

3. Believe govt on point of surrendering.

4. Have briefed JMBLUG that govt must agree to following points act or deny statements issued by Calligeris:

- A. Arrest Communist and other leaders responsible for situation.
- B. Declaration martial law.
- C. Cessation of hostilities.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

---

**245. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 27, 1954, 2251Z.

06753. Please deliver the following message from [*name not declassified*] to [*name and place not declassified*].

"1. Very distressed on return here to note serious distortion of Guatemalan developments in US and foreign press. This distortion made worse by apparent inability or unwillingness grasp true significance these developments plus effects of iron clad press (both foreign and domestic) censorship by Guat Gov't. *Time* cover story this week excellent but almost unique job.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 9, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; Urgent. Drafted by Wisner.

"2. Among distressing reports was an Agence France Presse cable which completely missed the boat and was heavily picked up in Europe chiefly Scandinavia.

"3. Because of former association and continued unofficial access to facts and great personal concern over how this whole thing looked in the newspapers, I have done some checking.

"4. If you consider advisable would appreciate your conveying following as message from me to Fernand Moulrier which he can feel free to use in AFP provided no personal or official attribution.

"5. The Guatemalan situation is not a banana republic fracas. It is an actual Guatemalan uprising against a Communist regime and Communist apparatus which is definitely linked to Moscow. That link is not a casual ideological or intellectual link—it is an operational link with the plays being called from Moscow both direct and via Mexico literally on an hourly basis.

"6. The fact that the revolt apparently started outside Guatemala proper and thereby handed the Communists the word 'invasion' on a silver platter is a grave over-simplification. The people involved are in absolute fact Guatemalans who happen to have had to seek sanctuary in fear of their lives outside Guatemalan borders and always wanted return.

"7. The 'invasion' label has been further emphasized by the apparent loyalty to Arbenz regime of Guatemalan army. The fact is that defections inside Guatemala have been large scale. So much so that the relatively small band with which Armas crossed the border is now three-to-four times its original size, entirely due to defections within Guatemala. The Guatemalan air force has virtually defected in toto, which accounts for what should have been an intriguing journalistic fact; namely, that no Guatemalan regime planes have been in action against the Armas forces.

"8. Arbenz regime statement that churches have been bombed is completely false. Falsity established by actual eyewitness testimony.

"9. Also false is Arbenz statement that Guatemala City has been bombed. A barracks on outskirts used as an arsenal was bombed but destruction of Mendoza House within Guatemala City, which was used by Arbenz as evidence bombing, was according to several eyewitnesses and neighbors arsoned by regime police in order provide an exhibit.

"10. The United Fruit Co. simply does not figure in this thing at all. In fact expect Armas to make public soon his private determination not to allow Fruit Company get away with traditional reactionary policies labor and otherwise.

"11. The 2000 ton shipment of Czechoslovak arms shipped via Swedish freighter out of Stettin, with false documents, was no invention. This ten million dollar consignment of arms actually landed in

Guatemala and was taken over by Arbenz and represents, in relation to the size of the regime military forces, a colossal shipment completely unbalancing the armament equilibrium of that area. This by no means only such procurement of arms by Guatemala.

“12. Arbenz is using part of these weapons to arm Communist-led civilian terror commandos who have received secret instructions to prepare for wholesale civilian massacres when the signal is given. In the meantime Arbenz has publicly announced that he will execute ten hostages for every bomb dropped.

“13. Finally, and to repeat, this is a very serious business. The stakes are not the dividends of the United Fruit Company. The stakes are whether or not imperial Communism shall have a tactical command post in Central America within a few miles of the Panama Canal and in position undermine neighboring states. Instead of yelling about Yankee imperialism and invasion the free world should be grateful that a handful of brave but maybe pathetically comical exiles got the pitch and decided to do something about it.”

---

**246. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 28, 1954, 0520Z.

4458. 1. Urge you exercise every means to have [*name not declassified*] remove STANDEL-1 before noon 28 June failing this prevail upon STANDEL-1 to accept Calligeris cease fire conditions.

2. FYI. There remains no choice but fight unless STANDEL-1 comes out immediately against communism accepting terms announced and call cease fire for forming new govt with Calligeris.<sup>2</sup> To do otherwise would be to surrender our present advantages and possibly fall victim of Arbenz Communist intrigue.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 6. Secret; Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 251.

247. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Mission Broadcasting Station<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 28, 1954, 0558Z.

4459. For Langevin and Cadick.

1. Arbenz is out but Diaz<sup>2</sup> refuses to accept Calligeris's terms. Only 500 regular army and 2500 untrained reserves in Adam.

2. Immediately inform public what has happened and that if cease and terms LINC 4362 (IN 22435)<sup>3</sup> not complied with immediately SYN-CARP will launch all out bombing attack and assault and destroy all those not joining anti-Communist forces. Communism must go and Diaz must agree to terms or army of liberation will continue its victorious march to Adam and fight Communists to last one.

3. Appeal to people that Communist Arbenz has resigned, first victory won and everyone should now join side of liberation movement for a greater WSBURNT. The government is obviously crumbling and further bloodshed futile. Prepare leaflets for troops in field.

4. Tell Diaz bombings to start noon 28 June and will not stop until liberation army occupies palace or Diaz agrees to terms announced.

5. Target but don't announce for noon 28 June is Matamoros again and knock out brief pilots from Langevin's staff or [*name not declassified*]. Put on maximum air show. Strafe all AA batteries.

6. SHERWOOD to keep steady strong appeal that anti-Communists are victorious and Diaz must agree cease fire before hundreds of innocent army men die in lost cause. Only way to stop bloodshed is to drive communism out. No other solution acceptable.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 6. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to [*name not declassified*] and the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> The CIA believed that Díaz was a "veteran trained Communist, graduate Commie military agent school Prague, Czechoslovakia preparing Moscow activities throughout Latin America." (Telegram 4478 from PBSUCCESS Headquarters to various Stations, June 28; *ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 26. (*Ibid.*, Folder 5)

**248. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 28, 1954, 0634Z.

4462. For Ontrich.

1. Dir urgently recommends Calligeris [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] emphatically declare independence from UFCO and allay labor fears liberation regime might return to Ubico<sup>2</sup> methods. Discuss this immediately with [*name not declassified*], urging him (a) make press statement immediately emphasizing this labor thesis and statement for occasion, (b) prepare appropriate statement for Calligeris to be made suitable moment, as soon as possible, possibly to be included into Calligeris general statement of policy.

2. Such statements should emphasize:

A. Present labor union leadership hall usurped by Commies, tied in with Moscow-led WFTU, CTAL. These Commie leaders must go.

B. Future labor unions will be protected against Commie infiltration and against intimidation or other restrictions by either domestic or foreign employers. Free union elections, collective bargaining, other basic labor rights guaranteed.

C. Liberation govt will protect interests entire people against any predatory financial powers, whether domestic or foreign. Unlike Commies who used UFCO only as propaganda stick, not finding any solution, new govt will reduce role foreign capital in line with country's economic interests, eliminating all traces obsolete colonialism. Reference to "new colonialism" in Commie satellites exploiting them for Russia.

3. Advise immediately LINC, Dir, result your talk with [*name not declassified*], report further action taken by him.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 6. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Station Chief in [*place not declassified*].

<sup>2</sup> Jorge Ubico, President of Guatemala, 1931–1944.

249. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

[*place not declassified*], June 28, 1954, 0816Z.

4467. Re: GUAT 984;<sup>2</sup> GUAT 986.<sup>3</sup>

1. Urge favorable reply soonest JMBLUG's acceptance offer of good offices to mediate situation as it affords such obvious advantage it should not be passed up particularly with possibility OAS team appearing on scene 28 June.

2. LINC also believes every effort should be made to follow up this maneuver as rapidly as possible with show of strength and does not concur with JMBLUG's suggestion we let up on bombing Adam. June 28 could be decisive date therefore both SHERWOOD and SOMERSET have been directed to increase not let up the pressure.

3. Conditions of cease-fire established in LINC 4362 (IN 22435)<sup>4</sup> are reasonable and minimal. Removal of Arbenz already partial step and others should be undertaken soonest. If JMBLUG mediates he could say he has heard Calligeris terms on radio and would like to receive STANDEL-1's terms if a cease fire is to be arranged.

4. Transmittal of msgs to Calligeris could be accomplished overtly as public knows he maintains residence in Tegu.

5. Needless to say LINCOLN fully concurs with JMBLUG's unwillingness to see Calligeris discarded at this time.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 6. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to Guatemala.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 11, Folder 5)

<sup>3</sup> Document 250.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 249.

**250. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 28, 1954, 0618Z.

986. From JMBLUG to Ascham and Whiting.

1. As result all day meeting with STANDEL 1 and General Staff, it has been determined that STANDEL 1 will assume presidency tonight. Then have agreed to move immediately on seizing Commie leaders and sending them out of country. They have refused to deal with Calligeris and sought good offices of PBPRIME to bring about cease fire on both sides.

2. It is my opinion that once STANDEL is out tonight, they should be forced to deal with Calligeris. I personally do not wish to become part of another Mihailovich–Tito deal. It seems to me that those who had the courage and guts to bring about this situation should not be sold down the river. While we might for temporary period attempt to stop bombing Adam, I believe attacks should continue in north until such a meeting arranged.

3. I do not trust the army leaders either on anti-communism or on keeping faith with PBPRIME. They are collaborators with communism and must pay penalty in form Calligeris assumption of presidency.

4. Our first victory has been won but not the battle. Please consult Holland on this matter in conjunction with my formal reports to him. In other words, force negotiations. If necessary, have Holland send me such instructions.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.



251. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 28, 1954, 0918Z.

4470. Ref: A. SLINC 4458;<sup>2</sup> B. DIR 06769;<sup>3</sup> C. SLINC 4467 (IN 22836).<sup>4</sup>

1. LINC recognizes possible conflict in your receiving orders from two places nevertheless believe action taken on ref A will not conflict too seriously with ref B.

2. Ref C was sent before receiving STANDEL-1's speech which failed to mention his removal of Communists as reported in GUAT 986 (IN 22794).<sup>5</sup> Thinking here was based on your having a crack in the door to put foot in which could be exploited. Second thought is that SWALLOW should mediate but this not too good as he would have to follow Osorio who is not our man.

3. LINC believes [*name not declassified*] is better choice than SMILAX to replace STANDEL-1 as closer to being agreeable to recognition of Calligeris which is important to our objectives.

4. On theory full advantage should be taken of first enemy weakness LINC has directed air strikes for Adam afternoon 28 June on TGW transmitter bldg, Matamoros and flak suppression. Anticipate this show of strength will provide substance to any consideration of Calligeris's position.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 6. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Document 247.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently wrong ref. See DIR 06759 (OUT 57820). [Footnote in the source text. Telegram 6759 is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 3.]

<sup>4</sup> Document 252.

<sup>5</sup> Document 250.

**252. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 28, 1954, 9:39 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. ALLEN DULLES

The Sec. asked if there is anything new, and AWD said there are a lot of messages—with several very good ones from Peurifoy. AWD doesn't like Diaz—he was put in by Arbenz.<sup>2</sup> They are maneuvering to get him out and get a better army officer in. They are trying to keep our own forces intact and not get too deeply engaged. They are sending out propaganda to the effect that officers in the field better go home quick or they will be taken. They have superior forces—the other side—and our side must use more air power. There may be a bombing attack on the radio. The bombing has been excellent and effective. AWD said he is looking into the British ship matter.<sup>3</sup> No authority was given for this. However, we can't say it. AWD said he will try to make it appear that Arbenz' boys thought this might get us involved.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations, Box 2, A67–28. No classification marking. Transcribed by Phyllis Bernau.

<sup>2</sup> Among other reasons, the CIA was critical of Díaz for allowing Arbenz to make a farewell broadcast in which he blamed the United States for the crisis and said "US aviators and other mercenaries had unleashed fire and death on civilians." (Telegram 1125 from Guatemala City, June 28, 1954; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 175, Folder 1)

<sup>3</sup> On June 27 the rebel air force mistakenly sank a British freighter carrying coffee and cotton. See Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, p. 340.

---

**253. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 28, 1954, 1558Z.

06765. LINCOLN is instructed by Ascham that all instructions to field particularly to SGUAT which have significant bearing upon political strategy and upon way in which political negotiations and maneuvers are to be conducted be cleared with headquarters prior to transmission. Believe LINCOLN will appreciate necessity for this in view strong ODYOKE policy implications and absolute requirement for ODACID assistance, backstopping, and parallel action. Please confirm. In case of emergency need for urgent decision clear with headquarters by telephone.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Bissell.

---

**254. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 28, 1954, 1823Z.

4482. 1. At meeting AFOL exec committee 5 Feb. Meany<sup>2</sup> letter to Arbenz released. It decried Commie subversion in Guat of democratic institutions and indicated willingness "democratic labor movement" in U.S. to aid in furthering democratic social reforms in Guat.

2. Believe most appropriate and useful for Meany now to renew via press labor desire to do all possible to help as soon as Guat rids itself of Commies and establishes regime genuinely anti Commie. Statement could tee off on Meany being shocked by evidence continued Commie brutality and hope that removal Arbenz indicates possibility of further necessary step of elimination all Commie influence. This would lead right into 5 Feb letter.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 6. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> George Meany, American Federation of Labor President.

3. This could then be basis for later follow up by Meany to new govt. if and when formed. In meantime statement could have value in minimizing claims of exclusive management UFCO interest in anti-regime forces.

---

**255. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 28, 1954, 2254Z.

992. Re: GUAT 990.<sup>2</sup>

1. We have been double-crossed.

2. [3 names not declassified] formed junta and announced it over TGW at 1145. [name not declassified] renounced presidency, kept chief armed forces. [name not declassified] Min Defense. [name not declassified] Minister of Gobernacion. [name not declassified] asked [name not declassified] remain. This complete violation agreement 7 hours earlier.

3. With [name not declassified] failure, issue became readiness of junta negotiate with Calligeris. JMBLUG, JMBLUG 1, ESQUIRE, Bannister, Nutting spent from 1200 to 1415 with junta. [name not declassified] spoke for junta. They refused give yes or no to JMBLUG question whether they would meet Calligeris. Evaded all issues, praised their own anti-communism, slandered Calligeris, cried have beaten army retain power in nation.

4. Urgently recommend bombing Adam this afternoon.

5. Next mtg 1730, same participants. Bombs would persuade them fast.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 28. (Ibid.)

256. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala to the  
Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Guatemala City, June 28, 1954, 9:42 p.m.

1133. Pass Defense. Diaz at 11:45 this morning June 28 issued following Decree establishing Junta consisting of himself and Colonels Jose Angel Sanchez and Elfego Monzon.

"Considering that it is desirable for stability of situation brought about by resignation of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman from position of constitutional president of republic<sup>2</sup> to give to new government broader composition which will lead to representation of other forces and that for these reasons it is convenient to bring into executive Colonels Jose Angel Sanchez and Elfego Monzon. Therefore, decrees:

1. A governmental Junta be constituted for conducting administration of nation.

2. Governmental Junta be constituted as follows: Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz, who will serve as chief of armed forces; Colonel Jose Angel Sanchez, who will serve as delegate of Junta in Ministry of National Defense; and Colonel Elfego Monzon who will be delegate of Junta in Ministry of Interior.

3. This decree enters into effect day of its publication in *Official Gazette*."<sup>3</sup>

Peurifoy

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 175, Folder 1. Unclassified; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Arbenz relinquished the presidency to Army Chief of Staff Colonel Diaz June 27.

<sup>3</sup> The first act of the new junta was to declare the Communist Party illegal. (Telegram 1134 from Guatemala City, June 28; 9:40 p.m.; *ibid.*)

**257. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland) and the Ambassador to Guatemala (Peurifoy)<sup>1</sup>**

June 29, 1954.

Early in the morning of Tuesday, June 29, Ambassador Peurifoy called me from Guatemala to say that he was talking on a clear line from which censorship had been removed for the purpose of that call. He said that at about three o'clock in the morning the Junta composed of Diaz, Monzon and Sanchez had been overthrown by a Junta composed of Monzon and two young colonels, Jose Luis Cruz and Mauricio Dubois.

Monzon is favorable to Castillo Armas, and the Junta wants to arrange an immediate cease-fire order and a conference with Castillo Armas on June 29 in El Salvador.

Ambassador Peurifoy says that he is very favorably impressed with the two additions to the Junta and feels that we should do everything possible to strengthen it. He asks that we use our good offices to try get word to Castillo Armas to set an hour today on which all ground fighting will cease and to ground all his airplanes immediately. If we will advise Peurifoy of the hour so fixed, the Junta will suspend activities of their ground forces simultaneously.

If the conference is arranged in El Salvador, the Junta will go in an Embassy plane. Ambassador Peurifoy and the Papal Nuncio will accompany them, but will stay in the background and not participate in the conferences.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 151, Folder 2. Confidential. Drafted by Holland, who was in Washington; Peurifoy was in Guatemala City.

**258. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Mission Broadcasting Station<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 29, 1954, 1359Z.

4510. Command msg for Cadick.

1. Junta taken over by Col. Monzon, believed friendly, who desires Calligeris to indicate soonest his cease-fire hour and Monzon will issue official cease-fire same time.

2. Also Calligeris to indicate what hour he willing to meet Monzon in DTFROGS to discuss terms.

3. Advise soonest of above meanwhile use your best efforts to hold position, suspend attack and specifically order all A/C keep away from Adam until authorized. Use A/C only for recon over Zacapa complex.

