Nation and conflict in modern Spain : essays in honor of Stanley G. Payne.

Madison, Wisconsin: Parallel Press, 2008

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NATION and conflict in modern SPAIN

Essays in Honor of Stanley G. Payne

Nation and Conflict in Modern Spain: Essays in Honor of Stanley G. Payne is a collection of original scholarship and reflective essays written by students and colleagues of the distinguished Hispanist. In keeping with Payne's long and varied career, the chapter topics range broadly and cover subjects from anarchism and anticlericalism to counterinsurgency and tourism. Despite the diversity of subject matter, all of the contributors strive to integrate political, material, and cultural factors and to interpret received wisdom with skepticism. The result is a collection bound together by a rich and balanced appreciation for the major events, attitudes, and conflicts that have shaped modern Spanish history.

Nation and Conflict in Modern Spain: Essays in Honor of Stanley G. Payne

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Parallel Press
University of Wisconsin–Madison Libraries
728 State Street
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

http://parallelpress.library.wisc.edu

ISBN 978-1-893311-76-3

Cover image: Carles Fontseré (Colección Fontseré, Barcelona) in *Los años del deseño: La década republicana (1931–1939)* by Eric Satué, page 199.

Design and production: University Communications, University of Wisconsin–Madison

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

Stanley G. Payne

Contributors' Note

This volume is a collection of original scholarship and reflective essays written by students, disciples, and friends of the distinguished Hispanist, Stanley G. Payne. The particular focus is Spain, the national historiography on which Professor Payne left his greatest mark. Chapter topics range broadly; some present focused research, others give synthetic overviews and comparative perspectives. Despite the wide cast of subject matter, all essays are inspired by Professor Payne's approach to modern Spanish history. That is to say, none favors any single historiographical orthodoxy over another. Rather, each contributor strives to balance material, political, and cultural factors, and to interpret received wisdom with skepticism. The result, we hope, is a collection bound together by a rich and balanced appreciation for the major events, attitudes, and conflicts that have shaped modern Spanish history—and a humble tribute to a man whose scholarly breadth, rigor, and originality, and whose kindness, wit, and charisma, have deeply touched all of us.

We thank John Tortorice of the George L. Mosse Program for his enthusiasm and generous support of this project. Additionally, we thank Kenneth Frazier, director of the University of Wisconsin–Madison Libraries, and Elisabeth Owens, manager of Parallel Press, for bringing this volume to fruition. The editors would, furthermore, like to call attention to James Cortada and Sean Perrone for their vital contributions to the making of this book while also expressing our gratitude to all of the other contributors. Last, but not least, we would like to thank the *Fundación Ignacio Larramendi* and *Editorial Actas* for kindly authorizing the reproduction of Colin Winston's chapter, originally published in Stanley G. Payne, ed., *Identidad y nacionalismo en la España contemporánea: el carlismo, 1833–1975* (Madrid, 1996). Subventions from The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History and the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, supported the research for Sean T. Perrone's chapter.

The Contributors

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Introduction

Stanley G. Payne: An Intellectual Biography

Michael Seidman

Stanley Payne is an extraordinary scholar who has produced a body of work whose range and depth cannot fail to impress. His seventeen books focus mostly on the political and diplomatic history of twentieth-century Spain (as do the contributions in the present volume), but two—*A History of Spain and Portugal* and *Spanish Catholicism*—cover two millennia of Iberian history. Moreover, Payne has not concentrated exclusively on the history of the Iberian Peninsula. His work on fascism is a model of European and global comparative history and may be the most important conservative and anti–Marxist interpretation of the fascist phenomena. In the course of writing both Spanish history and what he calls—with some irony—"fascistology," Payne has demonstrated an intellectual sophistication and linguistic cosmopolitanism that includes a command of nearly all the Romance languages plus German and Russian.

These striking accomplishments make it imperative to focus on Payne as an individual, not as a member of any particular group of scholars—whether "cold warriors" or modernization theorists. In other words, contrary to current trends in social and especially cultural history which argue (or rather generally assume) that individuals are determined by their membership in a group based on politics, race, class, gender, religion, or age, I shall concentrate on Payne as an exceptional intellectual. Of course, his modest origins, Protestant upbringing in Texas and California, and development as a white male scholar during the Cold War undoubtedly influenced his work, but certainly did not determine it. Like other creative scholars, Payne combined these and other influences to form an original oeuvre.

Given his remarkable achievements, it might seem petty and presumptuous to disagree with Payne's interpretation of his own work. In response to a question during a March 2005 interview with the British political scientist, Roger Griffin, Payne asserted that *The Spanish Revolution* (1970) constituted a real rupture in his thinking:[1]

> For the [*Spanish*] *Revolution* book, [I] did primary research on the left for the first time. The latter was much more of an eye-opener than any of the research on the right, for I had been raised on the myth of the Republic and of the (at least fundamentally) virtuous left. Discovering that the left, rather than the right, had initiated political violence, both small-scale and large-scale, and was responsible for the initial breakdown of democracy was the most radically new finding of my entire career, and changed my whole outlook. It also meant that my reputation among the left would begin to go into decline.[2]

Instead of seeing *The Spanish Revolution* as a break with his first two books—*Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* (1961) and *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (1967)—I will emphasize their methodological and even ideological continuity. These first volumes

are the key to understanding Payne's contributions to both Spanish and, more broadly, European history.

Falange showed Payne's commitment to what he called a "balanced view" of his subject. Throughout his career, the author has written from a rare but, especially for historians, a desirable professional detachment. Unlike so many of our colleagues, Payne never went "native." *Falange* also anticipated his trenchant critique of the Spanish left. The author did not wait a decade to imply that the left had begun the violence that ultimately led to the civil war. In his first book, he noted that in early November 1933 the Socialists had initiated violent attacks against the Falange. In contrast to Socialist extremism, Payne repeatedly described the CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas) as a "moderate" political grouping. At the same time, he also expressed a deep skepticism of fascist goals. According to Payne, José Antonio forgot that his "creative minority" would be forced to control the "resistant majority only by the ruthless and terroristic exercise of power."[3] Fascists used "demagogy" when they "preached unity and sacrifice as well as social justice and economic readjustment."[4] Their anti-Semitism proved "doubly stupid" both because of the absence of Jews in Spain and their ridiculous reprinting of the fabricated "Protocols of the Elders of Zion."[5] *Falange* showed that Spanish fascism in general, and the Falange in particular, became a tool of Franco and of the enduring oligarchy supporting his regime.

Falange also prefigured Payne's later work on generic fascism. Like other European fascists, Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, a founder of the Spanish party, "yearned for emotional identification with a Spanish proletarian movement, a truly nationalistic workers' revolution."[6] Well before the publication of *The Spanish Revolution*, Payne had taken on progressives and leftists who viewed the fascist phenomena as merely rhetorically revolutionary. Instead, Payne argued that Fascist "nationalist syndicalism"—which, he noted, was hostile to a market economy—was "genuinely" revolutionary. Thus, the leader of the Falange, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, wanted to "nationalize" the Spanish revolutionary Left and disdained José Calvo Sotelo and other wealthy monarchists as advocates of the *ancien régime.*

This analysis in 1961 prefigured Payne's general characterization of fascism in 1979: "Fascist culture, unlike that of the right, was in most cases secular but, unlike that of the left and to some extent of the liberals, was based on vitalism and idealism. . . .The goal of metaphysical idealism and vitalism was the creation of a new man, a new style of culture that achieved both physical and artistic excellence that prized courage, daring, and overcoming of previously established limits in the growth of a superior new culture."[7] Drawing on the Spanish model, Payne directly linked the left to the foundation of fascism: "Fascism was created by the nationalization of certain sectors of the revolutionary left, and the central role in its conceptual orientation was played by revolutionary syndicalists who embraced extreme nationalism."[8]

Payne remained skeptical of both the radical Left and the radical Right. In 1961, he drew a picture of Madrid that reflected what one of his major influences, Juan Linz, called

the "depolitization" typical of authoritarian regimes. Payne comprehended these jaded *madrileños*: "By 1955, if not before, Madrid was politically the most cynical city in Europe. Every political ideology of the modern world had been introduced there during the 1930s. Each had suffered either physical defeat in the Civil War or moral pollution in the years following. There was no sign that any significant part of the population really believed in anything, beyond the minority that attended church."[9] Of course, fascism or neo-fascism could not survive in this cynical climate, a point Payne later made in his *Fascism*.[10] Early in his career, he was (and would remain) sympathetic mainly to moderation—whether of the CEDA, the liberal center, or social democrats.

Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (1967) deepened and broadened paths which *Falange* had begun to explore. Like the latter, the former concentrated on politics and the state and more precisely on the relationship between the Spanish military and governments in the context of a backward society lacking a dynamic middle class, a tradition of self-government, and literate masses. As he would confirm a few years later in his two-volume *A History of Spain and Portugal* (1973), the military was a key factor throughout the history of the Iberian Peninsula. Throughout the nineteenth century many Spanish army officers were liberals, but the rise of proletarian movements at the end of the century led them to more conservative politics. The army's main task became the defense of the status quo, and it would intervene constantly in Spanish politics during the first half of the twentieth century.

While *Politics and the Military* was, as its title indicated, centered on politics, the author was sensitive to military sociology and social history in general. After all, Payne had dedicated his first book to Jaume Vicens Vives, the Annales School's foremost advocate in Spain, whom Payne called "undoubtedly the greatest historian whom I have ever personally known in any country."[11] Payne established the context of Spanish backwardness by pointing out that although at the start of World War I, Spain spent more per capita on its army than Russia or Austria-Hungary, the noncombat death rate of the Spanish Army was nevertheless the highest in Europe. Thus, its draft evasion rate was a "fantastic 22 percent" of conscripts.[12]

Politics and the Military was informed throughout by national and cross-national comparisons inspired by sociology and political science. As Charles Maier has written, all history is comparative history, and one of Payne's many virtues is that he makes his comparative history explicit.[13] *Politics and Military* provides a number of stimulating examples of the author's alertness to historical parallels: The War of Independence against the French was the first "people's war—the first modern guerrilla war."[14] Payne situated the role of the military in late nineteenth-century Spain into a wider European and even global framework: "The emerging credo of Spanish militarism had little in common with the aggressive bellicosity infecting much of Europe at that time [after the colonial disaster of 1898]. It was not aimed at war or external action but rather toward enhancing the position of the Army within the national structure."[15] Thus it was not surprising that the Franco regime became the longest

lasting "military-based regime" of the twentieth century.[16] In his later work these comparisons were elaborated. Franco himself was pictured as a kinder, gentler Tito.[17] Both leaders had come to power through bloody civil wars, both adopted their personalized versions of "totalitarian" models, and both used massive repression to rule nations with powerful separatist movements.

Anticipating *The Spanish Revolution, Politics and the Military* was critical of the left, especially of Manual Azaña, "a writer and intellectual of limited accomplishment" and an "ultra-liberal."[18] At the same time, Payne admired Azaña's most incisive critic, the tough-minded conservative Catholic republican, Miguel Maura. Maura was "one of the few responsible, farsighted leaders produced by the Republic,"[19] a judgment seconded and reinforced in his latest work, *The Collapse of the Republic.*[20] Following Adolphe Thiers' precedent of republican reconstruction after the Paris Commune, Maura's chief concern was to establish a "Republic of Order," similar to the French Third Republic. The Spanish Second Republic's failure to replicate the French model and its inability to maintain order in the 1930s, especially in 1936, led to civil war. Similarly, the so-called Bienio Negro of 1934–35 was not a black period of rightist rule for Payne but rather the "dead center" of Spanish politics. During the Bienio, "it was the extreme left, not the extreme right that was ready for violent rebellion."[21]

Payne's third book, *The Spanish Revolution*, focused on that extreme left. As in his previous volumes, the author reaches back into Spanish history to find parallels. He sees the Catalan civil war of the 1460s as prefiguring the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s. Both were "touched off by a resort to arms by the upper classes in face of a strong latent revolutionary threat from the peasants and urban workers."[22] Global comparisons complemented the use of analogies in the Spanish past: Unlike in other Western European nations, "urbanization in Spain was not exactly a product of industrialization, but to a certain extent preceded it" in the nineteenth century.[23] "On the basis of civic culture, literacy rates, and economic development, it might be hypothesized that by 1930 Spain was at the level of England in the 1840s and 1850s or France in the 1860s and 1870s. Neither mid-nineteenth-century England nor even France at the beginning of the Third Republic had to face such severe political tests as Spain underwent in the 1930s."[24] Rather as in the German states during 1840s, Spain in the 1930s had to confront simultaneously thorny issues of constitutionalism, national identity, and land reform. Furthermore, the Second Republic was burdened with decisions concerning religious, military, and social legislation. The Republic's desire to break with the past came back to haunt it. The Constituent Cortes of June 1931 unwisely exhibited a lack of continuity with its last predecessor, the parliament of 1923: "This is in sharp contrast to the rebuilding of representative government in more mature countries, such as France after 1944 or in Italy, Austria, and West Germany following long periods of dictatorship."[25]

The most relevant cross-national comparison in *The Spanish Revolution* was between Spain and Russia since contemporaries—particularly the Socialists, the major party of the

left—vigorously debated the resemblance. On this issue, Payne sided with the Socialist moderates, such as Julián Besteiro, who argued that the Spain of the 1930s had little in common with the Russia of 1917 since the former had not suffered a defeat in a great world war. The Spanish middle and upper classes, the Church, and the military were intact and ready to do battle with revolutionaries. In fact, the "hero" of *The Spanish Revolution* may be Besteiro (although he misunderstood the brutality of the Nazis and that of the coming Franco regime) just as the "hero" of *Politics and Military* had been Miguel Maura. Payne endorsed Besteiro's doubts about leftist revolutionary violence by correctly affirming that during the civil war "many Spanish Catholics showed greater discipline, determination, and self-sacrifice than did a large number of the secular utopians."[26]

Another analogy found in *The Spanish Revolution*—that between the Spanish Revolution of 1936–37 and its Hungarian predecessor of 1918–19—had major implications for Payne's future work. Payne views the Spanish Revolution, like its Hungarian counterpart, as part of the post–World War I revolutionary wave, a judgment which he has recently confirmed in *The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism.*[27] In other words, the Spanish Civil War was not a pre-figuration of the Second World War and should not be interpreted as a struggle between democracy and fascism. Instead, it must be viewed within the framework of leftist revolution against rightist counter-revolution as had occurred in Central and Eastern Europe after World War I. As in Hungary during 1918–19, in Spain during 1936–39 the Communists became one of the main, if not the most important, driving force behind the revolution. Thus, Communism and the Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War were hardly "counter-revolutionary" as many leftists, anarchists, and even some scholars maintain. Rather Communists worked to create in the Iberian Peninsula a model of a people's democracy which the USSR would sponsor throughout Central and Eastern Europe after World War II. Communist actions in Spain during the civil war previewed what would occur "in the first phase of the new east European Communist regimes" immediately after 1945.[28] Payne followed Burnet Bolloten in arguing that the Spanish Republic during the final years of the civil war foreshadowed the coming Communist domination in ostensibly semipluralistic regimes after the Second World War. For example, the Partit Socialist Unificat de Catalunya "was the first Socialist-Communist *partido único* ever formed in Europe."[29] Payne refines this analysis in *The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism.*

Payne's recent judgment that *The Spanish Revolution* constituted a significant rupture with his previous work cannot be fully sustained. Although *The Spanish Revolution* condemned the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) and other revolutionaries who sparked the Asturias Insurrection in 1934 and attributed to them primary responsibility for the breakdown of representative government, he is nearly as harsh on the CEDA. The latter, like the PSOE in 1933, warned that if election results did not guarantee their basic goals, they would not hesitate to violate the constitution. He continued to see Falange activists as likely to engage in "terrorism" as Communist, Socialist, and CNT militants.[30] He was also

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8. Ibid., 42.
9. Payne, *Falange*, 249.
10. Payne, *Fascism*, 156.
11. Roger Griffin, e-mail message to author, 2005.
12. Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 101.
13. Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 98–99.
14. Payne, *Politics and the Military*, 7.
15. Ibid., 90.
16. Ibid., 449.
17. Stanley G. Payne, *The Franco Regime 1936–1975* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 634.
18. Payne, *Politics and the Military*, 266.
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20. Stanley G. Payne, *The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933–1936: Origins of the Civil War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
21. Payne, *Politics and the Military*, 296.
22. Payne, *The Spanish Revolution*, 6.
23. Ibid., 11.
24. Ibid., 84.
25. Ibid., 89.
26. Ibid., 371.
27. Stanley G. Payne, *The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
28. Payne, *The Spanish Revolution*, 373.
29. Ibid., 283.
30. Ibid., 189.
31. Ibid., 219.
32. Juan Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in *Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain*, ed. Stanley G. Payne (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976), 160–207.
33. Payne, *Fascism*, 201.
34. Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 4.
35. Payne, *Politics and the Military*, 74.
36. Ibid., 67.
37. Ibid., 413.
38. Ibid., 420.
39. Stanley G. Payne, *Basque Nationalism* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1975).
40. Ibid., 69.
41. Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 483–84.
42. Stanley G. Payne, "Jaime Vicens Vives and the Writing of Spanish History," *Journal of Modern History* 34, no. 2 (1962): 119–34.
43. Ibid., 120.
44. Ibid., 130.
45. Payne, *Politics and the Military*, 223.

CHAPTER 1

Carlist Worker Groups in Catalonia, 1900–1923

COLIN M. WINSTON

Spanish Carlism is a more varied and vital movement than often portrayed. The prototypical Carlist, in the words of the party's chief ideologue, Juan Vazquez de Mella, has been caricatured as "a kind of crow lurking in the crevices of feudal keeps, disposed to damn every scientific discovery and condemn all marvels of industry. . . a kind of romantic poet who, bogged down by present-day reality and a nostalgia for the past, turns tearful eyes toward bygone centuries."[1] Nevertheless, this relic of the past managed to represent the interests of a wide swath of Spanish society for over one hundred years, nearly topple the liberal regime at least twice during the last century, and develop a sophisticated corporatist ideology that went well beyond a call to revive medieval guilds. Politically, the movement proved flexible enough to encompass throne-and-altar absolutism, decentralized, quasi-constitutional monarchism and—in its most bizarre variant—"worker managed socialism" in the immediate post-Franco period.

Even those who recognized Carlism's complexity, however, generally portray it as an overwhelmingly rural movement with little appeal in urban areas. Even at its apogee during the First Carlist War, the movement could not capture the main urban centers of the Basque Country. Moreover, as a symbol of rural resistance to modernity, it has long been assumed that Carlism had nothing to offer Spain's urban working class, that it never faced the challenges of industrialization and proletarian pauperization, and that it offered workers nothing more than the social nostrums of Pope Leo XIII's famous encyclical, *Rerum Novarum.*

This is a false generalization. Early twentieth-century Catalan Carlism, specifically a populist current born in Barcelona, recruited industrial workers, defended their interests against capitalist employers, and eventually formed the kernel of a class-based, combative trade union federation, the *Sindicatos Libres.* Worker Carlism in Barcelona repudiated the paternalism of the Catholic clergy and steadfastly fought the equation of social Catholicism

with defense of the socioeconomic status quo. This chapter describes the origins and development of this authentic working-class Carlist movement and shows how, under the right circumstances, Carlism could successfully adapt to the exigencies of the modern industrial age.

The Social Failure of Mainstream Catalan Carlism

Catalonia was one of Carlism's first and strongest bastions: the *Guerra dels Malcontents* (1827–1828) was a kind of Carlism *avant la lettre*, and the Second Carlist War was an almost exclusively Catalan affair. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, Catalan Carlism had fallen on hard times. It seemed incapable of adjusting to the political realities of the Alfonsine Restoration and still indulged in futile insurrectionary gestures such as the "Badalona movement" of 1900.[2] The failure of this *opera bouffe* revolt impressed upon the party the need to move from armed struggle to electoral politics. Catalan Carlism reorganized itself and joined other forces in the *Solidaritat Catalana* alliance to fight the parliamentary election of 1907, which won the Carlists six out of their national total of seventeen deputies, the party's all-time high for the Restoration period.

The leadership of revived Carlism quickly made peace with Catalonia's conservative Catholic elite, forging a long-term partnership with the *Lliga Regionalista* of Enric Prat de la Riba and Francesc Cambó. Although electoral cooperation with the Lliga enabled the Catalan Carlists to maintain a parliamentary presence in Madrid, there were disadvantages to longstanding and intimate cooperation between such unequal partners. Catalan Carlism became politically dependent on the Lliga and lost much of its dynamism and distinctive character. It came to differ little from conservative Catalanism, save for its quaint loyalty to an exiled pretender and a more militant defense of religion.

Just as in politics mainstream Catalan Carlism became a Lliga satellite, its social views revolved around those of the Catholic hierarchy and Barcelona's bourgeoisie. Although Carlist leaders were theoretically opposed to political and social liberalism, long association with bourgeois parties and interests undermined their hostility to the liberal social order. Like their counterparts in the wider Catholic community, these Carlists were eager to resolve social problems through "love and harmony between social classes."[3] They condemned most strikes and all truly independent, worker-run trade unions as instruments of godless socialism, the "principal enemy of the worker."[4]

The Carlist elite supported *Acción Social Popular* (ASP), the social Catholic organization that created Catholic trade unions in Catalonia from 1908 to 1916.[5] ASP's founder, Father Gabriel Palau, had been a Carlist, as were several of his closest collaborators. The Duque de Solferino, the regional party chief, served on the ASP's directorate; in 1911 at least four of the nineteen members of its board of governors were party leaders. The ASP unions were characterized by lack of combativeness, paternalism, submission to clerical au-

thority, and the anathematization of all conflict between labor and capital as corrosive of the social order. They were, in fact "yellow" unions whose ideology was formulated and bills paid by a handful of clerics and industrialists, most notably the wealthy Catholic businessman Claudio López Bru, the Marqués de Comillas. The ASP's Barcelona unions neither initiated nor seconded a single strike between 1907 and 1916. Not surprisingly, few workers were attracted to such listless entities: at their peak in 1916 the ASP's Barcelona unions enrolled at most 4,000 to 5,000 manual workers, or less than two percent of the Catalan capital's blue collar proletariat. By 1918, following Father Palau's departure from Barcelona, Barcelona's Catholic unions had all but disappeared.

There was one small exception to the dismal record of the Catholic unions supported by the leaders of Catalan Carlism. In Igualada, a small industrial center sixty miles from Barcelona, an ASP-affiliated Catholic union emerged with a different rhetoric and record. The Igualada unionists exulted in their *obrerismo* (literally, "workerism"); these self-proclaimed "radical syndicalists" lambasted "oppressive" owners who "before being Catholics are capitalists."[6] Unlike the Barcelona unions, they organized boycotts and seconded several strikes against recalcitrant bosses. The main difference between the Barcelona and the Igualada Catholic unions lay in the make-up of their rank and file. The Barcelona workers were recruited largely from the city's Catholic worker centers and included very few Carlists.[7] In Igualada, the unions were composed primarily of Carlist workers, whose relations with the Barcelona-based ASP were rocky at best. The contrast between the two illustrates that, alongside the yellow unionism advocated by the official leadership of Catalan Carlism, there existed a more dynamic and socially less elitist current of Carlist *obrerismo.*

The Development of Carlist *Obrerismo*

Worker Carlism's capital was always Barcelona, although the current did not spawn trade unions there until 1919, after the ASP's demise. Between 1907 and 1913 the center of gravity of Catalan Carlism as a whole shifted from the interior to the capital, from the country to the city. Before 1907 only three Carlist party centers existed in the capital. In that year alone, eight new centers—mostly in peripheral worker districts—were founded, a clear testimony to the impact of the Solidaritat Catalana elections on the party. From 1910 to 1913 two or three centers were created yearly. The process tapered off after 1914, the total number of Carlist centers fluctuating between twenty and twenty-three for the period 1915–1920. Determining the number of Carlist militants in the city is difficult, but an electoral analysis, combined with the party's own estimates, suggests that in 1910 there were about 10,000 Carlist activists and sympathizers in Barcelona—a city with more than half a million inhabitants.[8]

An important minority of these 10,000 were workers or lower-middle-class shop assistants *(dependientes). La Trinchera*, the chief organ of Carlism's *obrerista* current observed

that "our neighborhood centers are essentially worker centers; visit [them]. . . and you will see the personification of the proletariat, the predominance of democracy, those faces defined by the suffering of work, those blue blouses so characteristic of the workers."[9] Analysis of the location and membership of party circles corroborates these claims. At least ten of the twenty Carlist centers were specifically called worker circles, and fully sixteen were located in lower-middle-class or worker neighborhoods. Their sizes varied, but averaged about 250 members for the ten worker circles. By taking into account all sixteen circles in non-middle-class neighborhoods and allowing for the few cases where membership was greater than 250, one can arrive at a rough estimate of about 3,500 Carlist workers in Barcelona, not too different from the party's own estimate of 4,000 to 5,000 worker members in the Barcelona traditionalist worker Census of 1910.[10]

That about one third of Barcelona's Carlist militants were workers is not surprising. The party had always been cross-class in nature, and even when restricted largely to the Catalan hinterland, artisans and town dwellers had fought in Carlist armies alongside peasants. Migration into Barcelona before World War I came hugely from the Catalan rural uplands where Carlism was firmly entrenched. Not all peasants lost their religion upon becoming workers and *dependientes.* For Carlist newcomers to the city, affiliation with their neighborhood traditionalists center eased the transition into urban life. These circles provided many of the services offered by the Church-directed Catholic centers and the ASP, but without their stifling paternalism and with a dose of social leveling inherent in common dedication to a political cause. Although few in number and surrounded by a working class hostile to all manifestations of Carlism, these traditionalists workers would eventually exert a far greater influence among the Catalan proletariat than all the efforts of the Church, the Catalan Catholic elite, and the Carlist party's official leadership combined.

Barcelona's Carlist workers sparred constantly with the official party leadership that represented mainstream Carlism. In 1912, a group of young, worker-oriented radicals founded the *obrerista* Carlist weekly *La Trinchera*, which engaged in constant guerrilla warfare with the official party mouthpiece, *El Correo Catalan,* until at least 1919. Throughout this period the official party leaders—represented by the Duque de Solferino, regional party president, and Miguel Junyent, editor of the *Correo Catalan*—retained control of Catalan Carlism. But the radicals maintained their dominance in the Barcelona worker centers and were especially well organized at the *Ateneo Obrero Legitimista* and the *El Porvenir* and *Crit de Patria* Carlist worker clubs.[11]

Worker Carlism differed from the mainstream in being primarily a movement of youth. The leaders of this faction, unlike the middle-aged moderates, were mostly in their twenties or thirties. *La Trinchera* spoke for "a youth fed up with being deceived and ridiculed" by old men "concerned only with retaining their seats in parliament." Unable to defeat the moderates, the radicals look refuge in bloody fantasies of civil war in which Carlism triumphed but "all our leaders" died, making way for a new generation of youthful party chiefs.[12]

Worker Carlism was also much more ready than the domesticated party elite to use violence. It took some time, however, to adopt new tactics appropriate to the shift from a rural to an urban battleground. As late as 1904 Carlists were still training within the constraints of their rural guerrilla heritage. A rout at the hands of the Young Barbarians (the street toughs of Radical party leader Alejandro Lerroux) at a party rally at the Arenas bullring in 1906, and, more importantly, the massive shock of the Tragic Week disturbances of 1909, galvanized the party into organizing urban paramilitary units. Known as *Requetés*, they were often composed of workers, probably recent migrants to the city for whom Carlism's violent rural traditions were a living reality. These traditions were nurtured and transformed through target practice at the party workers' circles and at the *La Trinchera* "combat center." In fact, a regular cult of weapons developed among radical Barcelona Carlists, who never tired of singing the praises of "the club and the Browning [pistol], the two indispensable companions of Carlist youth."[13] The radicals put their weapons to good use. From 1911 to 1918, street scuffling and shootouts between the Requetés and the Young Barbarians were part of the Barcelona scene. One of the more notorious incidents came in 1912, when fifteen armed Carlist worker Requetés from Barcelona disrupted a republican rally in Granollers by firing on the crowd. One Requeté was killed, the remainder imprisoned, and numerous bystanders were wounded.

The party's mainstream deplored such conduct. After the Granollers incident, the Duque de Solferino nearly expelled a number of young hotheads, lamenting that their violence compromised Carlism's reputation as "a party of order."[14] The party's radical workers were not, in fact, much concerned with maintaining order. They saw themselves as the shock troops of the Carlist counterrevolution, more concerned with the pursuit of the traditionalist millennium than with the electoral politics advocated by the party's hierarchy. They found Carlism's electoral alliance with the Lliga Regionalista odious in the extreme. One of their slogans was "Down with the traitors!" directed not against the left or the Alfonsines but against the Lliga, many of whose leaders (such as Francesc Cambó and Joan Estelrich) came from Carlist families.[15]

Radical Carlism felt that the party's leaders were selling out to the Lliga, which was merely using the party "as a barricade against the revolutionaries."[16] Carlist youth and workers wanted to overcome the purely defensive, passive conservatism which they felt was undermining the party's character and vitality. Moreover, radical Carlism had a positive, innovative program which, although presented as a return to a medieval past, would have brought about sweeping transformations. At times the radicals even dropped their usual counterrevolutionary guise, revealing a Carlist potential to evolve toward explicitly right-revolutionary positions.

The clearest example came in 1912 when Dalmacio Iglesias, a Cortes deputy from Girona, suggested that Carlism ally with the revolutionary republicans to overthrow the Alfonsine system. As an electoral tactic, the proposal was unexceptional. Catalan Carlists had

long pondered the advisability of such a move and Vazquez de Mella himself had toyed with a catastrophe theory of politics whereby Carlism achieved power only after a failed socialist regime.[17] Iglesias went further, emphasizing that he wanted no mere agreement between political leaders but an alliance between the Carlist and republican masses for revolutionary change. He realized that conservatives would castigate him as "revolutionary." In such a case, Iglesias advised his followers "not to let it bother you. Revolution is all rapid change in the slate of things; and just as there is a bad revolution there can be a good one."[18] Iglesias never elaborated his ideas, which were hailed by the radical current and rejected by the party's leadership. The Lliga denounced Iglesias' advocacy of a "strange marriage" between "the red beret and the Phrygian cap," but breathed a sigh of relief that the "sensible" elements in Carlism had scotched his project.[19]

Although worker Carlism never articulated a coherent revolutionary ideology and strategy, potentially revolutionary social and economic postures existed in the movement and contrasted sharply with the paternalist social Catholicism of party leaders. Party radicals rejected vague populism for explicit *obrerismo*, a positive identification with the aspirations of the working class. At times, Carlist youth came close to adopting the rhetoric of class struggle, championing worker rights as opposed to those of other classes. Such a stance was congruent with a total spurning of capitalism, and not merely of its excesses. The radicals perceived what their elders failed to recognize: that as long as traditionalism was associated with the socioeconomic status quo, its political ambitions would remain a dead letter.

Thus the radical worker current broke with the Catalan Catholic (and Carlist) elite's paternalistic approach to worker rights. The radicals rejected charity as a basis for social action because it perpetuated the exploitation of the proletariat by the rich, estranged the worker from the Church, and insulted human dignity. Likewise, the radicals lauded the left for taking a sincere interest in the workers' material needs, in contrast to social Catholicism's obsession with confessionalism and pious acts. The radicals, unlike the social Catholics and the ASP, accepted May Day as a positive manifestation of the nobility of work and the emancipation of the poor. They described it as the prototypical Catholic holiday because "the basis of all catholicization of the workers is, without doubt, their economic well-being."[20]

Radical Carlists translated their spirit of worker solidarity into extensive support for the Barcelona labor movement. They were wildly enthusiastic about the 1912 railroad strike, and from then until 1914 (the period for which data are available), backed many other work stoppages, all conducted by non-Catholic resistance societies.[21] The chasm between radical Carlist and mainstream social Catholic attitudes explains why Carlist workers (with a few exceptions, such as the previously mentioned group in Igualada) generally spurned the ASP's Catholic unions. Unconcerned with preserving capitalism and willing to provoke short-term violence and disruptions to improve their lot, Carlist workers chafed at the Catholic insistence that social peace be preserved at all costs. And radical Carlist *obrerismo* generated hostility to unions paid for and controlled by non-working-class elements. When the Marqués de Comillas was

named to head the National Council of Catholic Worker Corporations in Madrid the radicals asked "do you believe that [under Comillas], when the moment of struggle between capital and labor arrives, Catholic workers will have sufficient guarantees that the private interests of an owner or a company director will not run roughshod over the defense of worker interests, which being those of labor are necessarily contrary to [those of capital]?"[22]

The Emergence of the Sindicatos Libres

Radical Carlism steered clear of union organizing until October 1919, when a group of about 100 militants met at Barcelona's *Ateneo Obrero Legitimista* to found the Sindicatos Libres.[23] Several reasons account for the relatively late debut of radical worker Carlism on Barcelona's syndical scene. Until the ASP's collapse in 1916 and the rout of the city's Catholic unions, the Carlists were inhibited by a reluctance to compete directly with the Church. Moreover, the emergence in Navarre and the Basque Country of the Free Catholic Unions—less yellow than Father Palau's syndicates—gave Barcelona's Carlist workers a union model distinct from both the ASP and the anarchosyndicalist-dominated *Confederación Nacional de Trabajo* (CNT). The previously mentioned Carlist-controlled Catholic union in Igualada, for example, joined the Free Catholic structure in 1918, and the movement's Dominican founders, Fathers Gerard and Gafo, frequented Barcelona's Carlist worker centers between 1914 and 1918. The Congress of Young Traditionalists of Catalonia, which met in 1917–18 and was heavily influenced by the party's radical current, explicitly recognized the need for "purely professional unions" and chided the Carlist leadership for too long ignoring worker problems.[24]

The main impetus to the formation of the Libres, however, was the growth and radicalization of the CNT. By late 1919 the CNT was coming under the control of anarchosyndicalist elements involved in the violence and coercion that would earn Barcelona the epithet Chicago of the Mediterranean. Ever since the massive general strike called by CNT radicals in March and April of that year, discontent had been growing among the city's Carlist workers, who feared that moderate syndicalists such as Salvador Seguí had lost out to hotheads and that the Confederation was planning to launch the revolution. The attendees at the Areneo Obrero Legitimista meeting were mostly CNT members as well as Carlists. They cited three major reasons for breaking with the Federation: its ideological radicalization and attempts to impose libertarian communism on the membership; the grip that the *pistoleros* (gunmen) of the Confederation's "action groups" were acquiring over the organization; and the practical futility of CNT maximalism, which polarized labor relations in Barcelona, rendering even the most basic bread-and-butter improvements unobtainable.

Thus the Sindicatos Libres first emerged as a minor schism provoked by traditionalist workers within the CNT. Initially, the union was aided by elements of both the radical and the moderate wings of Catalan Carlism. This support extended to the party's highest levels,

reaching the pretender, Don Jaime, himself. Shortly after the Libres' foundation, the union's President Ramón Sales traveled to Paris and obtained an audience with Don Jaime, making him an honorary member of the new organization—one of the few cases of a royal trade unionist on record. Don Jaime was enthusiastic about the project and encouraged Sales. Apparently the two established a correspondence which lasted for several years, the would-be king bolstering Sales' spirits and urging him to keep up the good work.[25]

Despite the heavy Carlist influence, it is wrong to define the Libres as simply a Carlist union. The role of the Carlist establishment in the union's creation was successfully hushed up, and most prominent party figures kept their distance from the Libres and seldom intervened in their operation. Many of the radical Carlists most active in the union—such as the editorial staff of *La Trinchera*, which joined en masse—were themselves workers or lower middle-class shop assistants. They recognized that an explicitly Carlist union would at best only appeal to the several thousand habitués of the city's Carlist worker centers. Indeed, during the first phase of the Libres' existence (1919–1920), the union enrolled no more than 10,000 members, mostly derived from these same circles. Maintaining a distance from the Carlist party, however, enabled the Libres to mushroom to some 150,000 members during the second phase (1921–1922), when it benefited from the repression of the CNT under the harsh rule of Barcelona's civil governor, General Martínez Anido.

Moreover, there was virtually no institutional continuity between Barcelona's earlier efforts at Catholic syndicalism—primarily the ASP's unions, backed by the Catalan Carlist establishment—and the Libres. There is only one clear case of such a transition: the ASP-affiliated Catholic union in Igualada that switched loyalty to Father Gafo's Free Catholic organization and finally joined the Libres in 1921. In addition, only nine out of a sample of over 1,200 members of the *juntas directivas* of individual Libre unions served previously in any leadership capacity in the ASP unions, and none of the Libres' chief leaders played any role in Father Palau's failed undertaking.[26]

A heterogeneous leadership also diluted the Libres' Carlist identity. After 1921 many non-Carlists acquired positions of considerable responsibility within the movement. One of the most notable was Augusto Lagunas, liaison secretary from 1922 to 1924. Both anticlerical and anti-Catholic, Lagunas was a former Communist who preached a Nietzsche-inspired voluntarism totally distinct from the Catholic mysticism characteristic of some Libre intellectuals.[27] Another indication of the lack of homogeneity within the Libre leadership was that only ten of the thirty-three "martyrs" (victims of labor terrorism) claimed by the Libres can be identified through the press as Carlists. The proportion of identifiable party members in the sample of over 1,200 Libre leaders is even smaller: only 52 are indisputably Carlist.[28]

The development of Sindicalismo Libre is a complex and murky topic that exceeds the scope of this paper. The union sparred with the CNT for syndical predominance in Catalonia from 1919–1923 and extended its radius of action to the national level in 1924. During the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, the Libres boasted nearly 200,000 members throughout Spain,

becoming the country's second largest labor federation after the Socialist UGT. Although the Libres were crushed by the Second Republic, their experiment in non-leftist syndicalism was a relative success, especially when compared to the abysmal failure of Catholic unionism in Spain. The reasons for this success are varied, but some of the most important stem directly from the union's radical Carlist heritage.

One of the most vital factors contributing to the Libres' early survival was the union's absolute rejection of any Catholic or confessional tag. This reflected both the radical Carlism's disenchantment with the ASP and the failed Catholic syndical heritage of the Catalan capital and the fact that the Libres emerged spontaneously from a segment of Barcelona's working class, rather than being created (as were the Catholic unions) by extraproletarian elements. Ramón Sales, a practicing Catholic who went to Mass daily, rebutted a suggestion to create a Catholic union at the Libres' founding meeting by arguing that "in Barcelona one should not even mention Catholic unionism because it has failed repeatedly and is yellow syndicalism."[29]

Early Libre propaganda hurled nearly as much invective at the Catholic unions as at the CNT. The Marqués de Comillas was lambasted for sponsoring scab unions and the ASP was dismissed as "the shoeshine boy of the Employers' Federation."[30] Libre militants considered themselves a different breed from the sniveling blackleg babies who hid under the robes of priests and bishops: "We want men without atavisms, without traditional prejudices, not educated in the confessional. We want youth with a firm will, virility in the groin, and with audacious thoughts." This contemptuous attitude toward the Church stemmed in part from radical Carlism, specifically the fear that the hierarchy was the servant of the liberal sociopolitical status quo. One Libre leader, in fact, accused his Catholic critics of attacking the union out of spite that "there exist potent organizations that are not slaves of the Lliga."[31] Not surprisingly, the Libres' overall relationship with Catalonia's non-Carlist Catholic elite—after a brief honeymoon during which it was hoped that the Libres would save the city from the godless CNT—quickly became antagonistic, Barcelona's Catholics attacking them as brutal white anarchists.

An equally crucial element in the Libres' success was their adoption early on of an aggressive *obrerista* rhetoric and conduct. At its most straightforward, the Libres equated *obrerismo* with proletarian solidarity, expressing the hallowed Catalan tradition of practical trade unionism. Unlike most Catholic unionists, but like the radical Carlists of *La Trinchera,* the Libres enthusiastically accepted May Day and did not hesitate to defend the basic postulates of modern trade unionism: strikes, boycotts, collective contracts, and an adversarial relationship with the employers. This alone gave them a tremendous advantage in the highly conflictive Barcelona labor scene, and enabled them to lead a host of successful strikes, especially during 1922–1923.

Obrerismo was also associated with the tradition of Barcelona's radical Carlists, the current most responsible for the group's creation. These individuals were in an ideological quan-

dary, caught between the meek class collaborationism of Carlist orthodoxy and their own tendencies toward worker exclusivism. The volatile social atmosphere of postwar Catalonia and participation in an explicitly class-defined entity brought this latent contradiction to the surface, and Libre leaders began to call for the destruction of the existing economic order through class war. This—as the development of Libre ideology would show—was not the goal of even the most radical Carlists, but neither was it a temporary aberration caused by anarchist influence. Once they had appropriated the tactics and rhetoric of class and syndical struggle, there was a strong temptation to make ends conform to means. The Libres were left with a hand-me-down version of the Marxist class struggle—but one which, when married to the practical benefits of bread-and-butter trade unionism, proved attractive to a sizable segment of the Catalan working class.

It should be noted that the divergent interpretations found among Libre militants of *obrerismo* reflected the rift in the union between moderate Carlists and the stream that emerged from the tradition of Dalmacio Iglesias and *La Trinchera*. *Libreños* in tune with official Carlism saw the union as having a fundamentally counterrevolutionary role of containing the left; a different socioeconomic regime was desirable but it was a long way off and should never be pursued at the expense of social disorder upon which the left might capitalize. *Obrerismo* was to this current merely worker solidarity, which had to be married to a corporatist or productivist outlook as a way of establishing harmony within the workplace and easing social tensions. The radical Carlists, however, inched toward a right revolutionary position in which establishing a new political and socioeconomic order was as important as crushing the left. This tendency was not new, but only during the acute social crisis of 1919–1923 and under the impact of direct participation in the class struggle, did radical Carlist political revolutionism take on a clear socioeconomic tinge. The resulting ideological formula was vague, ephemeral, and shot through with contradictions. But it was sufficiently radical and threatening to worry the Liberal government and much of the Catalan bourgeoisie. The *gendarme* who had appeared to protect its privileges now seemed almost as dangerous as the thief whom it had chased away.

A third Carlist-derived element that enabled the Libres to thrive was the union's willingness to participate in Barcelona's postwar terrorist struggle. The refusal of Church-sponsored unions to engage in the violence and coercion that dominated the Barcelona syndical scene quickly sealed their fate. The Libres, however, joined the terrorist struggle against the CNT with veritable gusto, forming action groups composed of young Carlist *exaltados* who had emerged from a background that virtually equated politics with violence. While the union suffered many casualties in the war against the CNT, its comparative advantage in street fighting and assassination—especially during 1921–1922, when Martinez Anido openly colluded with the union—helped it survive in the rough-and-tumble world of Catalan industrial relations.

A cult of death and martyrdom, clearly derived from the radical Carlist obsession with

war and armed struggle, quickly developed in Libre ranks and became deeply rooted in the union's collective psyche. For some leaders it was bound up with the afterlife and apocalyptic Christian theology; less sophisticated militants expressed themselves in terms of macho values and sexual virility. One Libre broadsheet, for example, urged workers to respond to harassment from CNT "henchmen" by "shooting them in the forehead without any hesitation or caution" and promised to "destroy 100 lives of the Único (CNT) for each Libre member who is assassinated by that brand of rascals, thugs, and ruffians."[32] The stress on voluntarism and the cathartic value of struggle was never mere rhetoric: when it came to violence, Libre unionists practiced what they preached.

Beyond Carlism

Early Libre syndicalism remained faithful to its radical Carlist roots. It cannot be adequately described as either a fascist or right radical movement. Rather, it was a *sui generis* form or heterodox Carlism, strongly imbued with a sense of worker unity, potentially revolutionary in some of its political and economic positions, but conservative on social and religious matters and bitterly opposed to the left. It remained sufficiently traditionalist to be vigorously defended by the Carlist party during a nationwide bank strike organized by the union in 1923, when the rest of the right and Spain's Catholic establishment denounced the Libres as crypto-anarchists.[33]

Under the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, however, the Libres broke decisively with the Carlist party and world view. This change came as an improvised response to altered political and social circumstances and was only later theoretically justified. Most Libre leaders were pragmatic, non-intellectual men who grappled in an intuitive fashion with the challenges of industrial conflict and the political crises of the Spanish state. By the late 1920s the union had articulated a position fundamentally foreign to traditionalism. Almost inadvertently, the constraints that had hampered the modernization of Carlism were overcome, and Sindicalismo Libre emerged as a uniquely Spanish form of indigenous lower-class right radicalism and Fascism.

It should be stressed that this evolution applied only to the movement's original radical Carlist core; the top leaders and the 10,000 or so traditionalist and Catholic workers that joined it during its first year of existence. The bulk of the Libre rank-and-file joined for the practical benefits of trade union membership rather than out of political conviction; it underwent no such ideological evolution. These workers looked elsewhere for political expression, and quickly abandoned the Libres when, as happened after April 1931, the political radicalism of the movement's elite gutted the syndicate's ability to function effectively as a trade union.

The Libres' close collaboration with the dictatorship brought about two ideological shifts that irrevocably severed the movement from Carlism: the adoption of a vigorous,

anti-Catalanist *españolista* outlook and of a secular, modernizing form of corporatism. Libre *españolismo* began as an opportunistic power grab linked to the union's usurpation, with the collusion of Interior Minister Martínez Anido, of the *Centre Autonomista de Dependents del Comerç i de la Indústria* (CADCI), a powerful white-collar union in Barcelona closed by the dictatorship for its outspoken Catalanism.[34] It gradually evolved, however, into a militant ideological defense of the Hispanic identity of Catalonia that reduced its political aspirations to the most anodyne administrative decentralization and annihilated the regionalist component of traditionalism. Although at first fueled by mere negativism—particularly against radical Carlism's longtime nemesis, the Lliga—Libre *españolismo* soon took on a wider significance, endowing the union with a rabid hypernationalist ideology of *hispanidad*, the absence of which had been so striking before 1924.

Just as collaboration with the dictatorship's anti-Catalanist policies triggered and developed Libre *españolismo,* so the union's participation in Labour Minister Eduardo Aunós' corporative system called forth latent productivist and organicist elements in Libre ideology. During the Primo de Rivera regime the uneasy balance between *obrerismo* and productivism in Libre ideology eroded and the latter, attired in new corporatist finery, became the dominant force in the union's thought. In embracing corporatism the Libres were not primarily drawing upon the social Catholic formulations of Vazquez de Mella but were responding to the practical demands of the dictatorship's experiment in corporative labor organization. This eventually led to the Libre goal, seldom baldly stated, of replacing the liberal regime with a corporate state. This was no return to Carlist roots, for the Libres embraced a secular, modernizing, and potentially statist form of corporatism that was generally shunned by traditionalists. In a poll of twenty-six top unionists, for example, only four indicated that guilds or medieval socioeconomic organization had any relevance to present day corporatist practice. Ramón Sales, moreover, came close to making an explicit totalitarian appeal when he emphasized that in the Libre conception of corporatism the state was above all, of particular interest, and "should intervene in everything at every moment."[35]

Rocky relations with Carlism began as early as 1925, when Don Jaime issued a manifesto expressing forceful disapproval of the dictatorshi Libre militants for whom loyalty to Don Jaime and a Catalanist conception of Carlism were primary quit the union at this time.[36] By 1927 the break between the party and the Libres was irreversible. Ramón Sales placed himself beyond the Carlist pale by conniving with Martínez Anido to take over the huge *La Margarita* Carlist worker center in Barcelona, which the regime had closed as part of an anti-Carlist crackdown earlier in the year. Sales and Anido used the same tactics they employed to take over the CADCl, and the center was reopened under the control of Sales' handpicked cronies who cut all relations with the official chiefs of Catalan Carlism.[37] The party announced publicly in May that there were no relations between it and the union, although some individuals who had been members were now Libre leaders. When, in contrast, the party had made a similar declaration in 1923 it had likewise denied organic links between the two entities but had vigorously

defended the right of Carlist workers to belong to the Libres.[38]

The *coup de grâce* came after the fall of Primo de Rivera in January 1930, when Catalan Carlism expelled the top Libre leaders from the party. The Libres at this time resumed publication of a weekly journal, *La Protesta,* that had fleetingly appeared in 1923 as the successor of the radical Carlist *La Trinchera.* Meanwhile, Carlist *ex-Libreños* resurrected *La Trinchera* as an official party organ. The paper attacked Primo de Rivera and affirmed that "we Jaimists who formed part of the anti-terrorist reaction before 1923 have nothing to do with those who have adulterated certain organisms [i.e., the Libres] by subjecting them to the men of the dictatorshi"[39] Thus Barcelona possessed two weeklies that claimed to be the legatees of radical Carlist *obrerismo,* one pro-Libre and *españolista,* the other anti-Libre and Catalanist. A measure of the distance between the two can be seen in their attitudes toward regionalism. While the Carlist heretics of *La Protesta* were proclaiming the need to suppress regional differences in favor of *hispanidad,* the official Carlist party elaborated an autonomy statute which granted Catalonia a greater measure of self-government than was even proposed by left republican Catalanists in 1931! Sindicalismo Libre and Carlism, for many years close allies, had finally gone their separate ways.

Notes

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5. For an overview of the development of the ASP see Colin M. Winston, *Workers and the Right in Spain, 1900–1936* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), chapter 2.
6. *El Sindicalista,* July 9, 1915; October 15, 1915.
7. This conclusion is based on a comparison of lists of leaders of the ASP's Catholic unions with membership lists; from Carlist worker centers, both derived from the Barcelona press, from 1907 to 1917. Only 16 out of 160 Catholic unionists can be positively identified as Carlists. Doubtless the actual proportion was somewhat higher, but these figures seem to indicate less than wholehearted enthusiasm on the part of Carlist workers for Father Palau's unions.
8. See Winston, 70, for an explanation of the methodology used to arrive at this estimate.
9. *La Trinchera,* October 6, 1912.
10. Winston, 74.
11. Josep María Junyent Quintana (Carlist party official), interview with the author. Also, Ramón Solsona Cardon, *Mi ciudad y yo: Un periodo de historia anecdótica* (Barcelona: N. Poncell, 1948), 238–39.
12. "Lo que pudiera ser en 1914," *La Trinchera,* July 25, 1912.
13. *La Trinchera,* July 20, 1913.
14. Duque de Solferino, *La Trinchera,*July 25, 1912.
15. Junyent, interview with the author.
16. *La Trinchera,* August 3, 1913.
17. Blinkhorn, 26.
18. *La Trinchera,* February 23, 1913.

19. La Veu de Calalunya, December 11, 1912.
20. R. Jac, *Vade-Mecum del Jaimista*, May 1912.
21. For radical Carlist support of strikes by carpenters, varnishers, barbers, waiters, and pastry cooks see *La Trinchera*, February 23 and July 13, 1913; and February 22, 1914; on the tram workers' right to organize and strike see *Reacció*, February 14, 1914.
22. M. Sino, *Vade-Macum del Jaimista*, March 1912.
23. The Libres' history is analyzed in Winston, chapters 4–7. The most important contemporary work is the official history by Feliciano Baratech Alfaro, *Los Sindicatos Libres de españa, su origen, su actuación, su ideario* (Barcelona: Talleres Gráficos Cortel, 1927).
24. *Conclusions del Congrés de Joves Traditionalistes Calalans. Celebrat els dies 18 de novembre de 1917 i 17 i 18 dl marc i 2 juny de 1918* (Barcelona: Hereus Viuda Pla, 1918), 36–39.
25. Junyent, interview with the author and Carlos Feliú de Travy (provincial Carlist chief of Barcelona, 1958–1960), interview with the author. See also Inocencio Feced, *La Batalla*, May 14, 1931. Little biographical material is available for Sales, the first president of the *Sindicato Libre Regional.* What is known suggests that his life was typical of a whole generation of Carlist workers, especially those recently arrived in Barcelona. Born in the village of La Fulleda in Lleida around 1900, he was orphaned at age seventeen and forced to migrate to Barcelona. He helped support his family through a job as a shop assistant and joined the *Sindicato Unico Mercantil* of the CNT in 1918. Coming from a rural Catalan background, Sales joined the Barcelona Requeté, and by 1919 was active at the *Ateneo Obrero Legitimista* and other Carlist worker clubs. Only nineteen years old when elected president of the union, he was younger than most of his fellow *Libreños,* yet his primacy was seldom challenged throughout the union's seventeen-year history. See Winston, 113–14.
26. Winston, 120. Even Ângel Pestaña, a CNT leader who at times lumped together Catholic and Libre unionists, the authorities, and the employers in the same bag of anti-CNT forces, admitted that "the elements who appeared as directors of the Sindicato Libre and who were responsible for so much crime, were not the same as those who led the Catholic unions." Ângel Pestaña, *Terrorismo en Barcelona: Memorias inéditas* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1979), 163.
27. On Lagunas see Winston, 160–63. His pre-Libre trajectory as a leftist is chronicled by Gerald Meaker, *The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1917–1923* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), 124.
28. The actual proportion of Carlists in leadership positions of individual Libre unions was probably somewhat higher than this figure suggests. Many modest Carlist workers would not have been named in the party journals from which lists of Carlist militants were taken or have served on any of the party center juntas, and thus remained anonymous.
29. Baratech Alfaro, 67.
30. *Unión Obrera,* August 13, 1921.
31. *Unión Obrera*, July 30 and November 5, 1921.
32. Cited in *El Eco del Pueblo,* March 31, 1923. Only very slightly less inflammatory exhortations were regularly published in the Libre weekly, *Unión Obrera.*
33. *El Correo Catalan,* August 5, 1923.
34. On the Libra takeover of the CADCI see Winston, 237–41. The deepest and most dispassionate contemporary account is by Ramõn Rucabado, "Pagines d'Historia," *Catalunya Social,* September 13 and 20, 1930.
35. *Unión Obrera,* December 7, 1928.
36. For example, Antonio Oliveras and Domingo Farrell, respectively vice president and secretary general of the union from 1920–23, left the Libres in 1925.
37. See the letter from Sales to General Milans del Bosch, September 11, 1928, published on May 25, 1931, in *La Batalla.*
38. See *La Vanguardia,* March 23, 1923, and May 22, 1927.
39. *La Trinchera,* April 10, 1930.

CHAPTER 2

"A Shape Note of Pugnacity": Conservative Youth Groups in Spain, 1914–1939

BRIAN D. BUNK

One of the most original developments in modern European political history was the mass mobilization of young people in the first decades of the twentieth century. The channeling of young people into political organizations followed decades of social and cultural change that brought attention to youth as an important phase of life. The increased focus highlighted the potential inherent in mobilizing youthful cadres of political believers but also brought with it fears over the malicious effects such action could have on the development of young people. Eventually, nearly all political parties created some type of youth organizations, but perhaps the most successful groups at mobilizing young people were those on the revolutionary fringes, including both Marxists and Fascists. The Bolshevik movement in Russia and the formation of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism clearly demonstrated the remarkable power that could be achieved, in part, through the large-scale mobilization of young people.[1]

The cultural and social changes occurring throughout Europe also touched Spain, and coincided with a demographic shift that substantially increased the total population of young people. In addition, the disastrous war with the United States in 1898 and the subsequent loss of imperial territories sparked a diverse national debate over how to modernize Spain and restore it to a position of strength and influence. For many, youth constituted an important source of national renewal. Cultural figures, church leaders and politicians recognized that educating and mobilizing young people would help shape the nation's future. As a result, youth came to play an increasingly important role in the cultural and political development of the nation. The process began shortly before the First World War but accelerated throughout the 1920s and culminated with the massive mobilization of young people during the Second Republic (1931–36).

Throughout this period of enormous social and cultural transformation Spain also

witnessed tremendous political change: in the twenty-five years following the start of the First World War, the Spanish political system went from constitutional monarchy to military dictatorship to democratic republic, followed by civil war and the establishment of an authoritarian regime under Francisco Franco. The level of political change helped create or exacerbate the political factionalism within the country as Spain became a veritable incubator of ideologies ranging from reactionary monarchism to revolutionary anarchism. In this atmosphere of regime change and intense competition for adherents, the mobilization of young people became a vital tool in building a powerful movement. Conservative parties looked to European models, especially in Italy and Germany, for ways of mobilizing young people and directing them away from membership in the revolutionary organizations of the political left. The rightist groups of all political ideologies therefore, placed an increased emphasis on the recruitment of young people and the numbers of organizations and youth groups rose steadily throughout the period. The results of this unprecedented mobilization proved overwhelmingly negative to the political system and ultimately contributed to the outbreak of civil war in 1936.[2]

Between 1914 and 1939, the young conservatives organized by the rightist parties played a subversive and destructive role in the political process. The youth groups of the political right consistently undermined, directly or indirectly, not just unfriendly administrations, but the very nature of the political system itself. Although the specific ideologies of the groups varied and changed over time, the actions of conservative youth remained consistently opposed to the political system, be it a constitutional monarchy or democratic republic. The organizations served to exacerbate political instability in three ways. First, the groups produced cadres of young people alienated from the political process who quickly learned to go outside the constitutional process to initiate change. This effect was most pronounced within the leadership of the earliest groups who went on to play important roles in the major political organizations of the Republic. In addition, the development of a national Catholic youth group during the 1920s provided organizational experience and served, despite the group's determined efforts, to politicize young people. Second, the youth groups employed modern techniques of mass mobilization and propaganda to insure widespread distribution of their subversive messages. During the Republican period this included the adoption of overtly fascist imagery even by groups who resisted the political tenets of Fascism. Finally, all of the youth groups employed violent rhetoric and sometimes direct violent action that helped to create and perpetuate a culture of conflict. The rhetorical and physical violence reinforced the belief that dramatic political change could only be achieved outside legal constraints. Only with the advent of civil war and the forced imposition of political unification and military discipline did the negative impact of young conservatives cease. By injecting a "shape note of pugnacity" into political discourse, the conservative youth groups played a key role in creating and perpetuating the political turmoil that engulfed Spain in the period 1914–39.[3]

The origins of modern Spanish conservative youth groups can be located with the foundation of the *Juventud Maurista* (JM) in 1914. The youth played an important role in the formation of the political movement named for prominent statesman Antonio Maura. Since early in the twentieth century Maura had been one of the most influential politicians of the Restoration system, leading the Conservative Party and also twice serving as president of the government. By 1913, however, Maura's position within the government and his leadership of the Conservative Party had begun to slip and he was ultimately displaced by Eduardo Dato, who also became head of the government in October of that year.[4] A group of the deposed leader's followers, at first without the explicit support of Maura himself, soon launched a distinct political movement dedicated to "interpreting [Maura's] thought, his doctrine and his example."[5] The new movement, christened *maurismo*, began with a series of meetings held in Bilbao during November 1913. José Gutiérrez-Ravé claimed that these events attracted thousands of people and that the majority were youths. Indeed, the movement proved initially quite successful at winning over segments of the Conservative Party's youth organization, including the whole of the Bilbao group, and the defectors quickly established themselves as *Juventud Maurista*. By the time the *mauristas* met in Madrid to form a central committee, the youth section of the party had claimed its own place on the organization's leadership council. From almost its origins JM proved enormously successful at mobilizing young people and enrolling them in the movement, thanks in large part to the efforts of its leader Antonio Goicoechea.[6] Although not the most charismatic leader, Goicoechea proved an effective organizer and quickly grew the Madrid group into the largest and most influential JM section. He also presided over the formation of a *Federación Nacional de Juventudes Mauristas* in April 1915.[7] Goicoechea later headed the Alfonsine monarchist group during the Republic; a group that consistently attacked the parliamentary system and incessantly agitated for its downfall.[8] José Calvo Sotelo was also an important member of JM and, like Goicoechea, played a key role in the development of Alfonsine monarchism during the 1930s.[9]

Owing to the circumstances of its initial formation and subsequent organization, *maurismo* remained rather vague in its ideological formulation, constituting "more a mood, a style or an attitude [rather] than an explicit alternative philosophy."[10] It was even unclear if *maurismo* constituted a separate party or simply a dissident segment within the traditional Conservative Party. As a result, the national movement remained undeveloped, leaving room for a great deal of regional autonomy. Among the groups who best took advantage of this ideological diffuseness and the lack of strong centralized control was JM, which quickly became the most active element of the entire movement.[11] If the overall message of the movement remained undeveloped, the youth quickly articulated a singular sense of mission to defend religion, the crown, and above all, the ideals and legacy of Antonio Maura. JM employed modern propaganda techniques to promote its agenda and at times the message sent was couched, not simply as an attack on the political parties, but rather as an assault on

the entire Restoration system. The group aimed to remake the monarchical regime into a system that reflected their ideology and one that presumably guaranteed them a position of power. JM's attacks combined with other pressures both domestic and foreign to undermine constitutional rule. By 1923, the parliamentary system of the Restoration that had functioned since 1870 was replaced by a military dictatorship under General Miguel Primo de Rivera.

The system of propaganda developed by the youth was perhaps unprecedented in modern Spanish political history since it was an effort aimed at mobilizing popular support for the movement. As a result, the members of JM viewed themselves as street fighters, contesting the political high ground with all comers, including socialists, whom they hoped to "teach a virile lesson in citizenship and patriotism."[12] The campaign generated plenty of innovative methods including famously printing "Maura, Sí!" on cigarette papers and creating a brand of liquor called Anís Maura. In addition, the group founded a newspaper, sponsored classes for workers and held mass rallies throughout the country.[13] Clearly these efforts anticipated modern techniques of mass mobilization, especially those developed by the fascist regimes of Mussolini and Hitler. Although it never fully developed to the extent of those surrounding other European leaders, there existed something of a cult of personality surrounding Maura. The youths often wrote of Maura's skills as a leader, declaring that if his reforms had been carried out, Spain would not have lost its colonies or had a war in Morocco and the political system would be free of corruption. In short, Maura was an "eminent statesman, a just and honorable man, [the] glory of the race and the Homeland."[14] The movement eventually produced a "Maurist Catechism" written by a priest who defined in general terms what it meant to be a follower. The true believer was "a man of beliefs, of ideals, of honor; a man that loves God and the Nation above all things and serves the King without deception or lies."[15]

Despite its professed loyalty to the monarchy, JM consistently attacked the current system. A letter sent to Maura in 1913 by individuals who later formed JM of Madrid stated that "the new recruits are taking up the flag that the veterans had left on the field of battle."[16] The letter continued by characterizing the crisis of the political system in terms of age and decay: "We in Spain are presently in a moment of deepest crisis: the maximum aggravation of the old humors of a governmental system contaminated from the skin to the marrow. Pus boils on the martyred corpse of the Nation, and in the heart of the pustules one perceives the growth of morbid germs."[17] Members of JM also played a key role in the formation of the paramilitary group called *Unión Ciudadana* that later named Mussolini an honorary member. *Maurismo* has been characterized as a "revolution from above" one that spoke of democracy and justice for all citizens but that took a paternalistic approach to social problems. The most radical elements of the movement, perhaps best represented by Goicoechea and JM, favored a strong executive and would enforce social and political stability while eliminating the possibility of radical change.[18] The choice of language echoed that

being produced in Italy both prior to and after the First World War. Such ideas would have an important impact in the development of Mussolini's Fascism in the post conflict period.[19] Indeed, by 1935 Goicoechea was claiming that JM had prefigured both Italian Fascism and Nazism.[20]

Another important effect of *maurismo* was the beginnings of large scale Catholic involvement in the political process. Defense of religion emerged as one of the movement's fundamental ideas and such attention helped politicize "neutral Catholics" who had previously remained aloof from the system.[21] The failure of Maura to form a national unity government in 1918, however, caused many to lose faith in constitutional government.[22] Catholics were drawn into legal political activity but the failure of those early actions led many to the conclusion that such methods were unable to definitively protect the interests of the church. At the same time the modern techniques of political action employed by JM, including militant language, the distribution of widespread propaganda and the holding of mass meetings, provided a blueprint for extra parliamentary action. The key role played by young people in the Maurist movement, along with other European examples, convinced influential Catholics of the importance of young people in any type of social or political movement. Inspired by an Italian party, Spanish Catholics created the *Partido Social Popular* (PSP) in 1922. The organization represented the first truly modern political party in Spain designed to protect Catholic interests.[23] The PSP also quickly formed a youth organization called *Vanguardia Social Popular,* whose first president was José María Gil Robles.[24] The initial period of large scale Catholic involvement in politics also corresponded with the formation of youth groups aimed at mobilizing and educating the next generation of believers. Although generally apolitical, the Catholic youth organizations served as a training ground for the conservative politicians, including Gil Robles, who later played key roles in the parties of the 1930s.[25]

The Primo de Rivera dictatorship limited the ability of conservatives to form political organizations, including youth groups. Such restrictions did not apply to the development of youth organizations by the Catholic Church, as long as they remained apolitical. The first such group, and the most important, was the *Juventud Católica Española* (JCE). The formation of the JCE in 1923 followed European models but also evolved from the Catholic Church's increased emphasis on its role in the intellectual and moral education of young people. It was also an attempt to stave off what many saw as the pernicious effects of modern culture and society.[26] One goal of the organization was to create a cadre of highly educated and devoted young Catholics who would defend the nation from moral decay and the church from attacks on the faith.[27] This didactic mission might have been influenced by the actions of JM, who had earlier attempted to inculcate the values of patriotism and religiosity through the widespread mobilization of young people. In some ways JCE was formed to be the youth equivalent of the lay organization called *Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas* (ACNP). Founded in 1909, ACNP was an elitist group of devoted Catholics

who believed that they had been chosen by God to protect the Church and to lead Spain back to its traditional values.[28] Both ACNP and JCE served as developmental organizations for the conservative political parties of the Republic, proving especially important in forming the leadership of these groups. Young men initially joined JCE before graduating to membership in ACNP, where the political affiliations varied but never included anyone enrolled in a republican, socialist or communist party.[29] Perhaps the most famous and influential member of ACNP during the Republic was José María Gil Robles who led the *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* (CEDA) between 1933 and 1936.

