African Slums: Constructing Democracy in Unexpected Places

By

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Abstract

Why does local democracy succeed in some contexts but not others? How does African democracy work in practice? To answer these questions I examine the process of local-level democratization in African slums. I argue that quality democracy depends on three factors relating to the initial settlement of the slum: 1) whether the slum was originally illegally inhabited (illegal), 2) whether it was legally purchased and settled (purchased settler), or 3) whether residents make indigenous claims to the land (indigenous). Specifically, these informal institutions of settlement structure the type of leadership, the norms of reciprocity, and the official status of the community. It explains why some local leaders have the incentive to serve the broader community interest while others serve their narrower ethnic and group interests; why ethnic identity is a salient political identity in some slums but not others, and; why and when residents make individual and collective claims on the government, political party, tribal leaders, or non-state actors. The study uncovers the different ways that residents hold their leaders to account in the context of daily life. It moves beyond conventional political science theories of electoral accountability and voting behavior to suggest that face-to-face mechanisms like sharing, claim-making, and public shame and honor are important aspects of local citizenship. I conclude that daily life is an important and necessary site of democratic practice. The dissertation combines ethnography, focus groups, and an original household survey in urban Ghana.

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Chapter 1: Studying local democracy

Why do some local democratic governments succeed and others fail? What explains the quality of democracy? These questions date back centuries, to the birth of Athenian democracy in the fifth Century BCE, to the rise of independent republics called *sanghas* and *ganas* in the sixth century BCE in India, to Europe's Enlightenment and French Revolution, to Alexis de Tocqueville's travels through America. The study of democracy spans scholarly disciplines and approaches; methodological divides and traditions; epistemological debates and philosophical disagreements. It contains theoretical importance and real-world empirical relevance. The continued political liberalization that followed the third wave of democratization provides a new landscape of democratic experimentation, with the expansion of political rights and freedoms extending to populations across Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. In developing countries, these liberalizations coincided with rapid urbanization and the growth of cities, placing new pressures on local and national governments to meet the basic needs of the rising numbers of poor urban residents. The dual transition of liberalization and urbanization is of critical importance, yet the workings and mechanics of politics and democracy in these spaces remain largely unknown.

This study aims to contribute to our understanding of the process of democratization and democratic quality. Why does democracy "work" in some local contexts but not others? What is the role of local communities and ordinary residents in the construction of their democracies? What are the conditions for a quality democracy? The investigation takes us to the grassroots, where democracy is messy, chaotic, dangerous and even smelly. It reconstructs democracy from the ground up, taking the site of daily life as its starting point to offer a lens into the nuts and bolts of a democratizing society. The examination uncovers the intricacies of daily political life by assessing the logics of collective action and locating the informal institutions that shape

democratic behavior. While the theoretical insights for the study of democracy span the world, the site of inquiry is where we might least expect to find it: African slums.

Democracy in unexpected places

The inquiry begins in Tulako-Ashaiman, a slum on the outskirts of Ghana's largest port city, Tema. In February 2012, a drunk driver drove his supply truck into an electricity pole. A local leader officially recognized as the "Zonal Council chairman" notified the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) to turn off the power because a dangerous livewire was now exposed and he wanted to make sure that children would not be harmed. This caused an electricity blackout and the entire neighborhood therefore went without power. The municipal representative, or Assemblyman, quickly rushed to the scene to "calm tempers." A group of residents joined the scene and started arguing. Some of them were close to beating up the driver. They debated whether to send the driver to the police station. Some argued that if he were arrested, he also would not be able to pay for the fixing of the pole. They also believed that the owner of the truck—the man for whom the driver worked—was a known "big man" in town and residents believed that he had influence over the police.

Everybody agreed that if they filed a formal complaint with the ECG the process would take too long. They knew that the Municipal Assembly and police would not help. The young men made uncoordinated phone calls to people they knew who worked for the ECG—they tried to save the day. As it started pouring rain, approximately twenty residents of the slum, including the Assemblyman, elders, owner of the vehicle, and other residents, gathered in the Zonal Council office to discuss how to solve the problem. They argued, complained and came up with a solution to get power back by the end of the day. In the end, the owner of the vehicle

negotiated and paid most of the costs; community members contributed a small amount. The Assemblyman went to the ECG and demanded they fix the pole as soon as possible. The ECG then upgraded the pole to "high density," an improvement to the pole that they had previously. By 4PM, the electricity was back on, including the power in the Assemblyman's personal house. This story illustrates the *political process serving the public interest* in an unexpected place: a slum with high levels of ethnic diversity, high levels of poverty and weak formal institutions.

Two months earlier, in Accra's notorious slum Old Fadama, derogatively called Sodom and Gomorrah, men, women and children sat alongside trash heaps with as many of their life possessions as they could salvage. Their structures had just been demolished by their own "community leaders" and they had nowhere to go. While some residents cried, most went about trying to figure out where to sleep that evening, not at all surprised at the day's events. They live in a slum that has been under the threat of eviction since 2002, after all. The demolition was not a knee-jerk exercise by state authorities in the efforts to establish its coercive power. Rather, it was the outcome of a series of negotiations and bargaining between the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), community leaders, and the NGO People's Dialogue for Human Settlements (PD) (Paller 2014d).

In October, 2011, Accra experienced its annual floods where fourteen people reportedly died. In response, the AMA secured funding to clean the gutters and dredge the Korle Lagoon. In order to complete the project, the AMA claimed they would need to clear all structures in Old Fadama within 100 meters of the lagoon. But the relationship between the AMA and the community is a tense one, illustrated by the AMA's longstanding desire to demolish the slum and the community's strong resistance to it (Du Plessis 2005; Grant 2006; Afenah 2010). The AMA reached out to PD who has a long history of acting as a "broker" between the AMA and

Old Fadama (Braimah 2010). Community leaders and PD worried that the AMA would use the opportunity to demolish more structures than necessary, so they proposed leading the demolition exercise themselves.

After a series of negotiations between the AMA and the community leaders, the Task Force for Old Fadama Development Association (OFADA) carried out the demolition exercise on December 21. But the exercise was problematic. It violated international human rights standards because it did not give proper notice to victims.[1] Several residents were left without relocation options (Kumah 2012). When a local chief realized that his structure was within the demolition path, he ordered some youth to throw rocks at the bulldozer. The driver and a few others were badly injured and had to go to the hospital. After the exercise, many residents accused their leaders of "selling out the community." Nonetheless, PD and Amnesty International deemed the exercise a success and expressed their satisfaction with it (MacPherson 2012). Today, the lagoon still has not been dredged and structures have been rebuilt in the very space that was demolished in December. Residents distrust the AMA; but perhaps more serious is the residents' distrust of their own leaders. There is still no solution to the government-community deadlock and Old Fadama residents continue to live under the threat of forced eviction. This case represents that despite the intervention of an international human rights NGO, participation of a group of community leaders, and the official authorities to improve sanitation in the area, the public interest was not served. Instead, the story illustrates the *political process serving private interests*—a select few leaders and activists who treated the exercise as employment, at the expense of the basic welfare of the majority of residents.

[1] A forced eviction is "the involuntary removal of persons from their homes or land, directly or indirectly attributable to the State. It entails the effective elimination of the possibility of an individual or group living in a particular house, residence or place, and the assisted (in the case of resettlement) or unassisted (without resettlement) movement of evicted persons or groups to other areas" (UNHCR 1993). The exercise constituted a forced eviction.

Just five minutes up the road from Old Fadama is the heart of Old Accra. The slum, called Ga Mashie, is the political center of this world dating back to pre-colonial times. The indigenous Ga people settled in the 16th century and maintained the community as their capital. They even have a proverb, "Ga se gbe jig be," translating to "The way of the Ga, that is the way" and also "All roads lead to Accra" (Parker 2000: ix). For the Ga people, *they* are Accra—and it is the center of their world. Ga Mashie is also the heart of Odododiodio constituency, one of the most historically important political areas for formal politics in the country. Independence hero and first president Kwame Nkrumah was the Minister of Parliament for the constituency; the struggle for political power at independence that largely formed the basis for Ghana's dual party system was fought there (Austin 1970). There is a local saying that the party who wins Odododiodio Constituency wins the national election. Elections are extremely competitive, civil society organizations are active, residents are politically engaged, and the community is directly next to Ghana's central business district. Despite Ga Mashie's vast political and economic power, the community has descended into a slum: houses are overcrowded and substandard, sewers overflow, sanitation is poor, and poverty and unemployment rates are high.

One morning in April 2013, Samuel Ashalley Addey-Ashley sat beside a major street in Ga Mashie drinking a beer. This was not any street, but *his* street—the street for which his family was custodian of the land and he was the family elder. Ashley serves as the preeminent landlord on the block due to his role as a fetish priest for the Ga people—for which his name is Nana Odupon Okomfo Abeka Sikafo II. As family elder, he is a caretaker for his 16 children, as well as the ten women who are the mothers of his children. On this particular day, Ashley was basking in his latest accomplishment: securing the government contract to rebuild the local Salaga Market. Ashley has no contracting skills and has never been to technical school. Instead,

his close political connections to Member of Parliament Edwin Nii Lantey Vanderpuye helped secure him the contract. Vanderpuye needed the support of a traditional elder to build on the land: he needed to offer what I call a customary entitlement to a traditional leader for the state to develop a market on the land. Ashley then sought the assistance of his son-in-law—an educated businessman living in the United States—to help finance the project and provide the contracting skills and expertise. The contract was the prize outcome of a long political struggle for the rights to rebuild the market, one that spanned political parties, market women associations, and various MPs and Assemblymen. At 3PM on this day, and several beers later, Ashley would meet with Vanderpuye and his son-in-law at the Parliament to discuss building the market and how many family members of his would be part of the project. Despite Ga Mashie's political and historical importance, family struggles for authority and power divide the community and undermine the public interest. This story illustrates the *political process serving club interests*—families with local authority and who claim ownership of the land.

Why does a community with such rich political and economic history descend into a slum? Why does a community that is growing in political importance and has the attention of powerful international human rights organizations continue to undermine the rights of its citizens? And most interestingly, how does a community with high levels of ethnic diversity, poverty, and weak institutions overcome these challenges to come together and get things done in the public interest? This study provides answers to these puzzling questions.

All three of these stories illustrate the process of local-level democratization in unexpected places. They document how democracy actually works in urban Ghana. Yet despite similar levels of ethnic diversity, low levels of poverty, and weak formal institutions, only Ashaiman-Tulako had the conditions that enabled local democracy to serve the public interest.

This successful case of quality democracy calls into question existing theories of democracy that emphasize levels of socio-economic development, competitive elections, state capacity and formal rule of law as necessary conditions for quality democracy. Instead, they suggest the need for a deep examination of the underlying conditions in local communities. It is this variation in local community political dynamics that leads to diverse social welfare and public goods outcomes. Therefore, the substantive nature of democratic quality is the focus of this study.

I make a few important claims about the study of democracy. As the stories above demonstrate, formal institutions like elections and Parliament are components in a broader redistributive game. In other words, formal institutions can serve public, private, or club interests. But, as Putnam (1993) famously argued, formal institutional performance depends on the underlying community dynamics in which they are embedded. I take this insight as a point of departure, but consider the important ways that community dynamics link to state institutions (Levi 1996; Boix and Posner 1996), and how local actors and politicians use a diverse range of strategies to secure particularistic benefits (Piattoni 2001). I do this by contributing to a growing research agenda that highlights the importance of informal institutions in the study of democracy (O'Donnell 1996; Lauth 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 2006; Bratton 2007; MacLean 2010).

These diverse social welfare and public goods outcomes also highlight the need for a substantive definition of democracy that extends beyond rules and procedures to select leaders through competitive elections (Schumpeter 1942) and "organized uncertainty" among elites (Przeworski 1991). On the one hand, these procedural definitions miss the substantive elements of democracy in people's daily lives (Wedeen 2004). As the stories above suggest, the democratic struggle in people's lives often depend on substantive outcomes like getting the electricity back on, protecting from eviction threats from the state, and holding leaders

accountable to use public money in ways that benefit the public good. On the other hand, the procedural approach overlooks the ways in which the electoral process is embedded in larger structures of power, suggesting the need for an additional element of popular control over the electoral process (Shapiro 1999; Maloy 2014). By focusing on the meaning of democracy, Frederic Schaffer (1998) shows how democracy is understood by ordinary Senegalese as more than a voting procedure, but as a way to reinforce community ties that may be called upon in times of crisis. Similarly, Elke Zuern (2009) argues that questions of poverty and material inequality should be at the center of the analysis of democratization because they better represent the local context and understandings of liberation that are central to ordinary Africans' understanding of the word.

Dahl's (1971) definition of polyarchy attempts to consider power dynamics by adding several substantive components of democracy that are overlooked in the procedural definition, namely effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusiveness. But this definition similarly falls short for its focus on individual action at the expense of collective action and agency. Instead, in this study I adopt a definition of democracy based on collective self-governance (Ober 2008; List and Petit 2011). This approach is more in line with the original conception of the word in Athens, and suggests the collective capacity of a public to make good things happen in the public realm (Ober 2008). Therefore, the definition of democracy advanced in this study is the collective capacity to get things done in the public interest. This definition emphasizes the importance of the public sphere to democratic practice (Habermas 1991; Fraser 1992; Wedeen 2004), the incorporation of the public interest into conceptions of democracy (Grofman and Feld 1988), the ability of residents to set the agenda in collective decision-making, and democracy as a method of collective problem-solving (Dewey

1927). The definition has the added benefit of being more in line with the empirical realities of political practice in urban Ghana. In this way, the study adds to a growing empirical research agenda that highlights the importance of collective action in the study of democracy in Africa (Fujiwara and Wantchekon 2013; Lieberman, Posner and Tsai 2014).

The dual transition of liberalization and urbanization

This study is situated in African slums.[2] While slums might seem like strange places to study local democracy, there are numerous benefits. Africa is urbanizing at a rate of 3.5% per year during the past two decades, the highest regional urbanization rate in the world (African Development Bank 2012). Leading scholars of African urban studies goes as far to call the situation a "revolution" (Parnell and Pieterse 2014). This is because Africa will reach the 50 percent urban mark by 2030, and currently is 40 percent urbanized with more than 414 million urbanites (UN DESA 2011). A result of this rapid urbanization is the growth of slums across the continent. An estimated 200 million people (Vidal 2010), or 62% of the urban population in sub-Saharan Africa resides in slums (UN-HABITAT 2010; Arimah 2010). The inability of African governments to provide public goods and services to the urban population, the increase of urban poverty, and the rising number of slums across the continent have led a number of experts to suggest that Africa is experiencing an "urban crisis" (Tibaijuka 2004; Bond 2000; Hove et al. 2013). The following table shows the growth of slums across the African continent.

[2] In this study, I use UN-HABITAT'S definition of slum: "a heavily populated urban area characterized by substandard housing and squalor."

Table 1.1: Proportion of urban population living in slums 2005 (UN-HABITAT 2008)

Major area or region	Urban population (thousands) 2005 a	Percentage of Urban Population living in Slum 2005 b	Slum population (thousands) 2005 c
Developing world	2,219,811	36.5	810,441
Northern Africa	82,809	14.5	12,003
Sub-Saharan Africa	264,355	62.2	164,531
Latin America and the Caribbean	434,432	27.0	117,439
Eastern Asia	593,301	36.5	216,436
Southern Asia	468,668	42.9	201,185
South-Eastern Asia	243,724	27.5	67,074
Western Asia	130,368	24.0	31,254
Oceania	2,153	24.1	519

The rapid urbanization is not only an "urban crisis," but also a "political opportunity" for a diverse group of actors, ranging from the urban poor, community leaders, and politicians (Paller 2014e). This is because the dual transition of rapid urbanization and political liberalization across the continent provides new spaces for the accumulation of political power. Slums are at the forefront of these political struggles as previously marginalized communities demand citizenship rights and seek inclusion into democratic polities (Holston 2008).

It has become conventional wisdom to attribute the rise of slums in the developing world, particularly in Africa, to an outgrowth of broader processes of globalization. Rising globalization has contributed to the growth of mega-cities, which has left huge portions of these populations suffering from congestion, pollution and slums (Van der Ploeg and Poehlhekke 2008). Urbanization in Africa is characterized by phrases like "urbanization-without-growth" or "urbanization-without-industrialization" that emphasize the informal sector and processes of informalization (Fay and Opal 2000; Davis 2004). The urbanization of poverty is now a widespread concern for economists and policymakers (Ravallion, Chen and Sangaula 2007). Similarly, the totality of urban life is widely characterized by poverty and lawlessness, castigated as a crisis that that needs to be tamed (a critique of this is advanced by Murray and Meyers

2006). As neighborhoods, they are deemed "brown areas" where a liberal rule of law is not yet institutionalized (O'Donnell 1993) and is a "moral and legal *no man's land*" (Da Silva 2001).

This alarmist sentiment has been popularized by Mike Davis in his book and article *Planet of Slums.* Davis argues that the debt crisis of the late 1970s and IMF-led restructuring of Third World economies in the 1980s decreased wages, increased unemployment, and led to an urban, informal proletariat (Davis 2004: 9). Davis places blame directly on "global forces:"

> The global forces 'pushing' people from the countryside—mechanization in Java and India, food imports in Mexico, Haiti and Kenya, civil war and drought throughout Africa, and everywhere the consolidation of small into large holdings and the competition of industrial-scale agribusiness—seem to sustain urbanization even when the 'pull' of the city is drastically weakened by debt and depression (10).

These accounts of African urbanization place blame on neoliberal economic policies for the rising "urban crisis." Situating African cities in a broader structural context of "global neoliberalism," scholars and pundits argue that rising land prices, privatization of subsistence agriculture, and declining state and social safety net has forced rural dwellers to the city to sustain basic livelihoods (Almeida 2012). Mahmud (2010) goes as far as to argue that "the genesis and persistence of slums and slum-dwellers testify to the iron fist of the state working in concert with the hidden hand of the market in the service of accumulation of capital"(1).

The particulars of neoliberal restructuring include privatization, deregulation, free trade and minimal state interference and regulation (Harvey 2005). The rise of informal self-employment and micro-entrepreneurialism has been attributed to neoliberal adjustment policies (Portes and Hoffman 2003). During Africa's rapid urbanization in the 1990s, its state and civil service was hampered due to neoliberal policies (Rakodi 1997). Specifically, these policies contributed to capital flight, collapse of manufacturing, marginal or negative increase in export incomes, drastic cutbacks in urban public services, and soaring prices and a steep decline in real

wages (ibid; Myers 2005). By the 2000s, many in the development and policy-making industry were already expressing the failures of these policies. The most important report on the growth of slums was published by the UN in 2003, and concluded: "Instead of being a focus for growth and prosperity, the cities have become a dumping ground for a surplus population working in unskilled, unprotected and low-wage informal service industries and trade…The rise of [this] informal sector is…a direct result of liberalization" (UN 2003: 76). The impact of neoliberal restructuring is believed to have hit African cities particularly hard, where breakdown of state services is more impactful in daily life than in rural areas where traditional and kinship networks play a larger role in providing services and welfare (O'Connor 1993).

Paradoxically, neoliberal policies have served as an impetus for greater political reforms while at the same time exacerbating socio-economic inequalities. Cities serve as a microcosm for broader national politics, and have typically been the main setting for political change in Africa (Chazan and Rothchild 1988). This tension dates back to colonial times where the city acted as both a system of control and as the only space to engage in a political struggle against colonial authorities (Austin 1966). When colonialism ended, the city maintained its importance as a site of struggle, but also became a sphere for positive participation and engagement with the state.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, cities served as important sources for homegrown political opposition that would usher in a new era of democratization (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994). The first protests broke out in urbanized countries, mostly in cities (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Until the wave of democratization that spread across Africa in the early 1990s, there were few institutional mechanisms for Africans to utilize their "voice" option. Thus, violent protest was the clearest option (Wiseman 1986: 509). The rise of democracy opened new

mechanisms for political dissent. Perhaps the greatest impact democratization had on urban cities was the development of an urban middle class and a burgeoning civil society.

The political liberalization, supported by international allies and finance institutions, also impacted public policy. This liberalization marked a focused attention on governance and the rule of law. As Crawford Young (2012) notes: "Governance initially appeared in a World Bank document in 1989 and was defined as 'the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs,' requiring 'a pluralistic institutional structure, a determination to respect the rule of law, and vigorous protection of the freedom of the press and human rights.'" (198). For urban planners and development specialists, governance included setting out to "fix" what went wrong with African cities (Myers 2005). In many ways, this meant taking a "back to the future strategy" that attempted to go back to the colonial city at Independence (Callaghy and Ravenhill 1993). This has limited the role of the state in this process, and ushered in further decentralization and attempted distribution of power to local administrative bodies (Eyoh and Stren 2003).

The dual processes of political liberalization and rapid urbanization place intense pressure on urban residents and communities to confront livelihood and welfare challenges without the assistance of the state. Scholars have attempted to give agency to urban dwellers and demonstrate the way that they actively participate in urban life and confront the "urban crisis." In this way, scholars emphasize the resilience of urban dwellers and their ability to overcome vulnerabilities. For example, Simone (2004) highlights the constant "state of emergency" of urban life, and argues that "there is a rupture in the organization of the present. Normal approaches are insufficient" (4). The ability "to cope" has been the subject of numerous anthropological and sociological studies (Maylam and Edwards 1996; Ferguson 1999). One

strategy is for local community networks to internationalize themselves—termed "globalization-from-below"—by forming alliances with international NGOs (Appadurai 2001; Grant 2009).

An alternative, reactionary approach is to politicize conceptions of belonging and notions of citizenship, making new claims over territory and land (Geschiere and Gugler 1998; Geschiere and Jackson 2006). As Geschiere and Nyamjoh write: "Thus political liberalization leads, somewhat paradoxically, to an intensification of the politics of belonging: fierce debates on who belongs where, violent exclusion of "strangers" (even if this refers to people with the same nationality who have lived for generations in the area), and a general affirmation of roots and origins as the basic criteria of citizenship and belonging" (2000: 423).

Another common response to this "state of emergency" is to form voluntary associations. These associations are vital for the well-being of urban residents, whether their objective is economic, political, educational, religious, recreational or cultural (Wirth 1938). In Africa, these associations are involved in a range of activities including community management, provision of social services and infrastructure, finance and credit, and religious and social affairs (Tostensen, Tvedten, and Vaa 2001). Furthermore, "people are embedded in webs of relationships which facilitate their access to niches in the urban informal economy, help them find a place to live, and sustain them through crises of various types" (Lourenco-Lidell 2001). In fact, informal rights and networks can act as useful coping mechanisms for vulnerable populations where the formal structures of the city or the state do not protect them (Tripp 1997; Attahi 1997). Stated simply, the informal economy of "self-organized energies of people, biding their time to escape from the strictures of state rule," provides good, services, and jobs that the formal economy cannot provide (Hart 2000). In this way, the informal economy represents societal disengagement from the state and the formal market and offers opportunities and freedom for vulnerable populations

(Azarya and Chazan 1987). The conclusion to be drawn from this research is that the success of local communities depends on the strength of its social networks and the underlying networks of civic engagement and social capital (Putnam 1993).

Yet while these attempts to understand community dynamics give agency to local populations, they do so largely by overlooking the institutional context, as well as the linkages with broader society and the state (Meagher 2005). Specifically, they overlook patterns of politics and political behavior that might shape and condition levels of social capital and types of social and political networks (Boix and Posner 1998). By examining the dual process of political liberalization alongside rapid urbanization in Ghana, I will show how these two processes interact, support and even shape each other. While increasing globalization, neoliberal restructuring, and levels of social capital are crucial factors in the growth of slums, these analyses are largely devoid of politics.

The dual transition has caused an empirical reality in which African slums are new and emerging spaces of intense political importance. By overlooking these spaces, scholars miss crucial sites of a democratizing society. Moreover, African slums also have the conditions that are of growing empirical and theoretical interest to social scientists. Some of the most important questions being asked by scholars today include: How to spur cooperation in ethnically diverse settings? How to foster human and economic development in impoverished settings? How to strengthen weak formal institutions? Studying democracy in these unexpected places sheds light on these very important questions.

Current theoretical explanations for democratic quality

Scholars have advanced a range of theories to explain democratic quality. Modernization theory posits that as people move to cities the society will transform from "traditional" to "modern." Urban residents will become more educated, gain higher incomes, and demand more democracy from their governments. Lipset (1963) forcefully sums up the claim: "All the various aspects of economic development—industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education—are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy" (41). In modernized societies, citizens develop social and cultural attitudes that support mass participation, providing the supporting conditions for democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2009). As levels of income rise, Epstein et al. (2006) find that democratic transitions are more likely to take place, putting the authors in contrast to Przeworski et al. (2000) who find that although per capita income might not predict the transition, it does explain the stability of a democratic regime. When applied to the urban context, scholars have emphasized the importance of including the urban poor into the modernization process. Failure to do so might result in radicalization, disorganization and anomie, and fragmentation, making poor urban communities ripe for illegal activity and undermining political institutionalization (Huntington 1968; arguments against this thesis have been made by Portes 1972 and Perlman 1975). This has led to the categorization of the urban poor either as "clients" or "activists," overlooking "whether certain conditions are conducive to more or less participation, different forms of conflict and cooperation, changing arrangements of power, and so forth" (Walton 1998: 462). *This approach emphasizes focusing on the socio-demographic characteristics of the urban poor, positing that Africans with higher levels of education, higher income, and who have spent more years in the city will construct a higher quality democracy.*

The dominant academic and popular view is that slum communities lack the capacity to access state resources and sit outside of state power, even though they exist within close geographic proximity to the state apparatus (Mann 1984). This outcome contradicts those who argue that the state can more easily broadcast its authority in urban areas than in rural areas (Herbst 2000) and that policymakers favor urban workers (Bates 1981). Yet, prominent democracy scholars argue that areas like slums should be deemed "brown areas"—sections of a newly emerging democracy where political rights are respected but a liberal legal order has yet to be established, posing a serious threat to democratization (O'Donnell 1993; Zakaria 2003). The threat to democratic consolidation is lack of formal institutionalization (O'Donnell 1996). The challenge for governments, therefore, is to incorporate slums into the broader state administration so that public goods can be provided and infrastructural developments can be applied to these neighborhoods. The growth of slums can be attributed to state weakness and lack of state capacity, including a non-institutionalized rule of law. *This approach emphasizes strengthening state capacity and the rule of law in slum areas, positing formal legal institutions as important conditions of a quality democracy.*

A third body of scholarship emphasizes the importance of competitive elections for promoting government responsiveness and accountability, crucial elements of a quality democracy (Ferejohn 1986; Przeworksi et al. 1999). National-level studies suggest that high degrees of party contestation in the context of competitive elections lead to a higher likelihood for political accountability (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). In Africa, Lindberg (2006) found that elections promote democratic learning and liberalization over time, even if elections are flawed. Levels of poverty and electoral competition contribute to the decisions politicians make about the distribution of resources (Lindberg and Morrison 2008). Even in contexts of political

clientelism, elections may enable more entrenched and responsive clientelist networks, contributing to public service provision in some local communities (Van de Walle 2007; Lindberg 2010). *This approach emphasizes levels of political competition and political party institutionalization as crucial factors in the development of quality democracy.*

A long tradition of Africanist scholarship focuses on the role of history in the contemporary political affairs, enabling or constraining the development of a quality democracy. Pre-colonial political forms, legacies of colonialism, and political struggles for citizenship all influence the democratic process. According to Herbst (2000), high population densities, domestic power infrastructure, the nature of national boundaries, and the design of state systems best explains political outcomes today. Contemporary governance institutions should not conflict with preexisting political institutions (Englebert 2000), and the role of pre-colonial institutions are crucial in the development of rational-legal state apparatuses (Robinson and Parsons 2006). The colonial state also reordered political space (Young 1994), transformed society (LeMarchand 1983), and redistributed land, determining "who should produce what and how" (Ake 1996: 2). Colonialism created enclave economies that privileged resource extraction over production (Leonard and Straus 2003), leading to perpetual local struggles over land (Berry 1994; Lund 2008). This legacy had severe consequences for leadership, leading to a strict rural-urban divide where power was centralized in the cities (Mamdani 1996).

But colonialism also defined the spheres of African political morality. Peter Ekeh argues that African societies have two publics: an amoral civic public in which political leaders "gain materially but to which they give only grudgingly" and a moral primordial public in which they "derive little or no material benefits but to which they are expected to give generously and do give materially" (1975: 108). In turn, leaders rob the civic public and redistribute these resources

to kin and patronage networks in the primordial public—or as Laitin (1986) calls them group members with the same "ancestral city identities." In this way, Africans are dual citizens: members of the state (based on an ideal of liberal universalism) and members of their ethnic group (based on an ideal of civic republicanism) (Ndegwa 1997).The long-term consequences are significant: postcolonial political institutions "constitute a distinctive regime of violence" (Mbembe 1994) that dominate all aspects of African life, contributing to deficits in the quality of democracy today. *This approach emphasizes the historical legacies of state-building as providing an enabling or constraining environment for democratic quality, and suggests that quality democracy depends on accumulated historical stocks.*

A final interdisciplinary body of scholarship examines the social and cultural underpinnings of a community. In diverse societies, ethnicity is particularly important because leaders have been shown to strategically manipulate ethnic identity for the sake of political power (Bates 1983; Chandra 2004). As Crawford Young forcefully argues: "In Africa, ethnicity in the political realm is…above all mobilized by issues of domination and distribution, relative to shares within a polity rather than separation from it" (2007). Wilkinson (2004) even suggests that democratization might give politicians the incentive to play the ethnic card. In Africa, politicians make decisions about alliances with other ethnic groups based on their need for a minimum winning coalition during election time, suggesting that ethnicity is only political salient in the context of certain formal institutional arrangements (Posner 2005).

But ethnicity also contributes to the civic life of a community, contributing to conditions for vibrant civic engagement and collective action (Putnam 1993; Varshney 2002). One of the most robust findings in economics and political science scholarship is that ethnic diversity undermines public goods provision, a crucial element of quality democracy (citations). One

reason for this is that co-ethnics are more likely to sanction members of their own group (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007). Dionne (2014) finds that the threats of ethnic diversity can be overcome through dense social connections. *This approach emphasizes the associational life of a community as well as the ethnic and social underpinnings of communal life, and posits that ethnic diversity threatens the quality of a democracy*.

This study does not reject these explanations outright, but rather seeks to shed light on when, where and how they matter for a quality democracy. For example, in some local contexts, ethnicity is a salient political identity upon which to mobilize voters, but in others it is not. Why? Alternatively, formal institutions serve the interests of the citizens in some cases, while in other places they do not work. What are the conditions that enable high institutional performance? Most importantly, on their own, none of these explanations account for the surprising finding outlined at the beginning of this chapter—that quality democracy can emerge in communities with low levels of socio-economic modernization, low state capacity, ineffective or uncompetitive elections, and high ethnic diversity. These explanations *on their own* do not explain the variation in democratic quality in African slums.

I argue that the reason for this is that they neglect the site of daily life as a crucial space for political and social inquiry. Therefore, my study shifts the focus of the study of democracy away from elections and legislatures—the dominant emphasis in comparative politics scholarship—to the site of daily life where politics and democratization take root. While formal institutions are influential in democratic quality, they are embedded in the norms, habits, behaviors, and practice of daily life (Bourdieu 1979).

Beyond state power and community resistance

The most significant reason for the shortcomings of these alternative explanations is their failure to overcome the "state power versus community resistance" dichotomy. These arguments get subsumed into a narrative that pits state power versus community resistance. In other words, urban communities are understood as sovereign territories with varying levels of autonomy from the state. The failures of economic growth, democratization, and human development across the continent are often attributed to macro- and top-down theories, while overlooking the local community dynamics and grassroots political processes that exist in local neighborhoods. Likewise, the accounts that do focus on the associational life of communities do not consider the linkages with state actors, and how these relationships contribute to the quality of democracy.

When taking these dynamics into account, as the stories at the beginning of this chapter demonstrate, the classic state power versus community resistance narrative breaks down. Local actors and political entrepreneurs have far more agency than conventional theories suggest. But, more importantly, the linkages between community actors (and leaders in particular) and state actors and politicians play a far more important role than the "state power versus community resistance" dichotomy would suggest. One of the most important contributions that I attempt to make in this study is to interrogate this dichotomy and show how it overlooks the empirical realities of daily political life.

Interrogating the linkages between state actors and societal groups and networks is not new, but requires further analysis. In their influential book, Rothschild and Chazan (1988) argue that African states and societies are in a precarious balance. They emphasize "constant movement between the official and unofficial, the private and the public, the rural and the urban" (ix). Further, Azarya and Chazan (1987) suggest the need to move away from the "engagement paradigm" to understand how African individuals and groups "have attempted to cope with the

state by distancing themselves from it as a hedge against its instability and declining performance" (108). In fact, Bratton (1989) argues that to truly understand the African state, one must grasp its relations with society. This has spurred scholars like Migdal (1988) to situate the state within society. In other words, the state is viewed as one of many social forces that is involved in the "the ongoing struggles among shifting coalitions over the rules for daily behavior" (Migdal 2001: 11).

Aili Mari Tripp deems this analytical move away from the state "societal autonomy" and argues that it is "critical to removing personalistic forms of governance from the state" (2000: 3). Rather than focusing on making demands from the state, associational autonomy allows space for groups to act outside of state patronage networks (ibid: 6). This move away from the state-civil society paradigm suggests new domains of societal activity for scholars to explore. One such space, especially in Africa, has been the unofficial economy which is a societal "response to political exclusion and economic incentives" (Emizet 1998: 128). The growth of the informal sector in Tanzania has also been attributed to the failures of political and economic liberalization of the 1990s (Tripp 1997). Despite this strong tendency to disaggregate the state and society in Africanist political science scholarship, it continues to draw from a Weberian concept of the state that focuses on state power, capacity, and coercion. This study challenges this conventional view by examining the role of the state and societal actors in urban Ghana.

The flip side of state power is community resistance in these "non-state" spaces (Scott 1990, 1998). The high levels of poverty and violence in these slum communities shape the strategies that residents use to survive on a daily basis (Simone 2004). This leads to a dominant narrative that residents are excluded from the state (Landau 2013). In these "hidden transcripts," residents have sets of routine claim-making actions available to the powerless as they resist the

powerful (Scott 1985: 4). Alternatively, political entrepreneurs use these same claim-making strategies to contest for dominance and establish hierarchies (Poteete and Ribot 2011: 440). These strategies, or performances, become "symbolic actions" (Alexander and Mast 2006) that make up a broader "culture of resistance" (Conquergood 2002). These "varieties of cultural schemas" (Geertz 1973) become the defining rules of social life (Ortner 1984). But this culturalist interpretation of cultural resistance is "blind to the processes by which ongoing practices and systems of meaning change, are sites of political struggle, and generate multiple significations within social groups" (Wedeen 2002: 716). They miss the local political struggles that dominate daily life.

With this in mind, some researchers have expressed concern that resistance has become romanticized (Abu Lughod 1990). This is because they lack an ethnographic perspective (Ortner 1995) that can uncover basic questions like: What do actors want and how can they get it? (Ortner 1981:366). Community resistance studies lack a focus of "internal political complexity" (Ortner 1995; a similar argument is made by Pelzer 1986). These studies highlight the simple point that the state and the community are not easily distinguishable analytical categories. Similarly, simple distinctions between the state and informal realms suffer from the same problem: the informal economy is often "absorbed" by the state (Elyachar 2003). In a different context, Saba Mahmood argues there are "dimensions of human action whose ethical and political status does not map onto the logic of repression and resistance" (Mahmood 2005: 14). I suggest that African slums should be considered such spaces.

My study shows that there is an underlying logic that governs state-society relations throughout important periods of formal regime change. These rules and procedures shape the activity and motivations of local leaders or political entrepreneurs and ordinary residents. This

approach privileges agency and unexpected change (Berk and Galvan 2009). As Berk and Galvan argue, institutional structure is not a script or a schema, but a skill. Human beings are not just playing by the rules, but playing through the rules as if they were instruments (Berk and Galvan 2009). But by and large, these rules are informal, yet play a central role in the functioning of Ghana's democracy. My ethnographic and anthropological approach to the study of democracy in Africa demonstrates how the "state power versus community resistance" approach to politics breaks down when the site of daily life is appropriately examined.

The evolution of political clientelism

One of the puzzling realities in Ghana today is the rise of clientelism despite the strengthening of liberal democratic institutions (Lindberg 2010; Paller 2014). Political scientists offer explanations for the persistence of clientelism that range from colonial legacies (Ekeh 1975), illegitimate state institutions (Englebert 2000), 'perverse' machine politics (Stokes 2005), inability of politicians to make credible commitments (Keefer 2007), role of party brokers (Stokes et al. 2013), high levels of poverty and electoral competition (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Lindberg & Morrison 2008), to weak indigenous industries and easy state financing from foreign aid (Whitfield 2011). In contrast to this growing body of scholarship, my research argues that the evolution of political clientelism in Ghana has its roots in pre-colonial and colonial structures of power. They pre-date the rise of Ghana's two major political parties in the early 1950s, and far precede Ghana's return to multi-party democracy in 1992. This simple observation suggests that the drivers of political clientelism exist outside formal institutions of power and is epiphenomenal to the formal political process. But, it is not entirely separate from officially sanctioned activity. Rather, informal institutions shape how formal politics works in Ghana, either by substituting for; competing with; complementing; or accommodating formal

rules and procedures of politics (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). I uncover the roots of political clientelism in Ghana, trace its historical evolution, and examine its contributing and growing importance in contemporary multi-party politics.

My study contributes to the growing research agenda that examines political clientelism as a central element of distributive politics. Susan Stokes and her collaborators provide an important theory of clientelism in their book *Brokers, Voters and Clientelism.* This study is the latest book in the "third wave of clientelism literature" that treats clientelism as a form of distributive politics. These studies emerge in the early 2000s and focus on the instrumental and particularistic elements of the electoral process. Following Piattoni (2001), clientelism and patronage are "strategies for the acquisition, maintenance, and aggrandizement of political power, on the part of the patrons, and strategies for the protection and promotion of their interests, on the part of the clients, and that their deployment is driven by given sets of incentives and disincentives" (2). For ordinary people, this offers new patterns of political accountability: "Clientelistic accountability represents a transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 2). These incentives are largely shaped by institutional features: levels of formal political competition, economic development, ethnic heterogeneity, and public sector involvement in the economy (ibid). My study suggests the need to incorporate informal institutions into the conversation of potential explanations for the persistence of political clientelism (Lindberg 2010; Paller 2014).

The third wave of clientelism scholarship has advanced a range of theories that focus on why politicians target swing voters (Stokes 2005); why politicians target loyal voters through the mechanism of turnout buying (Nichter 2008); why vote buying is salient in certain contexts but

not others (Schaffer 2007); why politicians opt out of clientelism (Weitz-Shapiro 2012); and why voters engage in clientelism (Baldwin 2013). This group of scholars—including Stokes et al.—provides instrumental explanations to these various outcomes. In other words, they emphasize the need to win elections. These studies follow the important contribution made by the "second wave of clientelism literature" of the 1980s and 1990s that suggest clientelism will not fade away with the rise of market capitalism, political and economic modernization, and the rise of civil societies across the world (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980; Roniger 1984).[3] Instead, clientelism takes various forms and there are different "varieties of clientelism" (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2013). Nonetheless, these scholars focus exclusively on elections and organizational capacity of political parties.

These studies stand in direct contrast to the first wave of clientelism scholarship that emerges in the 1960s and 1970s and has a culturalist and developmental basis. The 1977 volume *Friends, Followers, and Factions* edited by Schmidt et al. includes a series of influential articles from top journals of political science, sociology and anthropology. This approach suggests that clientelism is maintained by cultural ties and low levels of economic and political modernization. For example, Scott defines patron-client relationships as the following: "An exchange relationship between roles-may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron" (92). Similarly, patron clientelism is described as: "A vertical dyadic alliance, i.e., an alliance between two persons of unequal status, power or

[3] This point is nicely argued in Roniger 2004 and Hicken 2011.

resources each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself" (Schmidt 1977: xx). In these models, the core attributes of clientelism are longevity, diffuseness, face-to-face contact, and inequality (Hilgers 2011). Most of these models build off a norm of reciprocity: "1) people should help those who have helped them, and 2) people should not injure those who have helped them" (Gouldner 1960). The concern for others' social welfare is at the center of these relationships, providing an important mode of representation. By focusing on instrumental and electoral modes of clientelism, the second wave of clientelism overlooks many of these important daily features of political activity (exceptions include Lawson and Greene 2012 and Finan and Schecter 2011). In doing so, they miss a powerful representative—the patron—who shows concern for his client's social welfare.

Javier Auyero attempts to bridge these different approaches to clientelism by developing a theory of electoral clientelism that relies on the underlying reciprocity and concern for others' social welfare. In effect, Auyero argues that formal party politics are outcomes of "ongoing informal problem-solving networks meant to ensure material survival and of shared cultural representations" in the context of daily life (2000: 14). Most importantly, he draws from Pierre Bourdieu to describe a system that is institutionalized in the practices of daily life:

> The social and mental structures of political clientelism are "interlinked by a two-fold relationship of mutual constitution and correspondence." Within inner circles, the distribution of material resources is important. Clients are, undoubtedly, interested actors. But interest cannot be taken as the actual cause- the generative principle-of clients' behaviors. Reciprocity and calculation exist, but demands for recognition within the inner circle are more significant. The emphasis that inner-circle members place on their "friendship" with their brokers and on the affective ties so contracted hints at the meanings that emerge and sustain these ties: clients' desires to be cared for and recognized should be considered the central cause of their behavior (Auyero: 180-181).

The Stokes et al. volume builds off this critical insight, but examines the role of the broker from the perspective of the political machine. These "problem solving networks" get subsumed into a

mechanism to monitor voters, an important but incomplete picture of the motivations and incentives that brokers face in daily life. Nonetheless, Stokes et al. build off this crucial insight to seriously consider the role that brokers play in "perverse accountability," or the machine holding voters accountable for their vote (Stokes 2005).

At the center of this theory is the role of the broker: "Brokers are local intermediaries who provide targeted benefits and solve problems for their followers; in exchange, they request followers' participation in political activities such as rallies – and often demand their votes" (Stokes et al. 2013: 75). In the context of the secret ballot, politicians require brokers to monitor the activity of voters. The authors write, "Clientelism involves a quid pro quo exchange—in which benefits are conditioned on votes, and in which at least imperfect monitoring of voters is required to sustain the clientelist bargain" (76).

Building off Auyero's crucial insight, Stokes et al. explain: "Brokers are neighbors who have acquired reputations for their abilities to solve voters' problems…The key theoretical point here is not that voters or brokers really observe preferences or competence exactly but rather that voters and brokers possess information about each other that allows them to infer capabilities and partisanship, information that is not readily accessible to distant party leaders. Information is transmitted via longstanding social relations in which brokers and voters are enmeshed" (80). In other words, brokers are embedded in the social context of ordinary people. This might serve as an important element of representation if brokers are adequately incorporated into the party apparatus and have the power to demand public goods and resources from the state through mechanisms of clientelist accountability. Nonetheless, the authors don't appear to examine the representative element of the broker, and instead focus exclusively on their instrumental utility for the political party machine. In contrast, my study considers when the broker is a

representative in his or her own right, but tries to disentangle when and why he or she serves the public interest versus a private or club interest. In other words, I bring the broker—who are really just important community leaders—to the forefront of the democratic process. I show how they are crucial for the core elements of democratic quality: cooperation, participation, and accountability.

Stokes et al. provide the institutional and structural conditions that enable the broker to serve as an effective representative: loyal voters in swing districts with powerful brokers are most likely to have the most power to represent. And they make it clear that party leaders have different incentives than brokers. Nonetheless, both have electoral incentives that shape how they mobilize followers and who they decide to represent. While the authors do a solid job of examining the conditions under which brokers help the machine win elections (and empower themselves), they stop short of analyzing the broker as a possible democratic representative in his or her own right. Further, they do not consider how "the least privileged elements of the population demand or claim as right" (Gay 1998) *through clientelism*, providing a potential solution to the "problem of democratic representation" (Piattoni 2001). In fact, the Stokes et al. volume reinforces the dichotomy between "client" and "citizen" that is introduced by Putnam (1993), reinforced by Fox (1994, 1996) and critiqued by scholars who argue that the distinction between private and public gets blurred in many developing societies (Roniger 2004). For example, Ayşe Güneş-Ayata (1994) argues that clientelist strategies are attempts to "search for flexible solutions oriented toward individual needs, taking private concerns into consideration and integrating everyday concerns as public issues" (in Roniger 1994: 26).

While formal institutions of accountability and representation clearly matter, they have limitations. The structure of the political economy, informal rules and norms, political culture,

and the policy-making environments all shape incentives and constraints for political leaders. This critique of a purely instrumental logic is most forcefully argued by Auyero in the context of clientelism: "This point of view assumes—wrongly—that, because favors, goods, and services circulate one way and support attendance at rallies, and—ultimately—votes circulate the other way, the former are causing the latter, that is, that votes and support come *because of* goods, services and particular favors. Confusing the circulation with the generative principles of action, this scholastic point of view makes a serious epistemological mistake" (Auyero 2000: 23).

For example, Stokes et al. do a fine job of demonstrating the electoral incentives of brokers, but fail to recognize that brokers face a menu of options and incentives to extend their political power and territorial authority. Electoral mobilization is one of many strategies in a broader political game. The next question is to ask why leaders and brokers serve the public good in some cases and not others. Why does clientelism serve the public interest in some contexts, while in others it undermines democratic representation? In other words, what are the conditions for successful clientelism?

My study argues that the answer lies outside of formal institutional channels. In effect, the answers to these questions demand a return to the first wave of clientelism scholarship, which examines formal institutions embedded in the context of society and daily life. It requires a focus on the norms and "cement" that tie ordinary people to their representative. It is these "generative principles of action," as Auyero calls them, that require more attention in studies of clientelism, and in which the current focus on electoral and instrumental approaches to clientelism overlook. Therefore, the practice of clientelism in daily life is a central focus of this study.

Informal institutions and the study of democracy

I argue that political clientelism in urban Ghana has its roots in the informal institutions of daily life (Paller 2014). Informal institutions are "the socially shared rules that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels" (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). They provide an underlying logic that explains patron-client relationships and behaviors of social exchange between groups and individuals. Informal institutions shape the modes of behavior and attitudes at a stage prior to political participation, and by defining the risks and opportunities of action and options available to political actors (Lauth 2000). In the context of weak formal institutions, they can provide a powerful social logic by way of an "economy of affection," through a network of communication, support, and interactions at the local level (Hyden 1983). In a young democracy, these rules and norms are important because they are often the real rules and norms being followed: the political process is *informally institutionalized* (O'Donnell 1996).

Recent studies in political science have attempted to show how informal institutions can play a role in holding politicians accountable to the population, building off principal-agent models (Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Tsai 2007; Cleary 2007; Bjorkman and Svensson 2009; Baldwin and Huber 2010; Baldwin 2013; Pande 2011; Humphreys and Weinstein 2012; Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2014). Bratton (2007) finds that informal institutions have a predictable outcome on attitudes of democracy: "Citizens defer to authority when they benefit materially, but question and condemn their leaders when benefits accrue to others, especially political elites" (108). Yet these studies focus their analysis on formal political activity like voting, elections, and government responsiveness. Further, they rest on elements of control by the citizens (principals) over their representatives (agents). In doing so, they overlook the importance of daily governance and everyday political life in the political development of local communities.

Others, like Lauren MacLean, argue that different experiences of state formation shaped different informal institutions of reciprocity, or long-term ties of exchange between members in a group (MacLean 2010). This approach demonstrates how micro-level norms of reciprocity contribute to different political outcomes and exercises of citizenship. Similarly, Sheely (2013) suggests that community institutions and government agencies must be working in tandem to promote the maintenance of public goods over time. These studies build off Elinor Ostrom's claim that members of groups will sanction one another and reduce the probability of free-riding without a centralized governance apparatus (Ostrom 1990). Scholars have found empirical support for these claims, particularly with respect to in-group policing (Fearon and Laitin 1996) and co-ethnic public goods provision (Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007, 2009). Other studies suggest that reciprocity and social exchange can be the motivating force of collective action (Gachter and Fehr 1999). My argument builds from this scholarship but further demonstrates how reciprocity and social exchange also forms the basis of political dynamics in urban Ghana. At the heart of these exchanges, as I will show, is the provision and control of housing and security of stay (Paller 2014f).

Transactional, reciprocal and social exchanges between leaders and their constituents (Scott 1972; Eisenstadt & Roniger 1980; LeMarchand 1981; Roniger 1994) become institutionalized over time, yet have their roots in the original settlement of a community. I provide an institutional explanation for the development of political clientelism through the persistence of certain modes of leadership, norms of reciprocity, and legal recognition of particular communities. While informal institutions are closely related to culture, institutions are distinct because they include a sanctioning mechanism that constrains and enables human behavior (North 1990). These "informal rules shape how democratic institutions work" by

reinforcing, subverting, and superseding formal rules, procedures, and organizations (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 2). The next section outlines this process.

The argument

The original formation of new polities in urban slums is a central, yet overlooked, aspect of contemporary governance. The expansion of populations to urban slums contributes to the formation of new polities, the attempted incorporation into the state by marginalized populations, and the emergence of contentious politics between local groups and state actors. The initial settlement pattern of slums sets communities on institutional pathways that have proven extremely persistent over time. Because the rules and procedures that govern daily life are directly tied to this initial settlement pattern, I call these *informal institutions of settlement.* Though not deterministic, I argue that these institutional pathways provide much explanatory power for the quality of democracy today.

The concept *informal institution of settlement* connotes "who settled first, and how." The concept of "who settled first" is a temporal measure, while the "how" refers to the type of purchase—whether it is viewed as a legitimate purchase by the broader population. This initial settlement pattern shapes the rules and norms that guide daily behavior, even in contemporary times. I choose to use informal institutions of settlement, as opposed to other concepts like citizenship regimes, political cultures, and land tenure arrangements. This is because membership in a political community, the symbolic and value-laden environments, and land tenure, respectively, are all outcomes of a historical and political process. By conceptualizing informal institutions, I focus on the norms and procedures that guide daily behavior, and show how they can change over time. I emphasize the role that political entrepreneurs play in shaping

and changing these institutions—through a process of creative syncretism (Berk and Galvan 2009). The informal institution of settlement provides a powerful logic for politics of belonging and exclusion; claims of citizenship rights and state goods; and modes of property rights enforcement. "Who settled first, and how" is relative, and it is this relative nature that enables some groups to use it as leverage and as a political resource against other groups over time. Because it is informal, it is also open to interpretation by actors involved, and allows more powerful actors to attempt to change the rules and procedures. It is through this political process that institutional change can occur.

My study argues that informal institutions of settlement shape modes and strength of local leadership, norms of reciprocity, and legal recognition. First, these settlement patterns shape the type and strength of leaders in urban slums. I use a crude definition of strong leaders: those who have many followers. In settings with weak formal institutions, strong leaders play a very important role because they coordinate collective action (Bianco and Bates 1990), serve as lobbyists for their constituents, and hold a visible level of prominence in society (Acemoglu and Jackson 2012). They gain reputations for their actions based on whether they reward their followers (Myerson 2011, 2012). Leaders accumulate followers based on the distribution of these rewards: the more rewards they can distribute to a group of followers, the more followers the leader will have. But leaders face different modes of selection and reputational incentives depending on the institutional context in which they serve (Paller 2014b). Without reputational mechanisms, leaders might "chop" state goods themselves, not organize for the benefit of the public, and not share their resources—all examples of "elite capture" (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005, Platteau 2004).

Second, the institutional context conditions the norms of reciprocity among residents, and between leaders and their followers. Norms of reciprocity are the social expectations of sharing goods and resources with members in a society. In the African urban neighborhood, norms of reciprocity often develop along ethnic lines (Sanjek 1972). Ethnic norms of reciprocity mean that residents and leaders will only share their goods and resources with members of their own ethnic group. Residents rely on co-ethnics for financial support in times of need. The failure to reciprocate is often sanctioned informally by peers (Habyarimana et al. 2007). Far less common in insecure and diverse setting are cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, or those that condition sharing between members of different ethnic groups.

I argue that the informal institution of settlement shapes whether communities develop ethnic or cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity. As Gouldner (1960) introduced, and recent scholars adapt (Finan and Schecter 2012; Greene and Lawson 2012), these norms of reciprocity serve as a self-reinforcing basis to political clientelism. As Gouldner writes: "The norm of reciprocity holds that people should help those who help them and, therefore, those whom you have helped have an obligation to help you. The conclusion is clear: if you want to be helped by others you must help them; hence it is not only proper but also expedient to conform with the specific status rights of others and with the general norm" (1960: 37). In this way, the norms of reciprocity explain *who* is helped in a particular community, and whether there is a cross-ethnic basis for the exchange of goods and assistance. In African slums, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity enable a political clientelism that provides a "broader scope of integration" than ethnicity because it "extends these perceptions beyond the realm of primordial loyalties and establishes vertical links of reciprocity between ethnically or socially discrete entities" (LeMarchand 1972: 70).

Third, and not surprisingly, the initial settlement pattern places communities on a pathway toward state legal recognition. In the West African context, directly-purchased land from a customary authority provides important legitimacy to claims for legal recognition. Without this legitimacy, it is difficult to secure legal recognition from the state. This process of territorial expansion extends back to colonial times. This element of state legal recognition works through the mechanism of local understandings of citizenship in African societies. Migrants to a territory are deemed outsiders, and the status of these outsiders shifts depending on their relationships to the host community. This study examines how these conceptions of citizenship continue to shape multi-party politics in Africa today.

These three independent variables explain the quality of democracy in urban Ghana. According to the theory, we would expect slums with strong leaders, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, and state legal recognition to have higher quality local democracy than slums without these characteristics.

Table 1.2: Explanatory variables and quality of democracy

Norms of Reciprocity	**Leadership**	**Legatl Status**	**Quality of Democracy**
Ethnic	Weak	Not recognized	Low
Cross-Ethnic	Strong	Recognized	High

Informal institutions and distributive politics

In West Africa, the three most common ways that populations settled in neighborhoods and urban slums were by squatting free of charge, purchasing land directly from traditional authorities, or claiming customary rights through their indigenous status. I call these three settlement patterns illegal settlements, purchased settlements, and indigenous settlements,

respectively. When an individual or a group of people move to the city they either *squat* on the land illegally or they *purchase* the land from customary authorities or the state. Groups of people that claim ownership to the land and were already residing in the city are indigenous—they *own* the land.

Table 1.3: Settlement patterns and state goods



In the first institutional context, illegal squatters do not have formal citizenship rights to claim housing rights from the state, so they make demands on their political parties and other non-state actors. While illegal settlements and forced evictions have recently gained international attention due to the growth of slums in the developing world, the roots of state-slum community

tensions date to colonial times and early periods of African urban development. Indigenous and migrant African communities were kept out of the Accra city planning and largely left unregulated (Njoh 2006). Africans lived in communities like Nima and New Town that were not regulated formally, and they developed in an unplanned nature. Public services were not provisioned. Colonial authorities used zoning laws and building codes in the attempt to control urban development and strengthen social control over native populations (Njoh 2009). Urban development that deviated from colonial codes and laws was considered illegal and was not condoned (Ocheje 2007). Colonial urban policy left an important legacy, as Ocheje writes, "The norm of city planning consisted of slum clearance, relocation and redevelopment. For this reason, planners in Africa refuse to accept the notion that unauthorized settlements, no matter how they came about, should be 'regularized', as that would be to condone illegality" (183). Governments use the threat of forced eviction and forceful demolitions to counter the fear that authorities have of poor urban populations. They also do so to counter short-term urban problems like flooding without tackling larger structural problems that contribute to large-scale urban growth (Obeng-Odoom 2010). These strategies are forcefully used against slums that were settled illegally, and little has been done to change these tactics. Therefore, illegal settlements are unable to gain legal recognition from the state.

In the post-colonial context, illegal settlements have emerged as a space for previously marginalized communities to extend their territorial authority and place demands on governments for democratic dividends. Leaders come to illegal settlements, clear off an unauthorized piece of land, and establish a political stronghold, backed by dense social networks. The settlements develop and grow as new residents tap into networks of trusted friends (Hart 1973), migrants, and co-ethnics (Agyei-Mensah and Owusu 2012) for assistance in finding

housing. In other words, they join a social network that makes up a distinct cluster in a particular neighborhood. For new migrants to the city, these clusters often link to one's hometown. In other words, residents from the rural countryside migrate in coordinated efforts to cities, and often settle in clusters within the same neighborhood of a low-income community.

In illegal settlements, leaders maintain active political ties to their hometown with the hope of running for political office or gaining chieftaincy status there in the near future. Therefore, they use the settlement as a space to accumulate power and goods to reward followers back home. This urban-rural connection is bolstered by the historical precedent that young migrants who move to the city but have family in their rural hometown are expected to remit money and accumulated resources back home, fundamentally shaping the nature of urban-rural political and economic cleavages (Bates 1983).[4] Further, without access to formal public services, they act as party brokers between a vast number of voters and formal politicians. Patron-client relationships serve the politicians' need to win votes and the leaders' desire to reward loyal followers, many of whom are linked to the hometown. Leaders also control land markets, allowing them to establish bases of power by providing land to co-ethnic followers. Similarly, norms of reciprocity develop along ethnic lines—there is no incentive to share limited resources with members from different ethnic groups. Political clientelism in illegal settlements develops along ethnic lines, as residents and leaders have incentives to empower their co-ethnics, and not others.

In the second institutional context, purchased settlers are much like pioneers on the Western-American frontier: they settle on land, secure its legal status, and make demands on the government to provide them services in exchange for tax revenue (and votes). With respect to a

[4] I thank Catherine Lena Kelly for emphasizing this point.

zongo community in Accra—the most common type of purchased settlement in Ghana—Pellow describes it as: "They domesticated what had been a 'wild' space making it into their place" (Pellow 2002: 44). But what is most important is that they are forced to make links with traditional authorities and the state to offer protection and security, with particular emphasis on housing. In Accra, this meant establishing clientelist networks with the indigenous Ga:

> The early Muslims who came to Accra fell into a patron-client relationship with the Ga, as they were beholden to the Ga to allow them to conduct their affairs, to observe their rituals, to settle their disputes, to select and honor their leaders. However, Ga land allotments to non-Ga were subject to British approval. Moreover, because the Gold Coast was a colony of Britain and these African foreigners had come up with no prior rights, their behavior was also moderated by European administrators (Pellow 2002: 47).

While this describes patron-client relationships with the Ga, the same is true for stranger communities in other cities, for example the need to make ties with indigenous Ashantis in Kumasi (Schildkrout 1970, 1978; Arhin 1971). Further, most of these communities are multi-ethnic, including many Hausa, Yoruba, and northern Ghanaian tribes. While ethnic networks dominate daily life, leaders and groups form alliances with other leaders and groups to form more powerful coalitions in the face of state power. The close ties that ethnic headmen have with indigenous traditional authorities provide the needed legitimacy to gain state legal recognition. Once the slum gains legal status, political entrepreneurs jockey for formal recognition and to become formal representatives to their followers. Therefore, they establish close political ties with the host city and need to reward loyal followers with the intention of staying in the city.

Norms of reciprocity develop cross-ethnically because residents and leaders have the incentive to build multi-ethnic coalitions in the face of state power. They need legitimate relationships with the indigenous ethnic group to protect their security of stay. They strengthen coalitions with other ethnic groups to place more pressure on the state. The more pressure they

put on the state, the more public services they can secure. Leaders also have incentives to work with other headmen for similar reasons; the cooperation between leaders from different groups has the effect of trickling down to groups members (Acemoglu and Johnson 2012). Patron-client relationships therefore develop cross-ethnically, with rewards being distributed within the slum community itself in the host city.

In the third institutional context, original owners of the land—or the indigenous—do not have the incentive to go through formal state channels to secure goods and resources because their leaders benefit from ambiguity and informality (Onoma 2010). The status of the slum is not under threat, and leaders can make demands on local authorities by way of *customary entitlements*—they offer land access in exchange for goods, services and resources. The control of the land market provides added power: indigenous communities demand that members of co-ethnics be placed in municipal positions, providing them a deeply entrenched clientelist network. Leaders will only be considered if they are of the indigenous ethnic group and are from the community. They must come from powerful families and demonstrate themselves as family heads. Leaders have the incentive to place their own ethnic group or family interest above that of the broader community interest. Leaders gain social status through traditional means. Chieftaincy struggles have a long history of being politicized for personal gain, dividing the community and seeding mistrust and resentment.

Norms of reciprocity develop along family lines—a specific type of ethnic norm. Due to the customary property rights regime, politicians and government authorities need access to land to implement public goods projects. Therefore, politicians have the incentive to align with traditional authorities to pursue their developmental priorities. Traditional authorities connect with politicians to promote their self-interest, with no incentives to invest in the interests of the

broader community. Politicians offer customary entitlements in exchange for land, votes, and spiritual support.

In sum, the informal institution of settlement shapes a certain type of distributive politics. Illegal settlements privilege private goods that are rivalrous and excludable: residents and community leaders secure their democratic dividend in the form of a private reward like a government contract, cash gift in exchange for votes (vote-buying), and protection for serving as a de facto landlord. Indigenous settlements privilege club goods that are excludable and non-rivalrous: members of the family and indigenous ethnic group secure a customary entitlement in the form of government contracts (to build educational and health facilities), jobs, or welfare project. The benefits are distributed to members of the club, typically along family lines. Purchased settlements privilege common goods that are rivalrous and non-excludable, or public goods that are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. In both of these scenarios, the public interest is served by public goods projects like water stations, public toilets, and education and health facilities. Both of these scenarios are positive outcomes, but the major difference between common goods and public goods in these slums is that common goods are governed by customary norms to manage common pool resources (Ostrom 1990), and the informal institution plays a *substitutive* role in the absence of state power (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). In the scenario of public goods, informal institutions play a *complementary* role to the state; the informal institution is seen as improving the formal institution, leading to the most favorable and efficient outcome (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). In this way, purchased settlements that lead to public goods is the optimal pathway.

Table 1.4: Informal institution of settlement and state goods

Illegal	**Purchased**
Private Goods (rivalrous and excludable) *Competing and Substitutive*	Common Goods (rivalrous and non-excludable) *Substitutive*
Indigenous	**Purchased**
Club Goods (non-rivalrous and excludable) *Competing*	Public Goods (non-rivalrous and non-excludable) *Complementary*

Mechanisms and processes of a quality democracy

My study argues that cooperation, participation, and accountability are core elements of a quality democracy. When formal institutions are weak, access to state resources is limited, and rights are poorly enforced, the quality of democracy becomes the responsibility of ordinary Africans. This is the case in African slums. For the urban poor, these core elements manifest themselves in a democratic struggle for basic goods and services, social welfare, and security of housing and stay. In other words, the democratic struggle is largely one for basic human dignity, or what Josiah Ober calls democracy's third core attribute (Ober 2012). In African slums, residents seek human dignity through their demands for streetlights, roads, tenure security, drainage systems, and toilets. I document the process and mechanisms of collective action throughout this study.

I examine quality democracy theoretically by incorporating logics of collective action into a theory of democratic accountability. I describe the process through which urban residents come together to place demands on their leaders and pressure their leaders to deliver services. I

substantiate these claims empirically by developing innovative measures of accountability, participation, and cooperation that are salient to the daily lives of the urban poor. For example, I survey levels of communal labor, cleanliness of community sewers, and neatness of public toilets. The workings of a quality democracy are a dirty and smelly affair. Part I of this study focuses on the distributive politics in three particular slums, and emphasizes the institutional environments that shape political behavior. Part II further develops a theory of democratic accountability based on dignified public expression. This theory takes a substantive approach to the study of democracy by highlighting the importance of participation, cooperation, and accountability at the local level.

A major innovation of this study is to place local interest and social welfare groups at the front and center of the democratic process in urban Ghana. Community associations and pressure groups have a long history in Ghanaian politics. Local *Asafo* companies—groups of military bands organized in towns, villages and traditional states—provided an organizational framework for popular mobilization during colonial periods (Datta and Porter 1971; Shaloff 1974; Simensen 1974, 1975; Fortescue 1990; Akyeampong 2002). Lindberg (2010) explains how chiefs often hold MPs accountable for community development projects; ordinary people channel their demands through chiefs or queen mothers. Informal actors and institutions are essential for the operation of accountability. They discipline governing officials to deliver services and maintain public goods. State actors also turn to local groups and associations, like soccer clubs and drum groups, for education campaigns and public service projects, like cleaning sewers and gutters. Former President Jerry John Rawlings popularized the activity of communal labor—organizing the youth to clean the community (Gocking 2005). Market women associations, youth clubs, keep-fit clubs, and hometown associations play an important role in local Ghanaian society as

lobbyists for ordinary Ghanaians. But not all of these pressure groups are effective at demanding goods and services; many others secure resources but do not share them equally. Some become politically co-opted while others suffer from their own lack of accountability and transparency. This study sheds light on the formation of pressure groups in Ghanaian society, their sources of effectiveness, and their role in multi-party politics. While their importance has been well-documented, their role in democracy is under-theorized and empirically undocumented. This study is one attempt at correcting this important omission in the study of democracy in Africa.

A second major innovation of the study is the incorporation of reputational incentives into the study of democratization, particularly into a theory of democratic accountability. The recognition of the dignity of individuals and groups is a foundational aspect of politics and social justice in today's world (Honneth 2003). The celebration of morality is a common feature of most societies and can be a powerful tool in politics. Lily Tsai (2007) explains how leaders in authoritarian settings (i.e. China) can gain moral standing for providing public goods. This is a powerful way that residents hold their leaders to account, by provoking their moral standing—"the esteem, respect, or approval that is granted by an individual or a collectivity for performances or qualities they consider above the average" (Goode 1979, 7). Leaders might provide public goods (when they otherwise would not be expected to) if they receive favorable attention from other group members for doing so (Hawkes 1993). This helps explain why Ghanaians constantly thank and honor individuals and groups for work well done—everybody wants to feel appreciated.

But when leaders do not live up to their high moral standing, residents experience a strong feeling of resentment and anger. They feel as though their leader has "forgotten" them. This denial of recognition is a serious form of disrespect—"human subjects are denied the

recognition they feel they deserve" to live a dignified life (Honneth 2007: 71). When failures of recognition occur in democratic settings, they can lead to serious feelings of political sting—feelings of betrayal, insult and disrespect by ordinary citizens stemming from a government's failure to protect and provide to its population (Paller 2013). James Scott emphasizes how these "insults and slights to human dignity" can foster a "hidden transcript of indignation" (Scott 1990, 7). But this moral disrespect and collective sense of injustice can also be used positively as a source of power to shame leaders into action. The challenge is to translate these feelings of collective subordination into the public transcript, and this is best done in face-to-face situations.

My study uncovers the conditions under which public shame and honor can work as mechanisms of political accountability. First, leaders must not have an exit option from the community that fails to threaten their welfare or status (Ermakoff 2011). They should be entrenched members of the community so that residents view the representative as "one of their own" and as the "father" of the community, providing legitimacy to the leadership role (Schatzberg 2001; Lindberg 2010). When they are viewed as "fathers" and providers of the community, they care for families, give away food and other goods, and pay for hospital bills, funerals, and school fees (Schatzberg 2001). Because leaders live and sleep in the slum, they act as "stationary bandits"—they have an incentive to encourage a degree of economic success and local development, since they will expect to be in power long enough to take a share of it and to enjoy the services that they secure (Olson 2000).

The second condition is that information and transparency are crucial to political accountability, but only if the accessible information contributes to greater collective action (Lieberman, Posner and Tsai 2014). Officials are unaccountable when they can "shield their actions from outside observation" (Ferejohn 1999: 138). A well-informed electorate curbs

opportunities for politicians to engage in corruption (Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003). This is because better access to information contributes to more active citizenship, leading to more government responsiveness (Besley and Burgess 2002). Recent experimental studies examine various aspects of information, ranging from the effects of public disclosure laws (Djankov et al. 2010), knowledge of public goods spending (Banerjee 2011), politician audits (Ferraz and Finan 2008), and information about government capacity (Gottlieb 2012)—all studies find that increased information lead to positive changes in political behavior. Yet Lieberman, Posner and Tsai (2014) show that increasing information in the form of a civic education campaign does not necessarily lead to greater accountability. This is because there are several conditions in the "information-accountability chain" that must be met. Two of the most significant are the belief that individual action will have an impact and the belief that other community members will join in and effect change. In other words, increased access to information will only lead to greater accountability if there are mechanisms to overcome collective action problems. As Platteau (2008) argues, "Community members must be able to use the available information jointly in a way that creates some action, that is, they must be able to come together, share and discuss their knowledge and be ready to act on it" (quoted in Barr, Packard, and Serra 2012: 128).

While these studies utilize innovative treatments and contribute greatly to studies of political accountability, they all focus on formal rules, voting behavior and electoral accountability. They do not consider the everyday practices of accountability that residents use to hold their own leaders to account, a key aspect of the democratization process in contexts of weak institutions and where electoral accountability does not necessarily translate to government responsiveness. In African slums, accountability is public. Information is shared in public gatherings, town hall meetings, governance forums, and night-time chats. Public discussions can

be important forums to negotiate power relationships between residents and leaders, and offer the opportunity for residents to make demands on their leaders and hold them responsible for their actions (Wedeen 2007). They provide community members of differing political affiliations, ethnic groups, and occupation the space to voice their concerns and grievances. Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013) find that town hall meetings that allow policy deliberation contributes to greater civic engagement through the mechanism of information sharing by participants and greater future coordination between community members. Public discussions facilitate the process of political accountability by fostering collaboration among citizens and providing the physical space for residents to shame their leaders. Part I of the study examines the mechanisms and process of a quality democracy by providing qualitative evidence in three case studies. Part II anchors the evidence in a theory of democratic accountability based on dignified public expression, and then tests these claims across a larger sample of slums.

Studying African slums

Ghanaian slums are important and unique sites to examine the process of local-level democratization in African societies. First, African slums are unexpected places for local-level democracy to emerge. They have characteristics that scholars suggest undermine democratization: low levels of state capacity, long histories of criminal activity and parallel governance authorities, informal property rights, customary legal norms, ethnic diversity, and high levels of illiteracy. Second, Africa is experiencing a huge demographic shift—by 2025 most Africans will live in cities. Most of these people will live in slum communities characterized by extreme poverty, substandard housing, poor health care and education, and unsanitary living conditions. Third, Ghana is hailed as a successful democracy in an African continent that struggles with extreme poverty, authoritarian regimes, and violent conflicts. Understanding how

democracy works at the local level in a successful African democracy like Ghana will provide important insights into how governments and societies can overcome the political and developmental challenges that confront large parts of Africa.

A major challenge in urban studies research is to find the best way to conceptualize poor urban communities. Scholars debate the analytical utility of using concepts like informal settlements, illegal settlements, squatter settlements, shantytowns and slums. Journalists have provided their own concepts to describe these neighborhoods, ranging from arrival cities to shadow cities (Saunders 2011; Neuwirth 2005). All of these concepts are contested and fraught with normative underpinnings. Africanists tend to emphasize the distinction between 'native' and 'settler' neighborhoods, emphasizing the impact that colonialism had on urbanization and the development of the city (Mamdani 1996, 2001). The poor urban communities that were left out of urban planning (and became the modern day slum) were considered "villages in the city." In West Africa, the term *zongo* is often used to describe these settlements, but these do not comprise all poor urban settlements (Kobo 2010; Pellow 1991, 2002). A provocative group of African urban theorists suggest that cities are better conceptualized by the people and networks that make them up; they emphasize the flows, fluids and bodies that make the city what it is (Simonsen 2004; Mbembe 2002; Simone 2004, 2004b).

While there are advantages and disadvantages to using each of these concepts and approaches, I prefer the term slum because of its emphasis on objective, observable characteristics. Despite some people's objection to the term because of its derogatory usage in certain contexts (Gilbert 2007), I use a very basic definition of the word derived from UN-HABITAT: "a heavily populated urban area characterized by substandard housing and squalor." I take into account the fact that not all residents in these communities know what a slum is; refer

to their community as a slum; or even think that their community possess the characteristics of a slum. For example, a resident in Ga Mashie answered the following in response to the question "Is your community a slum?": "For me I don't see here to be a slum because in a slum it is densely populated and there is no proper layout. A slum is a place where buildings have been unarranged and I don't see Kinka [the center of Ga Mashie] like that. It is not a slum because in some places you can't even open your own windows but this is not the case here" (Bukom Youth Focus Group). Nevertheless, according to the UN definition, slum households must lack one of the following: 1) Durable housing of a permanent nature; 2) Sufficient living space; 3) Easy access to safe water; 4) Access to adequate sanitation; 5) Security of tenure. The book starts with the concept of slum and proceeds to distinguish the most important political and context-specific characteristics that explain variation between poor urban communities. As introduced earlier in this chapter, I find that the pattern by which the slum was initially settled is the most appropriate factor by which to compare slums.

The study of slums, particularly in Africa, is a difficult and potentially dangerous endeavor. Baseline data is virtually nonexistent because censuses notoriously undercount slum populations, often for strategic purposes. NGO reports provide some baseline data on particular communities (see SDI 2011 for an enumeration of Old Fadama), but they lack systematic assessment across numerous slums. My fieldwork also found that NGOs have their own incentives, framing issues in slums in ways that improve their chance of securing funding. Newspaper reports are far from objective, particularly with respect to reporting on slum issues in Africa. Therefore, significant fieldwork is necessary to uncover a clear and accurate picture of politics in slums.

Research design and methodology

The site of political practice in daily life is the source of social inquiry in this study. To best examine the site of the everyday, I use the method of ethnography, or "immersion in the lives of the people under study" (Wedeen 2010; Schatz 2009). While ethnography is often criticized for being subjective, unruly, and biased, I demonstrate how it can be used as a viable empirical strategy in political science research (Paller 2014c). Ethnography can be used to uncover systematic observations of political life—evidence that is central to empirical research. Specifically, ethnographic methods can be used to uncover the process of politics, the informal networks that underlie political arrangements, and the spontaneity in decision-making that shapes institutional pathways. But in order for ethnography to be an empirical strategy for political scientists, a norm of consistency must be met. Researchers must make empirical observations on a consistent basis, whether it is participating in events, observing political behavior, or examining rituals or other speech acts. Over the course of ten months, August 2011-June 2012, I conducted a multi-sited ethnography in three Ghanaian slum communities (Marcus 1995; see Chalfin 2010 for a recent empirical example of this approach). I visited at least one of the case study communities on a daily basis. I ate meals with residents and leaders; observed community meetings; visited the private offices of politicians and chiefs; participated in party rallies; and attended ritual events. By interacting with community residents and leaders on a daily basis, I gained crucial insights into their motivations and incentives. Often, we would make decisions together, giving me in-depth understandings of urban Ghanaians' decision-making process. I documented empirical observations in field notes that now serve as an empirical dataset (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 2011). While these notes themselves might not be replicable, they can be used to confirm or draw alternative conclusions.

I supplement the ethnography with archival research and historical process-tracing that uncovers the timing and sequence of the democratic consolidation process. Specifically, I analyze the history of each community from the early migration period to the present, placing special emphasis on the original settlement pattern (Brady and Collier 2004; Pierson 2004; George and Bennett 2005). I compare slum development at different time periods in terms of leadership, norms of reciprocity, and state legal recognition in order to evaluate my hypotheses. Therefore, variation in political development and local-level democratization extends beyond space to include the important temporal dimension.

The qualitative case studies compare Old Fadama, Ashaiman, and Ga Mashie; all located in the Greater Accra Region.[5] I selected these cases based on a most-similar systems research design; they exhibit comparable demographic characteristics in terms of population size, household income, education, and health indices. They also enable me to control for the most important alternative explanations outlined at the beginning of the chapter: levels of political competition and party institutionalization; state capacity and formal institutionalization; legacies of state-building; and ethnic demography and diversity. However, they display varying levels of democratic quality. Ashaiman shows notable success in accountability, participation and cooperation; Ga Mashie has high levels of participation but little accountability; and Old Fadama struggles in all aspects of democratic quality.

I initially selected the three cases due to their variation in state legal recognition. Old Fadama lacks legal recognition entirely and is under the threat of eviction; Ashaiman has uneven state legal recognition, with specific neighborhoods gaining recognition at various times; and Ga Mashie is fully recognized. During the course of my research, it became clear that these various

[5] Old Fadama is colloquially called "Sodom and Gomorrah" by locals. Ashaiman is a growing municipality outside the port city of Tema. I focused most of my work in Ashaiman in two neighborhoods, Tulako and Valco Flat. Ga Mashie includes James Town and Ussher Town.

orientations toward the state dictated the way that local politics was played at the grassroots. I would later discover that state legal recognition is an outcome of the institutional contexts that I promote in this book—the informal institutions of settlement. Through numerous interviews and ethnographic research, I came to the conclusion that the informal institution of settlement shaped the politics that led to state legal recognition in the first place. Further, the struggle for state legal recognition is the outcome of a long political struggle that can only be explained by understanding the community political dynamics. I document this struggle with particular emphasis on the case of Ashaiman throughout the course of this study.

Ga Mashie is dominated by the ethnic Ga, the indigenes of Accra, and it is the political and historical center of Accra. Yet migrants from the entire country have been moving in large numbers. Ashaiman and Old Fadama are ethnically heterogonous, with large numbers of Dagombas from the Northern Region and Ewes from the Volta Region. While all three slums have varying levels of ethnic group dominance, they are all ethnically diverse slums. I control for political party affiliation—all four slums are strongholds for the ruling party government, as are most slums in Greater Accra, thereby ruling out the possibility of governance challenges in opposition strongholds (Resnick 2011). By controlling for party affiliation, I am able to show how an important locus of political decision-making is within a single party apparatus. I suggest that intra-party analysis is an important, yet overlooked, aspect of contemporary African politics (for examples, see Bob-Milliar 2012a on NDC in Ghana; Lodge 2014 on ANC in South Africa).

I supplement the ethnography and case studies with two series of focus groups (26 in total): one with local leaders and one with residents. Focus groups are "a research technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher" (Morgan 1997: 6). Focus groups have been used effectively to study public opinion in American politics

(Gamson 1992), and have recently been used in studies of local African politics (Kendhammer 2013). Focus groups provide an alternative forum (to ethnographic methods and interviews) to discuss with other slum residents potentially sensitive topics like frustrations with leadership, issues of trust between ethnic groups, and challenges facing community associations. The first series of focus groups were conducted in ten communities and asked local leaders how residents hold them to account, the developmental and political challenges facing the community, and how the community grew over time.[6] The interviews were conducted in Twi and Ga and translated into English. They lasted approximately two hours each.