4. Comply soonest. Avoid needless bloodshed.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and Station Chiefs in Guatemala and [*place not declassified*].

---

**259. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Mission Broadcasting Station<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], June 29, 1954, 1631Z.

4515. Re: LINC 4510.<sup>2</sup> For Cadick.

1. Do not be influenced by cry of hoax as we shall retain power of retaliation until Calligeris position is secure. [2 lines of source text not *declassified*] Regret we unable to fully inform you of every detail therefore you must keep confidence throughout this difficult period.

2. Your complete compliance to ref msg is mandatory.

3. Modification of use of A/C: You may re-supply field forces to extent necessary to maintain effectiveness while awaiting final decision.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Station Chiefs in Guatemala and [*place not declassified*].

<sup>2</sup> Document 258.

Use armed fighter A/C for recon for defensive purposes. Instruct air and ground to be particularly alert for withdrawal enemy units to Adam as such action would violate cease-fire principle of troops in place. Important that enemy not take advantage of cease-fire in any way. Report violations before taking action.

4. Clear all plans and significant actions with LINC until further notice.

5. Report your compliance ref msg soonest.

---

**260. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 29, 1954, 2025Z.

999. 1. [1 line of source text not declassified]

2. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] his only ambition is obtain cease fire and end of “useless” slaughter.

3. He sending plane to Zacapa in attempt land there [1 line of source text not declassified]. I warned him that plane might be shot down and it would be advisable to waggle wings etc if approached.

4. He preparing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] asking for cease fire and immediate start discussions with Calligeris.

5. My impression is that govt here so completely shaken they will make only half hearted attempt to establish any conditions.

6. ESSENCE has many men ready though they without arms at moment. However irregulars from Via Canales area may start moving in immediately.

7. Saw some of Salama prisoners. They horribly beaten. Several were assassinated by guards.

8. [name not declassified] stated that STANDEL 1 had forced him into deal with help certain army officers which had obliged him play cagey game and arrange for inside coup. [1 line of source text not declassified] Believe nobody desirous of occupying hot seat at this moment.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.



261. **Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 30, 1954, 0023Z.

07063. Here is present situation and headquarters' instructions:

1. Since objective of throwing top Communists out of Guatemalan Government accomplished and Monzon whom we believe reliable and friendly to Calligeris now in charge of situation in Guatemala City our prime objective must be to prevent fratricidal civil war.

2. PBPRIME and Salvador have been asked by Monzon group to use good offices to bring about immediate cease fire and to arrange El Salvador meeting between Monzon group and Calligeris group. We are anxious to bring this about as promptly as possible.<sup>2</sup>

3. Council of American States met today and was advised of good offices invitation and of its acceptance by both PBPRIME and Salvador and that latter is endeavoring to bring about immediate San Salvador meeting.

4. SKILLET has been asked by ODACID to send his attaché and member of his staff to Calligeris to urge his acceptance of El Salvador invitation and to facilitate cease fire proposal made by Monzon who has asked Calligeris to fix time for such cease fire.

5. Whelan is being asked to request Somoza to help persuade Calligeris to accept El Salvador invitation.

6. We are anxious that air operations should be stopped at earliest possible moment consistent with vital security Calligeris forces and hope that Calligeris can take some action in the field to bring about a cease fire. We understand Monzon may attempt to approach him through emissary to effect this.

7. Desire [place not declassified] should immediately send Ontrich to Calligeris Hdqrs on behalf of the group which has been extending support to Calligeris. Ontrich should report as promptly as possible regard-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 146, Folder 6. Top Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters, the Mission Broadcasting Station, and the CIA Station in Guatemala. Drafted by Allen Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Arrangements were set in motion later that morning, Allen Dulles told the Secretary of State during a phone call: "we must decide this morning whether Jack [Peurifoy] should go down to the meeting. It is important that some dynamic wise fellow be there." The Dulles brothers then agreed that "we cannot let Armas down." (Memorandum of telephone conversation, June 30, 8:44 a.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations, Box 7, A67-28)

ing attitude Calligeris and present military situation. He should tell Calligeris that consistent with the vital security of his forces he should not undertake offensive action and should permit Guat forces to disengage if they show willingness to do so and should not call for or expect air support inconsistent with above policy. Also he should propose Calligeris accept Monzon proposal for cease fire and fix time if he able do so in advance Salvador meeting.

8. Calligeris should be advised that his supporting group will exert its influence to see that at El Salvador meeting legitimate claims and interest of Calligeris group are protected unless he insists upon prolonging hostilities if other side is willing to accept honorable conditions and carries out cease fire.

9. Calligeris has just sent message reading as follows: "I accept interview with the categorical understanding that the fact of attending it does not forcibly bind me to come to an agreement. If it be that the conditions do not satisfy the ideals and plans of the liberation movement for broad and definitive national reform." We consider his expressed attitude to be reasonable. [*place not declassified*] should facilitate trip to Salvador if Calligeris requests. Desirable that his pilot [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] and preferably one of his own people. Since Monzon being flown by official U.S. plane same facility might be accorded Calligeris if available [*place not declassified*] and Embassy approves. Possibly preferable Calligeris should use his own light plane directly from Hdqrs in field. Suggest Calligeris advise estimated ETA Salvador.

10. Since dictating above message GUAT 001 IN 23524<sup>3</sup> received indicating situation Guat City strongly favorable Calligeris, that population overjoyed and want their hero now. Cable recommends that Calligeris simply announce coming Guat City by plane with fighter escort.

We are endeavoring check this recommendation by phone through ODACID with JMBLUG. This daring program appeals to us provided adequate security at airfield can be arranged in opinion JMBLUG and Guat Station. Will send further advice on this subject as soon as JMBLUG's views obtained.

11. [*place not declassified*] please pass entire message to SKILLET.

---

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 29. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 6)

**262. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 30, 1954, 0031Z.

003. 1. TGW at 1545 announced junta taking all steps to effect cessation of hostilities.

2. Believe we must have in mind [name not declassified] will try consolidate his power by delay in talks. Fundamentally [name not declassified] is hostile to Calligeris as he stated [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Do not believe him above taking advantage cessation air activities to delay cease-fire orders to army and thus wipe out Calligeris ground forces.

3. Therefore repeat our recommendation Calligeris arrive here tomorrow with fighter escort. Suggest SHERWOOD announce this and request great public demonstration at airport. Also have plane at same time drop "Nuestro Libertador" post D-day leaflets.

4. Repeat Calligeris has massive public support and bloodshed will occur in city if he does not arrive soonest.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 6. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

---

**263. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, June 30, 1954, 0036Z.

002. 1. This is to fill you in on nights developments.

2. Holland called JMBLUG approx 2230 about DTFROGS mtg.

3. JMBLUG met at Jefatura Fuerzas Armadas with STANDEL-1 and SUMAC-2 approx 0100 June 29 to pass Holland's message.

4. Approx 0400, ODUNIT attaché called JMBLUG out of meeting. Jose Luis Cruz had been to see him, said pro-Calligeris officers had taken Base Militar 2000 June 29. Said new junta formed, would march on Jefatura building shortly to seize STANDEL-1, SUMAC-2.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 6. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

5. JMBLUG decided stay so as not tip hand.

6. [name not declassified] phoned, asked JMBLUG come to palace. JMBLUG declined. [name not declassified] said he would be at Jefatura right away.

7. STANDEL-1, SUMAC-2 excused themselves, conferred briefly. Came back, said they planned resign.

8. New junta arrived, surrounded Jefatura, marched into conference room armed. Took over.

---

**264. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 30, 1954, 1933Z.

07147. Re: DIR 07144.<sup>2</sup>

1. For a number of obvious reasons we must not lose opportunity collect for later study and exploitation the mass of documentation which undoubtedly exists in Guatemala attesting to activities and workings international communism there.

2. Communist Party hqs, private offices Communist leaders, labor and other Communist-controlled organizations, FonOff, Caracas Conference Staff, G-2, G-4 are some of the places and sources which will yield such info but only if made clear this absolute and immediate necessity and that "protection" will not be tolerated.

3. Need for this should be transmitted [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Calligeris and effected [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] immediately. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] work with Cruz or whoever can give you authority and support. Not a minute should be lost. Suggest you assess desirability use of CLOWER who although remaining in background would control indigenous team armed with appropriate authority of requisition. When above operational hqs prepared assign TDY Embassy KUBARK SGRANGER

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 4. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by [name not declassified]. Repeated to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters.

<sup>2</sup> Dated June 30. (Ibid.)

CP expert with small clerical staff respectively to give guidance and collate material for processing hqs.

4. Determined move this direction will yield additional advantage placing us in position affect [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

---

**265. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 30, 1954, 2352Z.

07298. From Ascham, Ordway and Whiting. Refs: A. DIR 07299;<sup>2</sup> B. DIR 07300.<sup>3</sup>

1. To Playdon, Dunbar, and all hands at LINC as well as all elements of PBSUCCESS complex: Heartiest congratulations upon outcome developments past forty-eight hours.<sup>4</sup> A great victory has been won. This victory is the more notable by virtue of the extreme difficulties of the operation and the odds which were recognized to be against our chances of success from the outset. The energy and devotion of the personnel at LINC and the field Stations has been truly exceptional and has served as an inspiration and a challenge to all of us at hqs.

2. It is requested that LINC pass on the foregoing to all appropriate elements of PBSUCCESS field complex and at full strength. Hqs assumes LINC will have its own special messages to send to the field but desires to have hqs congratulations expressed as well.

3. Not necessary to repeat hqs congratulations to Guat and [place not declassified] because this done directly by refs. These messages were thus sent by hqs for special reason that JMBUG and SKILLET key members team effort WSBURNT and WSHOOPS parts of operation and had their initial briefings and indoctrination from hqs. Accordingly it seemed appropriate hqs extend congratulations to them both as members of the true team effort and individually.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 4. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> Document 266.

<sup>3</sup> Dated June 30. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 4)

<sup>4</sup> The following sentence was deleted from the original text: "(Although matter obviously not finally resolved.)"

**266. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 30, 1954, 2352Z.

07299. For JMBLUG and Bannister from Ascham, Ordway and Whiting.

1. To JMBLUG and all hands at Station heartiest congratulations upon outcome developments past forty-eight hours. Great victory has been won and what is now required is consolidation of achievements and shoring up of gains.

2. Accomplishments of KUBARK station have been outstanding and all hands should know that all at hqs realize what they have achieved under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.

3. Concerning role played by JMBLUG although no surprise to those of us familiar with his record, we would like him to know we feel he has surpassed even our greatest expectations. He can take great comfort and satisfaction from fact that his accomplishments are already well known and fully appreciated in all important quarters of govt. His inspiring and steadfast leadership and his wholehearted support and cooperation with our efforts and our personnel are deeply appreciated and we trust he not disappointed that we embarked upon this operation together.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 4. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner and approved by DCI Dulles. Repeated to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

267. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Mission Broadcasting Station<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], July 1, 1954, 1618Z.

4575. For Cadick.

1. Word received mtg broken off due unacceptable demands both sides. Calligeris apparently insists on right entering Adam leading his army liberation. Monzon demanding remain number one for 30 days.

2. Both demands are unreasonable. Calligeris insistence on triumphal march would antagonize army upon which he must lean for support. Monzon's position strengthens with each hour that passes.

3. Hqs expects Calligeris might return soon to SOMERSET or Tegu and desires Cadick or Ontrich (with SKILLET) make immediate effort to turn him around and go back to DTFROGS soonest for resumption of discussions. Further Calligeris must be told unless he becomes reasonable he will lose his friends quickly.

4. Although everyone PBSUCCESS very anxious have Calligeris succeed in final step same time cannot support hostilities between anti-Communists. Request you impress upon him high moral principles involved which must not become sacrificed for vanity or personal interests.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Station in Guatemala and the Director of Central Intelligence.

268. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 1, 1954.

RE

Control in Guatemala

It became increasingly evident to those members of PBSUCCESS who were in close contact with Calligeris during the period leading up to D-Day that he was not an intelligent individual, lacked administrative ability and was easily penetrated and influenced. In conversations with LINCOLN Senior officers this was a subject of much concern and discussion and it was recognized that some control would have to be maintained over him so that his future government would not fall flat on its face. After discussing the aforementioned with the WH Division they recommended that Wellbank, presently residing in San Salvador, be considered as the person to attach to Calligeris to furnish the necessary control and guidance.

Your attention also is being called to the fact that one of the conditions for [name not declassified] to return to the group in May, was that the group take a more realistic look at the limitations of Calligeris and adopt a stronger position in controlling him.

I feel that our endeavoring to control [name not declassified] thru Page may cause us to alienate Calligeris who undoubtedly will be following all of [name not declassified] actions and contacts on a constant basis. Furthermore [name not declassified] has not indicated any ability to wield influence; on the contrary, he has reached his present position through the process of elimination. We never have had any control over his actions nor has he any reason to be obligated to us at the present time. I recommend strongly that we make up our minds what phase of the govt we are planning to back and follow this course inasmuch as the Latin mind is so suspicious and with such a talent for intrigue that they will perceive immediately our two-pronged device which to them will be *very* apparent and we will find ourselves in the position where we will be playing both ends against the middle when actually there is nothing in the middle, and so will really be playing against our own interests. In Latin America you always have two powers: The party that is IN power and the one intriguing to GET IN. We are IN power and I

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 154, Folder 1. Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "Mr. Bissell Recd 7/5/54."



believe that we should take all steps possible to remain in that position and you won't accomplish this by trying to back two horses.

[*name not declassified*]

---

**269. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], July 1, 1954, 1624Z.

4577. 1. Desire to state for your consideration that failure to back Calligeris strongly at this time resulting in loss of his position and assets would seriously jeopardize ultimate success in effectively eliminating Communists from WSBURNT.

2. [*name not declassified*] has no claim to authority for popular support. Calligeris has become symbol of anti communism and has demonstrated support from people. For all we know this could still be a maneuver to trap and dispose of Calligeris and must remember Communist regime leaders are all waiting in asylum. For what? We note none were arrested.

3. Urge we use every influence to support Calligeris to fullest at this moment, not only to avoid further bloodshed which would inevitably result but to ensure final success of our undertaking.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> Pending word from Washington, staffers at PBSUCCESS Headquarters had to temper their support for Castillo Armas in a telegram to the Mission Broadcasting Station: "basic agreement contained no mention of commitment to support any one person for top position only to attain objectives of freeing country. While we may desire and do all possible to place Calligeris on top this is a policy matter above and apart from PBSUCCESS jurisdiction." (Telegram 4598 from PBSUCCESS Headquarters to the Mission Broadcasting Station, July 2; *ibid.*)

270. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 1, 1954, 2002Z.

07377. Ref LINC 4579.<sup>2</sup>

1. Hqs agrees with your concern on score that situation has deteriorated somewhat and may deteriorate further, particularly if agreement cannot be achieved soonest [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. However as we have discussed with you on telephone this morning we must concentrate our energies at this time on supporting ODACID efforts achieve such agreement and this will require pressure to be brought to bear on both parties. JMBUG is under instructions to do this and it is our purpose have Ontrich available for additional arm twisting Calligeris if deemed necessary by JMBUG.

2. For your further background info and guidance, it is present policy position that Calligeris should be urged by all who have influence on him to accept either one of two positions; viz., command of military forces or presidency of junta, but not both, and that it is deemed preferable he accept command military forces. We understand it is being pointed out to him that in this position he will really hold the power and will be able to enforce appropriate Communist cleanups and bring his trusted men into high army positions.

3. In any event it is crystal clear to us and you should understand that for us to take different line than JMBUG would be highly confusing and very dangerous. Best way to avoid this is let JMBUG call the signals and we act solely in supporting role. Hence LINC should not issue any instructions or advice to Calligeris or PBSUCCESS personnel re this aspect of [*matter?*] without prior and distinct instructions from hqs. ODACID is carrying the ball now having been brought officially into picture as result request use good offices effectuate cessation hostilities and arrival at agreement.

4. Since dictating above your cancellation message (LINC 4582)<sup>3</sup> arrived indicating you intend resubmit.<sup>4</sup> However we dispatching this message in order inform you ODACID policy position.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 142, Folder 5. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 1, not printed. (Ibid., Box 6, Folder 7) A handwritten note on the telegram reads: "This is canceled as per LINC 4582."

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2 above.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram LINC 4579 (see footnote 2 above), PBSUCCESS Headquarters had taken a very tough line: "Believe situation deteriorating rapidly and only above positive action will save our position. LINC does not have confidence in [*name not declassified*] or his followers to clean out and control Communists who are deeply entrenched throughout social structure. Only leaders or front persons have been removed thus far and we must assume Soviet will use maximum effort to regain its hold."

5. Recommend you send substance of above policy line to SHERWOOD.

---

**271. Telegram From the Mission Broadcasting Station to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], July 2, 1954, 0832Z.

519. 1. Entire [*name not declassified*] strain was cover up for real motive, i.e. if ODYOKE does not back Calligeris, [*name not declassified*] will. Holding planes and gear was to prevent flying gear anywhere out for Calligeris. Impasse now broken on promise. If ever ordered fly gear away prior settlement to any point other than Calligeris support, will inform [*name not declassified*]. On receipt alert, [*name not declassified*] will undoubtedly impound.

2. F 47 recon Zacapa area 0800 July 2. C 47 may resupply. [*name not declassified*] leery of flights during talks.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 12, Folder 6. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

---

**272. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [*place not declassified*]<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 2, 1954, 2337Z.

07707. Please deliver following to JMBLUG from Ascham: I have seen Holland's cable to you<sup>2</sup> and wish strongly to reinforce views expressed regarding treatment of Calligeris. I need not stress responsibilities and loy-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 9, Folder 4. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Dulles. Repeated to the CIA Station in Guatemala.

