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# Foreign Relations of the United States



1952-1954

Volume V


WESTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY

(in two parts)

Part 2

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# Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954

## Volume V

## Western European Security

(in two parts)

Part 2




*Editor in Chief*
William Z. Slany

*Editors*
John A. Bernbaum
Lisle A. Rose
Charles S. Sampson

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# PREFACE

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

*a.* To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.

*b.* To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.

*c.* To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.

*d.* To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.

*e.* To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains

the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government. The Center, in coordination with the geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

Until his retirement in 1979, Deputy Historian Frederick Aandahl directed the entire *Foreign Relations* project, including the preparation of this volume. His successor as General Editor, William Z. Slany, supervised the process of review, declassification, and final editing.

Mr. Slany also prepared the compilations on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council and the London Foreign Ministers meeting. Charles S. Sampson prepared those on the implementation of the Lisbon reorganization of NATO, Secretary of State Acheson's trip to Europe and Latin America, the Foreign Ministers meeting at Washington, and the Bermuda Conference. John A. Bernbaum edited the documentation on the Nine-Power Conference and the Dulles–Stassen trip to Europe. Lisle A. Rose prepared the compilations on the "New Look" in NATO and the European Defense Community.

Joann Alba of the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief), performed the technical editing under the supervision of Margie R. Wilber. Anne K. Pond prepared the index.

WILLIAM Z. SLANY
*The Historian*
*Bureau of Public Affairs*

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# INTRODUCTION

## Methodology

In presenting the materials in this volume the editors have sought to use records from a wide variety of sources. For the most part, the documentation, as indicated in the individual headings, comes from the central (decimal) files of the Department of State. The records of the central files have been supplemented by materials from decentralized "lot files" of the Department of State, both those of the offices and bureaus within the Department and those of United States Missions abroad. The editors have also examined numerous record collections at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, and lot files of the Mutual Security Agency and its successor organizations held at the Federal Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. Where it proved important to the presentation of the record of United States foreign policy, the editors have also sought documentation from the Truman Library and from other agencies of the United States Government, primarily the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The editors have indicated in all cases the source of the documents presented in this volume, either in the individual headings for the documents printed or in the footnotes or editorial notes. A list of the sources used in the preparation of this volume is printed on page XXXVII.

In the case of documents chosen for inclusion in this volume, the editors have, whenever possible, identified the drafter and those officers or institutions which cleared each document. The editors have also indicated as appropriate the major officers who initialed telegrams for the Secretary of State and have recorded those instances when President Truman, President Eisenhower, Secretary Acheson, or Secretary Dulles drafted, cleared, initialed, or signed any document. In the case of the more significant documents, the editors have further noted officers and institutions, other than the primary recipient, to whom additional copies were sent or to whom telegrams were repeated.

The classification line for each document represents the original classification given that document and does not reflect any further alterations in its security handling. The dateline represents the date of transmittal as well as can be determined; if the dateline is in

brackets, that denotes the fact that the source text did not bear a date but that one was supplied by the editors based on other materials. If doubt exists about the information provided in the dateline, the editors supplied a question mark in the brackets.

All documents referred to in the text of this volume have been footnoted. The footnote citations to printed documents are either to a page in the same volume; to a page, compilation, or chapter in another volume of *Foreign Relations*; or to another published source. Those documents which the editors examined but decided not to publish will generally have a footnote citation "Not printed" followed by a description or summary of their contents, unless their substance is obvious from the text, and a citation to the place in which they can be found. Documents which the editors were unable to find have the footnote citation "Not found in Department of State files" or less frequently "The document under reference here has not been identified further." In general these citations have been used for those documents which could be expected to be found in Department of State files but were not located after a reasonable search or were incorrectly or insufficiently identified. Documents transmitted between other countries or agencies which could not be expected to be found in the Department of State files will only be footnoted if they were found. In some cases the editors have presented as editorial notes the substance of larger bodies of documents which were not printed. In these cases they have included appropriate references to the sources from which the material cited was drawn.

To assist in the use of this volume, the editors have prepared a list of abbreviations and a list of identifications of persons. These lists include explanations of the most frequently used abbreviations and the full names and positions for persons who appear more than once in this volume.

# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

AA, anti-aircraft
ACC, Allied Control Council for Germany
Actel, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington
AFP, *Agence France Presse* (French Press Agency)
AGSec, Allied General Secretariat, Allied High Commission for Germany
AHC, Allied High Commission for Germany
AMG, Allied Military Government
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States
AR, Annual Review
Aramco, Arabian American Oil Company
ARC, Annual Review Committee
ARQ, Annual Review Questionnaire
ARS, *Action Républicain et Sociale* (French Political Party)
ASDIC, Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Committee
ASIC, Associated States of Indochina
AWX, type of airplane
Benelux, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg
BHE, *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* (League of Expellees and Disfranchised)
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
BOB, Bureau of the Budget
C, Counselor of the Department of State
ca, circular airgram
Cab, Cabinet
CD, Council Deputies
CDU, *Christlich-Demokratische Union* (Christian Democratic Union)
CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers
CGIL, *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro* (General Confederation of Labor in Italy)
Chanc, Chancellor
CHANCOM, Channel Command
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIC, Commander in Chief
CINC, Commander in Chief
CINCAAFCE, Commander in Chief, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe
CINC(AF)MED, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean
CINCALFCE, Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, Europe
CINCNELM, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCNorth, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe
CINCSouth, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
Coled, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community
Colux, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Chiefs of Mission meeting at Luxembourg, September 18–19, 1953
Contel, Consulate telegram
Cotel, Country Team telegram
CP, Communist Party
CPF, Communist Party of France
CSC, Coal and Steel Community
CSU, *Christlich Soziale Union* (Christian Social Union)
CY, calendar year

**DA IN**, Department of the Army incoming telegram
**DefDept**, Defense Department
**DefMin**, Defense Minister
**Defto**, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of Defense
**Depcirtel**, Department of State circular telegram
**Dep(s)**, Deputy (Deputies)
**Deptel**, Department of State telegram
**Depto**, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Deputy Representative to the North Atlantic Council
**DGB**, *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (German Federation of Trade Unions)
**DKV**, *Deutsche Kohleverein* (German Central Coal Sales Agency)
**DM**, Deutsche Mark
**DMS**, Director of Mutual Security
**DOD**, Department of Defense
**DP**, *Deutsche Partei* (German Party)
**DPB**, Defense Production Board
**DTG**, date time group
**Dulte**, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
**EB**, Executive Bureau
**ECA**, Economic Cooperation Administration
**ECE**, Economic Commission for Europe
**ECSC**, European Coal and Steel Community
**EDC**, European Defense Community
**ED/IC**, Interim Committee of the European Defense Community
**Edcol**, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community
**EDF**, European Defense Force
**ED(S)T**, eastern daylight (savings) time
**EE**, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
**Emb**, Embassy
**Embtel**, Embassy telegram
**EPC**, European Political Community
**EPEK**, *Ethniki Prodeftiki Enosis Kendrou* (National Progressive Union of the Center), Greek political coalition
**EPU**, European Payments Union
**ERP**, European Recovery Program
**EUCOM**, European Command
**EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
**FDP**, *Freie Demokratische Partei* (Free Democratic Party)
**FE**, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Far East
**FEB**, Financial and Economic Board
**FedRep**, Federal Republic of Germany
**FinMin**, Finance Minister
**FM**, Foreign Minister
**FOA**, Foreign Operations Administration
**FOCE**, Forces of Occupation, Central Europe
**FonMin**, Foreign Minister
**FonOff**, Foreign Office
**FonSec**, Foreign Secretary
**FTT**, Free Territory of Trieste
**FY**, fiscal year
**FYI**, for your information
**G**, Deputy Under Secretary of State
**GA**, General Assembly of the United Nations
**GAF**, Greek Air Force
**GDR**, German Democratic Republic
**GER**, Bureau (from 1953, Office) of German Affairs, Department of State
**GFR**, German Federal Republic
**GMT**, Greenwich Mean Time
**GNP**, gross national product
**GPA**, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State
**GTI**, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State
**H**, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
**HICOG**, United States High Commissioner for Germany
**HICOM**, High Commission(er)
**HICOM/P**, paper of the Allied High Commission for Germany
**HMG**, His (Her) Majesty's Government
**IC**, Indochina
**ICJ**, International Court of Justice
**ILO**, International Labor Organization
**Indo**, Indochina

**infotel**, information telegram
**infra**, infrastructure
**Infra Comte**, Infrastructure Committee
**IRC**, International Red Cross
**IS**, International Staff
**ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
**JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
**KPD**, *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (Communist Party of Germany)
**L**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
**L/GER**, Assistant Legal Adviser for German Affairs, Department of State
**LibDef**, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Air Attaché in Lisbon
**LOC**, lines of communication
**LST**, landing ship, tank
**MAAG**, Military Assistance Advisory Group
**MC**, Military Committee
**MC–PC**, Military Committee–Political Committee
**MDA**, Mutual Defense Assistance
**MDAP**, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
**ME**, Middle East
**MEDO**, Middle East Defense Organization
**Mil Com(ite)**, Military Committee
**MOG**, meetings on Germany
**MP**, Member of Parliament
**MRC**, Military Representatives Committee
**MRP**, *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (French Political Party)
**MSA**, Mutual Security Agency
**MSA/G**, Mutual Security Agency Mission in Greece
**MSB**, Military Security Board
**msg**, message
**MSP**, Mutual Security Program
**MTB**, motor-torpedo boat
**mytel**, my telegram
**NA**, North Atlantic
**NAC**, North Atlantic Council
**NAT(O)**, North Atlantic Treaty (Organization)
**NATO AR**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Annual Review
**NATO IS (NATIS)**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Information Service
**NATOP**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization preparatory paper
**NCO**, noncommissioned officer
**NEA**, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
**niact**, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
**NNG**, Netherlands New Guinea
**noforn**, no foreign nationals (distribution)
**NPC**, Nine-Power Conference
**NPT**, Nine-Power Talks
**NRW**, Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia)
**NSC**, National Security Council
**OCB**, Operations Coordinating Board
**ODM**, Office of Defense Mobilization
**OEEC**, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
**OIR**, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State
**OSD**, Office of the Secretary of Defense
**OSP**, offshore procurement
**ourtel**, our telegram
**P/POL**, Public Affairs Advisory Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
**PA/HO**, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
**PCI**, *Partito Communista Italiano* (Italian Communist Party)
**Perm Rep**, permanent representative
**Perm Under Sec**, Permanent Under Secretary
**PM**, Prime Minister
**PNM**, *Partito Nazionale Monarchico* (National Monarchist Party)
**POL**, petroleum, oil, lubricants
**Polto**, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Special Representative in Europe (after June 12, 1953, the U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council)
**POW**, prisoner of war
**PPS**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

**PriMin**, Prime Minister
**PSC**, Social Christian Party
**PSDI**, *Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano* (Italian Social Democratic Party)
**RA**, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
**RAF**, Royal Air Force (British)
**RCAF**, Royal Canadian Air Force
**reEmbtel**, regarding Embassy telegram
**reftel**, reference telegram
**Repto**, series indicator for telegrams from the Special Representative in Europe to the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington
**RI**, Republic of Indonesia
**ROK**, Republic of Korea
**RPF**, *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (French Political Party)
**S**, Secretary of State
**S/A**, Ambassador at Large, Department of State
**S/AE**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs
**S/MSA**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs
**S/P**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
**S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
**SAC**, Strategic Air Command
**SACEUR**, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
**SACLANT**, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
**Safehaven**, code name for a United States program begun in 1944 to block the flight of Axis capital assets to neutral countries
**SCAPE**, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe
**SC**, Security Council of the United Nations
**SCEM**, Signing Ceremonies in Europe, May
**SCS**, Screening and Costing Staff
**SEA**, Southeast Asia
**SEATO**, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
**SecGen**, Secretary-General
**Secto**, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of State from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences
**SED**, *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Socialist Unity Party)
**SFIO**, *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (French Socialist Party)
**SG**, Standing Group
**SGLO**, Standing Group Liaison Office(r)
**SGM**, Standing Group Memorandum
**SHAPE**, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
**Soc**, Socialist
**SOF**, status of forces
**SPD**, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (German Social Democratic Party)
**SRE**, Special Representative in Europe
**TAC**, Tactical Air Command
**TCC**, Temporary Council Committee
**Tedul**, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
**telecon**, telephone (teletype) conference
**TGG**, Tripartite Group on Germany
**Todep**, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Deputy Representative to the North Atlantic Council
**Topol**, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
**Tosec**, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences
**UDSR**, *Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance* (French Political Party)
**UN**, United Nations
**UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly
**UNRRA**, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
**UP**, United Press
**ur**, your

**URAS,** *Union des Républicains et d'Action Sociale* (French Political Party)

**urtel,** your telegram

**USAREUR,** United States Army, Europe

**USCINCEUR,** United States Commander in Chief, Europe

**USDel,** United States Delegation

**USDel/TCC,** United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee

**USEUCOM,** United States Army, European Command

**USIA,** United States Information Agency

**USIE,** United States Information and Educational Exchange Program

**USLO,** United States Liaison Office(r)

**USRO,** United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

**WE,** Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State; Western Europe

**WEU,** Western European Union

**WG,** working group

**Wise Men,** Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Council

# LIST OF PERSONS

ACHESON, Dean G., Secretary of State, January 19, 1949–January 20, 1953.
ACHILLES, Theodore C., Vice Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council after October 3, 1950; Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in France from April 1, 1952; Chief of Mission after September 18, 1952; Minister after October 25, 1954.
ADAIR, Charles W., Jr., Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, July 1954; thereafter Counselor of Embassy in Belgium.
ADENAUER, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, after September 1949; Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany after March 1951.
ALDRICH, Winthrop W., Ambassador in the United Kingdom, February 20, 1953–February 1, 1957.
ALESSANDRINI, Adolpho, Italian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
ALEXANDER of Tunis, Lord, (Harold R. L. G. Alexander), Field Marshal, British Governor General of Canada until March 1, 1952; British Minister of Defense until October 18, 1954.
ALGER, Frederick M., Jr., Ambassador in Belgium, July 22, 1953–March 27, 1957.
ALLEN, William Denis, Head of the Central Department of the British Foreign Office until May 1953; thereafter Assistant under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
ALPHAND, Hervé, French Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council until September 1954.
AMERY, Julian, Conservative member of the British House of Commons.
ANDERSEN, Hans G., Legal Adviser in the Icelandic Foreign Ministry; after 1954, Icelandic Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
ANDERSON, Frederick L., Deputy United States Special Representative in Europe at Paris after March 13, 1952.
ANDERSON, Robert B., Deputy Secretary of Defense, May 3, 1954–August 4, 1955.
ANDREWS, George D., Consul at Strasbourg from March 15, 1950.
ANDRONIKOV, Constantin, interpreter in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
ARMSTRONG, Frederick S., Jr., Division of Research for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern Europe, Department of State, February 1952–September 1954; thereafter Consul in Quebec.
ARNESON, R. Gordon, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs until April 1954; thereafter Deputy Science Adviser.
ATTLEE, Clement B., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and First Lord of the Treasury, July 1945–October 1951; thereafter Leader of the Opposition (Labour Party) in the British House of Commons.
AUCHINCLOSS, John W., Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, 1953–1954.
AURIOL, Vincent, President of the French Republic, January 16, 1947–January 15, 1954.

BAILEY, Ronald William, First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States from April 1952.
BARBOUR, Walworth, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, until May 1954; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until November 1955.
BARNARD, John L., Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, February–August 1952; Assistant United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of European Affairs after November 1952.
BARNES, Robert G., Deputy Director of the Policy Reports Staff in the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, September 1951–April 1952.
BATTLE, Lucius C., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State after June 26, 1951; Foreign Affairs Officer in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs after October 13, 1952; Attaché in Denmark after January 30, 1953; First Secretary after July 26, 1954.



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BEALE, Wilson T. M., Jr., Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, after April 15, 1951; Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, after July 20, 1952.

BEAULIEU, Leroy, Chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Financial and Economic Board.

BEAUMONT, Jean Michel Guèrin de, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs after June 1954.

BECH, Joseph, Luxembourg Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and National Defense after 1951; Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs after December 29, 1953.

BECKER, Fritz, Free Democratic Party member in the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany after September 1953.

BECKER, Walther, Director of the Division of Trade Policy in the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany.

BEELEY, Harold, Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States, February 18, 1953–May 14, 1955.

BEGOUGNE DE JUNIAC, Gontran, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States, 1949–1955.

BEIGEL, Edgar J., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, after December 10, 1951.

BELCHER, R. H., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States.

BENARD, Jean, Second Secretary of the French Embassy in the United States until January 1954.

BENEDIKTSSON, Petur, Icelandic Minister in France until 1956.

BERARD, Armand, French Assistant High Commissioner for Germany.

BERIA, Lavrentiy Pavlovich, Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, until June 1953; Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs, March 1953–June 1955; member of the Politburo (Presidium from October 1952) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, until June 1953.

BETTENCOURT, Manuel, Admiral, Chief of the General Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

BEVAN, Aneurin, Labour member of the British House of Commons.

BEVIN, Ernest, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, July 1945–March 1951.

BEYEN, Johan W., Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 1, 1952–October 11, 1955 (position held jointly with Joseph Luns).

BIDAULT, Georges, Deputy Prime Minister of France and Minister of National Defense until March 1952; Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 8, 1953–June 19, 1954.

BIGART, Homer, staff reporter for the *New York Times*.

BIRGI, Nuri, Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

BLANK, Theodor, Christian Democratic Union member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany; *rapporteur* for the Federal Republic of Germany for talks with the Allied High Commission regarding the German financial contribution to Western defense after December 1951; unofficial Personal Adviser to Chancellor Adenauer.

BLANKENHORN, Herbert A.H., Director of the Political Affairs Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany after March 13, 1951.

BLUECHER, Franz, Deputy Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Chairman of the Free Democratic Party after 1949.

BLUM, Robert, Assistant Deputy for Economic Affairs in the Office of the United States Special Representative in Europe at Paris.

BLUMBERG, Warren P., Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State, 1951–1952; Office of German Political Affairs, 1952–1953; Office of German Affairs, 1953–1954.

BOHLEN, Charles E. (Chip), Counselor of the Department of State after March 13, 1951, and member of the Senior Staff of the National Security Council after July 1951; Ambassador in the Soviet Union, March 27, 1953–March 8, 1957.

BONBRIGHT, James C. H., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs after June 27, 1950; Special Assistant to the United States Permanent Representative in Europe at Paris, April 1954–January 1955.

BONNET, Henri, French Ambassador in the United States, January 1, 1945–January 31, 1955.

BONSAL, Philip W., Counselor of the Embassy in France with the personal rank of Minister until March 1952; Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, until September 1954.

BOON, Hendrik N., Secretary-General of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1, 1949–November 1, 1952; Netherlands Minister in Italy after November 25, 1952; Netherlands Ambassador in Italy after January 27, 1954.

BOONE, Walter F., Admiral, United States Navy, Navy member of the Joint Strategic Survey Command, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

BOOTHBY, Sir Robert J. C., Labour member of the British House of Commons.

BORIS, Georges, Chargé de Mission in the Personal Cabinet of French Prime Minister Mendès-France after June 1954.

BOUGENOT, André, Independent Republican Party member of the French National Assembly.

BOUHEY, Jean, Socialist Deputy in the French National Assembly.

BOURBON-BUSSET, Jacques de, Director of the Cabinet, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

BOURGÈS-MAUNOURY, Maurice, Deputy in the French National Assembly after 1946; French Minister of Armaments and Minister of Finance, March 1952–January 1953; Minister of Industry and Commerce, June 1954–February 1955.

BOWIE, Robert R., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, after May 18, 1953.

BRADLEY, General of the Army Omar N., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 14, 1953.

BRENTANO, Heinrich von, Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany after September 1949; German Representative to the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community and German Representative to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

BRIND, Sir Eric James Patrick, Admiral, British Navy; Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe, April 1951–May 1953.

BROFOSS, Erik, Norwegian Minister of Commerce until 1954.

BROSIO, Manlio, Italian Ambassador in the United Kingdom after March 18, 1952.

BRUCE, David K. E., Ambassador in France, May 9, 1949–March 10, 1952; Under Secretary of State, February 7, 1952–January 20, 1953; United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community and United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community after February 19, 1953.

BRYN, Olaf, Norwegian Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

BUCHANAN, Wiley, Envoy in Luxembourg after September 1953; Minister after December 1, 1953.

BUNKER, Ellsworth, Ambassador in Italy, May 7, 1952–April 3, 1953.

BURROWS, Bernard A.B., Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States, January 1950–July 1953.

BUTLER, Richard Austen, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, October 1951–December 1955.

BUTTERWORTH, W. Walton, Ambassador in Sweden, September 18, 1950–December 9, 1953; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission in the United Kingdom.

BYINGTON, Homer M., Jr., Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, from June 30, 1950; Counselor of the Embassy in Spain after August 1, 1953.

BYROADE, Henry A., Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, from November 1, 1949; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs after April 14, 1952.

CACCIA, Sir Harold, British Ambassador in Austria after November 28, 1951; Deputy Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office after February 1, 1954.

CALHOUN, John A., Deputy Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, October 1950–December 1952.

CAMPILLI, Pietro, Italian Minister of Transport, Industry, and Commerce until 1953; thereafter Minister without portfolio.

CARLSON, Delmar R., Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, from May 1953.

CARNEY, Robert B., Admiral, United States Navy; Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1950–1952; Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, 1952–1953; after May 1953, member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations.

CARNS, Edwin H. J., Colonel, United States Army; Deputy Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CARPENTIER, Marcel Maurice, Lieutenant General, French Army; Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe.

CARRAUD, Pierre, Secretary to French Ambassador Bonnet in the United States after April 1953.

CAUWELAERT, Jan Frans van, President of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives and member of the Christian Socialist Party.

CAYEUS, Jean, Deputy in the French National Assembly and member of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire.*

CHABAN-DELMAS, Jacques, Deputy in the French National Assembly and, after June 1954, French Minister of Public Affairs.

CHAPIN, Selden, Ambassador in the Netherlands, October 27, 1949–October 30, 1953.

CHARPENTIER, Pierre, Director General of Economic, Financial, and Technical Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CHERWELL, Lord (Frederick Alexander Lindemann), British Paymaster General and Adviser to Prime Minister Churchill on Atomic Energy Affairs.

CHIPERFIELD, Robert Bruce, Republican Representative from Illinois.

CHIPMAN, Norris B., First Secretary and Consul in the Embassy in the United Kingdom after December 1953.

CHURCHILL, Winston S. (after April 24, 1953, Sir Winston), Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and First Lord of the Treasury, October 26, 1951–April 6, 1955; Minister of Defense, October 1951–January 1952.

CLASEN, André, Luxembourg Minister in the United Kingdom after November 30, 1944.

CLAUDIUS-PETIT, Eugene, Deputy in the French National Assembly.

CLAUSONNE. *See* Seydoux de Clausonne.

CLAXTON, Brooke, Canadian Minister of National Defense until July 1, 1954.

COLLINS, Denis A., Fiscal Officer in the Embassy in France after January 1954.

COLLINS, Joseph Lawton, General, United States Army; Chief of Staff of the United States Army, August 16, 1949–August 14, 1953; thereafter United States Representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee.

CONANT, James B., United States High Commissioner for Germany after February 1953.

CONOVER, Harry, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in France, June 1951–August 1954.

COOK, Orval R., General, United States Air Force; Deputy Commander in Chief, United States European Command, after 1954.

COURANT, Pierre, Independent Deputy in the French National Assembly.

COTY, René, President of France, after December 23, 1953.

COURSON DE LA VILLENEUVE, Comte Tanguy, Counselor of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

COUVE DE MURVILLE, Maurice, French Ambassador in Egypt, 1950–1954; French Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, October 1954–January 1955.

COWEN, Myron M., Consultant to the Secretary of State until June 1952; Ambassador in Belgium, June 11, 1952–June 8, 1953.

COWLES, Willard B., Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State.

CRAWFORD, William A., First Secretary of the Embassy in France, February 1952–August 1954.

CROMBRE, Sir James, Deputy Secretary of the British Treasury.

CUNHA, Paulo Arsenio Virissimo, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 2, 1950–September 29, 1958.

CUTLER, Robert, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs, March 1953–April 1955.

DALADIER, Edouard, Deputy in the French National Assembly after 1946.

DARIDAN, Jean, Minister Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States until June 1954.

DAVIS, Arthur C., Vice Admiral, United States Navy; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, November 1951–March 1952; United States Representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standing Group until November 1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until August 1954; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

DEAN, Gordon E., Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 11, 1950–June 3, 1953.

DEBRE, Michel, French Senator and member of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*; French Representative to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and French Delegate to the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.

DE GASPERI, Alcide, Prime Minister of Italy and Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 1951–August 1953; Secretary of the Italian Christian Democratic Party until July 1954.

DE GAULLE, Charles, leader of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*, 1947–1954.

DE GREEF, Edouard, Lieutenant Colonel, Belgian Minister of National Defense.

DEHLER, Thomas, Minister of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany until 1953; Chairman of the Free Democratic Party and member of the Bundestag.

DELBEZ, Louis, Independent Deputy in the French National Assembly.

DELBOS, Yvon, Radical Socialist Deputy in the French National Assembly.

DE MARGERIE. *See* JACQUIN DE MARGERIE.

DE MOUSTIER, Roland, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

DE STAERCKE, André, Belgian Representative on the North Atlantic Council after 1951.

DE TOVAR, Comte, Portuguese Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

DILLON, C. Douglas, Ambassador in France, March 13, 1953–January 28, 1957.

DIXON, Sir Pierson John, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs after June 1950; British Representative on the Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission.

DODGE, Joseph M., Director of the Bureau of the Budget, January 21, 1953–April 15, 1954.

DONNELLY, Walter J., Ambassador in Austria, November 28, 1951–July 19, 1952; United States High Commissioner for Germany, July 1952–January 1953.

DORSZ, Edmund J., Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, until May 1952.

DOWLING, Walter C., United States Deputy High Commissioner for Austria, January 18, 1952–June 26, 1953; United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany until May 6, 1955.

DRAPER, William H., Jr., United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council and Special Representative in Europe at Paris, April 1952–June 1953.

DREES, Willem, Prime Minister of the Netherlands and Minister of General Affairs, August 6, 1948–December 22, 1958.

DULLES, Allen, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence after August 1951; Director of Central Intelligence after January 1953.

DULLES, John Foster, Secretary of State after January 21, 1953.

DUNCAN, Donald B., Admiral, United States Navy: Vice Chief of Naval Operations from August 10, 1951.

DUNN, James Clement, Ambassador in Italy until March 27, 1952; Ambassador in France until March 2, 1953; Ambassador in Spain after April 9, 1953.

DUPONG, Pierre, Prime Minister of Luxembourg until December 22, 1953.

DURBROW, Elbridge, Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel, Department of State, after July 17, 1950; Counselor of the Embassy in Italy after July 14, 1952.

DUVIEUSART, Jean, Belgian Minister of Economic Affairs.

EDELSTON, Sir John H., Admiral, British Navy, Commander-in-Chief, Channel, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Command, 1952–1954.

EDEN, Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, October 27, 1951–April 5, 1955.

EINAUDI, Luigi, President of the Italian Republic, May 1948–April 1955.

EISENHOWER, General of the Army Dwight D., Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, April 2, 1951–May 30, 1952; President of the United States after January 20, 1953.

ELBRICK, Charles Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs after December 16, 1953; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs after May 26, 1954.

ELY, Paul, General, French Army; French Member of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after August 1953; French High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of French Forces in Indochina after June 3, 1954.

ERHARD, Ludwig Minister of Economic Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany from September 20, 1949.

EXINTARIS, Georges, Greek Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

EYSKENS, Gaston, Social Christian member of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives.

FALAIZE, Pierre-Louis, Director of the Cabinet of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs after 1953.

FAURE, Edgar, Prime Minister of France and Minister of Finance, January 22–March 11, 1952; President of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the National Assembly 1952–1953; Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, after June 1953.

FAURE, Maurice, Secretary-General of the French Radical Socialist Party after 1953.

FECHTELER, William M., Admiral, United States Navy; Chief of Naval Operations, August 16, 1951–August 17, 1953; thereafter Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

FERGUSON, John Haven, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, April 1, 1951–August 12, 1953.

FESSENDEN, Russell, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after June 1951.

FISHER, William Dale, Counselor of the Embassy in France, February 21–December 21, 1952; thereafter Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.

FOSTER, Andrew B., Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, after January 1952; Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom, after September 1954.

FOSTER, William C., Deputy Secretary of Defense, September 1951–January 1953.

FOULKES, Charles, Lieutenant General, Canadian Army; Chairman of the Canadian Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1951.