The second series of focus groups consisted of 16 groups in 10 different slums.[7] Each group consisted of 6-7 residents of the community; 102 residents participated in total. I used a combination of convenience and snowball sampling: with the help of a resident who works with local NGOs, we reached out to community members in the ten different slums. The contact on the ground then found various participants who varied along gender, age, ethnicity and political party lines. We emphasized the importance of having a diverse range of people at the focus groups. In Old Fadama and Ashaiman-Tulako, I varied ethnic composition of the groups because I inducted from ethnographic immersion that ethnic divisions play an important role in community affairs. Therefore, I conducted one focus group with all members of the Dagomba ethnic group, one with entirely non-Dagombas, and one with three Dagombas and three non-Dagombas. Similarly, in Nima and Ga Mashie I varied the composition along the lines of age: I conducted one group with youth and another group with elders. Each group lasted approximately

[6] Focus groups were conducted in Ashaiman-Taboo, Ashaiman-Tulako, Agbogbloshie, Chorkor, Ga Mashie, King Shona, Avenor, Abuja, ECOMOC, and Old Fadama.
[7] Focus groups were conducted in Old Fadama (3), Agbogbloshie, Ga Mashie (2), Nima (2), Abuja, Chorkor, Ashaiman-Valco Flat, Ashaiman-Taboo, Ashaiman-Tulako (3), and King Shona.

three hours and participants were compensated 10 cedis (~$7) for their participation. The group interviews were conducted in Twi, Ga, Hausa, and Dagomba.

The goal was to uncover everyday forms of accountability that residents use to make sure that their leaders do their jobs. I asked a range of questions about how residents understand the meaning of accountability; questions were conducted in their native languages and followed similar techniques to ordinary language interviewing (Schaffer 1998, 2006). I used various techniques to get at the challenges and successes of local accountability in Africa, using philosophical, hypothetical, and real scenarios that might occur in daily political affairs. The focus groups were particularly helpful in designing context-relevant questions for my household survey. I draw from this rich data to build a theory of public accountability in chapter 6.

The qualitative portion of this study is primarily inductive, and uncovered the importance of my independent variables—leadership, norms of reciprocity, and state legal recognition—for the quality of a democracy. But the qualitative research is also limited in its scope. Therefore, I develop a household survey to test these generated hypotheses across a larger sample of slum residents in communities across Ghana. This is the first comprehensive survey to my knowledge that examines different types of slum communities in Accra in a comparative framework, particularly the illegal ones. While NGOs and academic institutions have conducted human development surveys in various slums, none have systematically examined all of them together. The Ghana Census does not consider all slum communities in their enumeration. The survey categorizes slum communities based on local knowledge, rather than official, formal designations. Boundaries of slums are determined by a rich assessment of how residents and officials designate certain neighborhoods based on insights acquired after qualitative research. The survey asks questions about political conditions in the slums, and specifically the nature of

local-level decision-making. The questions are tailored to fit local context and consider dynamics that are specific to slum life. The questions include attitudinal and behavioral measures, as well as embedded survey experiments to test the level of trust and feelings of reciprocity that residents have with their leaders, associations and pressure groups, and other community members.

I conducted the survey in April 2013 in tandem with the Center for Democratic Development—Ghana (CDD). CDD has extensive experience conducting surveys in Africa; they also administer the *Afrobarometer* surveys for the continent. The survey includes approximately 80 respondents in 15 distinct slum communities in Accra, Ashaiman and Kumasi (1,183 total respondents). Slums were selected to vary the informal institution of settlement. [8] Due to lack of adequate baseline data in these communities, I utilize a spatial sampling technique (Landry and Shen 2005). Using *Google Earth*, I constructed maps of all 15 communities. I then constructed a spatial grid of equal geographical units that I call clusters. I randomly sampled 10 clusters in each slum (150 clusters total). The cluster is the enumeration area. Using satellite imagery, I then selected a visible geographical marker as close to the center of the cluster as possible. The enumerators started at the geographical marker and used a random walk protocol. I discuss the administration of the survey, its original contribution to studies of politics and urban studies, and its findings in Chapters 7 and 8.

Plan of the study

I have spent this first chapter introducing the study and its major arguments. The remainder of the study is divided into two parts. Part I (Chapters 2-5) tells an institutional story about the

[8] Accra slums include: Old Fadama (illegal), Abuja (illegal), King Shona (illegal), Chorkor (indigenous), Ga Mashie (indigenous), Avenor (indigenous settlers), Nima (zongo-purchased), Maamobi (zongo-purchased), Sabon Zongo (zongo-purchased). Ashaiman slums include: Tulako (illegal), Taboo (indigenous), Valco Flat (zongo-purchased). Kumasi slums: 1 illegal, 1 zongo-purchased, 1 indigenous.

political development of slum communities in Ghana. It relies on historical and ethnographic evidence to contribute to our broader understandings of political clientelism, informal institutions, and urban development. I generate a number of hypotheses to explain why democracy works in some local contexts and not others. Part II (Chapters 6-9) further develops these hypotheses and attempts to incorporate them into a broader theory of democracy and political accountability. The study shifts focus to political behavior and examines accountability, participation, and cooperation as core elements of democracy. I also test the hypotheses generated in Part I across a national sample of slum communities to broaden the generalizability of my findings.

Chapter 2 elaborates the concept of informal institution of settlement and explains how it functions in the Ghanaian context. It provides a general overview of settlement patterns in Accra and explains how it shapes authority patterns that become institutionalized over time. The chapter discusses the histories of Ga Mashie, Ashaiman, and Old Fadama to shed light on how the initial settlement pattern places these communities on varying institutional pathways that shape local leadership, community organization and norms of reciprocity, and legal status—these factors contribute to the quality of democracy today. I highlight the key historical junctures where informal norms of settlement constrain and enable political behavior. The case of Ashaiman-Tulako is particularly interesting because I demonstrate how community residents overcame their illegal status to demand political recognition and shift institutional pathways. The crucial case demonstrates a positive case of institutional change. The chapter also shows how the roots of slum development date back to institutional formations in colonial times, thereby dispelling the popular argument that slums are an outgrowth of globalization, structural adjustment and neoliberalism (Davis 2006).

Chapters 3-5 are ethnographic case studies of three Ghanaian slums with differing informal institutions of settlement and diverging levels of democratic quality. I show how democracy "works" in these communities by illuminating the daily activities of accountability that residents use to make sure leaders do their jobs, how the informal institutions of settlement create incentives for certain types of leadership and political claims-making, and how daily political life operates in insecure environments. Chapter 3 is an ethnographic account of politics in Old Fadama, Ghana's largest illegal settlement. The chapter demonstrates how the informal institution of squatter illegality in slums provides opportunities for leaders to "cash-in" and strengthen power, political parties and politicians to mobilize support, and international NGOs to support a cause while the most vulnerable residents are left unrepresented. Illegality shapes political incentives of community leaders and the strategies that residents use to contribute to the persistence of insecure and uncertain living conditions.

Chapter 4 is an ethnographic account of multi-party politics in Ga Mashie, one of Accra's oldest indigenous settlements. Residents claim ownership of the city; leaders exploit this indigenous narrative to win votes, secure state resources, and claim land. The chapter demonstrates how Ga Mashie's indigenous status contributes to the salience of ethnic identity as a political tool in multi-party politics. Indigeneity is not just an identity or cultural resource—it is an institution that shapes and enables daily political behavior. But the institution of indigeneity creates perverse incentives: it incentivizes family heads to become personal rulers, privileges insecure property rights to benefit traditional authorities, and underlies patron-client relations with government. The informal institution of indigeneity provides a powerful mechanism to demand public services, but it does not contribute to the fair and equitable sharing of these services for the public good, thereby undermining electoral accountability. Contrary to dominant

strands of public goods literature, ethnic homogeneity actually undermines public service provision because it facilitates unaccountable governance in the form of club goods provision.

Chapter 5 is an ethnographic account of multi-party politics in Ashaiman, one of Ghana's largest slums that is now a city. The chapter argues that the initial informal institution of purchased settlement created rules and procedures that privilege democratic learning. Specifically, the institutions of leadership contribute to a democratic environment that enables the collective capacity to get things done: Community leaders have the incentive to solve collective concerns in the public interest, residents overcome ethnic and religious differences to demand goods from the state, and community members struggle to overcome insecure land tenure institutions. The chapter demonstrates how slum communities can overcome structural barriers to effect transformational change, in the process creating new institutions that facilitate collective capacity—a crucial element of a quality democracy.

Part II develops a theory of democratic accountability based on dignified public expression and attempts to uncover the determinants of a quality democracy. Chapter 6 draws from the historical and ethnographic chapters to present a theory of public accountability in Africa. The chapter relies heavily on the focus group data to substantiate the theoretical claims. I demonstrate the shortcoming of the principal-agent model and procedural models of accountability. Instead, I advance a theory based on authority, obligation and reciprocity. I emphasize the importance of respect (Honneth 2003) and peoples' ideas being "taken into account" (Paley 2004). I advance Lisa Wedeen's research agenda to uncover "sites for the performance of citizenship," places where everyday practices of accountability occur (Wedeen 2002, 2007). I propose that this theory of democratic accountability can account for the success

or failure of public service provision in African society; it also provides a partial explanation to local political accountability in other parts of the world.

Chapter 7 draws from evidence from the original household survey to document patterns of political participation across slum communities. How do Ghanaian slum dwellers participate in politics? What are the relationships between government authorities, political parties, and slum communities and residents? While the chapter is primarily descriptive, it shows that slum dwellers are a diverse group of people with respect to education, socio-economic characteristics, ethnic affiliation, and ties to the host city. Categorizing them as a homogenous category of the "urban poor" or "slum dwellers" obscures more than it explains. Similarly, slum populations are not "hidden" populations actively resisting the state. Instead, they interact with the Ghanaian state in various ways, depending on demographic and slum-level factors. Local-level community organization is diverse and multi-faceted, with varying levels of participation and cooperation at the individual and slum-levels. The chapter confirms the qualitative analysis that there are distinct differences in political participation and public attitudes between slums with different informal institutions of settlement.

Chapter 8 further examines the observable implications of dignified public expression. The observable implications of my theory of democratic accountability suggest that a quality democracy involves local communities with residents who participate in politics and community decision-making, cooperate in communal affairs, and hold their leaders to account in the context of daily life. This chapter uncovers the micro-foundations of this political behavior. Who cooperates, participates, and holds their leaders to account in slums? Why? I demonstrate how explanations that rely on socio-demographic characteristics and ethnicity do not fully explain political behavior. I then show how the hypotheses I generated in my ethnographic fieldwork and

outline in Chapters 3-5 go further in determining who participates in local decision-making. Residents who are secure in their tenure (state legal recognition), share with members from different ethnic groups (cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity), and follow strong leaders (strong leadership) are more likely to participate, cooperate, and hold their leaders accountable in slums. Confirming my qualitative data, residents living in purchased settlements are most likely to make democracy "work" and experience higher quality democracy than those living in illegal and indigenous settlements.

I conclude the study in Chapter 9 by describing the empirical and theoretical implications of the work. I demonstrate how the model is best generalizable to other West African countries—particularly countries like Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire—where customary law structures land access and the historical experience of indigeneity and settler dynamics are similar. Nonetheless, my theory of democratic accountability, with its focus on leadership, norms of reciprocity, and legal status goes a long way to explaining the quality of democracy in Africa—and slums across the developing world. I briefly discuss the urban experience in Kenya to show how my theory applies to Eastern and Southern Africa. While scholars have successfully demonstrated the governance challenges that face ethnically diverse, weak state capacitated, and insecure communities, this study presents a model to overcome those developmental deficits and challenges. By briefly discussing the policy implications of the study, I conclude that for successful slum upgrading to occur, change must come from below.

Chapter 2: The Historical Foundations of Politics in Slums

This chapter traces the roots of slums' political development to pre-colonial and colonial Africa. Contrary to a large literature that attributes the rise of slums to increased globalization, unsuccessful structural adjustment and neoliberal policies, and failed modernization, this chapter uses the technique of process-tracing to uncover the historical roots of political authority in Ghana's slums. The chapter argues that the challenges of development in slums today can be largely attributed to the original settlement pattern by which the first migrants or settlers laid claim to the land. The political authority structures that develop out of this original settlement pattern become institutionalized over time creating rules and procedures that shape local politics. I call these rules and procedures of daily life the informal institutions of settlement. Three informal institutions of settlement are notable: 1) whether the settlement was originally illegally occupied (squatter illegality), 2) whether it was purchased legally and settled (purchased settler), or 3) whether residents make indigenous claims to the land (indigenous). Specifically, these informal institutions of settlement structure the quality and strength of leadership, the norms of reciprocity, and the legal status of the community. The chapter draws from anthropology and history scholarship to demonstrate how informal norms and duties underlie formal political development and remain an enduring feature of Ghanaian political life. Local political entrepreneurs work within the constraints and opportunity structures of the institutional environment, finding creative ways to accumulate power and take advantage of otherwise insecure environments. The chapter concludes that this political activity and creative syncretism of institutional development (Berk and Galvan 2009) leads to the persistence of the status quo.

Introduction

In 1927, a Hausa Headmen in Kumasi referred to as the Sarkin Zongo (Chief of the Zongo), was officially incorporated into the Native Administration, the bureaucratic section of the colonial government in charge of indigenous African affairs.[9] Until this point, leaders of *zongo* communities—or stranger's quarters where migrants to African cities settled—held local authority but were not officially recognized by the government.[10] In this capacity, the Sarkin Zongo was nominated to serve on the Kumasi Public Health Board, ran his own court tribunal, and successfully mobilized unpaid laborers for community labor exercises. The power of the Sarkin Zongo was emboldened by his link to colonial authorities. Yet outside of official channels

[9] The following history of political development in Kumasi's Zongos derives from Schildkrout 1970.
[10] In Nigeria, the term *zongo* is used to refer to a cattle market (Cohen 1969). In Ghana, the early inhabitants of these communities were Muslims from the North. Today, they are generally understood to contain a strong Muslim identity and members speak the Hausa language, although not all members are of the Hausa ethnic group.

at the local-level, the Sarkin Zongo could not gain the support of non-Hausas, was accused of abusing his power, and was forced to resign after only five years in office, in 1932.

In the 1950s, most Zongo headmen in Kumasi were aligned with the Asantehene. They formed a political bloc that opposed the governing political party of the Convention People's Party (CPP). In 1957, deportation laws were altered and the majority of these leaders were deported, accused of being non-Ghanaian citizens. The rival of the Hausa headman was a CPP constituency chairman and became Sarkin Zongo in 1958. The CPP consolidated its power in the Zongo communities and established voluntary organizations that were closely aligned with the party. Residents were interested in party politics only insofar as they related to the appointment of ethnic headmen. New ethnic headmen received their authority directly from the Government, through their alliances made with the CPP. Yet the headmen were unable to mobilize supporters and effectively govern because they had very little popular support on the ground.

When Nkrumah left government in 1966, the struggle for recognition of various headmen, many of whom were deported during the CPP government, intensified. The recognition of headmen and ethnic group became further politicized with the Alien Compliance Order of 1969, when all non-citizens were faced with deportation. The importance of headmen with close links to government provided basic protection from deportation. As Schildkrout (1970) explains, "Their headmen are able to represent their communities only informally, through the patronage of officials" (268). A crucial aspect of this patronage was protection from being deported, central to strangers' livelihoods.

These three anecdotes of the construction of authority in Kumasi's Zongo communities are illustrative of broader political development patterns in Ghana's poor, urban communities.

First, the development of patron-client relationships in urban Ghana precede Independence, and persist throughout three major changes in formal government: colonial authority, democratic multi-party regime, and one-party rule. Second, these patron-client relationships exist between local pressure groups (which most often represent ethnic groups), political entrepreneurs in the form of ethnic headmen, and state authorities. The state and community are not homogenous entities. Third, while the state and political parties have significant power in *providing* citizenship and goods, authority and legitimacy develop at the grassroots, shape the success of these communities, and enable the successful *management* of these neighborhoods. The underlying informal organizational and institutional features of community life—which include the collective action capacity and ongoing political clientelism—are crucial for the developmental trajectories of these neighborhoods.

In this chapter, I trace the roots of slum political development to the original settlement pattern by which settlers and migrants laid claim to the land. Like the case of the Kumasi Zongos, local pressure groups and political entrepreneurs had considerable autonomy, but they maneuvered and acted creatively within a constraining institutional environment. This institutional environment has its roots in the way the neighborhood was settled: whether it is indigenous, illegally squatted upon, or purchased directly from a recognized traditional authority. I further demonstrate how these patterns of political behavior become institutionalized over time and shape the quality and strength of leadership, norms of reciprocity between groups and residents, and legal status of the community.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I demonstrate the importance of taking a historical and political anthropological approach to the study of slum political development. I demonstrate the shortcomings of conventional state-versus-society approaches to the study of slum

development. Second, I develop a theory of informal institutional development by drawing from influential historical and anthropological literature on Ghanaian urban development. I outline three important factors that contribute to the development of urban communities: leadership, norms of reciprocity, and legal recognition. These three variables are directly shaped by the underlying informal institutional environment. Third, I process trace the political development of three Ghanaian slum communities with similar demographic profiles but varying degrees of political efficacy. I show how local political entrepreneurs and pressure groups play an active role in the developmental prospects of these communities over time and then trace the underlying causality of important variables of interest. This is done for Ga Mashie (indigenous), Old Fadama (illegal) and Ashaiman (purchased settler) and I describe how they generalize to other communities across Ghana.

The struggle for political and economic space

As I argue in the introduction to this study, the classic narrative that pits state power versus community resistance does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. Much of the reason for this can be explained by tracing the political authority in urban slums and demonstrating the different linkages between local and state actors and institutions. While urban slums have only recently gained significant scholarly attention, the patterns of political authority in these communities have been examined by anthropologists and historians in the years succeeding Independence. The historical record shows a relatively consistent development of local leadership in poor urban communities. Despite this historical evidence, there is very little attempt to connect the historical context with contemporary forms of authority and political power in these communities. This chapter will show how historical forms of political authority continue to shape and structure local politics and democracy today.

Since colonial times, poor urban slums have offered local leaders and their followers the political space to experiment with new modes of governance, or the rules that shape daily life and everyday affairs. Barrington Moore describes this endeavor as "room to experiment with making the future" (Moore 1978: 482 cited in Schatzberg 2012), and urban slums provide one laboratory for local African leaders. In other words, they offer political entrepreneurs the opportunity to exploit new opportunities to expand territorial authority and political power. This mode of political power was not new, but rather extended from a long history of pre-colonial patterns of authority.

My argument takes as its point of departure Michael Schatzberg's claim that "much of African history since 1960 [is] a continuation of the pre-colonial struggle for political, cultural, and economic space" (Schatzberg 2012:3). This includes the expansion of populations to urban slums, where new polities form, marginalized populations seek incorporation into the state, and contentious politics emerge between local groups and with state actors. But I diverge sharply from Schatzberg's argument that this struggle pits centralized control versus decentralized autonomy. Instead, the view from below suggests that local leaders seek alliances with decentralized authorities but also interact with state actors—all with the intention of expanding their power and economic base. This does not mean that local actors prefer decentralized autonomy over centralized control. Rather, they exploit whichever model empowers them the most. The line between decentralization and central control is blurred in urban slums. Even more importantly, the underlying network of social interactions and exchanges provides an important organizing logic for party politics today. In other words, it provides a powerful explanation for why political clientelism persists, and along which lines, in Ghana's functioning and improving liberal democracy.

This argument builds off a large literature on patrimonialism and personal rule which is an enduring feature of African politics (Vansina 1990; Lonsdale 1981; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997), and Ghanaian politics in particular (Owusu 1971; Price 1971).[11] In Ghana, this tradition of political authority has been termed the "big man," and privileges the public demonstration of power, generosity, and consumption of expensive goods (Owusu 1971: 73). Big man rule penetrates all levels of society and has become an institutionalized pattern of expected behavior and defining feature of daily life (Price 1971: 175). The "big-man small-boy" phenomenon, characterized by the relationship between wealth and virtue, is especially powerful because it has been used to explain national-level politics (Nugent 1996).

Yet the tension between personal rule as a regime type versus personal rule as a political form in a particular society or culture has not been adequately scrutinized. In the original conception of the big-man, Marshall Sahlins describes the big man as "thoroughly bourgeois, so reminiscent of the free enterprising rugged individual of our own heritage" and who attempts "to show a standing above the masses that is product of his own personal manufacture" (Sahlins 1963: 289). He explains that a big man's goal is to amass a "fund of power" (Malinowski 1921). The goal of the big man is to widen his social sphere—to extend local-level politics as much as possible. In other words, the local big man amasses a fund of followers and grows his authority from the ground up.

On the other hand, Jackson and Rosberg (1984) introduce a model of the big-man that treats personal rule as a regime type. Therefore, personal rule is an institution of power where rivalries and struggles between powerful men shape political life (Jackson and Rosberg 1984: 421). In this way, personal rule is distinctly elitist and inherently anti-democratic. The important

[11] This section is adapted from Paller 2014.

point to be made is that political scientists have mostly expanded on Jackson and Rosberg's treatment of personal rule and big-man politics by treating it as a national-level feature of political life (i.e. Ake 1996; Joseph 2008; Diamond 2008; Erdman and Engel 2007; Pitcher et al. 2009). The overall consensus is that personal rule is a major threat to democratic politics.

But the case of Ghana shows that democratic politics and personal rule can coexist, albeit in unconventional ways. The focus on personal rule as a regime type and form of national-level institution obscures the important ways that leaders relate to their followers and amass power in daily life. Instead, informal institutions that underlie democratic governance in Ghana shape the clientelistic behavior that has entered contemporary multi-party politics. The role of the big man in Ghanaian society that Price and Owusu document, in addition to the "big man" concept that Sahlins describes, were not replaced by "impersonal institutions" during the era of multi-party democracy. Rather, informal institutional arrangements perpetuate personal rule by enabling Ghanaian politicians and actors to accumulate a "fund of followers" in order to amass political power. This can undermine electoral accountability because leaders are expected to reciprocate—often by directly distributing goods and services—to their followers.

In urban slums, the struggle for political space hinges on the control of access to housing and the provision of security of stay. Personal rulers establish territorial authority by founding new neighborhoods, taking in migrant "guests" and strangers, selling land as *de jure* or *de facto* landlords, and serving as representatives and spokesmen for social networks and interest groups. In the absence of formal regulation and property rights, residents rely on strong leaders for basic livelihood goods. Further, the underlying land tenure and ownership regimes in West Africa are customary: the state never acquired ownership of land (Casely-Hayford 1903). This gives considerable power to indigenous tribes who are custodians of land, but also places the control of

land, territory, and housing outside the purview of state and formal jurisdiction. In theory, this means that there is no land in Ghana without an owner (Ollenu 1962; Ollenu and Woodman 1985; cited in Konadu-Agyemang 1991). The land tenure regime therefore privileges legitimacy, or the popular acceptance of authority and ownership, over formal or state rights. It also creates distinctions based on settlement and ownership, as "a person of a different tribal origin is regarded as a stranger" (Pogucki 1954: 31). The struggle for legitimacy, often played out between groups, is therefore a deeply political struggle.

Due to this underlying land tenure regime, the relationship between strangers, host societies (indigenes), and the state shape narratives of belonging and exclusion. These narratives have developed throughout history, and have been further intensified by interventions like the slave trade, colonial rule, and refugee flows. Today, these narratives are exacerbated by foreign investment and international NGOs. In Ghana, this has even resulted in the mass expulsions of foreigners in the Alien Compliance Order of 1969 (Peil 1971; Kobo 2010). While there is significant scholarship that examines these narratives of belonging and exclusion, there are few systematic studies that examine variation in these stranger-indigenous relationships across communities, particularly with respect to urban Ghana (exceptions include Adida 2014). Further, these narratives of belonging and exclusion become institutionalized in the daily practices of individuals and leaders—they shape the ways individuals and groups make meaning of their daily environments (Wedeen 2002). These narratives become cultural resources that leaders and residents use to guide the politics and governance in daily affairs. They are used in the various experiments, as strategies and tools to gain followers, in the struggle for political space.

The politics of slum clearance under colonial rule

The history of migrant communities is often left out of the historiography of Accra (Ntewesu 2012). Nonetheless, the struggles over housing in these neighborhoods are notable for what they demonstrate about the political roots of slums. In fact, the challenge of slums was at the forefront of the municipal governance during colonial rule. Further, the debates, politicking, and eventual inaction under colonialism demonstrate a consistent pathway in the growth of slums from the colonial period to the present.[12] The growth of slums was considered a massive public health concern, with outbreaks of tuberculosis and the bubonic plague catching the attention of colonial authorities. Yet the quality of housing was also central to debates in the Accra Town Council.

Consider the following debate in the Accra Town Council over whether the municipal authorities should allow temporary "swish buildings" in Sabon Zongo, a slum near the center of Accra.[13] The official building code did not allow these types of structures, but some members of the assembly appealed to the "prevailing depression" and "sympathy" for the poor residents. Those who supported the ordinance to demolish all structures made with swish materials made the following arguments:

> Definite building regulations had been laid down and they must be adhered to. If they were relaxed in this instance, other divisions in Accra as well as other communities throughout the Colony and Ashanti would ask for the same amendments for their building regulations.

The medical authorities framed the situation as a public health concern:

> The Medical Officer of Health, in supporting Councillor Roberts, observed that the people living in the Sabon Zongo area were strangers to Accra, and their idea was to build any sort of house for the short period they would settle here. They were aware of the regulations laid down, and he considered the Council should not recommend the alteration of the regulations. From the health point of view, he pointed out that swish

[12] I focus specifically on migrant communities in this section. But the persistence of government inaction was consistent across indigenous communities as well. For example, a 1908 ordinance in response to the need for disease control recommended demolishing houses of ethnic Gas on land near the new Harbour Works and Customs Office. However, the local Ga population resisted and would not relocate. (PRO CO 96/470, Rodger to Crewe, No. 326, 1 July 1908, enclosed).

[13] CSO/20/5. 8 October 1934.

> buildings harboured rats, termites, and other pests, and that after these houses had been built, dangerous borrow pits were left.

What is most notable about this account is that the authorities deemed the population of slum dwellers as "strangers" and thereby temporary dwellers in Accra. The Medical Officer of Health further declared "that when houses are put up for sale for default of rates the Accra Town Council should buy them with a view to their demolition, if necessary, and the clearance of slum areas."[14]

But the communities were not defenseless. In fact, three council members came to the defense of the Sabon Zongo residents to score major political points. Councillor Michael Thompson was perhaps the most vocal. He argued that "masons generally make mistakes in laying the foundations of buildings…he asked that the owner of the building should not be penalized."[15] More importantly, he appealed to their plight: "He stated that Council should take into consideration the condition of the poor people, and if they could live in properly built swish houses, they should be encouraged to do so to avoid congestion." Councillor Kitson Mills made a similar point that "he had brought up the question at the request of the people living at Sabon Zongo, who were poor and could not afford to put up cement block buildings." Another argument suggested that "Sabon Zongo was outside Accra proper and he failed to see why the poor people there should be bound by the Regulations." And perhaps most forcefully, one councilor added, "It would be bad policy to force our people to build beyond their means. He expressed the hope that Councillors would be sympathetic and consider the question seriously."

In the end, the ordinance to demolish these structures passed by a vote of four to three—the structures were to be demolished. But this did not mean that they actually were. In fact, the

[14] 8 October 1934.
[15] CSO/20/5. 8 October 1934.

situation persisted with government inaction.[16] The discussion of Sabon Zongo came up again on September 12, 1938 when the Municipal Executive's office issued the following: "I appeal to the President to stop the collection of hawker's license in this area until the Council has been able to discharge its own obligations."[17] In other words, the government did not demolish the structures but were still collecting rents, creating a confusing situation for residents and their political representatives. The inaction of the Assembly came up again with regard to the construction of the Municipal Sports Stadium in 1938.[18] Councillor Jones Nelson motioned:

> That this Council is of the opinion that a more definite policy with regard to slum clearance in Accra be laid down by Government and that in view of the inevitably heavy expenditure involved, this work will only be made possible by being carried out by installments, a reasonable sum being provided each year in the Estimates of the colony for that purpose.

In other words, the Council politicized the issue of slum clearance to attract potential relocation packages for either themselves or those whose structures were to be removed. But in reality, the situation persisted: "Councillor Jones Nelson noted that since the outbreak of the plague in 1907 nothing had been done in the matter of slum clearance in Accra."

While there was a clear policy in place to remove unauthorized structures and demolition notices were handed out, government inaction persisted:

> The President had a list of 600 unauthorised structures. It seemed to him that the responsible employees of the Council were not doing their work properly but that failure on their part to report the presence of unauthorised structures might be due to a mental attitude induced by seeing unauthorised buildings springing up on all sides and their

[16] Government inaction was a consistent trait of colonial rule. Gale describes how in 1878 the Town Council passed the Towns, Police and Public Health Ordinance. The ordinance was meant to keep the town clean and provide proper sanitary conditions. The provision included: "No building could be erected without the Governor's permission, and decayed buildings must be repaired or demolished; the Colonial Surveyor was given the task of clearing and draining the streets, and the government could impose fines on those who committed public nuisances." Nonetheless, the ordinance was rarely enforced, and even inspired the Gold Coast proverb "Laws are passed to throw dust in the eyes of the Colonial office" (Gale: 191).
[17] 12 September 1938.
[18] 12 December 1938.

> inability to take any action to remove these structures before the lapse of six or seven weeks…The President remarked that he himself was shocked when he saw the list. If any one took the trouble to go round Accra he would find there were many buildings which should not be allowed to stand.[19]

Yet the reply to this statement by Councillor Mark Addy demonstrates that the Council's response was not sure to a "mental attitude" but rather to rational political calculations: "Much suffering of privation is being felt and a general outcry against their removal exists." In other words, councilors adapted and responded to popular pressure.

The politicization of slum clearance was not just a problem facing Accra, but confronted other cities across the country as well, including Sekondi-Takoradi. In June 1938, the Sekondi Town Council deliberated slum clearance in their city.[20] They discussed the "congestion" in the city as well as what to do with the large "floating population" in the Gold Coast. The main question was: "Should the area between Sekondi and Takoradi be brought under control and if so how can this be done?" At the heart of the matter was what to do with the people who would lose their structures, many of whom were fishermen. One councilor argued: "It was undesirable to embark upon any scheme of slum clearance until the Council was assured that there was available land which could be placed at the disposal of the dispossessed."[21] Meanwhile, the Medical Health Officer urged for action: "It has to be borne in mind also that, quite apart from being overcrowded, many of these houses are crudely constructed, inadequately ventilated and lack almost all the minor comforts and conveniences appropriate to reasonably good habitations." But nonetheless, nothing was done and the situation persisted:

> Although the urgency of the need for relieving the present conditions in Sekondi is fully recognized and unlikely, especially in view of the scarcity of building materials, that it

[19] 13 February 1939.
[20] CSO 11/14/352. 20 June 1938.
[21] 1941.

> will be possible to do more than complete the preliminary work connected with the formulation of a scheme of slum clearance until after the war.

Like Sabon Zongo, the situation in Sekondi presents a situation of congestion, over-crowdedness, and substandard housing and squalor. While the government was attune to this situation and sought to fix it—it could not. In this case, the political will was not there during the time period of World War II.

Yet what these deliberations in the Accra and Sekondi Town Councils demonstrate is the overarching politicization of slum clearance schemes. State administrators used demolition notices and building regulations as a source of social control. On the other hand, politicians and councilors used the ensuing insecurity as a way to gain political support of local communities. With insecure property rights, local communities relied on politicians to support their cause, as the case of Michael Thompson clearly demonstrates. At the root of the situation was the settlement pattern by which populations in Sabon Zongo and Sekondi settled the land, as "strangers" and "floating populations," respectively. Without formal housing rights, these populations were pawns in a larger political game, one in which the politicization of the situation simply led to the persistence of the status quo. State administrators established social control without having to establish real authority, provide services, or expend financial obligations.[22] They could continue to extract rents from the populations.[23] Politicians acted as representatives of the local communities, but established themselves as the real powerbrokers. With the threat of

[22] F. Fitzgerald, a London editor of the *African Times*, wrote condemningly of the colonial officials as people who could "enjoy their mistresses and drink their brandy and champagne upon a dungheap, provided they may occupy the highest positions on the stinking mess" (Gale: 187).
[23] Colonial officials were really only interested in their own well-being (Gale).

demolition, communities relied on these politicians for security of stay and protection from eviction. This pattern continued into the Independence period.[24]

Continued housing shortages and slum growth during Independence

Ghana has faced a housing shortage since Independence which dates back at least to the earthquake that hit Accra in 1939 (Acquah 1958).[25] In response, Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first President, launched a modernization campaign that placed access to affordable housing at the center of the agenda (Elleh 2002). The government formed two state bodies to address housing issues: The State Housing Corporation (SHC) and the Tema Development Corporation (TDC).TDC, for example, purchased 64 miles of land 17 miles outside of Accra and formed the city of Tema. The formal and regulated housing units coincided with the transfer of the national port from Accra to Tema. The 1958 Accra Town Plan outlined the problem facing urban residents in their quest for affordable housing: "Land is often not available for purchase because of an obscure title, inflated price or because it is held by an owner who, whilst he cannot build, will not release the land because of its intrinsic value to him" (Republic of Ghana 1958: 41). At the very early years of Independence, the Ghanaian government recognized the challenge that the small and insecure land market had on the provision of housing.

In the post-Independence urban plans, the Ghanaian government specifically highlighted slums like Nima, Maamobi and Chorkor as neighborhoods that were under-resourced and in need

[24] The situation was further propagated by specific policies that encouraged extraction of resources over investments in urban sustainability and planning. Gale writes: "It was clear that African towns were being permitted to grow in much the same unplanned, unhealthy manner in which early British industrial towns had developed…The problem was not simply a lack of funds…[but] the lack of commitment to spend money on major sanitary projects" (Gale: 197-198).

[25] This section is adapted from Paller 2014f.

of upgrading.[26] Nevertheless, the government suggested a piecemeal approach that allowed poor residents to stay in these areas. Slum demolitions should only occur "where the redevelopment of the area will enable money to be made available to finance the construction of new houses to replace those demolished or to assist the dispossessed to build or buy dwellings" (Republic of Ghana 1958, 42). In fact, in existing slum communities like Nima the government recommended lowering building standards so that residents could build houses within their income—they called this "relaxation of structural standards" (53-4). At the very early stages of Independence, the government's plan was to formalize and regularize land tenure security of these slum areas.

The government's policy toward slum growth and the politics of these communities demonstrates a consistent pathway from colonialism to independence. Nowhere is this clearer than in Nima, where the rapidly growing slum in the middle of the city needed massive infrastructural upgrading. In 1951 the settlement was officially incorporated into the city, allowing it to come under the jurisdiction of the Accra city council. In 1954, local ward members aligned with the CPP were successful in getting four public latrines built for residents. But the struggle to upgrade Nima remained a difficult situation:

> There has been a history of state interest and attempted intervention to include Nima in a general campaign for slum clearance, starting in 1961 with the short-lived 'Accra Slum Clearance Committee.' In June 1970 the Accra-Tema Metropolitan Planning Office presented a plan for the redevelopment of Nima and Maamobi (a similar area immediately to the north). This plan would have effectively destroyed the existing areas and forced over 50% of the residents out. However, starting in 1968 there were the beginnings of opposition to the slum clearance 'remedy.' At that time Operation Help Nima (OHN), a Christian Council controlled organization, was established to work for

[26] It was not just the migrant communities that contained slum-like conditions. Salm (2003: 98) writes: "In 1954, a journalist referred to Bukom Square and Cow Lane as "notorious slum areas" and introduced images of warfare to describe them. He asked readers: "Accra has never been bombed. Why should it look like a bombed city?" (Daniel Badu, "Clean Up Accra," *Daily Graphic*, 24 November 1954, 8-9). Further, slum redevelopment and upgrading was recommended in many official reports by the Accra Town Council. Local resistance to redevelopment by indigenous populations extends to other countries in West Africa, and has been well-documented in Nigeria (Arabiah 1974; Baker 1974; cited in Peil 1976).

> incremental improvements to the living conditions without destroying the existing Nima 'community.' The obvious differences in approach formed the genesis of a conflict which developed between the OHN-led Nima 'community' and the NRC/SMC military government. The latter group, ostensibly in league with local businessmen, wanted to raze the area, remaking Nima as a middle-class estate area and geo-economic center of Accra (Arn 1996: 438).

In the end, the status quo persisted due to local politics, a recurring theme throughout Ghana's urban history. The seeds of distrust between local communities and the state are the result of political alliances between local leaders in the community and state administrators, party members, and bureaucrats with connections to the governing regime. Rather than a state-community deadlock of homogenous entities, the relations between Nima and the state shifted due to which political party was in power and who maintained local control in the communities. The important point is that these changes were constantly shifting.

The housing shortage in urban Ghana persisted. Ghana faced a housing deficit of 736,657 in 1970; 1,184,636 in 1984; 1,526,275 in 2000; and 1,600,000 in 2010 (Awugafoge 2013: 13). In 1986, the Ministry of Works and Housing (MOWH) formed a National Housing Policy Committee to examine the housing situation in Ghana (Bank of Ghana 2007). The report detailed a comprehensive strategy to improve service delivery across the country, mainly focusing on institutional mechanisms that could coordinate the process. This new plan was part of a broader strategy, instigated by structural adjustment programs, to shift the focus of affordable housing from the government to the private sector.

The state withdrew from direct housing production and financing and attempted to stimulate the growth of the real estate sector and the indigenous market (Tibaijuka 2009). The 1980s also marked the emergence of the new interest group Ghana Real Estate Developers Association (GREDA), who represented the private interests. In effect, quasi-government agencies like Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), entrusted with the

responsibility of public housing development, have decreased their investment in public housing by 50 percent over time (Arku 2009).

The government's strategy in 1991 shifted from an emphasis on direct provision to coordination. Interestingly, the plan understood issues of local resistance. For example, the Strategic Plan states, "It must also be recognized that forced relocation of people—especially the Gas—from densely populated areas will meet with resistance, so that new innovative approaches to upgrading and re-housing people in the inner city will be required" (Republic of Ghana 1991, vol. 1:43). Further, "the shortage of housing has given rise to very high occupancy levels, unaffordable rents, unstable tenancies and poor living conditions. These factors, combined with issues of land litigation, high cost of building materials, shortage of skilled manpower and infrastructure services, underline the seriousness of the problems facing housing delivery in the metropolitan area" (Republic of Ghana 1991, vol. 1: 82). Most people cannot afford owning their own homes in Accra: fewer than 25% of household heads live in accommodation that they own (92). Until 1990, the strategic plan estimates that 15% of the housing stock was government provisioned housing; it rapidly declined with structural adjustment and the inability of the State to finance and provision more housing. In 1990, the plan estimates that the housing shortage was 19,135 units of accommodation.

The government's shift toward a liberal approach to development included the attempt to regularize land tenure security. According to this perspective, affordable housing in countries like Ghana is in extralegal environments where housing rights are not secured and owners are unable to produce capital. This informal housing market produces "dead capital": residents are unable to invest in their homes and leverage their ownership assets into other progressive development (De Soto 2000, 2003). This strategy was initially introduced by former President

Kufuor in 2002 but never fully materialized (Panapress 2002). The World Bank supported Land Administration Project was the cornerstone of this agenda, and sought to "harmonize statutory laws and customary interests bearing on Land" (World Bank 2013).

The ambiguous and insecure land tenure regime has long been recognized as an impediment to economic growth in Ghana (Besley 1995; Goldstein and Udry 2008), and an impediment to accessible affordable housing. The Bank of Ghana recently found that, along with the rising cost of inputs, land acquisition is the driving force behind the rising price of housing in Ghana (Bank of Ghana 2007). The high costs complement the fact that land transactions are not recorded; titles are not provisioned; and multiple individuals and families claim the same plot of land (Onoma 2010). The government recognized that customary law needed to be better incorporated into the formal state property rights regime (Blocher 2006), and the Land Administration Project attempted to do this. But the project has been for the most part unsatisfactory (World Bank 2013).

By the end of the twentieth century, the state and formal private enterprises had failed in their attempts to provide sufficient housing to urban residents. In response, the international community stepped in to play a role in facilitating the process of increasing access to housing for poor urban Africans (Arimah 2010). The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I, implemented in 2001, focused on attracting foreign capital to fund housing development. The GPRS II (2006-2009) specifically focused on poor and marginalized populations, detailing a special program for slum-upgrading (Bank of Ghana 2007). Two major initiatives are particularly notable: the Cities without Slums (CWS) action plan, under the auspices of the Cities Alliance and the Slum Upgrading Facility (SUF). These programs seek to mobilize foreign capital and to link this financial assistance with local actors. The projects seek to "package" the financial, technical, and

political elements of development projects (UN-HABITAT 2006a). While the effectiveness of these policies are still not known, several scholars blame them for contributing to a housing market that privileges the rich over the poor, increasing income inequality, and undermining an indigenous housing market that favors the poor (Gruffyd Jones 2009; Obeng-Odoom 2012).

This brief history of housing in Ghana demonstrates two important points. First, it suggests that the housing shortage in urban Ghana dates back to colonial times, and is not an outgrowth of globalization, structural adjustment programs, and neoliberal policies. This is consistent with Fox's (2014) recent finding that slum incidence can be traced back to colonial-era institutions and investments (or lack thereof). Similarly, plans have been put in place by the Ghanaian government, private enterprises, and the international community to quell the housing shortage—yet they all have failed. Second, despite the housing shortage, Ghanaians continue to migrate to cities in large numbers. With the government, international community, and private businesses unable to keep up with the growing demand of housing, residents seek alternative means to access and secure housing. The role of politics is central to this story.

Building political communities from the ground up

In the context of slum clearance and insecurity, communities and neighborhoods have found creative ways to secure protection and security of stay throughout Ghanaian history. Most importantly, local groups and populations formed patron-client relationships with members of the Town Council, colonial administration, and later political parties: they offered votes and support for protection and security of stay. But the formation of these political constituencies occurred from the ground up outside of officially sanctioned activity. Clearly, formal institutions, regulations of building code, and slum clearance schemes mattered to state authorities, as the previous two sections describe. But with persistent government inaction, life continued for years

and political communities formed. Groups jockeyed for local power; political entrepreneurs navigated the insecure institutional context in ways to personally enrich themselves; state administrators extracted rents and issued eviction and demolition threats to establish social control; and norms of reciprocity developed over time. While often overlooked in discussions of state and society, these grassroots political dynamics were instrumental in the formation of distinct and durable political communities. As the anecdotes at the beginning of this chapter demonstrate, the formation of these political communities develops across formal regime change. What do not change are the underlying informal institutions and subsequent political clientelism that emerge.

Land and housing are at the center of these early political struggles. Early settlers to the city established authority on the ground and struggled to establish control of the housing market:

> As more and more families came to settle on the site of the first settlements, the job of the father became that of headman. With further increases in migration his job became more complex. Other family heads in charge of their own clan groups were ranged under his authority, and responsible to him, since his priorities of leadership derived from the original occupancy of land. As larger social units consisting of groups of families, or clans, accrued to the settler family and its descendants, the senior family headman became a sort of chief (*odikro*), whose authority extended to custodianship over land held by clan members not immediately related to him. He dispensed land to newcomers. His dispensation was more or less final, insofar as these acts were in fact the creation of ancestral lands (Apter 1955: 90).

These original settlers quickly became political figures, or personal rulers. In the absence of state social welfare, they play a role as caretakers of the community: "A man could establish himself by providing others with lodging. This primarily meant enacting the traditional role of the *mai gida* or patron. Such a man not only needed to have money, but also had to be generous with others… In this foreign situation, if a man died on the street and had no kin nearby, the *mai gida* would buy the necessary cloth and coffin and see to his burial" (Pellow 1985: 431). While these

figures certainly resonate with African cultural patterns, they were especially notable for their economic and political importance (Schatzberg 2001). The most important resource that they controlled was housing, as described by Cohen (1969) in his discussion of a migrant neighborhood in Ibadan, Nigeria:

> Housing is the most important capital asset of a business landlord. Apart from the house in which he and his immediate family live, he needs housing for the accommodation of his clients—brokers, assistant-brokers, clerks, servants, errand boys—and of their families…Command over housing is thus command of economic power, and because of the increasing scarcity of housing fierce competition between the business landlords has developed. Most of the important political disputes within the Quarter have been the result of an underlying struggle for control over housing (72).

Securing land and housing brought great political power to local leaders. These so-called "business landlords" had important political power, and served as authority figures in these new settlements.

The development of patron-client relationships with respect to land and housing at the community-level in urban West Africa has been well-documented by anthropologists (Skinner 1963, 1972; Cohen 1969; Arhin 1971; Schildkrout 1970, 1978; Peil 1971; Barnes 1986; Allman 1991; Pellow 1985, 2002; Kobo 2010). These arguments should not be under-emphasized: they highlight the agency of local communities; the importance of political entrepreneurs and norms of reciprocity; and the relative consistency in political activity despite structural and formal-institutional change in the development of these communities.

For migrant non-citizens, the establishment of patron-client relationship was particularly acute, as Peil (1971) explains, "Whereas the citizen has a formal position in regard to political leaders, the non-citizen's position is in-formal and may vary considerably from one official to another. It tends to be based on patronage and influence rather than authority" (216). This is

because residents relied on these connections for protection of their livelihoods: they feared being deported. Schildkrout writes, "Their settlement was encouraged, for as strangers they had no traditional authority and were dependent on the government for permission to remain in the town and, even more, for any rights and privileges they required" (Schildkrout 1978: 67). There were also significant differences between first- and second-generation migrants (Skinner 1963). Early stranger populations had closer connections to traditional African authorities; second-generation migrants established closer links with Europeans and had more autonomy in relation to customary authorities like local chiefs. Yet, traditional chiefs still had power via their control of land:

> Thus, the chiefs still had the right to distribute land to persons who needed it, including civil servants and politicians as well as migrant cultivators. In return for land, the ordinary people gave presents to the chiefs; civil servants and politicians not only gave presents but also became indebted to the chiefs (Skinner 1972: 1211)

It is important to note that local communities forged alliances with those who provided access to housing and land, and while these relationships changed due to formal-institutional change, the groups in these communities still self-organized in ways to protect their economic livelihoods, as in the case of Kumasi:

> The strangers' relationships with the British and with the Asantehene, and later with elected or party officials, have always been characterised by patronage rather than by the formal devolution of authority. The most effective patron is usually felt to be the one with whom a group of strangers has a close relationship at a particular time, and this depends upon the exchange of favours, including political support. Since many strangers are vulnerable because they are not citizens, they are in need of protection from officials; strained relations with those in power can mean a real risk of deportation. During the colonial period, stranger leaders maintained direct personal relationships with individual British officials. They would greet them in person or with gifts whenever the opportunity arose. They also still pay allegiance to the Asantehene as 'owner of the land', and conscientiously greet him in a formal pro-cession on festival occasions (Schildkrout 1970: 258).

Yet, locally, ethnic groups jockeyed for political alliances and protection; slum communities were not homogenous entities (Nadel 1942; Allman 1991). In fact, ethnic groups acted as interest or pressure groups (Cohen 1969): they self-organized to put pressure on state authorities for distribution of services. This was particularly clear in the aftermath of the 1939 earthquake when organizations from zongos entered the political fray to demand humanitarian assistance (Allman 1991). Therefore, groups formed locally in order to extend their political power. As Barnes (1986) writes in the context of a Nigerian slum:

> The public were seekers. Political aspirants were givers, who used patron and middleman roles in their quest for authority. Leaders who had large numbers of client followers were able to legitimate their political actions and, consequently, to influence community affairs because they had these followers. For people who did not hold official positions in government, the politics of clientelism was thus an effective vehicle for generating attention and moving upward in the political hierarchy (11).

Clearly, groups and their leaders used creative ways to control the housing market and make alliances with the state to protect their livelihoods. They also needed the recognition from state authorities to legitimate their rule within their own communities—they sought being "gazetted" in local newspapers to recognize their role as headmen in particular ethnic communities (Pellow 1985: 434). This also allowed them to serve as judges, which brought gifts and honor to their personal rulership. Interestingly, these local political constituencies withstood formal-institutional regime change. The historical record suggests that they were able to do this through patron-client relationships that they established with politicians and state bureaucrats.

This historical and political anthropological approach to the study of slum political development has uncovered the role that ordinary residents, political entrepreneurs and social networks play in the construction of their political communities and constituencies. But most of these accounts of slums in Ghana focus on one particular community, and are unable to explain

similarities and differences between communities. In other words, they uncover the role that patrons and clients play in the persistence of slum conditions, but they are unable to demonstrate the varying structures of these patron-client relationships. Not all political clientelism in these communities is the same, and they rely on different logics of social exchange. In the next section, I provide an explanation for why political communities in slums vary across the city, with particular reference to leadership, ethnicity, and state legal recognition. To do so, I trace the origins of political clientelism back to the original settlement pattern of the slum.

The history of illegality in Old Fadama

In a 1976 article, Margaret Peil argues that squatter settlements are rare in West Africa, particularly when compared to regions like Latin America (Peil 1976). She suggests that residents in poor urban communities have plausible alternatives to squatting: they can purchase land legally or they can rent rooms with the intention of returning home. Land tenure and community norms make it very difficult for residents to obtain title if they squat illegally, providing a strong disincentive. Konadu-Agyemang extends this argument but adds that the underlying ancestral ties to the land make squatting unthinkable in West Africa (Konadu-Agyemang 1991). In other words, Kumasi residents will not sell away their land, because that would mean they would be disconnecting with their ancestors. Therefore, they allow others to use or rent their land, but they do not sell it—they remain the custodians.

But as the rate of urbanization continued to intensify in the 1980s and 1990s, squatter settlements provided new opportunities for marginalized groups and migrants, particularly from the northern regions, to find economic opportunities. Politically, this type of slum offered the space to seek political incorporation into the state. For the government, they offered what they

hoped would be a temporary outlet for a migrant population that they could not otherwise accommodate. But as the settlements grew, the underlying norms and rules of daily life persisted, and provided numerous opportunities for leaders to gain power, politicians to win votes, and residents to secure cheap housing.

The largest squatter settlement in Ghana is Old Fadama, located in central Accra. While Peil and Konadu-Agyemang make strong points about the low levels of squatter settlements by the 1980s, the roots of political development in illegal settlements date back to the early years of Independence. In 1962, the first President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, relocated a group of residents who were living there because of floods. The space was named Fadama, which means "marshy, uninhabitable area" in Hausa. The area then became uninhabited and was used as a garbage dump for the city. Residents from nearby James Town and Ussher Town recount memories of fishing in the Korle Lagoon and playing soccer on the fields that have since been squatted upon.[27] By the early years of Independence, this territory was marked an "uninhabitable area." These memories have become powerful narratives used to mobilize people—especially the Ga people from James Town and Ussher Town—against the "squatters" of Old Fadama. They also helped frame the vision of the Korle Lagoon Ecological Restoration Project, which was supposed to clean up the area and remove the residents from the occupied space (Grant 2006).

In the 1980s, people started squatting there illegally. The slum's population exploded due to a few government policies and decisions: the resettling of Northerners fleeing a conflict, movement of the Yam and onion markets, and the establishment of Makola Market #2. But

[27] For example, at the Amnesty International Stakeholders Meeting, Ga Mashie Development Association Director Mr. Tagoe told the story of when he was a kid as a "native son" of Accra. Right after Independence he would sit by the lagoon with his friends. Accra was a beautiful city and they dreamed of finally adopting the city for themselves. It had gardens and beautiful water spots left from the colonial authorities. "We expected to live in a better Accra," he said. He continued to discuss the temporary structures and how the name of Sodom and Gomorrah is appropriate. "To me, it is very sad as a Ghanaian. It's about human dignity—I feel ashamed" (October 20, 2011).

because the area was deemed illegal and uninhabitable by the government, the pattern of political development was personal, spontaneous and sporadic. The story from the squatters themselves is untold in official documents and academic scholarship, but it is crucial to contemporary governance in the community. Here is one description of the growth of the settlement from a resident named Kobe:

> This place now it is full community, but first time we came, the whole place was bushy, there were crabs in our structures, we were in it like that, very bushy especially this side. It all started from the yam market which was a very small portion; from one side of the lagoon to the other side the only boundaries you could see was the yam market. Behind the yam market was the Korle Lagoon, full of water and very muddy. By then I was in Agbogbloshie [the community across the main road]. So we use to come here to carry loads for money. Behind the yam market was the place we go to toilet. So the market was here, but there is a place close to the they called Mensah Guinea, if you go to the see, there is this David Power memorial hall, left of it very close to the sea. There were some boys there, they were not northerners, some of them were from Koforidua, Kumasi and Takoradi. They came to Accra to do work so they camped there. But some soldiers also went there occasionally to harass them, and finally drove them away from there. Some of them came to this side. *Who drove them away?* The soldiers. *Why?* Because, some of them were thieves (focus group, June 4, 2012).

Contrary to popular opinion that the community was started by Northerners, this account suggests that squatters from other parts of the country came even before the large groups of migrants came in the 1990s. But the image of the community as a "den of thieves" dates back to the very early years of the settlement, even before the Northerners arrived in great numbers. Kobe continued:

> So some of them [the early squatters] went to Agbogbloshie, others came here. When they came, they could not go to the back because of the water. But there was a portion back there that was a bit high so they put up structures there and was sleeping in there. During the day when they go, some women too came to use their structures to sell. Some of them just made sheds and fill the floor with sore dust, and sleep in it in the night and the women use it to sell during the day. Some other people in other parts of the city who didn't have homes to sleep started joining them (focus group, June 4, 2012).

Kobe emphasizes the housing shortage in Accra that contributed to the growth of the community. He also explains that the area became a commercial area for women to sell.

> Some people started building from this side. The water would have been a challenge, but for the sore dust at the timber market. So people started going for the sore dust and using it to fill the grounds behind the yam market and put up a structure. It got to a time people used sacks to fetch the sore dust and put it on the floor to create a path to a little parcel of land that is a little high and put up his structure.

A powerful Mallam elder in the community describes a similar process of "building the community":

> When you are in difficulty, you don't fear dirty. We collected stones to cover the dam. We collected them to cover the dirty things—and they aired. We then started to educate the people not to do bad. During previous times, there were some bad people doing bad things. God cursed them. But we started doing goodness. We cut the tree underneath the criminals. We cut the tree down. We don't allow bad people to stay here (Personal interview, February 9, 2012).

The community grew in a haphazard manner, without proper planning or procedures. The squatters found a way to curb the "swampy area" by filling in the community with dirt. But once the community started growing, individuals realized that they could take advantage of the situation for personal gain. A few Ga family heads saw the illegal squatting as an opportunity to sell land and make money.

> So people started joining them until Billy and Pii Laryei came from the Ga community, but what I heard was that, they were coming from the family that owned the lands here. He [Pii Laryei] was not sleeping in the community, he was in the Ga area until his mother built a house at Abusei Okan and he moved there. But he moved from there and came to settle here. His structure is back there, even his wife is still in the structure, close to Billy's structure, where Abojuse is, the woman is called Awu she sell things there. So when Pii Laryei came he started selling the lands to people, so before you could build, you needed to give him some money. When he started doing that, Alhaji Egbe also came, and he was also a Ga, he went and put up his structure at a location behind Ash town videos, and was selling the lands there. Billy also came down towards the road and was selling there. Another man also came he is also Ga, still in the community, he is called Gavey, for him now he does not have a structure on his own but he sleeps outside, he also went behind where my structure is now and was also selling the land to the people to put up their structures. So it started building from four areas (focus group, June 4, 2012).

The community grew from the ground up, with the Ga family heads serving as landlords of the community and personally benefitting from the sales. At first, people built their structures from

thin wood slabs and cartons. They would use rubber sleeves as windows. People then started using bigger wood slabs. Plywood was used after this. At the early stages of development, the floors were made with wood chips. One man explained how it was a big step when residents started cementing the floors. Today, many people are starting to build cement structures (Personal interview, December 7, 2011). Interestingly, the community leaders did not allow permanent structures until 2009 when there was a big fire outbreak. Before then, a prominent community group decided that it was not a good idea to build permanent structures because they did not want to be viewed as criminals by the authorities. One resident explained, "We wanted to be relocated, and we did not want to appear as wanting to settle here" (Personal Interview, September 16, 2011).[28]

The area grew in accordance with the local big man who sold the land. These leaders became influential opinion leaders in the community and still hold symbolic importance: leaders are expected to show allegiance to them and occasionally pay tributes. However, the growth of other tribes has shifted the power away from these Ga leaders. Further, other local strongmen have taken over the informal land market—mostly because the Ga leaders sold off most of their shares of the land and have since moved out of the community. Ga leaders, like Billy, are treated as "custodians" of the land, but they do not control the daily housing market. The origins of tribal leadership arose early in Old Fadama's political development. Ethnic headmen established territorial authority and accumulated wealth by acting as *de facto* landlords. Migrants from their hometown came to them when they needed housing in Accra, providing clustered ethnic social networks within the slum.

[28] This was a strategy used by OFADA and PD to try to state their case for relocation. Community leaders believed if they cooperated with the authorities they would benefit from the relocation package in the future. But this was also used by the community leaders to keep the place "temporary" so they could further benefit from their private businesses and control the informal markets.

The government also played a role in the development of the slum when they had plans to build a market. They evicted some of the residents in the front of the community. But these squatters simply moved toward the back of the community where the land had not yet been inhabited.

> So it was growing until one day when some people came that they were coming to build something, I don't remember but they mentioned something like market or hospital and they evicted those who came earlier and settled close to the road. That was the first time I heard the name Sodom and Gomorrah. Those people they evicted were moving towards the back there carrying their things and people started saying that they are going like the people of Sodom and Gomorrah people. They were moving to a place we use to call 'no man's land' there were a lot of water there. There was one man in the bush called Commando; he was alone there, on the bank of the lagoon growing okra there. So when they evicted those here, they carry their things and we called them people of Sodom and Gomorrah, they joined him there and occupied the whole area there. For some time everybody called there Sodom and Gomorrah. I am sure it was this area that they moved them from. Yes it was here and they built a market. So when they went there they built their structures in straight lines, leaving walk ways. That is how the community came to be (focus group, June 4, 2012).

In 1997, the community was labeled "Sodom and Gomorrah." Interestingly, local Ga leader named Billy was the first person to use the term to designate the area in the back that was considered "the bush" by community residents from the yam market, or the front of the slum (Personal interview, December 7, 2011). There was a fire outbreak in the community, and Billy wanted to distinguish the place where businesses and individuals operated and bought land through the Ga landlords from the back of the slum that was perceived as "no man's land" and a "den of criminals." This is because, as the Chairman of OFADA explains, "Anybody who would walk over there [the back] they thought were going to smoke or shit" (Personal interview, February 9, 2011). A reporter from Sunshine Radio overheard Billy and used the term in the report. The name stuck. This story also highlights how internal divisions exist in the slum and become politicized over time: Old Fadama residents are not as unified as the scholarship suggests and these divisions hurt the broader political interest of the community in the long term.

In fact, norms of reciprocity developed along ethnic lines—not cross-ethnic lines. Dozens of different languages, ethnic groups, and social networks settled there, and the diverse groups have very little inter-ethnic engagement with one another.

Over time, people from outside the community labeled the entire community Sodom and Gomorrah, without clarifying the internal division and nuance that Billy originally described. While Billy highlighted one specific neighborhood of Old Fadama, the popular narrative tagged the entire slum with the derogatory name. In a community that was formed illegally, even the name of the slum was started informally, but has become regularized and is called as such in official plans of the city (AMA mid-term development plan). Kobe clarified:

> The time the northerners were coming, the community was there already, it was not overcrowded like this though. Also some areas of the community were still not built. They were coming in groups, normally in the evenings. Whenever they came we will come out and be watching them moving in their number. As they came they had individuals they were coming to and they intend gave them the go ahead to put up their own structures. Even then, they were building big structures to house many people in one that is why they have big structures. They were mainly women and children, you will see them, coming in a group of young women, that even brought about this 'Kayayei' [head porter] business. When we were here there was nothing like 'Kayayei' here. We the boys used to carry loads including refuse, two of the boys I was doing that work with are still here. That is how the community came to being (focus group, June 4, 2012).

The community grew in the 1990s when a severe drought affected the Northern Region and the Kakumba/Nanumba War contributed to a large flow of migrants to Accra. Former Mayor Nat Nunoo Amarteifio explains:

> At the time they came to settle, we didn't pay much attention to it. Some northern politicians asked us to be charitable, so we said they could stay there for a short time. We had our own problems so we decided to ignore it (Personal interview, March 22, 2012).

Amarteifio continually referred to the migrants as "refugees," denoting their temporary status. He highlighted that he allowed the people to settle at Old Fadama temporarily. Nonetheless, they

stayed and the community continued to grow. Further, the fire that destroyed Makola Market in 1993 also changed the heart of the city. Many market sellers moved to Agbogbloshie where Makola Market #2 was built. Amarteifio continues, "It was frankly easier for us to ignore them than to get involved in potential confrontations with refugees and their political masters."

The informal institution of squatter illegality creates incentives for squatters to establish early control by selling land, forming alliances with politicians, and controlling as many "followers" as possible. In illegal settlements, power is personal and is centered around a "big man" who establishes territorial authority. For example, in the Old Fadama neighborhood called Zuguline, a *zongo* area where the early settlers were all from the same community in Tamale, residents would go to "a certain madam to purchase land" (Personal interview, December 7, 2011). Different neighborhoods are even designated by the local strongman in control, for example Yaw's Park and Jima's Park. Other neighborhoods in the slum are named after references from the north, demonstrating the close links that "settlers" maintain with the Northern Region. For example, Takorolyili is named after a Chieftaincy in the North meaning "Chief Warrior." The land in the slum is currently controlled by seven local strongmen who are responsible for maintaining order on the ground.

The original settlement pattern of the slum shapes the broader public opinion of illegal settlements as well. The perception of the residents as squatters has not changed. Poor Ghanaians living in other slums across the city characterize the residents as illegal squatters and criminals. My focus groups demonstrate how poor Ghanaians who have similar demographic characteristics, political party connections, and tribal affiliations view residents of Old Fadama differently than they do their own slum neighbors. Youth in Ga Mashie, a community that neighbors Old Fadama describe the people there:

> They dwell in wooden structures, there are no hospitals there, no schools, there is no layout there. They built in places where there is flooding when it rains…They defecate anywhere around the Korle Lagoon…They have built kiosks in a storey form where they use one part as a clinic and the other as a school… If you go there for the first time it is difficult for you to get out…They even bury their dead there. And thieves exist there, and there are plans to evict them. They use light and water illegally. It is a place for hustlers (focus group, June 20, 2012).

Elders in Nima hold a similar view of Old Fadama as a temporary settlement:

> Sodom and Gomorrah is not a community. It is there for a particular project. There is a project meant for the area but because of the inhabitants the project is not being executed. Old Fadama is also very overcrowded. We also have house that pay property rates but Old Fadama is for squatters. We have chiefs and a MP that are legitimate but power relations in Old Fadama is based on who squatted in a particular place (focus group, June 28, 2012).

Dagomba residents in Tulako, Ashaiman hold similar views. This is particularly surprising because the majority of residents in Old Fadama are also Dagombas from the Northern Region who came to the Greater Accra for similar reasons. Nonetheless, the pattern of settlement differs between Tulako and Old Fadama contributing to differing trajectories of slum development. One Tulako resident and focus group participant explains:

> Here, you rent a room in a house where there is a land lord who advises you, and stops you from misbehaving, but over there people own their kiosks, they are not living in houses, so they do what they want good or bad do you (focus group, June 3, 2012).

These beliefs affect the way residents and leaders organize. When local leader Mr. Kwasi strategized which slums to include in his Slum Union of Ghana, he considered the institution of settlement that frames the way that residents view themselves in relation to others. Even though many slums across the city need upgrades in public services, are marginalized politically and economically, and have land tenure insecurities, he was hesitant to reach out to indigenous and *zongo* communities, including Ga Mashie and Nima respectively. He explained:

> They do not see themselves as having the same problems as us. They do not want to cooperate. They are not serious in dealing with slum issues. I think we should get up and

> running first and they can join later when they see the impact that we have made (Strategic meeting, April 27, 2012).

The evidence suggests that there is no collective identity among the urban poor. Instead, poor urban populations that have similar objective and demographic characteristics, and even hail from the same political party, do not identify as having shared interests. Instead, they are divided along local political lines determined by the informal institution of settlement. Persistent ethnic norms of reciprocity contribute to these divisions.

Political debates and the mass media contribute to the propagation of these public perceptions. The debates in Parliament reinforce this view of Old Fadama residents as "immigrants who provide casual labor in the city," "settlers" and "the Sodom and Gomorrah people" (Parliamentary Debates Official Report. August 14, 2008. Fourth Series: Vol 60, No. 3). Some politicians continue to use the term "refugees" to describe the settlers in Old Fadama. These perceptions are further spread in the popular media. The following table summarizes the origins of tribalism based on the initial settlement pattern of Old Fadama. Chapter five will demonstrate how this initial settlement pattern provides the institutional basis for tribal politics.

Figure 2.1: The historical foundations of tribalism



Owners of the city: The history and persistence of indigeneity

"Downtown Accra – 'Ga' – survived as an overcrowded, vibrant hothouse of indigenous culture and political intrigue" (Parker 2000: 196).

"A Ga man who has achieved any modicum of success will try by all means to build himself a house, which has to be in the suburbs since there is no room in Central Accra" (Robertson 1977:210).

Ga Mashie is the indigenous center of Accra dating back to the settlement in the 16th century. Residents take great pride in being owners of the city, contributing to an indigenous narrative that structures daily life. Norms in indigenous settlements privilege a politics of autochthony—claiming to be "sons of the soil," thereby excluding outsiders they deem strangers who "do not really belong" (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000, Geschiere and Jackson 2006, Berry 2009, Pelican 2009). In the context of democratization and increasing land values, these claims are heightened and politicized in the process of multi-party politics. But the institutionalization of indigeneity did not simply come to fruition in the contemporary context, but rather has shaped the authority structures in local communities since pre-colonial times.

The first settlers of Ga Mashie, who themselves were Ga-speaking migrants, arrived in the sixteenth century, coming into contact with the Kpesi people and immediately absorbing them into their communities (Acquah 1958; Field 1940). While they settled inland, they moved toward the coast to take advantage of the opportunity to trade with European merchants. They settled just to the east of the Korle Lagoon in what was called "fish village"; this original settlement makes up what is modern-day Ga Mashie. The original settlement pattern was based on family migrants who established so-called quarters, which became modern-day neighborhoods:

> The towns themselves are of curious constitution. The people of each one narrate that it was founded by what seems to have been a harried gang of refugees fleeing easterly

> lands and travelling probably along the beach, a natural highway still carrying much foot traffic. The gangs appeared at different times and each consisted of 'a few men and their sons and brothers and many wives and children.' Each gang seems to have fortified one of several hills, now uninhabited, on the boundaries of the plain—Legon, Okakwei, Adzangote, Lanma, etc. and to have removed later to the coast and settled there permanently, deciding that coastal sites were safer as they needed protecting on one side only.
>
> The first care of each of these little coastal settlements was to keep up its numbers, for only so could it defy inland raiders. For this reason it seems to have been the habit of all the Ga towns to allow any friendly band of outsiders to attach itself to the town and receive all its benefits and protection in return for military help.
>
> Thus it came about that each town today consists of several so-called 'quarters' (Field 1937: 2).[29]

At the very early stages of settlement, the importance of family rooted itself in the authority structure of the Ga Mashie neighborhoods. The basic social unit of the Ga is the *we*, or the ancestral house through which all inhabitants trace their descent through a common male ancestor (Odotei 1991). The ancestral house has physical implications because it marks the political space of the neighborhood, providing ways to mark differences in the community (Osei-Tutu 2001). From this emphasis on space and settlement, where early settlers are marked physically by where they live and their dividing boundaries they set, an insider-outsider narrative emerged: families established political structures (and *asafo* companies) to protect themselves from potential raids from "inland raiders."[30] In fact, Quartey-Papafio argues that from this first-settler status developed an entitlement to land and territory: "The Gas have never been conquered and made slaves of the soil of the land has always been, and is, the property of the Ga people" (Quoted in Josiah-Aryeh 1997). The politics of space and desire to control territory within each

[29] Territory is particularly important because the important markers in the community are where ancestors are buried. For example, the Founders of the Gbese quarter are buried under the Ussher Fort, marking an important location in the community.

[30] The *asafo* company also represented the voice and interests of the commoner: The "*asafoi* were seen as the institutional expression of 'commoner' interests, ready to defend the rights of the ordinary *manbii* [townspeople] and keep in check the prerogatives of the chiefs" (Parker 2000: 19).

neighborhood was of particular significance to the local dynamics of communities (Pellow 2002).

At the center of the narratives that developed was origin[31]: Ga people trace their histories to central Africa, where they came into contact with Ancient civilizations and even adopted parts of the Hebrew language (Bruce-Myers 1927: 72).[32] But more importantly in the origin narratives is the importance of first arrival, or who came to Accra first (Parker 2000: 8).[33] This represents who is a "true Ga." For example, descendants of the Otubluhom quarter of Ga Mashie are originally Akwamus, and do not hold the highest prestige (Bruce-Myers 1972: 72). The descendants of Kinka, the oldest quarter, point to their first-settler status for garnering respect:

> The largest in size, and the most ancient in date, is Kinka, or Dutch Akkrah, which, according to general tradition, was built long prior to the others, and on this account, therefore, not only assumes the precedency over the whole as the metropolis, but formerly exerted a certain amount of supremacy over those political or other native disputes which, from this exalted position, were exclusively referred to their arbitration and decision (Daniell 1856: 2).

But many of the important divisions that remain in Ga Mashie today are outcomes of political struggles that can be traced back to the 17th century (Osei-Tutu 2001: 63). In 1680 the Ga State lost a war to the Akwamus, and were ruled until 1770. The powerful King Okaikoi was killed, centralized authority collapsed, and authority decentralized. Gas remember this point as a critical juncture when Gas lost unity and cohesion. The Ga state developed through political struggles and military might. Political incorporation and leadership developed through those who would help perpetuate the power of the Ga state, not along ethnic lines. Odotei writes:

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[31] Origin is of further importance because ancestors are often buried under houses. Josiah-Aryeh (1997) describes a comment that a resident told him: "If you pick a speck of dust in the centre of Accra or any major Ga-Dangme town, it is likely some minute remain of an ancestor of mine might be mixed with it."

[32] Others trace their origin to Benin City in Eastern Nigeria.

[33] Parker writes: "Despite their lack of historicity, such claims [of origin] are striking characters for cultural tensions in early colonial Accra, when traditions of origin were mobilized and further elaborated in Ga political action" (Parker 2000: 8).

> The policy of incorporation adopted by the Ga was aimed at giving the immigrants a sense of belonging to the state. With the defeat of the Ga by Akwamu in 1680, the power of the Ga rulers was shattered. Immigrants who displayed certain qualities and had the ability to help in protecting and defending the Ga were elevated. Since the immigrants, like everybody else in the state, had the responsibility of arming themselves, it was necessary, especially if they were wealthy and had lots of followers, that they should be part of the power structure. By giving them a position in the government, they identified themselves with the stability of the government and the survival of the state (Odotei 1991: 67).

The killing of King Okaikoi by the Akwamus in 1677 threatened the centralization of power in the Ga state, leading to the development of seven quarters in Ga Mashie around the 1730s (Arn 1996). After the defeat, powerful leaders of the six Ga towns outside of Accra claimed autonomy from the centralized authority in Accra. The "indigenous core" of the Ga split into five different quarters, and two immigrant groups also established quarters due to the "wealth of their founders, their association with Ga war efforts, and, lastly, their alliance with powerful African as well as European allies" (Osei-Tutu 2001: 64). Otubluhom, Abola, Asere, and Gbese made up Dutch Accra (Ussher Town), while Sempe, Akumadjzei, and Alata were part of British Accra (Jamestown). These quarters developed their own paramount chieftaincies and were hardly unified, developing *asafo* companies and political networks based on these new family alliances. There were constant military battles and struggles for power between the different quarters in the 1700 and 1800s. The divisional rulers of these quarters controlled land, and were not ruled directly by a centralized Ga Mantse, or king. This control of land provided family elders with the source of political authority (Shipton 1984). In this way, the origins of authority and leadership derive from control of land, military power, and ability to strengthen the stool, a central part of Ga society.

The conflict over authority and power was further complicated by the role of Europeans in the 1700s and 1800s. The Ga people established a lucrative business in trading slaves and gold

(particularly in the late 1600s and early 1700s) and later in palm oil (after gold decreased after 1850). To bolster their strength in trade, Europeans erected forts: The Dutch built the Ussher Fort (then called Crevecoeur) in 1650; the Swedes built Christiansborg Castle in 1657; and the British built James Fort in 1673. It was during this time that the Ga political entrepreneur established himself as a middleman between the Europeans and his own people: he exchanged land for the construction of forts in exchange for economic power (Acquah 1958: 16). The Ga people benefited from the role as middlemen in the larger long-distance trading routes:

> When the European traders first called at Accra they traded with the Gas whom they found in occupation of the territory. These Gas acted as middle-men between the Europeans and the tribes in the interior, zealously guarding their monopoly of buying from the foreigners. When the latter erected forts, and later still when they hired premises in the township, the Gas still acted as their middlemen. This system had been accepted on the part of the foreign companies because of the desire to maintain the goodwill of the people on whose land they were trading (Acquah 1958: 17).

The importance of land is central to the role of Ga middlemen: they controlled the land and therefore required a certain level of goodwill, or respect, but also a direct exchange of profits. The desire to control the coast—and therefore vast trading routes—was at the forefront of local politics (Arn 1996). This also contributed to the development of a stratified class system, where new "merchant princes" served apprenticeships under the Europeans and gained wealth, prestige, and territory (Daaku 1970 cited in Arn 1996). Political entrepreneurs gained power and extended territorial authority based on their control of followers and access to firearms, as was the case with the rise of Wetse Kojo and the Alata stool (Parker 2000: 14). The Gas were also under constant attack from the Akwapim people of the north, and depended on their links with Europeans for guns, economic power, and other wealth. The role of Ga leaders as middlemen between Europeans and inland tribes underlie the logic of social exchange and marks an early point in the evolution of political clientelism in Ga Mashie.

In the 1830s a group of Nigerians and freed slaves from Brazil arrived in Ussher Town, and one of the local chiefs gave land to the settlers. But what is most notable is that they absorbed into Ga society by marrying Gas, speaking their language, and trading and participating in daily life (Field 1940; Gocking 1999). By 1840 the Abola Mantse became the Ga Mantse due to his leadership in the Ashanti-Fanti War (Sanjek 1972: 35). Throughout the 1800s, "strangers" incorporated themselves into one of these seven quarters, learned the Ga language, intermarried with indigenous Gas, and assimilated into the Ga ethnic group. Power was not based on kinship, but rather the number of followers—and the addition of immigrants was part of this accumulation of political power. But, in Ga Mashie, this involved the process of "becoming Ga," as the Ga maxim "*Ablekuma aba kuma wo*" suggests: "May strangers be added onto us" (Parker 2000: 16).[34] It also included joining *asafo* companies and "defending the town" (Parker 2000: 48). This was also at the forefront of male honor: to become an honorable Ga man, you had to fight and defend the town (Field 1940). Norms of reciprocity, therefore, emerged along ethnic lines. But it was a particular type of ethnic solidarity, one that involved an indigenous esprit de corps.

Struggles between diverse factions continued to divide the community through colonial rule. For example, the 1884 "Civil War" between residents of Ussher Town and James Town erupted when groups of residents in James Town insulted King Tacki Tawia I (Osei-Tutu 2001: 66). Testimony at the 1907 Commission of Enquiry into Ga indigenous institutions highlights the "importance of military organization and of warfare in determining the form of Ga institutions and the dynamics of political competition" (Parker 2000: 46). These "fights" over the process of

[34] Parker notes that the final custom that distinguished Gas from inland tribes was their circumcision: "Three centuries later the lament could still be heard in Accra: *Nye ha folio eha Nkranpon fee*—'You let uncircumcised people snatch Great Accra'" (Parker 2000: 16).

incorporation began to change in the early years of colonial rule. The introduction of indirect rule and rising land values in the 1920s and 1930s led to intense stool disputes (Sackeyfio 2008). In fact, stool succession disputes became "the curse of Ga politics" (Field 1940: 51). This contributed to local rivalries and competitive struggles for followers, but in new arenas of politics (Parker 2000 in *Africa's Urban Past*).

The way that stool succession disputes dominated Ga politics in the late colonial period is illustrated by the following case. On the surface, the local opposition to the colonial authorities' Municipal Corporations Ordinance appears to be a typical story of state power versus community resistance. In 1924, the British Administration in the Gold Coast published a new law that conceded a majority of Town Council seats to African merchants and elites (Osei-Tutu 2001). The law also implemented new revenue raising measures including property rate increases and license fees. The incumbent Ga Mantse Nii Tackie Yaoboi (1919-1929) supported the ordinance, along with African educated elite. The Ga Mantse was also the local representative for the Aborigines Protection Rights Society, an organization that represented the rights of customary law and ownership. The *asafobii*, or group of youth who view themselves as military figures and protectors of the Ga state, organized against the ordinance claiming that it disrupted their Ga indigenous culture. They claimed that the Ga Mantse did not have the authority to rule over the entire Ga Mashie community without their popular support. The details of the account are more striking. The mass of *asafobii* marched to the bedroom of the King at dawn ("traditionally, a time for sober reflections and level-headed discussions" [Osei-Tutu 2001:71]) and offered their disapproval. The Ga Mantse strongly disagreed and stated his plan to continue supporting the ordinance. The Ga Mantse refused to succumb to popular pressure and was later deposed by his people (in 1925) and officially destooled in 1929.

One of the crucial mistakes the Ga Mantse made was that he did not make his decision by subscribing to informal norms and duties of Ga political culture: he did not discuss the decision in a public meeting where he could come face-to-face with those he ruled (Osei-Tutu 2001: 73). When the Ga Mantse did finally call the populace together, he gathered them at a local place that signified belligerence or war, not compromise (Osei-Tutu 2001: 75). In these ways, he could not legitimate his decision, but rather was accused of forcing the ordinance on his people (and doing so on behalf of the colonial authorities). But this was not simply a struggle between the colonial state and Ga society. Instead, local political entrepreneurs use the institutional and cultural resources available to them to consolidate their own power.

Upon closer investigation, the situation represented a political struggle between Western educated elite Ga and the traditional "stable" poor, both of whom sought the necessary political space to govern their daily affairs (Quarcoopome 1998). Local Ga residents were not as forcefully resistant to the state or colonial rule as a state power versus community resistance narrative implies: after the bubonic plague outbreak in 1908 residents understood the value of paying rates and cooperated with the Town Council. Instead, Quarcoopome (1998) explains: "This action, by a section of the people of Accra led by some divisional chiefs, was to make the Ordinance unpopular and then to associate its enactments with the Ga Mantse with whom they were engaged in a dispute" (30). The underlying political struggle involved the sitting Ga Mantse and the Asere Paramount Chief. In other words, the struggle over the Municipal Corporations Ordinance "was used as a tool in a chieftaincy dispute" (Quarcoopome 1998: 45). This approach to Ga Mashie political development shows how local political entrepreneurs build political communities from the ground up, with the desire to dominate and control political space. The politicization of the chieftaincy is an enduring feature of Ga Mashie political life, as chiefs were

deposed in the 1950s depending on which side of the political divide they lie (Austin 1970) and continues to this day (see Chapter 4).