<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

alties resulting from operational background with which you are familiar. Naturally I cannot judge relative merits of the two individuals as I know neither of them personally. I do know that Calligeris was the chosen instrument to effect a high objective and that his actions have contributed mightily to that end. He has borne the risks and if he were now to feel that he had been double crossed not only would our moral position suffer but we would be incurring the gravest of security risks. My great admiration for you personally and for the skill with which you have handled this matter makes me feel that this message is probably unnecessary nevertheless I wish you to know how I feel particularly as I see from Holland's message that this view is not inconsistent with that of ODACID and because the security of our ops may be involved.

---

### 273. Editorial Note

The CIA Station in Guatemala strongly favored absolute U.S. support for Castillo Armas in opposition to the junta that he replaced. PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida generally agreed with those sentiments, but cabled the Station in Guatemala on July 6, 1954: "Entire political situation now in hands of ODACID." The cable authorized the Station Chief to confer with Ambassador Peurifoy "to follow his instruction in event you are needed, otherwise leave entire matter in his hands." (Telegram 4700 from PBSUCCESS Headquarters to the Station in Guatemala, July 6; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 9)

In a discussion with White House Press Secretary James Hagerty on July 7, Secretary of State Dulles "recommended that the President say that this country was 'taking normal steps to satisfy ourselves that the new Guatemalan Government was stable and was willing to carry out its international obligations.'" Hagerty concluded: "That is as far as Dulles recommended we go at this time." (Hagerty Diary Entry for July 7, 1954; Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers, Box 1, A-71-79)

Telegram 049 from the Station in Guatemala, July 8, emphasized the political uncertainty within the country, lack of support for the junta, and Communist activities: "Five man junta has not enjoyed popular support but to contrary has provoked disquiet since anti-Commies fear situation unfavorable to them while Commies not being arrested began to swagger and talk of revenge. Some indications of plotting within army. . . . Party records still not found. Known Commies wandering streets, starting

undercover activities, endangering stability of government which not proceeding with necessary vigor." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 146, Folder 1)

Telegram 08056 to the CIA Stations in [*place not declassified*] and [*place not declassified*], July 7, provided additional details about the continuing activities of the Communist Party in Guatemala. (Ibid., Box 9, Folder 5)

---

**274. Memorandum From William Robertson of Operation  
PBSUCCESS to the Chief of the Project<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 8, 1954.

SUBJECT

PM OPERATION

*I. General:*

A. This report is to serve three purposes: to record the operation from its outset to its finish; to summarize the factors adding to and detracting from the success of the operation; and to list those errors made, avoidable in future operations.

B. The outline to be followed will be informal and in chronological order as follows:

1. Staging and Pre-Operation Preparations
2. The Operation
3. Comments.

*II. Staging and Pre-Operation Preparations:*

*A. The Background of the Situation Prior to the Staging*

1. Approximately 85 Calligeris personnel had received training in Nicaragua, 75 of these under the guidance of Pivall. Pivall graduated 30 sabotage leaders, 6 shock troop leaders, 16 organizers, 4 staff personnel and 19 incompetents. Exactly 13 radio operators graduated under the guidance of Dunavant and Middlecott.

2. Eighty-nine tons of equipment were prepared in three forms at FJHOPEFUL. Forty-three tons were waterproofed for burial. Fifteen

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 146, Folder 4. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

tons were packed for drop. Thirty-one tons were prepared for shock troop use. Prior to the staging period the entire burial and shock troop equipment had been moved to Honduras.

3. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was reluctant to provide support for this operation. The Honduran Government allowed all staging to occur inside its borders. The Nicaraguan Government permitted training and support in the form of air operations to occur within its borders.

4. The personnel situation: We were operating under the belief that we had 267 men in Honduras and Salvador for use as shock troops and specialists, outside of the training personnel that had been sent to Nicaragua.

5. *Plans:*

a. Our plans were based on the belief and strong proof that a large percentage of the people inside Guatemala were opposed to Communism and were willing to fight against Communists, and the belief that the Calligeris organization was a good one and that Calligeris had strong organizations in each of the 9 target areas. Each of these target areas was to be organized by a trained organizer to the point that each target area could be conquered by its own inner organization, with the realization that the amount of organization within the Army unit would be the key to the amount of bloodshed necessary.

b. In addition, shock troops were prepared in the following manner:

*Puerto Barrios*—116 men under the leadership of [name not declassified], to move from Macuelizo to Tenedores to Entre Rios, in order to seal off the Puerto Barrios area.

*Jutiapa*—46 men under [name not declassified] to move from a point 15 miles west of Metapan through Asuncion Mita to Jutiapa and subsequently to the capital city.

A force of 70 men under [name not declassified] was to move from Florido to Carta Blanca and be in position in Zacapa at H-Hour.

A force of 96 men under [name not declassified] was to move from Copan Ruinas to Camotan to Jocotan to Vado Hondo to seize Chiquimula. These were to hold at Chiquimula until it could be seen whether Zacapa or Jutiapa forces needed aid.

A force of 106 men under [name not declassified] was to move from Nuevo Ocotepaque to Esquipulas to Quezaltepeque. They were to hold at Quezaltepeque and if no aid was needed at Zacapa or Jutiapa, they were to move to San Luis Jilotepeque to Jalapa to Palencia to Guatemala City.

[name not declassified] with 16 men was to break away from [name not declassified] group and take Morales in order to back up the block of Puerto Barrios.

*B. Staging and Preparation for the Operation*

1. Just prior to D-Day the Commmunists made a concerted drive against our inner organization. Thousands of people, including key leaders of the Army and civilians were jailed or otherwise incapacitated.

2. Based on the fact that we believed the inner organizations were much more extensive than the portion jailed, we decided to launch the organizers and sabotage leaders to the undamaged portion of the inner organization.

3. All organizers and sabotage leaders were launched by 10 July [June?]. It is not known the percentage of these men that reached their destination but there are many reasons to believe that a large percentage were intercepted at the border.

4. Twenty-two pre-D-Day drops were attempted. No definite light patterns were received on these drops. Portions of the arms were used later at Canales, Palencia and Quezaltenango.

5. Resident radio operators were launched, and later contact was made with Zacapa, Puerto Barrios, Guat City and Quezaltenango. One Quezaltenango radio operator and one Guat City radio operator did not come up. A radio operator formerly scheduled for Jutiapa was converted to a tactical radio operator.

6. Approximately 100 men crossed into Honduras from Jutiapa just prior to D-Day. In light of the recent roll-up of our inner organization, it was decided to use these men as harassment teams to agitate the rear of the enemy in order to determine if such agitation would ignite the inner organization to the point of a premature D-Day, at the same time hoping that an organized D-Day could be launched when practicable.

7. On assembling the shock troops, however, it was found that Calligeris' total available men was approximately 165. We used the 100 men scheduled for harassment teams in order to fill out our shock troops and depended on pre-D-Day air drops to provide the agitation desired to stir up the inner forces. In addition Nicaraguans, Costa Ricans, Hondurans and any other injected parties that wanted to join our shock troops were recruited.

8. A pre-D-Day movement of arms into Guatemala was not as successful as desired due to the *Alfhem* alert, delay in movement to Honduras and other troubles too numerous to mention.

9. Two days before D-Day, the decision to request permission to go was made. The facts bearing on the case were weighed and the field decision to request go was made in spite of the fact that in many cases we could not follow the original plan. One of the most weighing factors was the belief that the history of failing organizations is based more on failures to act than on failures from acting. A report on the factual condition of the situation was withheld with the realization that if the full situation were reported, pressure from above LINCOLN might have caused a delay in operations. A firm belief was shared by all that further delay would only call for a deteriorating situation.

*III. The Operation:*

On the evening of the 18th all shock troops crossed the line at first darkness as scheduled. Throughout the 19th reporting was sketchy. On the 20th [name not declassified] passed Tenedores. [name not declassified] captured Camotan after a short fight with only one casualty. [name not declassified] took Esquipulas with no fight. At this point we picked up 400 recruits for the [name not declassified] group. [name not declassified] was reported at Carta Blanca. [name not declassified] departed the [name not declassified] group. The Gualan sabotage team cut the rail bridge between Zacapa and Puerto Barrios. Indications are that communications cuts Jutiapa to Guatemala City, San Jose to Guatemala City, Puerto Barrios to Guatemala City and Zacapa to Guatemala City were successful at this time. [name not declassified] bombed tanks at San Jose and Retalhuleu.

On the 21st [name not declassified] was resupplied four miles out of Gualan, indicating that he was not where he was supposed to be. He was resupplied during the daylight hours. [name not declassified] joined [name not declassified] and his instructions were to break away when Quezaltepeque was taken and go to Jutiapa. [name not declassified] was moving toward Vado Hondo. [name not declassified] captured Jocotan after a small fight with the local garrison. [name not declassified] captured one half of Puerto Barrios and controlled the communications from Puerto Barrios to Guatemala City. [name not declassified] captured Morales, Bananera and Los Amates. [name not declassified] bombed the tanks at Puerto Barrios.

On the 22nd [name not declassified] sent an advance party into Gualan, which party became engaged with the opposition. He took the remainder of his forces to support the engagement and after winning, he remained in Gualan. The same day the *La Ceiba* boat, apparently off course, as they were scheduled to land to a reception party near Santo Tomas, landed above Puerto Barrios and immediately became involved in a fire fight. The exact efficiency of this group can only be determined by the fact that every Puerto Barrios military communiqué from this day on mentioned this group of 27 men and grossly exaggerated their size. The last 9 men were captured on the night of the 28th. [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] joined at Vado Hondo. Calligeris joined them there, and the FCP moved to Managua. The fighter aircraft ran their first tactical mission, hitting the Guatemala City tanks on this date. [name not declassified] was still containing the Puerto Barrios group. [name not declassified] occupied Morales. Reports from TGW indicated Canales and Quezaltenango uprisings among the populace, and the two chiefs of the Chiquimula Garrison were captured by surprise at Vado Hondo.



On the 23rd [name not declassified] met a superior force at Gualan consisting of the majority of the reinforced Zacapa Command. His radio operator was incapacitated and the radio destroyed, [name not declassified] retreating to a point near La Union. [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] attacked Chiquimula without air support. The attack was successful except for remnants of the garrison which held out at the Cuartel. Thirty-two men and 2 officers were captured. The men reported that the Army did not desire to fight Calligeris. One of the officers joined our forces. [name not declassified] fled from Puerto Barrios under duress. [name not declassified] was still holding Morales on the 23rd. The fighter support on that day hit the Zacapa Garrison, exploding an ammo storage dump, and bombed a bridge between Chiquimula and Jutiapa.

On the 24th air support was launched against the garrison that was holding out in the Cuartel at Chiquimula and against artillery installations within range of the town. An unsuccessful try was made to resupply a reported 500 men organized at Jutiapa. [name not declassified] was run out into the mountains near Morales and the Puerto Barrios commander dispatched a large group toward the Zacapa area. Air search along the Puerto Barrios-Zacapa corridor was made a daily secondary mission for fighter aircraft from this point forward.

On the 25th the Zacapa Garrison counter-attacked Chiquimula. This counter-attack was withstood by a junior officer, [name not declassified], with 200 men. [name not declassified] was brought into the fight as support and was reported as having left in the face of the enemy. [name not declassified] reports 500 dead, probably an exaggerated report. [name not declassified]'s weapons placement and leadership won the day. The Guardia de Honor was reported moving from Ipala toward Quezaltepeque. Air search and opportune flights were run on a continuous basis from this point forward. A small drop was made to a group at Jalapa. Immediately thereafter the recipients attacked the Jalapa Garrison. The air hit four trains full of re-enforcements, destroying 3 of them. Matamoros was hit. El Jicaro bridge was destroyed and the Zacapa to Chiquimula road was strafed and bombed to prevent re-enforcement from Zacapa. Two hundred fifty enemy troops were reported at La Union. Recruits continued to flock to the Liberation Army. The reported strength was 1100 at Chiquimula.

On the 26th the Zacapa Garrison again counter-attacked Chiquimula. On the same day our air support surprised them assembling at the line of departure and they were easily routed. The Jalapa group was resupplied and immediately the enemy commander reported that he was under attack by 1500 rebels. It is believed that the appearance and equipping of this group caused the immediate holding up of the Guardia de Honor in its advance into our rear from Ipala to

Quezaltepeque and caused the enemy commander to delay throwing his reserves in at Zacapa–Chiquimula. The air hit the Zacapa marshalling yards, hitting one passenger train carrying troops, hit the Jutiapa bridge and strafed TGW. Somoza's intelligence reports that TGW went off the air at that time and that Quezaltenango radio shifted frequency to TGW frequency, Quezaltenango radio ostensibly becoming TGW. Through Somoza, Ydigoras Fuentes offered 300 men to cross against Jutiapa from Salvador. He was lined up with an air drop which was to occur on the night of the 30th. He was given operation money and dispatched to Salvador to make the arrangements. (Eventually, when the final Junta was formed, Ydigoras was informed that he was not to cross the border under any circumstance.)

All radios were ordered to concentrate on communications cuts, as evidence was on hand to substantiate the fact that PT/16 was causing confusion, which was counteractable only by phone and telegraph. Proof that the teams must have acted on orders comes from a Guatemalan Army emergency order the following day to protect the lines against the rebels at all costs.

On the 27th Calligeris attacked Zacapa and on receipt of enemy fire and without air support due to weather fell back to Chiquimula. The fighter support assigned to hit the tanks at San Jose struck a ship of unknown origin reported by Somoza to be carrying arms to Guatemala.

On the 28th a 200-man feint was launched at Ipala for the purpose of deception, and at total darkness all forces were pulled down to the road for the final attack on Zacapa. The air that day hit the Zacapa fort, getting secondary explosions, making us believe an ammo dump was hit. Matamoros was bombed again. TGW was strafed and bombed. The Jalapa group was launched toward Zacapa and [name not declassified] was resupplied and instructed to move to Zacapa the following morning.

On the 29th all ground forces and air support commenced the attack on Zacapa. The advance party entered Zacapa. Zacapa officers were conferred with and arrangements for the Zacapa truce were made by [name not declassified]. The Monzon agreement was completed, and our forces were ordered to hold up. The final disposition of troops was 1500 Calligeris men surrounding 700 Zacapa soldiers at Zacapa, with a reported 4500 men of the Guatemalan Army below Quezaltepeque and 1500 Liberation Army above and to the left of Quezaltepeque at Jalapa.

#### *IV. Comments:*

Certain lessons, some newly learned and some paramilitary axioms ignored for the sake of expediency, should be recorded for KUBARK/KUHOOK study and prevention or inclusion in future operations.

### A. Planning

As can happen in any military or paramilitary operation, PBSUCCESS Headquarters was massive, while the implementing staff was necessarily restricted to a very few. Twenty men can easily think up more things to be done than three men can put into practice. The end result is either a necessary discarding of ideas or a valiant but imperfect implementation of the plans handed down. In this case, because of the loyalty and untiring devotion of KUHOOK field personnel to the project at hand, the latter case proved true. In the event the above is unavoidable in the future, care should be taken to arrange the planning/implementation time ratio giving the implementation phase its proper precedence. Again, since the KUHOOK field personnel did devote itself to the job, the defect was not seriously detrimental but could have been one more *possible* asset to the opposition.

### B. Headquarters Direction

It is believed that one of the keys to the success of the operation was LINCOLN's willingness to delegate command to the field at the crucial operational moment. LINCOLN direction was completely constructive and avoided hand-tying, operation-crippling restrictions sometimes found in this type of project.

LINCOLN laid down the rules of conduct of the operation before the operation, confining its direction to those new situations which developed as the operation progressed. This should serve as a model for the future.

### C. Timing Errors

Unfortunately, three incidents completely removed the element of surprise.

1. The propaganda program, one of the most effective arms of the project's paramilitary machine, was exposed prematurely in this writer's opinion. The first leaflet drop caused the opposition to spring into action right at the moment when the inner organization was necessarily the most active—organizing, equipping, recruiting, etc. To quote [*name not declassified*]: "In my country I have much opposition, mostly underground. I cannot afford to continually oppress that opposition, but at the first sign that it is ready to act, for instance with the type of forewarning that your leaflet drop gave to Arbenz, I would do exactly what he did—incapacitate the entire organization if possible."

In fairness to the PP Section, any criticism of this leaflet drop is "Monday Morning Quarterbacking." All field personnel, including the principal agent and his staff, were elated at the first news of the successful drop, and it was only when the serious consequences occurred that the act was criticized.

It is believed that the most effective leaflet drops during the operation were those following a successful paramilitary blow.

2. The premature paramilitary actions in connection with the attempt to stop the *Alfhem* arms movement aided the enemy in preparing counteraction to the movement. By not accomplishing the destruction of the arms and yet exposing routes of ingress and launching points, we practically negated proposed arms and specialists' movements due to occur within the following three weeks.

3. A request for a June 16 crossing and a June 18 H-Hour was delayed on June 16 to a June 18 crossing, again giving the opposition extra days of preparation after certain exposing preparatory moves had been made.

The result of the above errors was a dearth of coordination of underground support to the operation.

#### *D. Value of Training*

One major factor in the success of shock troop movement and combat was the calibre of unit and sub-unit leaders. Our leaders proved more effective than those of the opposition in the ground skirmishes and in the two major battles engaged in. It is believed that this effectiveness was gained in paramilitary training received under PBPRIME direction.