FOX, Alonzo P., General, United States Army; Army Member of the Joint Strategic Survey Command, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until 1953.

FOX, Homer S., Counselor for Economic Affairs of the Embassy in Belgium, October 1949–1954.

FRANÇOIS-PONCET, André, French High Commissioner for Germany, 1949–1955.

FRANKS, Sir Oliver S., British Ambassador in the United States, June 3, 1948–February 13, 1953.

FREEMANS, Paul L., Jr., General, United States Army; Deputy Director for Plans and Operations, United States Command, Europe.

FULLER, Leon W., Deputy Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, from June 16, 1952; member of the Policy Planning Staff after September 26, 1952.

GAILLARD, Felix, French Secretary of State for Finances, January 1952–January 1953; Secretary of State for the Council of the Presidency, January–June 1953.

GAITSKELL, Hugh, British Chancellor of the Exchequer until October 21, 1951; thereafter Labour member of the House of Commons.

GALLOWAY, William J., Special Assistant in the Embassy in the United Kingdom after October 1950; Special Assistant in the Embassy in France after April 1952; Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State after July 1953.

GERHARDT, Harrison A., Colonel, United States Army; Deputy Director in the Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, 1953; Deputy Director for European Affairs in the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, 1954.

GERHART, John K., General, United States Air Force; Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

GIBSON, William M., First Secretary of the Embassy in France after December 1952.

GIFFORD, Walter S., Ambassador in the United Kingdom, December 21, 1950–January 23, 1953.

GLEASON, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council after January 1950.

GLOBKE, Hans, General Director of the Office of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until 1953; thereafter Secretary of State of the Federal Republic of Germany.

GODLEY, G. McMurtrie II, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State; after March 1, 1952, Consul and First Secretary of the Embassy in France.

GONTRAN DE JUNIAC. *See* Begougne de Juniac.
GOODPASTER, Andrew J., Colonel, United States Army; Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower after October 10, 1954.
GORDON, Lincoln, Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission in the United Kingdom after September 1952.
GORE-BOOTH, Paul Henry, Director of the British Information Service in the United States, October 1949–November 1953; thereafter British Ambassador in Burma.
GRANDVAL, Gilbert, French High Commissioner for the Saar until January 1952; thereafter French Ambassador in the Saar.
GREWE, Wilhelm, Head of the Office for Changing the Occupation Statute through Contractual Relations of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Chief of the Law Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
GROS, Louis Gabriel Marie, Senator in the French National Assembly representing French Morocco.
GRUENTHER, Alfred M., Lieutenant General, United States Army; Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, December 1952–July 1953; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, until November 1956.
GUDMUNDSSON, Kristinn, Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 13, 1953–July 24, 1956.
GUILLAUME, Augustin, General, French Army; Chief of Staff of the French Army, after March 1954.
GURLER, Sahopp, General, Turkish Army; Deputy Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces.

HAGERTY, James C., Press Secretary to President Eisenhower after January 1953.
HALABY, Najeeb E., Jr., Assistant for International Security Affairs in the Mutual Security Agency, 1952; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs after 1953.
HALLSTEIN, Walter, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany after March 1951.
HAMILTON, William L., Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, after January 1950.
HANSEN, Hans Christian, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 30, 1953–October 9, 1958.
HANSEN, Rasmus, Danish Minister of Defense, September 30, 1953–May 23, 1956.
HARRIMAN, W. Averell, Director for Mutual Security, November 1951–January 1953; Chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Temporary Council Committee, September 1951–February 1952.
HARRIS, Michael S., Director of the Office of Economic Affairs, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, after July 1951; thereafter Head of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in the Federal Republic of Germany; subsequently, Head of similar Missions for the Mutual Security Agency and Foreign Operations Administration.
HART, Charles E., Major General, United States Army; Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group in Greece after October 1951.
HARVEY, Sir Oliver C., British Ambassador in France, January 1948–April 1954.
HASSLER, Horst, *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.
HAY, John, Head of German Security and Allied Controls, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.
HAYTER, Sir William G., British Minister in France after December 1949; British Ambassador in the Soviet Union after October 10, 1953.
HEALEY, Denis W., Labour member of the British House of Commons.
HEENEY, Arnold D. P., Canadian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council; after August 1953, Canadian Ambassador in the United States.
HEINE, Friedrich, member of the Social Democratic Party in the Federal Republic of Germany.
HEINEMANN, Gustav, former Minister of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany.
HENSEL, H. Struve, General Counsel, Department of Defense, 1952–1954; Counsel and Special Adviser to the Secretary of Defense, 1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1954–1955.
HERRIOT, Edouard, Deputy in the French National Assembly, from 1919; President of the National Assembly, January 1947–January 1954.
HERWARTH VON BITTENFELD, Hans-Heinrich, Chief of Protocol of the Federal Republic of Germany.

HERZ, Martin F., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in France, June 1951–February 1955.
HEUSINGER, Adolf E., General, Military Consultant to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.
HEUSS, Theodore, President of the Federal Republic of Germany after September 1949.
HILLENBRAND, Martin J., Officer in Charge of Government and Administration, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, after June 1950; Economic Officer at the Embassy in France after September 1952.
HOFFMAN, Johannes, President of the Saar.
HOLMES, Julius C., Minister of the Embassy in the United Kingdom, April 1950–November 1954.
HOMMEL, Nic, Luxembourg Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
HOOKER, Robert G. Jr., Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, November 1953–September 1954.
HOOVER, Herbert, Jr., Consultant to the Secretary of State from October 1953; Under Secretary of State from October 1954.
HOUTTE, Jean van, Belgian Minister of Finance, June 1950–January 14, 1952; Prime Minister, January 15, 1952–April 21, 1954.
HUGHES, Emrys, Labour member of the British House of Commons.
HUGHES, John C., United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, June 1953–April 1955.
HUGUES, Emile, Radical member of the French National Assembly and French Minister of Justice, June–September 1954.
HULL, John Edwin, General, United States Army; Vice Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration until 1953; thereafter Commander in Chief of the United Nations Forces in the Far East.
HUMPHREY, George M., Secretary of the Treasury after January 21, 1953.

ISMAY, Lord (Hastings Lionel Ismay), British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations until March 12, 1952; thereafter Secretary General and Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

JACOBS, George R., Director of the Trade and Resources Branch in the Office of German Economic Affairs. Department of State.
JACQUIN DE MARGERIE, Roland, Assistant Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
JAEGER, Richard, Christian Social Union member of the Bundestag and Vice President of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1953.
JEBB, Sir Gladwyn Hubert Miles, British Permanent Representative at the United Nations after June 27, 1950; Ambassador in France after April 13, 1954.
JERNEGAN, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs after June 26, 1952.
JESSUP, Philip C., Ambassador at Large, March 19, 1949–January 2, 1953.
JOHN, Otto, Head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany until July 1954.
JOHNSON, U. Alexis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, after November 1952; Counselor of the Embassy in Czechoslovakia, after October 30, 1953; Coordinator for the Geneva Conference, after March 31, 1954.
JONES, John Wesley, Counselor of the Embassy in Spain, November 1949–November 1953; thereafter Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.
JONSSON, Eysteinn, Icelandic Minister of Finance.
JOYCE, Robert P., member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, after December 23, 1948; Counselor of the Embassy in France after December, 22, 1952.
JUIN, Alfonse Pierre, General, French Army; Inspector General of the French Armed Forces after January 1951; Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces in Central Europe after August 1951; Commander-in-Chief, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Forces, Central Europe, after June 1953.

KANELLOPOULOS, Panayotis, Greek Minister of National Defense.
KARKELIS, George, Greek Minister of Economic Coordination.
KENNAN, George F., Ambassador in the Soviet Union, May 14–September 19, 1952.

KESSEL, Friedrich von, Deputy Chief of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community, 1952–1954.

KHRUSHCHEV, Nikita Sergeyevich, member of the Politburo (Presidium from October 1952) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from 1939; Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 1949–March 1953; from March 1953, First Secretary of the Communist Party.

KIDD, Coburn D., Director of Government and Administration in the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, June 1952–March 1953; Deputy Director for Government and Administration, Office of German Affairs, March 1953–September 1954; thereafter Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs.

KIESINGER, Kurt Georg, Christian Democratic Union member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

KIRKPATRICK, Sir Ivone A., British High Commissioner for Germany after June 1950; Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, after November 1953.

KITCHEN, Jeffrey C., Acting Chief of the Policy Reports Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, May 26–November 9, 1952; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, until January 23, 1953; thereafter Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat; after October 1954, Deputy Director of Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

KNIGHT, Ridgway B., Acting Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, until July 6, 1952; Adviser on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Affairs after July 1951; Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs until August 11, 1953; Acting Director of the Office of Western European Affairs until January 15, 1954; thereafter Deputy High Commissioner for Germany.

KNUDSEN, Kai, Norwegian Minister of Defense, May 23, 1954–January 21, 1955.

KOENIG, Marie-Pierre, Deputy in the French National Assembly and Minister of National Defense, June 19–September 5, 1954.

KÖPRÜLÜ, Fuad, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 22, 1950–April 15, 1955.

KRAFT, Ole Bjørn, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 27, 1950–September 30, 1953.

KRANICH, Robert H., Foreign Affairs Officer in the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after July 1950; Officer in Charge of North Atlantic Treaty Economic and Military Assistance in the Office of European Regional Affairs after August 1954.

KRISTENSEN, Thorkil, Danish Minister of Finance until September 20, 1953.

KRONE, Heinrich, Berlin Christian Democratic Union member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

LABOUISSE, Henry R., Jr., Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in France after August 1951; after January 1952, Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission; Director of the Foreign Operations Administration Mission in France after July 1, 1953.

LADD, John C., Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State.

LANGE, Halvard M., Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs after February 1, 1946.

LANGHELLE, Nils, Norwegian Minister of Defense, January 5, 1952–May 23, 1954.

LANIEL, Joseph, Prime Minister of France, June 28, 1953–June 19, 1954.

LAY, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council after January 1950.

LE GALLAIS, Hugues, Luxembourg Minister in the United States after November 8, 1940.

LEISHMAN, Frederick John, Assistant Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary after June 1951; First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States after September 1953.

LEITE, Joao Pinto da Costa, Portuguese Minister of the Presidency after August 1, 1950.

LE JEUNE, MAX, Socialist Deputy in the French National Assembly; President of the Commission on National Defense.

LEMNITZER, Lyman L., General, United States Army; Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, United States Army, after 1953.

LE ROY DE LA TOURNELLE, Guy, Director General of Political Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

LETOURNEAU, Jean, French High Commissioner for Indochina after April 1952; Minister for Relations with the Associated States, January–May 1953.
LETROQUER, André, President of the French National Assembly after January 1954.
LEWIS, Jeffrey W., Deputy Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, from July 1950; Acting Director, Office of German Affairs, after November 1953.
LINDER, Harold F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from February 15, 1951; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, December 12, 1952–May 15, 1953.
LLOYD, John Selwyn Brooke, Minister of State, British Foreign Office, after October 1951; Minister of Supply after October 1954.
LOMBARDO, Ivan Matteo, Chairman of the Italian Delegation to the Conference for the Organization of a European Army until May 1954; thereafter Chairman of the Italian Delegation to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community.
LOORAM, Matthew J., Jr., Second Secretary of the Embassy in France after July 1952.
LOUSTAUNAU-LACAU, Georges, Deputy in the French National Assembly.
LOVETT, Robert A., Secretary of Defense, September 1951–January 1953.
LUCE, Clare Booth, Ambassador in Italy, May 4, 1953–December 27, 1956.
LUNS, Joseph M. A. H., Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs after September 1, 1952 (position held jointly with Johan W. Beyen).
LYON, Cecil B., Director of the Berlin Element, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, from June 11, 1951; Director of the Office of German Affairs, Department of State, after February 8, 1954.
LYTTELTON, Oliver, British Secretary of State for the Colonies.

MACARTHUR, Douglas II, Counselor of the Embassy in France, February 1951–October 1952; Counselor of the Department of State, March 1953–December 1956.
MACDONALD, Malcolm John, British High Commissioner in Southeast Asia, until September 13, 1955.
MACGINNIS, Francis Robert, Second Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States after April 1952.
MACMILLAN, Harold, British Minister of Housing and Local Government, until October 1954; thereafter Minister of Defense.
MACVEAGH, Lincoln, Ambassador in Portugal, until February 26, 1952; Ambassador in Spain, March 27, 1952–March 4, 1953.
MAGISTRATI, Massimo, Italian Director General for International Cooperation, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until November 1954; thereafter Director General of Political Affairs, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
MAKINS, Sir Roger M., British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, April 22, 1948–December 30, 1952; British Ambassador in the United States from January 7, 1953.
MALENKOV, Georgiy, Maksimilianovich, Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, 1946–March 1953; Chairman of the Council, March 1953–February 1955; member of the Politburo (Presidium, from October 1952), 1946–1957.
MALFATTI, Franco M., member of the Italian Christian Democratic Party and Head of the Italian Delegation to the Conference on the European Defense Community.
MANSFIELD, Mike, Democratic Senator from Montana and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
MAROGER, Jean, French Senator in the Council of the Republic.
MARRAS, Efisio, General, Italian Army; Chief of the Italian Defense Staff.
MARSHALL, Peter H. R., Second Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States after October 1952.
MARTIN, Edwin M., Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after October 3, 1949; Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs to the Secretary of State from September 28, 1952; Deputy United States Representative on the North Atlantic Council after June 25, 1953.
MARTIN, Jacques, Secretary to French Ambassador Bonnet after April 1953.
MARTINAUD-DEPLAT, Leon, Deputy in the French National Assembly, after 1951; Minister of Justice, March 8, 1952–June 27, 1953; Minister of the Interior until June 18, 1954.
MARTINO, Gaetano, Italian Minister of Education, February–September 1954; thereafter Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

MASSIGLI, René, French Ambassador in the United Kingdom from November 1944, and Chairman of the Brussels Treaty Permanent Council.

MATTHEWS, H. Freeman, Deputy Under Secretary of State, July 5, 1950–September 31, 1953; Ambassador in the Netherlands from Ocobter 1, 1953.

MAUDLING, Reginald, Conservative member of the British House of Commons and Economic Secretary to the Treasury.

MAUPEOU, Jacques, French Senator in the Council of the Republic.

MAYER, Daniel, Deputy in the French National Assembly and President of the Commission on Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly.

MAYER, René, Deputy in the French National Assembly; Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, August 11, 1951–January 20, 1952; Prime Minister of France, January 8–June 28, 1953.

MCBRIDE, Robert H., Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, after February 1952; First Secretary of the Embassy in France after September 1954.

MCCARDLE, Carl W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs after January 30, 1953.

MCCLELLAND, Roswell D., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until January 1953; thereafter Consul at Madrid.

MCCLOY, John J., United States High Commissioner for Germany, June 1949–July 1952.

MENDE, Erich, Deputy Chairman of the Free Democratic Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

MENDÈS-FRANCE, Pierre, Prime Minister of France, June 19, 1954–February 23, 1955.

MERCHANT, Livingston T., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs until March 24, 1952; Deputy to the United States Special Representative in Europe at Paris until March 11, 1953; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

MERKATZ, Hans-Joachim, Chairman of the German Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1953.

MESTA, Perle, Minister in Luxembourg, September 21, 1949–April 13, 1953.

MIKOYAN, Anastas Ivanovich, Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, from 1946; Minister for Internal and Foreign Trade, March–September 1953; Minister for Foreign Trade, from September 1953; member of the Politburo (Presidium, from October 1952) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from 1935.

MILLAR, Sir Frederick Robert Hoyer, British Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council until September 1953; thereafter, British High Commissioner for Germany.

MILLAR, John Y., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, February 1952–February 1954.

MILLARD, Hugh, Counselor of the Embassy in Belgium, June 1947–October 1954.

MILLER, Robert H., Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, May 1952–July 1954.

MILLER, William K., Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State.

MITTERRAND, François, Deputy in the French National Assembly from 1946; Minister of State, January–March 1952; Minister of the Interior, June 1954–February 1955.

MOCH, Jules, French Minister of Defense until August 1951; thereafter Socialist Party member in the French National Assembly.

MOLLET, Guy, Deputy in the French National Assembly and President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 1953–1956; member of the Politburo (Presidium from October 1952) from 1926.

MONNET, Jean, Chairman of the Schuman Plan Conference and, from July 24, 1952, President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.

MONTGOMERY, Edward P., Chief of the Current Information Policy Staff, United States Information Agency, November 1952–August 1953; thereafter Acting Public Affairs Adviser for the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

MOORE, Ben T., First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom after June 5, 1950; Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after September 29, 1952.

MORELAND, Allen B., Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until April 1953; thereafter Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State.

MORGAN, Gerald D., Administrative Assistant for Congressional Affairs to President Eisenhower, September 1953–February 1955.
MORGENSTIERNE, Wilhelm M. Munthe de, Norwegian Ambassador in the United States after May 14, 1952.
MORRIS, Brewster H., Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, July 14, 1952–November 1, 1953; Officer in Charge of Political Affairs, Office of German Affairs, until June 30, 1954.
MORTON, Thruston B., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, January 30, 1953–February 29, 1956.
MOUTET, Marius, French Senator in the Council of the Republic.
MURPHY, Robert D., Ambassador in Beligum, November 29, 1949–March 19, 1952; Ambassador in Japan, May 9, 1952–April 28, 1953; Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs from March 20, 1953; Political Adviser to the United Nations Command on the Korean Armistice Negotiations, April 28–July 11, 1953; Chief of Mission, United Nations, May 31–November 30, 1953; Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State, in addition to duties as Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, November 30–December 18, 1953; thereafter, Deputy Under Secretary of State.

NAEGELEN, Marcel, Deputy in the French National Assembly.
NASH, Frank C., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, August 28, 1951–February 10, 1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until February 28, 1954.
NAVARRE, Henri, General, French Army; Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in Indochina, May 9, 1953–June 3, 1954.
NENNI, Pietro, Secretary-General of the Italian Socialist Party.
NITZE, Paul H., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until April 1953.
NIXON, Richard M., Republican Senator from California until January 1953; thereafter Vice President of the United States.
NOLTING, Frederick E., Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State after October 14, 1951; Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs after August 4, 1953; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs after January 4, 1954.
NORSTAD, Lauris, General, United States Air Force; Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe, until July 27, 1953; Air Deputy, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, until November 20, 1956.
NUNLEY, William T., Public Affairs Adviser in the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after November 1950.
NUTTING, Sir Anthony, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs after October 1, 1951.

OAKLEY, Raymond K., Consul at Geneva, June 1951–June 1954.
O'CONNOR, Roderic L., Assistant to the Secretary of State after January 21, 1953; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State after February 21, 1954.
OGBURN, Charlton, Jr., Chief of the Division of Intelligence Research, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, after October 10, 1954.
OHLY, John H., Assistant Director for Policy and Program Development in the Office of the Director for Mutual Security after October 14, 1951; Assistant Director for Programs, Office of the Director for Mutual Security, after April 17, 1952; Deputy to the Director for Program Coordination, Mutual Security Agency, after March 23, 1953; Deputy Director for Program and Planning, Foreign Operations Administration, after October 1, 1953.
OLLENHAUER, Erich, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.
OVERBY, Andrew N., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, January 24, 1952–February 28, 1957.

PACCIARDI, Randolfo, Italian Minister of National Defense until July 1953; Vice President of the Italian Parliamentary Committee of Foreign Affairs.
PAGE, Edward, Jr., Counselor in the Office of the United States Special Representative in Europe at Paris and Representative on the Brussels Treaty Working Party after June 1953.
PALEWSKI, Gaston, Vice President of the French National Assembly, 1951–1955.
PALMER, Joseph II, First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom after May 23, 1950; Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after October 15, 1953.

PARKER, Chauncy G., Chief of the Mutual Security Mission in Italy after July 1952.
PARKER, Sir Harold, Permanent Secretary in the British Ministry of Defense.
PARKMAN, Henry, Director of the Berlin Element, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, after December 1953.
PARODI, Alexandre, Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
PARSONS, James Graham, Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, until May 16, 1952; Acting Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs until July 18, 1952.
PATERNOT, Marcel, Deputy in the French National Assembly.
PEARSON, Lester B., Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1948–1957.
PELLA, Giuseppe, Italian Minister of the Budget until February 1952; Minister of the Budget and Treasury until July 1953; Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of the Budget, August 1953–January 1954.
PENFIELD, James K., Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom from July 1950; Deputy Chief of the Mission in Austria from August 1954.
PERKINS, George W., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, August 1, 1949–January 31, 1953.
PETURSSON, Gunnlaugur, Icelandic Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
PHILIP, André, Head of the French Delegation to the Economic Commission for Europe.
PHILLIPS, Joseph B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, March 6–October 23, 1952; Acting Director of the Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, until June 30, 1954.
PHLEGER, Herman, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, February 2, 1953–April 1, 1957.
PICCIONI, Attilio, Italian Deputy Prime Minister until July 1953; Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 1953–September 1954.
PINAY, Antoine, Prime Minister of France and Minister of Finance, March 8, 1952–January 8, 1953.
PINTON, Auguste, French Senator in the Council of the Republic.
PIPINELIS, Panayotis, Greek Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
PLEVEN, René, Prime Minister of France, August 1951–January 1952; Minister of National Defense, March 1952–June 1954.
PLOWDEN, Sir Edwin N., Chief Planning Officer in the British Treasury, until 1953; British Adviser on Atomic Energy Organization, 1953–1954.
POLLACK, Louis H., Legal Adviser in the Office of the Ambassador at Large, Department of State, until January 1953; United Nations Planning Staff, March–July 1953; thereafter Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs.
PORTER, Ivor F., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States after March 1951.
PORTER, Paul R., United States Deputy Special Representative for Economic Affairs in Europe at Paris, after January 15, 1952.

QVISTGAARD, Erhard J. C., Admiral, Danish Navy; Danish Chief of Defense and Member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee after 1950.

RADFORD, Arthur W., Admiral, United States Navy; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 15, 1953–August 14, 1957.
RASNER, Will, member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.
RASQUIN, Michel, Luxembourg Minister of Economic Affairs.
RAYMOND, John M., Assistant Legal Adviser for German Affairs, Department of State.
RAYNOR, G. Hayden, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, after March 4, 1951.
REBER, Samuel, Director of Political Affairs, Office of Political Affairs, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, after May 10, 1950; Deputy United States High Commissioner for Germany, October 13, 1952–June 1953.
REILLY, D'Arcy Patrick, British Minister in France after June 1953.
REINHARDT, G. Frederick, Counselor of the Embassy in France, November 10, 1952–April 19, 1955.

REINSTEIN, Jacques J., Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, from August 1951; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from November 1953.

REYNAUD, Paul, Deputy in the French National Assembly after 1946; President of the National Assembly's Commission on Finances; French Member of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.

RHEE, Syngman, President of the Republic of Korea after August 1948.

RICHARDS, James P., Democratic Representative from South Carolina.

RIDDLEBERGER, James W., Political Adviser to the Economic Cooperation Administration after September 4, 1950; Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, after May 14, 1952; Ambassador in Yugoslavia after July 31, 1953.

RIDGWAY, Matthew B., General, United States Army; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, June 1952–May 1953; Chief of Staff of the United States Army after August 15, 1953.

ROBERTS, Sir Frank K., Deputy Under Secretary of State in the German Section of the British Foreign Office after October 1951; British Representative on the Brussels Treaty Commission after November 1952.

ROBERTSON, Walter S., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from April 8, 1953.

ROGERS, Charles E., Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, 1952–1953.

ROIJEN, Jean Herman van, Netherlands Ambassador in the United States after September 19, 1950.

ROSE, Edward Michael, Political Adviser, Office of the British High Commissioner for Germany, after February 1952.

ROSENBLATT, Marcel, Deputy in the French National Assembly.

ROSSI LONGHI, Alberto, Italian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

ROTHSCHILD, Robert, Counselor of the Belgian Embassy in the United States until May 1954; thereafter Chief of the Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ROUX, Jacques, Officer in Charge of Asian Territories and Pacific Ocean Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after December 1952.

RUMBOLD, Sir Horace Anthony C., British Minister in France from June 1953; Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary after May 1954.

SAKELLARIOU, Alexander, Vice Admiral, Greek Minister of National Defense.

SALAZAR, Antonio de Oliveira, Prime Minister of Portugal after 1932.

SALISBURY, Lord (Robert A. J. G. Cecil), British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations from 1952; Acting Foreign Secretary, June–October, 1953.

SANDYS, Duncan, British Minister of Supply, October 1951–October 1954.

SANTOS COSTA, Fernandos, Lieutenant Colonel, Portuguese Army; Portuguese Minister of National Defense.

SATTERTHWAITE, Livingston L., Counselor of the Embassy in Turkey after May 2, 1952; Political Adviser to the European Commission after March 17, 1953; Counselor of the Embassy in France after March 16, 1953.

SAUVAGNARGUES, Jean, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

SCELBA, Mario, Italian Minister of the Interior until July 1953; Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, February 1954–May 1955.

SCHAETZEL, J. Robert, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, October 15, 1950–August 15, 1954.

SCHLITTER, Oskar, Counselor of the Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany in the United Kingdom.

SCHMIDT, Helmut, Social Democratic Party member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

SCHNEIDER, Herbert, member of the Executive Committee of the German Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

SCHREIBER, Walter, Mayor of West Berlin from October 1953.

SCHUMACHER, Kurt, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the German Social Democratic Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany until August 1952.

SCHUMAN, Robert, French Minister of Foreign Affairs until January 1953; Deputy in the French National Assembly, 1953–1954.

SCHUMANN, Maurice, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1951–1954; Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the French National Assembly.

SCHUYLER, Cortland T., General, United States Army; Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, until 1953; thereafter Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe.

SCHWARTZ, Harry H., Member of the Policy Planning Staff and Department of State Representative on the National Security Council Planning Board, May 1953–March 1954.

SCOTT, Sir Robert H., British Minister in the United States after July 15, 1953.

SCOTT, Walter K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, September 1950–June 1953; thereafter Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State.

SEIBOLD, Frank, member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

SEYDOUX DE CLAUSONNE, François Fornier, Director of the Office of European Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs after September 1949.

SEYDOUX DE CLAUSONNE, Roger, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States until February 1952; Minister of the French Embassy in the United States, December 1952–September 1954.

SEYNES, Phillippe de, Chief of the Cabinet in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June–December 1954.

SHUCKBURGH, Charles A. E., Private Secretary to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until May 1954; thereafter Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

SIEVEKING, Kurt, member of the Bundesrat of the Federal Republic of Germany and First Mayor of Hamburg and President of the Hamburg Senate.

SILVERCRUYS, Baron Robert, Belgian Ambassador in the United States after March 8, 1945.

SILVERMAN, Julius, Labour member of the British House of Commons.

SKAUG, Arne, Norwegian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

SKYLSTAD, Rasmus I. B., Secretary-General of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs after May 1, 1948.

SLATER, Joseph E., United States Secretary on the Allied General Secretariat of the Allied High Commission for Germany.

SLESSOR, Sir John, Marshal, Royal Air Force; Chief of the British Air Staff until December 1952.

SMITH, H. Alexander, Republican Senator from New Jersey and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

SMITH, Walter Bedell, Director of Central Intelligence until February 8, 1953; Under Secretary of State until October 1, 1954.

SNYDER, John W., Secretary of the Treasury, June 25, 1946–January 20, 1953.

SOAMES, Arthur Christopher J., son-in-law and Private Secretary to British Prime Minister Churchill.

SOUTOU, Jean, Assistant Director of the Cabinet of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1954–February 1955.

SPAAK, Paul-Henri, President of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community after July 1952; Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 1954–May 1957.

SPALDING, Francis L., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1954.

SPIEDEL, Hans, General, Military Consultant to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

SPINON, Antoine, Belgian Minister of National Defense, April 22, 1954–June 25, 1958.

SPOFFORD, Charles M., United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council at London until January 1952.

SPROUSE, Philip D., Counselor of the Embassy in France, November 1952–September 1953; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Belgium.

STAF, Cornelis, Netherlands Minister of Defense, March 15, 1951–May 19, 1959.

STARKENBORGH. *See* Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer.

STASSEN, Harold E., Director for Mutual Security after January 20, 1953; Director for Foreign Operations after August 1, 1953.

STEEL, Sir Christopher, British Minister in the United States, November 1, 1950–July 15, 1953; from August 18, 1953, Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

STEENSEN-LETH, Vincens de, Danish Deputy Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, April 16, 1952–January 1, 1954; thereafter Danish Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

STEPHANOPOULOUS, Stephanos, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 23, 1952–October 6, 1955.

STEVENSON, Sir Ralph Clement Skrine, British Ambassador in Egypt after June 15, 1950.

STIKKER, Dirk U., Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 1948–September 1952; Chairman of the Council of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

STOESSEL, Walter J., Jr., Acting Director in Charge of Soviet Affairs, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, after March 1, 1953.