The strong indigenous narrative that developed in Ga Mashie due to its first-settler status persisted after Independence.[35] In fact, the first political crisis the country faced was a riot instigated by the Ga Shifimo Kpee, a Ga nationalist political party that splintered off from the CPP: "Operating from the slum quarter of Accra gangs paraded the streets in distinctive dress, red armbands, sashes and headgear, shouting slogans and campaigning for the Ga cause, demanding that jobs and houses in Accra should be given to Gas, the local people, before strangers and migrants" (Hodge 1967: 114-115). The Ga Shifimo Kpee (The Ga Standfirm Society) organized in opposition to Nkrumah at the very early years of Independence:

> The basis of the opposition seems to be a combination of tribalism and bread-and-butter issues. It is tribal in its emotional appeal to the narrow loyalties of the Ga people. Speech after speech referred to "the strangers" taking over the better jobs, the better housing in Accra. The implication is that Nkrumah is favoring the Fanti, the Ewe, and other groups in Ghana. Bread-and-butter issues show up in the movement's appeals to the economic frustration of the people. It is charged that cabinet ministers, who are not Ga, are feathering their own nests by buying the better land and taking over homes upon which taxes have not been paid (Houser 1957: 4).

The motto of the group was "gboi ngbe wo," or "the foreigners are killing us" (Osei-Tutu 2001: 78). The rise of the nationalist group took the CPP by surprise, as "It took shape in the capital, in Nkrumah's own constituency, from within the party's own ranks" (Austin 1970: 44). But from the grassroots, the formation of the organization represented politics as usual. This fear of the "outsider" fueled rumors, resistance and opposition to state policy throughout the post-colonial period. For example, in 1972 there was a proposal to put sewers in the entire city. But the people

[35] This narrative is propagated by Ga intellectuals and elites. For example, Josiah-Aryeh (1997) writes: "If the trend in the study of Ghanaian history persists, the Ga-Dangme stand in danger of becoming a people without a history; and even court the greater danger of denying their progeny the pride that arises from the knowledge of the heroic acts of one's forebears."

of Ga Mashie resisted because a rumor spread that the sewers were used to steal the sea and bring it to the hinterlands, especially Kumasi (personal interview, July 3, 2012). Ga Mashie residents were afraid that they were going to lose their sea. These fears of "losing their sea and city" fuelled recent resistance to plans to modernize Bukom Park put forth by the former Minister for the Modernization of the Capital City.

The following table summarizes the origins of indigenous politics based on the initial settlement pattern of Ga Mashie. Chapter four will demonstrate how this initial settlement pattern provides the institutional basis for a specific kind of tribalism, indigenous politics.

Figure 2.2: The historical foundations of Indigeneity



The 'old pioneers': Settlers and the frontier in Ashaiman

> *"New landlords must usually work to secure the title they have acquired (either through customary gifts if the area is as yet undeveloped or by formal sale) by making friends with their neighbors and becoming part of the local community. In developed areas, joining the landlords' association and becoming active in local politics helps to insure that the owner will receive support should his title be challenged* (Barnes 1974)" (Peil 1976: 162).

Ashaiman developed as a squatter settlement in the early 1960s when the Ghanaian government constructed the new port in Tema. Located just across the major highway, the settlement provided low-cost housing to workers who could not afford accommodation in Tema. Residents constructed houses made of cardboard cartons (from shipping containers), corrugated iron sheets, and simple sheets of plywood. Non-natives of Tema who were displaced when the government constructed the port were also designated plots in Ashaiman, but the area was meant to be a temporary settlement (Owusu 1991). Ashaiman quickly grew due to lack of affordable housing in Tema, unregulated official land and housing control (Kircherr 1968 cited in Mazeau, Scott and Tuffuor 2012), and nearby opportunities for employment. The population rapidly grew from 185 in 1948, 2,624 in 1960, 22,000 in 1970, to 50,000 in 1984 (Ghana Statistical Service 1986), and today is estimated at over 230,000 people. During the 1960s and 1970s, Ashaiman developed a burgeoning informal business sector, where an estimated 79% of residents were employed (Owusu 1999). At the early stages of settlement, however, many of the settlers were skilled or semi-skilled workers (Sandbrook and Arn 1977).

At the onset of the settlement, the entire community was a "squatter settlement." But parts of the settlement developed on customary land while others on government land, leading to distinct developmental trajectories of particular neighborhoods (Peil 1976). Residents who purchased customary ownership have legitimacy, while those squatting on government land fear that a politician, soldier, or other government worker might take the land away for "the good of

the nation" (Peil 1976: 165). This contributes to variation between Ashaiman neighborhoods today, and is the reason why the neighborhood variation in Ashaiman displays different authority structures.

For example, the neighborhood Tulako is a typical squatter settlement. The word Tulako means "logs" in Hausa and the settlement was labeled this because the early settlers tied their cattle to logs, and from here a large cattle market developed. In the early 1960s, there were very few structures and people in the area. The following quotes are from a focus group with community leaders and elders. These men's stories are important because they possess oral histories of the community that have not been formally documented. But they are also important because they demonstrate the settlement patterns of the slum and how authority developed from the initial formation. Rather than formal land title, customary ownership, or other markers that might designate control of property, early arrival and subsequent local control mark the roots of political development:

> Formally there were few houses around the traffic light, the church was mud house made with thatch and some one or two scattered houses here, before Tulaku came, when the market came it was becoming popular and then the Nigerians started buying, but one or two people bought plots here, my house was bought by a Nigerian and when they were asked to leave, he sold it to me. But other people had their houses around Tulaku, but all this place was bush (Tulako Slum Profile Focus Group).

Like the illegal settlement Old Fadama, local spots within Tulako were named after the local authority figures, or big men, who established territorial control. Similarly, even the local names have political implications:

> When people started buying the lands here, then the name [Tulako] started extending… When the name started spreading it took over the whole area, it was called Tulaku electoral area, but the indigenous people said no, it is a Ga land, it is our land, we will not sit down aliens to come and name the places, so under political and geographical

> demarcation, there was no any other name so they named it Tulaku electoral area, and then they segmented it into four units, unit one is the Traffic light, stretching to under the bridge, it is called Kai Abom (Kai is a Ga name for female and Abom means Garden) which means Kai's Garden, because a woman by named Kai was formally having her garden there, so the indigenous people said the place should be named Kai Abom, But from the traffic light to where we have the structure is called Tulaku but it have been change to Amuijor, which means Amui's valley, I think the there was a stream passing here. Then from the EP building to Clementina is err, err it is spelt with M ok let's leave it out, then the fourth unit is called Shiabu, they win sand there, from the African advance up to the top, the roundabout, Shiabu means sand winning area. And the third is Moko Memo…So we have Kai Abom, Amuijor Moko Memo and Shiabu (Tulako Slum Profile Focus Group).

In this way, Tulako is a first stop for new migrant arrivals:

> Most of them come from outside the country, these Malians, most of the reside here, and again too, those from the north who come in to look for greener pastures their first abode is here, it is a place where they can lay their heads for whiles looking for what they came for, until they get where they can finally work and get their daily bread, for the first time they have to reside here.

Residents understand the history of the settlement by when members of particular ethnic groups arrived. In the earliest years, Hausas from Nigeria settled, then one Ga and one resident from Prampran. At the time, the area was a refuse dump where people from the surrounding areas came and dumped their garbage. And this continued:

> If you want a place to sleep you just clear the place, and put your head, then Ewes come in, I think the father of Mr. Zonyira, the late Zonyira himself was an Ewe chief, who was here, then there was this Ga man, Grandfather of this land, then there was one Dagomba man who then shifted the refuse dump here to the next house, that is a very huge refuse dump, then one old man, Mr. Narter, from Ningo, come to clear the place, he is also a cattle farmer and a cattle trader, he cleared the place to settle down, behind there they pushed the refuse dump to the dump site, then came a Dagomba man called One-one, he is still alive he also cleared the place…, that is when my brother came in, noo Mr. One-one's place was there before…, no, no, no, my brother's place was there before, my brother put up three wooden structures for the first time then it was rented by these Ewes, some Ewes in the house who were called…, so in short we have Hausas, we have Ewes, we have Dagombas, as well as Dangbes.

The roots of political development in Tulako hinge on these very men. Mr. Zonyira's father was Ewe chief, and his son now leads the private school in the community. He is a respected elder who serves as headmen for the Ewe community. Baba Alhassan, one of the early Dagomba (northern) migrants served as Assemblyman for two terms in the 1990s. He was instrumental in clearing the roadways to make way for two lane roads. His deputy, Honorable C succeeded Alhassan as Assemblyman and represented the Dangbe community. He also was close to the Tema Chief, which helped legitimate his rule at first but later undermined him because he was accused of colluding with the customary authorities to sell off the land. Nonetheless, both Alhassan and Honorable C were elected because they promised to demarcate the area and provide formal plot allotments to the residents. Tulako residents relied on these big men for security of stay because they did not have formal title. At the same time, these men grew powerful because of their commitment to the neighborhood. Baba Alhassan would take in "guests" from the north on a regular basis. He was recognized as a very kind man. Honorable C had a large compound where youth would gather to discuss community affairs. All the elders are very engaged in local decision-making. Most of the men also had close links to the Ashaiman Divisional Council—the group of headmen who represented traditional authorities. This added legitimacy to their local roles as opinion leaders.

Of course the informal settlement of Ashaiman was not without its problems, as one resident recounts:

> When settlers came, some were able to acquire land by dubious means. Sometimes the people would sell land to 2 or 3 people. When the authorities came to demarcate the land, 2 or 3 would come. People have to be fast enough to 'create documents.' People will fake documents. The strongest people will win. If people know people, it will happen.

But the early settlers and big men worked together to solve these disputes, and had the authority to determine cases. In the early years, even the police and the state stayed out of these affairs. Other settlers remember the lack of order and security during the early years of settlement:

> Ashaiman started as a 'haven'—just like Australia did—with convicts. As a kind of slum. There is a place called Site 1 where laborers were housed. They moved toward this place as settlers. It started to develop in a haphazard manner. Lots more people started coming in. [I came in 1974]. All this are was actually a forest. Around '68 and '74 you dare not be around the Station at 3PM. You'd be attacked (personal interview, February 27, 2012).

Little by little, the early settlers attempted to clean up their community: "You'd see pigs destroying all the gardens. We had to help control the pigs. People would steal fuel. We'd have clean-up campaigns" (personal interview, February 27, 2012).

These elders in Ashaiman maintain authority and take pride in the city they helped settle. They call themselves "settlers" and refer to themselves as the "Old Pioneers." Selassie, a teacher at Christian International School recounts the important figures who developed the town: "Doctor Afenyo used to call people and tell them to clean up. He was strict" (personal interview, February 27, 2012). He started an international school in the center of town; his son is now a leading political candidate in the NDC party. "This man, Abogo, of Africa Advance, owned a lot of land and sold a lot of land." Chief Driver Alhaji Yuseif Ibrahim was a one-time chairman of the NDC: "He called me once to have me bring in the students to mobilize youth. He is very rich. He owns a lot of cattle. The rich men were supporting the teachers. This is how rich people came into politics." This implied that they served community service first, then entered formal politics. The first Minister of Parliament of Ashaiman was an Ewe regent. These powerful early leaders established private schools, health clinics, and settled disputes. They also led communal labor exercise, particularly during the regime of President Jerry John Rawlings who made communal labor central to his agenda. Selassie remembers that "People who refused to participate in clean-

up exercises. [The elders] would not let them open their shops…Those who refused were forcibly given shovels to do some digging. After a while we would all benefit."

Ashaiman was well-organized from the early days of settlement. Each ethnic group had their respective hometown associations; friend's clubs met on Sundays; religious groups met during the week; youth clubs met throughout the week. When Rawlings implemented the People's Defense Committees, Ashaiman residents were easily regimented to participate. This local associational activity was documented by scholars in the 1970s:

> The local chieftaincy and Northern Ghanaian headmen dominate the existing Ashaiman Development Committee, with the established churches, market women and the Youth Council also having representation. Political demands are invariably made by writing letters and sending delegations, requesting support for local improvements from the Managing Director of the Tema Development Council and the Chief Executive of the Tema District Council. Representations are sometimes also made to the various ministries of the central government. As well, there is an Ashaiman Landlords Welfare Association which provides a specific service to landlords in Ashaiman. The founder and driving spirit behind the Development Committee is also the Chairman of the association. In effect, its operations protect and further the interests of member landlords vis-à-vis tenants (Sandbrook and Arn 1977: 63-4).

On the surface, Ashaiman began as a settlement that looked very much like Old Fadama: unauthorized building, substandard housing and squalor, and swampy environs. But the leaders quickly gained the legitimacy of their land by aligning with customary authorities and securing the legal recognition of their neighborhoods. In fact, by the 1960s Tema realized that there was a growing problem and allowed the building to continue (Owusu 1999). Even more so, they tried to control some neighborhoods in town by aligning with local leaders to demarcate formal plot sizes, allowing them to regulate the development and extract taxes from residents.

But what distinguishes the settlement pattern of Ashaiman from illegal settlements like Old Fadama is that the original move to the land was considered a "legitimate purchase" in the

eyes of customary authorities, not illegal squatters who are staying temporarily. For early settlers, moving to Ashaiman provided not only an opportunity to purchase land and property, but also the chance to found a political community and expand his authority. This is consistent with the settlements of *zongos*, or stranger quarters across the Greater Accra region. For example, the origin of Nima is traced to Alhaji Futa's purchase of the land in 1931; Alhaji Seidu Kardi exchanged gifts to customary authorities for Madina in order to "play a more important role as local leader" (Peil 1976: 163); Malam Nelu purchased a plot of land at Zongo Malam; Malam Bako founded Sabon Zongo (Pellow 1985); and Braimah founded Tudu in in the early 1900s (Ntewusu 2012). Establishing roots in Ashaiman provided these same political opportunities. This initial legitimacy of ownership provides the basis or roots for future local-level democracy.

The following table summarizes the origins of democracy based on the initial settlement pattern of Ashaiman. Chapter five will demonstrate how this initial settlement pattern provides the institutional basis for effective democratic activity.

Figure 2.3: The historical foundations of a quality democracy



Variation across settlement patterns

As I have shown, the broad contours of political clientelism take a long time to develop and can be traced to the initial settlement of the slum. Differences in quality of housing, socio-economic characteristics, home ownership, and state capacity require a deeper analysis than a state-power versus community resistance framework allows. In the subsequent chapters of Part I, I will provide evidence for how the initial settlement pattern institutionalizes the informal rules and procedures of the political game in urban Ghana. In part II, I show how it also creates the conditions for political accountability (Chapter 6) and political participation (Chapters 7-8) in Ghanaian slums. I will show how the patterns of political behavior and the logics of social exchange that form the basis of political clientelism in Ghana is part of a longer and continued evolution of grassroots, local politics. This chapter set the stage for why political clientelism operates in various ways in diverse contexts. The next three chapters show how these logics of social exchange explain modern-day multi-party politics.

Chapter 3: Illegality as Opportunity: Democratic Politics in Illegal Settlements

Based on an ethnographic account of politics in Old Fadama, Ghana's biggest slum, this chapter argues that the initial informal institution of squatter illegality shapes the subsequent eviction threats and daily political activity that persist in the community. The chapter challenges studies of insecurity and uncertainty in local communities that emphasize coercive state power and unified community resistance, demonstrating why a government versus community dichotomy obscures the important local political divisions that exist in communities, government-community linkages, and incentives that community leaders have to maintain a certain level of informality. Instead, the chapter demonstrates how the informal institution of squatter illegality in slums provides opportunities for leaders to "cash in" and strengthen power, for political parties and politicians to mobilize support, and for international NGOs to support a cause while the most vulnerable residents are left unrepresented. In contrast to Ga Mashie and Ashaiman, two slums with different informal institutions of settlement that will be examined in Chapters 4 and 5, squatter illegality shapes political incentives of community leaders and the strategies that residents use to contribute to the persistence of insecure and uncertain living conditions.

Introduction

One mile from Ghana's central business district is the slum that Accra residents call Sodom and Gomorrah, an informal settlement that receives no government-provided services and sits along huge trash heaps. Despite being under the threat of forced eviction since 2002, several subsequent eviction threats, and numerous plans to modernize the capital city, the structures have not been demolished and the number of people living there has rapidly increased. Residents in the slum emphasize daily conditions of insecurity, informality and uncertainty—and these realities persist. This puzzling situation motivates an important question: In the context of multi-party democracy and human rights, why do illegal settlements continue to grow, public services are not provided to these communities, and the status quo persists? In this chapter, I suggest an alternative way of understanding informality in slums: illegality as opportunity. Squatter illegality in slums provides opportunities for community leaders to "cash in" and strengthen power, political parties and politicians to mobilize support, and international NGOs to support a

cause while the most vulnerable residents are left entirely unrepresented. The informal institution of squatter illegality shapes accountability mechanisms to bypass formally sanctioned channels so that residents make patronage claims on political parties and NGOs, and leaders gain their authority through accumulation of wealth, early settlement in the slum, and political party connections.

This case represents a growing challenge to governments across the world, as the number of people living in slums has recently reached one billion (UN-HABITAT). But this state-society deadlock also calls into question important theoretical arguments that emphasize coercive state power (Scott 1998; Mitchell 2002) and unified community resistance (Scott 1985, 1998; Wedeen 1999). It also challenges theories of democratization that suggest a liberal rule of law and formal electoral institutions will replace informal power arrangements. Instead, liberal democratic institutions and norms of human rights evolve and are shaped differently depending on the existing informal institution of settlement.

The view from within the slum—derived from ethnographic data that emphasizes networks, processes, and spontaneity in decision-making—suggests that squatter illegality has become institutionalized, creating rules and incentives that privilege rent-seeking and opportunistic behavior. Multi-party politics and Ghana's emerging human rights agenda are simply embedded in a larger informal-institutional context of squatter illegality. In fact, multi-party elections and political liberalization contributes to the persistence of the status quo by making it very difficult to act on the situation of slums—due to political survival calculations by politicians, mobilization by international NGOs, and consciousness of their rights and power in numbers by slum dwellers themselves. But this does not mean that the informal institution of squatter illegality is replaced. Instead, the threat of forced eviction that policy-makers and state

representatives use is not only a tool of state coercion—and does not immediately lead to slum removal or demolition. Alternatively, residents and community leaders do not unify to end their insecure living conditions and overcome the status of illegality. Rather, residents, community leaders, and politicians draw on a variety of cultural and institutional resources to "live through" squatter illegality and find ways to benefit from the institutional arrangement (Berk and Galvan 2009). In doing so, this behavior leads to the persistence of squatter illegality and the prevention of transformational change.

The previous chapter laid out a theory of local slum politics based on the informal institution of settlement. It theorized that the initial pattern of human settlement in Ghanaian slum communities—squatter illegality, purchasing settler, or indigenous—shapes the incentives and political strategies of residents, leaders and politicians. Specifically, the informal institution of settlement structures the type of leadership, the form of community organization, and the legal status of the community. The informal institution of settlement explains: 1) why some local leaders have the incentive to serve the broader community interest while others serve their narrower ethnic and group interests; 2) why ethnic identity is a salient political identity in some slums but not others, and; 3) why and when residents make individual and collective claims on the government, political party, tribal leaders, or non-state actors. These three aspects are crucial for the provision and management of state services like roads, gutters, streetlights, sanitation, toilets, and security. They also shape the accountability mechanisms that connect residents to their leaders and politicians. In other words, residents make individual and collective claims on the community leadership and government depending on the institution of settlement in which they live, leading to the persistence of the status quo.

Democratic politics in illegal settlements

How does democracy "work" in illegal squatter settlements? What impact does the "temporary" and illegal nature of a squatter settlement have on multi-party democracy? This chapter will demonstrate how the institution of squatter illegality shapes the type of community leadership, the norms of reciprocity, and the legal status of the community. It will also provide empirical evidence that shows how community leaders, political parties and NGOs benefit from an informal settlement's illegal status. The informal institution serves both *substituting* and *competing* functions (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). In a very basic way, the illegal institution of settlement substitutes for the failure of formal institutions to provide affordable housing and secure property rights, particularly for the urban poor. Informal institutions substitute for the state by providing alternative dispute mechanisms, public security, and social sanctions to create order. But these institutions are far from democratic, and therefore also serve a competing function by structuring incentives that are incompatible with formal rules, violating qualities of equality and freedom of access. Instead, they enable the provision of private goods over the public interest. In this way, goods are rivalrous and excludable—not democratic ideals.

Community Leadership: First, illegal settlements are not formally recognized by the state, and are thus not eligible to receive public services. Therefore, leaders are not selected based on government performance or responsiveness—their ability to secure public services or citizens' concerns on these matters. But illegal settlements are large vote banks and parties rely on residents for support. Community leaders capitalize on patron-client relationships to bolster their own personal power. They make connections with politicians and offer their mobilization skills and "political muscle" in exchange for private goods and security. Second, the labeling of the slum as "temporary" influences leaders and residents to maintain strong links to their hometown, usually in other parts of the country. They build a political following by gaining support from

people in their hometown—they do this by sharing resources and distributing patronage to members of their own ethnic group. Leaders do not have the incentive to work with leaders from other groups to improve the community interest because they might run for political office one day, but in their home region. This also contributes to tribalism. Similarly, without institutions of formal representation, majority ethnic groups are able to dominate positions of power. Third, as the previous section shows, the time of arrival to the slum and wealth greatly enhances local power, as big men establish personal power by extending territorial authority. Without formal security apparatuses in place, they often use coercive means to strengthen power. Fourth, leaders take advantage of the insecure and informal property rights institutions to enhance their wealth and power through private operations of "public services" like shower and toilet businesses, scrap recycling, and exploiting the informal land market. Finally, leaders take advantage of increasing international funding from NGOs to build political followings, make money, and travel outside of Ghana. But this also leads to intense internal rivalries over the sharing of goods and opportunities, which are often distributed unequally.

Norms of Reciprocity: The informal institution of squatter illegality shapes norms of reciprocity in two ways. First, associational activity develops along ethnic lines because residents do not have the incentive to reach out and engage people from other ethnic groups. Youth rely on hometown associations and family networks to assist with daily survival and find work with members from their own ethnic group. Without formal institutions that provide security and public services, residents rely on tribal heads to settle disputes and co-ethnics to share private goods. A slum's "temporary" status makes maintaining strong links to one's hometown particularly crucial, because there is no security that the community will remain and develop. Second, the institution of squatter illegality contributes to a situation where a dominant ethnic

group hoards resources and shares them privately among themselves. This stands contrary to dominant strands of economics and political science literature that suggest ethnic diversity undermines public goods provision (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007). Rather, ethnic homogeneity and group dominance undermines public goods provision because co-ethnics are unable to hold their own ethnic leaders to account. Residents rely on their tribal heads and leaders for daily security, private goods, and job opportunities; this makes it very difficult for them to hold leaders to account if they suspect them of wrongdoing.

Legal Status: While illegal settlements and forced evictions have recently gained international attention due to the growth of slums in the developing world, the roots of state-slum community tensions date to colonial times and early periods of African urban development. As I describe in Chapter 2, indigenous and migrant African communities were kept out of the Accra city planning and largely left unregulated (Njoh 2006). Colonial urban policy left an important legacy, as slum clearance, relocation and redevelopment became the only strategies used by city planners and policymakers. Governments use the threat of forced eviction and forceful demolitions to counter the fear that authorities have of poor urban populations. Unable to shed the illegal status of their slum, residents and community leaders seek different avenues to demand accountability from the state: they place patronage demands on political parties, make claims of human rights on government, and seek assistance from non-state actors like NGOs.

"Cashing in": Community leadership in illegal settlements

"We were literally outgunned. On paper we held all the marbles, but in reality there were too many people who wanted the status quo."—Former Accra Mayor Nat Nunoo Amarteifio on Old Fadama

The following story demonstrates how slum residents and community leaders work together to make demands on their elected officials. It also explains why a 23 year-old university student forms an alliance with a 40 year-old slumlord and accused criminal.[36] Old Fadama residents know that they cannot demand public services from Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) because they are not an officially recognized settlement, so they instead seek private benefits for a small group of people. Mohammed, a university student, woke up very early on November 4, 2011 to write a letter on behalf of Boss, a local strongman in Old Fadama. Mohammed is one of the few literate and educated residents of the slum and while Boss is a powerful local leader, he cannot read or write.[37] Mohammed wrote the letter at the NDC office for Agbogbloshie Youth, where there is a computer that was donated by the area's Minister of Parliament Jonathan Nii Tackie Komme.[38] This is one of the few permanent structures in the slum and serves as a hangout for youth and space for local branch meetings. One of Boss's friends, a minister in government, was hiring for jobs at the fishing ports and Boss was trying to get jobs for some of the youth from Old Fadama. Boss uses his connections to the ruling NDC party to secure jobs for area youth. Boss was previously successful in securing a contract for cleaning the gutters of Alajo (a nearby suburb), for which he employed at least eight young men from the community (informal conversation, October 18, 2011). On December 8, 2011, Boss brought 15 men from Old Fadama to the National Youth Employment Program office to enroll them in the government skills training and jobs program (informal conversation, December 8, 2011).

Mohammed likes Boss because he thinks he is fair and honest—"he is a straight shooter", as one resident described him (personal interview, December 7, 2011). Mohammed's best friend,

[36] Throughout this chapter, I use pseudonyms to protect the anonymity of my research subjects.
[37] Mohammed is often asked by the local strongmen to write letters on their behalf. It is a very valuable resource to be literate and educated in Old Fadama (informal conversation, November 21, 2011).
[38] The two largest political parties are the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the National Patriotic Party (NPP). Currently the NDC is in government and the NPP is in opposition.

Arwal, is Boss's "Deputy Secretary." Boss has a whole organization of youth who "follow" him. Like Mohammed, Arwal is impressed by Boss's ideology. He explains it as: "People should have what is due to them. His [Boss's] main aim is to get the people who suffered to get government into power to get them what they want. He is very disappointed with government for not doing this" (personal interview, November 21, 2011). This perception is shared by Chief, an opinion leader in the community who explains that other leaders—like Old Fadama Development Association (OFADA) Chairman Chairman and Farouk Braimah [Executive Director of the NGO People's Dialogue for Human Settlements]—do not always pay people on time for the jobs they do. In contrast, he says, "This does not happen with Boss. He makes sure these things are fair." But Mohammed, Arwal, and Chief also hail from the same hometown, live in the territory under which Boss controls in the slum, and is protected by being closely aligned to him. Sometimes Boss even pays for their visits home to the North. Boss's presence is simply felt, Arwal explained to me, "Sometimes his name alone will stop things" (personal interview, November 21, 2011). In an illegal settlement that does not provide basic public security, residents rely on figures like Boss for personal protection. Young people, like Arwal and Mohammed, also rely on him for potential job opportunities and to link them up with his friends in powerful positions.

Boss is a controversial figure. In the early 2000s after the NPP government took over power [after 20 years of P/NDC government], Boss fled to Libya because he was suspected of criminal activity in the 2000 elections. The NPP had a warrant for his arrest—he is closely aligned with the NDC and is suspected of aiding them illegally in political mobilization (personal interview, April 19, 2012). He is labeled a "Rawlings boy"—a term given to supporters of former President Jerry John Rawlings. He returned in the mid-2000s and sought refuge in Old

Fadama where he would be hard to find. His status in Old Fadama increased after the 2008 elections when the NDC regained power. NPP strongmen from the community were forced out of the slum, losing their businesses and properties. In 2009, four NPP supporters were killed after trying to return to the community. Boss's name always comes up in the news reports in relation to the killings. Many residents denounce these allegations as false and maintain that he is innocent. Nonetheless, for this, "his name is tainted" (informal conversation, October 31, 2011).

Boss is one of the first squatters in Old Fadama. When he settled in the early 1990s, there were only 50-100 people living there (personal interview, April 19, 2012). In illegal squatter settlements, early arrival greatly enhances a leaders' ability to amass power by extending his territorial authority. Boss has always been an ardent supporter of the NDC. His family was NDC and he credits President Rawlings with bringing development to the Northern Regions, which has always been marginalized in Ghanaian politics.[39] But he became an active force in Old Fadama when one of the MPs from the North, Alhaji Hudu Yahawa became a patronage presence in the community. Yahawa was Regional Secretary during the PNDC regime and became General Secretary of the NDC from 1992-2000. He was also from Tamale, and he wanted to bolster his hometown ties in the capital city. The MP opened an NGO, paid for some basic services, and handed out cash and contracts to mobilize and organize the youth. Yahawa provided Boss an important and formal link to NDC politics. Alhaji, another NDC insider in the community, also describes Yahawa as the main influence behind him getting into politics (personal interview, June 30, 2012). Yahawa in many ways politicized the residents of Old Fadama—solidifying the community as an NDC stronghold and potential NDC vote bank for

[39] This is a common narrative that Northerners often say about why they support Rawlings and the P/NDC.

politicians from the North. Community leaders, like Boss, found refuge in Yahawa's patronage network because it provided financial and employment opportunities.

In an illegal settlement like Old Fadama, community leaders rely on politicians for security. Yahawa "shielded" NDC insiders who would work for the party. But even ordinary residents in illegal settlements often need protection; they are stigmatized and are considered criminals. Sometimes they were thrown in jail without due process. Residents recount "join the line," when the police used to come in the middle of the night with buses, round up residents, and throw them in jail. MPs and politicians are expected to bail residents out of jail, especially party activists and insiders.

Despite a slum's illegal status, residents are still citizens of Ghana and active voters in its democracy. Old Fadama residents are no exception. The NDC further consolidated its numerical strength in the community after the Dagbon King was killed in 2002, sparking a chieftaincy crisis and creating entrenched political divisions that remain today: the majority Andani "gate" of the Dagombas [whose king was killed] aligned with the NDC, and the minority Abudu "gate" [who were accused of killing the king] aligned with the NPP. These divisions were reflected in Old Fadama politics, where Abudu political leaders lost considerable power and "followers" (due to lack of numbers), but maintained criminal gangs that they could maintain with the backing of the NPP government. These gangs were particularly strong between 2000-4, when the NPP ruled the National Government and held the MP seat for the constituency. NPP Branch leaders, like Yaw, Zachi, Brum, and "Old Man," also controlled territory, businesses, and property in the slum. Some of them even allocated land to those from their own party (personal interview, February 3, 2012). According to one resident, "[Yaw] was so powerful in this community. He caused so many problems. He was a landlord and would just seize houses. He

had a gang and was armed—he had a pistol. And he was a big drinker. There were lots of problems when he drank. When we tried to report his abuses, he would always be let off the hook because he was so close to the people in power" (informal conversation, October 25, 2012). Another explained how "Yaw would occasionally go around with the police and arrest NDC supporters. He would beat people and get away with it" (personal interview, February 3, 2012). After the 2008 elections, these NPP-aligned community leaders, like Yaw, were forced out of the community. NDC aligned leaders and "thugs" seized their property and now run their businesses. Residents today worry that if the NPP wins the 2012 election, they will seek revenge.

Illegal settlements are particularly reliant on informal security arrangements because public security services are under-provisioned—there is only one police station on the outskirt of the slum and it has very little authority inside the settlement. Inside Old Fadama, community leaders have a powerful incentive to win elections: if their party loses the election, they might lose their business and property and have to relocate somewhere else. It is for these reasons that elections and campaigns are particularly tense and heated in Old Fadama (as opposed to other slums like Ga Mashie and Ashaiman).

Power struggles in illegal settlements are particularly contentious within the governing political party networks. Internal rivalries within opposition parties do not shape daily slum governance because they have fewer opportunities to distribute state resources and often a smaller presence on the ground (as the previous story demonstrates). Currently, Old Fadama political struggles happen within the NDC party. The personal rivalry between Boss and OFADA Chairman—who everybody calls "Chairman"—represents an important division in Old Fadama that underscores how politics works in the slum. But it also signals a shift in government-community linkages—with Boss representing the old guard and Chairman the new guard—as

Ghanaian politics becomes more decentralized and democratic. Boss and Chairman are both early settlers in the community and even lived in the same house. "We were together," Boss told me. Since then, Boss and the Chairman have built their own followings and rival polities. Boss is perceived as rough and violent, yet principled, with political connections to the Ghanaian old guard and the "top" of the NDC party structure. These connections bring him private benefits, like plane tickets to his hometown and early notifications of recycled government vehicles and goods on which his "scrap business" depends. Boss also uses coercive strategies and threats of violence to secure goods from the state and from the NDC. As one resident told me, "If Boss is not getting support from people he would be causing lots of problems" (personal interview, February 3, 2012). Like former President Rawlings, he is a populist who can rapidly mobilize people—he is dangerous and fast. Boss controls people: he can create chaos and mobilize crowds. Many Old Fadama residents lost trust in Boss in 2009 when he secured goods from the government after a fire outbreak. Instead of sharing them with the affected residents, he brought them to his hometown and sold them. But residents could not accuse him of wrongdoing because he still provided them security and job opportunities. Dagomba youth found it particularly difficult to voice their concerns because he brought the goods home—they still went to their own people.

Some aspiring politicians in illegal settlements rise through the party ranks by climbing the grassroots structures. But they still have the incentive to share party goods with their own ethnic group in order to hold onto power, increase their chances of future electoral success (in their hometown), and ensure that they receive a bigger share of the resources. For example, Chairman, in contrast to Boss, is a "gentle" leader who built his following by advancing through the grassroots structures in the local constituency, first as Vice Chairman and then as Chairman.

He cooperates with the NGOs and aligns himself with the powerful politicians of Odododiodio Constituency, for which Old Fadama is a part. He grew wealthy and expanded his territorial authority by taking advantage of the informal land market and selling property in Old Fadama. He owns a store in the slum and at night it serves as a hangout for men to sit around and discuss politics. Sometimes his wife makes food and they feed the group. And he is an impressive public speaker. "Some say he has special powers," Mohammed says of his speaking ability (informal conversation, November 20, 2011). But Chairman is criticized as being extremely corrupt and serving only his narrow self-interest. Residents are disillusioned by his leadership and are unable to hold him to account. Now he has too much power: he is Chairman of the NDC for the community, Chairman of OFADA, and leads the Old Fadama campaign team for MP aspirant Nii Lantey Vanderpuye, who was special aide to President Mills. One resident sums up the difference between Boss and Chairman, "You know, he [Boss] and Chairman [Chairman] are very different types of people. Chairman is soft and gentle; Boss is rough" (personal interview, December 8, 2011).

The climax of the rivalry between Boss and Chairman came in 2009 when they ran against one another for NDC Special Ward Chairman.[40] The position is extremely powerful because they control the distribution of party goods to the community. Now that the NDC government is in power, and the NPP party activists have been forced out, the NDC executives control the flow of resources from the government to local structures. As a hierarchical organization, the NDC relies on its NDC grassroots formal structures to distribute goods: jobs, contracts, and government assistance (like loans, vehicles, and labor contracts). The Chairman of the Old Fadama Special Ward is the first point of contact between the NDC government and the

[40] Currently, they are campaigning for this same position—five years later.

community; he therefore is able to control the "sharing" of resources with his own polity. This allows him to consolidate the party structures with his own supporters. Alternatively, residents who seek government or party assistance must go through him. While the race for Constituency Chairman was heated, Chairman won in a landslide, greatly bolstering his power (and wealth) in the community.

In illegal settlements, the majority ethnic group can dominate leadership positions because there are no institutions to check and balance power. The potential for a tyranny of the majority is greater than in indigenous and purchased settler slums. Leaders also build their political support with future payoffs in mind, and the future requires running for political office in their hometown region. Boss and Chairman are both Dagombas, and they draw their support from their Dagomba followers. Dagombas are the majority ethnic group in Old Fadama, and because there are no formal structures of representation they do not need to reach out to other tribes for inclusive governance. They also do not need to provide any public services in return for support. But more importantly, Dagomba aspiring politicians in the community still consider the settlement "temporary" and are building their political support in order to run for political office in the Northern Region. They become "ethnic chauvinists" because they have the incentive to empower their own people and share with other Dagombas because this is who they consider their future prospective voters. As Alhaji explains, "I want to be a politician. To be a DC or constituency chairman back in the North—back home. I have been here 13 years, but I was not bred here so I don't want to be MP or anything here" (personal interview, June 30, 2012). According to residents, current Assemblyman Otie Bless has severely underperformed and people even laugh when I ask him if he is seen in the community—"Once he won the election,

his phone immediately stopped working," one resident said, but he recently ran for MP in his home region, with support from the NDC—and he won.

Residents constantly form local political alliances, even with members from different ethnic groups, to improve their daily living situation and increase their personal power, but trust between residents remains low. The institution of squatter illegality incentivizes sharing of goods with co-ethnics, and when goods are shared across ethnic groups, those who did the sharing are often punished or accused of "selling out." In Old Fadama, this arrangement fuels great distrust among residents, with minority groups often complaining that Dagombas dominate and do not share resources and goods with other groups. Mr. Kwasi, who publicly works and forms alliances with people from all ethnic groups, cannot shed his distrust of Mohammed, who is a Dagomba: "I like Mohammed. But still his tribal affiliation. He still has a soft spot for his people—this is the problem. The blood relation." What angers Mr. Kwasi the most is how Dagombas share goods: to him, they seem to only share among themselves. Dagombas now control most positions of power in the community, especially NDC special ward executives and OFADA leadership positions. One way that the minority groups are trying to counter "Dagomba dominance" and ensure that they will be included in sharing of party goods is by starting NDC branches. Mr. Kwasi launched the NDC Sankofa Branch, made up of entirely non-Dagombas, but has been unable to officially register it—he must get approval from Chairman, a Dagomba who is not forthcoming with linking non-Dagomba residents with the constituency executives who will make branch designations official.

Despite ethnic affiliation, illegal settlements provide plentiful business opportunities. Contrary to conventional wisdom that businesses benefit from secure property rights, entrepreneurs in illegal settlements take advantage of the insecure and informal property rights

institutions to enhance their wealth and power through private operations of "public services" like shower and toilet businesses, scrap recycling, and exploiting the informal land market. The following example demonstrates how community leaders have the incentive to maintain a minimum level of informality because they profit from the illegal and insecure environment. On October 31, 2011 a man walked through the community carrying a large bag of cash (informal conversation, October 31, 2011). But this day was not unique; he does the same thing every day. Master collects cash profits from several different shower operators in Old Fadama and brings it to the bank. Each month, one person gets a loan from the group, interest free. Master donates to local CBOs, youth groups, NDC branches, and other festivities. There are approximately 400 shower operators in the community and their association forms an important interest group in the community. They are invited to all community functions and even have representatives when the community meets with AMA (informal conversation, November 29, 2011). The shower price in Old Fadama is now 40 peswas (20 cents), more than the price of all other showers in Ghanaian slums. This is because when Master needed money, he called the association together and told them to raise the price ten peswas—they all agreed (personal interview, April 1, 2012).

Running a shower business—a commercial enterprise that provides showers to residents because homes (or kiosks) do not have running water—in Old Fadama is extremely profitable. For example, Kofi inherited a shower business from his father, who was a very early settler in the community. He also inherited a hotel business where people rent rooms mostly on an hourly rate. He controls a large compound that is used for "outdoorings"—funerals, weddings, or baby-naming ceremonies. He explains that his shower business is one of the smaller ones in Old Fadama and he makes approximately 1,050 Ghana cedis ($525) each month. Many of the operators have several shower businesses. Master also owns a toilet facility. There are

approximately 300 toilet businesses in the community, and they are equally as lucrative. Shower and toilet operators are some of the wealthiest people in the community—along with scrap dealers and transport operators. They do not pay taxes and earn consistent, daily income. Master's businesses have been so successful that he has purchased land and built a house outside of the community; he now sleeps there. Many of the business owners no longer sleep in the community.

Illegal settlements are not entirely "off the grid" in the way that they are often portrayed. Kofi explains that people in government positions own businesses in the community, and residents are often "tipped off" early when there is a rumor of eviction. On December 8, Kofi rushed to Ghana Water Company to complain that the water was not flowing. He accused people like Master—who has two lines and thus is rarely without water—of colluding with the water company so that he can charge 70 peswas for a shower, as opposed to the usual 30 peswas. Similarly, residents accuse cinema owners of colluding with the Electricity Company of Ghana and turning off the electricity during popular football matches; this was the case when there was no power for the Champion's League Final between Chelsea and Bayern Munich and people with generators made huge profits for the evening.

With a population of more than 80,000 the business opportunities in Old Fadama are plentiful. Dagombas do not dominate the business scene, and there are vibrant markets for most things that Ghanaians would find useful. But Dagombas do dominate the informal land market, having taken it over from the early Ga settlers (as described in the previous chapter) and ruling with force since. When local strongman Yaw was forced out of the community after the NDC won the 2008 election, Storm and his small gang immediately stepped in to control his territory. If somebody wants to purchase a plot of land, they go to one of the seven landlords in the

community. This includes several Dagomba Youth Chiefs and even Chairman. The landlords all have various ways that they accumulated power: wealth, early settlement, chieftaincy status, coercion, and even spiritual power. One Chief, the Daboli Lana is "based in the North. On and off he comes and goes. He's a magician. He does amazing things" (personal interview, November 21, 2011). These landlords call in "the Thugs," like Storm and his boys, to come in and "create the necessary order for the deal to go through." They make sure that the person moving in will be safe on the ground; they take their cut from the financial deal. Community leaders in illegal settlements craft creative strategies to take advantage of their informal living environment. In the absence of formal institutions, leaders find informal means to consolidate power through the amassing of wealth, extension of territorial authority, and accumulation of followers.

Sharing the goods: Party politics and norms of reciprocity in illegal settlements

Multi-party politics is vibrant in illegal settlements, but politicians have short term time horizons focused on winning enough votes for the next election rather than long term plans for development. While this is true in any slum, the institution of squatter illegality forces politicians to find creative ways to take advantage of slum populations. Illegal settlements develop haphazardly, and politicians often have never visited all areas within a slum. Therefore, decision-making with respect to illegal settlements is often spontaneous in nature, and new relationships and alliances form on a daily basis. The following example demonstrates how an exogenous shock—a fire outbreak—shifted one politician's campaign strategy to attempt to win votes from the settlement.

On May 24, 2012, Retired Captain Victor Okaikoi, the NPP MP aspirant for Odododiodio Constituency visited the scene of the recent fire outbreak in Old Fadama. Three days earlier, hundreds of homes were burned down in the worst fire since 2009. It is common for politicians to visit disaster sites, funerals, and other gatherings to "show concern." They are also expected to donate relief items like mattresses, bags of rice, and cooking oil. CPP Presidential aspirant Abu Sakara visited immediately after the fire and donated mosquito nets while NDC MP aspirant Nii Lantey Vanderpuye visited and took down names of people who were affected. Residents expect that he will be able to distribute goods from NADMO, the state disaster management agency, but they expect that these goods will only be provided to NDC activists. As one resident explained, "You know, the way this place works is that the politicians come to support their people, but they do not share with everyone" (informal conversation, May 24, 2012). These fears are not unwarranted. Over one month after the fire outbreak, on June 30, Vanderpuye donated used clothes for fire victims through the NDC Constituency Chairman, whose house was also burned down (June 30, 2012). Chairman was given a large plastic bag of goods; he dropped the bag in the compound of a nearby Dagomba Chief and friends and relatives plundered the goods. Nearby Ashantis who were also fire victims were not notified of the donation.

Okaikoi arrived with a caravan of NPP "big men" that included the former Accra Mayor, Stanley Adjeri Blankson, the constituency Chairman, Organizer, and Women's Organizer, and the Regional Woman's Organizer. Mohammed laughed that Blankson would not visit the community when he was Mayor, and would only threaten the community with eviction threats. A young party activist led them around and introduced them to NPP supporters whose homes were demolished. Okaikoi was not trying to appeal to swing voters; he was trying to make sure that he "takes care" of his own supporters. Okaikoi was surprised and impressed at the pace of

reconstruction. He turned to me and quietly said, "This will make it much more difficult to move the people. It was much easier when the place was a shanty" (informal conversation, May 24, 2012). Residents were now building with cement blocks—replacing the wooden structures that were razed down. The local leaders are telling the residents that they must build with cement: if they cannot afford it, they can sell their plot of land. One resident, named Isaac, laid the foundation of his plot and encircled it with a row of cement blocks. Each week, as he earns more money, he will add more cement blocks to the structure. He explained that he at least had to put the first row of blocks up because he is an Akan, and most of the people in the area are Dagombas "who know each other." The area chief who controls the land is a Dagomba, and Isaac is worried that he would sell his plot of land to one of his own. Isaac's uncle could not afford to rebuild with cement, so he sold his small plot for 550 cedis ($275). The pace of reconstruction was swift; within two weeks, permanent homes were in place (personal interview, June 30, 2012).

Politicians use disaster sites as campaign events. A major challenge that politicians have reaching out to voters in illegal settlements is relaying their message in a language that all residents can understand. After walking through the site of the fire, the group assembled under a canopy near the lagoon. Okaikoi spoke in English and explained his sadness for what had happened and how the NPP would do what it can to help. He told the residents to organize into groups, write down their names and what they need. The biggest problem with the discussion was translation: people spoke different languages. A young Dagomba man translated Okaikoi's English into Twi. When Okaikoi told them to organize in their groups, the young man translated it to mean that residents should organize in their ethnic groups. On the surface, this appears that the NPP is "tribalizing" politics—something it is often accused of doing. But this was simply a

mistake with translation. The Constituency Women's Organizer interrupted to correct him; she emphasized that they were not to organize into ethnic groups, but rather groups based on need.

Blankson then spoke and symbolized a seasoned, Ghanaian politician. He asked the people what the NDC has done for the community. He then asked how many fire outbreaks occurred during the NPP government; he answered two. He then said that there have been more during the past few years when the NDC has been in power. Therefore, he claimed, the NPP does a better job of governing. He asserted that there is a spiritual reason for why this happened: This is God's way of saying that the NDC should no longer be in power. People laughed at this statement. He ended with opposition rhetoric that if they vote the NPP into government, they will improve the lot of the community, unlike the current government that has done nothing.

Not only do lots of people live in illegal settlements, but they are an important mechanism of information transmission to rural parts of the country. Old Fadama is a big vote bank: over 80,000 residents live there, and they have connections to their extended families back "home" in the rural areas. For example, Mohammed explains that his brother has three wives in Tamale; they will all vote for whoever he tells them to. But because of Old Fadama's illegal status, the slum cannot receive public services from the state. Therefore, politicians find different ways to win votes, through distributing private goods, giving tickets to Hajj, linking them up with jobs, and providing personal security. Okaikoi's visit after the fire outbreak was one of the few times he has walked through the slum. While the group of NPP activists discussed what to do with the slum, Okaikoi also noticed that there was a big opportunity to win votes in the community. Shortly after his visit, Okaikoi reached out to Old Fadama residents attempting to win the votes of "slum dwellers" (informal conversation, June 14, 2012). This demonstrates how spontaneous events can shift decision-making and influence political behavior.

The governing political party has the incentive to expand their formal grassroots structures into illegal settlements so that they can distribute state goods as patronage. This allows them to consolidate their support in these communities. Okaikoi's opponent Nii Lantey Vanderpuye, has long understood the importance of Old Fadama as a large vote bank. As Assemblyman, he often visited the community. Old Fadama residents even recollect that he would sometimes stay the night in the community. "He would even stay in my house," Boss said. In his speeches, he tells stories of how he grew up playing football at the fields where Old Fadama now lies. While he is considered a "Ga Nationalist" and leader of the Ga Youth, he is very careful when he speaks of what to do with Old Fadama, unlike other Ga leaders who loudly call for its destruction. He was even recently on the television program "Good Morning Ghana" calling for "upgrading in place." In 2004, the NDC decided to extend their grassroots party structures into Old Fadama (personal interview, January 11, 2012). They designated the community a "Special Ward" and inaugurated four new branches. This was done for political reasons: eight new delegates were created, and the people behind the creation of these new branches hoped that the eight delegates would support their primary candidate. Instead, all eight delegates voted for Vanderpuye. Isaac further explains how the growth of Old Fadama "handed us [the NDC] a victory on a silver platter" (personal interview, January 11, 2012). There are now 13 party branches in the community, with several new groups hoping to be officially inaugurated soon. The branches are organized along ethnic lines: 11 are Dagomba, 1 is Kokomba, and one is "other ethnic groups."

The question of what to do with illegal squatter settlements is often a very public subject, leading to political jockeying and debate that is meant to influence public opinion and pander for votes. Politicians accuse each other of preventing a lasting solution to the Old Fadama crisis

because of pandering for votes. During the August 14, 2008 Parliamentary Debates when parliamentarians discussed a potential loan for sanitation improvements, MP I.K. Asiamah stated, "Most often, when such national projects are to be carried out and people will have to be moved…you will hear interested parties, more so, people who will benefit politically, politicizing the whole exercise." In the same session, MP C.S. Hodogbey responded, "Why are we now trying to impress upon the Sodom and Gomorrah people, that we are very nice to them, when for so many years this has not been done? Now that it is an election year, they have brought this kind of a loan so that the thirty thousand people will vote for them." MP Lee Ocran added his opinion, "Initially, they tried to induce settlers with cash for them to move voluntarily. It did not work because some of the issues…were raised by certain politicians in the year 2000, trying to let the people not to move." Numo Blafo, the Public Relations Officer from AMA describes similar frustrations as to why the Mayor is unable to act, "The Chief Executive is a political appointee, so sometimes he has to bow to pressure." He further explained that "There is an authority who says he will deal with this issue, but I cannot give you his name" (personal interview, June 15, 2012). Public perception on the ground is that the former NPP Vice President, Aliu Mahama, is the person who was tasked with "solving" the crisis, but when the NDC came to power the plans stalled.

In illegal settlements, governments often use the threat of forced eviction against the community when the country experiences a natural disaster, like a flood. The community becomes a scapegoat for larger structural or institutional problems that the government is unable to solve. Politicians are particularly active during eviction threats to the community. On July 16, 2009 the Regional Minister issued an eviction threat to Old Fadama. The threat was supported by the Mayor of Accra. Alternatively, in September, the Deputy Minister of Information

contradicted the threat by saying the government was examining relocation packages. Public opinion leaders like Kwesi Pratt, Nana Oye Lithur, and the leader of CHRAJ all made statements in the media in support of Old Fadama. According to one activist, "Behind the scenes, the NPP had our side. When we are tasked with anything, they provide us with information" (personal interview, July 30, 2012). In Ghana, the opposition [regardless of party] often politicizes issues in order to make it as difficult as possible to move forward with policies and development; they do this to pander for votes. On October 11, the President asked his Vice to visit the community and personally handle the issue. The community was never demolished. On September 27, 2011, President Mills addressed the Ghanaian community in New York, where he politicked and fundraised. He made it clear that "forced eviction in Sodom and Gomorrah is not an option, and that any relocation must happen with a human face" (*Daily Graphic* September 27, 2011).

Illegal slum residents are not just prospective voters; they are also valuable "political muscle." In new democracies where formal institutions are weak, political parties rely on party activists, "foot soldiers," and "macho-men" to patrol polling stations (during voting and registration periods), attend rallies, and mobilize voters (Bob-Milliar 2012b). Old Fadama is comprised mostly of youth working in the informal sector; they are willing to "work" for the party on a short term basis. Political parties view illegal settlements like Old Fadama as a valuable source of labor. Former Mayor Nat Nunoo Amarteifio explained, "Political parties find muscle there. We also had our own connections with them" (personal interview, March 22, 2012). During the 2008 elections, the NDC shipped four buses of Old Fadama residents to Tain Constituency during the final round of voting to "show force and numbers" (personal interview, April 19, 2012). The busloads of people also were "to put NDC people on the ground to make sure that the NPP did not use extra-legal means for their advantage—such as stuffing ballot

boxes or busing in NPP voters from elsewhere" (personal interview, April 19, 2012). In other words, they provided a de facto electoral vigilante group. Boss describes how he is often called by NDC higher-ups—Constituency Executives, National Security personnel, and politicians themselves—to organize youth from the community. During the NDC MP primary, Boss served as "security" for incumbent candidate Jonathan Nii Tackie Komme. He stood at the front of the room, barking, "Survey the crowd, survey the crowd." He was hyped up and extremely paranoid—he was sure that Vanderpuye's people were "up to something" (informal conversation, January 28, 2012).

Illegal settlements are often sources of instability, and politicians have the incentive to maintain peace. The eruption of violence in an illegal settlement, especially one in the capital city, might affect the national economy. It could also spark violence or riots in other parts of the country. But without formal institutions of security, politicians devise creative strategies to "keep the peace." One strategy is to pay off leaders and residents in order to keep quiet and stay calm. Leaders in illegal settlements can even use the potential for chaos as a threat against government; this increases their bargaining power. Policymakers and politicians also view Old Fadama as a "ticking time bomb" that could explode at any minute.[41] The Dagbon Chieftaincy dispute is sometimes "fought" in Old Fadama, where formal security is weak, populations are dense, and young men are abundant. Community leaders even use this potential for conflict and instability to their advantage by threatening government. Politicians are forced to deal with these threats informally, without solving the underlying political deadlock. In 2009, suspects who were arrested linked to the death of the Dagbon King in 2002 were released, and the NDC government issued a statement that there is not enough evidence to charge the suspects. Andani youth across

[41] The community is designated a "National Security Zone" and is under special government surveillance.

the country were furious, including those in Old Fadama—they expected the NDC government (who they helped put in government and with whom they allied largely because of this issue) to bring the perpetrators to justice. In protest, many Old Fadama residents staged a press conference and burned NDC paraphernalia. They rioted in the community. This worried NDC constituency executives and they called together 36 opinion leaders from Old Fadama and urged them to excise patience (personal interview, October 18, 2011). Residents explain that at this meeting, David Lamptey—former minister, NDC donor, Chief Executive of Sidalco, and close friend of Nii Lantey Vanderpuye—"paid off" these leaders with $30,000 cash. The money was supposed to be shared with residents so that they would keep calm. But most opinion leaders kept the money for themselves.

Word got out among residents that money was distributed but it was not shared fairly. A group of youth stole the soda machine from Chairman's store in protest, who they accused of stealing most of the money (Dagomba Youth Chief Zachi was also rumored to have taken $7,000, and other chiefs took $2,000). Others began agitating and making noise. This worried Lamptey and the NDC constituency executives. The next day, they called all residents from the community to a meeting and distributed 100 Ghana cedis to anybody who showed up; approximately 300 people attended the meeting. Most residents did not even know who the man was; he was simply referred to as a "very rich man." Today, residents constantly worry that they will be left out of any money being shared by politicians or other "big men" if they do not show up for meetings. Alternatively, residents and community leaders try to keep secret meetings where goods or money will be distributed; this is so they can share with as few people as possible.

The relationship between politicians and residents of illegal settlements is in constant flux, with politicians reaching out for votes and residents attempting to secure as many private favors as possible. But the relationship is also akin to employer-employee, with slum residents working for the party as valuable "political muscle" and the politician distributing payment for the necessary work.

Supporting a cause: Human rights and NGOs in illegal settlements

This section explains how community leaders and residents take advantage of international NGOs for their own personal empowerment. It also demonstrates how NGOs espouse a public narrative of social welfare and human rights, but in reality the narrative does not confront the informal institution of squatter illegality that keeps the status quo in place. It also shows how NGOs fuel distrust within illegal settlements and heightens existing personal rivalries.

In October 2011, Accra experienced its annual floods where fourteen people reportedly died. In response, the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) secured funding to clean the gutters and dredge the Korle Lagoon. To complete the project, the AMA claimed they would need to clear all structures in Old Fadama within 100 meters of the lagoon. But the relationship between the AMA and the community is a tense one, illustrated by the AMA's longstanding desire to demolish the slum and the community's strong resistance to it (Du Plessis 2005; Grant 2006; Afenah 2010). The AMA reached out to People's Dialogue for Human Settlements (PD) who has a long history of acting as a "broker" between the AMA and Old Fadama (Braimah 2012). Executive Director Farouk Braimah is an expert on slum issues in Ghana (and across the world) and has helped the community fight against the eviction threats, first as a member of CEPIL when the community took the government to court in 2002 and lost, and then as an advocate

trying to open up space for dialogue and engagement. Other NGOs, like Amnesty International (AI), started working on behalf of Old Fadama residents in 2009 after slum issues became an international human rights concern. AI has launched a campaign claiming that forced evictions violate international human rights law.[42]

Community leaders and PD worried that the AMA would use the opportunity to demolish more structures than necessary, so they proposed leading the demolition exercise themselves. After a series of negotiations between the AMA and the community leaders, the Task Force for Old Fadama Development Association (OFADA) carried out the demolition exercise on December 21.[43] OFADA is an organization that developed out of the need for the community to come together and organize to fight against forced eviction. Members of OFADA tell me that the organization started in 2003 (personal interview, September 21, 2011). Others tell me that it has been in operation since 2006. In reality, the organization was reconstituted in 2009 after the Regional Minister issued the eviction threat on the community.

Illegal settlements are often portrayed by academics and NGOs as united communities, obscuring the important divisions that exist on the ground. Studies of Old Fadama portray the community as organized and unified (Du Plessis 2005; Grant 2006, 2009; Afenah 2010, Braimah 2012). Even residents of Agbogbloshie, the slum across the street, think Old Fadama is well-organized, as one person described: "There, they are united, if one person has a problem, or one person needs something, they all come together as one and help him. The reason why we think

[42] In 1993 the UN Commission on Human Rights indicated, "forced eviction constitutes a gross violation of human rights." And in 1998, the UN Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights reaffirmed that "the practice of forced eviction constitutes a gross violation of a broad range of human rights; in particular the right to adequate housing, the right to remain, the right to freedom of movement, the right to privacy, the right to property, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to security of the home, the right to security of the person, the right to security of tenure and the right to equality of treatment." (COHRE Global Survey 11).
[43] For a longer analysis of the demolition exercise, see Paller 2014d.

that place is better than here is that when the government wanted to demolish their homes, they came together to fight against it, they proved to the government that they are many" (Agbogbloshie focus group, June 9, 2012). Braimah takes credit for establishing OFADA, even bragging that he paid the initial registration fee (informal conversation, April 27, 2012). PD even secured funding from Slum Dwellers International (SDI) for the OFADA office. SDI reports a donation of $6,000 for the construction of the office, well over market price. This leads to the perception in the community that PD "controls" OFADA by providing its leadership with money and jobs—OFADA is simply PD's "puppet." Another allegation is that PD establishes committees on the ground with Old Fadama residents, but controls them with the power of funding and information. He will only empower individuals who join his savings groups and slum dwellers federation. For example, he helped start a "health committee" in partnership with the government; the representatives of the committee are the same residents who have leadership roles in OFADA, local NDC branches, and GHAFUP (informal conversation, November 21, 2011). In the face of eviction threats, the community organizes to fight against the government. But in daily governance, the community is far from united, and NGOs contribute to personal rivalries, lack of accountability, and intense power struggles.

Governments often seek the help from NGOs working in illegal settlements if they want to carry out any projects in the community. Without any formal representative, governments rely on these private organizations as an entry point into the community. The demolition exercise that OFADA led, with logistical and financial support from PD, was problematic. It violated international human rights standards because it did not give proper notice to victims.[44] Several

[44] A forced eviction is "the involuntary removal of persons from their homes or land, directly or indirectly attributable to the State. It entails the effective elimination of the possibility of an individual or group living in a particular house, residence or place, and the assisted (in the case of resettlement) or unassisted (without

residents were left without relocation options.[45] When a local chief realized that his structure was within the demolition path, he ordered some youth to throw rocks at the bulldozer. The driver and a few others were badly injured and had to go to the hospital. After the exercise, many residents accused their leaders of "selling out the community." Nonetheless, PD and Amnesty International deemed the exercise a success and expressed their satisfaction with it.[46] Today, the lagoon still has not been dredged and structures have been rebuilt in the very space that was demolished in December. Residents distrust the AMA; but perhaps more serious is the residents' distrust of their own leaders. There is still no solution to the government-community deadlock and Old Fadama residents continue to live under the threat of forced eviction.

NGOs have no incentive to provide for the community interest, but rather support a small group of people who they can rely on to assist them with securing funding in the future. Residents complain that NGOs like PD and AI empower community leadership and themselves, but not the vulnerable residents for whom they claim to be advocating. One allegation is that when Braimah receives funding from organizations like SDI, he will funnel the money to his personal account, invest it, and only use a portion of the funding for programs (informal conversation, October 13, 2011). Braimah has positioned himself so that PD will be commissioned to carry out resettlement and other development projects whenever there is a proposal for a slum community. As one person hypothesized with regards to the demolition exercise, "It is a stepping stone for him to demand more: To secure contracts, enumerations, and other exercises" (personal interview, December 29, 2011). Another resident explains, "Farouk [Braimah] is an opportunist who always uses the community to his benefit" (personal interview,

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resettlement) movement of evicted persons or groups to other areas" (UNHCR 1993). The exercise constituted a forced eviction.

[45] See: http://philipkumah.wordpress.com/2012/01/05/eviction-day-bulldozers-part-i/.

[46] See: http://www.sdinet.org/blog/2012/01/23/negotiating-right-stay-community-led-process-old-f/

November 20, 2011). A local leader in Ashaiman views the NGO as a business, and explained how this undermines PD's projects. He said, "Farouk's approach is all business—'I want to get funding'—it was too much for his own personal business. He should have come to work with existing groups in the community" (personal interview, February 13, 2012).

Mr. Kwasi thinks Braimah is unfair and will only assist the Dagombas. He is angry that Braimah gave a loan of 3,000 Ghana cedis to Chairman, but would not give it to him for his tailoring business (personal interview, October 13, 2011). A resident in another slum similarly feels "used" by Braimah. "I am getting old, and I do not want to be thrown to the road anymore," he said (personal interview, October 28, 2011). Residents are especially aggravated that they are not paid fairly when they do a project for PD. One resident tells me that he and a group had to go to the PD offices and "make noise" to demand their payment after their work in an enumeration exercise (personal interview, October 21, 2011). When he comes to the community, he gives out "small-small" to the residents. When Mr. Kwasi started his own NGO with some other residents in the community, he blames Braimah for trying to close down the office. He says that he first tried to go to the Dagomba chief in the community to put a stop to the organization. When this didn't work, he sent a group of youth to riot and cause trouble outside the office (personal interview, October 13, 2011).

International NGOs have the incentive to support resettlement in cases of squatter illegality because it means that they might be contracted to support the resettlement. Part of the problem between PD and Old Fadama dwellers is that residents have to live there and deal with immediate issues like poor sanitation, disease outbreaks, and bad drainage. PD, on the other hand, views the status quo as a good thing: it means that the authorities do not have any immediate plans to demolish the structures. A PD associate explains to me why they are not

currently advocating for the community: "We want to show the authorities that things are quiet and calm there so we do not need to make noise. GHAFUP and OFADA are still there. When we need to mobilize people we call them" (personal interview, October 24, 2011). In other words, PD still treats the community as a space that needs to be "protected," not upgraded. PD advocates resettlement, and hopes to be a stakeholder in the resettlement process if it ever progresses. But this angers some residents who do not see any progress being made in their community. Instead they simply see Braimah acquiring contracts, securing more funding from international donors, and buying more cars—the rumor is that he has four of them. As one angry resident complains, "Ask Farouk: Has he ever slept here before? We were here before PD came. The destiny of Old Fadama is in the hands of us, not PD" (informal conversation, September 21, 2011).

Working on slum issues has brought Braimah close to politicians, and interested in joining politics himself. One resident explained, "When the NPP was in power he was close to them. Now he is close to the NDC. He is very politically connected" (personal interview, October 13, 2011). Braimah has told some people that he has ambitions to be a minister from the North, but if the NDC loses the elections he will be left with nothing. When the mother of Vanderpuye passed away, a large group of supporters attended the funeral to show their support. Chairman suggested to Braimah that he should go; he attended the funeral (informal conversation, Februry 11, 2012). He has already used his political connections to secure government contracts, as he did for his "brother" who he helped link up and secure the construction of a gutter in Ashaiman (informal conversation, May 11, 2012). But he has also learned that to get anything done with urban development in Ghana, you have to "go political."

"If you are not at the table," he told me, "you will not get a thing" (informal conversation, May 11, 2012).

But community leaders also view NGOs as an opportunity to empower themselves and raise their status in the community. Mr. Kwasi tells a story about how PD asked him and the Chairman to search for land in the community for a special economically-friendly toilet facility for a partnership for which PD was a part (personal interview, December 15, 2011). He and Chairman purchased a plot of land for 3,500 Ghana cedis ($1,750). They then told PD that it cost 5,000 Ghana cedis ($2,500) and they pocketed the remainder of the money. The current spokesperson for OFADA does not even live in the community (informal conversation, May 24, 2012). When I asked him if his structure was demolished after the recent fire outbreak, he angrily sneered, "Oh no no. I don't live in this place." Contrary to common understandings that NGOs serve a non-profit and social welfare function, many Ghanaians view NGOs as profit-generating enterprises with valuable political payoffs. In Ghanaian slums, people start or get involved in NGOs for three reasons: 1) to make money, 2) to travel and meet new people, often outside of the country, and 3) to gain prestige in the community (personal interview, October 31, 2011). As more global public attention is placed on urbanization and the growth of slums, private donor-funded projects for issues regarding slums has escalated as well. Slum dwellers and community leaders see this as an opportunity for profit.

NGOS are often embedded in local community divisions and politics—they are not apolitical. Kofi helped found Women in Slums Economic Empowerment (WISEEP) in 2010 with Mr. Kwasi and three others after they "split" from OFADA and GHAFUP (the CBO affiliated with PD). They had several grievances against their previous organizations. First, they claim that OFADA is corrupt. Several residents complain that OFADA taxed people in the

community to improve basic infrastructure, but the leadership kept the money for itself. Second, they did not think they were getting a fair share of the money and the recognition that PD and OFADA received. Third, they think that Dagombas dominate these organizations and share the money amongst themselves. They hoped that WISEEP would serve as a new avenue to bring other tribes into leadership positions, raise money from new funding sources, and bolster their own personal power in Old Fadama. They also had their personal reasons, as Kwasi told Chairman in a meeting of reconciliation between the two. He explained, "I just needed to make some money for my family because I was not doing well in the shop. We opened the NGO because we needed to improve our lives. My shop was not doing well and OFADA was not providing me anything. We need to benefit and feed our families too (informal conversation, December 13, 2011)." Kwasi and Opoku faced fierce resistance from OFADA, PD and other community leaders when they announced the new organization; the personal and organizational rivalries continue to be felt in daily governance.

Local NGOs in illegal settlements are often reliant on larger international organizations for funding, and therefore lose a lot of their autonomy. WISEEP is funded on a project basis by AI. Several times a year AI will have stakeholder forums and program meetings at upscale hotels. They partner with WISEEP to invite residents from the community. Kwasi and Kofi use these opportunities to build their own coalition of followers and loyalists. AI has provided international travel opportunities for several members of WISEEP. These trips provide international networking opportunities and educate participants on the rights of slum dwellers. But they also impact the community when the participants return, contributing to extreme internal jealousy and raised expectations. Kofi came back from the Netherlands with a new laptop computer and digital camera. After securing a contract to show educational movies about

the rights of slum dwellers, Kofi talks about how he wants to use the purchased projector to show regular movies each night as a business. When Mohammed went to Kenya, OFADA members complained that somebody from OFADA was not selected, and even claimed that this decision was "tribal." They did not know that a Dagomba was selected, demonstrating how people try to use claims of tribalism to undermine their political opponents. After Kwasi returned from the Gambia, he wrote an opinion article in the *Daily Graphic*, with assistance from AI. These travel opportunities are highly sought after; there are even rumors that Kofi has tried to "sell off" these opportunities for personal profit. On the same trip to the Netherlands, a slum dweller from Chorkor accompanied Kofi. One day into the trip she fled the conference hotel and never returned. While this is an extreme case, some people view international NGOs as a path out of poverty; most see them at least as a short-term employment option or opportunity for material rewards.

But most participants do enjoy the events and learn a lot about slums and human rights. Mr. Kwasi returned from Gambia with new knowledge for when he speaks to the media, and he now talks of "progressive realization" of land ownership and "minimum core obligations" (personal interview, October 28, 2011). Mohammed learned about the "rapid response to forced evictions" in Kenya and hoped to replicate it in Ghana. Slum dwellers are taught to emphasize that they do not invest in their own businesses or houses because they are afraid of eviction. But this is not entirely true. Residents did not invest in permanent structures before 2009 because PD and community leaders instructed them not to: they thought it would undermine their claims for resettlement packages. The recent fire outbreak demonstrates that people will invest in their houses, despite lack of security of tenure. Shower operators invest thousands of Ghanaian cedis in their businesses because there is a solid return on the investment; microcredit and savings and

loans institutions do the same. In Mr. Kwasi's opinion article in the *Daily Graphic*, the AI representative from Kenya sent a template. Mr. Kwasi added two sentences about his personal story; the rest he kept the same (informal conversation, November 3, 2011). The article was published with Mr. Kwasi as the byline author, but the representative from AI who did most of the writing. AI and other international NGOs attempt to construct a narrative of human rights and fairness that does not necessarily confront the informal institution of squatter illegality. In fact, applying the dominant international narrative of human rights to domestic slum issues sometimes has a backlash domestically (Autesserre 2012).

In some cases, this sparks a backlash against human rights organizations by policymakers who view many of these NGOs as supporting illegality and instilling a culture of indiscipline. One policymaker explains how international human rights have "meddled" in Ghanaian affairs: "They are always talking about people's rights when people are doing the wrong thing. This leads to resistance instead of leading to rules and enforcement and common sense" (personal interview, June 21, 2012). Another man similarly states, "I do not understand human rights. These days you have people urinating everywhere, throwing their trash all over the place. Young men will speak to elders with no respect. All because they can claim human rights. Human rights is indiscipline" (personal interview, November 2, 2011).

NGOs might help individuals but only to a certain point. Mr. Kwasi has traveled to South Africa, The Gambia, Brazil, and Senegal for various international trainings and conferences, but he still feels as though he is used. He says, "I like the training but nothing comes of it. These organizations use us—they say they do this, that, and this, they get funding and we get nothing" (personal interview, October 13, 2011). All of the organizations are fighting against one another for limited resources, and they create strategies depending on what will secure them international

funding. They are upwardly accountable to foreign donors, but not downwardly accountable to residents on the ground. When Mr. Kwasi returned from The Gambia and Mohammed returned from Kenya they learned about the Rapid Response team. They decided to start a team in Ghana. While AI Ghana mentioned that they were interested in the project, several fire outbreaks occurred in slums with AI Ghana not doing anything publicly. Mr. Kwasi wrote an email to the representative in Kenya. He had met the representative while in The Gambia, and she explained that he should e-mail her if he ever needed her support:

> I hope things are well with you in Kenya. I am writing to update you on the work that we are doing in Ghana…This Thursday, a group of about 60 slum residents from across Accra will be meeting to discuss the formation of a union of slum dwellers in Ghana…One of the most important aspects of our organization is to create a rapid response team for disasters and emergencies in Ghanaian slums (i.e. demolitions, fire outbreaks, floods, etc). This idea of the rapid response was introduced to us in Gambia and we have considered the idea as something we want to incorporate into our union. Mohammed also recently returned from Kenya and has further educated us on the activities of the Rapid Response team in Kenya…We would like to collaborate with you and your rapid response team in Kenya, if possible. We would also like to learn more about the challenges and successes that the team has had. Finally, we would appreciate any support or advice that you might have for us as we build our rapid response team.

The representative in Kenya was very happy about the idea and cc'd the AI-Ghana office in her reply. The representative in AI-Ghana was so upset that Mr. Kwasi wrote the email without her permission and warned him never to do it again. She then told him that he would not be attending the upcoming international training in Kenya, as she had earlier promised. By August 2012, the Rapid Response Team had not been started. While slum residents are educated at AI and PD conferences and trainings, they still must follow orders and are not given the space to act independently or empower themselves. This leads to a situation where residents do not have the incentive to organize the community themselves. Rather, they must wait and take orders from the

international organizations if they want any of the material benefits that come along with the partnership.

While NGOs work in illegal settlements and attempt to speak on behalf of its residents, they are upwardly accountable to foreign donors and not downwardly accountable to all slum residents. NGOs attempt to speak on behalf of the residents but they often construct narratives that do not confront the informal institutions that frame domestic politics.

Power in numbers: Squatters and private goods

On September 9, 2009 more than 20,000 Old Fadama residents stayed home from work and attended a large demonstration against the earlier forced eviction notice. Community leaders woke up at 4 AM and prevented people from going to their businesses. By 10 AM, thousands of people covered the main street, with people sitting and hanging from walls, trees, cars, and rooftops. Mr. Kwasi addressed the crowd, radio and TV stations, and challenged the government to fulfill their responsibilities to the Old Fadama people and not demolish their structures. Two days later, the Deputy Minister of Information stated that the government was pursuing relocation options, not forced eviction.

Squatters hold power in numbers: the more slum dwellers, the more votes. They also can threaten chaos: the Ghanaian government worries that instability in Old Fadama is a national security concern. Slums can provide residents new opportunities to demand inclusion into the national polity, legitimate property ownership, and participate as equal citizens in social life (Holston 2008). But not all squatters are equal, and this chapter demonstrates how slum community leaders are an important, yet overlooked level of analysis that must be examined—beyond a simple framework of state-community relations. While Old Fadama residents and

NGOs are united in their fight against forced eviction, they have different interests and incentives with respect to daily governance and slum development. The institution of squatter illegality creates differing incentives for diverse actors and institutions: community leaders, politicians, NGOs, and squatters themselves find ways to benefit from their insecure environments and "live through" squatter illegality and informality. Multi-party politics and the emerging human rights agenda do not transform these communities. Instead, they contribute to the persistence of squatter illegality and maintenance of the status quo.

But the power in numbers that voters in illegal residents have does not translate to public goods. Instead, I show how democratization in these communities has significant unintended consequences: the provision of private goods to individuals who do not serve the public interest. The process of democratization without appropriate accountability mechanisms undermines collective capacity and democratic decision-making. In this way, this chapter calls into question dominant theories of democracy by shedding light on the underlying informal institution of settlement that leads to sub-optimal outcomes.

Chapter 4: Indigeneity as Institution: Owning the City

Based on an ethnographic account of multi-party politics in Ga Mashie, one of Accra's oldest indigenous settlements, this chapter argues that the initial informal institution of indigeneity shapes the demands that residents make on the government and the strategies that leaders use to mobilize support. Residents claim ownership of the city; leaders exploit this indigenous narrative to win votes, secure state resources, and claim land. The chapter demonstrates how Ga Mashie's indigenous status contributes to the salience of ethnic identity as a political tool in multi-party politics. Indigeneity is not just an identity or cultural resource—it is an institution that shapes and enables daily political behavior. But the institution of indigeneity creates perverse incentives: it incentivizes family heads to become personal rulers, privileges insecure property rights to benefit traditional authorities, and underlies patron-client relations with government. The informal institution of indigeneity provides a powerful mechanism to demand public services, but it does not contribute to the fair and equitable sharing of these services for the public good, thereby undermining electoral accountability. Contrary to dominant strands of public goods literature, ethnic homogeneity actually undermines public service provision because it facilitates unaccountable governance.

Introduction

Ga Mashie has great historical importance and is a source of political power in Ghana. Yet, the community has descended into slum-like conditions: houses are overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and public services deteriorate. This puzzling situation motivates an important question: In the context of multi-party democracy and human rights, why does a community with such a proud history and immense political and economic resources descend into a slum? How does a community *become* a slum? In this chapter, I suggest an alternative way to understanding ethnic homogeneity in slums: indigeneity as institution. Ga Mashie's indigenous settlement provides opportunities for family leaders to amass political power without merit, patronage from political parties to be distributed along family lines, and traditional authorities to actively undermine property rights. The informal institution of indigeneity contributes to the salience of ethnic identity as a political tool, undermining electoral accountability and effective governance.

West Africa is often noted for its lack of squatter settlements in its postcolonial history (Peil 1976; Konadu-Agyemang 1991). But the rise of slums in the region is intense in the last 20 years. Much of the population growth of slum dwellers is attributable to the rise of slum conditions in pre-existing urban settlements. While illegal settlements like Old Fadama get the most scholarly and public attention, the rise of slums in pre-existing communities like Ga Mashie provides an important lens into the institutional context that facilitates socio-economic progress and underdevelopment. A case like Ga Mashie demonstrates how the process of democratization does not lead to linear developmental outcomes and progress: not all communities experience multi-party democracy in the same way, even with similar formal institutional arrangements. This chapter challenges theories of democratization that suggest a liberal rule of law and formal electoral institutions will replace informal power arrangements. Instead, the informal institution of indigeneity shapes the trajectory of liberal democratic institutions, development, and how norms of human rights are understood by local populations.

Democratic politics in indigenous settlements calls into question many of the current theoretical propositions advanced to explain democratic quality. The socio-demographic characteristics of Ga Mashie residents should be expected to strengthen democratic activity: Ga Mashie residents are relatively formally educated, are rooted in the host city, and achieve livable incomes. Most residents live in family homes so they do not need to pay rent. Ga Mashie has high levels of state capacity and state infrastructural power: the Accra Municipal Assembly, the National Post Office, and a large police training station sit within its jurisdiction. Roads are paved, streetlights have been provisioned, and there is an Ussher Town Health Clinic and several government schools. Elections are highly competitive and political parties are deeply institutionalized and organized. While colonialism clearly left a negative imprint on Ghanaian

society (Berry 1993), some residents and leaders benefited from their privileged position of being close to the main port, serving as land owners on valuable land, and gaining access to quality education (including access to higher education in the United Kingdom for several Ga Mashie elite). In this way, Ga Mashie society was far from marginalized (Parker 2000). Finally, while the overall population is ethnically heterogeneous, the governance of daily affairs is dominated by the Ga ethnic group. This would lead to the expectation that residents and leaders are more likely to sanction one another and residents share similar preferences—all mechanisms that might lead to the ability to serve the public interest. Yet the process of democratization in Ga Mashie—and in other indigenous settlements—has led to unintended consequences and poor democratic quality.

The view from within the slum—derived from ethnographic data that emphasizes networks, processes, and spontaneity in decision-making—suggests that indigeneity has become institutionalized, creating rules and incentives that privilege rent-seeking and opportunistic behavior. Multi-party politics and Ghana's emerging human rights agenda are simply embedded in a larger informal-institutional context of indigeneity. In fact, multi-party elections and political liberalization contributes to the persistence of the status quo by making it very difficult to overcome challenges of development—due to political survival calculations by politicians, underlying chieftaincy disputes, and claims of ownership and patronage by Ga Mashie residents themselves. The informal institution of indigeneity is not replaced. Instead, politicians, community leaders, and residents draw on a variety of cultural and institutional resources to "live through" indigeneity and find ways to benefit from the institutional arrangement (Berk and Galvan 2009). In doing so, this behavior leads to the persistence of indigeneity, the undermining of political accountability, and the prevention of transformational change.