In addition to lifting the morale and confidence of the troops, the military efficiency of the unit leaders was shown when the first counterattack against our forces was withstood solely because of a junior officer's wise weapons' placement and command presence under fire. Although very seldom in the future will we be able to train hosts of troops when working behind the Iron Curtain, it should be a prerequisite of our KUHOOK programs that we withdraw unit and sub-unit leaders for at least a month's leadership training. By this means we regain the edge lost through lack of capability to organize in the open.

#### *E. Air Support*

Air Support provided the clincher to the operation. Air was used strategically to substitute for the vacancy left by the roll-up and subsequent disorganization of the majority of the inner organization. By this method, bridges were cut, reinforcements harassed, resupply by shipping stopped, troop movements interrupted, gasoline supply virtually destroyed, and arms and ammo supplies destroyed.

The psychological effect of fighter air support was tremendous and added to the myth that Calligeris' Army was an organized, unbeatable force.

Air support was confined to strategical, semi-tactical and supply support. Close-air support was not feasible for several reasons:

1. No trained air-ground liaison teams.
2. Inefficient tactical communications system.

3. The nature of the fighting was such that unstable positions, undefinable lines and the fast aircraft being used prevented orientation by the pilots.

It should be noted here that the sole close air support employed was by a Cessna 180 and by a C-47 circling the combat area with 30 lb. fragmentation bombs and home-made TNT—nail and scrap iron bombs.

#### *F. Communications*

We were not prepared for a tactical communications net. Six tactical radios and the FCP radio occupied a full schedule for the base setup we employed. Team to FCP to team communications at times took 24 hours because of staff traffic and blanks in communications due to atmospheric conditions. At times, the round trip traffic was only two hours, but this was not dependable.

Use of code is impractical in a tactical net, due to the time involved and also due to the garble factor. In this operation certain immediate action messages, FCP to Air Support, were garbled. The most damaging were those in which an error or a garble occurred in coordinates. An intelligent guess by a commo officer or an air operations officer's surmise as to what was meant does not suffice. Resupply runs were made under just such circumstances when time did not permit cable clarification. In at least one such instance, it is known that the team was on the ground and that the drop occurred 9 miles North of the team area. Usually, garbles were more prevalent when the operator or commander was under fire.

Having the agent pads and Chief of Operations separated by radio from air support was a serious error rectified early in the operation. Until rectified, air requests were sometimes received after the ground action had occurred. Allowances had been made for this possibility by placing special air request pads in agent hands with the base pad at air operations, but this left air operations working in the dark as to the ground situation. When rectified, we were able to support the operation more properly.

Before rectified, however, we were forced to use voice code using [name not declassified]'s personal communications to [name not declassified]. In these cases, at times, 6-8 hours could be cut from the time necessary for an air request to be honored.

#### *V. Special Subject:*

In every business there is a special group of persons who comprise the "scoffers," the disbelievers"—men content to bury their complete lack of usefulness under the guise of lack of faith in success.

Our organization has its share. Some have drifted from project to project and from division to division—confusing assumed "professionalism" with plain lack of energy or ability to do more than point out weakness in other people's thinking.

In most cases these people are only dead wood. Usually, their most damage to an operation is confusion of the issue for a short period. However, on this project I can point out four specific instances in which support functions were warned by such characters *not* to offer requested support as “this project is doomed to failure.”

The possible effects of tolerating such persons in an operational organization are too obvious to list here.

It is hoped that this situation can be pointed out to KUBARK heads as an existing condition, true not only in this project but also in others with which the writer has had experience.

VI.

Recommendations for all field personnel considered as having performed in an efficient manner are being presented in separate reports. I wish at this time, however, to place in the body of this report my personal opinion that the key man to the success of this project is Vincent C. Pivall.

Pivall’s firm adherence to orders enabled LINCOLN to rely on the fact that plans were being carried out within the realm of possibility and that Principal Agent attempts to alter those plans were minimized. The preservation of KUBARK interests was considered a solemn duty by Pivall and it showed up in the results of his work.

His professional knowledge and direct manner of dealing with the indigenous personnel gained him, and KUBARK, their respect and spirit of camarade necessary to good guidance on operations of this type.

In addition, Pivall’s analytical and objective thinking and reporting spotted for LINCOLN many defects in the old Calligeris organization, useful in planning the operation.

It is recommended that his services would be valuable in a KUHOOK staff position within WHD if he is to remain in WHD. If released from WHD, it is recommended that KUHOOK staff consider him for training assignments or a field project assignment after completing a KUHOOK training course at [*place not declassified*].

It would be a serious KUBARK/KUHOOK loss to lose this man through disinterest on the part of KUBARK or through allowing him to become de-motivated.

**William Robertson<sup>2</sup>**  
**CPM/PBSUCCESS**

---

<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

275. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], July 9, 1954, 1946Z.

4728. Re: [*telegram indicator not declassified*] 746;<sup>2</sup> GUAT 049.<sup>3</sup>

1. LINC declines to suggest any candidates aside from those already proposed by Ontrich as it now appears to be the prerogative of the field and particularly JMBLUG.

2. It is now apparent that the present govt of WSBURNT is entirely KUBARK PBSUCCESS character and that a period of vigorous consolidation must now be undertaken to ensure ultimate success this operation. Although this phase is primarily ODACID's responsibility it is urged that KUBARK through WHD consider this area a matter of primary interest until completely stabilized.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 9. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Stations in Guatemala and [*place not declassified*].

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 13, Folder 8)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 273.

---

276. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

[*place not declassified*], July 9, 1954, 2100Z.

4731. Re: A. [*telegram indicator not declassified*] 1090;<sup>2</sup> B. [*telegram indicator not declassified*] 744.<sup>3</sup>

1. LINC strongly concurs with [*name not declassified*] desires for P-51's and subsequent sale F-47's to Calligeris and urges all possible KUBARK effort to insure favorable decision on KMFLUSH request to ODACID and expeditious delivery of aircraft.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 9. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS; PBCABOOSE.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid., Box 92, Folder 19)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

2. As expansion of above views and to insure fullest utilization of experience and knowledge gained through PBSUCCESS the following points are submitted for your consideration.

A. Personal [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] support PBSUCCESS both have emphatically pointed up [*name not declassified*] opposition to communism, his clear insight Latin American affairs and his realization of need for and desire to establish and continue ODYOKE support and collaboration.

B. SKIMMER as authorized by Hqs has made definite commitments to [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Calligeris re help on air support which while not officially ODOYOKE commitments must be morally recognized as such and fulfilled if any future ODYOKE–Latin American dealings are to have proper foundation.

---

277. **Memorandum From Jerome Dunbar, Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Chief of Station in [*place not declassified*]**

[*place not declassified*], July 9, 1954.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 104, Folder 3. Secret; RYBAT. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]



278. **Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Stations in Guatemala and [place not declassified]**<sup>1</sup>

[place not declassified], July 13, 1954, 0047Z.

4757. 1. LINCOLN closing Station 2400 hours 12 July. Thereafter PBSUCCESS stations revert WHD command.

2. Please continue PBSUCCESS slug for those matters relating to project or matters that would reveal existence of same.

3. Hope you enjoyed association as much as LINC has. The book is now closed but the story was a good one. Thanks.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 6, Folder 9. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.

---

279. **Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King), to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 22, 1954.

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Joe Montgomery and Mr. Thomas Corcoran of The United Fruit Company

Present at meeting on 22 July were Mr. Montgomery, Mr. Corcoran and Col. King

1. Mr. Corcoran opened the conversation by saying that Mr. Montgomery had just arrived from Central America and would like to report on recent events and his observations.

2. Mr. Montgomery said:

A. He had reached a satisfactory settlement with the United Fruit Co. workers in Honduras, and that this would remain in effect until the new government, which will take office in January 1955, passes certain proposed social legislation. The period of tranquillity is estimated at approximately one year.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 154, Folder 2. Secret. Drafted by King on July 22.

B. President Galvez showed himself to be a man of courage with considerable iron in his backbone during the critical period after the uprising began in Guatemala. While the outcome was in doubt he strongly resisted all pressure to turn against Castillo. Galvez is now feeling very happy and much relieved. Valenzuela, the Foreign Minister, was weak and of no help at all.

C. Somoza had planned to move against Figueres immediately after Castillo's success in Guatemala and was only prevented from doing so by Washington. He still intends to move at a more opportune moment.

D. Montgomery saw [name not declassified] in Guatemala City on the 13th and found him much disturbed about the future because of:

(1) In his opinion Castillo was not acting promptly enough in the appointment of his people to key positions. In particular he was delaying too long in selecting the head of the Security Police. It was only after Montgomery went to Peurifoy at the request of [name not declassified], and Peurifoy in turn spoke to Castillo, that Col. Mendoza was made the head of the police. Col. Mendoza is considered an excellent selection.

(2) The fact that almost all the leading Commies were successful in taking asylum in the Mexican and other embassies instead of being caught and thrown in jail, is considered a threat to future stability. There is talk of a clandestine radio in the Mexican Embassy being used for their purposes.

(3) There is no criticism however, of the speed with which the minor Commies were rounded up nor with the number who are in jail.

E. Mr. Montgomery said he had heard that Col. Monzon was considered a good man although [name not declassified] had some doubts about him.

3. Mr. Corcoran then got to what I am sure was the main reason for today's visit. He said he had never seen anything more ill timed than the announcement of the anti-trust suit against the United Fruit Co. as it weakened their bargaining position with the Hondurans since it was announced prior to the settlement of the strike, and would undoubtedly make things more difficult in Guatemala. He compared the suit against the Fruit Co. at this time with the breaking up of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire when there was nothing good to replace it at the end of World War I. He indicated that the breaking up of the Fruit Co. would leave a chaotic situation. He wanted to know what guidance could be given to Mr. Montgomery because of the political importance of all this in Central America, and Mr. Montgomery added that *he* would like to know if the Fruit Co. were considered expendable. They had heard on the Hill, prior to the uprising in Guatemala, that CIA would bring about the fall of Arbenz and then see that the blame fell on the Fruit Co. I replied that the first I heard of the anti-trust suit was when I read about it on the front page of the *Washington Post*, that nothing had come to me

since, that I was sure CIA had nothing to do about it, and I did not believe the Fruit Co. was considered expendable. I asked Mr. Montgomery whether he still planned to carry out various of the steps he had promised to make in Guatemala if a democratic government came into power. He replied that such was still his intention, and among other things he had in mind turning over the railroad. However, he did not wish to do this in such a way that everyone would say the Fruit Co. was responsible for the revolution, and that he was awaiting an invitation initiated by Castillo to discuss arrangements. Another step would be to give Guatemala an increased share of the profits. I stated that since he was in a frame of mind to be on the giving rather than the collecting end I did not see why he was too concerned about any charges of complicity in the revolution because it would appear more natural, if that were so, for them to be receiving rather than turning over the railroad. I said that there was a recent cartoon (and described the one of 10 days ago) about second chances, and that this seemed the opportunity they had long been waiting for to do things with a reasonable government which we all hoped that of Castillo's would be. Mr. Montgomery agreed and said he felt that the outcome could build up a much more favorable impression of the Fruit Co. in the Caribbean. Mr. Corcoran then said he had not been able to find out who was responsible for the suit, that Henry Holland said he had nothing to do with it, the Secretary of State said he was not responsible, that others with whom he talked all declined to accept responsibility. I said that I had no idea who was behind it except that I wished to repeat I was quite certain the Agency had nothing to do with it because this was not our business, and that if he wished to discuss the political implications in other countries I felt the proper place to make his facts known was with the Department of State.

J.C. King

**280. Report Prepared in the U.S. Information Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 27, 1954.

**REPORT ON ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES  
INFORMATION AGENCY IN THE GUATEMALAN SITUATION**

In concert with other departments and agencies and for the purpose of supporting specified foreign policy objectives, the Agency began last November–December 1953 to regroup its limited resources in an effort to meet the growing crisis conditions in Guatemala and neighboring countries. Unfortunately, the sharp cutback in Agency funds and personnel during the summer and fall of 1953 had forced reduction of the already small operations in the area, especially in various smaller countries where the programs amounted to one-man holding operations. Actions taken by the Agency to remedy these deficiencies and to carry out an effective operation may be grouped under three time-periods: the six months prior to the communist arms shipment; the crisis period of May–June; and the current post-crisis period.

*I. Pre-Crisis Period*

A. *Policy*—Up to the 10th Inter-American Conference at Caracas in March much Latin American opinion refused to concern itself with the communist issue in Guatemala, either regarding the Arbenz regime as a “home-grown” revolutionary movement dedicated to improving the lot of the exploited Guatemalans, or preferring to dwell on the United Fruit issue and speculate as to United States motives of economic imperialism.

In this context our principal information effort was directed toward creating greater awareness throughout the Hemisphere of the real threat to peace and security posed by the verifiable communist penetration of the Guatemalan government. In accordance with established policy at that time, this effort stopped short of accusations, directly attributed to the Agency, against the Arbenz regime as communist-dominated but did include the preparation and placement of unattributed articles labeling certain Guatemalan officials as communists, and also labeling certain actions of the Guatemalan government as communist-inspired.

Even though Guatemala alone voted against the anti-communist resolution at Caracas, public attention in Latin America did not begin to focus on the issue of communist penetration and resultant threat to

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–R01731R, Box 30, Folder 1011. Secret. The report was submitted to the Operations Coordinating Board on August 2 at the request of USIA’s Acting Director, according to an attached cover memorandum.

peace and security. With this in mind, the Agency intensified its efforts to get irrefutable evidence publicized throughout the Hemisphere, again short of directly labeling the Arbenz regime as communist but using its actions as self-evident proof.

B. *Operations*—In November and December, 1953, the information program in Guatemala was reviewed with Ambassador Peurifoy, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency. A new Public Affairs Officer was appointed and provisions were made for such internal strengthening of personnel and funds as events might require. In order to give direct support to the Guatemalan program, long seriously handicapped in operations through Guatemalan government restrictions, and to help meet the problem of communist penetration in the Central American area, a regional servicing operation was developed whereby USIS Mexico could give program support to Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. This servicing concentrates on anti-communist materials produced by USIS Mexico in direct collaboration with the other posts and tailored to meet specific needs in individual countries. A third phase of organizational build-up was a considerably expanded 1955 budget projection, parts of which were to be initiated with 1954 funds, especially the strengthening of the one-man holding operations in the smaller countries.

Elsewhere in the Caribbean, and related to the Central American plan, a new office was established in Port-of-Spain for the Trinidad-British Guiana-Barbados area. The existing small operation for the French West Indies, based in Martinique, was re-examined and provision made for selected expansion.

Media and field operations were directed to intensify their efforts in the collection, preparation, and placement of materials demonstrating communist design on, and penetration of, the Hemisphere. A successful project in January, for example, was the preparation here of a series of articles exposing Guatemalan communists Fortuny and Gutierrez; these were planted in a Chilean newspaper and later reprinted in selected other countries with Chilean attribution.

Throughout this period and on through the crisis itself emphasis was placed on cross-reporting Latin American opinion which opposed the Arbenz regime and supported the U.S. stand as taken at Caracas.

The Agency's special coverage team at the Caracas Conference fed out a continuous flow of news, backgrounders, photos, and tape recordings, concentrating on the anti-communist resolution and Guatemala's lone opposition. Through direct Wireless File to all missions and fast pouch these materials were disseminated by all field offices throughout the conference with good placement, backed up by frequent background briefings and conversations with editors, commentators, and

public opinion leaders. Film coverage was arranged for newsreel and TV outlets and, for future continuing use, full film documentation was developed on the anti-communist resolution, including speeches by Secretary Dulles and Assistant Secretary Holland.

## *II. Crisis Period*

A. *Policy*—The communist arms shipment to Guatemala in mid-May marked a definite turning point: first, among the small neighboring countries fearing intervention or aggression; second, elsewhere in the Hemisphere a mixture of surprise, concern and even alarm at this unexpected development; third, elsewhere in the world as the issue became headline news and the communist propaganda network openly took up Guatemala's cause. Especially significant was the attention given to the problem in Moscow radio broadcasts which from the beginning had been high and became a continuous clamor, so that by June 23 one *Pravda* article was broadcast thirty separate times.

As part of the basic U.S. decision to see the issue through to an emergency OAS meeting of consultation, the Agency immediately embarked upon an aggressive information effort, utilizing all available resources, to expose and discredit the Arbenz regime as communist-dominated, to dramatize the threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere, and to encourage positive action by other American Republics. This effort included use of direct attribution but continued to emphasize cross-reporting of desirable Latin American opinion. Strong advantage was taken of key developments which helped swing Latin American opinion to our side, such as the Soviet arms delivery and the Guatemalan-Soviet maneuver in the U.N.

Output was directed not only to the hemisphere but also to other parts of the world where, because of public unfamiliarity with the Latin American scene, communist propaganda found ready acceptance. Content was aimed at such attitudes as: skepticism or outright disbelief regarding the U.S. position, ranging to public acceptance of allegations that the U.S. engineered the revolution and that U.S. officials had strong financial interests in the United Fruit Company; public rejection of the premise that international communism had in fact subverted the Guatemalan government; reaction in principle to the U.S. stand on searching vessels in American waters and to the U.S. opposition to U.N. Security Council consideration of the Guatemalan request.

Information treatment was complicated by censorship within Guatemala which, for a period, gave the communist side a distinct advantage in getting out its story first; also by the marked tendency of certain foreign news agencies to cross-report reactions adverse to the U.S. and to select comment out of context.