Throughout the 1920s the JCE stressed its role in educating urban, middle-class men in the importance of defending the Catholic faith. The organization studiously avoided any direct political involvement, although many of its members supported the Primo de Rivera regime. Throughout the group's existence, church officials and JCE leaders tried to limit the overt politicization of young people. Nevertheless, along with an emphasis on Catholic faith, the organization celebrated the era of the Catholic Kings and indirectly promoted the connection between throne and altar. It was clear that for many in the organization, the mission of the JCE to defend the faith necessarily entailed a political struggle. Other developments highlighted the same connection such as the 1919 ceremony where the king officially gave the nation over to the Sacred Heart of Jesus at Cerro de los Ángeles. It is not surprising that devotion to the Sacred Heart increased during the 1920s, precisely at the moment when the JCE was first being formed.[30] Under these circumstances the distinction between religion and politics evaporated despite the refusal of JCE to declare itself in favor of any single party. In a sense, the JCE remained above party politics while continuing to organize and mobilize cadres of youths dedicated to a conservative ideology that linked defense of religion with defense of the nation.[31] Once the heavy hand of the dictatorship was removed, the JCE struggled to maintain its official stance against political involvement. In the Republic's first days, the organization mobilized its adherents to combat anti-clerical legislation through "direct and effective action."[32] As the Republic developed, the JCE found it increasingly difficult to prevent its members from becoming politically active, especially as the conservative political parties stepped up efforts to recruit young people. In addition, political involvement began to be viewed as a lesser evil compared to the possibility of increased secularization or the advent of a revolutionary regime. Even violence could be justified, if it was practiced in defense of the moral and religious values held by the organization.[33] Feliciano Montero suggests that the attitude of the JCE may have hindered the development of a Catholic party dedicated to Christian democracy.[34] In this way the youth of JCE could be directed to those parties who at best held a tepid loyalty to the Republican system and at worst actively aimed to destroy it. Despite its nature as a religious organization rather than a political group, the JCE still employed modern techniques of mass mobilization. Each JCE center had its own flag and in the aftermath of the October 1934 revolt some favored the creation of a "Civic Movement" to aid authorities during times of crisis. In addition, the organization would be

charged with the vaguely militaristic task of "[defending] the principles of our society."[35]

The regime of General Primo de Rivera, following the model of the Fascist party in Italy, attempted to create a national youth movement.[36] Owing in part to fears that such a party would be uncontrollable, the *Juventud de la Unión Patriótica* (JUP) never became an effective national organization. Throughout the regime the JUP's role was largely to hold rallies, attend patriotic ceremonies, and sponsor soccer tournaments. Its stated goals of indoctrinating and mobilizing young people to defend Spain and the dictatorship remained largely unrealized. One local leader of the group complained in a letter to the dictator that JUP's lack of development had created "youths who sleep like octogenarians."[37] In addition, when organized groups of university students began the first serious protests against the regime in 1928, the JUP proved unable to respond to this threat and failed to mount an effective defense of the regime's policies.[38] In the final years of the dictatorship, some effort was made to increase the combative potential of the JUP. The organization's rhetoric became increasingly heated and the group began to take a more ambivalent attitude toward the use of violence, declaring that they would defend Spain "to victory or death."[39] Despite such efforts the organization, like the regime itself, was unable to stem the tide of discontent.[40] Nevertheless, the JUP, like other rightist youth groups before it, had served as both training and, more importantly, as a lesson to the conservative youth groups that emerged in the final years of the monarchy and into the Republican period.[41] The succeeding groups that formed in the wake of the dictatorship took from the JUP's failure to staunch the student rebellion the lesson that a militarized youth organization was essential to defending the existing social order. The small groups formed at the end of the dictatorship, such as the *Juventud de la Unión Monárquica Nacional* and the *Juventudes Monárquicas Independientes* encouraged street fights with both leftist students and the growing ranks of young socialists.[42] Such activities would be taken up by the next generation of conservative youth organizations, including the *Juventud de Acción Popular* (JAP) and the *Falange Española* (FE).

One of the most original groups formed in the wake of the dictatorship was the *Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista* (JONS), which began in October 1931. The organization resulted from the fusion of two smaller groups led by Ramiro Ledesma Ramos and Onésimo Redondo Ortega. Throughout its brief history, the JONS would be one of the few conservative youth groups whose ideology posited a truly revolutionary role for young people and was not simply an organization designed to mobilize them on behalf of a traditional political cause. The JONS developed a program that celebrated both the destructive and creative role of young people in Spanish politics. The speeches and writings of both men emphasized the need to rally young people into action, both to defend true Spanish values but also to topple the existing political and social system.[43] Ledesma described the type of individual wanted by the movement: "we seek militant young squads without any hypocrisy about guns and military discipline."[44] Redondo echoed such sentiments: "Young people must be trained in physical combat, must love violence as a system, must arm themselves with whatever they

can, and must be prepared to finish off by whatever means a few dozen Marxist imposters."[45] Later, as the Republican system grew increasingly polarized, Ledesma penned a tract that identified youth as the only force capable of creating a new and powerful Spain based on the principles of national socialism. He justified the use of violence by arguing that such actions constituted a moral force overthrowing false values and defending the nation against its enemies.[46] Although not initially very significant, the JONS probably represented the first true example of generic Fascism to emerge in Spain prior to the Civil War.[47] Only after February 1934, when the group fused with the nascent *Falange Español* (FE), did it begin to play a significant role in political developments.

The FE had been formed scarcely three months earlier in the fall of 1933 by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the former dictator. From the beginning the organization received financial support from the most ardent monarchist groups including Calvo Sotelo's *Renovación Español* (RE).[48] Along with personal connections, the two organizations shared a desire for both a moral and political change in Spain, followed by the creation of an authoritarian state. Unlike Ledesma, José Antonio and the FE never made youth a central focus of the party's ideological formation. To be sure the "vocabulary of mystical exaltation, sacrifice and violence, national mission and revolution" clearly resonated with young people and they formed the backbone of the organization's support.[49] From the start the FE remained open to the possibility of using violence to effect political change. In his remarks at the founding of the FE in October 1933, José Antonio declared that violence was justified in defense of justice or the nation, and he famously spoke of the "dialectic of fists and pistols."[50]

Although FE never achieved any real position of political authority it proved influential in two important respects. To begin with, the rhetoric of violence made the FE the target of attacks by the increasingly radicalized socialist and communist youth groups, especially during the spring of 1936. The response of the FE, although muted at first, soon escalated into a series of street fights and shootings that left dozens of young people dead. The level of political violence gave the impression of a society on the brink of collapse, and as such contributed to the general climate of polarization that soon exploded into outright war.[51] The FE also became the scaffolding upon which Franco constructed the political regime that emerged during the course of the Civil War. FE's original 27-point program (minus one) was soon promulgated as the movement's official ideology and important members of the organization continued to serve in the new administration. Perhaps the most prominent was Sancho Dávila, one of the closest allies of José Antonio from the start of the FE, who was named the first director of the Francoist *Organización Juvenil* (OJ) during the Civil War.[52]

Although the FE was probably the most famous youth group in Spain prior to the Civil War it was not the most successful or powerful. Instead the largest and most influential conservative youth organization of the Second Republic was the JAP.[53] The party drew on previous conservative youth organizations for both its inspiration and its leadership. One scholar has called the JAP the direct heirs to JM, especially concerning the emphasis on

defending religion and the social order from revolutionary threats. The first director of the JAP was José Maria Valiente, who had previously served in the leadership of the short-lived *Vanguardia Social Popular.*[54] Source limitations make any estimate of the organization's numbers problematic, but a reasonable suggestion puts the figure at something like 200,000.[55] The JAP's greatest strength echoed that of its parent organization, the CEDA, and was concentrated in Castile, especially around Madrid, although substantial numbers also existed in Andalusia and Valencia. Like previous youth organizations on the political right, the social origins of the *japistas* were predominantly in the urban middle class.[56] Ideologically, the JAP differed little from that of the CEDA as the political statements of the youth group's publications were strictly controlled by Gil Robles and *cedista* leadership.[57] In this sense, the JAP's importance lies not in its articulation of a unique political identity based on youth but rather as an agent of radicalization, especially in the period following the October 1934 revolt. The imagery and rhetoric of the organization mimicked that of international fascist organizations and significantly heightened the atmosphere of political tension. Simon Lowe argues that the presence of the JAP as a "fascist option" explains the limited growth of the FE prior to the spring of 1936.[58]

The effectiveness of conservative efforts to mobilize youth during the Republic, especially the JAP, can be clearly seen at the local and regional level. Cadres of young rightists often provided the most energetic and enthusiastic supporters of the conservative parties. In Galicia during the first month of the Republic, conservatives quickly recognized the need to form a unified movement to defend traditional values and pursue a conservative political agenda. In a few cases, such as the cities of La Coruña and Lugo, youth groups organized themselves before any official party had been formed. Eventually, the province's conservative youths were united into the *Juventud de Unión Regional de Derechas* which came into being by the end of 1931. The group's foundational manifesto attacked the Republican system, declaring it to be a "bastard trick" hidden behind the words of "Liberty and Democracy"[59] By 1934 the organization had affiliated with the JAP and became the most active and vocal element of the conservative movement in Galicia, including stating at one point that "life is combat."[60] A similar arc of development occurred in Toledo, where conservatives used the *Juventud Católica de Toledo* to organize youth in protest of the Republic's anticlerical legislation. Eventually the region formed its own branch of the JAP and counted representatives from more than fifty towns in the regional group. Throughout the Republic the youth served to organize and attend patriotic meetings, including ceremonies honoring soldiers killed in the October 1934 revolt and the mass JAP rally held in Uclés in 1935.[61]

The period between October 1934 and February 1936 marked a time of tremendous growth for the JAP. The group, along with the CEDA, helped mobilize conservative members of the middle classes who had been previously uncommitted to the political process. Members across the country embarked on a campaign to increase participation, and to a certain extent, radicalize the base of the organization. The JAP also began publication of

a journal called *J.A.P.* Officially the party disdained political violence, but the aggressive tone of the journal belied such notions. Articles continually spoke of the need to "smash," "crush," and "annihilate" foreign invaders who threatened the integrity of a unified and powerful Spain.[62] Other writings attacked the liberal parliamentary system and exhorted readers to defend religion and the social order.[63] The JAP appropriated the trappings of Fascism, including the development of a cult of personality surrounding the leader, or *jefe*, Gil Robles. In a gesture perhaps taken from the activities of the Juventud Maurista, the JAP even produced Gil Robles cigarette papers. Because Gil Robles had attended and had been favorably impressed by the Nuremburg rallies, the JAP organized its own mass meetings. These events were characterized by the presence of banners and cadres of uniformed *japistas* displaying the organization's symbol. The imagery featured the Cross of Victory on a white background (to symbolize purity) surrounded by a red field (to recall the blood of martyrs).[64] The leadership of the CEDA also utilized the meetings as an opportunity to announce major new initiatives, especially those that could be potentially controversial. The decision to finally enter the government, an event that triggered the October revolution, was made at a JAP rally in September 1934.[65] The JAP used violent rhetoric to construct a political movement dedicated to replacing the Republican system with something more authoritarian, although the exact nature of this new state remained undeveloped. The paradoxical rhetoric emanating from the JAP, in which exhortations to aggressive defense were combined with renunciations of physical violence, could only function in relationship with a political organization supremely confident in its ability to win power. Following the CEDA's defeat at the polls in 1936, many *japistas* lost faith in the legal means to achieving power and either fled the organization to join more aggressive groups or left politics altogether.[66] Although the exodus of membership was not as great as has been assumed, it is clear that the relatively legalist option had by that point run its course. Many *japistas* flocked to other, more militantly violent groups such as the FE and Carlists, while others began to actively join the nascent military conspiracy.[67]

While many of the conservatives who first learned the value of mobilizing young people worked within the CEDA during the Republic, others resisted the Catholic parties 'accidentalist' attitude and remained committed monarchists. Alfonsine monarchists such as Goicoechea and Calvo Sotelo eventually created *Renovación Español* (RE). Throughout the Republic, RE was one of the most recalcitrant enemies of the constitutional system.[68] The organization's youth movement, called *Juventud de Renovación Española* (JRE), was developed to form the political vanguard of the movement and eventually took on some fascist characteristics including uniforms (gray shirts and green berets) and a salute. From the start, JRE remained completely subordinate to the main party because the leadership feared giving the organization too much autonomy. Within months, however, the young members of JRE were engaging in street fights and gun battles, culminating with the murder of an anarchist worker in April 1933. Eventually RE cracked down on the most violent elements of JRE and

placed the group under even tighter controls.[69]

The Carlist movement was another monarchist organization that sought to mobilize youth to destroy the Republic and initiate an authoritarian monarchy. With the fall of Primo de Rivera, the group soon began to regroup and reorganize its energies toward effecting dramatic political change. One result of this reformulation was the creation of a highly militarized section of young adherents. The movement's steadfast anti-Republican position had already begun to attract elements who had originally affiliated with *Juventud de la Unión Monárquica Nacional.* Eventually the Carlists relaunched themselves as the Carlist Traditionalist Communion in 1932.[70] As part of the new movement, the Carlists formed a student group called *Agrupación Escolar Tradicionalista* (AET), which, in part influenced by the rise of Hitler in Germany, became increasingly radicalized over the course of the Republic.[71] The formation of the student group represented the growing importance of young people within Carlism during the Republic. Martin Blinkhorn characterized the organization in Andalusia as a "youth movement" that played a significant role in electing several young (in their 20s or 30s) deputies to the parliament. The strength of Carlism in the south of the country and the growing importance of the younger generation crystallized with the naming of Manuel Fal Conde (at age forty) head of the national movement in May 1934. The increasing role played by young people is also reflected in the fact that while the movement as a whole gained members during the Republic, it was the youth sections that saw the most dramatic growth.[72] By early 1934 the movement boasted of having 700,000 adherents and over 800 youth sections.[73] Along with the AET the organization founded the *Juventud Española Tradicionalista* and a group for children called *Pelayos.* Members paid a special tithe to generate funds in support of the youth organizations. The radicalization of the youth, and the entire movement, accelerated in the final years of the Republic. Perhaps the most important effect was the development of the Carlist militia called the *Requeté,* which recruited youths, especially those with military potential, from AET. By 1935 special emphasis was placed on military training in order to be prepared for what they saw as an inevitable rising against the Republic.[74] During 1934–36 the AET worked closely with the Fascist student group and contributed to the rising level of political violence, especially in Madrid.[75]

The start of the Civil War in July 1936 significantly changed the landscape for conservative youth groups. Some, including the JAP, withered and died during the war, while others prospered. Since the uprising had been planned and led by members of the armed forces, the needs of the military overshadowed the desires of the conservative political organizations and their youth groups. The effective mobilization and utilization of young people quickly became a priority for the Nationalist regime. Soon many of the youth militias organized by FE or the Carlists were placed under military command, and within a year plans began to be made for the development of an organization that would indoctrinate young people and encourage support for the new regime. Franco and the other leaders of the uprising recog-

nized the need to educate the flood of new members attracted to the Nationalist cause, including young people. In addition, Franco viewed the regime of Primo de Rivera as a model, but one whose mistakes needed to be avoided.[76] The political unification of the Nationalist forces that occurred in 1937 also included the formation of a new youth organization. Much like the decision to fuse all of the conservative political organizations into the *Falange Española Tradicionalista de la JONS* (FET), the formation of a single youth organization was designed to minimize conflict within the Nationalist forces and create an organizational foundation for the new regime. It also seems that the disorientation and chaos that followed the start of the war had allowed for a great deal of local autonomy and the military administration wished to eliminate that freedom. Sancho Dávila characterized the situation during the first few months of the war as an "abundance of improvisations" when many "impious" individuals flocked to join the Nationalists.[77] Clearly the regime viewed young people with both optimism and apprehension. The lessons of previous youth groups had clearly demonstrated the political and social power of young people. After all, the agitations of the young Maurists had sped the downfall of the Restoration system while the actions of student protestors contributed to the resignation of Primo de Rivera. However, the leaders of the military rising also understood that when given too much autonomy, the youth groups could become unpredictable and uncontrollable. Therefore, the new youth group needed to be highly organized and completely under the discipline of its adult leaders. The new group, called *Organización Juvenil,* was officially launched on May 28, 1938. It was designed "to shape [youth] ideologically, physically and technically" and to provide future members of the FET.[78] The movement's two primary goals were the development of Catholic values and paramilitary training. Through each they emphasized values such as discipline, subordination, and cooperation. As a result, the political power of young people diminished—at least until student protests of 1956 initiated a new generation of youth mobilization.

Notes

1. See, Anne E. Gorsuch, *Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, Delinquents* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); Tracy H. Koon, *Believe, Obey, Fight: Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Italy, 1922–1943* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), and Michael Kater, *Hitler Youth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
2. This is not to say that youth organizations on the political left did not also play a crucial role, however, the focus of this chapter is on the role played by the political right. See, Sandra Souto Kustrín, "Taking the Street: Workers' Youth Organizations and the Political Conflict in the Spanish Second Republic," *European History Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2004): 131–56 and Sandra Souto Kustrín, "Entre el Parlemento y la calle: políticas gubernamentales y organizaciones juveniles en la Segunda República," *Ayer* 59, no. 3 (2005): 97–122. For the development of youth groups in Barcelona see, Joan B. Culla y Clarà, "Ni tan jóvenes, ni tan bárbaros. La Juventudes en el republicanismo lerrouxista barcelonés," *Ayer* 59, no. 3 (2005): 51–67, and Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, "Los 'malos de la película': la Joventuts d'Esquerra Republicana-Estat Català y la problemática de un 'fascismo catalán,'" *Ayer* 59, no. 3 (2005): 147–72.
3. The quotation is from Stanley Payne, *Fascism in Spain, 1923–1977* (Madison: University of Wisconsin

Press, 1999), 19.

4. Luis Arranz, Mercedes Cabrera and Fernando del Rey, "The Assault on liberalism, 1914–1923," in *Spanish History since 1808*, ed. José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (London: Arnold, 2000), 193. See also Javier Tusell and Juan Avilés, *La derecho a española contemporánea. Sus orígenes: el maurismo* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1986), esp. chapter 2.
5. José Gutiérrez-Ravé, *Yo fui un joven maurista* (Madrid: Libros y revistas, 1946), 165.
6. Ibid., 164–65, 178, 189.
7. Julio Gil Pecharromán, *Conservadores subversivos. La derecha autoritaria Alfonsina (1913–1936)* (Madrid: Eudema, 1994), 14. Gutiérrez-Ravé, 189, 192.
8. On the group's actions see Gil Pecharromán and Paul Preston, "Alfonsist Monarchism and the Coming of the Spanish Civil War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 7, nos. 3/4 (1972): 89–114.
9. Other members, such as Luis de Onís, who was one of the leaders of JM in Madrid, later played a role in the formation of the CEDA in 1933. José R. Montero, *La CEDA. El catolicismo social y politico en la II República* (Madrid: Ediciones de la Revista de Trabajo, 1977), 1:554.
10. Stanley Payne, "Spanish Conservatism 1914–1923," *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 4 (1978): 782.
11. Gil Pecharromán, 14.
12. Gutiérrez-Ravé, 187.
13. Ibid., 188–89, 193.
14. Ibid., 196.
15. Ibid., 197.
16. Ibid., 176.
17. Ibid.
18. Gil Pecharromán, 16, 19, 32.
19. Walter L. Adamson, *Avant-Garde Florence: From Modernism to Fascism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
20. Gil Pecharromán, 31.
21. Ibid., 13.
22. William J. Callahan, *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1998* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University Press of America, 2000), 98.
23. Ibid., 99–100.
24. José Maria Báez y Pérez de Tudela, "El ruido y la nueces: La Juventud de Acción Popular y la movilización 'cívica' Católica durante la Segunda República," *Ayer* 59, no. 3 (2005): 126. Another prominent member of PSP was José Calvo Sotelo. Gutiérrez-Ravé, 263.
25. Chiaki Watanabe, *Confesionalidad Católica y militanca política: La Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas y la Juventud Católica Española (1923–1936)* (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educacción a Distancia Ediciones, 2003), 95.
26. See for example, Máximo Molina Collada, *El llamado modernismo en la vida actual. Su influencia higiénica y moral en la educación de la Juventud de ambos sexos* (Madrid: Imprenta de la Ciudad Lineal, 1924).
27. Watanabe, 17.
28. José Manuel Ordovas, *Historia de la Asociacíon Católica Nacional de Propagandistas. De la Dictadura a la Segunda República 1923–1936* (Pamplona: EUNSA, 1993).
29. Watanabe, 76.
30. Ibid., 124, 133, 193.
31. See, Feliciano Montero, "Juventud y política: Los movimientos juveniles de inspiracion Católica en España: 1920–1970," *Studia histroica* 5, no. 4 (1987): 108.
32. Watanabe, 228.

33. Ibid., 302, 303, 308.
34. Montero, "Juventud," 114.
35. Watanabe, 160, 312.
36. The "parent" organization was the dictator's *Unión Patriótica*. On the legacy of UP see Shlomo Ben-Ami, "The Forerunners of Spanish Fascism: Unión Patriótica and Unión Monárquica," in *Spain in Conflict, 1931–1939. Democracy and its Enemies*, ed. Martin Blinhorn (London: Sage Publications, 1986). See also, Eduardo González Calleja, *La España de Primo de Rivera. La modernización autoritaria 1932–1930* (Madrid: Alianza editorial, 2005) and Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Fascism from Above: The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923–1930* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
37. Alejandro Quiroga Fernández de Soto, "Perros de paja: las Juventudes de la Unión Patriótica," *Ayer* 59, no. 3 (2005): 80.
38. Protests on campus were largely the result of actions by the liberal student organization *Federación Universitaria Escolar* (FUE), founded in 1926. In addition, demographic shifts and the Primo de Rivera regime's emphasis on developing the educational system had led to an explosive rise in the number of students attending university. In 1922 the total number of students was 18,696; by 1929 the figure had grown to almost 60,000. González Calleja, *La España de Primo de Rivera*, 86, 90.
39. Quiroga Fernández de Soto, 89.
40. An Italian publication concluded that the dictatorship's inability to mobilize the support of young people had contributed to its downfall. Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, 36–37.
41. Quiroga Fernández de Soto, 71–72, 86, 91–92.
42. The JUMN was formed in 1930, and its top men included many former leaders of JUP. Quiroga Fernández de Soto, 93–94. On the JUMN's parent, the *Unión Monarquica* see, Ben-Ami, "The Forerunners of Spanish Fascism," 114–26. For *Juventudes Monárquicas Independientes* see Eugenio Vegas Latapie, *Memorias políticas. El suicido de la Monarquía y la Segunda República* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1983), 74–85.
43. Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, 61, 63.
44. Quoted in ibid., 59.
45. Quoted in ibid., 104.
46. Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, *Fascismo en España? Discurso a las Juventudes de España* (Espulgues de Llobregat: Ediciones Ariel, 1968), 209–10, 255–56.
47. Gil Pecharromán, 153.
48. Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, 89, 92.
49. By 1936 over half of FE's membership was under 21 years of age and this caused some tensions, especially after the fusion with the JONS, between the youths and the older, original members of the party. Ibid., 100, 141, 165.
50. "Discurso de la fundación de la Falange Española" (speech, Teatro de la Comedia, Madrid, October 29, 1933). José Antonio Primo de Rivera, *Escritos y Discurso. Obras completas (1922–1936)*, ed. Agustin del Rio Cisneros (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1976), 1:191, 194.
51. Eduardo González Calleja, "The Symbolism of Violence during the Second Republic," in *The Splintering of Spain. Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939*, ed. Chris Ealham and Michael Richards, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 38–42.
52. Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, 81, 303.
53. A contemporary account of the formation of the JAP can be found in José Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular. Estudios de biología política* (Madrid: Sáez Hermanos, 1936). See, also José Maria Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1968), chapter 10.
54. Báez y Pérez de Tudela, 125, 126. The JAP also owed something to Primo de Rivera's JUP as both organizations claimed the Virgin of Pilar as patrons. Quiroga Fernández de Soto, 88.
55. Simon Lowe, "The Juventud de Acción Popular and the 'Failure' of 'Fascism' in Spain, 1932–1936" (master's thesis, University of Sheffield, 2000), 12. For a discussion of the problems with sources see, 10–11.

56. Ibid., 14, 20, 23–24.

57. Báez y Pérez de Tudela, 127, 129. By 1936, during the critical electoral period, the director of JAP was José María Fernández Ladreda who had been vice president of the JAP at its founding and led the powerful Asturian section of Acción Popular. Báez y Pérez de Tudela, 127. Montero, *La CEDA*, 1:620, states that this may have been to avoid fines but it may also have insured that its output remained consistent with the ideology of AP and the CEDA.

58. Lowe, 6, 96.

59. Emilio Francisco Grandio Seoane, "El desarollo politico de un Partido "defensivo' en la Galicia de la II República. La contrarrevolución parlementaria: la Unión Regional de Dererchas," in *Estudios sobre la derecha contemporanea*, ed. Javier Tusell, Julio Gil Pecharromán, and Feliciano Montero (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educacción a Distancia, 1993), 425, 426, 429.

60. Grandio Seoane, 436, 437.

61. Carlos Maria Rodríguez López-Brea, "Dos claves de la política de Acción Popular durante la II República: agrarismo y catolicismo. El ejemplo de Toledo," in Tusell, Gil Pecharromán, and Montero, 532, 534, 539, 543.

62. Lowe, 13, 44, 45.

63. Báez y Pérez de Tudela, 129.

64. On the cult of personality see Lowe, 60–62, on the rallies, 68, notes 252 and 253.

65. Báez y Pérez de Tudela, 128.

66. Ibid., 139, 144.

67. Lowe argues that the number of *japistas* who left to join the FE was less than ten percent. While this represented a huge growth for the FE it was not a significant reduction in JAP membership. Lowe, 90.

68. On RE see Gil Pecharromán, esp. chapter 5.

69. Ibid., 150–52.

70. Martin Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 70, 73, 76, 134.

71. Eduardo González Calleja, "Hacia una nueva 'guerra carlista' (1931–1939)," in *El Carlismo y la guerras carlistas. Hechos, hombres e ideas*, ed. Julio Aróstegui, Jordi Canal, and Eduardo González Calleja (Madrid: La esfera de los libros, 2003), 109–10.

72. Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis*, 116, 134, 138–39. González Calleja describes the ascension of Fal Conde as a "generational break" and argues this signaled the triumph of the most radical elements of the movement. González Calleja, "Hacia una nueva 'guerra carlista'," 111.

73. González Calleja, "Hacia una nueva 'guerra carlista'," 110.

74. Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis*, 209–11, 214.

75. Ibid., 182, 235.

76. Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, 240, 244, 253.

77. Sancho Dávila, *De la O.J. al Frente de Juventudes* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1941), 45, 64.

78. Ibid., 14.

CHAPTER 3

Pragmatism Unveiled: The Meanings of Revolutionary Rhetoric in Spanish Anarchosyndicalism

JORDI W. GETMAN-ERASO

The last six decades have produced considerable research devoted to determining who was to blame for the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). The anarchosyndicalist labor union *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (National Confederation of Labor or CNT), has always been at the heart of this debate. Contemporary interpretations of the Civil War pointed overwhelmingly to the CNT syndicates as crucial to the breakdown of the Second Republic and as the leading instigators of the accompanying social revolution. At the beginning of the conflict, rightist conspirators justified their coup against the Republican government as a preemptive strike against an imminent leftist revolutionary insurrection led by anarchosyndicalists and socialists.[2] Within the leftist camp, Communists and Socialists accused the CNT of undermining the war effort against the rightist Nationalists by giving priority to the social revolution.[3] Historians have continued this tendency by ascribing the anarchosyndicalist movement and the CNT responsibility for the political polarization of the spring and summer of 1936.[4]

For years the CNT's militancy had preached the overthrow of the capitalist system and the establishment of *comunismo libertario* (libertarian communism).[5] CNT syndicates rose up on three occasions between 1932 and 1933, hoping to incite popular revolt.[6] In 1934, the Socialist-led revolt in the province of Asturias received active CNT support.[7] Although all these insurrectionary attempts failed and the CNT was severely repressed by state authorities after each incident, new threats of insurgency continued to appear in the anarchosyndicalist press. Indeed, what seized the imagination of contemporaries was the threatening revolutionary character of the movement. Socialists of the *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT) and *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) and the Communists in the *Partido Comunista Español* (PCE) proclaimed similar revolutionary aims, but their participation in the political system implied an acceptance of the state and the political superstructure, at least

temporarily.[8] On the other hand, the CNT's refusal to participate in the electoral process placed the syndicate conceptually outside the political establishment, and as such, came to be seen as a genuinely revolutionary movement.[9] No other labor organization or political group incorporated revolutionary rhetoric in its discourse to this degree. A similar fascination with the CNT's revolutionary character has dominated scholarly analysis of anarchosyndicalism. In nearly all studies of the movement, the focal point of inquiry has been the movement's revolutionary character and the working-class consciousness of which it was thought to be the manifestation.[10] These studies have analyzed the Spanish anarchosyndicalist movement almost exclusively in terms of its ideological rhetoric. Thus, from the beginning, there was virtual unanimity among observers that anarchosyndicalism had to be interpreted in the context of its ideological goals.

In contrast to the prevalent approaches to anarchosyndicalism, whose starting point is some conception of the revolutionary temperament of the movement, I would argue that the ideologies that informed the anarchosyndicalist movement cannot be discussed in abstraction from their practical deployment. The general tendency has been to accept the literal meaning of revolutionary language *ipso facto*. All too often, revolutionary talk has been interpreted as revolutionary intentions, planning, and action. However, the meaning of anarchosyndicalist revolutionary language cannot simply be inferred from quotation taken out of context.[11] A close look at the CNT organizational press, local meeting notes, and syndicate congress notes reveals a significant and complex pragmatic context for the use of revolutionary rhetoric, one that communicated messages that reached beyond the simply dogmatic. Without dismissing ideological inspiration, I argue in favor of placing more emphasis on the practical influences and motivations for the use of revolutionary rhetoric in CNT circles. My intention is not to reject the presence and strong influence of revolutionary factions within the anarchosyndicalist movement; these existed without question. My objective is to delve into the other practical uses of the revolutionary rhetoric that identified the movement. By freeing the interpretation of revolutionary language from *a priori* ideological inferences, it becomes possible to establish a more precise relationship between ideological rhetoric, its intended meaning(s), and the CNT's policies and actions during the Second Republic.

Ideological Origins and Practical Finalities

The CNT was founded in 1910 to give concrete form to an amalgamation of ideological projects, among which we can include anarchism and revolutionary syndicalism that came to be identified as anarchosyndicalism. Defining this ideological construct, however, is a complex task. The malleable and flexible nature of the CNT, composed of numerous and diverse ideological factions, lends support to a great variety of interpretations, making it difficult to define appropriately and completely this composite ideology.[12] Ideological influences included the proto-anarchism of Proudhon, the anarcho-communism of Michail Bakunin, the

anarcho-collectivism of Kropotkin, the revolutionary syndicalism of George Sorel, and the federalism of Pi i Margall, though the theoretical spectrum spread wide enough to include Stirnean and Nietzschean antisocial individualism and such peripheral groups as vegetarians and nudists.[13] In fact, the *Federación Anarquista Ibérica* (Iberian Anarchist Federation, or FAI), the extra-official ideological branch of the CNT dedicated to the integration of *la específica* (the anarchist ideal) into the labor syndicate, was founded in 1927 during a gathering of anarcho-nudists on the beaches of Valencia.[14]

With so many varying tendencies, the only common thread uniting all of the CNT's ideological factions was a strong rejection of the state.[15] This strong anti-statist and, by extension, antiestablishment principle was the most distinctive identifying characteristic of the CNT. It made the syndicate unique and placed it on a different operational plane.[16] Scholars have traditionally considered the CNT's anti-statist stance and the predominant use of revolutionary rhetoric that accompanied it convincing enough proof of the revolutionary nature of the movement. After all, had the membership not favored the revolution in some form or another, would it not have opted for other more reformist-oriented labor organizations, such as the Socialist UGT, especially after the entrance of its political arm, the PSOE, into the government in 1931?[17] Members of the CNT must have ultimately preferred the radical alternatives offered by the CNT's revolutionary platform.

A new generation of scholars has recently veered away from this previously dominant analytical paradigm to argue instead the importance of practical factors in explaining the popularity and success of the CNT.[18] Mercedes Vilanova and Anna Monjo's extensive oral histories have confirmed what for years was claimed by many within the CNT, that a great majority of the union's membership was more concerned with practical bread-and-butter issues than with the coming of a social revolution.[19] As these recent contributions have revealed, workers chose to enroll in the CNT in large part because of the success of its labor tactics and its defense of workers' practical interests. This new interpretational paradigm differentiates between militants, who typically understood their role in the CNT in ideological terms and included some type of belief in the eventual coming of the revolution, and the rank-and-file, who had little if any knowledge of revolutionary theory and saw in the CNT an effective representative for the attainment of practical improvements in the workplace.[20]

Other new studies have further expanded our understanding of the role played by the CNT outside of the factory or workplace to include the worker *barrios* (neighborhoods), where it is argued the union's militants helped create a separate worker's "public sphere" and fulfilled the role of service providers for a worker society that had largely been marginalized by the dominant social and political groups and the state.[21] The CNT represented an alternative social and cultural framework that rationalized the structures of everyday life for the underprivileged in the socioeconomic order. Within the syndicate, the worker found protection from employer, church, and state repression. The CNT offered workers a distinct set of social norms and cultural mores and a rapid and effective executive element that resolved

conflicts in both the workplace and the worker neighborhood.[22] In addition, obtaining a position of influence within the CNT offered the worker the possibility of upward mobility that had been continually denied him by "bourgeois" society. The CNT organizational framework provided an alternative social structure within which enterprising workers could climb to higher levels, gaining respect and authority.

However, placing a strong emphasis on the pragmatic motivations for enrolling in the CNT raises the question of why the rank-and-file did not respond negatively to the evident use of revolutionary rhetoric within the CNT, but in large part accepted it and even embraced it as representative of its experience and perceived place in society. At the same time, however, this acceptance did not translate into support for the various revolutionary insurrections organized and led by the syndicate's radical anarchist elements in 1932 and 1933. The *tres ochos* were overwhelming failures largely because they received very little support from *cenetista* workers. Why would CNT members who accepted and used revolutionary rhetoric not join the revolutionary act when it presented itself? The traditionally accepted answer is that the much smaller militant base manipulated the syndicate's democratic decision-making process to impose their ideological prerogatives.[23] The revolutionary discourse of militants, especially radical anarchists, aimed to push the CNT down the road to revolution without recognizing that its much more pragmatic constituency was more concerned with bread-and-butter issues. Although partially correct, this explanation fails to consider the need of militant elites to cultivate the support of the rank-and-file to preserve their dominance within the organizational hierarchy.[24] Even if one accepts the assertion that the CNT was largely controlled from the top down, the perceived influence of the rank-and-file membership's mindset on decisions made by the organizational hierarchy and the language militants used to communicate with the lower echelons of the CNT cannot be underestimated. If the largely ideologically indifferent constituency had not accepted the militants' rhetoric, they might have retracted their support or perhaps even have left the movement.

I would argue that the conceptual distance between militants and rank-and-file was not so large. The ideologically indifferent rank-and-file did not reject revolutionary discourse outright. They could identify with the revolutionary language without necessarily believing in or desiring an immediate revolution. In this context, workers understood mentions of the revolution to be more than direct references to the complete destruction of the bourgeois world and the imposition of *comunismo libertario.* Anarchosyndicalist revolutionary rhetoric combined abstract notions of a utopian tomorrow with references to the concrete changes and benefits instituted by workers' *acción directa* (direct action) labor tactics.[25] I would further argue that for many workers, the CNT's anti-statism did not so much represent revolutionary conviction as the defense of a separate worker space and society in the *barrio* beyond the reach of government authorities and outside the influence of bourgeois culture. To these *cenetistas,* belonging to the syndicate or being sympathetic to the anarchosyndicalist movement symbolized active (and real) participation in an ongoing experiment in social

self-governance, which though initially limited to the worker *barrios,* found its way into the workplace and the political sphere through the CNT. From syndicate centers and worker *ateneos* to anarchosyndicalist rhetoric and direct action, CNT members became immersed in a culture that not only provided them with a unique collective identity, but also with a common language.[26]

Variance in Meaning(s): Situational Context and Intended Audience of Revolution-Speak

The danger in presuming to determine the intended meanings of anarchosyndicalist revolutionary rhetoric is in becoming overly reductionist. Within the CNT, the plethora of factions inevitably resulted in numerous and varied interpretations of the meaning of revolutionary language. The meanings might change depending on the speaker's intentions, the intended audience, and the audience's prior understanding of the use of such rhetoric, its interpretation of the speaker's motives in using the rhetoric, and its reaction to these understood motives.[27] To cite some examples: for a radical *faista* anarchist, references to *treintista* revolutionary syndicalism might be understood to be, at the very least, *descafeinadas* (decaffeinated). At the very most they might be interpreted as reformist tendencies that directly betrayed the CNT's antipolitical position and the potential success of a social revolution.[28] Moderates, on the other hand, could find in the radicals' use of revolutionary discourse anything from naïve and simplistic beliefs in the viability of a spontaneous revolt all the way to a betrayal of the CNT cause through unnecessary waste of precious organizational resources and incitement of harsh governmental repression that undermined organizational strength and, therefore, the possibility of carrying out a successful revolutionary general strike that would topple the capitalist system.[29]

Outsiders also read a variety of interpretations into the CNT's use of revolutionary language. For factory management and the socially privileged it might invoke fear of the "volatile" popular masses. For government authorities it could represent anything from a threat to local authority and social stability to a direct challenge to the government's very existence.[30] For leftist political and labor groups such as the UGT or PSOE, the propagation of a proposed solution to the inadequacies of capitalist society that was both more radical and had more popular support than their own placed them in an uncomfortable position, caught dangling between reformism and radicalism. Without the radicalizing influence of the CNT, would the UGT have taken such a drastic turn in its approach to political participation after losing its influence in the national government in late 1933?[31]

The meaning of revolutionary language also varied widely based on time and situation. For example, a factory owner's concern or fear of a worker insurrection—whether real or unfounded—fluctuated depending on a variety of temporal and geography-specific circumstances that included, but were not limited to: the recent history of labor conflicts; the

economic situation of both the factory and the workers; the organizational strength of the CNT in the factory, in the local worker neighborhood and at the larger regional and national level; the recent history of confrontation, whether violent or not, of CNT syndicates with local authorities; and the existence of larger regional or national labor or political conflicts.

There were also the intended (and unintended) reactions to the use of revolutionary language, which were typically included in the narrative explanation of the larger revolutionary strategy, but which responded more to practical everyday concerns and objectives. Though robbing a bank was often justified as a proto-revolutionary forced expropriation of capitalist wealth, it was more often motivated by the practical need for cash to fund affinity group activities or to support families of imprisoned militants, if not simply for personal enrichment.[32] Affinity groups often stretched the definition of the revolution to fit the action and ensure its acceptance as a "revolutionary" deed. The insistence by *Los Solidarios* strongmen Buenaventura Durruti and Juan Garcia Oliver that all actions, no matter how minute, contributed to the eventual success of the "revolution" is a good example.

Of course, this list of interpretations is only representative. Within each of these broadly defined groups the opinions differed widely, providing us with a potentially endless list of understandings of what the appearance of the word "revolution" in *Solidaridad Obrera* or the proud proclamation of the "workers' revolution" during a labor strike might actually have meant. This is especially so if we consider that the CNT's antipolitical rhetoric was often inconsistent with its organizational practice. While the syndicate militancy staunchly rejected any direct participation in the political process, throwing out any member who joined a political party, many within the CNT in fact were not averse to manipulating the political system and the legislative process in Spain to the syndicate's advantage when the occasion arose. CNT syndicates often used labor conflicts and strikes to pressure national and regional parliaments into passing favorable legislation.[33] In addition, its leadership often allowed, and in some cases actively encouraged, syndicate members to vote for preferred candidates in regional and national governmental elections.[34] Both moderates and radicals within the CNT had negotiated their opposition to the Primo de Rivera dictatorship with political parties, and even the most ardent revolutionaries welcomed the Second Republic with open arms. In early May 1931, the CNT national committee published a manifesto in *Solidaridad Obrera* directly linking the CNT's future with that of the Republic.[35] The famed revolutionist Buenaventura Durruti even wrote an article in *Solidaridad Obrera* asserting that Francesc Macià was the only political leader capable of proclaiming libertarian communism in Catalonia.[36] Although many saw in the three *ochos* the spark of revolution, there were also reactions to shifts in state politics and attempts to redirect state policies to better benefit the CNT's pragmatic interests.[37] Though the instigators of the *ocho* revolutionary insurrections had perhaps hoped that they would lead to a mass popular uprising, these antiestablishment actions were more immediately designed to influence the establishment, its operation, and the CNT's place within it, not outside of it.[38] With this in mind, I would

argue that there existed a practical use for revolutionary rhetoric that both rank-and-file and militants acknowledged. Revolutionary language served the much more nuanced and complex purpose of intraorganizational communication among *cenetistas.* The interactive dependency of the militancy and the membership tailored a language that both could agree on but which was also flexible enough to allow each group to insert a meaning that would best represent its interests and objectives, whether revolutionary or pragmatic in nature.

Revolutionary Language as Identifying Idiom

That anti-statism was the conceptual cornerstone of the anarchosyndicalist movement implied a total rejection of the established state and, ultimately, its destruction. The outright refutation of the state set the CNT apart from all other organizations, even other leftist organizations that were at least nominally revolutionary. Because revolutionary language was the most visible expression of the movement's anti-statist stance, it became an identifying idiom of the anarchosyndicalist movement. First and foremost, the use of revolutionary language within CNT circles was a prerequisite to being accepted as a true *cenetista*, no matter whether one was a radical revolutionary or a moderate syndicalist. Maintaining a clearly separate position from the establishment was critical to the credibility of the CNT as the only major political outsider, not only metaphorically, but also physically detached from the political process. Revolutionary rhetoric served as a type of organizational *carnet* (identification card) that identified one as a member of the union and a follower of the movement. From organizational congresses to barroom debates, using the rhetoric was equivalent to the displaying of the *carnet* necessary to enter into discussions about organizational business.[39]

All CNT factions at least nominally supported the revolution as the syndicate's ultimate objective. Militants did not have to agree on their definition of the revolution, but they had to agree that they rejected the state and sought its ultimate destruction through the revolution, whatever form that might take. Just as radical anarchists referenced the revolution, so too did moderate elements, including the much maligned *treintistas*, who in their impacting 1931 manifesto directly referred to the revolution as their long-term objective.[40] Not including revolutionary rhetoric in one's dialogue quickly placed one outside of the CNT's inner circles and dangerously close to the "political" world. As such, everyone within the CNT was required to pay homage to the revolutionary dogma. Those who did not do so risked being expelled from the CNT and the anarchosyndicalist movement. It happened to Communists Joaquín Maurín and Andrés Nin in the early 1920s, to *treintista* moderates Joan Peiró and Angel Pestaña in late 1931, and to large sections of the Catalan CNT regional in 1932.[41]

Tied so closely to the CNT's *raison d'être*, the "revolution" became a large umbrella term used to justify the logic of actions undertaken by the many factions operating within the CNT or in its name. Interpreting actions through the lens of the CNT's larger revolu-

tionary objectives, no matter how vaguely defined, granted them credence and acceptability. That which was considered or labeled as illegal or immoral in "bourgeois society" became acceptable or morally legal within the alternate rhetorical framework of the anarchosyndicalist movement.[42] Revolutionary talk also served the purpose of increasing leverage vis-à-vis the establishment, whether government officials or factory management. Revolutionary threats put pressure on employers fearful of a general strike or resorting to violence to resolve a labor conflict. Showing up with a pistol under one's shirt to intimidate a factory owner in negotiations of a new labor contract or discussions over the firing of an employee from the factory might not have been revolutionary actions, but CNT militants certainly did not mind the panic and fear it instilled in employers.[43] Even those *cenetistas* most adamantly opposed to the use of violence did not completely reject its use, acknowledging its utility in certain cases.[44] Diego Abad de Santillán, an outspoken opponent of the CNT's involvement in assassination attempts, admitted the difficulty of denouncing such incidents. "I did not even mention those types of acts—so easily justified psychologically—to avoid draining our strength, which we preferred to employ on more significant and longer-ranging goals."[45]

I would argue that discussions of the "revolution" were not always concerned with the long-range goal of radical social transformation. In fact, they were, in most cases, veiled discussions of tactical preferences and the practical employment of organizational resources. Rather than read anarchist ideological dogma as a guide book or an instruction manual to be executed in a precise and predetermined manner, I believe that most CNT militants saw in the ideology a point of departure, one that proposed a repertoire of alternative explanations and approaches to the harsh realities of industrial society. Each militant adapted the dogma to best fit the local situation—the neighborhood, the syndicate, or the affinity group—establishing a self-serving set of principles and beliefs which, in the mind of the militant, created logical tactics to be used in the affairs in which he was engaged, from syndicate meetings and management negotiation to framing perspectives on the revolution. In this manner, the revolutionary utopia came to represent something different to each militant. As such, revolutionary talk served to identify an affinity or action group's *modus operandi.*

With this in mind, it can be argued that militants developed their ideological interpretations of the revolution based on their favored organizational and operational structure. In other words, the way in which they operated in the workplace and worker neighborhood influenced their understanding of the revolutionary process. Accustomed to operating individually or in small numbers, radical anarchist members of the *Los Solidarios* action group found large-scale regimented operations requiring the coordination of a large number of workers under restrictive organizational structures to be foreign and disingenuous.[46] Moderate *treintistas*, on the other hand, prioritized structure and centralization and, as such, could not conceive of a spontaneous and unplanned revolution. Their revolution had to follow a well-organized, well-thought-out plan.

Because membership in the CNT required commitment to the revolution, opposing

factions accused each other of diverging from the "revolutionary" path and lacking ideological purity. The primary objective of rival factions was to weaken opponents by accusing them of collaborationism and rhetorical contradictions. What better way to do so than to accuse them of adulterating the sacrosanct anarchosyndicalist ideology? Factional confrontations proved especially fierce at regional and national syndicate congresses. Without an explicit ideological framework within which to justify organizational procedure, the CNT depended on congresses to determine policy. To this end, the fulfillment of congress agreements became a heavily exploited legitimizing tool.[47] When a group or faction could claim to enforce agreements reached at a congress, it achieved the highest degree of authority attainable within the CNT. This had been the case since the syndicate's inception. Every major structural change in the CNT was introduced and passed at regional or national congresses, from the *Sindicatos Únicos* drawn up at the *La Comedia* Congress in 1919 to the restructuring of the syndicate into *Federaciones Nacionales de Industria* at the 1931 Madrid Congress.[48]

Control over organizational congresses became critical to obtaining influence within the CNT. Moderates and radicals alike used agreements reached at congresses both to legitimize their actions and to exclude those who opposed them. In the first months of the Republic, moderates controlled more leadership positions, had more delegates attending the Madrid National Congress, and consequently monopolized policy agreements reached at that meeting.[49] Radicals, unable to stop moderate proposals from being passed, stood by in frustration, but soon learned their lesson. Infiltrating important syndicate positions from the bottom up, the radicals came to control a larger and larger portion of the CNT hierarchy.[50] This shift was reflected in their increasing influence and eventual domination of subsequent congresses. After radicals overtook moderates at the helm of the syndicate, they used the same tool of legitimacy—the fulfillment of accords reached at congresses—to justify the organizational policies they implemented.[51] In 1931, the moderate *treintistas* lost their influence within the CNT hierarchy because of their rapprochement with a Republican government which, even though leftist in orientation, had clearly turned against the CNT's interests on the street.[52] In turn, radical *faistas* gained power using a façade of repudiation of the Republican government and insistence on radical revolutionary action.

Antiestablishment Stance and the Success or Failure of the CNT

Since its inception, the CNT had enjoyed its greatest periods of success when the syndicate's efforts concentrated on centralizing organizational structure and coordinating effective labor actions. Between 1915 and 1919 and again from 1930 to 1932, union membership numbers soared.[53] Significant improvements in salary and working conditions were obtained as strength and efficacy in labor negotiations increased. However, this process drew the CNT closer, both physically and metaphorically, to the political and social establishment. In the eyes of certain militant factions, this threatened to undermine the CNT's antipolitical

and antiestablishment stance, the ideological basis for its *raison d'être* and the source of its popular appeal.[54]

This was a central paradox of the CNT: while legality typically brought great numbers of workers into the union and increased its effectiveness in the workplace, drawing near to the political establishment and the accompanying increase in the potential for collaboration was difficult, if not impossible, to accept for radical anarchist elements. It was also difficult for a large part of a constituency weaned on direct action and the revolutionary rhetoric which was the foundation of the anarchosyndicalist movement and which justified its unique identity.

Being outsiders, anarchosyndicalists could criticize the establishment and count any successes as great victories against the bourgeois-dominated political and economic system, without having to accept any responsibility for the system's shortcomings. In addition, the CNT's own failures could be easily justified as the result of government repression, management intransigence, or simply the imperfection of the capitalist system. Any alteration to this winning formula (i.e., the passing of centralizing measures such as the *SindicatosÚnicos* in 1918 or the *FederacionesdeIndustria* in 1931) caused great consternation among the movement's more radical factions because in their minds it meant drawing closer to the political or economic organisms, something that threatened the CNT's position as a political outsider.[55] In order to avoid this eventuality, it became necessary periodically to expel or marginalize those who "betrayed the revolution."

Ironically enough, these internal shakeups always came at moments of greatest strength and highest achievement for the CNT. In 1931, the possibility that the *treintista* moderates might steer the syndicate toward collaboration with the political and socioeconomic establishment provoked deep internal divisions and opened the door to more radical *faista* factions to "correct" the union's path. The establishment itself exacerbated the situation, especially the Socialist-influenced Left Republican government. It was increasingly believed that the "Republic of Order" had betrayed its commitment to the cause of the Spanish workers and the poor by failing to institute effective social and political reforms, by resisting direct worker action in the factories and farms, and by using the police to physically repress workers in the streets.

With the excuse of cleansing the movement of "traitors to the revolutionary cause," radicals gained control of the CNT hierarchy at the 1932 Sabadell Congress and steered the union onto a more radical and, it was argued, "revolutionary" path.[56] This strategic direction and the tactical actions radicals implemented resembled in great measure those utilized by the movement in times of political repression and clandestinity, the height of subversive antiestablishment existence.[57] The support of a considerable portion of the syndicate militancy for the radicals' rise to power in 1931 convinced the revolutionists within their ranks that they were free to organize revolutionary gymnastic exercises. Initially they found little resistance from within the union. However, support waned as each passing *ocho* unleashed

tougher state repression, increased management intransigence in the workplace, and landed more militants in jail.[58] Government subjugation raised the direct costs of organizing revolutionary actions—jailed members and the flight of the disillusioned constituency—without increasing the possible returns, or the chance that the revolutionary "double games" might successfully influence the political process in favor of the CNT. In fact, the chance that revolutionary gymnastics would succeed tended to diminish as the "Republic of Order" tightened its control over labor disturbances. The severity with which the *guardias de asalto* suffocated the Casas Viejas insurgence in December 1933 made it clear to *cenetistas* that the government was no longer willing to play double games. By early 1934, the undeniable failure of these episodes of playing at revolution spelled the end of CNT revolutionary gymnastics. The total failure of the *ochos* demonstrated the strategic error of thinking that labor agitation truly reflected a predisposition for revolution. Worse yet, the syndicate's ideological orientation as well as its strength and efficacy began to be seriously questioned by large numbers of its own membership. Many *cenetistas* left the organization altogether. The Catalan regional, for example, fell from just over 300,000 members in 1931 to about 100,000 in early 1934.[59]

The most significant consequence of the *ochos*, then, was a dawning realization by its leadership that the CNT membership was largely uninterested in joining them for the exercise of revolutionary gymnastics. Radicals had confused the antiestablishment sentiment of large numbers of workers with revolutionary resolve. In practice, it represented the difference between repudiation and contestation of the establishment. Workers were happy to support the first, but afraid to commit to the second. Years of melding both concepts together under the discursive heading of the "revolution" in the CNT discourse made the confusion inevitable. As it turned out, workers were predominantly antiestablishment, but not necessarily revolutionary. Practical everyday concerns such as basic living and working conditions continued to be of dominant importance to the worker. This depressing insight sank a number of important leaders into an existential crisis of considerable proportions. From Abad de Santillán to Buenaventura Durruti, anarchist revolutionaries were forced to reconsider their fundamental purpose. Serious doubts arose as to the revolutionary working-class identity of the membership. Durruti and Ascaso went so far as to recognize that Spanish labor was not only unprepared to bring about the revolution, it was not even aware of the revolutionary message promulgated by the anarchists.[60]

Radicals who had criticized and later expelled moderates a couple of years earlier for trying to reign in the "revolutionary aspirations of the workers" were themselves demanding that "irrational revolutionary games" cease. The CNT came full circle and returned to a period of strengthening its organizational structure. As *Solidaridad Obrera* reflected in its April 15, 1934, editorial, a number of militants and leaders began to doubt the adequacy of the policies and plan of action used by the CNT on the eve of the last *ocho* revolt. Faced with dwindling membership numbers and threatened by the looming prospect of an orga-

nizational crisis, they encouraged an introspective analysis of the organization's present and future.[61] For Felipe Alaiz, editor of *Solidaridad Obrera*, the CNT's problem resided in its tendency toward premature and unorganized actions. The solution, he maintained, resided in increased patience and composure when faced with social conflicts.[62] Interestingly, the language Alaiz used was remarkably similar to that used by *treintista* moderates in describing their interpretation of the revolutionary process.[63]

Discipline and structure were the strongest messages emerging from the CNT press. Revisiting the moderate viewpoints of the early Republican period, the CNT leadership admitted the need to rebuild the syndicate. Regional committees encouraged members to concentrate single-mindedly on pragmatic labor-related concerns and fortifying the organization.[64] This opinion became so prevalent among anarchosyndicalist militants in early 1934 that when the Socialist-led leftist worker alliance, *Alianza Obrera*, organized an insurrection months later in October, CNT syndicates with few exceptions refused to join the effort, preferring to avoid unnecessary confrontation with government authorities. In fact, the direct rejection of violence became a major concern for the syndicate leadership. A directive issued by the Catalan regional committee argued without apprehension that, "Apart from being frankly monstrous, violence for violence's sake and terror for terror's sake are as sterile as art for art's sake. Violence, as an imperative necessity, yes. Violence, as principle, no. In no way. This does not bode well for anarchism."[65]

As building political polarization and social strife broke down the Republic through the spring and early summer of 1936, the CNT had no intention of undermining the government, seeking instead to defend it from a potential rightist *coup d'état*.[66] At the national congress held in Zaragoza in early May, CNT delegates representing nearly half a million members throughout Spain approved a dictum that made official the moderate turn in strategy.[67] In order to avoid ideological contradictions, the dictum was preceded by an introductory statement justifying the plethora of labor conflicts and "revolutionary actions" which had followed the founding of the Second Republic as a necessary channeling of "the people's. . . desire for vindication. . . against the first crimes of the nascent republican-bourgeois democracy."[68] In addition, the third *ocho* was interpreted to have "[saved] the revolutionary dignity of the Confederation" and the lack of CNT support for the October 1934 revolt outside of Asturias was ascribed to the "confusion that reigned in the different regions" as well as the Socialists' "refusal to accept [the CNT's] proposals to intervene."[69] With the revolutionary reputation of the CNT preserved, the dictum went on to deal with the practical priorities of the moment. The first item on a list of changes necessary in the CNT was a direct order to end any and all "sporadic movements organized. . .without minimum control, without the circumstances that would indicate an appropriate moment for the revolution, and without the necessary preparation to impose itself. . . on the capitalist system."[70] It further denounced "conflicts of economic or other nature organized at either the local or national level to protest against determined measures passed by the gov-

ernment," ordering that such grievances be "reduced to their minimum expression."[71] It further called for the immediate establishment of the *Federaciones de Industria* (Federations of Industry), precisely the structural changes the radicals had so ardently opposed five years earlier in Madrid. The moderate turn also made itself noticed in the announcement of the CNT's intention to defend the standing government against any "military pronouncement" threatening the stability of the Republic. The dictum finished with a strong recommendation to put aside "individual criteria" in favor of "organizational discipline," something unheard of in prior congresses and bordering on ideological blasphemy.[72]

Though still married to the use of revolutionary rhetoric and willing to use violent tactics and intimidation, CNT syndicates largely turned to moderation, concentrating almost entirely on labor-related issues and finding solutions to the precarious economic situation. Even though the Republican period coincided with the hardest years of the Great Depression, the economic situation in Spain was not critical enough to convince workers to risk everything, including their lives, to effect profound social change. In fact, when the opportunity for revolution finally came in July 1936, the CNT hierarchy was more concerned with restoring an advantageous position within the Republican Popular Front government than with organizing any serious revolutionary insurrection.[73]

Perhaps the most influential impact of the CNT's use of revolutionary rhetoric was to encourage some of the major players in Spanish politics to opt for extra-legal tactics, stepping outside the boundaries of democratic political participation. The rightist *Sanjurjada* in 1932 and the October 1934 events in Asturias and Catalonia stand out as clear examples of this disregard for democratic participation. Clearly, both the military and leftist political elements involved in organizing these two failed coups considered the disdain for legal avenues of political participation and the use of violence acceptable methods to attain power. However, one wonders what their level of conviction and determination would have been if the CNT had, during the first years of the Second Republic, not pushed so far the boundaries of "acceptable" political action.

Many factors influence each revolutionary situation. While in 1932 and 1933 not enough factors came together to convince workers to take to the streets, in July 1936 those factors aligned. Among the most significant were the lack of government power, a growing fear of "Fascism," the relative success (when compared to the three *ochos*) of the October 1934 revolt, the general radicalization of the Spanish political landscape that followed it, and the decision of an increasing number of political groups to forego legal avenues of political participation. Of all of these, perhaps the most crucial was the collapse of government power caused by the military *coup d'état*. The popular revolution of July 1936 was much more a direct result of the power vacuum left by the coup and the authorities' inability to stop factory occupations and violent *ajustes de cuentas* (settling of old scores) than of any structured revolutionary strategy. Although the continued exposure to revolutionary rhetoric contributed to workers' willingness to change the social, economic, and cultural establishment, the

workers were finicky about who led them and under what circumstances they would follow them onto the streets to challenge the establishment. The workers' pragmatism made them well aware of the likely consequences of rising up against the establishment. The loss of one's job, jail time, or maybe even death were great prices to pay for workers, especially those with a spouse, (or *compañero/compañera*) and children to feed. They were not ideologically blind and, as such, did not join revolutionary movements just because the militancy issued directives encouraging them to do so. Theirs, after all, was the ideology of pragmatism. Though they had made theirs the language of revolution, workers were not willing to carry out an insurrection until it seemed practicable. In a society where the intensity of popular response was inherently linked to the level of government repression, the lack of any effective political authority led to a groundswell of popular power that quickly snowballed beyond any local authority's control, even that of the CNT.

Notes

1. Stanley Payne has played a critical role in this scholarly effort. From his first book, *Falange: A Study of Spanish Fascism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), to his most recent, *The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933–1936: Origins of the Civil War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), Payne has sought to explain the reasons for the breakdown of what he called Spain's "first democracy." Stanley G. Payne, *Spain's First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931–1936* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). Payne's leadership in the field is also reflected in the wide and varied gamut of studies about the period that his students have assembled over the years. His first graduate student, Robert Kern, published the first comprehensive study of Spanish anarchosyndicalism in English: *Red Years, Black Years. A Political History of Spanish Anarchism 1911–1937* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1978). Colin Winston contributed the only serious study of rightist worker organizations in the interwar and Republican period in his *Workers and the Right inSpain, 1900–1936* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). More recently, Daniel Kowalsky has contributed a much-needed study of the Soviet involvement in the Civil War with his *Stalin and the Spanish Civil War* (Project Gutenberg-e, 2004) http://www.gutenberg.e-org/kod01/. Lastly, Brian D. Bunk's *Ghosts of Passion: Martyrdom, Gender, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007) is a groundbreaking study of the manipulation of the historical memory of the October 1934 revolution by both the political left and right in the months leading up to the outbreak of hostilities in July 1936. My own work on Spanish anarchosyndicalism can be included as well: "Rethinking the Revolution: Utopia and Pragmatism in Catalan Anarchosyndicalism (1930–1936)" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2001).
2. The most noted is José María Gil Robles, *No fué posible la paz* (Barcelona: Ediciones Ariel, 1968). Elements of this argument have resurfaced in recent scholarship, most notably in Pio Moa's copious work on the Civil War. See especially his *Los mitos de la Guerra Civil* (Madrid: Esfera, 2003) 183–95, and *Los orígenes de la guerra civil española* (Madrid: Encuentro Ediciones, 1999).
3. This was a central argument of Burnett Bolloten's *The Grand Camouflage* (London: Hollis and Carter, 1961) and his later *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press Hill, 1991). For partisan accounts, see Communist youth leader Santiago Carrillo's *Memorias* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1993) as well as Victor Alba's *Els problemas del moviment obrer a Catalunya* (Barcelona: Pórtic, 1976). Additional documents have recently been made available in Ronald Radosh, Mary Hableck, and Grigory Sevostianov, eds., *Spain Betrayed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
4. Among the more significant studies are: Stanley Payne, *The Spanish Revolution* (New York: Norton, 1970); Santos Juliá, *Orígenes del Frente Popular en España 1934–1936* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1979); Ronald Fraser, *Blood of Spain. The Experience of Civil War 1936–1939* (New York: Pantheon, 1979); Raymond Carr, *The Spanish Tragedy* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1977);

Manuel Benavides, *Guerra y revolución en Cataluña* (Mexico: Ediciones Tenoctitlan, 1946); Bolloten, *The Spanish Civil War*; Payne, *Spain's First Democracy*; Paul Preston, *The Coming of the Spanish Civil War. Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic* 2nd edition, (London: Routledge, 1994); Pamela Radcliff, *From Mobilization to Civil War. The Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón 1900–1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston, eds., *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 1999); Stanley Payne, *Fascism in Spain 1923–1977* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999); Nigel Townson, *The Crisis of Democracy in Spain. Centrist Politics under the Second Republic 1931–1936* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2000); Helen Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War 1936–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

5. The revolutionary aims of the CNT were clearly laid out in the founding congress and confirmed at each major national congress thereafter. *Congreso de Constitución de la Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT), Palacio de las Bellas Artes, 30 de octubre a 1 de noviembre de 1910* (Barcelona, 1976); Confederación Regional de Cataluña, *Memoria del Congreso celebrado en Barcelona los días 28, 29, 30 de junio y 1 de julio de 1918* (Barcelona, 1918); CNT, *Memoria del Congreso celebrado en el Teatro de la Comedia de Madrid los días 10 al 18 de diciembre de 1919* (Barcelona, 1932); CNT, *Memoria del Congreso Extraordinario de la CNT celebrado en Madrid los días 11 al 16 de junio de 1931* (Barcelona, 1932); and *El congreso confederal de Zaragoza, 1 de mayo de 1936* (Madrid, 1978). At the local level, affiliated syndicates stressed in their statutes the commitment to the principles and objectives established at CNT congresses and the use of accepted tactics of struggle. See, for example, "EstatutosSin dicatodeServiciosPúblicos,"Barcelona, 1931, PS Barcelona 939, Archivo Histórico Nacional-Sección Guerra Civil, (hereafter, AHN-SGC); "Reglamento porque se ha de regir el sindicato metalúrgico de Gijón afecto a la C.N.T. domiciliada en la casa de pueblo," April 1930, PS Gijón K46, AHN-SGC. For a comparative analysis of national congresses, see Miguel González Urién and Fidel Revilla González, *La C.N.T. a través de sus Congresos* (Mexico: Editores Mexicanos Unidos, 1981).