Democratic politics in indigenous settlements

How does democracy "work" in indigenous slum settlements? What impact does the indigenous status have on multi-party democracy? This chapter will demonstrate how the institution of indigeneity shapes the type of community leadership, the norms of reciprocity, and the legal claims involving land that residents and leaders make. It will also provide empirical evidence that shows how community leaders, political parties and residents benefit from the slum's indigenous status but also how it undermines public goods provision and political accountability. The chapter concludes that the informal institution of indigeneity undermines the public interest, and instead advances club interests. This is because the informal institution serves a *competing* function: it coexists with formal institutions but structures incentives that are incompatible with formal rules, and undermines the formal rules of the game (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 15). While corruption and patrimonialism are often associated with competing informal institutions (O'Donnell 1996; Borozc 2000; Lauth 2000), this chapter provides an explanation as to why corruption and patrimonialism persists. In other words, the underlying informal institution of indigeneity shapes incentives and behaviors to serve club goods, creating a logic of politics that might be considered patrimonial and corrupt.

The argument builds off of a large interdisciplinary body of scholarship that pays close attention to notions of indigeneity and autochthony. Autochthon means "of the soil itself," privileging a rightful claim to a particular territory (Geschiere and Jackson 2006; Loraux 1996). "Indigenous" means literally "born inside" with the connotation in classical Greek of being born "inside the house" (Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005). Waldron (2003) further explains that "'Indigeneity' is derived from 'indigenous' which means '[b]orn or produced naturally in a land or region; native or belonging naturally to (the soil, region, etc.),' from *indu*, an old Latin root

meaning 'within' (like the Greek *endon*) and *gignere* meaning 'to beget'" (1). As described in Chapters 1 and 2, some populations claim authoritatively their first comer status and prioritize the time of arrival (Daes 1996), leaving no doubt to the question "who settled first, and how." This is especially the case in customary property rights regimes, where access to land is determined by traditional norms. In these contexts, indigenous populations claim to be the rightful owners of the land, providing them an important source of profits. This was true of autochthonous populations in Cote d'Ivoire who profited from the *tuteur* system of land ownership, regularly asking for gifts from stranger populations (Chauveau 2000: 107). Ga traditional authorities in Ghana took advantage of this privileged position throughout its history, particularly during the colonial period when Ga chiefs benefited from selling land to the colonial government (Sackeyfio 2012), as did the Ashantis in the cocoa regions (Austin 2005).

In most of these historical contexts, migrants settled in new lands as "allochthons," or strangers, and established patron-client relationships with customary "landowners" (Chauveau 2000). I document this process in Chapter 2, particularly in the cases of *zongo* chiefs who purchased land directly from customary authorities.[47] But this settlement status also set the stage for a powerful way to limit the citizenship rights of foreigners or outsiders, as Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (2011) explains:

> Given the fact that for the most part land was held in common for all members of the community, and was not a commodity for private appropriation…only indigenes could be considered rightful heirs to this property. This is why across the continent, groups identified as strangers or settlers may live in an area for over one hundred years and still be considered as having no legitimate rights in the land they occupy.

[47] In these cases, this legitimate purchase sets the stage for a multi-ethnic political coalition that can lead to strong leadership, state legal status, and cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity—all necessary for quality democracy. I explain this in Chapter 5.

Strangers are therefore defined in opposition to the indigenous group, creating a political cleavage based on origin. This leads to the "synthesis of nearness and distance which constitutes the formal position of the stranger" (Simmel 1908: 404). But it is important to emphasize that the labeling and ongoing political salience of the category of "stranger" is socially constructed and politically manipulated, or what Whitehouse calls an "actively generated condition" (2012: 13). The indigene-stranger dichotomy is always relative (Geschiere and Jackson 2006), with individuals and groups, even those of the same ethnic group, negotiating and making claims to first comer status (Hodgson 2002; Kuper 2003, 2005).

These dynamics are particularly salient in local communities with a large population claiming indigenous status. In urban Ghana, these slums include Ga Mashie, Chorkor, and Shiabu in Accra; Ashtown in Kumasi; Taabo in Ashaiman. Throughout its history, the indigenous ethnic group has restricted the scope of the political community, limiting the number of individuals able to participate in community decision-making to members of the indigenous ethnic group. This leaves a large number of residents—particularly migrants and strangers—on the outside of the decision-making process. In the most severe cases, strangers are "unassimilable aliens" (Fortes 1975: 245) who never gain full citizenship status. These "tales of origin" become the most important political cleavage there is (Boas 2009). In the context of urban slums, I call these communities indigenous settlements because the governance and control of the rules of community decision-making are shaped by claims to indigeneity.

Indigeneity as a system and strategy of rule was introduced by the colonists, first in French Sudan in the late nineteenth century as a classification and organization strategy to establish social control (Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005). The politicization of indigeneity in the postcolonial state is a lasting legacy of colonialism (Mamdani 1996). These manifest themselves

in strategies of authenticity and a politics of belonging and exclusion (Bayart 2005). Yet, as I document in Chapter 2, local struggles over "who settled first, and how" date back to precolonial times and leaders used this rhetoric to extend their territorial power and fight for political space. These first-comer struggles have been documented in precolonial Ghana and Burkina Faso (Lentz 2003). The most important point is that these claims to indigeneity and autochthony status have an underlying political and material aim, as Pelican explains: "The concept asserts privileged rights to land and natural resources on the basis of descent from the original inhabitants of a country or—in the case of hunter-gatherers—representation of the original human population of the world" (2009: 53). In other words, claims to indigeneity and autochthony provide an alternative conception of citizenship, providing some groups the entitlement "to enter the struggle for resources" (Mamdani 2002: 505).

In many respects, the development of the postcolonial state remains bifurcated through the institutionalization of ethnic entitlements and alternative conceptions of citizenship (Mamdani 1996; Adejumobi 2001). Describing the Kenyan context, Ndegwa (1997) argues that most Kenyans subscribe to two notions of citizenship: their ethnic and national community. In this way, African societies have two publics: an amoral civic public in which political leaders "gain materially but to which they give only grudgingly" and a moral primordial public in which they "derive little or no material benefits but to which they are expected to give generously and do give materially" (Ekeh 1975: 108). In turn, leaders rob the civic public and redistribute these resources to kin and patronage networks in the primordial public—or as Laitin (1986) calls them group members with the same "ancestral city identities." In the context of state failure and limited resources, struggles over citizenship rights can become important sources of ethnic conflict (Bates 2008; Keller 2014). Therefore, ethnicity, tribalism, and playing the ethnic card

become political strategies to claim resources and citizenship rights from the state. I will show how tribalism and ethnic chauvinism are outcomes of an informal institutional politics that privilege autochthony and indigenous claims due to original settlement patterns.

The dual transition of political liberalization and rapid urbanization has actually contributed to the heightening of claims to indigeneity and autochthony. Geschiere and Nyamjoh (2000) explain: "Political liberalization leads, somewhat paradoxically, to an intensification of the politics of belonging: fierce debates on who belongs where, violent exclusion of 'strangers' (even if this refers to people with the same nationality who have lived for generations in the area), and a general affirmation of roots and origins as the basic criteria of citizenship and belonging" (423). These struggles now play a prominent role in the national politics across many African countries (Gugler and Geschiere 1998), but also are played out locally through efforts of boundary-making and closure, central aspects of politics of belonging (Appadurai 1996). In the rapidly globalizing environment, some scholars argue that discourses of belonging evoke local claims to access global goods and resources (Mbembe 2001, 2002; Simone 2001). These discourses lead to a "global conjecture of belonging" (Li 2000) and what one scholar has termed "glocalization" (Robertson 1992). In countries that experienced significant decentralization, many of these claims for belonging became an important source of friction in local communities (Adejumobi 2001). This is evident in countries like Nigeria where a preoccupation with indigeneity shapes local government administrative bodies (Ejobowah 2012).

Politicians in Africa have a long history of manipulating citizenship laws to benefit their groups and constituents, and this worrisome trend is heightened in the context of political liberalization (Manby 2009). In these contexts of liberalization and decentralization, local elections, land management and citizenship are often linked, leading to electoral strategies that

attempt to displace and disenfranchise "strangers" (Hilgers 2011). Not surprisingly then, the political salience of indigeneity and autochthony is much more intense in competitive electoral districts, in the same way that the salience of ethnicity depends on the need to form a minimum winning coalition (Posner 2005). In other words, formal electoral arrangements and informal settlement patterns often work in concert. Yet, as I will argue, the formal institutions are embedded in the informal institution of settlement, and is the latest example of transplanted rules and norms being creatively syncretized in local environments (Galvan 2004). Evidence of these dynamics have been found in Cameroon (Jackson 2006), Cote d'Ivoire (Boas 2009; Chauveau 2001; Mitchell 2012; Losch 2000; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2003; Mbembe 2001), the Congo (Autesserre 2010), Ghana (Lentz 2003), Burkina Faso (Lentz 2003), Nigeria (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2011; Ejobowah 2012), and Kenya (Klaus 2014).

The politics of belonging is even more intense in the urban context, particularly in slum environments, where autochthony discourse is an attractive response to the "ontological uncertainty" that insecure living conditions present (Dunn 2009: 114). For example, the dual transition of liberalization and rapid urbanization has led to intense struggles over inner-city space in Johannesburg, as "citizens and non-nationals have developed competing idioms for relating to one another and the space they share" (Landau 2006). This becomes a viable political strategy as groups and leaders seek legitimacy and power (Gotz & Simone 2003). In Accra, political parties draw from discourses of indigeneity to prevent migrants from registering during elections. The rest of this chapter will explain how the rules and procedures of indigeneity shape politics in settlements where a large indigenous population restricts the decision-making sphere to members of their own. Democratic politics in indigenous settlements work through the following mechanisms and variables.

Community Leadership: First, the institution of indigeneity continues to structure leadership selection in formal politics. Most importantly, leaders will only be considered if they are of the Ga ethnic group and are from Ga Mashie. They must come from powerful families and demonstrate themselves as family heads. The institution of indigeneity privileges family over merit. Second, the nature of indigeneity underlies patron-client relationships in Ga Mashie. Leaders are family heads and share goods with their families. The distribution of goods occurs along family lines; club goods trump public goods in the community, undermining political accountability. Mitchell (2012) calls these leaders 'autochthony entrepreneurs,' or those who "share a similar goal—the exclusion of 'illegitimate' residents from both political and economic arenas, often by violent means" (268). Third, the institution of indigeneity contributes to the persistence of chieftaincy disputes that severely undermine local development. One avenue of power in indigenous settlements is the chieftaincy; these struggles have a long history of being politicized for personal gain. They also lead to serious divisions within the community that harbors deep mistrust and resentment. Fourth, the institution undermines political accountability because residents are unable to hold their own 'traditional' leaders to account. There are no mechanisms to speak out and shame their leaders.

Norms of reciprocity: The informal institution of indigeneity contributes to the formation of norms of reciprocity along ethnic lines. Residents have the incentive to organize themselves ethnically in order to maintain their indigenous status, a label that they view as an important economic and political resource. Hilgers (2011) goes so far as to argue that autochthony is a product derived from social capital, and confers status, prestige and access to networks. It works as capital, and this "allows it to play the role of an actual form of capital that can be invested, valued and protected from" (Hilgers 2011: 35). This insight is consistent with a growing

literature that suggests norms of reciprocity (and social capital) can serve exclusionary purposes (Berman 1997; Voth, Voigtländer, and Satyanath 2013; Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson 2013). In the capital city where migrants come in large numbers and land values continue to increase—while "outsiders" buy large swaths of land—Ga residents worry that they are "losing their city." A narrative of indigeneity offers a strong incentive to organize ethnically and not incorporate outsiders; this allows them to maintain their entrenched patronage network with politicians and the city authorities. The narrative of indigeneity has a long history in Ghanaian politics, thereby serving as a strong basis for community leaders to organize members, especially when the economy is struggling. Second, the informal institution of indigeneity privileges the hoarding of resources by family, undermining public goods. Therefore, public services are provisioned along family lines (a type of club good), not contributing to the community as a whole.

Legal Status: Unlike other slums, especially illegal settlements, Ga Mashie is not under the threat of forced eviction and does not suffer from slum demolitions. But this does not mean that Ga Mashie does not have underlying land tensions—it does. The informal institution of indigeneity creates three unintended consequences with respect to legal status and land tenure security. First, the informal institution of indigeneity creates opportunities for traditional authorities to amass wealth, at the expense of ordinary Ga residents. Similarly, it creates the incentive for Ga traditional leaders to perpetuate informal property rights so that they can exploit double allocation of land (Onoma 2010). This makes it very difficult for private developers and the government to purchase land for the public interest. It also creates severe disputes among members of the Ga people, creating longstanding conflict that divides the community and seeds distrust. Second, the institution of indigeneity contributes to placing legal residents of Ga Mashie versus "illegal" residents in surrounding slums (like King Shona and Old Fadama), thereby

undercutting a powerful class identity or alliance that ends up undermining a collective cause. In other words, the institution of indigeneity contributes to the division of the poor to the benefit of a small "traditional" elite. Third, Ga Mashie's indigenous legal status creates opportunities for residents and community leaders to place patronage demands on political parties through claims of land ownership, to make claims of indigeneity to international organization and non-state actors to secure resources, and to fill positions of city authorities with members of their own at the expense of merit and technical expertise.

The family head: Community leadership in indigenous settlements

This section explains how family divisions structure multi-party politics in indigenous slum settlements. This is because the institution of indigeneity constrains and enables leadership by establishing the family head as a powerful metric for the accumulation of political power. The informal institution of indigeneity shapes the mode of leadership selection, the norms of sharing (with whom the leader will share his resources), and the reputational incentives that he faces to gain social approval (Paller 2014b). Rising through the family and becoming a family elder, royal, chief, or kingmaker provides the basis for community leadership. Community leaders have various formal positions of power, ranging from Ministers of Parliament, local Assemblymen, and AMA representatives. Due to the underlying indigenous institutional context, leaders face the reputational incentive to present themselves as "first comers" to the land. Leaders are rewarded for rising the ranks within their family—a type of club that will offer them vast social approval in the surrounding settlement. Leaders build reputations by rewarding followers who are members in their family, undercutting a cross-club and cross-ethnic coalition that is necessary to strengthen public trust in the broader community (Myerson 2011). In other words, they are expected to share their goods with members of their own family. Even though leaders

come from the same ethnic group—all are Ga indigenes—they are divided along club lines, calling into question a broad range of scholarship that suggests social sanctions operate most effectively within ethnic groups. This chapter presents evidence suggesting that in informal institutional contexts of indigeneity, "tales of origin" serve as an important political cleavage that cuts across ethnicity, undermining the ability of co-ethnics to come together to collectively act. This process starts with the incentives that leaders have to divide the community along family (or club) lines.

On June 7, 2012 the Ga State lifted the ban on noise making and drumming in lead up to its annual Homowo Festival. The Ga community held a large ceremony at the Gbese Blohum, or the royal family palace; the program was entitled, "Peace, Progress and Development." The official statement was posted on the Government of Ghana's official website with the following statement: "It is the prayer of the elders that the entire political leadership in the country, will live up to their word, to give mother Ghana peace, progress and development." The ceremony included royal family members (i.e. members of the Tackie Komme We), luminaries and politicians (including the Regional Minister, Minister of Works and Housing, and area MP), and area youth hired to serve as security guards. The youth were hired to keep order and they carried whips and scolded the children to sit down and not move freely. Tourists and the media also attended the event; the Ga community wanted to project a unified, glamorous celebration to the outside world. Hundreds of residents and visitors attended the event, royal family members paraded through the streets in their traditional garb, and the party lasted late into the night in Ga Mashie.

While the ceremony was indicative of traditional ceremonies that take place across the country, it was most notable for the underlying informal politics that structured the event. Only a

portion of the Ga community attended the event—those who supported the controversial Nii Ayi-Bonte II as the Gbese Mantse, and the accredited Wulomei of the Ga State led by Nuumo Ogbarmey III (Sakumo Wulomo). Since 2007, there has been a divisive Chieftaincy dispute that has pitted family members against one another. Members of the NDC party leadership supported Ayi Bonte II (aka Tommy Okine), and the government officials who attended the event were NDC big men of Ga-Dangbe ethnic origin: E.T Mensah, the Minister for Works and Housing, Nii Laryea Afotey Agbo, the Greater Accra Regional Minister, and Odododiodio Constituency MP Jonathan Nii Tackie Komme. While Ayi-Bonte II gains most of his political support from the NDC, his cousin is a former NPP MP and served as host of the event. Tommy Okine is former CEO of Hearts of Oak, the football team that is perceived to align with the NDC and draws support from Accra, particularly its indigenous areas (Fridy and Brobbey 2009). Numo Blafo, the Public Relations Officer for Accra Metropolitan Assembly participated in the ceremony; he is an important member of a royal family that is aligned with Ayi-Bonte II. The Tackie Komme We strongly endorses Ayi-Bonte II, as the Odododiodio Constituency MP and his brother marched in the ceremony. The security guards were led by Nii Okai and Brunos, two local "thugs" who are known to support Tommy Okine and other NDC politicians; they also work as land guards for various Ga big men.

Contrary to fears of many community members, the celebration was peaceful. Two years earlier, fights broke out at the event—gunshots were even shot near the royal palace. In 2011, only a very small crowd gathered for the celebration. The chieftaincy dispute continues in court, with both sides winning important judgments in various levels of the court system. The fact that it is an election year only seemed to heighten the tension. This is because the NPP is perceived to support Okine's opponent, Nii Okaidja III. The belief is that if the NPP wins the 2012 election,

Nii Okaidja will gain the upper hand and take over the royal palace. Okaidja has the support of NPP big men like former Regional Minister Sheik I.C. Quaye, former Accra mayor Stanley Adjeri Blankson and current MP aspirant Victor Okaikoi. None of these figures attended the celebration—doing so would suggest that they support Ayi-Bonte II's claim to the throne. The ability to carry out peaceful events on behalf of the Ga community bolsters Ayi-Bonte's power and legitimacy in the community.

The close alliance with AMA among this Gbese faction bolsters their popular legitimacy and demonstrates how Ga indigenous politics underlies formal politics and development. Ayi-Bonte II's backing by AMA, as evidenced by Numo Blafo's appearance and the Government's official announcement of the event, gives him important political backing to influence decision making. This is further evidenced by the ability of Okine and the Ga Mantse he enstooled (Adama Lantse, who is also embroiled in a chieftaincy dispute) to align with city authorities like AMA to carry out issues of development. For example, on November 18 the mayor of Accra and a caravan that included several cars of Ga traditional authorities arrived in Old Fadama and along the railways with the goal to evict squatters—they painted the words "Gbese land" on structures that they wanted demolished. The mayor used his close alliance with this faction of the Gbese people to bolster his popular support to carry out his plan for the city. This would allow him to reward his loyal followers and bolster his support among his club.

The popular perception among Accra residents is that the mayor was appointed as AMA Chief Executive because the support he had from the Ga chiefs. The Ga chiefs are an important interest group because they are the custodians of the land, a very important factor in a country

under the jurisdiction of customary land ownership.[48] But perhaps just as importantly, the Ga authorities use formal political institutions to broaden their own support at the local level. As one Old Fadama resident explained, "Sometimes Ga chiefs do this to extract and make money—and to put fear into people" (personal interview, November 22, 2011). According to a Ga Mashie resident, they are simply trying to build their case as the legitimate traditional authorities of the Ga people: "By coming through the community it looks like they are doing something for their people. This is especially true when the Adama Lantse is trying to build support for his case to the throne" (personal interview, November 22, 2011). In this way, multi-party politics is embedded in the context of indigenous institutions that frame daily political life in Ga Mashie. In other words, Ga community leaders use multi-party democracy to bolster their own support in underlying chieftaincy struggles. As Numo Blafo explains with respect to their ability to build popular support, "You can't impose a chief on its people. The majority is what matters. The Ga chieftaincy system is very democratic. He has a council. They have already deliberated the issue on the ground before they go to council. The people themselves will rise up. It is the people who have risen up against his own chief" (personal interview, June 15, 2012). This is how the Ga authorities who led the celebration before Homowo Festival used "democratic" politics to bolster their own local power.

Politicians publicly acknowledge their support to certain interested parties, contributing to divisions in the community. Residents and leaders on the ground attach political party affiliation to certain "sides" of the dispute. In the current Ga Mantse dispute, one side claims that King Tackie Tawiah (aka Joe Blankson) was enstooled by the NPP government. While

[48] For example, the Acting Chairman of the Ga Traditional Council, Nii Dodoo Nsakie, claims that the Ga authorities will not support the mayor unless he demolishes structures and evicts squatters on Ga land: "Until Dr. Vanderpuije demolishes Sodom and Gomorrah, all his effort will be null and void. If he does that, we (Ga Traditional Council) will give him the needed support to stay in office."

traditional authorities rarely publicly pronounce their support for a political party, residents on the ground verify alliances by indicating which events the leaders attend. For example, a resident explains that he saw Blankson at former government events (when the NPP was in power), and suggests that he has many friends who are in the NPP. But the opponents use this against them, as the Asere Kingmaker explains, "We have people who are Chief Contractors. Blankson is not from the Royal House. He is a politician from the NPP government. He was put in by force" (personal interview, July 5, 2012). The politicization of chieftaincy disputes has a long, historical precedent in Ga Mashie affairs. Historian S.S. Quarcoopome documents the way in which a group of people led by some divisional chiefs politicized the proposed Municipal Corporations Ordinance of 1924; they made the ordinance unpopular and then tied its association to the sitting Ga Mantse in order to undermine his popular legitimacy (Quarcoopome 1988).

Disputes over the Gbese Chieftaincy and Ga Mantse continue to divide the community, thus affecting the developmental prospects of the settlement generally. Nii Okaidja III, one of the claimants to the Gbese throne explains how chieftaincy disputes undermine development, "When governments come to power, they work hand-in-hand with the traditional Councils to fast-track development in the various communities. But when there are chieftaincy disputes, it retards development and that is the problem we are facing. Chieftaincy disputes have, actually, retarded the progress of Ga State and this must stop now."[49] The informal institution of indigeneity enables leadership based on family lines. But because the rules that govern chieftaincy in Ga Mashie are ambiguous and disputed, community leaders use creative strategies to accumulate power. This involves politicizing the traditional institutions in order to gain popular support and legitimacy. While these strategies can be effective for strengthening traditional support, it

[49] http://omgghana.com/demolish-sodom-gomorah-now-ga-chiefs/

undermines socio-economic progress and development because the Ga Mashie community is unable to unify to demand improvements for the public good.

In a focus group, Ga Mashie youth explain their frustration with the chieftaincy disputes:

> It exists in this place in the form of chieftaincy. When you look at Sempe, they have two chiefs, two queenmothers. At Gbese, someone knows he is not fit to be a Chief but he is forcing himself to be one. When you see people fighting for position it means there is some wealth to be looted that explains that behavior. *Is this thing dividing the community?* In Sempe, one royal house supports the dethroned chief, all the royal houses support the new one. So there is misunderstanding and how can this bring development when people are being hurt. When the leader Adote Obauer was dethroned, items meant for school children were in his palace spoilt (Biscuits, shoes, dresses). He leaves the palace and goes to US. He is a typical bad leader. Look at Gbese Asere Djorsie. The people of Asere want to tell Gbese who is their rightful leader. People bribe the kingmakers to enstool them as chiefs. Hence the process is full of corruption (focus group, June 20, 2012).

There are no accountability mechanisms to hold the traditional authorities and chiefs to account. Most residents do not think the Chiefs do anything for the community. One man said, "They get slush funds from the government and use it to enrich themselves. They don't even live in the community" (informal conversation, December 7, 2011). For these reasons, residents do not respect their chiefs. "We do not fear them," one resident told me (informal conversation, December 15, 2011).[50] But the traditional authorities matter for more than symbolic reasons; they control the family land and developers and politicians must rely on them if they want to pursue and development project.

Politicians also rely on family heads to secure votes and improve their electoral chances. Family heads serve as political party brokers—intermediaries between the party and the residents on the ground. The informal institution of indigeneity contributes to the strength of family

[50] In Africa, the words "fear" and "respect" are often used interchangeably to connote the "bonds of respect" that will be discussed in Chapter 6.

leaders; these leaders control votes and have significant influence in mobilizing followers. For example, on May 2, fetish priest Nana Odupon Okomfo Abeka Sikafo II celebrated his 50th birthday party. To honor the traditional leader—and to thank him for his valuable support—NDC MP aspirant Nii Lantey Vanderpuye donated 500 Ghana cedis for his birthday party. The priest has been an NDC insider since former President Rawlings staged his first coup d'état in 1979. He is also the father of sixteen children with ten different women. At his birthday party he relished in his role as father figure. While various women cooked large bowls of rice, stew and chicken, he was in charge of 'dishing out' the food on people's plates. He made sure that all visitors would eat. This activity held symbolic power: as a leader, he fed his followers. His various children brought the plates out to the important visitors from the community, thereby strengthening social support for the priest and indirectly solidifying political support for Vanderpuye. During Homowo Festival, Vanderpuye sponsored another event at the fetish priest's house; he made a banner with both of their pictures on it and displayed it on the main street. The banner symbolized two important points: First, Vanderpuye's support of Ga indigenous culture, and second, the fetish priest's political support for Vanderpuye.

The role of family heads in politics is ubiquitous in Ga Mashie, and many locals see them as an impediment to progress. One resident tells the story of a police forum that the NDC organized to recruit community members into the police service. However, one of the families who was supposed to organize the event took the money for themselves; police recruits were never chosen from the community. But this behavior is so embedded in daily life that residents do not see it as "stealing." As one man explained to me, "It is not exactly stealing. Their family just took the money" (informal conversation, November 22, 2011). Former Mayor Nat Nunoo Amarteifio described his frustration with dealing with Ga Mashie, "I used to go there for party

outreach programs. They always complained about lack of jobs. Unfortunately most of them don't have skills. We tried to give them employment but was inevitably menial work. If we hired them to start at 9, by eleven seven would disappear. By four, two more would leave. The rest would take our tools. But they are quite vocal about their entitlements" (personal interview, March 22, 2012). The institution of indigeneity privileges a situation where residents feel "entitled" to state resources, including public services and jobs. Politicians are expected to provide these goods and services in return for votes.

Politicians are also expected to serve as family heads of their constituencies (Lindberg 2010). Family lineage continues to shape politics for the indigenous Ga people. While MP aspirant Nii Lantey Vanderpuye's campaign tried to withdraw publicly from engaging in chieftaincy struggles, family lineage continues to influence voters and legitimate candidates. For example, Vanderpuye's campaign highlighted that he comes from a very powerful clan, Lante Djan-We (personal Interview, December 17, 2011). This clan is 'steeped in tradition'—they are the first clan to celebrate the Homowo Festival, the Gas most important annual ceremony. They celebrate the festival two weeks before other clans. But Vanderpuye's family connections are not without dispute. Some members of the opposition claimed that he is not really from the Lante Djan-We family, but rather from Otubluhom (a different quarter of Ga Mashie). As one supposed member of this family told me, "We have the Blanksons, Lawsons, Mays, etc. But we do not have the Vanderpuyes" (personal Interview, July 3, 2012). These family alliances are particularly important in indigenous settlements because they signal "who came first, and how," marking an important political resource to extend authority.

The importance of family requires a brief history in Ga Mashie formal politics, and the political constituency of Odododiodio for which it is a part. Since multi-party democracy

emerged in 1992, family lineage continued to influence the choice of candidates. For example, in 1996, New Patriotic Party (NPP) candidate Samuel Odoi Sykes struggled to overcome the fact that he is perceived to be from La (outside of Ga Mashie with different familial histories). His opponent, Nii Okaidja Adamafio is from Gbese (in Ga Mashie), greatly bolstering his electoral chances. Adamafio narrowly won the election. "The message caught up with people," one politician told me (personal Interview, June 8, 2012). In 2000, Nii Ayi Bonte won the election for the NPP. He was selected as NPP's candidate largely because he is from Gbese, his father was Chief of Gbese from 1959-1978, his great-grandfather was Chief of Gbese from 1911-1940, and the acting Chief is his father's first cousin. As Ayi Bonte told me frankly, "You are an indigene, you are the Chief's son, so they voted for me" (personal interview, June 8, 2012).

In the by-election of 2005, the NDC considered similar family dynamics when choosing its parliamentary candidate. The NPP selected a candidate who happened to be a "Captain of War."Anis Mankattah was an "Asafoatse"—traditional Ga leaders who are marshals of war. In response, the NDC then decided they needed someone to counter this captain of war, so they selected Jonathan Nii Tackie Komme who is a royal king. The NDC believed that because the king trumps the captain of war, they could get more supporters. As one man told me, "It worked—you follow the king." In 2008, the NPP selected a man named Adjei Sowa to contest against Tackie Komme. He lost to Tackie Komme. As one politician explained to me, "He [Adjei Sowa] did not have support because of his name. He comes from Teshie. They look at names. Tackie Komme used this against him" (personal Interview, June 8, 2012). In contrast to government performance, ideology, or programmatic ideas, the institution of family continues to influence leadership selection in local politics, contributing to the persistence of political clientelism even within electoral politics.

Family lineage influences voters in traditional ways, especially among the elders. One resident's eyes lit up when Nii Lantey Vanderpuye's name was mentioned at a meeting. "He is my cousin!" she happily proclaimed (informal conversation, January 14, 2012). But Vanderpuye also used the metaphor of family to create a "new political family." The creation of a new family is especially influential among the youth. In a focus group of Ga Mashie youth, two participants explained that they view Nii Lantey Vanderpuye as the "father" of the community. This is because he is a vocal leader who provides jobs and opportunities to the youth (focus group, June 20, 2012). Creating a "new political family" was strategic for Vanderpuye: he needed to be seen as a benevolent leader who can feed and provide for the community. He also needed to defeat the incumbent Tackie Komme who draws significant support from his traditional family ties. Politicians present themselves as father figures to legitimate their power in the community.

Vanderpuye built this new political family in various ways. He pays the school fees for children in the community. "I brought over 300 cedis last week" to pay for the school fees of one resident, Vanderpuye's administrative secretary told me (informal conversation, January 9, 2012). He used his personal and professional connections to the President to submit letters of support for constituents for jobs or educational opportunities where the President might have some influence. He linked up a group of women with loans to support their businesses (informal conversation, January 24, 2012). He hands out rice, clothes and other gifts to constituents at various rallies and events, as he did on January 2 for the New Year's celebration. He paved the alleyway in front of his family home (and claims that he will do the same for the entire community if he is voted in as MP). At a campaign rally in the slum of Old Fadama, he reached out to the women by saying, "You are all my wives. You are all part of my family" (campaign rally, March 4, 2012). Similarly, when he picked up his nomination form he called up "my

brothers from Old Fadama" to join him on stage (campaign rally, December 16, 2011). He wanted to make sure that the residents, many of whom are migrants from the North, felt part of his political family.

Vanderpuye attended and financially supported funerals and birthday parties of influential members and politically connected residents in the community. A member of Vanderpuye's campaign team explained, "This is how it works here. You have to pay for these personal things so that people see what you do" (personal interview, December 7, 2011). Residents consider these opportunities when they support a candidate. As one resident told me, "If Vanderpuye wins, I get the chance to make more money before the elections. If Tackie Komme wins, I get nothing" (informal conversation, December 19, 2011). The last week before the primary election, especially the last night, is particularly expensive for the candidates. NDC Odododiodio constituency administrative secretary explained, "From what I hear, they [all three candidates] are saving their money for this week. For Friday. People change their minds so quickly that you have to be the last one to convince them" (informal conversation, January 24, 2012).Vanderpuye sponsored a big dinner at the local pool hall the night before the primary elections. The need for politicians to feed their constituents and keep them believing that they will personally benefit from the election contributes to the persistence of political clientelism, in spite of free and fair elections.

Vanderpuye was particularly effective at reaching out to the youth. The youth are most concerned about jobs, and they felt as though the incumbent did not provide employment opportunities to them. Vanderpuye's chief strategist explained that in the early 1990s, young boys would watch from their homes the police academy training, which was located in the community: "They would see people from their community, young men they grew up next to.

But now, they do not see anybody they know. These people want positions, but they are not getting them" (personal interview, January 11, 2012). The belief is that in the 1990s, the MP was also a minister. Vanderpuye's campaign emphasized that if he is elected, he will not just be a "backbencher" like the incumbent, but rather a minister who has the ability to link the youth up with jobs. Politicians in Ghana are expected to link up their own constituents, especially the youth, with state jobs.

On January 18, the "NDC Concerned Youth of Odododiodio Constituency" held a press conference at a local pool hall to express their disappointment with the incumbent. Vanderpuye's campaign invited the media and provided the usual "financial allowance" for them to cover the event. This is standard practice in Ghana. Controlling a cadre of media personnel assists politicians with their electoral aims, as articles often portray candidates in positive ways. For example, one article describes:

> Nii Lantey Vanderpuye is seen generally as a good and generous politician by the constituents and is credited with the beautification of the Zongo Lane area with concrete slabs and the sponsoring of some Muslims to Mecca which forms the reason for which countless party members besiege his office at around the Central Business District for assistance on a daily basis.[51]

Several media outlets attended the Youth event and reported on the press statement. The press statement accused the incumbent of misallocating funds and not serving the interests of the youth. "We need somebody to lobby for us, not someone who sits in Parliament and does nothing," the President of the group stated. After the event, one of the participants explained, "The youth do not want money. We do not even want jobs directly from the MP. We want the MP to lobby for us. To make a call for us. To connect us with those who matter" (personal interview, January 18, 2012). Another resident explained, "It is not that he is rich, but he has a

[51] 'NDC primaries: Nii Lante asks God to do something new in his life.' *The Enquirer* January 19, 2012.

link. We need people like that. He has links with people. He's all around. When you go to Brong Ahafo, he has friends. Go to Western, he has friends. Go to the North, he is known there" (personal interview, June 27, 2012). Vanderpuye established youth groups, "keep-fit" clubs [athletic training teams], and friend's clubs to formally organize disparate clusters of youth throughout Odododiodio Constituency. He placed banners throughout all parts of Odododiodio Constituency with emblems that read things like: "Striker's Fan Club Votes Nii Lantey Vanderpuye for MP of Odododiodio Constituency." The youth clubs are modeled after the popular fan clubs for Premier League football teams.

Leaders have the incentive to extend their political family as much as possible, allowing them to amass social approval and prestige. While voters make sophisticated political inferences that their local father figure will provide goods (Baldwin 2013), they are also relying on the self-enforcing norm of reciprocity that their family figure will distribute goods back to them along club lines. This norm of reciprocity has deep historical roots, and is only heightened in Ghana's competitive clientelist environment.

Keep them out: Tribalism and ethnic norms of reciprocity

"You don't know what is in Dodowa Forest."—Ga proverb

This section shows how the informal institution of indigeneity shapes tribalism in the organization of the community. Indigeneity enables community members to play the ethnic card—they organize effectively around the fact that they are the rightful owners of the land and use this as a rallying cry. Residents have the incentive to keep "strangers" or "outsiders" out, especially during elections when political parties attach ethnicity to political affiliation. In this way, the institution of indigeneity undermines trust between different ethnic groups, making it

very difficult for members of diverse groups to come together for development projects. In other words, norms of reciprocity develop along ethnic lines, creating dense networks of social engagement and associationalism based on ethnic ties. However, contrary to dominant strands of economics scholarship, it does not strengthen bonds of trust between co-ethnics. Instead, it provides a basis for politicians and elites to use divide and rule strategies along ethnic lines to divide the community, hampering productive collective action among all residents, including co-ethnics.

On November 10, 2011, a fight broke out among young men outside of Salaga Market, Ga Mashie's largest foodstuffs market. A group of men were cleaning the sewers as a form of "communal labor," a practice that was popularized during the presidential tenure of Jerry John Rawlings. The fight started because a Ga big man came by the market and was pleased at the work they were doing; he gave two of the men 100 Ghana cedis in appreciation. The men who received the cash thought that they should split the money between the two of them—they each would keep fifty cedis each. The other workers were angry about this, and demanded that the money be shared among all the workers. They could not decide and began fighting for the money. An onlooker remarked to me, "We just let people fight it out here." The young men fought for ten minutes until a group of community opinion leaders divided them, split up the money, and the two original men left the scene angry. The rest of the men and onlookers laughed and continued cleaning out the gutters.

The young men who cleaned the gutters were members of the Ussher Town football team. They won an important match the past Sunday—a holiday that coincided with festivities. In good spirits, local opinion leaders organized a community clean-up exercise and the football team provided the labor. The Assemblyman could not organize the event or mobilize AMA

resources because he was at Hajj—he was awarded a ticket through the NDC Hajj fund for his loyal work for Nii Lantey Vanderpuye, a key Presidential aide. Without the assemblyman's organization, community opinion leaders mobilized the youth by themselves. Youth groups in Ga Mashie are deeply established: football clubs, boxing groups, fan clubs, keep-fit clubs, church organizations and associational organizations are active in the community. On the surface, Ga Mashie has an active civil society. But without accountability mechanisms to internally govern these associations, and without external institutions to make sure that these energies are productively utilized, clubs and associations are easily used by power holders and by individuals for personal gain.

As the previous story demonstrates, the sharing of goods is not transparent and happens during face-to-face interactions. People must be present during the distribution of resources if they hope to receive their share. On December 8, a group of young men sat behind the Shell Building on High Street discussing sports and eating lunch. A group of businessmen came and argued about a plot of land that a company was trying to develop. The men met with the chief and agreed to move forward with the project. The boys were known to cause problems—some were "landguards," and they were intimidating, especially in a large group. The group of businessmen paid 1,300 Ghana cedis in cash to "quiet them down" and ensure that they would stay calm. One of the men explained to me how the money was shared: "Whoever was sitting here. If you didn't happen to be here, you did not get any money. There were some petty arguments about who got more, but the older men got a little more than the younger boys. This is how it works here" (informal conversation, December 8, 2011). Not surprisingly, all the men were Gas. While formal associations exist, most of the groups are informal in nature and revolve

around hang out spots in the community. These informal groupings form the basis for formal groups when politicians seek to mobilize crowds or distribute patronage.

The sharing of state goods and resources is prevalent in Ga Mashie, but as Vanderpuye's campaign strategist explains, "We share, just not with the Ashantis" (personal interview, December 17, 2011). Ga Mashie residents fear that the Ashantis will dominate—economically, politically, and culturally. Isaac explains the serious distrust that has historically developed:

> In the history books, Ghanaian history is Ashanti history. This is because Ashantis have dominated Academia, and most historians are Ashanti. They wrote the history of Ghana with their group at the center. Ewes might get one chapter, Gas might get five, but the Ashantis get ten. It is always like this. This is something that belies politics in Ghana. It gives them the feeling of megalomania. They couldn't even come to Accra. They were stopped at Katamanto and then they old Ashantis ran into Dodowa Forest. There is a Ga saying, 'You don't know what is in Dodowa Forest.' This is used as a warning, a 'be careful—you don't know what they are up to.' The Ashantis infiltrate all chieftaincy problems. They have this higher-than-thou attitude toward all tribes. We are *here*. They have *come*. There are no Ashanti landlords in Ga Mashie. We even refused the Asantehene land when he wanted to build a lodge for himself in Accra (personal interview, December 17, 2011).

This indigenous narrative is used to keep the Ashantis from moving in, organizing, and investing in Central Accra. Fear of a dominant ethnic group is common across Africa, and in poor indigenous settlements, leaders often use language of indigeneity to score political points. The indigenous narrative has proven incredibly strong in relation to recent developmental plans for the community. During the NPP government, there were several plans to modernize the capital city. Some of these plans included upgrading Bukom Park, in the center of Ga Mashie. But local residents vehemently resisted the NPP's plans to develop the park, and politicians like Vanderpuye mobilized youth against the project. Isaac explains the rationale:

> Bukom is a place of free access. We go there and we do whatever we like. It is ours. But we were afraid that if the NPP came and developed the land they would sell the land like they have done elsewhere across the city, to private businesses and individuals. They

> have done this all over the city. We were worried that they will take it from us (personal interview, December 17, 2011).

Area youth verify these sentiments by claiming that the NPP's plans were to benefit the wealthy and the government, not the residents in the community. But they also realize that they are easily manipulated by politicians—along ethnic lines. During the youth focus group, the members admit that they contribute to the underdevelopment:

> Sometimes we are also the main problem. The Bukom people who prevented the museum from being established. Our leaders are also not bold, they can't organize task force to let people stop selling in the street. The mayor came to look at unauthorized structures in Kinka and some residents told him "You are looking at us, we would share that beard of us." When there was an attempt to provide WC toilets in every household, people resisted saying "Do you want to use our sleeping place for WCs!" (ibid).

Ga Mashie residents organize along ethnic lines because their indigenous status provides a powerful mechanism to demand club goods and services from their leaders. They view the inclusion of "outsiders" as a disruption of the clientelist status quo and a threat to their existence. The informal institution of indegeneity enables the persistence of this status quo.

Politicians benefit from the indigenous status of the settlement by using it to their own advantage during election time. The institution of indigeneity enables the NDC to play the ethnic card and use tribalism as a political tool to gain votes and win elections. The following section explains how the informal institution of indigeneity shaped Nii Lantey Vanderpuye's campaign strategy. This was particularly evident during the biometric registration period when the NDC's electoral strategy depended on preventing "outsiders" from registering to vote. This was a political strategy that would help the NDC—most "outsiders" were perceived to be Ashantis and supporters of the NPP. The institution of indegeneity provided a powerful organizing mechanism to play the ethnic card.

The proverb "You don't know what is in Dodowa forest" continues to be particularly relevant in today's politics, where in Odododiodio Constituency the Akans are typically aligned with the NPP, and the traditional Gas largely support the NDC.[52] Today, the constituency is labeled a swing constituency, largely because the NPP won the election in 2000. The NDC sees it as their own, treating their defeat in 2000 as an outlier. But this distrust of the Akans and their rapid migration into the center of the city continues to shape the NDC's campaign strategy. The lead campaign strategist for Nii Lantey Vanderpuye, and the man who is responsible for much of the grassroots mobilization in the NDC in the last decade, explains how politics, ethnicity, and history are intertwined:

> The ethnic card or whatever you perceive it to be was not played by people residing in Odododiodio, it was played by people outside of Odododiodio who came to interfere. It was Ursula Owusu [an influential NPP politician, and Akan] and the rest who crept in. [In the late 90s and the 2000 election], the executives of the NDC were not in tune with the changing dynamics on the ground. This is the commercial center of the country and people were creeping in all the time. And you know, Akans normally prefer trading to other types of skills. This is a huge trading hall. And as they were coming in, it changes the political action on the ground. And I was taking notice. The temperature was changing. The trend is changing. People are coming in with a different mindset and you always have to analyze that threat level. In 2000 we lost the election. And now, the NPP can beat their chest and say Odododiodio is a swing constituency. It is not a swing constituency! It was never a swing constituency! It is not a swing constituency. This constituency is for the NDC. In 2000, what happened was that *those people* came and outnumbered our votes. Gas didn't desert the NDC. We still had our support at Kinka, alright. But what happened was that *they* outnumbered us. They outnumbered us there. They are coming everyday to trade. Almost three million people each day are milling about. The amount of traffic and human congestion just coming for nine or ten hours a day. The groups that came in were actually parasitic groups. The NDC knew that their waterloo was there, and they tried to accommodate them. When we lost the elections, he [a prominent politician] went back to the NPP. You can't trust those people (ibid).

[52] There are definite factions within each party, and large blocs of each group in the other party. But the dominant power brokers in each party in Odododiodio constituency is how I have outlined above.

The language that the campaign strategist uses is shaped by the indigenous nature of the slum. He explains how Akan traders are "creeping in." He refers to them as "those people," in contrast to "us"—who are from here. His strongest claim is that they are "actually parasitic groups," claiming that they are a disease that is infiltrating their homeland and spreading rapidly: they need to be controlled and extinguished. But he is adamant that the constituency is for the Gas, and for the NDC—it is theirs.

Of course, this extreme distrust is not solely ethnic, but inherently political as well. The strategist's story is framed by a very real threat of losing an election, and even more shaped by the recent loss in 2000. He tells the story of Global 2000, an NDC branch that was organized to mobilize people in the marketplace, particularly along the Railways where the largest amount of Akans (mostly from the Ashanti and Eastern regions) voted. The branch was led by a big man who was working in the NDC government at the time:

> In 2000, you see, there's one MP in Parliament now, he owns PNC Motors. They sell Land Rover and other things. Tata. He was once a Deputy Minister for Trade. In NDC Government. He's an NPP MP now. They came in to say this our kingsmen we can organize them for NDC. They created an NDC group called Global 2000. They did this to try to get people to vote for the NDC. But it was a charade. It was a charade. They did Global 2000 and used that to even become Deputy Minister of Trade. It was his connection in the Trade Ministry that even got him the connections to start PNC Motors. When we lost the election in 2000, he said, oh, I am going back to my mother party. And he went back to the NPP. You can't trust those people over there. So we don't touch them. Initially we thought we could, but we don't want them (ibid).

The strategist suggests that they tried to organize the Akans and traders in 2000, only to be deceived by their leader, a known and popular big man who switched parties. The NDC vows never to make this mistake again, and instead has crafted up a new strategy to win the constituency: do not allow them to register to vote. They have no desire to try to organize them

and win them over to their side; there is no mobilizing agenda based on programmatic lines. Instead, he explains how they actively prevent them from registering to vote:

> I am limiting their numbers. In the voter's register. If they come I will challenge them. They don't live in this community. They come to trade. They must go where they sleep. We are using challenge forms. See, most of them are semi-literate. So when they are challenged and they are not given their ID card, they are told you have to face the District Review Committee before they are given their card, they turn violent, and they turn to attack the agent. They think he is responsible for him not getting their voter's ID card. But it's a process. We have done our research. We know who resides in the area. We have done our house-to-house. We know who are NPP and NDC. We have house-to-house data (ibid).

I asked him how they know who *really* resides in the area, without a proper census of the area. He replies, "People are neighbors. I know my neighbor and he also knows me. My other neighbor also knows me. So these are the houses. If you want to see the layout of all these areas, you have to see these places on Sunday. When there is no commercial traffic. So you can go there all the way and see who resides here." He even showed me the voter's register with particular names circled—all of the names circled were Akan names. They targeted these people to try to prevent them from voting.

The informal institution of settlement even shapes how the strategist interprets the electoral laws. During the biometric registration process, the constituency experienced sporadic acts of violence between parties, as I will explain later in this chapter. The NPP claimed that the NDC prevented their voters from registering; the NDC claimed that they did not live in the constituency and therefore did not have the right to vote there. In the areas of the constituency with large amounts of Akan migrants, the NDC challenged all residents who spoke Twi. But the NDC only had problems with the commercial migrants—typically Akan and NPP—who did not sleep in Odododiodio, but not indigenous Gas who sleep elsewhere. As the strategist explains, "If you mean ordinarily resident, it is my family house. My grandfather comes here. They might

sleep somewhere else, but they are ordinarily resident there." In other words, the NDC interprets that those whose family is from the constituency can register, and these can only be indigenes of Ga Mashie.

The demographics of community organization in Odododiodio constituency have developed along ethnic lines. But as I have shown, this is not because residents are inherently (or primordially) ethnic chauvinists. Instead, democratic political competition takes place in an informal institutional context, and this political sphere has deep historical roots. The political geography of the constituency parallels the way norms of reciprocity have developed—with deep ethnic undertones. Ghana's first president Kwame Nkrumah was also the MP for Odododiodio Constituency; he successfully consolidated Ga Mashie as a stronghold for the Nkrumah tradition. Jerry John Rawlings further consolidated this base during his military rule (1979-1992) and his terms under democracy (1992-2000). Yet grassroots mobilization was intense throughout the decades. Nowhere was this more intense than in the central markets, where the opposition organized under the guise of the Ghana Union of Trader's Association (GUTA). GUTA represented the interests of the traders, the majority of whom were Akan. This became the local stronghold for the NPP. Ghanaians were unable to publicly criticize the government under military rule; instead, GUTA expressed opposition and dissent to the military government's economic policies. The marketplace became a further source of political contention when the central market, called Makola Market, burned down in 1979. This event had serious consequences. On the one hand, Ga women who had controlled the marketplace lost their powerful positions in the market. This is because the Revolutionary government did not discriminate with stalls when the new December 31 market was built. In fact, this only emboldened the Akan traders to use the marketplace as organizational space independent of the

state. An opposition force grew, while leading to a reactionary narrative among Ga market women: “We are losing our markets.” This further inflamed the indigenous narrative: *they* are taking over our marketplaces, and our city. Today, these historical roots continue to be played out in party politics, and the constituency is spatially divided between the central market (NPP territory) and indigenous Ga Mashie (NDC territory).

The strength of the indigenous narrative and its impact on political behavior is most evident among the youth. This section is a short political biography of a Ga Mashie resident. He represents a Ghanaian youth and political activist (or foot soldier) in Ga Mashie. The short biography provides important insights into how a Ga Mashie resident understands and makes sense of his political environment. It further demonstrates the way that the informal institution of indigeneity shapes his political behavior, how he interacts with residents and “outsiders,” and why he votes the way he does. His norms of reciprocity develop along ethnic lines.

“Phobia! Phobia!” Junior yelled to a man across the busy street, “Phobia!” The man looked up and waved. Junior and the man were both fans of the Accra Hearts of Oak, the local football club that gained its support from the Ga faithful. Junior seems to know everybody in Ga Mashie. At the chop bar, he argues about why the NDC is the best party for Ghana. At Blue Gate, the hang out spot for local NPP members, he argues about the latest newspaper headline about an embattled MP. Across from Bukom Park, he argues with a group of youth why Islam “holds the truth.” He constantly runs into “mates from school” and family members he calls “boss.” He frequently tells me “you will love politics here, it is so exciting.” He will only speak his local Ga language; when somebody addresses him in Twi, he goes on a long rant about how when we are in Accra, we need to speak the indigenous Ga language.

Junior gains his livelihood from the different ethnic associations in which he participates. He is a leader in the Concerned Youth of Odododiodio Constituency, a forum that has been supported by Nii Lantey Vanderpuye to support the local youth, but also bolster the aspiring politician's electoral chances. He is involved in the Ga Dangbe Youth Association, a Ga nationalist organization that seeks to advance the interests of the Ga community. He provides some promotional assistance for the boxer Joseph Agbeko, who is from Ga Mashie but is currently boxing internationally and is being promoted by Don King. He occasionally runs errands for various family members; a big man in the family will need a few letters dropped off to various government buildings, and he will ask Junior to deliver the envelope. He will give Junior "something small." He relies on some support from the family head of the moment, a man who works in the Sports Ministry.

Junior's entire political narrative is one of "standing ground." When I talk to him about NDC and NPP, he constantly talks about how "we cannot let them [the NPP] in." He mentions how NDC has never lost a polling station in Ussher Town. He talks about how they must "stand firm" and not allow the NPP—and specifically the Ashantis—to "come in." His whole narrative is very territorial. When we walk by the Post Office, he says, "This is ours. We oversee this land." When we talk NPP-NDC, it's a narrative of "keeping them out." He does not talk about winning people over; rather, it is about standing ground. In the thick of Vanderpuye's campaign for MP, he makes it clear that "Van's campaign cannot allow 'them' to bus people 'in.'" He is in charge of hanging banners at every main intersection with Van and Mills; he explains that they must mark their territory. They need to make it clear that people know it is NDC territory (informal conversation, April 3, 2012). For him, and many youth in Ga Mashie, the "real" Ga people support NDC—the NPP is an Ashanti party.

On June 16, 2012 Junior invited me to his room to have a serious chat (informal conversation, June 16, 2012). He wanted to discuss his future—his desires to get a job so that he can pay for his education. He also needed some money so that he can propose to his girlfriend. He is approaching the age of 30 and he feels like he has to show her that he is serious. To do so, he has to give gifts to the woman's family, and he estimated that the gifts would cost 3,000 Ghana cedis. I told him that I could not provide the money, and I asked him why he did not plan for this big life event. He answered, "Tackie Komme really let us down." He was visibly upset. I did not understand how his inability to pay a bride price was the MP's fault. He explained that Tackie Komme had promised to get a number of the youth in the area jobs at Immigration. Immigration is one of the few government departments where its jobs do not require a college education. People are also known to seek Immigration jobs because it can be lucrative—there are lots of opportunities to take bribes. Junior expected that due to his many years of work for the party, he would be rewarded with a job at Immigration. Junior really expected this to happen and he views this failure as a large contributor to his challenges today. "We had a list and everything and he never submitted the list," Junior continued, "He did not do what he was supposed to do."

After a long back and forth about dependence on politicians, Junior told me that he has a job lined up "as soon as the new districts are created." He has a politically-connected friend who has "promised" him a job in one of the new district offices—45 new districts will be created for the election. However, this will take several months and there is no guarantee that this job will go to him. "Maybe it is time for me to go to Haruna Iddrissu," he said, referring to the Minister of Communication. He had been close to him in the past—he worked on a campaign with him. Now Junior is really stretching—he thinks of all the politicians he can go to who might "link him up." Many youth in Ga Mashie rely on politicians and big men for job opportunities and daily

sustenance. In many cases, youth hang around when they expect a big man to come through the community—they hope for *nokofio,* or something small. Nii Lantey Vanderpuye has been accused of winning over the youth by handing out *nokofio* at campaign rallies and other events. But youth like Junior rely on this money and expect it improve their lives.

It would be easy to discount this behavior as pure vote-buying or turnout buying, but the motivation for this behavior extends much deeper and is better understood as part of a daily problem-solving network (Auyero 2000). It has been a social norm and source of political authority since pre-colonial times that family heads in Ga Mashie provide welfare to his followers. In indigenous settlements, these personal networks form along ethnic lines. Youth treat their role in these personal networks as employees: they run errands for big men, and they get compensated in return. In places where jobs are scarce, this reciprocal exchange enforces clientelistic politics, but is also an ordinary part of daily life. Reducing these problem-solving networks to instrumental mechanisms to garner votes obscures the historical and sociological dimension that this norm of reciprocity takes.

The big men who Junior relies on do not live in Ga Mashie. His most important patron lives in the nearby suburb of North Kaneshie. Tackie Komme, the current MP bought a house far away and is rarely seen walking through the community. When I asked former MP Nii Ayi Bonte whether he lives in the community, he replied, "There's no accommodation space. I cannot live there with wife and children. How many people have their own private toilets?" (personal interview, June 8, 2012). Rather than improving the community and upgrading the slum, leaders tend to move out and only return during election time. They are accused of using youth like Junior for their own political gain. As the former Mayor explains, "They are also bedeviled by the fact that they don't have too many leaders. When Gas become successful they

move out of the community. They rarely come back to the community. There is a dislocation between Ga Bourgeoisie and relatives in Bukom" (personal interview, March 22, 2012). The youth admit that this undermines accountability, as one man asked rhetorically, "Like you are a parent, and you sleep in Dansoman and your children sleep at Kinka, how can you control him?" (focus group, June 20, 2012). I asked Junior if there is anybody he can go to for advice, to mentor him. He responded, "Vanderpuye is the one. But he is too busy for me right now" (informal conversation, June 16, 2012).

Like I showed in Chapter 3 in Old Fadama, norms of reciprocity develop along ethnic lines. But unlike Old Fadama, Ga Mashie is structured by families, or institutionalized clubs that organize the community. Claiming to be part of these clubs provides an important source of power and answer to the ever important question "who settled first, and how." The claim of indigeneity can provide a particularly powerful impetus to secure state resources, thereby undermining other potentially powerful alliances like class, business, or cosmopolitan demands. But the underlying norms of reciprocity allow state goods to be "captured" and shared along club lines. These norms are hard to break, and have become a guiding principle in Ghanaian politics.

Owning the city: Indigeneity and entitlement

Directly outside Nii Lantey Vanderpuye's office in Central Accra, two men walked past a group of young girls who were sleeping on the pavement. The girls were *kayayei*, or head porters from the northern regions of Ghana who migrated to Accra to find work. Most *kayayei* are under sixteen years of age, do not attend schools, and are extremely poor. One of the men sneered and displayed his disgust at the girls. The other man then complained, "Ahhh, these girls. And on Accra property!" (December 15, 2011). This is a common view that Accra residents, especially

Gas, have against migrants in the city. Indigenous Ga residents do not see the challenges facing the *kayayei* as a socio-economic problem that confronts all Ghanaians, or portions of the urban poor. Instead, they portray the women as migrants and trespassers who are stains on the city. This belief also underlies policymaking: the Accra Metropolitan Assembly is dominated by the Ga ethnic group and they form a strong interest group when it comes to development policy and slum upgrading.

As owners and custodians of Accra, the Ga leadership makes demands on the government by evoking the language of entitlement to the land. While the Accra Metropolitan Assembly has identified more than 80 slum areas in Accra, Ga Mashie was chosen as a sight for slum upgrading, supported by UN-HABITAT and other international organizations. As Nii Tackie Tagoe, the Executive Director of the Ga Mashie Development Association, explained, "[Ga Mashie] is an indigenous area and it needs upliftment" (personal interview, June 21, 2012). He explained that the next communities in line for upgrading are Korle Gonno and Chorkor, two indigenous slums. He explained that other communities include squatters, and they do not deserve state resources when "there are people here who 'need development.'" The Ga nationalist organization Ga-Dangme Council make a similar claim: "the GaDangme are falling behind as Ghana moves forward" (quoted in Grant 2009: 125). This is a common sentiment of Ga nationalists, but also policymakers who are heavily influenced by Ga interest groups and lobbyists.

In the context of multi-party democracy and human rights, the informal institution of indigeneity shapes how Ga community leaders make claims to land and property in Accra. Leaders evoke their indigenous ownership and make social justice assertions and to re-claim land that their family members sold off several years before. This strategy can be particularly

lucrative because land values in Accra are increasing rapidly. For example, Nii Owoo is a family elder and his family is engulfed in a court case over land. The Owoo clan is trying to reclaim a plot of land that Owoo's ancestors sold to the colonial government in 1921. The family is suing the Achimota School, arguing that the school has not used the land for the educational purposes that they expressed when they bought the land in 1921. The school is now using it for an eco-tourism park. The family is embroiled in a court case demanding the land back.

Owoo constantly told me that it is a burden on him as a family elder to lead his people without land. "It will be difficult to take care of my people," he told me (personal interview, July 5, 2012). He showed me the court documents. It stated that the family has "lost" more than 90% of its lands through government acquisitions, "rendering the family virtually landless." Nii Owoo emphasized the injustice and how his family is suffering. The document continued, "The Nii Owoo family is desperate and concerned about the plight of the indigent and landless Gamashie people." He then emphasized the injustices of colonialism. "The land was compulsorily acquired," he explained to me. "We did not buy it according to proper value. We were forced to sell it."

But Nii Owoo is a controversial and polarizing figure. He is the head pastor of the Rejected Cornerstone International Ministry, a charismatic church in Ga Mashie. While the church boasts more than 200 hundred followers, some residents in the surrounding area express their distrust of the church. One resident says that the church steals the money of the followers and the pastor uses it for his personal empowerment—he is accused of being a false prophet. Nii Owoo is also a political figure. He explains, "If a pastor says he is not a politician, he may not know what he is doing. All pastors are politicians. And pretending does not bring us anywhere." He is an NDC activist and works on Nii Lantey Vanderpuye's campaign and publicly supports

him. “As regards for Nii Lantey, I see what he can do. How he relates to the indigenous people. I choose him,” he says. He uses his political connections to assist him with his court case. He explains, “I sent him documents to give to the President. He is helpful with relations to the President.” Nii Owoo is also the Executive Director for a land investment firm: he attempts to use his political connections and influential Ga networks to profit from the growing Accra land market. Many other family heads have also stepped into this position of power.

The claims of historical injustices through the rhetoric of indigeneity are common in Accra today. The Asere Kingmaker makes a similar claim:

> We are not lucky. All the Natives of the city, in every country, the government has taken lots of land without paying any compensation. It deprives you of taking care of your people. If our grandfathers did not give our land out, we could take care of our people. The government is trying to find ways to invest in lands so chiefs can take care of people. How can I take care of my people? (personal interview, July 5, 2012).

But skeptics blame the chiefs for “filling their own pockets” and not investing back in the community. The youth complain that “Our leaders don’t help us, they care about themselves alone” (focus group, June 20, 2012). Because the traditional authorities control access to land, they can make a heavy profit when land is sold. The Asere Kingmaker explains the process: “The lands belong to the family. The family has to sell the land. Then the family brings the paper to me and I sign it. So my name is on the paper. I don’t sell land. I just get the signing fee” (personal interview, July 5, 2012). But even the Asere Kingmaker’s position is in dispute—his brother is now claiming the position. The problem is that his brother is a known supporter of the NPP and is a well-educated lawyer who is affiliated with the Ga Traditional Council. The Asere Kingmaker, on the other hand, is aligned with the NDC (although he claims that he “does not do politics”) and has enstooled a disputed Gbese Mantse and Ga Mantse. The belief on the ground is that customary law privileges big men and politicians to benefit from the land market. The fact is

that land access and control is politicized, contributing to insecurity and deep divisions in the community.

While the true motivations of leaders like Nii Owoo and the Asere Kingmaker are unknown, the role of Ga leaders in the Accra land market is undisputed. But what is less known is the way that local leaders benefit from the customary land institutions. The institution of indigeneity shapes the incentives for community leaders to keep land and property rights ambiguous in order to benefit from rising land values (Onoma 2010). Mr. Ashley explains how the land market works: "One of our brothers will sell a piece of land. They will collect the money and immediately tell their cousin. The cousin will then go to the plot with macho men and demand payment, saying it is their plot. They do this constantly" (informal conversation, April 5, 2012). The land market has established an illicit business where community members serve as landguards and "macho men" for area big men. For example, on April 9 a man drove by a local chop bar in a flashy Mercedes convertible. He was the former Mayor's bodyguard, and also a landguard. The man profited by winning land deals; now he is driving around Ga Mashie with a Mercedes convertible (April 9, 2012). In a slum like Ga Mashie, unemployed and uneducated young men find lucrative employment opportunities by working as landguards and macho men. The institution of indigeneity provides further incentive: the Ga people are the owners and custodians of the land—they have the right to control it, access it, and profit from it. While it is difficult to get accurate data on how widespread this behavior is, the ethnographic evidence suggests that land ownership and entitlement to Accra shapes the power dynamics of Ga Mashie in daily life. Residents also perceive it to be a big problem, and many family struggles and rivalries are fought because of land disputes.

These dynamics are intensified in the dual transition of political liberalization and rapid urbanization. The Ghanaian government has a mandate to carry out development projects. With the political and economic center of the country in Accra, the Ghanaian government relies on their close connections with Ga family heads to purchase land for development. Therefore, the exchange of customary entitlements for land is a self-enforcing mechanism of particularistic politics. But these are not norms of reciprocity that serve the public interest, but rather a small club or family interest.

Unintended consequences of electoral competition

"It's only [partisan] politics. Otherwise we are okay" is a common response that residents give about the sources of distrust and divisions in local African communities. In indigenous settlements like Ga Mashie, partisan politics can fuel deep mistrust in the slum, as residents accuse their neighbors of using political parties to bolster their family and private interests. But perhaps more damaging is the strategies and tactics that are used during election times to displace outsiders and prevent strangers from registering in the community, threatening the ability of residents from diverse ethnic groups to come together and promote the public interest. Contrary to existing theories of democratic quality that suggest electoral competition and political party institutionalization increases the quality of democracy, this section shows the unintended consequence of political competition when embedded in the indigenous institution of settlement.

Voter registration is a crucial part of winning elections in Ghana, and across Africa. Much of the controversy and anger surrounding elections can be traced back to the registration process. Campaign strategists explain that victories are decided during voter registration.

Candidates use different strategies to gain advantages; they also run into problems of disqualification that stick with them for several years. For example, parliamentary candidate Nii Lantey Vanderpuye was disqualified in 2004, accused of double registration—registering the same voter twice. He has spent the previous eight years trying to clear his name, both in the Courts and also among the voters. Alternatively, Vanderpuye's campaign strategist explains how the decisions that he made during the registration exercise in 2004 working for a different candidate lost him the election. He explained the decision to inaugurate a Special Ward for Old Fadama in order to register their voters, "We created that ward in 2004—the Chairman, [the Candidate] and I. We inaugurated four branches so that we could get eight more votes [of the delegates]. It turns out, we lost those votes [and hence the election]" (personal interview, January 11, 2012). Finally, registration exercises are opportunities for democratic learning. In young democracies with brief experiences with elections, registration exercises offer a trial run or preliminary heat for the real thing—without international observers looking on. In the lead up to Ghana's 2012 election, Ghanaians would be using biometric verification for the first time. Biometric registration is a tactic used to register voters using their thumbprint; this prevents the problem of double registration that has been shown to be a serious problem during African elections. In this way, the exercise added a new opportunity for Ghanaians to experience politics, have their voices heard, and interact with their politicians. Yet the outcome of this process was directly attributed to the underlying politics of indigeneity and belonging that shaped the rules of the game in the community.

The biometric registration exercise began on March 24, 2012, eight months before the December 2012 elections. It was one of the first chances to see the strength of the organizational apparatuses of each candidate, and their ability to mobilize supporters. Tension between the

political parties started even before the official exercise, as the March 20 Joy News report suggests:

> Dozens injured in clashes between NDC, NPP supporters at Odododiodio. A scuffle between some supporters of the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) in the Odododiodio constituency last night left several people injured. The scuffle ensued when a meeting called by NPP activists in the constituency was interrupted by some youth from the NDC.

In many ways, this altercation set the stage for further tension during the registration exercise. The political party supporters explained that the problem was local, and was about a meeting that went on at the candidate's house. One NDC supporter explained, "Some of the other side was having a meeting just outside our PC's house. It was very disrespectful. So our guys had to go chase them away" (informal conversation, March 24, 2012).

For many of the slum residents, particularly the youth, partisan politics evokes great emotional attachments and feelings of disrespect. These feelings of disrespect fuel the process of political mobilization. These feelings are especially strong among the youth, who take commands from the organizers in the party office. During the first week of the exercise, the NDC accused the NPP of bussing people into the constituency to register. The NDC split the campaign into three teams: the Youth whose job was to attract and mobilize voters (and scare outsiders from entering the constituency), the Executive team who planned rallies and events, and PC Vanderpuye's team who was to raise money (informal conversation, April 2, 2012).

Observing the registration exercise on a consistent, daily basis shows how the entire process is strategic and well-organized. There are extremely high levels of political party institutionalization in Ga Mashie. Registering voters has a very important logic that all members of the campaign understood. The campaign team built on an insider-outsider narrative that stressed the indigeneity of the Ga ethnic group—the majority of who supported the NDC. The

youth claim that they "know who live in their houses" and if an outsider "who they do not know" tries to register, they use a formal "challenge" to intimidate the potential voters and scare them from voting in the constituency. The boundaries between ethnic group and political party blurs when discussing politics with residents in Ga Mashie. The NPP is perceived as being an Akan-based party; therefore, the NDC tries not to let Akans "in" because that will mean the NPP will gain political power. But politicians also try to physically mark their territory—create a political space of their own—by placing large banners and posters everywhere. These posters become a central part to people's daily life during the electoral process, and residents cannot escape these images.

The NDC was particularly aggressive in challenging registration at the border areas of the constituency: the railways, markets, and Fire Station (informal conversation, April 5, 2012). With limited resources at their disposal, the NDC had to decide where they should send their workers to "quell registration." They strategically chose areas where there would be outsiders and Akans: marketplaces and railways. The NPP executives reported that this caused problems, claiming that the NDC came with Macho Men and told people not to register. After some disagreements, the police came and the commander even fired warning shots to create order. The NDC strategy clearly had an ethnic dimension: they were challenging anyone who speaks Twi, not knowing whether they are CPP, NDC or NPP (of course assuming they were NPP sympathizers). They did this to try to intimidate them and make it difficult for all Akans to register in the area.

Everyday talk coincided very closely with the strategies that the politicians use to win elections. Residents also think about their neighborhood in terms of political divisions—their sense of daily geography—which often overlie with ethnic divisions. Despite the problems in the

community, and even within the NDC itself, Ghanaian residents constantly claim that they are unified. They constantly told me that they "are one," and the fact that the parties could meet each other and try to settle their disputes was evidence of this. For example, the NPP and NDC meet on Wednesday evenings within a three minute walk from each other. The political parties meet at the same time on Wednesday evenings. After the meetings those in attendance will join each other again: sitting outside their homes, having drinks, and watching their children. Their children play together; they go to "outdoorings" together.

Daily accounts of the registration exercise expose the important interest groups in the community; in this case, youth groups like footballers and bikers. These informal interest groups are important because they command great mobilization power, and they can create a lot of noise. Politicians distribute club goods to these groups to attract their support, although it is hardly a quid pro quo. Nonetheless, it sometimes makes an impact, as one resident describes that he has supported the NDC candidate "since he supported the boxers" (informal conversation, April 5, 2012). Consistent ethnographic research exposes the public opinion of important informal interest groups on the ground. These groups are rarely counted in public opinion polls. Campaigns do not always need to use strategies of persuasion; instead, the NDC takes a defensive approach by trying to maintain the demographic status quo.

But the stakes are extremely high during the registration exercise, and this led to extreme tensions that contributed to violent activity. Two weeks into the registration exercise these tensions boiled over, as *Myjoyonline News* reports: "The New Patriotic Party is incensed at what it says is an act of thuggery being perpetrated by the aspiring Member of Parliament for Odododiodoo and presidential aide, Nii Lantey Vanderpuiye. The party has thus issued a 24-hour ultimatum for the acts of violence and thuggery to stop or they will take steps to protect their

members." It is extremely difficult to trust the media reports with the truth in Ghana. Not only are the media stations heavily politically polarized, but they also report the news in such a direct fashion without doing deep investigatory work. In other words, political parties will make claims and reports to the media outlets and they will be reported directly. Therefore, the news reports might be objective, but they might only report exactly what the political parties send them.

The tension reached its peak when NPP politician and Akan Ursula Owusu visited the community on April 11 and tried to reassure market women that they had the right to register in the constituency and to not be afraid. She was allegedly attacked by a group of macho men. The scene was becoming more and more polarized. For example, the administrative secretary of the NDC explained that the entire political process sincerely bothered her and that she was "scared for her life" (informal conversation, April 12, 2012). She was less scared of the local boys than the national party members, especially Ursula Owusu, who has a reputation for being violent. She continued, "We will not let that happen again this time. We have to stand our ground. We have to fight back. This time we are armed—we will not let them bully us" (informal conversation, April 12, 2012).

The unintended consequence of the registration exercise was the transformation of everyday life into an arena of tribalism and ethnic chauvinism. Ordinary residents started evoking the language that the political parties used, and blaming the other party. As the administrative secretary explained—a daughter of a minister and leading choir member in the local church, no less—that "they" were causing the violence and it was time to "stand our ground," even that "we are armed." But what was more surprising was that for many, peoples' sense of security had changed—the level of fear had risen and their community felt like a battleground. As one resident explained, "But why Ursula? They did not need to bring her in"

(informal conversation, April 12, 2012). In the past Owusu has been to the constituency and it has caused problems. She has allegedly riled up support and played her own tribal card in previous years.

The entire situation became politicized by the political parties involved. On April 12, the NPP held a press conference in Ga Mashie. A national figure in the NPP began the press conference:

> We don't want to get to the point where we perpetrate violence against women. We have to stop this. Nobody tolerates women being hit. Violence against women cannot be tolerated. Women beat at Makola Market—is that what we want in this country? This marks a dark time in Ghana's history under Rawlings dictatorship when market women were beaten naked at the central market.

The NPP strategically made the violence into a gender issue to mobilize support of women. They also politicized the issue by connecting it to the violence that the founder of the NDC, Jerry John Rawlings, presided over. The next speaker was Professor Oquaye, a well-known NPP politician and prominent Ga leader:

> The NDC candidate has declared this a no-go area from those he perceives as physical opponents. He is representing his own interests and not the interests of the Ga people—I say so as a proud Ga. Gas love to live with all and sundry, we say Ablekuma Ablekuma wo – meaning we want to welcome strangers so as to make progress together. The NPP belongs to all tribes.

While tension was high for several days, the leaders took it upon themselves to settle their dispute and meet for a "Peacemaking Ceremony." The two politicians met seaside and agreed to settle their differences. But interestingly, this happened without the formal procedures of the Electoral Commission, Police, or Judges. It was an informal event.

Throughout the registration exercise, I had several in-depth conversations with the executive members from both political parties. Some of the most interesting campaign strategies came from these informal discussions. For example, on April 17 the NDC secretary showed me

the 2004 Registration register they were using to target potential voters. The Secretary knew the tribes of all potential voters, and used the booklets to systematically target individual voters. He uses the names as ethnic cues for which voters to target. The Secretary was honest: "The Electoral Commission has done its best. But they are not fully in control of the process" (personal interview, April 17, 2012). In its stead, the political parties play by the rules that the underlying informal institution of settlement provides them.

The example of the biometric registration exercise shows how tensions rose; peoples' sense of security changed; and politicians and elites used these underlying fluctuations in the everyday context to mobilize support. Elites skillfully navigated the everyday context by living through it, but also contributing to the existing social and political divisions. This example also demonstrates how political competition and political party institutionalization can erode democratic quality in indigenous settlements, seeding deep distrust along ethnic lines. This is not to say that political competition is not an ideal in its own right, but rather that the underlying informal context shapes what this competition will look like and whether it will contribute to a broader public interest, or as this case shows, contribute to the strengthening of a club interest. The implication is clear: indigenous politics threatens democratic collective action that is at the heart of a quality democracy, even though it serves political value and instigates collective action among indigenous factions (Hilgers 2011).

Customary entitlements and club goods

Indigenous settlements like Ga Mashie present a puzzle for the study of public goods in new democracies. On the one hand, indigeneity is a powerful resource that communities can use to secure state resources. This enables indigenous communities to secure the provision of public toilets, roads, drainage systems, and streetlights. In this way, indigenous settlements have strong

state capacity and infrastructural power. But once in the community's jurisdiction, these services do not necessary benefit the public interest. Instead, powerful leaders secure customary entitlements from the state, and use the proceeds from these services to empower their families—a club interest. The informal institution of settlement does not enable accountable governance, but rather undermines public goods of the community. The informal institution of settlement creates competing incentives that undermine the formal rules of the game, shifting what should be public services like toilets, schools, markets and sanitation into club goods that benefit particular families.

This is apparent in the example at the beginning of this book where Samuel Ashalley Addey-Ashley secured the contract for Salaga Market due to his control of the land and political connections to the MP, and used the proceeds to empower his family. The struggle for contracts for public service projects becomes politicized: in 2008 the rehabilitation project for Salaga Market was planned, but the contract was re-provisioned to a different family beneficiary after the NDC came to office in 2008. The rehabilitation project became a public debate and there was no work done on the project until Vanderpuye came to power in 2012.

Examples like this abound. The public toilet in James Town is so mismanaged that the youth gang who manages the toilet would not even let my team of researchers enter the facility. Residents in this part of Ga Mashie are forced to use private toilets or walk ten minutes to the beach. Development projects are understood as club goods by family heads in Ga Mashie. Jobs with Zoomlion also are distributed as political favors to youth clubs, forcing youth into personal and political problem-solving networks in order to meet the needs of daily survival. Alternatively, the owner of the "public toilet" in Otubluhom takes pride in his business, and explains that he secured the contract as a customary entitlement for his role as custodian of the

land. He takes great pride in his territorial authority over the people of Otubluhom—it brings him great pride and social approval. It is through these mechanisms of social approval that leaders will be accountable to their followers.

The arguments presented in this chapter demonstrate that ethnic homogeneity in an indigenous context undermines public service provision. But, perhaps more importantly, the chapter suggests that ethnic identification and trust between groups does not take place in a political vacuum, but rather in a context where the struggle for resources and power is front and central. The dual transition of political liberalization and rapid urbanization only heightens these struggles. The customary nature of land access and ownership in Ghana contributes to a situation where indigenous claims to land can become a very powerful tool to demand state resources, but can serve exclusionary purposes (Berman 1997; Voth, Voigtländer, and Satyanath 2013; Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson 2013). This is one important reason why the study of social capital and ethnicity should not be understood in a political or institutional vacuum. Instead, the informal institution of settlement shapes how social capital is used and the way politics is played—from the way that leaders interact to their followers to how organizations and associations form in daily life. Ethnicity matters, but only in the context of the historical process of indigenous settlement.

Chapter 5: Democratic Learning and Collective Capacity in Slum Settlements

Based on an ethnographic account of multi-party politics in Ashaiman, one of Ghana's largest slums that is now a city with diverse settlements, this chapter argues that the initial informal institution of purchased settlement created rules and procedures that privilege democratic learning. Specifically, the institutions of leadership contribute to a democratic environment that enables the collective capacity to get things done: Community leaders have the incentive to solve collective concerns in the public interest, residents overcome ethnic and religious differences to demand goods from the state, and community members struggle to overcome insecure land tenure institutions. These democratic practices are supported by a civic life that fosters strong leaders, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, and state legal recognition. The chapter demonstrates how slum communities can overcome structural barriers to effect transformational change, in the process creating new institutions that facilitate collective capacity and democratic activity.

Introduction

Just outside Tema, a city that has Ghana's largest harbor, citizens of Ashaiman slum "learn democracy." But the process does not involve merely voting and political campaigning—it also includes local struggles for power, citizen demands on the state, and the re-creation of traditional norms to fit a modern, liberal-democratic environment. Since residents began squatting in the early 1960s and building makeshift structures from the containers of the nearby port, the slum has grown rapidly to more than 200,000 people. Despite the dense settlement patterns, poor infrastructure, high levels of ethnic heterogeneity, and the challenges of global capitalism that include high levels of unemployment and poverty, residents and leaders of Ashaiman have come together to demand legal recognition and political representation. They are now undergoing the process of democratic learning as they attempt to govern themselves. This crucial case of "bottom up" or organic slum upgrading motivates an important question: In the context of global capitalism, how do slum communities overcome challenging structural conditions of insecurity, poverty, and weak formal institutions to improve their collective well-being? How do slums transform into well-functioning cities?

In this chapter, I suggest an alternative way to understanding democracy in slum settlements: democracy as the collective capacity to get things done (Ober 2008). Ashaiman's initial pattern of settlement—where settlers purchased land and established authority at the grassroots—enabled the collective capacity of community members to organize together and "get things done" in the public interest. The informal institution of purchased settlement creates incentives for local leaders to invest back in the community, residents of different ethnic groups and religions to come together and demand public goods and services from the state, and community members to struggle to overcome insecure land tenure institutions. Due to the enormous growth of Ashaiman, it is no longer analytically useful to look at Ashaiman as one slum, but rather a city made up of various neighborhoods (some of which are slums). Therefore, this chapter analyzes specific Ashaiman neighborhoods like Tulako and Zongo to compare and contrast the experience of institutional change, but it also treats the Ashaiman experience as a unified political experience in order to compare to Old Fadama and Ga Mashie.

The case of Ashaiman shows that communities can overcome institutional barriers and effect transformational change—communities can shift the institutional path to improve their collective welfare and pull themselves out of poverty. Communities are not destined on a path dependent process of persistent poverty. But this process is not simply a matter of strengthening formal institutions, rule of law, and norms of human rights. Instead, democratic learning is the outcome of a combination of community-level factors: quality community leadership, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, and state legal recognition. Slum upgrading depends on the collective capacity to get things done at the local level. The informal institution of purchased settlement incentivizes community leaders to live in their community and seek solutions for the

public interest, residents to overcome ethnic differences and come together to demand goods and services from the state, and community members to fight for secure and official legal status.