B. *Operations*—Benefitting from the previous organizational build-up, an emergency working party under the leadership of the Assistant Director for American Republics was established in the Agency, with special liaison officer assigned to Assistant Secretary Holland in the Department of State. Specialists were reassigned within the Agency to the Policy and Programs Staff for Latin America, the intelligence-research staff, and the press, radio, and films media. A series of directives was issued formulating the various tasks to be undertaken by media and field operations.

Despite the lack of lead time in the policy decision to change from a largely unattributed effort to an aggressive labeling campaign, more than 200 articles, backgrounders, and scripts were prepared and transmitted by Wireless File, cable, and fast pouch during four weeks beginning the end of May for press and radio placement abroad. These were developed partly from public sources and partly from declassified intelligence from State and CIA. Content ranged from coverage of daily developments in Guatemala, Washington, the UN, and elsewhere in the area, to original verified exposés of communist penetration. Illustrative of numerous pamphlets prepared, a "Chronology of Communism in Guatemala", written here and printed in Habana in 100,000 copies, was distributed to all posts in Latin America. In addition some 27,000 pieces of anti-communist cartoons and posters were expedited to the field for selective placement. Based on Agency materials WRUL broadcasts were stepped up throughout the crisis period. Newsreel coverage of Guatemala's action in the U.N. and the emergency OAS meeting were released worldwide. Three special film subjects, including the film "Caracas: Resolution and Reality," were sent to all posts in the area.

Not only posts in this area but selected posts around the world regularly filed back useful stories for cross-reporting together with analyses of local opinion trends. When it became clear from these reports and other sources that censorship inside Guatemala was preventing foreign correspondents from reporting the story, while at the same time Guatemalan and allied sources were pushing their own version of the revolt, the Agency detailed an experienced press officer to Tegucigalpa in Operation Berry. This consisted of assembling daily, from intelligence sources, a succinct account of events within Guatemala and forwarding by cable to Embassy Tegucigalpa. The press liaison officer informally passed this information along to selected correspondents. Coverage immediately began to improve, helping also to offset cross-reporting by foreign news agencies of anti-U.S. comment.

Field reports now coming in show effective use of materials produced here and by the field posts themselves. Wireless File materials were well received by both metropolitan and provincial papers as

timely and effective and were widely printed, frequently without attribution to USIS. This was also true of the anti-communist cartoon prints and plastic plates. Through well-organized mailing lists the various pamphlets and posters were put into the hands of selected individuals and groups. Local radio outlets likewise were successfully brought into play. For example, the important CMQ network in Cuba early in June agreed to use all hard-hitting commentaries on Guatemala at peak listening hours, without USIS attribution. Selected films were redirected to key groups throughout the area, including films exposing communist activities in other countries clearly paralleling the Guatemalan situation.

### *III. Post-Crisis Period*

At the present time, the information treatment of the Guatemalan problem has entered the phase of disseminating the documentation only now becoming available from within Guatemala, which confirms the communist nature of the Arbenz government and demonstrates the truth of the representations previously made by the United States. In this task, the Castillo Armas government can be expected to help by exposing the atrocities and the tactics of the previous administration. Since this is the first time a communist government has been overthrown, a full case history of "rise and fall" is available, pointedly useful on a sustained basis in arousing Latin America to the methods and dangers of communist penetration. This line is also being carried worldwide to offset the large measure of skepticism which characterizes public reaction to the Guatemalan situation.

As part of the basic job of getting verified facts on communist penetration in Guatemala, the Agency detailed two cameramen to Guatemala as soon as it was possible to enter the country. A considerable quantity of sound film documenting communist atrocities is already on hand. Together with other film materials this footage will be developed into two permanent film records on communism in Guatemala, one short subject for immediate theatrical release worldwide and one longer subject for continuing use. A similar effort is being made with regard to still photos and recorded interviews. These and other efforts are in addition to publicizing official statements or reports as they become available for public use.

The Agency will continue to give high priority to Guatemala during what undoubtedly will be a long period of rehabilitation. A long-range effort of re-orientation seems indicated, at government levels and particularly in the interior areas where land has been distributed and doubts about the future persist. The Agency desires to play its part in a coordinated multi-Agency effort and has informally exchanged views



with the Department of State on the type and size of resources that might be employed.

In addition to efforts within Guatemala, there is urgent need for a marked step-up in the information program for the hemisphere, for the two-fold purpose of aggressively exposing communist penetration and bolstering democratic forces. As in efforts directed toward Guatemala, this should be part of a multi-Agency plan of action, bringing to bear on the hemisphere greater attention and larger resources than the U.S. government has given it in the years since the war.

---

## 281. Briefing Paper<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

### GUATEMALA BRIEFING

(1) Entire briefing *top secret* and more. Danger in relaxing security after operation completed, particularly if successful. Fortunate so far in keeping CIA out of publicity. [*Times & Luce (Time)*]<sup>2</sup>

(2) Last August pursuant OCB action, initiated program to eliminate pro-Communist government in Guat. Action program approved December. Team assembled from Korea, Germany, Egypt, Chile.

(3) Plan contemplated:

(a) Internal revolution, spark-plugged by Colonel Castillo Armas from Honduras—most available Guat exile long subsidized by CIA. In several revolutions.

(b) Defection of Guat Military at highest level.

(c) Defection of individual Army garrisons at strong points.

(d) Radio campaign from clandestine transmitters.

(e) Subversion of individual Guat leaders, military and civilian.

[Changes during Ops—importance of air]

Also parallel State Dept. Ops through O.A.S. to hold conference to take steps vs "Communist Guat."

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 2. No classification marking. A covering memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence from Tracy Barnes listed the participants scheduled to attend the White House briefing on July 29.

<sup>2</sup> Brackets in the source text in sections 1, 3, and 6.

U.S.A. diplomatic pressures—Navy & Air reconnaissance, etc. Program budgeted at approximately 3 million dollars. Total spent slightly in excess.

(4) U.S. government hand *undisclosable*. Established theory of fictional group of Anti Commie American businessmen interested in South America and desirous of eliminating Communism (not United Fruit). CIA dealt with Armas as representative this group. Somoza, Galvez, etc., might have made good guess—but implicated.

(5) Operation presented problems over and above those of usual Banana Republic revolution.

(6) *Background:*

Following fall of Dictator Ubico in 1944, pendulum swung far to left and Guatemala under left-wing leader Arevalo 1944 to 1951 when Arbenz took over. Arbenz able army officer but slowly came under complete influence of hard-core Communists, particularly Fortuny, Pellecer, Gutierrez, and others who trained in Communist school, frequent visitors to Moscow and satellites. [Prague School]

Arbenz controlled army; hard-core Communists took over labor unions, radio, major press organs, and dominated Indian peasantry who had little interest in Marx, et cetera. Foreign properties taken over, land divided up and Communist type state fast being organized. Some thirty abortive revolutions.

Time running against us and faced early probability of purge in Army, arming of the laborers, and further liquidation of the intelligentsia. Also critical situation Honduras (elections).

(7) Via intelligence channels information obtained regarding Arbenz negotiation to purchase 5 million dollars worth of arms from Czechoslovakia. (Refer attempt trace these arms—ran down wrong vessel (German flag)—arrival of *Alfhem* at Puerto Barrios May 15.) This arrival really blessing in disguise since publicity brought entire situation Guat to a head. However, resulted severe reprisals and due indiscretions one of our main chains within Guatemala completely liquidated (May 30) and danger that our entire network would be rolled up unless we moved rapidly.

Summer rains impending which would impede ground and air operations. Castillo forces augmented by defections following *Alfhem* incident but still the total of his forces on D-Day represented 80 bodies trained in guerrilla operations by CIA and approximately 400 men in all went over line on D-Day. Necessary move immediately or lose psychological opportunity and control of assets. Reports from Guat and outlying regions indicated popular expectation built up by our radio and by events forced decision to move or lose entire initiative.

(8) Operation run—

*Policy control:* HQ Wash—

Wisner–Bissell

WH Division—Col. King; [*name not declassified*]; Esterline, etc.

*Ops Control and Field Coordination:*

Lincoln HQ [*place not declassified*]

*Field Control:*

[*place not declassified*]

[*place not declassified*]<sup>3</sup>—SOMERSET—SHERWOOD

Guat City

*Support:*

[*place not declassified*]<sup>3</sup>

[*place not declassified*]

---

<sup>3</sup> The following handwritten notations appear at the end of the paper: “1. Chance clear out commies in S.A.; shown weakness; 2. Air power—dangers to them; 3. Coordinated action—State, Defense, CIA; 4. Do something for Central America.”

---

## 282. Editorial Note

A revolt of Guatemalan military cadets disturbed the tentative peace in Guatemala City on August 2, 1954. Castillo Armas viewed the uprising as the precursor of a large-scale army revolt by “unknown forces.” He told Ambassador Peurifoy that he planned to “escape” the city in the evening to regroup his liberation forces. (Telegram 116 to the CIA, August 3; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 7)

The revolt faltered the same day and order was restored by nightfall. On August 5 Allen Dulles reported to the National Security Council: “The revolt of the cadets was a natural development from the possibility that the liberation army would secure all the military positions which the cadets had hoped for. Everything was quiet now that both the cadets and the liberation army had been disarmed.” (Memorandum of discussion at the 209th meeting of the NSC; Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File)

Documentation on the revolt is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central File 714.00. For a discussion of the incident, see Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, pages 357–360.

**283. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 9, 1954.

12215. GUAT 130.<sup>2</sup> 1. Appreciate advice contained in para 1 of ref however desire further clarification including answers to following questions. Although your team “discovered” believed understood, please confirm upon completion discovery of documents 2 to 9 any others in brochure, and also please advise of terms and conditions any understanding or agreement on part of regime covering our use, including overt exploitation this material. Also what can we cite as the *source* of these documents and method our obtainment thereof for purposes of public exploitation of documents. This “sourcing” should of course be in form acceptable to regime.<sup>3</sup>

2. We again call to your attention and that of entire PBHISTORY team the extreme importance of any and all documentary evidence tending to establish contacts, connections and courses of dealing as between Arbenz regime and/or Guat Communist Party and leaders on the one hand, and Moscow–Prague and international Communist organization on the other hand. ODACID particularly keen obtain any such documentary evidence soonest possible to assist in tying down allegations still made in some quarters that Guat Communist apparatus was purely indigenous affair, not directed, controlled or guided by world Communist hqs.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 168, Folder 6. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBHISTORY. No time of transmission is on the telegram.

<sup>2</sup> Dated August 8. (Ibid., Box 173, Folder 4)

<sup>3</sup> A handwritten note beside this paragraph reads, “Done.”

---

**284. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, August 24, 1954, 0337Z.

185. 1. Since returning to Station, have held conversations with ESQUIRE, Calligeris, ESCOBILLA, [*name not declassified*], ZPSEMAN-

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 7. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

TIC, [name not declassified], ZPSECANT and other contacts this Station. Following conclusions have been reached which believe represents true picture although some details lacking.

A. Political situation tends worsen because Calligeris shows little political sense.

B. Calligeris apparently putting to one side tried collaborators of previous days and now surrounded by highly suspicious opportunistic elements including Jorge Garcia Granados, former secretary of Vicente Lombardo Toledano, former Ambassador to Washington, well known for Communist tendencies. Calligeris denies he has anything do with Garcia Granados, blamed latter's presence in palace and closeness to govt on [name not declassified]. However known that Calligeris has dined with him and consulted him on important matters.

C. Though Calligeris told Bannister that [name not declassified] was responsible for 2 August uprising, ZPSECANT stated [name not declassified] was loyal and acted correctly.

D. [name not declassified] told ESQUIRE that he leaving on long tour including ZRMETAL trip around 20 September. Stated he realized this effort Calligeris to dispose him but professed willingness leave quietly. Professed hope be able get govt on sound footing prior his departure. Stated, believe correctly, that he alone of junta has done real work in setting up govt administration. It true that [name not declassified] is hard worker and knows way around govt departments.

E. Meanwhile [name not declassified], ZPSEMANTIC, others consider [name not declassified] as menace who trying cut ground out from under anti Communists and weaken Calligeris. [name not declassified] has no popularity but does have some army support. Cannot see how tranquillity achievable with [name not declassified] remaining in junta. Problem is how get him out without trouble if he refuses to leave as [name not declassified], ZPSEMANTIC, Calligeris and others desire.

F. All anti Communist groups with sole exception Putzeys and a few others have eagerly awaited return [name not declassified] with view he only one capable solving situation and giving needed political guidance.

G. Meanwhile Calligeris has made some military moves with political ends which merit consideration. On 16 August, 500 CEUA picked soldiers from Canales region were incorporated into Base Militar while 500 soldiers who could not be trusted were released. This move gives Colonel Neiderheitman, Calligeris picked but [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], strong control potentially over this key military installation. At same time 350 picked men under Eduardo Taracena, CEUA leader, have been posted as palace guard. A further group of 300 picked men will be placed in the Guardia de Honor on 23 August.

H. Calligeris told Bannister evening 20 August that he needs aid in immediately obtaining two armored scout cars for palace guard. Bannister referred him to JMBLUG.

I. ZPSEMANTIC told Clower noon 20 August that he has 900 armed men concentrating in city which will act in whatever way necessary to ensure that anti Communist cause is not defrauded by palace or by incompetence. Obvious that ZPSEMANTIC is [*name not declassified*] man. Have checked and ZPSEMANTIC story is true. More being armed daily.

J. [*name not declassified*] told Bannister 18 August morning that he hopes reach working agreement with Calligeris but when asked what reaction would be if this proved impossible and it became necessary overthrow Calligeris Bannister replied that it most desirable he and Calligeris reach working agreement. Believed essential that Hqs consider possibility that [*name not declassified*] followers may rise against Calligeris as last resort if they find it impossible continue collaborate with him.

K. ZPSEMANTIC, Coronado Lira, Mario Sandoval, ESSENCE, and other key anti Communists and govt figures facing dilemma concerning their future actions. One hand do not wish jettison Calligeris who still popular hero. They consider supporting him desirable but only up to point where they can continue doing so without sacrificing anti Communist cause and their reputations. On other hand, break with Calligeris would play into army and possibly Communist hands unless this accompanied by successful movement which would control country.

L. Available info indicates that [*name not declassified*] has strong support in western part of country while ZPSEMANTIC, [*name not declassified*] and CEUA believe they control eastern part including bases of Zacapa, Jutiapa, Puerto Barrios, and Jalapa.

M. Meanwhile Calligeris promised Bannister that he intends divide air force between Puerto San Jose and Puerto Barrios, strengthen Quetzaltenango, Quiche, Zacapa garrisons to point where these will have two companies 80 mm mortars, two companies 60 mm mortars, and two companies heavy weapons each plus one observation plane. Each will make daily flights over surrounding countryside. At same time these key bases will become centers of intensive training of anti Communist army reserve for future eventualities.

N. Have delayed advising this data while checking and attempting fit into overall picture.

O. Crucial meeting between Calligeris and [*name not declassified*] to be held 23 August and consider future peace WSBURNT depends outcome this meeting.

P. As suggestion believe following should be done: [*name not declassified*] should be removed from junta and sent abroad on diplomatic mission. Calligeris and ZPSECANT should invite [*name not declassified*]

to join them on junta while agreeing to follow [*name not declassified*] political plan which has support key anti Communist figures now occupying important positions in government.

Q. [*name not declassified*] addition to junta would offer tremendous advantages including built in check and balances plus propaganda value of having [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] as member of government. Idea of having [*name not declassified*] (portion garbled; being svcd) eminence but without any real power would probably be unworkable since Calligeris could always refuse follow advice or drag feet in carrying out plans. If [*name not declassified*] member of junta he could see that program carried out. Moreover wise that [*name not declassified*] have responsibility as well as authority.

R. These matters have been discussed with JMBLUG who is in general agreement.

S. Recognize this policy matter but [*name not declassified*] and Calligeris have asked Bannister for advice. Calligeris urgently asked for instructions.

---

**285. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Guatemala City, August 29, 1954, 0040Z.

208. Re: GUAT 185;<sup>2</sup> DIR 14411.<sup>3</sup>

Have held further series conversations with contacts this situation and following is résumé info obtained.

1. Political situation continues to worsen with probability that groups regular army will soon attempt coup or when and if cadets participating in Aug 2 and 3 uprising are sentenced by court martial.

2. [*name not declassified*] has refused to depart on scheduled trip outside WSBURNT prior to 20 Sept and strong indications he conspiring with disaffected army elements against Calligeris. If so probable this movement would be launched prior [*name not declassified*] departure.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 11, Folder 7. Secret; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> Document 284.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

3. [2 *names not declassified*] meeting held night 23 Aug but no satisfactory working agreement reached. According to [*name not declassified*] and ESGAIN, Calligeris does not consider [*name not declassified*] collaboration essential but to contrary is closely working with Jorge Garcia Granados in plans for oil development Peten region.

4. [*name not declassified*] stated morning 27 Aug he believes impossible reach serious working agreement with Calligeris since latter always promises carry out [*name not declassified*] suggestions but never does so.

5. [*name not declassified*] sure Calligeris would balk at [*name not declassified*] membership in junta.

6. Calligeris through ESGAIN advised Bannister he desirous removing [*name not declassified*] from junta but desires remain as sole head of govt.<sup>4</sup>

7. Insistent rumors that dishonesty appearing in govt handling of funds.

8. ESCOBILLA, [*name not declassified*], ESGAIN, and ZPSEMANTIC advised that Calligeris had collected more than \$200,000 for aid to army of liberation but these funds have been spent on other "confidential" matters. Funds embarked by Arbenz govt for Congressional expenditure have also been spent for intelligence activities by Calligeris!