6. These insurrectionary attempts came to be known as the *tres ochos* (three eights), taking place on January 18, 1932; January 8, 1933; and December 8, 1933. Though successful in a handful of small towns, where *comunismo libertario* was temporarily established (at least in essence), overall each of the *ochos* was an unmitigated failure, with few militants actually taking to the streets. Detailed accounts of the revolts can be found in John Brademas, *Anarcosindicalismo y revolución* (Espluges de Llobregat: Ariel, 1974); José Peirats, *La CNT en la revolución española* (Madrid: Ruedo Ibérico, 1978); and Julián Casanova, *De la calle al frente.*

7. For the October 1934 uprising, see Paco Ignacio Taibo II, *Asturias 1934*, 2 vols. (Gijón: Júcar, 1984); Angeles Barrio Alonso, *Anarquismo y anarcosindicalismo en Asturias (1890–1936)* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1988); Adrian Shubert, *The Road to Revolution in Spain: The Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860–1934* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987); and Bunk.

8. This distinction became especially notable in Catalonia, where the UGT struggled to overcome its active participation in the political process. Xavier Cuadrat, *Socialismo y anarquismo en Cataluña (1899–1911). Los orígenes del la CNT* (Madrid: Ediciones Revista del Trabajo, 1976); José Luis Martín Ramos, *Els orígens del Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya* (Barcelona: Curial, 1977); Pere Gabriel, "Sindicalismo y Sindicatos socialistas en Catalunya. La UGT, 1888–1938," *Historia Social* 1, (1990): 47–71; andDavid Ballester, *Marginalidades y hegemonías: la UGT de Cataluña (1888–1936)* (Barcelona: Ediciones del Bronce, 1996). General studies on the UGT and PSOE include Amaro del Rosal, *Historia del a UGT en España, 1901–1937* (Madrid, 1977); Manuel Contreras, *El PSOE en la II República: Organización e ideología* (Madrid, 1981); and Santos Juliá, *Madrid, 1931–1934. De la fiesta popular a la lucha de clases* (Siglo Veintiuno Editores: Madrid, 1984).

9. José Manuel Macarro, "La disolución de la utopía en el movimiento anarcosindicalista español," *Historia Social* 15, (Winter 1993): 146–47.

10. Antonio Elorza, *La utopia Anarquista bajo la Segunda República* (Madrid: Editorial Ayuso, 1973); Brademas, *Anarcosindicalismo y revolución*; Juan Gómez Casas, *Historia del anarcosindicalismo español* (Buenos Aires: Editorial ZYX, 1969); Juan Gómez Casas *Los anarquistas en el Gobierno 1936–1939* (Barcelona: Editorial Bruguera, 1977); Kern, *Red Years, Black Years*; Eulàlia Vega, *El treintisme a Catalunya. Divergencies ideologiques en la CNT (1930–1933)* (Barcelona: Curial, 1980); Eulàlia Vega, *Anarquistas y sindicalistas durante la Segunda república. La CNT y los Sindicatos de Oposición en el País Valenciano* (Valencia: Institució Valenciana d'Estudis i Investigació, 1987); Graham Kelsey, *Anarchosyndicalism, Libertarian Communism and the State. The CNT in Zaragoza*

and Aragon 1930–1937 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1989); Julian Casanova, *De la calle al frente. El anarcosindicalismo en España (1931–1939)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1997); Stuart Christie, *We, the anarchists! A Study of the Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI) 1927–1937* (Hastings: Meltzer Press, 2000).

11. See the outdated, but still useful Gareth Stedman Jones, *Languages of Class. Studies in English Working Class History 1832–1982* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 90–97, and James Epstein, *Radical Expression: Political Language, Ritual and Symbol in England, 1790–1850* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For a deep corrective to Stedman Jones and the linguistic turn, see William Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

12. For a detailed discussion of these interpretative obstacles, see Xavier Paniagua, "Una pregunta y varias respuestas. El anarquismo español: desde la política a la historiografía" *Historia Social* 12 (1992): 31–52.

13. The principal studies on the origins of the anarchist movement in Spain are Josep Termes, *Anarquismo y socialismo en España: La Primera Internacional (1864–1881)* (Esplugues de Llobregat: Ariel, 1972), and Clara E. Lida, *Anarquismo y revolución en la España del siglo XIX* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972). Ideology is best covered by George Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working Class Movement in Spain, 1868–1898* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) and José Álvarez Junco, *La ideología política del anarquismo español (1868–1910)* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1976). Also useful is Jordi Piqué i Padró, *Anarco-col.lectivisme i anarco-comunisme. L'oposició de dues postures en moviment anarquista català (1881–1891)* (Barcelona: Publicacions de L'abadia de Montserrat, 1989); Xavier Paniagua, *La sociedad libertaria. Agrarismo e industrilazación en el anarquismo español, 1930–1939* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1982); and Pere Solà i Gussinyer, *Educació i moviment llibertari a Catalunya (1901–1939)* (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1982). On the Stirnean influence, see Walter Bernecker, " 'Acción directa' y violencia en el anarquismo español," *Ayer* 13 (1994).

14. Juan Gómez Casas, *Historia de la FAI* (Madrid: Zero, 1977), 117–25.

15. Álvarez Junco, *La ideología*, 583–85.

16. The CNT's categorical rejection of the capitalist state and its refusal to collaborate with government authorities or participate in the political process appealed to Spain's disgruntled industrial workforce. Also attractive to workers was the CNT's rejection of political bureaucracies within the syndical framework. The fact that CNT militants continued working in their place of employment, even while holding posts on regional and national committees, created a closer relationship with their fellow workers. Employment concerns affected them as well as the other workers in the factory. Officers in the rival Socialist UGT left their factory jobs and went on the union payroll. Getman-Eraso, "Rethinking the Revolution," 8–12.

17. Although the UGT's numbers grew rapidly after the declaration of the Second Republic, the workers joining the Socialist trade union were rarely from the CNT. In fact, the movement of members tended to go in the opposite direction. After years of forced clandestinity the legalization of the CNT in late 1930 saw the mass flocking back into the CNT of workers that had previously belonged to the anarchosyndicalist union but had joined the legal UGT as a stopgap measure during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. Susanna Tavera and Eulàlia Vega, "L'afiliació sindical a la CRT de Catalunya: entre l'eufòria revolucionària i l'ensulsiada confederal, 1919–1936" in *Revolució i Sindicalisme* (Barcelona: Universitat De Bellaterra, 1989) 2:357–58; Winston, *Workers and the Right in Spain*.

18. Though this argument first appeared in the mid 1970s in the works of Temma Kaplan and Antonio Calero, it did not gain wider acceptance until recently. Temma Kaplan, *Anarchists of Andalusia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977) and Antonio Calero, *Movimientos sociales en Andalucia 1820–1936* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1976). Among the most notable recent contributions are Michael Seidman, *Workers Against Work. Labor in Paris and Barcelona During the Popular Fronts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Radcliff, *From Mobilization to Civil War*; and Christopher Ealham, *Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

19. Mercedes Vilanova, *Las mayorías invisibles. Explotación fabril, revolución y represión* (Barcelona: Icaria, 1996); Anna Monjo, *Militants. Democracia i participació a la CNT als anys trenta* (Lleida: Universitat de Lleida Edicions, 2003); and Anna Monjo and Carme Vega, *Els treballadors i la guerra*

civil (Barcelona: Editorial Empuries, 1986).

20. Monjo, 314–39.
21. Nick Rider "The practice of direct action: The Barcelona rent strike of 1931," in *For Anarchism: History, Theory, Practice*, ed. David Goodway (London: 1989); Radcliff, *From Mobilization to Civil War*, 15–22, 169–83;Ealham, *Class, Culture and Conflict*, 134–45; and Jordi Getman-Eraso, "The CNT in the Worker Neighborhood: A Labor Mafia?" (unpublished paper, 2001), 6–10.
22. Getman-Eraso, "Mafia," 8.
23. Most recently Monjo, 279–307. As the "anarcho-bolshevik" Garcia Oliver remarked, "the heterogeneous composition of our organization determines that we continually move between doubts and vacillations. Because of this, it was always directed, in reality, by a more or less numerous group. The constitution of the [*Treintistas*] sought this finality. With the Nosotros group we sought the same." Joan Garcia Oliver, *El eco de los pasos* (Barcelona: Ruedo Ibérico, 1978), 190.
24. What José Manuel Macarro refers to as the transition between the "nascent state" and becoming the establishment. Macarro, 145.
25. José Álvarez Junco, "La subcultura anarquista en España," in *Culturas populares. Diferencias, divergencias y conflictos* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez/UCM, 1986), 200.
26. See, Rider; Getman-Eraso, "Mafia,"; Chris Ealham, " 'Revolutionary Gymnastics' and the Unemployed. The Limits of the Spanish Anarchist Utopia 1931–1937," in *The Twentieth Century: A Century of Wars and Revolutions?* ed. Keith Flett and David Renton (London: Rivers Oram, 2000); and Ealham, *Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona.*
27. William Reddy, "The Logic of Action: Indeterminacy, Emotion and Historical Narrative," *History and Theory* 40, no. 4 (Dec., 2001): 10–33.
28. Adolfo Bueso's description of the heavy criticism leveled on Ángel Pestaña and Joan Peiró at the 1931 Madrid Congress follows this model quite closely. Though not as impassioned, the congress's proceedings also reflect this typology. Adolfo Bueso, *Recuerdos de un cenetista. De la Segunda República al final de la Guerra Civil* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1978), 158–164; CNT, *Memoria del Congreso Extreordinario de la CNT celebrado en Madrid los días 11 al 16 de junio de 1931* (Barcelona, 1932), 147; According to Camil Piñon, Garcia Oliver's impassioned intervention against Pestaña and Peiró's perceived political collaborationism earned him a loud round of applause from likeminded delegates and even a strong hug from anarchist legend Federico Urales. Manuel Lladonosa i Vall-llebrera, *Sindicalistes i llibertaris: l'experiència de Camil Piñón* (Barcelona: Dalmau, 1989), 156.
29. This was precisely the complaint voiced in the declaration against spontaneous revolutionism that was signed by thirty syndicalist heavyweights – Ángel Pestaña and Joan Peiró among them—that came to be known as the *Manifiesto de los treinta*. Quoted in Albert Balcells, *Trabajo industrial y organización obrera en la Cataluña contemporanea (1900–1936)* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1974), 244–45.
30. See Ealham "Revolutionary Gymnastics," and Getman-Eraso, "Mafia," 9–10.
31. Santos Juliá has for many years underlined the strong influence the UGT's radicalization after the 1933 elections had on the breakdown of the Second Republic. More recently, other scholars, including Paul Preston, have also increased the blame they are willing to lay on the Socialists for the outbreak of the fratricidal conflict. Santos Juliá, *Madrid*, 138–145; Paul Preston, *La república asediada: hostilidad internacional y conflictos internos durante la Guerra Civil* (Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 2001).
32. Bueso, 35–46. In fact, robberies carried out in the name of the CNT became a growing concern for a syndicate hierarchy fearful the organization would be too closely associated with common criminals. Stick-ups and bank raids spiraled out of control after 1932, no matter how hard union leaders tried to curtail this "misuse" of organizational resources. Apart from recurrent appearances in the CNT daily *Solidaridad Obrera*, the anarchist *Tierra y Libertad*,and even the anarcho-cultural magazine *Revista Blanca*, the topic came to be discussed in regional and even national congresses in late 1935 and early 1936. See, for example, "El momento actual," *Solidaridad Obrera*, May 15, 1936, and "Serenidad," *Solidaridad Obrera*, June 13, 1936.
33. Enric Ucelay-Da Cal and Susanna Tavera García, "Una revolución dentro de otra: la lógica insurreccional en la política española, 1924–1934," *Ayer* 13 (1994): 125–28.
34. In fact, of the three national elections that took place between 1931 and 1936, the CNT hierarchy

only directed members to abstain from voting in the December 1933 election.

35. "The CNT"—the communiqué read—"is not opposed to the Republic. Furthermore, well aware of the feeling the masses have for the Republic, the CNT has sworn to oppose by whatever means necessary any reactionary uprising. Whether we like it or not, the CNT's gesture implies the defense of the Republic." La Confederación Nacional del Trabajo ante el momento actual," *Solidaridad Obrera*, May 14, 1931.

36. Sebastià Clarà, interview in Susanna Tavera and Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, "Conversa amb Sebastià Clarà, un líder cenetiste català," *L'Avenç* 6, (1977): 16.

37. *Chantajista* (blackmail) revolutionism was rooted in Spanish insurrectionary traditions dating back to the early nineteenth century. The radical anarchist *grupos de acción* that came to dominate the CNT in late 1931, exemplified by Buenaventura Durruti, Francisco Ascaso, and Juan Garcia Oliver's *Los Solidarios* (The Solidarians group), developed their modus operandi within the context of the political struggles against the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. The repression of the CNT by the Primo de Rivera regime contributed to the radicalization of these young idealists. With the CNT in forced clandestinity, these young activists did not have practical syndical experience as a reference. Their understanding of direct action and proletarian struggle was determined much more by the illegal, insurrectionary tactics employed by the opposition to the regime, which accepted the "double game" of aspiring to political participation through insurrectionary action, their only viable path at the time. Ucelay-Da Cal and Tavera, 125–37.

38. Even prior to the Republic, CNT leader Joan Peiró had made it clear that the CNT was not anti-political, in the sense of being opposed to the participation in a political process, as much as it was anti-statist, opposed to the established political system. This argument permeates Peiró's contributions to the controversial debate which unfolded in *L'Opinió* in 1928. The articles are reproduced in Albert Balcells, *El arraigo del anarquismo en Cataluña, textos de 1926–1932* (Barcelona: 1973).

39. Abel Paz, *Chumberas y alacranes* (Barcelona: EA, 1994) 34, 206–10; Getman-Eraso, "Rethinking the Revolution," 99–104, 110.

40. *Manifiesto de los treinta*, quoted in Balcells, *Trabajo industrial*, 244–45.

41. Gerald Meaker, *The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914–1923* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), 145–49; Vega, *El treintisme a catalunya*, 132–69; Eulàlia Vega, *Entre revolució i reforma. La CNT a Catalunya (1930–1936)* (Lleida: Pagès Editors, 2004), 167–73, 214–19; CNT, *Memoria del Congreso celebrado en el Teatro de la Comedia de Madrid los días 10 al 18 de diciembre de 1919* (Barcelona, 1932); Confederación Regional del Trabajo de Cataluña, "Actas del pleno regional de sindicatos convocado para los días 24, 25, 265, 27, 28, 29, y 30 de Abril de 1932 en Sabadell," April 1932, PS Barcelona 932,AHN-SGC; and "La expulsion de Ángel Pestaña," *Boletín de la Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (Barcelona, 1933). Peiró and Pestana's reactions to their expulsion from positions of power within the CNT in "El poder de los Sindicatos," *Solidaridad Obrera*, October 2, 1931, and Ángel Pestaña, *Trayectoria sindicalista* (Madrid: Ediciones Tebas, 1974), 607–64.

42. Macarro, 148.

43. Bueso, 138.

44. The syndicalist Ángel Pestaña, a determined opponent of violent tactics, did not completely denounce its use until 1933, when he left the union to form the *Partido Sindicalista* (Syndicalist Party). Pestaña, *Trayectoria sindicalista*, 188–89; Manuel Buenacasa, *Historia del movimiento obrero* (Barcelona: Impresos Costa, 1928), 53.

45. Diego Abad de Santillán, *Memorias, 1897–1936* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), 279.

46. This tactical preference permeates the memories of *Solidarios* members. See especially, Ricardo Sanz, *El sindicalismo y la política. Los "Solidarios" y "Nosotros"* (Toulouse: Duraulier, 1966) and Garcia Oliver.

47. The first information newly created syndicates received from the regional offices was a summary of the latest standing congress agreements, which oriented the recently recruited militants on both organizational structure and syndical policies being employed at that moment. Comité Local CNT de Sabiñanigo, Letter to the National Committee "Siderometarurgica," June 28, 1936, PS Gijón K20, AHN-SGC. It was common during syndicate meetings for militants to remind their colleagues that while the discussion of differing viewpoints was aceptable, syndicate policy had to

always respect accords signed at Congresses. See, for example, "Acta del la segunda sesión del Pleno de Sindicatos celebrada en Barcelona," May 21, 1933, PS Barcelona 932, AHN-SGC; "Actas del Sindicato Provincial Técnico de Telégrafos de Barcelona," January 26, 1934, PS Barcelona 1053, AHN-SGC; and "Justificaciones al orden del día," CNT-AIT, *Pleno Nacional de Regionales de la CNT a celebrar el ... de abril de 1935*, March 19, 1935, F.1450, AHN-SGC.

48. CNT, *Memoria del Congreso celebrado en el Teatro de la Comedia de Madrid los días 10 al 18 de diciembre de 1919* (Barcelona, 1932), 220–245; CNT, *Memoria del Congreso Extraordinario de la CNT celebrado en Madrid los días 11 al 16 de junio de 1931* (Barcelona, 1932).

49. Bueso, 55; Lladonosa i Vall-llebrera, 53.

50. Anna Monjo,."La CNT durant la II República a Barcelona: liders, militants, afiliats" (Ph.D. diss., University of Barcelona, 1994), 204; Bueso, 128–29, 248.

51. "Reflexiones sobre la crisis de la C.N.T.," *Solidaridad Obrera*,March 22, 1932; "La C.N.T. y la ofensiva revolucionaria," *Solidaridad Obrera*, April 2, 1932; and "Sobre los resortes de la ofensiva," *Solidaridad Obrera*, 8 April 1932. Also Bueso, 63–64; and Getman-Eraso, "Rethinking the Revolution," 160–69.

52. For the strong influence government repression had on the radicalization of the CNT, see Graham, and Kelsey.

53. Tavera and Vega, 357–58.

54. Macarro, 152.

55. Ibid., 145–49.

56. Confederación Regional del Trabajo de Cataluña, "Actas del pleno regional de sindicatos convocado para los días 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, y 30 de Abril de 1932 en Sabadell," April 1932, PS Barcelona 932, AHN–SGC, 2–8.

57. Ucelay-Da Cal and Tavera, 129.

58. Tavera and Vega, 357–58.

59. Ibid.

60. Jacinto Toryho, *No éramos tan malos* (Madrid: G. del Toro, 1975), 67.

61. "Cuestiones palpitantes," *Solidaridad Obrera*, April 15, 1934.

62. "[The solution consists] in administering with more caution and foresight the formidable energy emporium of which [the CNT] is proprietor. In better gauging its means. In appreciating the series of circumstances that indicate the most appropriate, most possible, and most promising moment to accelerate the revolutionary project . . . Let us abstain from our determination to reach them as soon as possible. Let us be capable of advancing along the new path without any doubts, always following the principles of anarchism and the revolutionary spirit which beat with such strength in the heart of the CNT and which are its reason for being." "Es hora de que nos encaremos resueltamente con nuestras realidades," *Solidaridad Obrera*, April 15, 1934.

63. See, for example, the justification offered in March 1936 for the moderate tactics adopted by the *Sindicatos de Oposición*: "Los sindicalistas revolucionarios tuvimos otra interpretación del momento, y ésta no era más que una consecuencia del concepto que nos merecía el Sindicato como instrumento de la revolución social. Estimábamos como posición táctica prácticamente más revolucionaria, el comenzar por dar a la C.N.T. una estructuración coherente con el principio industrialista de los Sindicatos que la integraban. Era necesario ensanchar la organización, estableciendo el complemento del Sindicato de Industria mediante la Federación Nacional de Industria, única manera de controlar y dirigir eficazmente la lucha contra el capitalismo, y de extender la influencia moral de la C.N.T. hasta zonas del proletariado español que en el momento decisivo de la acción revolucionaria a fondo fuesen sostén de ésta y base al triunfo definitivo del proletariado enrolado en la C.N.T. Entendíamos que era preciso, paralelamente al plan de estructuración, otro de mejoramiento de la clase obrera que, de una manera progresiva, por medio de la acción directa y revolucionaria, elevara la moral del pueblo español y preparándolo para acciones a fondo contra el régimen capitalista una vez se iniciase el derrumbamiento de las ilusiones en la democracia establecida el 14 de Abril de 1931." *Memoria que presenta el Comité Nacional de Relaciones de los Sindicatos de Oposición de España a las organizaciones de Cataluña, Levante y Huelva en la Conferencia Nacional que se celebrará durante los días 29 y 30 de marzo de 1936* (Mataró: Arts Grafiques Trias, 1936), PS Barcelona 819, AHN-SGC.

64. "Con la vista fija en el porvenir," *Solidaridad Obrera*, April 18, 1934.

65. Ibid.

66. Getman-Eraso, "Rethinking the Revolution," 328–37.

67. CNT, *Congreso confederal de Zaragoza.*

68. "Dictamen de la ponencia designada para el tercer punto del orden del día: Analisis de actividad y fijación de normas," May 1936, PS Gijón J 22, AHN-SGC, 1.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. "Dictamen de la ponencia designada para el tercer punto del orden del día: Analisis de actividad y fijación de normas," May 1936, PS Gijón J 22, AHN-SGC, 2.

72. Ibid.

73. The moderate tendency permeated all levels of the CNT, even the anarchist weekly *Tierra y Libertad.* In a letter addressed to the heads of the Barcelona branch of the FAI, Alfonso Nieves Nuñez leveled a vitriolic attack on the editors of *Tierra y Libertad* for not "wanting or knowing how to" recognize the revolutionary moment Spain was experiencing in the early summer of 1936. He deeply lamented the "sectarianism" inherent in the FAI and went as far as to threaten founding a separate anarchist weekly to "tell all that is not being told by *Tierra y Libertad* about the revolutionary moment." Letter to the Catalan Regional Committee of the FAI, no date, PS Barcelona 1335, AHN-SGC.

CHAPTER 4

Nineteenth-Century Spanish Anticlericalism

ENRIQUE A. SANABRIA

Despite claims by some Catholic authors that Spain has always had an anticlerical strain (*veta*) with proclivities toward physical violence,[1] most Hispanists understand that anticlericalism, in its proper definition, cannot exist nor has it existed without clericalism. Indeed the word *anticlericalism* originates in the nineteenth century as a clerical description for lay resistance to the political power of the Catholic Church.[2] Europeans have, of course, lived with some form of anticlericalism for generations, and recent research demonstrates that powerful religious institutions targeted by anticlericals need not be Catholic.[3]

In Catholic countries, however, forms of anticlericalism have historically come not from lay or nonbelieving opponents of the Church, but from within the clergy or believers, many of whom harbored serious grievances with ecclesiastical wealth and influence. Conservative medieval anticlericalism, for example, eventually gave way to the radical Protestant critique of clerical status.[4] But while most forms of medieval and Early Modern European anticlericalism were taken up by believers, scholars argue that modern forms of anticlericalism, dating from the late eighteenth century and French Revolution, sought to truly injure the Catholic clergy or were attacks on the faith. It was at that time when anticlericalism arose to challenge clerical attempts to protect the status quo and when anticlericalism transformed into a positive affirmation of human liberty in support of secularism and the desire to separate the religious realm from the secular or civil society.[5]

This chapter will briefly survey the dramatic battle between clericalism and anticlericalism throughout Spain's turbulent nineteenth century, and assert that it was clericalism and even clerical violence responding to both the threat of the process of secularization and the spirit of secularism that begat anticlericalism and anticlerical violence. Although the liberal state and the liberal Spain that emerged in 1840 had made a significant dent into the mate-

rial wealth of the Spanish Church and clergy, as well as fundamentally altering its scope, the Restoration regime (1875–1923) orchestrated by Antonio Cánovas del Castillo returned clerical power and influence to late eighteenth-century levels and thereby prompted an anticlerical response. In addition, that late nineteenth-century anticlericalism—perhaps best embodied by José Nakens, the republican editor of *El Motín* (1881–1926)[6]—was itself a significantly different form of anticlericalism, borrowing from laic nationalist projects in places like France under the Third Republic. Here I am concerned with the new form of anticlericalism that emerged in the late nineteenth century because it was an important component in a larger battle for cultural and national identity in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Spain.

As in other European countries, Spain witnessed a decisive move toward secularization and the increased presence of advocates of secularism in the nineteenth century. Secularism is characterized by but not limited to a firm belief in industrialization and urbanization, technological innovation, a differentiation of the secular and the religious, the development of a civil religion or civic loyalties, and an emphasis on separating the individual from corporate identities. The land disentailment programs initiated during the reign of Charles III in the late eighteenth century were a blow to Church privilege, but should be regarded as "anti-feudal" rather than antireligious. Ecclesiastic reforms put forward by the Cádiz Cortes of 1812 and subsequent provisional governments were more antiaristocratic and antiabsolutist than anticlerical.[7] The liberal state's well-intentioned efforts to reform the Church and clergy required that the Church's privileges be suppressed and much of its property nationalized, as those goods were thought to be tied to an outmoded institution possessing an undue embarrassment of riches.

As a response to secularization, Spain, like other European nations, also witnessed the rise of clericalism, which was characterized by but not limited to fear of or hostility toward secularization and secularism, an increase in forms of religiosity, defense of the clergy, and a refusal to accept that areas of human existence (politics, education, social and economic organization) lay outside of the boundaries of religion. Of course, the Church hierarchy fought eighteenth century disentailment of Church property and wealth as French-inspired attacks on a Spanish way of life, and the war against Napoleon presented the Church leadership with an opportunity to present liberals, especially the *afrancesados*, as anti-Spaniards. Clericalism—be it in the form of editorializing in the conservative or ultramontane press or the taking to the hills to fight French soldiers or Spanish liberals—gave rise to anticlericalism and anticlerical violence, which are characterized by but not limited to ideas and actions that develop as a response to clericalism, and which seek to curb the influence of the Church and clergy, if not attain the complete separation of the Church and state. Unlike secularism, anticlericalism often features emotional attacks against the clergy and is more punitive toward the religious.

Modern anticlericalism grew out of medieval and early modern traditions (be they anti-Papist or rooted in the skepticism of the Enlightenment's *philosophes*), but it was shaped

by dominating nineteenth-century ideologies such as liberalism, secularism, nationalism, and socialism, which demanded allegiance to institutions or groupings that clashed with traditional ties to the Church and clergy.[8] More directly, modern anticlericalism is a response to an increased presence and intensity of clericalism or the "ascendancy of an institution with a deeply antiliberal policy that to critics appeared increasingly aggressive in its efforts to force its values on an entire society."[9] Indeed, the Western Europe of the early nineteenth century was rapidly changing and becoming secular, causing great concern among the forces of clericalism. While modern anticlericalism and secularism are not necessarily the same thing, they are very much related because the latter also affected religious forms and practices. The process of secularization constitutes a context, an impersonal social force that created responses to that context: clericalism and anticlericalism.[10] In the struggle for secularism, anticlericalism cannot simply be considered a negative ideology, but often a negative and violent expression of the broader positive ideology of secularism.[11] Modern anticlericalism was a militant attitude that either rightfully or erroneously perceived clericalism as a threat to secularization and progress, and as an even bigger threat to the construction of a modern liberal Spain.

A number of brief examples from the Peninsular War of 1808–14 and the subsequent liberal revolution illustrate the relationship between secularization, clericalism, and anticlericalism. Religious leaders throughout the country revived the traditional Spanish identity as a divine bulwark of Catholicism and used the pulpit to call for resistance against the French. Stanley G. Payne asserts that "not a single province in all of Spain [failed to] produce at least one guerrilla band led by a priest or monk" during the Napoleonic War.[12] Perhaps the most notorious of these was Jerónimo Merino, whose ruthlessness and exploits against the French earned him a canonry in Palencia from Ferdinand VII, and who was immortalized in the novels of Pío Baroja.[13]

Nothing of this type of clerical leadership and mobilization had ever been seen before in Spain, and it set the tone for clerical resistance to not only liberalism emerging from France, but also that which persisted through the Cádiz Cortes, the First Fernandine Reaction (1814–20), and the Liberal Triennium (1820–23). Juan Sinisio Pérez Garzón lists a number of clerical publications that were published and distributed in this period that proposed "Holy Cruelty *(Santa Crueldad)* against the liberals for their foreign nature which made them enemies of the Catholic fatherland *(patria católica)*."[14]

Conspiracies against the liberal state surfaced throughout Spain within days of the Cortes's adoption of the *ley de monacles*, which reformed and at times eliminated convents with less than a minimum number of residents and established new rules for the remainder of convents and monasteries.[15] In early January 1821, an absolutist conspiracy uncovered in Madrid vindicated the liberal project as it was masterminded by the King's chaplain Fr. M. Vinuesa. Although liberals hoped for the death penalty for Vinuesa, he was sentenced to a mere ten years in prison, prompting a mob of approximately 150 people to overtake the

prison and prison guards and kill Vinuesa by smashing his head in with blows from a hammer (*destrozaron su cabeza a martillazos*).[16]

Now obviously it is important to acknowledge at this point that not all of the clergy was categorically opposed to liberalism and liberal reforms in Spain. Indeed, nearly a third of the deputies at Cádiz were liberal priests who gave direct support to constitutional liberalism in order to achieve a freer and more enlightened Spain, but only once religious toleration was off the table and only once the constitution firmly asserted that Spain's identity remained Catholic. These very same liberal priests would find themselves purged from their ecclesiastical posts during the second Fernandine reaction (1823–33) in which the alliance of throne and altar allowed ultramontane factions in the clergy to restore the Inquisition, lift the suppression of the Jesuits, and undermine much of the building momentum for liberal reform. The die of the vicious cycle was cast as clerical resistance to and mobilization against liberalism grew more sophisticated and violent, which in turn triggered anticlerical responses, also often violent, designed to safeguard the gains of secularization. The second Fernandine reaction may have temporarily put to rest clerical-anticlerical unrest, primarily by suppressing anticlericals and liberals altogether, but it was founded on macabre images of the absolutist King, the Inquisition, and the ultramontane forces hanging Riego in Madrid's plaza de Cebada in 1823. From that point on, the collective memory was one that drew the lines between liberals on the one hand and friars, priests, and monks on the other.

Perhaps this explains the ferocity of the anticlerical violence of 1834, which took place in the midst of the First Carlist War. A cholera epidemic had spread from Andalusia to the Ciudad Real Province and into Madrid, where the disease claimed over 500 souls each day beginning on July 15, 1834.[17] Anticlerical propagandists spread a rumor that Jesuit priests poisoned the public water supply in order to punish the liberal capital for its impiety.[18] Under the pretext of searching for incriminating evidence, an angry mob stormed through the city's central plazas, including the Plazuela de Cebada, and sacked several religious structures, including residences. In less than twelve hours the crowd murdered seventy-three priests and friars and left eleven others injured. Some priests were hacked to death with sabers, others were hanged naked in the streets, and many of their corpses were desecrated with still more knife attacks. Clerical accounts of the atrocities accuse the police of willfully turning a blind eye to the anticlerical violence under the pretext that they were investigating the veracity of the poisoning rumor.[19] There appears to have been police and military misconduct during the riot, and the police superintendent, the mayor, and civil governor were all forced to resign because of the perception that their units were undisciplined. Of the seventy-nine persons arraigned after the riot, fifty-four were civilians, and twenty-five were either policemen or national guardsmen. Only two men, a cabinetmaker and a military musician, were executed for their part in the riot, but both were accused of theft, not homicide.[20]

Clearly the 1834 Madrid anticlerical riot was more than a spontaneous reaction to an alleged poisoning. The nation was involved in a civil war, the cholera epidemic had created a

great deal of anguish over the city's social conditions, the antiabsolutist as well as antimontane energies had been building throughout the second Fernandine reaction, and anticlerical *exaltados* took advantage of this when they made up such a horrible rumor. However, the Church and the clergy, especially the Jesuits, had become symbols of an absolutist identity that was anathema to men dedicated to the liberal vision of the Spanish nation. Still, atheists and freemasons were not the sole forces behind the riot, and many of the rioters themselves were Catholic. This riot was not so much a riot against the Catholic faith, but rather a collective unleashing of anger toward symbols of absolute power. For the sociologist Julio Caro Baroja, the 1834 riot was more than an action based on the polarization between good guys and bad guys, but rather symptomatic of a society with a fundamental discord between its actors, and one in which there is no understanding.[21] When the antiabsolutist daily *El Eco del Comercio* reported on the anticlerical riot, it transformed the victimized clergymen into "enemies of the nation (*patria*)," and minimized the violent acts by referring to them as "a few mishaps (*algunas desgracias*)."[22] Already the rhetoric of nationalism tied to the liberation of the individual was in place, and it explained anticlerical violence as a way to combat obstacles to the freedoms offered by liberalism. The same rhetoric of nationalism took shape around the dichotomy of liberal and antiliberal. The monks and priests were enemies of the Spanish nation because they were symbolic obstacles to Spain's march toward a liberal system.

One of the results of the popular anticlerical sentiment of the early years of the First Carlist War was that the Spanish state now enjoyed the ideal environment in which to force the Church to abandon its Old Regime character. This was accomplished through the disentailment of Church land. The underlying motivations for this new wave of expropriation, which began in 1836, were to boost the state's finances and create a constituency of dominant bourgeois land owners loyal to the state.[23] For some in Spain, as in other countries, the disentailment of Church land was interpreted as an attack against the Church as anticlericals argued that the Catholic Church's authority over issues of conscience, as well as wealth and property, could not be broken without the intervention of the state. The Old Regime Church, which had dominated both the spiritual and temporal life of all Spaniards for centuries, could no longer function as it had once the Spanish liberal state asserted itself in 1840.

The victory for the new liberal political system was a Pyrrhic victory for liberal Spain because it was achieved at the cost of tearing apart the nation. Church leaders had no choice but to acquiesce to the liberal state and abandon their hopes of returning to the Old Regime. However, all was not lost for the Church because the painful transition from the Old Regime to liberalism had offered the Church—both its clergy and lay following—political opportunities to use the liberal system to further or protect their interests. The Church and clergy knew that Spain could not go back to the days of absolutism, but the Church and clergy could use the legal rights afforded to them by liberalism in order to undermine the legitimacy of liberal Spain. If the liberal ideal of a Church reduced largely to its spiritual and pastoral missions was accomplished after the Carlist revolts were put down and the disentailment of

Church property was completed, the triumph came at the expense of any possibility that the Church could be put in the service of liberalism.[24] Thus, if the liberal state were to engage in a political nation-building discourse, it would not find a sympathetic audience among the clergy and its following.

Aside from a brief but unsuccessful Carlist uprising in Catalonia in 1846 (often called the Martiners' War or the Second Carlist War) and the Liberal Unionist Revolution of 1854–56, which resulted in a new bout of political anticlericalism primarily stemming from Liberal Unionists' disgust with the 1851 Concordat, the Spanish state and Church were on neutral terms until 1868. The political and military elite that controlled the government between 1843 and 1868 was primarily concerned with excluding radical democrats (including the earliest Spanish republicans) from power and with maintaining social order. There was a noticeable decline in anticlerical violence throughout Spain after 1843.

Anticlerical episodes were limited to Cathedral break-ins, drunken disruptions of ceremonies, or a minority's disrespect for the Faith, but it certainly did not constitute a frontal assault on the Church.[25] The sweeping political measures of February 1855, which resulted in the confiscation of approximately 143,000 units of property belonging either to the regular or secular clergy, did not prompt any anticlerical violence despite clerical resistance and an increase in anticlerical agitation in the radical-liberal and democratic republican press.[26] When popular or crowd violence did erupt during this period it was directed at other symbols of power or oppression such as the Queen Mother's Palace and homes of the notables in 1854, or against commercial enterprises during the June 1856 bread riots in Old Castile. The Church and clergy, it appeared, were no longer the symbols of the people's oppressors.

This reconciliation between the Church and the Spanish state, which continued well into the Restoration engineered by Cánovas, did not bode well for the process of creating national identity; in fact, it hampered the state tremendously. The traditional clergy continued to criticize the liberal polity and prevented the faithful from adhering to the liberals' vision for Spain. Borja de Riquer has argued that the 1851 Concordat gave the impression that Catholicism was consubstantial with political conservatism. The Concordat "consolidated the Catholic confessionalism of the state and reinforced the traditional identification of Spain as the 'Catholic-nation' *par excellence*."[27] These relatively peaceful conditions also allowed the Church hierarchy, clergy, and laity to attempt to re-clericalize Spain. Antonio María Claret, a Catalan prelate who would also become the Queen's confessor, was a key figure in the mid-nineteenth-century religious revival. He retained a team of missionaries to launch a counterattack on what he considered a depraved secular society, and these, and other clerical texts maligned rather than supported liberalism and the political system.[28]

Clericalism also struck a tremendous victory for itself on November 8, 1857, when the Minister of the Interior, Cándido Nocedal (an important Carlist leader and founder of the ultramontane daily, *El Siglo Futuro*), passed a press law that prohibited the publication

of any discussion of religious themes without the authorization of the local diocese.[29] These restrictions helped establish a proclerical pro-Catholic context that saw clericals publicly laud Pius IX's *Syllabus of Errors* (1864) and lead a campaign against the republican journalist and historian Emilio Castelar's tenure case while republicans and anticlericals on the margins of power seethed.[30] The political atmosphere that resulted after 1857 was a paradoxical one: though the liberal state depended on the Catholic Church for its base of support and though the Church was more dependent (especially financially) on the state than ever before in the nineteenth century, the state was, nonetheless, legally and constantly maligned by clericals and Catholics.

Of course this new wave of clericalism was not to go unpunished when anticlericalism again sprang up after 1868. The Revolution of 1868 was launched by a coalition of liberal generals and urban radicals who grew resentful of *moderado* dominance since 1856. However, the revolution of these elites was also accompanied by a number of local juntas whose members often included antireligious radicals and republicans. In many of Spain's provinces, these revolutionary juntas restricted the freedom of action of bishops and priests, and sometimes looted churches, shot religious statues, and beat up clergymen.[31]

Popular forms of anticlerical agitation grew when Spain's First Republic was proclaimed in 1873. Anticlerical mischief was especially prevalent in southern Spain where, for example, Seville youths dyed holy water red so that the faithful would emerge with brows tinted the color of the revolution. In Cádiz, republican bands disrupted solemn benedictions and the city's municipal government changed religious street names to those of the republican litany.[32] A new series of Carlist rebellions in the North of Spain that included atrocities against liberal prisoners at the hands of a small minority of priests prompted anticlerical reprisals similar to those during the first Carlist War. The weakened Church of the 1850s that had not been worth the wrath of the disgruntled mobs was now once again attacked precisely because it had become affiliated with the recently fallen regime.[33]

As in the French Third Republic, anticlericalism in Spain shifted during this period to its modern decisively antireligious form. A new generation of radicals that included Fernando Garrido and José Nakens—but also Catholic-raised intellectuals such as Clarín, Juan Valera, and Benito Pérez Galdós, who all believed that there was no possibility of a Catholic accommodation with liberalism—viewed religion as a fundamental evil that had to be repressed or even extirpated altogether.[34] For a new generation of Voltairean radicals, inheritors of the *exaltado* liberal tradition, the answer to Spain's conflict with the Church was simple: the complete separation of Church and state.

For various radicals and republicans, anticlericalism became an identity in itself rather than a tendency that merely flared up whenever clericalism grew strong. So long as the forward progress of Spain toward becoming a modern European nation was hampered by clericals, or at least so long as modern anticlericals perceived this was the case, the modern anticlericals were determined to curb the Church and clergy's presence in society for the

good of the nation. Because of the success of anticlericalism throughout nineteenth-century France and especially during the Third Republic, anticlericalism became a lifestyle, a philosophy, and an almost sacred tool in the cosmos of Spanish modern republicans (and opponents of the Restoration oligarchy) who were inspired by France's liberal polity. For modern anticlericals, anticlericalism was what divided liberals from antiliberals, the enlightened from the fanatical, and progressive Spain from absolutist Spain. Numerous local studies of the clerical-anticlerical battle in Restoration Spain reveal that while acute moments of violence were rare, the drama created by the rhetoric of both sides and the discourses promulgated through their printing industries sustained a tension in everyday life.[35]

The premier republican anticlerical of Restoration Spain was José Nakens, editor of the Madrid weekly *El Motín,* who put forward any number of anticlerical discourses and symbols of radical republicans in their attempt to discredit the Catholic Church, its clergy, and Restoration state on behalf of the exploited nation (*pueblo*). Beginning in April of 1881 a special section of *El Motín* called "Manojos de flores místicas" ("Bunches of Mystical Flowers") listed dozens of clerical abuses and crimes because: "Jesus Christ lashed out against the merchants at the Temple; we, humble sinners, shall try to imitate him, censuring those who forget his law."[36] Nakens' project involved the mass-production of the anticlerical message in a deliberate attempt to turn people against the Church and clergy. *El Motín* pursued that end with the "Manojos" page, through the printed word, which appealed to literate and cultured readers, and through large centerfold cartoons that hammered home the paper's anticlerical spirit and which no doubt appealed to illiterate workers, and even socialists and anarchists.

It was very common for Nakens and his staff to represent the clergy as insects, serpents, spiders, or crows who prevented allegories of Spain from greater things. A particularly poignant example of the dehumanized-constrictive clergy image appeared in the center cartoon for the May 31, 1885, issue of *El Motín.* In it, a female allegory that could represent either Spain or education is constricted by a large python whose head is that of a Jesuit priest. She is gagged by a tape that reads *Syllabus*— referring to the *Syllabus of Errors* of 1864—while a raven wearing a beret of the traditionalist Carlist movement prepares to claw her. Rather than allowing her to study a modern curriculum, she is forced to read religious and theological texts.[37] If Spain were to progress and modernize toward becoming a wholly liberal democracy governed by morality, reason, and the tenets of the Enlightenment, then the clergy—these representatives of backwardness and obscurantism who all wore black like the ravens, the black spiders, and snakes—were incompatible with the nation's regeneration.

Nakens would be among the first of the Spanish republicans to mass-produce images that conflated anticlericalism with nationalism. In the republicans' eyes, Spain was a nation that was enslaved by the Vatican. The center illustration in the March 27, 1887, issue of *El Motín* again juxtaposed another image of the Pope bowing in deference to the allegory of the French Republic with an image of the Pope stomping on the back of a shocked and

confused *España*. Similarly, the centerfold illustration for the January 26, 1890, issue depicts a long train chugging from Spain toward St. Peter's Basilica in Rome. The train's boxcars, which are labeled "E á R" (*España á Roma*, Spain to Rome), are filled with sheep all wearing Carlist berets and clerical hats. The final car has a couple of rotund friars sitting on large sacks of *duros* with markings of 800,000, 300,000, or 40,000.[38] The loyalty that the clergy held toward their "monarch," the Pope in Rome, meant that the Church represented a supranational or internationalist threat to the Spanish nation and attempts to establish a modern secular Spanish identity. For this reason, the clergy was depicted as unpatriotic and not the least bit concerned for the health and progress of the Spanish nation.[39] In another one of its center cartoons, *El Motín* juxtaposed those "who give their lives for the nation"—injured and dismembered veterans from the Cuban campaign—with those "who sacrifice their nation for their lives" (fat drunken friars).[40] Priests were not only noncitizens; they were also anti-Spaniards. According to radical republicans, since the Restoration state was an accomplice in furthering the goals of the Church (if not merely a pawn under the Vatican's control) it followed that the state was also a curse to the nation. The anticlerical message itself constituted an evaluation that a secular and anticlerical republican vision of Spain should be privileged above any other conservative, oligarchical, or clerical vision of the nation.

Nakens updated a long anticlerical tradition and blended it with a modern European-wide obsession with nationalism. With his anticlerical campaign between 1881 and 1926, he developed a range of symbols with which many Spaniards could identify. His newspaper, plays, collections of essays, cartoons, posters, postcards, and almanacs were part of a desire to make tangible his vision of the nation to provide emotional flashpoints that evoked more complex ideas. The almanacs, which either poked fun at or provided grisly accounts of clerical violence and torture during the Carlist Wars or the sixteenth-century Inquisition, were attempts to undermine the Church and clergy's present state by using their bloody past and in order to justify and obviate a republican future.[41] Anticlericalism, its symbols and language, was particularly useful for Nakens because it offered a unifying cross-class appeal: all who felt aggrieved by the opulence of the Church or clergy could join Nakens in his imagined community. At the root of the anticlerical imagery and discourse was a fundamental belief that the forward progress of the Spanish nation could only come through a significant alteration of the relationship between the clergy and the state.

Like Alejandro Lerroux and Vicente Blasco Ibáñez, the much more successful populist republicans who followed his lead and who, unlike Nakens, were eager to run for political office in the late nineteenth century, Nakens focused on republican morality and honor rather than class status. In this way, he appealed to everyone who opposed the Restoration *status quo*, especially in relation to the clergy's role in Spanish society. This republican quality of *rassemblement*—appealing and uniting all who sought to end the oligarchy's reign—was very powerful, but necessitated the skillful manipulation of discourse in order to maintain a following among people from different classes and occupations. One of the most powerful

unifying forces for the Restoration regime's opponents was anticlericalism, and José Nakens was a master at purveying these symbols and mass-producing them.

While the anticlericalism of the late nineteenth century continued to mimic the relationship anticlericalism had with secularization and clericalism in the early nineteenth century, it was recast by an anticlerical industry—a proliferation of anticlerical literature, theater, newspapers, and other artifacts, many of which were mass-produced by Nakens and *El Motín*— that was nationalistic.[42] The production of anticlerical discourse was motivated by a concern for the nation and its regeneration. It was a product of a perception that the Church and clergy had made a financial, social, and cultural comeback at a time when the secular was supposedly triumphant over the religious. In addition, it was a product of a self-pitying belief that Spain was falling behind in the international race toward modernity.

Republican anticlericalism was very much a modern phenomenon because it blended the politics of morality with a European-wide language of racial or biological degeneration. Republicans like Nakens were obsessed with controlling the Church and clergy because they considered them to be agents of the nation's moral and racial/biological degeneration. While clerical elements tied degeneration to secularization and modernity, anticlerical republicans separated national degeneration from the history of progress. Closely tied to these languages of moral and racial/biological degeneration is that the rhetoric within the anticlerical industry conveyed the idea that an anticlerical-republican conception of good government and social justice should be privileged over those of Catholics, the clergy, and the oligarchs. Only republicans—who conceptualized politics as a moral endeavor rather than a means toward social control and depoliticization—knew what Spain ought to be like.

The terrain in which the clericals and anticlericals fought out their battles in the Restoration was as much cultural as it was political. These battles took place not so much in the rarified circles of formal politics, but rather in the press and other avenues of the public sphere in which Spaniards discussed the common good. Nakens' sustained anticlerical campaign and mass production of anticlerical propaganda beginning in the early 1880s was a form of the "new politics." Nakens' manipulation of symbols and rituals was crucial for the anticlerical republicans because not only did anticlerical symbolism simplify and abbreviate their message, but it also served as a way to reach the masses emotionally and increase the chances of mobilizing those masses. Appeals to anticlericalism were thus very much a central part of the discourse of populists like Blasco and Lerroux because anticlerical rants allowed them to secure a following without having to present a concrete plan or strategy for bringing about the Republic.

As the man who spoke for the *pueblo* (nation) against the abuses of the clergy, and the man who was obsessed with distributing anticlerical paraphernalia for the good of the nation, Nakens was one of the primary inventors of an anticlerical republican culture and vision. His anticlerical production was designed to break the almost hypnotic control that the clergy maintained over the Spanish nation. It was an attempt to, as Timothy Mitchell

has put it, "override the old scripts" of the Church and clergy.[43] Nakens sought to surround Spaniards with the symbols of an alternative vision of Spain, and the constant and repetitive nature of the themes discussed above constituted an effort to get Spaniards to think in anticlerical ways. The anticlerical industry was an effort to unite opponents of the regime through the hatred of a common enemy, and thus define the nation through those who were excluded, largely the clergy. People feel most like a community when they think alike and are engaged in similar activities. Anticlerical discourse provided the regime's progressive opponents such a social glue. In many ways, anticlericals from all facets of society lived their own anticlerical battles vicariously through José Nakens. Anyone who came in contact with *El Motín*, be it directly (actively reading his newspaper) or indirectly (hearing about it at the *ateneum*, or even hearing it maligned at the Sunday sermon), was engaged in the process of evaluating, rewarding, or discarding the anticlerical republican vision of Spain.

This chapter has attempted to show the significant changes in Spanish anticlericalism over the course of the nineteenth century. Late nineteenth-century anticlericalism borrowed from previous anticlerical discourses and traditions, but developed a new ideology and political forms that conflated national malaise with the influence and power of the Church and clergy, and prescribed a multivalent and multi-vocal campaign to politically and culturally transform Spain. The anticlericalism of the late nineteenth century already pinned Spaniard against Spaniard, and late nineteenth-century anticlericalism was replete with a tradition of symbols, images, and attitudes toward the Church and clergy that foreshadowed the bloodletting of the Civil War when 6,832 Catholic priests, seminarians, monks, friars, and nuns lost their lives.[44] As powerful and utilitarian anticlericalism had become to opponents of the regime, its violent and revolutionary potential was never well appreciated or easy to control.

Notes

1. See for instance Alejandro Nieto, *Los primeros pasos del Estado constitucional: Historia administrativa de la Regencia de María Cristina de Borbón* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1996), 488.
2. According to J. Salwyn Schapiro, *Anticlericalism: Conflict between Church and State in France, Italy, and Spain* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1967), 32, n. 1: "The terms "clericalism" and "anticlericalism," French in origin, did not come into general use until the middle of the nineteenth century.
3. See the essays in Nigel Aston and Matthew Cragoe, eds., *Anticlericalism in Britain, 1500–1914* (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2001) for the case of Anglican anticlericalism. Modern anti-Catholicism and anticlericalism need not take place in a Catholic setting either. See D.G. Paz, *Popular Anti-Catholicism in Mid-Victorian England* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); and John Wolffe, *The Protestant Crusade in Britain, 1829–1860* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
4. An outline of the history of anticlericalism appears in José Sánchez, *Anticlericalism* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973). See also the articles in Peter A. Dykema and Heiko A. Obeman, eds., *Anticlericalism in late medieval and modern Europe* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993).
5. Julio Caro Baroja, *Introducción a una historia contemporánea del anticlericalismo español* (Madrid: Istmo, 1980), 14, 44; Sánchez, 79–93; and René Rémond, "Anticlericalism: Some Reflections by way of Introduction," *European Studies Review* 13, no. 2 (April 1983): 121–26. See also René Rémond,

L'Anticlericalisme en France de 1815 á nos jours (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1986), 3–16.

6. Research on José Nakens is unfortunately scarce. However, he has been the subject of a recent enlightening article: Manuel Pérez Ledesma, "José Nakens (1841–1926). Pasión anticlerical y activismo republicano," in *Liberales, agitadores, y conspiradores. Biografías heterodoxas del siglo XIX*, ed. Isabel Burdiel and Manuel Pérez Ledesma (Madrid: Espasa, 2000). Nakens also looms large in Enrique A. Sanabria, "Anticlerical Politics: Republicanism, Anticlericalism, and the Public Sphere in Restoration Madrid, 1875–1912," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 2001).
7. Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, "Curas y liberales en la revolución burguesa," *Ayer* 27 (1997): 69–70.
8. Sánchez, 79.
9. William J. Callahan, *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1998* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 51. See also Joan Connelly Ullman, "The Warp and Woof of Parliamentary Politics in Spain, 1808–1939: Anticlericalism versus 'Neo-Catholicism,'" *European Studies Review* 13, no. 2 (1983): 155–61.
10. The bibliography on secularism is expansive and still growing. See for instance, David A. Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978); Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Richard Fenn, *Toward a Theory of Secularization* (Storrs, CT: Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1978); and Karel Dobbelaere, *Secularization: A Multi-Dimensional Concept*, a special issue of *Current Sociology* 29, no. 2 (1981): 1–216.
11. Julio de la Cueva Merino, "The Stick and the Candle: Clericals and Anticlericals in Northern Spain, 1898–1913," *European History Quarterly* 26 (April 1996): 248–49.
12. Stanley G. Payne, *Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 72.
13. William J. Callahan, *Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 1750–1874* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 124. On Merino, Pío Baroja wrote:

    > He was a little fat man, short, with no distinguishing characteristics, thirty-something of age. The only thing that gave him any character was his menacing gaze, devious and harsh. He wore a black beret off-set toward his forehead as if he was afraid of anyone looking into his eyes; he wore a grown and rough beard, with short hair, a kerchief around his neck, his black jacket closed with everyone of his buttons, and a hangman's noose between his legs. That man had something of the enigmatic personalities of blood-thirsty men, of assassins and executioners; his cruel and barbarous reputation extended throughout Spain. He knew of it, and the fear that his name evoked gave him a great deal of pride. Deep down, he was a poor hysterical devil, sick, convinced that his mission was God's work...
    >
    > Cited in Edouard Barry, ed., *España y españoles: paisaje, monumentos, tipos de la corte y de provincias, usos y costumbres, leyendas y tradiciones* (Paris: Garnier, 1913), 235.

14. Pérez Garzón, 71.
15. William Callahan, "The Origins of the Conservative Church in Spain, 1793–1923," *European Studies Review* 10, no. 2 (1980): 217; Pérez Garzón, 74–75; Payne, 76–77.
16. The episode is related in M. Lafuente, *Historia de España* (Barcelona, 1881), 5:367; and cited in Pérez Garzón, 75, no. 15.
17. Javier Puerto and Carlos San Juan, "La epidemia de cólera de 1834 en Madrid," *Estudios de Historia Social* 15 (1980): 9–61.
18. Payne, 82. On this ferocious anticlerical riot, see Salvador Camacho Pérez, "Violencia anticlerical en Madrid en julio de 1834," *Almotacín. Revista de la E.U. del Profesorado de EGB de Almería*, 9 (Jan–June 1987): 68–101. See also Anna M. García Rovira, *La revolució liberal a Espanya i les clases populars (1832–1835)* (Vic: Eumo, 1989), who suggests that the anticlerical riot was part of a larger conspiracy designed to discredit the government and install a truly radical-liberal regime.
19. Pérez Garzón, 82. The Jesuit Manuel Revuelta González, *La exclaustración (1833–1840)* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Católicos, 1976), 214, relates the anecdote that crowd members, including women, put on religious vestments and engaged in profane dancing in front of the police.
20. Pérez Garzón, 84.

21. Caro Baroja, 155. Caro gives an example: this society was so disjointed that it was a society in which the clergy could honestly believe that the romantic literature that dominated literary circles was an articulation of a poorly-veiled satanism!

22. Ibid., 87–88.

23. Angel Bahamonde Magro and Jesús A. Martínez-Martín, "La desamortización y el mercado inmobilario madrileño (1836–1868)," in *Urbanismo e historia urbana en mundo hispano*, ed. Antonio Bonet Correa (Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1985), 2:939–56. See also Francisco Simón Segura, *La desamortización española del siglo XIX* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1973), and Germán Rueda Hernanz, ed., *La desamortización en la península ibérica*, *Ayer* 9 (1993).

24. Callahan, *Church, Politics, and Society*, 183. See also Borja de Riquer i Permanyer, "La débil nacionalización española del siglo XIX," *Historia Social* 20 (Fall 1994): 111–12.

25. Callahan, *Church, Politics, and Society*, 181–82.

26. Ibid., 199–201; Payne, 90; Simón Segura, 175.

27. Riquer i Montanyer, 97–114.

28. Callahan, *Church, Politics, and Society*, 236–37.

29. The *Ley de Nocedal* was not only designed to curb anticlericalism in the press, but also control democratic, republican, and socialist propaganda. See Pedro Gómez Aparicio, *Historia del periodismo español* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1967), 1:449–52.

30. Caro Baroja, 203; Gómez Aparicio, 559–65.

31. Callahan, *Church, Politics, and Society*, 250–51, remarks that though a Claretian priest was assassinated in Tarragona in early October 1868, severe violence against priests was often isolated rather than widespread. See also, Payne, 93; and Vicente Cárcel Orti, *Iglesia y revolución en España (1868–1874): estudio histórico-jurídico desde la documentación vaticana inedita* (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1979), 134–39. Cárcel Ortí's study primarily focuses on the Papacy's diplomacy with the Spanish state, but is exhaustively researched and an impressive treatment of the political turmoil of the Revolutionary Sexenium.

32. Callahan, *Church, Politics, and Society*, 250–51; Payne, 93; Cárcel Ortí, 134–39.

33. Cárcel Ortí,135.

34. Payne, 93. On the anticlericalism of the dominant literary figures of the final third of the nineteenth century see Francisco Pérez Gutiérrez, *El problema religioso de la generación de 1868: la leyenda de Dios* (Madrid: Taurus, 1976). Juan Varela's Catholic anticlericalism is the subject of Paul Drochon, "Juan Valera et la liberté religieuse," *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez* 8 (1972): 407–44. José Nakens describes his involvement in the Revolution of 1868 and his commitment to anticlericalism in "Apuntes Biográficos," *El Motín*, September 12, 1889, which he would later republish in José Nakens, *Trozos de mi vida* (Madrid: Hermanos Sáez, 1914? or 1915?), 7–16.

35. Julio de la Cueva Merino, *Clericales y anticlericales: el conflicto entre confesionalidad y secularización en Cantabria, 1875–1923* (Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 1994), Julio de la Cueva Merino, "The Stick and the Candle." The Church and clergy in Málaga is the subject of Elías de Mateo Avilés, *El anticlericalismo en Málaga (1875–1923)* (Málaga: E. Mateo Avilés, 1990); and Elías de Mateo Avilés, *Paternalismo burgués y beneficiencia religiosa en la Málaga desde la segunda mitad del siglo XIX* (Diputación Provincial de Málaga, 1985). On Valencia see Ramiro Reig, *Blasquistas y clericales. La lucha por la ciudad en la Valencia de 1900* (Valencia: Institució Alfons el Magnànim/ Institució Valenciana d'Estudis i Investigació, 1982).

36. *El Motín*, April 24, 1881, cited in Pérez Ledesma, 309.

37. *El Motín*, July 27, 1884. This cartoon was also reproduced on the front page of *El Motín*, April 21, 1910, with the caption: "What the clericals want education to be."

38. *El Motín*, January 26, 1890. The cartoon's caption reads: "Rejection of worldly goods."

39. See for example, "Frailes y clérigos," *El Motín*, July 8, 1893, and "Frailes y clérigos, II," *El Motín*, July 29, 1893. In "Abrid los ojos, católicos," *Las Dominicales del libre pensamiento*, April 28, 1898, an incensed Fernando Lozano offered the Vatican's declaration of neutrality in the Spanish American War as evidence that the Church and clergy worked to destroy the Spanish nation.

40. *El Motín*, July 25, 1886.

41. *Almanaque de la Inquisición por El Motín* (Madrid: Domingo Blanco, 1912?); *Almanaque del Carlismo, para los años 1913 á 1999, por El Motín* (Madrid: Domingo Blanco, 1912?); and *Almanaque cómico del Carlismo para los años 1914 á 1999* (Madrid: Domingo Blanco, 1913?).

42. Credit for the term "anticlerical industry" goes to Timothy Mitchell, *The Betrayal of Innocents: Desire, Power, and the Catholic Church in Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 37.

43. Ibid.

44. Antonio Montero Moreno, *Historia de la persecución religiosa en España, 1936–1939* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Católicos, 1956), 761–62.

CHAPTER 5

The Camino de Santiago and the Paradox of National Catholicism in Modern Spain

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One of the most dramatic processes in recent Spanish cultural history has been the revival of the Camino de Santiago, a pilgrimage to the supposed site of the remains and apparition of St. James the Apostle at Santiago de Compostela. The shrine to St. James had been the destination of countless pilgrims from throughout Europe between the tenth and fifteenth centuries, such that at one point, Compostela attained a splendor and prestige briefly to rival Rome as a pilgrimage site. The practice declined in the Early Modern period; by the latter nineteenth century, the remote Galician town received pilgrims only in the dozens even in a jubilee year, and these almost entirely from nearby districts in Spain and northern Portugal. A century later, Compostela had regained much of its former prominence. It became the third largest Christian pilgrimage destination after Rome and Jerusalem, and in 2004, the Prince of Asturias Foundation—royal patron of Spain's most prestigious awards for arts, sciences, and humanism—recognized the Camino de Santiago with its annual prize for Harmony.

The Foundation's interest in Compostela reflected the Spanish crown's long-standing aim of establishing itself as Spain's reigning conciliator. Properly conveyed, the pilgrimage formed a national symbol above the diverse ethnic, civic, and religious particularisms within Spain and a shared tradition among the rival nations of Europe. In its award statement, the Foundation praised the Camino de Santiago for its role as a "generator of extraordinary spiritual, social, cultural economic vitality," adding, "It has become, over the course of its 1,200 years of history, a symbol of brotherhood among peoples and a true axis for the first common European consciousness."[1] The statement's implication that the pilgrimage possesses over a millennium of continuous history is dubious and its rhetorical distance from the crusading religious origins of the medieval pilgrimage is notable. As Catholicism lost most of the official status and prestige it once enjoyed in Spanish life, the pilgrimage appeared

to have transformed from the commemoration of a miraculous event of the crusades to an abstract symbol of humanistic ideals.[2] Such discourse was characteristic of the prosperous, Europeanist democracy that has governed Spain since 1978. The Spanish crown similarly deemphasized the religious aspect of the ambiguously nationalist and religious shrine at Covadonga in 2001.[3] Movement toward a more secular public square reflects a standard trait of classic European modernization, of which twentieth-century Spain is an exemplary poster child.[4]

The Camino's political value eclipsed its sacred meaning well before the dramatic phase of economic development and decline in religious practice in Spain began in the 1960s. Its slow revival began as a component of neo-Catholic medieval revivalism, a project of pious nationalist intellectuals rather than the Church or any Catholic organization. The pilgrimage became an aspect of Nationalist Catholicism during the Civil War. Francisco Franco's government, eyeing as early as 1937 an auspicious accessory to its wider domestic and international political strategy, became from that point the major patron of the Camino's revival. The Franco regime engaged in a steady and committed labor to convert the Camino de Santiago into a prominent symbol of ethnic nationalism and a motor for regional economic development. The route's revival was from the outset a secular and political effort, a bellwether for the political uses of religious heritage in modern Spain and for the Franco regime's changing priorities over its nearly four-decade lifespan.

The story of the Franco regime's patronage of the pilgrimage provides a window of insight into the nature of Spanish National-Catholicism. Versions of this peculiar synthesis of nationalism and religious heritage developed in countries such as Poland, France, and Austria in the late nineteenth century, and thrived in Spain well into the twentieth.[5] In contrast to the Catholic populism to emerge in much of Catholic Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Spanish National-Catholicism was largely an ideology of elites. Its basic premise held that intense religious devotion was an essential Spanish trait that should guide the nation as it confronted the challenges of modernity. Modern National-Catholics rejected the oft-repeated postulate that Spain's stagnation stemmed from a stubborn devotion to the faith and a failure to embrace rationalist, secular principles. They argued, rather, that liberal Spain had, on the contrary, embraced them too exuberantly and at the expense of the national soul. Though National-Catholicism implied piety, it was in essence a political movement concerned with improving Spain's material conditions and national cohesion.

The rise of National-Catholicism closely paralleled the revival of the Camino de Santiago, and the latter might be regarded as the most enduring legacy of a largely outmoded political movement. In a country known more for its piety than its nationalism, none of the many living shrines of popular Catholicism attained anything like the levels of visitors or renown of this ancient, dormant, and dubious relic of the *Reconquista*, tucked away in a remote, thinly populated, and relatively inhospitable corner of the peninsula. Of interest here is not the subjective motivation and experience of individual pilgrims, but the curious

turn of events by which, as distinct from most national pilgrimages in modern Catholic Europe, secular-nationalist interests came to control the meaning and uses of the Camino de Santiago.