STRANG, Sir William, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February 1949–November 1953.

STRAUSS, Franz-Josef, Christian Socialist Union member of the Bundestag and, from 1953, Minister for Special Tasks of the Federal Republic of Germany.

STRAUSS, Lewis L., Admiral, United States Navy; Assistant to President Eisenhower on Atomic Energy Matters after March 9, 1953; Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission after July 2, 1953.

STRONG, Lester Corrin, Ambassador in Norway, August 10, 1953–February 16, 1957.

STRUYE, Paul, President of the Belgian Senate and member of the Christian Social Party until June 1954; Belgian Representative to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and Delegate to the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.

TALBOTT, Harold E., Secretary of the Air Force, February 4, 1953–August 13, 1955.

TARCHIANI, Alberto, Italian Ambassador in the United States, March 8, 1945–January 1955.

TAVIANI, Paolo Emilio, Under Secretary to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs until July 1953; Minister of Foreign Commerce, July–August, 1953; Minister of Defense after August 1953.

TAYMANS, Roger, Counselor of the Belgian Embassy in the United States until December 1953.

TEITGEN, Pierre-Henri, President of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire*, May 1952–May 1956; Vice President of the French Council of Ministers, June 1953–June 1954; French Representative to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and French Delegate to the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.

TERRENOIRE, Louis, Secretary-General of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*, 1951–1954.

THURSTON, Ray L., Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, June 1952–May 1954; Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, May 1954–March 1955.

TITO, Josip Broz, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia and Minister of National Defense until January 1953; President of Yugoslavia and Chairman of the Federal Executive Council after January 1953.

TJARDA VAN STARKENBORGH STACHOUWER, Alidius W. L., Netherlands Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council until 1952.

TOGLIATTI, Palmiro, Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party.

TOMLINSON, Frank S., Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States, February 1951–December 1954.

TOMLINSON, William M., Finance and Economic Adviser of the Embassy in France until August 1952; thereafter United States Deputy Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community.

TREVELYAN, Humphrey, Office of the British High Commissioner for Germany until August 1953.

TRIBOULET, Raymond, Deputy in the French National Assembly.

TRIMBLE, William C., Counselor of the Embassy in the Netherlands until March 1954.

TRIVERS, Howard, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, July 1952–August 1954.

TRULOCK, Walter N., Committee Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, after April 1952; Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, after October 1954.

TWINING, Nathan F., General, United States Air Force; Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force until June 30, 1953; Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force until June 30, 1957.

TYLER, William R., Counselor of the Embassy in France after September 27, 1948; Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, after May 9, 1954.

ULRICH, Guy Ennes, Portuguese Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

ULVER, Henri, Deputy in the French National Assembly after 1946; Secretary of State for the Budget, June 25, 1953–June 18, 1954; Secretary of State for the Budget and Minister of Industry and Commerce, June 19, 1954–February 22, 1955.

UNGER, Leonard, Consul and First Secretary of the Embassy in Italy, March 13, 1952–December 13, 1953; thereafter Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.

VANCE, Sheldon B., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, after April 1951; Second Secretary of the Embassy in Belgium after July 1954.

VAN HOUTTE. *See* Houtte.

VAN LAETHAM, Gabriel, Second Secretary of the French Embassy in the United States from February 1952.

VAN ROIJEN. *See* Roijen.

VAN TUYL VAN SEROOSKERKEN, Baron Samuel John, Secretary-General of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs after November 1952.

VAN VREDENBURCH. *See* Vredenburch.

VAN ZEELAND. *See* Zeeland.

VASS, Laurence C., Officer in Charge of North Atlantic Treaty Economic and Military Assistance Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, May 1951–August 1954.

VENIZELOS, Sophocles, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 27, 1951–October 9, 1952.

VESTBIRK, Anthon, Danish Permanent Represenative on the North Atlantic Council.

VIDAL, Germain, Director of the Cabinet of the President of the French Council of the Republic, June–December 1953.

VIMONT, Jacques, Director of the Cabinet of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs after March 1953; Minister Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States after June 1954.

VREDENBURCH, Hendrik F. L. K. van, Head of the Netherlands Delegation to the Conference for the Organization of the European Defense Community, October 1951–May 1952; thereafter Deputy Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

VYSHINSKY, Andrey Yanuaryevich, Soviet Foreign Minister, March 1949–March 1953; Deputy Foreign Minister and Soviet Permanent Representative at the United Nations, April 1953–November 1954.

WALTHER, Genhardt von, Counselor of the Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany in France, 1951–1955.

WATSON, John Hugh Adam, Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States until January 1956.

WATTS, Philip H., Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, after February 1952.

WEBB, James E., Under Secretary of State, January 28, 1949–February 29, 1952.

WEICKER, Lowell P., Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, after July 9, 1953.

WEST, George L., Jr., Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs, Department of State, after September 1954.

WHITE, Miller G., Major General, United States Army; Office of the Secretary of the Army.

WHITE, Paul L., Assistant Chief of the News Division, Department of State, after June 23, 1953.

WILEY, Alexander, Republican Senator from Wisconsin and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after January 1953.

WILGRESS, L. Dana, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, 1949–1952; Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1952–1953; Canadian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council and Canadian Representative to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 1953–1958.

WILLIAMS, Elwood, III, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.

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WILLIAMSON, Francis T., Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, June 30, 1950–July 20, 1952; Director of the Policy Planning Staff, July–November, 1952; Counselor of the Embassy in Italy after January 23, 1953.

WILSON, Charles E., Secretary of Defense from January 28, 1953.

WOLF, Joseph J., Acting Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after May 1952; Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs after July 1952; Special Adviser for North Atlantic Treaty Organization Affairs after July 1954.

WOOD, Chester C., Rear Admiral, United States Navy; Commander in Chief of the United States Naval Forces, Europe.

WRIGHT, Jerauld, Rear Admiral, United States Navy; Commander in Chief of the United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1952–1954; thereafter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standing Group and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

XANTHAKY, Theodore A., Attaché and Special Assistant in the Embassy in Portugal from March 1945.

ZARUBIN, Georgiy Nikolayevich, Soviet Ambassador in the United States after September 25, 1952.

ZEELAND, Paul van, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, August 10, 1949–April 21, 1954.

ZOPPI, Vittorio, Secretary-General of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1948–November 1954.

ZORLU, Fatin R., Turkish Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

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# LIST OF SOURCES

The principal source of documents presented in this volume is the indexed central (decimal) files of the Department of State. Central file documents are identified by means of the decimal file number provided in the headnote. The provenance of documents obtained from other sources is also shown in the headnote. The following list provides a description of the other sources used in the preparation of this volume, with information concerning the origin, size, and scope.

Bruce Mission Files, Lot 57 M 38

Master file of telegrams, memoranda, briefing and background papers relating to the European Defense Community, the European Political Community, the Saar issue, and the European Coal and Steel Community, for the years 1951–1954 as maintained by the Embassy in Paris. (27 ft.)

CFM Files, Lot M–88

Consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancillary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center. (254 ft.)

Conference Files, Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documentation on certain official visits of Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (13 ft.)

Conference Files, Lot 60 D 627

Collection of Documentation on certain official visits of Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1953–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. This file is a continuation of Lot 59 D 95. (25 ft.)

EDC Files, Lot 57 M 44

Comprehensive collection of official documentation of the Paris Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community and related reports, memoranda, and correspondence for the years 1950–1951, as maintained in the Embassy in Paris (by Second Secretary Stanley Cleveland).
Retired by: Paris
Location: FRC Acc. No. 68 A 5159, Item 106, boxes 72–80
Volume: 9 ft.

**EUR Files, Lot 59 D 233**

Files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs for the years 1945–1957. (6 ft.)

**PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563**

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda and related correspondence for the years 1947–1953 of the Policy Planning Staff. (42 ft.)

**PPS Files, Lot 65 D 101**

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda and related correspondence for the year 1954 of the Policy Planning Staff. (8 ft.)

**Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204**

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and the Heads of Foreign Governments for the years 1953–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (9 ft.)

**Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609**

Chronological collection of the records of the Secretary of State's daily meetings with top Department of State officials for the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. (5/12 ft.)

**Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 65 D 238**

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with the President for the years 1949–1952, memoranda of the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State for the years 1951–1952, and the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with Senator Tom Connally of Texas for the years 1950–1951, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. (1 ft.)

**S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351**

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (20 ft.)

**S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95**

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State for the years 1947–1963. (9 ft.)

**State–JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417**

Top secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the period 1951–1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the period 1954–1956 as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (3 ft.)

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# III. EVENTS LEADING TO MEMBERSHIP OF ITALY AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN THE BRUSSELS TREATY ORGANIZATION, TO MEMBERSHIP OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, AND TO THE RESTORATION OF SOVEREIGNTY TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

## A. REACTION TO THE FRENCH REJECTION OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY TREATY: FOREIGN SECRETARY EDEN'S TRIP TO BRUSSELS, BONN, PARIS, AND ROME, SEPTEMBER 11–15, 1954; SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES' TRIP TO BONN AND LONDON, SEPTEMBER 16–17, 1954; DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD EUROPE IN LIGHT OF THE FRENCH REJECTION OF THE EDC TREATY (NSC 5433); AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE NINE-POWER AND FOUR-POWER CONFERENCES

**740.5/8–3054 : Telegram**

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, August 30, 1954—9 : 11 p. m.

757. For Ambassador from Secretary. Following is text of proposed statement which I propose to issue tomorrow Aug 31 twelve noon EDST. This has been approved in highest quarters subject to observations you may make and which reach me by ten a m EDST tomorrow

*Verbatim text.*

1. The French rejection of the European Defense Community is a grave event.[2] France thus turns away from her own historic proposal to merge the military potential of continental European nations into a single European army and thus basically to change the present European system which has regularly produced wars, the last two of which became world wars.

2. If there is any one area of the world where sovereignty over armament needs to be subordinated, it is Western Continental Europe.

[1] Repeated for action to London for the Ambassador and to Bonn for Conant.

[2] For documentation concerning the French rejection of the treaty establishing a European Defense Community, see pp. 871 ff.

That was the lofty purpose of the EDC Treaty. It grappled with these basic and stubborn facts:

*a.* There cannot be an effective defense of Continental Europe without a substantial military contribution from the Germans; yet German rearmament could be dangerous if it occurs in a national form and under a nationalistic German General Staff;

*b.* Germany cannot be indefinitely neutralized or otherwise discriminated against in terms of her sovereignty, including the inherent right of self-defense. Any limitations on German sovereignty, to be permanently acceptable, must be international in character, shared by others:

*c.* The prevention of war as between neighboring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats but only by merging certain functions of government into federal institutions.

3. The French rejection of EDC; without the provision of any alternative means of dealing with the basic ills of Europe, compels the US to reappraise its foreign policies and to adjust them to the resultant situation. The need for such a review can scarcely be questioned since the North Atlantic Council has itself twice declared, with unanimity, that the consummation of EDC was of paramount importance to the European defense it planned. Furthermore, such review is required by conditions which the Congress attached last year and this year to authorizations and appropriations for military contributions to Europe.

4. Four of the six prospective members of EDC had ratified the treaty—Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. A fifth, Italy, seemed on the point of ratifying. The UK and the US had made far-reaching commitments of association. But now France, after three years of negotiation and discussion, has rejected the Treaty. The rejection was accomplished by votes which came from Communist deputies, who wished Europe divided so that Soviet Russia might extend its rule, and from those whose national patriotism blinded them to the fact that not even a nation as great as France can independently be safe in the fire-trap created by rival European armies.

5. US post-war policy had assumed that, given US aid and support, Western Europe would at long last develop a unity which would make it immune from war as between its members and defensible against aggression from without.

That assumption had seemed justified. The imperative need for unity was recognized by the leading statesmen of all the free nations of Europe. Such unity was, indeed, the premise upon which vast US aid was extended and accepted.

As said in 1950 by the then President of France, "Europe must unite herself if she wishes to recover and live, and if she does not want American assistance to be a gesture without future."

The United States, for its part, joined the North Atlantic Treaty defensive alliance with the Western European countries and assisted these countries to recover from the weakening of World War II. Both on the economic and military side we made massive contributions. The US stationed 5 US Divisions in Europe in an effort to implement the European desire for a "forward strategy". We furthermore made our

leading military figures available to assume high positions in the military organization designed to defend Western Europe.

6. During the same period the nations of Europe did, in fact, take significant steps toward unity. They associated themselves cooperatively in many ways, and in 1952 created the European Coal and Steel Community [3] which, in a limited but important area, merged sovereignty and subordinated nationalism. In May 1952 there was signed the Treaty to create the European Defense Community.[4]

7. The US will, of course, remain faithful to the letter and spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty. It should, however, be recalled that that Treaty was made by the US in the conviction that it was the mutual pledges of aid to any victim of aggression that would most powerfully deter aggression.

8. The US owes it to the Federal Republic of Germany to do quickly all that lies within our power to restore full sovereignty to that Republic and to enable it, by reasonable re-armament, to contribute to international peace and security. The present Treaty to restore German sovereignty is, by its terms, contingent upon the coming in force of EDC. Failure to realize that result, through no fault of Germany's, must not be allowed to serve as an excuse for penalizing Germany. The West German Republic should resume its place as a free and equal member of the family of nations. That was the purport of the Resolution which the US Senate adopted unanimously last July.[5]

9. The US should stand ready to consider sympathetically the plight of the many in Western Europe who are left in grave peril and anxiety. There are, in Europe, men of vision and realism and of action. In this fact lies our greatest hope and that is a hope which the US must not dim by any ill-considered action of its own. It is a tragedy that France has seemingly reverted to a pattern of narrow nationalism which the other members of NATO believe to be contrary to the best interests of them all, including France. That tragedy would be compounded if the US were thereby led to conclude that it too must turn to a course of narrow nationalism. It is a matter of elementary prudence that the United States should change its own arrangements to take account of the new situation now created. We are fortunately so situated that we do not need completely to identify our destiny with policies that seem to us to be self-defeating. But it still remains true that we cannot, in isolation, find safety ourselves.

*End verbatim text.*

*Note to London*—You may show this to the Foreign Office indicating that textual changes may still be made.

*Note to Paris*—Please also transmit David Bruce's views.[6]

DULLES

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[3] Documentation concerning the European Coal and Steel Community is presented in volume VI.

[4] For documentation concerning efforts leading up to the signing of the treaty in Paris in May 1952, see pp. 571 ff.

[5] For the text of Senate Resolution 295 approved on July 30, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 284.

[6] For Bruce's views on Dulles' draft, see telegram Coled 32 from Paris, Aug. 31, p. 1118.

740.5/8–3054

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary
General Smith
Mr. Robert Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Admiral Radford
Mr. Merchant

Mr. Anderson and Admiral Radford called at the Secretary's request to be shown the draft statement which the Secretary proposed to issue in consequence of the French rejection of EDC.[1] The Secretary pointed out that it had already been approved by the President but that he felt authorized to make any editorial or language changes. Both the Admiral and Mr. Anderson stated that they considered it a fine statement. Each made several minor suggestions, some of which were incorporated.

Secretary Anderson then raised the question as to how far Defense should go in halting MDAP programs to France[2] and the other European countries. He said that he had already called for a review of the European military end item program which would have the effect of slowing down deliveries. The Secretary indicated that he believed, in accordance with the Richards Amendment,[3] deliveries should promptly be cut off from France. Secretary Anderson then repeated that he would proceed on the basis of a general review program which would have the effect of an unannounced slow-down but that in the case of France end item deliveries would be stopped. The Secretary indicated agreement (although not explicit it seemed that this discussion referred to military aid to metropolitan France and that the cut-off in deliveries was not intended to include deliveries to Indochina).

There was then a brief exchange concerning the offshore procurement program in France and reference was made to the part which some French industrialists behind the scenes had played in killing the EDC. It was agreed that new contracts in France would be held up but there was no suggestion that existing contracts in France should be canceled.

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[1] The text of Dulles' draft statement is included in telegram 757 to Paris, Aug. 30, *supra*.

[2] Documentation concerning Mutual Defense Assistance Pact programs in France is presented in volume VI.

[3] Regarding the Richards amendment, which was designed to curtail aid to countries that did not ratify the EDC Treaty, see the editorial note, p. 973.

740.5/8–3154 : Telegram

*The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PARIS, August 31, 1954—noon.

Coled 32. For Secretary. Re Deptel 757.[1] Have following comments to make on text proposed statement.

Paragraph 4, 5th sentence. Suggest elimination portion of sentence following word "rule." *Comment.* It is better to represent yesterday's Parliamentary action as having been caused by Communist deputies and not involve ex-Gaullists or others in it. Also, there are many who would question whether the majority of votes from those sources other than Communists who opposed EDC were dictated by "national patriotism." Having made this elimination, would replace language starting "not even" and ending "armies."

Paragraph 7. Would eliminate entire paragraph. *Comment.* In my opinion, this vitiates much of the force of the statement, since it might be seized upon as indicating that our reappraisal would result in no major disturbance of our previously expressed policy in regard to NAT commitments. We may wish to make this statement later, but I think it especially inapposite to do it in this context.

In paragraph 8 eliminate word "full." Its retention might limit our freedom of manoeuver.

These are the only textual changes I would advocate in this excellent and strong paper. However, it seems to me that something else must be added to it in the way of a program of action. Otherwise it will be regarded as merely a reaffirmation of principles already and frequently pronounced by us. Since we have no certitude the Germans will accept a return of sovereignty with the limitations imposed by the Bonn contractuals and by the protocols now under discussion in London, and since the question of German sovereignty and German rearmament are almost inextricably intertwined, I strongly advocate the Secretary's statement conclude with a demand for the convocation of an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council not later than October 1 to review the situation created by yesterday's French parliamentary action, and further to deliberate upon the German problem.

This leaves unsolved the method by which consultation may be had with the Chancellor. Some appropriate means must be found to do so. In this connection, it is all-important that Mendes not be allowed to talk with us, the British and Germans to the exclusion of our other partners in NATO about this situation. This is what Mendes will undoubtedly count upon in order to fortify himself against the bitter criticism which is now pouring in against him from all parts of Europe. Also, this would be considered by the Benelux countries as a betrayal of them. They are likely to feel that, although we have a

[1] Dated Aug. 30, p. 1114.

right, as occupying powers, to exclude them from such conversations, their interest is as great as that of France in spite of the differences of population, in assuring the security of Western Europe.

They will undoubtedly think that the French should be faced with all their partners in NATO before any action or program is adopted by the U.S., U.K. and France in regard to the German problem.

Have discussed this with Ambassadors Hughes and Dillon who agree with suggested program for positive action. Hughes asked me to say he concurs in suggestions regarding paragraph 4 and 7, and also would prefer, as I would, a restatement of paragraph 2*a*. See immediately preceding cable for Spaak's views re NATO meeting.[2]

BRUCE

[2] In telegram Coled 31 from Paris, Aug. 31, Bruce informed the Secretary of State that Spaak came to Paris for an hour that day to request that Bruce urgently send Dulles Spaak's comments that the French Government had "committed an indecency in democratic parliamentary procedures in shutting off debate," that this was due to Mendès-France "who has deliberately falsified what took place in Brussels in his determined efforts to kill EDC" and that Spaak had dropped any idea of calling a four-, six-, or seven-nation conference in advance of an emergency NATO meeting. (740.5/8–3154)

740.5/8–3154

*The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Spaak* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 31, 1954.

MY DEAR FRIEND: The action of the French National Assembly in rejecting, even without full debate, the European Defense Community Treaty is, I know, a bitter disappointment to you as it is to me. David Bruce has relayed your comments to me.[2] You have done everything that anyone could do to bring about the realization of this bold concept which held such hopeful significance for the future of Europe and our Western Alliance. I want you to know how deeply I and my fellow Americans appreciate your strenuous and imaginative efforts over the years and in particular during these last critical weeks. The qualities of true statesmanship which you have displayed have won the admiration and respect of all of us.

We must, of course continue our common efforts to build a strong, united and hopeful Europe, though under far less auspicious circumstances than we have had in the past. The United States will be faced with the most difficult decisions if our combined efforts in the future do not bring early success. It is, however, reassuring for me to know

[1] This message, which was drafted by Merchant and cleared with O'Connor, was transmitted to Brussels in telegram 236, Aug. 31, with instructions that Ambassador Alger deliver it to Spaak.

[2] See footnote 2, *supra*.

that dedicated men such as yourself will be devoted to achieving somehow these common goals.

I am leaving now for Manila [3] but will be following most closely developments in Europe in the coming days. I understand that you plan to be in New York for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly and I shall look forward with great pleasure to seeing you again at that time.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

FOSTER DULLES [4]

[3] Secretary Dulles was leaving Washington for the Manila Conference scheduled for Sept. 6–8; documentation concerning this conference, which laid the groundwork for the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, is presented in volume XII.

[4] In telegram 238 from Brussels, Sept. 2, the Embassy informed the Department of State that Dulles' message was delivered to Spaak on Sept. 1 and that Spaak "was visibly pleased, expressed deep appreciation and said he would send reply shortly". (740.5/9–254)

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*Statement by the Secretary of State* [1]

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1954.

The French rejection of the European Defense Community is a saddening event. France thus turns away from her own historic proposal made nearly four years ago. That proposal sought a unification of the military strength of Continental Europe into a single European army so as to end the era of recurrent European wars, the last two of which became world wars.

The French action does not change certain basic and stubborn facts:

(*a*) the effective defense of Continental Europe calls for a substantial military contribution from the Germans; yet all, including the Germans themselves, would avoid national re-armament in a form which could be misused by resurgent militarism;

(*b*) Germany cannot be subjected indefinitely to neutrality or otherwise be discriminated against in terms of her sovereignty including the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Limitations on German sovereignty to be permanently acceptable must be shared by others as part of a collective international order;

(*c*) The prevention of war between neighboring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats, but only by merging certain functions of their government into supranational institutions.

To deal with these facts was the lofty purpose of EDC. Four of the six prospective members of EDC had ratified that treaty—Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. A fifth, Italy, was on the

[1] Reprinted from the Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 13, 1954, pp. 363–364. The source text was issued as Department of State press release 486 on Aug. 31.

point of ratifying it. The U.K. and the U.S. had made far-reaching commitments of association with EDC. France thus disassociates herself not only from her own proposal but from her prospective partners who had stood united at the recent Brussels Conference.

The U.S. post-war policies beginning in 1946 were framed on the assumption that Western Europe would at long last develop a unity which would make it immune from war as between its members and defensible against aggression from without. The imperative need for that unity was recognized by the leading statesmen of all the free nations of Europe. The U.S. joined the North Atlantic Treaty defensive alliance with the Western European countries. We assisted these countries to recover from the weakening of World War II. Both on the economic and military side we made massive contributions. We stationed the equivalent of 6 divisions in Europe. We furthermore made our leading military figures available to assume high positions in the military organization designed to defend Western Europe.

The French negative action, without the provision of any alternative, obviously imposes on the United States the obligation to reappraise its foreign policies, particularly those in relation to Europe. The need for such a review can scarcely be questioned since the North Atlantic Council of Ministers has itself twice declared with unanimity that the EDC was of paramount importance to the European defense it planned. Furthermore, such review is required by conditions which the Congress attached this year and last year to authorizations and appropriations for military contributions to Europe.

The Western nations now owe it to the Federal Republic of Germany to do quickly all that lies in their power to restore sovereignty to that Republic and to enable it to contribute to international peace and security. The existing Treaty to restore sovereignty is by its terms contingent upon the coming into force of EDC. It would be unconscionable if the failure to realize EDC through no fault of Germany's should now be used as an excuse for penalizing Germany. The Federal German Republic should take its place as a free and equal member of the society of nations. That was the purport of the resolution which the United States Senate adopted unanimously last July, and the United States will act accordingly.

The United States stands ready to support the many in Western Europe who despite their valiant efforts are left in grave anxiety. We need not feel that the European idea is dead merely because, in one of the six countries, a present majority seems against one of its manifestations. There is still much on which to build and those foundations should not be shaken by any abrupt or any ill-considered action of our own.

578-017 O - 83 - 4 (Part 2)

It is a tragedy that in one country nationalism, abetted by Communism, has asserted itself so as to endanger the whole of Europe. That tragedy would be compounded if the United States was thereby led to conclude that it must turn to a course of narrow nationalism. It is a matter of elementary prudence that the United States should review its dispositions and planning in the light of the new situation now created. We are fortunately so situated that we do not need to identify ourselves with what to us seem self-defeating policies. We have flexibility to adjust our own policies to take account of developments elsewhere. In doing so, we shall be governed by the realization that we cannot in isolation find safety for ourselves.

When the NATO Ministerial Council came to adjourn last April to meet next December, I pointed out that if the EDC failed of realization that would create an emergency situation which would call for a special meeting of that Council. That condition has arisen, and the United States believes that there should promptly be a special meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council, as well as early consultations with Chancellor Adenauer. We shall move accordingly.

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**740.5/9–154: Telegram**

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, September 1, 1954—noon.

636. Dowling had dinner in Baden-Baden with Blankenhorn and Hallstein last night at latter's request to discuss situation created by French rejection of EDC. He found them troubled re advice which they shld give Chancellor at this juncture.

They said they had no doubt that coalition leaders wld continue—for this stage at least—to endorse whatever policy Chancellor shld put forward at meeting today. Problem was what position Chancellor shld take, as they felt it imperative for the future of Germany that his program this time be assured of success. If he shld again fail to achieve his aims, the inevitable result wld be to throw German leadership into other hands, and as a minimum a weakening of German ties with the West. It soon became evident that they were particularly concerned re danger of Chancellor coming out publicly at this time with demand for full German membership in NATO, which he seemed inclined to do as simplest way out of his dilemma, and were looking for arguments to dissuade him from this course.

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in two sections and repeated to London and to Paris for Bruce.

Hallstein voiced particular doubts re British policy, saying he feared Churchill and Eden must have given Mendes-France commitment not to move on German question without French consent,[2] and said problem was to find formula which wld avoid French veto of equitable solution. As he saw it, French wld never agree to full and equal German membership in NATO, and he wondered what other arrangement French cld be brought to accept. Moreover, he doubted whether British opinion wld support German membership in NATO if France were adamantly opposed. It was therefore, he said, superfluous to point out that Germany and the Chancellor were wholly dependent upon U.S. policy in this problem. Chancellor, he added quickly, was not unhappy at this, as he had long ago recognized realities of world situation and was content to throw in his lot with U.S. His hope was that we cld bring Britain to join with U.S. in persuading French to accept necessity of early and reasonable solution of German question.

As to solution, he said Chancellor rightfully felt he shld not abandon goal of European integration in economic and political fields, at least, but he wondered what effect wld be if Adenauer now threw his might behind German national army in NATO. There were elements in Germany (he mentioned Oberlander and Dehler in particular) who wld cheer such a decision, but they wld be first to exploit situation when it became clear that French wld veto full NATO membership or at best wld insist upon discriminatory restrictions unacceptable to Germans. On other hand, he observed, majority of Germans were not keen about national military organization as opposed to European army—but he then himself dismissed this argument by saying that any way Germans wld make good soldiers in national army, perhaps even too good. He went on to say that there might well be limitations on German participation in NATO which Germans cld accept, such as, for example, the size of German contingents, since the 12 divisions envisaged under EDC was the maximum defense contribution which Germany cld afford at this time. Such limitations wld however, have to be freely accepted by Germany, and not imposed.

Dowling then reminded Hallstein of report given Chancellor re London Study Group's work[3] following Washington talks[4] (Bonn's 125 to Dept[5]), whereupon Hallstein pointed out that German Govt

[2] For reports concerning Mendès-France's visit to London on Aug. 23, see the letters from Churchill and Eden to Dulles, both written on Aug. 24, pp. 1077 and 1078.

[3] A Study Group of officials of the United States and the United Kingdom met in London July 5–12, 1954, to discuss their policies toward Germany; for the text of their report, see p. 997.

[4] This is a reference to the Eisenhower–Churchill discussions in Washington in June 1954; regarding these talks, see the editorial note, p. 984.

[5] Not printed; it informed the Department of State on July 13 that Chancellor Adenauer appeared satisfied with the United States-British initiative evident in the Report of the London Study Group. (662A.00/7–1354)

had always maintained connection between Bonn conventions[6] and EDC, and he felt sure Chancellor wld have to take position that 2 were interdependent. If EDC were not to come into being, then new arrangements wld have to be found to take place of Bonn conventions. He argued further that agrmts along lines of Bonn conventions wld be difficult for Germans to accept without simultaneous agrmt on nature of German defense contribution, and that here again problem of French veto arose.