9. [*name not declassified*] and ESGAIN report Calligeris keeps large sums in his possession which he uses in effort buy support.

10. On 25 Aug Calligeris through ESGAIN requested \$100,000 from Bannister for liberation army necessary expenditures. Bannister replied he understood WSBURNT govt has considerable funds in PBPRIME banks. On 26 Aug Calligeris repeated his request through ESGAIN. Bannister advised that he had no funds but would forward Calligeris request.

11. Meanwhile it known that army of liberation members have received as little as \$18 in two months and are fed through charity. Liberation army leaders contrary to Calligeris orders refuse to disband because they fear such will play into hands of army which would immediately launch coup and seize power. Widespread belief that Calligeris is either blind or possibly sold out to regular army.<sup>5</sup>

12. [*name not declassified*] and ZPSEMANTIC advised that following individuals are ready to resign from govt in mass protest against Calligeris political activities: Hector and Domingo Goicolea, Carlos

---

<sup>4</sup> A bracket drawn in the margin encloses paragraphs 6–10 along with the word "out."

<sup>5</sup> Handwritten notations in the margin next to both paragraphs 11 and 12 read "OK."



Salazar, Carlos Sosa, Carlos Cifuentes, Gabriel Martinez del Rosal, Enrique Salazar Liguens, Mario Sandoval, Oscar Cobar, Adan Manrique Rios, Manuel Orellana, Adan Serrano and Luis Coronada Lira.

13. [name not declassified] has consistently prevented these resignations but bluntly stated today that continuance irresponsible activities by Calligeris will force him to permit the resignations of these individuals and the opening of a strong political campaign against Calligeris. Said campaign to be marked by mass demonstrations of protest against Calligeris and junta political activities.

14. [name not declassified] stated that army of liberation has withdrawn its support of Calligeris and has pledged its support to him.

15. On 25 Aug Col Manuel de Jesus Perez, commander of the liberation units in Jutiapa, was ordered by Calligeris to disarm his men. Perez refused, sent his 300 well armed men to Jalapa and himself came to capital where he defied Calligeris and pledged his support to [name not declassified]. [name not declassified] sent Perez to Puerto Barrios to take command of two companies of liberation army which allegedly control that port. Perez stated he would remain maximum of one month unless an anti-Calligeris movement was launched.

16. Col Jorge Barrios Solares, Commander liberation forces in Chiquimula, is estimated have approx 800 men still under arms. Barrios Solares refuses obey orders from Calligeris and junta and has also pledged loyalty to [name not declassified]. Chiquimula forces now better armed than before and have light and heavy artillery as well as machine guns.

17. Col Ernesto Niederheitman, commander of Base Militar, has promised full support to [name not declassified] and has drawn up plans to neutralize Aurora Air Base if the air force does not side with [name not declassified] when and if emergency arises. [name not declassified] stated he may be able to take over air force through Lt Guillermo Mendoza and Col Luis Urrutia de Leon. Niederheitman having difficulties with the Base Militar because Calligeris has permitted unfriendly, pro-regular army officers to be put in subordinate positions in base. Niederheitman advised he intends to remove these officers as soon as possible.

18. Guardia de Honor under command of Col Francisco Oliva, [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] it doubtful that Colonel Oliva could control Guardia de Honor since majority officers are regular army.

19. CEUA picked soldiers have been infiltrated into both Guardia de Honor and Base Militar as reported by GUAT 185. These soldiers are expected oppose any efforts on part regular army against govt or against liberation army.

20. Colonel Antonio Estrada, Commander Zacapa zone, has promised full collaboration.

21. Garrisons of Coban and Quetzaltenango considered as [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. He making efforts gain control Quiche and Jutiapa garrisons.

22. Said ESODIC 1 was his man.

23. Inferred he will send representative discuss matters with [*name not declassified*] who displeased with Calligeris.

24. Advised that Trujillo has offered arms but only if ODYOKE approves.

25. [*name not declassified*] requested Bannister forward this info without delay and, knowing of Calligeris request for funds ostensibly for liberation army and confidential expenses, asked that 100,000 be given him and not Calligeris. [*name not declassified*] stated that continued existence for next six weeks of liberation army is only guarantee that anti Commies and cause will not be eliminated through army coup followed by massive retaliation on part of army and Commie elements.<sup>6</sup>

26. Meanwhile have picked up statements allegedly made by Calligeris in confidence indicating he trying win over regular army by inferences he will rebuff Americans. Obvious that he cutting ground out from under National Committee of Defense Against Communism. *Comment:* Feel serious trouble inevitable unless Calligeris gets together with [*name not declassified*] on loyal (rcvd unloyal) basis, eliminates highly suspicious, opportunistic elements from positions as advisers, and adopts more realistic political line. Request advice soonest concerning Calligeris and [*name not declassified*] request for funds. Though funds could be delivered to [*name not declassified*] without difficulty believe that, if decided give to him, better this should be done through bank in PBPRIME rather than through Station.<sup>7</sup> Believe necessary that liberation army be maintained during this critical period when political tension rapidly reaching explosive point.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Handwritten notations in the margin next to this paragraph read "out."

<sup>7</sup> The previous two sentences are enclosed in a hand-drawn box and "out" is written in the margin.

<sup>8</sup> A handwritten note in the margin next to this sentence reads: "comment."

## 286. Editorial Note

By the beginning of September 1954 all the major documentary sources in Guatemala, including the Foreign Ministry and the Communist Party, had been explored, but few incriminating documents were found. The Station in Guatemala concluded: "All sources agreed Commies and govt. implicated officials either destroyed or personally took out damaging documents. For example, Calligeris advised all Army G-2 files burned, which included *Alfhem* correspondence." (Telegram 290 to the CIA, September 5, 1954; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 168, Folder 7. See also memorandum dated September 3; *ibid.*, Folder 10)

According to a Summary Progress Report dated September 28: "The PBHISTORY team reviewed more than 500,000 documents, not including several hundred thousand duplicate copies and illegible or semi-destroyed papers and masses of Communist propaganda, books, leaflets, and magazines." But of that number, only 2,095 were duplicated and a further 50,000 microfilmed. While considering the overall mission a success, the report admitted that "very few" "Communist damaging" documents had been found. (Report attached to dispatch HGG-A-1375 from the Chief of Station in Guatemala to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, October 1; *ibid.*)

Exploitation of the documents included their release to the press. The documents offered were printed by an "unusually cooperative" Guatemalan press, but "the editors made little embellishment of even the most provocative documents, unless suggestions, captions or stories written by the KUGOWN officer went with the photostatic copy." (*Ibid.*) Attempts to publicize the findings throughout Latin America, however, were unsatisfactory. The report noted that only one news service had even carried the initial press release by the Minister of Propaganda. The others "felt the story was not 'spot' news, and consequently did not value it to the point of cable traffic." (*Ibid.*) The conclusion reached was that the bulk of the documents "may be of value for research study." (Memorandum, September 3; *ibid.*)

287. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 12, 1975.

SUBJECT

CIA's Role in the Overthrow of Arbenz

In August 1953, the Operations Coordinating Board directed CIA to assume responsibility for operations against the Arbenz regime. Appropriate authorization was issued to permit close and prompt cooperation with the Departments of Defense, State and other Government agencies in order to support the Agency in this task. The plan of operations called for cutting off military aid to Guatemala, increasing aid to its neighbors, exerting diplomatic and economic pressure against Arbenz and attempts to subvert and or defect Army and political leaders, broad scale psychological warfare and paramilitary actions. During the period August through December 1953 a CIA staff was assembled and operational plans were prepared.

Following are the specific operational mechanisms utilized by the Agency in the overall missions against the Arbenz government:

a. Paramilitary Operations. Approximately 85 members of the Castillo Armas group received training in Nicaragua. Thirty were trained in sabotage, six as shock troop leaders and 20 others as support-type personnel. Eighty-nine tons of equipment were prepared. The support of this operation was staged inside the borders of Honduras and Nicaragua. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] There were an estimated 250 men in Honduras and El Salvador for use as shock troops and specialists, outside of the training personnel that had been sent to Nicaragua.

b. Air Operations. The planning for providing air operational support was broken down into three phases; i.e. the initial stockpiling of equipment; the delivering of equipment to advance bases by black flight; and the aerial resupply of troops in the field. Thirty days prior to D-day, a fourth phase, fighter support, was initiated. There were approximately 80 missions flown during the 14–29 June 1954 period, by various type aircraft such as C-47's, F-47's and Cessnas which were used to discharge cargo, distribute propaganda and for strafing and bombing missions.

c. Clandestine Communications. A clandestine radio broadcasting station was established in Nicaragua. The purpose of these broadcasts was to intimidate members of the Communist Party and public officials

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 153, Folder 3. Secret.

who were sympathetic to the Communist cause. The radio station, prior to D-day, broadcasted programs on why they were on the air; dramatized examples of Communist tyranny; the ideologies and aims of the Liberation Movement and what effect was intended vis-à-vis each individual who was listening; an aggressive program outlining the activities which would ultimately bring down the Communist threat, etc.

d. Q Program. The objective was spreading responsibility for the operation throughout as many Latin American countries as possible in order to lessen the impact of United States participation.

e. Indigenous agent radio operator training program. This included 13 radio operators, including seven residents and six tactical, and one cryptographer who were trained in Nicaragua from 6 March–9 June 1954.

One of the propaganda ploys was to fabricate reports of Soviet arms deliveries to Guatemala by submarine, and then arranging to have a CIA planted cache of Soviet arms discovered and publicized. The mythical arms deliveries were superseded by the real thing when a ship carrying 2,000 tons of Czech weapons and ammunition arrived. This shipment created an international furor and provided clinching proof of what had been the main CIA propaganda theme, that Guatemala under Arbenz had become a Soviet satellite.

The results of the operational efforts described above were positive, however key Guatemalan Army officers wanted either official assurance of U.S. Government support or an overt military incident which would demonstrate Castillo's power and determination. On 1 June the Arbenz regime began a wave of arrests which obliterated Castillo's intelligence nets and action assets inside the country and on 8 June a 30-day suspension of all constitutional liberties was announced.

On 17–18 June five shock teams trained by the Agency crossed into Guatemala. The turning point came on 25 June when Castillo's forces repulsed a counterattack and later bombed a fortress in Guatemala City.

On 27 June Arbenz resigned and turned the government over to another Communist, Carlos Enrique Diaz, chief of the armed forces. Following the resignation the Chief of Station and another agency officer held a negotiating session with Guatemalan Army officers. The Agency representatives argued that Diaz was unacceptable [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Following assurances from the U.S. Ambassador that Monzon was indeed the U.S. choice, those present agreed that Monzon would be the head of a junta. The agreement soon broke down when Diaz doublecrossed Monzon by appointing him as Minister of Government while Diaz retained his position. Diaz caved in following bombings by F-47's.

Negotiations took place between Castillo and Monzon, President of the Junta, who agreed to accept Castillo as a member. In early July

Castillo became President of the Junta with Major Enrique Oliva and Monzon as the other two members.

The budget allocation for this activity was \$3,000,000 and the actual cost, less recoverable assets, was just under the original allocation.

### *Background*

It was considered that Guatemala represented a serious threat to hemispheric solidarity and to U.S. security in the Caribbean area. Guatemala was ruled by anti-U.S. President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman who was elected to office as a result of fraudulent elections in November 1950. Arbenz was supported by a leftist coalition government, with all key positions below the cabinet level thoroughly controlled by a Communist-dominated bureaucracy. The country also maintained the balance of military power in Central America through the army of 7,000 men, the well-trained, hard-core element of which was stationed in Guatemala City. Because of this Communist influence and a hardening anti-U.S. policy, on the part of Guatemala, which was targeted directly against American interests in the country, the U.S. Government was forced to adopt a somewhat firmer attitude toward Guatemala. Based on NSC 144/1 and PSB policy guidance, the Agency placed top operational priority in an effort to reduce and possibly eliminate Communist power in Guatemala.

### BUDGET SUMMARY

Psychological Warfare and Political Action	\$	270,000
Subversion		250,000
Intelligence Operations		150,000
Maintenance of present cadre (8 months)		160,000
Expansion of cadre to 500		60,000
Arms and Equipment		400,000
Operation of Nicaraguan training center		100,000
Support of internal organization (estimate)		150,000
Transportation, storage and travel (estimate)		85,000
Transport Aircraft and maintenance		800,000
Current liabilities		10,000
Contingencies		<u>565,000</u>
	\$	3,000,000

# Index

## References are to document numbers

- Acheson, Dean, 19, 31, 33  
Agrarian reform. *See* Land reform program.  
Air Force, U.S., 120, 159  
Aldana Sandoval, Col. Carlos, 2, 5  
Alfaro, Adolfo, 122  
Allen, Harry H., 73  
Alvarado, Humberto, 130  
Alvarado Jerez, Carlos, 130  
Alvarez Vidaurre, 223  
American Federation of Labor (AFL), 255  
Anderson, Robert B., 195  
Anti-communism (*see also* Psychological warfare):  
    Catholic Church, 6, 131, 133, 134, 136  
    CIA estimates, 2, 133  
    National Intelligence Estimates, 6  
Anti-Communist Party of Guatemala, 2  
Arana, Col. Francisco, 6, 148  
Arbenz, María Vilanova de, 77  
Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo (*see also* Arbenz Guzmán overthrow plans; Guatemalan political situation; Land reform program):  
    Departure, 252  
    On Guatemalan Army, 184  
    Illness rumors, 2, 5  
    Political orientation, 2, 6, 27, 33, 130  
Arbenz Guzmán overthrow plans (*see also* Operation PBFORTUNE; Operation PBSUCCESS):  
    Opposition groups, 57  
    Overviews, 1, 3  
    Simmons, 7, 10, 14  
Arenas, José Luis, 106  
Ares y Valladares, Manuel José, 57  
Arévalo, Juan José, 6, 27, 33, 35  
Argentina, 37  
Armstrong, W. Park, 34  
Army. *See* Guatemalan Army.  
Ascham, Robert A. *See* Dulles, Allen.  
Assassination plans:  
    Operation PBFORTUNE, 5, 20  
    Operation PBSUCCESS, 113, 119, 131, 151, 164, 166, 167  
Baez Bone, Alberto, 122  
Baez Bone, Luis, 122  
Baldanza, Stephen, 236  
Baldocchi, Archie, 93  
Balmer, Gen., 74  
Bannister, Earl D., 173, 193, 210, 226, 266, 284, 285  
Barnes, Tracy:  
    Operation PBSUCCESS, 135  
    Air support, 215  
    Defection program, 191  
    Psychological warfare, 169, 171  
    Review briefing, 281  
    State Department discussions, 113, 116  
    Toriello statements, 49  
    U.S. military aid to Central American countries, 50  
Barrios Klee, Waldemar, 130  
Barrios Peña, Col. Roberto, 56, 57, 106  
Barrios Solares, Col. Jorge, 57, 285  
Barzanallana, Col., 153  
Bernardino, Félix W., 18  
Bernau, Phyllis, 189, 195  
Berry, J. Lampton:  
    Operation PBSUCCESS, 44, 113  
    Peurifoy briefing, 45  
    Toriello statements, 49, 50, 53  
    U.S. military aid to Central American countries, 50  
Bissell, Richard M.:  
    Operation PBSUCCESS, 253  
    Air support, 211, 213, 215, 232, 233  
    Castillo Armas military action, 214  
    Contact reports, 135  
    U.S. military aid to Nicaragua, 180  
Bolivia, 37  
Brazil, 37  
Bruce, David K. E., 21, 22, 23, 26  
Bull, Lt. Gen. Harold R., 132  
Burkett, Maj., 20  
Burnette, Cyrus E., 173  
Cabell, Gen. Charles P.:  
    Operation PBSUCCESS, 40, 44, 52, 54, 206, 265, 266  
    U.S. military aid to Central American countries, 56  
Cabot, John M., 61, 63, 72, 73, 77, 79  
Cadick, Irving G. (pseudonym), 164, 201, 247, 259  
Calligeris, John H. *See* Castillo Armas, Carlos.  
Canessa, Roberto, 130, 223