Pilgrimage and Politics

Religious pilgrimage has trod in the temporal realm, as readers of Chaucer can attest. A main thread of the civilizational fabric of medieval Europe, Christian pilgrimage declined in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as religious warfare hindered long-distance travel and Catholic and Protestant reformers grew critical of a practice built on indulgences, idolatry, secular commerce, and earthly curiosity.[6] The Camino de Santiago exemplified this historical trajectory. Travelers claiming the privileged legal status of pilgrim increasingly did so for commercial or other profane motives, while the hostels built to provide charitable sanctuary to pilgrims became profitable enterprises. The eighteenth-century Spanish monk Feijoo upbraided those who wandered throughout Spain, "out of human curiosity, with the pretext of going to Compostela."[7]

Pilgrimage returned to vogue in nineteenth-century Europe, but was more the product of a new age than a return to an older form of worship. Although the Congress of Vienna nominally restored Church privileges, the feeling grew among liberal Catholics that the Church was increasingly subservient to state interests, and only a strong sense of transnational Catholicism and an emphasis on individual piety such as pilgrimage could forestall a creeping subjugation to the state. The development of passenger railway also contributed to an upsurge in international and trans-local pilgrimages throughout Catholic Europe.[8] Yet religion also became inscribed within the context of modern nationalism as many Catholics came to understand nations, in the words of Michael Burleigh, to be "as essential to the divine plan as the family or monarchy."[9] Various nationalist theorists predicted, explicitly or implicitly, that the new religion of the nation progressively would supplant what they considered to be the outmoded tenets of the Church, and that nationalism and religion were in Europe rival loyalties. Yet it must be recalled that the main elaborator of this notion was Mazzini, whose own Italian cause had to reckon with Rome's dual identity as a religious and political capital. The modern challenges to divine Church authority such as those outlined by Mazzini and his followers—namely liberal nationalism and anticlericalism—challenged Catholics to adapt to the politics of modern nationalism and to practice their religion in part as an expression of identity.[10] In several Catholic countries other than Italy, Catholicism, though many clergy feared the consequences of this trend, far surpassed liberalism as a cohesive nationalist force.[11]

Pilgrimage was well suited to help Catholics confront modern challenges. The visual effect of a mass demonstration captivated organizers and agitators of several political movements during the later nineteenth century, depicting the sheer human power behind their

shared grievances or identities.[12] The optics of Catholic identity functioned much the same way at pilgrimage sites; as William Christian has remarked, pilgrimages must be interpreted as social as well as religious statements.[13] With increasing frequency, clergy and lay Catholic groups organized journeys to holy shrines, many of which were sites of recent apparitions of the Virgin Mary. In 1858 an apparition at Lourdes, in southern France, became a shrine that attracted masses of pilgrims by the 1870s. The Lourdes pilgrimage soon became a national event, understood by many as a soaking of national sins following the tumultuous and violent birth of the Third Republic, and evoking a powerful alternative to the laic Republican understanding of the French nation.[14] A number of Virginal apparitions in this period coincided with a renewed Church emphasis on the Marian cult, indicative of the commonly recognized feminization of religion in the Catholic world during this period.[15] Cults and pilgrimages formed around several recent apparition sites, including Marpingen in Germany, Joaseiro do Norte in Brazil, and Fátima in Portugal, all of which, though they differed radically in origin and character, represented a form of collective rebellion against the penetration of secular bureaucratic authority.[16]

In Spain, political and religious identities also coalesced around pilgrimage, though with some differentiating characteristics from the European pattern. As elsewhere, the Virgin was by 1900 a potent symbol among those who rejected the onset of secularization and liberalism—certainly far more so than the St. James relic.[17] Spanish priests made attempts to create national pilgrimages in the mold of Lourdes. Yet, despite considerable devotion to the Virgin, popular pilgrimages to the Virgin of Pilar at Zaragoza and the Black Madonna shrine at Montserrat were in competition with one another and none became a truly national event like Lourdes or Fátima.[18] This may have been due in part to their incongruence with the modernist and modernizing values that captivated most Spanish nationalists and their failure to deploy modern marketing techniques, as the Lourdes organizers had done so effectively, to attract a wider movement.[19] A far more versatile symbol was the shrine at Covadonga, where an eighth-century Virginal apparition spurred on Iberian Christians to begin their protracted struggle against the peninsula's Muslim rulers. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Covadonga received considerable attention from clergy, regional politicians, and national conservative elites hoping to establish a national pilgrimage site. The Covadonga shrine appealed not only to traditional Catholic values and anti-liberal integrism, but also—and despite scholarly doubts about its authenticity—to some modernizers in search of a potent symbol of civic cohesion and renewal. At a time when the Church felt under siege from anticlerical forces and the nation appeared to be unraveling, the Covadonga shrine might have been expected to command broad support. But as Carolyn Boyd has argued, "the multivalency of the Covadonga myth made it a somewhat problematical vehicle for promoting national solidarity," as politicians, Catholic activists, and regional Asturian authorities clashed over which aspects to emphasize in the commemoration.[20] After about 1917, liberal or civic nationalists began to lose interest in the shrine, which proceeded to a

fairly static career as a modest National-Catholic tourist site.

"*Volvamos a Santiago*!"

In contrast to the Virginal apparitions, the shrine at Santiago de Compostela captivated neither popular Catholic imagination nor the attention of influential regional politicians, but did attract new interest from scholars and some conservative Catholic elites. The first stimulus was an 1884 papal decree declaring the remains of St. James found there to be authentic. An upsurge of scholarly interest in Compostela followed, not so much as a living holy place, but rather as a historic monument with important political, military, and cultural dimensions.[21] Popular participation in the pilgrimage itself grew at a much slower pace. Accounts in the daily *Voz de Galicia* indicate that the jubilee years of 1926 and 1943 drew more pilgrims than prior years, but the quantum leap remained some years off.[22] Most Spanish Catholics were far more interested in recent apparitions in their locales than in antiquated symbols.

To the extent that the Church hierarchy harbored any interest in the Compostela shrine, it was as a confirmation of its privileged relationship with the state. Compostela was the site of the crown's ceremonial offering to St. James, held annually since 1643, in nominal recognition of the Church's protection of the kingdom. As the Church became increasingly on the defensive in many aspects of Spanish life, such symbolism became increasingly hollow. By the early twentieth century, an astute observer might have regarded Compostela as a symbol of the hierarchy's dependence on the Spanish crown, rather than the latter's protector. The Restoration monarchy frequently worked to curtail the growing influence of anticlerical groups and fight the uphill battle of enforcing laws governing morality. It was for similar reasons that the Church broadly welcomed the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera, who seized power in 1923 amid a period of major social and colonial turmoil and presented himself as a champion of nationalist and religious virtues. Primo made an important gesture when he prostrated himself before the Compostela shrine in 1924, begging forgiveness for his and his nation's many sins; the same year, the modest independent Catholic party, the Popular Socialist Party, was absorbed into the new state party, the Patriotic Union, under the banner of "Monarchy, Religion, and Authority." As the National-Catholic rhetoric swelled, the opportunities for the Church to maintain an autonomous political movement fell off. The dictatorship's commitment to promoting a genuine religious recrudescence was limited, however. Its main contribution to religion was to suppress various political movements espousing anticlericalism.[23] Compostela, rather than evoking the splendor of the Spanish Church, might have been more suggestive of a hierarchy that had forfeited the prospect of political independence in exchange for dictatorial protection.

The mobilization of nationalist and religious passions during the Civil War marked the breakthrough for National-Catholicism. General Franco's Nationalist cause quickly transformed from a standard military coup into a crusade against the atheist, "anti-Spanish"

forces of Communism and Republican liberalism. The cult of St. James, the peninsula's premier evangelizer who miraculously appeared as a warrior as Christian armies battled the Moors, held particular appeal for many of Franco's fascist and ultra-nationalist supporters. After the fall of Galicia to Nationalist forces, the annual royal tribute ceremony, having been abolished by the Republic in 1931, was restored (absent the monarch) in July 1937.[24] Moreover, in one of its more imaginative propaganda campaigns during the war, the Nationalist government escorted tourists along portions of the pilgrimage route while narrating the National-Catholic interpretation of the war as a modern *Reconquista* against Communist latter-day Moors.[25]

Advocates and critics alike portrayed National-Catholicism as a close alliance between Church and state in a common project of re-evangelizing the peninsula.[26] Indeed, the Church emerged from the war a major beneficiary of the new Francoist state. The Spanish hierarchy asserted a renewed vigor and confidence that occasioned a genuine religious resurgence, particularly among populations where religious devotion had been historically high.[27] Though it competed with other conservative and rightist constituencies for political influence, the Church initially retained the position it had gained during wartime as the national overseer of education and public morality. Moreover, the hierarchy now enjoyed considerably more freedom and funds to publicize and organize than it had under the Republican regime.[28] For its part, the regime moved quickly to capitalize on its outwardly Catholic identity. Initially, this formed an important part of the fascist and imperial aesthetic, though National-Catholicism both predated and outlived the Franco regime's fascist phase. Yet the pretensions of radical National-Catholicism would likely never have been countenanced by Church leaders. Church and state remained separate institutions, albeit with certain common goals and outlooks. Giuliana di Febo has interpreted National-Catholicism as the "politicization of the sacred," little more than an elaborate aesthetic developed with the aim of equating loyalty to Franco with moral righteousness and Catholic tradition.[29] Franco was rendered in art and lore as a modern *El Cid*, visited in one notable painting by an apparition of St. James overhead.[30] The simultaneously nationalist, hypermasculine, and religious theatrical rituals peaked in their intensity between 1938 and 1942, coinciding with the regime's fascist phase. Most clergy acquiesced to participating in these celebrations, though some prominent Church officials, including the liberal Tarragonese Archbishop Francesc Vidal i Barraquer and Seville's ultraconservative Cardinal Segura, complained as early as 1939 that the mass Catholic spectacles sponsored by the regime were overly political and lacked religious depth.[31]

Demonstrating again its fondness for such events, the Franco regime took considerable interest in promoting the historic pilgrimage to Compostela, the incipient rediscovery of which dovetailed with the ends of its wider political outlook. The first effort came in 1943 when one of the regime's preeminent cultural institutions—the *Instituto de España*—sponsored a national contest to publish a winning book-length study on the theme *las peregri-*

naciones Jacobeas (the pilgrimage of St. James). The call generated two noteworthy redactions, both massive works in excess of 1,000 pages: Luciano Huidobro's *Las Peregrinaciones Jacobeas* received the contest's 50,000-peseta prize; the runner-up, Father Luis Vázquez de Parga's more scholarly *Las Peregrinaciones a Santiago de Compostela* was chosen the same year for the more prestigious Francisco Franco Prize. Apart from their evident literary and scholarly merit, each of the works possessed the necessary political credentials to warrant consideration for the prize. Huidobro's tome captured what contest judges called "the urge to discover the historic past which characterizes our society, and the return to the glorious traditions that inform the political movement of today's Spain."[32]

Vázquez de Parga's work presented a more rigorous historical treatment of the pilgrimage and emphasized its role in the wider context of medieval Europe. The study chronicled Compostela's rise in the eleventh century to an international prestige rivaling Rome and depicted a crusading European spirit drawn toward the Iberian Peninsula, frontier of the Christian world. Long dependent on trade with the Islamic peninsular dominions, Christian Spain, he wrote, "would now look toward Europe. The pilgrimage route would at the same time become the great trade route of northern Spain."[33] The advent of the pilgrimage stimulated commerce, repopulated the northern Iberian corridor, and propelled a southward thrust of European society and culture. The Camino de Santiago, Vázquez de Parga concluded, was "a collective phenomenon of Medieval Christian Europe."[34]

The Europeanist angle of Vázquez de Parga's study resembled a cultural outgrowth of the Franco regime's policy toward post–World War II Europe. Hampered by Franco's associations with interwar fascism and enduring perceptions of Spain's "oriental" character, many in the Spanish government regarded their country's cultural and religious contributions to European civilization as a just rebuttal to the ostracism they continued to endure. After 1945, conservative and Christian-Democratic leaders throughout Western Europe regarded Europe as a "family of nations," founded on common Christian values but with each maintaining its distinctive character and sovereignty. This attitude came to form the basis of the regime's increasingly active European policy.[35] Santiago and the pilgrimage usefully recalled a myth placing Spain's national origins in an earlier age of European cultural, commercial, and military dynamism and spiritual unity.

Several quasi-official organizations obliged the Francoist taste for mass spectacle into the 1940s, turning the old pilgrimage into a political manifestation with highly publicized group treks to Compostela during the Jubilee year of 1948. Various youth groups organized pilgrimages, including sections of Catholic Action, which, more than other group, kept the focus on the devotional aspects of pilgrimage.[36] Far the greater number, however, arrived under the auspices of the youth syndicate of the official state party, which sponsored several regional pilgrimages and a thirty-three-day march to Compostela from the French frontier, a manifestation the local daily *Voz de Galicia* called a "harmonic synthesis of the military and the religious."[37] On July 25, St. James' Day, the press reported the arrival of 6,000 pilgrims

on sixty buses, in addition to another 8,000 arriving on foot from nearby points like La Coruña and Santander. Official comment on the event certainly emphasized political symbolism rather than sacred devotion: "The old routes of our greatness," observed a regime spokesman, "again signal monuments to reality rather than monuments to hope."[38] Appeals to past greatness and restored hope lay at the heart of the "national resurrection" that defined the Franco regime's central myth. From the perspective of the diverse Nationalist right, the pilgrimage was an ecumenical symbol of Francoist politics.

The main patron of the Camino de Santiago would continue to be the regime rather than the Church, which, though an active promoter of several Marian pilgrimages throughout the country, was divided and at best lukewarm toward the nationalism at the center of the Compostela project. As Spanish politics evolved, official interest in Compostela changed as well. By 1950 the regime perceived the main threats to its survival to lie in international isolation and economic stagnation rather than some enemy within against whom Santiago's providence should be marshaled. It was of special interest, therefore, that 1950 saw the creation of a modest French society promoting the pilgrimage (the *Association des amis de Saint-Jacques de Compostelle*) and an attempt by a major British travel agent to sell "Pilgrim Tours" to Compostela, though the latter was cancelled for lack of interest.[39] These nonetheless indicated that the pilgrimage might become a propitious auxiliary to official diplomacy and a component of the regime's strategy to obtain foreign currency without appearing to abandon its nationalist program. After 1951, the task of promoting the Camino de Santiago fell to the newly established Ministry of Information and Tourism. This new administrative body would seek to forge a kind of moral legitimacy for the growing presence of foreign tourists, who, though a blessing in economic and diplomatic terms, were judged by much of the Francoist constituency as a threat to the nation's social decorum. In particular, Spain's fastest-growing tourist attraction—its sunny coastline—was viewed with skepticism. The evident increase in foreigners present on the Iberian Peninsula aroused concern from those wary of what was frequently labeled an "imported modernity"—libertine habits, secular attitudes, and relaxed mores.[40]

The Ministry of Information and Tourism therefore would make a disproportionate cause of the more politically acceptable religious tourism. The Camino de Santiago was readily adaptable to tourism promotion, for it constituted not just a shrine to be visited and admired, but an entire thematic itinerary of historic sites through several cities. For those reluctant to exploit religious custom for earthly motives, historians affirmed that this had always been an aspect of this particular pilgrimage. Vicente Huidobro's prize-winning submission, referred to earlier, noted that the "Pilgrim-Tourist" was "not incompatible with devotion to Santiago," and that his activities "came to constitute. . . a special type who did our Fatherland the great service that tourism offers: that of propaganda for Spain's beauty and grandeur."[41] A guide published by the ministry in 1971 emphasized the route's millenarian monumentalism, and in general pilgrims' guides depicted a site of cultural heritage

and individual spiritual transcendence rather than a living Christian shrine.[42] Here forms a contrast with the Portuguese national pilgrimage in the mid-twentieth century: visitors to the shrine at Fátima expressly were encouraged to leave tourist dress and curiosity at home and arrive instead with a pilgrim's mentality.[43]

It is difficult to gauge the number of pilgrims to Compostela, as official statistic-gathering lacked the necessary sophistication until the 1990s. One indication was a rapid increase in the number of visitors to the Compostela tourism information office: in the jubilee year of 1954, by this measure, the volume of Spanish visitors quintupled from 1953 to 31,000; foreign visitors, mostly French and Portuguese, quadrupled to 19,000.[44] The slow recrudescence of travel to Compostela aroused commercial interests, including from within the government. The *Instituto Nacional de Industria* (INI), a massive state-financed holding company, eyed opportunities in developing tourism in all its forms. As industrial managers, INI directors harbored no moral concerns about beach tourism, but in order to gain cabinet approval for such ventures, they sought first to improve the image of tourism as a national enterprise. This was a goal they apparently shared with the Ministry of Information and Tourism. The Camino de Santiago was, again, an ideal target toward which to aim this campaign. As a result, the INI, with little expectation of profitability, contributed the bulk of investment in the Hostal de los Reyes Católicos, an impressive luxury parador situated at the route's terminus in the center of Compostela, that opened in 1954. Another, the Hostal de San Marcos, at the route's midpoint in León, would follow in 1963.

A nexus of economic, political, and diplomatic interests in the Camino de Santiago thus had materialized, with the Church itself largely absent. In addition to the commercial prospects, the symbolic value of Compostela transcended Spain's borders to encompass all of Christendom, and this at a time when the European democracies were increasingly ambitious about interlocking their economic and political futures. The regime's emphasis on economic development and cautious pro-Europeanism aptly complemented the themes of travel, economic dynamism, and European spirituality present in contemporary discussions of the Compostela pilgrimage.

One regional organization dedicated to promoting the pilgrimage route argued in a 1961 open letter to *ABC*,

> The transcendent cultural and religious importance of the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela during the Middle Ages is so high that it is no exaggeration to assert that thanks to it, Spain was united to Christian or European civilization, as it was the counterweight to the influence of Islam that dominated almost the entire peninsula.[45]

The group, calling itself "Friends of the Camino de Santiago," emphasized its "highly religious patriotic mission," though this was not incompatible with its "economic motives." Publicity for this patriotic mission would begin, paradoxically, with a journalistic contest on the topic, "Pan-Europeanism and the Route of St. James."

The new minister of Information and Tourism, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, appointed in June 1962, was far more enthusiastic than his predecessor about tourism promotion in general, and also more aggressive in exploiting the multifarious political utility of the Camino de Santiago. The pilgrimage indeed already was undergoing a dramatic revival. One guide book estimated that a half-million pilgrims made the journey in 1962; more conservative government figures stood at 350,000, but predicted a doubling to 700,000 for the Holy Year of 1965.[46] Riding this tailwind, Fraga persuaded the cabinet to authorize greater state investment in tourism development, largely by demonstrating commitment to projects, like the Camino de Santiago, that would make the enterprise more palatable to critical figures like Franco's orthodox vice-president Luis Carrero Blanco.[47] Fraga's office informed Carrero Blanco of the ministry's intention to "turn the Camino de Santiago into a living and current [tourist] itinerary." This would "diversify the attractiveness of our country for tourists, and, as a consequence, attract a type of visitor with characteristics independent. . . of those who constitute the massive tourism on our coasts and beaches."

If the logic of religious tourism mollified traditionalist politicians, the language both of interior economic development and Europeanist engagement also applied. Fraga's staff further commented that,

> By its very nature, the Camino is also a bond of European union, a political factor which in these times should not be sold short.

In addition, pilgrimage tourism would

> Improve the distribution of internal tourist currents, giving structure to a large area practically untouched by the benefits of tourism.[48]

Though it would not ignore what it called the "clichés" of beach resorts and exotic Andalusian folklore, Fraga's ministry argued that the time had come "to change the face that touristic Spain presents to the world."[49] Fraga would write in 1965 that "in Medieval times, the route of the pilgrimage became not only the major commercial road of the North of Spain, but also the new profile of European unity. . .We must make it a national enterprise to update with modern means the ancient route."[50]

The increasingly familiar language of developmentalism and Anglo-American modernization theory was not far behind. The earnestly christened "Operación Camino de Santiago" seized on the idea that "in the language today so common in economics, these provinces are at the 'initiation of the phase of economic expansion.'"[51] The great take-off for religious tourism in the northern Iberian corridor would be stimulated by the kind of fiscal investment current everywhere in postwar Europe, aimed principally toward hotel construction and road improvement, but including a considerable budget for advertising as well. The plan even made a special case for beefing up the presence of mailboxes along the route to facilitate the maximum diffusion of postcards.[52]

The efforts stimulated some limited economic development in the region, but fell well short of the Frankish and Castilian achievements depicted in medievalist historiography. Pilgrims were not the big spenders that the regime had learned to expect from seaside tourists. The massive influx did modestly spur the hotel and restaurant industries, though not nearly to the proportions experienced in other heavily trafficked tourist centers. On one summer day in 1965, a government envoy from Madrid reported with dismay that 5,000 pilgrims arrived that day, but most had "brought their own snacks and lunches, including drinks," and "abandoned the city at mid-afternoon."[53] In Burgos, León, and Lugo—provinces in which the pilgrimage was by far the largest source of tourists—hotel capacity increased by 80 percent from 1963–1969. This was somewhat higher than the overall national average (76 percent), but far exceeded the 15 percent increase among provinces outside the major urban and resort areas.[54]

The other motif of Fraga's revitalization project centered on the opportunity for a propaganda campaign aimed at foreign and Spanish pilgrims alike. Publicity and informational guides candidly encouraged pilgrim-tourists to consider the place of Spain in a common European identity. A pamphlet distributed in 1964 informed pilgrims in several European languages that pilgrimage "initiated the most fecund spiritual contacts among the Occidental peoples." This statement was muted in comparison with an earlier draft of the pamphlet, which was to have informed pilgrims that "European unity is transparent. . . When a common style is so apparent. . . it is proof that Europe, that is, Occidental culture, exists.For medieval Spaniards the vocation of what we today call Europeanism was indispensable." [55] The Spanish embassies in Paris and Rome were enlisted as well, charged with the delicate task of promoting the pilgrimage, "naturally, with the appropriate discretion, to assure that a lay organization such as is a government ministry is not seen to be exploiting an eminently religious event for profit."[56] This final challenge was to be met by making available guided pilgrimages led by ecclesiastical authorities, though it would soon become clear that commerce was, as in the Middle Ages, central to the Camino's essence.

Interest in the pilgrimage exploded in the 1960s coinciding with a period of rapid growth in international leisure travel among Europeans. Twenty-four Spanish travelogues appeared in that decade compared with six in the 1950s, and foreign interest swelled.[57] Occupancy at the two luxury paradors increased, among both foreign and Spanish clientele, such that by 1971 they were profitable.[58] The total number of pilgrims of continued to grow; by 1993, according to one estimate, Compostela hosted 7 million pilgrims.[59] Assessing patterns in the pilgrims' origins, motives, practices, and experiences requires further research, and is beyond the scope here. Let us proceed instead to some preliminary conclusions about the nature, timing, and significance of the Camino's revival.

Pilgrimage and Neo-Catholicism

As an emblem of providential Spanish nationalism, the dynamic unity of medieval Europe, and the eternal power of w*anderlust*, Santiago de Compostela was a flexible symbol. Though not a living cult beyond a small circle of dedicated nationalists, the Camino was germane to the crusading and often fascistic zeal of the Civil War era and the 1940s. In order to survive after the fall of Europe's other interwar dictatorships, the Franco regime was forced to appeal to the values of peace and internationalism abroad and promote economic development at home. The spectacle of a mass pilgrimage to Compostela was readily adaptable to a project to promote the unity and prosperity of a resurrected Europe.

But it may be insufficient to regard this practice merely as a cynical appropriation of religious symbols for political ends. Let us consider the hypothesis that the Franco regime effectively erected a barrage of religious displays—most notably the Camino de Santiago—to obscure the conjunctural process of secularization and Church-state separation. The piety of many regime leaders and significant clerical support for the regime notwithstanding, National-Catholic politics under Franco in practice largely resembled a marriage of convenience—and one which over time became less useful to both parties as the regime adapted to lower rates of religious practice and the Church came to be increasingly at odds with the dictatorship. Once described by sixteenth-century critics as a "smokescreen for vagabondage," the Camino de Santiago became a smokescreen, albeit a rather thin one, for a rapidly changing relationship between Church, state, and Spanish society. In this sense, National-Catholic symbols willy-nilly contributed to the decoupling of Church and state in Spain, as the evangelical and anti-Communist coalition of earlier times gave way to a liberal Church coming to terms with democracy.

A comparable process, though with important differences, can be observed in post–1945 Italy. There, the lead-up to the critical election of 1948 was accompanied by a sharp upsurge in pilgrimage activity, which the nascent Christian Democratic Party stood ready to exploit.[60] Encouraged by the Vatican, the Marian cult thrived, became fused with anti-Communism, and even became a preferred metaphor for the Italian civilization the Christian Democrats claimed to defend. The popular outpouring of devotion to the Virgin Mary translated into a Christian-Democratic victory even though the party was a big tent of the non-fascist Italian right and often differed fundamentally with the Pope over the Vatican's role in Italian politics.[61] Like the Italian center-right—though through authoritarian rather than democratic means—the Franco regime became a big tent of conservative and right wing interests not always reconcilable with Church interests. Throughout the dictatorship, state promotion of the Camino provided the Church with symbolic external reinforcement of the privileged character of Catholicism in national life while the political and social processes of secularization progressed just below the surface.

The contrasts with the Italian example help illuminate the idiosyncrasy of the Camino de Santiago in the postwar period. The appearance of spontaneous Italian shrines dropped off considerably by the early 1950s; the Camino de Santiago grew unabated. The Italian apparitions followed the modern European tendency to produce religious symbolism centered on the miraculous and the feminine. By no means did this pattern apply to Francoist National-Catholicism. Rather than the Virgin, the main figures to receive significant patronage were Santiago and Theresa of Ávila, who, though female, was a warrior who scarcely evoked feminine fragility.[62] Pilgrimage to the various Marian cults remained important for most devoted Catholics—including the Virgins of Pilar, Montserrat, and the Sacred Heart—and each possessed a vast infrastructure of devotional rites alien to the non-Catholic. By contrast, the central aspect of the Camino de Santiago was the act of pilgrimage itself, a mythical journey toward an ancient center, a *vía dolorosa* through which any pilgrim, regardless of religion or nationality, could find transcendence through his will to overcome the suffering and hardship of a thirty-day walk.[63] Veneration of Santiago could be at once a nationalist cult and an aspect of Catholic heritage, but over the course of the dictatorship it evolved into an ecumenical and even touristic search for modern subjective understanding.

The pilgrimage to Compostela brought together the inherent economic and cultural dynamism of travel, the individual act of spiritual fulfillment, and an important cosmopolitan or at least European aspect of Spanish cultural heritage. The Camino's fluid transition from a romantic nationalist to a quasi-fascist to a post-Franco Europeanist symbol highlights some of the most important poles of modern Spanish nationalism and the political implications of modern pilgrimage. In its promotion of the pilgrimage, the regime adapted religious symbolism to its broader political project in a manner that neither the Church nor the majority of Spain's devout Catholics likely would have chosen. The story of the pilgrimage to Compostela and its twentieth-century revival reveals some inherent tensions between political Catholicism, Catholic nationalism, and Catholic religious culture itself, which constitute a central problem in several nations of modern Europe.

Notes

1. Fundación Príncipe de Asturias, web page, accessed Oct. 23, 2004, http://www.fpa.es/esp/premios/galardones/galardonados/trayectorias/trayectoria795.html.
2. Sharon R. Roseman describes a parallel phenomenon with respect to Santiago de Compostela's entry in the "European City of Culture" competition, in "Santiago de Compostela in the Year 2000: From Religious Center to European City of Culture," in *Intersecting Journeys: The Anthropology of Pilgrimage and Tourism*, ed. Ellen Badone and Sharon R. Roseman (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 68–88.
3. Carolyn Boyd, "The Second Battle of Covadonga," *History and Memory* 14, nos. 1–2 (Fall 2002): 37–64.
4. On patterns of secularization, see David Martin, *On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), esp. 123–40; and Robert Wuthnow, "Understanding Religion and Politics," *Daedalus* 120, no. 3 (1991): 1–20.

5. Alfonso Botti, *Cielo y Dinero: El Nacionalcatolicismo en España (1881–1975)* (Madrid: Alianza, 1992), traces National-Catholic thought in Spain to the 1880s. For a comparative study of National-Catholic movements, see Martin Conway, *Catholic Politics in Europe, 1918–1945* (London: Routledge, 1997).
6. Luigi Tomasi, "*Homo Viator*: From Pilgrimage to Religious Tourism via the Journey," in *From Medieval Pilgrimage to Religious Tourism*, ed. William H. Swatos, Jr., and Luigi Tomasi (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).
7. Quoted in Luis Vázquez de Parga, José María Lacarra, and Juan Uría Riu, *Las Peregrinaciones a Santiago de Compostela* (Madrid: CSIC, 1949), 1:277.
8. See Michael Burleigh, *Earthly Powers: The Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 138; William J. Callahan, *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1998* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press of America, 2000), 262–63.
9. Burleigh, 157.
10. Conway, 16–17.
11. For example, see Brian Porter, "Thy Kingdom Come: Patriotism, Prophecy, and the Catholic Hierarchy in Nineteenth-century Poland," *Catholic Historical Review* 89, no. 2 (2003): 213–39.
12. This idea is developed in George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975).
13. William A. Christian, Jr., *Person and God in a Spanish Valley* (New York: Seminar Press, 1972), 46.
14. On Lourdes as a pilgrimage destination, see Jean Chelini and Henry Branthomme, *Les Chemins de Dieu* (Paris: Hachette, 1982), 319–21; Ruth Harris, *Lourdes: Body and Spirit in the Secular Age* (New York: Viking, 1999); and Suzanne K. Kaufman, *Consuming Visions* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
15. David Blackbourn, *Marpingen: Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (New York: Knopf, 1994).
16. On the pilgrimage to Joaseiro do Norte, see Ralph Della Cava, *Miracle at Joaseiro* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
17. Christian, *Person and God*, 49, 99.
18. William A. Christian, Jr., *Moving Crucifixes in Modern Spain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 13.
19. On the advertising of Lourdes, see Kaufman, 62–94.
20. Boyd, 54.
21. Ofelia Rey Castelao, *La Historiografía del Voto de Santiago* (Santiago de Compostela: Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, 1985), 223–27.
22. *Voz de Galicia*, several issues, June–July 1926.
23. This argument is developed in Callahan, 149–168.
24. Giuliana Di Febo, *La Santa de la Raza: Un Culto Barroco en la España Franquista* (Barcelona: Icaria, 1988), 45.
25. See Sandie Holguín, "'National Spain Invites You': Battlefield Tourism during the Spanish Civil War," *American Historical Review* 110, no. 5 (December 2005): 1416.
26. See, for example, Alfonso Álvarez Bolado, *El Experimento del Nacional Catolicismo, 1939–1975* (Madrid: Editorial Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1976), and Alfonso Álvarez Bolado, *Teología Política desde España: Del Nacionalismo y Otros Ensayos* (Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, 1999).
27. Stanley G. Payne, *Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 183.
28. Callahan, 399–400, 462.
29. Giuliana Di Febo, *Ritos de Guerra y de Historia en la España Franquista* (Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, 2002), 180.

30. See the description in Geoffrey Jensen, *Irrational Triumph: Cultural Despair, Military Nationalism, and the Ideological Origins of Franco's Spain* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2002), 1.
31. Frances Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1975* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 33; Ramon Muntanyola, *Vidal i Barraquer, el Cardenal de la Paz* (Barcelona: Estela, 1971), 422; Payne, 180–81.
32. Gonzalo Martínez Díez, "Introducción y Bibliografía del autor," in *Las Peregrinaciones Jacobeas*, ed. Luciano Huidobro (1950; reprint, Burgos: Diputación Provincial de Burgos, 1999), 1:1,3, 11–14.
33. Vázquez de Parga, 47, 465–66.
34. Ibid., 466.
35. For example, see Petra María Weber, "El CEDI: Promotor del Occidente Cristiano y de las Relaciones Hispano-Alemanas de los Años Cincuenta," *Hispania* 54, no. 3 (1994): 1077–1103; Miguel Ángel Ruiz Carnicer, "La Idea de Europa en la Cultura Franquista, 1939–1962," *Hispania* 58, no. 2 (1998): 679–701; Antonio Moreno Juste, "La Unidad Europea en la Bibliografía Española de 1945–1962," *Hispania* 50, no. 3 (1990): 1453–73; Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, "Neoconservadurismo e Identidad Europea (una aproximación histórica)," *Spagna Contemporanea* 13 (1998): 41–60; and Antonio Moreno Juste and Juan Carlos Pereira, "Spain: in the centre or on the periphery of Europe?" in *Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union, 1945–1980s*, ed. António Costa Pinto and Nunio S. Teixeira (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 2002), 41–80.
36. Callahan, 385.
37. *Voz de Galicia*, June 12, 1948.
38. *Arriba*, June 4, 1948.
39. Roger Bray and Vladimir Raitz, *Flight to the Sun: The Story of the Holiday Revolution* (London: Continuum, 2001), 58.
40. These ideas are further developed in Sasha D. Pack, *Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe's Peaceful Invasion of Franco's Spain* (New York: Palgrave, 2006).
41. Huidobro, 340.
42. See, for example, *Año Santo Compostelano* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1971).
43. Ali Murat Yel, "'Este Lugar e Sagrado...': The Creation and Re-creation of Sacredness in Fátima," *Lusitania Sacra* 6 (1994): 295–307.
44. From data compiled by Dirección General de Turismo Oficina de Estadística, Archivo General de la Administración (hereafter AGA), 3: 49.08/37676.
45. *ABC*, April 18, 1961.
46. Janine Ducrot, *Vers Compostelle. Grandes Routes et Petits Chemins Touristiques* (Paris, Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1962), 8.
47. AGA 3: 49.08/35199.
48. Rodríguez-Acosta to Carrero Blanco, March 8, 1963, AGA 3: 49.08/35199.
49. Dirección General de Turismo, "Ruta de Santiago: Estudio Turístico Preliminar", n. d., 1962, AGA 3: 49.05/22599.
50. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, *Cinco Loas* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1965), 34, 37.
51. See note 49.
52. The Ministry called for 444 million pesetas in hotel investment (about 7 percent of the annual total estimated in the First Plan for Economic Development) and 70 million pesetas for roads (a minuscule amount in the overall roadway improvement budget).
53. Salvador Pons to Manuel Fraga, July 16, 1965, AGA 3: 49.08/35199.
54. Data compiled from information given in *Guía de Hoteles* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, various years).
55. AGA 3: 49.05/22599. The pamphlets were authored by the Oficina de Información Turística of the DGPT with collaboration from the Archbishop of Compostela and the city's mayor.

56. Rodríguez-Acosta to Carlos Robles Piquer, Spanish Ambassador to Paris, February 20 1965, AGA 10: 97/11526.

57. José Guerra Campos, "Bibliografía (1950–1969): Veinte Años de Estudios Jacobeos," *Compostellanum*, 16 (1971): 575–736.

58. ENTURSA, "Memoria, Ejercicio, October 1971," AGA 3: 49.22/46567.

59. Hervé Poutet, *Les Images Touristiques de l'Espagne* (Paris: Editions Hartmann, 1995), 246. The author notes that in the post-1978 Constitutional period, propaganda has emphasized Galician regionalism and its ties to European identity.

60. See Robert Ventresca, *From Fascism to Democracy: Culture and Politics in the Italian Election of 1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 100–137.

61. Steven F. White, "Christian Democracy or Pacellian Populism?: Rival Forms of Postwar Italian Political Catholicism," in *European Christian Democracy: Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Thomas Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigieg (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 199–227.

62. On imagery of St. Theresa as warrior, see Erin Kathleen Rowe, "Disrupting the Republic: Santiago, Teresa de Jesus, and the Battle for the Soul of Spain, 1617–1630," (Ph.D. diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 2005), esp. 294–98. On the Franco regime's sponsorship of the Teresan cult during the Franco period, see Di Febo, *La Santa de la Raza*, 128–36.

63. For a discussion of the history of the Camino's spiritual appeal, see Juan G. Atienza, *La Ruta Sagrada* (Barcelona: Robinbook, 1992), 22–23.

CHAPTER 6

The Role of Spanish Consuls in the United States, 1795–1898

SEAN T. PERRONE

In January 1809 nearly three hundred people, including most of the political elite of Massachusetts, attended a dinner at the Boston Exchange Coffee House in honor of the Spanish patriots. The hall was bedecked with the flags of the United States and Spain, and numerous toasts were made to the rightful king, his consul of New England, and the Spanish people. The attendees even sang odes to Spanish patriots. An account of this gathering was published, and it included a brief sketch of Spanish history in which the author went so far as to equate Spain's struggle against French oppression as "the last act in the eventful drama of HUMAN LIBERTY."[1] John Stoughton, the Spanish consul of New England, immediately sent copies of the account to the minister and others. In a letter to his correspondent in Havana, Stoughton recounted the spontaneous effusion in favor of Spain's liberty and independence and the great honor bestowed on him as the representative of Ferdinand VII. He even described the party as the happiest and most glorious day of his life.[2] Spanish officials were just as pleased as Stoughton by the turn of events. The Supreme Governing Junta of Spain sent a letter expressing its gratitude for the friendly gesture of the residents of Boston, and officials in Havana expressed their gratitude by removing the duty on American lumber.[3] This outpouring of pro-Spanish sentiment in notoriously anti-Spanish and anti-Catholic New England is surprising and has generally been overlooked in most discussions of Spanish-American relations.[4] The most straightforward explanation from the published account for why Bostonians rallied to Spain was liberty, but the toasts and songs also suggest that economic and personal relations played a role. Fostering closer economic and personal relations between Bostonians and Spaniards was the purview of the Spanish consul of New England, and one can only assume from the toasts that John Stoughton's conduct as consul won respect for himself and for the Spanish nation.[5]

The event at the Boston Exchange Coffee House stands in stark contrast to the often

hostile relations between Spain and the United States in the nineteenth century.[6] The camaraderie found in Boston does not negate the traditional interpretation of Spanish-American relations in the nineteenth century, but it does suggest that by reorienting the history of Spanish-American relations from the ambassadorial level (capital) to the consular level (regional), we will find more active engagement between Spaniards and Americans and more cooperative interaction in times of tension. Spanish diplomacy in the United States also becomes more layered by incorporating the consuls into the story. The low-level diplomacy of the consuls, especially in regard to commercial transactions, often had an immediate impact on the lives of individual Americans and Spaniards, winning the consuls respect or disdain in the mercantile community. At the same time, the local activities of the consuls, especially in regard to filibusters (military adventurers), could impact relations between the two nations. In either case, the consuls probably did more to bridge the Hispanic-American world than the ambassadors in Washington and Madrid. Essentially, they were agents for transatlantic integration, and by learning more about them and their activities, we will learn more about the commercial, cultural, and political networks that tied the Atlantic world together.

In 1795 Spain and the United States finally formalized their relationship with the Treaty of San Lorenzo, also known as Pinckney's Treaty. This treaty ended twelve years of conflict between the two nations over Americans' right to navigate the Mississippi River and the border of Florida, with Spain conceding to all American demands. It also set the basic framework for Spanish-American relations until 1898: the treaty allowed nationals of each country to have access to the courts of the other country in the settling of disputes; it also established procedures for the treatment of merchant ships in wartime and the protection of property for the nationals of each country, requiring the restoration of goods seized by pirates, and prohibiting either country's citizens or subjects from taking letters of marque to attack the other. Finally, it included articles for the establishment of consular services. Pinckney's Treaty, however, did not permanently resolve all Spanish-American problems. Disputes quickly arose regarding the interpretation and enforcement of clauses, most notably the clauses regarding privateers. Moreover, the treaty only briefly settled the territorial disputes between Spain and the United States, and the rivalry for territorial control was renewed with the Louisiana Purchase (1803) and continued until Spain lost Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Spanish-American War (1898).[7] Economic, cultural, and political exchange then always took place within a tense geopolitical context.

The consuls facilitated much of that exchange. Prior to Pinckney's Treaty, Spain's diplomatic presence was limited to the capital, where a chargé d'affaires employed local agents to attend to Spanish affairs. This rudimentary diplomatic presence was replaced in 1795 with an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary and a consular service, consisting of a consul-general, consuls, and vice-consuls. The last Spanish chargé d'affaires to the United States drew up the first set of consular instructions and appointed the first Spanish consuls. By late 1795 Spain had consuls or vice-consuls in Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia,

Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, and Savannah. Many of these men would serve as consul for ten or more years. Some even settled permanently in the United States. Spain occasionally employed Americans as consuls as well.[8] A tradition of long-serving consuls created real continuity, allowing the consuls to build reliable networks of friends and colleagues in their districts.[9] The consular service was also nimble enough to expand with the expansion of the United States.

Trade was the rationale for establishing consular offices, and trade between the United States, Spain, and the Spanish empire was crucial to the young American republic.[10] This trade flowed in large part due to the networks of trust that the consuls fostered between American and Spanish merchants, especially in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The consuls in the United States quickly established close relations with local American merchants, who in turn curried favor with them to obtain trading privileges and recommendations. These relationships were often cemented by religion and marriage. Spanish diplomats reserved the most prominent pews in their parishes, and Catholic merchants did not hesitate to use a chance meeting at Mass to discuss commercial ventures with them. Many Spanish officials also married local Catholic women. Such personal relationships often gave merchants an advantage in the Spanish trade. John Leamy, for example, used his ties to Spanish diplomats to become the principal Philadelphia merchant trading with Spanish America. Those merchants without links to Spanish officials, such as the Boone family of Philadelphia, often lacked the connections to prosper in the Hispanic marketplace. These networks may not only explain the prosperity of individual merchants, but even possibly the prosperity of regions in the Hispanic trade. Linda Salvucci notes, for example, that the Spanish diplomatic and consular presence in Philadelphia largely explains why the Pennsylvanian port was the center of U.S.–Spanish Empire trade until the mid-nineteenth century.[11]

The consuls also directed goods to specific Spanish colonies at the urging of colonial officials. In April 1805, for example, the garrison at Saint Augustine was in desperate need of supplies. So the governor of Florida wrote the consul of Norfolk asking him to contract a merchant to supply 1,200 barrels of flour, 80 large barrels of rice, and 60 barrels of pork to the fort. The governor added that if no one in Norfolk wished to undertake the venture, the consul should forward the order to the consul of Baltimore.[12] The governor of the Yucatan also sent passports for the export of grain and other foodstuffs to the peninsula during times of famine in the early nineteenth century. For example, in July 1810 the governor authorized the import of over 200,000 barrels of flour duty-free. The consuls immediately placed advertisements in newspapers letting Americans know of this opportunity. Either the duty-free incentive was not enough or there was little surplus flour in Virginia at the time, because the consul of Norfolk returned both passports allotted him after the deadline for exporting flour expired in October.[13] The following May another decree permitted foreign vessels to bring flour and corn to the Yucatan. It, however, prohibited the introduction of any other items, including passengers, in order to prevent French agents from infiltrating Mexico (see

below).[14] In 1816, trade in foodstuffs was once again permitted between the Yucatan and the United States.[15] In all cases, the consuls were to announce these opportunities and provide the merchants with the proper documentation. Undoubtedly, if there were only a few passports to grant, friends and acquaintances had the first opportunity. The problem for many merchants was that such trading permits often limited what could be traded and were abruptly canceled in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, American merchants grabbed at the opportunity to trade with the Spanish colonies, even for a limited period of time, and the consuls promoted this trade. Moreover, even if the consuls failed to find merchants to supply all the food desired, what was shipped certainly fed hungry people. By allowing the colonial governments to tap into trade networks, the consuls might have helped those governments to maintain control in a period of turmoil. Had the governments not secured supplies, the population might have rebelled against royal authority.[16]

With the opening of free trade between Spain and the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, the role of consuls as facilitators of trade diminished somewhat. Still, Spanish law required that consuls certify the papers of all vessels bound for Cuba or other Spanish ports. Without proper certification, the vessels could be seized on arrival. The consuls then continued to facilitate commercial transactions. At times, though, the activities of individual consuls could impede this trade and increase diplomatic tension. In September 1874 the merchants of Baltimore complained to the Treasury Department that the Spanish consul of Baltimore was charging a tax of forty cents per package on merchandise destined for Cuba. The merchants acknowledged that "the consul had a right to charge a fee for certifying the ship's papers," but a tax on each individual package would cost thousands of dollars per cargo. They therefore expected the federal government to intercede with the Spanish minister on their behalf, especially as a number of vessels were awaiting the outcome before sailing for Cuba. In the end, the minister agreed to lower the fee, and the merchants paid the unspecified sum.[17] Consular records then provide a fuller understanding of Spanish-American trade in the nineteenth century, especially in regard to the personal idiosyncrasies that either smoothed over difficulties or made them worse.

Such rewards also provide important details on the volume and type of trade between the nations. From the early nineteenth century, the consuls began to gather commercial and economic information for the consul-general and minister. In 1802, for example, John Stoughton reported that he had certified 291 ships of one hundred to three hundred tons leaving for Spanish ports or arriving from Spanish ports in his district.[18] Of course, with a district as large as New England, Stoughton relied on many people to gather accurate data. In February 1818, he wrote to individuals in fifteen New England ports asking them for information on all ships sailing between their ports and Spanish domains for the last six months of 1817. In this particular year, he apparently received little assistance, because he only recorded four responses to his inquiry.[19] Stoughton possibly forgot to record other responses, but more than likely he had to cull the information on other ports from news-

papers. The consuls then may not always have provided the most accurate information, but what they did provide was used to prepare reports on the status of the American economy and the general economic trends between the two countries. Such information, for example, provided the substance of then consul-general Valentín de Foronda's *Apuntos ligeros sobre los Estados Unidos de la América Septentrional* of 1804.[20] In addition to economic data, the consuls also provided information on the population of each state, the size of the militias, the political situation, and so on. Some of this information may also have had more immediate ends. For instance, in 1820, the new minister wanted the consuls to provide him with information on the tariffs and duties charged on Spanish vessels entering and leaving American ports; he especially wanted to know if these rates varied from port to port or state to state. He also wanted to know if Spanish ships coming from the peninsula and Latin America paid the same fees.[21] Clearly, such information would be crucial in any trade negotiations. Whether for reports back to the Spanish government on trade or to seek trade concessions in Washington, the consuls continually provided the minister and Spanish government with vital data to govern Spain's relation with the United States.

Spanish colonial officials also tapped the consular network to recruit immigrants. Royal decrees permitted white Catholic immigration to Puerto Rico in 1815 and to Cuba in 1817. The United States quickly became a source for immigrants. Consular documents indicate that Cuban officials actively sought immigration from the United States. In 1817, for example, the intendent of Cuba sent the consuls copies of the royal decree and regulations for white immigration, and by the spring of 1818, Luis de Onís, minister plenipotentiary, ordered the consuls to translate the documents and put announcements in the local newspapers. The consuls were to encourage immigration, especially of skilled artisans. To facilitate this, the intendent even authorized the consuls to pay up to twenty-five *pesos fuertes* per person for passage to the island. Apparently, many Americans eagerly moved to Cuba, because in 1818, a Cuban official expressed his gratitude to Onís for the settlers that had arrived in San Fernando de Nuevita.[22] Yet, minor problems did appear in time. Passage from New England to Havana, for instance, was forty *pesos fuertes*—too much for most immigrants, who expected a full subvention from the Spanish government for their passage. Stoughton entreated the intendent of Cuba to rectify the problem, and the intendent appropriated additional funds to aid those immigrants in late 1819.[23] In 1820, the intendent reminded the consul of Norfolk that all immigrants must meet the qualifications set out in the royal order. Later that year, the consul general reminded the consuls that colonists needed to obtain a passport from them before going to Cuba, and that not all immigrants should settle in Havana.[24] Clearly, many Americans wanted to settle in Cuba, especially Havana, and some apparently moved there illegally. The consuls even overlooked the restrictions on immigration in granting passports at times. These settlers likely strengthened informal networks of communication between the Hispanic world and the United States.

Spanish consuls were also active members of North American society. Most social

interaction took place within the Catholic Church. John Stoughton, for example, hosted many gatherings of local Catholics at his home prior to the construction of the Church of the Holy Cross. He also was a member of the committee charged with raising funds to build that church in 1799 and an intimate of Bishop Cheverus of Boston.[25] Other consuls participated in similar fundraising efforts and maintained close relationships with the clergy. Of course, not all social activity took place within the Church. Stoughton, for example, attended the aforementioned gala in 1809. In 1818, the Mayor of Norfolk invited Pablo Chacon, consul, to a banquet with the President of the United States. Chacon was invited to another banquet with the leading citizens of Norfolk in 1819.[26] In 1875 New Yorkers celebrated the 259th anniversary of Cervantes' death with the Spanish delegation.[27] The consuls then had many opportunities at social and religious functions to mingle with the American elite and form personal contacts with those they might appeal to in a professional or private capacity. John Stoughton, for instance, wrote Secretary of State Monroe in May 1815 on behalf of a Spanish correspondent, asking him to recommend two Spanish merchants to the president for reappointment as American consuls in Bilbao and La Coruña. Stoughton did not promise his correspondent success, but he did note, "I am personally known to the President of the United States."[28]

The consuls also became involved in a number of odd affairs, chasing after runaway husbands, criminals, and artwork. In 1875 an art dealer returned a portion of Murillo's *The Apparition of the Infant Christ to Saint Anthony of Padua* stolen from the cathedral of Seville to the consul-general in New York. The Spanish consul-general then employed a detective to kidnap the thief and bring him to Havana. Apparently the lack of an extradition treaty led to this questionable means of rendition. The captain general of Havana was so appalled by the method used that he released the prisoner.[29] Spanish consuls then tracked many criminals and fugitives who hoped to escape Spanish justice by disappearing in the United States.

Of a more serious concern were the filibusters and adventurers who threatened the territorial integrity of the Spanish empire from the United States. For over one hundred years, the consuls were Spain's first line of defense against such hostile attacks. Various forces perpetuated these attacks over time, including the American government, European governments, adventurers, and most notably Latin American insurgents. During the French and Napoleonic wars, Spain's European rivals threatened Spanish territory in North America from bases within the United States, so the Spanish consuls had to keep those rivals under surveillance. Prior to the formation of the consular service, Spanish agents in Georgia and the west monitored the activities of French agents who began to enlist Americans in 1793 to attack Spanish positions in North America in order to reunite Louisiana with France. This effort came to naught with the recall of the French minister.[30] The Treaty of Basel (1795) temporarily ended the French threat by establishing an alliance between France and Spain, but it eventually led to war with England. By 1797 English plots to attack Florida and Louisiana were under way. In April 1797, Carlos Martinez de Irujo, the Spanish minister to

the United States, asked Antonio Argote Villalobos, consul of Norfolk, to find out from his contacts in Kentucky if the English intended to attack Louisiana and if they had engaged any Kentuckians to help them sail down the Mississippi to attack Saint Louis. Argote was also to inquire if the English agent in Tennessee had purchased six cannons procured by the French minister for an expedition against Spanish territory in 1793 and 1794.[31] Meanwhile, Diego Morphy, the Spanish consul of Charleston, advised the minister and governor of Florida of plots to attack Florida. He worked tirelessly with the local French consul to uncover the English plans, and he happily reported that General Elijah Clark rejected the English proposition to command an expedition against Florida. Yet, Irujo worried that the zeal of the two consuls had carried them away, because the French consul had subsequently asked Clark to raise French troops to defend Florida. The minister feared that such conduct would compromise the Spanish legation with the federal government and advised the consul to limit himself to observing, investigating, and giving punctual advice to the governor of Florida. The governor could then take the proper steps to defend the territory. Morphy, however, did not limit himself to observing. When the English Admiral Ricketts publicly recruited troops in Charleston for an expedition against Florida, the French and Spanish consuls likewise recruited local Frenchmen to reinforce Saint Augustine. By June, Morphy had chartered a vessel to transport the French recruits to Florida. He advised the vice-consul of Savannah to recruit any Frenchmen there who wished to join the expedition. The vice-consul dutifully complied with the request, enlisting six Frenchmen willing to go to Florida. He asked the governor of Florida to pay sixty *pesos* for their transport, a request that was obliged, indicating the governor's satisfaction with the volunteers. The minister, however, was perturbed that he had only learned about the recruiting efforts in the newspaper, and he stressed to Morphy that in the future he must be informed of such developments.[32]

Still, the situation had improved for Spain by July. Irujo elatedly reported the discovery of a conspiracy involving Senator William Blount of Tennessee to aid the English expedition against Louisiana. He ordered the consuls to have his letter to the secretary of state published immediately in the local gazettes. He clearly hoped that this incident would silence American complaints about Spain's slow withdrawal from garrisons along the Mississippi as stipulated by Pinckney's Treaty, because self-defense justified Spain's temporary retention of those garrisons. He also believed that more details regarding the Clark proposition would serve the Spanish cause. So he ordered Morphy to obtain any documents from General Clark or others linking the offer to outfit the expedition against Florida to the British minister or his consul.[33] Clark, however, refused to give names, only writing to Morphy that he had firmly rejected a British agent's offer of $10,000 to lead the expedition. Nevertheless, Irujo still made use of the letter. In November 1797 he passed it on to the committee of the House of Representatives charged with preparing articles of impeachment against Senator Blount. In February 1798 the committee appointed a commission to depose Clark regarding his letter to Morphy. The general was more forthcoming with the commission, saying British Captain

William Carrick made him the offer in person, but he knew of no other American citizens engaged in hostile activities.[34] This probably came as a disappointment to the Spanish, who had hoped that Clark would implicate the British minister or consul. In any case, the entire Spanish effort in 1797 shows how the consular service could be mobilized to counter enemy plans and work closely with governors in threatened Spanish territories. More interestingly, a large part of the Spanish effort in 1797 took place within the public square. The Spanish consuls submitted Irujo's letters to government officials and their own letters to the press for publication. Given the extent of the consular service from New England to Georgia, the Spanish undoubtedly managed to get their message out to most of the country. They essentially tried to influence public opinion through press campaigns, providing reasonable explanations for Spanish action to prevent anti-Spanish sentiment from reaching a fever pitch.

In time, the consuls also had to keep an eye on various Latin American rebels and other filibusters. The first important filibuster to set sail for the United States was Francisco de Miranda, who outfitted his ill-fated voyage from New York in 1806. The various consuls all provided information to the minister regarding the reception of Miranda in the United States and what they could learn of his preparations.[35] Karen Racine suggests that Irujo's "spy network" kept the minister well informed of all Miranda's movements.[36] Clearly, then, the activities of the consuls were not negligible. In addition to providing the minister with critical information, the Spanish consuls discussed developments with colleagues in other ports. On July 8, 1806, for example, John Stoughton informed a friend in Havana of Miranda's defeat and related his hope that this failure would dissuade others from trusting the vain promises of that traitor.[37] Of course, it did not dissuade anyone, and the Spanish consuls continually had to keep an eye on Latin American patriots operating in the United States.

This was especially true after 1808. In that year, Napoleon Bonaparte installed his brother, Joseph, on the Spanish throne. The dynastic change led to political unrest across Spanish America. Local elites questioned whether they owed loyalty to the new king, to viceroys appointed by the Bourbons, or to the Supreme Governing Junta in Spain. In time, many colonists organized their own local juntas and declared autonomy, and gradually declarations of autonomy led to declarations of independence. The erstwhile colonists looked to the United States for aid. Meanwhile, Joseph Bonaparte tried to influence affairs in Latin America and win colonial support for his rule. He consequently sent agents to the United States, which was a convenient staging point to insert them into Spanish America and to distribute pro-Bonaparte propaganda. The United States then was a critical place for Spain to safeguard its interests in the western hemisphere. The Supreme Governing Junta realized that it needed a strong diplomatic agent to observe developments and, hopefully, to prevent the United States from overtly or covertly aiding French agents or Latin American revolutionaries. In the summer of 1809 it appointed Luis de Onís envoy extraordinary and

minister plenipotentiary to the United States. The United States, however, refused to recognize Onís as the new Spanish minister, arguing that as a neutral nation it could not take sides in a dispute over the rightful king. Consequently, it would not accredit diplomatic agents of either the Bourbons or the Bonapartists. Only in 1815 did the president finally accredit Onís as Spain's minister to the United States.[38]

Yet, even without official recognition, Onís was effective in his first six years in the United States, thanks to the Spanish consular service. The United States continued to recognize those Spanish consuls who had been accredited prior to the French invasion of Spain.[39] These consuls had all sworn an oath of loyalty to Fernando VII,[40] and they would remain loyal to him during the reign of Joseph Bonaparte. Onís took charge of the consular service, giving the consuls directives and requiring them to report to him.[41] These subordinates also acted as intermediaries between Onís and the government. They allowed the royalists to maintain an official position within the United States and provided an effective network to follow both the activities of French agents and insurgents.[42]

To prevent French agents from entering Spanish America via the United States, the consuls were prohibited from granting passports to any foreigners going to South America and to any Spaniards who did not have authorization from the government of Cuba to receive a passport. This order was restated in March 1810, noting that this restriction was essential to the security of Cuba, but the new order did give the consuls some leeway. It allowed them to grant passports to Spaniards whom they personally knew.[43] The government of Cuba did have reason to worry. In December 1809 the consul of Baltimore wrote to his counterpart in Norfolk regarding the disembarkation of French and Spanish agents of Joseph Bonaparte in Norfolk. According to the consul of Baltimore, these agents carried false letters and proclamations from Ferdinand VII and Joseph I to foment dissent and uprisings in the Spanish colonies. Some had already passed through Philadelphia where they received financial support, and others had established a base of operation in Baltimore. The consul of Norfolk was advised to keep an eye on any Spaniards or Frenchmen passing through Norfolk and report their movements to both the minister and the government in Havana. Shortly thereafter, Luis de Onís also asked Argote to track the movements of those agents diligently. The consular network, however, was not a perfect spy catcher. In February 1810, Onís sharply rebuked Argote for not providing any information on French activity. He stressed to Argote that since the principal French conspirator had established himself in Baltimore, Norfolk was a key point from which to follow his machinations. Consequently, Argote needed to be patriotic and investigate all those who entered and left the port and to uncover the French scheme.[44] Onís' rebuke may have had some effect. In July 1810, a Cuban official replied to Argote's letter of June 18, informing him that a passenger aboard a Spanish vessel sailing from Norfolk to Havana was arrested on arrival as an agent of Bonaparte. The individual was tried and sentenced to death.[45]

The policy of closing the colonies to all foreigners without proper passports was rea-

sonable enough, but Onís found problematic the order for the colonial officials to execute any spy or agent who managed to circumvent these measures, and to confiscate the cargo and ship on which the spy arrived. He consequently ordered the consuls to place this decree in all the gazettes so that no one could claim ignorance of the law.[46] Onís undoubtedly realized that such heavy-handed policies, especially the confiscation of goods, could only hurt Spain's position in the United States. The consuls, then, not only kept an eye on potential subversives but also made clear the dangers to Americans who wittingly or unwittingly abetted them. Except for one letter regarding capturing and killing a spy, and another letter advising all the Spanish consuls that French agents had managed to forge the seal of the Spanish consulate of Pennsylvania,[47] the consular records do not indicate how successful the Spanish efforts were at intercepting and disrupting the efforts of the French or how many French agents successfully infiltrated Latin America. Of course, the French were not Spain's only worry. At exactly the same time, the Latin Americans were beginning to rebel, and the consuls had to guard against them as well.[48]

Although the United States government did not recognize the Latin American republics until the 1820s, the Latin Americans looked to the United States for support and supplies. The consuls then had to monitor the activities of Latin American patriots and the many Americans who aided them for political or economic reasons. After the War of 1812, for example, many unemployed American captains and sailors took commissions as privateers from the rebellious provinces and other American businessman and officials connived in the process.[49] In May 1816 Onís informed the consuls that letters of marque from the insurgents of Buenos Aires had recently arrived in the United States and various ships were now being outfitted to cruise against Spanish commerce under the rebel flag. He ordered the consuls to do everything in their power to impede the vessels from sailing.[50] In March 1817 Onís sent the consuls a recent United States government decree prohibiting the outfitting of vessels within the United States by foreign powers to commit hostilities against friendly nations. The decree also ordered collectors of customs to detain such vessels. Onís hoped that with this decree in hand, the consuls would be able to pursue cases of piracy that had hitherto been practically immune.[51] Argote could clearly attest to this impunity. In December 1816 he logged a protest with the collector at Norfolk, Mr. Mallory, regarding the arrival of an Argentine-flagged privateer. Mallory curtly replied that he would treat the vessel no differently than any other foreign vessels entering the port and that he would "take care in this, as in other cases to see that the Laws of the United States and other regulations of the government, so far as they come within the sphere of my authority are duly observed."[52] On April 10, 1817, Argote objected to the arrival of two Argentine-flagged privateers that had been armed and equipped in the United States, contrary to federal laws and treaty obligations between Spain and the United States. He reminded Mallory that in his December letter he had promised to observe all laws and regulations of the United States.[53] Mallory replied on April 11 asking for more documentation. He was not satisfied with the additional evidence,

and he thoroughly refuted all of Argote's arguments on April 14. At this point, Argote remitted his correspondence with Mallory to the Spanish minister. He apparently anticipated problems with the collector, because on April 10, he also wrote William Wirt, the United States attorney in Richmond. Wirt responded on April 14 that if Argote's facts were correct, his objective of having the ships seized was attainable. He added, "the government of the US being one of Laws, merely, the officers of that government have no discretion independent of the laws. The instructions to Mr. Mallory are in conformity with this principle and if they fall short of your views, I must, of necessity, refer you to the government of the nation." Wirt's letter prompted Mallory to act. On April 16, he told Argote that he would take action against the vessels. Mallory warned Argote, however, that if he did not make good the charges, he would be liable for the legal costs.[54] Government officials dragging their feet was a common problem for Spanish consuls. Yet, without pressure from the Spanish consuls on the local level and their efforts to pressure the federal government via the minister, one can easily infer from the actions of Mallory that the laws would not always have been faithfully enforced. Of course, not all federal officials were negligent. United States officials in Boston showed greater alacrity enforcing the laws. A short article in the *Baltimore Patriot* complained that the Spanish consul of Boston "seizes every warlike vessel on the eve of sailing."[55] John Stoughton may have had more success than other consuls because he had developed close personal relationships throughout New England or because the officials he worked with there were more scrupulous and competent than elsewhere. Nevertheless, most consuls were often engaged in a cat-and-mouse game with local officials; they gathered documents to have the law enforced, and some government officials, sympathetic to Latin American independence, nimbly skirted the law.

The networks that the Spanish consuls had established amongst themselves and with various merchants throughout the Atlantic Basin helped them to gather information and to exchange evidence on the activities of United States–based privateers for legal actions. In 1795, for example, the Spanish consul in Boston needed proof that the French privateer *Brutus* was illegally provisioned in the United States in order to redeem a Spanish prize. He immediately turned to his counterpart in Charleston for help, asking the consul to forward all proof that he had of the illegal provisioning of the *Brutus*, and more importantly to confirm if the French captain of the ship had become a United States citizen in either North or South Carolina. With such proof in hand, Stoughton anticipated success at the next court session, but he also acknowledged in a letter to his brother Thomas that without such proof, "we stand in a poor plight of gaining anything more than trouble for our pains in libeling."[56] The outcome of that case is not clear from Stoughton's correspondence, but the case indicates that the consuls immediately recognized the importance of the consular service as a clearinghouse for information. In 1813, for example, Onís circulated information on captured Spanish vessels and the captors so that the consuls could libel the ships and goods if they docked in their districts.[57] Spanish merchants also linked into this network.

In December 1816, for example, a Cuban merchant wrote to Thomas Stoughton in New York regarding the seizure of a Spanish vessel in which he had an interest. He enclosed the captain's deposition describing the vessel's capture and the armament of the privateer in the United States. The merchant then asked Stoughton to keep an eye out for the captured vessel or privateer in order to reclaim the stolen property. On April 4, 1817, Onís sent copies of these documents to Argote to use for the arrest of the Argentine privateers referred to above.[58] As just seen, the documents did not impress the collector, but they were more than adequate for the United States attorney. The Spanish efforts to stop privateers and to redeem prize vessels brought to the United States relied heavily on the efforts of the consuls, and the consuls often worked together to gather the evidence necessary to force federal officials to comply with the law.

The consular efforts to redeem captured property often led to protracted lawsuits as well. For example, John Stoughton libeled the Spanish vessel, *Divina Pastora*, for the rightful Spanish owner. This case went all the way to the Supreme Court before the proceeds from the ship's auction were finally returned to the rightful owners after three years of legal wrangling. In the process, though, the case helped to refine U.S. law regarding privateers. The efforts of the consuls were therefore crucial for the return of the property to the rightful owners, but these efforts also led to refinements in international law and legal proceedings in the United States.[59] Those lawsuits led the Spanish consuls to retain lawyers, including some prominent Americans, such as the former attorney general of Pennsylvania (Ingersoll), a congressman from Virginia (Newton), a former governor of New Jersey (Bloomfield), and even a future secretary of state (Daniel Webster). Many Americans then were engaged by the consuls to represent Spanish interests in courts of law. Often the relationship remained simply professional: Webster, for instance, represented the privateers in a case before the Supreme Court shortly after representing the Spanish libellants in the case of the *Divina Pastora*. Others, however, built longstanding personal and professional relations with the consuls that often gave the consuls access to some of the highest echelons of American society.[60]

In addition to privateers, the consuls also had to deal with the outfitting of full-fledged expeditions. In 1816, for example, the consuls kept close tabs on the activities of Francisco Javier Mina, who was outfitting an expedition in Baltimore for Mexico. They reported his activities to Onís and tried to hinder him. The consul of Baltimore protested sharply to the local attorney general, calling for the arrest of those who blatantly broke the law of the United States. The attorney general curtly responded that he could not proceed against the individuals based on the word of a single individual, and that at the very least he needed a sworn deposition and legal proofs from a judge before he would act. Such foot dragging on the part of American officials clearly infuriated the Spanish officials. It was obvious to all that Mina and his men were illegally outfitting an expedition. Still, such recalcitrance was nothing new. In September 1816, Onís wrote to the viceroy of New Spain that the same thing had occurred in 1806, when the Marques of Casa Irujo had presented even firmer evidence

and testimonies regarding the expedition of Miranda, and he still was not able to stop it. Nevertheless, Onís forwarded the information that the consuls gathered to the viceroy in Mexico. This allowed the viceroy to take steps to defend Mexico from the expedition.[61] Mina's expedition was eventually defeated, and Spanish officials executed him.