The view from within the slum—derived from ethnographic data that emphasizes networks, processes, and spontaneity in decision-making—suggests that democratic learning has become institutionalized, creating rules and incentives that privilege the collective capacity to get things done. Multi-party politics and Ghana's emerging human rights agenda facilitate this process, contributing to the strengthening of political accountability and effective, organic slum-upgrading. Politicians, community leaders, and residents draw on a variety of cultural and institutional resources to "live through" the process of democratic learning and purchased settlement, finding ways to benefit from the institutional arrangement (Berk and Galvan 2009). In doing so, this behavior leads to the collective capacity to get things done, improvements in political accountability, and transformational change.

Democratic politics in purchased settlements

How does democracy "work" in purchased slum settlements? What impact does the initial pattern of purchased settlement have on multi-party democracy? This chapter will demonstrate how the institution of purchased settlement shapes the type of community leadership, the form of community organization, and the legal claims involving land that residents and leaders make. It will also provide empirical evidence that shows how community leaders, political parties and residents benefit from the slum's purchased settlement status and how it contributes to public goods provision and political accountability.

Community Leadership: First, the informal institution of purchased settlement structures the type of leader who will be selected for formal political office. Leaders are selected based on

their level of community service, and not solely on tribe, religion, or political affiliation. Leaders have the incentive to invest in the community and provide service to the neighborhood because residents purchased their property and plan on living there indefinitely. Second, community well-being underlies political accountability in purchased settlements; if leaders do not serve the community interest, they will be voted out of political office. Third, community leaders have the incentive to hold each other to account and come together to push for effective change. In a growing city, economic and political opportunities are abundant. Leaders have the incentive to work together to benefit from these opportunities, thereby creating an institutional environment whereby leaders compete and "learn democracy" together. Fourth, leaders must live in the community. This facilitates political accountability because residents have the opportunity to voice their grievances, shame their leaders, and make life difficult for leaders who do not do their jobs—leaders do not have an exit option (Ermakoff 2011).

Norms of Reciprocity: First, the informal institution of purchased settlement enables community organization to develop along "programmatic" lines, not solely ethnic, class or religious lines. Residents join friends clubs, self-help groups, football fan clubs and political associations that span beyond ethnic affiliation. This fosters cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, where the sharing of goods and services extends across ethnic groups. Second, residents have the incentive to organize formal local associations because opportunities are distributed to formally organized groups. This includes private goods through political parties and NGOs, but also public services from the District Assembly. Third, local youth must respect leaders and authority because they provide jobs. Therefore, youth do not have the opportunities to gain social mobility without the support of local authority—therefore, they toe the line. These three factors facilitate

the growth of cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, where the social expectation of sharing goods and resources with members from different ethnic groups is institutionalized in daily life.

Legal Status: In neighborhoods that have not been legally recognized by the state, residents come together to fight for legal recognition. They make claims based on their history of purchasing the plot; politics involve these claims. Neighborhoods that have legal recognition are well-demarcated and incorporated into the Municipal Assembly's development plans. Therefore, the provision of public services is mandated, and the local struggle for power revolves around who will manage the public services, like toilets. This does not mean that service provision is a given or that politicians will be accountable to the citizenry, but it does mean that public service provision is the jurisdiction of the formal political domain. That said, informal political activity continues to structure provision of services through the form of "toilet wars" and struggles for government contracts, where the fight for power occurs within the governing political party. The informal institution of purchased settlement enables longstanding, wealthy leaders to consolidate their control through their involvement in the governing political party.

Stepping into power: Making politicians from community leaders

"He is learning. We are still learning."—Mr. Zonyira on the Mayor and politics in Ashaiman

Recount the story at the beginning of this study whereby a drunk driver drove his supply truck into an electricity pole in the Tulako neighborhood of Ashaiman. The story is notable for the active response of community members and the leaders to take care of the problem and get the electricity back on by the end of the day. All of this occurred despite the fact that the owner of the vehicle was a known "big man" in town, and could influence formal authorities. Yet, the Assemblyman faced intense pressure from the community to get the power back as soon as

possible and the Assemblyman was able to pressure the Electricity Company of Ghana to fix the pole—and even upgrade the electricity line in the process.

This story demonstrates how the Tulako neighborhood had the collective capacity to get things done—to fix the problem and make sure that the electricity was back on as soon as possible. The story includes a leader with the authority, legitimacy and ability to lead, community members (both elders and youth) with the desire to participate in the community decision-making, and the utility company who had the incentive to get the power back on as soon as they could. But the sequence of events also reveals how politics and decision-making occurs in the informal realm, outside of formal institutions and official space. Community members refused to report to the police, compile a formal report to ECG, or seek the assistance of the Municipal Assembly; residents took matters into their own hands to fix the problem. Why were they able to do this? What conditions made this possible?

The Assemblymen in Tulako are respected opinion leaders who have established themselves as community leaders. Honorable Yakubu has lived in the neighborhood for more than ten years and runs a small shop. Honorable C has lived in the area for almost twenty years and runs a school, as well as several small businesses. Youth gather at his compound to discuss timely political and social issues. Both leaders are seen walking through the community on a daily basis. Residents even joke that Yakubu greets people too much—"He is always walking around greeting people!" one resident laughs. A group of youth explains that they appreciate "his contribution to development, his participation in communal labor, how he visits the people in their homes, how humane he is" (focus group, June 3, 2012)." Residents refer to him as the "father" of the community because he is approachable and takes care of issues that are of interest to the community well-being (focus group, June 14, 2012). Perhaps most importantly, the

leadership is not dominated by one tribe, as community members explain, "Since growing up different tribes have had their members as Assembly member. The first Assembly man was an Ewe, and then we had Dagbani, Ga and Dagbani assembly members" (focus group, June 14, 2012).

Residents are very close to the Assemblymen: they live together, eat together, and hang out with them. As Assemblyman Thomas Adongo explains:

> Here, the nature of the settlement, you are close to the Assemblyman—they don't feel isolated. They will come knock on your door at all times. In some areas, the Assemblyman is a lion—you are afraid to get close. But not here. In the chop bar, I eat with them. Our sandals are the same, we live here. We do everything on rank and file. Patronage of the Assemblyman is very high. Sometimes I cannot even sleep! (personal interview, February 13, 2012).

While I spoke to Adongo, he pointed to the stack of light bulbs that were sitting in the corner. They were bulbs for streetlights. He explained that he bought them with his own money so that when a stoplight went out he would just have the Assembly put it back in. "If I waited for the Assembly to get it done, it would never get done. So I had to do it myself. And it was my own money! If I don't do it, I won't sleep." He went on, "It is expensive to be an Assemblyman here."

Demographically, the ethnic make-up of Tulako is similar to Old Fadama. There is a significant number of Dagombas and Ewes. But the authority pattern in Tulako differs because landlords settled early and purchased structures; they then became opinion leaders in the community. One resident explains how this plays an important role in community affairs, "Here, you rent a room in a house where there is a land lord who advises you, and stops you from misbehaving, but over there [in Old Fadama] people own their kiosks, they are not living in houses, so they do what they want good or bad" (focus group, June 3, 2012). Another community

member explains, “Well if you look at our house we have honest landlord who serve us as leaders, then also we have elected leader the assemblyman also a good leader” (ibid). A third community member explains, “Here, we have older people who talk to us. They calm us down. In Old Fadama, it is mostly young people” (informal conversation, March 9, 2012). Residents also rely on the elders for jobs. Youth work for elders who own butcher shops, transport companies, restaurants, and auto-repair garages. Therefore, youth are forced to respect and submit to authority for daily livelihood and survival. One young university student explains how these landlords serve as de facto parents:

> The land lord of this house, his name is Father Abdullai. So will you say if I am in this community Father Abdullai can serve as my father. Yes if you have problem, you just go to him even if he does not solve he will guide you to solve it. You will realize that there many people around all because we are having naming ceremony here, if I tell you that the father of the child is not here will you believe? No. but that is the case and everything went well thanks to father Abdullai, do you now understand why he is seen us our father? (focus group, June 3, 2012).

Community leaders are expected to act as parents and guides, and this bolsters their legitimacy in the community. It also provides them with the political capital to get things done.

This does not mean all leaders are good. One resident explains:

> Look we have ‘419’ leaders in this community. The ‘419’ is English let me break it down for you to understand, if I you put in leadership position and entrust money in your care and you don’t do your work and keeps spending our money then you are ‘419’ leader. We have him in this community and we know him. Who is he? I will not mention any name but he is a community leader and also family head. *Why do you think he is a bad leader?* In life there must be a leader, so we chose him to lead us but he is traitor because when he goes somewhere to represent us he takes money keeps quiet (focus group, June 3, 2012).

Leaders like this exist in every community. But the difference with Tulako is that they have the collective capacity to choose new leaders and hold them accountable. Leaders did not approve of

this man's behavior, so they mobilized against him. In Tulako, and Ashaiman as a whole, community leaders step into formal positions of power and become politicians. When politicians do not perform, they are voted out of power. Residents explain that this is how they select their leaders: "Here we select on character. And community service. Whoever will do it right. If you consider tribe or religion, it can lead to conflict" (ibid). But this is not simply a matter of formal institutions—the Tulako community has the underlying conditions to make these formal institutions work. Leaders hold each other to account because they all have the incentive to improve the neighborhood, not simply their own house. As leader and politician Ibrahim Baidoo explains, "The people who gained a voice in Ashaiman were already leaders on the ground. Then they entered into formal positions" (personal interview, February 13, 2012). He continued, "The community has nurtured leaders and they are taking up leadership positions."

Like Ghana as a whole, many of the politicians established their authority as teachers when they settled in Ashaiman. "The majority of the people in Parliament," NPP MP aspirant Seji Saji Amedonu told me, "are teachers. They are already involved in the community and have respect. This is more common in the rural areas, but it appears to hold for Ashaiman as well" (personal interview, February 15, 2012). This is the case for Amedonu who taught for the Ashaiman Government School in the early 1990s and has been involved with the African Centre for Energy Policy, Youth Development Commonwealth Training, the National Youth Platform, and the UNDP (which sought to develop a National Youth Charter). Two of the three leading candidates for Ashaiman's MP seat are trained teachers. One of them is a proprietor for a private school that sits prominently in the center of town. Across the street from the school is a private health clinic, also run by the aspirant. Starting schools and working as teachers demonstrate a leader's ability to provide a social good, build the trust of his constituents (and can even use the

distribution of school fees as political favors), and make some money. These provide crucial advantages to the candidates when they attempt to build their political followings.

The most important source of authority and leadership in Ashaiman is service to the community. While tribal and family affiliations are important, they are not sufficient for the accumulation of a large group of followers. Leaders are expected to represent the neighborhood as a whole and not just one interest group. In a focus group with local leaders, the participants discussed how they became leaders in the community:

> [Leaders gain power and authority] from the way they are asking, from the angle they are coming from, is just like you are in the community you give participatory services, you interact with the people, the way you behave with the people then they get to know you, after you have always been maybe, let's say handling yourself and the way you manage with peoples affairs come out to give you that position, so that when you come out and say you are coming to do this when you are given the mandate, but from your exemplary behavior they take it and you are given the mantle (focus group, May 5, 2012).

Like the story at the beginning of the chapter demonstrates, leaders are expected to assist with daily survival and coordinate public goods projects in the community:

> Fire outbreak you go there, if you cannot fight it yourself, the role that you play, if there is a flood somewhere, you go there, the role that you play, you know the commitment of yourself gives you that position. *And how about all of you who are leaders in the community, how were, why are you leaders?* As we said when there is a problem, one has to come out boldly as a man, you don't have to say I don't care about somebody, it is me and my family, if you do that you can't be a leader, you have to think of somebody as yourself, if there is a problem, even if you don't have the means, you can do something by advising, showing the way that you will solve the problem, that is how most of us became leaders. And from sometimes too, charity begins at home, the way we are a cosmopolitan community, where we serve our individual tribes, from the way you appear with your people, and from the way people make their enquiries about your background, they will give you the nod to become a leader (ibid).

Most local politicians and Assemblymen in Ashaiman are new to politics, but they have stepped into formal positions of power after serving their neighborhoods for many years. They have proven to their constituents that they are viable leaders and hope to upgrade their

communities—this gives them legitimacy and the political capital to lead. “Most of us here, we grew up here and we want to see it grow,” Baidoo explained to me his rationale for working on behalf of the community (personal interview, February 13, 2012). The Zongo Chief agrees, “We are all born and bred here. Upon growing to see that the system is not right, we took it upon ourselves to fix things” (personal interview, February 16, 2012). The elders and leaders are respected and have fostered an environment of innovation and progress. As Thomas Adongo said, “Our early elite have really opened the door of democracy. We have been able to adopt that system [in the US] and make it work here. Anything that happens there [in the US] you will see it here the next day” (personal interview, February 13, 2012). Ashaiman leaders mimic democracy— they learn from global examples like the United States and the UK, but also from nearby districts and municipalities to improve their own living conditions. They actively learn democracy. For example, Appointed Assemblywoman Gifty Avorgbedor learns from the surrounding districts. This encouraged her to suggest to the Assembly to have a Deputy Coordinating Director. As she explained to me, “LEKMA has a Deputy Coordinating Director and look at that place. Things are going on well there. We should know better.” She is pushing hard for the Ashaiman Municipal Assembly to bring this position (personal interview, February 24, 2012).

Ibrahim Baidoo, aka Bronx, lives a few miles from Tulako in Valco Flat, a *zongo* community in central Ashaiman. The area is named after a Tema-based manufacturing company who built apartments in the 1970s and the building remains one of the few multiple story buildings in the community. The area is well-demarcated, with 50x50 plots, planned streets, and a central gutter running through the neighborhood. The neighborhood has objective characteristics of slum communities, like substandard housing, overcrowding, and inadequate

sanitation and infrastructure, but compared to other neighborhoods like Tulako, residents do not necessarily view it as a slum:

> A slum is an unplanned place where buildings are put up anyhow. The layout is not perfect. Here in our community, certain practices in the slum areas go on here but not so serious so I can say Valco Flat is not a slum area. Some places in Valco Flat are well demarcated that if there is a fire outbreak, the Fire Service can get access to the place. But there are some few places around that are not well demarcated. Valco Flat is not a slum area to me. If you observe, there are streets in between houses built. But it is just that some of our roads are not tarred. If you go to the slum areas, there are certain practices going on there that you will see here too. A typical example is throwing away of refuse (focus group, May 31, 2012).

Since residents began settling there in the 1970s, people have upgraded their homes, streets have been tarred, and the community continues to improve its collective well-being.

Bronx is a community leader in Valco Flat. He is the former Assemblyman and did not contest the last Assembly election because he was running for MP as the NDC aspirant. He came in second in the NDC primaries. He lives in the middle of Valco Flat; his blue Toyota Camry sits in front of his house, indicating whether he is at home or not. In the morning, young men give it a car wash. There is a large banner across his front wall that says "Spartan Youth Club." Bronx formed the self-help group for Muslim Zongo Youth to "pull themselves up": it provides scholarships to young people, includes income-generating opportunities for area youth, and serves as a forum for residents to talk about and solve their own problems. The youth club meets every Sunday evening to discuss their issues and problems. The youth club also serves a very important political purpose for Bronx: it allows him to build a support network that is well-organized, yet formally apolitical. However, he can secure state goods and political party patronage and distribute through this seemingly apolitical enterprise. By building a "club",

Bronx has created a pressure group that youth must join if they want to receive any state benefits: followers must join his club.

In Ashaiman, every big man has his followers. They are disguised as youth groups, friends clubs, and keep-fit clubs—in the way that the Spartan Youth Club follows Bronx. In 2011, several of these youth clubs demanded that the MCE resign. In 2012, a number of Muslim Youth began agitating for the Chief Executive to step down again. Local residents know that Bronx is behind this resistance; the rumor is that Bronx is next in line to be Chief Executive and is trying to demonstrate his popular support. As one local leader explained to me, "Every leader has people working for them privately, and then they say all the right things publicly. This is African politics" (informal conversation, April 4, 2012).

While political science literature might portray Bronx's behavior as clientelistic, residents in Ashaiman yearn for leaders like Bronx. As a community member in Tulako explains, "We have weak leaders. They are not vocal. If we had Bronx here, he would have convinced the Assembly and this place would be developed. This community and Taboo are not well demarcated. Our new Assemblyman is not that vocal. We community members do not understand the Assembly. They do not educate us. We do not know the role of Assemblymen and the Unit Committee" (personal interview, February 29, 2012). Alternatively, Bronx educates his people on the political and decision-making process—and he gets them state goods. In return, they offer their support to him in the form of votes.

Bronx is a community leader and a politician; these roles are complementary. Perhaps the most obvious way that these positions overlap can be demonstrated through the provision of public services. In Ashaiman, one of the biggest problems with the provision of services is the politicization of the process, as the situation involving public toilets illustrates. In 2000, the NPP

took over the management of public toilets after they won the election. Local branch leaders seized the toilets by force. In 2002 after many arguments and complaints, the Assembly reclaimed management of the toilets. However, the Assembly simply awarded the contracts back to the NPP "big men." In 2008, after the NDC won the election, NDC youth seized the toilets and re-gained control. After some complaints, the Assembly re-claimed control. But political influence dictated the process: The Assembly abrogated the contracts to the NPP and re-awarded them to the NDC. They are now run by NDC branch leaders and others who have served the party, including Bronx.

Bronx explained to me that not all public toilets are operated the same (informal conversation, August 14, 2012). Some operators only "share" among their friends. This creates problems because people do not feel as though they are getting a fair share. People fight and argue about the "sharing." But Bronx explains that his toilet operates in a better way. There is a council—he is the coordinator—and they meet occasionally to determine where the proceeds will go. Usually they are distributed equally to various organized groups—clubs, opinion leaders and churches and mosques. He said that one of the most important things is to make sure that the Christians get some of the proceeds; if they do not do this they will claim that the Muslims are dominating and this will create problems. "Everybody knows how much it costs," he said. "You cannot cheat them." He explained that the toilet brings in 35 cedis per day.

The public toilets serve a political agenda: the proceeds are often used for NDC functions and campaigns. Bronx mentioned that during the biometric registration the proceeds went to feeding the NDC polling agents. The "big men" in local politics make these decisions: The Chief Executive asked the operators to donate the money for the exercise. The operators complied—they are operating the toilets because of their political affiliation. Bronx emphasized the need for

organized groupings. “This is how you distribute goods,” he said. Without the organized groups, people do not know how things are “shared.” This creates confusion and mistrust. But with the organized groups, goods are shared through the outlets and they cannot be accused of empowering their own pockets. By establishing organized groupings, Bronx has established a clientelist network that has the collective capacity to get things done—demand state goods, improve their collective welfare, and vote their leader into positions of power.

Despite having little formal education, people constantly mentioned Bronx as a good leader: he is a loud talker, he lobbies for his people, and he secures contracts from the government. It is not surprising that people like him: he is charismatic, good looking, charming, and visible. During the biometric registration exercise he visited the polling agents and laughed with the workers. He flirted with the women and joked with the men. He is easily accessible: by ten o’clock, groups of youth enter his compound and wait for his assistance and guidance. There is often a large group of youth sitting at his compound discussing politics. He helped local leader Mary get involved with Ashaiman Women in Progressive Development and he participates in the Governance Forum and other NGO activities. For these reasons, NGOs use his ability to mobilize people when they need participants at their events. This helps him maintain loyal followings in many different types of groupings in the community. But he is a businessman, and he uses his political connections to profit. For example, he secured the contract for the Lebanon Bridge, even though he has no contracting expertise that deals with building bridges. He immediately subcontracted the project and he is alleged to have kept a ten-percent “cut” for himself. After the deal went through, he traveled to the United States (informal conversation, March 23, 2012).

Bronx is now the mayor, or Municipal Chief Executive of Ashaiman. He was appointed by President Mahama after a grueling vetting process. While Bronx has broad-based support across Ashaiman, his post is notable for one major factor: he is not an indigene—a member of the Ga Dangbe ethnic group—nor Ewe, the powerful early settlers. Instead, he built his support from his close links and service to the NDC party, as well as his broad support from youth groups across Ashaiman. While he is undoubtedly a patron, his clients form a broad-based coalition of groups from different ethnic groups. His grassroots organizing capacity enabled him to step into power, and he now controls the second-most powerful position in the city (second to the MP).

Civic associationalism and the development of cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity

Sundays in Ashaiman are Tocqueville's dream: days when the "democratic spirit" is flourishing and the collective capacity of its citizens is visibly evident. At four o'clock in the afternoon, chairs throughout the city are set up, youth club and friend's groups banners are hung, and residents have changed their church clothes to association t-shirts and outfits. Some of the clubs are ethnically-based, like the Frafra Youth Group that meets on Monday nights. Others are self-help groups made up of friends, like the Friend's Club and the Executive Youths (which is a recent spinoff from the Friend's Club). The Ashaiman Women in Progressive Development is based along gender lines, while the Spartan Youth Club comprises mostly of Muslim Youth.

On May 20, 2012, there were forty people sitting in plastic chairs waiting for the Friend's Club to begin its meeting. Three quarters of the audience was men, while the rest were women. They were all wearing matching green wax print fabrics with the Friend's Club insignia on it. The Friend's Club started in 2006 to serve as a self-help group for its members. When people are

in need, they can go to the club and ask for financial assistance or other support. For example, at this meeting the leadership discussed the money that was given to a member to travel to a funeral that was several hours away in the Volta Region. Some of the members had not paid their dues so they were naming who was still in need of payment—they were publicly shaming the people so that they would be embarrassed and pay their balance. At the beginning of each meeting, participants pay one cedi; if they are late to the meeting, they pay a small penalty. If their phone rings, they also owe a penalty.

Michael, a civil society activist and social worker, went to the meeting because he needed to drop off invitation letters to his civil society event. The Friend's Club provides a good forum to advertise his event and mobilize participants. The President of the Club is charismatic—he founded the club and has served as President for two terms. There has not yet been a different President and he seems to have solid control over the organization. Nearby, the "Executive Club" group held its meeting. This was a smaller group, with only ten people gathered. A few former members of the Friend's Club split off in 2009 to begin their own club: There was an internal power struggle and the new leaders wanted more control in the executive. This club focused on married couples—individuals came with their spouse and the mission was to help couples live moral lives together. Two women sat at the front table and signed people in. They wore matching orange collared shirts. There was a big banner in front of the building labeled "Executive Club." Several hundred meters from the meeting, two youth groups were busy playing football at Starlight School. Community members sat along the sidelines watching their friends and relaxing.

Groups in Ashaiman also organize along occupational lines. For example, the Minister's Association of Ashaiman meets the first Monday of every month to discuss the challenges facing

Ashaiman, the church, and the minister's themselves. One youth pastor explains that after the city gained municipality status (of which the ministers were a large group of advocates), "The ministers were sidelined. Our local government does not include the ministers in the decision-making process. We are still figuring out what our role is" (personal interview, February 16, 2012). The pastor said that the organization serves as an accountability mechanism—it functions for them to hold each other to account: "Because of our network, we caution each other. We are our brother's keeper. We talk to each other. We are not far from each other." They also serve to help each other out and reward one another for their good work. During the March 2012 meeting, 35 pastors and ministers attended the meeting. They discussed dues and fees, reward amounts for graduations and certificates, and upcoming events to preach peace for the 2012 election.

Political parties, NGOs, and religious organizations are all active in Ashaiman, and they continue to fund projects and invest in the community because they have been relatively successful. But much of this success can be attributed to the fact that Ashaiman is well-organized and has been for many years. In other words, they are only successful because of the collective capacity of the community that already exists *on the ground.* For example, in 1989 the NDC used Ashaiman as a pilot testing site for its new decentralization program; Ashaiman was already very well organized. In the early 2000s, UN-HABITAT with partners People's Dialogue began working in Ashaiman; the initiative built a pilot housing project in 2011. Leaders in Ashaiman mention that the fact that the community is well organized makes it a desirable place for political parties and NGOs to work. As one leader explains, "We have owned the community. We have owned the processes. Sometimes people just go and buy the lights and go to the Assembly to put them in. This gives us the advantage to go and get more funding because of our maintenance culture" (personal interview, February 13, 2012). Another resident emphasizes that different

tribes work together and cooperate, “We are all born here, and grew up with people from different tribe so we have learnt to speak each other’s language and eat their food” (focus group, June 14, 2012).

The early settlers in Ashaiman made it a point to organize effectively in order to improve their lives. One community leader named Selassie is a teacher and secretary for the Ewe Council, an ethnic organization that represents the Ewe community in Ashaiman. According to Selassie, who came to Ashaiman as a settler in 1974, “In those days you needed to be in a group to survive. You needed to belong to a family. But now people feel more free. They do not need to feel bound to a group to survive” (personal interview, February 27, 2012). Selassie describes that in earlier times, there were communal labor exercises every two weeks in the year 2000 but it is no longer being done. He attributes this lack of motivation to the poor leadership of his current Assemblyman has led to this: “You can see the Assembly member lacks organizational skills. In 2003, there was a student’s group and a keep fit club which he could used” (focus group, June 14, 2012). The challenge of collective mobilization ebbs and flows depending on the quality of leadership. But the roots of broad-based coalitions and the subsequent cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity underlie community life in Ashaiman, contributing to a successful “maintenance culture” that contributes to successful public goods management.

The development of cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity underlies political party behavior, as the discussion about toilet revenue suggests. The social expectation of sharing goods and resources with members of non co-ethnics contributes to broader political cooperation among residents from different ethnic groups. Without formal transparency mechanisms in place, the social norm provides the incentive for leaders and residents to share goods with members from different groups, particularly with respect to state resources. For example, in a focus group of

Dagomba youth, participants were asked what they would do if their leader provided jobs to only members of his own family and ethnic group, when the contract was intended to employ members from all tribes. They replied:

> We will call him and tell him that by doing that it tarnishes the image of Dagombas, so he should stop. He knows that it is because all the tribes want him to be chairman that is why he is and not one tribe. We can also call for executive meeting to sit him down and talk to him because that can also affect the party's popularity, the tribe, so we will call him (focus group, June 3, 2012).

Residents take their group identity seriously, and the accusation of ethnic chauvinism or tribalism tarnishes group identity in Ashaiman. In other words, the residents in Ashaiman have pioneered a new form of ethnic mobilization: they mobilize to *prevent* the ethnicization of identity in the form of excessive in-group patronage.

Ashaiman homes are also constructed as compound houses, facilitating the need to share a common space, water, and maybe even a bath house. In this situation, different tribes might even live in the same compound. One resident explains that this fosters inter-ethnic engagement that promotes unity:

> We live in compound houses and in these compound houses are people from different tribes so there is harmony among the people. We are all born here, and grew up with people from different tribe so we have learnt to speak each others language and eat their food (focus group, June 14, 2012).

The importance of eating together and sharing one's food displays the intimacy of daily life. In West Africa, a household is defined as those eating from the same pot. The sharing of food brings people from diverse backgrounds together, even allowing them to join the same household. The inter-ethnic households even extend to leadership, as the NPP MP aspirant, who is a member of the Ewe ethnic group told me, "You will hardly find an intertribal conflict in Ashaiman. We are closely bonded—in one house you will find all different types of people. Even me, I married an Ashanti" (personal interview, February 15, 2012).

The rise of dense networks of associational life preceded formal civil society and NGO activity. As a leader explained to me, NGOs began coming here because "the community was already organized in groups" (personal interview, February 13, 2013). The political organization on the ground, with different tribes being represented by their leaders, enabled further cooperation between groups. The dense networks of social engagement contribute to the growing presence of NGOs and INGOs in Ashaiman. This is because NGOs need community partners on the ground, and pre-existing local structures facilitate the success of the proposed project. Therefore, Ashaiman has become marked as an NGO-friendly community, and NGOs based in Accra and international NGOs continue to invest in the community. While NGOs have their own agenda, one of the important effects that they have is they bring people together publicly to discuss political issues.

For example, on January 23, 2014, a group of Ashaiman women from different ethnic groups met at the USAID funded project that assists women who have HIV. But these women were not necessarily infected with the disease, nor did they come to talk about the NGO's agenda: they came to discuss problems in the community, as they did every Tuesday morning at 10. They used the space paid for by USAID to gather and talk. Immediately, the women started complaining about the public toilet. They explained that it was not cared for and was very dirty. They also complained that they had to pay 10 peswas for their young children to use the toilet; they did not think this was fair. They explained that the proceeds go to the NDC party, and most of the money goes directly to the Assemblyman. The women are so displeased with the toilet that they walk ten minutes further to another public toilet. This toilet is cleaner, and is run by another Assemblyman. But the problem is that there is often a long queue at the neat toilet, so people go and "shit around," making a mess throughout the community. The women explained that this

toilet is much cleaner because the Assemblyman's family uses the toilet and therefore takes care of it for them, while the Assemblyman who operates the closer toilet has a private toilet in his own house, providing a disincentive to keep the public one clean.

The women discussed potential solutions to solve the problem. They have previously confronted the NDC Assemblyman to clean the toilet, but he said he will not help them because many of the women do not live in his district. This did not make the women happy, because they said that even though they do not live in the district, they voted for him—because he campaigned for them to. He claims that he does not have to account to them, because they are not his constituents.

While the women discussed the issues, the Assemblyman walked by on the street. The leader of the women's groups walked outside and called him in. He entered the room to speak to the group. He said that he would discuss the issue later and told them to write a formal letter to him and the Assembly. He tried to leave, but the women continued complaining to him and would not let him go. The back-and-forth lasted several minutes, until they all started laughing and smiling. The assemblyman left and the women immediately started drafting a letter. They had a formal letter by the end of the session. The leader of the group then used the USAID-provided computer to type the letter formally. The rest of the meeting was spent complaining about the "Dagomba boys" speeding through the streets on their motorbikes: The young men drive really fast on the very narrow roads.

This story of women entering the decision-making process to fix the problems in the community is part of a broader form of institutional learning that is taking place in Ashaiman. As Assemblyman Thomas Adongo explained to me: "Anything you can think of here we have it here in Ashaiman. Crime combatting. You name it. We have what it takes to educate ourselves.

Even if you are an ignorant man in an area, you will learn from the other social groupings. We have these networks" (personal interview, February 13, 2012). In other words, local pressure groups form, compete, and learn from one another to advance their interests and strengthen their agenda. In the process, broad-based democratic learning takes place. With these dense networks in place, NGOs have better chances of success. Further, residents and leaders on the ground benefit from what the NGOs teach them; it is a form of education. As one strong party member said with respect to political parties, "They do not groom people. There is no training. It's the NGOs who have come here to show us the truth. We even have the talent but we did not know that we had it" (personal interview, February 27, 2012).

Cross-ethnic struggle for representation

Cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity build trust between members of different ethnic groups, which can serve as an important basis for collective action. Over time, the development of cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity contributed to a broad-based political struggle that evolved at the grassroots. Grassroots political activity was particularly intense in the mid-2000s, when residents and leaders began agitating for municipality status from the national government: they wanted to govern themselves. Up until this point they were part of Tema Metropolitan Assembly but as Ashaiman grew, they believed that they were not getting their fair share of resources.

The struggle for municipality status had its roots in the associational life and authority structures dating back to the initial settlement of the slum. But the social movement gained traction and entered the "public transcript" in the early 2000s when political parties, traditional authorities, and assemblymen joined together in a broad-based coalition. Several key members of Ashaiman civil society trace this cooperation to the Ashaiman Youth Governance Forum that began in 2003. Local activist Jonathan Avisah describes the origins of the forum as an attempt

"to engage the duty bearers" and produce real change in the community. Local leaders wanted to shed the community's image as a "den of criminals." Avisah explains, "You could not identify yourself as being from Ashaiman because of the negative stigma associated with the community" (personal interview, February 8, 2012). Instead, the community was used as a political resource, in the same way that Old Fadama is currently used: "Political leaders would come here and bus people out to create mayhem."

The idea of the forum began when Professor Martin Adjei, a US-based professor with ties to University of Ghana, met an old friend wanting to promote good governance in Africa. Adjei was part of the NGO NIMBA Community Support Services, or NIMCOSS, which was based in Legon. They partnered with Danish-based EBIS to fund the Ashaiman Youth Governance Forum in 2003. Ashaiman was selected as a test-case for the forum because of its pre-existing associational life, closeness to Accra, and extreme poverty.

In 2003, the leaders started holding monthly forums on good governance. A Task Force was assembled to find out how local leaders and assembly members were performing. The face-to-face forum grew out of this Task Force and began be held publicly to "hold leaders to account. At these forums, leaders and residents alike began expressing their grievances and demanding more local authority over the governance process. As one local leader explained, "You can be called upon to give account of your actions," he said. "The governance forum will expose you. You are watching and somebody is also watching" (personal interview, February 13, 2012). Of course, the forums have their challenges, as one resident made clear: "Some people are of the perception that those behind the Governance Forum are doing it for their own personal gain. But we try to mingle personal relationships into socio-economic development issues" (personal interview, February 20, 2012). Another resident complained, "At the end of the day they push it

under the floor. For example, there is a five year action plan at the Assembly. We go to participate. But at the end of the day they do nothing. And they do it to get a big carpe diem for themselves, and give participants minerals and small chop…[But] They are good. They enlighten us. They create awareness in the community" (personal interview, February 29, 2012). Like Ghanaian politics in general, personalities and personal rivalries matter. But the forum places these rivalries at the forefront, and brings various rivals face-to-face.

At the time, development was very difficult because Tema would not distribute proper funding to the Zonal Councils. The struggle grew particularly intense in 2007 when Adenta was selected as a new municipality at the expense of Ashaiman. The selection of Adenta was seen as a political move: Adenta is a stronghold of the (at-the-time) governing NPP government, while Ashaiman is an NDC stronghold. This selection further emboldened the grassroots movement against the government.

The struggle for political representation included members from all different levels of society and political leanings. The MP lobbied at the National Level; the community agitated at the local level; the traditional authorities agitated in their space; and even NPP residents lobbied in party circles. A key moment of dissent occurred when Honorable Thomas Adongo, an influential NPP Assemblyman, left his party's stance publicly and joined the Youth in advocating for municipality status. The Market Women's Association soon joined. The Assembly Members formed a caucus. "There was one enemy—the Castle," Avisah explained, referring to the building that houses the government. "It was a movement, a struggle. Let us organize and demonstrate" (personal interview, February 8, 2012).

The struggle took on many protest forms. For example, a group of Ashaiman women even threatened to march to the doorstep of the Deputy Minister of Local Government and Rural

Development naked, and jump into his bed to sleep with him.[53] They would do this to protest the government's proposal to make Adenta the capital of the Ashaiman-Adenta Municipality, rather than Ashaiman. This kind of demonstration finds its roots in colonialism when Queen Mother Yaa Asantewah led an army of women to fight against white rule (Attenkah 2007, *Rhapsodysinger* 2008). The women proposed this plan at a meeting that included traditional authority, opinion leaders, assembly members and leaders of the various community-based associations. The struggle culminated in an enormous demonstration. Three people in particular were all over the national radio stations: Ibrahim Baidoo, leader of the Assembly Man Caucus (now the MCE); Prince Muhammed, President of the Ashaiman Youth Coalition (now leading Assembly Man), and Jonathan Avisah, representing the Ashaiman YouthGovernance Forum and Civil Society.

They were able to get the attention of the media and over the next few days made "lots of noise." A few days later the announcement was reversed: Ashaiman got its own municipality (Adenta maintained its own as well). Gaining formal political representation was a crucial moment in the development prospects of Ashaiman. But what it further shows is that political representation is not a given in urban Ghana: neighborhoods and communities have to fight for it. In other words, it is an outcome of collective action. While NGOs, formal government bodies, and political parties clearly play an important role in Ashaiman's local governance, the underlying cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity and authority structures form the basis for broader political representation.

The Municipal Assembly and daily life

On the one hand, the Municipal Assembly in Ashaiman symbolizes the importance of formal politics. Leaders gain formal recognition by becoming Assemblymen; the Chief Executive and

[53] The threat of nakedness, especially from mature women, can be quite powerful in many African cultures.

Minister of Parliament hold budget meetings to discuss the distribution of funds; and a staff of professional bureaucrats control the funds for the provision and management of public services. When a local representative was asked about public services in the city, he seemed confused: "Oh, you mean municipal services," he corrected, indicating the importance of the municipal assembly in the provision of goods (personal interview, February 13, 2012). But to limit the importance of the Municipal Assembly to the formal and official realm would be to undermine the real value that the Assembly has to the Ashaiman community: as a public meeting place for local-level decision-making and as a symbol of democratic self-governance. Ashaiman leaders and residents take pride in their struggle for political recognition and self-governance, and the physical building where the Municipal Assembly is housed maintains a central presence in the city.

On a daily basis, residents, technocrats and politicians fill the halls; Assemblymen park their motorbikes outside and walk like "big men" through the staircases; Youth groups gather to try and get hired for communal labor exercises; and NGO representatives meet with Assembly workers to try to find ways to collaborate with the city government. There are several reasons for this. One important reason is that assemblymen and big men want to be the first to hear when projects are announced and the bidding process opens; they want a "leg up" on the contract bid (informal conversation, February 27, 2012). All Assemblymen in town have private businesses that are registered as businesses so they can secure these contracts. The Municipal Assembly provides them the physical space to be close to power. It also is a gathering place for outsiders and visitors to the community: researchers begin their studies there; NGOs seek permission from the authorities; and utility companies sign contracts there. Ashaiman residents and leaders hope to spark a relationship that might bolster future power or employment opportunities.

Gifty Avorgbedor, an NDC party activist and local leader, visits the Assembly often for all of these reasons: to try to secure contracts and to visit with other leaders to scheme potential projects. But she also visits the Assembly to let off steam and air her grievances. Sitting directly underneath the open window of the MCE's office, she complains about a slew of governance problems in the community:

> There is also a problem with the Coordinating Director. The man is too old. We need a Deputy Coordinating Director. Most of our things go wrong here. When light off, all of the staff do what they like. There is no order of authority from the head. Lack of leadership. There is no respect… People at the revenue site go for bribes. There is no authority. Most of the civil servants here are NPP. Few are NDC. Even when he [the former MCE] comes from the gate, you will be on your feet. He deals with partisan but he deals with his work. He had respect and discipline. When he was in his office, everyone was at work. All of these things are based on lack of leadership, lack of initiative and vision… We had tried to get rid of MCE, but every district has to sign. There was political play. Something was given to the Regional Minister—he would not sign… We want the man kicked off… If you are my party person but you are not doing the right thing, then I will not spare you. I will attack the man fili fili [completely]. I do not shell he's my party man—and so what?... If anybody steps on me now, I will eat the person (personal interview, February 24, 2012).

Gifty has many complaints about the people working in the Assembly, and she is not afraid to go straight to the Assembly and tell the people off. Creating noise also places pressure on authorities and can act as a symbol of power: she recently received a contract to cater lunches for public schools in town. One resident provided the following rationale for how she secured the contract: "Let's give it to her to shut her up" (informal conversation, February 24, 2012). This is not uncommon in Ashaiman: when individuals or pressure groups begin to make lots of noise, they are often given a contract or other good to keep them quiet. This leads to a situation where residents on the ground want their leaders to be loud and strong—this is one way how you secure development projects in the community.

As Gifty's statements suggest, the relationship between the Assembly and the community members is a tense one. The fact that most of the technocrats are outsiders brought in to govern the city contributes to the problem. Residents and community leaders on the ground want more power in the decision-making process. Technocrats in the Assembly want more assistance from community leaders and less political partisanship: they claim to just want to get things done. Neither the Assembly workers nor the community dwellers trust one another. The MCE is appointed by the President, meaning he is not directly accountable to the community members. Perfect, the Administrator in the Coordinating Office has worked in Ashaiman since the Assembly opened in 2007. She expressed serious concerns: "The major issue in Ashaiman is the youth. They don't want to learn. They don't understand this is a government establishment. People come here and beat the workers. People are afraid to work here. They always come to beat you. It was not easy at first. We had to start running. But now there is a change" (personal interview, March 1, 2012). She explained that community members do not understand the decentralization process, "It's because at the grassroots we are not able to explain to them how the government system works. They don't know." While this is part of the problem, a larger problem is that community residents and leaders want more power in the decision-making process and do not trust Assembly technocrats to do what is in the best interests of Ashaiman—they are not from the community, and there is a long history of misallocation of funds and government ineffectiveness.

The mistrust extends to daily activities. On May 14, 2012 the headline in the *Daily Guide* read "Ashaiman Market Women Stage Demo." The market situation is a huge problem in Ashaiman. Women sell everywhere: in the streets, *tro tro* [minibus] station, and busy intersections. It contributes to an enormous traffic problem in town. To counter the problem,

ASHMA has plans to build a new market. But the tomato sellers heard that the new stalls do not include space for them; they became incensed. Therefore, the previous day, they staged a demonstration against the development exercise and marched directly to the Municipal Assembly chanting, singing, and they barged into the meeting hall and demanded an answer.

The next day, Perfect asked Michael, a social worker and NGO activist, for help (informal conversation, May 15, 2012). She showed him the model of the market; she was very proud. She begged Michael to help her calm the women down. Michael responded that the women do not think they are being included in the plan. The other problem is that there are rumors the market will benefit only those connected to the politicians, and not the women selling there now. Their concerns are legitimate; this has been a serious problem in the past. This occurred in the recent stalls near the Metro Bus station. Further, there is also a history of "white elephants" when it comes to markets in Ashaiman. For example, one resident explains that the Afariwa Market scheme was a white elephant. He was a victim of that scheme (informal conversation, May 15, 2012). The main point is that there is very little trust between the market women and ASHMA and these issues continue to be politicized. Politicians can easily take advantage of the situation to score cheap political points. Already, community leaders in town connected themselves to the grievances by the market women and contributed resistance to the Municipal Assembly.

Yet Ashaiman residents and leaders still take pride in the Municipal Assembly building because it symbolizes all that they have accomplished over the past forty years: the struggle from a squatter settlement to a functioning city. In February 2012, a group of women from Ashaiman Women's for Progressive Development sought to clean the main assembly hall as a way to build morale and provide a service to the Assemblymen. It was a way to gain recognition from the

authorities; build community among themselves; and hopefully get a free lunch and allowance for their hard work. But the clean-up mission was canceled because the Assembly refused to pay allowances and offer lunch: they had already given the cleaning contract to a group of young men who worked for the NDC, but they never actually did any work. The exercise was delayed several weeks until they finally raised the money themselves and cleaned the Assembly Hall.

Governing through the Municipal Assembly is the prize for all local leaders in Ashaiman. It provides them the economic opportunities to socially advance, the political recognition to act as representatives of their constituents, and the prestige to uplift their big man status. But more than anything, the Municipal Assembly is suspended above pre-existing authority structures and associational bodies, and the constant process of governance depends on creatively combining these structures together. The process is not one of state power versus community resistance. Rather, it is the constant recombination of institutional rules and procedures with local norms and cultural practices. But with a dynamic associational life and authority structure that has developed from an optimal informal institutional context of purchased settlement, the process embodies the process of democratic learning. In 2013, the community reached another achievement: the selection of one of their own—Ibrahim Baidoo, a.k.a. Bronx—to the position of Municipal Chief Executive after a loud and arduous struggle sparked by the grassroots.

Leadership and the control of the housing market

The importance of serving the community and organizing followers suggest that leadership and authority is a daily affair. Politics and the decision-making process take place on the roads of Ashaiman in daily life. For example, on January 26, 2012, Charles, a pressure group leader ran into the Assemblyman Honorable Yakubu on his way to a meeting. While the two men greeted one another, another resident came up to the Assemblyman and expressed his grievance: There

are a group of people who will not move off a main road, which is now being completed by the government. The authorities are putting in a drainage system and they need to relocate the squatters. The Assemblyman said that he had spoken to the residents and told them to move: "Just give it a few days—we need to do this with a human face" (informal conversation, January 26, 2012). He explained how he did not want to be seen as the man responsible for displacing squatters when it was not his fault, but rather the order from the government. The conversation was frank and face-to-face and they spoke for another 15 minutes about the problem. The Assemblyman would spend the following days trying to find relocation options for the squatters and organize some money to help them move.

The control of housing and the situation surrounding squatters continues to be an important part of politics in Tulako, in the rest of Ashaiman, and across all slum communities in Ghana (as I have shown in earlier chapters of this study). While Tulako is legally recognized by state authorities and has political representation, individual structures still do not have property title. In Tulako, the immediate problem involves "squatters" living along the drain along the main road: the government wants to upgrade the drain and road system and needs them to relocate. In this particular situation, there are competing narratives that divide the community.

The assemblyman, Honorable Yakubu and Charles discussed the problem in the middle of the road. Yakubu explained the first narrative: Several years ago the government decided to upgrade the drainage system. Residents were told to go to Tema Traditional Authority. They went and then were told to go to TDC. TDC then "sold" them land at Aje Kojo, another neighborhood in Ashaiman. They took money but they were not issued papers. They tried to move to Aje Kojo but because they have no papers, the locals there will not allow them to move.

Now they refuse to move from their land where the drainage system is. Today, the government is blamed for failure to process the land in a transparent, effective manner.

Charles expressed an alternative narrative: Residents along the drainage system were given land by Tema Traditional Authority to move. No "papers" were given. Some people moved. Others did not think the government was really going to move forward with the project. As Charles explained, "You know how things are in Ghana—people do not actually believe that the government will follow through with what they say they are going to do." Some of these people then sold the land that was given to them and remained where they are. Now they refuse to move. The government places the blame directly on the people themselves, and has ordered them to relocate.

The local assemblyman race in Tulako has centered on the land issue dating back to the election of Honorable Baba Alhassan in the early 1990s. Stated simply, a leader's ability to control and attempt to solve the underlying housing issues leads to victory in the local Assembly elections. Voters select their assemblymen based on who they think will protect their housing rights. Without formal property title, they rely on their leader to lobby on their behalf.

Land issues have shaped the development of Tulako since its initial settlement, as I documented in Chapter 2. While TDC authorities allowed people to build in the area, they designated it a "temporary workplace" and anticipated that it would be a workshop; they did not intend for a human settlement to develop there. When the area was not used for this purpose, TDC had to give the area back to traditional authorities, as customary law dictates. The Assemblyman at the time was known as a kind and gentle man, and he allowed squatters to construct kiosks as long as they paid him and lent their support as followers. It allowed him to

expand his power and authority. But many of the structures he allowed were unplanned and unauthorized formally, and did not adhere to the 50x50 plots that the early settlers had. Not surprisingly, this would lead to future problems between landlords, squatters, the traditional authorities and TDC.

One of the reasons that the land was not designated for housing was because there was a pipeline underneath a major portion of the land. The strip on which the pipe line stood was deemed the "green belt." This area has become a contested piece of property within the slum. The Tema Traditional Council had plans to sell the land to SSNIT, a government agency. The secretary of the Tulako Landlords and Landladies Association, whose father was an early settler, explains:

> They told my father that they will vacate the area—he told this to Baba Alhassan. They told him to go to Traditional Council. When the Assemblyman went, he told them to give priority to us. Every landlord must pay 500,000 Ghana cedis (the old currency) for the land fee. There was also an additional 7,000. The Tulako Development Association Secretary was Honorable C. People were given the chance to pay in installments. People made the payments. Most of us have our payments around. Almost everybody has his or her receipts (personal interview, February 29, 2012).

Residents take pride in this initial payment, viewing it as appropriate payment for the land. At the time, the traditional authorities, TDC, and local leaders did too. But in 1984, the authorities wanted to work on the pipeline. The secretary explains:

> Nobody gave us land—we bought land at Aje Kojo. This issue came about in 1984. It was at that time they wanted the pipeline here. A company called Sandani. When the contractor came, he measured a small amount—20 feet here and 20 feet there. So we moved the structures there and the man did his work. The Traditional Council said that the land is no longer in my hand. We went back to Traditional Council—formed by Green Zone Association, led by my father, the late Hudu Abdullai. There was also another man we call "Porter Porter" with my father who struggled to get land. First went to Lebanon Zone 5. Then he pointed to land at Aje Kojo. We went to TDC and told them that we like it. They will sell it to them. TDC sold it for 25,000 Ghana Cedis (old currency). It was a lot of money then. They bought the land. I will prepare the documents

> for you. This was in 1984 for the pipeline. Then in 1996 the issue came up again. Tema wanted to sell the land to SNIIT for reasons not known, but obviously to make money.

When the workers completed the job, residents went back to squatting in the Green Belt. Baba Alhassan continued allowing guests to settle there under his authority. And some of the residents who purchased land at Aje Kojo sold this land, thinking they did not need to move. The center of each assemblyman's campaign has been the promise of settling the underlying land dispute: to secure property title for the residents, and formally demarcate the community in 50 x 50 plots, like most Ashaiman neighborhoods. The story is further complicated by the fact that many residents accuse Baba Alhassan of collecting money from his followers, but never paying it to the Traditional Authorities. As one resident explained, "They paid Baba Alhassan and the money never went to the Tema Chiefs. He kept it for himself" (informal conversation, February 29, 2012).

But the previous assemblyman (who followed Baba Alhassan), Honorable C, is also accused of having his own agenda: to join efforts with the traditional authorities, sell off land to foreign interests, and make a hefty profit. The ambiguity of the land tenure arrangement allows him to do this. During his time as Assemblyman, he had immense power: he was a prominent member as secretary of the Ashaiman Divisional Council and the leader of the indigenous Dangbes in Tulako; proprietor of a private school near the main traffic light; executive member of the Tulako Development Association; and entrenched member of the NDC. As one resident explained, "everything that came through the community comes through him" (informal conversation, February 29, 2012). The issue surrounding the houses on the Green Belt came up again under his watch, when UN-HABITAT and People's Dialogue (PD), an NGO affiliate of Slum Dwellers International wanted to build a Slum-Upgrading Facility (SUF) in Tulako.

From the very beginning of the proposal, the slum-upgrading project proposed by UN-HABITAT originated from outside of Ashaiman. The original federation, a group of local community members who come together to save, started in Old Fadama. But the project could not make progress there because the land was illegal, and they could not garner the political support needed to build a SUF on illegally-occupied land. Not wanting to give up on the project, PD sought an alternative space to move forward with a pilot project. Tulako, a slum with similar demographic characteristics but embedded within a friendlier political environment with a stronger civic life provided a good alternative. PD reached out to the Assemblyman and the traditional authorities and got them on board. But because Honorable C was the Assemblyman, he did not attend the meetings and did not do an effective job of educating the community members. To be part of the project, residents had to join a savings group and attend federation meetings. Without proper leadership and communication, most community residents did not join the group: they did not trust the outsiders and did not want to save their money with an organization they did not know.

The project gained the logistical support of key stakeholders: TDC, the Tema Chief (who was the custodian of the land), and Honorable C. They claimed to have the support of community members with the start of the federation. However, the federation did not include the majority of community residents, and included lots of people from outside of Tulako. In particular, it did not gain the support of most Dagombas, a powerful interest/ethnic group in Tulako. Instead, a large portion of the population mistrusted the Tema Chief and Honorable C. What is particularly surprising is that the cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity that had slowly developed over time in Tulako, had been challenged with the influx of foreign capital and outside influence. In other words, UN-HABITAT and PD exacerbated ethnic tensions. Residents

viewed leaders like Honorable C and the Tema Chief as opportunists trying to privilege their self-interest over that of the community. This was heightened when the NGOs paid for Honorable C and the Chief to visit India to see how the SUF project might work.

A major problem with the SUF is that the building was proposed to be built in the Green Belt. This allowed the authorities to claim ownership; the Tema authorities to provide legitimacy; and the international funders to provide funding legally. But on the ground, the residents currently living on the Green Belt were not part of the federation, and viewed the SUF as a way to displace them of their rights. In fact, in a focus group residents were asked whether they faced the threat of forced eviction:

> *Is the community under the threat of eviction?* Yes, yes they have been threatening us but it will not happen. *Why do you think it will not happen?* Because we sacrifice cow every month to pray to God, we don't want to be evicted, where do they want us to go? We have many children, where we going to take them? *Who is evicting you?* Some NGOs, and the chief. It is because the land belongs to the chief, so the NGOs and the chief. *Which NGO is it?* The name is UN-HABITAT. *UN-HABITAT talks about housing rights and is threatening you with forced eviction?* No, it was the representative here, he was not honest with them, if this land belongs to you and you sell it to me and someone comes to you for the same land, you have to tell him the truth but if you don't and keep telling him you will sell the land to him, "if you come I will get you the land" when finally you come, what will you do? So if you look into that case well you will realize that UN-HABITAT was not told the truth.

This discussion confirms that poor communication between NGOs, property developers, community leaders, and residents leads to deep distrust among these different actors. Residents view the international organization UN-HABITAT as leading the eviction, something it does not stand for. They also think that the partner NGO is colluding with the chiefs to profit themselves. The biggest problem is that they do not trust their community leader, who happens to be the two-term elected Assemblyman for the neighborhood. They think that he is colluding with the

international organization and the chief to make money, at the expense of community members. Finally, community members utilize everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1990); in this case, the sacrifice of cows, for protection and to collectively respond to the pressure. But it would incorrect to claim they are resisting the state; instead, they are resisting a leader and interest group within their own community, who has partnered with the state and international actors.

While Honorable C initially benefitted from the ambiguous land tenure arrangement, his inability to solve the underlying problem eventually led to his downfall: he lost the last assembly election. On the surface, the election delivered democratic accountability. But the view from the grassroots shows how strong leadership and cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity fueled a collective campaign against Honorable C. The community was able to withstand external influence and self-interested leaders due to their vibrant civic life. Residents and other community leaders came together to sanction corrupt leadership. While elections in Old Fadama and Ga Mashie fail to deliver democratic accountability, it worked in Ashaiman due to the collective capacity of the community to make the election perform effectively.

Nonetheless, the insecure land tenure arrangement persists, and the SUF wants to expand their project beyond the pilot stage. In fact, overlooking the seeds of distrust they have sown locally, they built the SUF and deemed it an unequivocal success: it even won an award for its ability to integrate "community participation." On the ground, it is clear that the continuing struggle involves who will control the local housing market and who will govern daily affairs. PD and the Federation continue to try and win over local landlords, but the landlords refuse. Honorable C and the traditional authorities continue to support the project. Current Assemblyman Honorable Yakubu, who derives his support from the Landlords Association, explains:

> What is happening is, the authority comes from the traditional authorities and they are trying to chip in some agenda that will favor them. Quite recently, the regent of Ashaiman met me and told me that they are bringing in some estate developers who will put up three story [buildings], then you the land owner will get the down floor. Before you go into that agreement you have to make a down payment of 20% of the cost, and if, from the way we make the calculation in Ghana cedis it was three bedroom and will cost 600 and something thousand, 6,6000 Ghana cedis, two bedrooms and 4 bedrooms around 700 and something. How many of our people here can afford that? Even still, even with that, we don't know if we will still be the owner of the land. After that has been done, the three story will be the agreement will fall between the estate developer and the chief, so after some time it is going to be on lease, after that time duration the house will be sent back to the traditional authorities and you the landlord will remain where you are allocated, so we are not satisfied with this. So if you look at this, is it going to favor the poor dweller? No. we have to say no to that, so all we need is our piece of land, and any developer who will assist us…So he was trying to convince us that everything was under control, the land will be allocated to the landlords and that, so he gave a questionnaire to be distributed to the people. But I said no, I won't do that until I seek the peoples consent. When the Landlords Association met, I opened it up to them and they said they will not do that. They wouldn't like to commit themselves and later on regret it, but rather, the 50-50 allotment should be given before any agreement can be entered (focus group, May 5, 2012).

Evidence on the ground suggests that ownership and control lies at the heart of the struggle. Building multi-story structures and creating individual title for all residents threatens this control and authority: landlords derive their authority in large part from their landlord status. These issues therefore become politicized, and contribute to political deadlock and the persistence of the status quo. They also divide the community, and lead to personal struggles between various residents and leaders. A federation member and community leader explained how the situation has led to a personal rivalry with a neighbor:

> She is a foreigner, from Nigeria but has been here for many years. The land originally belonged to her husband, who was a wealthy man with several plots. When he died, the son was able to inherit the land—and she took over all of the properties. The man was also a scrap dealer. The woman sold all of the scraps and made a lot of money. She also had structures where young men would live—those who fix shoes and work in scraps. During the relocation project for the pipeline, she needed to move. She was given land for relocation—but she sold it. She now refuses to move. Even the Tema Chiefs said that

> they would give her a room in the new facility free of charge—and she refused it. At one point she wanted to take the case to BNI, but the people were not okay with that (informal conversation, February 2, 2012).

The Federation, PD and traditional authorities tried many different things to try and get the woman on board, and she refused every time. One of the community leaders even explained how she threatened him, "She said she will hire boys to burn down my home. She said she will get guns to kill me. She said that she will buy petrol to burn down my school." As chapter 2 shows, schemes like this are evident throughout history, and in most cases led to failed projects, personal rivalries, and the persistence of the status quo.

The struggle over control of land happens in other neighborhoods in Ashaiman as well. The most recent land dispute involved a piece of land near Community 21, a neighborhood on the outer edges of Ashaiman. Approximately 15 years ago, the Ghanaian government purchased land for Free Zones—a government Agency. The land has been lying fallow since. Recently, Ashaiman has grown so much but is very short on land. Therefore, residents of Ashaiman would like to use this land for development purposes. They want to build a hospital, school, fire station and police station. The Ashaiman Divisional Council is trying to claim the land back from the government because the land was not used for intended purposes. Afterward, they would like to release it to Ashaiman Municipal Assembly. The government, on the other hand, has released it to TDC (who manages it) and they want to sell it to private developers. The perception on the ground is that the "big men" in government will benefit (informal conversation, February 29, 2012).

Of course, the situation is not as clear cut as the Ashaiman community struggling against a coercive and corrupt state. As the Administrator in the Coordinating Office explains:

> The land there is not for the Chiefs. TDC gave it to Free Zones; it is a water area. Free Zone gave it to farmers and now it has temporal structures. Now they have to negotiate. It is 100+ acres. TDC came to the Chief Executive and said if they need land for development purposes, then just ask them. But the Chief Executive never came. And you cannot trust the Chiefs. They just want to sell. The Chiefs were not supposed to move forward. But they started selling the land. They collected 500 cedis from each of the market women here, and when they were moving the soldiers stopped them. TDC then broke down the structures. They had been warned not to put structures up for a market. *Where does the MCE stand on the issue?* He is not ready to put his mouth on the issue. He is not sure what their [the Chiefs'] real goal is. These are people you cannot trust (personal interview, March 1, 2012).

This quote illuminates a struggle for authority at the grassroots in Ashaiman. With the price of land values rising, owners of the land want to benefit from land sales. The Ashaiman Divisional Council therefore has tried to gain political traction by making this a story about local control and authority. But they have already collected money from market women for future market stalls, suggesting that they want to control the entire process and benefit their self-interest as well. They are also trying to make the situation a popular struggle. On the other hand, people close to government also can benefit from the purchase of government land. In the end, the underlying land tenure ambiguity becomes a political struggle between various actors trying to control the housing market and establish authority at the grassroots.

External actors like UN-HABITAT and foreign companies are part of a long history of foreign influences in urban affairs. As Chapter 2 showed, community leaders have long sought to act as middlemen between outsiders and traders and indigenous communities; colonial administrators and residents; and now foreign NGOs and the community. Strikingly, the interactions with these outside powers take a similar trajectory over time: community leaders act as political entrepreneurs to find ways to benefit their self-interest. More so, they use these external interventions to pursue their domestic political agenda: to gain authority, reward followers, and extend their territorial authority.

The police and everyday state-building

On March 1, 2013, a caravan of police and military vehicles swept through the main street of Ashaiman. A truck with a dozen ASHMA Task Force men led the caravan, while a military truck with an open hatch filled with soldiers followed behind them. They carried big guns and AK-47s. There were also police who were fully armed. The caravan bulled their way through the streets as their siren scared other cars aside. The caravan stopped at "I Shall Return," the most notorious ghetto in Ashaiman.

At "I Shall Return," a group of men were taking down their kiosks in a rapid panic. They were trying to clear the area in front of the public toilet. The authorities had plans to make the road wider so that they could tar it in the near future. A crowd gathered and the men panicked, trying to take down their structures before a big bulldozer demolished the structures. Honorable Yakubu, the Assemblyman, walked around with a rolled up poster and a municipal assembly pamphlet. He was monitoring the demolition, and seemed annoyed with the young men. "I have told them to clean up the toilet, it is not neat. But they are not listening to me." He said the same thing about the public toilet in Tulako. "The toilets were given to the managers by the DC," he said. They were given as political favors or paybacks. Therefore, Yakubu has had no authority in telling them to take better care of them. "I have gone to them several times to tell them to clean them up." He also said that he had told all of these people to move their structures, but they did not move them.

Although people were angry, they were complying with the orders. Some of the kiosks had already been pulled down, so the men were just trying to salvage whatever they could. A man laughed and joked, "The structures will be back up by 5 o'clock." The ghetto was called "I

shall return" for a reason. All of the important people in town were nearby. The MPs truck was parked in the parking lot at the main traffic light. The driver rolled down the window and explained that the MP was in a meeting on the top floor of the story building. The MCE's SUV, a pitch black car that seems oversized for Ashaiman's roads, led the caravan. The caravan dominated the road, in an attempt to show force: Guns, muscles, and fatigues.

The caravan continued to the middle of Zongo, another slum neighborhood in Ashaiman. The army guys started questioning observers who were not part of the exercise. An army officer carrying an AK-47 angrily asked for ids from some onlookers. The scene was very chaotic, tense, and fearful—about 20 of the men were carrying huge guns. Apparently there was only one kiosk that had to be demolished in this neighborhood. The caravan continued to Valco Flats which was the last destination. A police officer explained that the owners of the kiosk were warned three months ago, then again two weeks ago, and finally again the previous day. They had been warned of the ensuing demolition.

The officers did not know how many structures were to be demolished. They were advised to be very clear about the information; otherwise the press is going to misrepresent what happened. "You have to be ready to defend yourselves to the press," a man close by said. He pointed to the headline in one of the newspapers that said "KMA goes on warpath," referring to similar demolitions taking place in Kumasi. He told him that this is what they will write if the authorities don't have their facts straight. One onlooker questioned why they needed the army to assist with the demolition exercise. "You know, people don't respect the police here in Ashaiman. And they don't have the capacity to get things done," another man explained. When

asked if the people would move their kiosks, the police officer responded in typical, Ghanaian absoluteness, "They have to move."

This event illustrates the process of state-building in a purchased settlement slum. State authorities struggle to find ways to "plan" roads and develop infrastructure, after a long history of unauthorized building and squatting. On the surface, the event appears to show coercive state power versus community resistance, but the ethnographic data suggest that the state-society struggle is better understood by uncovering the actors and interests involved. On the one hand, state officials are trying to clean up the city, build infrastructure and spur development. Unauthorized structures that do not follow building codes get in the way of the development plans for the city and the country. They even reach out to assemblymen and other local leaders to assist with the process: they know they need the cooperation of people on the ground so problems do not arise. But the exercise also presents the opportunity to assert the little formal authority the Municipal Assembly has, by driving through the streets with army personnel and displaying big guns. It is a display of visible power. It also provides an income: all workers get paid additional salary for the day's work. On the other hand, residents resist as much as they can—they keep their structures up until the very moment of demolition. They complain until the last moment, but then are forced to comply. Even more telling is the role of local leaders. During this exercise, the neighborhoods with strong local leaders had fewer problems: residents had already taken down their structures and found alternative locations to set up their homes. The success of the exercise depended as much on local trust and strong community leadership than on the coercive power of the state or the determined resistance of the residents. These types of exercises occur across the city in all slum settlements, and the process and success of everyday state-building depends on the underlying civic life of each community.

The relationship between police, residents, workers and soldiers in Ashaiman is a tense one, but also a very personal one. On the one hand, soldiers have been settling in Ashaiman since the 1960s and established their authority from the time they purchased their plot. In fact many of the neighborhoods are named after countries or regions of the world where the soldiers did their foreign service, like Lebanon and Middle East. In the center of town at the lone traffic lights (that never seem to work—"they used to work but now they are just 'ceremonial'" (informal conversation, January 26, 2012)), police officers squawk orders at *tro tro* drivers, harass hawkers, and try to direct traffic. They seem to get in the way more than remedy the situation. Police are often getting into heated arguments with residents, demanding authority and getting very little. Residents know the names of the officers, and talk about them behind their back in personal terms. They know who they should be afraid of and who they can ignore. But the relationship between police, ordinary residents and local leaders has a long history, and is part of the process of state-building and developing Ashaiman from a squatter settlement to a functioning city.

The climax of community-police relations occurred in 2009 when a dispute erupted between drivers and the police. The drivers accused the police of extorting money from them. A fight broke out and two innocent people were killed by stray police bullets, including one small boy was selling pure water. The military was already in the community and had to rush to the scene. "The way bullets were flying I had to run away," one witness explained. "The military came in to calm the tension. Otherwise this would have degenerated into something else" (informal conversation, February 24, 2012). A committee was set up to investigate the issue. Compensation was given to the victim's family. The Governance Forum was one avenue used to

mend the relationship between citizens and the police. In the end, the entire police leadership was transferred to another municipality.

This was not the first time Ashaiman residents had problems with the police. Residents tell stories of police cooperating with criminals and drug dealers by "handing rifles to armed robbers" and collecting money from them: "There is a 'drug addict spot' just behind the school, and there are often cops walking in and out of there," one resident explains (informal conversation, January 26, 2012). He suggests that things used to be so bad that mothers even tried to get their own kids arrested but could not. "We started noticing that the police were wearing flashy clothes and driving fancy cars," he explained. "There was no way they could make that much money on police salaries." They began to notice that the CID was "in bed with the drug peddlers" (personal interview, February 8, 2012). Prominent leaders in the community came together and pushed for reform. The issue was taken up by the Ashaiman Youth Governance Forum, and after several meetings of deliberations, the government institutionalized a reform that no CID could work in Ashaiman for more than three years. Once the CID started getting "comfortable" with the terrain, they must transfer, a prominent leader explained (ibid).

While Ashaiman has long been considered a "den of criminals," it has always been a point of concern for community members and leaders. From the earliest years of settlement, leaders have tried to find ways to rid the slum of crime: "In Ashaiman, security issues are really important. The community can rally together to solve the problem," as one leader explains (ibid). This does not always mean relying on the police. For example, long-time residents remember the infamous criminal named Alimenu, who was the "most notorious" criminal in town. His father was also a criminal, and residents recount how he even gave birth to a criminal. Several years

ago, a group of community residents went to the police complaining about his activity, and the police gave them the go ahead to "do what you need to do to take care of it." They were a watchdog, or vigilante, group. So they killed the man (personal interview, February 16, 2012).

In August 2012, the Ashaiman Youth Governance Forum began a series of decentralized fora based on building bridges between the police and the community. With the financial support of IBIS and the partnership of SYPPA, the fora were used as a way to bring residents, community leaders, and the police together with an attempt to collectively problem solve issues that are of concern to the community. The police would report on their data-gathering exercise that involved going to most neighborhoods in Ashaiman to speak to residents, collect information about their concerns, and personally introduce themselves to leaders in the community. For police officers, this provided them the chance to go into neighborhoods they had never entered previously. As one officer explained, "I did not even know this street existed. I am learning so much" (informal conversation, June 13, 2012). The exercise was part of a broader "community policing" initiative meant to "change the face of policing in Ashaiman," explained the new Divisional Commander of Ashaiman, David Eklu (public forum, August 1, 2012).

On August 1, 2012, the Divisional Commander presented his report to a group of residents in New Town, a neighborhood in Ashaiman. His opening statement was meant as a basic introduction: "What are the security concerns of the community? Most of the info we get is from police reports, but this does not really tell us all concerns about security. People don't even know what the police service is about. It is important that you understand how we operate" (public forum, August 1, 2012). The commander went on to explain the role of the service and how they can work with the community to improve security. The commander then took

questions from the residents. The forum provided an interesting account of honesty and frankness. One resident aired a grievance, “It is ridiculous that the police view everyone they don’t know as a suspect. If I am arrested, you must tell me why.” The commander empathized with the resident and even admitted that the police service has had its problems, and reiterated that the service is learning. He continued, “If you have a problem, come and see the Commander directly.” He went on to emphasize that residents do not need to pay bribes, “You do not need to pay this,” he explained, admitting that this had been a problem.

One week later in a nearby neighborhood, Commander Eklu introduced the concept of community policing to a different crowd of residents and leaders. “Policing has changed all over the world,” he said. He described how it is much more personal and the challenges are different. He explained that he wanted a relationship built on trust and “face-to-face—you can know our names. We can learn from each other” (public forum, August 7, 2012). He kept emphasizing how the police could not do their jobs without a good working relationship with the communities. Eklu explained that crime had decreased since January, but that fear was still a problem. He called on residents to work with the police: “Once in a while, come by and you can know us. We can exchange numbers. You are the ones who know the criminals. This is a partnership.” The dialogue continued, with residents asking police what was being done with the problems at notorious ghettos P-Squared and Soweto Lane, as well as the smokers around market square—“They smoke their gonja and their cocaine and snatch the mobile phones,” a resident complained.

Eklu had a direct answer: come work with us. “Members of the police force will be going to your study area. If the community wants to support us with a tent, then we will work with

you," he responded. He explained the concept of Tent City Policing, where there could be a tent in each neighborhood that was used as a space to report and solve crime. This is crucial in areas where there is no office space and budgets are low. But he also emphasized that this would only happen in places where the community put up the tent: "If the community can mobilize themselves and help us, by all means we will come." But the community must make the initiative: pressure and capacity for security improvements must come from below. Eklu made a final plea: "I plead. If you know of a Big Man, then ask for us." He was attempting to fund raise for the police force. "If the community speaks, people listen. I need your support. Add your voice. I am trying but I need your help!" Eklu was clear: he needed the help of the community to help him lobby, reduce crime, and raise resources. It clearly was not going to come from the top, or through tax revenue. For him to do a good job, he needed the support of the residents and leaders at the grassroots.

The Ashaiman police force has one truck to serve a population of more than 230,000 people. It has a few motor bikes but those are often used to make trips from Ashaiman to Tema. It suffers from a history of mistrust and ineffectiveness. But this does not mean that the process of state-building is not occurring in Ashaiman—it is. Rather, the process is an everyday process that involves constant interactions and negotiations between local communities, leaders, politicians, and state technocrats. Further, as this section demonstrates, the success of state-building depends on the underlying dynamics in the community: the strength of community leadership, the underlying norms of reciprocity, and the effectiveness of its pressure groups. The basis for state capacity does not rest on state coercion, nor does it fuel unmitigated community resistance. It relies on personal relationships, public discussion, and hard work in daily life.

The pull of political parties and the production of democracy

Citizens and residents make rational calculations about whether they join "politics." What Ghanaians mean by "politics" is the game of multi-party democracy, and particularly whether they join the ranks of the NDC or NPP. On the one hand, joining political party ranks can bring immediate opportunities, like jobs, educational opportunities and contracts (Bob-Milliar 2012b).[54] Michael, the civil society activist, told me one morning that if he joined the NDC, "I would be the first person that they help. They help out people who follow them—who work for them" (informal conversation, February 20, 2012). On the other hand, it immediately "outs" you as partisan. This can be used against people in all matters of daily life: partisans are accused of furthering their party's agenda at the expense of the common good. In all slums across Ghana, joining a political party is one important pathway for social mobility. As the assistant secretary for Ashaiman constituency of the NDC told me, "Party work is sacrificial work. It's for love of the party. But when something flows, we extend it to them. If there is a job opening, especially if it's governmental, we help them get the job" (personal interview, August 8, 2012). But multi-party democracy in Ghana has also become a production or performance: it creates new spaces for economic empowerment, everyday enjoyment, and daily struggles.

Nowhere was the performance of multi-party democracy on greater display than during the biometric registration exercise that consumed one month of daily life. The exercise provided a particularly good opportunity for Michael, the self-declared grassroots activist and civic educator. Michael is affiliated with a local NGO called SYPPA, who received a contract to observe the elections. He was tasked with visiting polling stations over the course of the month,

[54] The NDC even has a "Hero's Fund" that rewards "political victims," supporters of the party who sacrificed time and energy for the party during a prior campaign. It provides scholarships and other employment opportunities for dedicated members of the NDC. The fund is modeled after a previous initiative of the NPP.

and assigning volunteers to potential "hotspots." The opportunity brought financial gain: he was being paid 400 cedis for his work. As a member of the Ewe ethnic group, Michael is perceived to be linked with the NDC. But this is not a problem in Ashaiman, an NDC stronghold. Nonetheless, he makes sure to stay out of formal politics publicly. Instead, he supports candidates "underground," by providing information at the grassroots to political candidates (informal conversation, March 26, 2012). For example, he meets often with the MP of Ashaiman, Lawyer Agbesi. He is able to get meetings with Agbesi because the MP likes to know what is going on "at the grassroots." NDC MP aspirant Tony relies on insights from Michael regarding his followers: Tony needs to make sure that the men who are assisting on his campaign are real followers, and not simply informations of his opponent (informal conversation, April 16, 2012). Michael always mentions that he is "working at the grassroots" and is "close to the people." He uses NGO buzz words—"We need to build capacity at the grassroots." While he admits that he would get assistance from the political parties if he joined, he knows that it comes with consequences: "It would completely compromise my work as a social worker" (informal conversation, February 20, 2012). In Ashaiman, he has choices to work outside the realm of political parties because there are economic and social opportunities that are tied to politics, but not consumed by the parties themselves. This does not exist in communities like Old Fadama.

The biometric registration exercise symbolizes the logistical challenges of democratization in African societies. For example, at one polling station, there was a long delay because one old man did not know what his surname was; he never identified himself as such (March 26, 2012). At another polling station, an 84 year-old woman could not find a ride home because she did not bring two cedis with her. This caused a fight in line when one of the young men paid for her taxi and then asked her for money. She replied, "You cannot even secure two

cedis for one of your own? Shame on you" (April 2, 2012). During the second week, a fight broke out at one of the polling stations when a man skipped ahead in line; a woman then smacked the man (April 4, 2012). The next day at Starlight Elementary School, dozens of people waited in the hot sun for hours to register. There were no trees under which people could wait (April 5, 2012). That same day, two of the registration stations started more than two hours late because the EC worker with the computers did not show up on time (ibid). At another, the biometric machine would not work. This same day, one of the EC agents was accused of extorting money from people to allow them to jump the line. Michael asked his volunteer to investigate, and if it looks like he is doing it then she should give somebody two cedis to conduct an experiment to see if he really was. There was no real evidence that the agent was breaking the rules. At a nearby polling station, residents complained that the owner of the hotel where the polling station was located was allowing his friends to enter the station through the back door, allowing them to cut in line. Michael told him to stop, and he did. Many of the complaints and problems were produced to create enjoyment and to manufacture tension. Rather than representing real problems in Ghana's democracy, they were mere frustration with waiting for hours in the hot sun.

The production of democracy illustrated by the biometric registration exercise provided a stage for local "big men" to assert their authority at the polling stations. The Municipal Chief Executive used the chance to drive around in his state-provisioned truck (March 26, 2012). MP aspirant Tony Afenyo used the chance to promote his community service, as one of the polling stations was his school; he also sought to attract new voters by handing out t-shirts in his office (April 2, 2012). Assemblymen used the chance to inform residents about the meeting the previous Wednesday when the Regional Minister visited Ashaiman and promised to tar all the

roads in town (March 26, 2012). Bronx used the chance to organize his youth supporters to pressure the higher-ups in the NDC party to make a switch at Chief Executive, threatening to cause local disturbances if nothing was done (April 4, 2012). The Constituency Chairman used the chance to assert his power and barked orders at his party faithful; he wore Muslim garb and brought snacks to the workers in a public display of generosity (April 16, 2012). Mr. Zonyira was formally employed by the EC to register voters; the biometric registration process gave him the chance to make some extra money and greet his neighbors. But more importantly, as an older man inherently interested in learning and strengthening his social networks, he hoped that it would help him establish links to maybe start his own NGO one day (informal conversation, April 10, 2012). Similarly, Rosabel who volunteered for Michael's NGO, used the chance to boost her CV as she applied to nursing school. She was in the middle of a gap year and the exercise provided something to do outside of her daily chores (informal conversation, April 16, 2012). Michael used the chance to be close to the grassroots and establish his authority as a "social worker." His personality shined through, and he glowed in the prestige it gave him. After hours, it provided him plenty of political capital, as politicians consulted him "usually at midnight, late into the process they call us" (informal conversation, April 4, 2012). They seek their advice from a governance and local government standpoint. While he is a not central player in the intense negotiations, his voice is heard and they seek his advice. In this way, he is an important stakeholder in the political game.

Political parties took the exercise particularly seriously. The NDC placed two "polling agents" at each station to make sure there were no problems with registration. The parties trusted neither the Electoral Commission nor the NPP, so they had to send their own watchdogs. The NPP also had agents, but not as many due to their lower levels of support in Ashaiman. This also

provided opportunities for young, unemployed youth to "volunteer for the party" and show their political commitment. Women were employed as caterers to feed the polling agents: they provided takeaway food for all agents. During this process, incumbency advantage proved strong: the NDC was able to fund the catering and extra money necessary to serve as watchdogs with revenue from the public toilets. The interplay between political party struggles, working for the party, and public services underlie the production of democracy during the biometric registration exercise.

Party support and initiatives rely on the control of public services to campaign and mobilize support. In 2000 after the NPP won the national election, they seized the operation of the public toilets. In 2002 after many arguments and complaints, the toilets were officially given back to the Assembly. However, the Assembly simply awarded the contracts back to the NPP party leaders. In 2008 when the NDC won the election, the NDC youth seized the toilets and took control. After some complaints, the Assembly took them over. But the Assembly is an administrative body of the NDC—the chief executive (or mayor) is appointed by the President. Therefore, the Assembly revoked the contracts (of the NPP) and re-awarded them to the NDC. The toilets are now run by NDC branch leaders and others who "have done a lot for the party." The toilet managers are expected to give a portion of the proceeds back to the political parties to fund campaign activities, including the biometric registration exercise which they used as a de facto campaign event.

In bringing people together, the biometric registration exercise precipitated the spread of rumors. While rumors are an important part of daily life in urban Ghana, the gathering of people at polling stations brought people together to talk, intensifying already existing rumors. Politics

and rumors became the talk of the town. As the MP race intensified, Tony began gaining more support. The new rumor that spread was that he allegedly received financial support from some oil barons from Toil—Tema Oil. They are big men in the NDC. It was also perceived that he had the "quiet support" from some NDC big men. In an additional twist, he was accused of receiving financial support from NPP big man Ken Agyapong, who sought to divide support among NDC candidates and create a three-man race. Tony was doing door-to-door campaigning. He visited the drinking spot in Tulako over the weekend. He paid for all of the young men's football and drinks. He told them that if they start a keep-fit club, he will fund it. The fact that he is doing door-to-door campaigning is a symbol that he is serious; it is a relatively new tactic in Ashaiman political campaigns. Members of the NDC were particularly angry with Tony's tactics, and accused him of trying to destroy the party. As one community member described, "He believes that because he has paid people's school fees and bought them things, they should vote for him. He demands it from them. He uses his bully pulpit to gain votes back from people" (informal conversation, April 4, 2012).