Dowling then inquired whether they thought that Chancellor had to take a position in favor of a specific formula at this time. Blankenhorn referred to conference of EDC powers plus U.S. and U.K. which had been proposed at earlier period, and said that if such a meeting cld be held soon, he was of opinion it wld be preferable for Chancellor not to propose a specific solution now, but rather to confine himself to general proposition that German Govt maintained its support for European integration and maintained its readiness to make its contribution to Western defense on basis of equality and in measure envisaged in EDC. Hallstein readily agreed, saying this wld provide opportunity for other powers to make such proposals as might be found mutually advisable, and might even persuade French that EDC was after all better solution from their point of view than NATO. He added that in any event negots were bound to be difficult, and while Germans were prepared to take on their share of this tough assignment, perhaps it wld be preferable for Germans not to take too much of the initiative.

Discussion between Hallstein and Blankenhorn then turned to consideration of what action, if any, cld be taken to impress upon French vital necessity of concluding agrmt at such a conference. They urged that there must be steps which U.S. and U.K. cld take towards organization of German defense contingent which while of provisional nature, and in anticipation of EDC (or even NATO or some intermediary solution), wld nevertheless convince French that German rearmament was fact which they must face now rather than later. They said openly that once this process began it cld not be halted short of completion, but felt that so long as these preliminary measures were under U.S. and U.K. control French cld not object too strenuously and other European powers might well approve.

Conversation was cut short at this point to permit Dowling to catch train for return to Bonn, but he was left with impression they wld recommend some such course as above to Adenauer, although they were by no means sure he wld accept their recommendations.

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[6] Documentation concerning the Conventions signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, is presented in volume VII.

We telephoned Hallstein this morning to give him gist of Deptel 592.[7] He said he was seeing Chancellor prior to coalition mtg today, and wld pass on Dept's views.

CONANT

[7] Not printed; it instructed Conant to give Chancellor Adenauer "a broad account" of what the United States and the United Kingdom intended to do for Germany now that the French rejected the EDC in order to encourage him to refrain from publicly announcing a rigid formula that would later deny him flexibility of action. Conant was instructed to do this without specifically mentioning the London Working Group protocols (see footnote 3, *infra*) which the British felt had to be shown to the French first. (740.5/8–3154)

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**662A.00/9–154 : Telegram**

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn* [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 1, 1954—8 : 21 p. m.

621. 1. Department telegram 566 to Bonn repeated London 1163 Paris 734,[2] British have replied they feel it important give Mendes-France text Protocols immediately and have proposed simultaneous communication to him and to Adenauer. Bonn and Paris in concert with British colleagues should therefore jointly present texts of two London Working Group Protocols on application of contractuals and German defense contribution telegraphed yesterday [3] as joint proposals of US and UK Governments. They should also be given texts of related notes included in report of Anglo-American Study Group [4] with change in second note indicated in Department telegram 1203 to London repeated Bonn 588 Paris 764.[5]

2. *For Bonn.* In presenting text to Chancellor you should make clear that proposal to place contractuals in effect without solution of armament problem does not represent in any sense lessening interest on our part in obtaining early German contribution to Defense, nor is there any intention of postponing indefinitely German right to rearm. On

[1] Drafted by Reinstein and cleared with Cowles, Merchant, Bowie, and Murphy; repeated for action to London and to Paris for Bruce.

[2] Not printed; it approved the recommendation that Chancellor Adenauer be approached concerning the protocols (see footnote 3, below) prior to consultation with the French. (740.5/8–2754)

[3] This is a reference to two protocols which were transmitted to Bonn in telegrams 595 and 596, Aug. 31 (662A.00/8–3154); the texts of the two protocols were based on a part of Document 3 which was attached to the Report of the London Study Group, July 12, p. 997. These protocols were subsequently referred to as the "London protocols."

[4] The texts of the related notes under reference were also a part of Document 3 which was attached to the Report of the London Study Group (see footnote 3, above).

[5] Not printed; it approved the deletion of the words "pending the entry into force of the Treaty establishing the EDC" from the opening sentence of the second exchange of notes the texts of which comprise a part of Document 3 (see footnote 3, above).

contrary Article 3 of Protocol is designed to force solution this problem as soon as possible. You may make clear if necessary that this text is designed to eliminate continued veto by any one country. It is our intention that Federal Republic will participate fully in all considerations of this question and our view that solution must be found which permits German participation on basis of equality and without discrimination.

3. *For Paris.* You should make clear to Mendes-France that US and UK Governments are seeking Chancellor's reaction to proposal and will wish take it into account in making final decision. You should give him aide-mémoire containing following explanation of basic concept of protocols. We do not believe, as stated in Secretary's statement of August 31, that we can continue indefinitely withhold from Germans sovereignty, including right to defend themselves and to contribute to Western defense. Provisions in Article 1 of second protocol for deferment of German rearmament "for the time being" are designed to afford opportunity for further efforts to reach mutually satisfactory solution this problem. However we are confronted with threat serious deterioration of our position in Germany and we could not envisage situation in which one of the Signatory Powers could block solution acceptable to others and create conditions which might cause us loss of Germany to the Western cause. Therefore, the provisions of Article 3, taken in combination with those of Article 1 are construed by us as in no sense permitting any one country to maintain a continuing veto on arrangements for the rearmament of the Federal Republic after the expiration of the 90-day period provided in Article 3.

4. *For London.* Please inform British of paragraphs 2 and 3 above and urge that they instruct their missions in Bonn and Paris similarly.

5. *For Bruce.* Believe paragraph 3 takes care of concern regarding French veto expressed in Coled 33.[6]

*Addendum (Primarily for Bonn)*

Since above telegram drafted British have informed us that Cabinet this afternoon decided joint approach to Adenauer not advisable since it would constitute conspicuous snub of French. We understand British High Commissioner being instructed see Adenauer as soon as possible after former's return Germany.

You consequently instructed to carry out above instructions when you see Chancellor tomorrow. When handing copies of protocols and related notes you should make clear you are acting on behalf of UK and US and that your British colleague will be calling on Adenauer

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[6] In telegram Coled 33 from Paris, Sept. 1, Bruce expressed the view that the language of the protocol dealing with a German defense contribution implies that the French have a veto power since nothing will be done by the United States and United Kingdom unless the French agree (740.5/9–154).

to make similar presentation shortly. For your background purposes, we are transmitting to you copies of British instructions to their High Commissioner which were given us here.[7] Fact that British propose sounding out Adenauer on his views with respect to NATO, which we are not prepared to do, in our opinion makes separate interviews advisable.

We have informed British that we accept their proposition of separate approaches to Chancellor on understanding that (1) British High Commissioner will make it clear to Adenauer that he is not speaking on behalf US when he refers to NATO matter and that (2) démarche on Mendes-France will be joint and will occur on Friday.

We have also informed British with respect to second sentence of numbered paragraph 3 above.

SMITH

[7] The text of the instructions to the British High Commissioner for Germany concerning the presentation of the two protocols was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 622 of Sept. 1 (662A.00/9–154). A summary of the discussion at the Department of State on Sept. 1 when British officials gave copies of the Foreign Office instructions to Department officers, is in a memorandum by George L. West of Sept. 2 in file 740.5/9–254.

740.5/9–154

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

PERSONAL CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, September 1, 1954.

DEAR LIVIE: You will have seen from my telegram 1069 of August 31 [1] what my basic reaction was to the first draft of the Secretary's lament on the death of EDC. I trust it did some good in helping to remove the tone of bitterness and preserve our position of leadership; the final draft was much improved.

However, I do believe that it does not help the cause of European integration—which we must not think of as dead because EDC has been defeated in a French Assembly that is by no means representative of current French opinion, as the Gaullists full well know—by presenting to the world as one of the three "basic and stubborn facts" what is neither stubborn (*sic*) nor a fact. The statement to which I take exception is: "The prevention of war between neighboring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats but only by merging certain functions of government into supranational institutions." The

[1] Not printed; it informed the Department of State of Butterworth's criticism of the draft statement to be made by Secretary Dulles. Butterworth's general position was the less said until constructive action was planned and underway the better. (740.5/8–3154)

history of Europe is replete with examples which belie this assertion from Scandinavia to Iberia, not to mention the fact that after centuries of strife France and England for the last century and a half have been at peace and have grown to be allies of half century standing.

Looking at the obverse side of this sole-cure patent remedy I seem to remember as a Southerner that the existence of federal institutions is no guarantee against war even within a single nation.

The fact is that statements like this put into the Secretary's mouth do far more harm in Europe than we generally realize, for they tend to give the impression of an ignorant or at best superficial approach to age-old and intricate human problems.

I trust that our agonizing reappraisal includes self-appraisal, and that despite the outrageous action of the French Assembly yesterday we are prepared to continue to work for the integration of Western Europe even if we have to make haste more slowly and more painstakingly than we would wish. In our present mood should we not recall that whereas it is valid to attribute to France the authorship of EDC it is equally true that it was called into being by the strident demands of the Pentagon for German divisions and, unfortunately, was not so much "framed on the assumption that Western Europe would at long last develop a unity which would make it immune from war as between its members" as precipitously to "make it defensible against aggression from without". In my view the essential reason for our failure is because we approached this problem with the latter consideration as the catalyst. Incidentally, all this goes back to that "Cottage Club" argument that you and I and Harry [2] had at Phil's [3] apartment in Paris.

[Here follow personal remarks.]

All the best.

As ever, WALT

[2] Presumably a reference to Harry Conover, First Secretary of the Embassy in France.

[3] Presumably a reference to Philip D. Sprouse.

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662A.00/9–254 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn* [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 2, 1954—12:13 a. m.

623. For Conant—to be delivered urgently Thursday morning.[2] We appreciate Chancellor's reaction to protocols may well be that they

[1] Drafted by Reinstein and cleared with Kidd, Lyon, and Merchant; repeated to Paris and London.

[2] Sept. 2.

are inadequate and could not get Bundestag approval. You should say that proposal was worked out in anticipation of French rejection of EDC treaty with idea they would be helpful to him. While we recognize there are many provisions of contractuals which Germans would like to have changed and while we appreciate that there may be difficulty with Bundestag, we are inclined to feel that placing contractuals in effect now has advantage of enabling us to end the occupation and would avoid numerous problems in our mutual relations during difficult period ahead. What is more important in our view, it would facilitate more rapid solution of defense problem by giving Federal Republic status of equality as first step and by removing broad area of subjects from discussion and possible disagreement in immediate future. We think that protocols as drafted meet substance of German government declaration and trust that Chancellor will weigh carefully disadvantages of negotiating whole parcel of difficult points *de novo* compared with immediate advantages provided by contractuals.

It is possible, in light of Government declaration reported in your 643,[3] that Chancellor may indicate Federal Republic is no longer willing to accept contractuals on any basis and that Federal Government now insists upon full sovereignty, i.e., without reserved powers. If he does so, you should point out that contractuals contain provisions to which Allies attach great importance and which they could consider relinquishing only if given equally adequate arrangements, e.g., for security of their forces. Reopening contractuals would certainly involve protracted negotiations and greatly complicate speedy settlement of defense problem.

You might point out, if he refers to reserved powers, that the positions regarding unification of Germany which we have taken vis-à-vis Soviets in full agreement with Federal Republic, including question of Allied agreement on free elections and their supervision, have been based on these powers. To abandon Allied position would risk giving Soviets real basis for asserting that unification can only be achieved by agreement between "sovereign" GDR and Federal Republic. Our

[3] Not printed; it transmitted to the Department of State the text of a German communiqué issued after a meeting of the Cabinet with Adenauer on September 1. The communiqué included a statement concerning the following goals of the German Federal Republic:

"1. Continuation of the policy of European unification with all willing countries, in every field, to reach the goal. Consultation on further treatment of military integration with those countries who ratified EDC or were expected to ratify EDC.

"2. Restoration of sovereignty.

"3. Participation in the defense of Western Europe without discrimination.

"4. Juridical regulations, reached by agreement, concerning the stay in West Germany of troops from other countries.

"5. Opening of immediate negotiations with the US and Britain." (762A.00/9–154)

rights regarding Berlin are of course essential to maintenance of Western position there.[4]

SMITH

[4] Documentation concerning all-German elections, the problem of German unification, and Allied rights in Berlin is presented in volume VII.

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662A.00/9–254 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France* [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 2, 1954—12:25 p. m.

804. Confirming Merchant's telephone conversation with Dillon we have informed British here of Dowling's telephonic report to Merchant to effect that Adenauer's reaction to Protocols was more violently negative than anticipated [2] and recommending postponement *démarche* to Mendes-France. British informed us they are telephoning and cabling London at once as follows:

(1) At our request interview scheduled with Mendes-France this afternoon be postponed until we all have an opportunity know results (*a*) Conant's and (*b*) Hoyer Millar's interviews with Adenauer.

(2) That we are instructing Amb. Dillon not to accompany Jebb to interview with Mendes-France this evening even if British insist upon going through with it.

We emphasized to British our feeling that purpose Protocol operation was to assist Adenauer and that his views as expressed to Conant indicated that far from being helpful it might prove harmful to him. British underlined to us their fear that if there were not a joint *démarche*, element of US–UK solidarity which is so necessary in coming weeks would be lacking. They appreciated however grave risk Protocols leaking to press once they are in French hands.

SMITH

[1] Drafted by Lyon and cleared with WE, RA, BNA, and EUR; repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] For a summary of Conant's conversation with Chancellor Adenauer concerning the protocols, see telegram 663 from Bonn, Sept. 2, p. 1138.

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740.5/9–254 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, September 2, 1954—3 p. m.

1120. At his request I called on Permanent Under Secretary this morning who wished to have a general discussion and to bring to the fore for comment by us following two matters.

[1] Repeated to Paris and Bonn.

(1) If as Scott has reported we do not favor an 8-power meeting is it because we regard a NATO ministerial meeting to be held in a month's time as the alternative? HMG's view is that NATO meeting would have grave disadvantage (unless it was a mere pro forma performance to isolate France) of 14 participants many of whom have no direct connection with problem at issue, and above all would not include Germany. I gather that HMG has open mind about its 8-power proposal and the fact that Adenauer reaction to protocols and British discussion of NATO plan is decisive factor. If by any chance 4-power discussions should go well then a jump from 4 to 14 would take on a different complexion. Since Canada is anxious to participate Kirkpatrick has been turning over in his mind as a possible formula the powers having military forces in Western Germany plus EDC powers. At any rate further elucidation of what we have in mind is desired.

(2) Secondly, if the time schedule of study group is to be adhered to Kirkpatrick pointed out that action in matter of Germany's military contribution is to be completed within 90 days after signature of second protocol. Scott having reported Department's reference this general matter to Pentagon Foreign Office wishes to know how soon our considered views will be forthcoming. (Department has already received for comment Study Group document 6 [2] containing British views.)

Incidentally, Kirkpatrick thought it fortuitous that Senator Wiley will accompany Ambassador Conant to Adenauer interview since he anticipates that the former's presence will have a restraining effect.[3] In his experience after suffering serious setbacks Chancellor goes into 3 stages: (1) "Quiet bereavement as for loss of a wife"; (2) bitter and formidable anger; (3) make the best of it and continue pursuing constructive role. He judges Adenauer to be in the midst of (2) and he attaches significance to point 4 of the German Cabinet statement,[4] namely, "judicial regulation of the stationing of troops of other countries in the Federal Republic by the conclusion of treaties". He has some bitter things to say about the example at Brussels [5] which

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[2] This is a reference to Document 6, which is an enclosure to the Report of the London Study Group, July 12, p. 1013; Document 6 is a British paper entitled "Restrictions on German Rearmament Which Might Be Feasible in the Event of German Admission to NATO."

[3] In a letter to Senator Alexander Wiley, dated July 27, Dulles asked him to take a trip to Europe in order to study firsthand the European defense situation with particular emphasis on "the use of American assistance, the possibility of coming into force of the European Defense Community, and the question of alternatives in the event of the failure of full ratification of the European Defense Treaty," as well as examining matters relating to the Foreign Service. (033.1100 WI/7–2754) When Wiley agreed to make the European trip, arrangements were made for him to visit Paris, London, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, Bonn, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, London, and Paris. Wiley, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was accompanied by Carl Marcy, a staff member of the Senate Committee, and their two wives. (CA–843, Aug. 4, 1954; 033.1100 WI/8–454) For a summary of the conversation among Conant, Wiley, and Adenauer, see telegram 663 from Bonn, Sept. 2, p. 1138.

[4] See foonote 3, p. 1129.

[5] For documentation concerning the Brussels Conference, Aug. 19–22, 1954, see pp. 1052 ff.

Mendes-France had set for the Germans if they chose to treat the contractuals as Mendes-France had tried to treat EDC by requesting omission of all disadvantageous provisions.

BUTTERWORTH

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740.5/9–254 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*[1]

SECRET PARIS, September 2, 1954—5 p. m.

938. Mendes asked me to come and see him this morning at Marly. When I arrived he said that he was very tired and suggested that we take a walk in the park, which we did for about 45 minutes. He said that he was presently engaged in remaking his Government which he considered to be a necessary waste of valuable time. He said that he intended to replace 33 pro[*anti*]-EDC ministers, who had resigned, with men who were in favor of EDC and who had voted that way in the Assembly. He was finding this task very difficult as the important pro-EDC figures would not join his government, and those pro-EDC men who were willing to join did not seem to have enough importance or ability to hold ministerial rank.

Regarding the 3 vacancies created by the earlier Gaullist resignations he said it was his present intention to take possibly one of the three ministers who had resigned back into his Government to indicate that there was no enmity between him and the Gaullist Party. In answer to a question he said that he would probably take back Chaban-Delmas but that he definitely would not take back General Koenig.

After this conversation Mendes said that he had been pleased by the Secretary's statement regarding EDC,[2] as he had feared and expected something much stronger. I told him that he should be under no illusions as to the strength of the feeling on the subject in Washington and he said that he realized how the United States felt and he fully realized what a great disappointment the defeat of EDC had been. He then related at some length his earlier arguments to show that there never had been a majority in favor of EDC. He said that if Monday's vote had been taken on EDC directly rather than on a procedural question, and if the Government had been allowed to vote as they pleased, there would have been 350 votes against EDC.

I told Mendes it was difficult for us to understand why he had not wished to go back to Brussels for a second try. He replied that he had been willing to do this but that Rene Mayer in his speech had accused

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[1] Transmitted in two sections to the Department of State and repeated to Bonn, London, and Manila, where Dulles was attending the Manila Conference of Sept. 6–8; documentation concerning the Manila Conference is presented in volume XII.

[2] For the text of the statement by Dulles on Aug. 31, see p. 1120.

him of sabotaging the Brussels conference and that therefore it made it necessary for him to ask specific approval of his conduct at Brussels which the pro-EDC people were not willing to give. He said he considered that Rene Mayer had broken the agreement which had been reached in the Cabinet earlier regarding his willingness to go back to Brussels.

Mendes then said that he had intended to make a dramatic move immediately after the close of the EDC debate. He had intended to send Adenauer a telegram asking if he could come to Bonn to visit Adenauer to discuss the situation. He said that this telegram had been all drafted and was ready for transmission Monday night [3] when he was informed of the Reynaud petition and the fact that the debate was going to be reopened on Tuesday. This made it impossible for him to send a telegram at that time and then yesterday had come the report of Adenauer's meeting with the public statement indicating that the Germans did not wish to talk further with the French. Mendes said that he could well understand the German position and was not too upset by it as he considered it primarily a question of internal politics. He quoted Tallyrand in this connection, saying "that which I exaggerated is of no importance". Mendes said that nevertheless he would like to go immediately to Bonn to see Adenauer but that he did not know just how to proceed. If he should ask Adenauer if he could come and see him and Adenauer should say "no" Mendes felt that the result on French opinion would be catastrophic coming after the way Adenauer had rebuffed his approaches at Brussels. I asked Mendes if he could not have Francois-Poncet make discreet inquiries and Mendes said that this would not be possible as it could not be kept from the public. He reverted to this subject two or three times during our conversation and finally mentioned it again just as I was leaving. I got the definite impression that he hoped that we would informally contact Adenauer to see if he would be willing to receive Mendes at Bonn. If Mendes were to receive informal assurances from us that Adenauer would be receptive to such a suggestion I am sure that he would proceed immediately to suggest to Adenauer that they hold a meeting at Bonn.

Mendes then said he was not quite clear on what the program was from now on as the Secretary had spoken of a meeting of the NATO Council, which of course was agreeable to him, but at the same time the British had suggested an 8-power meeting. He said that he was inclined to prefer the British suggestion as it foresaw a meeting taking place very promptly and he felt that there was not time to waste.

Mendes said that as far as France was concerned he had committed himself to ratify the Bonn convention subject to a clause postponing

[3] Aug. 30.

German rearmament. He said there would be initial difficulties with the French assembly but that he was prepared to make this a question of confidence and that he felt that given the full backing of the United States and United Kingdom he would be successful in obtaining the approval of the Bonn convention by a large majority. He said that the Communists would of course oppose the Bonn conventions and that this would please him as it would disassociate the Communists from his majority. He emphasized that the vote on the Bonn conventions must be simple and uncomplicated and something that would be easy for the Assembly to understand. He expressed some concern at the German position that the Bonn conventions were no longer satisfactory. He said that he could fully understand why they wanted something more and personally he was in favor of giving it to them. However that would require a complicated renegotiation and would make the problem with the French Assembly much more difficult. Mendes argumentation along this line was practically identical to that in Deptel 623 to Bonn repeated Paris 802, London 1254.[4] He said that he felt that after the Bonn conventions had been ratified, it would be possible to make steady and rapid progress toward the granting of full sovereignty to Germany, but that what was important was to get a favorable vote on the first step.

Regarding a defense contribution for Germany, he said that he had no very clear-cut ideas but that there should be immediate negotiations and a final agreement should be reached no later than the first of November. The final agreement should be simple and easy and very short. When I asked him if he had any particular thoughts in mind on this subject he said only that the most important thing from the French point of view was to have a close association with the United Kingdom. Therefore he would hope for some sort of a little NATO including the United Kingdom. He repeated almost word for word what he had told me at our last interview regarding his ideas on German rearmament (Embtel 747 [5]).

Finally Mendes said that a Saar settlement would have to be part of the final arrangements with Germany. I asked him whether this meant that a Saar settlement would be tied to the ratification of the Bonn contractuals, or whether it would only be tied to the settlement of the question of rearmament. Mendes replied he personally would rather it was only tied in with the rearmament problem but that Rene Mayer had during the last week spoken twice in the Foreign Affairs Committee and once in the Assembly to the effect that he would never approve the Bonn conventions until a Saar settlement had been reached. If Rene Mayer proved to have much following on this subject it would be necessary to reach a Saar settlement simultaneously or

[4] Dated Sept. 2, p. 1128.
[5] Dated Aug. 24, p. 1071.

prior to the ratification of the Bonn accords. Mendes said that he felt he could settle the Saar in two days conversation with Adenauer. He said that he had not studied the question in great detail and did not want to commit himself on the detailed wording of the Teitgen–Adenauer agreement but that he was in full accord with the general outline of that agreement. He said that in his view the fact that the French Assembly had been against supra-national clauses in the EDC did not mean at all that the idea of European unity should be shelved, and that he still foresaw the Saar settlement taking place in the framework of a future European political community.

During the course of our conversation Mendes asked me what the United States and United Kingdom proposals were on the question of giving sovereignty to Germany. I told him that I hoped to be ready to see him tomorrow, Friday, with Jebb to give him our joint proposals but that I was not yet free to do so. I had talked to Jebb just before going to see Mendes and Jebb said he had as yet not received any instructions on this subject from London but he would telephone and clear the matter up during the course of the day.[6]

DILLON

[6] In telegram 942 from Paris, Sept. 2, Dillon informed the Department of State that during his conversation with Mendès-France reported in telegram 938 he had asked Mendès-France what his ideas were concerning possible controls of German rearmament. He replied that he realized there could be no discrimination and that everyone would have to accept any controls that were proposed which meant that the controls would have to be considerably weaker than those provided in the EDC plan. (740.5/9–254)

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740.5/9–254 : Telegram

*The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, September 2, 1954—8 p. m.

Polto 321. Limited distribution. Subject: Proposed NATO Ministerial Meeting. Ref: Polto 309, rptd London Polto 70.[2]

1. As noted reftel, NATO reps all welcomed enthusiastically, although in most cases personally, initiative taken by US in calling for NATO ministerial meeting.[3] Discussion implied their understanding ministerial meeting would be called upon to deal with entire complex

[1] Transmitted in two sections to the Department of State and repeated to London.

[2] Not printed; it reported on a private session of the North Atlantic Council on Sept. 1 during which various Permanent Representatives gave their initial reaction to Secretary Dulles' statement of Aug. 31. (740.5/9–154)

[3] In telegram Topol 222 to Paris, Sept. 1, the Department of State instructed Hughes to recommend an emergency meeting of the full NATO Ministerial Council for the general purpose of considering the serious situation created for NATO by the French rejection of the EDC (740.5/9–154).

of problems created in Western alliance by failure of EDC. No distinction was made by any member between political problems that might be resolved by US–UK protocols and problem of arrangements for German military contribution, although of course possible such distinction might have been implicit in their minds. Despite general understanding that NATO ministerial meeting would be seized of totality of problems raised by French action, believe there was general understanding that substantial amount of preparatory work would be necessary for ministerial meeting to be in fact fruitful.

2. In view welcome given Secretary's statement and in view prevailing atmosphere of anger and uncertainty re future of alliance, believe it essential to keep NATO Council fully informed of all steps being taken to deal with crisis, to consult it as fully as possible about proposed procedures and measures, and to use perm reps to maximum extent feasible in handling necessary work of preparation for ministerial meeting.

3. Believe if this general approach followed consistently, should be no difficulty in securing understanding of necessity, as part of preparatory program linked directly to ministerial meeting, of consultation among more limited groups. For example, occupying powers and Germans would be recognized as in best and legally appropriate position for dealing with contractual question provided it can be divorced from military issues. UK-proposed group of eight, consisting of countries best informed on problems involved in German military contribution, might be equally accepted as necessary to work out plan for that field. We believe these types of preparatory steps are useful and necessary, but wish urge that Council be brought into picture to maximum extent possible at each stage.

4. As example of implementation of policy proposed above, we recommend that if Adenauer accepts protocols, at least as basis for discussion, text be promptly circulated to other NATO countries perhaps day after distribution to EDC countries, and that shortly thereafter discussion of them be held in private NAC session. By same token believe reasons for eight-power talks, if US, UK and others decide to go ahead with them, should be explained to Council, their link to NATO ministerial meeting made clear, and perhaps tacit approval secured in advance final public decision. De Staercke advised me this morning that Spaak felt would be difficult to reject proposal of eight-power meeting, and thought if it took place it should be considered as preparatory meeting to NAC ministerial meeting later. Steel said this afternoon he personally had recommended to Roberts that any invitation issued for conference of eight state that it was preparatory meeting to later NAC.

5. (*a*) Consistent also with this approach we urge that by early next week we be prepared propose to NAC limited number alternatives re time and place ministerial meeting and seek their agreement these points. Cooperation in this matter is not assisted by stories appearing in French press with Washington dateline about US Govt intentions prior to our receipt of such info, let alone consultation with NATO countries, as did occur yesterday. This leak makes early formal action important.

(*b*) On basis informal soundings, our present belief is meeting should be tentatively scheduled for early Oct with understanding preparatory work must proceed satisfactorily to meet this date, and that Council will be kept informed of such progress in order that date may be re-examined if necessary. Nevertheless believe relatively firm date agreed soon will assist in giving sense of urgency to preparatory work.

(*c*) We believe that psychological factors of substantial importance in selecting location for meeting. For this reason we fairly automatically rule out Paris and have grave doubts about wisdom of any location in US, despite fact may be convenient few ministers attending UN General Assembly to meet in New York. In course contacts we have been able make, have not found any govt which feels this should be considered major factor and number of them believe problem best settled where it is, namely, in Europe. Our own preference is for Rome. Apart from obvious general prestige factors from Italian point of view (important since failure EDC appears to present grave difficulties for Italian foreign policy), choice of Rome would underline fact that NATO countries do not consider Italian delay on EDC ratification puts Italians in same category as French.

(*d*) These conclusions re time and place represent best we have been able to do checking informally. Many perm reps not in Paris at present. Will cable further tomorrow giving additional reactions as result of further informal talks with reps or dels. Personally would hope that time and place of meeting could be set at NAC meeting Thursday Sept 9 at latest.[4]

6. While do not believe can be precise about agenda until preparatory work further advanced, consider would be helpful be able clarify soon whether we wish meeting to deal with totality of problem or merely military aspects. We would hope would be possible next week to make some statement on this and try to reach agreement in Council. Whether or not there would need to be affirmative actions re implica-

[4] In telegram Polto 325 from Paris, Sept. 3, Hughes informed the Department of State that while there was little agreement among the Permanent Representatives concerning the location of the next NAC Ministerial meeting, although several voiced strong objections against the possible choice of New York or Paris, the consensus seemed to favor the convening of an NAC Ministerial meeting no later than early October. (740.5/9–354)

tions of failure of EDC for 54 it will presumably depend on solution reached re German defense contribution. There is, however, active interest in this question.