The consuls continued to watch Latin Americans after independence was won. In 1822 the Spanish consuls observed the activities of Mexican commissioners sent to the United States to buy naval vessels.[61] In 1829 the consul of New Orleans informed the minister of the activities of a visiting Mexican commodore. This information, however, failed to persuade the American government to act against him. In fact, Secretary Clay told the Spanish minister that the consul's letter demonstrated the vigilance of the federal officials in New Orleans to prevent acts contrary to the law.[63] In the 1830s the consuls continued to work to prevent the outfitting of privateers in American ports, plus a new threat—the export of arms to Carlists in northern Spain.[64] Of course, after this point in time, the rivalry over Cuba began to dominate Spanish-American relations.

Prior to the 1840s the United States had basically favored continual Spanish control over Cuba to prevent British intervention there. After its victory over Mexico in 1848, however, the United States decided to annex Cuba. This dramatic change in policy was in part to calm southern slave-holding states. Annexation would allow for the creation of another slave state. Many Cubans also favored annexation to the United States to gain access to the thriving American slave trade. As a result, the United States offered to buy Cuba in the 1840s and 1850s, but Spain rejected the offers. Consequently, some Americans called for annexing the island by force. In this atmosphere, Cuban exiles in the United States, who favored annexation, found sympathy for their cause and began to launch attacks from the United States. Spain suspected that the United States tacitly supported these attacks, but the Taylor-Fillmore administrations enforced the Neutrality Act of 1818 and worked to maintain peace between the two nations. All the while, trade between the United States and Cuba grew rapidly in the middle of the century, and many Americans began to see Cuba as critical to their economic and military security.[65]

Narcisco López organized the most notable early filibustering expedition to Cuba. He sought independence for Cuba, but skillfully manipulated the annexationist fervor in the United States to gain money and men. Spanish and American officials, however, constantly hindered his efforts. In 1850, for example, López and his coconspirators were arrested and indicted by a New Orleans grand jury for violation of the Neutrality Act of 1818. The government, however, failed to win a conviction, and following several mistrials, López and his fellow conspirators were set free.[66] Clearly, popular sentiment favored the filibusters. This popular sentiment led to a violent outburst in New Orleans in 1851 after Narcisco López was finally captured and executed by Spanish officials in Cuba. French Chadwick succinctly described the riot:

[A] mob attacked the Spanish consulate, destroying the archives and furniture, de-

> facing the portrait of the Queen of Spain, and tearing to pieces the Spanish flag. The printing office of the Spanish newspaper, *La Union*, was completely destroyed, and ten Spanish coffee houses and cigar shops wholly or partially demolished. The riot was only suppressed by calling out the militia. The Spanish consul placed himself and the business of his office in the care of the British and French consuls.[67]

The Spanish minister immediately lodged a complaint with the American government over the outrage committed against the consul and Spanish citizens in New Orleans. The American government was chagrined and agreed to a national salute to the Spanish flag if the consul returned to New Orleans on a Spanish vessel.[68] The second half of the nineteenth century saw a continuation of filibuster attacks from the United States. Over time, American sentiment became more anti-Spanish, and this occasionally put the consuls in danger, especially as more Americans, including naturalized Cubans, were arrested by Spain in questionable circumstances.[69] For example, the Spanish seizure of the American ship *Black Warrior* almost led to war in 1854, and tensions remained high the following year over an incident involving another American vessel.[70]

In such a charged atmosphere, the search for filibusters could prove tricky for the consuls. In January 1855 Francisco Stoughton informed the district attorney that the captain of the steamer *Massachusetts* planned to use the vessel for an expedition against Cuba. On presentation of the proper affidavits, the U.S. Marshall promptly seized the *Massachusetts* for violations of the U.S. Neutrality Act, and the *New York Daily Times* duly reported that the officials discovered thousands of flintlock muskets, ammunition, and a large quantity of provisions on board the vessel. The captain of the vessel immediately refuted this claim in a letter to the paper, and he referred to another examination of the ship that found no such weapons and only the appropriate amount of supplies for a voyage to New Orleans.[71] The captain then posed two rhetorical questions to the readers:

> Is there no way in which an American master can be protected from such outrages upon the part of our government officers, at the dictation of an agent of a foreign government? Or is it no longer possible for an outward bound vessel to proceed upon her lawful voyage until she obtains the consent of the Spanish Consul?[72]

In February a newspaper correspondent in New Orleans reported that an expedition was afoot and that the *Massachusetts* and two other steamers were engaged.[73] Without further documentation, it is hard to determine the true status of the *Massachusetts*. Were the newspapers simply misinformed, or did one of the inspectors lie? What the news reports do make clear is that United States officials in New York took the consul's accusations seriously and that if the accusations proved false there could be negative consequences. There can be little doubt that the captain's questions rankled many readers. The fight against filibusters then could be risky for the consuls; failure to pursue leads vigorously might result in successful expeditions, yet the pursuit of false leads could fuel anti-Spanish feelings.

The mid-nineteenth century was especially dangerous and complex. The American

Civil War briefly nullified America's threat to Cuba, and it strengthened Spain's position throughout Latin America. The Spanish subsequently reoccupied Santo Domingo (1861–1865) and went to war against the Quadruple Alliance of Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia (1863–1866).[74] The Spanish also debated whether to remain neutral in the American Civil War before finally proclaiming neutrality in June 1861. The Spanish government, however, continued to allow covert trade between Cuba and the Confederacy, and the continual use of Cuba by Confederate blockade runners led to many maritime incidents. The consuls also became involved in several incidents during the Civil War. The most notable involved the consul of New Orleans. The Spanish minister in Washington, for example, authorized the consul in New Orleans "to clear shipping under the Confederate flag for various Spanish ports."[75] Later, after New Orleans fell to Union forces in early 1862, General Butler discovered that the same consul was involved in a scheme to sell 80,000 muskets to the Confederacy. The consul also tangled with the Union commander over detaining Spanish shipping unjustly and harassing Spanish merchants in the city.[76] Other consuls apparently had fewer problems with Union officials during the war. They, however, continued to monitor northern abolitionists, who were outfitting expeditions for Santo Domingo.[77] The mid-nineteenth century, then, saw a brief resurgence of Spanish power. Once the American Civil War was over, however, America would again challenge Spanish interests in the Caribbean. The victory of the abolitionists in the United States gave the Cuban independence movement, which also favored abolition, valuable allies in the United States. The stage was set for a renewal of filibuster expeditions.

The Ten Years War (1868–78) in Cuba and the end of the Civil War in the United States (1865) led to a spike in filibusters. Numerous officers and soldiers from the north and the south enlisted with the Cubans. Some joined to fight for the cause of liberty, but financial rewards tempted many more—$20 a month and a $500 bonus if the revolution was successful. The United States government also ordered the sale of surplus arms, munitions, and ships. Third parties for the Cubans purchased many of these goods. The Spanish consuls kept close tabs on these developments, hiring detectives and employing spies within the Cuban community. They brought complaints before U.S. officials, but the newspapers reported that in ports such as New Orleans, the customhouse officials, who favored the Cuban cause, would do little to stop such expeditions.[78] Yet, not all federal officials forsook American law. In October 1869, United States officials summarily seized "the Cuban privateer *Hornet* without any complaint being entered by the Spanish Consuls."[79] Later, in 1871, the Spanish consul at Key West disrupted a plan to launch a small expedition by reporting it to local officials. In retaliation, an angry mob stoned his house.[80] The ambivalent position of American officials toward filibusters led to continual tensions and distrust between Spanish consuls and some American officials. Had all American officials strictly enforced the law there may have been more clarity. On the other hand, the evidence that the Spanish consuls mustered often proved to be flimsy.

A further problem may have resulted from different understandings of international law and treaty obligations. Some of these differences became clear in the *Virginius* affair of 1873. In October, the Spanish navy captured the *Virginius* after chasing the Cuban-owned American-flagged ship for several years. The Spanish commander at Santiago, Cuba, executed most of the crew, including American citizens, within a week. He rejected the pleas of the American consul to give the Americans a proper trial in accordance with the Treaty of 1795. News of the outrage quickly reached the United States, where immediately there were calls for war and the annexation of Cuba. President Grant, however, followed the advice of his secretary of state, Hamilton Fish, and resolved the conflict peacefully. The settlement called for Spain to return the vessel and surviving prisoners and for an investigation into the true ownership of the vessel. In late November the United States circuit court for New York began to take depositions regarding the ownership of the *Virginius*. The court determined that the vessel was illegally flagged. For Spaniards, the ruling justified the seizure of the vessel and the punishment of the crew as pirates. Americans, however, were not willing to go so far, arguing that this was a violation of municipal law and therefore it was the responsibility of the United States to punish the culprits. In hindsight, both sides probably took their positions too far. For example, the United States wrongly claimed that Spain could not seize the ship on the high seas. If only the United States could seize vessels flying its flag illegally, there would be no way to prevent individuals from sailing under false colors. Yet, the Spanish clearly went too far in deeming the captives pirates and summarily executing them.[81] Such legal wrangling, however, had implications for international law and bilateral relations. During the nineteenth century, the vague law of nations of the early modern period gradually gave way to a more comprehensive code of international law. The process was often arduous and pushed forward by litigation involving privateers and filibusters. Thus, such cases could set important legal precedent, and for a weak state like Spain a favorable legal ruling might allow it to force a stronger adversary to adhere to the law (municipal or international) or face international opprobrium. So, in the late nineteenth century, the Spanish consuls and their lawyers continued to develop legal arguments and justifications for Spain to pursue the filibusters on the high seas and to prevent their setting sail from American shores. The consuls were often at the nexus between municipal and international law. Closer scrutiny of consular legal efforts might provide insights into the development of American and international law in the nineteenth century.

Despite the peaceful resolution of the *Virginius* affair, tensions between Spain and the United States continued to simmer over Cuba and Cuban filibusters until 1898. In the 1880s, for example, Key West became a major point for filibuster expeditions to Cuba. The Spanish consuls there worked steadfastly to prevent such expeditions from setting sail, but faced a hostile public and a negligent official at the customhouse. In fact, in 1884, a mob threatened the consul with violence, and the secretary of the Treasury ordered his agent in Key West to work with the local naval authorities to protect the life and property of the

Spanish consul.[82] In 1885, the customs collector was removed from his office after a formal Spanish protest over "his participation in pro-Cuban demonstrations."[83] In 1890, the consul left Key West because the Cuban refugees there threatened his life.[84] His public departure may have prompted federal officials to act, because a consul was soon back, tracking down filibusters.

By the mid-1890s the situation was becoming more tense. The American public closely followed the renewal of fighting in Cuba, and the inflammatory pro-Cuban stories published daily by the American press increased public support for the Cuban cause. Despite growing hostility, the Spanish minister and consuls worked assiduously to disseminate their own message to the public and to prevent filibuster expeditions from leaving American shores. The Spanish supplied the Associate Press with positive stories about Spain and provided a subsidy to the pro-Spanish newspaper, *Las Novedades.* The minister also hired Pinkerton detectives to work with the consuls to gather evidence that the filibusters had violated the Neutrality Act of 1818. The consul in Philadelphia coordinated the detectives and other consuls' investigations. These efforts cost the Spanish government $20,000 a month.[85] Nevertheless, filibusters kept leaving American shores. In 1895 the consul of Philadelphia said, "These expeditions are like fleas. You catch them here, and then you catch them there."[86] Spanish vigilance, however, made it more costly for the Cuban filibusters. Spanish efforts, for example, led United States agents to seize the *Commodore* twice in 1895. In both cases, the government lacked sufficient evidence to hold the vessel, and the Spanish evidence that the captain and crew had violated the Neutrality Act of 1818 was circumstantial. Still, the Spanish legal efforts delayed the delivery of munitions for eight months; the *Commodore* reportedly delivered its cargo of munitions in March 1896.[87] The Spanish managed to impede or prevent twenty-one other expeditions out of forty known expeditions between 1895 and 1898.[88] So Spanish efforts were somewhat successful, and this success led to acts of violence against the consuls. In Jacksonville, Florida, a fight broke out between Cuban sympathizers and the Spanish consul and some Pinkerton detectives. The Spanish minister complained directly to President Cleveland for reparations.[89]

The consular network was never able to halt filibustering expeditions, but it did put pressure on the participants and occasionally persuaded American officials to impound a ship. More importantly, the consuls monitored the insurgents' activities and provided information to the minister and to royal officials in the colonies. This information gave royal officials some chance of intercepting or capturing the insurgents. Spanish officials were clearly pleased with the successes and duly awarded the consuls. For example, Francisco Stoughton was made a commander of the Royal Order of Charles III in 1852, a year after he helped thwart an expedition leaving New York City, which Stoughton stated "was an indirect cause of the capture and execution of Narcisco López ."[90] In the long run these efforts failed, but they do suggest that the United States never became the complete haven that many insurgents and sympathetic Americans wished it to be. By the end of the century, United States

officials also acted more quickly on Spanish charges. The telegraph probably made it more difficult for federal officials far from the capital to ignore the law and treaty obligations. The telegraph also made it easier for the Spanish to exchange information. Consuls, for example, could more easily inform the Spanish minister, who then supplied the United States government with detailed evidence of violations, making it more likely that the federal government would stop the vessels before they set sail. The more aggressive posture of the federal government, though, might have only increased anti-Spanish hostility among the American populace, especially when vessels were detained on erroneous information. A more serious problem for Spain was its policy in Cuba, which many thought violated the laws of war. The press matched recent stories on Spanish brutality with old stories about Spanish atrocities including the brutal execution of the *Virginius* crew,[91] and American sentiment turned decisively against Spain. The final push for war came in February 1898. The *New York Journal* published a letter from the Spanish minister to a friend criticizing President McKinley, and a week later the USS *Maine* exploded in Havana harbor. Shortly thereafter, Congress authorized the president to invade Cuba.[92] The Spanish-American War was quickly over, and with its termination a new phase in Spanish-American relations began.

This review of consular activities in the nineteenth century does not provide us with a complete picture of Spanish-American relations, but it does provide a wider lens to view more familiar episodes, such as General Jackson's invasion of West Florida in 1817, the *Amistad*, the López Affair, the *Black Warrior*, the Ostend Manifesto, the *Virginius* Affair, and the sinking of the *Maine*. These episodes clearly illustrate the existence of animosity and even outright hostility. Yet, Spanish consuls continually worked with Americans on the local level to defend Spain's interests and to make sure that municipal laws and treaty obligations were observed in regard to privateers, filibusters, and other adventurers who threatened Spanish territory. Without the diligence of consuls and their attorneys, less Spanish property would have been redeemed from privateers and fewer filibuster expeditions impeded. The legal strategies pursued by consuls led to the clarification of finer points of law in the courts. In a sense, legal proceedings involving consuls, privateers, and filibusters led to calls for the clarification of treaty obligations and national and international law. At the same time, the economies of the two nations continued to become more intertwined, especially in regard to Cuba, where Americans owned many sugar refineries and plantations by the end of the century.[93] Many Spaniards saw the growing economic influence of the United States in Latin America as a threat. Yet, the United States provided the Spanish empire with crucial aid at key moments. One might wonder if the Spanish position in places such as Florida and the Yucatan would have been even less tenable in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century without the timely arrival of American foodstuffs. One might also wonder how the direct relations between the consuls and the governors of Cuba and Puerto Rico may have fostered even closer economic relations between those islands and the United States, especially after the consuls facilitated American immigration to the islands in the early nineteenth century.

Economic ties often depended on personal ties and networks of trust. The Spanish consuls were often at the center of those networks. Such networks explained some economic trends at the beginning of the century, and a deeper understanding of these networks throughout the nineteenth century might further deepen our understanding of Spanish-American relations. The consular records, then, give us greater insights into what Jaime Vicens Vives called "the inner development of things," that is, the social dynamics that underlay larger economic and geopolitical trends.[94]

Notes

1. Robert Treat Paine, *Spain. An account of the public festival given by the citizens of Boston at the Exchange Coffee House, January 24, 1809, in Honor of Spanish Valour & Patriotism...* (Boston, 1809), Early American Imprints, 2nd Series, 18667, 11, 12, 14, 16–19.
2. John Stoughton to Pedro Juan de Erice, February 28, 1809, vol.3, Don Juan Stoughton Collection, Baker Library, Harvard Business School, (hereafter DJSC).
3. *Columbian Centinel*, May 6, 1809, 2; *The Farmer's Museum*, May 8, 1809, 3; *The American*, August 18, 1809, 2.
4. A notable exception being Richard L. Kagan's reference to the same episode to frame his discussion of the more balanced, optimistic views of Spain in nineteenth-century United States writing on Spain. See Richard L. Kagan, "From Noah to Moses: The Genesis of Historical Scholarship on Spain in the United States," in *Spain in America: The Origins of Hispanism in the United States*, ed. Richard L. Kagan (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 26–27.
5. José de Onís made a similar point regarding the activities of Valentín de Foronda, *chargé d'affaires* from 1807–1809, writing, "This spirit of friendship felt for Spain at this time in the United States, was to a large degree due to Foronda's activities." See José de Onís, "Valentín de Foronda's Memoir on the United States of North America, 1804," *The Americas* 4 (1947–48): 361.
6. For an overview of Spanish-American relations see Rodrigo Botero, *Ambivalent Embrace: America's Troubled Relations with Spain from the Revolutionary War to the Cold War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001); James W. Cortada, *Spain in the Nineteenth-Century World: Essays on Spanish Diplomacy, 1789–1898* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994); and James W. Cortada, *Two Nations Over Time: Spain and the United States, 1776–1977* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978).
7. Botero, 24–31, 97.
8. For example, F.A. Browne, a local resident and merchant, was appointed vice-consul of Key West in 1840.See Circular Letter from Consul General Chacon, November 14, 1840, Box 4, Folder 1840–1844, Spanish Consulate, Charleston, S.C. Papers, Duke University, (hereafter Duke).
9. Of course, the consuls might become too ensconced in American life. Philip Coolidge Brooks noted, for example, that "Fearing that [the Spanish consul of Baltimore]'s American wife of obscure background and her seven or eight children might have weakened his zeal for Spain, Onís [the Spanish minister] recommended that he should not be given the post of consul general..." Brooks, "Spanish Royalists in the United States, 1809–1821," *Colonial Hispanic America* 4 (1936): 564.
10. Javier Cuenca Esteban, "Trends and Cycles in U.S. Trade with Spain and the Spanish Empire, 1790–1819," *The Journal of Economic History* 44 (1984), 543.
11. Linda Salvucci, "Merchants and Diplomats: Philadelphia's Early Trade with Cuba," *Pennsylvania Legacies* 3 (Nov. 2003): 6–10.
12. Enrique White to Antonio Argote Villalobos, April 2 and June 7, 1805, Mss 3 Sp 155 a 276–78, Virginia Historical Society, (hereafter VHS).
13. Luis de Onís to Antonio Argote Villalobos, June 25, 1810, Circular letters from Luis de Onís, October 10, December 2 and 12, 1810, a 395, 396, 410, 413, and 414, VHS.

14. Circular letter from Luis de Onís, May 2, 1811, a 422, VHS.
15. Circular letters from Luis de Onís, May 19 and June 21, 1817, a 699 and 702, VHS.
16. Regarding an earlier period and a slightly different situation, Henry Kamen wrote, "Had there been no illicit traders, the supply and maintenance of the very many outposts manned by Spaniards would have collapsed. In there own way, the foreign traders were actually making it possible for the empire to survive." The same might also be said for the legal American traders in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. See Henry Kamen, *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492–1763* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 264.
17. *New York Times*, September 18, 1874.
18. "Nota de los Barcos... Enero 1 de 1802," vol. 1, DJSC.
19. Circular letter from John Stoughton, February 16, 1818, vol. 4, DJSC.
20. See Onís, 351–87.
21. Mateo de la Serna to Pablo Chacon, June 3, 1820, Mss. 3 Sp 155, a 804, VHS.
22. Circular letter from Alexandro Ramirez n.d. [1817], Circular letters from Luis de Onís, May 7, August 6 and 13, 1818, a 717, 737, 738, 747, and 751, VHS.
23. John Stoughton to Alexandro Ramirez, August 1, 1819, October 11, 1819, and January 6, 1820, vol. 4, DJSC.
24. Alexandro Ramirez to Pablo Chacon, February 26, 1820 and Circular letter from Consul General, April 1, 1820, Mss 3 Sp 155 a 795 and 797, VHS.
25. Robert H. Lord, John E. Sexton, and Edward T. Harrington, *History of the Archdiocese of Boston: In the Various Stages of Its Development 1604–1943* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944), 1:507, 553–58, 673.
26. John Holt to Pablo Chacon, June 8, 1818; Citizens of Norfolk to Pablo Chacon, March 31, 1819, Mss 3 Sp 155 a 743 and 768, VHS.
27. *New York Times*, April 22, 1875, 5.
28. John Stoughton to James Monroe, May 16, 1815 and John Stoughton to Ventura Gomez de la Torre and Grandsons, May 1815, vol. 4, DJSC.
29. *New York Times*, January 20, February 2, and March 20, 1875.
30. Robert Alderson, "Charleston's French Revolutionary Consul: Michel-Ange-Bernard de Mangourit, 1792–1794," *Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association* (1998): 148, 152.
31. Carlos Martinez de Irujo to Antonio Argote Villalobos, April 21, 1797, Mss 3 Sp 155 a 27, VHS.
32. Carlos Martinez de Irujo to Diego Morphy, April 7, April 17, May 16, May 30, and July 19, 1797; Diego Morphy to Manuel Rengil, June 16, 1797; Manuel Rengil to Diego Morphy, June 20, 1797; Manuel Rengil to Enrique White, June 29, 1797; and Enrique White to Manuel Rengil, July, 1797, Box 1, Folder 1797, Duke.
33. Carlos Martinez de Irujo to Diego Morphy, July 19, 1797, Box 1, Folder 1797, Duke; *Federal Gazette & Baltimore Daily Advertiser*, July 17, 1797, 2.
34. Elijah Clarke, *Deposition of Gen. Elijah Clarke of the State of Georgia, Respecting a Letter from him to Don Diego Morphy, Consul of His Catholic Majesty, At Charleston, South-Carolina...* (Philadelphia, 1798), Early American Imprints, 1st series, 34786.
35. Carlos Martinez de Irujo to Antonio Argote Villalobos, April 1, 1806, and Circular letter from Consul General Foronda, September 6, 1808, Mss 3 Sp 155 a 309 and 319, VHS.
36. Karen Racine, *Francisco de Miranda: A Transatlantic Life in the Age of Revolution* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003), 158.
37. John Stoughton to Pedro Juan de Erice, July 8, 1806, vol. 3, DJSC.
38. Brooks, 561.
39. French Ensor Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain: Diplomacy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), 112.
40. Circular letter from Consul General Foronda, July 29, 1808, Mss 3 Sp 155 a 352, VHS.

41. Circular letter from Luis de Onís, November 4, 1809, and Luis de Onís to Antonio Argote Villalobos, December 21, 1815, a 375 and 483, VHS.
42. Brooks, 562.
43. Circular letter from Consul General Foronda, May 18, 1809, and Circular letter from Luis de Onís, March 3, 1810, Mss 3 Sp 155, a 365 and 388, VHS.
44. Juan Bernabeu to Antonio Argote Villalobos, December 25, 1809; Luis de Onís to Antonio Argote Villalobos, December 31, 1809, and February 10, 1810, a 355 and 382, 387, VHS.
45. Marques de Somervelos to Argote, July 28 and August 23, 1810, a 403 and 409, VHS.
46. Circular letter from Luis de Onís, August 12, 1810, a 405, VHS.
47. Circular letter from Luis de Onís, March 11, 1811, a 419, VHS.
48. Circular letter from Luis de Onís, March 3, 1816, a 485, VHS.
49. Charles C. Griffin, "Privateering from Baltimore during the Spanish American Wars of Independence," *Maryland Historical Magazine* 35 (March 1940): 1–2.
50. Circular letter from Luis de Onís, May 1, 1816, Mss 3 Sp 155 a 487, VHS.
51. Circular letter from Luis de Onís, March 13, 1817, a 503, VHS. It was partly due to the protests of Onís that the revised neutrality acts were passed in 1817 and 1818. See Brooks, 569.
52. Charles K. Mallory to Antonio Argote Villalobos, December 16, 1816, a 484, VHS.
53. Antonio Argote Villalobos to Charles K. Mallory, April 10, 1817, Mss 2 Ar 382 a 1, VHS.
54. Charles K. Mallory to Antonio Argote Villalobos, April 11, 14, 15, and 16, 1817; William Wirt to Antonio Argote Villalobos, April 14, 1817, Mss 3 Sp 155 a 495–500, VHS.
55. *Baltimore Patriot*, September 11, 1819, 2.
56. John Stoughton to James Morphy, November 12, 1795, and John Stoughton to Thomas Stoughton, November 30, 1795, BV Stoughton Letterbook, 1795–1800, New York Historical Society, 22–23, 26.
57. Circular letters from Luis de Onís, January 2 and 27, 1813, Mss 3 Sp 155 a 452 and 454, VHS.
58. Luis de Onís to Antonio Argote Villalobos, April 4, 1817, a 504–506, VHS.
59. Sean T. Perrone, "John Stoughton and the *Divina Pastora* prize case, 1817–1819," *Journal of the Early Republic* (forthcoming).
60. Argote, for example, watched over Thomas Newton's slaves while he was away at Congress. See Antonio Argote Villalobos to Thomas Newton, December 14, 1801; Thomas Newton to Antonio Argote Villalobos, December 26, 1801, Mss 3 Sp 155 a 532 and 562, VHS.
61. José R. Guzmán Rodriguez, "La correspondencia de Don Luis de Onís sobre la expedición de Javier Mina," *Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación* 9 (1968), 509–43.
62. Circular letter from Joaquim de Anduaga, June 26, 1822, Mss 3 Sp 155 a 834, VHS.
63. Henry Clay to Don Francisco Tacon, October 29, 1827, item 01419, The Gilder Lehrman Collection, New York Historical Society.
64. Circular letter from Consul General Bernabeu, April 21, 1831, Juan Bernabeu to Vicente Antonio de Larrañaga, February 20, 1832, and Circular letter from Minister Tacon, September 9, 1834, Box 3, Folder 1804–1834, Duke.
65. James W. Cortada, "The United States," in *Spain in the Nineteenth-Century World: Essays on Spanish Diplomacy, 1789–1898*, ed. James W. Cortada (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 134–37; Lester D. Langley, "The Whigs and the López Expedition to Cuba, 1849–1851: A Chapter in Frustrating Diplomacy," *Revista de Historia de America* 71 (1971):13, 20–21.
66. Langley, 14–15.
67. Chadwick, 239.
68. Ibid., 240.
69. In 1859, for example, the Spanish government arrested some filibusters, including Americans, outside Spanish jurisdictions. See *The Farmer's Cabinet*, May 11, 1859, 2.

70. Cortada, "The United States," 135.
71. *New York Daily Times*, January 26 and 29, 1855, 4.
72. *New York Daily Times*, January 29, 1855, 4.
73. *New York Daily Times*, February 26, 1855, 1.
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75. Clifford L. Egan, "Friction in New Orleans: General Butler versus the Spanish Consul," *Louisiana History* 9 (1968): 44.
76. Ibid., 45–50.
77. Brauer, 23.
78. *New York Times*, April 23 and May 9, 1869, 1.
79. *New York Times*, October 7, 1869, 4.
80. Gerald E. Poyo, "Key West and the Cuban Ten Year War," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 57 (1978–79): 296.
81. Richard H. Bradford, *The Virginius Affair* (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1980), 14, 16, 44, 94, 100–1, 129–31.
82. *New York Times*, April 7 and May 17.
83. Gerald E. Poyo, "Cuban Patriots in Key West, 1878–1886: Guardians at the Separatist Ideal," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 61 (1982–83): 28.
84. *New York Times*, November 3, 1890, 1.
85. Carlos García Barrón, "Enrique Dupuy de Lôme and the Spanish American War," *The Americas* 36 (1979): 53–56.
86. *New York Times*, September 1, 1895, 5.
87. Stephen H. Halkiotis, "Guns for *Cuba Libre*: An 1895 Filibustering Expedition from Wilmington, North Carolina," *The North Carolina Historical Review* 55 (1978): 72–75.
88. Cristóbal Robles Muñoz, "La oposición al activismo independentista Cubano," *Hispania* 48 (1988): 269.
89. *New York Times*, October 3, 1896, 2.
90. Relation of service of Francisco Stoughton, January 2, 1854, Personal, leg. 231, ex 13121, Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid.
91. *New York Times*, March 22, 1896, 28.
92. Cortada, "The United States," 141–42.
93. For a recent study of one American businessman, see Christopher Harris, "Edwin F. Atkins and the Evolution of the United States Cuban Policy, 1894–1902," *New England Historical Quarterly* 78 (2005): 202–31.
94. See Stanley G. Payne, "Jaime Vicens Vives and the Writing of Spanish History," *Journal of Modern History* 34 (1962): 130.

CHAPTER 7

Departure from Asia: Spain in the Philippines and East Asia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

FLORENTINO RODAO

Although the Iberian Peninsula led the European arrival to the Asia-Pacific region and Spanish colonization of the Philippines dated from the sixteenth century, the role of contemporary Spain in this dynamic region has been very limited. One of the most significant changes in the Asia-Pacific region during the nineteenth century was the decline of Spain's position. Having once enjoyed the status of one of the main Western powers in the region, Spain became the first colonial power to be expelled, after defeat at the hands of the United States in the war of 1898. Since that time, Spain has not been able to recover from that episode, and Asia has commanded little interest in the national psyche.

For centuries, Asia has commanded little attention from Spanish decision makers. Spain's general decline as a world power and its domestic problems can explain it only partially; its presence in Asia has been characterized by its own independent dynamic that can be traced even to its early days. The abnormally small presence of Spain in Asia can be attributed to several very different factors, such as history, domestic hegemonies, international politics, or colonial perception, but this chapter will focus the study of the Spanish presence on the days when the Philippines was still ruled from Mexico, until the present times, when Spain has attempted to regain some of the lost ground. The focus will be in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, considering the forced departure from the region in 1898 merely as one link in the chain. Furthermore, the course of events is analyzed through an interdisciplinary perspective, which the author considers most effective for fully explaining the events.

At the height of Spanish imperial power, Asia was a crucial target, but only for a short time. After settling in the Philippines in the 1570s and joining hands with Portugal in the 1580s in the Union of the Iberian Crowns, Spain undertook projects of conquest in China and expeditions to Cambodia in the 1590s. These reflected the hope of expanding and

stimulating a second wave of exploitation and conquest in East Asia, similar to that in the Americas decades before. Those efforts failed, and the cooperation with the Portuguese soon dwindled. After the turn of the seventeenth century, the profitable silver route of galleons from Mexico to Manila, despite its enormous value, was a remote affair to Madrid and the Spanish imperial Crown.[1] From the perspective of Madrid, Asia's significance was limited to a strategic area to defend the galleon route from Dutch attacks, considerations which were no doubt behind the conquest of the only two regional outposts Spain occupied: Taiwan (briefly) and Micronesia, especially the island of Guam.

The Catholic Church was the greatest benefactor of this diminishing role of the Pacific outposts. Missionary orders used their unusually prominent role in the Philippines to expel most lay Spaniards settled permanently in the islands, especially *hacenderos* out of Manila that could balance Church influence over the islanders. They effectively spread the gospel and, at the same time, enhanced their own influence. As a colony governed in essence by another colony (Mexico), the Philippines never received great attention from Madrid, which did little to challenge the friars' excessive power. Moreover, the colonial administration in the Philippines remained faithful to the power of the Catholic Church, which was never counterbalanced by any other interest group on the islands, much less the governor or the small bureaucracy.

Profits from the silver trade diminished in the middle third of the seventeenth century, and for the next century the nature of Spanish presence in the Philippines would change little until a new breeze brought by the Enlightenment was felt. The two-year British occupation of Manila begun in 1762 served to reinvigorate the Spanish government in the Philippine capital. It subsequently opened the first direct link across the Indian Ocean to the Spanish peninsula and imposed a new tax system designed to make the colony self-financing. The nineteenth century, then, brought new ideas and the possibility of a direct link to the peninsula for a colony in a remote area that had stagnated throughout most of its existence. There was a chance for a new beginning for Spain in Asia if the longstanding pattern of laziness and unmitigated church dominance could be overcome.

The Nineteenth Century

The overall context of European presence in the Asia-Pacific region changed dramatically after the turn of the nineteenth century. Among the European powers, only Holland, Spain, and Portugal maintained colonial possessions there, chiefly in the form of several coastal outposts with hinterlands of varying sizes. New European powers (mainly France and England) advanced from India and settled closer to China and Japan; colonialism was making important inroads in the region. The impact of the galleon trade in East Asia subsided after the rise of trade links in several new commodities between Canton and European ports, which left the Philippines marginalized in the region.[2] Meanwhile, the main focus of colonial attention

for the Spanish was on the other shore of the Pacific, that is, the independence movements of the Hispanic American colonies, with the exception of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Like the Caribbean island colonies, the Philippines did not revolt and remained loyal to the Crown, but the independence of New Spain in 1810 directly affected its role in the diminished empire, given that until then, Manila depended both politically and financially on the newly independent Republic of Mexico. The events of the early nineteenth century therefore gave rise to the possibility of a new role within the Spanish Empire for the Pacific archipelago beyond the secondary position it had held under the Mexican viceroys. With three main island territories remaining under Madrid's control, and the galleon route a memory, the Philippines were in a position to further the reforms taken since the Enlightenment and to forge a stronger colony. But this would not be an easy task.

Continuity (1810–1840)

France and Britain made further incursions into Asia during this period. Although the French Revolution and the conflicts in Europe slowed European expansion, as with French settlement in Vietnam, the British soon recovered their initiative and in 1819 established a new base in Singapore, hitherto a small fishing outpost. The Philippines also saw important changes during the first third of the century, the impacts of which were crucial for Spanish colonialism. These included the establishment of a new trade route via the Cape of Good Hope and further colonial penetration into the hinterland. Neither of these developments resulted from the influence of private interests, as one might expect, but rather from the new possibilities for state revenue after the creation of a tax on popular consumption in the countryside: "The Philippines was turned into a colony, in fact, due to the impulse of the state."[3]

This mild reinvigoration of Spanish colonization in the Philippines, however, amounted to a false start. Spain was in turmoil domestically and in the colonies. The rupture of ties between the Peninsula and Mexico, the territory where the Manila galleons landed, coupled with the Peninsular War against Napoleon and continued instability under King Ferdinand VIII, was the worst news the Philippines could receive in its path to development.

The presence of Spain in Asia was weakened by the numerous crises unfolding inside the Iberian Peninsula. Madrid fought in alliance against the United Kingdom, suffering defeat at Trafalgar. Spain joined forces with Britain to expel the Napoleonic invasion, after which followed the reign of one of the worst monarchs in Spanish history, during which most of the American colonies fought and won independence. The new scenario limited the Spanish Empire to three main colonies, all of them islands: Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. The Philippines was now Spain's largest colony, though this fact was of little import because the immense profits obtained from Cuban sugar exports attracted the lion's share of early capitalists' and officials' attention. During the first decades of the nineteenth

century, there was no thrust toward Asia and no invigoration of the colonial government, while capital investment in the Philippines, whether directly from the Americas or indirectly from the Spanish metropolis, was negligible. The main attempt to strengthen the Pacific colony was the declaration of Manila as Free Port *(Puerto Franco)* in 1837. The Philippines languished during this period. Governors of Spanish colonies possessed considerable power to define policies, a practice which in the Philippines' case yielded little reform.

The improvement of Spanish contacts with other parts of Asia was minimal, and it is even possible to identify clear signs showing the decline of the Spanish colonial rank in Asia. A French proposal in the 1830s to buy from Madrid the small island of Basilan, in the southern Philippines, to be used in its expansion around Southeast Asia following the example of British Singapore, is one indication of a widespread perception at the time that Spain was weaker in Asia than other powers.

The Colonial Opportunity (1840–1868)

The first Opium War (1840–42) triggered the main changes in Asia during the nineteenth century. The Chinese defeat not only led to the British settlement of Hong Kong, but also dismantled the traditional hegemony of China over the rest of the region. Beijing proved incapable of defending even its own territory from foreign attacks, and the impact of the military defeat was large, even in not-so-isolated Japan. The military might of Europeans forced Asian governments to accept a kind of secondary status in their dealings, such as the so-called Unequal Treaties, which provided for high fees on their imports and granting Westerners the right of extraterritoriality, which excluded local tribunals from handling law violations committed by foreigners.

Spain shared the European colonialist euphoria in these times, hoping to also benefit from the new imperial wave both in trade and territories. Diplomatic efforts soon began. The first treaty with China was signed in Nanjing in 1842 after a mission led by a diplomat-traveler, Sinibald de Mas. This was followed decades later by a new Treaty of Friendship and Navigation, and treaties with Japan in 1868 and Siam in 1870, which further expanded the Spanish diplomatic presence in Asia. These years marked the peak of Spanish colonial interest in Asia, especially when the *Unión Liberal* party dominated national politics. Madrid sent expeditions to Puerto Rico, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Chile, Peru, and Morocco, some of them with thinly disguised colonial aims, and later to Southeast Asia. The killing of a Dominican missionary there in 1856 gave Madrid and the self-proclaimed protector of Catholicism in overseas territories, France, a convenient excuse to send a joint punishment operation after declaring unsatisfactory the explanation given by the government of Annam. The mission, or Cochinchina Expedition (1857–63), was a military success, easily defeating the Vietnamese and even seizing the city of Saigon. From the perspective of the then-prevailing colonizing mentality, the move appears as part of a coherent plan to reach the closest

mainland territory to the Philippines. The Cochinchina Expedition certainly could have led to a renewed awareness in Spain about Asia, to an increase in the Philippines' foreign trade, and even to Spanish colonial expansion in the region since the Asian markets were opening in those years, and Southeast Asia was the most obvious place to expand from Manila.

The intensification of colonialist activities, however, did not renew Spain's vigor in Asia. The trade treaties failed to attract new contacts, and trade with the signatory countries remained below expectations. The peace treaty provided for Spain to receive half of the war indemnity, but France was the major beneficiary of these military triumphs because of its financial and military might. In any case, the Franco-Spanish military alliance was uneven. Although Spain provided most of the troops—including Filipino soldiers—the difference in fire power was immense: only one of the initial thirteen warships used against the Annam government was Spanish (the *Elcano*, which was armed only with two cannons), while all of France's vessels were armed at least with four, and its main frigate, *Nemesis*, had 52 pieces.[4] The strength available to France allowed it to profit from the military triumphs and to continue a political pressure that ended after some years in the colonization of all Southeast Asia, which would have been impossible for Spain. The end of the Cochinchina war coincided with the final crisis of the reign of Queen Isabel II, partly out of these foreign fiascos and the tremendous financial costs of the expansionism.[5] The internal crisis after 1863 was not resolved until the queen was defeated and exiled in 1868, starting a new six-year political course that proved no more capable of tackling the domestic instability and in fact only created further problems. The metropolis didn't help much, certainly, for the development of the Philippines.

Domestic instability and its particularly negative impact in Asia provoked a crucial change in Spanish perceptions of East Asia. The optimistic images of opening Asian territories and the expectations of benefit turned into pessimism and fear. The groundwork for the Treaty of Friendship with the kingdom of Siam shows this clearly, since it took more than a decade from the first reports until it was finally signed. Spain started preparations in 1858, merely two years after London signed the first such treaty, expecting to play a bigger role in Siam in the wake of the victory in the Cochinchina Expedition, and considering the treaty a springboard for increasing Spain's presence in the region. The plans were delayed, however, and when a Spanish ambassador was sent to Bangkok to sign the treaty in 1870, the directives had changed; he was warned not to accept any new clause by which other countries could benefit in the Philippines from any legal loophole. Initially aiming to expand its role in Asia, Spain underwent a complete change of attitude. The documentation shows that the main reason for going ahead with the treaty was to avoid unfavorable comparisons with other colonial powers. It was the turning point for both Madrid and Manila in Asia, since they were in the same position as the Asian governments at this time—on the defensive.

The Strategic Fear (1868–1898)

During the last third of the nineteenth century, at the high tide of imperialism, Spain harbored mixed feelings about colonization, trying to expand in order to demonstrate its rightful place as a colonial power while at the same time fearing the loss of her old colonies. The main concern of Madrid as the imperial race became more intense was the possibility of some other country usurping its possessions. This was not a groundless fear; Cuba suffered a widespread rebellion that was defeated only after large expenditures that left the colonial treasury in a state of permanent debt. In the Philippines, the Cavite Mutiny in 1870 shows that unrest also increased and, although it was suffocated more easily, it left many demands unresolved. The period saw important attempts at reinvigorating colonization, such as the creation of the Overseas Ministry (*Ministerio de Ultramar*) and the Philippine Exposition of 1887. Both were made possible by newfound domestic stability and the Catalan impulse in colonial policy, and produced excellent economic results. As Benito Legarda notes, "Spain had in a few years managed to lift itself to a position of importance in Philippine commerce."[6] The Philippines certainly were increasingly perceived in Spain as the colonial priority, as Cuba appeared to be switching allegiance to the United States. In fact, the annual budget dedicated to the Pacific archipelago increased a total of 15.5 percent from 1894 to 1897, while that of Cuba stagnated after 1892.[7] But the economic recovery never translated into political results. Amid these overwhelming fears, Spain had three main aims in East Asia during the last third of the century: sending Chinese labor to Cuba, trade, and new efforts at expansion.

The most important target for Spain in Asia during the nineteenth century was the transportation of unskilled workers from Asian shores to Cuba in order to provide labor for its sugar mills. After the difficulties with the transportation of African slaves became insurmountable, sugar mill owners in Cuba involved Spanish officials in search of an alternative. China was soon considered the best substitute, and workers were taken to Cuba as early as the above-mentioned treaty of 1842. This first agreement was not a definitive solution, especially after increasing protests over working conditions and transportation to Beijing made recruitment difficult. The port of Macao replaced Beijing as the main transport hub for Asian labor. The General Consulate, the highest-ranking Spanish office in China, was in fact maintained in this Portuguese enclave until 1874, when international pressure forced Spain to grant the Chinese the same labor standards accorded to other foreign workers in Cuba. The Chinese workers lost their advantage in cost, but Spain continued to recruit new workers from the same area. As a consequence, the most resourceful expedition to East Asia any diplomat had enjoyed in the entire century was sent and, for two years, an ambassador with a warship at his service visited cities and governments in Southeast Asia in order to explore the feasibility of sending new labor to Cuba.

Spanish trade with East Asia was also an obvious target for Spain in Asia. Spain ex-

ported only a few products of little value, such as sherry, raisins, and small arms, whereas it imported mainly forest products, sometimes in significant quantities, and commodities like pepper. The trade between the Philippines with the rest of Asia was based mostly on cotton manufactures and rice brought directly from Southeast Asia, while the main exports were sugar and Manila hemp. In any case, the figures never showed the trade to be important, partly due to the complementarity of the Philippine economy with its neighboring territories, and also due to the failure of the statistics to indicate products' final destinations because of the role of Hong Kong and Singapore as a hub for commodities in Asia.[8]

Imperial ambitions never disappeared. The idea remained prevalent that a nation had to expand to show its vitality or else it would die. The Berlin Conference of 1885 and the rule that effective occupation of a territory trumped historical rights had an impact on the Spanish presence in the Pacific, making Spain aware that the rights over many Micronesian islands dating from fifteenth- and seventeenth-century Spanish landings should be brought up to date (if desired) with formal declarations of sovereignty. Madrid sent a warship to Yap in order to legalize its imperial claims over Micronesia, but Germany harbored similar ambitions. A German ship arrived only four days later and performed the same ceremony, claiming the Spanish one was void on a technicality. As a consequence, Madrid and Berlin entered a bitter dispute, with massive demonstrations in Spain passionately claiming Spanish rights over the faraway territories. Finally, Pope Leo XIII was asked to arbitrate the dispute, and decided that Spain had the right to claim legal sovereignty over the islands but made clear that she should allow German companies to continue operating in Micronesia. This late Spanish expansion in the Pacific, then, was another frustrating colonial experience. Besides the pride of adding territories, Madrid had to bear the costs of imperial overextension, of chronic rebellions in Pohnpei, and, what is more, was now obligated to permit Germany, in particular the copper merchant *Jaluit Geshellschaft*, to reap the economic profits.[9]

The last decade of the nineteenth century witnessed growing fears over the future of the Spanish presence in the Philippines. Those fears about the future of the islands were indicated by the increasing budget for warships to defend the islands, but also through a migratory policy prioritizing security over long-term commercial advantages. The increasing number of Japanese and Chinese moving to the Philippines and Micronesia was perceived with suspicion in Madrid, which feared that they could act as fifth-columnists, back a foreign invasion, and even worse, form a racial alliance with Filipinos that could trigger the Spanish departure from Asia.[10] "Yellow peril" fears blinded Spaniards. The definitive departure of Spain from Asia occurred when the Philippine Revolution broke out in 1896, and the United States decided to remain in the Philippines (an island that could serve as a post for communications). The end of the three centuries of presence in Asia was not received with great sadness in Spain. Spaniards mourned the loss of Cuba, but the economic elites went so far as to welcome the defeat of Admiral Montojo's Armada in Manila to the United States, as shown by the rise in the Madrid's stock market upon the reception of the news.

The Last Century of Spanish Colonial Presence in Asia

Over the course of a century characterized by colonial expansion, Spain followed the opposite trajectory in Asia. Rather than increasing its territorial holdings, it was the first power to be expelled. Domestic problems in the metropolis, coupled with the emergence in the Philippines of a nationalist elite, can explain this apparent anomaly, but in relation to Asia, three additional reasons can be summoned: the lack of administrative resources; the role of the Philippines as a hindrance for expansion in Asia; and the disproportionate role of the exotic and orientalizing images when defining policies.

First, the Spanish administration was unevenly installed in Asia. Its diplomatic-consular network in East Asia had some special features that did not help: for example, the maintenance of the chancellery and the payment of fees to the chancellor for his work led to an inflated consular bureaucracy. Moreover, the Manila colonial government contributed very little to Spanish consular presence in Asia, and the Chinese were prohibited from using honorary consuls, private Spanish nationals holding special authorization to perform official consular duties. The permanent Spanish embassy was opened in Beijing, while the General Consulates were placed in Yokohama (but not in Tokyo), Singapore, and in Macao (transferred to Shanghai in 1868).[11] Opportunities for Spaniards to pursue diplomatic careers were scarce due to the constantly changing destinations, the difficult demands of many posts, and the high proportion of diplomats sent to Asia against their wishes. All these factors point to the difficulties in achieving an effective diplomatic deployment in Asia. Most diplomats who went to Asia did so out of obligation, and departed from the area as soon as possible. Madrid never managed to prepare the appropriate personnel for the task of increasing its presence there.

Second, the Philippines distorted relations with Asia by hindering passage to the continent. After the expansion of Catholicism in Asia proved futile by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Catholic Church deliberately obstructed contacts between the archipelago and the mainland by fellow nationals. The Philippines therefore became an obstacle rather than a springboard to the enlargement of Spanish presence in Asia. There were few or no capitalists in Manila that could press to end the near isolation from its neighbors, besides the Chinese junks, and the scarcity of contacts with mainland Asia inherited from Early Modern times had changed little by the nineteenth century. The main efforts to reach the Asian mainland were made by Cuban sugar interests, which were instrumental in getting contacts and experiences with Asia in order to transport Chinese laborers to the Antilles. By contrast, companies in the Philippines relied on foreign transportation and, for example, the first direct line between the Philippines and Japan was inaugurated by the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (日本郵船会社) in 1891 in spite of the many earlier projects from Spanish companies. The individuals living or traveling in East Asia during the nineteenth century were surprisingly few, as shown by the Spanish workers at the Chinese Custom Service between

1854 and 1949; although officially there were seventy-four, the family names show that many were from the Philippines and, in fact, only two or three of those workers were indoor staff, that is, more highly skilled. Only one, the Catalan Francisco Martí, became a commissioner, the post attained by some of Spain's best-known travelers to the Middle East, such as Sinibald de Mas, Eduard Toda or Alí Bey (Domingo Badía).[12]

Third, the continuing influence of the most distorted visions of Asia posed a difficult problem to solve. In the case of Spain, the exotic and orientalizing images not only predominated, but were adopted uncritically by officials even though they differed considerably from the first representations created by Spaniards. Throughout the century, Spaniards tended to ascribe to Asians two dominant traits: military might and extreme deference to protocol. Although they ran counter to Spanish interests, most dealings with Asia were informed by these perceptions. Diplomats claimed constantly that "luxury and splendor" was the most-needed policy with the governments of East Asia while, in case this policy failed, the so-called "gunboat diplomacy" was the next step in obtaining demands from their governments. Unfortunately for the diplomats, the costs of these ideas were excessive for decision makers in Spain, who were largely uninformed about Asia. On the another side, the image of Spain held by the modernizing elites in Asia was filtered through Anglo-Saxon lenses, overburdened again with exotic perceptions like cruelty or passion—probably not the best way to start negotiations. Regardless of their accuracy, the mutual representations strongly influenced the encounters.

The visit to Spain of King Chulalongkorn of Siam in 1897 is an example of the influence of exoticism informing both sides. During a visit to Europe after the strange purchase of a second-hand Spanish warship previously ordered to the Hong Kong dockyards to participate in the defense of the Philippines, the Siamese king witnessed the Spain familiar to any number of Romantic travelers—with Seville, Toledo, and bullfighting as the centerpieces. From the Spanish perspective, although the media began with favorable comments about the King's good manners, the press soon included purported news from French sources that reinforced the idea of Oriental despotism, and the representations changed instantly. The fallout affected the trip, creating friction between the Spanish and Thai members of the royal entourage that ultimately prompted Chulalongkorn to abandon Spain (and Portugal) sooner than expected. Most surprising however, is the lack of references in the press to Siam's proximity to the Philippines.

The lack of human channels to Asia, of material resources, and of an essential commodity, plus the difficulty in forging regional alliances, therefore, can also explain some of the obstacles to Spanish incursions in the Pacific area. The most frequent instructions given by the Foreign Affairs Ministry headquarters to the diplomatic corps in Asia clearly illustrates the lack of a policy: "Act like the rest of the powers." The absence of Spanish initiative, however, was filled not only by other colonial powers, but by Asians as well. As mentioned, the Japanese set forth the first line of steamships between the Philippines and Japan. In addition,

the Siamese drove mutual relations even when Spain neglected any kind of official activity with Bangkok between 1887 and 1914.[13] Spain suffered a kind of paralysis in Asia.

The Twentieth Century

The Spanish departure from Asia at the turn of the twentieth century marked a kind of liberation. Although the Spanish were first forced out by the military defeat, they soon willingly abandoned remaining interest there and seemingly made an effort to forget the whole experience. After Spain ended its presence in the Philippines and Guam with the Peace Treaty of Paris in 1898—selling the Philippine territory with no regard for the will of inhabitants or rising nationalist feelings—the Micronesian islands, unwanted by the United States, were sold to the German empire, through a former agreement that was maintained in secret until the end of the negotiations with the United States. In the years to follow, Spain was inactive in confronting the Boxer uprising in China, despite the disappearance of the Spanish representative, then the dean of the diplomatic corps, and despite the fact that several other European countries, such as Belgium and Austria-Hungary, sent troops to free Westerners from Beijing's Diplomatic Quarter. Amid this panic, the Foreign Ministry even considered closing the Spanish delegation either in Beijing or Tokyo,[14] although this idea was never carried out. After that, Spain showed little interest in contacts with Japan, China, or Siam. Spaniards were not comforted at comparing themselves on equal terms with so-called "Yellow" people—probably because they felt themselves becoming the counterexample to prevailing beliefs in white supremacy over the "Orientals."

Private Links (1898–1931)

The official relations between Spain and Asia were almost nonexistent during the first decades of the century. In the case of Japan, Spain participated in a limited way during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 by providing the Baltic Russian fleet with coal, in spite of British opposition, on its long voyage to the Pacific shores. During the First World War, Madrid was in charge of representing Japan's interests once it declared war on the Central Powers. In the case of China, by contrast, Madrid refused to risk lending money to the post-imperial governments, though it continued to collect the indemnity agreed after the Boxer uprising in 1900. The Chinese and Siamese efforts to end the Unequal Treaties received cold replies from Madrid, which awaited the decision of the leading powers; however, diplomats in general enjoyed relative freedom of action in the small number of issues to be decided.

Notwithstanding the departure from the Philippines, Spain's diplomatic structure of the nineteenth century was largely maintained, including the consulates it opened at the end of the century in the Dutch East Indies and British India. Diplomatic posts generally car-

ried little prestige, with the exceptions of the Tokyo delegation, which received a boost as a consequence of Japan's ascendancy, and the General Consulate in Manila, which became a significant post for diplomats. The personnel problems continued. Even though many of the posts could be filled by honorary consuls, it was often difficult to find merchants ready to commit to the task of representing Spain. The consulate in Shanghai, for instance, was vacant for years because the ministry did not find anybody willing to accept the designation of honorary consul, and eventually a person residing in Manila received the commission. The quality of the diplomats appointed to Asia was not much better. Many took the job as a last quiet post before retirement, or, in contrast to the nineteenth century, after committing mistakes in other posts. The Marqués De Dosfuentes, for instance, was appointed minister in China after the government of Venezuela revoked his diplomatic *placet* due to a number of careless political comments. When the Spanish diplomat Luis Pastor's wife abandoned him in New York to live with another man, his fate was a front-page item in some newspapers. The solution: reassign him to China.

Trade can be considered generally light but occasionally relevant. Spain continued to export the same products as in the previous century, including raisins, sherry, and small arms. Its most important Asian imports were raw tobacco from the Philippines, Japanese perfumes and silks (partly as the result of a fashionable *japonismo*), and woods and spices from other territories. Japanese products, mostly cheap goods of low quality, probably arrived at a higher rate than statistics indicate because of the intermediate role of other ports, particularly in Morocco, in distributing the merchandise around the region. Chinese vendors of those Japanese goods were numerous throughout Spain, as evidenced by many a popular song lyric from this period.

The most transcendental event for Spanish relations with Asia in the twentieth century was the American colonization of the Philippines. After 1907, the United States permitted Philippine products access to its market, launching numerous profitable business opportunities for the economic sectors able to export to America. Many Spanish companies netted impressive profits. Among them were the Barcelona-based *Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas*, the biggest private employer in the islands; San Miguel, a brewery owned by Andrés Soriano; the insurance companies owned by the Zobel de Ayala family; the properties and industries of the Elizalde family; and even the missionary orders that invested the compensation funds for their expropriated lands. The situation then took an interesting turn. After the Spanish administration left the Philippines, private individuals and organizations took the lead in promoting contacts, substituting the role assigned to the state. There were still many remnants of more than three centuries of common history.

World Politics and War (1931–1945)

The Second Spanish Republic (1931–36) gave rise to a new phase in which Spain began to share with Asian governments similar concerns in the international arena, and relations went beyond bilateral contacts. The fall of the Spanish Bourbon monarchy and the proclamation of the Second Republic in April 1931 was coldly received by Siam and Japan, both of which delayed official recognition amid concerns of possible repercussions on their own countries. It was not groundless fear. The following year the Siamese King Prajadhipok was to be the object of a *coup d'état* that forced him to accept a constitution, and he was deposed three years later. In 1935 the Spanish government pushed for the banning of a film that contained scenes it considered defamatory for Spain's image (*The Devil is a Woman*, directed by Josef von Sternberg and starring Marlene Dietrich). For the first time, public opinion in Asia mattered.

During the autumn of 1931, just half a year into the Second Republic, when the Japanese invaded Manchuria, Spain became deeply involved in the diplomatic reaction to the incident at the League of Nations. The Manchurian incident, being the first major challenge to the system of international relations established after the First World War, provided the first opportunity for the Second Republic to implement its foreign policy of engaging with Europe through the international organization. The Spanish delegate in Geneva, Salvador de Madariaga, led the denunciations against the Japanese government, and his role was greatly enhanced by also representing the voice of the middling powers. Spain was a member of the Committee of the Five with the most important countries of the League. While the major powers cared about short-term interests, such as trade and the desire to avoid confrontation with the most powerful country in Asia, Madariaga was more concerned with defending the League's ideals and affirming its role in defending small and medium-sized countries from the ambitions of larger powers. Madariaga's famous but futile task in forcing Japan to exit the conquered territories earned him the nickname of "Don Quixote of Manchuria."

Spanish interest in Asia suddenly increased after the start of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 with the Iberian nation already embroiled in civil war. In Republican Spain, ideological disputes were increasingly considered universal. With simultaneous armed conflicts involving Spain, China, and Japan, all of the parties were inclined to draw parallels and assume they had allies fighting the same global enemy, and, furthermore, that what affected their counterparts also affected their own fight despite the vast distance separating the two theatres of battle. And since misinformation acquired a crucial role in those wars, the propaganda machines of both sides suddenly searched for arguments in their favor in this new conflict. Identifying allies and enemies by ideological criteria, Spaniards began to distinguish Japanese from Chinese by ideology rather than nationality. Exotic "orientalist" perceptions as a consequence, lost ground.

Supporters of Franco's Nationalists understood the Japanese as fellow anti-Communists

on the opposite flank of the Eurasian continent, and the Chinese as their Communist enemies, in spite of the fact that Jiang Jieshi (蔣介石, Chiang Kai-shek) and his Guomindang party (國民黨, Kuomintang) maintained close ties with German Nazis. Spanish Republicans acted in inverse fashion, siding with the Chinese. Even the anarchist press praised Chinese figures such as Sun Zhongsan (孫中山, Sun Yatsen) or Jiang himself despite utter dissonance with anarchist ideals. Among all of the groups, the Chinese Communists were the most crucial promoters of the idea of parallelism. They deployed slogans from the Spanish war to galvanize their troops, such as the famous *"No pasarán"* [They (fascists) shall not pass]—this time in reference of the seizure of Wuhan (武漢)—and also promoted experiences learned in Spain, such as the cross-class unity against fascism *(Unidad Popular)*.[15]

On the Francoist side, inroads to Asia were complicated by Asian countries' widespread recognition of the Republican government. Italy provided considerable support for the Francoist cause in Asia, being crucial in 1937 in winning Japanese recognition of Nationalist Spain, whose government had been deeply divided over the issue, the diplomatic corps having favored maintaining the status quo and the military supporting Franco. The Italian commitment was so intense that Rome even agreed to recognize the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria, the Manchukuo (滿洲國), established in 1932, in order to win the Japanese acceptance for Franco. The sequence of events left little doubt: Italy recognized Manchukuo on November 30, 1937; Japan recognized Franco's Spain the following day; and Franco recognized Manchukuo the day after that in an act performed at the Spanish embassy in Italy. This Italian decision to bet on the Japanese policy in Asia was a reversal of previous policy, but also a crucial step for the separation of the world powers into two opposite camps during 1938. Germany finally agreed also to recognize Manchukuo in the month of March, while Tokyo and Berlin, after rebuffs from the Netherlands and Great Britain, invited Rome to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. Italian aid to Franco upon his entry onto the Asian stage therefore had unforeseen effects. By being instrumental in helping Spaniards (who, for their part, accepted their subordination to Rome in an area that was not among its priorities), the Italians hoped to enhance their status among the Great Powers.

Spain had a mixed attitude toward Asia during the Second World War. At first its position mirrored the Japanese militarists—initially shocked by Hitler's pact with the Soviet Union and later restored to the Axis realm by Germany's victories, though never entering directly in the fight. Although the Hitler-Stalin pact rendered obsolete the Anti-Comintern Pact, Spain and Japan continued to be linked by Spain's secret adherence to the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, that had been agreed to at the meeting of Franco and Hitler at Hendaye in October 1940. Thanks to the political friendship, Spain became the main Western help for Japan's war effort after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 by collaborating with the Japanese on intelligence in the United States, by representing the interests of Japan in most of the Western Hemisphere, by being ready to sell raw materials, and by using its remaining influence in the Philippines to support Japanese bids to

wrest it from American domination.

The unexpected course of the Second World War, however, forced Spain to convert into an enemy of Japan, and nearly a declaration of war. Spain used Japan as a kind of test case for transforming policy from the initial pro-Axis position to one ensuring survival in a postwar world dominated by the Anglo-American allies. In April 1943 Spain started acting as a neutral country by balancing its collaboration with Germany by antagonizing Japan. Franco privately declared his contempt for the Japanese, followed only some months later by a formal statement from his government to the Falangist press that its erstwhile admiration for Japan had been a mistake. When Franco was certain of the Allies triumph and obsessed with the challenge of perpetuating his regime, attacking the Japanese Empire was one of the trump cards he still retained. Franco's government was even prepared to declare war on Japan and send a second Blue Division, not against the Soviet Union as in 1941, but to fight the Japanese. Once the United States and Great Britain made clear that such actions would not persuade them to alter their position toward Spain, Franco chose the milder tack of cancelling the representation of interests and breaking diplomatic relations. After the war's end, propaganda efforts lost their significance and Japan and Asia returned to the largely forgotten corner of Spanish diplomacy they had previously occupied.

The dramatic change of the Spanish attitude toward Japan was a product of war, but even so it was unusually sudden, passing in just two years from friendship and admiration to contempt. To trace a common *leitmotiv* of continuity during a period of such quick changes, two facts need to be taken into account: (1) the lack of Spanish specialists in Asia (with the exception of some missionaries), which limited the decision-making process to discussions among people, such as Admiral Carrero Blanco, and General Franco, who interpreted the Japanese through his experience with the "Orientals" he knew the best, the Moroccans; and (2) the quick recovery of the most negative images of the Japanese. Political pressure had brought about the advent of positive images of Japan in Spain, and now forced a return to more negative attitudes. The negative images of Japan did not need to be created, for they were just dormant, latent, or snoozing, but certainly not forgotten. The Spanish sense of racial superiority emerged again. Japanese again were disparaged as "Orientals," and animosity dating from the Pacific War was revived. No such reversal occurred toward Germany or Italy.

The "Back Door" to the United States (1945–1975)

The end of the war in the Pacific signalled the low point in Spanish relations with East Asia. The former collaboration with Japan isolated Spain in postwar Asia and the Guomindang, for instance, suppressed the Spanish Legation in 1946 (but not the Consulate in Shanghai) during the Chinese Civil War.[16] Private interests in the Philippines lost their former role as a tie that bound Spain to the Philippines, partly owing to the destruction wrought by fight-

ing in the archipelago and partly because the Philippine interest in praising its Spanish past waned in view of Spain's unfavorable reputation after the war. Spain lost those pillars that had hitherto maintained a certain level of engagement, namely the recent political disputes and the private interests that continued to represent Spain after 1898. Relations with Asia declined again and throughout the Franco dictatorship, and Asia again became an auxiliary to advance Spanish interests elsewhere.