Meanwhile, incumbent MP Lawyer Agbesi was accused of being a womanizer and a drinker. Similarly, Bronx was accused once again of cheating on his wife. Tony tried to use these things to his advantage, and constantly let people know how many school fees he had paid for Ashaiman children. The Chairman of the NDC party was accused of "chopping" from the contracts; he now has a big, unfinished set of apartment buildings in the middle of town. As one resident said, "People are angry at him because he takes all the contracts. He is a 'greedy man' who will not win the next election. For the NPP, they at least shared among themselves" (informal conversation, April 23, 2012). This is nothing new. At the early stages of the vetting process for NDC constituency executives in 2009, the Organizer was asked by the committee

what democracy meant to him, he replied: "You chop and then I chop." This understanding of democracy derives from the Twi word for democracy *ka-bi-ma-menka-bi*, or "I talk and then you talk" government. The underlying meaning is that one person has the chance to talk, and then another will be given the chance. In Ashaiman, instead of the chance to talk, democracy provides the chance to "chop." From that point on, the leaders in Ashaiman refer to democracy as "Chop-Chop" (informal conversation, April 16, 2012).[55] This perception is shared by most residents as one man complained about politicians and assembly workers: "Those government people. Now, there is no development. They just eat their *dokono* [kenkey, an indigenous food]" (personal interview, June 13, 2012).

The misallocation of funds was on the front of people's minds during the month of the biometric registration exercise, and was a constant topic of conversation while residents waited in the long lines. In the NGO circles, SYPPA was dealing with a similar internal crisis that could de-legitimize the organization. A former Assemblywoman and strong supporter of the NPP had taken out a big loan for women's development. The executive director of SYPPA brought her to the bank to sign the loan and assisted with the process. The woman was supposed to distribute the money to different women. Instead, she took most of the money for herself. She also collected a large sum of money from different women to secure new market stalls. However, in reality she had no access to the stalls—it was all a scam, or white elephant. Now, the bank is demanding her payments and the women are demanding their money back. The woman came to the executive director to discuss ways of raising money. The executive director was not surprised one bit, and did not think she would face any dire consequences. "If you are in a political party,"

[55] To chop is the informal or slang word for "to eat." It also is used to refer to stealing from the state coffers. Politicians are often accused of "chopping" state funds; i.e. eating and consuming state revenue. For further clarification about eating and power in African societies, see Bayart 1988 and Schatzberg 2001.

he said, “You will go scot free” (informal conversation, April 16, 2012). These allegations hurt all organizations locally in Ashaiman, including the Anti-Corruption Coalition that has begun doing work in the community. As one resident explained, “They are not a good organization. Even though they are fighting against corruption, they skim money themselves. They get big contracts and then they don’t share fairly” (informal conversation, April 18, 2012).

Ghanaians needed the biometric registration exercise for more than just the right to vote: it signaled an important action of exercising citizenship. They need the picture ID as a form of identification; without state ID cards (they are in the process of being issued), residents rely on the voter’s ID cards to help secure bank loans and other potential assistance from the state. Further, they are proud of the card—it symbolizes their Ghanaian identity. Many residents carry it with them everywhere they go. In a focus group a few weeks after the exercise, community leaders in Tulako were asked the population of their neighborhood. They looked at each other confused, and answered with the number of residents who registered to vote. With new migrants coming in each day, the biometric registration exercise provided a much closer estimate of the real population than the 2010 census or any other documented figure.

While the biometric registration exercise was certainly important for the elections in December 2012, it was also important for the production and performance of democracy in peoples’ daily lives. It offered the chance for leaders to establish their authority; it allowed economic opportunities for unemployed but educated youth; it legitimized the work of social workers and NGOs; and it allowed the chance for ordinary residents to exercise their citizenship. It also highlighted some important aspects of the democratic process that are crucial for its success, and is embodied in the daily practices of Ashaiman residents. First, Ghanaians are

extremely patient. They are willing to stand (and even sleep) in line. But any time people are asked to wait for long periods of time, there might be some problems. Ghanaians are willing to wait, but at some tipping point patience wears thin. Second, and relatedly, residents are incredibly dedicated to the entire process. They are dedicated to their political parties, to the democratic process, to their State. Third, the democratic process is expensive. Over 200 million cedis was spent on the exercise. While a lot of this money was donated by foreign governments, political parties and politicians at the grassroots also spent lots of money. This meant that they had to raise these funds from somewhere, and they often did this by tapping into state coffers and revenue from public services. Finally, the process included men and women; people from different ethnic, class and religious groups; and people of all different levels of education.

The biometric registration exercise was important in all communities across the country, but it took different forms depending on the underlying informal institutional context and the nature of local political competition. For example, in Ga Mashie fights broke out over registration as members of the NDC tried to prevent "outsiders" from registering.[56] They couched the debate both in ethnic terms, but also exploited the lack of legal property rights in some areas by suggesting that many of the opponents work in the constituency, but do not sleep there. This presented a preview to the forms of political mobilization that would be used during the subsequent campaign. Despite similar ethnic demographics and comparable settlement patterns in some neighborhoods, Ashaiman did not have the same problems. As one resident told me at a polling station that has had a history of competitive voting, "Nothing like that happens here in Ashaiman. It is very calm" (informal conversation, April 10, 2012).

[56] I write about this case in more depth in a related working paper entitled, "Ethnography as Empirical Strategy: Process, Networks, and Spontaneity."

This ethnographic analysis of the biometric registration exercise provides insights into why formal democratic procedures and practices take different forms and produce different results in various contexts. The daily practices of residents, leaders and political parties shed light on the production of democracy in Ashaiman. While the exercise is a formal procedure and is guided by official rules and regulations, the underlying informal norms tell us equally as much about the success of the exercise in Ashaiman as opposed to the difficulties in places like Ga Mashie and Old Fadama. In Ashaiman, leaders are able to assert their *informal* authority through formal means. In other words, they are able to act as fathers, caretakers, and personal rulers to their followers as Assemblymen, constituency executives, and politicians. Similarly, young people have alternatives to political parties for social mobility—they can work as EC agents and for NGOs. This is in contrast to youth in other slum communities like Ga Mashie, where one youth resident told me that he "works" for the NDC because they give him jobs and a motorbike: "They feed me and make me happy," he said (informal conversation, May 13, 2012). In other words, youth do not rely solely on political parties for their daily livelihoods. Members from different ethnic groups have opportunities to come together and engage in daily life; the long waiting lines at the polling stations provided a vibrant "public space" for cross-ethnic dialogue and discussion. In the end, formal processes like the biometric registration work better in settlements like Ashaiman, but only because the underlying institutional context of strong leaders, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, and state legal recognition shape the entire process.

The conditions of accountability and public goods

Unlike Old Fadama and Ga Mashie, Ashaiman has the appropriate conditions to foster political accountability. Leaders in Ashaiman must reside and sleep in the slum; therefore, they face the prospect of public shame and honor on a daily basis. Leaders do not have an exit option. Leaders

gain social status by meeting their residents face-to-face. As one campaign strategist for the MP told me, "Go to his house before sunrise and you will see a line out the door. It takes him several hours before he can even leave for work."

Leaders hold each other to account using these reputational and face-to-face mechanisms. For example, in January 2012, there was an event and Mama Mary was in charge of collecting the money from various participants. One of the women gave her money to Junior, an Assemblyman, to give to Mama Mary, but he did not give the money to her. He said that he had every intention to, but then his child had to be rushed to the hospital. Mama Mary was depending on the money so that she could travel to the Volta Region, but now Junior was not giving her the money. She asked another community leader for assistance. So he sent the following text message to Junior:

> My bro. Junior I sympathise with ur child situation n wish speedy recovery. However, de fact remain that as u wished people to sympathased with ur situation, u shd also endeavor to do same to others situation. I will choose to go hungry than to end up reducing my credibility n creating suspescious around my stature. U know we all struggle to build credibility n lets guard around it before all people. I must b honest wth u as a brother dat things like dis may tarnish image as a leader (informal conversation, February 13, 2012).

The next day Junior returned the money to Mama Mary—the reputational mechanism worked. This example suggests that Ashaiman has the conditions for political accountability: residents have personal access to their leaders and leaders are expected to serve the common interest, or they will be hassled in daily affairs. The initial settlement pattern sets the context for these leader-follower relationships to develop. In other words, the logic of social exchange and the evolution of political clientelism extend beyond ethnic group, involve cross-ethnic norms of sharing, and require strong leadership in daily life. As this chapter demonstrates, Ashaiman has

the proper conditions for non-electoral forms of political accountability. The following chapter examines and theorizes how this practice of accountability actually works.

This chapter demonstrates that Ashaiman continues to develop its formal institutions and politics and governance occurs through formal means. But what it also shows is that these formal institutions are embedded in a civic life that enables the success of liberal-democratic institutions. Further, the formal political process is an outcome of a vibrant political struggle that finds it effectiveness from key components in civic life: strong leadership, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, and state legal recognition. The informal rules and procedures that shape daily life are expressed through formal institutions, leading to the successful process of democratic learning in Ashaiman.

Chapter 6: The Everyday Practice of Accountability

This chapter extends the literature on political accountability in three ways. First, I demonstrate how formal, principal-agent models of accountability overemphasize the concept of control. These models suggest that citizens (principals) control their representatives (agents) by sanctioning them out of office (usually through voting). But in many parts in Africa, including urban Ghana, the goal for residents is not to control their leaders, but rather to strengthen the bonds of respect between them. Therefore, second, I show how accountability is not a good that is delivered or respect that is granted; instead it rests on a relationship of reciprocity, morality, authority, and obligation. Mechanisms of accountability develop from relationships of respect and quests for social approval—for both the leaders and ordinary residents. Deficits in transparency and lack of information, central to existing theories of accountability, are critical to accountability, but not as the literature suggests. Third, I develop a practice-oriented theory of accountability using original evidence from 26 focus group interviews with Ghanaian slum leaders and residents. These discussions emphasize the meaning of political accountability in the daily lives of urban Ghanaian residents.

Introduction

In early January 2012, a rumor spread through Ashaiman that Mary was supporting parliamentary candidate Tony for MP. The rumor was based on a false claim that she hosted a meeting between Tony, the former MP, and another local big man at her house. This unsubstantiated claim was significant because informal networks of support underlie political power in urban Ghana (Paller 2014). If the rumor were true—that Mary was supporting Tony as opposed to the incumbent MP—this would mean that Mary turned her back on the incumbent and was actively supporting another candidate. The act would signal disloyalty because the incumbent supported Mary's recent campaign for local Assemblywoman, demonstrating his allegiance to her; this also signified her position as a follower to him. In this way, Mary as constituent has important obligations to her representative.

Mary is an important local figure because she is perceived as both an ordinary resident but also an aspiring politician with strong support from two important interest groups: women and the Ewe ethnic group. While the rumor signified potentially important local political

divisions, the implications on the ground were far greater: Mary might be accused of disrespecting her leader and being ungrateful, a dangerous combination for her future aspirations to be a community leader. The situation might also harbor dishonesty, resentment, and divisions among community leaders and followers. Leaders and followers are at the same time representatives, clients, protégés, and followers, suggesting that the relationship between a leader and follower is a complicated one. This calls into question simple binary models like "principal and agent" and concludes that they are inadequate descriptors of local power dynamics.

When I met Mary the morning she heard this rumor, she was livid. She was angry for several reasons. First, she claimed that the rumor was false and that she never facilitated a meeting with the incumbent's rivals. She did not like that somebody would make up what she deemed a "nasty lie." Second, and more significantly, she heard that the incumbent believed the rumor and was accusing her of turning her back on him. This drew her direct ire against the incumbent—"I don't know if I can ever support him again. What he is doing is so wrong." Third, the incumbent is inaccessible; she tried calling him and "begged" him to talk but he is unavailable. The bonds of respect between the incumbent (leader) and Mary (his follower) were broken, and it threatened not only their relationship but potentially cohesion in the community as well. These bonds of respect are reciprocal and based on social exchange, developing prior to the now-established political relationship.

The next morning, Mary woke up at 4 AM and went to the incumbent's house before sunrise. "In our tradition, if you have a problem with a leader, you go to his house before sunrise and discuss your issue." They spoke face-to-face and she expressed her grievances. He explained himself. Whatever misinformation and rumors had spread, were settled. She left the house having told him a clear message about spreading and believing false rumors; their bond of

respect was restored. That afternoon, Mary saw the incumbent driving his big black truck through an Ashaiman neighborhood. She went up to his window and they talked for several minutes. They both laughed throughout the entire conversation. The public performance indicated that the bonds of respect between leader and follower persisted, and remained strong.

This story is a typical example of the practice of political accountability in urban Ghana. While democratic elections serve as an important context for political jockeying and electoral competition—both important aspects of democratic governance—the practice of political accountability takes place outside of these formal channels. Followers must meet their leaders face-to-face and *demand* accountability; otherwise, the ideas of residents will not be taken into account. As one campaign strategist for the above-mentioned incumbent MP told me, "Go to his house before sunrise and you will see a line out the door. It takes him several hours before he can even leave for work." But constituents also have obligations to their representatives and must reciprocate with loyalty. In this way, political accountability is what I call dignified public expression: a dynamic and deliberative process of talking *and* listening that strengthens bonds of respect between representatives and constituents. It is public, relational, and practiced in the context of daily life. It is democratic because citizens must come together to set the agenda with its desires and interests; in turn, citizens' ideas must be directly "taken into account" by lawmakers engaged in policymakers (Paley 2004). To deliver accountability, policymakers must foster respectful modes of interactive communication.

This chapter extends the burgeoning literature on the conditions of political accountability in sub-Saharan Africa in three ways. First, I demonstrate how formal, principal-agent models of accountability overemphasize the concept of control. These models suggest that citizens (principals) control their representatives (agents) by sanctioning them out of office

(usually through voting). But in Africa, the goal for residents is not to control their leaders, but rather to strengthen the bonds of respect between them. Therefore, second, I show how accountability is not a good that is delivered or respect that is granted; instead it rests on a relationship of reciprocity, morality, authority, and obligation (Paller 2013). Mechanisms of accountability develop from relationships of respect and quests for social approval—for both the leaders and ordinary residents. Deficits in transparency and lack of information, central to existing theories of accountability, are critical to accountability, but not as the literature suggests. Third, I develop this practice-oriented theory of accountability by presenting original evidence from focus group interviews with Ghanaian slum leaders and residents.

Rethinking political accountability as dignified public expression

In one of the earliest and most significant discussions of representation, Hanna Pitkin (1967) criticizes the formalistic view, or what she calls the authorization view: a representative has been authorized to act on behalf of the represented (38-39). The problem with this view, according to Pitkin, is that it sets the representative relationship as a transaction that happens only before the actual representing begins. The representative gains a new status—"a right to act which he did not have before" (39). Przeworski et al. (1999) call this the mandate view of representation: politicians have the mandate to carry out what they said they would do. But there is no way in this model to determine whether the representative will do their job. In this description of representation, there are no formal institutional mechanisms in place to ensure that representatives adhere to the promises they made during their campaigns (Manin 1997; emphasized in Przeworski et al. 1999). This is why there is also the need for mechanisms of accountability which would induce incumbents to anticipate in the future that they will have to account for their past actions (40).

Scholars call the model in which elections serve to hold politicians accountable retrospective voting: politicians must satisfy some criteria—they must have performed—or they will be voted out of office. Voters make decisions based on an assessment of their politicians' behavior while in office (Ferejohn 1986). As Fiorina (1981) writes, "Given political actors who fervently desire to retain their positions and who carefully anticipate public reaction to their records as a means to that end, a retrospective voting electorate will enforce electoral accountability, albeit in an ex post, not an ex ante, sense" (11). These theories of political representation and accountability rest on formal and procedural principal-agent models: "When decision-making power is transferred from a principal (e.g. the citizens) to an agent (e.g. government), there must be a mechanism in place for holding the agent to account for their decisions and if necessary for imposing sanctions, ultimately by removing the agent from power" (Lindberg 2009). In sum, one prominent theory of accountability privileges retrospective control of authorized representatives through the threat of withdrawal of support during elections.

The theoretical model based on the principal-agent relationship conceptualizes accountability as control: power is transferred from one actor or institution to another. In some variants, the agent (politician) has *control over* the principal (citizens). For example, Stokes (2005) argues that representatives have *control over* voters through what she calls "perverse accountability." This model is updated in the broker-mediated model by which the political machine controls voters—in the absence of secret ballots—through brokers on the ground who have established followerships based on their "personal problem solving networks" (Auyero 2000) (Stokes et al. 2013). In others, principals have *control over* the politicians because they can sanction them by voting them out of office (Ferejohn 1986). This has also been extended to

theories of clientelism whereby citizens have significant power by controlling politicians through the demands of rents (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).

Traditional principal-agent models rest on this element of control. As Bentham argued, "The more strictly we are watched, the better we behave." The representative governs under the *control* of the citizenry; otherwise he is removed from office. This element of sanctioning appears to be the determining characteristic of accountability (Schedler 1999), distinguishing it from other concepts like responsiveness. In other words, accountability is a property of institutional structures, whereas responsiveness is an outcome or consequence of the institutional design (Ferejohn 1999: 131). Existing theories of electoral systems attempt to uncover the degree of control that voters have over their representatives, suggesting that this plays an important factor in the amount of accountability (Cox 1997; Powell 2000). Nonetheless, accountability as control models attempt to simplify a variety of complicated relationships and give divisible power to either the principal or the agent. But as empirical data from Ghana suggests, accountability occurs outside the logic of control. As the case of Mary and her incumbent MP at the beginning of this chapter demonstrates, it is unclear who has power and control over whom. Furthermore, this question is irrelevant: Mary is not angry that there has been an abuse of power or control, but rather her bond of respect with the MP has been shattered. She is unable to tell her side of the story, and the representative is unwilling to listen. Respectful modes of interactive communication between the representative and constituent were missing—and the story shows how they are needed to deliver accountability.

The rise of importance of accountability in our understanding of democracy has led to a strange paradox. On the one hand, accountability is now understood as a core element of democracy (Moncrieffe 1998; Schmitter and Karl 1991). This has mostly focused on

strengthening elections (Mainwaring 2003), although there is a small literature developing on the role of watchdog agencies (Manin et al. 1999; O'Donnell 2003; Besley 2006). Yet, on the other hand, there is significant "electoral skepticism"—empirical and theoretical research that shows that elections do not deliver accountability (Maloy 2014). For example, elections have been shown not to enforce economic accountability in democratic regimes (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). Besley (2006) strongly concludes that democratic elections are "highly imperfect" and possess "incomplete ability to discipline and select incumbents" (196). Stokes (2005) finds that strong parties might have political monopolies over their constituents that restrict vote choice (Stokes 2005). Maloy (2014) builds off the four constraints to electoral accountability advanced in the literature—information, incentives, institutions, and norms—to outline ten limiting conditions of electoral accountability (Maloy 2014). He concludes: "The requirement that voters agree on a unitary standard of judgment could be the most pessimistic part of the principal-agent theory, given the ineradicable complexities of policy issues and of human psychology" (ibid). This suggestion effectively argues that elections are embedded in a broader environment of agreement and disagreement, where the degree of electoral accountability depends on underlying norms—whether voters view elections as a mechanism of accountability in the first place. This point was strongly made previously by Fearon (1999) who argues that most people view elections as a way to select leaders, not to hold them to account. As a result, accountability ceases to be limited to the moment of an election, but instead is found to be a characteristic of an ongoing relationship between representatives and constituents. Accountability and representation are not easily distinguishable by a particular moment or decision, and instead involve repetition and ongoing political practice and participation between elections (Urbinati 2008).

While these critiques go a long way toward our understanding of the limitations of elections as a mechanism of the principal-agent model of accountability, they still rely on a clear logic of control. In other words, they assume what Lukes (1974) has termed the first face of power. Drawing from Dahl (1971), the first face of power posits that "X exerts power over Y, when X can get Y to do something Y would not otherwise do" (also Lasswell 1948). These formal models fail to capture the complexity and variety of relations among constituents and representatives, and assume that accountability rests on this first face of power.

Another shortcoming of principal-agent models and procedural theories of democracy in general, overlook the importance of the public sphere in attaining accountability in developing democracies (Wedeen 2004, 2007, 2008). Wedeen stresses the implications of this: "Any political analysis that fails to take into account participation and the formation of 'public spheres' as activities of political expression in their own right falls short in capturing what a democratic politics might reasonably be taken to include" (2008: 111). In other words, the analysis of public spheres, or spaces of public deliberation where public opinion to impact policy is formed (Habermas 1991) is a crucial centerpiece of democratic practice. Public spheres must also be engaged in decision-making, and they should give citizens equal access to participate in the creation of government policies (Fraser 1991). But as I have argued elsewhere (Paller 2013), the public sphere is not limited to public deliberation among ordinary citizens, but also must be extended to interactions between the government and its citizenry. In urban Africa, the relationship between leaders and their followers is a formative and central dimension to local public spheres, and the crucial arena for political accountability. In other words, citizens hold their leaders to account through public interactions and deliberations—face-to-face discussions,

night-time chats, weekly forums, and daily meals. It is through these respectful modes of interactive communication that dignified public expression occurs.

A theory of dignified public expression extends Josiah Ober's concept of democracy's dignity (Ober 2012). In his conceptualization of dignity, defined as equal high standing characterized by nonhumiliation and noninfantilization, it is democracy's third core value, in addition to liberty and equality. Dignity requires that every person deserves to be treated in a manner on par with the highest worth of humanity (Kateb 2011). It expresses the highest and equal status of all human beings (Waldron 2009). Citizens require dignity if they are to successfully govern themselves, or what Ober calls democracy: the collective capacity to get things done in the public interest (Ober 2008). On the one hand, this requires basic capabilities of human development (Rawls 1971; Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2000). In Africa, this has been referred to as the need to eat, consume, and survive (Owusu 1971; Ake 1991). This is because dignity is required for people to put their political liberty to use. Dignity makes democracy robust as "democratic institutions defend dignity, whereas the habits of dignified citizens provide behavioral foundations for defending democracy and for improving institutions over time" (Ober 2012: 828).

But it requires more, that "relevant information is made public" (Ober 2012; 827). In this way, a theory of public expression builds off principles of deliberative democracy. In particular, it joins in existing attempts to reconcile theories of deliberation with those of representation (Guttman and Thomson 1996; Urbinati 2000; Young 2000; Mansbridge 1999). Central to these theories is a form of reciprocity, or fair terms of cooperation among equals (Guttman and Thompson 1996). This involves a public sphere where individuals from diverse social standings discuss problems together and "try to arrive peaceably at solutions in whose implementation

everyone will co-operate" (Young 2000: 28). At a very basic level, this requires political equality, or the ability to express one's views on equal standing with others in a polity (Verba 2003). But it also requires participatory parity, where all individuals have the political space to participate in discussions about justice (Fraser 2003, 2008). In the space of public deliberation, representatives and their constituents are on equal standing, and both engage in expression that involves "talking and listening." It goes one step further than Waldron's (2014) demand that constituents "owe an account" by requiring that leaders "give reasons that can be accepted by all those who are bound by laws and policies they justify" (Gutmann and Thompson 196: 129).

A crucial aspect of dignity in a democracy is that the other—another person, government, politician, etc.—listens. Dignified public expression exists only when there is speaking *and* listening. People must also understand the rules and procedures that pattern their lives (Markell 2003). Another way of saying this is that the rules and institutions that govern people's lives should be an outcome of their personal expression, or what Arendt calls "uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership" (quoted in Markell 2003: 11). But far too often, the lack of political accountability threatens democratic self-governance, preventing dignified expression between representatives and their constituents. Therefore, the bonds of respect between representatives and constituents are unable to develop. Just as Ober shows that democracy's dignity rests on nonhumiliation (having respect as a moral equal) and noninfantilization (having recognition as a choicemaking adult), political accountability must also fulfill these norms.

Dignified free expression in daily life extends the concept of political accountability far beyond the principal-agent model, and far beyond elections, voting, and formal institutions. It builds from the ideas of Waldron, Maloy and Urbinati who suggest that accountability is an ongoing relationship, but deepens them by stressing how dignified free expression takes place in

the public spheres in local communities, where residents and their leaders come face-to-face to collectively get things done. The need for a vibrant public sphere that brings together representatives and their constituents—leaders and their followers—is a necessary condition for the everyday practice of accountability in Africa. It is this active form of democratic deliberation, similar to what Nadia Urbinati terms advocacy representation that African residents demand in their daily lives:

> Attendance and speech are the structural forms of democratic participation. They are prior to, and the precondition for, any democratic decision. They entail both passivity and activity while denoting the plastic dimension of speech that actually presumes both outward expressiveness and inward reflection, *talking and listening*. 'They highlight the difference between isolation and solitude, and between mere presence and a deliberative kind of presence (Arendt 1978)' (italics my emphasis; 2000: 762).

In this way, the process of "talking and listening" is a central element of democratic accountability. More importantly, a good leader is an advocate who helps shape the public sphere into a forum for political action:

> A representative can be an advocate who turns the whole nation, not merely the assembly, into a public forum. The representative is an intermediary who can expand the space for political discussion beyond governmental institutions and at the same time bring political decisions to the people's attention for scrutiny. The representative takes the claims and ideas of the people to the assembly so debate there expands and is enriched. Yet, for this to happen, *society cannot be a silent place*. Advocacy in parliament both requires and stimulates advocacy in society (italics my emphasis; ibid: 766-67).

The "noise" of society occurs in the context of daily life, and is a crucial part of democratic accountability. This also ensures that those who are affected by decision-making are included and presence in the public sphere: their presence is embodied (Phillip 1995; Young 2000).

By incorporating the importance of the public sphere in political accountability, I move closer to the way that individuals in new African democracies understand the concept. For urban Ghanaians, accountability is more than voting leaders out of office; it involves daily interactions

and deliberation with their leaders, as the case of Mary demonstrates. To include this dimension of accountability, I borrow Julia Paley's two-part definition of accountability that she develops after significant ethnographic research in post-dictatorship Chile (2004). According to her, accountability entails two components: 1) Policymakers must enact into law and put into practice the desires of its citizens; 2) Citizens' ideas are directly "taken into account" by lawmakers engaged in policymaking.

Citizens must be able to set the agenda for what they want legislated, ensuring that they are part of the process of local decision-making, not just public opinion formation (Fraser 1991). But it also requires that representatives "owe an account" of what they are doing directly to the people (Waldron 2014). The failure to foster respectful modes of interactive communication has serious consequences for democracy and can result in political sting, or feelings of betrayal, insult, and disrespect by ordinary citizens stemming from their government's failure to protect and provide for its population (Paller 2013). Therefore, dignified public expression necessitates a central place in a theory of democracy and accountability.

Method

The focus on accountability in people's daily lives is motivated by my ethnographic research. To substantiate my theoretical claims, I designed two series of focus groups (26 in total) that I conducted during the course of fieldwork: one with local leaders and one with residents. Focus groups are "a research technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher" (Morgan 1997: 6). Focus groups have been used effectively to study public opinion in American politics (Gamson 1992), and have recently been used in studies of local African politics (Kendhammer 2013). Focus groups provide an alternative forum (to

ethnographic methods and interviews) to discuss with other slum residents potentially sensitive topics like frustrations with leadership, issues of trust between ethnic groups, and challenges facing community associations. The first series of focus groups were conducted in ten communities and asked local leaders how residents hold them to account, the developmental and political challenges facing the community, and how the community grew over time.[57] The interviews were conducted in Twi and Ga and translated into English. They lasted approximately two hours each.

The second series of focus groups consisted of 16 groups in 10 different slums.[58] Each group consisted of 6-7 residents of the community; 102 residents participated in total. I used a combination of convenience and snowball sampling: with the help of a resident who works with local NGOs, we reached out to community members in the ten different slums. The contact on the ground then found various participants who varied along gender, age, ethnicity and political party lines. We emphasized the importance of having a diverse range of people at the focus groups. In Old Fadama and Ashaiman-Tulako, I varied ethnic composition of the groups because I inducted from ethnographic immersion that ethnic divisions play an important role in community affairs. Therefore, I conducted one focus group with all members of the Dagomba ethnic group, one with entirely non-Dagombas, and one with three Dagombas and three non-Dagombas. Similarly, in Nima and Ga Mashie I varied the composition along the lines of age: I conducted one group with youth and another group with elders. Each group lasted approximately three hours and participants were compensated 10 cedis (~$7) for their participation. The group interviews were conducted in Twi, Ga, Hausa, and Dagomba.

[57] Focus groups were conducted in Ashaiman-Taabo, Ashaiman-Tulako, Agbogbloshie, Chorkor, Ga Mashie, King Shona, Avenor, Abuja, ECOMOC, and Old Fadama.
[58] Focus groups were conducted in Old Fadama (3), Agbogbloshie, Ga Mashie (2), Nima (2), Abuja, Chorkor, Ashaiman-Valco Flat, Ashaiman-Taabo, Ashaiman-Tulako (3), and King Shona.

I analyze the focus group data using a method akin to ordinary language interviewing, a technique used "to uncover the meaning of words in everyday talk" (Schaffer 2006: 151). This is also the technique used by Pitkin in her groundbreaking work on representation, and I attempt a similar project with respect to the word accountability in the African context. This requires attending carefully to the way words are used when not philosophizing about them, as well as placing the word in all contexts of human life, not just politics (Pitkin 1967:6). That said, my focus groups focused particularly on politics and attempted to emphasize and uncover the meaning of political accountability in the daily lives of urban Ghanaian residents. While chapters 3-5 paid close attention to the characteristics of the actors involved in my case studies, this chapter presents quotations without emphasizing the individual characteristics of the respondents. The focus is on what is said, not the people saying it.

Democracy's dignity and respectful modes of interactive communication

A theory of dignified public expression resonates with Ghanaians understanding of democratic accountability that is delivered through respectful modes of interactive communication. Ghanaians substantiate Ober's claim that freedom and equality are not sufficient elements of democracy: they must also be able to express themselves publicly, and this requires dignity (publicity is also a central tenet of Guttman and Thompson's model (1996) and Young 2000). As one respondent says: "[Democracy is] a simple way to express yourself. To express the grief that you have within you. We have the legislature and those with the veto powers and when they are abusing us, we have to voice out" (focus group, May 18, 2012). Another respondent explains: "Democracy is not all about government, it is a collective responsibility, between the citizens and the government, that is why initially I said democracy comes with responsibilities" (focus group, June 3, 2012). In fact, the word "Democracy" in Akan-Twi, Ghana's most widely spoken

African language, is "Ka-bi-ma-menka-bi." This translates to: I speak and then you speak. In Ghana, democracy is the process of free political expression between equals, and this requires the norm of dignity.

A crucial aspect of dignity in a democracy is that the other—another person, government, politician, etc.—listens. Dignified public expression exists only when there is speaking *and* listening. In one focus group, a respondent suggests that democracy is working:

> I will say democracy is working in this community because everyone enjoys freedom, because if you are doing something that is wrong somebody will call you and talk to you, saying what you are doing is not good, is not good, so stop it. And we are also listening, because when you are doing something and somebody tells you, well in terms of democracy, there is no problem in this community (focus group, June 3, 2012).

The respondent mentions that "everyone enjoys freedom" because they have the ability to talk and express themselves. But perhaps more importantly, the respondent says that "we are also listening" to the critique against them, that what they "are doing is not good." There is a collective capacity to change "wrong" behavior; there is a sense of collective responsibility, manifesting itself in the practice of public expression that can move the community forward. It is this process of public expression that leads to collective learning that residents particularly value about democracy:

> Everyone is speaking his mind. I feel it is good; it is, because maybe there is something I know that he does not know, so if I come on air and say it, he will know how the thing is, so democracy is good… here you can say anything and walk away freely so I can say we are practicing democracy in Ghana. I think democracy is about sharing ideas, so it is good, it helps so many people, many people learn from it…So if you speak well on issues, the whole country will benefit from you (focus group, June 9, 2012).

Residents emphasize the importance of democratic learning, viewing themselves as one citizen among "the whole country." Speaking, but then being able to "walk away freely" is a crucial

aspect of "sharing ideas" and this respondent verifies that this is indicative of the way that Ghanaians practice democracy.

The collective nature of democratic practice that dignified public expression entails is more in line with the "grain" and fabric of African societies, resonating with their understandings of power (Galvan 2004; Kelsall 2010). In his study of Senegalese elections, Schaffer (1998) shows that for ordinary Senegalese, democracy, and electoral institutions in particular, are a means to reinforce community ties that may be called upon in times of crisis. Similarly, socio-economic concerns and desires for liberation and transformation are central to Africans' understandings of democracy (Zuern 2009). Focus group data confirms that residents understand political accountability to entail these conceptualizations, which I show are also central tenets of dignified public expression. They suggest that it is an active behavioral relationship between leaders and followers; a relationship of stewardship by which leaders must "owe an account" of their actions; and a public phenomenon. For example, one respondent emphasizes this active and deliberative process:

> Because democracy is people's power, we must know the essence of the power so we can demand for accountability. It is a way of getting back to the people to let them know what you are using the power they have given you…To me, we have our Assemblyman, he is supposed to call us to find out our problems and he must forward them to the Assembly. When the problems are being tackled, he has to come back to tell the people the progress of action being taken, when the rest would be carried etc…Meet the people and put into action whatever we have said… To give account of their stewardship (focus group, May 18, 2012).

The duty to engage in respectful modes of interactive communication and maintain social relations is emphasized as "a way of getting back to the people to let them know what you are using the power they have given you." While there is a transfer of power—from the followers to the leader, as the respondent indicates—this power is not given without expectation of physically

(and personally) hearing back from the leader. As Waldron emphasizes, the leader needs to owe an account, as another respondent emphasizes:

> The president needs to tell the people what he is doing with the power… Doing work according to your master's order and if you do not do it well, it will bring about low productivity- so you have to deliberate on it so you can find solution to them… Once we have the president given power to the people, at the end of the month the people will have to give account to the president… One person being adequate with the task you have been given and providing the right account that they need from you (focus group, June 14, 2012).

The leader "needs to tell the people what he is doing with the power." The leader has the responsibility to come back and account to his or her people, or "when the problems are being tackled, he has to come back to tell the people the progress of action being taken," as the quote above suggests. But the process is reciprocal: constituents must also "give account to the president," suggesting that accountability is collective and involves responsibilities and obligations by both parties.

Political accountability is also a relationship of stewardship. Leaders are not just given a mandate to represent his or her constituents; they are given the responsibility to be stewards over the resources of the entire country, or community (for local positions). The country, or community, is now "a trust under his care," as a respondent suggests:

> Asking someone to account for a trust under his care. Do you think it is good 'accountability' if someone likes you and gives you a job, after he returns you should give him account of what transpired in his absence in order for respect to be between us. So that in the future he can put his business into your care without any tears (focus group, June 12, 2012).

Another respondent makes a similar claim:

> You have been entrusted with a job; you need to render a report on the progress of the job – the shortfalls and the success… Our leaders are not doing their best in that area. Leaders who have been given a job to do giving account of work done… Telling the people what you are using our natural resources for (focus group, May 31, 2012).

Here, leaders have been entrusted to use "our national resources," with "our" meaning the constituents who voted the leader into power. This act of stewardship is the act of being "entrusted with a job." How the leader acts has important implications for not only the leader, but the followers or constituents as well. The actions of the leader will even affect future decision-making, the above respondent suggests that "the future he can put his business into your care without any tears." In this way, political accountability extends far beyond the mandate view and the formal accountability model—accountability is not simply about sanctioning the leader out of office, or controlling the actions of the leader. Political accountability also entails overall trust in leadership, and the future ability to get things done. The bonds of respect between the leaders and their followers must be strong for the effective, future management of resources.

Finally, political accountability is a public phenomenon. Respondents mention that leaders should "meet the people" and residents should be able to physically "see the details of your [leader's] activities." One respondent suggests that the process of making actions aware is a public process that must be done in front of the constituents:

> It [Accountability] means to give account of something. It means people should be made aware of how a common resource is being managed. *How do you see it in Ghana?* It means people should be able to see the details of your activities. *Is accountability a good thing?* Yes, it is. Without it you won't see your shortfalls and your profit (focus group, June 22, 2012).

This gets at the heart of the respondent claim above that "democracy is people's power" and that they must "know the essence of the power" so that they can hold their leaders accountable. The only way citizens can "know the essence of the power" is if they are made publicly aware of the governing responsibilities of their leaders.

Bonds of respect

In contrast to principal-agent models that emphasize logics of control, the practice of accountability in Africa rests on a relational norm of respect about how leaders should interact with his or her followers, and how citizens should in turn treat their representatives. As one respondent in a focus group explains: "If you don't respect them [the leaders] how can you expect them to help you" (focus group, June 20, 2012). Another: "Because you selected him to be your leader so you have to support him to do the work, and respect is a way of supporting them" (focus group, June 4, 2012). A third: "Yes. Yes we need to respect them; even the bible says we should respect our leaders" (focus group, May 27, 2012). And: "Yes, respect is very good. Even if the leader is a small person we need to respect him" (focus group, June 28, 2012). Finally: "We need to respect them because when you have a problem you would go to them" (focus group, June 12, 2012). These comments demonstrate the importance of followers and citizens respecting their leaders. In other words, ordinary residents and citizens are obligated to respect their leaders; otherwise, they will not be able to demand accountability. Stated differently, leaders are not expected to perform their duties in office unless they are respected. In contrast to authorization views of representation, leaders are not given a mandate to perform solely by being voted into office—they must also be respected by the populace once in their position. Alternatively, retrospective voting and the formal accountability view would not work either. This is because leaders would not be expected or obligated to perform their duties without a basic level of respect from their followers.

Michael Schatzberg (1993, 2001) argues that this norm of respect is based on a very different conception of power than that which operates in the West: in the West power is seen as the ability to get somebody to do something, whereas in Africa power is about consumption—the ability to "eat" (1993). This form of governance, famously termed "politics of the belly," allows

the leader to consume as much as possible, as long as his followers continue to eat (Bayart 1989). This consumption provides status and prestige—a visible sign of power (Owusu 1971; Price 1971; Nugent 1996). But leaders are expected to act like fathers and feed their families—real or metaphorical (Schatzberg 2001). Jean and John L. Comaroff (1997) locate the roots of this norm of respect in pre-colonial, traditional leadership forms, like chieftaincy institutions. Here, they explain:

> Chiefs were expected to rule 'with' the people…What this meant, in practice, is that sovereigns were expected to surround themselves with advisors to guide the everyday life of the polity…to be open always to approach by their subjects, whose physical welfare they were also obliged to heed, redistributing food and other requisites in times of need…But delivering improvements, in turn, hinged on the public cooperation that a ruler could command (131).

Therefore, the daily behavior of chiefs was crucial to governance, and rested on this norm of respect. This point is forcefully made by a quote from a speech made by a local elder: "A chief can only be judged by what he does… If you treat [people] with respect, they will treat you with respect. If you shun them, they will shun you. And if you frighten them, they will run away" (quoted in Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 131).

But it is important to emphasize that respect in Africa is not something that is solely given or earned in a transaction—or by winning an election. It must be earned. For leaders to earn the respect of their constituents, they must also respect them, as the Comaroffs made clear. My data substantiate these claims, as one resident explains: "When the leader does not respect people, he would also not be respected. Leaders who are performing their duties are respected; if you don't perform people will not care about you" (focus group, June 28, 2012). Another describes how the names that citizens attach to their representatives invoke respect: "Yes, we call them Honourables. But if they do not respect us we will also not respect them" (focus group,

June 14, 2012). Another respondent explains that respect is an outcome of government performance, suggesting that respect might be a sanctioning mechanism that is consistent with the accountability view of representation: "We don't need to respect them because they don't perform their duties" (focus group, June 12, 2012). As I have argued elsewhere (Paller 2013), the failure of a government to deliver basic goods and services to its population—metaphorically feeding the citizenry—is understood as a failure of political accountability. But this is not only because of failures of redistribution or cultural recognition; rather it stems from the failure of the political process, a process that extends far beyond elections and legislative decision-making. The bonds of respect between leaders and their followers are broken when citizens' ideas are not taken into account and law is not enacted based on these desires (Paley 2004).

In contemporary Africa, political liberalization has led to the challenge of incorporating traditional institutions like the chieftaincy into a modern system of government (Ntsebeza 2005; Williams 2004; Logan 2009). But the challenge is not only making democracy "the only game in town," the key measure of democratic consolidation that Linz and Stepan (1996) espouse in their influential study. It also requires dealing with the inherited norms that leaders, and particularly traditional authorities, follow in daily life. And these norms and duties do not simply wither away with the establishment of liberal-democratic electoral institutions (Paller 2014). In fact, democratic consolidation can even embolden local leaders and authorities, as evidenced by a quote of a South African in Williams (2004): "Freedom is doing anything you like…No restrictions on what you are doing. There is no democracy with the chiefs and izinduna…They must be taught what is democracy" (114). The challenge is to make sure that leaders continue to

rule "with the people" as Comaroff and Comaroff suggest, a crucial factor in strengthening bonds of respect between leaders and followers.[59]

There is a historical precedent of popular control over chiefs in African societies—groups can always depose their chief and sanction him out of office (Goody 1966; Owusu 1986). Most of these arguments approach African democracy with communitarian instincts: the traditional African model of governance depends on the all-embracing concept of community, rather than individual values (Casely-Hayford quoted in Sampson 1951; Davidson 1977; Owusu 1979; Ayittey 1991). As Owusu (1992) argues: "Popular, participatory democracy based on African concepts of community appears to be an essential element in any meaningful answer to endemic political and economic troubles" (380). In fact, "traditional" African values set an incredibly high standard for democracy:

> Traditional African political systems were infused with democratic values. They were invariably patrimonial, and consciousness was communal; everything was everybody's business, engendering a strong emphasis on participation. Standards of accountability were even stricter than in Western societies. Chiefs were answerable not only for their own actions but for natural catastrophes such as famine, epidemics, floods, and drought. In the event of such disasters, chiefs could be required to go into exile or 'asked to die' (Ake 1991: 34).

The cultural and traditional norm of sanctioning the chief out of power—locally called de-stoolment—has been used as an argument that democracy can build off this precedent of popular rule (Ayittey 1991). But it also has been viewed as a threat to democracy with the rise of coups

[59] The term "bonds of respect" is most used in theories of restorative justice and youth delinquency. The term is used in Brathwaite's (1989) influential theory of reintegrative justice where he emphasizes the power of shaming and the importance of social and community cohesion. It is also used in studies like Sampson and Laub (1994) who use the term in the context of family dynamics and parent-child breakdown. Charles Barton highlights the interconnectedness of these two scenarios in his paraphrasing of Brathwaite as follows: "The best place to see reintegrative shaming at work is in loving families…Family life teaches us that shaming and punishment are possible while maintaining bonds of respect…[F]amilies are the most effective agents of social control in most societies partly because of this characteristic" (Brathwaite 1989: 56). While I locate the sources of respect in African societies, the concept of respect can also be traced philosophically to Kant (1785, 1788, 1797) who claims that all humans are owed respect because they are "free rational beings."

d'état, or "rituals of rebellion" (Owusu 1986). While sensitive to the cultural underpinnings of African societies, and particularly the obligations and reciprocity that shape daily life (as outlined in Part I of this study), my theory of dignified public expression rejects communitarian ideals and embraces liberalism. It also extends beyond the limitations of the principal-agent model. While the one-shot sanctioning by the populace in cases of de-stoolment is consistent with the principal-agent model, it is not delivering what Africans understand to be accountability. The representative is not giving account of his actions, the populace has not been able to set the agenda, and it is not demanding the representative do his job. Instead, it is an admission of the failure of accountability and complete institutional breakdown. The bonds of respect between the leader and followers are broken.

The importance of bonds of respect between leaders and those they govern is not limited to the African context. Axel Honneth (2003) forcefully explains how "improved insight into the motivational sources of social discontent and resistance" (125) demonstrate that "what those affected regard as 'unjust' are institutional rules or measures they see as necessarily violating what they consider to be well-founded claims to social recognition" (133). Stated simply, at the basis of all social and political struggles is the desire to be socially recognized. By providing a moral basis for social and political struggles, Honneth emphasizes the positive aspects of social mobilization: the struggle for recognition is part of a broader process of self-fulfillment. The implication of Honneth's argument is clear: the social and political claims that ordinary people make stem from anger and feelings of disrespect. The manner in which these claims are expressed and enforced through respectful modes of interactive communication provides the real basis of accountability in African societies.

But to treat respect as a simple sanctioning mechanism undermines the emotional attachment between leaders and followers that is so important to self-fulfillment. In other words, respect cuts at the very heart of what it means to be socially recognized as a person (as Honneth suggests). One respondent explains this in the Ghanaian context:

> They [our leaders] are not honest, their biggest problem is power, they don't want give recognition to other because those people are 'no bodies,' that is the problem with them. 'He is nobody' is their biggest problem, and in leadership if you don't give due recognition to your people, they will not also give you any recognition (focus group, May 19, 2012).

Here, the respondent clearly suggests that the problem of leadership in his community is that the leaders do not treat them as persons—they are "no bodies." But at the heart of this relationship is power. By undermining a person's humanity—by not recognizing him or her as a person—the leader damages the relationship of respect. This act of disrespect makes it impossible to pursue developmental priorities for the community: there is no norm of respect on which to cooperate publicly (as the Comaroffs describe). A lack of respect filters down to the community, creating a deadlock for community cooperation.

The lack of respect has serious implications for development and community cohesion. As one respondent explains:

> Old man, honestly, the leaders do not respect us. I don't want to cover up anything. They don't respect—the leaders do not respect anyone. They are only concerned about what they will eat. If you go to the roadside, look at how they are choked. If it is cleaned every week it will look nice, but when you go there it is choked. It is filled with filth. It is a lot of diseases. He [the leader] is richer than you so he does not respect you. When it is time for elections they will come and stand. When it is time for elections they will come and repair what is spoiled…He thinks he has won two times, so when you go to him he is not concerned. It is the Assemblyman who is not able to perform. You know this light was off a time before and they came and fixed everything—but it was time of the election. Now that he is in power and it has spoiled again, he is supposed to come and fix them. Now that they are not working, nobody wants to take up the responsibility. Nobody wants to leave his job and go and look for the Assemblyman to complain about the lights to

> him. So that is why you see the lights not working. Nobody is ready to go and log the complaint (focus group May14, 2012).

Here, the respondent touches on what Schatzberg describes as a lack of legitimacy: even though the leader has won two democratic elections, he lacks legitimacy because he does not feed and care for his followers. Of course, this requires a material dimension, making it very hard to disaggregate the concept of money, and distribution of material rewards, from that of respect. Referring to Ghanaian society, Van der Geest argues that "money (*sika*) was one of the most effective symbols by which people viewed their lives, assessed their relationships and expressed their feelings" (1997: 535). In the case of the respondents above, he makes clear that the lack of respect cuts both ways: the leader does not feel the need to "care for his community" and the community residents do not feel the need to "complain about the lights to him" because they do not think anything will get done. In some cases, this leads to a cycle of disrespect: "People take you as being foolish when you respect them as leaders. One man among us I can call my father he respects me and I can do the same with him. Most of our leaders have not been able to deliver on their promises" (focus group, June 22, 2012). In these cases, a deficit of respect hinders community cooperation and public coordination.

Accessible leadership and advocacy

The importance of respect and the expectations that representatives publicly account for their actions in front of constituents is apparent in Ghanaians' assessment of good and bad leadership. Democratic accountability requires that the leaders "of the people owe the people an account of what they have been doing, and a refusal to provide this is simple insolence" (Waldron 2014: 27). Residents expect their leaders to do more than deliver the goods; they also expect them to listen to their ideas and hear their voices. Government performance is about more than serving

the original mandate or the representative's ability to perform in government to avoid sanctioning. Rather, leaders are expected to have a personal connection with their constituents—a connection that strengthens the bonds of respect. The failure of leaders to engage their constituents in the public sphere engenders deep resentment and disrespect.

Consider the following assessments of good leadership:

> A good assemblyman is one that brings improvement to the community, one that listens to the people when they call on him, one that call[s] the people to meetings to discuss ways to improve…One who listens to the problems of the people, one who listens to your plight anytime you call on him even at night, one that will come to your community and when you call him, take you[r] concerns and present them at the assembly, so as to make sure all your problems are solved, that is a good assemblyman (June 9, 2012).

Another respondent mentions the importance of intervening in community affairs: "We have good leaders whom when they intervene in a dispute, there is peace due to their wisdom" (focus group, June 28, 2012). Another resident stresses that the leaders are accessible: "I think there are good leaders, if you bring [a] complain[t], they work on it so they are good leaders" (focus group, June 4, 2012). Leaders are also expected to reflect the community sensibility, as one resident makes clear about what he sees as good leadership: "One that shares the cry of the community and the joy of the community. One that understands the problems of the community. A good assemblyman is one who stays in the community and makes sure the community is clean, one that is able to mobilize the youth for communal labor" (focus group, June 4, 2012). Similarly:

> A good assemblyman is one who does his job. What is his job? Let's take the gutters, if the assemblyman is able to organize the community to clean the community and open up gutters for water to flow, the[n] he is doing his work. A good assemblyman is one who after been voted for stays in the community and work[s] with the people to solve their problems. A good assemblyman is one who is able to bring projects to his community, bring in projects like toilets, and gutters (focus group, May 27, 2012).

Or, as one respondent simply states about two specific leaders: “These two people help you any time you call on them in the community” (focus group, May 19, 2012). As another respondent explains:

> A good leader is someone who is willing to listen to me… He must respect the people he leads…He should know how to relate with people. He is a welcoming person who is willing to listen to your problems… He must be able to manage human relations… One of the cardinal points of a leader is meeting with the people. Because they do not meet us, we cannot see them as good leaders (focus group, May18, 2012).

A leader is expected to be a family figure—a father to his broader political family (Schatzberg 2001; Paller 2014). A good father is the sign of a good leader, as one respondent mentions: “A father is always there for his children, to speak for them. He should be courageous. One who can stand for the community and for the community to develop? I have not seen a father yet…One who is ready to listen to his people (focus group, May 18, 2012)…A father is someone who can easily be approachable” (focus group, June 14, 2012).

The final respondent emphasizes creating a public space for citizen-leader engagement, or a place for the leader to learn about the problems facing the community members:

> He should be able to sit with us and know our problems. He should be able to settle people’s problems when they approach him. The assemblyman should provide me a job since I am unemployed. He should work on our complaints. We have choked gutters and we don’t see it being removed. Family members of criminals call him to bail their sons out when they are arrested (focus group, June 22, 2012).

The leader’s failure to engage in the respectful modes of interactive communication renders him less able to address important material needs. The failure to address material needs is compounded by the implication that he was not listening. The respondent emphasizes a direct link between the complaints of the residents and the ability of the leader “to take these ideas into account” as Paley emphasizes, and work on them. In this way, the process of political accountability depends on a public sphere where the leaders interact with his or her followers. In

these conversations, residents mention the importance of "listen[ing] to the people," "call[ing] people to meetings," "com[ing] to your community when you call him," "tak[ing] you[r] concerns and present[ing] them at the assembly," "manag[ing] human relations," "being easily approachable," and "stay[ing] in the community and makes sure the community is clean." All of these necessary conditions of good leadership suggest the importance of creating a space for public dialogue and deliberation. Akin to the Comaroff's discussion of traditional chiefs, a ruler is expected to command a certain level of public cooperation.

Alternatively, a bad leader fails at these tasks. As one respondent says, "Most of our leaders are selfish and do not mingle with us" (focus group, June 22, 2012). Another explains a bad leader as: "One that does not listen to the problems of the people, one who does not respond to our calls. If you are going to him and he sees you first, he hides, such is a bad assemblyman, one that is not working in the interest of the people" (focus group, June 9, 2012). Here, the respondent emphasizes that the leader is shirking his face-to-face responsibility—he is "hiding" from his constituents. Bad leaders literally do not show up to meetings: "He [my leader] can call you to come and you will go and sit there till evening he will not show up (focus group, June 9, 2012). Similarly, a respondent says: "Any assemblyman who does not think about his community is a bad assemblyman. A bad assemblyman is one who runs away after the people have voted for him" (focus group, June 4, 2012). Finally, a bad leader "is unconcerned about the activities and concerns of his community" (focus group, June 22, 2012).

At the crux of bad leadership is the disrespect that the leader has for his followers. As one respondent mentions: "Only he knows, he doesn't know how to lead people, he does not value us, he treat[s] us like slaves or fools thinking that anytime he comes here we will vote for him" (focus group, May 19, 2012). This is an extremely common complaint across Africa. Similarly,

"If you are a leader, you become [a] servant. You think about the people before yourself. But now, they think about themselves and their families only" (focus group, May 31, 2012). Residents constantly complain that their leaders have "forgotten them" and "turned their back" on them. They complain that the leaders no longer "pick my calls." The most serious complaint is that they no longer visit the community—the leaders do not live among the residents anymore. These complaints are experienced as a serious form of disrespect that endangers the ability of the community to progress and develop.

Everyday forms of accountability

The principal-agent model is an appropriate starting place in discussions of political accountability. Even in places where formal institutions are weak, citizens need a way to influence their leaders. But as the story at the beginning of the chapter demonstrates, it is very difficult to discern who should be controlling whom: the leaders or the residents? Consider the following answer from a focus group participant when asked if leaders should sleep in their communities: "Like you are a parent, and you sleep in Dansoman and your children sleep at Kinka, how can you control him?" (focus group, June 20, 2012). The comment seems to suggest that leaders must sleep in the slum so as to control their constituents. The visibility of the leader is important to instill community discipline but also foster collective participation. But accountability is as much about the leader *controlling* his followers as it is about followers *controlling* their leaders. What the situation really suggests is that the concept of control does not truly get at the core of what accountability means and how it is practiced in Ghana.

Instead, accountability is a give-and-take process whereby residents publicly express their concerns and leaders actively listen to the claims made. Then they come to an agreement

together. In my focus groups, I asked a series of questions about the provision of contracts for public service projects. In this question, I asked the group what they would do if they heard that one of their political party leaders was given a contract but was not getting the work done. One man responded:

> We will attack him. No, allow him to express his view. Yes I will attack him, and he will tell me why the work is not done, we can also go and tell the one who gave him the contract. I will go to him and find out from him whether it is true that he was given a contract, then if he confirms, then I will ask him why it was not done, then from his explanation, I will know the next step to take. I am not a member of NDC [the governing political party], so I will just organize people so that we will give the information to the press. We will take it to the media so they will mention it on radio, then the politicians will act (80)…We don't even see him, so I will tell the media to expose him. I will go and ask him to be sure it is true. I will give it to the media and he will come and defend himself. No you have to ask him first. He does not come to the community how do I ask him? The best way to get him to confirm or deny the story. I will go to him. If I know the one who gave him the money, so I will go and tell him (focus group, May 27, 2012).

A number of points are notable in this exchange. First, the immediate reaction is to attack the man. Many respondents mentioned that this is what people do in their communities—they fight. In another interview, the respondent simply stated: "Look if we don't attack the chairman how will the assembly know that the work is not done?" (focus group, May 19, 2012). Second, the respondent mentions that he will "go to him and find out from him whether it is true." He is clear that he will "allow him to express his view." In this way, the leader must be accessible so that residents can go talk to them. The respondent expects to be able to have a conversation with his leader so that he can express his concerns about the community. The participant explains that "from his explanation, I will know the next step to take." This was an extremely common response throughout the interviews: respondents suggest that they can tell if the leader is truthful and genuine after the process of public expression. Third, another respondent mentions that "we don't even see him, so I will tell the media to expose him." Here, the resident emphasizes the importance of public accessibility—leaders must be visible in their community so that residents

can begin the process of accountability. Otherwise, they will be forced to make these claims public via the radio. Fourth, the process can be politicized. The respondent mentions that "I am not a member of NDC, so I will just organize people so that we will give the information to the press." In other words, the resident does not feel like he has the right or ability to hold the leader accountable—he is not from the same political party. Not being from the same group, the respondent feels like he does not have the access or power to hold leaders from this political party to account. So, instead, he suggests "organizing people" and giving the information to the press. In this way, accountability is the process of public exposure.

Of course, the everyday practice of accountability does not always lead to outcomes that benefit the public interest. This discussion of accountability demonstrates what happens when people perceive their leaders as corrupt—and what they will do in response:

> Here, many people are not enlightened to know that they should hold leaders accountable, so most times we do that through violence, yes in this community that is how it is done, so I will say that we don't have any formal way of holding them accountable, just violence. Like I said before, we take leaders base on their ability fight and be violent, so the same way we hold them accountable, when we were selected to work in the community office and the terms were that, we will be paid, but they never paid us, so people were unhappy and they planned to attack the office for their money. One evening the chairman called me and offered me a bribe so I will support him when my other colleagues come for their money, I turned him down because I knew I could not betray [the Youth Chief], and if I took that money, I have put the name of the chief who I advise in disrepute, but some other people went and took the money and supported him the next day, so people had to employ the violence means and the money was released. We formed [another] party [group] in this community, but still we were not getting anything in the party. One day when [the party organizer] brought some things for the community, we did not get anything, so we decided to contact [the organizer] herself, and she said our share was part, so we told her that we were not given anything so we choose to go to their superiors (focus group, June 4, 2012).

Once again, the respondent mentions violence. But quickly thereafter, he explains a situation that happened in his community and how he responded. In this scenario, the leader was accused of dishonesty and petty corruption. Rumors spread, people were angry. The leader called up

important people in the community to offer bribes so that they would support him—he tried to buy them off. The respondent made his decision based on his sense of loyalty to his superior, as he says he could not "betray…and put the name of the chief I advise in disrepute." Here, his bonds of respect were with his chief, not with the corrupt leader. But the respondent also wanted to make sure that he would be able to get goods in the future, so he formed a new group that might be able to apply pressure and demand resources from the political party. He knew that his mobilization power and ability to demand resources depended on numbers, noise, and organization. Accountability is clearly a political process, and like representation, the "effects of a practice" that is reiterated in the behaviors of daily life (Seitz 1995: 144; Saward 2006).

Without formal accountability mechanisms in place, residents find creative ways to hold their leaders to account. Rather than attempt to control their leaders, they attempt to strengthen the bonds of respect between them—they do this through the threat of public shame and the prospect of public honor. As one respondent explains in response to a question about the ethnic chauvinism of a leader:

> Yes, I will tell him what he is doing is not right, and demand that he does the right thing. We will call him and tell him that by doing that it tarnishes the image of Dagombas, so he should stop. He knows that it is because all the tribes want him to be chairman that is why he is and not one tribe, we can also call for executive meeting to sit him down and talk to him because that can also affect the party's popularity, the tribe, so we will call him (focus group, June 3, 2012).

Here, the respondent mentions that the appropriate way to fight tribalism in local Ghana is to make it public. By doing so, he "tarnishes the image of the Dagombas," a serious and shameful offense. In another interview, the respondent emphasizes the importance of public expression, making eye contact with the leader, and frequent visits:

> What I do is that, if there is something to be done I go to them to find out how they are planning to do it, on the answers they give me tells me they do the work we give them. If

> you give a position to somebody and you go to sleep, if he fails you, you share the blame. What I think we can do is, they come to us for advice, to see our condition, they ask us what the problem is if we don't go to work, also they come and sit down and get time to chat. Fine, the past leaders when they see you they don't look at you, if you go to him he will say he wants to sleep, these ones we go to them and they also come to us (focus group, June 9, 2012).

The respondent mentions a sense of collective responsibility—"if he fails you, you share the blame." Another respondent mentions that he will do all that he can do disgrace the leader—he will shame him into action by his public actions: "If it is me I will ask him, when I do it may lead to a quarrel so everybody will hear it. We will do demonstration. We will call the media and make some noise for people to hear of it" (focus group, June 9, 2012). By "making noise," residents hope that others will join in the process and they can get something done: "Because there is no trust, I will tackle him or her alone. I will make noise for people to join me to collect the money" (focus group, May 18, 2012). The activity of public shame is not simply to control the leader, but rather to invite others into the process as a collective endeavor.

When leaders do not live up to their high moral standing, residents experience a strong feeling of resentment and anger. They feel as though their leader has "forgotten" them. This denial of recognition is a serious form of disrespect—"human subjects are denied the recognition they feel they deserve" to live a dignified life (Honneth 2007: 71). When failures of recognition occur in democratic settings, they can lead to serious feelings of political sting—feelings of betrayal, insult and disrespect by ordinary citizens stemming from a government's failure to protect and provide to its population (Paller 2013). James Scott emphasizes how these "insults and slights to human dignity" can foster a "hidden transcript of indignation" (Scott 1990: 7). But this moral disrespect and collective sense of injustice can also be used positively as a source of power to shame leaders into action. The challenge is to translate these feelings of collective subordination into the public transcript, and this is best done in face-to-face situations.

The power of public shame and honor can work in a regenerative capacity, working to strengthen the bonds of respect between representatives and their constituents. It is important to note that this must work through regeneration into the community, rather than through stigmatization and humiliation (Brathwaite 1989). While authors like Nussbaum (2007) suggest that there are no grounds for shaming, I argue that in cases where the representative is not being accountable to its citizenry—and therefore slighting the dignity of individuals which is a basis of disgust (Kahan 2000)—shaming can serve as an appropriate and just mechanism of accountability. Residents use the threat of public shame and honor as a way to get their representatives to do their jobs. While shaming certainly includes complaints (Botero, Ponce and Shleifer 2013), it requires that these complaints are made publicly and directly to those involved. Therefore, rather than serving as a mechanism of control and one-stop sanctioning, public shame and honor serves as an ongoing endeavor to strengthen bonds of respect in the collective. Building from this logic of reciprocity, rather than one of control, trust is promoted providing a necessary component of democratic accountability (Kahan 2003).

Trust

On August 1, 2012, Ashaiman held a governance forum to discuss security and other public service projects in the community. The forum was financially sponsored by an NGO called IBIS, who has a history of supporting community participatory governance programs in the slum. IBIS partnered with a community-based organization to mobilize residents and administer the public discussion. The forum was well-attended. The *Zongo* chief, Ewe traditional leaders, several assemblymen, journalists, and the Divisional Police Commander showed up to the event. Early in the discussion, a community organizer who served as the moderator introduced the Assemblyman of the area and called him forward to address his constituents. The organizer

looked the assemblyman directly in the eye and said, “You must tell us something today. Why are you not engaging the community?” Put on the spot, and demanded to account for his actions, the Assemblyman responded to the allegation that the residents don’t see him around. He explained that during biometric registration he went around with a megaphone announcing the exercise. He went on to educate the participants about how his sub-committee for the Environment and Sanitation works. He was very passionate about what he had done and answered the organizer’s claim directly. He ended his response by saying that if people felt the way the organizer felt, “Then I am sorry. But I beg to differ.”

After the event, the assemblyman went up to the organizer and said, “I never liked you before. But I like you now.” Prior to the forum, the assemblyman always assumed that the organizer supported his chief rival. He therefore greatly distrusted the organizer. But the forum demonstrated that the organizer simply wanted to hold the assemblyman accountable for his actions. But, even more importantly, he gave the assemblyman the chance to defend his actions publicly and explain how he does his job. The forum provided the necessary space for the assemblyman to educate his constituents about the role of the governing Assembly, the organizer the space to seek answers from his leader, and the collective public space to build bonds of respect between leaders and followers. The assemblyman now had more trust for the organizer, and the residents gained more trust for their leader. Trust was publicly and collectively generated through the process of dignified public expression—democracy was at work.

It is very difficult to disaggregate the concepts of trust, accountability, and transparency. For example, one focus group participant explains, “The behavior of some of the leaders of the community gives us reasons not to trust them. We don’t trust them because they are not transparent (focus group, June 4, 2012). Ghanaians trust their leaders if the leaders can account

for their actions; the provision of resources is transparent; and the leaders can explain to them the decision-making process. It is this third component of trust that is often overlooked in economic models of trust: residents must publicly share in the experience of the process in order for them to gain trust in their leaders. In other words, leaders can do their jobs and act in a transparent manner, but if residents are not publicly engaged in this process, trust will not be generated. This sentiment is described by one respondent:

> The reason [we trust our leaders] is that, when we meet and give the landlords association money, they take it to the bank and come and show us the pay in slip, so we are sure our money is in the bank, and whatever we tell them to they follow, now the leaders we have are open and transparent so we trust them, they explain everything to us well (focus group, June 9, 2012).

The respondent highlights that the leaders are open and transparent, but perhaps just as importantly, "they explain everything to us well." Failure to explain the process leads community members to believe that their leaders think they are better than them, have "forgotten them," or are no longer part of the community—the bonds of respect are not strong. But trust is generated by leaders' ability to bring residents into the decision-making process and collectively moving forward together.

Trust has a simple interpersonal quality. One respondent explains, "No, we don't trust ourselves. Why? People who you have complained about a neighbor and have agreed to help you can easily turn their back on you. We don't trust ourselves" (focus group June 12, 2012). Here, the respondent describes how bonds of respect can be broken: someone says they will help you, and then they do not. This is the same way that residents express lack of accountability of their leaders—they "can easily turn their back on you." Trust is earned in face-to-face interactions, and it is broken when public expression is no longer possible.

While this trust strengthens reciprocity and bonds of respect, it does not necessarily lead to consensus or bounded community. Dignified public expression makes no such claims about Rousseau's Paradox, that good citizens presuppose good laws, but good laws presuppose good citizens. Instead, the struggle for political accountability is therefore much like the struggle for politics as agonists like Bonnie Honig explain: "The paradox of politics is not a paradox of founding, a problem only at a regime's beginning, but rather a problem of everyday political practice in which citizens and subjects try to distinguish general will from will of all without knowing for sure whether they have got it right (or whether it has got them right)" (Honig 2009: iii). What is notable about this view is that disagreement and public justification through daily political practice can build trust, as the example at the beginning of the section demonstrates. It does not require consensus, as Ranciere makes clear in his assessment of "consensus democracy" (Ranciere 1999: 95). But it does require that all individuals are able to voice disagreement on equal standing—all people are able to express themselves freely as dignified beings.

Why information matters

Information and transparency are critical aspects of political accountability, but for hitherto under-theorized reasons. Officials are unaccountable when they can "shield their actions from outside observation" (Ferejohn 1999: 138). A well-informed electorate curbs opportunities for politicians to engage in corruption (Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003). This is because better access to information contributes to more active citizenship, leading to more government responsiveness (Besley and Burgess 2002). Recent experimental studies examine various aspects of information, ranging from the effects of public disclosure laws (Djankov et al. 2010), knowledge of public goods spending (Banerjee 2011), politician audits (Ferraz and Finan 2008), and information about government capacity (Gottlieb 2012)—all studies find that increased

information lead to positive changes in political behavior. Yet Lieberman, Posner and Tsai (2014) show that increasing information in the form of a civic education campaign does not necessarily lead to greater accountability. This is because there are several conditions in the "information-accountability chain" that must be met. Two of the most significant are the belief that individual action will have an impact and the belief that other community members will join in and effect change. In other words, increased access to information will only lead to greater accountability if there are mechanisms to overcome collective action problems. As Platteau (2008) argues, "Community members must be able to use the available information jointly in a way that creates some action, that is, they must be able to come together, share and discuss their knowledge and be ready to act on it" (quoted in Barr, Packard, and Serra 2012, 128). Dignified public expression fosters individual belief that collective action will make a difference, providing an important mechanism to translate information into action.

Information and transparency play critical roles in accountability by inviting the public to join the sphere of public expression. Information is not a resource one has, as several recent experimental studies seem to suggest (see above)—"You either have the information or you don't." Another way of saying this is that access to information is not an independent variable.[60] Instead, the information that matters is that which brings people together. This information allows people to make claims to representation and accountability, through this collective endeavor (Saward 2006). And it is this kind of information that is a valuable resource. Communities that are "information-poor" in this regard, do not have spheres of public expression, or as one person explains: "We don't have a community center, so we don't even think of coming together" (focus group, June 22, 2012). These "sites for the performance of

[60] Another aspect of the existing experimental literature is that it mostly focuses on formal political practices like voting, overlooking the site of daily life where political accountability might actually take place.

citizenship, as Wedeen (2007, 2008) calls them, generate the necessary information that can make political accountability possible. Stated simply, people need the space to generate information that will improve their communities. Another way that this information matters is that it can bring leaders and residents face-to-face. As one resident explains, "We cannot confront the person. Everybody is chopping and we have no such leaders to mobilize the people against such cases" (focus group, June 14, 2012). People need information that will bring residents and their leaders face-to-face so they can strengthen their bonds of respect and engage in dignified free expression together.

Sites of public expression might strengthen collective efficacy, or a group's belief that they have the power to achieve goals through collective action (Bandura 2000). These sites provide one possible linkage mechanism of mutual trust that provides willingness of representatives to intervene for the common good—they provide the context for collective efficacy (Sampson 1997). This is clear with the example of the assemblyman and the respondent mentioned above: both have the chance to set the agenda and participate in decision-making, therefore building trust and strengthening bonds of respect, enabling them to form a common interest that did not exist previously. Individuals might also perceive dissent in new ways, as Paluck and Green (2009) find in their randomized treatment of a radio campaign in post-Genocide Rwanda. While informal or formal rules and norms might not entirely change, new practices become "thinkable" as behavioral practices in their "cultural toolkit" (Swidler 1986). Sites of public expression provide the opportunity to strengthen bonds of respect between leaders and their followers, as well as overcome the necessary steps needed to transform accumulated information into citizen accountability (Lieberman, Posner and Tsai 2014). In these ways, a theory of dignified public expression satisfies more than Guttman and Thompson's (1996) and

Waldron's (2014) limiting demands of representatives "giving an account" of their actions, but also provides potential for the political practice of citizens to set their own agenda.

Toward a theory of dignified public expression

This chapter critiques current theories of political accountability that focus solely on formal institutions like elections. While formal institutions might include a sanctioning mechanism to vote politicians out of office, they do not include an accountability mechanism in the way that Ghanaians understand it in their daily lives—leaders do not have to "tell their account." Elections might simply work as the Ga indigenous folk dictum describes: "moko aya moko aba"—Let one go and then another come. In other words, elections might only serve as a selection mechanism, not one that delivers accountability (Fearon 1999; Maloy 2014). Politicians and leaders might never have to perform; they might be able to hide their actions from residents throughout their entire tenure in office. But this chapter demonstrates how the everyday practice of accountability, through dignified public expression between leaders and residents in face-to-face situations, better reflects how Ghanaians understand the concept of accountability, as a public, relational, and action-oriented process. In this way, the cultural and aesthetic values of accountability are key components of any theory of democracy (Saward 2006).

Habermas' theory of the public sphere produced a strong basis for how public opinion impacts governing officials. Perhaps most importantly, he describes how deliberation is the cornerstone of democracy. Nancy Fraser forcefully argues for a "strong public," one that includes not only the formation of public opinion, but the ability to create and make decisions as well (1990). Further, Paley attempts to interrogate whether deliberation translates into policy (Paley 2004). As my discussion of the everyday practice of accountability shows, the more

serious matter is that while citizens talk and deliberate, their leaders actively *go behind their back* and lie to them—they not only do not listen, but they "forget them." A space for dignified public expression is therefore necessary to prevent these bonds of respect from breaking. In the local Ghanaian context, this requires a space where leaders and their followers deliberate together, face-to-face.

This chapter has important implications for the empirical study of political accountability. Most notably, it suggests that the ways in which political scientists have been operationalizing accountability might be off base. Political scientists who study democratic accountability have mostly focused their studies on voting behavior and access to information. But these variables might not be explaining political accountability in the African context. Instead, this chapter proposes operationalizing variables that might actually explain accountability as dignified public expression. These measures might include whether residents stop their leaders on the street and question whether they are doing their job; whether residents can call their leaders on their cell phones; whether there are community spots where leaders and residents talk face-to-face and discuss community affairs. Chapters 7 and 8 operationalize these daily practices of accountability.

The chapter also provides a model of democratic accountability that can work in contexts of weak formal institutions and in competitive clientelist environments. Chapters 2-5 empirically analyzed how politics works in urban slums, introducing the importance of key variables of legal status, norms of reciprocity, and strong leadership. This chapter theorizes a model of democratic accountability that can take root in these informal institutional contexts. In sum, clientelism and democratic accountability are not necessarily mutually exclusive. But it requires shifting

mechanisms from one of control (as the principal-agent model suggests) to one of reciprocity and respect, as the theory of dignified public expression favors.

Accountability is not merely about control. Instead, it is about strengthening the bonds of respect between leaders and their followers. Accountability is more than just "throwing the leader out." By contrast, accountability is about getting the leader to "account for his words and actions"—the goal is to find the mechanisms that allow residents to do this. Mechanisms of accountability therefore create the space for dignified public expression that allows leaders to gain the respect of one another—and to make sure that this respect endures.

A theory of dignified public expression requires dignity of individuals and a sphere of public expression that brings together representatives and the represented. These requirements are in line with the social and cultural norms that govern African societies, and I would posit many developing democracies across the world. Of course, the face-to-face individual communication that I outline in this paper is not relevant to all contexts, due to the scale of operations and cultural differences. But what is generalizable is what the face-to-face interactive modes of communication do: they strengthen the bonds of respect between representative and constituent. This element of respectful modes of interactive communication can be bolstered in different ways in diverse contexts, for example by using the media to create channels of communication that would give constituents this sense of respect.

In this way, the theory also offers insights into strengthening accountability in today's environment of social media, sophisticated data-storing capabilities, and vibrant media sources, as forms of transparency and accountability have become less personal and more bureaucratized. Governments, international organizations and NGOs are using social media to combat

corruption, funding civic education campaigns to bolster political education, and tracking World Bank projects using digital technology.[61] But while these innovations in accountability mechanisms should not be discredited, they do not replace the values that face-to-face interactions between citizens and representatives foster. This is not just the case in Africa and the developing world, but in the developed and industrialized world as well. For example, in response to former Newark (USA) Mayor Cory Booker's constant posts on *Twitter*, one citizen complained, "When's the last time you did a town hall? Why do we have to go to *Twitter* to find out what you're talking about?"[62] The citizen is expressing the desire for respectful modes of interactive communication with his representative. While a theory of public accountability holds most of its explanatory power in new democracies with weak institutions, the implications extend far beyond Africa. Strengthening bonds of respect across the world bolsters accountability, providing the necessary element for quality democratic self-government.

[61] "Saving the World through Social Media: How development is going digital." *The Guardian* (January 4, 2013). Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/jan/04/saving-world-social-media-development-digital?CMP=twt_gu.
[62] Zernike, Kate. "Promise versus Reality in Newark on Mayor's Watch." *New York Times* (December 13, 2012).

Chapter 7: Patterns of Political Participation across Ghanaian Slums

How do Ghanaian slum dwellers participate in politics? What are the relationships between government authorities, political parties, and slum communities and residents? Qualitative studies of Ghanaian slums effectively uncover mechanisms of power and patron-client relationships, but do not place these processes in a broader comparative framework. Existing quantitative studies of Ghanaian slums do not examine politics and remain incomplete: they rely on imperfect census data, nationally representative samples that underrepresent the urban poor, and covariance between variables in definitions of slums that muddle the potential impact of politics. To overcome these shortcomings, I conducted an original household survey in April 2013 that addresses the political attitudes of 1,183 residents across 15 slums in 3 cities. The goal is to generalize key findings in the qualitative portion of the study across a larger sample of Ghanaian slums. While the chapter is primarily descriptive, it makes four major claims. First, slum dwellers are a diverse group of people with respect to education, socio-economic characteristics, ethnic affiliation, and ties to the host city. Categorizing them as a homogenous category of the "urban poor" or "slum dwellers" obscures more than it explains. Second, slum populations are not "hidden" populations actively resisting the state. Instead, they interact with the Ghanaian state in various ways, depending on demographic and slum-level factors. Third, local-level community organization is diverse and multi-faceted, with varying levels of participation and cooperation at the individual and slum-levels. Fourth, as the qualitative analysis suggests, there appear to be distinct differences in political participation and public attitudes between slums with different informal institutions of settlement. By introducing the major descriptive findings of the survey project, the chapter sets the stage for hypothesis testing of key arguments that will be done in Chapter 8.

Variation across Ghanaian Slums

Numerous studies demonstrate that neighborhoods in urban Ghana vary significantly with respect to quality of life and important livelihood characteristics. Where one lives impacts health delivery and waste management (Obeng-Odoom 2011), sanitation services, and potential for violent crime (Appiahene-Gyamfi 2003). These factors, in turn, have important social implications (Owusu 2010) that shape basic livelihood outcomes. These findings seem to be consistent with sociologist Robert Sampson and his associates' work on the enduring neighborhood effects in the United States (i.e. Sampson 2012). Therefore, a close and systematic analysis of variation across urban neighborhoods is required to draw inferences about communities *and* individuals in urban Ghana.

While most surveys in urban Ghana focus on individual characteristics or attitudes toward national-level developments (i.e. Afrobarometer), there are some notable exceptions. Ione Acquah's (1958) *Accra Survey* is one of the first and most important social surveys of Accra, undertaken for the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1953-1956. One of the major themes throughout the *Survey* is the transformation of Accra from a Ga-indigenous city to a heterogeneous society with diverse interests and institutions. It draws from census reports to show the shifting and growing population. In her survey, Acquah notes interesting variation between indigenous Ga political attitudes and those of newer migrants. She notes a particular political belief that remains unchanged: "It is a widely held view that members of the indigenous Ga tribe do not favour the entry of members of other tribes into municipal positions and, in consequence, the latter take little or no interest in civic matters" (95). Acquah highlights the importance of insider-outsider narratives and how settler status might shape political attitudes in slum communities.

A series of surveys in the 1970s provide a glimpse into the lives of the urban poor. Sandbrook and Arn's survey of residents in Nima and Ashaiman conclude that a working class consciousness does not exist among the "laboring poor," undermining a revolutionary political consciousness (Sandbrook and Arn 1977). Keith Hart's survey in Nima concludes that most residents work in the "informal economy," outside the purview of the state, and rely on friends and social networks as bases of trust (Hart 1973). Similarly, Peil argues that industrialization has a smaller impact on slum residents than modernization theories predict in other parts of the world (Peil 1972). One of the reasons for this is that new migrants rely on ethnic networks for support (Sanjek 1972), and maintain distinct ties to their hometown. This has been termed "circular migration" in the economics and migration literature. These pioneering studies provide a glimpse

into the social organization and economic life of Ghanaian slums, and continue to shape discourses of the informality and the urban poor. However, by emphasizing the role of the global economy and structural conditions of labor, these studies fail to interrogate the political relationships of this subset of urban poor vis-à-vis other residents in Accra and Ashaiman. To do so, a survey of the urban poor would have to include a more diverse set of communities beyond Nima and Ashaiman; these communities need to be placed in a broader comparative framework.

The most ambitious project to examine variation across Ghanaian slum communities combines health data, census analysis and sophisticated GIS techniques. A group of researchers based out of San Diego State University shows significant variation in health outcomes and poverty across Accra (Weeks, Hill and Stoler 2013). To do so, they create an innovative "slum index" and categorize the degree of slum-ness in neighborhoods across the city and map the variation using GIS (Weeks et al. 2007). In other words, they operationalize UN-HABITAT's criteria of slum and show that there is significant variation in neighborhoods across the city with respect to access to potable water, access to piped sewerage, housing of adequate space, housing of adequate durability, and security of tenure. They are clear to point out that slums are defined by their physical and infrastructural environments—a characteristic of place—and not by the people residing there.