7. Would be most helpful to us if we could receive indication of latest Washington thinking on substantive arrangements to be sought as alternative to EDC. Most recent info we have is copy of draft Departmental position paper dated 27 July,[5] which seems to us outmoded in some important respects.

HUGHES

[5] The editors were unable to further identify the position paper under reference here.

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662A.00/9–254 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State*[1]

SECRET NIACT BONN, September 2, 1954—9 p. m.

663. Limit distribution. In conformity with instructions from Wash,[2] presented protocols to Hallstein this morning in Baden-Baden and argued for Chanc's agreement along lines Wash instructions as vigorously as possible. Hallstein from start took very negative position and assured me our protocols were quite unacceptable. Cabinet had in essence realized what might be in the wind in Fr and Brit quarters along this line and had taken unanimous stand in opposition yesterday. I labored point intent US at end ninety day period was to force decision and that we had no intention allowing Fr veto to prevail. He replied that this was not in document and document was what had to be placed before the Bundestag and public. Said he felt Chanc wanted no steps taken about partial sovereignty before whole problem full sovereignty including rearmament was settled.

Immediately following this discussion, met Senator Wiley at airport and drove with him to Buehlerhoehe.[3] Chanc had opportunity of reading protocols before our arrival. In few words during preliminary conversation with Senator, he made it plain he was very unfavorably disposed towards document in question. I endeavored get discussion with Chanc of whole subject without bringing in Senator, who I point out had no knowledge of documents. I succeeded for first part of visit, as when Senator was out of room for short time I could speak quickly with Chanc, and on subsequent occasion was able argue

[1] Repeated to London and to Paris for Bruce.

[2] Presumably a reference to telegrams 621 and 623 to Bonn, Sept. 1 and 2, respectively, pp. 1125 and 1128.

[3] For information concerning Senator Wiley's trip to Europe, see footnote 3, p. 1131.

with him in absence of Senator. But after lunch Chanc insisted on bringing Senator fully into argument and before call ended, Senator was privy to whole subject. Chanc was negative to my arguments as was Hallstein and said it was completely impossible for him present any such document to Bundestag which would unanimously reject it. He said that proposals in this document would be terrible shock to German people and great blow to him worse than blow which he had suffered after vote of French Assembly. He spoke so strongly, that I became convinced it would be impossible to move him and that his apprehension as to consequences of public discussion of this document and knowledge that it had been communicated to French would be very grave. Therefore I left room at 2:20 and telephoned Dowling in Bonn; asking him to relay Wash my urgent recommendation that protocols not be shown to Fr. At that time I believed schedule called for Friday, which was as stated in my tel and which I stated to Chanc. I told Chanc it had not been settled as yet as to whether Fr would see protocols and I was reporting his point view to Wash at once, but made no statement as to my own recommendation.

Senator Wiley was much impressed by Chanc's argument and shared his apprehension as to consequences of showing this document to Fr.

On my return to Bonn, I found that approach to Fr had been held up. Urgently repeat my previous recommendation that we give up any idea of showing this proposal to Fr, and if Brit insist they do it alone as UK proposal. Brit HICOMer at airport after my interview with Chanc and before his, took attitude that Brit were not going to push protocols, but if Chanc didn't like them, say they were merely an idea of three months ago. This line of Brit, if it were carried out by HICOMer, puts American position in awkward light since I argued strongly with Hallstein and Chanc for acceptance these protocols.[4]

I now believe I made serious error in following Wash's instructions in arguing for acceptance of protocols after Chanc made his first statement to me that they were unacceptable. For as consequence my arguments and presentation this document, Chanc seems now convinced that Wash does not understand present German problem. He said document was put together by bureaucrats who had taken old texts and who had no understanding of political and psychological problems. He even spoke of this document as being step back. At this point I did my best to point out good intentions of both my Govt and Brit, and that if we were in error, it was based only on misunderstanding.

Then talk turned to what should be done. Chanc showed no interest in meeting with occupying powers or with EDC countries plus US and UK until such time as US and Germany had agreed on common

[4] For a report by the British concerning Hoyer Millar's conversation with Adenauer that same day, see telegram 1153 from London, Sept. 3, p. 1141.

policy. In this connection an earlier remark of Chanc's to Senator that he had been lied to by Mendes-France at Brussels seems to me of enormous significance. He said we were only country which could help him in his objective, which was to bring about German rearmament within European defense community framework. On being challenged as to these words by Senator, who asked about NATO, he said yes perhaps NATO, but he really wanted EDC. He believes this can be done if US and Germany can agree on a position.

My own opinion, based on this conversation and certain hints by Hallstein, is that HICOG proposal, although it has never been discussed with any German, would be acceptable to Chanc. But nothing need be done about sovereignty in immediate future.

Chanc spoke of desirability of his sitting down with Secretary. I pointed out difficulties of bilateral talks from political point view and also reminded him Secretary will be in Philippines for some weeks. He then spoke of sending Hallstein to see Secretary, or Hallstein and myself. I succeeded in diverting conversation at this point because it seemed to me fruitless to discuss before Senator and his assistants the next steps in our communications between FedRep and Wash. Needless to say, I am very much opposed to any visit by Hallstein.

Chanc said he would formulate more clearly in few days the exact steps which the Germans had in mind as to what was needed, and would communicate them to us, but did not indicate he wished to communicate with any other nation.

CONANT

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662A.00/9–354 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, September 3, 1954—2 p. m.

666. Personal for Merchant from Conant. Supplementing my telephone conversation of last night recommend strongly we drop once and for all any further discussion London protocols. Furthermore, venture recommend equally strongly we proceed to disengage completely from the British in our approach German problem. Would remind you that Washington instructions to me based on British FonOff stubbornness prevented my exploring with Chancellor protocols some days ago. British insistence that French must be kept on equal basis very nearly caused major blow-up in delicate situation. We missed by only few hours a most serious diplomatic blunder, the blame for which, if it had occurred, would have been clearly on British.

I have reported by phone to Hallstein that so-called London protocols were not shown to French yesterday. He reported that British HICOMer had told him they were being shown. I said this report, I

believe, to be completely in error. As far as I was concerned the discussion with Chancellor yesterday should be regarded as purely exploratory discussion of possible line of action which U.S. had thought might help Chancellor. The less said about matter in future the better and it was my belief that matter would not be discussed by U.S. with French.

I have appointment to see Chancellor next Thursday when he will have returned from his vacation. He wishes to be left undisturbed over week-end, including Monday.

Situation seems to me so complicated and mistrust between Chancellor and Mendes-France so great that normal diplomatic channels will have difficulty laying basis for fruitful conference whether it be held on EDC or NATO level. It would be highly desirable to have some American visit FonSecys each of EDC countries and London as soon as possible to act as "friend of the court" in preparing ground work for subsequent meeting, preferably on eight-power basis. Would it not be possible for you to make this journey? Would recommend such step most strongly. The absence of Secretary in Far East is one of factors which leads me to this recommendation. Believe public opinion can simmer for few days to week but in this period soundings by an American in seven countries primarily involved might be of great value not only to U.S. but to other countries involved.[1]

CONANT

[1] In telegram 651 to Bonn, Sept. 3, the Department of State informed HICOG officials that they should not discuss the matter of the London protocols with the French or other interested countries. Bonn was also informed that the Department concurred with the remarks in the source text concerning the exploratory nature of Conant's discussion with Hallstein. No action was taken on the suggestion in the final paragraph except to inform the Embassy that it was being given consideration. (662A.00/9–354)

740.5/9–354 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, September 3, 1954—6 p. m.

1153. Frank Roberts called Chipman to Foreign Office this afternoon to give Embassy outline of British HICOMer's conversation with Adenauer although he assumed that British Missions in Bonn and Washington would give us full account.[2] Briefly, he stressed point that while Adenauer was in less angry mood than was case when he

[1] Repeated to Bonn and to Paris for Bruce and USRO.

[2] A summary of the British High Commissioner's meeting with Adenauer in Bonn on Sept. 2 was provided by British Embassy officials during a call at the Department of State on Sept. 3 (memoranda of conversation, Sept. 3; 740.5/9–354). For Adenauer's summary of this meeting, see his *Erinnerungen 1953–1955*, pp. 305–306.

saw Conant,[3] Chancellor made it clear that events had overtaken protocols and that he would have to have more than they offered. British HICOMer replied, said Roberts, that protocols had been designed to help him and asked what Chancellor had in mind. Chancellor responded that he would have something definite to say next week. Roberts thought that it would be only realistic for UK and US now to regard protocols as inadequate to meet new situation.

In touching on German rearmament, Roberts said British HICOMer made it clear to Adenauer he was speaking only for British Government and outlined in general British preference for some form German participation in NATO to any other solution. Adenauer seemed to understand British position but vaguely suggested that possibly German troops could be placed under SACEUR apparently in order, British assume, to avoid French veto.

Roberts then took up British suggestion of eight-power conference defending it on grounds that Germans would be admitted thereto while in NAC conference, Germans would be excluded or if somehow admitted conference could not risk failure to admit Germans in NATO. Roberts insisted that British consider an eight-power conference as necessary step toward NAC conference and thought that arrangement might be made for Canadian participation.

In conclusion, Roberts touched on matter for which he obviously had called Chipman to Foreign Office, namely, when British could expect to obtain American reaction to document 6 of paper on Anglo-American discussion in London. He felt that UK and US should be prepared by next week to have joint position thereon. In this connection he stressed point that document in question had been approved in two latest British Cabinet meetings. Roberts added that Prime Minister is most restless and "burning to take action on German rearmament" which, however, is reluctant to do prior to reaching agreement with Washington.

Roberts explained that Spaak had sent special message on occasion latest British Cabinet meeting expressing opposition to "small European army" solution and in favor of NATO membership. While British, he continued, were not endeavoring to line up governments in favor of NATO solution, Italian, Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg Ambassadors had expressed to him during past few days during general conversations, preference for German rearmament under NATO to any other solution, now that EDC was dead.

BUTTERWORTH

[3] For a report on Conant's meeting with Adenauer, see telegram 663 from Bonn, Sept. 2, p. 1138.

740.5/9–354

*Foreign Minister Spaak to the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET BRUSSELS, September 3, 1954.

DEAR MR. DULLES: I have received the message which you were so very kind as to send me.[2]

This comforting message touched me deeply at a time when, I must admit, I feel both disappointed and anxious. I believe that I did all I could during the Brussels Conference and the few days thereafter, to convince the President of the French Council. He proved to be unyielding. It is very difficult for me to say why.

Now the big question is to decide what we are going to do. I have the impression that here in Europe the greatest confusion reigns everywhere to some extent. It is so easy to say "no" to something and so difficult to do something positive.

In my opinion, we must, by definite action, make each one face his responsibilities. It seems clear to me that German rearmament is essential. Without the support of German divisions, Western defense can not be effective. This being the case, we must bring it about, and the simplest way is to offer Germany her place in the Atlantic Organization.

Perhaps an attempt might be made to limit, at least in the preliminary stage, the number of German divisions that could be organized. I know that this is not consistent with the spirit of the Atlantic Pact, but it is a reservation which can be justified for political reasons. However, I am opposed to the creation of a German national army. Not that I fear that a national army would be guilty of reckless actions, but because I am certain that all the German ultra-nationalist elements would again group themselves around such a national army and the big general staff directing it.

Under these conditions, I should like to make a supreme effort to avoid such an unfortunate solution, and I wonder if, while deciding, now that Germany should begin her rearmament in NATO, we should not at the same time affirm our desire to resume discussion of the EDC treaty in the light of the ideas exchanged at Brussels.

We might fix a three-month period. At the expiration of this period, each of us would then be obliged to make a definitive choice between a defense community and the entry of Germany into the Atlantic Organization.

[1] An official translation of the text of this letter from Spaak, a copy of which was presumably given to Embassy officials in English, was transmitted to the Department of State in niact telegram 244 from Brussels, Sept. 3. That same day what the Department described as an "informal translation" of the Spaak letter was forwarded to Dulles in Manila in telegram Tedul 6. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 350)

[2] Dated Aug. 31, p. 1119.

Such a procedure would avoid the postponement of German rearmament and yet leave a chance to accomplish this rearmament in the right direction.

I know that this proposal is far from perfect, and that it is perhaps already outstripped by events, but I confess that I should like to attempt this last chance.

According to the news I have received from Paris, such an attempt would not necessarily be doomed to failure, for there is hope that on the day when the French Parliament really chooses between these two systems, it will vote for the better of the two.

Actually, the question has never been clearly put to the Parliament. A number of French Deputies, in rejecting EDC, hoped to prevent any German rearmament. When they see that their hope is blighted, perhaps we may trust that they will adopt a formula which, from all evidence, gives France more guarantees.

I am aware that all this rests on hypotheses that are far from being certain, but apart from pure and simple rearmament, I can see nothing else to do.

I thank you again most sincerely for your kindness in sending me your message in these difficult times, and I beg you, dear Mr. Dulles, to accept [etc.]

P. H. SPAAK

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Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower* [1]

TOP SECRET

[LONDON, September 3, 1954.]

[MY DEAR FRIEND:] I should like you to see the following message I sent to Dr. Adenauer which I believe had a fairly good reception. I will write again soon in answer to your letter of August 20.[2] Kindest regards.

*Message begins.* "It seems to me that at this critical juncture a great opportunity has come to Germany to take her position among the leaders of free Europe. By a voluntary act of self-abnegation she could make it clear that in any new arrangement as a substitute for EDC she would not ask for a level of military strength beyond that proposed in the EDC plan or to be agreed with her partners in western defence. This would invest the new Germany with a moral dignity and respect far more worth having than merely claiming the right to create as many divisions as she chose or as anybody else and plunging into an endless legalistic argument on the subject. This might well be expressed in terms in no way derogating from the equal and honourable

[1] The source text was delivered to the White House on Sept. 3 by Sir Robert H. Scott; it was then forwarded to the summer White House in Denver for President Eisenhower where it was received on Sept. 5. A copy of the source text was also delivered to the Department of State on Sept. 3 and transmitted to Secretary Dulles in Manila in telegram Tedul 8 the same day. (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower")

[2] Not further identified.

status of the German Federal Republic and would indeed open a new chapter by the very fact that the decision was taken on the initiative of Germany herself. I beg you to think this over as coming from one who after so many years of strife has few stronger wishes than to see the German nation take her true place in the worldwide family of free nations." [3]

[WINSTON]

[3] In telegram 1349 to London, Sept. 5, the Embassy was instructed to deliver the following message to Prime Minister Churchill: "I think your message to Dr. Adenauer is perfect. I hope he responds favorably. With warm regards, Ike." (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill")

740.5/9–354

*The President to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET DENVER, September 3, 1954.

DEAR BEDELL: For some days I have been storing up a few matters regarding which I wanted to write to you. I have felt so pushed during the first ten days of my so-called vacation that I have really neglected bringing to your attention one or two points that concern me very much.

The first one is the state of our thinking toward the development of a substitute for EDC. I take it that all of us agree we cannot sit down in black despair and admit defeat.

It seems to me there are two possible approaches—or maybe even three—

(*a*). Through the revision of the EDC idea by the nations concerned.
(*b*). Through a meeting of the entire NATO group, with a view of including Germany as an equal partner therein.
(*c*). Through unilateral agreements with Germany—to which agreements we would, of course, have to get the concurrences of a sizeable number of Western and Atlantic nations.

Please do not have your planners send me a long dissertation; I would merely like to know the direction of attack that appears to them to be the most hopeful and to get the outlines of their thinking.

Another subject is the Rio Conference,[1] and along with this Foster's suggestion that we send Kemper somewhere else. I have already okayed the latter idea, and I assume that my office has telephoned you today so that Foster's letter to Jimmy Dunn can be sent at once.

Last evening I went over with Bobby Cutler the Security Council's recommendations on South American policy, which I accept. In connection with this subject, I should like to have some idea of the approach that we intend taking. I am interested in specific objectives and our calculations as to what will be our greatest difficulty.

[1] Documentation concerning the Rio Conference of November 1954 is presented in volume IV.

Still another subject in which I am tremendously interested is Trieste.[2] We have been working on it a long time and my impression is that we have been letting Tito block us, perhaps needlessly. Over a period of many weeks I have been told time and again that it looked as though we were just on the point of securing an agreement, after which there has been nothing but silence. I think that whatever we do must be done soon, if for no other reason than to provide some counterbalance for the EDC flop.

I know that all of us are concerned about Italy and I personally know how much our friends there have been counting on the enactment of EDC. They must be very low in their minds and we could suffer an irretrievable disaster if things really went wrong. I know that the group in London has been working on this for a long time and I do not mean to complain. I merely mean that the situation begins to look rather grim, and I would hope that we could get our British friends to push a little harder on Tito. Perhaps we could do it ourselves, providing this would not cross wires with others who are working toward the same ends.

Please do not take your own time to answer my questions and to supply the information I seek. I merely ask that the proper sections of your staff prepare for me *very short* memoranda on these matters so that my own thinking may have the benefit of some specialized knowledge.

With warm regard,

As ever, D[WIGHT] E[ISENHOWER]

[2] Documentation concerning Trieste is presented in volume VIII.

740.5/9–354

*The Counselor of Embassy in Belgium (Sprouse) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

SECRET OFFICIAL–INFORMAL BRUSSELS, September 3, 1954.

DEAR LIVIE: With the failure of the Brussels Conference on EDC and the unfavorable vote in the French National Assembly, there has been some criticism here of the role played by Spaak. Some of it has emanated from within his own party. As you know, the Socialist Party here is not united on foreign policy and the principal opposition to EDC came from Socialist quarters.

We have discussed this criticism briefly in our despatch 189 of September 1[1] (which you may wish to have brought to your attention) but hesitated to make too much of it in a telegram lest the wrong impression be created in Washington. As we emphasized in our despatch the recent criticisms are not in themselves too significant. What is

[1] Not printed; it reported on the criticism that Spaak was receiving from within his own Socialist Party. (755.00/9–154)

important, however, is that there is a sizeable number of leading Socialists who do not see eye to eye with Spaak. Some of these are close to the top in the party hierarchy. This opposition is a factor which Spaak must consider in taking public positions on important foreign policy questions. It could possibly give him some trouble in the future.

Spaak's presentation of his case yesterday before the Chamber Foreign Affairs Commission was, in our opinion, designed chiefly to meet this criticism and to make clear to the Belgians that Belgium had not willy-nilly and without justification lined up with any group of countries against France. He also must have been considerably irritated with Mendes-France over the latter's apparently blatant misrepresentations of what had happened at Brussels.

I am writing you all this informally as, needless to say, we do not like to spread any impression or criticism about Spaak which might get to his ears through contacts at Paris, and thus render our position impossible. This description of the situation is not intended as a criticism of Spaak but as an explanation of why he has been giving so much publicity to actions taken by him during and after the Brussels Conference. I am sure that we here all feel that he has performed magnificently and has held the line extremely well in the face of great difficulties.

He was most appreciative of the Secretary's letter,[2] particularly coming as it did when his role was subject to some criticism here. His presentation before the Commission seems to have mollified the Commission at least, if we are to believe opposition newspaper reports.

With all good wishes.

Sincerely yours, PHIL

[2] Dated Aug. 31, p. 1119.

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740.5/9–254 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, September 4, 1954—1 : 44 p. m.

1330. Following replies to questions raised London's 1120, September 2.[2]

1. Department unaware basis Scott's impression we do not favor eight-power meeting but suspects it may derive from conversation with Departmental officer between Brussels and French debate on EDC. At that time we were inclined favor seven-power conference (i.e., without French) but this possibility no longer in our thinking at this stage, and we do not exclude possibility eight-power meeting.

[1] Drafted by Joseph Palmer; cleared with Murphy, Lyon, WE, and BNA; and repeated to Paris and Bonn.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1130.

However, Department feels primary requirement in present situation is for NATO Ministerial meeting, agenda for which would be drawn in general terms set forth Topol 222 (repeated London 1232).[3] It would further be our hope that such conference would concern itself with question of alternatives, provided sufficient meeting of minds obtained by that time. We do not think an eight-power conference would be adequate substitute for NATO Ministerial meeting but feel that it might be useful preliminary to such meeting by affording opportunity explore problem among eight powers primarily interested. You should make foregoing clear Kirkpatrick, emphasizing at same time that we do not wish take final decision until we know more clearly what British have in mind. (In this connection, Department's only official knowledge of proposal based on paragraph in text UK instructions to Bonn re Contractual protocols given us in confidence by British Embassy on September 1 in which FonOff refers to possibility of eight-power meeting in London, to be followed by NATO Council meeting, to prepare alternative plan to EDC.)

2. You may also inform Kirkpatrick that while we recognize desirability earliest possible US–UK discussion on question German military contribution, it is doubtful that we will be ready before another ten days to two weeks in view necessity relating our study this problem to general reappraisal US European problems referred to by Secretary in his statement of August 31st.

3. Department would be grateful to receive any information which you may obtain as to whether and to what extent British may have revised their thinking on German participation in NATO with certain restrictions as set forth in Document 6 London Working Papers.

4. For your information Joint Chiefs are considering this British proposal in connection with their general study of alternative planning.

5. FYI Canadians have today informed us they feel question German participation Western defense should be considered in NATO and not eight-power forum, even though Canada were added to latter.[4]

6. Italians today stated that their Permanent Representation to NAC instructed Italy has in principle no objection to advanced meeting NAC, but should first see what emerges in next few weeks, especially following developments of UK initiative to call 8 power conference.[5]

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[3] Not printed; it recommended an emergency meeting of the full NATO Ministerial Council for the general purpose of considering the serious situation created for NATO by the French rejection of the EDC (740.5/9–154).

[4] A memorandum of this conversation between officials of the Department of State and the Canadian Embassy is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 375.

[5] A memorandum of this conversation with Italian Ambassador Tarchiani, including as an enclosure a memorandum from the Italian Government concerning the EDC, is in Department of State file 740.5/9–354.

7. If 8-power meeting develops, inclined to favor formula be found to include Canadians.

8. Understand from UK Embassy Eden thinking of Sept 15 for 8-power meeting, which, if held, would be early for us in terms our projected status preparation, and has difficulty for us that Secretary will not then be available.[6]

SMITH

[6] In telegram 1176 from London, Sept. 6, the Embassy informed the Department of State that Prime Minister Churchill in particular and the British Government in general were most anxious to avoid any delay such as outlined in the source text. Accordingly Eden sent a message to Secretary Dulles asking him to return from Manila through London if at all possible. (740.5/9–654) For the text of Eden's message to Dulles, see telegram Dulte 11 from Manila, Sept. 7, p. 1151.

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**740.5/9–454 : Telegram**

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, September 4, 1954—2 p. m.

983. Re London's 1153 [2] and 1154 [3] to Department. British Embassy this morning received instructions that in view of Adenauer's reaction protocols were no longer adequate to present situation and should definitely not be communicated to French. British Embassy assumes London now considers them definitely dead. British Embassy also instructed to answer any inquiries to effect that United Kingdom is consulting with United States and Adenauer about present situation. Also on instructions Reilly told De Margerie this morning that United Kingdom had never been willing to make binding commitment to maintain forces on continent over long time and would certainly not do so now that French must realize that current situation could not be met by generalities such as agreement in principle on necessity for German rearmament which had been reached years ago.

He like we have found De Margerie and other Foreign Office officials depressed, uncertain and in dark as to Mendes' intentions. We have impressed on British Embassy here, which shares our feeling, that French are taking foreign reaction to defeat of EDC much too lightly and that further action to make clear depth of British as well as United States displeasure would be desirable.

DILLON

[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Dated Sept. 3, p. 1141.

[3] Not printed; it informed the Department of State that Mendès-France had casually suggested to the British that they might consider making a binding commitment of long duration to maintain given levels of forces on the continent, joining a European arms pool, and agreeing jointly with the Europeans to common limitations on armament production in zones likely to become involved in fighting in case of hostilities (740.5/9–354).

740.5/9–654: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Manila* [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 6, 1954—12:25 p. m.

Tedul 15. British firmly desire nine-power (six EDC countries plus US, UK and Canada) meeting London September 14 on post-EDC situation. They will not issue invitations until certain our acceptance.

Despite tightness schedule and difficulty our arrival any firm detailed US position by that date, I recommend you authorize me inform British we will accept formal invitation on understanding meeting preliminary to later full NAC meeting. I do not see how I could attend with you still out of country. Murphy may well be Triesting at that time and hence unavailable for London. Accordingly, I recommend designation Bruce to represent US at London meeting and request your approval.

SMITH

[1] Drafted by Merchant and cleared with Murphy.

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396.1 LO/9–754: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET NIACT MANILA, September 7, 1954—noon.

Dulte 10. Eyes only Acting Secretary and Merchant from Secretary. Re Tedul 15.[1] I now have personal message from Eden (cabling text separately [2]) expounding his program for nine-power meeting "in London in course of next week" and suggesting I return via Europe to attend this meeting. He also says, "You will know how anxious we would be on all grounds to have you here. Indeed your presence seems essential if results are to be achieved."

I feel September 14 too early for nine-power meeting and that British may be deliberately attempting to rush us in order to put across some plan of their own which we may or may not approve. I feel that probably I personally should attend and both Senators Smith and Mansfield feel Bruce inadequate in view of his long absence from US and inevitable lack of sensitivity to Congressional opinion. However, I think it unwise for me to attend without first talking with President and with State and Defense representatives Washington. Therefore, I propose that we seek delay preferably until Foreign Ministers are in New York for UN meeting.

Believe important from public relations standpoint not to put British in position where they can plausibly blame us for delay. We can, therefore, take position with British that in view of my physical

[1] *Supra.*
[2] *Infra.*

presence here and Eden's own statement that he considers my presence essential to success of nine-power meeting, there must be delay to enable me to prepare for nine-power meeting and to re-establish contacts with President, Congressional leaders and recent thinking of State and Defense Departments. I could conceivably do this and go to London Thursday night, September 16, getting back on twentieth for UN opening. This would be burdensome but possible if deemed necessary to facilitate participation by Churchill and Adenauer.

For your information tentative planning now to proceed Formosa September 9, Tokyo September 10, and arrive Washington via Denver September 12.

DULLES

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396.1 LO/9–754 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET NIACT MANILA, September 7, 1954—noon.

Dulte 11. Eyes only Acting Secretary and Merchant from Secretary. Following text Eden's message (reference Dulte 10 [1]).

*Verbatim text.*

I have been in close touch with the United States Embassy about the situation arising from the rejection of EDC and have no doubt that the State Department have been keeping you informed of our views about the next steps to be taken.

Adenauer will be sending me comments within 24 hours on the ideas which we have expounded to him about German entry into NATO with safeguards and I will of course pass these on to your people at once. The way will then I hope be clear for a conference of the powers principally interested as a preliminary to any ministerial meeting of the Council of NATO. As you know we have been working for such a conference and other European governments are all favourably disposed towards the idea.

Apart from the intrinsic urgency of the matter there is the question of fitting any such conference into the rest of the international timetable. You will know how anxious we would be on all grounds to have you here. Indeed your presence seems essential if results are to be achieved. How would you be placed if we suggested that the conference were to be held in London in the course of next week? I believe you were hoping to visit Japan and Formosa after Manila. If you were to forego these visits you might perhaps be able to return home rather earlier via London and attend the conference. I put this suggestion to you with diffidence knowing the extent of your existing commitments and the amount of travelling which you have already had to do recently. But this is a very grave moment in European history and we shall need your invaluable help in unravelling the tangle. Warmest regards.

*End verbatim text.*

DULLES

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[1] *Supra.*

396.1/9–754 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT BONN, September 7, 1954—1 p. m.

690. Hallstein tells us Chancellor is seeing Hoyer Millar this morning and will say to him that while German Govt appreciates U.K. initiative he does not favor 8 or 9 power conference as proposed by British. He will justify his position by arguing that he cannot be placed in position of negotiating "safeguards", which British have still not spelled out for him, at a conference without giving them appearance of discriminatory restrictions imposed on Germany. He feels therefore that such safeguards must be discussed through diplomatic channels and will propose that work begin on this at once.

Hallstein says Chancellor is particularly anxious that onus of blocking 8-power conference not fall wholly on Germans. Chancellor is therefore anxious that U.S. maintain position in favor of early NATO meeting and will communicate with Spaak in hope he will likewise press on this point. Hallstein added that Chancellor attaches great importance to this NATO meeting taking place before Sept 21 and would discuss this further with me during my call on him this afternoon.