- Carias Andino, Tiburcio, 7  
 Carroll, John, 9  
 Casadei, Giuseppe, 130  
 Casado, Marciano, 4  
 Castillo Armas, Carlos (*see also*  
   Castillo Armas organization;  
   Operation PBFORTUNE;  
   Operation PBSUCCESS):  
   Bernardino meeting, 18  
   CIA estimates, 1, 2, 41, 51, 133, 148  
   CIA reports, 3, 4, 7, 62  
   Invasion/revolt plans (June, 1953),  
     38  
   Operation PBFORTUNE termination,  
     24, 25, 30  
   Post-operation political situation,  
     282, 284, 285  
   Somoza meetings, 16, 76  
   U.S. communications, 84, 88, 106,  
     107, 109, 135  
 Castillo Armas organization (*see also*  
   Operation PBSUCCESS):  
   CIA estimates, 133  
   CIA reports, 62  
   Guatemalan Army and, 38, 47, 199  
   Military capabilities, 32, 38, 47, 51  
   Psychological warfare and, 51, 61  
   United Fruit Company support for,  
     57  
 Castillo Flores, Leonardo, 130  
 Catholic Church:  
   Anti-communism, 6, 33, 131, 133,  
     134, 136  
   CIA estimates, 51  
   Missionary assignment to  
     Guatemala, 9  
   Psychological warfare and, 32, 100,  
     136  
 Cazali Avila, César Augusto, 130  
 Centeno, Carlos. *See* Castillo Armas,  
   Carlos.  
 CEUA, 80, 285  
*Ceuage*, 61  
 Charnaud MacDonald, Augusto, 27,  
   130, 162, 202  
 Chávez, Maj., 7  
 Chávez Nackman, Ricardo, 2  
 Chinchilla, Carlos Samayoa, 57  
 Cifuentes, Carlos, 285  
 CLOWER, 264  
 Cobar, Oscar, 285  
 Committee for the Liberation of  
   Guatemala, 61  
 Communist activities in Guatemala (*see*  
   *also* Guatemalan political situation):  
   CIA estimates, 2, 27, 32, 33, 130, 132,  
     133  
   Operation PBHISTORY, 264, 283, 286  
   Schoenfeld reports, 34, 60  
   United Fruit Company and, 2, 7  
 Conde, Oscar, 142  
 Contreras, Francisco, 93, 130  
 Corcoran, Thomas (*see also* United Fruit  
   Company), 9, 20, 178, 279  
 Córdova Cerna, Juan, 4, 13  
 Coronado Lira, Luis, 284, 285  
 Costa Rica:  
   Exile groups in, 2  
   Nicaraguan relations with, 140  
   Political situation, 31, 56  
   U.S. military aid to Central American  
     countries and, 37  
 Cowden, 101  
 Cruz, Col. José Luis, 257, 263  
 Delgado, 88, 90, 92, 148  
 Dennison, Rear Adm. Robert L., 2  
 Díaz, Col. Carlos Enrique, 131, 193  
   CIA estimates, 4, 133, 252  
   Díaz/Sánchez/Monzón junta,  
     249, 255, 256  
 Dominican Republic, 1, 16, 17, 18, 31,  
   285  
 DTFROGS. *See* El Salvador.  
 Duarte, Lt. Guillermo, 122  
 Dubois, Jules, 145, 147  
 Dubois, Col. Mauricio, 257  
 Dulles, Allen:  
   Communist activities in Guatemala,  
     132, 133  
   Guatemalan constitutional guarantee  
     suspension, 174  
   Guatemalan Friendship Society, 182  
   Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms pur-  
     chases, 150, 156, 158  
   Operation PBFORTUNE, 12, 13, 20,  
     21, 22, 23, 26  
   Operation PBSUCCESS:  
     Air support, 203, 204, 206, 208, 217,  
       222, 225  
     Assassination plans, 164  
     Authorization for, 52, 75  
     British freighter attack, 252  
     Budget, 54  
     Castillo Armas military action, 214,  
       220, 229, 230, 241



- Dulles, Allen—*Continued*  
 Operation PBSUCCESS—*Continued*  
 Chief of Station instructions, 78, 94  
 Closing, 278  
 ERRATIC role, 235, 242  
 Guatemalan Army defection program, 177, 179, 186, 188, 200, 204, 220  
 Guatemalan government demonstration and, 198  
 Operation PBHISTORY, 264  
 Pre-D-Day action proposals, 161, 183  
 Program, 66, 67  
 Progress reports, 175  
 Review briefing, 281  
 Security compromises, 85, 94  
 State Department discussions, 72, 116  
 United Fruit Company and, 245, 248  
 Victory congratulations, 238, 265, 266  
 Operation WASHTUB, 144, 147  
 Political situation in Guatemala, 234, 260  
 Air support and, 251  
 Castillo Armas role, 247, 250, 267, 272  
 Díaz role, 244, 250  
 Díaz/Sánchez/Monzón junta, 255, 263  
 Monzón/Cruz/Dubois junta, 258, 261, 263, 267  
 Nicaraguan position, 271  
 United Fruit Company anti-trust suit, 196  
 U.S.-Guatemalan relations, 36, 53, 70  
 Economic sanctions, 36, 66, 189  
 U.S. military aid to Central American countries, 66
- Dulles, John Foster, 187, 261, 273  
 Economic sanctions on Guatemala, 189  
 Operation PBSUCCESS, 72, 116, 195, 252  
 United Fruit Company anti-trust suit, 196
- Dunbar, Jerome C., 277  
 Communist activities in Guatemala, 130  
 Operation PBSUCCESS, 76, 78, 94, 101, 112, 176  
 Psychological warfare, 136, 155, 181
- DYMAROON, 14, 19
- Earman, J. S., 2  
 Ecuador, 172  
 Edson, Gen., 20  
 Edwards, Col., 42  
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 77, 196  
 El Salvador:  
 Communist activities, 130  
 Exile groups in, 2  
 Guatemalan relations with, 27, 184  
 Operation PBSUCCESS, 115, 126, 230, 261, 263, 267  
 State Department paper, 37  
 U.S. military aid to, 47, 50  
 General Plan of Action on, 51  
 JCS approval, 59, 61, 63, 66  
 Proposals, 41  
 State Department and, 37, 77
- ERRATIC, 117, 230, 235, 242  
 ESAGE, 222  
 ESCOBILLA, 284, 285  
 ESCONSON, 222  
 ESGAIN, 285  
 ESODIC-1, 285  
 Espe, Adm., 121  
 ESPERANCE, 222  
 ESQUIRE, 157, 175, 177, 185, 186, 193, 210, 222, 284  
 ESSENCE, 136, 260, 284  
 Esterline, Jacob D.:  
 Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms purchases, 128  
 Operation PBSUCCESS, 90, 103, 115, 140, 243
- ESTIMATOR, 222  
 Estrada, Col. Antonio, 285  
 Estrada de la Hoz, Julio, 6, 130
- Fanjul, Roberto, 27  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 66  
 Figueres, José, 31, 56  
 Fisher, 57  
 Fisher, John W., 132  
 Flinn, Dennis, 113  
 Flores Amador, Armando, 130  
 Flores, Lic. Victor Ramiro, 57  
 Fortuny, José Manuel, 33, 34, 130  
 Franco, Maj. Marco Antonio, 130  
 Franco y Franco, Julio, 130
- Galbond, Oliver G. *See* King, Col. J. Caldwell.

- Gálvez, Juan Manuel (*see also* Honduras):  
Operation PBFORTUNE, 7, 13  
Operation PBSUCCESS, 106, 112, 126, 127
- García, Capt. Marco Antonio, 130
- García, Col. Julio Pablo, 57
- García Granados, Jorge, 284
- General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (CGTG), 6, 33, 35, 130
- GIMMICK, 134
- GINSENG, 134
- Girón, Col. Luis A., 133
- Givloch, Kenneth S., 82
- Glejjeses, Piero, 143
- Godoy, Antonio, 242
- Goicolea, Domingo, 285
- Goicolea, Hector, 285
- Greenberg, 39
- Gruson, Sidney, 182
- Guatemalan Army (*see also* Guatemalan Army role in Operation PBSUCCESS):  
Castillo Armas invasion/revolt plans (June 1953) and, 38  
CIA estimates, 51  
National Intelligence Estimates, 6
- Guatemalan Army role in Operation PBSUCCESS (*see also* Alternate leader role and Defection program under Operation PBSUCCESS):  
Air support and, 199, 200, 203, 204, 207, 208, 211, 219  
Arbenz Guzmán loyalty and, 184  
Castillo Armas military action and, 214, 216, 220, 241  
Castillo Armas organization and, 38, 47, 199  
CIA estimates, 132, 133, 220  
Constitutional guarantee suspension and, 174  
Garrison commander shifts and, 32  
Monzón role, 79, 83, 86, 133  
Operation PBSUCCESS timing and, 190  
Page departure, 177, 179  
Page doubts, 165, 173  
Page return, 188, 191, 194  
Peurifoy role, 129, 168  
Pre-D-Day action proposals and, 167  
Psychological warfare and, 141, 181  
Security compromises, 85, 173  
Guatemalan Army role in Operation PBSUCCESS—*Continued*  
Soviet bloc arms purchases and, 156, 184  
U.S. military aid to Central American countries and, 37  
U.S. military missions and, 69, 74, 159
- Guatemalan economic situation, 2, 6, 27, 33
- Guatemalan Friendship Society, 182
- Guatemalan political situation (*see also* Communist activities in Guatemala):  
Castillo Armas role (*see also* Alternate leader role under Operation PBSUCCESS), 269, 270, 272, 273  
Díaz/Sánchez/Monzón junta and, 247, 250  
El Salvador meeting and, 261, 267  
Monzón/Cruz/Dubois junta and, 257, 258  
Nicaraguan position, 271  
Pre-operation plans for future government, 97  
U.S. control, 268  
U.S. good offices request and, 249
- Cessation of hostilities, 259, 260
- CIA estimates, 2, 12, 27, 32, 51
- Constitutional guarantee suspension, 173, 174
- Díaz role, 244, 246, 250, 249, 253, 260
- Díaz/Sánchez/Monzón junta, 256, 249, 250, 255, 263
- El Salvador meeting, 261, 267
- Military revolt (August 1954), 282
- Monzón/Cruz/Dubois junta, 257, 258, 261, 263, 267
- National Intelligence Estimates, 6
- Peurifoy role, 45, 131, 275
- Post-operation, 282, 284, 285
- Pre-operation plans for future government, 96, 97, 111, 163, 185, 223
- Resignation of Arbenz, 256
- U.S. military aid to Central American countries and, 37
- Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms purchases, 128
- Guatemalan Army defection program and, 156, 184
- Intelligence reports, 150, 153
- OAS meeting discussion, 170
- Psychological warfare and, 99, 102, 121

- Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms  
 purchases—*Continued*  
 Sabotage, 150, 154, 158, 162  
 State Department position, 33, 121,  
 170  
 State Department support for United  
 Fruit Company and, 169, 171, 172  
 Willauer role, 152
- Guerra, Virgilio, 130
- Gutiérrez, Víctor Manuel, 33, 130, 131
- Haden, Allen, 237
- Hagerty, James, 273
- Hedden, Stuart, 9, 13, 20, 21, 22, 23
- Hediger, Donald, 55, 61, 63, 115
- Helms, Richard:  
 Operation PBFORTUNE, 7, 15  
 Operation PBSUCCESS, 68, 78  
 U.S. military missions in Guatemala, 69
- Hennig, Col., 132
- Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 189
- Hill, John C., 79
- Hinton, Ralph, 236, 237
- Hirsch, Richard, 60
- Holland, Henry F.:  
 Appointment, 113  
 Communist activities in Guatemala,  
 132  
 Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms pur-  
 chases, 121, 170, 172  
 Operation PBSUCCESS, 124, 170, 172,  
 195, 272
- Honduras:  
 Communist activities, 32, 130  
 Operation PBFORTUNE, 7, 13  
 Operation PBSUCCESS, 106, 112, 115,  
 126, 127, 218  
 Political situation, 56, 135  
 U.S. ambassador, 50, 53  
 U.S. military aid to, 47  
 General Plan of Action on, 51  
 Intelligence activities and, 120  
 JCS approval, 59, 61, 63, 66  
 Proposals, 41  
 State Department and, 37, 77
- Hurtado, Charles, 237
- Ibarra Mayorga, Francisco, 122
- Inter-American Peace Committee  
 (IAPC), 221
- International Railways of Central  
 America (IRCA), United Fruit  
 Company control, 6
- Jerez de Fortuny, María, 130
- JMBLUG. *See* Peurifoy, John E.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 58, 59, 61, 63,  
 66
- Joyce, Robert P., 21, 22
- JULEP, 3
- Kennedy, Paul, 142
- King, Col. J. Caldwell:  
 Communist activities in Guatemala, 2,  
 94  
 Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms pur-  
 chases, 121, 128  
 Operation PBFORTUNE, 18, 20, 21,  
 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29  
 Operation PBSUCCESS:  
 Authorization for, 52, 54, 75  
 Chief of Station instructions, 55, 78,  
 94  
 Communications, 82, 95  
 Defection program, 118  
 Field case officer discussions, 46  
 Guatemalan accusations, 114  
 Honduran support, 112  
 Jurisdictional issues, 81  
 Nicaraguan support, 76  
 Security compromises, 101, 103, 108  
 State Department discussions, 72,  
 79, 113, 116  
 U.S. aid, 41  
 U.S.—Castillo Armas coordination,  
 107  
 U.S. military missions in Guate-  
 mala and, 77  
 U.S. personnel, 42, 44, 68, 72
- Peurifoy briefing, 45
- Psychological warfare, 80, 142
- United Fruit Company anti-trust suit,  
 279
- U.S.—Guatemalan relations:  
 Economic sanctions, 71, 72  
 Toriello statements, 49, 50  
 U.S. military missions in  
 Guatemala, 69, 77  
 U.S. military aid to Central American  
 countries, 37, 50, 51, 72
- KMFLUSH. *See* Nicaragua.
- K-Program. *See* Defection program  
*under* Operation PBSUCCESS;  
 Guatemalan Army role in  
 Operation PBSUCCESS.
- Krieg, William L., 79, 83, 86
- Kubes, 86

- KUGOWN. *See* Psychological warfare.  
Kyes, 56, 58, 66
- Labor movement, 163  
CIA estimates, 6, 135  
Communist activities and, 2, 6, 33,  
130, 132  
Defection program, 118  
Land reform program, 12, 27, 34, 35, 97,  
111  
Communist activities and, 130  
United Fruit Company and, 39, 49, 50  
Langevin, Paul D. *See* Phillips, David  
Atlee.
- LCPANGS. *See* Costa Rica.  
Leddy, Raymond G.:  
Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms pur-  
chases, 172  
Operation PBSUCCESS, 42, 44, 77, 113  
Toriello statements, 49, 50  
U.S. military aid to Central American  
countries, 50, 56, 58, 59, 61
- LIONIZER, 80  
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 236  
Lugton, Stephen R., 82, 112  
Luna, Carlos A., 57  
Lynade, Pinckney E. *See* Bissell,  
Richard M.
- Magoffin, Francis D., 140, 144, 147  
Mallek, Franklin D., 223  
Mann, Thomas C., 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 42,  
44  
Mara, Col. Neil, 11, 14, 31  
Marmol, Miguel, 130  
Marroquín Rojas, Clemente, 133  
Martínez, Maj. Alfonso, 27, 111, 130  
Soviet bloc arms purchases, 99, 102,  
153  
Martínez Del Rosal, Gabriel, 285  
Martínez Reyes, Juan, 122  
Matthews, H. Freeman, 23  
Meany, George, 255  
Mendoza, Lt. Guillermo, 285  
Mendoza, Oscar, 4  
Mexico, 2, 29, 37, 182  
Military. *See* Guatemalan Army;  
Guatemalan Army role in  
Operation PBSUCCESS.  
Miller, Edward G., 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 32  
Montenegro Paniagua, Carlos, 224  
Montes, Col. Rivas, 32  
Montgomery, Joe, 279
- Monzón, Col. Elfejo:  
CIA estimates, 133  
Operation PBFORTUNE, 4  
Operation PBSUCCESS, 79, 83, 86  
Díaz/Sánchez/Monzón junta, 249,  
250, 255, 256, 263  
Monzón/Cruz/Dubois junta, 257,  
258, 261, 263, 267
- Morales, Col. José Luis, 130  
Morazán, Francisco, 32  
Morgan, George A., 40  
Mullen, Maj. Gen. Charles, 115  
Murphy, Edmund, 236, 237
- Nash, 56  
National Intelligence Estimates:  
NIE-62, "Present Political Situation in  
Guatemala and Possible  
Developments During 1952," 6  
NIE-70, "Conditions and Trends in  
Latin America Affecting US  
Security," 34  
NIE-84, "Probable Developments in  
Guatemala," 37, 47, 51, 132, 133  
National Security Council (NSC):  
NSC 144, "U.S. Policy With Respect to  
Latin America," 36, 51  
United Fruit Company anti-trust suit,  
196
- Nicaragua (*see also* Somoza, Anastasio):  
Communist activities, 130  
Costa Rican relations with, 140  
Duarre affair, 137  
Guatemala invasion/revolt plans, 11,  
14, 19, 32  
Guatemalan post-operation political  
situation, 285  
Operation PBFORTUNE:  
Security compromises, 24, 27  
Support for, 1, 7, 12, 17  
Operation PBSUCCESS, support for,  
32, 43, 46, 115, 271  
Air support and, 209  
Castillo Armas-Somoza meetings, 76  
Covert communication, 105  
Guatemalan international appeals  
and, 218  
Psychological warfare and, 110  
Security compromises, 92, 101, 103  
Termination proposals and, 127  
Operation WASHTUB (Soviet bloc  
arms discovery), 143, 144, 145,  
146, 147, 155

Nicaragua—*Continued*

- U.S. military aid to, 47, 50, 72, 180
  - General Plan of Action on, 51
  - JCS approval, 58, 59, 61, 63, 66
  - Negotiations, 56
  - Operation PBSUCCESS victory and, 276
  - Proposals, 41
  - State Department and, 37, 77
- Niederheitman, Col. Ernesto, 285
- Octubre*, 2
- ODACID. *See* Embassy personnel roles under Operation PBSUCCESS; Peurifoy, John E.
- ODUNIT. *See* Air Force, U.S.
- Oliva, Col. Francisco, 4, 285
- Ontrich, Matthew H., 125, 126, 137, 248, 270
- Operation PBFORTUNE (*see also* Operation PBSUCCESS), 2, 12
  - Assassination plans, 5, 19
  - Background, 2, 4
  - Chronology, 22
  - CIA plans, 7, 8
  - CIA report, 20
  - Dominican Republic support, 1, 16, 17, 18
  - Honduran support, 7, 12
  - Nicaraguan support, 1, 7, 12, 16
  - Psychological warfare, 7, 14
  - Security compromises, 15, 24, 26
  - Simmons invasion/revolt plans and, 10
  - State Department and, 1, 21, 23, 24
  - Truman administration discussions, 1
  - U.S. aid, 12, 13, 14, 19
  - U.S. termination, 1, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30
- Operation PBHISTORY, 264, 283, 286
- Operation PBSUCCESS (*see also* Castillo Armas organization; Guatemalan Army role in Operation PBSUCCESS; Psychological warfare):
  - Air support, 206, 209, 216, 251, 256
  - Alternate leader role and, 193, 199, 200, 204, 208, 210, 213
  - Authorization, 215, 217, 219, 233
  - Government reactions and, 229
  - Guatemalan Army defection program and, 199, 200, 203, 204, 207, 208, 211, 219
  - Guatemalan Army reactions, 226
  - Operational review, 274