In a related study, the researchers combine GIS data, interviews and intensive research on neighborhood structure and find that proportional abundance of vegetation in a neighborhood serves as the crucial indicator of local health levels in Accra (Weeks et al. 2012). Stoler et al. (2011) find that the higher level of neighborhood rationing of water sachets negatively correlates with health of women. The researchers even find that neighborhood and household factors shape fertility decline (Benza 2013). Similarly, Jankowska et al. (2011) find that slums have varying

vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities. The approach builds off two related studies that treat slums as continua and not dichotomies (Weeks et al. 2007; Gulyani and Bassett 2010). In sum, researchers conclude that there are significant spatial inequalities across the city that do not correlate with income and employment opportunities. Instead, place matters resulting in significant neighborhood effects.

UN-HABITAT and AMA's collaborative assessment of slums in Accra seeks to document all slum neighborhoods across the city. The goal is to uncover empirical realities of the city so as to influence urban planning and better policies. In general, 78 slum settlements and pockets were identified by the PSUP survey, using aerial photography, with confirmation by census data (community population against number of houses, income levels by city classifications), the City's Assembly members and slum dwellers. In this way, the assessment combines observable characteristics with local knowledge of slum populations. The indicators for identification were durable housing, easy access to safe water and sanitation and community overcrowding. The other major strength of the survey is its emphasis on tenure status and "maturity" of the slum. This introduces an important temporal dimension to the study of slums that will directly influence policy: it matters whether the slum is an old or new slum. High tenability slums are those where residents have lived on the lands which were given to them mainly by the then traditional authorities, who in Ghana own about 84% of land. "Maturity" levels document whether the slums are recently settled or initially inhabited many years ago. These indicators are closest to my classification of slums based on the original settlement pattern by which residents laid claim to the land. The added benefit of my approach is that tenability is an outcome of settlement status, allowing me to overcome potential problems of endogeneity.

In Chapter 2 I highlighted the important anthropological studies of specific Ghanaian urban migrant communities and discussed significant historical studies of indigenous communities. In Chapters 3-5 I argued that there are significant differences between slum communities, and suggested the need to analyze them within a comparative framework. In this section, I reviewed the relevant literature on urban Ghanaian slums, and showed how neighborhoods vary with respect to tenure security, environmental conditions, health outcomes, and demographic characteristics. Yet all of these approaches fail to uncover key political dynamics across a large and national sample of slum communities. What are the political attitudes of Ghanaian slum dwellers? How do slum dwellers participate in politics? Do these attitudes and behaviors vary across slums? Are there neighborhood-level differences between slums and do these contribute to differences in political behavior? With these questions in mind, I draw from the existing studies to design a household survey to shed light on the political dynamics of Ghanaian slums.

The Challenge of Selecting Slums

The survey "Public Service Provision in Urban Ghana" was administered by Lead Researcher Jeffrey Paller in tandem with the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD). CDD is the preeminent organization in Ghana that has experience conducting social science research surveys. The enumerator training took place on April 10-11 2013 at CDD in Accra, and the enumeration team administered the survey April 15-20, 2013. 25 Ghanaian enumerators participated in the survey. Enumerators had experience working with CDD on other survey projects; many of them served as enumerators for the *Afrobarometer* survey project. They were from Accra, Ashaiman, and Kumasi.

The goal of the survey is to test hypotheses about public service provision, accountability, and political participation across a larger sample of slums than qualitative analysis allows. The second major goal is to test hypotheses about political outcomes that were first generated in the qualitative field research.

The survey used an "as if" stratified two-stage sampling procedure. I purposively selected three cities in Ghana to conduct the survey. Accra is the largest city with an estimated 4.3 million people (GSS 2012). As a primate city (Myers 2011), it also has the largest number of slums and a growing migrant population. It is the economic and political center of the country. Ashaiman is a city on the outskirts of Tema in the Greater Accra Region. Ashaiman provides an interesting comparison to Accra because they are both in the Greater Accra Region and land is controlled by the Ga Dangbe customary authorities. Further, because the cities are only 30 minutes apart from one another, migrant patterns are very similar, with large populations of Northerners and Ewe migrants settling in the two cities. I also conducted ethnographic fieldwork and focus groups in both cities.

Kumasi is the third city selected. It is widely considered the second-most politically and economically important city (behind Accra) and the capital of the Ashanti Region. Kumasi adds important variation along several important variables of interest. Unlike Accra and Kumasi, it is a stronghold of the opposition NPP political party. Some scholars have suggested that political dynamics and party activity differ in opposition strongholds (Resnick 2012). Further, land is controlled by the Ashanti ethnic group, notable for their proud history, centralized governance apparatus (Wilks), and large population (they are the largest ethnic group in Ghana making up 47 percent of the population). By including Kumasi in the survey, I am able to broaden the scope of the survey from a Greater Accra project (where most recent studies of slums have taken place) to

a more national sample. Further, I am able to test whether political dynamics can be attributed to certain patterns of ethnic arrangements or specific ethnic group dynamics, or underlying institutional factors as my hypotheses suggest.

I then selected 16 slums across the three cities: ten in Accra, three in Ashaiman, and three in Kumasi. Determining what is a "slum" is not an easy endeavor, and the word itself is loaded with potentially stigmatizing characteristics (Gilbert 2007). As mentioned above, the shift in the urban studies literature is to focus on physical characteristics of a place. The San Diego State researchers operationalized UN-HABITAT's definition of a slum at the household level, and then aggregated households to a geographic territory based on administrative boundaries and local understandings of neighborhoods. Similarly, Gulyani and Bassett (2010) advocate an interactive "living conditions diamond," where slums are categorized based on living conditions, or the "physical characteristics of settlement." The four characteristics in the diamond are tenure, infrastructure, housing unit quality, and neighbourhood and location. The problem with both of these approaches when categorizing slums is that these indicators of slums might co-vary, and that these outcomes might be dependent on other outcomes of interest. For example, tenure security might shape quality of housing, or vice versa (Gulyani and Bassett 2010). The Accra Metropolitan Assembly indicates slums based on tenure security and maturity of the slum, taking into consideration informal mechanisms of land security. This is a more approximate estimate of local knowledge (Scott 1998; Hayek 1945) and how Ghanaians and state bureaucrats categorize slums. Yet as I uncovered in my ethnographic fieldwork, tenure security is endogenous to another important informal institutional feature of a slum—the settlement pattern by which original inhabitants laid claim to the land. In other words, while place-based objective definitions frame the overarching minimum threshold of whether a community is a slum or not, Ghanaian

residents and policymakers categorize communities based on whether the slum is indigenously owned, illegally occupied, or purchased legitimately at the original time of settlement. The minimum threshold to be included is based on UN-HABITAT's general definition is an area of "substandard housing and squalor."

With these caveats in mind, I created a list of all slums in Accra, Kumasi and Ashaiman. I started with AMA's slum inventory, and added a list of slums from Ashaiman and Kumasi. I did not include any slums that have an estimated population of less than 2,000 people. With lack of census data on these communities, the estimate was a crude approximation based on local knowledge. Many of the "immature" squatter settlements on AMA's list are small pockets of structures, and therefore do not constitute a slum community in my definition. I then classified these slums into three categories: indigenous, squatter-illegal, and purchased. In total, 29 slums made my list. I selected 5 indigenous and 5 purchased slums, and 6 squatter settlements. This was necessary because Abuja and King Shona are small, but have similar institutional characteristics.

Table 7.1: List of Ghanaian Slums

Slum Name	City	Institutional Type
Aboabo *+	Kumasi	Purchased
Abuja CMB *+	Accra	Illegal
Agbogbloshie +	Accra	Illegal (part indigenous)
Alajo	Accra	Indigenous
Amakom New Town *	Kumasi	Illegal
Asawase	Kumasi	Purchased
Ashaiman Zongo *+	Ashaiman	Purchased
Ashtown (Ashanti New Town) *	Kumasi	Indigenous
Avenor *+	Accra	Illegal (part indigenous)
Chorkor *+	Accra	Indigenous
Darkuman	Accra	Purchased
ECOMOC +	Accra	Illegal
Ga Mashie *+^	Accra	Indigenous
Gbegbeyise	Accra	Indigenous

King Shona (James Town Beach) *+	Accra	Illegal
Kotobabi	Accra	Purchased
Maamobi *	Accra	Purchased
Nima *+	Accra	Purchased
New Fadama	Accra	Purchased
New Town	Accra	Purchased
Nii Boi Town	Accra	Indigenous
Old Fadama *+^	Accra	Illegal
Sabon Zongo *	Accra	Purchased
Shiabu *	Accra	Indigenous
Sukura	Accra	Purchased
Taabo *+	Ashaiman	Indigenous
Tulako *+^	Ashaiman	Illegal
Valco Flat	Ashaiman	Purchased
Zongo Laka +	Ashaiman	Illegal

*Slum included in household survey +Slum included in focus groups ^Slum included in ethnography

Squatter settlements are the least ubiquitous slums. Nonetheless, they are crucial for three important reasons. First, many of the settlements with a population under 2,000 people are squatter settlements, and have the potential to develop into bigger slums. With increasing migration, new migrants might settle in these young communities. Second, slums like Tulako and Old Fadama have huge populations and are growing every day. Many experts estimate Old Fadama to have more than 100,000 residents. Third, squatter settlements are increasing rapidly across the developing world, from India and Brazil to South Africa and Egypt. Understanding political dynamics in these communities in Ghana might shed light on similar dynamics in slums across the developing world.

Sampling "Hidden" Populations

It is incredibly difficult to compile representative samples of slum populations, due to the mobility of these populations and their ability to "hide" from surveyors (Bloch 2007; Vigneswaran 2009). Conventional sampling frames are difficult to compile because reliable baselines often do not exist, leading to a scholarly debate about the values (and practicality) of representative sampling among mobile populations (Vigneswaran and Quirk 2012). Landau and

Misago (2012) suggest an approach that seeks representativeness, and advocates working with local practitioners to assist with the process. They argue that this outweighs the potential drawbacks of "operational agencies conduct[ing] research or assessments for their own purposes" (8).

In urban Ghana, reliable baseline data on slum populations is nonexistent. Ghana Statistical Services recently published a preliminary summary of the 2010 census, yet detailed population data at the Enumeration Area is not publicly available. Previous studies rely on the 2000 census, for which population figures have drastically changed in the last decade. For example, the population of Accra has risen from 2.26 million to 4.3 million. Further, many residents of some slum communities, particularly illegal settlements like Old Fadama, anecdotally reported that enumerators did not survey all parts of the settlement. This leads to underreporting of a crucial population who live in slum communities. The Ghana Statistical Service even acknowledges this in their report: they estimate a population of one million migrants living in Accra who do not fit neatly into the household sampling procedure and enumeration area methodology to which they subscribed (GSS 2012).

The Enumeration carried out by People's Dialogue in tandem with Slum Dweller's International in Old Fadama suggest that residents in these communities are not "hidden" populations, but rather abandoned (or overlooked) by the authorities (SDI 2011; Braimah 2012). My results that I present later in this chapter substantiate this claim: slum populations are not "hidden," but rather just not easy to count. Ghanaian slum residents are not actively resisting being enumerated. Many of them do, however, live in places that are difficult to access, and outsiders do not always feel comfortable going into these areas. Further, many of the

neighborhoods where these populations live are not "on the map"—in officially designated areas that can be easily categorized and counted.

A true representative sample of slum populations is not possible in Ghana, due to lack of baseline data and fluidity of migratory populations. Nonetheless, researchers have devised unique strategies to sample populations in informal settlements and insecure environments. Landry (2005) describes how spatial probability sampling can overcome the challenges of population mobility and coverage errors that confront traditional survey techniques. The increasing availability of GIS technology makes this technique more feasible (Landry 2010). Spatial sampling techniques have recently been used to assess dengue fever outbreaks in Nicaragua (Chang et al. 2009), mortality rates in Iraq (Galway et al. 2012), vaccination coverage in Niger (Grais et al. 2007), respiratory health conditions in India (Kumar 2007), immigrant residential patterns in Johannesburg (Singh and Clark 2012), and demographic estimates in Somalia (Driscoll and Lidow 2014).

I adopted these spatial sampling techniques and applied them to Ghanaian urban slums.[63] Having selected 16 slums to conduct the survey, I then created boundaries of slums using Google Earth. I combined information from AMA's Slum Inventory with my local knowledge of slum borders. Local knowledge included residents' own perceptions of where the slum begins and ends. In a few cases, I visited slums with a GIS to make sure that I was documenting the correct border of the slum. I corroborated this information during focus group interviews with leaders in 12 of the 16 slums.

In the next step, I created grids using a KML writer. Each slum was divided into equal 10x10 grids for potential sampling. Not all slums are the same size. Therefore, many of the grids overlaid territory both within and outside the slum. Nonetheless, all grids that included parts of

[63] I owe particular thanks to Kyle Marquardt for providing fantastic advice on my sampling procedure.

the slum are included in my initial sampling list: this provided a mix of grids along the boundary of the slum and deep within the slum. This is an important potential source of variation because residents who live along the border might be substantially different from those deep within. Urban geographers have demonstrated that slums develop organically, and there are several reasons why border areas might be different from non-border areas: land values might be higher in border areas because they might be economic centers, inside slum areas might be older (or vice versa) and different demographics of people might live in these different areas, and access to state services and security might vary throughout different territories in the slum. For example, in Old Fadama, residents along the main road are more likely to be integrated economically and politically with the state than residents toward the back of the slum. The point of the spatial sampling approach is to make sure that all spaces within the slum are equally represented in the sample. This is particularly important in Ghanaian slums because ethnic groups live in spatial clusters (Agyei-Mensah and Owusu 2010). The spatial sampling technique, therefore, allows me to include different ethnic clusters within my sample with equal probability. I created a list of all potential grids and randomly selected ten grids to serve as "neighborhoods"; I used the program random.org to select the grids. In the final analysis, I create design weights based on this level of selection, which corresponds to the different probabilities of choosing the ten grids out of the initial list of grids (five for Abuja and King Shona). The key outcome of my sampling procedure allows me to make generalizations and inferences at this level of analysis: there is a random chance that all "neighborhoods" might be included in the sample.

Table 7.2: Example of slum grids



Once I selected slum "neighborhoods," I created smaller 10x10 grids to select a starting point for the enumerators. I randomly selected a grid that would become the enumeration area. The enumeration area is a subset of the "neighborhood" and is meant to represent the population in the broader neighborhood. After randomly selecting a grid, the middle of the grid was given a point marker and I recorded the GPS coordinates. Therefore, I include 150 point markers representing 150 slum neighborhoods. I led a research team to each GPS point to find an easily identifiable starting point as close to the GPS point as possible. At each starting point, I recalculated the GPS point. The small research team collected data on local public goods provision around each starting point, serving as indicators of public goods provision for each slum neighborhood. Data was collected on road quality, sanitation, streetlight provision and maintenance, electricity, water, public toilet availability and cleanliness, and shower access. The team recorded directions for enumerators that they would be used to carry out the survey.

Enumerators used a random walk protocol at each starting point. They interviewed 6-8 residents at each starting point. Gender parity was imposed.

Table 7.3: Example of slum neighborhood and small grids



Table 7.4: Example of directions for enumerators

Enumeration Area: 50

Community: Tulako (Ashaiman)

Starting Point: National Primary School

GPS: 5◦41.298'N, 0◦01.712'W

Directions:

Opposite Old Total Gas Station, Ask of National Primary School (or Mr. Zanyira's School).

Interview residents opposite National Primary School (across road), behind the butcher and toward the Traffic Light (Ashaiman-Tema Road).

Who are Ghanaian Slum Dwellers?

Slums have been characterized as "villages in the city" and spaces where migrants live temporarily to work until they return to their hometown (Konadu-Agyemang 1991). Early studies of Ghanaian slum dwellers describe them as "the urban sub-proletariat" (Hart 1973) or the "laboring poor" (Sandbrook and Arn 1977). Habyarimana et al. (2007, 2009) emphasize the ethnic diversity of African slums, privileging ethnic identity as a key characteristic of slum dwellers. So who are the Ghanaian slum dwellers?

Ghanaian slum dwellers are not a homogenous group of people. They vary by age, socio-economic characteristics, occupation status, education levels, and ethnic affiliation. There is not a "typical slum dweller." In my survey, the majority of slum residents (68 percent) were under 40 years of age. Nonetheless, 31 percent of respondents are over 40 years of age, demonstrating that slums are not merely depositories of urban youth. Similarly, levels of education vary significantly: 21 percent indicated no formal schooling; 16 percent primary school; 29 percent Junior High School; 34 percent some secondary schooling. More than 25 residents in the slums of Aboabo, Old Fadama, and Sabon Zongo report having no formal schooling while higher levels of education appear dispersed across slums. Interestingly, there are the most pockets of highly educated individuals in indigenous settlements. This might be due to the fact that during colonial urban planning, schools and educational facilities were built closest to the urban center, where indigenous settlements remain (Myers 2005, Mabogunje 1976). What does not appear to be driving education levels is the length of time having lived in the slum: residents in purchased and indigenous settlements display similar lengths of time living in their respective slum. Additionally, 29 percent of respondents are illiterate; 39 percent can "read a little"; and 30 percent are literate. Ashaiman residents tend to have high levels of literacy compared to the other

cities. There are also a large number of residents in indigenous settlements who are literate, compared with a high number of illiterate residents in squatter settlements.

Table 7.5: Characteristics of slum dwellers







My data confirm Hart's (1973) claim that most residents are employed in the informal economy[64]: 53 percent respond they work full time in the informal sector, while 14 percent are employed part-time. This is a clear majority: only 10 percent of residents indicate they are

[64] The informal economy includes all businesses that are not regulated by the state.

employed in the formal sector. But it is important to highlight that only 19 percent of respondents are unemployed, calling into question the claim that slums are filled with large numbers of unemployed. By and large, these numbers represent the national average: The African Development Bank reports that an estimated 54 % of the labor force is engaged in informal economic activities while only 11.5 % work in the formal sector (AfDB 2012). They further report that the age group of 15-24 has an unemployment rate of 25.6%, twice that of the 25-44 age group and three times that of the 45-64 age group (AfDB 2012). In terms of occupation status, the Ghanaian slum dweller looks very much like the typical Ghanaian.

The mean household daily income is 15 cedis (~$10). The majority of residential households (61 percent) make less than 30 cedis per day. While some of these respondents have several dependents, respondents still seem to be comfortably above the $1.25/day national poverty line, and even above the 2$/day designation of the middle class. In my sample, only 12.1 percent of households indicated making less than 5 cedis (3$/day). While this figure does not take into account the number of dependents, it does suggest that Ghanaian slum dwellers fare better than the national average, which reports a 29% poverty rate (World Bank 2014). This suggests that the urban poor fare considerably better than the rural poor. It appears that these trends in household income translate into quality of life indicators as well. For example, only 10 percent of respondents indicate long periods of time (many times or always) that they go without medicines or medical treatment. 37 percent of residents have not experienced this problem in the past year; 29 percent have only experienced this problem once or twice in the past year. One potential explanation for this is that most residents (65 percent) are enrolled in the National Health Insurance Scheme. The lived experience of poverty is less severe for education: only 7 percent of respondents indicated that they cannot afford to send their children to school (many

times or always). 51 percent of residents never have the problem of affording school fees. These data suggest that the lived experience of poverty is quite low for slum dwellers. This counters UN's report that considers "two out of five African slum-dwellers live in a poverty that is literally 'life-threatening'" (UN Slums of the World 2003).

Table 7.6: Income, Employment, and Lived Poverty









Most Ghanaian slum dwellers are not recent migrants to the city. Only 284 respondents (24 percent) indicated that they moved to the host city in the past five years. 150 of these respondents (53 percent) reside in squatter settlements. Yet many squatter residents indicate that

they have lived in the slum for a very long time: 42 respondents (10 percent) indicate living in the slum for more than 20 years. While squatter settlements tend to be newer, there is significant variation between the length of time that residents have lived there. The mean length of time that respondents have lived in the slum is 17.6 years, with a standard deviation of 15 years. Unlike the portrayal of slum dwellers as transient migrants, the majority of Ghanaian slum dwellers have set up roots in their slum community. In fact, 23 percent of respondents indicate living in a "family home," while another 23 percent built the structure in which they live. 43 percent of respondents rent their structure. For the residents who are not "head of the household," 44 percent indicate that they are related to the "head of the household," and 35 percent rent directly from the "head of the household." This suggests that the head of the household maintains distinct ties to the slum community. This finding contrasts slums like Kibera and Mathare in Nairobi, Kenya where many landlords live outside the slum and do not have familial ties to the slum community. This also provides suggestive evidence that family and kin relationships continue to structure access and security of stay in Ghanaian slums.

Table 7.7: Migration patterns and length of time in city





Ghanaian slums are extremely ethnically diverse. I recorded 55 different "home languages," a viable proxy for ethnic group identification in Ghana. 18 percent of respondents are Akan-Twi; 16 percent Ga; 14 percent Ewe; 10 percent Hausa; 9 percent Dagomba; and 6 percent Fante. There are significant clusters of ethnic group members across slum communities, confirming *Facebook's* recent report that Accra, Ghana is a top site for coordinated migration (Facebook Analytics 2014). The next step in analyzing this data is to construct an ethnic diversity index at the "slum" and "neighborhood" level; the first step in this process is to conduct ELF measures for each. The data also appear to confirm David Laitin's (1993) theory that language choice is a political resource in slums: residents speak numerous languages in urban Ghana. For example, 11 percent indicate speaking 5 languages; 24 percent speak 4 languages; 32 percent speak 3 languages; 22 percent speak two languages. Not surprisingly, residents in indigenous communities speak the fewest number of languages. Ghanaian slums tend to be highly cosmopolitan: 32 percent of respondents indicate that more than 5 people from different ethnic groups live next to them; 35 percent indicate between 2-5 people from different ethnic groups live next to them. Squatter settlements tend to be the most diverse while indigenous settlements the least diverse.

Table 7.8: Language and ethnic diversity







Clearly, there is not one Ghanaian slum dweller, and it would be very difficult to characterize residents in slum communities by age, occupation, education, wealth, or ethnicity. They vary along all of these lines. But they also compare favorably with the national population on many indicators, particularly members of the broader urban population. All in all, slum residents are a diverse group of people.

Variation in Housing Conditions

One of the novel contributions that this survey makes is the ability to disaggregate between various observable characteristics. While existing surveys lump together important variables of interest into a definition of slum, this survey looks at important variables across slums and settlement types.

The quality of housing appears to vary significantly between slums. The majority of urban slum dweller respondents (64%) live in compound houses, although 29% of respondents live in shacks or kiosks. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of these respondents (72%) live in squatter settlements—slums with no legal recognition by the state. Nonetheless, 64 respondents

(17%) of residents in indigenous communities, slums where the land is controlled through customary law by the Ga ethnic group, also live in shacks or kiosks, suggesting that there is "downgrading" in historic communities (Arguello et al. 2013). Only 6% of respondents in slums live in multi-story buildings, and 29% of these reside in Ashtown (Kumasi) and 22% reside in Ga Mashie (Accra). 38% of respondents in squatter settlements have dirt or wooden floors, by contrast to only 16% in indigenous communities and 12% in purchased-settler communities. However, the decision to cement the floor of a structure seems to be determined by community-level factors. For example, the vast majority of structures in Abuja CMB (84%) and King Shona (68%) have cement floors, despite being squatter settlements. 31% of squatter residents indicate that their structures always flood, 21% who indicate that it sometimes floods, and 21% who indicate that sometimes water drips. Finally, squatter settlements are more likely to have fire outbreaks, and Old Fadama, Avenor and Abuja CMB residents indicated that their structures have been affected by fire outbreaks many times. Despite the fact that all of these communities are slums, there is considerable variation in the quality of housing among residents and between slums.

Table 7.9: Variation in quality of housing











Residents pay different prices for similar accommodation options across the range of slums. The price depends largely on the neighborhood where one settles, but even this price is not constant. In my field research, I found that prices vary from house to house; neighborhood to neighborhood; and city to city. This is not unlike housing markets across the world. Variation in housing affordability is indicated by monthly rent. The mean amount that residents pay is 27 cedis (sd. 27). The range is between 0 (free) and 300 cedis per month. But additional measures include how much residents pay for basic livelihood services including price of water; price of toilet use; and, price of shower use.

Despite the informal nature of the housing market, residents still find ways to secure security of stay. By security of housing, I mean that a resident feels as though they will not be forcibly removed from their house or structure. But not all residents are secure. While some of this variation can be attributed to the illegal nature of some settlements, not all of it can be. For example, many residents in these settlements actually do feel secure in their stay—despite lack of property title, land rights, and legal recognition.

Perhaps what is most convincing is how informal norms outside of officially-sanctioned channels shape security of stay. 50% of respondents do not have property title (or are not sure); 64% of respondents in squatter settlements do not have title. In Old Fadama (the largest illegal settlement I discuss later in the article), only 4 of the 80 respondents indicate that they have property title. Further, only 45% of respondents indicate paying property rates to the local government authorities; a very high 34% indicated that they do not know. Yet, only 20 percent of respondents indicate that they do not have security of stay. This suggests that formal property title and payment to authorities (the classic relationship in Western social contract theory) is not the only indicator of whether residents feel secure in their stay in a community.

So why do slum dwellers feel secure, despite lack of formal property title? The answer lies in the mechanisms through which people secure their stay. For example, 22% of respondents indicate they have security of stay because they are indigenes in the city. 30% indicate they have security of stay because their family purchased the land legally or they pay their rent on time. The evidence is clear: Understandings of security do not coincide with the formal housing market and state-sanctioned land access, but rather informal norms around the original settlement pattern of the community. An additional 3% of respondents indicate they have security of stay because their political party is in power; 2% indicate security due to their ethic group having

local control of the land. Uncovering these mechanisms requires further investigation. In a related paper, I argue that residents rely on non-state providers of housing— local informal social networks led by political entrepreneurs, who are embedded in daily community life (Paller, *Under Review*). I investigate patterns of community leadership in a later section in this chapter.

Table 7.10: Perceptions of security of tenure



Beyond State Power and Community Resistance: State-Slum Linkages

Informality in urban Ghana does not mean an absence of state power. Slum communities are not outside the purview of state jurisdiction. Quite the opposite: 94% of respondents have a voter's ID card, suggesting that they participate in the political process. Further, 24% of respondents have a passport; 42% have a National ID card; 48% of respondents have a bank account; and 65% have a Health Insurance Scheme ID Card, suggesting they are enrolled in the national health insurance program. As mentioned above, 67% are employed in the "informal economy" while only 19% are unemployed. The majority of sampled slum dwellers have never worked for

the government (81%), while a small portion have worked for the government after 2000 (10%). This provides evidence that slum residents do have some relationship to the state; my ethnographic evidence verifies this claim. The role of the state and the relationship between informal networks and official government activities requires further clarification.

Table 7.11: Orientation toward the state



The most apparent link between the state and community residents is the two major political parties in Ghana, the NPP and NDC. With the NDC in power, the political party apparatus of the governing party has incredible power distributing state resources, employing party members, and allocating contracts. The "Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project," led by Duke University's Herbert Kitschelt, attempts to disentangle the linkages between politicians and citizens. This strategy is one powerful way to disentangle the relationship between state power and community resistance. Danielle Resnick (2013) also uses this strategy in her survey of markets in informal settlements. My survey asked several questions about political parties that draw from Kitschelt's survey questionnaires (https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html).

Political party activity is important in all slums across Ghana, but individual residents maintain distinct relationships to the parties. The majority of residents (69 percent) are not formal, card-holding members of a political party. The few that are have various roles with their parties: 11 percent are local branch members; 6 percent are local branch executives; and 1 percent is constituency executives. It is through these local channels that many ordinary residents access goods from the state. 86 percent of respondents have never worked on a government project; 88 percent have never secured a government contract. Interestingly, 56 respondents in indigenous settlements have secured a government contract, compared with only 24 in purchased and 28 in squatter settlements, respectively. This provides suggestive evidence to substantiate the claim that indigeneity is a powerful political resource in municipal assemblies.

Table 7.12: Political party activity



There appears to be very little variation with respect to the targeting of party goods to individual households. 46 percent of individuals have never been targeted with household gifts or money; 47 percent have never been targeted with promises of social welfare benefits; 45 percent have never been targeted with promises of employment; and 59 percent have never been promised government contracts. Even more convincing is that those who do answer affirmatively with respect to hearing these promises, only hear them during election times. In other words, they are campaign strategies that do not necessarily translate into observable outcomes. These

measures appear to provide a glimpse into individual characteristics about access to information and party activity. In other words, they might shed light on who participates in party politics and who has access to party information, but they do not provide any patterns into variation between neighborhoods and slums in terms of politician-citizen linkage strategies.

Kitschelt and his associate's project attempt to distinguish between clientelist goods versus programmatic goods. Yet, as I mentioned, this strategy does not appear to help with explaining variation between Ghanaian slums. This might be because the line between clientelism and programmatic concerns is blurred in Ghanaian elections that take place in a broader environment of competitive clientelism (Whitfield 2011; Idun-Arkhurst 2012). But it also speaks to a larger shortcoming in studies of electoral and democratic accountability that focus narrowly on elections and campaign mobilization strategies, at the expense of "brick-and mortar" clientelism that are instrumental to people's daily lives (Cammett 2011). To better understand these issues, the role of "brokers" and community leaders play a central role in disaggregating state versus community dichotomies (Stokes et al. 2014).

Variation in Quality and Perceptions of Community Leadership

My ethnographic case studies document the importance of community leaders in the daily lives of Ghanaian slum residents. They play a particularly important role in public goods outcomes; accessing and securing housing (Paller 2014f); and providing livelihood opportunities to followers (Paller 2014). The qualitative research uncovered three important types of community leaders: formal representatives, brokers, and customary authorities. All three derive their authority in different ways, depending on the informal institution of settlement. Further, these types behave in different ways across slums, leading to diverse patterns of political participation. This section highlights some of these key differences.

Chapter 6 outlined a theory of accountability based on dignified public expression. For this type of accountability to function, there has to be conditions for face-to-face encounters in daily life. In turn, community leaders need to be accessible during these meetings. Not surprisingly, the attendance of community leadership at public debates varies considerably. 24 percent of respondents indicate that their opinion leaders sometimes hang out at community spots where politics and local affairs are discussed; 8 percent indicate that they often hang out there. Similarly, 22 percent indicate that the assemblyman hangs out there; 6 percent respond that they often hang out there. These numbers are significantly higher in purchased settlements. Constituency executive members of political parties sometimes hang out there (18 percent responded affirmatively), but not often (4 percent). 30 percent of respondents indicate that they have an opinion leader with power who acts as a father to this area in the community. Another 18 percent indicate that a father figure exists, but wields no power. This figure is significantly higher in squatter settlements; one hypothesis might be that residents in insecure slums rely on leaders for securing livelihoods and leaders are more likely to establish personal rule in these communities.

For responsive and accountable leadership, leaders must not have an exit option (Ermakoff 2011). The most basic exit option for leaders in daily life is to sleep outside the slum. This allows leaders to avoid night-time chats and surprise visits from residents at sunrise. This measure is particularly notable for formal representatives. 43 percent of respondents indicate that their assemblyman always sleeps in the community. These figures are highest for purchased settlements, but significantly lower for squatter settlements. Residents also want to have their leaders' phone numbers saved in their cell phones, but only 12 percent of residents indicate that they have this information. This indicator is significantly higher for purchased settlements, and

appears to be highest for Ashaiman. MPs do not visit slum communities on a regular basis: only 6 percent indicate that their MPs visit the community regularly, while 25 percent indicate that they sometimes do. 23 percent indicate that their MP never visits the community. This number is lowest in indigenous settlements.

Another way to measure the effectiveness of local leaders is to assess their responsiveness. This can be measured in different ways, but in slum communities the voices of residents is often overlooked. My survey documents how residents assess their leaders and perceive their effectiveness. 23 percent of residents indicate that their opinion leaders never listen to the concerns of their community; 45 percent indicate sometimes; and 14 percent indicate often. Squatter settlements have the most number of residents indicating non-responsive leaders while purchased settlements overwhelmingly have the greatest number of residents who indicate responsive leaders. 39 percent of respondents indicate that their leaders do not respond to the needs of residents; only 33 percent indicate that they do. These numbers remain consistent across responding to problems with public services and responding to problems in the community. This confirms that the leadership deficit that has been documented at the national level (Rosberg 2003) extends to the local level as well. Overall, respondents are dissatisfied with the performance of their local leaders: 42 percent are dissatisfied while only 29 percent are satisfied. Residents in purchased settlements are most satisfied, while indigenous resident are most strongly dissatisfied. Part of the reason for this might be that indigenous residents have higher expectations for their leaders than squatter or purchased residents. I examine these measures more in depth in the following chapter.

I asked a series of hypothetical questions about the responsiveness of community leaders. One question asked about whether residents believed anything could be done if they found out

that a political party chairman received a contract for community work but no work was done. 57 percent of respondents indicated that they had no or very little confidence that something could be done. This suggests that residents do not feel like they can hold their leaders accountable. Respondents were asked if a streetlight stopped working, how confident they are that something will be done. 27 percent of respondents have no confidence; 22 percent have little confidence; 23 percent have some confidence; 15 percent are extremely confident. Residents in purchased settlements are the most confident.

This suggests that some residents are able to hold their leaders accountable in daily life. As mentioned in earlier chapters, this is done through face-to-face interactions and modes of public expression. In response to the following question "If a leader does not follow through on a promise, how often would you go to his house and tell him he has done something wrong?", the majority of respondents (59 percent) indicate that they never do this. Nonetheless, 17 percent of respondents indicate that they sometimes do this, while 7 percent indicate they always do this. These figures are significantly highest in indigenous and purchased settlements. The responses are similar for those who responded that they would "stop him [the leader] on the road and tell him he has done something wrong." A less used strategy of residents is to "call him [the leader] on his cell phone and tell him he has done something wrong." Interestingly, 14 percent of respondents indicate that this is a strategy they use sometimes (8 percent) or often (6 percent). This strategy is most used in indigenous settlements. The most common strategy used in squatter settlements is to "tell your neighbors not to support him as a leader"; this strategy is not popular in purchased settlements. In all slums, 50 percent of respondents never use this tactic, while 35 percent (sometimes or often do). The accessibility of leaders is crucial in these settings, and 69 percent of respondents indicate that they never go to the Assemblyman to tell him about

problems in the community; 20 percent sometimes or often do. It is important to highlight that these concerns are not only about personal matters: only 8 percent of respondents go to the Assemblyman to discuss personal problems. These options are statistically less available to squatter residents.

Table 7.13: Variation in daily community experience across settlement types

Difference in Means Tests (T-tests): P-values are reported

	Indigenous	Purchased	Illegal
Political Party Activity			
How many contracts have you received from the government?	+ .0004	- .0157	- .1266
Community Leadership			
Do you have an opinion leader who, in your view, acts as a father figure to this community?	- .0619	- .4783	+ .0571
Does your Assemblyman sleep in the community?	+ .0000	+ .0000	- .0000
Do you have his cell phone number saved in your phone directory?	+ .0177	+ .0051	- .0000
If you or your neighborhood needs public services, do you feel like your opinion leaders listen to your concerns and the concerns of your community?	+ .3750	+ .0011	- .0003
If a leader does not follow through on a promise to your community, how often would you go to his house and tell him that he has done something wrong?	+ .0042	+ .0112	- .0000
Exercising Citizenship			
Within a five minute walk of your house, is there a spot where neighbors come together to discuss community affairs and development?	- .0184	+ .0009	- .1345
Please name as many neighbors as possible in the surrounding houses.	- .0088	+ .0000	- .0014
How often do you visit the houses of people from other ethnic groups.	- .0001	+ .0000	- .3403
How often do you do business with people from other ethnic groups.	- .0000	+ .4575	+ .0001
In your view, does one ethnic group seem to dominate the politics in this community?	+ .1131	- .0000	+ .0010
You discover that members from your own ethnic group have been "chopping" money from a	- .0758	+ .0009	- .0446

community fund. Is there anything you can do?			
You discover that members from a different ethnic group have been chopping money from a community fund. Is there anything you can do?	+ .2496	+ .3246	- 1300
In the past month, have you contributed money to a community group?	+ .0030	+ .0004	- .0000
Do you think people in the community would try to take advantage of you of they get the chance or would they try to be fair?	+ .2699	+ .0000	- .0000
How often does the community come together to help each other?	- .1811	+ .1191	- .3871

My survey is unique because of its ability to assess perceptions, types, and responsiveness in local level leadership. It does so by asking a series of behavioral and attitudinal questions, and extends beyond surveys like the *Afrobarometer* that focus solely on politicians and state bureaucrats. In this way, it draws from World Bank social capital surveys to investigate themes of elite capture and leader-follower relations. The goal of the next chapter will be to disentangle why some leaders are more responsive to the public good than others, and which residents are most likely to hold their leaders to account.

How do Slum Residents Exercise Citizenship?

Who participates in community decision-making? Which residents are the most cooperative? Surprisingly, these questions are largely unanswered in the scholarly literature. The *Afrobarometer* asks questions about political participation, but most of these answers correspond to national-level politics. Even Ghanaians themselves are largely unsure about how politics operates at the grassroots, and who participates in community decision-making. Locals often use vague terms like "the youth" and "opinion leaders," without being able to describe who these people really are. A major aspect of this survey is to disentangle who participates in community decision-making and why. Relatedly, I attempt to uncover the conditions that facilitate broad-

based community participation. I confront the questions in two ways. First, I ask a series of behavioral questions about participation and community cooperation. Second, I ask a series of behavioral, hypothetical and experimental questions to shed light on norms of reciprocity and attitudes of trust in slum communities. I draw from the *World Bank* social capital measurement tools (http://web.worldbank.org/) as a guide.

There appears to be neighborhood-level variation for conditions that facilitate community participation. For example, respondents indicated a range of answers to the question "Is there a neighborhood spot to discuss community affairs?" 33 percent of respondents indicate that there are no such spots; 37 percent indicated that there are spots where residents sometimes gather; 16 percent of respondents indicated that there are spots where residents often or always gather. While these spots exist in all type of slums, purchased settlements seem to have more residents who answered affirmatively. 26 percent of respondents indicate that there are spots but "not for people like me." 38 percent of respondents who indicate that these spots exist answer that they never spend time at these spots; 13 percent indicate they gather there a few times per month; 14 percent indicate that they spend a few times a week or every day at these spots. Overwhelmingly, and surprisingly, these community spots tend to be non-partisan (30 percent indicate this, compared to 3 percent who indicate they are NPP and 5 percent who indicate they are NDC). They also appear to be multi-ethnic (35 percent of respondents indicate this, compared to 6 percent who indicate only one ethnic group).

Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) famously argued that dense networks of social engagement facilitate collective action at the local level. In turn, these norms of reciprocity underlie successful institutional performance. Associational activity has been shown to play an especially important role in slum communities, ranging from Cairo (Abu-Lughod 1964), to neighborhood

associations in Guatemala City (Roberts 1973), tribal unions in Jos, Nigeria (Plotnicov 1967), and ethnic and women's associations in Africa (Cohen 1969; Tripp 1997). In Africa, ethnicity is infused into associational life, contributing to or hampering effective civic life, depending on levels of ethnic diversity (Habyarimana et al. 2007). My survey attempts to show patterns of ethnic diversity, norms of reciprocity, and density of social networks. Most slum residents know their neighbors: 44 percent of respondents indicated being able to name 9 or more of their neighbors; 12 percent can name 9 neighbors; 21 percent can name 6 neighbors; 16 percent can name 3 neighbors. Neighbors are important because they serve a social welfare function in insecure settings like slums: they offer protection and assistance in times of need. Residents of purchased settlements are highly likely to know their neighbors, while many residents in indigenous settlements surprisingly do not. This might be because outsiders in indigenous settlements find it harder to incorporate into civic life.

Patterns of inter-ethnic engagement vary across slums, as Varshney (2002) highlights in his survey of Indian cities. I measured quotidian interactions by asking whether "you visit the houses of people from different ethnic groups": 24 percent of respondents never do; 15 percent rarely do; 35 percent sometimes do; and 25 percent do often or every day. Once again, residents in purchased settlements are most likely to visit members from different ethnic groups while indigenous residents are least likely. These figures are similar for residents who attend "outdoorings" of people from different ethnic groups. The figures decrease when asked whether "you eat with members from different ethnic groups": 32 percent never do; 18 percent rarely do; 32 percent always do; and 15 percent do often or everyday. These numbers are particularly high in squatter settlements (58 squatter respondents eat with non co-ethnics often, compared to only 36 purchased and 28 indigenous residents, respectively). Not surprisingly, slum residents do

business with non co-ethnics often or everyday (55 percent of respondents). The number is statistically significant for residents in squatter settlements who do business with non co-ethnics daily. Only 18 percent of respondents never do business with members of different ethnic groups, and a statistically high percentage (42 percent) of these reside in indigenous settlements.

Varshney (2002) shows that a more robust form of inter-ethnic engagement than quotidian interaction is associational relations. To measure this, I asked respondents about their participation in associational life, building off questions from the World Bank's Social Capital Survey. The majority of respondents (57 percent) indicated that the association they are most active in is multi-ethnic. Only 15 percent of respondents indicate that their association comprises of one ethnic group. These groups are important because in times of emergency, the group will donate money for assistance (61 percent of respondents confirm that the group sometimes [27 percent] or often [34 percent] does this).

Residents admit that one ethnic group might dominate the local politics in a slum. Only 31 percent of respondents mention that one ethnic group does not dominate local politics, whereas 34 percent admit there is group domination but it does not contribute to problems. 21 percent of respondents indicate that there are problems because of ethnic group dominance, and this is most common in indigenous and squatter settlements. Purchased settlements Maamobi, Nima, Sabon Zongo and indigenous settlement Shiabu appear to have few problems, whereas Taabo and Tulako (in Ashaiman) residents mention some group conflict. This matters because it has been documented that it is more difficult to sanction members from different ethnic groups (Habyarimana et al. 2007). This claim is verified using a set of hypothetical questions. First, I asked residents if they discover members from their own ethnic group "chopping" money from a community fund whether there is anything they can do: 34 percent said that there is nothing they

can do; 18 percent said maybe; 39 percent said definitely. Residents who answered "definitely" were significantly higher in purchased settlements. I asked the same question but replaced "members from own ethnic group" with "Members from another ethnic group": 47 percent indicated that there is nothing they can do; 17 percent said maybe; and 25 percent said definitely. Clearly, a significant portion of residents who mentioned that there is "definitely" something they could do now answer "nothing," lending support for the hypothesis that co-ethnics can more easily sanction one another than non co-ethnics. In reality, it appears that both of these scenarios are relatively rare: 50 percent of respondents indicate that co-ethnics never "chop" from the community fund, whereas 47 percent of respondents indicate that non co-ethnics "chop" from the community fund.

Admittedly, there might be social desirability bias in these answers. While I think respondents were likely to answer honestly, I also embedded a list experiment to further probe this question of reciprocity and overcome social desirability bias (Blair and Imai 2013; Corstange 2012). The question was specifically used to address whether neighbors from different ethnic groups might share with non co-ethnics. The control is followed by the treatment:

143c. I will read you a list of three statements. You will then tell me the number of statements with which you agree. You will not tell me which statements you agree with. You have the option of marking 0 if you do not agree with any of the statements.

A group of 10 community members receive a bag of clothes donated by the MP. I will now ask you to tell me how many of the following statements you agree with—how many of the statements are true:

> If the bag was given to a group of neighbors from <u>your ethnic group</u>, they <u>will</u> share with you.
>
> If the bag was given to a group of party activists <u>from your political party</u>, they <u>will</u> share with you.

If the bag was given to a group of local landlords, they will share with you.

0. I agree with none of these statements

1. I agree with one of these statements

2. I agree with two of these statements

3. I agree with three of these statements—all of them

143t. I will read you a list of three statements. You will then tell me the number of statements with which you agree. You will not tell me which statements you agree with. You have the option of marking 0 if you do not agree with any of the statements.

A group of 10 community members receive a bag of clothes donated by the MP. I will now ask you to tell me how many of the following statements you agree with—how many of the statements are true:

If the bag was given to a group of neighbors from your ethnic group, they will share with you.

If the bag was given to a group of party activists from your political party, they will share with you.

If the bag was given to a group of local landlords, they will share with you.

If the bag was given to a group of people from a different ethnic group, they will share with you.

0. I agree with none of these statements

1. I agree with one of these statements

2. I agree with two of these statements

3. I agree with three of these statements

4. I agree with four of these statements—all of them

While I will not analyze the results statistically here, some preliminary descriptive analysis is worth mentioning. First, 29 percent of residents in the control indicate that none of the statements are true, suggesting that there are low levels of reciprocity in slums. The number falls to 24 percent of residents in the treatment. 15 percent of respondents in the control indicate that all three statements are correct; 11 percent in the treatment suggest that all four statements are correct. This suggests that a small portion of slum residents have very high levels of trust in their neighbors. The mean of the responses are as follows (Control=1.27; Treatment=1.557). This requires more statistical analysis. But the point for this chapter is that residents vary with perceptions of trust across slums, including with respect to trust and norms of reciprocity with members from other ethnic groups: Not all residents distrust residents from other ethnic groups, and the goal for future research is to disaggregate why some residents are more trusting and reciprocal than others.

Which residents are most likely to reciprocate with their neighbors? While this question will be more fully answered in Chapter 8, I provide a brief summary of the patterns of reciprocity here. 40 percent of respondents never lend other residents money, and a large number of these respondents live in Tulako, Sabon Zongo and Ashaiman Zongo (which is a bit strange because they have high levels of quality government). 40 percent of respondents sometimes or often lend other residents money. The mean amount of people to whom people owe money is .5, suggesting that most people do not think they owe money to others. However, the mean number jumps to 1.14 for the amount of people to whom owe you money. 28 percent of respondents indicate that in the past month they have contributed money to a community group, and 18 percent of those respondents are sure that the money was used correctly. Interestingly, a high number of respondents in this sample are from Ashaiman Zongo and Sabon Zongo, suggesting that

residents assist one another with money, but through an association (rather than directly). Residents from purchased settlements are most likely to give money to these groups, while residents in squatter settlements are least likely. 26 percent of residents mention that sometimes or often a neighbor will give food, clothes, or transport fare; another 14 percent indicate that this rarely happens. Surprisingly, this assistance does not come directly from an opinion leader: 83 percent of respondents indicate that an opinion leader never provides this kind of assistance. This data confirm the many scholars who suggest that slum dwellers rely on self-help networks when the state is unable to provide social welfare.

Overall, the level of trust appears to vary between slums. Most residents (69 percent) lock the doors to their house when they leave the community. However, a large number of indigenous residents never (57) or rarely (31) do this. Most respondents in squatter and purchased settlements often do. This suggests that locking doors is not a measure of trust, but rather a norm of public safety, as it is in most cities in the United States. Respondents were also asked the following question: "Do you think people in the community would try to take advantage of you of they get the chance or would they try to be fair?" 17 percent of respondents said "most" people would try to take advantage; 23 percent said "some" people would take advantage; 34 percent said "few" people would take advantage; and 8 percent said all people are fair. A statistically significant number of these respondents who believe community members are not likely to take advantage are from purchased settlements, while a large portion of respondents from squatter settlements are least trusting of their community members.

There is significant variation as to whether "the community comes together to help each other." 33 percent of respondents indicate that this never happens and another 17 percent indicate that this rarely happens. Nonetheless, 26 percent mention that this sometimes happens and 11

percent indicate that this often happens. These numbers are highest in purchased and squatter settlements. Interestingly, this does not necessarily mean coming together to demand public services. In fact, 36 percent of respondents indicate that this never happens and 18 percent indicate that it rarely happens. Surprisingly, a statistically significant percentage of these respondents are from purchased settlements. 29 percent of respondents indicate that their community sometimes (24 percent) or often (5 percent) does come together to fight for better services.

The data are clear: norms of reciprocity in slums vary by individual and across community. This seems to lead to different levels of cooperation and participation in community affairs. As Putnam predicted the quality of democracy hinges on local norms of trust and sharing in the communities themselves. In the next chapter I further analyze which residents and communities are most likely to cooperate.

Perceptions of Distribution

The final portion of the survey tests individual perceptions of distribution of public services. To do so, I develop a framing experiment (Druckman et al. 2013) to test the impact of asking individuals' perceptions of distribution depending on different ways of framing the target community. I posed the following question as a control:

144c. Consider the following scenario. The government needs to decide how to distribute public services to five communities. The residents in these communities are all poor; these are five of the poorest communities in the city. Please select which distribution you support.

1.	2.	3.
		
Two communities get a lot; Two get some; One gets very little	All communities equal with some services	Three communities with lots of services, two with very little

The control is meant to provide a baseline for level of liberal-egalitarian values (Norton and Ariely 2011). In other words, part of the motivation for the experiment is to test whether Ghanaian slum residents are motivated by liberal-egalitarian values, communal (or ethnic) notions of citizenship, or insider-outsider conceptions of belonging. Qualitative evidence suggests that insider-outsider conceptions of belonging are particularly important in indigenous settlements and among residents of the indigenous ethnic group.

To experimentally test the potential impacts of notions of citizenship on distribution, I include three treatments: nickname, ethnicity, and settlement type. The treatments are as follows:

Nickname:

144ta. Consider the following scenario. The government needs to decide how to distribute public services to five communities:

--Community 1=Sodom and Gomorrah

--Community 2=Nima

--Community 3=Sabon Zongo

--Community 4=Ga Mashie

--Community 5=Chorkor

Please select which distribution you support.

Ethnicity:

144tb. Consider the following scenario. The government needs to decide how to distribute public services to five communities:

--Community 1= 49% Mole-Dagbani, 15%Akan, 36% other tribes

--Community 2= 25% Akan, 16%Ewe, 16% Mole-Dagbani, 12% Ga-Dangme, 24% other Northern tribes

--Community 3= Large portion of Northern groups, Akans, and Ga-Dangme

--Community 4= Majority Ga

--Community 5= Majority Ga

Please select which distribution you support.

Settlement Type:

144tc. Consider the following scenario. The government needs to decide how to distribute public services to five communities:

--Community 1= an illegal squatter settlement

--Community 2= a community where families purchased land

--Community 3= a community where families purchased land

--Community 4= an indigenous community

--Community 5= an indigenous community

Please select which distribution you support.

When asked about distribution of services based on socio-economic characteristics, in this case poverty (the control), slum residents overwhelmingly support (84 percent) distributing

public services equally. This confirms that philosophically, Ghanaian slum dwellers possess liberal-egalitarian values. But the treatment cues garnered different results. The ethnic cue had minimal impact: 79 percent of people (down from 84 percent) continued to support full equal distribution, while 13 percent (up from 9 percent) supported distributing resources to situation 1 (scale of distribution). The nickname and settlement type treatments garnered even more significant differences. In the nickname treatment, 15 percent of respondents support situation 1 while 9 percent support situation 3 (both unequal distribution of services), up from 9 percent and 7 percent in the control, respectively. This suggests that residents have underlying attitudes about communities that cloud their liberal-egalitarian philosophies: real, political and experiential logics shape judgments about distribution, rather than simply philosophical concerns.

The settlement type treatment provides the most robust evidence that respondents do make judgments about public services to target communities depending on settlement of the slum. 17 percent of respondents (compared to 9 percent of control) favor situation 1 and 9 percent favor situation 3 (compared to 7 percent of control), leading to a 10 percent difference in support for unequal distribution. 74 percent of respondents (down from 84 percent) favor full equal distribution. Further, it appears that residents view communities in terms of settlement types rather than socio-economic or ethnic make-ups: the figures of the settlement treatment are closest to the nickname treatment, suggesting that the underlying judgment of communities is based on settlement rather than ethnic or socio-economic concerns.

Table 7.14: Framing experiment results



The implications of these findings are great. In real life, Ghanaian slum dwellers condition their beliefs about distribution according to an alternative conception of justice based on insider-outsider notions of belonging. This evidence provides an answer to one of the puzzles that has confronted social scientists for many years: why are poor people unable to form class alliances? The answer is different from conventional theories that emphasize identity and ethnicity. Instead, the pattern of settlement appears to shape different conceptions of citizenship, which in turn shape different opinions of distribution.

Conclusion

This chapter outlines the broad patterns of political participation across Ghanaian slums and among slum residents. The goal is to provide descriptive evidence to challenge some common assumptions about slum dwellers and political life, namely that: 1) slums dwellers are a homogenous group, 2) slum communities are "hidden" and actively resisting the state, 3) slum political organization is the same across slums, and 4) political participation and attitudes are the same across slums. My data challenge all of these earlier claims.

The next challenge is to use these data to test popular hypotheses about slum politics using multivariate statistical analysis. In the following chapter, I tackle this challenge by looking at determinants of accountability, participation, and cooperation among Ghanaian slum dwellers. As I argue throughout this study, these individual and collective features of political participation are crucial to the quality of democracy across urban Ghana.

Chapter 8: Daily community experience and the quality of democracy

What explains the varied ways that ordinary Ghanaian slum dwellers participate in local politics? And why do some residents actively contribute to the functioning of a vibrant democratic public sphere while others do not? What explains the quality of democracy in urban slum communities? Scholars have long debated the relationship between economic modernization, state-building, and civic participation. Less attention has been paid to the daily community experience that my qualitative analysis finds to be crucial in shaping political behavior. This chapter contributes to these debates by connecting the micro experience of communal and civic life to individual-level political behavior that reinforces democratic quality. The chapter argues that daily community experience—particularly the norms, community leadership, and legal recognition that make up an individual's daily life experience in a slum—profoundly shapes the way slum dwellers engage in politics and exercise citizenship.

What explains the varied ways that ordinary Ghanaian slum dwellers participate in local politics? And why do some residents actively contribute to the functioning of a vibrant democratic public sphere while others do not? What explains the quality of democracy in local urban slum communities? Scholars have long debated the relationship between economic modernization, state-building, and civic participation. Less attention has been paid to the *daily community experience* that my qualitative analysis finds to be crucial in shaping political behavior. This chapter contributes to these debates by connecting the micro experience of communal and civic life to individual-level political behavior that reinforces democratic quality.

The proliferation of slums across Ghana provides an excellent opportunity to assess the role, if any, that socio-economic modernization, state capacity, and associational life has on democratic political behavior. Ghanaian slum dwellers are poor, belong to different ethnic groups, have varying orientations toward the state, and have different experiences with formal politics. I argue here that daily community experience—particularly the norms, community leadership, and legal recognition that make up an individual's daily life experience in a slum—profoundly shapes the way slum dwellers engage in politics and exercise citizenship today. Drawing on original household survey data, I show that slum dwellers that live in a

neighborhood with strong leaders, exhibit cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, and have existential (but not necessarily formal) security of tenure are more likely to be active citizens and help construct a quality democracy in their local context than those who do not experience these factors of community dynamics. Thus, slum dwellers that have this daily community experience contributed more to community groups, participated more in associational life and community decision-making, and questioned their leaders more in daily contexts. As I demonstrate in the rest of this study, these behaviors of cooperation, participation and accountability are crucial elements of a quality democracy.

These results are striking because they reveal the importance of non-state and communal dynamics on individual political behavior in the African context. They are counterintuitive because they show that the very people scholars suggest undermine democracy—the urban poor—contribute to, and even construct, quality democracies in their local neighborhoods. Thus, the individual-level variation in daily community experience is a fundamental political challenge and opportunity for the consolidation of democracy at the grassroots in urban Africa.

Theoretical explanations for the variation in democratic quality

Scholars have advanced a range of theories to explain democratic quality. Modernization theory posits that as people move to cities the society will transform from "traditional" to "modern." Urban residents will become more educated, gain higher incomes, and demand more democracy from their governments (Lipset 1963). In modernized societies, citizens develop social and cultural attitudes that support mass participation, providing the supporting conditions for democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2009). As levels of income rise, Epstein et al. (2006) find that democratic transitions are more likely to take place, putting the authors in contrast to Przeworski

et al. (2000) who find that although per capita income might not predict the transition, it does explain the stability of a democratic regime. When applied to the urban context, scholars have emphasized the importance of including the urban poor into the modernization process. Failure to do so might result in radicalization, disorganization and anomie, and fragmentation, making poor urban communities ripe for illegal activity and undermining political institutionalization (Huntington 1968; arguments against this thesis have been made by Portes 1972 and Perlman 1975). This approach emphasizes focusing on the socio-demographic characteristics of the urban poor, positing that Africans with higher levels of education, higher income, and who have spent more years in the city will construct a higher quality democracy.

The dominant academic and popular view is that slum communities lack the capacity to access state resources and sit outside of state power, even though they exist within close geographic proximity to the state apparatus (Mann 1984). This outcome contradicts those who argue that the state can more easily broadcast its authority in urban areas than in rural areas (Herbst 2000) and that policymakers favor urban workers (Bates 1981). Yet, prominent democracy scholars argue that areas like slums should be deemed "brown areas"—sections of a newly emerging democracy where political rights are respected but a liberal legal order has yet to be established, posing a serious threat to democratization (O'Donnell 1993; Zakaria 2003). The threat to democratic consolidation is lack of formal institutionalization (O'Donnell 1996). The challenge for governments, therefore, is to incorporate slums into the broader state administration so that public goods can be provided and infrastructural developments can be applied to these neighborhoods. This approach emphasizes strengthening state capacity and the rule of law in slum areas, positing formal legal institutions as important conditions of a quality democracy.

A third body of scholarship emphasizes the importance of competitive elections for promoting government responsiveness and accountability, crucial elements of a quality democracy (Ferejohn 1986; Przeworksi et al. 1999). National-level studies suggest that high degrees of party contestation in the context of competitive elections lead to a higher likelihood for political accountability (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). In Africa, Lindberg (2006) found that elections promote democratic learning and liberalization over time, even if elections are flawed. Levels of poverty and electoral competition contribute to the decisions politicians make about the distribution of resources (Lindberg and Morrison 2008). Even in contexts of political clientelism, elections may enable more entrenched and responsive clientelist networks, contributing to public service provision in some local communities (Van de Walle 2007; Lindberg 2010). This approach emphasizes levels of political competition and political party institutionalization as crucial factors in the development of quality democracy.

A final interdisciplinary body of scholarship examines the social and cultural underpinnings of a community. In diverse societies, ethnicity is particularly important because leaders have been shown to strategically manipulate ethnic identity for the sake of political power (Bates 1983, Chandra 2004). Wilkinson (2004) even suggests that democratization might give politicians the incentive to play the ethnic card. In Africa, politicians make decisions about alliances with other ethnic groups based on their need for a minimum winning coalition during election time, suggesting that ethnicity is only politically salient in the context of certain formal institutional arrangements (Posner 2005). But ethnicity also contributes to the civic life of a community, contributing to conditions for vibrant civic engagement and collective action (Putnam 1993; Varshney 2002). One of the most robust findings in economics and political science scholarship is that ethnic diversity undermines public goods provision, a crucial element

of quality democracy. One reason for this is that co-ethnics are more likely to sanction members of their own group (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007). This approach emphasizes the associational life of a community as well as the ethnic and social underpinnings of communal life, and posits that ethnic diversity threatens the quality of a democracy.

This chapter does not reject these explanations outright, but rather seeks to shed light on when, where and how they matter for individual political behavior. I argue that the reason for their incompleteness is that they neglect the site of daily life as a crucial space for political and social inquiry. Therefore, this chapter, in line with the rest of this study, shifts the focus of democracy away from elections and legislatures to the site of daily life where politics and democratization take root. While formal institutions are influential in democratic quality, they are embedded in the norms, habits, behaviors, and practice of daily life (Bourdieu 1979).

Research design and methods

This chapter compares individual-level responses from an original household survey conducted in 16 African slum communities in April 2013. The sample of African slums includes wide variation in terms of socio-economic modernization, state capacity, ethnic demography, political competition, and associational activity. The sample of slums includes an equal number of respondents from the three important institutional types uncovered in this study: illegal, indigenous, and purchased. 1,183 respondents are included in the sample.[65]

The chapter is primarily based on quantitative analysis of this innovative public opinion data set. Logistic regression is used to investigate the effects of daily community experience on

[65] For a detailed description of the survey and its sampling procedure, see Chapter 7.

the quality of democracy in urban Ghana. The interpretation of the quantitative data draws implicitly on my fieldwork and qualitative research.

Conceptualization and measurement of the dependent variable: the quality of democracy

The focus of this chapter is on the quality of democracy in urban Ghanaian slums. As earlier chapters of this study demonstrate, the quality of democracy requires democratic practice and political behavior in the context of daily life. In other words, it involves active citizenship. The quality of democracy is therefore conceptualized as individual political *behaviors*, and does not include self-reported norms, attitudes, or political identities.[66] The conceptualization of democratic quality includes more than voting behavior and electoral mobilization. Elections occur every four years and it is unclear what real impact they have on development and people's lives. Further, as I demonstrate in Chapter 6, elections serve more as a selection mechanism rather than delivering accountability. This chapter systematically explores the variation in the extent to which ordinary African slum dwellers participate in politics—the extent to which they are active citizens—to construct a quality democracy.

Hence, the quality of democracy is conceptualized here to include three major subdivisions: 1) cooperation in communal affairs, 2) the frequency of the practice of accountability, and 3) the frequency of participation in community decision-making. Because these three subdivisions have distinct conceptual logics, they are analyzed separately.

[66] The one exception is the practice of accountability, where individuals are asked what actions they are likely to take.

Table 8.1: Conceptualization and measurement of the dependent variable: The quality of democracy

Abstract concept	Subdimension of concept	Measures	Mean	SD	Obs.	Min	Max
Quality of democracy	Cooperation in communal affairs	Contribute money to community group	.233	.423	1152	0	1
	Practice of accountability	Go to leader's house	1.652	1.001	1143	1	4
		Stop leader on road	1.595	.980	1143	1	4
		Call leader on phone	1.433	.884	1142	1	4
		Political accountability index	2.679	2.269	1142	1	10
	Participation in community decision-making	Spend time at local spots where community issues are discussed	1.449	.834	1168	0	1
		Attend political party meeting	.751	1.124	1163	0	3
		Attend friends meeting/youth club	.689	1.111	1165	0	3
		Attend hometown association meeting	.664	1.123	1165	0	3
		Attend community meeting	.488	.922	1166	0	3
		Attend prayer group/religious meeting	1.181	1.328	1168	0	3
		Attend trade meeting	.462	.969	1166	0	3
		Attend other local meeting	.392	.794	1158	0	3
		Community decision-making index	5.998	4.356	1137	1	24

The descriptive statistical analysis of the survey data reveals a wide variation in quality democratic practice across Ghanaian slum dwellers, as I initially show in Chapter 7. First, I analyze three measures of the frequency of the practice of accountability and then combine the measures together to form an index. First, I measured cooperation in communal affairs. I measured this by asking whether residents contributed money to a community group in the past

month.[67] Contributing to community funds demonstrates a high level of cooperation that an individual has within the community because financial assistance is needed to undertake communal labor exercises and fund other public goods projects. Cooperation is a more robust measure than mere participation: it demonstrates a level of commitment to the public good that participation does not necessarily entail. 23.26 percent of respondents indicate having contributed to a community fund in the past month.

The second subdimension of the quality of democracy refers to the practice of political accountability in daily life. I measure this in three ways, including the frequency of going to a leader's house to tell him that he has done something wrong (if the leader does not follow through on a promise). In total, 33.51 percent of respondents indicate that they might engage in this practice of accountability.[68] The second measure refers to the frequency of stopping a leader on the road to tell him that he has done something wrong. This practice is slightly less common, with 30.62 percent of respondents indicating that they might engage in this practice.[69] The third measure refers to the frequency of calling him on the phone and telling him he has done something wrong. This practice is the least common, with only 22.69 percent of respondents indicating that they might engage in this practice.[70] In total, as the index shows, 52.01 percent of respondents answer that they will never engage in the practice of accountability.[71] As I explain in

[67] The question asked "In the past month, have you contributed money to a community group?" No is coded 0; Yes is coded 1. All "don't knows" are coded 0.
[68] 8.92 percent indicate rarely doing this; 17.50 percent sometimes; 7.09 percent often.
[69] 8.75 percent indicate rarely doing this; 14.87 percent sometimes; 7 percent always.
[70] 8.32 percent indicate rarely doing this; 8.14 percent sometimes; 6.22 percent always.
[71] The practice of political accountability (PPA) index was constructed by summing the three types of practices of political accountability, each measured from 1 to 4 to reflect the frequency of the behavior. The question of the wording was: "If a leader does not follow through a promise to your community, which action would you try to take?" The respondent was given the three options: 1) Go to his house and tell him that he has done something wrong; 2) Stop him on the road and tell him that he has done something wrong; 3) Call him on his phone and tell him that he has done something wrong. The respondent was probed as to the frequency of each activity, whether he or she would 1) *never*, 2) *rarely*, 3) *sometimes*, 4) *often*, 5) *don't know*. I recoded "don't know" to "never" in the

Chapter 6, a crucial element of the practice of accountability is getting representatives to listen to the needs and desires of constituents. Therefore, I also measure the frequency to which residents go to the Assemblyman to tell him about the problems in the community. I also use this measure as a test to make sure that respondents answer actions they *would take* in the same way as actions *they take*—they do, as evidenced by the similar response: 30.12 percent indicate that they go to the assemblyman to tell him about problems in the community.[72] This confirms that these questions are adequate reflections of the practice of accountability in Ghanaian slums.

The third subdimension of a quality democracy involves participation in community decision-making. I measure this by asking the frequency to which residents participate in community decision-making practices.[73] In Ghanaian slums, an important space where decisions are made is local hang out spots where public issues are discussed. 26.88 percent of respondents indicate that they hang out at these spots at least a few times a month.[74] I then include several measures for the frequency to which residents attend associational activity, whether they never, rarely, sometimes, or often attend associational club meetings. Ghanaian slum dwellers vary in their participation in these community decision-making venues: 34.57 percent indicate attending political party branch meetings; 30.81 percent attend friends meeting or youth club; 28.84 percent hometown association; 25.29 percent community meeting; 48.21 percent prayer group meeting/religious group meeting; 21.17 percent trade/professional association; 16.06 percent other local meeting. The data confirm my qualitative findings that church and party politics are

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analysis. The total minimum score was 1, the maximum was 10, and the mean was 2.6786 with a standard deviation of 2.27. The PPA index was reliable, where Cronbach's alpha= 0.7006.

[72] 9.55 percent indicate rarely doing this; 11.79 percent sometimes; 8.78 percent often.

[73] The question asked "How often do you spend time at local spots where community issues are discussed?" Answers include: 1) *I never hang out there* 2) *I hang out there a few times a month* 3) *I hang out there a few times a week* 4) *I hang out there every day*. I code *not applicable* as 1 (never hanging out there).

[74] 13.10 percent of respondents indicate a few times a month; 9.50 percent a few times a week; 4.28 percent every day.

crucial dimensions of civic life. I include these measures in a participation in community decision-making (CDM) index.[75] Slum dwellers participate in civic life: only 19.79 percent of respondents indicate never attending these spaces of collective decision-making.

Explanation for a quality democracy: daily community experience

This chapter's main hypothesis is that daily community experience shapes an individual's ability to participate in and construct a quality democracy. This study is different from other studies because it focuses on individual's local-level experience in their slum community as the key explanatory factor for active citizenship, and in turn democratic quality. Unlike the dependent variable, the explanatory variables include attitudinal and behavioral measures. By utilizing this strategy, the study contrasts alternative explanations for democratic quality that include socio-economic modernization, state capacity, political competition and party institutionalization, historical legacies of state-building, and ethnic diversity. Instead, I focus on three explanatory variables of interest: strong leadership, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, and state legal recognition. I focus on individual survey responses to assess perceptions of the strength of local leadership, residents' engagement in relationships of reciprocity with members from different ethnic groups, and community understandings of a slum's relationship to state power.

I hypothesize that strong leaders contribute to a quality democracy in urban Africa. Strong leaders play a very important role because they coordinate collective action (Bianco and

[75] The participation in community decision-making (PDM) index was constructed by summing the eight types of practices in community decision-making. The first question (explained above), measured the frequency to which resident hang out at local spots, and was measured from 1 to 4. The next seven questions were: "How often do you do the following?" The respondent was given seven options: 1) Political party branch meeting; 2) Friends meeting or youth club ; 3) Hometown association; 4) Community meeting; 5) Prayer group meeting/Religious group meeting; 6) Trade/professional association; 7) Other local meeting. The respondent was probed as to the frequency of each activity, whether he or she would 0) *never*, 1) *rarely*, 2) *sometimes*, 3) *often.* The total minimum score was 1, the maximum was 24, and the mean was 5.9982 with a standard deviation of 4.36. The PDM index was reliable, where Cronbach's alpha= 0.6265.

Bates 1990), serve as lobbyists for their constituents, and hold a visible level of prominence in society (Acemoglu and Jackson 2012). They gain reputations for their actions based on whether they reward their followers (Myerson 2011, 2012). Leaders accumulate followers based on the distribution of these rewards: the more rewards they can distribute to a group of followers, the more followers the leader will have. But strong leadership is a subjective measure: followers must feel as though their leader is legitimate (Schatzberg 2001), effective, and unified with other leaders.[76] I therefore measure strong leadership—whether an individual believes that his or her community has strong leaders—through a series of attitudinal questions.

There is significant variation in individual assessments of community leadership. A majority 53.79 percent of respondents indicate that there is a "father figure" in their area of the slum.[77] 59.41 percent of respondents indicate that their leaders at least sometimes listen to the concerns of the community.[78] 34.2 percent of respondents indicate that their leaders respond to the needs of residents; 35.4 percent indicate that their leaders do something about problems with public services; 35.96 percent indicate that their leaders respond and take care of problems in the community; 29.87 percent indicate that the leaders care about the well-being of the people. 46.55 percent of respondents indicate that their community leaders are united. I combine these

[76] I describe in more depth perceptions of good leadership in Chapter 6.

[77] The question asked "Do you have an opinion leader who, in your view, acts as a father to this area in the community?" 46.21 percent responded that "there is no leader like this"; 5.43 percent responded that "Yes, there is a leader who is like a father but he is not around often"; 18.02 percent responded that "Yes, there is a leader like this but he is not able to influence power"; 30.34 percent responded that "Yes, there is a leader like this who most of us see as a father and he has power."

[78] The question asked "If you or your neighborhood needs new streetlights, the gutters cleaned, better roads, or any other service need, do you feel like your opinion leaders listen to your concerns and the concerns of your community?" Only 17.61 percent responded that they "never listen to people's concerns" (coded as 1); 22.99 percent responded that they "don't know" (coded as 2); 45.56 percent responded that they "sometimes listen to people's concerns" (coded as 3); 13.85 percent responded that they "often listen to people's concerns" (coded as 4).

measures of assessments of the strength of local leadership (SLL) into an index.[79] Generally speaking, residents have positive attitudes toward their community leaders.

Table 8.2: Explanatory variables: Daily community experience

Variable	Measures	Mean	SD	Obs.	Min	Max
Strong leadership	Existence of "father figure"	2.325	1.324	1160	1	4
	Leaders listen to concerns of residents	2.556	.936	1170	1	4
	Leaders respond when needed	3.444	1.498	1158	1	6
	Leaders act when there is problem with public services	3.521	1.490	1164	1	6
	Leaders act if there is a problem	3.616	1.457	1165	1	6
	Leaders care about well-being of people	3.362	1.478	1162	1	6
	Unity of leadership	4.011	2.009	1162	1	6
	Strong Leader Index	16.859	7.120	1125	1	32
Cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity	Frequency of visits to houses of people from different ethnic groups	2.671	1.205	1164	1	5
	Frequency of attending outdoorings of people from different ethnic groups	2.863	1.154	1166	1	5
	Frequency of eating with people from different ethnic groups	2.357	1.182	1161	1	5
	Ethnic Engagement Index	5.888	2.778	1160	1	13
State legal recognition	Eviction from state or landlord	1.528	.723	1162	0	2

My second hypothesis is that cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity contribute to democratic quality. Norms of reciprocity are the social expectations of sharing goods and resources with

[79] The strength of local leadership (SLL) index was constructed by summing the six questions about local leadership. The first question measured the responsiveness of local leadership with respect to public services, and was measured from 1 to 4. The next four questions were: "We'd like to ask you about the responsiveness of your community leaders." The respondent was given four questions: 1) Our leaders respond to the needs of us residents; 2) When there is a problem with public services, our leaders do something about it; 3) If there is a problem in the community, the leaders respond and take care of the problem; 4) Our leaders care about the well-being of the people. The respondent was probed as to their level of agreement 1) *Don't know*, 2) *Disagree strongly*, 3) *Disagree*, 4) *Neither agree nor disagree*, 5) *Agree*, 5) *Strongly Agree.* The last question in the index measured unity of local leadership by asking "Please assess the level of local leadership struggles in the community." Answers include 1) *Don't* know, 2) *Leaders are mostly divided, and never unite*, 3) *Leaders are mostly divided, but sometimes unite*, 4) *Leaders are united during emergencies, but mostly divided*, 5) *Leaders are mostly united, sometimes local struggles*, 6) *Leaders are united, there are no struggles*. The total minimum score was 1, the maximum was 32, and the mean was 16.8587 with a standard deviation of 7.12. The SLL index was reliable, where Cronbach's alpha=0.8140 .

members in a society. In the African urban neighborhood, norms of reciprocity often develop along ethnic lines (Sanjek 1972). Ethnic norms of reciprocity mean that residents and leaders will only share their goods and resources with members of their own ethnic group. Residents rely on co-ethnics for financial support in times of need. The failure to reciprocate is often sanctioned informally by peers (Habyarimana et al. 2007). Far less common in insecure and diverse setting are cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, or those that condition sharing between members of different ethnic groups. The norms of reciprocity explain *who* is helped in a particular community, and whether there is a cross-ethnic basis for the exchange of goods and assistance. In African slums, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity enable a "broader scope of integration" than ethnicity because it "extends these perceptions beyond the realm of primordial loyalties and establishes vertical links of reciprocity between ethnically or socially discrete entities" (LeMarchand 1972: 70). Therefore, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity strengthen the quality of democracy because it expands the public good to include diverse ethnic groups.

Cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity are measured at the individual level by asking a series of behavioral questions about personal engagement with members from other ethnic groups. Asking people about their everyday behavior with others is a reflection of the behavioral regularities—which reflect social norms—that exist in slum neighborhoods. 60.66 percent of respondents indicate at least sometimes visiting the houses of people from different ethnic groups; 67.49 percent indicate at least sometimes attending outdoorings of people from different ethnic groups; 48.41 percent indicate at least sometimes eating food with members of different ethnic groups. These measures reflect reciprocity because these forms of everyday engagement often involve sharing goods and resources: when visitors stop by another's house, food is often shared; when people attend outdoorings they are expected to donate money or gifts; and when

people dine together they eat from the same bowl. I combine these measures of everyday ethnic engagement (EEE) into an index.[80]

The third explanatory variable is state legal recognition, or the security of tenure. I hypothesize that residents who feel secure in their tenure are more likely to be active citizens, contributing to democratic quality. I measure this as the perception of tenure security—whether individuals feel secure against eviction threats by the government or landlords. The element of state legal recognition works through the mechanism of local understandings of citizenship in African societies. Migrants to a territory are deemed outsiders, and the status of these outsiders shifts depending on their relationships to the host community. Communities without state legal recognition are unlikely to make claims on the state for public goods, undermining the quality of democracy.

I measure state legal recognition by asking whether residents feel secure in their stay (tenure) or whether they do not have security because the government or landlord threatens to evict them. I code security of tenure as 2; "Don't know" as 1 (suggesting that these respondents are somewhere between secure and insecure); and insecurity as 0. 66.52 percent of respondents indicate that they have security of tenure; 13.68 percent indicate insecurity. An alternative measure is whether the individual lives in an illegal settlement. One-third of my sample of respondents lives in illegal settlements.

Control variables

[80] The everyday ethnic engagement (EEE) index was constructed by summing the three questions about daily behavior. The prompt asked: "How often do you do the following." The respondent was given three questions: 1) Visit the houses of people from other ethnic groups; 2) Go to outdoorings of people from other ethnic groups; 3) Eat with people from other ethnic groups. The respondent was probed as to the frequency of the behavior 1) *Never*, 2) *Rarely*, 3) *Sometimes*, 4) *Often*, 5) *Every day*. "Don't know" was coded "Never" (1). The total minimum score was 1, the maximum was 13, and the mean was 5.8879 with a standard deviation of 2.78. The EEE index was reliable, where Cronbach's alpha= 0.6869.

Based on the literature at the beginning of this chapter (and that which frames this study as a whole) I include as controls several variables that correspond to possible alternative explanations. I include variables that capture individual socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, literacy[81], level of education[82], employment status[83], income[84], lived experience of poverty[85], and frequency of information[86]. I also include control variables that might indicate both status in the slum and levels of modernization, such as the number of years spent living in the slum; ownership versus rental status; settler versus indigene versus migrant status; and number of languages spoken. To control for local ethnic diversity, I ask respondents how many people from different ethnic groups live next to them. I control for state capacity by measuring whether residents have a property title for their structure; whether residents pay property rates to the local municipal or metropolitan assembly (a proxy for tax collection capacity); and whether their household was counted in the 2010 National Census. I control for formal political factors like political affiliation; party membership; and whether the respondent has a voter's ID card.

The results: the political consequences of daily community experience

This section analyzes whether certain aspects of daily community experience affect how a citizen participates in politics, in turn shaping whether they contribute to the construction of a quality democracy. To summarize, the analysis suggests that having experience with strong leaders,

[81] I asked the question "Can you read?" Respondents answered: 0) *No, I am illiterate*; 1) *Yes, I can read a little*, 3) *Yes, I am fully literate.*
[82] I asked the question "What is the highest level of education you have completed?" Respondents answered: 0) *No formal schooling*, 1) *Primary*, 2) *JHS*, 3) *Some Secondary*, 4) *Secondary*, 5) *Certificate*, 6) *Undergraduate (B.A. or B.S.)*
[83] I asked the question "What do you do to earn a living?" Respondents answered: 1) *Unemployed*, 2) *Part-time in informal sector*, 3) *Full-time in informal sector*, 4) *Part-time in formal sector*, 5) *Full-time in formal sector*.
[84] Daily household income.
[85] I asked the question "In the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in this household gone without medicines or medical treatment?"
[86] I asked the question "How often do you listen to news on the radio?" Respondents answered: 1) *Less than once a month*, 2) *A few times a month*, 3) *A few times a week*, 4) *Every day.*

engaging in cross-ethnic reciprocal behavior, and not facing the threat of eviction in daily life significantly and substantively affect the likelihood to contribute to communal affairs, participate in community decision-making, and hold leaders accountable, even when a number of different controls are considered. The following subsections analyze the result for each sub-dimension of the quality of democracy.