Two factors prompted Spain to look again toward Asia. First, some of the religious orders in Japan, especially the Jesuits, became convinced that the Japanese defeat provided the occasion to Christianize the country. Thinking that the sense of despair in the first months following the war would continue, and even occasion a total overhaul of the Japanese mentality, many in the Franco regime were convinced of the new missionary role in Asia. Second, Asia became a venue for Spanish officials to persuade their partners, principally the Americans, who by this time had come to accept Spain into the international community and forget past peccadilloes.[17] The proclamation of the People's Republic of China, the Communist guerrilla activity in Southeast Asia (including the Philippines and Malaysia), and the war in Korea, provided excellent arguments. Communist triumphs in Asia, then, were not entirely bad news for Franco's avowedly anti-Communist regime. Notwithstanding the obvious concern about enemy advances, the Communist victories reinforced the geo-strategic value of Spain, well protected against a hypothetical Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

During the first years of the Cold War, Asia was important for the Spanish foreign policy, primarily for propaganda purposes. Still isolated because of its former links with the Axis, but seeking to improve relations with the United States, Spanish diplomats found the indirect character of their contact with Washington to be a luxury. This gave them the chance to discuss and contact officials without upsetting public opinion, as occurred in the rest of the world. Moreover, Spanish diplomats profited from the popular American support for General MacArthur and the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces in Japan, especially its Chief of Intelligence, General Charles A. Willoughby. In addition, Spain benefited from close relations with the main U.S. allies in Asia, such as the Philippines (Friendship Treaty signed as early as September 1947), Japan (Friendship Treaty signed in 1952 just after independence) and Thailand (Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Navigation signed in 1952), while the Guomindang in Taiwan finally agreed to establish contacts with Spain. Finally in 1953, the United States (and the Vatican) decided to renew relations with Spain, a move followed in 1955 with the acceptance to Spain into the United Nations. The Spanish isolation had ended.

In his book *Una Política Exterior para España* (1980), Socialist Foreign Minister Fernando Morán characterized the Franco regime's relations with the Arab World and Latin America as a "Substitution Policy," a tool for the isolated regime to open communication with the West through friendly countries.[18] Once European countries dared to speak to Spain directly, however, Madrid disparaged those contacts with Arabs or Latinos. Spanish

relations toward East Asia can be understood in similar terms, as they were also considered secondary and went unattended once relations with Western countries improved. The shortness of the period of interest with Asia and the almost exclusive focus toward the United States are therefore the most salient features of the contacts with this area.

Franco's Spain recognized the sovereignty of Asian countries as they attained independence. Madrid maintained official positions not only on the war in Korea, but also the internal struggles in Southeast Asia, notably the fall of Sukarno and the Vietminh's triumph in Vietnam. For his part, King Shihanouk of Cambodia visited Spain in 1958 to balance his visits to some Eastern European countries under the shadow of Moscow. Also, relations with South Vietnam increased in importance as the war there escalated.[19] The most difficult decision to explain, however, was in 1973 when Spain and the People's Republic of China established mutual relations. The rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, and Spain's relatively cold relations with Taipei, can explain the Spanish decision to establish relations with a Communist country. Nevertheless, we must not dismiss the fact that the lack of Spanish diplomatic expertise on China left such decisions to the perceptions of people like Franco. He seemingly never forgot the representation of the Guomindang during the 1930s and early 1940s as subservient to the Communists, and he even asserted the desirability of Communist revolutions in these countries, going as far as confessing a kind of admiration both for Mao Zedong and for Ho Chi Minh.

The period following 1945 was the low point of Spanish interest for the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Exacerbating the longstanding lack of interest, there were now no more private groups in the Philippines pushing for contacts with Asia. Furthermore, once the wartime propaganda value of relations with Asia began to disappear after about 1943, Asia only received scant attention, and always for motivations related to wider affairs, such as the battle against Communism or the possibility of Christianization.

The 1898 Bumper Effect

The behavior of Spanish society and diplomacy after the defeat to the United States shows that the colonial departure from Asia after 1898 was not as painful as one might expect, and might even be considered liberating. The forced departure was in some sense a blessing, the military defeat acting as an excuse for a *de facto* decision taken long before (though against the wishes of the Catalan industrialists). The Foreign Ministry's contempt for the Boxer uprising coincided with the lack of interest on the part of the Ministry of Commerce in promoting trade—a striking contrast to the interests shown by both the Italian administration and the Japanese, whose foreign minister invited the Spanish minister in Tokyo for the first time in years to ask for favorable tariffs for Japanese toothbrushes.[20] In 1925, for example, the booklet published after the Treaty of Commerce between Spain and Siam in 1925 concluded its introduction by asserting plainly that "mutual trade is nil," an exaggera-

tion suggesting that the negotiation of the treaty was little more than bureaucratic routine. Official statistics in fact recorded some quantities and products that should have been noted by a document signed with the aim of further developing trade. Moreover, Spain had occasionally purchased important quantities of Thai rice at Port Said, another fact which trade officials might be expected to have known. Besides this, Spanish statistics showed significant divergences from those compiled by Asian countries, and the intermediate role of Hong Kong, Singapore, or Port Said is only one cause of this discrepancy. The administrative lack of interest towards Asia was another hindrance for contacts with Asia. Comments by diplomats ranking Spain in an intermediate position between the big powers and the secondary ones in Asia, more than wishful thinking, appear as convenient lies to justify to themselves and their superiors in the absence of relations.

In addition to nineteenth-century legacies, there were new factors that parried the decline of Spanish presence in Asia. The most important was the role of the Spanish community in the Philippines. With the money available, especially among the prosperous of Manila society, the Spanish community created associations and funded a wide range of Hispanist activities, such as establishing the Hospital de Santiago for the city's needy, erecting luxurious Spanish casinos in the main three cities (Manila, Cebu, and Ilo Ilo), and organizing social activities related to Spanish culture and inviting prominent personalities, such as best-selling author Vicente Blasco Ibáñez. In addition to these direct efforts at promoting Spain in the Philippines, the money sent annually from the Philippines (company profits, payment of rents, etc.) offset Spain's trade deficit with the Philippines, mainly a result of the purchases of raw Philippine tobacco. The contributions of the Spanish community even covered some of the expenses of the Spanish government, such as rent for the consulate and sending to Shanghai the destroyer *Sánchez Barcáiztegui* in 1927, to protect Spanish nationals. Able to press the Spanish government to defend its interests and even to encourage that Spain perceive Asia through their lenses, private interests in the Philippines (chiefly the Church, businesses, and oligarchic families) became the prime movers of Spanish-Philippine relations. The Spanish government showed signs of following their example, opening a program to invite prominent scholars and literati to the Pacific archipelago. Unfortunately, poet Gerardo Diego and chemist Julio Palacios were the first and the last of them in 1935.

Spanish behavior during the Manchurian incident of the 1930s is indicative of the main characteristics of Spanish diplomacy in Asia. First, interest in the events was indirect. Madariaga himself claimed that he was more interested in the "Tokyo-Geneva" conflict than in the "Tokyo-Beijing" conflict, because the Japanese invasion was the first important violation of the security system devised at Versailles after the end of the First World War. Asia was a springboard toward Europe. In the same vein, there were some late comments on the losses of trade with Japan due to the behavior in Geneva, but they did not seem to be important in the decision-making process in Spain, although the Japanese did create a new embassy at Lisbon. Second, the officials on-site were the crucial actors. In similar fashion

to the governors in Manila and ambassadors in Asia in the nineteenth century, Salvador de Madariaga could perform at the League of Nations mostly according to his will, with little intrusion from his superiors, who in fact would have preferred more moderate behavior. Third, the possibility of war was always maintained as a diplomatic instrument. Madariaga offered the British Ambassador a Spanish warship in the very improbable case that London declared war on Tokyo. It is significant because Spain was prepared to declare war in Asia three times during this century; at this juncture in 1932, in 1945 against Japan, and finally, in the early 1950s, when Madrid planned to declare war on the Korean Communists even though Spain was not a member of the United Nations. The twentieth century was a new period in which Spain inherited old problems but also faced new challenges in Asia.

Policy toward Asia in Democratic Spain (1975–2005)

Since the end of General Franco's regime in 1975, democracy has triggered important changes in Spanish foreign policy, both in aims and in the concept of foreign policy itself. Together with an increasing presence in the world both through bilateral relations and through international organizations, the decision making process has become decentralized and diversified. The Autonomous Communities and state administrative bodies other than the Foreign Ministry have become participants in foreign affairs. Moreover, Spanish firms have become increasingly international. Asia has gained an increasing importance in the world, both because of its unparalleled economic growth in this period and because Japan (mainly in the 1980s) and later China are most frequently cited as the biggest threats to American hegemony.

After joining the European Community in 1986 Spain participated in developing the Asian strategy of the European Union that initiated new ways to increase, stabilize, and deepen mutual contacts, such as the ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) process, and the Asia Europe Foundation (ASEF). In the economic sphere, Spain has developed a number of initiatives to profit from the Asian economic growth. There have been numerous conventions and expositions to sell Spanish products throughout the major Asian cities. Furthermore, initiatives from different ministries, autonomous communities, and chambers of commerce opened offices, mostly in Japan and China, while countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and East Timor received significant development assistance. Many initiatives showed a clear impulse toward recovering the ground lost during the twentieth century. Furthermore, President Felipe González (1982–96) showed a personal admiration for Asia, frequently invoking Chinese proverbs and being a devoted aficionado of Japanese bonsais.

The results, however, remain to be seen. There has been no significant political dialogue with any Asian country, and personal interest rarely has dragged Spain into Asia beyond anecdote. The Spanish government has never been ready to spend money on Asia, contribute to European initiatives, and indeed declined to organize the 2002 ASEM sum-

mit. In the economic sphere, Asia is the source of the largest part of Spain's trade deficit, accounting for one-third even though it merely accounts for less than 10 percent of total exchanges.[21] Cultural events related to Asia have proliferated, but these still belong to the realm of the exotic, and images remain anchored in the colonial period. Spaniards appear ready to recognize Asia's economic might but not the political implications of this rise.

Only the most recent data allows us to foresee that the efforts are finally rendering results. The first comprehensive plan to draw Spain close to Asia was presented in 2000, mostly out of pragmatism rather than genuine interest in the region. The idea focused on economic targets, but provided no budget for achieving those targets and showed scarcely a marginal interest on culture. The *Plan–Marco Asia-Pacífico* showed the many contradictions of a country wishing to sell products but lacking expertise in Asian affairs. At the presentation, the guest speaker was a typical Orientalist, himself having written a book on "Orient and Occident," fond of referring to religions and past inventions of the Chinese, but forecasting the future with ideas taken from Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations,* and praising a Japanese system that "works wonderfully." The only new institution, the *Casa Asia*, was created in Barcelona, with activities ranging from the fields of economics to the arts and teaching, in an attempt to coordinate and provide expertise on Spanish efforts in Asia. *Casa Asia* has rapidly developed into a hub for Spanish society; ministries, companies, universities, and municipalities call upon it to help them approach the region. Furthermore, in 2005, *Casa Asia* played a crucial role in drafting a new plan by the Socialist government, since for the first time there was money devoted to it, there was coordination between the different administrative bodies, and there were clear ideas about goals and the methods to attain them. Beyond the initiatives, creative ways have been found to solve the historical lack of presence in Asia. One such approach is known as *triangulación*, or trying to simultaneously reinforce the links between Spain, Latin America, and Asia, and generate synergies in different ways. The role of the administration may diminish, but it appears that Spain is again building some kind of interest in Asia. Spain's historical disregard for Asia may be coming to an end. The many lost opportunities over the past centuries will never, however, be recovered.

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CHAPTER 8

The Rif War as a Frontier Conflict

SHANNON E. FLEMING

The Protectorate and the Expansion of the Frontier (1912–1921)

The establishment of a Spanish Protectorate in northern Morocco in the second decade of the twentieth century was the consequence of the implosion of the Moroccan polity at the hands of the north European powers, especially France, coupled with Great Britain's effort to create a buffer between French North Africa and its strategic base at Gibraltar. While some Spanish elites saw this as an opportunity to play a role, albeit a limited one, in the diplomatic "concert of Europe"; others saw it in more traditional terms as the fulfillment of the Catholic Queen's testament that Spain's future somehow lay in bringing the traditional adversary, the "Moor," into an acquiescent relationship to the Spanish state, Western culture (at least the Spanish version of it), and the Roman Catholic faith. The fact that some of the traditional enemy's land was to be occupied and administered by Christian Iberians seemed finally to fulfill this injunctive. Spain's frontier would be established, as many nineteenth-century *Africanistas* argued, at its natural border, the Atlas Mountains.

From the Moroccan viewpoint, the passing of real *makhzan* (sultanic) authority to the Christians in 1912 was a catastrophe of the first order. Many Rifian tribes, for instance, considered themselves holy warriors in the defense of one of *dar al-islām's* most exposed frontiers. For centuries they had diligently undertaken this responsibility, harassing the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and pursuing small-scale piracy along the North Moroccan coast. Now the traditional Iberian enemy was not only at their doorstep but actually invited into their homeland to impose unwelcome 'reforms' under the Sultan's legal mantel.[1]

On paper, Spain secured approximately 20,000 square kilometers of northern Morocco to protect and civilize in the name of the Moroccan Sultan. This constituted about 20 percent of what was then defined as Morocco territory with a population of anywhere from 600,000 to 700,000 indigenous Moroccans. The overwhelming majority of these were rural

Berber agriculturists. They were portioned into sixty-six tribal units and most eked out a meager existence in a territory that was mountainous, arid, a third cultivable, and overpopulated. Much of the area was an inaccessible backwater whose populations generally paid lip service to the Sultan's authority but who in reality retained a great deal of local autonomy.[2] Unlike the French Zone, the Spanish Protectorate lacked important urban centers, most natural resources, and even the rudiments of a physical infrastructure to support economic and commercial growth. A notable exception was significant deposits of iron, lead, and zinc ores west of Spain's Melillan *presidio*. As both Víctor Morales Lezcano and María Rosa de Madariaga have noted, the exploitation of these minerals represented the Zone's one economic positive. And the fact that they were developed primarily by Spanish concerns was a constant reminder to indigenous elites that the Spanish were there not only to "protect and civilize" them but to exploit what little wealth their homeland contained as well.[3]

The development of the Protectorate policy and administration after 1912 seemed to be a perpetual work in progress. The actual job of occupying and policing the Protectorate was logically handed over to the Spanish army. From the *presidios* of Ceuta and Melilla, and the more recently occupied Atlantic coastal port of Larache, the army was tasked with bringing the Sultan's authority into the Protectorate's interior. It was questionable whether Spain's conscript army had a plan, structure, resources, training, and morale to carry out this charge in a way that assured efficient operations and mitigated indigenous resistance.[4] Furthermore, the army's Protectorate responsibilities were considerably more than combat, occupation, and policing. In those areas that had been "pacified," military personnel assumed ongoing administrative, legal, and security roles. And prior to the late 1920s, most Spanish military administrators, unlike their French counterparts, were neither systematically trained nor mentored in these responsibilities. Some lacked even a superficial introduction to indigenous languages, customs and religious practices, tribal politics, and the Zone's economics and sociology. Much of this suggested the generally questionable level of the Spanish army's preparedness, but some of it also reflected a traditional bias towards a long-time adversary that many Spaniards judged to be cultureless and motivated mostly by violence and force.[5]

At the same time, it is perhaps too easy to critique the Spanish army and make unfair comparisons to the more sophisticated and better-funded Lyautey administration in the French Protectorate. Under the leadership of three High Commissioners, Generals Alfau, Marina, and Gómez-Jordana, Spain did advance the real frontier out from the coastal enclaves and impose minimal administrative authority on the "pacified" tribes—the so-called "*moros amigos*." By the time the fourth army general, Dámaso Berenguer, assumed the High Commissariat in early 1919, the Spanish, with the sporadic cooperation of the Jibalan warlord, Mawlay Ahmad al-Raisuli, had subjugated some of the western third of the Protectorate and pressed beyond the Spanish mining camps of the eastern Rif. Significantly, six years of effort still left about three-fourths of the Protectorate "unpacified." As the Spanish discovered,

the expansion of the frontier into the land of the traditional foe was a difficult undertaking. Both the topography and the inhabitants, who hardly welcomed Spanish Christian domination, made the enterprise costly both in terms of resources and military causalities.

Anwal and the Violent Frontier (1921)

Given these difficulties, by late 1918 Spanish elite enthusiasm for the Protectorate had faded considerably. In fact, efforts to interest France in purchasing the Spanish Zone were pursued but ultimately abandoned due to French reluctance to accept the offer.[6] Seeing no real option to colonial commitment, the postwar Romanones ministry pursued the opposite tact, authorizing General Berenguer to ratchet up efforts to bring more of the Protectorate under Spanish control. As a result, between 1919 and 1920, Berenguer pursued both a political and military penetration of the western third of the Protectorate. Given Berenguer's careful preparations, these efforts were mostly successful. Again, with Raisuli's acquiescence, if not assistance, the Spanish were able to penetrate the Jibalan highlands and by October 1920 occupied the important strategic and holy city of Chaouën.[7] At the same time, in January 1920, the command of the Protectorate's eastern zone, based in Melilla, was given to General Manuel Fernández Silvestre, a close associate of Berenguer's and supposed confidant of King Alfonso XIII. The expectation was that he would pursue a more aggressive occupation of the Protectorate's eastern half, the Rif and Ghumara.

Silvestre was a much decorated and respected military officer and an "old Moroccan hand" who had spent most of his career in pre- and post-protectorate Morocco. In 1920 he led his forces beyond the Kert River establishing a string of small forts in newly occupied territory. By January 1921 he had set up a significant advanced post and base for further advances at the hillock of Anwal, about seventy kilometers west of Melilla and thirty kilometers east of Alhucemas Bay. The latter fact is significant since Alhucemas Bay was the geographic heart of the Rif, and the Spanish judged its occupation to be crucial to the "pacification" of the Protectorate. It was assumed by both the Spanish command and the local indigenous tribes that Silvestre's next step would be the subjugation of the territory between Anwal and Alhucemas Bay, then ultimately the conquest of the remainder of the Rif and the Ghumara.[8]

The comparative ease of Spanish advances in the eastern Zone in 1919–1920 had been facilitated by the lack of organized opposition which, to some degree, was the consequence of a severe drought over a four-year period resulting in the temporary migration of many Rifian tribesmen to work on *colon* farms in western Algeria.[9] However, this was not to be the situation as the Spanish continued to move into the central Rif. These advances would stimulate a traditional and violent Moroccan backlash, led by the largest Berber tribe in the area, the Beni Urriaguel. This resistance would be organized and commanded by Muhammed bin 'Abd al-Karim, the son of a local *qadi* or religious judge and Spanish "pensioner" in

Adjir, the Beni Urriaguel tribal community most proximate to the Spanish island fortress of Alhucemas.[10]

It is interesting that Abd al-Karim should have been the leader of this opposition given his family's two-decade-long association with the Spanish military bureaucracy. Furnished a traditional Islamic education in Tetuán and at one of the Qarawiyyin madrasas in Fez, Abd al-Karim was able, through his father's connections as an informant and pensioner with the Native Affairs Office on Alhucemas Island, and his own intelligence and linguistic abilities, to gain entry in late 1906 into the ranks of the Spanish civil service as an interpreter. He subsequently secured a judgeship in the *Shari'a* court in Melilla, and in 1913, a position as chief religious judge for the eastern Rif.[11] In addition to these important responsibilities he also served as editor of the Arabic supplement of the Melillian daily, *El Telegrama del Rif,* writing columns, as Germain Ayache noted, supporting Spanish development in the eastern Rif and espousing modernization and the "European model" as a basis for Moroccan reform, and economic and social development.[12] Further, his columns and personal opinions reflected an anti-French and anticolonial disposition for which he was imprisoned, at French insistence, for a brief time by the Spanish military in 1915–16. Abd al-Karim and his father also had close ties to local German and Spanish mining interests; they supported his brother's university studies in Málaga, and subsequent matriculation at the School of Mine Engineering in Madrid from 1917 to 1919.

Any analysis of Abd al-Karim's break with the Spanish in 1919, and the initiation of the Rif resistance to Spanish military advances in June and July 1921, is easier to understand if it is placed in the context of anticolonialism and protonationalism. However, as the Moroccan historian Mohammed Tahtah noted, Abd al-Karim's motivations were more complex. During the period 1917–19 they involved local tribal pressures placed on his family to move out of the Spanish orbit, and concomitantly, Spanish pressures to move more decidedly into it; a personal animus toward the Spanish military and the French resulting from his 1915–16 incarceration; a much noted *Salafiyyan* idealism, which he apparently carried over from his Fez days; and an admiration for the reformist nationalism of the Young Turks' movement which he was aware of through his journalistic work. It has also been noted that the Abd al-Karims originally sought collaboration with the Spanish in the expectation that Spain was advanced enough to provide the expertise and resources to develop and modernize their homeland.[13] However, by 1919 it had become apparent that this was a carrot-and-stick situation. Any developmental opportunities the Spanish offered would by necessity be coupled with an unwanted military occupation and the curtailment of local autonomy. The traditional Moroccan opponent was there to serve Spanish interests, not the other way around.

General Silvestre's advances into tribal areas proximate to the Beni Urriaguel in early 1921 stimulated what Abd al-Karim later described to one of his biographers as his "superhuman" effort to "destroy" the commonly held position that he had sold out to the

Spanish, and at the same time, to create under his leadership an intertribal confederation to confront Spanish military advances and occupation.[14] Despite later statements, made mostly to "western" journalists, that his motives were mainly nationalistic and secular based on the Turkish model, his actual appeals to the Beni Urriaguel and adjacent tribes were much more particularistic, traditional, and direct, emphasizing his commitment to the *patria chica*, to conventional Islamic forms, and to anti-Spanish and anti-Christian sentiments.[15]

The consequence of these appeals was the formation of a loose confederation of central Rifian *harkas* or *ad hoc* tribal military units. The Abd al-Karims led these forces in a surprise attack on the advanced Spanish outposts of Dahar Ubarran and Sidi Drius in late June 1921. These attacks resulted in approximately 150 Spanish causalities, the capture of significant amounts of munitions and artillery, and most alarming for the Spanish, the desertion of seventy-six indigenous *Regulares* and Native Police to the Rifian side.[16] The psychological boost this victory gave to Abd al-Karim's leadership and cause was tremendous. Rifian children sang of the first real defeat of the Spanish Christians since 1909:

> The Spanish armies die and the *mujahidin* are winning.
> Oh Dahar Ubarran, there the bones have fallen.[17]

The prestige gained by this victory allowed Abd al-Karim to strengthen his political position in the Central Rif and to create a confederation of tribal units, although at this point a fairly loose one. As Spanish intelligence reported, in the Beni Urriaguel markets visitors from behind the Spanish lines were being encouraged in the most traditional terms to come over to Abd al-Karim's movement:

> If you are truly Muslims hear us. To those present from the Beni Said, Beni Ulichek, M'talsa, Taferset, and Guelaia: if you join us, we will be as one. We will defeat the Christians with your help or without it. Any member of the (Spanish) police who comes over to us will be well received.[18]

By mid-July 1921 Abd al-Karim felt confident enough to initiate a general attack against the Spanish front, first against the advanced post of Ighariban and then eventually on July 21, 1921, against the primary encampment of Anwal. Despite the presence of General Silvestre and 4,000 troops at this post, Abd al-Karim's *harkas* harassed it so fiercely and constantly that Silvestre was eventually forced on July 22, 1921, after much soul searching, to order a hastily planned retreat to the next major encampments of Izumar and Ben Tieb—a retreat that he neither led nor participated in, having either committed suicide or died in the ensuing defense of Anwal.

It is probably indicative of the quality of Spanish military leadership at this specific time and place, the morale of the Spanish forces, the problematic logistics of the Spanish encampments, and the generally poor state of Spain's colonial army—particularly its staff and logistical support—that the Anwal evacuation turned into an uncoordinated retreat along the entire Spanish front and then into a humiliating rout of epic proportions. This resulted in Spanish deaths that ranged anywhere, as Juan Pando noted, from 8,000 to 10,000.[19] What

is perhaps interesting is how the unfolding of events in July–August 1921 took everyone at the highest leadership levels by complete surprise. The memoirs of General Berenguer and the minister of war, the Vizconde de Eza, for instance, attest to their astonishment that local tribesmen were able to pull off such a crushing defeat against a European army, which while not the equivalent of the French, had some pretense toward being modern and mechanized.[20]

Abd al-Karim and his commanders were equally surprised by their success. Richard Pennell noted that "the Spanish defeat had been so rapid that bin 'Abd al-Karim was hardly in control at all."[21] Most of the attacks against the Spanish posts and the retreating Spanish forces were undertaken by tribesmen, and significantly tribeswomen, in those areas that had been under Spanish control. What was even more significant was the ferocity of these attacks. Comparatively few prisoners were taken, but they were subjected to cruel humiliations. Even more horrifying was the torture and slaughter of the retreating Spanish and the almost ritualistic mutilation of their corpses. The frontier had indeed become a killing field where the Moroccans were subjecting the traditional Christian Spanish enemy not only to defeat but debasement as well.[22] It would perhaps be hard not to see the animosity and conflict between these two proximate cultures represented in this slaughter.

Spain and the Rif Republic: The Interim Frontier Reestablished (1921–1923)

The Anwal disaster was greeted in Spain with concern and apprehension and an outpouring of patriotism and religiosity. With the exception of the Communists and some anarcho-syndicalists, the political parties demonstrated discretion in their public pronouncements and none at this point used the national tragedy to destabilize the system or the government in power. Although strictly censored, the press exhibited prudence and patriotism, printing articles that were intended to uplift the nation, sustain the public spirit, and highlight the barbarism of the traditional Moroccan enemy. Local municipalities, businesses, professional and social organizations, and the Catholic Church contributed donations, organized patriotic and religious celebrations, and undertook subscriptions to support the troops in the Protectorate.[23]

It is significant that General Berenguer, who for a variety of reasons managed to remain in his post until July 1922, termed the counteroffensive that he launched against the Rifians in October 1921 a "*Reconquista.*" Not only did this aptly describe what he was about, but it also resurrected the symbolism of the Middle Ages and the Catholic Kings' ultimate successes. This *Reconquista* had all the hallmarks of a crusade of vengeance for the slaughter and the loss of territory of July–August 1921. Tribal leaders were subjected to humiliating acts of surrender and the reconquered tribes to mandatory disarmament, harsh reprisals, and stringent martial law. The war, as Frederico Villalobos observed, took on a heightened brutality.

In a 1922 manual for colonial infantry officers, for instance, Emilio Mola, then an officer in the *Regulares,* emphasized the need for quick raids to terrorize and burn the isolated farms and settlements "of a people in a state of barbarity." And the decapitation of "bestial" Rifian captives was a particular specialty of the recently created Spanish Foreign Legion.[24]

By the early winter of 1922 the Spanish had recouped the territory lost the previous summer. Despite the success of this campaign, the Maura ministry of National Concentration and the subsequent Sánchez Guerra and García Prieto ministries still faced a fundamental dilemma as to how much more Spain would invest to "pacify" the Protectorate, or at most, to maintain the frontier that had so laboriously been reestablished. The Spanish military found it difficult to advance further because Abd al-Karim's forces had taken "firm control" of the mountainous Central Rif with large stocks of heavy and light weapons captured in 1921.[25] By late 1922, the Spanish public's frustrations with the war's static nature, with the lack of progress in securing the return of some 400 Spanish prisoners captured during the Anwal retreat, and with the Picasso Commission's revelations concerning the colonial army's incompetence, malfeasance, and corruption, had created deep fissures in Spanish political society and the military.

The divisions within the Spanish Army are to some degree important in understanding the course of the Rif War at this point and in the future. The Anwal defeat in particular united a number of youngish Spanish colonial officers into a somewhat cohesive group of so-called *Africanistas*, or *Africanomilitaristas*, as María Rosa de Madariaga termed them, who accepted the premise that their mission was "to prepare the ground for the penetration into North Africa of western civilization as embodied by traditional Spanish values," and in so doing, to "restore the prestige of the army and the nation."[26] For these individuals, Spain's efforts in Morocco had little to do with mining, commerce, or infrastructure, and more to do with subduing the traditional enemy and enhancing national prestige. Hard-line *Africanistas,* particularly commanders of indigenous units and Foreign Legion *banderas*, had little patience with those who questioned Spain's mission in Morocco and the resource commitment to it. Their feeling was that given its historic links to North Africa, Spain was well suited for this mission and that it was best accomplished through punitive military campaigns. Methods involving extensive political preparation and the co-opting of indigenous elites, such as those employed by Hubert Lyautey in French Morocco, were judged inappropriate for a basically rural population of cultureless and backward Berbers. In the coming five years, *Africanista* opinions, while not necessarily having a direct link to specific colonial and military policy decisions, probably had a great deal to do with Spain's sustaining its commitment to the war.

On the other side of what had become a frontier of perpetual violence, indigenous reaction to Anwal was not only astonishment that they had easily defeated a European army, but given the effectiveness of this trouncing, a renewed commitment to expelling the Christian Spanish from Morocco altogether. One proclamation that was read in the markets

of the borderland tribes in September 1921 reveled in the recent victory, and for the first time called for a traditional *jihad* against the Christian Spaniards:

> Mujahidin! Through God's will we have declared war on the Christian Spaniard, and have thrown him out of our beloved land, blessed by the Prophet. Our victory must be completed by the total expulsion of the Christians. To that end *jihad* has been called throughout the Rif.[27]

Another declaration that was posted on the walls of Tetuán's Great Mosque in August 1921 justified that "uprising" on the grounds that:

> . . . the Spanish have drowned us in every calamity. They have soiled our honor, killed our children, possessed themselves of our goods, and ruined our religion. They have committed every evil, which would have frightened you if you could see them.[28]

As Richard Pennell has noted, while Abd al-Karim believed that the concept of *jihad* was a "medieval anachronism,"[29] neither he nor members of his immediate leadership circle abjured it; and, in fact, the traditional *bay'a* that declared the *al-jumhuriyya al-rifiyya,* or the Rif Republic, in February 1923 provided extensive Koranic justification for what Abd al-Karim wanted the outside world to see as a mostly secular state.[30] And while he called himself "president" of this state, his followers referred to him in more traditional terms as *mujahid* (war leader) or *amir al-mujahidin* (prince of warriors).[31] Moreover, while it has been suggested that he aimed for a modern state much like that of Ataturk's Turkey, the results were far less secular and certainly politically and socially less modern. It has been noted that the Rifian state Abd al-Karim created was a synthesis of traditional Moroccan forms and modern political society.[32] If this is the case, traditionalism far outweighed the impulse to commit totally to modern, secular republicanism.

Primo de Rivera and the Defined Frontier (1923–1927)

It would not be an exaggeration to state that the success of General Miguel Primo de Rivera's September 1923 coup which toppled the Restoration political system was to a degree the result of domestic weariness with the frontier conflict in Morocco that had become a full-fledged war. In his *Barcelona Manifesto* Primo de Rivera promised a "prompt, worthy, and reasonable" solution to the conflict. At the same time, he also reassured the Spanish public that "we are not imperialists, nor do we hold that upon a stubborn insistence in Morocco depends the honor of the Army."[33] Susana Sueiro Seoane has cogently argued that the dictator did not at this point, nor in fact through the duration of the Rif War, "have a fixed or concrete plan regarding Morocco."[34] She notes that his "pragmatic, opportunistic, intuitive, spontaneous, improvisational and optimistic" personality prevented him from committing to any specific course of action. At the same time, Primo de Rivera sensed that Spain's interests were not well served by engaging the traditional enemy in a seemingly endless guerrilla

war. His not-so-hidden agenda, from the beginning of his regime through almost the entire war, was to reach an accommodation with Abd al-Karim and to pull the frontier back from the inhospitable interior of the Protectorate, focusing Spanish interests on the presidios and some coastal enclaves such as Alhucemas Bay, and, through negotiation, Tangier.[35]

In other circumstances Primo de Rivera's pragmatism might have stood some chance of success. Given the resurgence of the traditional religious and ethnic conflict arising from Anwal, the likelihood of an accommodation between the Spanish and the Rifians was a pipe dream. However, despite the continued conflict, which in early 1924 even included the Spanish use of mustard and other asphyxiating gases against Rifian civilians, Primo de Rivera doggedly pursued a settlement with Abd al-Karim, which, according to Sueiro Seoane, involved the Spanish offer of "an autonomy close to independence over an extensive area and the promise of considerable Spanish subsidies (three million pesetas a year)."[36] However, after Anwal, Abd al-Karim had moved to a position, as he later told the Cairo newspaper *Al-Manar*, where he would only accept "a free state with full sovereignty and not an Amirate, subject to the regulations and ordinances of the Protectorate."[37]

Given his fundamentally abandonist sentiments, Primo de Rivera coupled his peace efforts with an ongoing Spanish pullback. Twenty-nine thousand draftees received early release in November 1923 and 26,000 more in March 1924. His most dramatic move, and the one that generated the most negative reactions from both the *Africanistas* and the French, was the abandonment of some 223 interior posts between Chaouèn and Tetuán in the Jibala in September–December 1924 and the withdrawal of some 25,000 troops to a line of fortified positions (the Primo de Rivera Line) ten kilometers south of Tetuán. It can be argued that while this was a difficult and bloody exodus, it was a disciplined withdrawal that probably prevented a second Anwal and the loss of many Spanish lives. Nonetheless, it created a power vacuum in the Jibala and further enhanced the prestige and power of the Abd al-Karims allowing them to move in and take control of most of the western third of the Protectorate.[38]

By spring of 1925 the Rifians controlled almost three quarters of the Spanish Protectorate. The Rif Republic was at its apex. Despite this success, Abd al-Karim faced the continuing and difficult challenge of keeping the various tribes and religious brotherhoods under control. In both the Jibala and the Ghumara, the imposition of Rif hegemony and the introduction of *Salafiyyan* religious reformism were not automatically welcomed by the local populace. Consequently, Abd al-Karim found it necessary to keep his erstwhile allies in line by two methods: first, disarming them and stationing what amounted to Rifian officials and police in their tribal areas; and second, appealing to their traditional hatred of the Christian Spaniards. According to Richard Pennell, he ordered all the *faqih-s* in every village mosque under his control to pray and recite applicable verses from the Koran giving thanks for his victories and for "the proximity of Muslim liberation."[39] Again, the basic *jihad* appeal was the common cement of Abd al-Karim's movement; it is what energized and sustained his fol-

lowers and propelled him in April 1925 to open a third front—this time against the French, bringing the *jihad* into their Protectorate.

While this invasion was to take Abd al-Karim's forces within 40 kilometers of Fez, and by July 1925 cost the French colonial army over 5,700 causalities, it also had the inevitable consequence of bringing the two reluctant European colonial powers together in an alliance against Abd al-Karim's movement. In May 1925 the French approached the Spanish concerning a collaborative effort in Morocco. By the end of July 1925 the two countries had agreed to a series of accords which committed them to joint efforts to curtail contraband, to offer joint peace terms to Abd al-Karim, and, should these be rejected, to the establishment of a joint committee to plan future military strategy.[40]

A serious attempt was indeed made to offer Abd al-Karim peace terms in late July 1925 which would have granted Rifian autonomy "compatible with international treaties," the exchange of all prisoners, and an amnesty for all "acts of rebellion" since January 1921. In turn, the Rifians would have had to allow the Spanish to occupy Alhucemas Bay and to accept an indigenous police force that would guarantee order and stop the import of arms and munitions into the area. Given the fundamentally *jihadic* nature of his movement and the seeming invincibility of his position in mid-1925, Abd al-Karim rejected these terms out of hand, holding out for what he had consistently fought for: the real independence of a territory that encompassed most of Spanish Morocco. However, neither the protectorate concept, nor standard colonial logic could allow for a sovereign state within a state. The inevitable result of Abd al-Karim's rejection of the Spanish-French peace offer was a Spanish-French military collaboration. After careful preparation and coordination, a joint offensive was launched against Abd al-Karim's forces on September 8–10, 1925, with the Spanish eventually landing some 20,000 ground and support troops at Alhucemas Bay and the French attacking from the south.[41]

Rifian resistance was determined and fierce—one might even say heroic—in the face of overwhelming manpower and the latest in military technology. Abd al-Karim's forces—which at most numbered 13,000 men—put up particularly stiff resistance against their traditional foe, the Spanish, forcing them to fight for every foot of territory and extracting a high price in dead and wounded. It took the Spanish about a month just to move the eleven kilometers from their landing point on the coast to Abd al-Karim's capital of Ajdir.[42] However, an effective and motivated fighting force was not Abd al-Karim's only weapon. The rallying call for *jihad,* which he had successfully used time and again to motivate and coalesce his own people and the tribes of the Ghumara and the Jibala, was employed in late 1925 and early 1926 to rally support from both within and outside the Rif Republic. In the markets of the Beni Amart, the buffer tribe between the Beni Urriaguel and the French Protectorate, the following was used to call men to arms:

> There is no God but God. There is no God but God. There is no God but God. May God damn Satan. Oh faithful. Oh sons of perfection. Go to fight tomorrow, God willing. . . against the Christians. [43]

Letters were distributed to a number of resistance leaders in the far south of Morocco and the Anti-Atlas Mountains, calling on them "to throw out the unbelievers and purify the Muslim lands of their presence, so as to set up a free Islamic government in Morocco."[44] Such appeals, however, generated little practical assistance, and given the overwhelming manpower that the Spanish and French planned to mount against the Rif Republic in the spring of 1926, it was just a matter of time before the Rif War was concluded. Nonetheless, the French, with the now reluctant Spanish in tow, made one final effort to negotiate an agreement with Abd al-Karim. However, the so-called Uxda Conference of April 18–May 1, 1926, was a failure. Even in *extremis,* Abd al-Karim refused to negotiate an allied precondition, the release of the Spanish and French prisoners, before discussing other issues.[45] The Spanish-French offensive resumed on May 8, 1926, and the immediate conflict concluded shortly after, on May 27, 1926, with Abd al-Karim's surrendering, significantly, to the French. It took another year for the Spanish to put an end to all residual resistance and to establish the real frontier at the Protectorate's borders.

Conclusion

It is the argument of this chapter that the Rif War of 1921–27 was something more than a colonial conflict between Europeans and indigenous tribesmen. For both the Spanish and the Moroccans it was, in fact, a frontier conflict between two religious and ethnic cultures that had a long and complex relationship. As the British scholar Amira Bennison has argued, while "the social, economic and political evolution of Spain and Morocco moved toward distinct and different outcomes, the means each society adopted and the processes they followed to achieve those ends were strikingly similar."[46] In both cases, the frontier created societies with aggressive warrior cultures and a strong identification with basic religious and sectarian values. Such characteristics had a profound impact on the course of Spanish and Moroccan history after 1492. Both societies judged the other, for want of a better term, as the traditional adversary. For the Spanish, the "Moor" became the symbol of the antagonist—a danger to their homeland, to their Mediterranean commerce, and, more fundamentally, to their culture and religion. For the Moroccans, Christian Iberians were the proximate and predatory enemy—a menace to both their territorial integrity and their religion.

Such attitudes, while not entirely precluding useful contact, more often resulted in hostility. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are replete with examples of both outright conflict (e.g., the Spanish-Moroccan War of 1859–60, the incidents of 1844, 1893–94, 1909, and 1911) and more limited episodes of individual or collective confrontation. As the Dutch anthropologist Henk Driessen pointed out, "both Spanish and Moroccan authorities perceived and represented the Spanish-Moroccan frontier for more than four centuries as a

hard and fast line or division between 'civilization' and 'savagery,' a divide that was mainly defined in terms of religion."[47] This attitude would seem to have been borne out during the Rif War. The particular savagery visited upon the Spanish during and after Anwal, and the equally savage response of the Spanish; the frequent calls for *jihad*, especially against the Christian Spanish; and the Spanish use of such things as asphyxiating gases and indiscriminate raids against Rifian civilians all seem to point to much more than just another "dirty little colonial war." For the Spanish and Moroccans who fought it, the Rif War was a continuation of an enduring frontier conflict and a defining moment in both their contemporary histories.

NOTES

1. Conde de Romanones, *Notas de una vida* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1947), 34. The "historicist" viewpoint is well summarized in Azucena Pedraz Marcos, *Quimeras de África: La Sociedad Española de Africanistas y Colonistas, El colonialism español de finales del siglo XIX* (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 2000), esp.133–52. See also Alfonso de la Serna, *Al sur de Tarifa, Marruecos-España: Un malentendido histórico* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001), esp. 147–72; Federico Villalobos, *El Sueño Colonial, las Guerras de España en Marruecos* (Barcelona: Ariel, 2004), 29–31; Manuel Fernández Rodríguez, *España y Marruecos: En los primeros años de la Restauración (1875–1894)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Centro de Estudios Históricos, 1985); Víctor Morales Lezcano, *Africanismo y orientalismo español en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 1988); and S.E. Fleming, "Spain's 19th Century Moroccan Policy: An Interpretation," *Revue d'Histoire Maghrebine* 25 (May, 1998): 313–20. For the Moroccan perspective see, among others, C.R. Pennell, *Morocco Since 1830: A History* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 136–74; Amira K. Bennison, *Jihad and its Interpretations in Pre-Colonial Morocco* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 2–4; and C.R. Pennell, "The Geography of Piracy: Northern Morocco in the mid-Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Historical Geography* 20 (1994): 272–82.
2. Ramón Sales Larrazábal, *El Protectorado de España en Marruecos* (Madrid: Mapfre, 1992), 115–23.
3. Víctor Morales Lezcano, *El colonialismo hispanofrancés en Marruecos, 1898–1927* (Madrid: Siglo veintiuno de España, 1976), 69–87, and María Rosa de Madariaga, *España y el Rif: Crónica de una historia casi olvidada* (Melilla: Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla y Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Centro Asociado de Melilla, 1999), 109–99.
4. Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 102–22.
5. See, for instance, María Rosa de Madariaga, *Los Moros que trajo Franco: La intervención de tropas coloniales en la Guerra Civil* (Barcelona: Martínez Roca, 2002), 32–33.
6. See in particular C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, *France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1981), 173–74. For French attitudes see Susana Sueiro Seoane, *España en el Mediterráneo: Primo de Rivera y la "cuestión marroquí," 1923–1930* (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 1992), 14–19.
7. Servicio Histórico Militar, *Historia de las campañas de Marruecos* (Madrid: Imprenta Ideal, 1981), 3:5–160.
8. Ibid., 353–405; Juan Pando, *Historia secreta de Annual* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1999), 47–122.
9. María Rosa de Madariaga, "Imagen del moro en la memoria colectiva del pueblo español y retorno del moro en la Guerra Civil de 1936," *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 46 (1988): 588.
10. According to C.R. Pennell, in 1917 Abd al-Karim's father was being paid 500 *pesetas* a month by the Spanish for his support. See Pennell, "The Responsibility for Annual: The Failure of Spanish Policy in the Moroccan Protectorate, 1912–1921," *European Studies Review* 12 (1982): 75–76.
11. For background on the Abd al-Karim family see, among many others, David M. Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif: An Ethnography and History* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), 369–73. Hart's detailed ethnography of Abd al-Karim's home tribe is a monumental work

not only for anthropologists but also for historians of Moroccan history.

12. Germain Ayache, *Les Origines de la Guerre du Rif* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1981), 180–81.
13. See the discussion in Villalobos, 138–140. M. Tahtah, *Entre Pragmatisme, Réformisme et Modernisme: Le rôle politico-religieux des Khattabi dan le Rif (Maroc) Jusqu'a 1926* (Louvain: Uitgevenj Peeters en Departement Oosterse Studies, 2000), 61–86. The *Salafiyyan* doctrine can best be described as "getting back to the roots" of pristine Islam and restoring its traditional beliefs and practices.
14. J. Roger-Mathieu, *Memoires d'Abd-el-Krim* (Paris: Librairie des Champs-Elysees, 1927), 86.
15. He would later rationalize this away by noting in an interview in a Cairo newspaper that "I do not deny that sometimes I was obliged to make use of religious sensibility in an attempt to win political support." Quoted in C. R. Pennell, *A Country with a Government and a Flag: The Rif War in Morocco, 1921–1926* (Wisbech: Middle East and North Africa Studies Press, 1986), 258. For the "party line" concerning Abd al-Karim's motives see Vincent Sheean's interview with him in Sheean, *An American Among the Rifi* (New York: The Century Company, 1926), 174–85.
16. See in particular, José Luis de Mesa Gutiérrez, "1919–1927, Casi una Década de Sangre," in *Las campañas de Marruecos, 1909–1927*, ed. Antonio Carrasco (Madrid: Almena Ediciones, 2001), 137; and Juan Tomás Palma Moreno, *Annual 1921. 80 años del desastre* (Madrid: Almena Ediciones, 2001), 60–66.
17. Quoted in Hart, 375.
18. Quoted in Pennel, *A Country*, 83.
19. Pando, 163, 338. A later *Cortes* report gave a figure of 13,192 deaths, 4,524 of these being indigenous, which leaves 8,668 Spanish causalities. Total staffing in the sector was approximately 25,000. Abd al-Karim's forces also captured 20,000 rifles, 400 machine guns, and 129 cannon as well as large amounts of munitions and other materials and supplies. These figures are quoted in Manuel Leguineche, *Annual, el desastre de España en el Rif, 1921* (Madrid: Alfaguara, 1996), 184–85, which in turn are taken from Carlos Hernández de Herrera and Tomás García Figueras, *Acción de España en Marruecos* (Madrid, 1929), 1:365. The most detailed narratives of the Anwal "Disaster" are provided in Pando and Palmo Moreno. An interesting summary, maps, and a large collection of pictures can also be found in Antonio Carrasco García, *Las imágenes del sesastre: Annual 1921* (Madrid: Almena Ediciones, 1999).
20. Dámaso Berenguer y Fuste, *Campañas en el Rif y Tebala: Notas y documentos de mi diario de operaciones* (Madrid: Sucesores de R. Velasco, 1923), and Vizconde de Eza, *Mi responsabilidad en el desastre de Melilla como Ministro de la Guerra* (Madrid: Gráficas Reunidas, 1923).
21. Pennell, *A Country*, 84.
22. See, for instance, Eduardo Pérez Ortiz, *De Annual a Monte-Arruit y diez y ocho meses de cautiverio. Crónica de un testigo* (Melilla: Artes Gráficas Postal-Exprés, 1923). See in particular chapter 6 of Pando, 195–266. The slaughter and mutilations at Mounte Arruit were particularly shocking and disgusting. Personal narratives are also contained in Leguineche's book.
23. See Pablo La Porte, "La respuesta urbana ante la crisis de Annual," *Revista de Estudios Africanos* 10 (1996): 109–24; Jean-Michel Desvois, "La prensa frente al desastre de Marruecos, de Annual a Monte Arruit 23 de julio a 13 de agosto de 1921," in *Metodología de la historia de la prensa española*, ed. Bernard Barrére (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno de España, 1982), 233–34; and Celso Almuiña Fernández, "El Desastre de Annual (1921), y su proyección en la opinión pública española," *Investigaciones Históricas. Época Moderna y Contemporánea* 8 (1988): 183–245. See also Antonio Moreno Juste, "*El Socialista* y el desastre de Annual: Opinión y actitud socialista ante la derrota," *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 12 (1990): 103–32.
24. Pennell, *A Country*, 98–99; Sebastian Balfour, *Abrazo mortal: De la guerra colonial a la Guerra Civil en España y Marruecos (1909–1939)* (Barcelona: Península Ediciones, 2002), 173–78. For a discussion and examples of the "brutalization" of the war see Villalobos, 143–52.
25. C.R. Pennell,*Morocco*, 190.
26. Madariaga,*Los moros*, 32–47; Sebastian Balfour and Pablo la Porte, "Spanish Military Cultures and the Moroccan Wars, 1909–1936," *European History Quarterly* 30 (July 2000): 312.

27. Quoted in Pennell, *A Country*, 97.
28. Ibid., 242.
29. Pennell, *Morocco*, 193. See his interesting discussion/analysis of Abd al-Karim's movement, 192–95.
30. An English translation is furnished in Pennell, *A Country*, 246–51.
31. Tahtah, 119, 138.
32. Pessah Shinar, "'Abd al-Qadir and 'Abd al-Krim: Religious Influences on Their Thought and Action," *Asian and African Studies: Annual of the Israeli Oriental Society* 1 (1965):139–174; Leon Gabrielli, *Abd el-Krim et les événements du Rif (1924–1926)* (Casablanca: Editions Atlantides, 1953), 88.
33. Quoted in Hernández de Herrera and García Figueras, 482.
34. Susana Sueiro Seoane, "El mito del estrategia. Primo de Rivera y la resolución del problema de Marruecos," *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 16 (1994): 114.
35. Ibid., 117–18.
36. Susana Sueiro Seoane, "Spanish Colonialism during Primo de Rivera's Dictatorship," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 13 (1998): 54. On the poison gas issue see Balfour, *Abrazo mortal*, 241–300 and S.E. Fleming, *Primo de Rivera and Abd-el-Krim: The Struggle in Spanish Morocco, 1923–1927* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1991), 140–42.
37. This interview is translated into English and reprinted in Pennell, *A Country*, 257.
38. See Fleming, *Primo de Rivera*, 133–201. The Raisuli-Abd al-Karim dynamic is well covered in an interesting article by David M. Hart, "The Saint and the Schoolmaster, or Jbala Warlord and Rifian Reformer Revisited: Conflicting Views of Islam in a Confrontation and Power Clash in Colonial Northern Morocco, 1924–25," *The Journal of North African Studies* 6 (Summer 2001): 29–60.
39. Quoted by Pennell, *A Country*, 168.
40. For the 5,700 figure see Fleming, *Primo de Rivera*, 235. French involvement in the Rif War is covered in a large number of sources. See in particular, the excellent works of W.A. Hoisington, Jr., *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 185–204 and Moshe Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco: Colonialism and its Consequences* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 122–41.
41. For an interesting discussion of the background of French cooperation see Pablo La Porte, *La atracción del Imán: El desastre de Annual y sus repercusiones en la política europea (1921–1923)* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2001), 135–76. For the Alhucemas landing see José María Campos, *Abd el Krim y el Protectorado* (Málaga: Editorial Algazara, 2000), 197–214, and Antonio Carrasco García, José Luis de Mesa Gutiérrez, and Santiago Luis Domínguez Llosa, *Las imágenes del desembarco: Alhucemas 1925* (Madrid: Almena, 2000). The Spanish troop numbers are based on S.E. Fleming, "El problema español de Marruecos y el desembarco en Alhucemas," *Revista de Historia Militar* 17 (1973): 162–63.
42. For causalities at Alhucemas see Carrasco García, Mesa Gutiérrez, and Domínguez Llosa, 215–16. See also Fleming, *Primo de Rivera*, 285–321. The Rifian military strength estimate is based on David Woolman, *Rebels in the Rif: Abd el-Krim and the Rif Rebellion* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 192.
43. Pennell, *A Country*, 205.
44. Ibid.
45. Perhaps the most interesting discussion of the Uxda Conference is provided in the work of Walter B. Harris, the London *Times* correspondent who covered North African affairs. See his *France, Spain and the Riff* (London: Edward Arnold, 1927), 273–303.
46. Amira K. Bennison, "Liminal States: Morocco and the Iberian Frontier between the Twelfth and Nineteenth Centuries," *The Journal of North African Studies* 6 (Spring 2001): 26.
47. Henk Driessen, *On the Spanish-Moroccan Frontier: A Study in Ritual Power and Ethnicity* (Oxford: Berg, 1992), 34. See also Josep Lluís Mateo Dieste, *El "moro" entre los primitivos: El caso del Protectorado español en Marruecos* (Barcelona: Fundación 'La Caixa', 1997), and Eloy Martín Corrales, "Entre el *moro* violador y el *moro* seductor: La imagen de los marroquíes en la Guerra Civil según las fuerzas respublicanas," in *Antropología y antropólogos en Marruecos, Homenaje a David M. Hart*, ed. A.Ramírez and B. López García (Barcelona: Ediciones Bellaterra, 2002), 221–36.

CHAPTER 9

The Practice and Politics of Spanish Counterinsurgency, 1895–1936

GEOFFREY JENSEN

The difficulties that the Spanish army has faced in occupying foreign lands and combating insurgency are anything but unique, as the United States military has been reminded recently in Iraq. Yet military planners have often avoided confronting the problematic nature of insurgencies and their favorite instrument—guerrilla warfare—until forced to do so, preferring instead to focus on regular warfare. (The contrast between the U.S. military's swift victory over Iraq in regular warfare and its current difficulties in maintaining order there is a case in point.) This tendency of much of the military establishment to shun irregular warfare may reflect in part the extremely complicated nature of many insurgencies, in which military, political, cultural, and social forces come together to create a situation that many officers are utterly unprepared to confront. Furthermore, military culture is inherently conservative and thus institutionally slow to adapt to the unexpected. Although officers may study and try to draw meaningful lessons from history more readily than their counterparts in other professions, they tend to do so in a very positivist fashion, striving for certainty whenever possible and—correspondingly—concrete lessons from history. Such lessons are much easier to draw from the study of set-piece, Napoleonic-style battles than from long, often inconclusive campaigns characterized by guerrilla fighting, terrorism, and other common insurgency tactics.

Moreover, battling an insurgency can be a very messy business, and it often entails treading upon moral terrain unappealing to adherents of classical notions of military honor, chivalry, and justice. While such concerns may mean little to a practically minded soldier, they trouble more reflective military thinkers, who often assume the roles of writers, educators, and authors of doctrine within armed forces. These concerns may help explain why military elites and planners have time and again failed to devote sufficient attention to the problem of insurgency.

Nonetheless, insurgencies can have a profound impact not only on colonial armies, but on metropolitan home fronts as well, as the history of France in Algeria, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and many other cases attest. The nature of the Algerian war of independence, for instance, in which insurgents favored assassinations, terror bombings, and other guerrilla tactics over regular warfare, affected France far differently than would have a war of Napoleonic-style decisive battles, clear geographical boundaries, and an easily-identifiable enemy. As a result of the conditions they faced and their previous experience in Indochina, French officers in Algeria elaborated the counterinsurgency doctrine of *guerre révolutionnaire*, which blended military, psychological, and political methods. In practice, however, *guerre révolutionnaire* did more than provide a conceptual framework for officers battling their Algerian opponents. It also blurred traditional civil-military distinctions, helping set the stage for considerable turmoil in France and its armed forces, including several coup attempts, the fall of the Fourth Republic, and the assumption of power by Charles de Gaulle.[1]

For the Spanish army during the last two centuries, counterinsurgency has been by far the most relevant form of warfare. Although the Spanish case differs from that of France in many ways, in both Spanish and French North Africa the ***kind*** of warfare the armies waged profoundly affected national politics and society. This chapter, by providing an overview of Spanish counterinsurgency from the late nineteenth century through the 1920s, thus sheds light on how changes in military thought and practice affected political developments in Spain. The chapter begins by examining counterinsurgency in Cuba during the last part of the nineteenth century. It then turns to North Africa, where practical experiences and needs during the next three decades helped convince an increasingly influential segment of the officer corps that irregular warfare was a legitimate subject of inquiry and emphasis for the Spanish army. The dramatic effects of these wars on political events during this period is well known, from the Cuban conflict's weakening of the political status quo to the 1923 seizure of power by General Miguel Primo de Rivera following the infamous military disaster near Anwal, Morocco.[2] Yet a full understanding of their impact requires an appreciation not only of the nature of the Spanish counterinsurgency campaigns, but also the process by which the army became more effective at waging them.

The armed resistance of Spaniards to Napoleon not only brought the term *guerrilla* into the Western military lexicon, but it also planted the seeds of what has been called the "guerrilla syndrome" in Spanish military culture.[3] According to the myth, Spanish soldiers have a natural aptitude for individual initiative on the battlefield and guerrilla-style fighting in general, a characteristic that many military writers attributed to the Arab legacy of medieval Spain. Correspondingly, by the mid-nineteenth century the exploits of the anti-Napoleonic guerrillas in Spain's "War of Independence" had found a prominent place in Spanish nationalist rhetoric, which argued that Spaniards had united in a truly national struggle against the French invaders. As with most myths, this version of the events may have had some truth to it. But army officers went as far as to use the alleged proclivity of Spaniards for guerrilla

tactics to justify military policies and tactical doctrine (or a lack thereof), and even long after Napoleon's fall such thinking still surfaced in the works of important Spanish cultural figures. The famous writer and cultural critic Ángel Ganivet, for instance, would make such an argument in 1896, writing that Spaniards were inherently better warriors (*guerreros*) than regular officers, and military and civilian writers continued to propagate similar arguments well into the twentieth century.[4]

All the same, Spain's own occupying forces later met defeat—sometimes spectacularly—in Cuba, North Africa, and elsewhere against enemies whose methods ironically resembled those of the original Spanish *guerrilleros.* At first glance, then, it appears that Spanish military thought evolved little between the last Cuban war and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, which itself seems to some commentators more like a repeat of the Western Front in World War I than the manueverist and *Blitzkrieg*-style warfare of the Second World War that it immediately preceded.

In fact, Spain's ability to wage war successfully did improve, and the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, evolved considerably during the three decades following the outbreak of the last Cuban war in 1895. Not only did the Spanish army's efficacy on the battlefield improve, albeit with some setbacks and the horrendous 1921 debacle near Anwal, but the cultural, political, and social aspects of its "pacification" campaigns and occupational policies—what the Spaniards called *acción política* and U.S. army now calls "civil affairs"—met with more success as well. Of course, serious, well-documented problems continued to plague the Spanish army during this period. What qualified as successful policy and operations from a purely military perspective was not necessarily perceived this way by the subjects of the Spanish campaigns—primarily Moroccans—or even in Spain itself, especially over the long term. Nevertheless, the Spanish military's performance during the first three decades of the twentieth century was simply not as lacking as is often assumed; like other European armies, it too developed a "learning curve" in war.[5]

After Spain lost Cuba to the United States in 1898, Spanish military thinkers had ample reason to study the campaigns of the Cuban Wars of Independence. Although easily overshadowed by the enormity of Spain's military defeat at the hands of the United States, these campaigns offered military analysts plenty of positive as well as negative models of colonial counterinsurgency. Such examples would have growing relevance as the Spanish military presence increased in North Africa, where the Spaniards often faced guerrilla warfare as well.

The Spanish army in Cuba suffered some major setbacks, thanks in no small part to inadequate training, grossly unfair and wildly unpopular recruitment methods, administrative incompetence, widespread disease, and at times, very poor leadership. Using classical guerrilla tactics, including ambushes, dispersal, and the refusal of battle with large Spanish forces, the Cuban rebels were formidable opponents. At the most basic level, moreover, the Cubans often employed their rifles better than the Spanish soldiers, who lacked proper training in the use and maintenance of their weapons, sometimes arriving on the island with no

live-fire rifle experience whatsoever.[6] Spanish soldiers also suffered far more from disease on the island than their Cuban enemies.

Nevertheless, operations against Cuban insurgents became notably more effective with time, especially after the Spanish leadership finally recognized that the insurgency demanded a new approach. Initially, General Arsenio Martínez Campos, charged with putting down the Cuban rebellion that broke out in 1895, could not, or did not want to, adapt Spanish strategy or tactics to the enemies' irregular methods. Under political pressure to spread his forces thin to protect property owners, he made no serious effort to separate the enemy from the areas and people from which it derived its resources, apparently because he could not bring himself to implement a policy that would devastate the civilian population. He also failed to promote adequate tactical responses to the situation he faced. These failures were symptomatic of his attitude toward the conflict as a whole, the very nature of which he despised because it bore so little resemblance to his conception of what war should be. He hated the jungle conditions, the guerrilla tactics of the enemy, and irregular warfare in general. As he had complained during the previous, failed struggle for Cuban independence in the Ten Years War of 1868–78, he was stuck in a war that, in his view, "cannot be called a war."[7] His successor, however, had far less difficulty adapting to the conditions in Cuba.

General Valeriano Weyler, who replaced Martínez Campos in 1896, did not hesitate to change things. Most notably, he implemented a counterinsurgency strategy that proved very effective against the Cuban rebels, and the Spanish forces were on the verge of military victory when Weyler was recalled because of developments back in Spain.[8] His infamous strategy of "reconcentration," which entailed forcibly moving 300,000 people into specific locations in order to isolate the guerrillas, brought with it mass disease, starvation, and death. The response of the rebel Cuban military leadership to reconcentration, moreover, only increased the numbers and suffering of its victims, and Weyler continued to "reconcentrate" very large groups of civilians even after the terrible consequences of such measures were clear. All together, reconcentration probably killed from 155,000 to 170,000 civilians, representing about ten percent of Cuba's population.[9]

Yet from a purely military perspective, Weyler's actions can be seen as a reasonable reaction to the insurgent strategy, which had called for its own form of reconcentration, thereby helping to provoke Weyler's brutal response. Reconcentration as a military strategy was not, moreover, unique. The Spaniards themselves had drawn up a reconcentration plan in Cuba during the Ten Years War, although they failed to implement it completely. In the twentieth century Chiang Khai Chek in China, the British in Malaya, the French and the United States in Vietnam, and other governments elsewhere would also "reconcentrate" civilians as a method of warfare, although the magnitude of the suffering in Cuba was far greater than in most of these cases. Weyler knew, as did the rebels who themselves had already cleared territories and forcibly relocated their inhabitants in their prosecution of total war, that economic warfare could be decisive in achieving victory, and in his view the ends justified the means.[10]

Yet even before Weyler became known for his reconcentration strategy, at the tactical level he had made some important innovations in the Spanish way of colonial war. He has been called the first officer in modern Spanish history to create a systematic program of counterguerrilla tactics, a claim that—even if exaggerated—rightly suggests that he was at the forefront of the development of modern Spanish counterinsurgency.[11] Shortly after the outbreak of the Ten Years War in 1868, General Blas Villate, Count of Valmaseda, embraced the new march formation Weyler had created, derived from his earlier experiences in Santo Domingo. Although it met with some resistance, in no small part because it clashed with traditional practice by requiring cavalrymen to advance on foot, it proved reasonably effective in defending columns against enemy attacks. At the request of Valmaseda, Weyler prepared a report on his tactics for use by the rest of the Spanish forces in Cuba. In this report and the others that followed, he elaborated on the use of what the Spaniards then called "guerrilla formations" (really counterguerrilla formations) that moved forward in advance of the main columns.[12]

Such methods should not have been new to Spanish military officers. After the war against the Napoleonic occupation, the army had already gained plenty of experience in situations at least somewhat appropriate to these formations, most notably in the Carlist wars. Nonetheless, leading nineteenth-century officers, often more concerned with the political situation in Spain than with their own professional skills, had paid relatively little attention to institutionalizing and refining new tactics. A strong emphasis in nineteenth-century Spanish army culture on bravery in battle, which discounted the guerrilla tactics used by Carlists as cowardly, hindered relevant doctrinal development. Thus each new counterinsurgency campaign, whether in mainland Spain or abroad, meant relearning tactics that should have been absorbed from earlier experiences.[13] Weyler himself complained that by promptly forgetting the lessons of the lost Santo Domingo war of 1863–65, Spain failed to gain "the one good thing that comes from the bad: learning to avoid past mistakes."[14]

Weyler, however, did not forget his military lessons. After the outbreak of the Ten Years War he prepared plans, reports, and instructions for the general staff on a regular basis about how to operate against the insurgents. As a commander in the field, he endeavored to train his soldiers in these ideas. Among other things, they called for going beyond the standard use of the so-called guerrilla formations by, after making contact with the enemy, charging ahead in the jungle in pursuit, thus taking the initiative away from the insurgents. Such tactics departed considerably from the textbook Spanish methods, which still called for closed formations and standard bugle signals that the enemy could learn, and they had no place at the time in the general staff and military academies. He also emphasized the importance of rapid maneuver as a general principle of war, often an unattainable goal for large, regular armies in colonial campaigns, which tend to plod through enemy territories in ways that make them and their supply lines perfect targets for the hit-and-run tactics of small, highly mobile guerrilla forces. In Weyler's view, dispersed guerrilla forces were unlikely to offer much resistance

in the face of skillful maneuver.[15] He also knew, however, that such tactics required highly adept and motivated soldiers, and he created special units with these needs in mind.

Weyler's counterinsurgency unit, Cazadores de Valmaseda—named for his former commander, who had been so receptive to his ideas—anticipated José Millán-Astray's Spanish Foreign Legion in several ways. A multiracial force manned by Cubans as well as Europeans from various countries, its ranks included more than a few fugitives from justice. Weyler's imposition of strict discipline, including personally administered corporal punishment in at least one case, also foreshadowed later stories of the Legion under the command of such men as Millán-Astray and Francisco Franco, even if Weyler later claimed that his striking of an insolent soldier was a unique instance. He later recounted that his men's performance in combat consistently met or exceeded his expectations, giving him ample reason to praise their toughness, loyalty, and overall performance in battle. Like Spain's legionnaires in North Africa years later, the Cazadores quickly earned a reputation for effective counterinsurgency that set them apart from the bulk of Spanish forces.[16]

In the end, however, Weyler's endeavors in Cuba were not enough, as the military victory of the United States in 1898 made painfully clear. Even if his tactics improved infantry maneuverability and his policy of reconcentration was effective as a military strategy, at the level of grand strategy it caused problems for him and the Spanish government. Abroad, it strengthened protests against the allegedly barbaric behavior of the Spanish military in Cuba, and in Spain it provided ammunition to liberal politicians trying to discredit the conservative approach to the war.[17]

Yet there was plenty for the Spanish military to learn from the Cuban experience, bitter though the war's conclusion might have been. After all, Spanish counterinsurgency had improved markedly over time, regardless of the persistence of some well-known flaws. Moreover, the Spanish military's next war, in Morocco, would also demand an irregular approach. Would Spanish army leaders bring with them the lessons of Cuba?