CONANT

[1] Repeated to London and Paris. The Department of State subsequently transmitted the source text to Secretary Dulles in Manila in telegram Tedul 21, Sept. 7.

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396.1/9–754 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, September 7, 1954—7 p. m.

698. Reference Bonn telegram 690 to Department, repeated London 104, Paris 111.[2]

Chancellor in conversation this afternoon outlined his present position and plans for immediate future. He intends continue discussing with British through British High Commissioner or special representative from London British proposal for German entry NATO with voluntary self-imposed limitations. He has in mind declaration by himself as Chancellor, possibly confirmed by vote confidence Bundestag. Limitation would be on number divisions. He is not thinking of any supra-national feature connection with entry NATO. He, however, assured me and asked me repeat Washington his intention if NATO solution is acceptable French to proceed try once again while

[1] Repeated to London and Paris.
[2] *Supra.*

German army in process forming to create something equivalent EDC concept. He emphasized same time his intention continue work for general policy European integration, and in discussion of Saar agreed that European solution this problem would be a test for success development of plans for future. He proposes to press for this and other European features his program at same time as attempting find solution rearmament in NATO framework.

I questioned him about sovereignty status. He believes this can be accomplished by declaration three governments that they will not exercise occupational powers insofar as Bundesrepublik is concerned. He believes this would not present legal problem, Berlin would still remain under occupation, but he agreed that legal problems would have to be carefully investigated before this solution could be made final. Convention covering stationing of our forces he would propose cover through something similar to present treaties with other NATO powers. It is quite clear that his present thinking is such that advantages we have in Bonn conventions would largely if not entirely disappear.

He believes all this can be accomplished without action French Chamber if Mendes-France so desires and without action Bundestag except for treaty on stationing of forces.

As indicated reference telegram 690, he dislikes idea nine or ten-power conference and hopes this can be avoided. His objections stem from his fear that German public opinion will feel limitations on German rearmament were imposed on him by conference rather than freely declared by himself. NATO Council meeting would determine nature German contribution and before this occurred he would be ready to state what his self-imposed limitations on this contribution would be. It would then be for French and other NATO countires to accept or reject.

As to date NATO meeting, he would prefer before September 21 but when I pointed out difficulties Secretary's presence he felt even October 1 might not be too late.

He clearly is not entirely optimistic as to possibilities Mendes-France will accept formula which would be worked out with British but feels this test must be made. Further indicated he has hopes Mendes-France Government will not long remain in power. We did not discuss steps which would follow refusal Mendes-France NATO solution acceptable to himself and British. He assumed US would be kept informed his negotiations with British at all points and would be, he hopes, in agreement.

In summary, seems clear that Chancellor is aiming at full and complete sovereignty with equal membership NATO, but he is prepared on behalf his government to give certain assurances as to rearmament and privately intends continue to work for something similar EDC

and above all to go forward solution French-German problems on European basis. These reservations in my opinion, place proposal have national army in NATO in quite different framework than if they came from a government with strong nationalistic bias.

CONANT

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740.5/9–854 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, September 8, 1954—4 p. m.

1212. At lunch for Senator Wiley today FonSec summarised views he will put to Cabinet for discussion this afternoon briefly as follows:

(*a*) German admission to NATO is best solution of military problem. (*b*) This should be supplemented by unilateral undertaking by Adenauer to abide by certain restraints re German rearmament. (*c*) Brussels Agreement might be revived and revised to make (*a*) more palatable to France and (*d*) in this connection UK would increase extent of its military commitment by undertaking to keep certain forces in Germany for specific period of time.

Eden also made the following points:

(1) This was a moment when Europe had to take the initiative to sort this essentially European problem out.

(2) That no solution could be found around a NATO conference table; that the real work had to be done prior to such a meeting.

(3) That holding of NATO meeting in New York about this essentially European problem was impractical regardless of whether or not many of Foreign Ministers were fortuitously there. In this connection he indicated he had received a message from Mike Pearson saying he was prepared to come to Europe. Needless to say I pointed out US had not and was not specifically urging any locus. Eden favored Rome.

Interchanges between Eden and Wiley were most cordial and friendly, as were those of yesterday when Wiley lunched with Churchill.

Senator after stating Communist objectives emphasized time element and danger of failure of London conference without adequate preparation and suggested that what was needed was a "Colonel House" to tour relevant capitols, lay foundations of agreement and particularly find firm basis among majority of French Deputies for agreement that would be approved. It so happens that I had been given to understand confidentially that Eden is contemplating undertaking just such a trip which will probably be discussed at Cabinet meeting this afternoon. Senator's suggestion was silently but obviously well received by Eden, Makins and Macmillan. Incidentally, Eden indicated that Adenauer had suggested that problem be first discussed on an Anglo-German basis which Eden said he found embarrassing; this will probably clinch trip.

Eden found occasion to tell me how much he appreciated Gen. Smith's message.[1] Makins leaves Sat. for Washington.

BUTTERWORTH

[1] Presumably a reference to Dulles' letter to Eden, dated Sept. 8 (*infra*), which was sent to London from Washington by the Acting Secretary of State.

740.5/9–854

*The Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Eden* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 8, 1954.

[DEAR ANTHONY:] I appreciate your message [2] concerning the problem of what we do next in Europe and fully share your feelings of urgency about situation. I have, however, certain grave doubts about your suggestion for a nine-power meeting in London. I am extremely anxious to avoid repetition of the disharmony of the Brussels meeting.[3] I seriously doubt whether it will be possible to carry out all necessary preliminaries in time to hold a successful formal meeting before the UN Assembly convenes. Before I can usefully discuss these matters, I must return home, reestablish contact with the President and Congressional leaders and inform myself concerning recent thinking within the US Government. Furthermore, I strongly feel that we will need considerable advance diplomatic preparation in order to clarify our objectives and insure success of any formal meeting of Ministers. In particular, I would like to have in hand a meeting of minds between your Government and ours. Also, I understand Adenauer is opposed to an early nine-power meeting. Finally, as you so thoughtfully recognize, I am currently overburdened.

You will realize of course that I want to make every possible contribution to a solution of this grave crisis. I am prepared if it would serve any useful purpose to come to Europe for the weekend of September 18 to 20. However, if I did so, I would think that my time could be more usefully spent in talks with you and Churchill and Adenauer, and perhaps Mendes-France, which will help to create a more solid basis for a conference, than in a nine-power conference itself which, in our present state, we would inevitably enter without the preliminary thinking and exchanges of views necessary to assure that that conference will produce agreement. I suggest we dare not at this juncture risk any further exhibitions of confused division.

[1] The source text was transmitted to London in telegram 1371, Sept. 8. An early draft of this letter was sent to Secretary Dulles in Manila in telegram Tedul 25, Sept. 7 (396.1/9–754); his approval of the draft with changes was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 18, Sept. 8 (396.1 LO/9–854).

[2] This is a reference to Eden's message the text of which was sent to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 11, Sept. 7, p. 1151.

[3] For documentation concerning the Brussels Conference, Aug. 19–22, see pp. 1052 ff.

I shall probably have started home by the time you receive this, and plan to get to grips with this European problem as rapidly as possible, and count on closest cooperation with you.

FOSTER

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359

*Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET [LONDON, September 8, 1954.]

Please tell Mr. Dulles that I realise the difficulties of timing. It now looks as though the meeting of Foreign Ministers will need a little more time for preparation. I do not think it can take place until a little later in the month. I am quite sure that it must be held in Europe and am more than ever convinced that it is essential that Mr. Dulles should be present. We will do all we can to meet his convenience on timing.

[1] The source text bears a notation which reads: "Message from Eden delivered to Secretary in Manila, Sept. 8, 1954". Secretary Dulles summarized the source text in a personal "eyes only" telegram to the Acting Secretary the same day; a copy of Dulles' summary in telegram Dulte 28, Sept. 8, is in Department of State file 396.1 LO/9–854.

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740.5/9–854

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lyon)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1954.

Subject: Discussion between British High Commissioner and Dr. Hallstein

Participants: Mr. F. J. Leishman, British Embassy
Mr. Cecil B. Lyon, GER

Mr. Leishman called this morning and after having handed me the copies of Mr. Eden's two messages to the Secretary in Manila,[1] which form the subject of a memorandum from Mr. Merchant to the Under Secretary, gave me some information concerning a talk between the British High Commissioner at Bonn and Dr. Hallstein.

Dr. Hallstein indicated that the Chancellor and the German officials were now coming around to the idea of German entry into NATO. However, it would be a fortified NATO with certain agreements which while not discriminatory towards Germany made it clear that Germany would not be able to embark on an unrestricted rearmament. A committee of experts should be appointed to work out the details of what the restrictions would be. As to the procedure to be followed to attain

[1] Not attached to the source text. Presumably this is a reference to Eden's letters of Sept. 7 and 8; for the text of the former, see telegram Dulte 11, Sept. 7, p. 1151, and for the letter of Sept. 8, *supra*.

this, Dr. Hallstein indicated that this would have to await the Chancellor's views.

The British High Commissioner asked what the Chancellor and Hallstein thought with regard to the restoration of German sovereignty. Dr. Hallstein indicated that the Chancellor, he and the legal authorities were of the opinion that Germany as an independent state possesses sovereignty but that the Occupying Powers enjoyed a special control over that sovereignty, to a certain extent, a sort of mortgage. The three Occupying Powers could restore sovereignty by merely making a unilateral declaration cancelling, so-to-speak, the mortgage. The British High Commissioner indicated that it would be unlikely that the Occupying Powers could make such a declaration unless they were granted certain controls and privileges which the Bonn Conventions embraced. Dr. Hallstein said that Germany would be willing to extend these controls and privileges through a series of fresh instruments to replace the Bonn Conventions and largely based on the Bonn Conventions. However, a group of experts would also have to be appointed to draw up these instruments. It would be sufficient if the Occupying Powers would make a declaration of their intent to restore Germany's sovereignty upon completion of these new instruments.

The British High Commissioner sees the course according to Dr. Hallstein's views somewhat as follows:

(1) The NATO Council would agree to admit Germany as soon as the safeguards drawn up by the experts had been agreed to. A declaration of this intent would be issued shortly.

(2) The three Occupying Powers would issue a declaration of their intent to restore German sovereignty as soon as the experts had agreed to the new instruments to replace the Bonn Conventions.

(3) As soon as the safeguards agreed upon by the experts were approved, Germany would be admitted into NATO, and as soon as the new instruments were agreed to, the three Occupying Powers would issue a declaration restoring Germany's sovereignty.

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740.5/9–854

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Palmer)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1954.

Subject: German Defense Problem

Participants: Mr. Adam Watson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Walworth Barbour, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Director, RA

Mr. Watson called today to inform the Department about a conversation which the British High Commissioner at Bonn had with

Chancellor Adenauer. Adenauer had begun the conversation with a lecture on the deterioration in the German situation and had emphasized that there was no time to lose in finding an alternative solution. He emphasized that there must be no watered-down EDC and expressed the view that we should work for a NATO solution. He indicated that Germany would be willing to accept safeguards, but that these must be non-discriminatory in character. Moreover, they must be willingly accepted by the German Government and not imposed by the other powers. The Chancellor stated that he felt that the German and other authorities concerned with this problem should begin immediately to work out the necessary arrangements for accomplishing a solution along these lines. He felt it particularly important that this work should be done in the first instance by experts and expressed himself as being chary of entering any discussions at the Ministerial level until this had been accomplished. The Chancellor also expressed concern that if an early solution to these problems were not found, the U.S. reappraisal might result in a decision involving a withdrawal from Europe. Hoyer-Millar confirmed that he thought this concern was legitimate.

Mr. Watson went on to say that he was somewhat confused about the procedural arrangements which would have to precede the NATO Ministerial consideration of the question and asked what the Department's thinking was on this subject. Mr. Barbour stated that, as the Secretary's message to Mr. Eden on the 9-power conference had indicated,[1] we were still uncertain as to how the necessary diplomatic preparation could best be handled. Mr. Barbour said that he thought that it would be much wiser if we de-emphasized our concern about the procedural aspects of the problem and concentrated on the substance. Once we had achieved a position, it would be much easier for us to see how the procedural aspects of the problem should be handled. Mr. Watson indicated agreement and said that he presumed that meanwhile there would be no harm in the U.S. and U.K. representatives in Bonn and Paris exploring with Adenauer and Mendes-France their views on the substance of alternative solutions. Mr. Barbour indicated agreement insofar as this indicated normal diplomatic intercourse, but felt that we should be careful to avoid any impression of anxiety to ascertain French views. Mr. Watson indicated agreement and observed parenthetically that he did not believe that the continuation of Mendes-France in office constituted any vital interest of HMG. On the other hand, he thought that the British could be helpful in smoking Mendes-France out, since the latter seemed to place great importance on the necessity of a close tie with the U.K.

[1] Dated Sept. 8, p. 1155.

110.11 DU/9–954

*Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State, at Tokyo* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY [LONDON, September 9, 1954.]

[DEAR FOSTER:] I am most grateful to you for your message from Manila.[2]

I quite agree that an early conference is now out of the question and you will have heard that I am proposing to do some preparatory work by visiting Brussels, Bonn, Rome and Paris. It would certainly be a mistake to hold any conference until the ground has been thoroughly prepared.

It is very kind of you to suggest coming to Europe for the week-end of September 18–20. I shall look forward to discussing these problems with you. But would it not be better to consider dates and methods of further consultations after I have seen Adenauer on September 12 in Bonn? I will send you a further message from there. I would not wish to expose you to the burden of making two trips to Europe in quick succession. For I still think that since this is a European problem any conference or conferences should for psychological reasons be held in Europe.

[Kindest regards, ANTHONY]

[1] The source text was delivered to the Department of State by officials of the British Embassy at 5 p. m. on Sept. 9 and was transmitted to Secretary Dulles in Tokyo in telegram 528 within the hour. Secretary Dulles visited Tokyo on his way back from the Manila Conference.

[2] Presumably a reference to Secretary Dulles' message to Eden of Sept. 8, p. 1155.

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Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower* [1]

TOP SECRET [LONDON, September 9, 1954.]

MY DEAR FRIEND: Thank you so much for your message of September 6.[2] Adenauer's response was good and I think his attitude is easier.

2. We are all agreed that an 8-Power Meeting of Allies, plus Canada, would be the right move now and prefer it to the 16 N.A.T.O. Powers proposal, which might well follow it, and we should like very much to have it in London which is a big and well known place and

[1] The source text was delivered to the White House by British Embassy officials during the evening of Sept. 9 and an additional copy was delivered to the Department of State at the same time. (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower")

[2] Presumably a reference to President Eisenhower's brief note to Churchill of Sept. 5 which was probably delivered to him on Sept. 6; for the text of Eisenhower's note, see footnote 3, p. 1145.

has stood by the Thames for quite a long time without having a Conference of this kind. Anthony, who knows all the Continental personalities involved from long experience, feels that he could smooth out difficulties, queries and objections, of which there are no lack, better by personal contacts than by the interminable interchange of coded messages and arguments. He is, therefore, at the desire of the Cabinet, proposing to start on a flying circuit of Brussels, Bonn, Rome and Paris to see what he can do. We shall keep you and Foster fully and punctually informed.

3. If he succeeds, it seems to me not improbable that we might reach a considerable measure of agreement and that the N.A.T.O. Meeting would follow as the second stage.

4. Of course it is always my hope that the prospects of an improvement in our affairs, arising out of a London Conference might be so good, or the results in sight become so good, that you might be able to come yourself, at least for the finale, and make that State visit I mentioned to you at the White House.[3] But that of course is not a matter which requires decision now.

5. I have read what has been disclosed to our people in Washington about the Pentagon's views on re-appraisal. This, I am sure, would mean disaster if it actually came to pass. I hope, nonetheless, that if such ideas are shaping themselves in Washington, you will let the French know about them at an early stage. It might help them to do their duty.

Kindest regards, WINSTON

[3] Documentation concerning Churchill's visit to Washington, June 25–29, is presented in volume VI.

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740.5/9–954 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the President, at the Summer White House, Denver, Colorado* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 10, 1954—10:13 a. m.

Following are brief memoranda on subjects your letter September 3:[2]

*EDC.* Keeping in mind the principal objectives of the EDC package, we are considering two alternative approaches. The first would bring Germany directly into NATO. The size, composition and disposition of German defense forces would be controlled principally by NATO agreement on non-discriminatory safeguards. The Germans would also undertake certain voluntary commitments unilaterally as

[1] The first section of the source text dealing with the EDC was drafted in EUR.
[2] *Ante*, p. 1145.

part of the terms of their admission to NATO. We would move concurrently to restore sovereignty to West Germany.

The second alternative would be used if, as is possible, the French prevent the first. This second alternative provides for steps by the US, UK, and Germany (including possibly Benelux and Italy) to proceed without French concurrence with German rearmament under a defense agreement along the lines of the Yugoslav-Greek-Turk Pact.[3] While negotiating this agreement actual training of German cadres could begin in the US and UK Zones. These steps might induce a welcome change in the French position.

We would continue to encourage European integration.

Our tactics and timing would be to reach as wide as possible agreement before a full NATO Ministerial Meeting early in October. At the NATO Meeting we would attempt to secure the preferred first alternative.

[Here follow a second section concerning Latin America and a third section dealing with Trieste; for the text of the paragraphs concerning Trieste, see volume VIII.]

SMITH

[3] Documentation concerning this subject is presented in volume VIII.

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740.5/9–254 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 10, 1954—8:33 p. m.

920. Believe views expressed by Mendes-France reported your 938 [2] require some comments on our part. On possibility his meeting with Adenauer, it should be conveyed to him by appropriate means that we have given it serious consideration but we believe that at this juncture the common meeting ground between two situations faced by himself and Adenauer has not been sufficiently clarified and early face-to-face meeting should it fail would have very adverse repercussions. Rather we believe we should all work through diplomatic channels to clarify broad lines of that meeting ground first.

On his general approach to problem expressed reftel, believe it should also be conveyed to him our view that he misjudges difficulties of Adenauer's situation which we see roughly as follows:

1. Adenauer has suffered defeat his major policy on which he based entire personal prestige.
2. Now three years after Japan's status settled and two years after West intended similarly to settle status of Fed Rep and several months

[1] Drafted by William D. Fisher and cleared with Kidd and Merchant; repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Dated Sept. 2, p. 1132.

after Soviets have ostensibly done so for propaganda purposes in East Germany.

3. In terms of West Germany's real not juridical situation, parts of Bonn contractuals were already out of date. Adenauer has maintained reasonable and patient attitude among his people with regard contractuals only with difficulty during last two years. With rejection EDC it should not be expected that he would accept contractuals without any determination of that key element sovereignty—right to carry out or participate in one's own defense.

4. In spite of his personal disappointment and his need act in such a way as to carry his people with him, we believe Adenauer will be reasonable if others are in turn reasonable with him. But this requires an appreciation of his position and realization that time and events have changed political facts of life since 1952.

SMITH

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740.5/9–1054

*The Acting Secretary of State to Prime Minister Churchill*[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 10, 1954.

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER: In talking with the President today, he referred to your last letter and particularly to paragraph 5,[2] regarding which he asked me to send you this personal note.

It can hardly be said that our soldiers have as yet any definite or coordinated views on reappraisal. We do not concede that Britain and we together will, on the diplomatic front, fail to produce a satisfactory solution to the grave problems arising from the rejection by France of EDC. Nevertheless, it would be less than prudent if the Joint Staff did not at this time consider long-range alternatives in the event that an unforeseen failure should take place.

These alternatives would undoubtedly include various forms of strategic regrouping, any of which at best would be a forlorn hope.

The President asked me to assure you that when views on these alternatives become a little more clear on the planning levels, British opposites will be kept informed, and certainly that no final decisions of any importance will be taken without advising you in advance.

My personal opinion, which I will urge, is that when a really serious appraisal of alternatives can be made we should attack it on a joint basis, as in the past.

We are inclined to think here that it will do no harm if the French realize that reappraisals are being made to cover all possible contingencies.

Faithfully, BEDELL

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[1] According to covering memoranda attached to the source text, this letter was drafted by Smith in accordance with telephone instructions which he received from President Eisenhower and was delivered to the British Embassy in Washington on Sept. 10 for transmission by telegram to London.

[2] Dated Sept. 9, p. 1159.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1954.

Subject: Alternative to EDC.

Attached at Tab A is a Memorandum for the President which he has already received outlining a program to meet the present European crisis.[2] At Tab B is a paper which spells out this program in greater detail. At Tab C is a proposed NATO resolution to be approved by a special Council meeting in October.[3] At Tab D is a proposal for restoring German sovereignty.

In connection with these papers, I should like to call your attention particularly to the following points:

1. The President should be aware that we have not attempted to deal with the problem of what happens in the event of the unification of Germany. We are continuing to consult the Legal Advisers' Office on this point in an effort to develop a position.

2. In your absence, we have not submitted a copy of these papers to the Department of Defense, although we have kept them generally informed of our thinking. I believe we should transmit copies of the papers to Defense for their comments as soon as you have had a chance to review them. We should also transmit promptly copies to Ambassador Hughes and General Gruenther for their private comments.

3. From the tactical point of view, particularly in negotiating with Adenauer, we should not accept the position that the contractual agreements are dead. There are still some principles in these agreements which are important to us and our bargaining position will be better if we cling as long as possible to the view that they remain in effect.

4. In discussing our position with the British and French we should emphasize that we are not relying only on unilateral German commitments. Many of the provisions in our program which will limit German control over their military establishment are multilateral.

5. In negotiating with the Germans on the status of forces problem, we will probably be driven back on acceptance, at least publicly, of the NATO SOF formula. In order to improve our position vis-à-vis Defense and Congress, we should, however, attempt vigorously to negotiate additional concessions on treatment of troops in a supplementary arrangement such as we have recently reached with Italy.

6. We are agreed that for the practical purpose of putting pressure on the French we must have a veto-proof alternative for German rearmament such as that outlined in paragraph 4 of Tab B. I wish to emphasize, however, my conviction that any alternative requiring us to proceed without French cooperation does not conform to your basic principle that a strong Europe can be built only on Franco-German collaboration. Consequently, any such alternative is not an end itself

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[1] Drafted by Ben T. Moore.

[2] For text of Tab A, see Acting Secretary of State Smith's unnumbered telegram to President Eisenhower of Sept. 10, p. 1160.

[3] Not printed.

but only a bargaining device and we should not become over-committed to it, but should retain essential flexibility.

7. If an opportunity presents itself, I suggest you ask Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford to pull together from the many studies now going on in the Pentagon the essential military comments on the British document outlining their program for German membership in NATO. I am convinced that at some point in our forthcoming negotiations we must have a position on this particular paper.

Tab B

*Paper Prepared by the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Moore)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, September 10, 1954.]

## U.S. POSITION ON ALTERNATIVE TO EDC

The major objectives of US security policy toward Western Europe have been:

1. To associate Germany with the West.
2. To foster further progress toward European integration, particularly France-German reconciliation.
3. To obtain a German contribution to Western defense.
4. To restore sovereignty to Germany and end discrimination against her.

French rejection of EDC has blocked that road to attainment of these objectives. If the Europeans can lay out and follow an alternate route promptly and with determination, we should support them because of our vital interest in a strong Europe. The essential elements of an alternative program would be the following:

1. *German Membership in NATO*

Germany should be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty by agreement among all the signatories in accordance with Article 10. In accepting this invitation, Germany would submit a formal reply emphasizing the defensive character of the forces she expects to contribute and undertaking to follow in her initial contribution the size and composition of forces specified in the EDC Special Military Agreement (this excludes submarines and strategic bombers). She would also undertake to produce equipment needed for the common defense. She would state, however, that she would not produce atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons, military aircraft, etc. (other items in Annex II of Article 107 of EDC Treaty) because of her exposed strategic position except as agreed by NATO.

Parallel with this step, NATO should reach agreement on a program for more effective military integration. In accepting membership in

NATO, Germany would, of course, be bound by these agreements. This program would have as its objective strengthening the military effectiveness of the forces committed to NATO. It would as a by-product limit autonomy of any forces committed to NATO in Europe which would include all German forces as provided below. It would thus have the advantages of being desirable in its own right and non-discriminatory vis-à-vis Germany. The following points should be covered:

(*a*) Further integration and internationalization of command.
(*b*) Strengthening of SACEUR's control over deployment of forces committed to him so that they will be deployed in accordance with NATO plans and can be moved within his area only as a result of his decision. SACEUR would be subject to appropriate political guidance in the exercise of these powers.
(*c*) Strengthening of Annual Review including formal NAC agreement that changes in previously approved force goals and force commitments to NATO should be made only in accordance with the Annual Review process.
(*d*) Agreement on integration of supply and logistics including proposal for international depots (Bogart Plan).
(*e*) Invitation to all NATO members willing to participate but aimed primarily at the Six to form an "Arms Production Pool" going as far as possible in the direction of the EDC provisions. (The US should be ready to indicate a preference for channeling its aid to the Six through such a body rather than directly.)

This program could be agreed and implemented without any modification of the Treaty. It would not, however, be effective unless supplemented by agreement on a new protocol committing signatories not to maintain forces other than those committed to NATO Commanders except for certain specified purposes. Since these would include the right to maintain forces needed to fulfill defense responsibilities in areas other than Europe or outside the NATO area, it should be possible to obtain Senate approval. At the same time this protocol should improve the chances of French and British approval by limiting German forces to those assigned to NATO.

Every effort should be made to reach agreement on this program first with the British and Germans and then with the other EDC countries and Canada in time for a meeting of the North Atlantic Council prior to October 15. At this meeting the Council would approve in principle German membership in NATO. It would also approve a resolution covering very broadly the program outlined above and instruct the Permanent Representatives, working with the military bodies, to draw up detailed documents carrying out the program for approval by the Council at its December meeting. The objective would be to agree in December on a complete program, made as impressive and attractive as possible, for use in securing parliamentary approval of those portions of it for which this is necessary.

2. *Restoration of German Sovereignty*

See attached Tab B [*D*].

3. *European Integration*

Every effort should be made to restore impetus to the movement for European unity. We should continue to support the European Coal and Steel Community and to encourage any other practical steps for economic integration. An effort should be made to move toward a European political community either by reviving the Charter drawn up by the Schuman Plan Assembly last year, or by calling a directly elected European Assembly, in accordance with the Declaration of May 1954, and assigning it the responsibility for drawing up a Charter. France, of course, would be expected to participate in these endeavors. At the NATO Council meeting in early October a strong resolution along these lines should be approved by the Ministers. We should also support a European solution for the Saar along the lines agreed between Adenauer and the preceding French Government.[4]

4. *German Rearmament outside NATO*

If the above fails to obtain French concurrence in German membership in NATO, and in the German defense contribution, we should be prepared to adopt a new position, the essential feature of which should be that it would make it possible to circumvent a French veto. We should work out the substance of this position in advance with the British, but should not discuss it with the French or other powers unless it becomes necessary because of French obstructionism on NATO membership and the defense problem. The French should be informed that the door is always open to French concurrence in the German NATO membership solution or to a revival of EDC. However, it is necessary in the meantime to work out a program for dealing urgently, although less satisfactorily, with the German problem.

The first step in this program would be a joint US-UK request to their respective Joint Chiefs of Staff to review together the strategy for Western defense on the assumption that French cooperation will not be forthcoming. Although a final US position should await the results of this study, we should indicate to the British that we are thinking along the lines of two main steps:

(*a*) Draw up a defense pact among the US, UK and Germany on a basis analogous to the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav pact. This pact would be valid only until a change of circumstances makes possible German admission to NATO or a revival of EDC.

(*b*) Prompt institution of the "interim measures" program for actually getting under way the preliminary training of German forces.

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[4] Documentation concerning European integration, including U.S. policy toward the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Political Community, is presented in volume VI.

This program should be implemented with the primary objective of putting political pressure on the French since it is highly unsatisfactory from the standpoint of obtaining the objectives listed at the beginning of this paper.

Tab D

*Paper Prepared by the Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs (Kidd)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON, September 10, 1954.]

GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY

A. *German Position*

With the rejection of the EDC by the French Assembly, Chancellor Adenauer has given notice that the Germans are no longer interested in the qualified sovereignty they were to have obtained through the Contractual Agreements. In a statement issued on September 1st the Federal Government declared its goal to be "Restoration of sovereighty." The Government gave point to this by adding "Participation in the defense of Western Europe without discrimination" and "juridical regulations, reached by agreement, concerning the stay in West Germany of troops from other countries." Amplifying these points in a radio statement on September 4th, the Chancellor said:

"I want to emphasize this: It goes without saying that in the negotiations on the Federal Republic's sovereignty the obligation of the three Occupation Powers, laid down in the Bonn Conventions, must be maintained to bring about, jointly with the Federal Republic, the reunification of Germany in peace and her integration in the west. . . .[5] I should like to stress the sentence in the statement made by Secretary of State Dulles in which he said that it was impossible in the long run to withhold from the Federal Republic the right to individual and collective defence. It appears to me that this sentence correctly expresses the cardinal issue of the whole matter." [6]

In conversation with Ambassador Conant on September 8th [*7th*], the Chancellor stated that he believed sovereignty could be restored by declaration of the Three Powers lifting the occupation powers. Berlin would remain an exception. He envisaged something like the NATO status of forces agreement instead of the Forces Convention. The latter was the only thing that would require Bundestag action.[7]

[5] Ellipsis in the source text.

[6] The text of Adenauer's radio statement was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 692 from Bonn, Sept. 7 (662A.00/9–754).

[7] For a summary of Conant's meeting with Adenauer on Sept. 7, see telegram 698 from Bonn, Sept. 7, p. 1152.

What the Germans find most unacceptable in the Contractuals are:

(*a*) Stationing of troops as a reserved (occupation) power rather than on the basis of agreement (Article 2, Convention on Relations).
(*b*) The reserved power to protect the security of our troops (Article 2) coupled with the emergency clause (Article 5) of the Convention on Relations. Few legal questions were more heatedly discussed in the Weimar and Hitler periods than the emergency clause, Article 48, of the Weimar Constitution, and the thesis of a Nazi jurist that "sovereignty lies in the power to declare an emergency."
(*c*) Perhaps the "Except by common consent" clause of Article 7 of the Convention on Relations, limiting the Federal Republic's treaty-making powers.
(*d*) Much of the Settlement Convention, as an extension of occupation requirements in another form.
(*e*) The Forces Convention, as discriminating in comparison with the NATO status of forces agreements.
(*f*) The Finance Convention, depending upon the modification of the Forces Convention and the form which the German defense contribution will now take.[8]

B. *U.S. Position*

By the Senate resolution of July 28th [*30th*] we have declared ourselves in favor of restoring German sovereignty.[9] In his statement of August 31st the Secretary said:

"Germany cannot be subjected indefinitely to neutrality or otherwise be discriminated against in terms of her sovereignty including the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Limitations on German sovereignty to be permanently acceptable must be shared by others as part of a collective international order." [10]

There is thus no policy obstacle to recognition of German sovereignty, by agreement or by executive declaration. To be entirely effective, however, and to avoid abrogation of the Occupation Statute by unilateral action, the Federal Republic's sovereign status should be recognized in conjunction with the British and French. There are also certain important collateral agreements with the Germans which should be made firm, and accordingly the timing of any formal act of recognition should be made dependent upon mutually satisfactory conclusion of these agreements. These include, in addition to arrangements for the German defense contributions:

(*a*) Preservation of our rights relating to Berlin (no difficulty anticipated);
(*b*) Preservation of our rights relating to unification and Germany as a whole (no difficulty anticipated);

[8] Documentation concerning contractual relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, including negotiations over the various conventions, is presented in volume VII.
[9] For the text of Senate Resolution 295 approved on July 30, 1954, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 284.
[10] For the complete text of Dulles' statement of Aug. 31, see p. 1120.

(*c*) Satisfactory agreement on stationing of troops (recasting a reserved right into the form of an agreement);

(*d*) Provision for security emergencies if not as a reserved right, at least as a practical arrangement.

(*e*) Parts of the Settlement Convention which have not been overtaken by time (e.g. deconcentration) but in fact needed to be "settled" (e.g. restitution).

(*f*) The substance of the Forces and Finance Conventions, modified to provide for the French in addition to the US and UK. In answer to a German request for a NATO status of forces agreement, a distinction may be made between the type of situation for which this was primarily designed (bases) and the situation in Germany, where sizeable armies in the field are maintained.

C. *Recommended Course of Action*

(1) German sovereignty should be recognized by the US as soon as the form of the German defense contribution and necessary collateral agreements have been worked out.

(2) So far as the Germans are concerned, if the NAC invites the Federal Republic to become in due course a member of NATO (or invites the NATO members to agree to German membership within a specified time), this will in itself amount to recognition of Germany's right to military sovereignty (Wehrhoheit), which will be a great satisfaction to them. At the same time the Occupation Statute will remain on the books until the Three Powers take some further, formal action. The NAC should accordingly invite the Occupying Powers, or the latter should state their intention, to recognize the Federal Republic's sovereignty as soon as suitable arrangements have been made for German defense participation.

(3) With regard to timing, if a period (e.g. 60 days) is allowed for working out NATO controls, conclusion of necessary collateral agreements by the Occupying Powers, and completion of governmental action by the respective NATO states to agree to German membership, the US, UK, and France might time their formal recognition of sovereignty to coincide with their deposit of ratifications. The Department has been informed that French recognition of German sovereignty will probably require Assembly action, and some of the NATO members, including the US, have reserved the right to obtain parliamentary approval of new members in NATO.

(4) With regard to the form, recognition of sovereignty could be accomplished by either a treaty or executive agreement, or by declaration of the respective states. It is believed that there is some advantage in using declarations, so as to avoid the possibility of further delays through negotiations and ratifications. Although tripartite agreement is required for abrogation of the Occupation Statute, the US and UK might be able to hasten French action if they should announce that so far as their respective Governments were concerned, recogni-

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tion of the Federal Republic's sovereignty would accompany their formal agreement to German membership in NATO. The French can of course withhold either consent to NATO membership or recognition of German sovereignty, but this cuts both ways, since the US and UK can render the Occupation Statute inoperative in their zones by recognition of sovereignty.

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PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "S/P Papers, August–October 1954"

*Paper Prepared by Leon W. Fuller of the Policy Planning Staff* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1954.

## US POLICY TOWARD EUROPE—POST-EDC

(May I call your attention to my earlier paper, "An Appraisal of US Policy Respecting Europe" of June 10,[2] written in anticipation of the possible rejection of EDC; most of it, I believe, remains valid.)

### I. THE US STAKE IN EUROPE TODAY

Following the presumed demise of EDC the US must reassess its vital interest in Europe in the new situation. To what degree is our national interest engaged here inevitably and irrevocably?

Defeat of EDC in no way diminishes this interest. We have lost a battle, not a war, and this loss points not so much to the need for withdrawal or retreat, much less surrender, as to a change in tactics, possibly in basic strategy. Our recent setback in SE Asia, despite the very partial and problematical recouping of our fortunes through the SEATO pact, and our still dubious strength in the Near East, make clear how isolated and disastrous our world position would be if Europe were lost. Nor does EDC's defeat mean that our prime objective of European strength through union is at fault or should be discarded. It does mean that we should weigh possible faults in our strategy. EDC failed, in the last analysis, because in the showdown it represented to many Europeans, particularly French, a *US* project to force *premature* federation along *military* lines involving a high risk of ultimate *German* predominance in a European union, and with a too apparent concern for realization of EDC as a device for mobilizing German armed forces. This view of our EDC policy was the more

[1] In response to instructions from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Robert R. Bowie, Fuller wrote a series of brief memoranda every few days following the French rejection of the EDC in which he attempted to pick up "straws in the wind." As a result of this assignment, Fuller drafted several papers on post-EDC U.S. policy toward Europe of which this is one. Copies of Fuller's "Post-EDC European Reactions" of Sept. 3, 9, and 17 are in the PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "L. Fuller chronological". There is no indication on the source text that Bowie gave this paper further circulation outside the Policy Planning Staff.

[2] Fuller's 38-page paper under reference is in the PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "S/P Papers, May–July 1954."

pronounced because recent developments seemed to point to (*a*) the lessened necessity to secure German ground forces for a prospective nuclear war, if war should come, and (*b*) the lessened likelihood, in view of presumed Soviet calculations of their own interests and world strategy, that there would be a general war involving Europe.

The US decision on German rearmament was made in 1950 in the shadow of the Korean oubreak. The decision that must be made in 1954 concerning our next moves on this and related issues must be made in the light of the four-year evolution of the world situation, involving the progressing nuclear revolution in the art of war, the evidences of modified Soviet World strategy, the obvious weakness and incapacity of France, the startling economic and nationalistic evolution of West Germany to potential great power status, the continued aloofness of Britain from the continent, and the growing nationalist disposition of our recovering European allies to resent US ascendancy and to work out national policies of their own. These are the realities which confront us, even through our involvement in Europe and our stake in maintaining it as a strong anti-Soviet bastion of the free world remain also as inexorable realities.

## II. THE HOT WAR DILEMMA

Earlier NATO and EDC planning was in anticipation of a possibly imminent hot war in Europe. Strictly *military* planning, of course, must continue to envisage this eventuality in realistic fashion. But our diplomatic and political strategy vis-à-vis Europe can no longer be guided mainly by consideration of this eventuality, as a point has been reached where, to Europeans, the outbreak of a hot war could only mean utter catastrophe, whatever its formal outcome.

Speculation on this theme is hampered by the difficulty in picturing the "next war" if it comes to Europe. We might assume that the U.S. and Soviet nuclear capacities would cancel each other out by non-use, and the war would be fought with conventional forces only. This would probably mean an early Soviet conquest of Western Europe. But current JCS strategy would seem to mean that U.S. nuclear capacities would be used in strikes against (*a*) major military and industrial objectives within the Soviet orbit, and (*b*) West European objectives (as the Ruhr) in event of their take-over by the Soviets so as to deny additional military capabilities to the enemy. There is the possibility that the Soviets, on the verge or at the inception of war, would seek to bribe the Europeans into non-resistance by offering immunity from air bombardment and even from military occupation. This, if successful, would seem to reduce a war to a long-distance air-atomic exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., by-passing or over-passing Europe. But it seems improbable that in any event, Europe could remain uninvolved for long. Another conceivable pos-

sibility is that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would virtually wipe out each other's nuclear capabilities early in the war, and that from then on hostilities would continue mainly with conventional ground forces in Europe. Furthermore, the development of certain new types of nuclear weapons, such as guided missiles, and of new techniques of nuclear defense, seems now unpredictable in its bearing on a war in Europe.

At any event, the expectations of Europeans of the probable consequences to them of an all-out war are horrendous enough, and with justification. This feeling, in conjunction with their prevailing estimate that a Soviet attack is not likely, their sense of relative weakness, inadequacy and vulnerability in the situation, and their suspicion and cynicism concerning U.S. intentions, creates a difficult situation for us, given our assumption which remains valid that only [by] the creation of massive, pooled strength in Western Europe can our vital objectives then be attained.

The U.S., therefore, would probably do well to "sell" its European defense program to its allies mainly on its merits as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. Our own military strategists must, of course, plan for all contingencies, which may include choices of action in event of a hot war extremely unpalatable to our allies if they were publicized (early retreat to the Rhine or farther west, scorched earth policy in evacuated areas, etc.). But our general position should be that we aim to create the strongest possible collective security structure through NATO, including arrangements for maximum effective use of unconventional weapons, in order to set up a successful deterrent to Soviet aggression. The underlying premise would be that, in event of hot war, this collective security complex would be utilized in accordance with the west military and political judgment in the given situation. How it would be used cannot and need not be pre-judged in advance, and the U.S. would do well to avoid excessive legalistic precautions to insure its "rights" regarding military decisions and actions in Europe, particularly respecting the employment of nuclear weapons. An excess of zeal would probably stimulate violently nationalist reactions and undermine rather than strengthen the edifice of collective military strength and political morale.

If we must be more candid with our European allies as to our expectations and plans for a hot war, we might picture it somewhat as follows. However it comes, if it is clearly the "real thing," we would plan maximum air-atomic strikes at once against Soviet military and industrial centers, communications, and all points of vulnerability where the Soviet war potential might be weakened or crippled. We assume the Soviets would reciprocate against the US in like fashion, but would have far greater difficulties than we due to distance of bases, lesser nuclear capabilities, etc., in delivering a knockout punch. Meanwhile, Western Europe might or might not be invaded by the Soviets

(they might be successful in blackmailing our NATO allies into refuse [*refusing*] cooperation by offering to refrain from atomic bombardment, or even invasion, but in that event we could still deliver massive air strikes against Soviet objectives). In a relatively short phase, characterized by the exchange of atomic blows between the US and USSR, we should be able to do such crippling damage to the Soviet war machine (and its "infrastructure" and sources of supply) that the Soviets either would be in no position to invade Western Europe or to hold it for long if they did (CIA's view). Thus we could assure our allies of two probabilities: (1) that they would not have to suffer a prolonged Soviet occupation, with subsequent destructive "liberation" by us, and (2) that we would not find it a military necessity to adopt a large scale "scorched earth" policy toward Western Europe as a means of denying it to the Soviets.

This, at least, is one concept of a future hot war that might not be too discouraging to our allies, and might induce them to give us their full cooperation in building up our nuclear strategic capabilities in the area.

### III. OUR PRIORITY OBJECTIVES

It would seem futile, on several counts, to make the attainment of absolute European defensibility a priority objective. If ever attainable—which it was not, according to military estimates, even given the full attainment of the Lisbon goals with German forces in being—it seems even less so now as the development of the atomic equation tends to cancel out whatever edge the West has had, due to superiority of atomic armaments. And economic, political and psychological factors all militate against making the attainment of "absolute" defensive capacity in Europe a prime objective.

Therefore the US is driven by logic and reality to place the main emphasis on two cold war objectives (this is on the assumption, pretty well validated today by the best intelligence estimates, both civilian and military, that the Soviets are extremely unlikely to gamble on a hot war at least for the next few years). These are (1) the strengthening of the *deterrent* effectiveness of the NATO military establishment to a maximum degree (which would also increase its potential effectiveness if war did come), and (2) halting any further trend to the disintegration of the free European community and promoting its economic, political and psychological strength through unity within itself and through closer ties with the extra-continental NATO powers (UK, US, Canada).

There are not, of course, new goals, but nothing in recent developments would appear to invalidate them as basic, short and long range, objectives. Recent failures may throw much light, however, on difficulties, methods and tactics, and help us in shaping future policy. In

general, we require a more pragmatic and flexible approach, less dogmatic reliance on any particular concept or project, a less overtly aggressive sort of leadership in relation to our NATO allies, yet with persisting firmness in pursuing really vital objectives, more patience and self-restraint. Inasmuch as the problem is immediately European we should defer to, and encourage European leadership in the inception and implementation of specific plans. We should seek to influence the evolution of European planning and action only in so far as this is essential to harmonize it with the inexorable, minimal purposes of a global strategy in which we are, by necessity, the prime leader and mover.

### IV. SHORT-RUN POLICIES

The above considerations should shape our thinking and planning about Europe and determine our long-range objectives. But we face an emergency and quick decision and action must proceed on a number of aspects of the European situation that cannot wait. The following courses of action are suggested as best fitting the actual situation that now confronts us, with the promise that *any* course now decided upon must evolve pragmatically in a "trial and error" fashion as we progress upon it, and that no "council of perfection" based on philosophic insights however profound can assure us a fool-proof blue print to guide us in a colossal venture in "social engineering" in which we must deal constantly with unforeseeable complexities and human imponderables.

A. *Germany*

It is clear that the status question must be resolved at an early date. We must probably scrap the London protocols and move farther toward a grant of sovereignty by three-power action, qualified only by reservations concerning the conditions of German rearmament, and Berlin and all-German questions. This move should not be clogged with legal or bureaucratic verbiage or thinking but should be sweeping and generous, for its psychological impact on the Germans. "Membership in the club" must be established without quibbling reservations.

As to German rearmament—the actual procedure, not the right, which should be established by return of sovereignty—the U.S. should, first of all, avoid the attitude it has displayed for years, that this is of primary urgency in order to strengthen NATO. We might do well to appear somewhat indifferent, merely assuming that it will come to pass eventually, and not giving France or the Germans themselves any opportunity to blackmail us or pry from us excessive concessions as a price for quick results. We should exert a more restrained influence, in the background, deferring to European leadership and thinking as to ways and means. We should indicate that we want a plan generally

acceptable to *all* our European partners, as the issue is an immediate, life-and-death issue for them.

We might do well to formulate a tentative plan of our own as a background for discussion and negotiation, but not to be set forth with insistence as "our plan." Even this plan should be highly provisional and subject to modification in the developing situation. It could, in general, favor (1) clear establishment of the German *right* to rearm; (2) German admission to NATO; (3) constructive development of NATO in the direction of a more integrated command structure, logistics system, etc., and possibly the exercise of additional powers respecting the size, nature and disposition of NATO forces on the continent; (4) salvaging of elements of EDC through renegotiated arrangements in the general direction of a European arms pool within NATO and conforming to the latter's requirements; (5) supplementing the above with other moves, somewhat as proposed in the British "Document 6." It could be assumed that French acceptance of "2" will be contingent on agreement on some of the subsequent points.

Regarding the German unity issue, I feel that the Germans will continue allergic to it, the Soviets and German Communists will exploit it to the utmost, and that our policy will remain at all times flexible and open-minded enough to comprehend necessary moves on this front. For instance, West Germany in NATO should not be bound to renounce her unification objective, and the diplomatic door should always be left open to renewed negotiation with the Soviets on this issue. There is not the complete incompatibility between our projected Western policy for Germany and hopes for German reunification that some assume, because it is clear that our only prospect for successful negotiation with the Soviets on this matter lies in so strengthening West Germany and integrating it with the West that we have a strong bargaining base from which to operate, and which we do not now have.

B. *France*

We face a grave dilemma here. We must, through our diplomacy, avoid being hopelessly hampered in pursuing our minimal vital objectives in Europe by French veto or serious obstruction, while avoiding, likewise, any policy which would really alienate France and could result only in a weakened and fragmented Europe.

The post-EDC phase has already given France a taste of isolation, and her European allies seem as indignant and determined to move ahead on constructive lines regardless of her opposition as we are. We should, not too overtly, support the tendency to effect France's diplomatic isolation, not to push her out of the club, but to compel her to a realistic reappraisal of her position and policies. We should continue to respect her legitimate and reasonable demands, i.e., those clearly

reflecting her unique national interests, but make clear, without threats, that we and the other NATO powers are going to move ahead to necessary decisions without her if she proves irrationally obstructive. We must gamble on the hope that such diplomacy will prove successful and that France, in the last analysis, will not prove recalcitrant to a suicidal and destructive degree.

In this spirit, and with such tactics, we should move forward to realize the program suggested in III–A above. We should avoid threatening France with ultimate or imposing deadlines, yet be prepared, in the last analysis to go ahead without French concurrence if necessary, with our other NATO allies, in taking essential actions.

C. *Britain*

We should employ our diplomatic resources to induce Britain to work closely with her continental allies in working out plans, and encourage her to exert constructive leadership in the matter (Eden already seems to be moving in this direction).

Feeling that Britain should associate herself more closely and integrally with the continent, we should, nevertheless, avoid "pressuring" her in this respect. Our most effective means here is a demonstration that we, too, recognize the need for closer association on our part and are ready to make certain commitments and sacrifices to this end.

D. *European Integration*

Underlying all our policies and acts should persist the basic concept of a unified free Europe. But we should have learned from our EDC experience to avoid the limelight. There remains a substantial residuum in Europe, even in France, of desire and readiness to move ahead toward a united Europe. We should defer, but helpfully and constructively, to European leadership, recognizing that only plans for association that are developed indigenously and have time to mature in the minds of Europeans, can be ultimately successful. We should largely divorce the European movement, in our own minds and policies, from procedures for securing a German defense contribution. Possibly these procedures can eventually converge with the integration program, but that must come later.

Finally, we must reassess our own relations to an evolving European community, seeking and considering ways and means to establish the maximum ties with this community, even of an institutional nature, that are in conformity with our constitutional limitations and enlightened public opinion. This may be the crux of our whole European policy, and a great institutional [*national*] debate and decision may well be precipitated on this issue if things move to a major crisis. The choice, at such a stage, may be between a radical move toward institu-

tional association with free Europe, and renunciation of our major European objectives and programs.

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751.00/9–1154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, September 11, 1954—2 p. m.

1056. With Parliament adjourned and many deputies away from Paris it is difficult at this juncture to make estimate of political scene in general and of possibility Assembly approving as yet indefinite EDC alternative in particular.

1. Embassy concurs with Deptel 896, September 9 [2] that, whether we like it or not, Mendes is man we will have to deal with on German rearmament issue, on assumption that some alternative plan will be formulated within near future, and believes it unrealistic to hope for resuscitating EDC in substantially old form. Parliament is adjourned until November 3 and no hurdles, apart from German rearmament issue, appear on horizon before appropriations debates in late November and December. Moreover, even though Mendes' majority is incoherent and his stock declined owing to equivocal position on EDC, he still enjoys considerable credit and cannot be easily brought down. Whether or not his majority, especially socialists, will stick with him will probably depend largely on implementation of his economic and social program.

2. On issue of German defense contribution, parliamentary situation as we see it at present is as follows: (It is assumed that new formula would be package deal again entailing both German sovereignty and rearmament.) Opposition to any foreseeable solution, in addition to that of Communists, will be of three kinds: (1) opposition to German rearmament as such, (2) opposition to Mendes, and (3) opposition to any solution which does not encourage European concept. Different groups are motivated by different combinations of the three. Socialist Party is still in throes of internal dissension. Guy Mollet had hoped quickly to oust main culprits—Moch, Daniel Mayer, LeJeune, et cetera—and get remaining anti-EDC deputies to eat humble pie, but is running into serious difficulties. Under circumstances, socialist elements would be strongly inclined to restore party

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it stated that regardless of one's opinion of Mendès-France his strength in the French Assembly did not appear to be greatly diminished and was greater than any other potential premier. While it was recognized that Bidault and Adenauer desired to force Mendès-France out of office, the Department of State believed that working for his downfall seemed destined to destroy the main chance for an early solution to the problem of German rearmament which would involve French cooperation. (751.00/9–754)

unity on basis of policy that would have wide support—namely, opposition to German rearmament in absence of supranational political authority.

MRP are now licking their wounds—leaders such as Tietgen, Bidault and Maurice Schumann all have deepest distrust of Mendes and are threatening to vote against anything he presents. Maurice Schumann is now writing articles warning against revival of German Wehrmacht. They are of course party most devoted to European idea.

Radicals, like UDSR, are split both on Mendes and on German defense contribution. Herriot and Daladier followers can be expected to vote against any plan for German rearmament, and other elements such as Martinaud-Deplat would tend to vote against anything Mendes proposes. Overseas independents would probably go along with Mendes.

Most independents, Peasants and ARS are strongly opposed to Mendes and are prepared to use any issue to bring him down. Majority of Social Republicans would probably accept some formula, if it contains safeguards against unrestricted German rearmament.

3. Assuming his sincerity, which is as yet by no means sure, it is obvious that Mendes is going to have difficult time getting Assembly to approve any alternative plan. Those elements who are opposed to any form of German rearmament without supranational controlling organization and without other guarantees contained in EDC would have to be convinced of merits of new scheme and those who are violently hostile to Mendes would have to be persuaded to put aside suspicions and animosity in view of gravity of international juncture. On this basis possible that independents, peasants, ARS and majority of radicals might be induced to come around. Most difficult to convince will be MRP whose support is necessary and who therefore largely hold key to situation. Any degree of socialist support seems highly questionable.

4. One requirement for success is that not only must Mendes press for rapid Assembly decision but must also give plan his full support including putting question of confidence on issue. Doubtful that possible advantages of his not making it question of confidence, namely to get support from elements hostile to himself, would offset obvious disadvantages. Important therefore that Mendes be given as much role as possible in negotiations for formulating new proposal. Mendes should not be excluded from any international meetings on issue, especially any to which Adenauer invited, as such would only give him easy way out. Mendes should be obliged to take full responsibility for contributing towards formulating feasible plan and for getting Assembly approval as logical sequence to his role on EDC.

DILLON

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower* [1]

TOP SECRET [LONDON, September 12, 1954.]

MY DEAR FRIEND: I promised to keep you fully informed of Anthony's tour.

He had a successful talk yesterday with Benelux Ministers whom he found robust and realistic.[2]

They are disturbed at the growth of nationalism in Germany and fear that the dangers which confront us all are not apprehended by Mendes-France or the French Chamber.

They are agreed on German entry into NATO with such safeguards as we can extract in the present German atmosphere. They are also attracted by the suggestion which Anthony laid before them of modifying the Brussels Treaty so as to admit Germany and Italy. We want of course to keep this idea secret until we can put it to the French.

As to procedure they consider that whilst the NATO Council must be brought in, a preliminary 9 power meeting should be held. They hoped this would take place in London as soon as possible after Anthony's tour, and be followed by a NATO meeting.

Finally they consider that we must proceed rapidly on the lines on which we are all agreed and do what we can to convince the French. But we must be ready to go ahead without France in the last resort (policy of the empty chair presumably) making clear our intentions in Paris in good time.

Kind regards, WINSTON

[1] According to memoranda attached to the source text, this message was delivered to the White House on Sept. 12 with an additional copy delivered to the Department of State the same day.

[2] British Embassy officials delivered a copy of the unofficial transcript of the meeting between Eden and the Benelux Foreign Ministers in Brussels on Sept. 11 to the Department of State with instructions that the transcript be held in strict confidence. The transcript was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation to the Nine-Power Conference as document NPT Special 1 of Sept. 20. A copy of this document is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363.

The Embassy in Brussels also reported on Eden's meeting; its summary is in telegram 268 of Sept. 13 (740.5/9–1354).

*Editorial Note*

In telegram Tedul 30 to Manila, September 8, Secretary Dulles was informed of President Eisenhower's desire that Dulles return from the Manila Conference by way of Hawaii for a short rest, arriving in Denver on Sunday, September 12, for a meeting with the President

followed by a session of the National Security Council. Members of the NSC were summoned to the summer White House in Denver to discuss the problem of the Chinese offshore islands and future policy in Europe following the failure of the EDC. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 350) At the 214th meeting of the National Security Council on September 12, the Council agreed that there was no objection in principle to exploring an increase in the authority of the NATO Council even though such an increase might apply to such forces as the United States might periodically place under NATO Command. This discussion, which occurred in connection with the possible admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO (NSC 160/1), met with the approval of the President (NSC Action No. 1225; S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action—1954"). For the text of NSC 160/1 of August 17, 1953, entitled "U.S. Position With Respect to Germany," see volume VII.

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740.5/9–1354 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET LONDON, September 13, 1954—8 p. m.

1305. I saw Perm UnderSec re Dept Topol 291, rptd London 1451.[2] In reviewing major points in reftel with Kirkpatrick, I attempted to minimize seeming contradiction between Dept's sense of urgency in connection with fixing date of ministerial conference and deliberation with which it approaches question of preliminary discussions either in NAC or in 9 power conference—but without success. Kirkpatrick put his finger firmly on these points and went on to emphasize that HMG had now come to view that Adenauer had been right in not favoring a 9 power meeting until effective preliminary exchanges had taken place, and in conversation with Eden he had advocated further exchanges through diplomatic channels after Eden's return to London.

I believe the British are determined to hold a 9 power conference in London if they possibly can and until they are in a position to fix a date for it they will be most reluctant to fix a date for NATO ministerial meeting. Eden plans to attend NAC meeting Sept 15 and

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] Not printed; it expressed the Department of State's disappointment with the failure of the North Atlantic Council to set a target date and place for an emergency ministerial meeting to discuss possible German membership in NATO. The Department emphasized the great urgency for such a meeting but stressed its view that the Council should not concern itself at this point with the substance of the preparatory work involved. (740.5/9–954)

make an abbreviated report on his findings. I urged that this be not allowed to presage general substantive discussion.

Kirkpatrick was pleased with outcome of Brussels talks, PM's report of which to President was shown me.[3] FonOff has to date only received account of 1st meeting between Eden and Adenauer with which they are also most satisfied.

BUTTERWORTH

[3] Dated Sept. 12, p. 1179.

740.5/9–1354 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT BONN, September 13, 1954—11 p. m.

755. Limit distribution. Murphy and I had long conversation with Chancellor this afternoon and will see him again tomorrow morning before Murphy departs for Belgrade.[1] Chancellor gave us report of his talks with Eden, re which he appeared completely satisfied, but throughout discussion ran thread of his concern re French attitude.[2] Murphy began by saying that Department had naturally been giving much thought to German question, but that Secretary had not wished to take final position until he had received Chancellor's views.

Adenauer replied by reiterating concern re Mendes-France's motives which he had expressed to me so often in past. He then turned to his talks with Eden, and asked Hallstein to give summary of position in which he and Eden had reached agreement in principle.

Hallstein thereupon gave lengthy exposé, in which Chancellor joined from time to time, pointing out two main aspects of problem were restoration of sovereignty and German defense contribution.