Operation PBSUCCESS—*Continued*

- Air support—*Continued*
  - Peurifoy position, 208, 227, 232
  - Pilots, 212, 233
  - Results, 222, 225, 226
- Alternate leader role, 185, 234, 243
  - Air support and, 193, 199, 200, 204, 208, 210, 213
  - Embassy statement proposal, 205
  - Guatemalan government demonstration and, 198, 199
  - Negotiations, 186
  - Page position, 177
  - Policy guidance, 185
  - Timing and, 197
- Arbenz Guzmán departure, 252
- Assassination plans, 113, 119, 131, 151, 164, 166, 167
- Authorization for, 40, 52, 54, 66, 75
- British freighter attack, 252
- Budget, 40, 51, 54, 64, 115, 287
- Cadick field command, 201
- Campesino role, 111, 192
- Castillo Armas arrival, 262
- Castillo Armas military action, 202
  - Government reactions, 229
  - Guatemalan Army response, 214, 216, 220, 241
  - Operational review, 274
  - Peurifoy position, 227
  - Psychological warfare and, 224, 245
  - Salvadoran reactions, 230
- Castillo Armas military capabilities, 32, 38, 47, 51
- Castillo Armas "moving" report, 195
- Chief of Station instructions, 55, 78, 94
- CIA responsibility assumption, 287
- Closing, 278
- Communications, 82, 84, 95, 135, 274
- Contact reports, 135
- Defection program (*see also* Alternate leader role *above*), 51, 111, 115, 116, 118, 129, 168
- Directives summary, 63
- Embassy personnel roles, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129, 135, 137, 168, 205
- ERRATIC role, 117, 230, 235, 242
- Field case officer discussions, 46
- General Plan of Action, 51, 52, 54, 84
- Guatemalan accusations, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 93, 114, 133
- Guatemalan government demonstration and, 198, 199

- Operation PBSUCCESS—*Continued*  
 Guatemalan internal support, 47, 46, 48, 77, 84  
 Guatemalan international appeals, 172, 218, 221, 236, 237  
 Honduran support, 106, 112, 115, 126, 127, 218  
 International society formation proposal, 52  
 Jurisdictional issues, 81  
 Leaflet drop proposals, 131, 137, 138, 160, 167, 170  
 Liberation committee proposal, 116  
 Meany letter, 254  
 Media reactions, 221, 245  
 Military planning, 61, 84, 133  
 Nicaraguan-Costa Rican relations and, 140  
 Nicaraguan support, 32, 43, 46, 115  
   Air support and, 209  
   Castillo Armas-Somoza meetings, 76  
   Covert communication, 105  
   Guatemalan international appeals and, 218  
   Psychological warfare and, 110  
   Security compromises, 92, 101, 103  
   Termination proposals and, 127  
 Operational review, 274  
 Operation PBHISTORY and, 264, 283, 286  
 Peurifoy reports, 131  
 Pre-D-Day action proposals, 131, 137, 151, 161, 176, 183  
 Program, 65, 66, 67, 68  
 Progress reports, 61, 133, 167, 175  
 Proposals, 41  
 Review briefing, 281  
 Salvadoran support, 115, 126  
 Security clearances, 72  
 Security compromises:  
   Castillo Armas military action and, 202  
   Guatemalan Army defection program and, 85, 173  
   Guatemalan White Paper and, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 93, 94  
   Seekford, 93, 93, 101, 108  
   SEMANTIC, 175, 176  
   Trinidad Oliva arrest, 98  
   U.S.—Castillo Armas communications, 7, 107, 109
- Operation PBSUCCESS—*Continued*  
 State Department discussions, 42, 44, 72, 77, 79, 113, 115, 116, 170, 172  
 Termination proposals, 127, 133  
 Timing, 47, 46, 51, 110, 190, 197, 274  
 United Fruit Company and, 97, 163, 178, 240, 245, 248  
 U.S.—Castillo Armas communications, 84, 88, 106, 107, 109, 135  
 U.S. civilian evacuation, 228, 239  
 U.S. exposure concerns, 113, 115, 133, 160  
 U.S. good offices request, 250, 249  
 U.S. military missions and, 77, 135, 139  
 U.S. personnel, 42, 44, 51, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 72  
 Victory congratulations, 238, 265, 266  
 Ydígoras Fuentes role, 104
- Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), 58, 59, 61
- Operation WASHTUB, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 155
- Ordóñez Paniagua, Ramiro, 2
- Ordway. *See* Cabell, Gen. Charles P.
- Oreliano Cardona, Manuel, 98
- Orellana, Manuel, 285
- Organization of American States (OAS):  
 Caracas conference, 87, 109, 113, 115  
 Ecuadoran position, 172  
 Guatemalan appeals, 218, 221, 237  
 Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms purchase discussions, 170  
 Guatemalan White Paper and, 89  
 Sanctions proposals, 133, 172  
 U.S. conference threats, 51  
 U.S. military aid to Central American countries and, 37
- Organized labor. *See* Labor movement.
- Osorio, Oscar (*see also* El Salvador), 126, 230
- Otilio Hasbun, Manuel, 130
- Page, Graham L., 129, 165, 168, 173  
 Defection program overview, 118  
 Departure, 177, 179  
 Return, 188, 191, 194
- Paiz, Julio Federico, 62
- Paiz Herrera, Federico. *See* Paiz, Julio Federico.
- Panama, 31
- PANCHO. *See* Castillo Armas, Carlos.

- Parinello de León, Col. Enrique, 133  
 Paz Tejada, Col. Carlos, 2, 4, 27, 130  
 PBFORTUNE. *See* Operation PBFORTUNE.  
 PBSUCCESS. *See* Operation PBSUCCESS.  
 Pedro, Don, 104  
 Pellecer, Carlos Manuel, 130, 131  
 Pereira, Francisco, 130  
 Pérez, Col. Manuel de Jesús, 285  
 Peurifoy, John E.:  
   Appointment, 44  
   Briefing, 45  
   Guatemalan political situation, 131  
   Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms purchases, 150, 152, 158, 162  
 Operation PBSUCCESS:  
   Air support, 208, 227, 232  
   Castillo Armas military action, 220  
   Defection program, 118, 129, 168, 208, 220  
   Good offices request, 250, 249  
   Leaflet drop proposals, 131, 137  
   Media reactions, 221  
   Role in, 129, 137, 266  
   State Department discussions, 79  
   U.S. civilian evacuation, 228  
   U.S. military missions in Guatemala and, 139  
   Victory congratulations, 266  
 Political situation in Guatemala, 275, 284  
   Castillo Armas role, 270  
   Díaz meeting, 244, 250  
   Díaz/Sánchez/Monzón junta, 256, 256, 263  
   Monzón/Cruz/Dubois junta, 257, 263  
 Pivall, Vincent C., 103, 274  
 Playdon, William. *See* Barnes, Tracy.  
 Ponce, Gen. Federico, 6  
 Prios Socorates, Carlos, 32  
 Propaganda. *See* Psychological warfare.  
 Psychological warfare (PW):  
   Cabot speech (Oct., 1953) and, 61, 63  
   Castillo Armas military action and, 224, 245  
   Castillo Armas organization and, 51, 61  
   Catholic Church and, 32, 100, 136  
   Díaz/Sánchez/Monzón junta and, 247  
   Directives summary, 63  
   Guatemalan Army defection program and, 141, 181  
   Psychological warfare—*Continued*  
     Guatemalan imperialism accusations and, 169, 171, 172  
     Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms purchases and, 99, 102, 121  
     Guatemalan suppression, 142  
     Guatemalan White Paper and, 89  
     Intra-program conflicts, 80  
     Operational review, 274  
     Operation PBFORTUNE, 7, 14  
     Operation PBSUCCESS assets, 133  
     Operation PBSUCCESS overview, 32, 51  
     Operation WASHTUB and, 155  
     Policy guidance, 181  
     Progress reports, 61, 110  
     SHERWOOD program, 110, 115, 135, 171  
     Toriello statements and, 49  
     U.S.—Castillo Armas communications, 88, 109  
     USIA circular telegrams, 236, 237  
     USIA report, 280  
   Putzeys, Guillermo, 57  
 PW. *See* Psychological warfare.  
 Raine, Philip, 237  
 Ramírez, Gen., 32  
 Ramírez, Arturo, 2  
 Ramírez, Miguel Angel, 89  
 Razmara, Eliot P., 61  
 Restrepo, Julio. *See* Castillo Armas, Carlos.  
 Revolution of 1944, 6  
 Ríos, Adan Manrique, 285  
 Rivas Montes, Jorge, 89, 122  
 Robertson, William, 115  
 Robleto, Hernán, 122  
 Rogers, Penny, 93  
 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 172  
 Roosevelt, Kermit, 54, 137, 139  
 Rossell y Arellano Monseñor Mariano, 100  
 RUFUS. *See* Castillo Armas, Carlos.  
 SAFFRON-1, 126  
 Saillant, Louis, 2  
 Salamá incident (1953), 1, 10, 41, 51  
 Salazar, Carlos, 285  
 Salazar Liqueens, Enrique, 285  
 Sánchez, 135  
 Sánchez, N., 115  
 Sánchez Barillas, Lt. Col. José Angel, 175  
   Alternate leader role and, 193

- Sánchez Barillas, Lt. Col. José  
 Angel—*Continued*  
 CIA estimates, 133  
 Díaz/Sánchez/Monzón junta, 256,  
 249, 250, 255, 263  
 Junta plans (1952), 4  
 Soviet bloc arms purchases, 150, 153
- Sancho (pseudonym), 118
- Sandoval, Mario, 284, 285
- Saqueda, Raúl, 103
- Sauer, Adm., 20, 23
- Schoenfeld, Rudolf E., 34, 39, 60
- Secaira, 148
- SECANT, 89, 93, 183
- Seekford, Jacob R., 18, 29, 76  
 Psychological warfare, 80  
 Security compromises, 93, 93, 101, 108
- SEMANTIC, 173, 175, 176
- SEQUIN, 92
- Serrano, Adan, 285
- Sevilla Sacassa, Guillermo, 19
- Shannon, 44, 68
- SHERWOOD, 110, 115, 135, 171
- Sierra, Capt. Raúl, 92, 93
- Simmons, Carlos, 1, 7
- SKILLET. *See* Willauer, Whiting.
- SMILAX, 165, 175
- Smith, 51
- Smith, Gen., 9, 42, 44, 49, 70
- Smith, Col. Brad, 74
- Smith, Gen. Walter Bedell, 72
- SOCCER, 129
- Somoza, Anastasio (*see also*  
 Nicaragua):  
 Conspiracy against, 122  
 Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms purchase and, 102  
 Operation PBFORTUNE, 1, 7, 12, 16,  
 17, 24, 27  
 Operation PBSUCCESS, 32, 43, 76, 127  
 Security compromises, 92, 101, 103  
 Operation WASHTUB, 143, 144, 145,  
 146  
 Truman administration discussions,  
 1, 11
- Somoza, Col. Tachito, 16, 24, 26, 75, 92
- Sosa, Carlos, 285
- Soviet bloc (*see also* Guatemalan Soviet  
 bloc arms purchases), 143, 144,  
 145, 146, 147, 155
- Soviet Union, 33, 236, 237
- Spalding, 22
- STANDEL. *See* Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo.
- STANDEL-1, 193, 244, 246, 249, 250, 260,  
 263
- Starke. *See* Smith, Gen. Walter Bedell.
- State Department:  
 Castillo Armas "moving" report, 195  
 Communist activities in Guatemala,  
 132  
 Dulles statement (June 15, 1954), 187  
 Guatemalan imperialism accusations  
 and, 231, 232  
 Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms pur-  
 chases, 121, 153, 170  
 United Fruit Company claims and,  
 169, 171, 172  
 Operation PBFORTUNE, 1, 21, 23, 24  
 Operation PBSUCCESS, 272, 273  
 CIA discussions, 42, 44, 72, 77, 79,  
 113, 115, 116, 170, 172  
 Termination proposals, 127  
 Toriello statements and, 49, 50  
 U.S. military aid to Central American  
 countries, 37, 50, 56, 58, 59, 61,  
 78
- Streibert, Theodore, 236, 237
- Suárez Rivas, Guillermo, 122
- SUMAC, 227, 229, 244
- SUMAC-2. *See* Sánchez Barillas, Lt.  
 Col. José Angel.
- SWALLOW, 168, 173, 175, 194, 210, 251
- Taracena, Eduardo, 284
- Tercero Lacayo, José María, 122
- Tofte, Hans V., 20, 49, 50  
 Operation PBSUCCESS, 47, 46, 52, 54,  
 64, 74
- Toledano, Vicente Lombardo, 2
- Toriello, Guillermo:  
 Acheson meeting, 32  
 Critical statements by, 49, 50  
 As defection target, 116  
 Eisenhower meeting, 77  
 Guatemalan-Salvadoran relations, 184  
 Intervention accusations, 114  
 Peurifoy reports, 131  
 Soviet bloc arms purchases, 169  
 U.S. civilian evacuation, 228
- Toriello, Jorge, 172
- Torres Rivas, Edelberto, 130
- Trinidad Oliva, Maj. Enrique, 98
- Trujillo Molina, Gen. Rafael Leonidas  
 (*see also* Dominican Republic), 16,  
 17, 32, 285
- Truman, Harry S., 11, 14, 19, 31, 127



- Ubico, Jorge, 6, 251
- UFCO. *See* United Fruit Company.
- United Fruit Company, 1, 27, 97, 163
- Anti-trust suit, 196, 279
- Communist activities in Guatemala and, 2, 7
- Guatemalan imperialism accusations and, 231
- Land reform program and, 35, 39, 49, 50
- Operation PBSUCCESS and, 178, 240, 245, 248
- State Department support, 169, 171, 172
- Support for Castillo Armas, 57
- United Nations (UN):
- Guatemalan appeals, 172, 218, 221, 236
- Operation PBFORTUNE and, 19
- Urrutia de León, Col. Luis, 285
- Uruguay, 37
- U.S.-Guatemalan relations:
- Cabot speech (October 1953), 61, 63
- Economic sanctions, 66, 113
- Business leader roles, 52, 61
- Cabot role, 72, 73
- Directives summary, 63
- Monzón interview and, 83
- OAS meeting proposals, 133, 172
- Oil supply, 51, 71, 170, 187, 189
- Peurifoy report, 131
- Proposals, 36, 51
- Senate bill proposal, 189
- Toriello-Acheson meeting, 32
- Toriello statements, 49, 50
- U.S. aid, 51, 163
- U.S. military missions, 69, 70, 74, 77, 135, 139, 159
- U.S. official pressure, 36, 51, 61, 131, 187
- U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 236, 237, 280
- Venezuela, 17, 31
- Vilanova de Arbenz, María Cristina, 27
- Vizcaino, Roberto, 142
- Wardlaw, Andrew B., 79, 83, 86
- Watts, Eric W., 137
- Welch, 31
- Wellbank, Clayton S., 268
- Whelan, 17, 31, 56, 77, 261
- Whiting, Harold S. *See* Wisner, Frank.
- Wieland, 170
- Willauer, Whiting, 53, 123, 124, 125, 126, 135, 137, 152, 261
- Wisner, Frank G.:
- Communist activities in Guatemala, 2, 133
- Guatemalan Friendship Society, 182
- Guatemalan Soviet bloc arms purchases, 121, 152, 158, 170
- Honduras, U.S. relations with, 53, 120, 124
- Operation PBFORTUNE, 12, 20, 23, 29
- Operation PBSUCCESS:
- Air support, 206, 211, 213, 215, 217, 219
- Authorization for, 40, 52, 54, 75
- Campesino role, 192
- Castillo Armas military action, 220
- Contact reports, 135
- Defection program, 118, 168, 191, 220
- Embassy personnel roles, 123, 124, 125
- Leaflet drop proposals, 138, 160, 170
- Media reactions, 221
- Peurifoy-Arbenz Guzmán meeting, 250
- Program, 67
- Progress reports, 133
- Security compromises, 103
- State Department discussions, 113, 116, 170
- Termination proposals, 127
- Timing, 190
- U.S. civilian evacuation, 228, 239
- U.S. personnel, 44
- Victory congratulations, 238, 265, 266
- Peurifoy briefing, 45
- Psychological warfare, 63, 142, 224, 245
- United Fruit Company anti-trust suit, 279
- U.S.-Guatemalan relations, 49, 53, 187
- U.S. military aid to Nicaragua, 180
- U.S. military missions in Guatemala, 69, 70, 135, 139
- Woolson, Peter, 62
- WSHOOFS. *See* Honduras.
- Ydígoras Fuentes, Gen. Miguel, 2, 57, 89, 104, 106, 223
- ZPSECANT, 284
- ZPSEMANTIC, 284, 285

ISBN 0-16-051304-9



9 780160 513046

90000