Tragically for the Spanish army, they largely failed to do so. Like the Russians nearly a century later, whose military was incapable of absorbing the lessons of Afghanistan and earlier colonial wars in ways that would have proved useful in Chechnya, the Spanish army proved incapable of meaningful institutional reform.[18] The army's effectiveness in Morocco would improve markedly over the next three decades but these improvements took place in spite of the dominant military culture and institutions. Indeed, although they should have made the most use of Spain's recent military history and endeavored to institutionalize its lessons, the academies and general staff proved to be some of the strongest resisters to much-needed reform, especially during the first two decades after 1898. The learning process was thus much slower than it might have been, and when it did occur it caused especially severe political shocks.

Hence in early twentieth-century Spain, academy lesson plans, military journals, and the countless books by army officers displayed remarkably little interest in the Cuban wars

and the problem of insurgency in general, focusing instead on such conflicts as the Wars of German Unification. Those who looked to irregular wars for lessons tended to favor the British campaigns against the Boers and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 over Spain's own actions in Cuba, and even they did not advocate serious study of guerrilla warfare in concrete tactical or operational terms. Instead they joined their counterparts in other European countries in emphasizing the "moral" and "spiritual" qualities of the frontal attack. And like advocates of the so-called "cult of the offensive" elsewhere in Europe before World War I, many also believed that social, political, and "moral" forces brought victory. Thus the maverick military officers who wrote about the Cuban wars often focused at least as much on issues of spiritual decadence and regeneration as on the practical, operational components of counterinsurgency.[19] With the escalation of the Moroccan conflict, however, the emphasis of Spanish tactical thought began to evolve.

Spain's presence in Morocco grew as the twentieth century progressed, but even those soldiers and officers who arrived in North Africa with more military training than their predecessors usually found that preparations had been neither adequate nor relevant. As an unusually astute and articulate young Spanish artillery officer, Carlos Martínez de Campos later wrote, that they confronted a situation very different from what they had been told to expect.[20] It was "war without battles," in which soldiers had to endure excruciating boredom, standing guard, and awaiting possible attacks that would only occur when and if their Moroccan opponents so desired.[21] In other words, the Moroccans of the Rif employed classical guerrilla tactics. They knew how to make up for their lack of modern weaponry and supplies by avoiding contact with the Spaniards except when the conditions were ideal for quick and deadly attacks, which they followed with a quick retreat before their opponents could recover.

Not surprisingly, the first army officers to call for integrating the early lessons of the Moroccan conflict into military education were those who actually fought in North Africa rather than their colleagues who made careers out of teaching at the infantry academy or doing staff work. Among these was the future dictator Francisco Franco. Although Franco was by no means a brilliant military thinker, he was a very serious, hard-driven young officer who seems to have devoted much thought to the tactical problems he confronted after being posted to North Africa for the first time in 1912.

The Moroccans understood very well, Franco subsequently wrote, that many Spaniards lacked the necessary "craftiness of war," and that they rigidly followed outdated regulations "without molding them to the special nature of the combat." Officers thus needed to instruct their men accordingly, Franco stressed, and the military units themselves needed weapons more appropriate for battling insurgents in Morocco. Franco stressed, for example, the enemy's tendency to avoid open contact, preferring to hide out in gorges, ravines, and hollows, a practice that caused him to emphasize the liberal use of mortars in addition to the traditional rifle skills cultivated in the infantry. He also highlighted the importance of

the artillery and the need for its close cooperation with infantry in operational planning and execution.[22] Although these suggestions hardly appear path breaking today, they had rarely made their way into Spanish military texts and doctrine in the wake of 1898. It is also significant that Franco stressed cooperation between the different arms, most notably the infantry and the artillery. The importance of this kind of joint operations may also seem apparent enough now, but in an army deeply divided by politically, socially, and cultural differences—especially between the artillery and infantry—Franco's suggestions stood out.

Not surprisingly, at the infantry academy the standard Spanish manual in tactics ignored the operational and strategic questions that advancing officers would presumably learn later at staff college, stressing instead small-unit tactics.[23] But even at the tactical level, it had surprisingly little to say about the kind of warfare the cadets would soon face in North Africa. The only use of the word *guerrilla* in the manual referred to the army's established version of "guerrilla tactics," described as "a line of men separated between themselves by more or less large intervals," acting as skirmishers at the head of echelons.[24] In other words, "guerrillas," which really meant "counterguerrillas," continued to be conceived of as one component of traditional, regular-warfare military units: here the so-called guerrillas were the men in the first line of fire of an advancing unit, who would advance in traditionally formed columns or lines but then fall into a "guerrilla formation" as they approached the enemy. The manual did not even incorporate the modifications to the counterguerrilla formations that Weyler had advocated decades earlier. Although these modifications might have been less practical in Morocco than in Cuba's jungle-like conditions, some discussion of them would have still been more relevant to young Spanish soldiers bound for North Africa than the regular, European-style warfare that the manual emphasized and the tactical methods it described.

More useful to the cadets would have been manuals explaining that their Moroccan enemies would not follow the traditional rules of European warfare, and that even acting in small numbers they could have deadly consequences for the Spanish occupiers. Although such discussions did take place in a few Spanish military books and journals, cadets had little or no exposure to them in their formal readings. Years later Franco himself would write of the irrelevance to the Moroccan campaigns of the tactical methods he had learned as a cadet at the Infantry Academy, specifically criticizing the outdated idea of "guerrilla formations." In his view, these formations did little more than create "highly-desired targets" for enemy fire.[25]

Paradoxically, though, Franco made scant reference to Cuba in his writings. Like the vast majority of his colleagues, he apparently saw little connection between the guerrilla tactics of the Cubans and Moroccans or the special character and composition of the units that enjoyed unusually high success rates against them, the Cazadores de Valmaseda and, after its founding in 1920, the Legion. In his case, at least, the absence of such comparisons may have stemmed from his association of Cuba with the counterguerrilla march tactics he criticized. But it probably also resulted from his failure to study the Cuban campaigns in any depth while a student at the Infantry Academy. This gap in the Infantry Academy's curricu-

lum reflected a greater weakness in the Spanish army: its institutional amnesia with regard to the Cuban wars.

Remarkably, the Spanish army produced no detailed history of the Cuban campaigns, as General Dámaso Berenguer, Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco during the Anwal disaster, would lament. Although Berenguer became a target for much criticism after Anwal, he strove as hard as anyone to understand and systematize the Spanish military mission in Morocco, and he was virtually the only officer to consider the tactical and operational relevance of Cuba for the North African campaigns. His reasoning and conclusions, moreover, were usually sound, even if translating his ideas into practice could prove difficult for the Spaniards. In his detailed study of tactical and operational methods in Morocco, published in 1918, he drew extensively upon his own experiences there, but he also looked to relevant Spanish military history for guidance. Criticizing colleagues who had promoted erroneous tactical concepts based on their perception of the French conquest of Algeria, he argued that they "could have derived precious lessons" from the past Cuban conflict instead. He also discussed the possibility of Cuban-style reconcentration in Morocco, although he concluded that its price had been too high under Weyler and that it would not prove practical in North Africa.[26] Even he, however, did not refer to the history of the Cuban wars as frequently as to military studies of the French and others in North Africa, probably because operational histories of the Cuban campaigns simply did not exist.

Of course, Spanish military doctrine was not completely lacking in insight, even if it did not draw upon history as it might have. Indeed, some official publications covered methods relevant to counterinsurgency in North Africa, especially at the operational level. Admittedly, infantry cadets learned little in their formal texts about the irregular warfare they would confront in Morocco, and during the first two decades after 1898 the army devoted relatively little attention to developing further its tactical doctrine and adjusting it to the conditions of Morocco. The official tactical manual, for example, recommended leading small-unit attacks against fortified positions with frontal assaults in strict formations, as one biographer of Franco notes. By the early twentieth century such an unimaginative method was often extremely deadly and ultimately unsuccessful against any reasonable amount of firepower. The manual also had little to say about the use of machine guns and other automatic weapons, as critics have noted.[27] But this omission was only part of the story.

In fact, the manual would soon be supplemented by a 150-page text devoted solely to the infantry's use of machine guns, and texts on many other aspects of infantry fighting were also published. Some of these manuals discussed surprisingly advanced operational, and occasionally tactical, methods that would prove useful in Morocco. For example, several years after Franco received his first commission—but before the British experience at Gallipoli—an official manual on joint infantry and naval tactics in amphibious landings saw print.[28] This manual represented an early step toward the successful Spanish landing at Al Hoceima (Alhucemas) Bay in 1925, aimed at suppressing the Moroccan insurgency. The Al

Hoceima operation, involving ground, air, and naval forces from two European countries and indigenous North African units, foreshadowed the kind of combined-arms coordination that Franco's side would come closest to mastering in the Spanish Civil War.[29]

The Spaniards also showed an increased understanding over time that a successful counterinsurgency required more than simply killing the enemy. Instead, one had to address the roots of the insurgency as well, which meant developing and implementing a policy of *acción política*, embracing social, economic, and cultural spheres. Although the army was not going to do anything about the most basic cause of the insurgency in North Africa—its very presence there—it could try to make the occupation more acceptable to the inhabitants. The tensions between officers who favored the methods of *pacificación política* over those who wanted to focus solely on traditional military methods never disappeared, but the impact of the former grew with time. Although their practical results contrast sharply with their lofty ideals, the Spanish endeavors seem to have met with at least some success, especially after the defeat of Rifian leader Mohammad bin Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi in 1925. The leading anthropologist of the Rif, David Montgomery Hart, would later comment that during the last phase of the Spanish protectorate in northern Morocco he did not see the "burning hatred" directed at Spaniards that characterized Moroccan attitudes in the south toward France. The military's increasing emphasis on a peaceful approach to its occupation of Morocco probably helps explains the goodwill, or at least the absence of "burning hatred," to which Hart refers, even if the violence inherent to a colonial relationship—whether real or symbolic—could never disappear.[30]

Nevertheless, the "pacification" of Spain's Moroccan territories was primarily a military problem through at least 1925, and the officers with extensive combat experience there had the most to offer the authors of Spanish doctrine. But even if they gradually began to find some listeners, their voices still fell largely on deaf ears within the army status quo. Many infantry academy professors continued to insist that only regular, European-style warfare merited serious study. Enrique Ruiz-Fornells, for instance, the author of the infantry's 1908 tactical manual and a leading military educator, resisted incorporating insurgency and counterinsurgency into academy curricula. In fact, in the 1930s he would go as far as to charge that the Spanish military difficulties in North Africa had stemmed from a *failure* to study and assimilate the lessons of regular European warfare sufficiently.[31]

Yet the undeniable character of the only kind of combat the Spanish army now faced, along with the growing effectiveness of irregular Spanish counterinsurgency methods, made this kind of argument increasingly difficult to sustain. The success of the 1925 amphibious landing at Alhucemas Bay, which marked the end of any noteworthy military threat to Spain's presence in North Africa, demonstrated the degree to which Spanish operations had improved. According to a French liaison officer writing to General Philippe Pétain about the Spanish forces at Al Hoceima: "A great enterprise of organization and training has been accomplished, and the first impression I have of this army is that it is a solid and perfectly tested instrument."[32]

This military success had political ramifications. Franco, already a public figure and hero in the eyes of some Spaniards, saw his political clout rise: in early 1928, dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera made Franco head of the newly reestablished Academia General Militar (AGM), where the professorship was drawn overwhelmingly from the available pool of tough, combat-hardened veterans of the North African campaigns. For the first time, then, the *africanistas* with extensive experience in counterinsurgency but scant interest in regular European warfare, dominated cadet education. The significance of this change was immense.

The thinking behind the reopening of the Academia General was in itself a good match for Franco, as it aimed to help overcome the deep-seated separation between the infantry, artillery, and cavalry. It also signaled a shift in emphasis from regular to irregular warfare at the tactical and operational levels. Army cadets would now spend their first two years together at the *Academia General* before pursuing more specialized studies in their own academy in Toledo (the infantry, artillery, and engineering corps maintained their separate academies). The teaching staff, moreover, consisted of many *africanistas* whose combat experiences in Morocco strongly outweighed any academic merit they might have had, and these veterans were to impart highly practical lessons on the cadets. In addition, forcing all the cadets to begin their studies together aimed to foster a better appreciation of the inter-corps cooperation that effective operational planning entailed. Such an approach to operational thinking had been fundamental to the Spanish military's eventual success in defeating the North African insurgents. In Morocco, Franco and other *africanistas* had come to appreciate the practical reasons to foster better relations within the army, especially between the infantry and the artillery. As we have seen, Franco had even gone to some lengths to praise the artillery in his published writings, which was noteworthy at a time when the relationship between the infantry and artillery was especially poor.[33]

Many other infantry officers, on the other hand, had not found it so easy to overcome their interservice prejudices, and they vehemently objected to the Academia General's approach to military education, continuing to argue that European regular warfare should form the basis of Spanish military thinking. Ruiz-Fornells, a strong defender of traditional military thought and instruction, strongly opposed the reestablishment of the Academia General, and he derisively referred to the man chosen to run it—Franco—as "*guerrillero e ignorante.*"[34] His use of the term *guerrillero* as a pejorative here could not be more telling.

Franco rejected the traditional system of military textbooks altogether at the AGM, preferring instead a more hands-on approach to education. This decision by Franco undoubtedly reflected in part his own academic and intellectual shortcomings, and the academy professors' emphasis on willpower, bravery, and right-wing nationalism instead of more rationalist, scientific, and theoretical aspects of war undoubtedly left its mark on the cadets—as Franco intended. His own brother Ramón, one of Spain's first pilots, complained about the "troglodytic education" imparted by the academy's conservative professors, even if the politically radical Ramón was not exactly an impartial critic.[35] Indeed, Franco's rejection of existing textbooks

probably had political motivation as well: the standard textbook on "moral education" assigned to generations of cadets was written by none other than Ruiz-Fornells, and it stressed the ideal of the "citizen-soldier," which it portrayed in essentially democratic terms.[36]

Yet in a sense, the refusal to base the curriculum around existing textbooks was a rational response to two undeniable flaws in Spanish military education. First, the long-time professors at Spanish military academies often supplemented their incomes by writing new and often superfluous editions of military textbooks. It was not just Franco who disliked this practice; other officers also found it appalling, and some singled out Ruiz-Fornells, whose textbooks came out in countless editions, for special criticism. Franco, however, went beyond mere protests and took concrete actions against what one officer had called the "blind mercantilism" behind the institution of military textbook publishing.[37] Second, and more significantly for our purpose here, most of the tactical methods that cadets had studied at the Infantry Academy—like those that received the most attention by Spanish military writers and institutions in general—had little relevance to counterinsurgency and did not prove very practical in Morocco. Given the Spanish army's most recent theater of operations, instruction in counterinsurgency by men with first-hand experience made more sense than the overwhelming emphasis on regular warfare that had characterized the Infantry Academy. As critics have noted, however, the kind of academy professors who focused on irregular warfare often tended to hold very right-wing ideological positions, and they would pose problems in the future.[38]

The growing emphasis on counterinsurgency in tactical and operational thought thus went beyond military efficacy, but also related to political developments in Spain. Just as the positions Spanish public figures adopted toward Weyler's counterinsurgency tactics carried with them specific political meanings at the end of the nineteenth century, so too did Spanish politicians' attitudes toward the subsequent Moroccan campaigns. Such a relationship between military doctrine and national politics was hardly unique. In late nineteenth-century France, for example, to favor the "Young School" approach to naval warfare was to associate oneself with democratic politics, and in the twentieth century Soviet military writers associated a capitalist outlook with specifically "bourgeois" tactics and strategies.[39] In the case of Weyler's counterinsurgency, moreover, the attraction of a hard-line strategy to those on the political right is not surprising.

In Morocco, the connection between the *kind* of war the Spanish army faced and national politics might not have been so obvious, although the impact of North Africa on Franco's subsequent prosecution of the Civil War has certainly not gone unnoticed. With good reason, scholars have highlighted the influence of the *africanista* experience on subsequent military behavior during the Civil War, from the brutal "cleansing" operations to how Franco's desire to avoid another Anwal may have made his strategy more cautious. As in Cuba, however, the kind of warfare that the army had to wage in Morocco—counterinsurgency—also had definite political ramifications, even before the outbreak of the Civil War.

Some of the loudest defenders of the traditional focus of Spanish military education,

such as Ruiz-Fornells, held notably more progressive political views than the *africanistas*, who rejected what they characterized as the overly-scientific, "European," and Enlightenment-oriented emphasis on Napoleonic-style regular warfare. This status quo had managed to maintain its dominant position in elite Spanish military culture for a surprisingly long time, but it eventually lost credibility and thus influence as its approach to military study proved less relevant. Those who found success on the battlefields of Morocco (like the French advocates of *guerre révolutionnaire* years later) tended to approach political situations as they had confronted military problems—in a way that left little room for the solutions of the liberal status quo, whether advocated by Spanish Republicans in the 1930s or their counterparts of the French Fourth Republic two decades later. Thus, the relative effectiveness of methods advocated by more conservative and antiliberal officers could affect the ideological outlook of leading officers as much as it colored their operational thought. The corresponding rise of a new, highly influential circle of officers in turn served to strengthen the political prestige and authority of Franco and his like-minded colleagues.

Notes

1. Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine* (New York: Praeger, 1964). Alistair Horne's classic *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962* (New York: Viking, 1977) remains a very useful history of the Algerian war.
2. Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford, 1967); Carolyn P. Boyd, *La política pretoriana en el reinado de Alfonso XIII*, trans. Mauro Hernández Benítez (Madrid, 1990).
3. Thilo Jens Wittenberg, "Mut und Ehre: Die professionelle, ideologische und politische Entwicklung des spanischen Offizierkorps im 19. Jahrhundert (1808–1908)," (Ph.D. diss., Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg i. Br., 1995), 5.
4. Wittenberg, esp. 10–30; José Álvarez Junco, *Mater dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus, 2001), 119–84; Ángel Ganivet, *Idearium Español con El porvenir de España*, ed. E. Inman Fox (Madrid: 1990), 77–87.
5. Gary Sheffield's *Forgotten Victory: The First World War, Myths and Realities* (London: Headline, 2001) refers repeatedly to the notion of an effective "learning curve" in its analysis of the British army in World War I.
6. John Lawrence Tone, "The Machete and the Liberation of Cuba," *Journal of Military History*, 62 (January 1998), 11–16.
7. Quoted in John Lawrence Tone, *War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895–1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 120. On Martínez Campos' attitude and approach to the war in general, 113–21.
8. Tone makes this argument very convincingly in *War and Genocide*. See also Gabriel Cardona and Juan Carlos Losada, *Weyler. Nuestro hombre en la Habana* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1997).
9. On reconcentration in Cuba see Tone, *War and Genocide*, esp. 193–224.
10. Ibid., 196, 150.
11. Cardona and Losada, 50.
12. Valeriano Weyler, *Memorias de un general. De caballero cadete a general en jefe*, ed. María Teresa Weyler (Barcelona: Ediciones Destino, 2004), 63–64; Cardona and Losada, 50.
13. Wittenberg, 29.
14. Weyler, 54.
15. Weyler, 65; Cardona and Losada, 50–51, 187–89.
16. Weyler, 63–64, 69–72.
17. Tone, *War and Genocide*, 233–35.

18. Michael Orr, "Russia and Warfare in the Postindustrial Age," in *War in the Age of Technology: Myriad Faces of Modern Armed Conflict*, ed. Geoffrey Jensen and Andrew Wiest (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 365–80.
19. Geoffrey Jensen, *Irrational Triumph: Cultural Despair, Military Nationalism, and the Ideological Origins of Franco's Spain* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2002).
20. Carlos Martínez de Campos y Serrano, *Ayer: 1892–1931* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1946), 72–73.
21. Martínez de Campos y Serrano, 57–59.
22. Francisco Franco Bahamonde, *Papeles de la Guerra de Marruecos* (Madrid: Fundación Francisco Franco, 1986), 176–78, 32, 59.
23. The term "operational" can refer simply to anything pertaining to military operations, or—as it is used it this case—it can denote the conceptual level of warfare that falls between tactics and strategy. Soviet military thinkers after World War I first developed the concept as they reflected on how warfare had changed with industrialization, concluding that the traditional categories of strategy and tactics, while apt for analyzing the warfare of Napoleon's day and before, no longer sufficed.
24. *Reglamento provisional para la instrucción táctica de las tropas de infantería* (Madrid: 1908), 124.
25. Franco, 43–44.
26. Dámaso Berenguer, *La guerra en Marruecos (ensayo de una adaptación táctica)* (Madrid: Fernando Fe, 1918), 68–69, 49–50.
27. George Hills, *Franco: The Man and his Nation* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 63–64.
28. *Reglamento provisional para la instrucción de tiro con ametralladoras de infantería* (Madrid, 1911); *Táctica para columnas de desembarco de los buques con arreglo al Reglamento táctico de Infantería* (Madrid, 1913).
29. On the Al Hoceima Bay landing and its immediate antecedents, see Shannon E. Fleming, "El problema español en Marruecos y el desembarco en Alhucemas," *Revista de Historia Militar* 35 (1973): 155–72; Shannon E. Fleming, *Primo de Rivera and Abd-el Krim: The Struggle for Spanish Morocco, 1923–1927* (New York: Garland, 1991), 263–99; José C. Álvarez, "Between Gallipoli and D-Day: Alhucemas, 1925," *Journal of Military History* 63 (Jan. 1999): 75–98; and Sebastian Balfour, *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 108–12.
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31. Enrique Ruiz-Fornells, "Memorias del Excmo. D. Enrique Ruiz-Fornells Regueiro, General Subsecretario del Ministerio de la Guerra" (unpublished memoirs,1935), 26–27.
32. Balfour, 112.
33. On the politics of the artillery and its relationship with the infantry corps, see Boyd, 345–48, and Payne, 237–40.
34. Ruiz-Fornells, 47.
35. Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 59.
36. Enrique Ruiz Fornells, *La educación moral del soldado*, 8th ed. (Toledo: 1918). This textbook, first published in 1918, went through over two dozen editions. On Ruiz Fornells during this period, see Jensen, *Irrational Triumph*, 115–39, 163–64.
37. Emilio Mola Vidal, *El pasado, Azaña y el porvenir: las tragedias de nuestras instituciones militares* (Madrid, 1934); Nazario Cebreiros, *Las reformas militares: estudio crítico* (Santander: Talleres Tipográficos J. Martínez, 1931), 212–215. Although Cebreiros does not identify Ruiz-Fornells by name, it is clear—and would have been to any interested reader at the time—whom he is attacking.
38. For an extreme critique of the professorate's ideological makeup, see Carlos Blanco Escolá, *La Academia General Militar de Zaragoza (1928–1931)* (Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1989). For a diametrically opposed appraisal of the academy, see Cebreiros.
39. Theodore Ropp, *The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 1871–1904*, ed. Stephen S. Roberts (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1987); *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972).

CHAPTER 10

The Swedish Left's Memory of the International Brigades and the Creation of an Antifascist Postwar Identity

CARL-GUSTAF SCOTT

The Spanish Civil War remains one of the most controversial events of the twentieth century, and its memory is still fiercely contested. At the time, the conflict was generally seen as a preview of a renewed war between the European Great Powers and was understood in highly ideological terms. Depending upon one's political point of view, the war was regarded as a showdown between democracy and fascism, or between communism and Christian civilization. In the Western democracies, however, it did not take long for the first mentioned interpretation to win out. According to this narrative, the Soviet Union single-handedly stood up to protect the democratic Spanish Republic in the face of fascist aggression, meanwhile the Western Powers simply looked aside as Hitler and Mussolini helped to secure a Nationalist victory in Spain. Franco might well have been victorious, but in this instance history was arguably written by the losers. Following the Second World War, international opinion has by and large favored the Republicans, who were hailed by the left as a preeminent symbol of the "good fight" against fascism.[1]

This outlook has been exceptionally pronounced in relation to the approximately 35,000 foreigners (representing some fifty-three different nationalities) who fought alongside the Loyalists in the Communist-organized International Brigades.[2] In the 1930s these foreign volunteers were routinely celebrated as paragons of the socialist ideal of "international solidarity," and they have been embraced as icons of the anti-fascist cause ever since. Well before the surviving members of the Brigades received honorary Spanish citizenship in 1996, numerous monuments had already been erected in their honor throughout the United States and Western Europe.[3] Even in Catholic Ireland, where during the war the overwhelming majority had sided with Franco's Nationalists, the memory of those few who fought for the Republic is now widely cherished.[4] To this day, there is intense international interest in the Brigades,[5] and a palpable goodwill has informed most European and North

American studies about the foreign volunteers.[6]

Given that the so-called *Brigadistas* became such potent symbols, it is not very surprising that their collective experience has been mythologized. Indeed, their legacy frequently has been shaped as much by postwar political calculations as by historical realities.[7] More than anything, their memory has conformed to the propaganda needs of the former Soviet Union, which was eager to promote the notion that the Comintern had led a broad coalition of leftist and progressive antifascist volunteers in defense of the democratically elected Republic. This was of course not a totally accurate representation of what occurred in Spain.[8] In particular, this narrative tends to glorify the *Brigadistas'* conduct while oversimplifying their motives (which in many instances were a bit more complex than Communist propaganda would have us believe). No less seriously, this version of events consistently downplayed—or ignored outright—Moscow's political exploitation of and ruthless hold over the foreign fighters.[9] Although the official Communist portrayal of the Brigades never went unchallenged by Western scholars,[10] it nonetheless survived largely intact until only very recently.[11]

In hindsight it appears that the Soviets mostly valued the *Brigadistas* as martyrs to the anti-Fascist cause. The USSR cited its assistance to the Spanish Republic, including its leading role in organizing the International Brigades, as evidence of the country's antifascist credentials.[12] As Stanley Payne points out, antifascism was crucial to the USSR because it was the key justification for Soviet rule in Eastern Europe after the Second World War.[13] While admittedly adopting a slightly less emphatic position, an antifascist identity was almost equally important to the West European Left.[14] For this reason, West European Socialist and Social Democratic parties have often been just as likely to pay tribute to the International Brigades' historical legacy as the Communists.

In the late 1930s, however, the International Brigades' popularity was actually quite problematic for Social Democratic officials, who, with few exceptions, actively discouraged their own cadre from fighting in Spain.[15] Most Social Democratic parties had endorsed the Non-Intervention Agreement, which in February 1937 was expanded to prohibit any foreign volunteers from participating directly in the conflict. This cautious attitude toward the war repeatedly put Social Democratic leaders at odds with their own followers and with the workers' movement as a whole. By extension, this created a political opening for the Communists, who were quick to capitalize upon popular approval of Soviet aid to the Republic, as well as their own prominence within the International Brigades. The situation proved especially troublesome for those Social Democratic parties that were in office during the Spanish Civil War, which soon found themselves caught between the necessity of protecting their nations' best interests on one hand, and their own adherents' call for a more proactive stance in Spain on the other.

Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti (SAP)—that is, the Swedish Social Democratic Party—was one of the principal parties that found itself in this dilemma. With

the SAP at the helm of the country's foreign policy, Sweden remained faithful to the Non-Intervention Agreement through the war's end, even in the face of increasingly flagrant Soviet, German, and Italian violations of it.[16] The country's timid behavior was primarily informed by *Realpolitik* concerns about its own security. As the threat of a renewed European conflict began to loom larger, the Swedish government was eager to protect the nation's neutrality and sought to avoid an adventurous course in international affairs. This defensive mindset was by no means unique to Sweden, as Ireland and the three Benelux countries, for example, reacted to the war in much the same way.[17] As a small vulnerable state, Sweden stood little to gain by an expansion of the conflict, therefore the SAP leadership wished to see it kept localized to Spain. To be sure, Stockholm privately had misgivings about the Non-Intervention Agreement, but it was not about to pursue a different stance than either London or Paris on this issue.[18] That this policy, moreover, had been initiated by a fellow Socialist, Léon Blum, undoubtedly made the Swedish Social Democrats' rigid adherence to it easier to justify.[19]

The SAP's passivity on the Spanish question could also at least partially be explained by the party's need to accommodate its nonsocialist coalition partner, the Agrarian Party. It was, in fact, the latter that had first signed the Non-Intervention Agreement, but the wisdom of this policy was never challenged by the Social Democrats once they joined together with the Agrarians in a new red-green coalition in September 1936.[20] In this respect, the SAP's position was not much different from that of its fellow Socialist and Social Democratic governments in Denmark, Belgium, and France, who all likewise governed alongside bourgeois parties. Yet, in the Swedish case, too much should not be made of this, since the SAP would have pursued a restrained policy toward the war regardless of the Agrarians, who did not have a strong foreign policy profile. The Social Democrats, furthermore, dominated the coalition, as they held the most influential cabinet posts, including Prime Minster (Per Albin Hansson) and Foreign Minster (Richard Sandler). For the next three and half years, Hansson and Sandler would put their personal imprints on the country's foreign relations, and, in the case of Spain, they both concurred that Swedish national interest must trump ideological preference.[21] An identical policy was pursued by the Danish and the Norwegian Social Democrats, essentially for the same reasons.[22]

There was an additional—more crucial—domestic dimension to Stockholm's compliance with the International Non-Intervention Agreement. Like elsewhere in Western Europe,[23] the Spanish Civil War had a polarizing effect on the Swedish political climate.[24] Whereas the entire left, and many Liberals, threw their full support behind the Loyalists, Swedish Conservatives took a more skeptical view of the Republic. This antagonism was mainly rooted in anti-Communist convictions, though there also was a feeling that a Nationalist victory would better serve the country's trade interests.[25] This opinion was not shared by the Left, which interpreted the military coup in Spain as part of a larger pattern of fascist aggression in Europe.[26] As in other countries,[27] there was widespread activism on

the Republic's behalf in Sweden, and substantial funds were raised for a variety of different aid projects.[28] While the average working class voter's level of engagement in Spain probably has been overstated,[29] there is little doubt that the war provoked an extraordinarily strong response among leftist political and cultural elites. In this regard, Sweden was no exception to the rest of Western Europe,[30] as intellectual sympathizers there sought to generate public support for the Loyalist cause through public meetings, theater productions, photo exhibits, poetry readings, and other similar events.[31]

Notwithstanding the Right's distain of such activities,[32] the Spanish Civil War was nowhere near as internally divisive in Sweden as it was in France, for instance.[33] Still, there can be no doubt that the government regarded the Non-Intervention Agreement as a welcome means to neutralize this question domestically. Since the Swedish Social Democratic establishment was anxious to maintain a unified front outwardly in the face of heightening international tensions, this precluded a spirited conflict over Spain between the left and the right.[34]

In truth, the government had little difficulty reaching an understanding about the war with the other two nonsocialist parties. In all probability this was in no small part because the bourgeois opposition was itself divided over this question, and therefore neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals had any real interest in provoking a potentially divisive fight over Spain.[35] Cross-party agreement was also facilitated by the fact that a significant pro-Franco lobby never existed, as the Nationalists had no natural base of support in Sweden. First of all, the Swedish radical and fascist Right was miniscule by European interwar standards.[36] Secondly, in contrast to France and Ireland (or even Britain),[37] there was no sizable Catholic population in Sweden that could have served as a latent source of pro-Franco opinion. More importantly, Conservative antipathy toward the Republic does not seem to have translated into genuine enthusiasm for the Nationalist cause. In the end, the Swedish parliamentary right was content to demand strict observance of the Non-Intervention Agreement and never pressured the government to assist the rebels.[38]

After the fact, it is clear that Conservative hostility toward the Republic served as a convenient alibi for the Social Democratic–led government's guarded approach to the war. All along the SAP hierarchy had harbored its own apprehensions about the Republic, which it deemed to be overly susceptible to Communist influence.[39] In comparison to Blum,[40] Hanson and Sandler, though not entirely unsympathetic, seem to have been far less personally committed to the Loyalists.[41]

The SAP leadership's own anti-Communist feelings were made manifest within the confines of the Socialist International,[42] where the party, together with its British, Belgian, and fellow Scandinavian colleagues, espoused a hard-line stance against any collaboration with the Communists. This set them in conflict with the organization's southern and east European members who were more open to such cooperation—a battle that the north Europeans ultimately won. None of the northern Social Democratic parties had any inter-

est in participating in the Comintern-initiated popular front strategy, nor did they have any desire to work together with the Communists on the Spanish question.[43] Instead, the International was used to launch a Social Democratic aid campaign for the Republic that was completely independent from the one set up by the Communists. As a result, rival Socialist and Communist collections were established not only in Sweden, but also in Luxemburg, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Britain, and France.[44] Social Democratic leaders viewed the International's assistance efforts as a constructive outlet for internal radical energies.[45]

Similarly to their French and Danish counterparts,[46] the Swedish Social Democrats likewise employed the International as a platform on which to profile themselves on the war. The SAP could usually second the organization's vaguely worded resolutions about Spain, without undermining official government policy.[47] The SAP hierarchy utilized *Landsorganisationen* (LO), its affiliated trade union movement, in much the same way; and LO-sponsored activism for the Republic served as another effective channel for the party to demonstrate its pro-Loyalist credentials.[48] Unlike its more conservative British equivalent, the Trade Union Congress (TUC),[49] LO played a leading role in the Spain collections,[50] and repeatedly assumed a far more militant stance on the war than either the party or the government[51]—a development that was also evident in Norway.[52] Even though these internal Social Democratic differences over Spain were not entirely unproblematic for the SAP leadership, LO's activities were still extremely valuable to the party in light of the pro-Republican sympathies of most Swedish workers.

In Sweden, the contest over Spain was far more fierce amongst the socialist parties than it ever was between the Left and the Right. Almost instantly, the pro-Republican agitation of the SAP's Marxist rivals created a considerable headache for the government, whose unwavering support for the Non-Intervention Agreement increasingly put it in a defensive position vis-à-vis the rest of the left.[53] Whereas the British Labour Party, as a party in opposition, could afford to turn against the agreement,[54] the Swedish Social Democratic-led government did not have this luxury. The SAP hierarchy's situation was made worse by its perceived need to keep reins on domestic antifascist opinion in order to avert unnecessary tensions with Nazi Germany. Neither policy was terribly well received within the Swedish workers' movement.[55]

From the very beginning the government's timidity on the Spanish question had been attacked by the rest of the Left, which consistently advocated a more Republican-friendly policy.[56] Hence, in Sweden, the domestic debate surrounding the war in effect centered on the question of how far the country should go to assist the Loyalists. Although the SAP's Marxist adversaries stopped short of calling for direct Swedish participation in the war, the Communists, the Syndicalists, and the Independent Socialist Party all demanded that Sweden sell weapons to the Republicans—a request that the cabinet felt was impossible to honor.[57] Since the Social Democrats' competitors were not responsible for the nation's

foreign policy, they were free to adopt a far more radical stance on the war.[58] This phenomenon was replicated throughout Western Europe, as many other Social Democratic parties also risked being outflanked on the left over the Spanish Civil War.[59]

The battle over Spain engulfed the entire Swedish left,[60] but the major contest pitted the Social Democrats against the Swedish Communist Party (*Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti*, SKP), which rapidly became the government's most strident critic. Just as Soviet assistance to the Republic had done much to boost the USSR's international image,[61] the SKP's Spain-related activities provided a huge public relations boon for the party.[62] As was true virtually everywhere in Europe,[63] in Sweden the Communists played a highly conspicuous role in the Spanish aid collections, and tried to profit politically from this effort.[64]

This was naturally a source of anxiety to the Social Democratic establishment,[65] whose prohibition against any collaboration with the Communists was not always followed on the local level.[66] (The British Labour Party experienced the same type of difficulties.)[67] Yet, from the Social Democratic leadership's perspective, Communist agitation would have been of little concern in itself, but for the fact that the SKP's militancy on the Spanish question was often shared by the SAP's own left wing, which was generally more positive about cooperating with the Communists.[68] As the bankruptcy of the Non-Intervention Agreement became more and more transparent, so did the problem of escalating internal dissent.[69]

Originally, the Social Democratic press and most party activists dutifully backed the government's decision to comply with the agreement,[70] but there had always been a few vocal detractors of this policy.[71] Georg Branting (the son of Sweden's first Social Democratic Prime Minister, Hjalmar Branting) led the dissenters. In addition to being a central figure in the Spanish aid campaigns,[72] Branting had at a very early stage expressed skepticism about the Non-Intervention Agreement, as well as an interest in the united front strategy—two positions that did little to ingratiate him to the SAP leadership.[73]

As party discipline over Spain started to break down by mid-1937, Branting's position on the war won ground within the party. Communist propaganda did much to incite Social Democratic unrest about the Spanish question, and, as time passed, louder and louder internal protests were directed against the country's continued adherence to the Non-Intervention Agreement. By now, criticism of the agreement had spread well beyond the party's left wing, and even to the normally loyal party press.[74] At this juncture, Social Democratic papers had also begun to question the government's handling of this issue, complaining that non-intervention only played into German and Italian hands.[75] Some party members went so far as to suggest that the cabinet should lift the arms embargo against the Republic. While the SAP hierarchy in the end stood fast by the Non-Intervention Agreement, this position became increasingly hard to defend, particularly after the British Labour Party renounced the agreement.[76]

To varying degrees, all European Social Democratic Parties were confronted with internal divisions over Spain as agitation favoring a more pro-Republican line eventually

gained momentum everywhere.[77] Even so, in comparison to their Belgian and French counterparts (who both came close to being torn apart by the war),[78] the Swedes experienced far less intraparty turmoil. The SAP's situation was more analogous to that of the British Labour Party; in both instances the chief concern was not so much about losing supporters to the Communists but about maintaining internal party discipline.[79] By international standards, then, the SAP hierarchy fared reasonably well at managing internal discontent over Spain, which never came close to reaching a crisis point in Sweden.

That said, the government's passive response to the war continued to elicit sharp criticism in Sweden.[80] Nor should the SAP leadership's relative success in handling this question obscure the fact that at the time the party was in an extremely compromised domestic position with regard to Spain. Nowhere was this as evident as in relation to its treatment of the so-called "volunteer question." In February 1937 the government affirmed the International Non-Intervention Committee's decision to ban all foreign combatants from participating in the Spanish Civil War. This meant that anyone who fought in the conflict would be subject to legal persecution upon his return to Sweden, and it also gave the state the right to prevent any potential volunteers from leaving for Spain. This decision was swiftly ratified by a nearly unanimous parliament. In the end, every Social Democratic representative fell in line behind the government's position, but some had done so only very grudgingly.[81]

Even though very few SAP activists fought in the Spanish Civil War, there was considerable Social Democratic support for the *Brigadistas*, particularly on the party's left wing, which regarded them as champions of the antifascist cause.[82] Georg Branting, in fact, became their most influential political patron,[83] and for this reason, a predominately Swedish company in the International Brigades was later named after him.[84] In view of the esteem in which the volunteers were held, the Social Democratic establishment immediately recognized that, for political reasons, it would be virtually impossible to enforce the legal prohibition against Swedish citizens serving in Spain.[85]

Above all, the Social Democratic hierarchy did not want to play into the SKP's hands by turning the Swedish *Brigadistas* into martyrs. Accordingly, the government not only facilitated the surviving volunteers' safe return to Sweden in late 1938 but also declined to persecute them for having gone to Spain in the first place.[86] (The Danish Social Democratic led government dealt with this matter in an identical manner.)[87] The volunteers' popularity within the workers movement consequently put the Social Democratic establishment in a tough spot.[88] Concerned about the Communists' successful exploitation of this issue,[89] the SAP leadership had little choice but to also embrace the *Brigadistas* despite its own grave reservations about them.[90] Such antagonism was likewise apparent in England, where many Labour Party officials held a negative view of the British volunteers.[91] It seems as if the SAP hierarchy's low opinion of the International Brigades was the rule, rather than the exception, among West European Social Democratic leaders.

Approximately 550 Swedes participated in the Spanish Civil War on the Republican

side.[92] None are known to have fought for Franco.[93] The first Swedes reached Spain at the end of 1936, where they were rapidly thrown into battle. Swedish volunteers notably saw action at the Battle of Guadalajara in February 1937, as well as in the failed Ebro offensive in July 1938.[94] A handful of Swedes joined the anarcho-syndicalists' militias,[95] but the overwhelming majority served in the Communist-sponsored International Brigades.[96] Specifically, most Swedes were deployed in either the Edgar Andre Battalion of the XI Brigade, or in the Thälmann Battalion of the XII Brigade, where, together with Norwegians, they briefly had their own company—the one that was named after Georg Branting.[97]

This association with a leading Social Democrat, however, in no way reflected the company's actual political composition.[98] Instead, most Swedes in the International Brigades were either members or known sympathizers of the Swedish Communist Party and its youth organization. The remainder were largely either politically nonaffiliated or belonged to the Independent Socialist Party, though there were a few Social Democrats as well.[99] Generally speaking, the Swedish volunteers were a fairly uniform group, both ideologically and socioeconomically. Politically however, the Swedes were not nearly as heterogeneous as, for instance, either the Italians or the Germans,[100] nor were there any of the intellectual elements that could be found especially among the American, British, and French troops.[101] The leftist intelligentsia might have ardently supported the Republican cause back home in Sweden, but virtually no intellectuals or white-collar professionals saw combat in Spain.[102] Rather, the Swedish *Brigadistas* had a distinctly proletarian identity—mostly an even mix of urban skilled and unskilled workers with seamen dominating.[103] As has been suggested, the group was almost just as homogeneous ideologically. If anything, Communists appear to have been overrepresented among the Swedes when compared to other nationalities within the Brigades.[104] The SKP certainly made no effort to hide the party's preeminence among the Swedish fighters in Spain; quite to the contrary, it became a central feature of its propaganda.[105]

Of the 550 Swedish volunteers, 164 were killed and another 64 remain unaccounted for, but the rest returned home.[106] Upon their return to Sweden, the *Brigadistas* were hailed as heroes by the entire workers' movement, and a number of prominent left-leaning Social Democrats actively took part in the homecoming celebrations. This enthusiasm was likewise evident within LO, and even in much of the Social Democratic press,[107] which hitherto, out of loyalty to the government, had little to say about the volunteers.[108] The Swedish experience was basically repeated in Denmark, where the returnees also received a warm welcome in Social Democratic quarters.[109] In Sweden, such positive sentiments even extended to parts of the Liberal press, not to mention almost all of the cultural elite.[110]

The Swedish *Brigadistas*' honeymoon period, however, proved to be short-lived. To begin with, many veterans of the Spanish conflict soon found themselves in dire economic straits. Even those who were not nursing serious wounds often had difficulty finding employment, as prospective employers often deemed them to be politically unreliable. The former

volunteers were, moreover, routinely subjected to police surveillance and harassment, and some were later interned as potential security threats during World War II.[111] For the next two decades not much was heard from the *Brigadistas*, at least not outside of Communist circles.[112]

Their marginalized position in Swedish society appears mostly to have been a reflection of the Communists' political irrelevance after the war. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 had prevented the SKP from capitalizing upon the goodwill that it had generated from its Spain-related activities,[113] and like everywhere in Western Europe, the party's brief postwar ascent was promptly undercut in February 1948 by the Soviet-sponsored coup in Czechoslovakia. Thereafter, the SKP was relegated to the fringe of Swedish politics, where it would stay until the onset of the détente.

It was only in conjunction with the political resurgence of the Communist Party in the late 1960s that the veterans of the Spanish Civil War became subject to renewed public curiosity, and the admiration of a new generation of young radicals.[114] This turn of events led to the publication in the 1970s of a series of new books about the former volunteers,[115] and also to, in 1977, the erection of the first public memorial in their honor. Ever since then, the Swedish left has shown consistent interest in the *Brigadistas.*[116]

This revival coincided with a general radicalization of the domestic political climate,[117] which to a large extent was fanned by growing popular opposition to the Vietnam War. In the 1960s and 1970s the Swedish Left frequently drew parallels between these two conflicts, both of which raised the flag of international solidarity. It was commonly asserted that Vietnam was the 1968 generation's equivalent of the Spanish Civil War.[118]

More to the point, the Communists had seized upon both conflicts as a means to discredit the SAP, and in the Vietnam era they once more attacked the Social Democratic establishment for not taking a stronger stance against "Fascist aggression."[119] The Communists' sudden desire to revisit the failings of Swedish foreign policy during the Spanish Civil War (and to celebrate the *Brigadistas*) must be understood in the context of their renewed attempt to detach the SAP's left wing.[120] In many respects, the Social Democrats and Communists internecine battle about Indochina was very reminiscent of their earlier contest over the Spanish Civil War.

This rivalry has very much informed the historiographical debate about the Swedish *Brigadistas*—a discussion that has consistently favored the Communists.[121] Kaj Björk's recent book on Sweden and the Spanish Civil War, *Spanien i svenska hjärtan* ("Spain in Swedish hearts"), aptly illustrates the Social Democrats' predicament.[122] Björk, a former International Secretary of the SAP, tries to disarm Communist criticism by stressing the Social Democrats' energetic contribution to the Spanish aid campaign. Björk further seeks to rehabilitate the party's image by drawing attention to Social Democratic radicals' record on the war.[123] The problem is that neither the latter's protests against the Non-Intervention Agreement, nor the party's role in providing humanitarian assistance to the Republic carried

the same political weight as that of those Swedes who were willing to make the ultimate sacrifice in Spain.[124]

As for those who were (i.e., the *Brigadistas*), Björk accentuates Social Democratic involvement in the Brigades while simultaneously minimizing the Swedish volunteers' overall significance.[125] And although the government's apologists have fired back at the Communists, they have by and large avoided any direct criticism of the volunteers.[126] This is because the SAP has also found the latter's legacy to be politically useful,[127] which was underscored by the party's decision to help fund the 1977 sculpture honoring the Spanish veterans.[128] That the Swedish-dominated company in the International Brigades was named after Branting unquestionably made it much easier for the SAP to appropriate the *Brigadistas'* memory to its own ends.

Perhaps the best indicator of the volunteers' value to the entire Swedish left is the sheer volume of works that have been written about them. The amount of attention that has been lavished upon the Swedish *Brigadistas* is completely out of proportion to their actual import. Their numbers do not justify the degree of attention they have received, especially when compared to the estimated 8,000 Swedish volunteers that served in the Finnish Winter War of 1939–40,[129] who so far have elicited much less interest in Sweden, even though the Finnish Winter War unleashed far greater popular passion among the Swedes than the Spanish conflict ever did.[130] In all probability this discrepancy is accounted for by the fact that the Swedes who went to Finland were, with few exceptions, "Whites," not "Reds."[131] Swedish public recollection of the Winter War, furthermore, has been clouded by Finland's subsequent military collaboration with the Third Reich during the Continuation War of 1941–44. For these reasons, the Swedish participants in the Finnish Winter War did not have the same value to the postwar left as the veterans of the Spanish Civil War.

The left's shared interest in upholding the *Brigadistas'* legacy has meant that the SAP has been unwilling to question unadulterated Communist propaganda about their factual experiences in Spain. The alleged virtue of the volunteers' actions and motives has become an unassailable dogma of the Swedish left, creating an oversimplified and conveniently sanitized historical portrait of them.

In Sweden, the principal conduit for the orthodox Soviet narrative on the Brigades was initially the testimonials of Swedish and Norwegian Communist sympathizers who had visited the front lines in Spain,[132] as well the volunteers' own writings. The first such accounts were published during or immediately after the war,[133] though a large number also came out following the rediscovery of the *Brigadistas* in the Vietnam era.[134] Like elsewhere in the West,[135] the overwhelming majority of these memoirs loyally repeated the Communist party line about what had transpired in Spain. This was to be fully expected, since, in other countries, those few veterans who later spoke out against Soviet abuses in Spain were branded as traitors and ostracized by their former comrades.[136] When one considers the volunteers' typically dismal personal circumstances following the war,[137] it would have been surprising

indeed had more of them turned their backs on the party by disputing publicly the Soviet version of events. Besides, it must be remembered that many—if not the majority—of the foreign veterans of the Brigades remained ardent Stalinists well after the war.[138] It is therefore quite understandable that the *Brigadistas'* own memoirs are less than forthcoming in many instances.[139]

What is more troubling is that ensuing Swedish studies of this topic have seldom attempted to provide a more balanced picture of the volunteers' wartime experiences. The veterans themselves actually tend to be more frank about what really took place within the Brigades than their latter-day admirers.[140] Swedish scholarly and journalistic works on this subject, for instance, usually overlook Soviet abuses within the Brigades. Very little if any attention is paid to NKVD-sponsored terror behind Republican lines,[141] and not much is said about the Comintern's enforcement of harsh discipline among the foreign forces in Spain.[142] Most Swedish studies likewise never consider the possibility that these troops were duped into serving Stalin's—not the Republic's—best interests.[143] This is somewhat perplexing, since outside of Sweden it is widely acknowledged that the International Brigades' propagandistic value to the Soviet Union far outweighed their military significance to the Republic.[144]

Along similar lines, in Sweden there has been very little mention of internal ethnic tensions or disciplinary problems among the Brigades,[145] both of which, according to Soviet military advisors, were major recurring problems.[146] In reality, it did not take long before morale broke down among the foreign volunteers, which is perfectly natural in light of their high casualty rates.[147] To this, one might add that many men had at first joined the Brigades with the belief that they would only serve a six-month tour, only to later find out that they would not be released from service until the conflict was over. These two developments, along with rising discontent about the Comintern's heavy-handed conduct in Spain, resulted in a large number of desertions.[148]

Even though Swedes also were known to have deserted from the Brigades,[149] Swedish works typically skim over this fact.[150] There has also been no substantive discussion about either the quality of consent of the Communist volunteers who went to Spain (who in most other countries were simply ordered by the party to go)[151] or of the Swedish *Brigadistas'* personal motives more generally. In Sweden, the volunteers' antifascist commitment has been accepted without question even though no such uniformity of opinion existed among other ethnic groups in the Brigades. A majority of the foreign fighters were surely ideologically motivated, but not all. According to one Swedish *Brigadista*, only 60 percent of the men he met in the Brigades had enlisted for political reasons, while the rest appeared to have very little idea of why they were there.[152] Some foreigners had evidently enlisted in hopes of either finding adventure or merely escaping misfortune at home.[153] The available evidence suggests that like-minded considerations caused a few Swedes to leave for Spain as well.[154]

In sum, virtually all Swedish studies on this subject[155]—including academic ones—

paint a largely uncritical picture of the *Brigadistas*, which not only attributes to them the best possible intentions, but also idealizes their exploits in Spain.[156] Those who did not conform to the propagandized portrait of the heroic and highly politicized volunteer have been weeded out from the collective history of the Brigades. The volunteers who left Spain completely disillusioned with the international Communist movement—which was a fairly common experience in other countries[157]—are given no voice in Swedish accounts about the Spanish Civil War.[158] Ironically, one of the main shortcomings of this fictitious version of events is that it does the former volunteers an enormous disservice. The performance of those who did serve with distinction in Spain would become all the more admirable if placed in the truthful context of draconian discipline, soaring causality rates, and widespread desertion among the Brigades. Instead, the Swedish *Brigadistas* have retroactively been turned into political symbols that have little bearing on historical reality.

In other parts of Europe, however, a more judicious interpretation of the International Brigades has recently emerged[159] (in no small part due to the opening of the Soviet archives).[160] Although some modest steps in this direction have been taken in Sweden during the past decade,[161] this progress is still far from satisfactory. In all likelihood, the chief reason that this larger trend has yet not made itself more felt in Sweden has to do with the myopic nature of Swedish historiography, which has often been slow to respond to new currents in international scholarship. Yet, it likewise stems from the fact that the Swedish Right has not contributed in any meaningful way to the debate about the former volunteers,[162] and consequently there has been no counterpart to the Left's interpretation of them. This is because Swedish Conservatives have had little incentive to involve themselves in discussions about the *Brigadistas*, whom they at any rate could not have cared less about.[163]

This was a discernable trend everywhere in Western Europe, where after the Second World War, the Right characteristically has been silent about Spain. This was in part because Conservative support for Franco had collapsed as early as mid-1937; that is, well before the conflict was over.[164] In the wake of the German bombing of Guernica, even former sympathizers such as Winston Churchill began to turn their backs on the Nationalist cause.[165] In the postwar period, moreover, the Right's earlier backing of the Non-Intervention Agreement was now discredited as appeasement.[166] Nor were West European conservatives at this point, eager to stick up for Franco's Spain, which in the early postwar years became a pariah state for its previous association with the Axis Powers. With all of this in mind, from a conservative point of view, the less that was said about the Spanish Civil War, including the International Brigades, the better.

It is more difficult to understand why West European Social Democrats have been so reticent to debunk the Soviet mythologized portrait of the Brigades, given their historic enmity toward the Communists. In part this presumably reflected a lingering reluctance to place Stalin's atrocities completely on par with Hitler's. While the Third Reich was considered utterly evil in the eyes of West European Social Democrats, the Soviet system was fre-

quently regarded as being more misguided than inherently wicked. It appears that the shared roots and ideological affinity between evolutionary and revolutionary socialism at times impeded the democratic left's ability to face up fully to the horrors of Stalinist Russia.[167] This tendency was particularly manifest in relation to the Spanish Civil War. Although Soviet brutality in Spain was well known in the West, it was never systematically reported in the Social Democratic press.[168] In hindsight, there can be little doubt that, at the time, the desire to maintain a united antifascist front discouraged a more vigorous Social Democratic critique of the USSR's behavior during the war.

In the postwar era the Social Democrats' continuing unwillingness to contest the official Soviet narrative was also rooted in the International Brigades' residual popularity among their own followers. Sweden was by no means the only place where the *Brigadistas* were lionized upon their return home,[169] nor was it the only country where the postwar celebration of the Brigades transcended Social Democratic-Communist divisions over the Cold War.[170] West European Social Democratic Parties simply did not stand to gain much by trying to impugn publicly the volunteers' historical legacy.

The International Brigades' attractiveness to the postwar European Left as a whole most likely results from the reality that there are historically so few other concrete illustrations of international solidarity at which to point. Since this is a highly cherished socialist ideal that in practice has hardly ever been realized, this has naturally had the effect of making the volunteers' sacrifices in Spain all the more precious. If anything, twentieth-century European history has been littered by examples of the failure to achieve transnational working class solidarity. Especially while in power, leftist parties have rarely if ever prioritized international solidarity over narrow national self interest,[171] as was aptly illustrated by the West European Social Democrats' collective failure to save the Spanish Republic.[172]

In the Swedish case, the appeal of the International Brigades probably likewise lies in that it is one of the few memories that the Social Democrats and Communists can both rally around. The value of such common symbols should not be underestimated, particularly once the Social Democrats in the 1960s turned away from any further collaboration with the bourgeois parties, in favor of the Communists. Ever since the 1970 election, every Social Democratic government has had to rely at least tacitly on Communist parliamentary support in order to govern.

Looking back, the Swedish Left has needed to lean on the International Brigades' legacy more than most. For unlike the majority of its West European counterparts,[173] the Swedish left could not employ its role in the anti-Nazi resistance as a basis for its postwar legitimacy. As elsewhere, this legitimacy was nonetheless largely built around an antifascist identity.[174] By default this has served to greatly enhance the political significance of the Swedish *Brigadistas*. One might surmise that this goes a long way in explaining the American Left's obsession with the Abraham Lincoln Brigade as well.[175] A comparable point might also be made about the British Left's persistent interest in the Brigades. For in contrast to

the United Kingdom's record of stoic wartime defiance against Nazi Germany, the memory of the British *Brigadistas*' sacrifices in Spain need not be shared with the Conservatives. This monopoly, in turn, surely accounts for much of the American, British, and Swedish Left's respective fascination with the Brigades. In many other Western countries this has been less of an issue for the Left, as the latter has been able to construct its postwar legitimacy around other, more powerful, antifascist symbols. Conversely, if one looks at Denmark, for example, the former volunteers have received far less attention than their Swedish counterparts,[176] even though the Danes contributed approximately as many men to the Brigades (around 500).[177] This is because in Denmark the *Brigadistas* have been overshadowed by the World War II resistance movement in the postwar hagiography of the Danish left. Deprived of this alternative, the Swedes have had to resort to the few antifascist fighters it had—however imperfect the former volunteers might be from a Social Democratic point of view.

Although this was not an exclusively Swedish problem (since after World War II most Social Democratic parties had weaker antifascist records to stand on than their domestic Communist rivals),[178] the SAP's relationship to the International Brigades is further complicated by the country's wartime concessions toward Nazi Germany. Sweden's policy of accommodation vis-à-vis the Third Reich—a policy pursued by a Social Democrat–dominated coalition government—obviously has not always been easy to reconcile with the SAP's postwar anti-Fascist profile. This historical reality becomes even more problematic when combined with the party's meek response to the Spanish Civil War, as they together constitute an unmistakable pattern of appeasement. It is no coincidence that after the Second World War the Swedish Social Democrats became one of the most forceful European critics of the Franco regime, to which Olof Palme once famously referred as "those damn murderers."[179] (This policy must be viewed as an attempt, either conscious or subconscious, to compensate for the party's failure to stand up to the fascist threat in 1930s and 1940s.)

This lingering preoccupation with the International Brigades well after the end of the Cold War should similarly be interpreted as a sign of a growing disillusionment among aging radicals with the pragmatic American and European-oriented character of the country's current foreign policy. The Swedish Left's sentimentality about the "good fight" might thus also be understood as a longing back to a time when ideological beliefs still meant something. This last point, in turn, accounts for why the Left's sentimental attachment to the *Brigadistas* has outlived its original political purpose, not only in Sweden, but I suspect elsewhere as well.

NOTES

1. George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context 1931–1939* (New York: Longman, 1995), 1–4, 243–52; and Michael Alpert, *A New International History of the Spanish Civil War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 1–2.

2. Jacques Delperrie de Bayac, *Les Brigades Internationales* (Paris: Fayard, 1968), 386; and Hugh

Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War. Revised and Enlarged Edition* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 982–983. Thomas estimates that another 5,000 foreigners served in the POUM- and CNT-sponsored militias. Andreu Castells, meanwhile, puts the total number of foreign recruits for the Republic at 59,000, but he does not know how many men eventually served in Spain. Andreu Castells, *Las brigades internacionales en la guerra de España* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1974), 383.

3. Tom Buchanan, "Anti-Fascism and Democracy in the 1930's," *European History Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (2002): 40; and Jim Fyrth, *The Signal Was Spain: The Spanish Aid Movement in Britain, 1936–1939* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 308–10.

4. Fearghal McGarry, "Ireland and the Spanish Civil War," *History Ireland* 9, no. 3 (2001): 35–36, 40; and Robert Stradling, *The Irish and the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939* (Manchester: Mandolin, 1999), 1–2, 203–12.

5. Even after the end of the Cold War, the publication of new academic works about the International Brigades shows no signs of dissipating. For a few recent examples, see Nancy Tsou and Len Tsou, "The Asian Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War: A Report," *Science and Society* 68, no. 3 (2004): 342–50; Remi Skotelsky, "L'Espagne après L'Espagne: la mémoire des Brigades Internationales," *Materiaux pour l'historie de Notre Temps* 70 (2003): 27–23; Fernando Vera Jiménez, "Cubanos en la Guerra Civil Española: La Presencia de Voluntarios en las Brigadas Internacionales y el Ejército Popular de la República," *Revista Complutense de Historia de América* 25 (1999): 295–321; and Michael Uhl, "Die Intentionalen Brigaden Im Spiegel Neuer Dokumente," *Intenationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegung* 34, no. 4 (1999): 486–518. In view of the enormous wealth of material on the subject, this study mostly limits itself to English and Swedish language studies about the northern European democracies. Other parts of Europe and the U.S. are, however, at times employed for comparative purposes.

6. For specific illustrations, see either Lawrin Armstrong and Mark Leier, "Canadians in the Spanish Civil War," *Beaver* 77, no. 5 (1997): 19, 23–24; or V.G. Kiernan's preface in Ian McDougall's book, *Voices from the Spanish Civil War: Personal Recollections of Scottish Volunteers in Republican Spain* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1986), v–xi. This favorable bias is likewise manifest in most literary works about the Brigades. Robert Stradling, *History and Legend: Writing the International Brigades* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003), vii–ix, 1–2.

7. Michael W. Jackson, "The Army of Strangers: The International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 32, no.1 (1986): 105; and Esenwein and Shubert, 154.

8. Eric Hobsbawn, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World 1914–1991* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 162; and Burnett Bolloten, *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 289. More specifically, many foreigners joined the International Brigades in hopes of helping to erect a Communist government in Spain.

9. R. Dan Richardson, "Foreign Fighters in Spanish Militias: The Spanish Civil War 1936–1939," *Military Affairs* 40 (1976): 7; and James Hopkins, *Into the Heart of Fire: The British in the Spanish Civil War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), ix–xiv, 7–11.

10. Vincent Brome, for instance, harshly criticizes Soviet behavior in relation to the Brigades, while simultaneously offering a sympathetic portrait of the foreign volunteers. He asserts that their idealism was exploited by the Comintern. Vincent Brome, *The International Brigades: Spain 1936–1939* (New York: William Morrow and Co, 1966), 14–28, 271–73. See also Verle B. Johnston, *Legions of Babel: The International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967).

11. Ronald Radosh, Mary R. Habeck, and Grigory Sevostianov, eds., *Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union and the Spanish Civil War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), xv-xxv.

12. François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the 20th Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 245–64, 353–54.

13. Stanley Payne, "Soviet Anti-Fascism: Theory and Practice, 1921–1945," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4, no. 2 (2003): 35, 55–56.

14. Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy. The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 353, 361, 411; and Stephen Padget and William Paterson, *A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe* (New York: Longman, 1991), 10.

15. Generally speaking, exiled Socialist Parties, such as the Italian one, were more willing to contribute

men to the International Brigades than their northern European counterparts. Lawrence Brown, "The Great Betrayal? European Socialists and Humanitarian Relief during the Spanish Civil War," *Labour History Review* 67, no.1 (2002): 89.

16. Sweden was, in fact, one of the original twenty-six signatories of the International Non-Intervention Agreement. In addition to providing a number of control officers, Sweden also served on the Chairman of Non-Intervention Committee's Special Subcommittee. Because Sweden had a substantial arms industry, the Western Great Powers wanted it participate actively in the Committee. William E. Watters, *An International Affair: Non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939* (New York: Exposition Press, 1971), 57–59, 71, 158, 211.

17. J. Bowyer Bell, "Ireland and the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939," *Studica Hibernica* 9 (1969): 162–63; and Thomas, 398.

18. Kaj Björk, *Spanien i svenska hjärtan* (Stockholm: Bäckströms Förlag, 2001), 31, 52–53, 98–99; and Bertil Lundvik, *Solidaritet och partitaktik. Den svenska arbetarrörelsen och spanska inbördeskriget 1936–1939* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1980), 155–56, 158–60, 187.

19. That Blum had been the one to propose the Non-Intervention Agreement was certainly also appreciated by the British Tory government, as this served to neutralize the Labour Party's objections to this policy. M.D. Gallagher, "Leon Blum and the Spanish Civil War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 6, no. 3 (1971): 56–64.

20. Björk, 27–28, 33–35; and Lundvik, 155.

21. Alf W. Johansson and Torbjörn Norman, "Sweden's Security and World Peace: Social Democracy and Foreign Policy," in *Creating Social Democracy: A Century of the Social Democratic Labour Party in Sweden*, ed. Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin and Klas Åmark (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988), 346–47; and Björk, 28–35, 81–82, 91.

22. Kersti Blidberg, *Splittrad gemenskaKontakter och samarbete inom nordisk socialdemokratisk arbetarrörelse 1931–1945* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1984), 61–69; Kjeld Arne Hansen, 'Socialdemokratiet og den spanske borgerkrig' *Arbejder Historie* 26 (1986): 8–9, 15; and Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen, *Tro eller blændværk? Danmark og Den Spanske Borgerkrig 1936–1939. En undersøgelse af den danske presses og den danske regerings holdning* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 2001), 30–32, 38–42.

23. Raymond Carr, *The Spanish Tragedy: The Civil War in Perspective* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 228–29. In many countries there was a strong tendency to project native domestic conflicts on to the situation in Spain. For example, in Ireland, the Spanish Civil War was typically interpreted as a religious rather than a political conflict. McGarry, "Ireland and the Spanish Civil War," 36.

24. Lundvik, 36–44.

25. Richard Järdel, *Kämpande solidaritet* (Stockholm: ARAB, 1996),146; and Björk, 64, 132–133, 128, 154. While this view was not necessarily shared by the Social Democratic leadership, it, too, sought to protect the country's trade interests in Spain, which by the war's end spoke in favor of normalizing relations with the new Nationalist government. Marcos Contera Carlomagno, *Sverige och spanska inbördeskriget* (Lund: Historiska media, 1999).