Cooperation in communal affairs: contributing money to a community group

Table 8.3: Cooperation in communal affairs: Contributions to community fund (coefficient: log odds)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Security from eviction	1.006 (.35) ***	1.034 (.36) ***	1.074 (.36) ***	1.121 (.33) ***	1.130 (.40) ***	1.068 (.37) ***
Ethnic Engagement Index	-.0183 (.03)	-.015 (.03)				
--Visit non co-ethnics rarely			-.181 (.31)	-.211 (.29)	-.169 (.33)	-.144 (.32)
--Visit non co-ethnics sometimes			.108 (.23)	.100 (.21)	.235 (.24)	.158 (.24)
--Visit non co-ethnics often			.055 (.26)	.094 (.24)	.163 (.27)	.104 (.27)
--Visit non co-ethnics every day			-.473 (.44)	-.504 (.40)	-.393 (.45)	-.450 (.44)
Strong Leader Index	.045 (.01) ***	.049 (.01) ***				
United Leadership			1.010 (.21) ***	.990 (.19) ***	1.060 (.21) ***	1.035 (.21) ***
Female	-.295 (.18)	-.254 (.18)	-.213 (.18)	-.222 (.17)	-.147 (.19)	-.185 (.19)
Age	-.008 (.01)	-.007 (.01)	-.006 (.01)	-.005 (.01)	-.003 (.01)	-.005 (.01)
Education	-.042 (.09)					
--Primary		.268 (.39)	-.153 (.33)	-.047 (.31)	-.281 (.35)	-.195 (.34)

--JHS		-.218 (.47)	.089 (.38)	.188 (.35)	-.084 (.40)	.055 (.39)
--Some Secondary		.130 (.71)	-.350 (.46)	-.245 (.44)	-.463 (.49)	-.371 (.47)
--Secondary			-.003 (.44)	.055 (.41)	-.088 (.46)	-.004 (.45)
--Certificate		-.559 (.62)	-.709 (.61)	-.390 (.56)	-.695 (.63)	-.685 (.62)
--Undergrad		.131 (.71)	-.299 (.69)	-.303 (.66)	-.398 (.71)	-.313 (.70)
Literacy	-.082 (.19)					
--Read a little		-.050 (.33)	.075 (.32)	-.002 (.29)	.303 (.33)	.145 (.33)
--Fully literate		-.247 (.42)	.010 (.40)	-.213 (.38)	.200 (.42)	.055 (.41)
Employment	.191 (.08) ***					
--Part informal		.823 (.31) ***				
--Full informal		.651 (.25) ***				
--Part-time			.865 (.30) ***		.782 (.30) ***	.831 (.30) ***
--Part formal		.383 (.64)				
--Full formal		.933 (.38) ***				
--Full-time			.754 (.25) ***		.740 (.25) ***	.753 (.25) ***
Income	.002 (.00)	.003 (.00)	.002 (.00)	.003 (.00)	.002 (.00)	.002 (.00)
# of Languages	.032 (.07)	.044 (.07)	.029 (.24)		.021 (.08)	.025 (.07)
Lived Poverty (medicine)	.178 (.08) **					
--Once or twice		.295 (.21)	.216 (.21)	.160 (.20)	.201 (.22)	.210 (.22)
--Several times		.325 (.24)	.287 (.24)	.237 (.23)	.227 (.25)	.252 (.25)
--Many times		.592	.356	.331	.310	.336

		(.38)	(.38)	(.34)	(.39)	(.38)
--Always		.751 (.52)	.853 (.51) *	.546 (.47)	.995 (.59) *	.871 (.53)
Lived Poverty (school)	-.019 (.09)					
--Once or twice		.016 (.23)	-.002 (.23)	-.082 (.21)	-.016 (.23)	-.006 (.23)
--Several times		-.111 (.26)	-.133 (.26)	-.214 (.24)	-.134 (.27)	-.132 (.26)
--Many times		.117 (.37)	.085 (.37)	-.130 (.36)	-.098 (.40)	-.000 (.39)
--Always		-.345 (1.20)	-.273 (1.32)	.435 (.97)	-.717 (1.36)	-.397 (1.35)
Ownership	-.255 (.20)	-.270 (.21)	-.217 (.21)	-.310 (.19)	-.423 (.23) *	-.278 (.22)
Years in community	-.001 (.01)	.001 (.01)	.002 (.01)	.001 (.01)	.001 (.01)	.000 (.01)
Property title	.022 (.15)	.216 (.36)	.090 (.34)	.212 (.31)	.095 (.38)	.095 (.35)
Pay property rate	1.021 (.66)					
--To local strongman		.057 (1.24)	.057 (1.19)	.319 (.65)	-.621 (1.25)	-.059 (1.20)
--To local chief		-.447 (.98)	-.101 (.87)	.400 (.55)	-.309 (.91)	-.111 (.88)
--To municipal authority		-.167 (.78)	.032 (.76)	.426 (.38)	-.285 (.81)	-.126 (.78)
Ethnic neighbors	-.180 (.22)					
--One or two		-.224 (.83)	-.310 (.81)		-.743 (.84)	-.492 (.83)
--2-5		-.975 (.88)	-.710 (.85)		-.914 (.91)	-.837 (.87)
NHIS ID card	-.225 (.19)	-.233 (.19)	-.241 (.20)	-.061 (.18)	-.331 (.21)	-.266 (.20)
Formal political role	.894 (.20) ***	.879 (.20) ***	.922 (.20)	.961 (.19) ***	.905 (.20) ***	.921 (.20) ***
Chi^2	77.77	92.59	109.73	114.82	106.20	86.41 (Wald)
Log Likelihood	-439.997	-432.588	-439.483	-499.910	-391.236	-438.716
N (respondents)	859	859	886	1006	886	886

***p<.01**p<.025*p<.05

Model 1 treats the predictors as continuous variables. The model suggests that people who answer that they do not face an eviction threat from the government or landlords are significantly more likely to answer that they have contributed money to a community group in the past month. Respondents who report a higher score on the Strong Leadership Index—those who perceive their leaders to be stronger and more responsive—also were significantly more likely to answer that they contributed money. Employment also positively correlated with contributing to a community group. Surprisingly, and counter intuitively, respondents who indicate having gone more days without medicine—those who experience more lived poverty—indicated a higher likelihood of contributing to community groups, as did respondents who have a formal role in a political party.

Model 2 treats all controls as categorical variables, except the two predictor indices. The results are similar, except that the lived experience of poverty no longer has an impact. This model also demonstrates more about the variable that examines employment, and suggests that it should be recoded to demonstrate Informal/Formal employment, and Part-time/Full-time employment.

I then estimate each measure of the Strong Leader Index separately. Each measure shows very little individual impact. For example, the only categorical variable that is statistically significant is the category of "agree" with respect to the statement "When there is a problem with public services, our leaders do something about it." Instead, the united leadership variable is doing all the work—whether residents perceive their local leaders to be united. Model 3, therefore, considers the unity of leadership as the measure for strong leadership. It also estimates the frequency that respondents visit the houses of people from different ethnic groups as a measure for cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity (instead of the Ethnic Engagement Index). The

employment variable is now coded as 0=unemployed, 1=part-time, and 2=full-time. This model confirms Models 1 and 2, but demonstrates more precisely that it is individual's perceptions of whether their leaders are united that correlates with whether an individual will contribute to a community group. Employment and having a formal political party role continue to be significant predictors as well. Model 4 estimates the same model without employment, number of languages spoken, and number of ethnic neighbors. These three variables contain the most missing values. Model 5 provides estimates using slum-level fixed effects. Model 6 provides estimates using slum-level random effects. The results stand across the three models.

Across all models, respondents who feel secure in their tenure and do not face eviction threats are significantly more likely to answer that they contributed money to a community group in the past month. The finding is particularly surprising when compared to other variables that scholars and policymakers have suggested might contribute to community trust and improve cooperation: having a formal property title and high levels of state capacity.

The predicted probability that a respondent who does not face an eviction threat from the state or a landlord contributes to a community group is 25%. While this number is only a quarter of the sample, it is 14% higher than those who answered that they face an eviction threat (11%). The finding is more telling when compared to the alternative theory that residents might be more likely to contribute if they feel formal security in their property: if they answer that they have a property title. In this case, 24% of residents without a title answer that they contribute to a community group; 26% with a title answer that they contribute. Having a property title does not make a substantive impact. It is helpful to consider these variables together (as the graph 1 shows): An individual who does not have a property title and fears eviction, has only an 11% chance of answering that they contribute to a community group. This number increases to 25% if

the individual answers that they feel secure from eviction, yet still does not have a property title. If an individual has a property title but still does not have security from eviction, he or she still only has a 12% chance of contributing to a community group. If that individual feels secure from eviction and maintains the property title, he or she has a 26% chance of having contributed to a community group. This suggests that what is driving political behavior is the daily experience of eviction, a variable that often takes place outside of formal sanctioning and is understood distinctly from formal property rights.

Graph 8.1: Freedom from eviction



Graph 8.2: United leadership



In the absence of strong state capacity, my findings suggest that strong leadership plays a very important role in community cooperation. While these findings are robust across all models, the measure that appears to be doing a significant amount of the work is whether residents perceive their leaders to be united. This makes sense: residents with united leaders might be more likely to trust that their contributions to a community group will benefit the entire community and not small factions in the community. The finding is stark: respondents who indicate that their community leaders are divided are only 14% likely to answer that they

contributed to a community group in the last month. The number doubled to 30% if respondents indicate that their leaders are united.

Consider the impact that employment has on an individual's likelihood to cooperate (see graph 2). Conventional theories suggest that individuals who work would be more likely to donate money to a community group, and this is in fact the case: Unemployed respondents only had a 15% chance of answering that they contributed money to a community group in the past month, compared to 27% who are employed full-time. But these figures are more interesting when united leadership is considered. For example, an individual who is unemployed and has divided leadership only has an 8% chance of having contributed to a community group, but a 19% chance if the leadership is united. Part-time workers who have divided leaders have a 17% chance of having contributed; the number doubles to 34% if leadership is united. Full-time workers have a 15% chance of having contributed if their leadership is divided; the number doubles to 32% if leaders are united. While employment status matters, community leadership appears to significantly increase the likelihood whether a person contributed to a community group, all else equal.

Respondents who answered that they have a formal role in a political party also were statistically more likely to answer that they contributed to a community group in the past month. There might be two reasons for this. First, formal leaders in the community might be more likely to lie that they contributed to a community group because they want to be seen favorably by the enumerators: they perceive that their reputation is on the line. In other words, there might be some social desirability bias. But my fieldwork suggests that what is more likely is that having a formal political role is actually endogenous to other community factors. My qualitative analysis finds that individuals who are more active in community associations are the same people who

join formal political party initiatives. Therefore, while the variable is included as a control, more analysis needs to be done to uncover the direction of causality between formal political party roles and daily community experience.

The practice of accountability: holding leaders to account in daily life

Model 1 treats the predictors and the dependent variable as continuous variables. The dependent variable in this model is the Accountability Index. Therefore, I estimate the model using OLS. The model suggests that people who answered that they do not face an eviction threat from the government or landlords are significantly more likely to answer that they will hold their leaders to account for their actions in the context of daily life. Respondents who answered that they engage and share with members from different ethnic groups—those who score higher on the Ethnic Engagement Index—also stated that they hold their leaders to account in daily life. Respondents who scored their leaders higher on the Strong Leader Index are also more likely to hold these same leaders accountable. Counter intuitively, respondents who answered that they have a National Health Insurance Scheme ID Card were less likely to answer that they practice accountability of their leaders. Similar to cooperation in communal affairs, respondents who reported that they hold a formal political role also reported that they practice accountability in daily life.

Model 2 looks at one specific dimension of the Accountability Index—whether residents will go to the house of the leaders to tell him that he has done something wrong if he fails to follow through on a promise. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent will go to his house rarely, sometimes, or often; coded 0 if never. Of the three measures in the index, this is the highest response (33 percent of respondents). Predictor indices and controls are treated as

continuous variables. The results are similar to model 1. Ownership of the structure has an impact: those who reported that the head of the household owns the structure were more likely to report that they would visit the leader's house to sanction him. Respondents who reported that they hold a formal political role also reported that they practice this form of accountability.

Table 8.4: The practice of accountability: Holding leaders to account in daily life

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Security from eviction	.558 (.25) **	.596 (.28) *	.607 (.29) *	.513 (.28)	.467 (.30)	.672 (.29) *
Ethnic Engagement Index	.074 (.03) ***	.103 (.03) ***	.093 (.03) ***			
--Visit non co-ethnics rarely				.466 (.27)	.575 (.29)	.331 (.26)
--Visit non co-ethnics sometimes				.108 (.23)	.226 (.24)	-.061 (.23)
--Visit non co-ethnics often				.536 (.25) *	.678 (.26) ***	.189 (.25)
--Visit non co-ethnics every day				.820 (.36) **	1.038 (.37) ***	.270 (.35)
Strong Leader Index	.069 (.01) ***	.075 (.01) ***	.076 (.01) ***			
--Disagree strongly				1.023 (.40) ***	.810 (.38) *	.830 (.41) *
--Disagree				.990 (.40) **	.659 (.38)	1.113 (.41) ***
--Neither agree/disagree				1.169 (.40) ***	1.200 (.39) ***	1.073 (.41) ***
--Agree				1.559 (.38) ***	1.430 (.36) ***	1.160 (.39) ***
--Strongly agree				2.149 (.48) ***	2.225 (.47) ***	2.004 (.46) ***

Female	-.235 (.16)	-.286 (.17)	-.303 (.17)	-.393 (.17) **	-.388 (.17) *	-.290 (.17)
Age	.008 (.01)	.010 (.01)	.011 (.01)	.009 (.01)	.011 (.01)	-.005 (.01)
Education	-.027 (.08)	-.018 (.08)				
--Primary			.152 (.31)	.096 (.30)	-.102 (.31)	.263 (.30)
--JHS			.122 (.37)	.070 (.35)	-.085 (.37)	.380 (.34)
--Some Secondary			-.348 (.44)	-.431 (.42)	-.641 (.44)	.3697 (.40)
--Secondary			-.144 (.43)	-.147 (.41)	-.225 (.43)	.0755 (.40)
--Certificate			-.200 (.55)	-.039 (.53)	-.068 (.55)	.128 (.51)
--Undergrad			.642 (.67)	.548 (.65)	.720 (.67)	.571 (.59)
Literacy	.224 (.16)	.088 (.18)				
--Read a little			.041 (.30)	.028 (.29)	.114 (.31)	-.1678 (.28)
--Fully literate			.325 (.39)	.255 (.38)	.292 (.39)	.243 (.35)
Employment	.092 (.07)	.126 (.07)				
--Part informal			.257 (.28)	.277 (.28)	.132 (.29)	.490 (.27)
--Full informal			.350 (.22)	.419 (.22)	.355 (.22)	.496 (.22) **
--Part formal			.244 (.57)	.328 (.56)	.040 (.58)	.531 (.50)
--Full formal			.406 (.35)	.362 (.339)	.162 (.35)	.558 (.33)
Income	-.002 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.001 (.00)	-.002 (.00)
# of Languages	.008 (.06)	.022 (.06)	.016 (.06)	.045 (.06)	.079 (.07)	.043 (.06)
Lived Poverty (medicine)	.036 (.07)	.065 (.08)				
--Once or twice			-.108 (.20)	-.190 (.20)	-.225 (.21)	-.262 (.19)
--Several times			.072 (.23)	.118 (.22)	-.006 (.23)	.030 (.22)
--Many times			.283 (.36)	.329 (.36)	.270 (.38)	.240 (.35)

--Always			.389 (.51)	.379 (.49)	.176 (.52)	.362 (.45)
Lived Poverty (school)	.038 (.08)	.019 (.09)				
--Once or twice			-.047 (.220	-.103 (.22)	-.169 (.22)	.120 (.21)
--Several times			.341 (.24)	.254 (.23)	.208 (.24)	.165 (.23)
--Many times			.070 (.36)	.024 (.36)	-.358 (.40)	.243 (.35)
--Always					-13.612 (424.53)	.135 (.98)
Ownership	.313 (.17)	.409 (.19) *	.425 (.20) *	.486 (.20) **	.395 (.21)	.205 (.20)
Years in community	.012 (.01)	.001 (.01)	.001 (.01)	.004 (.01)	.001 (.01)	.017 (.01) **
Property title	-.145 (.13)	-.110 (.14)	-.249 (.30)	-.137 (.30)	-.128 (.32)	-.5925 (.28) *
Pay property rate	.494 (.51)	.501 (.58)	-.004 (.23)	-.094 (.23)	-.219 (.19)	.389 (.23)
Ethnic neighbors	-.069 (.17)	-.190 (.19)				
--One or two			-.516 (.51)	-.465 (.50)	-.409 (.51)	-.991 (.53)
--2-5			-.130 (.42)	-.051 (.41)	-.084 (.42)	-.090 (.39)
NHIS ID card	-.358 (.16) *	-.198 (.18)	-.190 (.18)	-.145 (.18)	-.219 (.19)	-.334 (.17)
Formal political role	.902 (.18) ***	.568 (.19) ***	.576 (.19) ***	.631 (.19) ***	.649 (.20) ***	.756 (.18)
Chi^2		116.55	127.42	127.80	135.38	125.08
Log Likelihood		-483.769	-476.684	-494.766	-444.523	-730.005
N (respondents)	848	848	844	872	872	900

***p<.01**p<.025*p<.05

Model 3 treats all controls as categorical variables, except the two predictor indices. All three explanatory variables report a significant impact. Respondents who reported that the head of the household owns the structure, as well as those who hold a formal political role, reported

that they are likely to visit the leaders' house and practice accountability. I then estimate each measure of the Strong Leader Index separately. In these models, I substitute whether respondents go to the house of members of different ethnic groups—non co-ethnics—for the Ethnic Engagement Index and treat it as a categorical variable; it maintains a positive statistical impact. Respondents who reported that heads of households own their structures, as well as those who hold a formal political role, also reported a higher likelihood of practicing accountability in daily life. The leadership questions show a little variation: 1) Documenting a father figure in the area shows little impact; 2) Answering that leaders respond to concerns of public services shows a significant impact; 3) The four questions that measure responsiveness of community leaders also show a significant impact. I report number 2 as model 4. Surprisingly, reporting whether local leaders are united does not appear to have any impact on the practice of accountability, suggesting that residents will practice accountability even when there are community factions. As a robustness check, I estimate the same model (using responsiveness to the needs of residents as the Strong Leadership variable) without variables for employment, number of languages spoken, and neighborhood ethnic diversity. These three variables contain the most missing values.

Model 5 provides estimates using slum-level fixed effects. The results stand with two major differences: respondents who answered that they face an eviction threat, as well as those whose head of household owns the structure, no longer correlates with the practice of accountability. I estimate the model using slum-level random effects and the results remain the same (they are not included in the table). The results in the first 4 models are confirmed.

While models 1-6 are dichotomous measures of whether residents practice accountability or not, model 7 test the *frequency* of practicing accountability. Model 7 estimates an ordered logistic regression using a composite scale of the Accountability Index as the dependent variable. In other words, the Accountability Index is consolidated into a scale from 1-3 and all observations that fall between these categories are compiled in one of these three measures. The model uses visiting the houses of different ethnic groups as a measure for cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity. Strong leadership is measured as the responsiveness of leaders when there is a problem with public services. Respondents who do not fear eviction are more likely to have answered that they more frequently hold their leaders to account in daily life. Surprisingly, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity have no impact on the frequency of the practice of political accountability. Strong leadership and employment status has a significant impact. The length of time a person has lived in the community also positively correlates with the frequency of the practice of accountability. Being a female and having an NHIS ID card negatively correlates with the practice of accountability. I also estimate the Ethnic Engagement Index and the Strong Leader Index as continuous variables. The results confirm the estimates of model 6.

Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) have found that employed Africans are more likely to participate in politics and be active citizens than those who are unemployed. The previous section of this chapter demonstrates how respondents who are employed are more likely to also answer that they contributed to community groups than those that are unemployed. But, employment does not have any significant impact on whether respondents will practice accountability in daily life. This section provides a more nuanced look at the conditions under which socio-demographic characteristics, like employment factors, might increase the likelihood that an individual practices accountability.

Consider the likelihood that an individual will go to a leader's house to tell him that he has not fulfilled on a promise (as shown in model 3). If the respondent is unemployed, he or she has a 28 percent chance to have answered that he/she would go to his house and tell him he has done something wrong. If the respondent works full-time in the informal sector, he/she has a 36% chance of having answered that he/she would go to his house and tell him he has done something wrong.[87] While this number increases, it is not statistically significant. But if we know about the underlying norms of reciprocity that this individual experiences on a daily basis, we can better predict this individual's political behavior. For example, an unemployed individual who never visits houses of people from different ethnic groups only has a 21 percent likelihood of answering that he/she will go to a leader's house to practice accountability. But if that same individual visits houses of people from different ethnic groups often or every day, the likelihood of practicing accountability jumps to 31% and 37%, respectively. Now consider the most common type of person: an individual who works full time in the informal sector—this makes up 55 percent of my sample. The worker who never visits the houses of people from different ethnic groups has a 28 percent chance of answering that he or she will practice accountability. The percentage increases to 40% and 47% if the respondent indicates visiting houses of people from different ethnic groups often or everyday, respectively.

Graph 8.3: Ethnic engagement

[87] The number is 35% if the respondent works in the formal sector.



The picture becomes even clearer if we know the perceptions of community leadership in the slum. There is a strong correlation between strong leadership and the practice of accountability. While this might seem obvious and spark concerns of endogeneity, it also reinforces the findings of chapter 6 that the leaders are expected to rule with the people. It highlights that followers have their obligations in the representative-constituent relationship as well. This analysis shows that residents who perceive their leaders to be responsive are the same respondents who are most likely to go to a leader's house to tell him that he has broken a promise. Consider the unemployed worker who strongly disagrees that his leader will do something about problems with public services: this respondent has only 23% likelihood to practice accountability. But an unemployed worker who agrees or strongly agrees that his leader will do something about problems with public services has a 33% and 47%, respectively, likelihood of practicing accountability in daily life. The results are confirmed with the common full-time informal worker: the worker without responsive leaders has a 14% likelihood of practicing accountability, whereas the full-time informal worker has a 43% (agrees) or 58% (strongly agrees) likelihood of answering that he or she practices accountability.

Perhaps it is not the community leadership dynamics or norms of reciprocity that are shaping this political behavior, but rather the underlying state capacity of the community. This can be examined by treating whether a respondent has a formal property title as a proxy for state capacity. Conventional wisdom suggests that people who are more formally secure in their property title are more empowered, and hence more likely to practice political accountability. But the impact of cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity remains significant. An individual who has a property title actually is less likely (32%) to answer that they sanction leaders at their house than those without title (35%). But if we know this individual's underlying norms of reciprocity, we can better predict his or her political behavior. For example, an individual with no property title and who does not visit houses of people from different ethnic groups has a 29% chance of practicing accountability; the number jumps to 40% and 46% if the respondent answers that he or she visits the houses of people from different ethnic groups often or everyday, respectively. A respondent with a property title but who does not visit houses of people from different ethnic groups has a 27% likelihood of answering that they practice accountability; the number rises significantly to 43% if the respondent answers that he or she visits the houses of people from different ethnic groups everyday.

Daily community experience also shapes the *frequency* to which residents practice accountability, as the ordered logistic regressions in models 7 and 8 demonstrate. Here, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity do not seem to have a significant impact on the frequency to which residents hold their leaders to account in the context of daily life. But community leadership does. Consider the likelihood of "rarely" practicing accountability, a 1 on the Accountability Scale. Respondents who indicate that they have leaders who are responsive to public service needs have a 30% likelihood of falling into this category; only 16% of respondents who strongly

disagree that they have leaders who are responsive to public service needs fall into this category. The results are even more telling for the small number of people who practice accountability more frequently—or "sometimes": the predicted probability rises to 10% from only 2% when the respondent answers that they have responsive leaders. While the sample size is smaller, the results trend in the same direction and consistently show that daily community experience is vital to the practice of accountability.

Graph 8.4: Strong leadership



Participation in community decision-making: participating in associational life

Model 1 estimates the frequency of participation using OLS; I treat the predictor and outcome variables as continuous. Interestingly, the threat of eviction has no impact on participation in community decision-making. Respondents who provide higher scores on both the ethnic engagement and strong leader indices also report statistically significantly higher levels of community participation. Being a woman negatively correlates with community participation.

Respondents who are employed and have a formal role in a political party also report higher levels of community participation.

Table 8.5: Participation in community decision-making

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Security from eviction	-.229 (.44)	.260 (.29)	.271 (.29)	.682 (.34) *	.019 (.22)
Ethnic Engagement Index	.155 (.05) ***	.035 (.03)			.062 (.02) **
--Visit non co-ethnics rarely			.440 (.31)	.434 (.33)	
--Visit non co-ethnics sometimes			.407 (.26)	.497 (.27)	
--Visit non co-ethnics often			.696 (.28) **	.770 (.29) ***	
--Visit non co-ethnics every day			.121 (.42)	.327 (.42)	
Strong Leader Index	.088 (.02) ***	.062 (.01) ***			.039 (.01) ***
United Leadership				.838 (.21) ***	
--Yes, but he is not around often			.601 (.36)		
--Yes, but he wields no power			.554 (.24) **		
--Yes and he is powerful			.848 (.21) ***		
Female	-1.138 (.28) ***	-1.652 (.19) ***	-1.622 (.19) ***	-1.519 (.19) ***	-.401 (.14) ***
Age	-.014 (.01)	-.006 (.01)	-.005 (.01)	-.003 (.01)	-.003 (.01)
Education	.178 (.14)	-.121 (.09)			

--Primary			.256 (.35)	.183 (.36)	.218 (.25)
--JHS			.123 (.40)	.099 (.42)	.278 (.29)
--Some Secondary			.326 (.45)	.298 (.47)	.564 (.34)
--Secondary			-.116 (.45)	.076 (.47)	.284 (.34)
--Certificate			-.719 (.59)	-.494 (.62)	.716 (.44)
--Undergrad			-.415 (.69)	-.080 (.72)	.887 (.54)
Literacy	-.124 (.29)	.266 (.19)			
--Read a little			-.124 (.33)	.003 (.34)	-.190 (.24)
--Fully literate			.300 (.40)	.357 (.42)	-.072 (.31)
Employment	.265 (.12)	-.013 (.08)			
--Part informal			.018 (.30)	.025 (.30)	
--Full informal			.087 (.24)	.047 (.24)	
--Informal					.466 (.16) ***
--Part formal			-.129 (.57)	-.154 (.58)	
--Full formal			-.098 (.38)	-.314 (.39)	
--Formal					.661 (.25) ***
Income	.001 (.01)	.001 (.00)	.003 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.002 (.00)
# of Languages	.023 (.10)	-.003 (.07)	.048 (.07)	.066 (.08)	.035 (.05)
Lived Poverty (medicine)	.222 (.13)	.246 (.09)			
--Once or twice			.539 (.22) **	.424 (.22)	.041 (.16)
--Several times			.505 (.25) *	.442 (.25)	.478 (.18) ***
--Many times			1.017 (.38)	.888 (.39)	.156 (.29)

			***	**	
--Always			.041	-.350	.018
			(.60)	(.65)	(.43)
Lived Poverty (school)	.351	.141			
	(.14)	(.09)			
--Once or twice			.475	.401	.077
			(.23)	(.24)	(.17)
			*		
--Several times			.436	.272	.121
			(.25)	(.26)	(.19)
--Many times			-.075	-.308	.276
			(.39)	(.42)	(.28)
--Always			.488	-.007	1.502
			(1.09)	(1.07)	(1.02)
Ownership	-.446	-.165	-.121	-.216	-.216
	(.31)	(.21)	(.21)	(.23)	(.15)
Years in community	.009	.007	.005	.008	-.001
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Property title	.347	.072	.079	.460	.505
	(.23)	(.15)	(.31)	(.36)	(.26)
Pay property rate	-.037	-.326	-.010		
	(.93)	(.60)	(.25)		
--To local strongman				-.434	1.290
				(1.23)	(.81)
--To local chief				-.445	.371
				(.80)	(.61)
--To municipal authority				-.516	-.127
				(.74)	(.54)
Ethnic neighbors	.045	.125			
	(.30)	(.20)			
--One or two			-.250	-.401	-.062
			(.51)	(.80)	(.57)
--2-5			.077	-.261	-.234
			(.42)	(.80)	(.58)
NHIS ID card	-.446	.290	.290	.326	-.288
	(.29)	(.19)	(.20)	(.21)	(.14)
					*
Formal political role	2.543	.626	.662	.724	1.159
	(.33)	(.200	(.20)	(.21)	(.16)
	***	***	***	***	***
Chi^2		175.85	189.31	182.97	191.56
Log Likelihood		-419.993	-428.698	-384.310	-1229.800
N (respondents)	847	865	895	892	872

***p<.01**p<.025*p<.05

Model 2 estimates participation in community decision-making by examining whether a respondent spends time at local spots where community issues are discussed. This measure is included in the larger participation index. 27% my sample answers that they at least sometimes spend time at the community hang out spots. The model treats all explanatory and control variables as continuous variables. The ethnic engagement index no longer appears statistically significant nor does employment, but the strong leader index continues to report a higher likelihood of participation at community hang out spots. Being a woman negatively correlates with community participation. Interestingly, and perhaps counter intuitively, respondents who experience more lived poverty in daily life are also more likely to hang out at community spots. Respondents who report having a formal political party role still report that they are more likely to hang out at community spots.

Model 3 estimates participation at local spots by treating explanatory and control variables as categorical. Cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity is measured as the frequency of visiting houses of people from different ethnic groups, and strong leadership is measured as the strength and existence of a "father figure" in the neighborhood. The results confirm model 2: cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity and employment have no predictive power. I also test for all individual measures of strong leadership and they are all statistically significant, including the unity of leadership.

Model 4 estimates the logistic regression using slum-level fixed effects. In this model, the threat of eviction holds some predictive power, as well as the mid-level frequencies "sometimes" and "often" for ethnic engagement. Respondents who perceive their leaders to be united continue to report significantly higher likelihoods of participating at community spots. Being a woman

negatively correlates with community participation. Respondents who have a formal role in a political party also report higher levels of community participation. The results are similar for the random effects model except that eviction threats and ethnic engagement do not have significant impacts on responses.

Model 5 predicts the frequency of participating in community decision-making by estimating an ordered logistic regression using a Participation Score as the dependent variable. The participation score is a composite measure of the participation index, and scores are grouped into 5 categories (0 for never and 4 for most frequent). Employment is measured as part-time/full-time. I first estimate the model treating the Ethnic Engagement Index and Strong Leader Index as continuous variables. Both of these explanatory variables positively correlate with higher Participation Scores with statistical significance. Being under the threat of eviction has no significant impact on whether a respondent scores higher on the Participation Index. Being a female, as well as having a NHIS ID card negatively correlates with participation. Respondents who are employed are more likely to score higher on the participation index as well. I also estimate a similar model but examines ethnic engagement with the measure of visiting houses of people from different ethnic groups, and Strong Leadership as united leadership. The results confirm those in model 5.

Not surprisingly, a few of the explanatory variables that explain cooperation in communal affairs and the practice in accountability in daily life do not help explain participation in community decision-making. For example, individuals who experience the threat of eviction and are unemployed are no less likely to participate in politics. In some ways, the stakes are higher for these individuals: they need to participate in community decision-making to ensure

that they will not be evicted (as Chapter 2 and 3 demonstrate), and the participation in politics might help secure them a job (as Chapter 3 shows). Further, unemployed residents might have more time to spend at community spots to discuss community affairs: they do not have a job to go to. This suggests that participation in associational life requires lower levels of personal empowerment than cooperation and accountability. In this way, participation is not the only, nor most important metric, of a vibrant public sphere.

But daily community experience with strong leadership has significant effects of bolstering participation in community decision-making. An unemployed resident with divided leadership has only a 14% chance of responding that he or she hangs out at local spots where community issues are discussed; the percentage increases to 26% if they indicate that the community has united leadership. Similarly, the full-time informal sector worker has a 16% likelihood of responding that he or she hangs out at local spots where community issues are discussed if he or she experiences divided leadership, and 28% if he or she experiences united leadership. The strength of leadership appears to be an important underlying condition to encourage community participation.

Graph 8.5 and 8.6: United and strong leadership





Cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity and strong leadership also helps predict the frequency to which individuals participate in community decision-making. Consider what impacts an individual to score high on the Participation Score, or whether he or she is likely to participate in several different types of associational affairs. An individual who experiences very low cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity is only 9% likely to score a 3 on the Participation score; the number increases to 15% with the highest cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity. The results are similarly telling for scoring a 4 on the Participation score: the number increases from 6% to 11% as the level of cross-ethnic norms increase. Experiencing strong leadership has an even greater impact: individuals who experience the weakest leadership have only a 7% likelihood of scoring a 3 on the Participation score, whereas those who experience the strongest leadership report a 16% likelihood. The increase is similar with respect to scoring a 4 on the Participation score: the likelihood increases from 4% to 13% as the Strong Leader Index increases. It is helpful to compare these figures to a socio-demographic characteristic like employment. The rise in scoring a 3 for Participation score as an individual answers from unemployed, to part-time, to full-time is: 8% to 12% to 13%. The predictive probability of scoring 4 increases from 5% to 8% to 10% as an individual answers unemployed to part-time to full-time. These figures are neither statistically nor substantively significant.

Interpretation of results and mechanisms of a quality democracy

The previous section shows that an individual's daily community experience has serious political consequences. The different experiences that individuals have with community leadership, state legal recognition, and norms of reciprocity shape the ways in which they exercise citizenship, in turn impacting whether they can construct a quality democracy in their communities. In particular, individuals who have strong leaders in their community are more likely to participate,

cooperate and practice accountability; those who experience cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity participate more in community decision-making and practice accountability in daily life. The threat of eviction affects whether an individual cooperates in communal affairs, as well as whether he or she practices accountability; but it has little impact on whether he or she participates in community decision-making.

The quantitative analysis established the existence of these interesting patterns of quality democratic behavior between individuals who have different daily community experiences. This is particularly important to document the ways in which individual behavior I show in my ethnographic case studies extend to a broader and national sample of slums in Ghana. Now I must shed light on the causal mechanisms of these effects. To begin, the causal direction of the explanation must be justified. Perhaps the threat of eviction, strong leadership, and cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity are outcomes of the quality democracy in which they are embedded. In this study, I argue the reverse: that the daily community experience with strong leadership, existential security from eviction, and cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity precede and shape democratic political behaviors. Most of the reasoning for this has been documented by my historical process-tracing in Chapter 2, and further explanation of community political dynamics in the ethnographic case studies in Chapters 3-5.

But the reasoning is further supported by quantitative evidence that show that individuals who might appear more likely to experience security from eviction, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, and strong leaders do not necessarily have these daily community experiences. More educated, literate, and residents who have lived in communities for more years might also be expected to cultivate these positive community experiences, as well as those who live in slums with greater state capacity. But this does not seem to be the case: daily community experience

appears to be independent from these possible explanations, and individuals cultivate these behaviors depending on the opportunities made available to them in daily life. The qualitative and quantitative data reveal the existence of different community experiences across slums that develop prior to the construction of a quality democracy.

What particular mechanisms are underlying these relationships? I argue that the causal mechanisms are tied to an individual's daily community experience, and not top-down, structural, and formal-institutional explanations that emphasize state capacity, socio-economic modernization, and elections. The secondary literature does not indicate that the quality of democracy produces different norms of reciprocity, strong and united leadership, or existential security. Instead, these factors have rarely been examined together, and require further interrogation.

In this study, I demonstrate how reputational mechanisms that work through public shame and honor in the context of daily life influence political behavior. In Chapter 6 I show how these mechanisms impact how leaders act toward their followers—leaders must foster respectful modes of interactive communication with their constituents. This chapter presents evidence that when leaders cultivate these spaces and conditions of dignified public expression, residents will actually take advantage of them. Strong, responsive and united leadership opens up space in local contexts for residents to come together and discuss community issues. Without strong and united leadership, residents will discuss club and private interests at the expense of the public, as politics in illegal and indigenous settlements show (Chapters 3 and 4). But leaders also rule through reputation: when followers witness their strong leaders participating in community decision-making, their followers will come together and follow suit. This behavior

was widely apparent in Ashaiman (Chapter 5), where good local leadership emboldened significant collective action among residents.

Unsurprisingly, when residents perceive their leaders to be responsive and strong they are more likely to practice accountability in daily life. But perhaps the causal arrow works in the opposite direction: leaders are responsive because they face the threat of public shame and honor. Admittedly, the process is circular and re-enforcing. But my historical process-tracing in Chapter 2 uncovers that strong leaders come first, and followers align their behavior accordingly. The most obvious condition for this practice of accountability is that leaders must be available to be confronted in daily life, either at their home before sunrise, or on the streets throughout the day. Without these options, residents are unable to practice accountability at all. This evidence suggests that the daily community experience of strong leadership precedes the practice of accountability: residents are unable to sanction weak or unavailable leaders through respectful modes of interactive communication.

Strong leadership is particularly crucial for cooperation in communal affairs. Residents follow the examples set forth by their leaders: if a leader contributes his or her money, followers will toe the line and contribute. Residents also need leaders to bring people together to collect the money and organize people; otherwise, there is no impetus to contribute. But respondents must perceive their leaders to be responsive and united; otherwise their contribution is at risk of being "chopped"—or privately used—by other factions in the community. My qualitative fieldwork uncovered an unfortunate pattern: communities often will start contributing money to local funds to improve their community, but the money will not be used appropriately by the leaders. Residents become aware of these problems and no longer trust their leaders: contributions to the community fund plummet. I show widespread evidence of this in Chapters 3 and 4. In the

absence of strong formal accountability and transparency mechanisms, strong leaders in daily life are crucial prerequisites for community cooperation.

Cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity also enable positive political behaviors, particularly participation and the practice of accountability. Individuals whose daily community experience involves more engagement with people from different ethnic groups, also extends into behaviors that contribute to a quality democracy. Once again, reputational and social mechanisms are at work. As residents visit the houses of people from different ethnic groups, attend outdoorings from people of different ethnic groups, and eat with them, the social expectations of sharing is widened to include a cross-ethnic group of people. The community has a cross-ethnic public. Therefore, as my analysis in Ashaiman shows, associational life is broadened to include a large and diverse group of people. Further, the conditions for the practice of political accountability are already set: not only will residents do things like visit the houses of their neighbors, they will also visit the houses of their leaders to practice accountability—no matter the ethnic group of the leader. Leaders are unable to use tribalism as a political strategy because cross-ethnic social norms are already institutionalized: sharing and trust has already been cultivated in the community.

Individuals who fear eviction from the state or a landlord face difficult circumstances and rely on politicians and community leaders for security. Therefore, their political behavior is not oriented toward constructing a quality democracy, but rather protecting their existential security and securing their property rights. They are unable to use reputational mechanisms like shame or honor to get leaders to do their jobs: leaders can use the threat of eviction as a political tool to empower themselves and embolden private interests, as I document in Chapter 3. Individuals are less likely to contribute to community funds because they do not trust their leaders, nor do they

believe that the money will be used for the public good. Residents still participate in associational life, and this participation often assists with feelings of existential security. But without freedom from eviction threats, accountability and cooperation is undermined.

Conclusion

This chapter provided more empirical evidence that an individual's daily community experience affects his or her ability to help construct a quality democracy. While Chapters 2-6 provide qualitative evidence and were useful to generate these hypotheses, this chapter draws on quantitative evidence from an original household survey across a national sample of slum dwellers to further substantiate the theoretical claims. The logistic regression models used in the chapter are particularly useful at precisely showing which aspects of an individual's community experience enables what type of democratic practice. For example, while strong leadership contributes to all facets of a quality democracy, existential security from eviction threats only appears to impact cooperation and accountability. Therefore, existing measures of associational activity and civic engagement that only consider participation miss out on crucial dimensions of democratic quality.

This last point has significant implications for the study of democracy, civic engagement, and civil society. By disaggregating elements of local democracy to include cooperation, accountability, and participation, I am able to show when certain kinds of social capital and civic engagement might actually undermine the public interest, as a growing group of scholars are beginning to demonstrate (Berman 1997; Voth, Voigtländer, and Satyanath 2013; Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson 2013). But rather than suggesting that the problems lie in the lack of formal institutionalization, I show how the roots of this behavior can be traced to the daily community

experience. In other words, political behaviors are shaped by the experience in which individuals find themselves on a daily basis, not by levels of state capacity or formal elections.

This chapter suggests that to improve the quality of democracy for ordinary people, the daily community experience must be considered. It is possible that these factors might even be cheaper and easier to implement in the short-term than long-term formal institutional and structural change. For example, protecting individuals from eviction threats might be as simple as the state deciding to legally recognize a particular community, rather than large-scale formalization and regularization of individual homes by distributing formal title deeds. Strengthening cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity might require investing in public forums where members from all different ethnic groups join to discuss community matters, as the forums in Ashaiman demonstrate. At these forums, trust and information is shared between different ethnic groups, providing a cross-ethnic basis for political participation and social change.

On the other hand, these strategies must consider the informal institutional contexts in which daily community experience is embedded. In this way, state legal recognition is a very politically-fraught enterprise, as Chapter 3 explains. Further, strong leaders are not easily cultivated: Leaders respond to reputational incentives based on informal institutions of parenthood, religion, entrepreneurship, and friendship (Paller 2014). But these incentives are often at odds with serving the public interest. Barriers to cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity are often political, as the roots of tribalism and indigenous politics extend deep into history, and power has been reproduced over generations. Nonetheless, it is at this level of analysis and locus of social and political inquiry where social scientists and policymakers focus should lie. More attention needs to be paid to individuals perceptions of the strength of their community leaders,

the type of underlying norms of reciprocity that and individual experiences, and the existential insecurity that residents feel in their tenure.

In sum, threats to a quality democracy are embedded in the community experience of daily life. But this is also where opportunities for the deepening of democracies avail themselves, in the time between elections and spaces where individuals live and work. In other words, individuals make different calculations and behave differently depending on their daily community experience. And it is these daily community experiences that shape an individuals' likelihood to construct a quality democracy around them.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

This chapter concludes with the empirical and theoretical implications of the study. I demonstrate how the model is best generalizable to other West African countries—particularly countries like Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire—where customary law structures land access and the historical experience of indigeneity and settler dynamics are similar. Nonetheless, the theory of democratic accountability, with its focus on leadership, norms of reciprocity, and legal status goes a long way to explaining the quality of democracy in Africa—and slums across the developing world. I briefly discuss the urban experience in Kenya to show how my theory applies to Eastern Africa. I briefly discuss the policy implications of the study, and conclude that for successful slum upgrading to occur, change must come from below.

Democracy in unexpected places

Ethnically diverse slums with high poverty, weak state capacity, and troubling colonial histories are unexpected places to find functioning democracies. Scholars and pundits portray these neighborhoods as "dens of criminals," "brown areas," and breeding grounds for the new urban guerilla and urban proletariat (O'Donnell 1993; Davis 2004; Kilcullen 2014). But as the case of Ashaiman in Chapter 5 demonstrates, and the quantitative data confirm, democracy can and does emerge in unexpected places. Even in slums with low democratic quality such as Old Fadama and Ga Mashie (which I analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4), residents and leaders can still benefit from the process of democratization, demanding customary entitlements or private goods as their democratic dividend. The simple point is that these areas are far more complex—and far more political—than conventional wisdom suggests, leading to the importance of placing the study of politics in poor urban neighborhoods in a comparative context.

In recent years, anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists have studied democracy in unexpected places, including health groups in Chile (Paley 2004), gas stations in Wisconsin (Walsh 2012), Qat chews in Yemen (Wedeen 2007), soccer clubs in Uganda (Schatzberg 2006), dance clubs in the Congo (White 2005), and street preaching in Ghana (Shipley 2009). All of these studies focus on public spheres and seek to expand upon conventional and procedural conceptions of the political. In other words, they locate the site of

politics beyond formal institutions like elections and legislatures to the site of daily life where democracy takes root. These studies also involve understanding political culture in an inductive manner—by examining societies through categories and analytical frames that mean something to the local populations themselves. This requires examining political behavior for what it actually is and does—not what intellectuals, foreign policymakers, and technocrats would like it to do (Scott 1998; Easterly 2014). Local people build institutions and apply local knowledge to their own political realities, and they do this in very different way depending on certain social, economic and political circumstances. They also draw on a number of available cultural and institutional resources to create novel combinations (Berk and Galvan 2009). These "syncretic institutions" become the guiding rules and procedures of the political game in daily life. My study applies these insights to African slums, and shows how ordinary people construct institutions in the attempt to serve their interests and bolster their status and prestige.

The study of democracy in unexpected places is an emerging research agenda that brings new meanings, fosters innovative concepts, and highlights new directions in the study of politics, particularly the study of democracy. It does so by uncovering the motivations, incentives, interests, and emotions that guide peoples' daily behaviors, and in turn, shapes their political choices and patterns of political participation. I was able to uncover the logics of collective action, and found that the basis of this collective effort was social change and reciprocity. This is not entirely surprising: behavioral economists and law scholars have shown that in small groups people are likely to cooperate when they face the threat of social sanction (Gachter and Fehr 1999; Kahan 2003). But these insights are only beginning to be applied to the study of African politics, and tend to either focus exclusively on community dynamics (Habyarimana et al. 2007) or sanctioning politicians during election time (Humphreys and Weinstein 2012; Gottlieb 2012).

The connections between local communities and the state is far less understood, and an exciting avenue of future research. What is especially missing in current analyses is the site of daily life where politicians and community leaders actually interact with their supporters and followers. This site of inquiry exposes the "personal problem solving networks" that leaders and followers form to deal with the difficulties of slum life and enhance daily survival (Auyero 2000).

My research demonstrates the need for innovative and unconventional ways to study insecure environments. Perhaps most importantly, it requires that social science is not done "behind peoples' backs."[88] Social science must consider the very people who are the actors in the story; they must be consulted with, spoken to, and placed front and center in the study of democracy. Of course, this is not a new endeavor: researchers have been conducting field research in Africa for many years; the *Afrobarometer's* public attitude survey is rapidly expanding across the continent; [89] and scholars are using innovative experimental methods to study interpersonal relations among residents and leaders (for a review, see Wantchekon and Vicente 2009). But so much of the important aspects of how democracy works happens in the "hidden transcript," and can only be understood by being in these spaces on a daily basis (Paller 2014a). This study shows how ethnography can be employed as an empirical strategy to uncover the process of politics, spontaneity in local-level decision-making, and informal networks that underlie formal political power.

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[88] James Scott used this phrase at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Comparative Politics Colloquium on October 24, 2014.

[89] The Afrobarometer is a comparative series of public attitude surveys, covering 35 African countries in Round 5 (2011-2013). It is now conducting Round 6. It measures public attitudes on democracy and its alternatives, evaluations of the quality of governance and economic performance. In addition, the survey assesses the views of the electorate on critical political issues in the surveyed countries. The Afrobarometer's main goal is to produce scientifically reliable data on public opinion in Africa while strengthening institutional capacities for survey research, and sharing research findings to inform policy and practice. The Afrobarometer also provides comparisons over time, as five rounds of surveys have taken place from 1999 to 2013. Afrobarometer surveys were conducted in Ghana in 1999 (Round 1), 2002 (Round 2), 2005 (Round 3), and 2008 (Round 4).

Observational and experimental survey research can assist with the study of politics in daily life, but only if the questions are relevant to peoples' lives. My survey was designed to probe and understand democracy in unexpected places, specifically in urban slums. To make sure I asked context-appropriate questions about political participation and democratic accountability, I supplemented the ethnographic research with in-depth (2-3 hours) of focus group discussions with community leaders and residents. Focus group discussions are useful because they ask open-ended questions and give participants the ability to deliberate and discuss issues that might be sensitive or difficult to ask in close-ended survey formats or one-on-one interviews. By incorporating strategies of ordinary language interviewing (Schaffer 1998, 2006) into these focus groups, I was able to understand how Ghanaians think about key concepts like democracy, human rights, and accountability.

I used the insights from the focus groups to construct questions that made sense to peoples' daily experiences and to how they think about politics for the household survey. While public attitude surveys like the *Afrobarometer* ask good questions that are useful for formal politics and the state, and the *World Bank* social capital survey offers good questions for community-level factors, there is not a good model for understanding state-society linkages in the context of daily life.[90] Further, many of these surveys leave out questions about important spaces where politics occur, relying on a very narrow and procedural approach to the political. My survey includes questions that document how individuals participate in politics and hold their leaders accountable in daily life. This includes expanding notions of the political to unofficial spaces like community hang out spots, outdoorings, and politicians' houses. It demands asking questions that have cultural relevance, like asking about whether leaders are

[90] As I discuss in Chapter 7, Kitschelt and his collaborators provide a good baseline for state-society linkages, but the questions focus mainly on elections and formal political arrangements.

"fathers" to their communities and whether they eat with them. While I developed the questions to understand the urban Ghanaian context, the next step is to ask similar questions in other cities across Africa to uncover patterns of politics and accountability across the continent. Comparing and contrasting the site of daily life across slums in Africa and across the world would help us understand the challenges that the urban poor face in today's world. The use of in-depth focus groups and context-specific household surveys could assist with this endeavor, and should be used more often in social science research.

Informal institutions, political clientelism and distributive politics

This study finds that informal institutions might be doing more of the work in shaping the quality of democracy than most studies give them credit. While scholars are beginning to take informal institutions seriously, they still are largely described as secondary to, complementary to, or outcomes of formal institutional arrangements. They are typically studied as separate from state power, divorcing them from the ways in which historical legacies of state formation impact informal institutions (MacLean 2010). Most importantly, informal institutions are largely understood as an outcome or reaction to weak state institutions. For these reasons, they are rarely studied in their own right, but rather as factors in a larger "official" political game.

But my research suggests that informal institutions play a more important role than previously understood. Rather than serving a subsidiary role to official activity, they are a primary element of politics, and shape the way formal institutions work, particularly with respect to the distribution of power and resources. Ghana, and all African countries, has undergone significant change over the past 300 years, from Western interventions during the slave trade and colonialism, to foreign influence via structural adjustment and promotion of human rights. But throughout these significant changes in the official transcript, the struggle for political space and

the rules and procedures that guide power dynamics in daily life have remained incredibly resilient. A focused study of the hidden transcript over time uncovers these enduring trends in the struggle for political power (Scott 1985, 1990). The main conclusion of this study is that the informal institutions in daily life, particularly the informal institutions of settlement, continue to shape relationships of clientelism and the type of distributive politics in urban Ghana. In other words, they shape the process of democratization and the quality of democracy in urban Africa.

But why do some informal institutions matter more than others? Informal institutions include traditional and customary institutions (Englebert 2000; Williams 2004), solidary groups (Tsai 2007), Pentecostalism (McCauley 2013), friendship (Hart 1973, 2000), parenthood (Schatzberg 2001), entrepreneurialism (Shipley 2009), witchcraft (Ashforth 2005), and personal rule (Price 1971; Nugent 1996). All of the informal norms associated with these institutions play an important role in shaping the motivations and desires of ordinary urban residents. They play a particularly important role in how leaders legitimate power and gain status and prestige (Paller 2014b). But during my fieldwork I found that they were secondary to concepts of first-comer status and concepts of legality. In other words, the question "who settled first, and how" was of utmost importance, and shaped daily discourse, struggles for leadership, and multi-party politics. All other informal institutions, and formal institutions for that matter, were secondary.

While the importance of first-comer status, indigeneity, and illegality are ubiquitous in contemporary politics, I show in Chapter 2 that these claims are part of a historical struggle for political space and the extension of territorial authority that dates back to the initial settlement pattern of a slum. The sometimes controversial question "who settled first, and how" has shaped local control, political legitimacy, and access to resources in pre-colonial and colonial eras. I document how illegality and indigeneity are political resources that leaders use to control

followers and establish control (Bailey 1969). In other words, mobilizing followers around narratives of belonging and exclusion, as well as exploiting illegality in squatter settlements, are options in leaders' cultural "tool-kits" (Swidler 1986), making a certain kind of politics "thinkable" (Schatzberg 2001). But these cultural forms are more than an aggregation of individual attitudes (Sidney and Verba 1963; Inglehart and Welzel 2005), fabrics of meaning (Geertz 1973), and semiotic practices (Wedeen 2002). Instead, they serve as the guiding rules and procedures that govern daily life. They also include powerful sanctioning mechanisms if leaders and residents do not follow these rules. It is for these reasons that I advocate using the concept of informal institutions, and show how they continue to shape contemporary politics.

The series of case studies presented in Chapters 3-5 demonstrate how these informal norms and procedures continue to structure politics in Ghana's multi-party environment. Most importantly, I show how they relate to formal institutions to complement, accommodate, substitute, or compete with formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). I find that a purchased settlement is the optimal institutional environment, serving a substitutive role of the state in the complete absence of state power, or serving a complementary role with the state to provide public goods. Illegal and indigenous settlements are suboptimal. Indigenous settlements privilege the distribution of club goods and compete with the rules of the state, while illegal settlements substitute for state activity but privilege the distribution of private goods. The extent to which these settlement patterns explain political behavior in the rest of the world remains an empirical question, but has been largely ignored in social science research. While significant attention has been paid to the importance of property rights, land tenure security, and public goods provision, more research is needed on the informal underpinnings of land security and public goods provision. While strengthening formal institutions like property rights and tenure

security might be the desired outcome (De Soto 2000, 2003; World Bank 2013), my research suggests that this might not be possible without reforming the informal institutional environment as well. This further necessitates the study of non-state providers of public goods (Cammett and MacLean 2014; Carter and MacLean 2014), as well as further interrogating the relationship between informal and formal institutions.

The next challenge is for scholars to place informal institutions in a comparative perspective to examine whether these different contexts have similar institutional environments that shape democratic politics. Do indigenous, illegal, and purchased settlements shape politics in Latin America in the same ways that they do in Africa? Do these categories even make sense in the rest of the world? In other words, there is a need for more empirical research on the informal institutions that underlie democratic governance, especially relating to the different ways that leaders in new democracies amass funds of power and accumulate followers at the local level. Without this, the study of politics remains incomplete, and the real sources of political struggle in African societies might continue to fuel sub-optimal outcomes, like the persistence of political clientelism, despite the continuing success of formal institutional development.

Implications for the study of democracy and political accountability

The simple finding that democracy emerges in unexpected places has important empirical and theoretical implications. Empirically, my study provides an optimistic view of the prospects of democratization in Africa. While scholars and pundits warn of a "democratic rollback" or "democratic recession" across the world (Diamond 2008), including much of Africa, this study shows how the urban poor engage in democratic behavior in their daily lives. They actively participate in party politics, cooperate in community decision-making, and sanction their leaders

in daily life. As the continent rapidly urbanizes, the conventional wisdom that African countries are experiencing "urban crises" is only part of the story. Instead, as my evidence shows, the rise of slums in the continent provides new political opportunities for previously marginalized communities, local leaders, and the urban poor to engage the state and participate in the construction of their democratic governments (Paller 2014e). Yet more research is needed to probe the impact of the dual transition of rapid urbanization and political liberalization on African societies.

While the vast majority of African politics scholarship explains why African nations and states fail (Van de Walle 2001; Bates 2008; Englebert 2010), this study shows how African societies can overcome these structural and institutional obstacles to reach democratic self-government. Like Onoma (2010), this study does not just explain why African politicians and leaders make economically irrational decisions (Bates 1981) or use disorder as a political instrument (Chabal and Daloz 1999), but rather why and when leaders will make decisions that benefit the public interest. This provides an empirically grounded explanation for how leaders and communities can overcome underdevelopment and ethnic diversity—factors that have puzzled social scientists for many years. But the study does not simply confirm the popular "Africa rising" narrative (Mahajan 2008); it provides many instances and examples where the process of democratization strengthens personal or club interests. Rather, it uncovers the conditions and incentives that contribute to a quality democracy. This means that I also show when and where democracy fails, an unfortunate yet enduring reality across African societies. Nonetheless, my evidence shows that factors like legal recognition, norms of reciprocity and strong leadership need to be at the center of studies of democracy and political accountability,

yet have not been central to existing theories of democracy in Africa. This requires a further examination of the politics of daily life as a site of social and political inquiry.

This shift in the space of politics has significant theoretical implications as well. It suggests that we re-think underlying assumptions and key concepts about democracy and political accountability. Since Robert Putnam's groundbreaking work on the importance of social capital to active citizenship and democratization (Putnam 1993, 2000), the study of social capital and associational life has been front and center of studies of democracy. This has contributed to what Michael Walzer calls "the civil society argument," namely "the neo-Tocquevillian belief…that the strength and stability of liberal democracy depends on a vibrant and healthy sphere of associational participation" (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002: 2). Versions of the civil society argument have been used to explain South America's successful democratization process (Kamrava and OMora 1998) and the weakness of civil society in Post-Communist Europe (Howard 2002). This is a welcome addition to the study of democracy, and has opened up a large avenue of research that considers community dynamics and the everyday sphere of politics. Yet, at the same time, the simple existence of social capital has been shown to serve exclusionary purposes as well, as in the case of 1930s Germany and the power of the Chieftaincy in Sierra Leone (Berman 1997; Voth, Voigtländer, and Satyanath 2013; Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson 2013). The response to this has been that without strong formal institutions, "destructive" social capital cannot be reined in (Levi 1996; Woolcock and Narayan 2000).

This study offers an alternative possibility. I suggest that instead of focusing on the strength of formal institutions to rein in "unsocial capital," more attention be paid to the informal institutions that shape the *type* of norms of reciprocity and *quality* of leadership. This is because different informal institutional environments have different logics of collective action. As I

demonstrate in this study, certain types of norms of reciprocity serve the public interest—cross-ethnic norms. Likewise, strong leaders are required to mobilize followers and instigate collective action. In the case of urban Ghana, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity and strong leaders are shaped by the settlement pattern of the slum. Whether this is the case in the rest of the world is an empirical question, but one that requires further analysis. More research needs to be done on how cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity develop in ethnically diverse settings (i.e. Dionne 2014), and why some communities develop strong leaders while others do not.

My study also suggests a significant re-thinking of democratic accountability. The major theoretical innovation is that accountability develops from relationships of respect and quests for social approval—for both the leaders and ordinary residents. This stands in direct contrast to the dominant principal-agent model that rest on control—either citizens controlling their leaders or politicians controlling the voters. The implications of this are great: elections do not necessarily deliver the necessary accountability for a quality democracy. Instead, mechanisms of accountability require spaces in daily life that allow residents to publicly shame and honor their leaders. More importantly, it requires that citizens have the ability set the decision-making agenda, and in turn, leaders tell account of the decisions they make. More research is needed to uncover the sites and conditions of dignified public expression in democratizing societies.

This discussion prompts the need for a substantive definition of democracy that considers patterns of participation, modes of cooperation, and mechanisms of accountability in daily life. In essence, this requires a return to the Athenian conception of democracy: the collective capacity of the citizenry to make things happen in the public interest (Ober 2008). Note that this involves a group's belief that they have the power to achieve goals through collective action (Bandura 2000), as well as an individual's belief that they have the power to effect change

(Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai 2014). Developing this collective efficacy is an empirical challenge that contributes to the democratic quality of a community or society.

The study of African slums

This study provides an innovative framework for studying African slums. Previous attempts at understanding slums emphasize extreme poverty, informality (informal settlements), parallel governance structures (shadow cities), and migratory patterns (arrival cities). My study suggests that slums have elements of all of these characteristics, but these definitions and insights do not adequately explain differences between poor urban communities and are insufficient ways to categorize them. Instead, my empirical evidence suggests that the best way to compare African slums is via their informal institution of settlement, whether they are illegally settled, purchased at arrival, or indigenous to the territory. These informal institutions of settlement go a long way to explaining the type and strength of leadership; the underlying norms of reciprocity in the community; and the legal status of the community. But do these categories extend beyond Ghana? How useful is the model presented in this book for the study of African slums across the continent? Preliminary evidence suggests that these categories do stand up to empirical scrutiny, and are useful for the comparative study of African slums.

The model is best generalizable to other West African countries—particularly countries like Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and Senegal—where customary law structures land access and the historical experience of indigeneity and settler dynamics are similar. The case of democracy in indigenous settlements (as explained in Chapter 4) is especially relevant to Nigeria where

conflicts over ethnic identity, religion, and resources can often be understood through the lens of indigene-settler dynamics.[91]

Consider the city of Jos, situated geographically in the center of Nigeria, and considered one of the most cosmopolitan cities in Nigeria due to its historical importance as a mining town. According to the 2006 census, it has approximately 900,000 people and has most likely grown each year since. But it has also been beset by communal and religious violence throughout the early 2000s. Like Ga Mashie in Accra, the tensions between indigenes and settlers in poor urban neighborhoods in Jos have gained increased importance during multi-party elections, particularly as the Christian minority has "voted out" all Muslim representatives from government. Danfulani (2004) explains that "In 1999, no Hausa-Fulani Muslim was voted to either to the Senate or the National House of Assembly and only one was voted to the Plateau State of Assembly," leading to a strong feeling by the Muslim minority that they are losing political control. But at the core of these political divides is a struggle over ownership of the city of Jos, with Muslim Hausa-Fulanis on one side, and Christian Yoruba, Urhobo, and Igbo on the other. For example, the struggles over political and economic space were at the forefront of the September 2001 conflicts.[92] As explained in Chapter 4, the struggle to retain or claim ownership of the city is the most important political struggle there is in indigenous settlements, and multi-party politics only intensifies these conflicts.

In the case of Jos, the most immediate parallels to Ga Mashie are the neighborhoods where the Afisare (Izere or Jarawa), Anaguta (Naraguta) and Berom people live. This is because

[91] Nigeria is further notable because the indigene/settler dichotomy is institutionalized in the 1999 Constitution. While this distinction plays an informal role in Ghana, in Nigeria it is part of the official rules and procedures of government.

[92] Gora, Daniel. October 23, 2001. "Remote Causes/Suggestions on September 7, 2001 Crisis". *Memerandum Submitted to the Nikki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Jos and Environs Communal/Religious Crisis*, Azi Nyako Youth Centre, Dadin Kowa, Jos.

these groups have been determined as the "true indigenes" of Jos dating back to pre-colonial times. Yet, not surprisingly, "The Plateau Peace Conference [of 2004] noted that certain individuals and groups distort history concerning land ownership for selfish purpose and in order to cause confusion" (Danfulani 2004). A Human Rights Watch report indicates a similar phenomenon:

> One prominent Hausa civil society figure told Human Rights Watch, "Indigene and non-indigene is a distinction used to manipulate the minds of the people and drag them into crisis, just like religion and ethnicity. [The elites] use this to drag innocent people into war with their neighbors." Nigerian President Obasanjo himself has voiced similar sentiments, stating on one occasion that the issue of indigeneity is used to manipulate people into serving as "foot-soldiers to the designs and machinations of power-seekers (Human Rights Watch 2006).

The Berom are a particularly interesting parallel to the Ga of Accra. While only numbering 300,000 nation-wide (as opposed to more than 30 million Hausas), their indigenous status in local government offers them the only opportunity for political control. As Human Rights Watch explains, "Because of the political realities all of this implies and in order to protect their cultural heritage, the argument goes, these groups have no choice but to jealously guard their status as the only "true indigenes" of the state" (2006: 38). Yet Muslim Hausa and Jarawa communities of Jos also claim indigeneity to the city, but are not officially recognized. This is particularly difficult for these communities because they do not have official indigenous status in any parts of the country. This leaves slum settlements of these groups, like Anguwan Rogo, Gangare and Rikkos under-resourced and with poor provision of public services, much like zongo communities in Ghana. The tensions over indigeneity and settler status are more severe than in Ghana due to the official importance indigenous status provides: access to scholarships, jobs in the civil service, and access to resources. Nonetheless, the politics of indigeneity guides multi-partyism and the process of democratization, and undermines democratic quality in Jos, Nigeria. Similar dynamics

arise in other cities of Nigeria as well, including Kano, Kaduna, and Warri. In Lagos, the rise of illegal settlements is a rapidly growing problem, as governance and authority structures in Makoko and Agogo appear similar to that of Old Fadama in Ghana (described in Chapter 3). The next step is to compare indigenous, purchased, and illegal slum communities in these cities to determine how these informal institutional contexts shape strength of leadership, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, and legal status.

This framework of African slums is not limited to former British colonies, but applies to Francophone Africa as well. For example, more than 50 percent of Cote d'Ivoire's population lives in urban areas (51.3% as of 2011). Like the Ga in Accra, the indigenous ethnic group "Ebries" have seen their total percentage of the city population decrease from 37 per cent of the total population of the city in the 1936 census, 6.8 per cent in 1955, 5.5 per cent in 1963 and 3.3 per cent in 1975 (Antoine et al, 1987 quoted in Appessika 2003).[93] The initial settlement of slums in Abidjan is documented in similar fashion to those of Ghana and Nigeria. For example, the slum Zoé Bruno, in the commune of Koumassi, dates from the early 1960s and is named after the founder of the settlement; a leader who settled in 1964 to extend his territorial authority (Appessika 2003). Residents of Abidjan slum communities include migrants from all over the country, as well as numerous non Ivorians (mostly from Burkina Faso).

Officially, the Abidjan Urban Development Agency (AUA)—the agency that governs Abidjan—distinguishes between "precarious" and "slum/spontaneous neighborhoods." The distinction is based on legality: precarious neighborhoods are poorly resourced and have poor infrastructure, but are legal and therefore eligible for upgrading. Slum/spontaneous

[93] Yet, like the Ga, the Ebries have maintained control over significant land and have stepped into positions as landlords. Freund (2001) argues that this is one reason that strict racial control and discrimination did not occur in Cite d'Ivoire like it did in South Africa. Freund writes: "The thriving development of Adjame and Treichville, and the real and growing importance of Ebrie claims and power, worked against any possibility of a clinically segregated city in Abidjan, not merely by race but also by class or by function" (540).

neighborhoods are illegal and not eligible for government services. These distinctions are critical in Abidjan, as the local authorities have been extremely aggressive in demolishing slum areas since Independence (Freund 2001). Between 1969-1973, for example, one-fifth of the urban population was forced to move as the authorities demolished unauthorized structures.[94] These distinctions were at the forefront of urban divisions in post-Independence Abidjan, and remain that way in contemporary politics. For example, Freund describes the development of Treichville, a commune that can be compared to Ga Mashie:

> Treichville, in particular, became a zone of freedom and sociability for the emerging African elite of the Ivory Coast. The ruling party was founded in there and this is where its leaders met in the course of their long struggle for power and independence (Rapley 1993: 45). Treichville, after independence, became the site of the *Maison du parti*. And even if the elite increasingly repaired to grand villas near the lagoon in Cocody, they continued to look back over the water to Treichville with considerable affection. They were certainly never inclined to plan its destruction. As Dembele mentions, the state was always tolerant of what were called 'habitatse 'volutifs', typical of Treichville (Dembele 1987:488). Such housing was characterized by its licit or near-licit status and its construction in solid, difficult-to-destroy materials. Such toleration was seen as part of the battle against the spread of *bidonvilles* (Haeringer 1985: 27 cited in Freund 2001).

These areas stand in direct contrast to illegally inhabited slums like Abobo, which Freund describes as developing "outside the law" (Freund 2001: 541). Today, Abobo includes some of the poorest and underserviced slums in Abidjan, and were the site of some of the worst post-election violence following the 2010 election.[95] Residents do not have land tenure security, and often distrust the process of land titling—they view it as a distribution of state patronage. Many of these residents are not Ivorian citizens, making it even more difficult for them to gain formal rights.[96] Nonetheless, the removal of these slums through demolition has subsided since the 1980s, leading to authority structures that are consistent with the pattern of politics that I

[94] Heather Joshi et al., Urban Development and Employment in the Ivory Coast (Geneva: ILO, 1976), p. 66. See also Yapi Diahou, 'Les politiques urbaines'.
[95] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/11/ivory-coast-abobo-abidjan-gbagbo.
[96] The politics of citizenship in Cote d'Ivoire is particularly contentious. See (citation).

document in illegal settlements like Old Fadama. But also like illegal settlements across Africa, electoral politics play an increasingly important role in residents' ability to gain access to the state and secure their tenure. Not surprisingly, this is where conflict is most likely. The underlying tensions between host societies and settlers continue to structure politics in these communities.

While the number of people living in illegal settlements is growing rapidly in West Africa today, the historical development of squatter settlements has not been as ubiquitous. This has been attributed to the customary land tenure systems (Peil 1976), as well as traditional norms of ownership and other spiritual beliefs (Konadu-Agyemang 1991). The dynamics I describe in Chapter 3 are providing new opportunities across West Africa for political entrepreneurs to extend their political power. Yet illegality as opportunity is nothing new to East and Southern Africa, where illegal settlements have developed since the colonial period as a space for "native" Africans to provide an important cheap labor supply. During the Independence period, these settlements persisted and provided an important source of "political muscle" for aspiring politicians.

Consider Kibera slum in Nairobi, Kenya. According to Brian Ekdale's excellent history of Kibera, the relationship between state and society in the slum is fraught with political struggle, patron-client relationships, and constant maneuvering between leaders, residents, developers, landlords, and politicians.[97] A simple state power versus community resistance narrative does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. The slum was founded in 1899 as a site of reserve labor for Britain's growing colonial presence. The early settlers were Sudanese "Nubians" who served in the British East African army. As the slum developed, the area grew haphazardly and was beset by crime, neglect and underdevelopment. The colonial government attempted to demolish the

[97] http://www.brianekdale.com/the-history-of-kibera/.

slum to no avail in the late years of colonial rule, turning their attention to more important matters like the Mau Mau insurgency and decolonization (Parsons 1997). The early Nubian settlers were unable to gain formal, secure land rights and lost their special privilege with the British colonial authorities in the early years of Independence.

In 1969 the Kenyan government declared all Kibera land state property (Clark 1972). The government and residents could not come to a conclusion about relocation packages, and the slum continued to develop and grow rapidly. In the 1970s, the government offered permits to build in Kibera, but Amis (1984) argues that these permits were a source of political patronage, "paying back favours, consolidating political clients, rewarding friends or fellow tribesmen by informally giving out free land for urban development" (90). While the state provides very few services to Kibera, the local leaders and landlords exploit illegality to make a hefty profit. Fox sums this up succinctly: "urban underdevelopment can be very profitable for some" (2013: 198). The lack of government services provides significant business opportunities for de facto landlords and private service operators. For example, in 2004 an estimated $31 million in rents were paid to landlords (Gulyani and Talukdar 2008). Like Old Fadama, this leads to a situation where community leaders have the incentive to maintain informality due to the huge profits they enjoy from its illegal status.

The informal institution of illegality in Kibera creates incentives for politicians to extend private goods to political supporters, often members of their own ethnic group. Residents, in turn, rely on these politicians for access to state resources and security of tenure, particularly protection from eviction by landlords (Amis 1984). In the same way that I demonstrate in Old Fadama in Chapter 3, residents need their politician in power to protect their security of stay. This is one reason why Raila Odinga has become so popular in Kibera, particularly to Luo

migrants who view him as critical to protecting their interests (De Smedt 2009). This is even more important as many of the landlords in the slum are Kikuyus or Nubians. It is for these reasons that cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity do not develop in illegal settlements like Kibera. In the absence of strong property rights in illegal settlements, residents perceive elections and multi-party politics to be a very important source of daily security.

While I briefly discuss the development of slums in Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and Kenya, these trends appear to hold throughout Africa. But more research is needed to examine state and slum relations across the continent. In particular, there is an urgent need to uncover the conditions of successful slum upgrading. My model argues that strong leadership, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity and state legal recognition are necessary conditions for successful upgrading. While my analysis suggests that these factors depend on the informal institution of settlement, the next step is to further analyze how informal institutional change can occur across insecure urban communities.

African slums in comparative perspective

The study of cities and slums is an emerging field in comparative politics research. These studies include uncovering logics of political party network expansion in Indian slums (Auerbach 2014), geography of governance (Wibbels et al. 2014) and informal leadership in India (Jha, Rao and Woolcock 2007), the politics of forbearance in Latin America (Holland 2014), informal governance of gangs in Brazil (Barnes 2012), and the political economy of slums in Africa (Fox 2014). By and large, these studies fall into four major topics: rights and citizenship (i.e. Holston 2008; De Soto 2000, 2003; Fischer 2008); race and ethnic politics in urban neighborhoods (i.e. Varshney 2002; Sampson 2012; Wilson 2009); party politics and patron-client relationships that link politicians to the urban poor (i.e. Auyero 2000; Boo 2012); and political mobilization (i.e.

Trounstine 2008; Pasotti 2009; Resnick 2013). Yet while these studies have a lot in common, they span subfields (American and Comparative) and even disciplines (Sociology, Anthropology, History and Political Science) and do not do a good job incorporating each's insights. My study has attempted to incorporate insights from these diverse studies, and demonstrate how conditions that underlie urban governance in India, Latin America, and even the United States exist and shape prospects for democratic quality in Africa.

More research is required to build a generalizable theory of democratic quality in urban slums. In particular, studies of local leadership, norms of reciprocity, and legal recognition would benefit from examining them in a comparative perspective. Why do some communities develop strong leaders while others do not? How do cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity develop? Does the development of legal recognition differ between societies? These questions are still largely unknown, but my study provides some initial working hypotheses to further test. A potential starting point is to examine the informal institutions that shape political behavior. Further, there is a need to uncover the reputational incentives that enable leaders and residents to place the public interest above narrow club or private interests. As the world urbanizes at an impressive rate, these questions are crucial for a prosperous and healthy urban future.

Overcoming urban poverty

Studies and policies to support African development have mostly focused on rural challenges. Poverty alleviation strategies focus on the rural poor. Technological innovations focus on electrification of the hinterland and connectivity across villages. Yet an emerging problem of African development is urban poverty. As the continent becomes increasingly urban, these problems will only be intensified. As my study shows, the urban poor face different obstacles

and challenges than the rural poor. Dealing with these challenges requires new and innovative solutions, including policies that confront politics and local authority structures.

One of the most important challenges that the urban poor face is difficulty in accessing basic public goods like toilets, sanitation, security, and housing. These challenges are distinct from the rural poor, who have a harder time accessing healthcare, education, and food security but do not face housing and sanitation challenges. By and large, the urban poor have access to food and water (especially in Ghana), but might not have security of tenure or live in safe neighborhoods. My study argues that this type of challenge requires confronting local collective action problems, rather than focusing solely on economic growth and technocratic "good governance" (Booth and Cammack 2013). To do so requires policy prescriptions that include a dynamic decision-making process that brings together local communities and state administrators and politicians. The implications of my research for public policy prescribe three potential strategies to address urban poverty: strengthening mechanisms of political accountability; providing state legal recognition and tenure security; and designing creative solutions for slum-upgrading (Paller 2012).

Throughout Accra's development, I have shown how change comes from "pressure" from below. In Chapter 5 I document how residents and leaders in Ashaiman overcame high poverty and insecurity to fight for political representation and effect developmental change. They were able to develop accountability mechanisms at the community level which fostered strong, quality leadership. To apply these lessons to other communities requires strengthening the shaming, sharing, and claim-making mechanisms that already exist. This involves "going with the grain" of African cultures and societies (Kelsall 2013). This can be done in a few ways. One way is to make sure community leaders live in the community. Residents find it much easier to

confront their leaders when they can go to their house and speak to them. Leaders are able to respond faster and more efficiently. This also helps build trust between a leader and his or her followers. Leaders will also have the incentive to improve services because he or she personally benefits from the improvements (Olson 2000).

Another policy is to implement participatory governance forums in all communities (Fujiwara and Wantchekon 2013). These forums give residents the opportunity to air their grievances. But they also allow the leaders the chance to educate and explain how local governance works. Information is shared to members of all political leanings, allowing a space for diverse interests to come together to effect community change. A third strategy is to strengthen transparency in sharing of goods, foods and jobs by leaders. They need to be clear how they share their resources. This will prevent rumors from spreading and undermine clientelist behavior. This is especially important at the level of the political party. All three of these prescriptions will strengthen the bonds of respect between leaders and their followers, a crucial aspect of political accountability that I discuss in Chapter 6.

The non-recognition of slum communities is perhaps the biggest barrier to socio-economic development of slums. Without security of tenure, communities cannot receive public services and residents live in constant fear of forced eviction, making it difficult for them to invest in their neighborhoods. Lack of land security also creates incentives for opportunistic leaders to exploit informality, leading to the persistence of the status quo. All communities need to be incorporated into city planning or presented with relocation options that satisfy international human rights standards. But as my research shows, this process is not as simple as formalizing or regularizing the informal sector, as analysts like De Soto (2000, 2003) advocate. This is because the informal institution of settlement provides an alternative logic to tenure

security than a liberal model suggests. Therefore, bolstering tenure security requires a political settlement where underlying land tensions and disputes must be settled. Otherwise these problems will be postponed to a later date, as the situation with the Ashaiman Slum-Upgrading Facility demonstrates. This requires political negotiations between communities, city authorities, politicians and traditional authorities. It might also include incorporating alternative dispute resolution mechanisms into community life to change behavior (Blattman, Hartman and Blair 2014). But difficult decisions must be made: there will be winners and losers.

Slum clearance has been the major strategy to deal with slums since colonial times, as I discuss in Chapter 2. This strategy has failed, as the number of people living in slums rise each year. Therefore, a new strategy is in order. Many residents in Old Fadama and other slums have the financial capital to upgrade their community if they are given the green light by city authorities. A recent fire in Old Fadama demonstrates this point: after hundreds of structures burned down, dozens of new structures were immediately built. These structures were a huge upgrade over the wooden structures that were burned down: residents used cement block, iron sheets, and bright paint. These creative solutions should be part of a broader strategy of strengthening decentralization by building the capacity of district assemblies (and sub-metro units) so that they can better negotiate the challenges facing slum communities. These three policy prescriptions have one thing in common: for transformation change to occur in urban African slums, change must come from below.

Studying local democracy

This project set out to explain why democracy works in some local contexts but not others. I found that strong leadership, cross-ethnic norms of reciprocity, and legal recognition explains

levels of democratic quality in African slums. Whether these factors explain the success of democracy in other developing societies remains an empirical question, but preliminary evidence suggests that it does. The development of these factors can be attributed to the informal institutions that underlie official political activity. This finding suggests the need for more research on informal institutions in the study of local democracy, particularly the ways in which they foster political participation in local decision-making, cooperation in community affairs, and the practice of accountability in daily life. My theory of dignified public expression provides a preliminary attempt at democratic accountability by integrating representation with deliberative democracy. Democracy is local, difficult, and dirty, but also possible.

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Appendix 1: List of focus groups (Referenced)

May 5, 2012: Tulako-Ashaiman

May 14, 2012: Chorkor

May 18, 2012: Taabo-Ashaiman

May 19, 2012: Old Fadama

May 27, 2012: Old Fadama

May 31, 2012: Valco-Flat Ashaiman

June 3, 2012: Tulako-Ashaiman

June 4, 2012: Old Fadama

June 9, 2012: Agbogbloshie

June 14, 2012: Tulako-Ashaiman

June 12, 2012: King Shona

June 20, 2012: Ga Mashie

June 22, 2012: Chorkor

June 28, 2012: Nima