26. Lundvik, 21–25.

27. Eley, 276. Ireland and the Irish Labour Party were the main exceptions to this rule. Fearghal McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War* (Cork: Cork University Press, 1999), 1–7, 85–106, 183–90.

28. Järdel, 145–54.

29. Robert Stradling, for example, argues that while Welsh public opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of the Republic, this sympathy nonetheless proved to be rather transient. In the end, pro-Republican agitation in Wales was mostly an elite affair. Robert Stradling, *Wales and the Spanish Civil War: The Dragon's Dearest Cause?* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2004), 23–31, 100, 171. I suspect that a similar point can be made about Swedish public opinion as well.

30. Kevin Foster, "Between the Bullet and the Lie: Intellectuals and the War," in *The Spanish Civil War: A Cultural and Historical Reader*, ed. Alun Kenwood (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993), 20–23; and Carr, *The Spanish Tragedy*, 232–35.

31. Lennart Lundberg, *Svenskarna i spanska inbördeskriget 1936–1939* (Göteborg: Tre Böker Förlag,

2001), 110; Järdel, 147–49; and Björk, 118.

32. Anna-Lena Lodenius, *Tvåfrontskrig–hur facket agerade mot nazism och kommunism före 1960* (Stockholm: Hjalmarson and Högberg, 2002), 80; Björk, 38, 79; and Lundvik, 29–30, 108–9.
33. Jean LeCoutre, *Léon Blum* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 334–35; and Gallagher, 62–63.
34. Björk, 17; and Lundvik, 43. Fearghal McGarry makes the same argument about Ireland. McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War*, 211.
35. This difference was most easily discernable in Liberal and Conservative newspapers' conflicting assessments of the war. Jonas Reiner, "Spanska inbördeskriget i tre svenska dagstidningar" (master's thesis, C-Uppsats University of Stockholm, 1975); Stefan Dahlin, "Den svenska lokalpressen och spanska inbördeskriget," in *Presshistorisk årsbok 2005* (Stockholm: Svensk presshistorisk förening, 2005), 81–101; and Björk, 25–26, 31, 35, 105, 115, 119–23.
36. Helené Lööw, *Nazismen i Sverige 1924–1979* (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2004), 13–36, 77–117, 241–45, 256–57; and Bernt Hagvet, "On the Fringe: Swedish Fascism 1920–1945," in *Who Were the Fascists?: Social Roots of European Fascism*, ed. Stein Ugelvik, Bernt Hagvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust, with the assistance of Gerhard Botz and others (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 715–42.
37. José M. Sánchez, *The Spanish Civil War as Religious Tragedy* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 157–83; K.W. Watkins, *Britain Divided. The Effect of the Spanish Civil War on British Political Opinion* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963), 1–2; and Alpert, 128–29.
38. Herbert Tingsten, *Svensk utrikesdebatt mellan världskrigen* (Stockholm: KB Bokförlag, 1944), 248; and Lundvik, 155, 160.
39. Björk, 16–17; and Lundvik, 160.
40. LeCoutre, 306–7, 358.
41. Björk, 24, 30–31, 35, 40, 45; and Lundvik, 11–14, 21.
42. Lodenius, 79; Björk, 23–24, 98–99; and Lundvik, 14.
43. Christine Collette, "The Labour Party and the Labour and Socialist International: The Challenge of Communism and Fascism," *Labour History Review* 58, no. 1 (1993): 31; Brown, 94; and Blidberg, 61–69. Generally speaking, the Norwegian Social Democrats had a more positive attitude about collaborating with the Communists on Spain than the International's other northern European members did.
44. Lundvik, 46–51, 102–4; and Brown, 83–99.
45. Tom Buchanan, *The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 220; and Björk, 40–41.
46. Hansen, 12–13; and Watkins, 178–79.
47. By 1938, however, the International's stance on Spain had grown much more militant, which placed the SAP in a defensive position vis-à-vis many other member parties. Lundvik, 171–72. At this juncture, disagreements over Spain had already created a serious fissure within the International. Thomas, 352.
48. Johansson and Norman, 347; and Tingsten, 249. On at least one occasion, however, the SAP's representatives to the International overstepped their authority, endorsing a more militant position than the government was willing to adopt. Björk, 140–43.
49. Buchanan, *The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement*, 220, 227–28.
50. Lodenius, 79–81; and Lundvik, 52–56, 91.
51. Lundvik, 169–70.
52. Blidberg, 66–67.
53. Björk, 143; and Lundvik, 186. For an example of contemporary criticism of the government's abidance to the Non-Intervention Agreement, see Holger Carlsson, *Sverige ett nytt Spanien?* (Stockholm: Federativs Förlag, 1938).
54. Fyrth, 37. The Labour Party eventually even went so far as to call for British weapon sales to the Republic. Watkins, 166–67.
55. Johansson and Norman, 346–48.

56. Lundvik, 40–42, 185–87.

57. Tingsten, 248; and Lundvik, 63, 83, 156, 173–74.

58. Björk, 64, 71, 90, 144; and Lundvik, 183.

59. Nathanael Greene, *Crisis and Decline: The French Socialist Party in the Popular Front Era* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 173–74, 181; Watkins, 189; and McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War*, 184.

60. Björk, 59, 73, 129–30; and Lundvik, 45–65. Like elsewhere in Europe, the conflict over Spain between the Swedish Communists, Syndicalists, and Socialist Party was without question as intense as the one between the Communists and the Social Democrats, it just had far less political significance.

61. Hobsbawn, 159.

62. Björk, 125; and Lundvik, 106, 110, 176, 178–88.

63. Brown, 84; and Fyrth, 22.

64. Lodenius, 80; Järdel, 148; and Lundvik, 25–26, 63–65, 71, 79–81, 89–90. In addition to the party's active involvement in the Swedish Help Committee for Spain's work (which was a nonpartisan organization that collected monies for humanitarian aid to Republic), the SKP had its own collection fund, *Röda Hjälpen* (Red Help).

65. Johansson and Norman, 347; and Björk, 23, 110, 125, 188.

66. Lodenius, 80; Björk, 37–39, 97, 133; and Lundvik, 66–70.

67. Hywel Francis, "Welsh Miners and the Spanish Civil War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 5, no. 3 (1970): 178–79; and Collette, 31–32.

68. Björk, 17–18, 101–2; and Lundvik, 15, 31, 64.

69. Johansson and Norman, 347–48; and Björk, 59, 81, 112.

70. Lundvik, 32, 159.

71. Lodenius, 79; and Björk, 25.

72. Järdel, 147; and Lodenius, 79.

73. Björk, 129; and Lundvik, 106–34, 168.

74. Björk, 112, 124, 128; and Lundvik, 123, 165–69.

75. Tingsten, 407; and Björk, 112.

76. Lundvik, 63, 170, 177.

77. Carr, *The Spanish Tragedy*, 231–32; Watkins, 141–52; and Hansen, 20–21.

78. Greene, 78–136, 158, 167, 171–84; LeCoutre, 330, 335–39; and Brown, 94.

79. Buchanan, *The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement*, 35.

80. Göte Nilsson, *Svenskar i spanska inbördeskriget* (Stockholm: PA Nordstedt and Söners Förlag, 1972), 5, 15; Lundberg, 99; Järdel, 145; and Lundvik, 164.

81. Lundberg, 150; Nilsson, 151–153; Björk, 69, 74; and Lundvik, 156–58. The Communists had also supported the ban since it was part of the Non-Intervention Agreement, which the USSR still officially backed. Only the Independent Socialist Party's representatives voted against it.

82. Lodenius, 77, 81; Nilsson, 155–56; and Björk, 53–54, 107.

83. Lundberg, 87, 150; and Nilsson, 151.

84. Björk, 53–54. Clement Attlee, a prominent British Labour M.P., had the equivalent honor bestowed on him. Tom Buchanan, *Britain and the Spanish Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 83; and Thomas, 609–11.

85. Nilsson, 156–58; and Björk, 64, 160–61.

86. Lundvik, 131–32.

87. Hansen, 18–19; and Lundgreen-Nielsen, 334–38.

88. It is of interest that that this was also a serious problem for the Independent Socialist Party, which

was likewise reluctant to openly criticize the Communist-dominated International Brigades. Bernt Kennerström, "Socialistiska Partiet och spanska inbördeskriget – den problematiska principfastheten," *Arkiv, För studier i arbetarrörelsens historia* 6 (1974): 39–42.

89. Lundvik, 128, 134, 140, 152–53, 176.

90. Björk, 169; and Nilsson, 156–57.

91. Watkins, 175–76.

92. Lundberg, 8–9.

93. In addition to regular Italian, German, and Portuguese troops, an estimated total of 1,000 Irish, British, Romanian and White Russian volunteers fought on the Nationalists' side. Judith Keene, *Fighting For Franco: International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain during the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939* (New York: Leicester University Press, 2001).

94. Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Soviet War Veterans Committee, *International Solidarity with the Spanish Republic 1936–1939* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 175–84.

95. Ivan Falundi, *I spanska folkets tjänst* (Stockholm: Federativs Förlag, 1937); and Nils Lätt, *Som milisman och kollektivbonde i Spanien* (Stockholm: Federativs Förlag, 1938).

96. Björk, 51–52, 79–80; and Lundvik, 139–40.

97. Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Soviet War Veterans Committee,277; and Lundberg, 64–68, 83–87. However, a few Swedes that had previously emigrated to the U.S. served in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade instead. Arvid Rundberg, *Frisco-Per* (Stockholm: Fram Bokförlag, 1985), 227–28.

98. Björk, 53–54; and Lundvik, 123, 130, 136.

99. Järdel, 32; and Lundvik, 123.

100. Arnold Kramer, "Germans against Hitler: The Thaelmann Brigade," *Journal of Contemporary History* 4, no. 2 (1969): 68; and Jackson, "The Army of Strangers," 111.

101. Peter Carroll, *The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Americans in the Spanish Civil War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 15; Esenwein and Shubert, 156; and Buchanan, *Britain and the Spanish Civil War*, 157.

102. The novelist Peder Sjögren appears to have been the only exception. In the early fall of 1936, even prior to the establishment of the International Brigades, Sjögren fought briefly in Spain before being wounded and sent back to Sweden. He provides a fictionalized account of his wartime experience in his 1937 novel, *Bar barbar* (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1937).

103. Nilsson, 29; Lundberg, 44, 57, 158–71; and Lundvik, 122, 136, 152.

104. Hugh Thomas estimates that approximately 60% of the men in the International Brigades were active Communists prior to the war and that perhaps as many as another 20% joined the party while in Spain, 455. Although the exact percentage of Communists cannot be ascertained, in the Swedish case the initial percentage was probably closer to 90%. Nilsson, 30; and Lundvik, 123, 136, 152.

105. Claes-Göran Jönsson, "SKP och den svenska spanienrörelsen," *Arkiv, För studier i arbetarrörelsens historia*, 4 (1974): 14. For specific illustrations, see SKP, *Svenska frontkämpar i spanien. Den internationella brigadens tappra hjältar* (Stockholm: Arbetarkulturs Förlag, 1937); andPer Meurling, *Den Blodiga Arenan. En bok om det spanska kriget* (Stockholm: Universal Press, 1937).

106. Lundberg, 8–9.

107. Björk, 169; Nilsson, 263–64; Lodenius, 81; and Lundvik, 85, 88, 128, 130–31, 133. LO, in fact, even provided economic assistance to the returning volunteers. In fact, even well before this, LO had contributed significant amounts to *Frontkämparnas stödfond*. This was a Communist-sponsored fund that had been established in October 1937 to aide the Swedish combatants in Spain.

108. Lundberg, 151.

109. Lundgreen-Nielsen, 325–28, 440.

110. Åsa Risberg, *Diktarnas krig.De svenska författarna och spanska inbördeskriget* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1986), 104–16.

111. Järdel, 33; and Lundberg, 126–32, 136–39.

112. A couple of shorter articles about the volunteers did, however, appear in 1956 in conjunction with the commemoration of the war's 20-year anniversary. See the special anniversary issue of *Clarté*, 2 (1956): 2–8; and Axel Österberg, "De kämpade mot Franco," *Julfacklan* (1956): 4–7. Österberg's article is of particular interest, since *Julfacklan* was a Social Democratic publication. The article noticeably omits the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Swedish *Bridgadistas* were Communists.

113. Jönsson, 18–20: and Lundvik, 183–85, 188.

114. At the time, this trend was also discernable in other West European countries. Yngvar Ustvedt, *Arbeider under våpen. Norske frivillige i den spanska borgerkrig* (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1975), 12.

115. Nilsson, *Svenskar i spanska inbördeskriget* (1972); and Arvid Runeberg, *En svensk arbetares memoarer* (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1973). See also list of memoirs in note 134 below. In addition to these new nonfiction works, a number of novels about the Swedish *Brigadistas* came out in this period, most of which also cast them in a heroic light. Risberg, 184–88.

116. Rundberg, *Frisco-Per*, (1985); Kerstin Gustafsson and Mekki Karlsson, *Spaniens sak var vår* (Stockholm: Svenska Fredskommittén, 1992); Järdel, (1996); and Lundberg, (2001).

117. This interest was by no means exclusively limited to the *Brigadistas* but extended to the war as a whole. Starting in the 1970s there was suddenly a sharp jump in new scholarly studies about Sweden and the Spanish Civil War. Jönsson, (1974); Kennerström, (1974); Reiner, (1975); Isabel Borrás, "Svenskarna och det spanska inbördeskriget. En bibilografi," (master's thesis, University College of Borås, 1977); Karin Sjöstrand, "Svenska författares engagemang i spanska inbördeskriget," (master's thesis, University College of Borås, 1979); and Göran Henrikson, "Spaniens sak var vår. Solidaritetsrörelsen i Örebrolän 1936–1939," in *Folkrörelser i Örebrolän. Människor och miljöer* (Örebro: Örebroläns Museum, 1979), 61–87. In these years, the Swedes' heightened interest in the *Brigadistas* (and the war) was further bolstered by reports of the Franco regime's escalating repression against domestic dissidents.

118. Sten Cederqvist, "Solidaritet–en bok med sikte på opinonsbildning, debatt och solidaritetsaktioner," in *Solidaritet. Antifascistisk Årsbok 1968–69*, ed. Kjell E. Johansson (Uddevalla: Bo Cavefors Förlag, 1968), 7–10. This parallel was also often drawn by the former volunteers themselves. See, for instance, Sixten Rogeby, "Internationella brigaderna i Spanien–ett 30-årsminne," *Tidsignal*, 12 (1966): 6–7: and Rolf Skandevall, "Vi förlorade Spanien, men Vietnam ska segra," *Vietnambulletinen*, 3 (1972): 17–22, 26.

119. For specific illustrations, see VPK, *Spaniens sak är vår* (Göteborg: Proletärkultur, 1975), 16–26; and Sixten Rogeby, *De stupade för Spaniens demokrati* (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1977), 16–17, 137–43.

120. Carl-Gustaf Scott, "A good offense is the best defense: Swedish Social Democracy, Europe, and the Vietnam War" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2005).

121. For a specific illustration, see Arne Larsson, *Knuten näve* (Göteborg: Bokförlaget Skrivare i Marginalen, 1995), 85–86. Larsson, a former volunteer, complains about the Social Democrats' attempt to usurp the memory of the Swedish *Brigadistas*, not least in light of the latter's dismal record on the war.

122. Here it should be noted that even Björk is critical of the government's timid approach to the war. Björk, 146, 157.

123. Björk, 17, 25, 37–39, 52–54, 133, 152–53, 176–77.

124. Lundvik, 164.

125. Björk, 54, 107.

126. Lars Olsson and Lars Ekdahl, *Klass i rörelse. Arbetarrörelsen i svensk samhällsutveckling* (Stockholm: ARAB, 2002), 93; and Björk, 18–22.

127. For a specific illustration of a Social Democratic tribute to the Swedish *Brigadistas*, see Pierre Schori, *Dokument inifrån. Sverige och storpolitiken i omvälvingarnas tid* (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1992), 208.

128. Sixten Rogeby, *De stupade för Spaniens demokrati* (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1977), 5–6. In 1976–1977, the Social Democratic majority in Stockholm's municipal government threw its sup-

port behind a Communist initiative to build a memorial for those Swedes who had fallen while in the service of the Spanish Republic.

129. William Trotter, *The Winter War: The Russo-Finnish War of 1939–40* (London: Arum Press, 2002), 198.

130. Lundvik, 93.

131. Lars Ericson, *Svenska frivilliga. Militära uppdrag i utlandet under 1800- och 1900-talen* (Lund: Historiska Media, 1996), 98–99, 118.

132. Nordahl Grieg, *Hosskandinaviervidfronten* (Stockholm: Sveriges Kommunistiska Ungdomsförbund, 1937); Knut Olsson, *Solidaritetens soldater. Med en internationell solidaritetsdelegation i Spanien* (Stockholm: Solidaritets Förlag, 1937); and Lise Lindbäck, *Internationella Brigaden* (Stockholm: Solidaritets Förlag, 1939).

133. Sixten Olsson, *Spanska frontminnen* (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1938); Karl Bystedt, *Fjorton månader i den spanskrepublikanska armén* (Sollefteå: AB Nya Norrland, 1939); and Schold Bergström, *Combatt. En frontkämpes skildringar* (Göteborg: Lindgren and Söners Boktryckeri, 1939).

134. Eugen Weichert, *Frihetens Soldater* (Malmö, Acupress, 1974); Gösta Anderson, *Partisaner* (Stockholm: Ordfront, 1975); and Sixten Rogeby, *De stupade för Spaniens demokrati* (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1977). In addition these memoirs, in 1976 the volunteers' own veteran organization, *Svenska Spanienfrivilligas Kamratförening*, began to print its own annual newsletter, "För ett fritt Spanien." See also Carl Mattson, *Spaniens sak var vår. Solidaritetsrörelsen i Värmland 1936–1939. Kampen mot krig och fascismen* (Karlstad: ABF, 1982).

135. Furet, 264; Lundgreen-Nielsen, 10, 432; and Buchanan, *Britain and the Spanish Civil War*, 144. For specific illustrations, see William Rust, *Britons in Spain: The History of the British Battalion of the XVth International Brigade* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1939); and Leo Kari, *De Danske Spaniensfrivillige* (Copenhagen: Rosenkilde og Baggen, 1952).

136. Dan Richardson, *Comintern Army: The International Brigades and the Spanish Civil War* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1982), 171–72; and Hopkins, 8.

137. The returning Irish and British volunteers' situation was, for example, no better than that of their Swedish counterparts. Stradling, *Wales and the Spanish Civil War*, 145–65; and McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War*, 80–81. Yet, here it must be emphasized that the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian volunteers were still in an enviable position when compared to their comrades who could not return home after the war for political reasons, and subsequently ended up in French refugee camps (or worse in the Soviet Gulag). Michael Jackson, *Fallen Sparrows: The International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1994), 129.

138. Brome, 274–76, 286; Lundgreen-Nielsen, 331; and Hopkins, 252–90. For Swedish examples, see pages 40–52 in Arvid Rundberg's book, *En svensk arbetares memoarer* (Arbetarkultur: Stockholm, 1973), which is about the life of Gustaf Ericson, a former volunteer.

139. In this context it is of some interest that many writers who had ardently supported the Republic during the war, but who later became disillusioned by the Soviets' conduct in Spain, likewise felt compelled to censor themselves after the fact. Foster, 20–23.

140. Nilsson's *Svenskar i spanska inbördeskriget* (1972), and Järdel's *Kämpande solidaritet* (1996) are two excellent illustrations of this tendency. In both cases the authors' introductions provide a far more idealized picture of the Swedish *Brigadistas* (and their experiences in Spain) than the ones often found in the veterans' own testimonials. Nilsson's and Järdel's introductions, for example, largely ignore a discussion of internal disciplinary problems, desertions, and terror within the Brigades—this despite the fact that these topics are repeatedly mentioned by the former volunteers, whose stories the books are based on. Here it might be added that the latter, with few exceptions, otherwise continue to uphold the Soviet-line about the war. Interviews with Swedish veterans of the Spanish Civil War as cited by Nilsson, 48–49, 71, 121, 124, 172, 186, 195–99; and by Järdel, 41–42, 44, 60, 64–65. For another example, along the same lines, see the preface and conclusion in Gustafsson and Karlsson, 7, 183.

141. Bolloten, 570–71; and Thomas, 458–59.

142. Johnston, 99–111; Richardson, *Comintern Army*, 105, 118–35; and Kramer, 70–74.

143. There have, however, been some isolated exceptions. Henrikson, 79; and Carlomagno, 47.

144. E. H. Carr, *The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 27; Radosh, Habeck, and Sevostianov, 431; Brome, 271–73; and Richardson, *Comintern Army*, 1–2, 90–118, 136–58, 177–80.

145. Bill Alexander, *British Volunteers for Liberty: Spain 1936–1939* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982), 66–69; and Kramer, 72.

146. Soviet military documents as cited by Radosh, Habeck, and Sevostianov, 444–63.

147. Delperrie de Bayac estimates that one-third of the *Brigadistas* were killed in battle, 386. According to Castells, nearly 10,000 foreign volunteers died, and many more were seriously injured, 383.

148. Hugh Thomas suggests that Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian volunteers had the hardest time adjusting to the harsh discipline in the Brigades. Thomas, 456, 543–44, 606–7, 716, 781. See also Stradling, *Wales and the Spanish Civil War*, 129; and Buchanan, *Britain and the Spanish Civil War*, 135–36. Many Swedes apparently revolted against the severe punishments meted out by the German officers, and this is why they and the Norwegians eventually got their own company, which subsequently was put under Austrian command. Interview with former Swedish *Brigadista*, Per Eriksson as cited by Nilsson, 48–50. Toward the end of the war, Eriksson served as one of La Pasionaria's personal bodyguards.

149. Castells places 19 Swedes in the somewhat ambiguously defined "Deserter, A.W.O.L., P.O.W.," 383. For a specific illustration, see interview with Swedish deserter, Gustaf Fridén as cited by Järdel, 64–65.

150. At best, this subject is mentioned in passing, but it is never examined in depth. See, for instance, Lundberg, 55.

151. Carr, *The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War*, 23; and Thomas, 454. Lundvik assumes that this probably occurred in the Swedish case as well, 141–42.

152. Interview with former Swedish *Brigadista*, Gösta Hjärpe as cited by Nilsson, *Svenskar i spanska inbördeskriget*, 188.

153. Jackson, "The Army of Strangers," 109–11. See also Francis, 186–87; McDougall, 4; and Kramer, 68.

154. For a specific illustration, see interview with former Swedish *Brigadista*, Knut Levander as cited by Järdel, 107.

155. The only Swedish studies that take a significantly different slant on this subject are those that examine the *Brigadistas* in the broader context of Swedish military history. Such works are written from a radically different perspective, and take a far more critical view of the *Brigadistas*, presumably because they have much less politically invested in the latter. See, for instance, Ericson, 90–95.

156. Although Bertil Lundvik, for example, offers perhaps the most nuanced portrait of the Swedish volunteers, in the end, he too falls well short of his own stated ambition to demystify their memory. Most notably, he ascribes to them the loftiest possible motives for both enlisting in and deserting from the Brigades. The problem is that neither judgment is supported by the available evidence. Lundvik, 114–15, 124–27. Lundvik's study is otherwise excellent, and it remains the most important work on Sweden and the Spanish Civil War.

157. Andrew Forrest, *The Spanish Civil War* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 94–95; and Brome, 271–303.

158. To date, there has not yet been a Swedish equivalent to either Gustav Regler's, or Jason Gurney's critical memoirs about their experiences in the Brigades. Gustav Regler, *The Owl of Minerva* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959); and Jason Gurney, *Crusade in Spain* (London: Faber and Faber, 1974).

159. Barry McLaughlin, "Colder Light on the Good Fight: Revisiting Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War," *SAOTHAR*, 24 (1999): 67–72; Stradling, *The Irish and the Spanish Civil War*, 203–12; and Hopkins, xiii–xv, 3–4.

160. McGarry, "Ireland and the Spanish Civil War," 40.

161. Evidence of a more balanced judgment of the Swedish *Brigadistas* can, for example, be found in a recent article by Stefan Dalin, "En bortglömd solidaritetsrörelse – det svenska Spanienengagemanget

1936–1939," in *Efter arbetet. Studier av svensk fritid*, ed. Peder Aléx and Jonny Hjelm (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2000), 102–9. See also Carlomagno, 39–40, 47.

162. So far, the right's input in the discussion surrounding this topic has largely been limited to two shorter articles written by high-ranking Swedish military officers. Olof Ribbing, "De internationella i spanienkriget. Några fakta och reflextioner kring ett omdiskuterat tidsfenomen," *Svensk Tidskrift* (1939): 370–79; and Börje Furtenbach, "Svenska frivilligförband," *Aktuellt och historiskt. Meddelanden från Försvarstabens krigshistoriska avdelning* (1958): 5–53. Not unexpectedly these two articles adopt a skeptical view of the *Brigadistas*, and, probably for this reason, are normally never cited in other Swedish works about the volunteers.

163. Björk, 61, 64, 169; Lundberg, 149–51; and Lundvik, 133, 155–58.

164. Alpert, 129; andBell, 157–58. Eric Hobsbawn points out that, in most instances, West European Conservative antipathy toward the Republic never amounted to anything like heartfelt sympathy for the Spanish Generals, 159.

165. Carr, *The Spanish Tragedy*, 231.

166. After the Second World War, the British Labour Party, for instance, employed the Tory Party's earlier "betrayal of Spain" to great political effect. Watkins, 204–5.

167. Anne Applebaum, *Gulag: A History* (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), xviii–xxii.

168. Furet, 261. Although Communist transgressions in Spain did not go completely unreported in the Swedish Social Democratic press, it is nevertheless evident that many Swedish Social Democrats' (including a number of prominent newspaper editors') views of the war were blatantly colored by Communist propaganda. Björk, 100–102, 107, 126, 154–55.

169. Ustvedt, 9–10; Hansen, 17–18; and Thomas, 853.

170. Buchanan, *Britain and the Spanish Civil War*, 197; and McGarry, *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War*, 240–43.

171. Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (New York: William and Norton Co, 1996), 167–86.

172. Eley, 274–75; Fyrth, 290; and LeCoutre, 349–58.

173. Hobsbawn, 163–67.

174. Alf W. Johansson, "Vill du se monument, se dig omkring! Några reflektioner kring nationell identitet och kollektivt minne i Sverige efter andra världskriget," in *Den Svenska Framgångssagan?* ed. Kurt Almqvist and Kaj Glans (Stockholm: Fischer and Co., 2001), 202–3.

175. Sam Tanenhaus, "Innocents Abroad," *Vanity Fair*, September 2001, 286–302.

176. That said, there are a couple of books on this topic. See, for instance, Carsten Jørgensen: *Fra Bjelkes Allé til Barcelona. Danske frivillige i Spanien, 1936–39* (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1986).

177. Hansen, 3.

178. Hobsbawn, 167.

179. Lodenius, 81–82. For a specific illustration of Swedish criticism of the Franco regime, see Olof Palme's comments as cited in *Newsweek*, November 24, 1975.

CHAPTER 11

The Cold War and the Spanish Civil War: The Impact of Politics on Historiography

GEORGE ESENWEIN

When, in November 1989, Berliners began the extraordinary task of tearing down the infamous Berlin Wall (or Wall of Shame as it was known to its critics over its twenty-eight-year history), their daring act was widely interpreted by the outside world as signaling the beginning of the end of the Cold War, a multifaceted rivalry between Communist and liberal capitalist systems that had dominated global affairs since 1945. The next two years saw the rapid dissolution of Communism in East Central Europe as countries, one by one, in that region declared an end to Communist rule. With the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union in 1991, the consensus among most political pundits was that the epitaph of the Cold War could at last be written.

The end of the Cold War presented historians with the opportunity to begin reflecting on the impact that the long-lasting conflict had on their profession, particularly in fields which inevitably had been shaped and colored by the political climate of the era. And while it seemed reasonable to assume at the time that the ending of the Cold War would serve as an impetus for generating an outpouring of revisionist scholarly monographs and articles in areas like international Communism and Soviet studies, the fact is that the process of reassessing the ways in which the Cold War had influenced our historical understanding of these and related subjects had begun some five to ten years earlier.[1] Significantly, these revisionist efforts took place against the background of renewed ideological tensions between East and West. In Central America, the Nicaragua Revolution raised the specter of another Cuba close to the U.S. border, and in Central Asia, the Soviets were hopelessly bogged down in their efforts to defend a "sovietized" Afghani government from the onslaught of Islamic fundamentalists (*mujahedeen*). In this country the veteran anti-Communist Ronald Reagan was President, and the newly appointed head of the Soviet regime, Mikhail Gorbachev, was still an inscrutable figure to the West. Indeed, in view of all the uncertainties and brewing

conflicts of the period, no one was speculating about how and when the Cold War could possibly end.

Given that their collective preoccupation with exposing the shortcoming of the anti-Soviet views of western scholars, it is apparent that few, if any, of the revisionist historians of the mid- and late 1980s were writing in the same spirit as the Berliners and East Central Europeans who began celebrating the end of Communist rule from 1989 on. In fact, they were doing just the opposite. Rather than see the collapse of Communism as a positive outcome, they were seeking to liberate a diverse body of politically sensitive historical literature which they claimed had for too long been held hostage to the anti-Communist views of western scholars. Nowhere was this truer than in the case of a distinguished group of historians based in Great Britain and Spain who began publishing at this time and who were above all concerned with dismantling what they characterized as a "Cold War" interpretive paradigm of the Spanish Civil War. For the most part, this generation of historians (whom shall be termed revisionist here and throughout) was comprised of left-wing scholars who had come of age in the post-Franco era. Nearly all had also received their formal training outside of Franco's Spain.[2] It should be further underscored in this connection that the partisanship exhibited by the revisionists is not surprising. Most anti-Francoist historians were partial to Marxist historiography, and not a few had been influenced by the scholarly writings of left-wing historians like Manuel Tuñón de Lara and Pierre Vilar. It was also true that, in the wake of Franco's dictatorship, the right had fallen from grace and it was now the time for the left to weigh in on historical discussions and disputes involving Spain's controversial recent past. Not least of the goals of the post-Franco generation of writers was to bring greater balance to the history of the Civil War by recovering the history of the Spanish left's role during the Second Republic and in wartime.

While scholars everywhere were indebted to this group of historians for sweeping away the tottering pillars of Francoist historiography, their efforts to conduct a similar revisionist campaign outside of Spain called into question the extent to which scholarship beyond Spain's borders had been affected by the Cold War. In fact, one of the underlying assumptions of the revisionist school was that a Cold War explanatory model of Spain's civil war had also gained currency in the two countries where the bulk of Iberian scholarship had been conducted throughout the Franco era, Great Britain and the United States.

In view of the fact that the vast majority of studies produced by Anglo-American scholars since 1939 have reflected a pro-Republican bias, this claim demanded further elaboration, above all because the precise meaning of how the term "Cold War" was being applied was never fully established. In the review essays, articles, and books published by the revisionists from the mid–1980s on, it became increasingly apparent that, outside of Spain, they were using "Cold War" to refer to writings that were consistently written from an anti-Communist perspective. It was further evident that the two most prominent and significant representatives of the "Cold War" version of the Civil War they had in mind were the

British author George Orwell (Eric Blair) and the independent scholar, Burnett Bolloten. According to the revisionists, it is because both of these men had become widely recognized as authorities on the Spanish Civil War that it was now necessary to expose the fundamental shortcomings of their works. Above all, this was to be achieved by treating their writings on Spain more as ideological expressions of the Cold War era than as important contributions to the historiography of the Spanish Civil War.

The main aim of this essay is two-fold. On one level, I would like to challenge the aforementioned suppositions of the revisionist school of scholars. To this end, I shall argue that, in their campaign to divest Civil War studies of its Cold War ideological overtones, the revisionists have unfairly and inaccurately characterized both Orwell and Bolloten as Cold War warriors. Secondly, the essay will point out the ways in which the revisionists' discourse on the Civil War is no less politicized than those of previous generations. As such their efforts to achieve a consensus view of the war which is constructed around their own readings of that conflict often impedes rather than encourages scholarly efforts to achieve a more balanced picture of this highly controversial and complex subject.

Personalities

Anyone who is familiar with the literature on the Spanish Civil War will recognize the names of Burnett Bolloten (1909–1987) and George Orwell (1903–1950). However, most people are unaware of the extent to which both men were connected by their respective personal and professional involvement in the Spanish conflict. George Orwell came to Spain in late 1936, not only as a writer and journalist, but also in order to fight for a cause in which he deeply believed: the defense of a democratically-elected government against a rebelling group of military officers and their supporters on the right. Though he was a person of strong left-wing convictions, Orwell was no ideologue. Thus, when he was unable to enlist in the Communist-directed International Brigades, he readily seized the opportunity to join a militia attached to the anti-Stalinist POUM (*Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista*), the sister party of the British left-wing organization with which Orwell had personal ties, the Independent Labour Party. As a member of the POUM militia stationed on the relatively quiet Aragon front, Orwell became a participant in the fighting. During and following the episode of the war that has come to be known as the May Events of 1937, his role in the war underwent a significant transformation. Caught up in the bitter and destructive political wrangling that characterized Republican Spain at the time, he was able to observe first-hand the war within a war that raged in Barcelona from May 3–7, 1937. Later, while he was convalescing from a near-fatal wound he received on the Huesca front, Orwell returned to Barcelona, where, thanks to his affiliation with the now vilified POUM, he became a political outcast. Along with his first wife, Eileen, he was forced to flee Spain in June 1937. It was also at this point in his sojourn in Spain that we see Orwell, the writer, coming to the fore.

Even before the May events, Orwell was keeping a diary and committing to memory his personal observations of what was happening at the front and behind the lines. It was these vivid recollections that would form the foundation of what would become one of his most enduring books, *Homage to Catalonia* (1938). It is important to note that Orwell saw this book not as an explanation of what he had experienced in Spain. Rather, it was meant as a blow-by-blow account of what he had witnessed both as a soldier and as a politically committed observer during the May Events.

Like Orwell, Burnett Bolloten was sympathetic to Communism and other left-wing causes during the 1930s. However, in contrast to Orwell, it was not politics which had brought him to Spain in 1936. Bolloten arrived in Barcelona on July 18, the first day of what he thought would be a relaxing two-week vacation. The next morning he awoke to find the city in turmoil. A military rising was underway, and it was in Barcelona that the attempted coup suffered its greatest defeat. After the conspirators and their supporters had been suppressed, a sweeping transformation of the city occurred. Workers from various left-wing organizations began taking over and collectivizing businesses throughout the city. Taxicabs, trams, and other forms of public transportation were also commandeered by the unions. Before long, the entire region was effectively placed under working-class domination. This was the Barcelona that Orwell would more famously describe some five months later as a town where the "working class was in the saddle." Sensing that he was witnessing an event of enormous significance, Bolloten contacted his former employer, United Press, asking them if they wanted him to report on the dramatic events unfolding before him. They agreed to take him on as a correspondent, and for the next year or so he remained in Spain covering the war. Throughout this time, Bolloten met and interviewed dozens of Republican figures, most notably, Francisco Largo Caballero, Buenaventuri Durruti, and Constancia de la Mora.[3] Bolloten was, like Orwell, captivated by political struggles in the Republican camp. Indeed, it was his determined but largely unsuccessful efforts to get to the bottom of the causes and fallout of the May events that led him to question the political reality that was being projected in Communist and pro-central government sources.

Bolloten went on to spend the next decade living in Mexico and writing up his impressions of the Civil War. But what began as a one to two year project soon developed into a much more extended labor of love. For the next forty-nine years—with only brief periods away from his life-long task—Bolloten would devote himself to the study of the Civil War and Revolution. Among his most notable achievements in this regard and one that was bequeathed to scholars everywhere was his renowned Civil War collection of primary and secondary materials, the greater part of which was deposited at the Hoover Institute in Stanford, California in 1946. By the time he died in Sunnyvale, California in 1987, the Burnett and Gladys Bolloten collection had grown into one of the most significant single collections on the Civil War, consisting of some 2,500 books on the war and revolution, tens of thousands of newspaper clippings, periodicals and newspapers (hard-copy and microfilm),

pamphlet literature, and over 107 archival boxes of Bolloten's personal correspondence and documents relating to the political, military, and international aspects of the Civil War.[4]

From these brief summaries it is apparent that both men shared much in common. For example, while they were in Spain, both were politically on the left, and both were sympathetic to the Republican cause. It is also true that the lives of both Bolloten and Orwell were forever changed by their experiences during the Civil War. Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia* was the first in a series of writings that he devoted to the subject.[5] His haunting memories of the May Events were also the main source of inspiration for his most famous and critically acclaimed novels, *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-four*. The Civil War exercised a much more powerful spell over Bolloten's personal and professional life as demonstrated by his devotion to the study of this event.

From a political standpoint, the Civil War affected Orwell and Bolloten in different ways. Despite the disillusionment he suffered while witnessing the repression of the revolutionary left in Barcelona, Orwell left Spain optimistic about the future of socialism. While he no longer saw Communism as a viable or desirable political system, he believed that the forces of democratic and revolutionary socialism would survive and eventually triumph over those of totalitarianism on the left and right. (We can only speculate as to whether Orwell would have recanted his beliefs in socialism had he lived to see the course of politics in the latter half of the twentieth century.) On the other hand, Burnett Bolloten did not conserve throughout his life a passion and abiding belief in socialism. His political perspectives shifted gradually to the right over the course of a number of years. While he retained his sympathies for Communism during the time he resided in Mexico, he began to lose faith in left-wing movements following the Second World War. Though liberal in his personal practices and beliefs, he increasingly embraced a conservative political outlook. Yet Bolloten never became a spokesman for right-wing or conservative causes. In fact, he never wore his politics on his sleeve. Nor did he want his writings on Spain to be put to specific political uses. Like Orwell, he remained throughout his life open and even sympathetic to various political perspectives, including those on the far left. He was (and still is) one of the few historians of the Civil War who possessed a genuine respect and warm regard for the ideals of anarchism. It should not be forgotten that one of Bolloten's primary goals in studying the Civil War was to write a history of the anarchist-inspired popular revolution. He also maintained fraternal relations with a number of activists who belonged to Marxist movements on the anti-Stalinist left. In short, Bolloten's personal politics, like those of George Orwell, cannot be easily categorized. Nevertheless, it would be wildly misleading to dub him—as most of his detractors on the left have done—as a reactionary or hide-bound Cold War warrior.

Before leaving the discussion of these two personalities, it deserves mention that neither Orwell nor Bolloten ever belonged to any formal group that identified itself as being specifically anti-Communist. Nor was either of them active in any prominent Cold War political or cultural organizations, such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom. It is well known that

Orwell took pride in being an iconoclast and was therefore loath to attach himself to organizations that had a specific ideological agenda. This is not to deny his total lack of political engagement. During the last years of his life, he belonged to several organizations concerned with civil liberties, but apparently was only active in one: the Freedom Defense Committee, which was primarily concerned with defending the rights of British left-wingers who were being prosecuted for political reasons. He was also loosely affiliated with more broadly based organizations of this type. For example, he briefly participated in the foundation of the League of Dignity and the Rights of Man (sponsored by such luminaries as Arthur Koestler, Bertrand Russell, and Victor Gollancz) and was invited by Koestler to join the international writers' organization PEN—which at the time had a distinctly anti-Communist message.

Like Orwell, Bolloten coveted his intellectual independence (and personal anonymity) so highly that he tended to shun formal political associations—especially those that were vying for the public spotlight—as well as ties to academia. And while it is true that he was privately supportive of various political causes he deemed worthwhile, he believed that writing history mattered more than engaging in doctrinal polemics. This latter point bears underscoring insofar as Bolloten has been falsely and maliciously accused by his fiercest critics—notably the International Brigade veteran and American historian Robert Colodny, and Herbert Rutledge Southworth, another independent scholar who spent the greater part of his life researching and writing about the Civil War and related themes—of having his work subsidized and sponsored by right-wing organizations (Hoover Institution) and even the CIA. According to them, Bolloten's writings should be regarded as vehicles for promoting the propagandistic views of political agencies fighting the ideological war against Communism.[6]

Sources

Any serious assessment of Civil War scholarship would have to begin by evaluating the evidence or sources that are being used to construct an historical narrative or interpretation. One of the major criticisms that the revisionists have leveled at Bolloten's explanatory model of the war and revolution, for example, is that it relies too heavily on a selective and highly tendentious body of evidence. Because his writings on Spain are more reportorial than historical, Orwell's reading of the Civil War has been attacked for other reasons. Above all, his descriptive accounts of the May Events and other noteworthy episodes of the war have been dismissed by his critics as the partisan views of an ill-informed eye witness whose experiences were restricted to parts of Aragon and Catalonia. According to the distinguished labor historian John Saville, Orwell and those who accept his anti-Communist version of the Civil War are guilty of engaging in what he characterizes as an "old-fashioned" Cold War approach to the subject. If we glance briefly at the empirical foundations of the writings of both Orwell and Bolloten, the speciousness of the revisionists' assumptions in this regard

becomes apparent.[7]

The most cogent and pointed revisionist effort to debunk the alleged "myth" that Orwell was an honest and clear-eyed witness to events in Republican Spain occurred in the mid–1980s, the period when the Cold War seemed to be heating up across the globe. The so-called neo-conservative revolutions in Great Britain (led by Margaret Thatcher) and the United States (under Ronald Reagan), the low-intensity conflicts in Central America (Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras) and Central Asia (Afghanistan), and the vociferous anti-nuclear movement spreading across Western Europe generated an atmosphere of mutual distrust and recriminations on both sides of the East-West political divide. Significantly, the disputes that arose at this time were couched in a language that bore a striking similarity to the rhetoric employed in the political debates of the 1930s. At the height of the Nicaraguan conflict, for example, echoes of the Spanish Civil War reverberated loudly. President Reagan lauded the *contras* as freedom fighters whom he likened to the volunteers who had fought for democracy in Spain. On the other hand, veterans of the Abraham Lincoln battalion threw their support behind the Sandinistas, heralding their struggle as an example of a modern-day "Good Fight." They therefore insisted that the civil war in Nicaragua should be seen as a contest between Democracy and Fascism.

It was against this background that a collection of essays appeared about Orwell entitled *Inside the Myth.* The postmodernist editor, Christopher Norris, warns the prospective reader that this is not a book that celebrates Orwell's writings, but rather one that attempts to demythologize his reputation (largely embraced by the right) as the pious left-wing crusader for democracy and historical truth. And though Norris goes on to say that one of the aims of the collection of essays is to begin the process of reclaiming at least some of Orwell's writings for the purposes of socialist critique, it is hard to believe that the much of anything Orwell wrote could be salvaged from the savaging he receives at the hands of the disparate group of authors who contributed to this collection. The essays devoted to Orwell's Civil War writings, for example, are exceedingly critical of their subject. Above all, the historical accuracy of Orwell's accounts of events is called into question. One critic, a pro-Stalinist veteran of the International Brigades, concludes that Orwell's anti-Communist bias caused him to distort the historical record. No less scathing is the essay written by the historian Robert Stradling. Following in the same footsteps of writers like Herbert Matthews and Malcolm Cowley, Stradling argues that it was Orwell's profound ignorance of Spain in general and the Republican political context in particular that contributed to his inaccurate reading of events.[8] He further contends that Orwell's own deeply felt sympathies for the social revolution and the victims of Communist repression (the POUM and "uncontrollable" elements of the CNT-FAI) caused him to self-consciously construct a largely false narrative of the May events and similar episodes.[9]

That Orwell's account of his experiences in Spain is filled with minor mistakes and inaccuracies cannot be denied. Orwell himself acknowledges his own shortcomings at the

end of *Homage to Catalonia*:

> . . . I hope the account I have given is not too misleading. I believe that on such an issue as this no one is or can be completely truthful. It is difficult to be certain about anything except what you have seen with your own eyes, and consciously or unconsciously everyone is a partisan. In case I have not said this somewhere earlier in the book I will say it now: beware of my partisanship, my mistakes of fact, and the distortion inevitably caused by having seen only one corner of events. And beware of exactly the same things when you read any other book on this period of the Spanish war.[10]

Having said this, the question is: How reliable is Orwell's eyewitness testimony? The answer to this query demands far more space than we can devote to it here. Suffice it to say that much of what Orwell records in *Homage to Catalonia*, *mutatis mutandis*, has been corroborated by other eyewitnesses who were on the anti-Communist left. For example, his account of the May events corresponds closely to versions that appeared in contemporary anarchist publications such as *The May Events* (Agustín Souchy) and in the personal testimonies of other first-hand observers like the ILP representative John McNair, the future head of the Federal Republic of Germany Willy Brandt, and Lois Cusick, a left-wing activist who had come to Spain to participate in the revolutionary movement with her husband Charles Orr. Scholars like Bolloten, who in assessing the significance of the May events in his writings has drawn upon a wide range of documents, and the POUMist historian Victor Alba, also support Orwell's recollection of events during these disturbances.

By citing the various documented writings that corroborate Orwell's version of the May events, I am not suggesting that scholars should ignore the shortcomings of *Homage to Catalonia*. There can be no doubt that Orwell's account of what he witnessed in Spain is flawed by his imperfect understanding of what was, for him, a mostly foreign political and cultural environment. As Stradling and others have pointed out, Orwell's ignorance of the Spanish political scene caused him to make numerous mistakes, including, among others, misspelling *Generalitat* and confusing the *Guardias de Asalto* with the *Guardia Civil*. It is also true that his recollections of the political battles that were raging behind the lines were colored by his sympathies for the revolutionary left. However, given the general state of confusion that reigned during the May events and in view of the polarized political context in which this episode occurred, none of this is surprising. But, if the historian should exercise caution in reading the first-hand accounts by Orwell and the pro-revolutionary elements, he or she must also take into account that there are no other contemporary sources that offer a more accurate and unbiased assessment of the May events. In fact, in light of what we now know, it is clear that the pro-Communist and pro-government sources relating to this conflict offer an equally if not more distorted view of the May events than those of their political rivals on the left. Significantly, Orwell's critics never feel the need to address this side of the evidence equation in their critique of *Homage to Catalonia*. Thus, like so many other documentary sources relating to the Civil War, Orwell's eyewitness testimony is problematic.

This does not mean, however, that we should accept the harsh and one-sided verdict of his critics, who implore the naïve reader to avoid reading his "Cold War" version of Civil War events.[11]

Earlier we said that the revisionists have taken Bolloten to task for constructing an explanation of the war that relies on a selective and highly tendentious body of evidence.[12] Before assessing the validity of this claim, it is important to bear in mind the obstacles that Bolloten as well as other Civil War scholars have had to labor under for the past sixty years. Not least of the problems they faced was in gaining access to documentary sources. After the war, many of the personal and official records of Republican individuals and groups that were smuggled out of Spain became widely dispersed in private and public collections stretching from Europe to the Americas. It would take the better part of fifty years for many of these records to be returned to Spain. In the meantime, few of these archival collections were sufficiently organized to be of much use to a scholar. Nor were many of them easily locatable let alone accessible to researchers. Some, like the ones that ended up in the Soviet Union, have only recently been opened to researchers. Even more problematic for the historian both inside and outside of Spain was the fact that, for a period of nearly forty years, the Franco regime enforced a strict code of censorship over Civil War studies, effectively preventing any serious scholar from consulting the massive collections of Civil War materials housed in state-run archives, like the one in Salamanca. The result was that, anyone who wanted to undertake a comprehensive study of the Civil War during the dictatorship faced a Herculean task.

As we have seen, Burnett Bolloten was one of the few individuals who rose to this challenge.[13] It should be added here that his quest to gather documents relating to the war did not end when he sold the bulk of his personal collection of documents and printed materials to the Hoover Institution. Over the next thirty-five years or so, he continued to enrich the original core of Civil War materials by obtaining microfilms, microfiche, and Xerox reproductions of archives from various institutions across the globe. He eventually deposited at Hoover all the materials he had obtained through his own personal efforts and at his own expense at various archives, including, the Institute for Social History in Amsterdam, the British Museum, the Civil War archives in Salamanca, the Fundación de Pablo Iglesias, and other organizations that housed special collections on the Civil War. Thus, Bolloten searched far and wide for documentary sources on the Civil War and it was his determination to build a comprehensive collection on the subject that made it possible for him and other scholars to conduct serious research on the Civil War long before it could be done inside of Spain itself.

What this has to say about Bolloten's writings on the Civil War should be self-evident. Above all, it suggests that he was not interested in producing a history of the war and revolution that was based on a select group of documents. A number of his critics, however, do not acknowledge the fact that his explanation of the war and revolution was grounded on such a

wide-range of documentation. Instead, they have tended to emphasize the extent to which he used tendentious sources to substantiate his interpretation of the July revolution and of the role the Communists played in Republican affairs. He has been accused, for example, of constructing a picture of Republican politics that was based almost exclusively on anti-Communist sources. A quick perusal of Bolloten's bibliography and list of acknowledgements suggests just the opposite. While in Mexico, Bolloten interviewed Republicans of all stripes, including Communists like Constancia de la Mora, Hidalgo de Cisneros, and Carlos Contreras (Vittorio Vidali). He also consulted all the major and minor Communist publications and archival sources at his disposal. In short, Bolloten never accepted at face value the word of one person or privileged the views of one party over another. More importantly he rarely accepted uncritically the testimonies of ex-Communists and others who operated in the shadowy world of underground movements, espionage, and intelligence.

Because we are here concerned with the types and range of documentary sources that Bolloten utilized in his writings on the Civil War, this last point is worth emphasizing. Bolloten's habit of documenting nearly every substantial claim made in his works—not infrequently his footnotes run to a page or more in length—has been interpreted by his critics as further evidence of his obsessive preoccupation with ferreting out Communists, Communist sympathizers, or fellow-travelers. Yet it was neither a pathological hatred of Communism nor an inquisitorial mindset *à la* Joe McCarthy that prompted him to make extensive use of footnotes. In *The Grand Camouflage*, Bolloten himself explained the reasons for providing so many ample footnotes: "Because of the highly controversial nature of the subject dealt with in this volume, because memories are short, and because there is a tendency to falsify and distort even the most elementary fact connected with the Spanish Civil War and Revolution, I have been forced to substantiate almost every important point in my exposition."[14] There was a further reason for Bolloten's reliance on footnotes. Recognizing that he was not an academic (he was not trained at a university) and aware that readers' reports of earlier drafts of *The Grand Camouflage* had complained of the lack of "scholarly apparatuses" such as footnotes, Bolloten did not want his work to be judged as a popular history. Nor did he want his more provocative claims relating to controversial themes to be dismissed as groundless accusations. It is necessary to point out that his preoccupation with getting at the so-called "truth" of the matter knew no bounds. Thus, for example, his long-held suspicion that the Communists had not announced their plans to liquidate or purge the anarchists and Trotskyists in Spain (on December 17, 1936) several months before the May events, caused him to pursue the source of the quote, which appeared in a number of key anti-Communist publications of the era. After he had exhausted his research into the question he assigned me the task. The result was a four-page footnote that traced the quote to a POUM publication. We eventually concluded that, because it did not appear in any of the major Soviet organs published on the dates most often cited, the quote was apocryphal and had most likely been fabricated by the POUM or a POUM sympathizer.[15] This is clearly

not an example of an historian who was being guided solely by his anti-Communist convictions.[16]

There is not space here to evaluate the impact that the opening of former Soviet archives have had on the revisionists' case against Bolloten and Orwell. Suffice it to say that the bulk of these documents—such as the formerly classified papers that have long been buried in the Soviet Military Archive (RGVA) and Russian Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences—reinforce the central arguments found in both Orwell's and Bolloten's studies.

Interpretation

In presenting their brief against Orwell and Bolloten, the revisionists emphasize their anti-Communist conclusions. In so doing they ignore the fact that it was not the intention of either author to write a diatribe or exposé of the Communists. (A classic example of the latter is Alexander Orlov's *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* (1953), which appeared at the height of McCarthyism.) Rather, both were concerned with recording notable episodes of the war with which they were intimately acquainted. In writing their respective accounts it became immediately apparent that their viewpoints contradicted the Communists' version of the war. While Orwell accepted their presentation of the war as an international struggle against Fascism, he violently rejected their attempts to demonize their left-wing adversaries. At the time, orthodox Communist views of the revolutionary left in Spain and elsewhere were heavily influenced by Stalinist politics and thus were generally immune from factual considerations. There are plenty examples of how the Communists manufactured their version of the truth during the war—perhaps the most famous being their elaborate efforts throughout the war to project their rivals in the Republican zone as enemies of the people. Because Trotsky and his followers had already been cast into this sinister role before the outbreak of hostilities in Spain, it was hardly surprising that the Stalinists indiscriminately attached this label to all republican groups that opposed their policies. Given its ties to the international anti-Stalinist movement (including to Trotsky himself), the POUM was easily transformed by this twist of logic into a Trotskyist party that was harboring spies and provocateurs who were acting in the service of international Fascism. In so doing the Communists were merely repeating a pattern of denunciatory behavior which they were more famously exhibiting in the Soviet Union during the show trials of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and other veterans of the Russian Revolution. Yet this obvious parallel was overlooked by pro-Communists as well as by those Republicans who held all revolutionaries in contempt. As a result, the burden of exposing the lies and distortions that emanated from Communist publications fell on the shoulders of their left-wing rivals. Despite their best efforts, however, the POUM's left-wing supporters—a group that included such formidable intellects as Orwell, Franz Borkenau, Sidney Hook, and Bertram Wolfe—lost their war of words with the Communists

during the Civil War. Thus, when Orwell brought out *Homage to Catalonia* in 1938 few on the left believed or wanted to believe the unpleasant truths his personal experiences had revealed about Communist behavior.

Bolloten was another observer at the time who was especially resistant to the Communists' elaborate efforts to conceal the nature and extent of the July revolution. In view of all the dramatic changes Bolloten witnessed at the street level in Barcelona and in the anarchosyndicalist-dominated countryside near the Aragon front, he could not understand how it was possible to deny the existence of the popular revolution. Early drafts of his manuscript on the Civil War did not emphasize these contradictions. But as he gathered more and more information about the war he was forced to scrap all the work he had completed up to that time. The revolution and how it had transformed the political, economic, and social landscape of much of Republican Spain now took center stage in his analysis. Yet when he showed his revised version to Carlos Contreras and other Communist or pro-Communist acquaintances in Mexico City, he was told that he needed to take a break from his studies. But Bolloten, like Orwell, was unwilling to abandon one of the central theses of his history. It was in pursuit of this goal that he began unraveling the complicated features of the Communists' narrative of the war.

Alongside his assessment of the popular revolution, Bolloten began developing another and equally controversial dimension to his historical inquiries. This was focused on the intra- and inter-party strife that characterized Republican politics throughout the war. As a journalist covering the war, Bolloten had been especially struck by the fact that few of the foreign correspondents with whom he had contact seemed to know (or care) about the political struggles that were palpable to any observer. He reasoned that this was most likely because they accepted the official propaganda which presented the war as a struggle between Democracy and Fascism. (On this view, the political squabbling on the left was not being read as a manifestation of diametrically opposed views held by the different factions regarding the nature and purpose of the Civil War.) For Bolloten, the true story of the war could not be revealed until an explanation of this struggle could be obtained. His quest to tell this story led him to focus on the Communists, not least because the evidence he was accumulating pointed to the fact that they were the most powerful and influential political force in Republican Spain. By doing this, Bolloten was not, as it has so often been assumed, attempting to blame the Communists for the self-defeating infighting on the left. His research told him that all the parties on the left (Anarchists, Socialists, Republicans, separatists, etc.) were divided into factions and that it was the fissiparous nature of the Spanish left which made the various factions vulnerable to manipulation by outside pressures.

Conclusion: Whither the Cold War?

The main aim of this essay is not simply to defend two important Civil War writers whom I think have been unfairly criticized by a school of historians. In fact, I believe that, in order for Civil War studies to continue to advance, it is necessary for scholars to disengage from partisan strife and to see that conflict in terms of the period in which it occurred. Certainly we cannot do this as long as the history of the Civil War and Revolution has been appropriated by ideologues of the left or right. I also agree with one of the fundamental premises of their scholarly agenda, namely, that political considerations have tended to over-determine the direction of research on this subject. Where I disagree with the revisionists is over the terms of their debate. Most of them have attempted to liberate the Civil War from its politically-charged past by setting up a straw man argument. They see writers like Bolloten and Orwell as representatives of a Cold War mindset that made the study of the Civil War ahistorical. The fact is, that by ignoring the Cold War implications of their own perspectives—such as their uncritical acceptance of Soviet and pro-Communist sources and their efforts to recast the Communists in a positive role during the Civil War—the revisionists are themselves perpetuating the myths that have long swirled around that conflict. I think it is naïve to believe that the Civil War could ever be fully divorced from politics. However, it might be possible for historians to reach a consensus over how we should characterize political life in Spain during the Civil War and Revolution. If the verdict is that not all the Nationalists were Fascists or that Republican affairs were dominated by the Communists, then we should try to build a consensus view around these assumptions rather than keep the sectarian quarrels of some seventy years ago alive.

My argument that neither Orwell nor Bolloten should be regarded as Cold War "warriors" has not included a critical assessment of their works on Spain. I am aware of the shortcomings of their writings and fully accept some of the criticisms that have been raised about them. For example, Bolloten's history of the Republic at war is so heavily slanted towards the political sphere that his narrative excludes otherwise important aspects of life in that zone. It is also essentially a male-centric study where cultural issues like gender, race, and religion are not even addressed. The behavior and activities of the average or anonymous citizen are also overlooked. Of course these themes were not emphasized in historical works produced before the 1970s, and it would therefore be both unfair and uncharitable to hold Bolloten to standards that came into existence long after he began his scholarly investigations. Nevertheless, the degree to which politics over-determines the themes and analyses of his works cannot be ignored by the contemporary scholar who is seeking a deeper, perhaps more subjective understanding of the war. In the end, however, both Orwell and Bolloten have important and necessary things to say about the Civil War. To ignore them is to close our eyes to the ways in which they have deepened our understanding of one of the most fascinating and contested events of the twentieth century.

Select Bibliography of Works by Burnett Bolloten and George Orwell

Bolloten, Burnett *The Grand Camouflage: The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War* (London: Hollis & Carter, 1961).

_____ *The Grand Camouflage: The Spanish Civil War and Revolution, 1936–1939* (New York: Praeger, 1961, 1968). Introduction to the second printing by H.R. Trevor-Roper.

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_____ Taped Interviews with Ronald Hilton. Burnett Bolloten Papers, 1923–1991. Hoover Archives, Stanford University.

Orwell, George *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell* Volumes 1–4. Edited by Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (New York/London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1968).

_____ *Homage to Catalonia* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974).

NOTES

1. The social, political, and economic consequences of the Cold War are well known. Now that we have had more time to reflect on the period from a distance of some ten years, the extent to which the Cold War shaped and colored cultural developments on both sides of the East-West divide is also becoming ever more apparent. For example, during the mid- and late 1980s a number of historians of contemporary Russia began a long and highly contentious examination of the historical legacy of the Soviet system, particularly during the Stalinist era (1929–53). Usually these historiographical exchanges reflected a clear-cut political divide that had come to characterize the polarized intellectual world of the Cold War era. On one side stood conservative and liberal conservative academics like Richard Pipes and Robert Conquest, who had spent the greater part of their writing careers depicting Soviet Communism as one of the greatest tragedies in modern history. Partly in response to the dramatic shift in the intellectual climate in Russia under Mikhail Gorbachev—when it was both possible and fashionable to have open discussions about controversial periods in Russia's recent past—a group of younger and mostly left-wing scholars based in Europe and the United States set for themselves the task of radically revising the so-called "Cold War" views that had for so long dominated Western thinking about Russia under Communist rule. One of the undeclared goals of this revisionist group was to show not only that Communism had a "human face" but also that its history had been ill served by anti-Communist or Cold War historians. One of the focal points of their attack was the view that Soviet Communism represented a totalitarian system that was controlled by a handful of unscrupulous individuals who ruled through anonymous and ruthless state apparatuses. While J. Arch Getty and other members of this revisionist group generally recognized that Communist rule was at times repressive and harsh, they argued that many of the excesses committed during these periods were exaggerated by Cold War historians. They further contended that top-down models of analysis employed by the old school of Sovietologists inevitably produced a distorted picture of Communism, not least because it did not take into account the agency of individuals who participated in the movement at the local level.
2. By characterizing this group as "left-wing" I am suggesting that their writings tend to reflect a leftist bias. However, this is not to argue that they are necessarily pro-Communist or Communist scholars, though this might be true in some cases.
3. Bolloten also struck up a brief relationship with pro-Republican writer-tourists like W.H. Auden.
4. These documents formed the empirical foundation of his multivolume history of the Republic during the Spanish Civil War. Few people also know that Bolloten's extensive collection of pamphlet and periodical literature was split between the Hoover Institution and Harvard University. At a time when Leon Trotsky was selling his papers to Harvard, Bolloten managed to sell the university a portion of the extraordinary collection of documents he had amassed by 1940. Many of these items were later integrated into the Blodgett Collection of Civil War materials housed at the Widener Special Collections division.
5. On Orwell's experiences during the war, see Bernard Crick, *George Orwell: A Life* (Harmondsworth:

Penguin, 1980); Michael Selden, *Orwell: The Authorized Biography* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991); Peter Stansky and William Abrahams *Orwell: The Transformation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980).

6. Southworth's numerous diatribes against Bolloten appear in several scholarly publications. His most thorough (and highly tendentious) critique of Bolloten's writings can be found in his essay, "'The Grand Camouflage': Julián Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten and the Spanish Civil War," in *The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain, 1936–1939*, ed. Paul Preston and Ann L. Mackenzie (Glasgow: University of Glasgow Press, 1996), 261–310. Colodny's inaccurate reading of Bolloten's political affiliations are summarized in "The Spanish Revolution: An Exchange of Views," *International Labor and Working-class History* 19 (Fall 1980): 13–20.
7. A further discussion of Bolloten's and Orwell's respective readings of the Civil War can be found in George Esenwein, "Seeing the Spanish Civil War through Foreign Eyes," in *Teaching Representations of the Spanish Civil War*, ed. Noël Valis (New York: Modern Language Association, 2006).
8. See, for example, Malcolm Cowley, "No Homage to Catalonia: A Memory of the Spanish Civil War," *The Southern Review* 18, no. 1 (January, 1982): 131–40.
9. Some twenty years later, Robert Stradling resumes his brief against Orwell in his study entitled, *History and Legend: Writing the International Brigades* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003).
10. George Orwell, *Homage to Catalonia* (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1974), 220.
11. For an interesting and informative assessment of the critical reception *Homage to Catalonia* has received since its publication in 1938 in the English-speaking world, see Tom Buchanan, "Three Lives of *Homage to Catalonia*," in *The Library: The Transactions of the Bibliographical Society* 3, no. 3 (September 2002): 302–14.
12. According to the scholar Helen Graham, this is done in order to support a preconceived "Cold War" thesis about the nature and significance of the Civil War.
13. Like other historians, Bolloten had restricted access to archives in Spain during the Franco era. Most of the works he obtained in the early days of the regime were culled from regional archives and non-government organizations which responded to the ads he placed in the Spanish press for copies of periodicals and newspapers printed between 1936 and 1939.
14. Burnett Bolloten, *The Grand Camouflage* (London: Hollis and Carter, 1961), 10. It is important to point out here that Bolloten was not happy with the provocative and sensationalist title and subtitle his original publisher, Hollis and Carter, assigned to his manuscript. Mainly for contractual reasons, he was not able to alter these in English-language editions—though he modified the subtitle in the U.S. edition published by Praeger—until he brought out his revised and expanded volume on the Civil War, *The Spanish Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979).
15. For a discussion of this footnote from someone who formerly accepted its validity, see Victor Alba, "Una rectificació al cap de quinze anys," *L'Avenç* 118 (September, 1988): 7.
16. More could be said about Bolloten's obsessive desire to present the historical truth even if this meant contradicting aspects of his own analysis. Another series of essay-length footnotes that I wrote at his bequest, for instance, dealt with the assassination of Camillo Berneri and the controversial "Friends of Durruti." See, Burnett Bolloten, *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 866–67.

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"I believe that many other historians and students of fascism owe, as I do, an intellectual debt to Stanley Payne's work. For over forty years his studies on contemporary Spain and his essays on the history and interpretation of fascism have constantly contributed to broadening historical knowledge and, as a result, to re-orienting, deepening, and fostering theoretical reflection."

Emilio Gentile, Professor of Political Science,
University of Rome La Sapienza

ISBN 978-1-893311-76-3
52500>
9 781893 311763

Parallel Press
University of Wisconsin–Madison