Re sovereignty, he said British agreed with German viewpoint that problem could be settled by simple declaration by each of three occupy-

[1] In telegram 684 from Bonn, Sept. 4, repeated to Manila as telegram Tedul 9, Conant recommended that Dulles consider returning from the Manila Conference by way of Bonn because Adenauer was disturbed by his feeling that he was isolated from the source of U.S. foreign policy (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 350). The Department of State replied that neither Dulles nor Merchant would be able to travel to Europe in the near future but that Murphy was on his way to Europe primarily in connection with the Trieste negotiations. Since the Department did not want this reason revealed, Murphy would visit Bonn and elsewhere as a cover; the press would be informed that his trip was planned to discuss problems arising from nonratification of the EDC (telegram 672 to Bonn, Sept. 8; 662A.00/9–354). For a summary of his meeting with Mendès-France, see telegram 1254 from Paris, Sept. 24, p. 1256; documentation concerning Murphy's role in the Trieste negotiations is presented in volume VIII.

[2] For a summary of the Eden–Adenauer meeting provided by the British Foreign Office, see telegram 1309 from London, Sept. 14, p. 1188.

ing powers to effect that occupation status had been ended. Hallstein seemed at first to be arguing that no specific reservation re Berlin and German reunification would be needed in such declaration, but in course of discussion admitted that appropriate language to maintain Western powers' position on these questions vis-à-vis Soviets might be included in declaration. He said it was further agreed status of forces convention would be required along lines of NATO model, but appropriately modified to take account of special situation of troops in Germany, i.e., special facilities arising from stationing in NATO forward area, financing of support costs, etc. It was recognized that negotiation of this convention would take time, and would come into force only with formal German entry into NATO (see below), hence Germans were prepared to accept commitment that in meantime and until Germany membership NATO finalized, allied troops should continue to enjoy rights and privileges presently available to them, as, for example, requisitioned housing. He went on to say that Germans felt declaration and forces convention, taken together, would cover substance of Bonn conventions which had not already been overtaken by events, such as decartelization, restitution, etc., but implied that Germans were prepared to be reasonable re allied desires and insisted that negotiation of this new convention would not be difficult.

Turning then to problem of German rearmament, he said there was agreement on German entry into NATO with self-imposed "safeguards" on nature and character of German rearmament which would reassure Germany's neighbors and at same time preserve as much as possible of EDC. This would mean that Germany would enter NATO with the contingents envisaged under EDC, and would undertake not to change this contribution without the consent of SACEUR, this control being exercised in fact by NATO Council through annual review procedure. (He was explicit that there could be no French veto over initial raising and equipment of German contingents.) As to future questions, he seemed to set great store on power of SACEUR and assumed he would always be an American. He went on to say that Germans were likewise prepared to accept a liberalized version of EDC restrictions on armament production, which would not be discriminatory under "strategic area" concept.

It was also envisaged, Hallstein continued, that mutual guarantee as contained in EDC Treaty would be preserved. On assumption US would not, for constitutional reasons, be party to such guarantee, it could be achieved for six EDC countries and UK by special treaty within NATO framework.

Turning then to time-table, Hallstein said British had insisted on nine-power conference. Germans had given in, and agreed therefore

that this meeting should be proposed for end of next week, with NATO meeting to follow in early October. In this connection, he argued that restoration of sovereignty and first practical steps towards rearmament could not await formal approval of German entry into NATO by all Parliaments concerned, as this ratification process would probably take twelve months. Therefore, it was agreed that steps for restoration of sovereignty should be taken immediately after agreement in principle had been reached by NATO conference, and that at this same meeting agreement should be concluded for early commencement on first essential steps of German rearmament such as infrastructure construction, training of cadres both in Germany and abroad, etc.

In conclusion, Hallstein emphasized need for information as given above to be held most closely until Eden had been able to present to Mendes-France proposals which had been agreed in principle by UK and five EDC powers. He said Benelux and Foreign Ministers had already accepted NATO solution as outlined above, and that Chancellor anticipated Eden would have no difficulty in obtaining Italian concurrence.

Murphy thanked Chancellor for opportunity for discussion, which he said would be most helpful to Secretary. Adenauer then said there were three points which he wished to make. First, acceptance of a NATO solution did not mean that he was giving up on European integration. French rejection of a European Army meant that this concept must be postponed but he would be prepared, and indeed would strive, to merge the German contingents under NATO into a European Army at the earliest opportunity. Secondly, he said Eden had told him of Francois-Poncet's query re Saar this morning (see my 754 [3]). He had thereupon assured Eden that he remained prepared to settle Saar problem on European basis as agreed with Teitgen. He continued to feel that European integration achieved to date, notably CSC, must be preserved and that further steps, including political community and ultimately European Army must be pursued without pause. Thirdly, he wished to emphasize again his concern re French attitude. He felt, he said, it would be important for French to realize that US was "in earnest" as concerns our recent statements of policy. Discussions will be continued with Hallstein and Blankenhorn tonight after dinner. It was evident from conversation that Anglo-German discussions had not gone into great detail on many of points enumerated above, and Murphy and I plan to question Hallstein more closely on German thinking re obvious difficulties in solution of these

[3] Not printed; it summarized Conant's conversation with Eden during which Eden expressed how disturbed he was that François-Poncet should raise the Saar issue as a serious obstacle to any action by the French Assembly on alternatives for the EDC (740.5/9–1354).

problems. Moreover, Chancellor's reiterated concern regarding French attitude raises question whether he really expects French to accept NATO solution, and we shall therefore endeavor to develop further information on this point.

CONANT

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740.5/9–254

*The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Spaak* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 13, 1954.

I wish to thank you for your message to me of September 3.[2] As you know, I have for the last several days been absent from Washington and I am sure you understand my pre-occupation with the problems of the Manila Conference.

I share fully your concern over the gravity of the problems we now face as the result of French rejection of the EDC. We are in process of developing urgently our thinking here on the steps which should be taken next, and receiving your views has been most helpful in this connection. I hope that we will in the very near future be in a position to discuss our views with you. We shall of course want to consult fully with you and your Government well in advance of the forthcoming meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

I am looking forward in particular to discussing this problem with you personally at the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly in New York.

DULLES

[1] This message was transmitted to Brussels in telegram 301, Sept. 13, with instructions that it be delivered to Spaak.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1143.

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359

*Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State*

SECRET [LONDON, September 13, 1954.]

[DEAR FOSTER:] I have been much encouraged by meetings in Brussels and Bonn. The Benelux Ministers and the Chancellor warmly welcomed our ideas. They considered that they provided the right basis for solving the double problem of German association with the West and of a German defence contribution.

2. I explained that our thought was to solve the latter problem by bringing Germany into NATO with such safeguards as could be

agreed on a non-discriminatory basis. I found the Chancellor ready to do his best to provide as effective safeguards as possible. Our Benelux friends also have some useful ideas to supplement our own. I think we now have the foundation for a practical plan which our experts in NATO could work out quickly with German participation.

3. I found that the Chancellor agreed with us in attaching even greater importance to the political problem of ensuring German association with the West through the maintenance in another form of the European conception. We have tried to work out a formula which would enable the United Kingdom to participate equally with France and Germany. We hope we have found it in the extension and adaptation of the Brussels Treaty Organisation with its automatic guarantees of assistance and machinery for political consultation to include Germany and Italy. All this should be within NATO and avoid dangerous duplication of our NATO defence system. Adenauer, Spaak, Beyen and Bech were delighted with this idea and think it should appeal to the French as well as to the Italians.

4. I also had useful talks with the Chancellor on the best way to restore German sovereignty quickly without leaving a legal vacuum, in regard to the many important issues covered by the Bonn Conventions, while preserving the essential Allied rights over Berlin and all-German questions and ensuring that the vital interests of Allied troops in Germany are met. I made it clear, however, that all this would have to be discussed in a wider circle with you and the French.

5. The upshot was that Adenauer is now fully satisfied that basis exists for a successful conference at an early date preparatory to a NATO ministerial meeting in October. We both thought that the smaller group is essential to discuss the Brussels Treaty idea, but all these questions are so interlocked that we cannot hope to make real progress without you. If all goes well in Rome and Paris, a nine power meeting might be held in London next week—say about Sept. 22nd. The Benelux ministers would I know welcome this and I hope very much that you will also agree. I think it would be very helpful if you could come to London a day or two sooner so that we can clear our own thinking together before going into the wider meeting.

6. While all has so far gone better than I could have hoped, Paris may well prove very difficult, although the Chancellor himself was surprisingly optimistic about probable French reactions. We can make no firm timetable until I have seen Mendes-France and I am sure you will realize the importance of keeping this message within a very small circle until I can send you a further message after seeing Mendes-France. I shall also be seeing the NATO permanent representatives in Paris and will I hope be able to remove any misconception that we are

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short-circuiting NATO. I am sure we must proceed with vigour and a sense of urgency and I look to your good counsel and powerful help.

Kindest regards, ANTHONY

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740.5/9–1454 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACT BONN, September 14, 1954.

757. Limit distribution. Regarding my 755.[1] In conversation after dinner last night with Hallstein and Blankenhorn, it quickly became evident that Germans did not in fact expect French to accept NATO solution. Hallstein argued, however, that such solution must be tried out, since British had proposed it, most other powers favored it to greater or less degree, and only method by which it could be eliminated as alternative to EDC was through French rejection.

Hallstein then outlined "third solution" which he said he had discussed briefly with Chancellor, but to which latter had not yet given his approval (although he had reason to believe Adenauer had previously been thinking along same lines). On assumption that French would reject NATO solution, or as seemed more likely, attempt to delay decision on German rearmament, he thought only way out was security agreement between Germany and US and UK modeled on Balkan Pact, which would give Germany somewhat the same indirect relation to NATO as that enjoyed by Yugoslavia by reason of its association with Greece and Turkey. French and, of course, Benelux countries would be invited to join, and door would remain open for French participation at any time. Should French not accept to join in such an arrangement, their position would become all the more isolated and this in turn would bring internal changes which might in the end serve the cause of European unity. He added that it would help if the French got wind of the fact that something along this line was brewing.

At same time, Hallstein did not exclude possibility that, faced with decision of US and UK, to proceed without them, French might return to modified EDC as best solution. He quoted Spaak as saying that if the French were faced with a solution involving German membership in NATO they might well be willing to renegotiate EDC. Spaak had in mind at one time, he said, possibility of calling conference for this

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[1] Dated Sept. 13, p. 1181.

purpose, if NATO solution were rejected by French Assembly, with understanding that agreement must be reached in ninety days, and new solution presented to French Assembly as soon as agreement concluded.

Hallstein expressed opinion that if French reject NATO solution, Benelux countries and Italy would favor arrangement which excluded France if necessary, and added it would be helpful if British "saw it that way." He hopes, in fact, that Eden will give French hint of this possibility. Asked in an aside whether this "third solution" had been raised with British, Blankenhorn said it had been mentioned cautiously; Eden had confined himself to commenting on how terrible predicament would be if French reject NATO solution, but Roberts had intimated British would then be prepared to proceed without French.

Reverting to NATO solution as discussed with Chancellor, Murphy asked if Germans believed French would be willing to end occupation status merely on basis NATO conference agreement in principle. I reminded Hallstein that Mendes-France had given French Assembly commitment to consult it before restoration of German sovereignty. Hallstein admitted this was problematical, but professed to believe that if US and UK were prepared to act, French would come along. He then referred to disappointing election results in Schleswig Holstein, to fact elections in Hesse were scheduled for November, with possibility of further weakening of Chancellor's position, and stressed urgent need for some sort of success for Chancellor. He said early end of occupation status (with Western troops, of course, retaining their present rights until forces convention concluded) was vital. In spite of considerable discussion on this point German proposal remained far from clear to me. Hallstein and Blankenhorn agreed Adenauer's position was safe for some months, possibly six, if there were some encouraging developments in meantime, but both felt that situation was already deteriorating.

I led the conversation into discussion of possibility that Mendes-France's rejection of reasonable NATO scheme might bring about his downfall. Hallstein and Blankenhorn agreed this would be most desirable. As subsequent French Government would undoubtedly take more moderate view German rearmament, but viewed it as improbable. It appears they are not counting on any change of government in France, which seems to be a reversal of Chancellor's implied position of a week ago.

In conclusion Hallstein raised question of US policy in event present British initiative failed owing to intransigence of Mendes-France or

rejection by French Assembly. He argued that it seemed not unlikely French could be brought to take decision only if they were made aware of alternative which faced them by reason of their rejection or postponement of decision and urged that we find some way to let them know what cost would be of further inaction.

CONANT

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740.5/9–1454 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State*[1]

SECRET LONDON, September 14, 1954—1 p. m.

1309. FonOff showed us this morning brief telegram outlining in most general terms Eden's talk with Adenauer as it touched on contractual relations.[2] Adenauer thought easiest way for everybody, including French, was for tripartite powers to renounce in formal declaration their occupation rights. While apparently Adenauer did not specifically say so, he implied that FedRep would issue counter declaration to effect that pending final settlement of forces, finance and other conventions would remain in force.

One thing Adenauer insisted upon was renunciation of emergency clause. Working level FonOff considers this reasonable demand on grounds that with FedRep in NATO all forces would go into action if necessary regardless of any reserved power. Adenauer recognized special position of Berlin.

Germans apparently according FonOff, had not decided how they would prefer to handle agreements revising occupation powers but one thought was that FedRep would declare conventions in force minus certain provisions in each convention. It was agreed that Grewe and Bathhurst, respectively German and British legal experts, would engage immediately in informal talks on matter.

FonOff's impression is that Adenauer is reasonable about contractuals and anticipates no great trouble. In fact, it is from British military that FonOff anticipates real trouble on question of status of forces agreement.

BUTTERWORTH

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[1] Repeated to Bonn and Paris.

[2] In telegram 1317 from London, Sept. 14, the Embassy supplemented the information provided in the source text by noting that Adenauer was "very forthcoming on accepting the limitations on German rearmament to be embodied in either Brussels agreement or NATO," provided they dealt with the following points: Limitations on the size of the force, undertaking to refrain from manufacturing certain types of atomic weapons and guided missiles, and rationalizing war material production. (740.5/9–1454)

740.5/9–1454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, September 14, 1954—2 p. m.

1078. In talking with Senator Wiley yesterday Mendes-France devoted at least half an hour to defending his course on EDC along now familiar line that previous governments had misled us as to prospects but been unwilling to put treaty to test. He alone had been honest, had been willing to force issue, had known it could pass only if modified in accordance with his Brussels proposals on which no one could help him although they affected only procedure and not substance of EDC.

As to future, he held objectives of EDC could be accomplished by means which would avoid its two basic defects: (1) Lack of British participation and (2) too much supranationality too suddenly. Curing second should help cure first. British participation, even if not complete, was key to French ratification. There must also be some commitment as to maintaining of British troops on continent. He would rather listen to Eden than make proposals himself but he nevertheless had a draft ready. We commented that he had said previous French governments had misled us as to French opinion but now he was predicating future course on British commitments which British Government had consistently refused to give. Had there been recent change in British position?

He stated he understood British reluctance but removal of supranational features of EDC should make great difference and each government must make new effort to achieve EDC objectives. Asked how US might help, he replied that it could pressure Britain at proper time. Asked whether NATO framework could not provide solution he said NATO provided the necessary outer structure but that there must be seven-nations interstructure as well.

Senator Wiley expounded forcefully the effect French rejection of EDC had had in increasing Neo-Isolationist sentiment in Congress and his own conviction that peace and survival of the west depended upon achievement of greater unity.

Last night at Mendes small dinner for Wiley (other guests were Letroquer, Moustier, Parodi and Senator Maroger) again expressed concern at extent to which he was counting on new British commitments. He said he knew they would not come in "all the way" but was confident his views provided basis for negotiation and would not be wholly rejected. Senator Maroger was equally insistent that British participation was key to French approval of any solution on Germany.

DILLON

[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BONN, September 14, 1954—6 p. m.

771. Limit distribution. Murphy, Dowling and I saw Chanc, Blankenhorn and Hallstein again this morning for nearly an hour. Chanc emphasized gravity of European situation, spoke again about his distrust Mendes-France and difficulties Chanc faced in Germany. He emphasized need for ending occupation status soon as possible.

In this connection we went over again some points yesterday's discussion with Chanc[1] and last night with Blankenhorn and Hallstein.[2] Chanc wishes declaration three occupying powers ending occupation except for (*a*) Berlin, (*b*) responsibilities reunification Germany, (*c*) for time being status of troops, but desires this status be given another name. He agreed that his objective was to dissolve High Commission, have Embassies replace High Commissioners' offices, eliminate veto on constitutional amendments and eliminate Military Security Board. In connection with this Board, he told story of French veto on expansion certain industry which was rescinded after negotiation between German and French concern. I had heard same story some months before and do not doubt there may be basis for his implied charge French were using MSB from time to time to further certain French commercial interests. In addition removing these occupation restraints, Chanc emphasized important psychological effect which could only occur if Allies declared occupation at an end.

Early in discussion Chanc raised frank question what was U.S. prepared do if Mendes-France refused NATO solution and ending occupying status. Discussion turned to Hallstein's outline his third scheme, which he had given us last night as being unofficial. Murphy said without committing Secy or Govt, he could say some of thinking in State Dept had been along similar lines. He felt that this discussion and his knowledge Chanc's views would help Secy reach decision which had not yet been possible because of his absence in Manila. In response to direct question, Chanc and Hallstein said discussion with British of what to do if French refused to accept second alternative, namely membership in NATO, had been very tentative and no details considered. (Preferred scheme, it must be remembered, is EDC, and Chanc repeated his preference for this and belief that after election

[1] For a summary of this meeting with Adenauer during the afternoon of Sept. 13, see telegram 755 from Bonn, Sept. 13, p. 1181.

[2] For a summary of this evening meeting with Blankenhorn and Hallstein, see telegram 757 from Bonn, Sept. 14, p. 1186.

May 1956, France would be prepared for integration German Army into European army, but said France could not hold up defense of Europe that long.)

It was opinion all participants in conversation that significance of a third scheme such as outlined Hallstein last night was in first instance to put pressure on France to accept NATO solution as outlined Eden–Adenauer talks. Chanc seemed to be of opinion that time for U.S. to step in with its pressure would be immediately after Eden–Mendes-France conversation if Mendes-France were obdurate or if he proposed further conditions such as Saar settlement.

My personal opinion in comparing conversations yesterday and today with talks last week with Chanc and Hallstein is as follows:

Germans seem less inclined to hope NATO solution inacceptable Mendes-France would result overthrow his government followed by modified EDC solution, though Chanc still emphasizes importance European idea Schuman Plan and eventual formation European army. Chanc seems more urgent about some dramatic political gesture ending occupation. Clearly wishes this to be accomplished without Bundestag action such as would have been involved had London protocol route been followed. Chanc has retreated from his belief that mere declaration of intent to limit German armament would be sufficient basis of responsible plan to present to French and has come to view of modified NATO Treaty. To meet obvious objection this plan that long delay and much negotiation required, he proposes to get political benefits by end of occupation status in return for agreement on principle by French. It would be my view if Mendes-France at all moved to accept NATO solution prompt action his Assembly should be forced and at same time Chanc should be required to place a status of forces convention before his Bundestag, a modified Bonn convention but with a different name and with the most objectionable feature from his point view removed, namely reserved powers which created a special status for Ambassadors U.S., U.K., and France.

CONANT

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740.5/9–1454

*President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 14, 1954.

DEAR WINSTON: Your report on the progress of Anthony's tour is very helpful to me.[2] It is encouraging to know that the Benelux

[1] This message was transmitted to London in priority telegram 1485, Sept. 14, with instructions that it be personally delivered to Churchill.

[2] This is a reference to Churchill's letter of Sept. 12, p. 1179.

people are thinking along constructive and realistic lines. We will look forward to the more detailed account of your proposals which Anthony has promised to send Foster at the end of his tour.

In the meantime, we are trying to pull together some useful ideas to contribute with respect to both the plan for German membership in NATO and a course of action in the unhappy event that the French refuse to go along. I feel that you and we should agree on this latter point as soon as possible since I am not certain that anything less drastic will bring the French to their senses.

With kindest regards, D[WIGHT] D. E[ISENHOWER]

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740.5/9–1454

*The Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Eden* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 14, 1954.

DEAR ANTHONY: I appreciate your keeping me informed of developments on your travels.[2] I am glad that you feel progress was made at Brussels and Bonn and I agree with you that Paris is where the greatest difficulty is in store.

I gather that the proposal regarding entrance of Germany into NATO which you are putting forward to our friends follows the line of Document 6 of the Study Group which met in London last July. I do not think that our thoughts are far apart on this general approach on the modalities of this matter. I realize that we have not yet given you in any formal or official fashion our comments on this document but I hope to do so soon after taking into account the views of our military.

I do however have certain firm convictions which influence all my thinking on tactics and methods. The first is that we must restore full sovereignty to Germany and do it promptly. I agree with Adenauer that the time is past when the position could be held by placing the contractual agreements in effect. From this it would follow that any secret limitations or conditions on German rearmament which were imposed or gave the appearance of being imposed on Germany would be a dangerous error. A voluntary and public declaration of self-imposed limitations would of course be another matter.

My second conviction is that we can only make Europe a perma-

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[1] The source text was transmitted to Rome in niact telegram 880, Sept. 14, with instructions that it be personally delivered to Eden who was there for talks with the Italian Government; the text was repeated in telegrams to Paris, London, and Bonn.

[2] This is a reference to Eden's letter to Dulles of Sept. 13, p. 1184.

nently secure place by merging significant governmental functions, including French and German, into supranational institutions. This was always to me the most important aspect of EDC. I hope we will not lose sight of this purpose and objective in seeking arrangements to restore German sovereignty including her right to participate in her own defense. Any arrangement which fails to move along on this European road I would regard as a makeshift and one which we on this side of the ocean would have to examine very carefully. I know that our Congress feels very strongly about this phase of the matter.

This leads me to another point on which I must confess some puzzlement. This is your reference to the Brussels Treaty and its enlargement to bring in Italy and Germany. As traditional treaties go I have always felt Brussels to be a good one but I read nothing in it of a supranational character nor can I see that its enlargement merely in terms of membership would add anything to the North Atlantic Treaty. If on the other hand your thought is to invest it with supranational features so that it might become in fact a true substitute for EDC, I would be deeply interested in your thoughts on this subject.

Now for your suggestions regarding a Nine Power meeting in London, I have felt, as you know, that it was a mistake to go into any such meeting without adequate spade work in advance. Some of this you are now of course doing. I have also felt and I gather that you agree that such a meeting should be considered as a preliminary to the special meeting of the North Atlantic Council which on August 31 I suggested be convened. The French rejection of EDC has created a situation of gravity for the entire membership of NATO and it is right that we should all meet together. I welcome your suggestion that before any London meeting you and I have the opportunity to spend some time together. I also feel I should see Adenauer since he has indicated to me his desire for such a meeting.

The date you suggest of September 22 for the 9-power meeting in London makes difficulty. I do not feel that I can go into that meeting and adequately represent the US position unless I have first talked with you and with Adenauer and then have an opportunity to digest what I learn and to discuss the resultant position with the President and with our Defense people. Without that I could only play the role of an observer and I gather that you and the others would want something more than that. Also, as you know, the General Assembly opens in NY on September 21 and I feel that there is some embarrassment in staging a major meeting in London which would attract many of the Ministers who would ordinarily take part in the General Assembly general debate.

My suggestion is that I should leave here tomorrow, Wednesday afternoon, for Bonn and spend the afternoon and evening with Adenauer if he is free, then come on to London and spend Friday with you if you are free, coming back Friday night, which would give me a weekend of rest which I need rather badly. Then I could take part in the general debate at the UN and have my talks in Washington with the possibility of returning for the 9-power conference during the succeeding week if you felt it could wait until then.

Please let me know immediately your reaction as this program would require me to leave a few hours after you get this message.

Sincerely yours, FOSTER

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Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower* [1]

TOP SECRET [LONDON, September 14, 1954.]

MY DEAR FRIEND: You will have seen the messages which Anthony sent Foster last night on his talks in Bonn.[2] Anthony found Adenauer in fairly good health and as quick as ever, though aged since their last meeting. Adenauer much liked the Brussels Treaty idea which he described as a most happy thought and psychologically valuable as providing a focus for European policies and keeping alive German youth's faith in the European idea. It was also important he thought to devise means of saving Mendes-France's plight.

We must now see how the talks in Paris go, but on present form it looks as if there will be plenty to discuss with Foster if, as we hope, he can pay us a visit.

Kind regards, WINSTON

[1] According to a memorandum attached to the source text, Churchill's message to President Eisenhower was delivered to the White House on Sept. 14. The White House staff sent a copy of the message to the Department of State the same day.

[2] This is a reference to Eden's letter to Dulles of Sept. 13, p. 1184.

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740.5/9–1554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, September 15, 1954—1 p. m.

1096. Re Embtels 1056 September 11, and 1078 September 14.[2]

[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Brussels.

[2] Both *ante*, pp. 1177 and 1189, respectively.

Events of immediate future should throw considerable light on Mendes' sincerity. When talking with him on September 13 we had not yet seen report of Eden–Benelux talks and were unaware how far British were prepared to go re Brussels Treaty and were therefore concerned at extent to which Mendes seemed to be putting his eggs in British basket. Our feeling was that if he were sincere in seeking practicable alternative to EDC, certainly British participation would be major element in securing acceptance by French Assembly. It seemed on other hand that if he were insincere, he might well be laying groundwork for another Brussels meeting like his last one, i.e., if Britain would not go as far as French desire in new arrangement with France and Germany, he could again say in effect, "I knew what was essential for Assembly approval and did my best to get it but no one would help me".

Jebb states Eden had mentioned Brussels Treaty to Massigli just before his departure and Massigli had stated Mendes was thinking along similar lines. So far indications are therefore that he is acting in good faith. If by chance he is not, this should quickly become apparent during his talks with Eden.

Principal question is whether Mendes will accept German membership in NATO as well as in Brussels Treaty. At first view French politicians will undoubtedly consider latter as modification of little NATO concept and will grasp it as alternative rather than supplement to former as Schuman did with EDC. However, events since 1950 and uncertainty as to French and other European policies in future make it more important than ever that Germany be in framework where it is directly linked with US, an advantage which other great advantages of EDC make us willing to forego temporarily but which could hardly be foregone in favor of Brussels Treaty.

In any event French acceptance will depend primarily upon provisions for limitation and control, whether embodied in NATO mechanism, revised Brussels Treaty or elsewhere.

DILLON

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110.11 DU/9–1554

*The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Mendès-France* [1]

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1954.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This is just a brief note to let you know that I plan to make a quick visit to London and Bonn Thursday and

[1] The source text, drafted by Merchant, was transmitted to the Embassy in Paris in niact telegram 954 of Sept. 15 with instructions that it be delivered to Mendès-France as a personal message.

Friday. I regret that time is so short because it will not permit me to stop over in Paris to talk with you much as I would like to do so. However I hope that we will have this opportunity very shortly when we meet either in London or in New York at the UN.

Until then, with best wishes,[2]

Sincerely yours, FOSTER DULLES

[2] In telegram 1098 from Paris, Sept. 15, Ambassador Dillon informed the Department of State that the message was delivered and that the effect of omitting Paris from the Secretary's itinerary "will be salutatory" (110.11 DU/9–1554).

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740.5/9–1554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, September 15, 1954—9 p. m.

1115. For Secretary from Achilles. Re Embtel 1112.[2] Mendes-France just sent for me to say he was deeply hurt by your message [3] and that while he realized he was personally blamed by American opinion for Assembly's rejection on EDC, he felt that any question of "punishment" was less important than future results and that he believed your omitting Paris would harm his and Eden's efforts to work out constructive solution.

I said I would transmit his views to you immediately and that I would not presume to question his estimate of effect on French opinion. At same time I could express personal belief that Washington felt Paris was taking American reaction to rejection of EDC much too complacently and had little conception of lateness of hour with respect to American relations with Europe. Mendes denied any complacency and reiterated he was doing his best to bring about constructive solution but that your failure to come would make his task more difficult. I said that if his talks with Eden went very well, it might be good reason for you to change plans and visit Paris.

Press has of course shown keen interest in subject. Your decision has already had strong effect on Mendes and will no doubt have considerable public effect through tomorrow morning's press. Will send further estimate of situation to Bonn tomorrow.

DILLON

[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.
[2] See footnote 1, *infra*.
[3] This is a reference to Dulles' letter to Mendès-France, Sept. 15, *supra*.

110.11 DU/9–1554

*Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, September 15, 1954.

[DEAR FOSTER:] I saw the French Prime Minister this afternoon. Our talks have been interrupted for half an hour and I will send you an account of them later. Meanwhile I think you should know that he said that he was much disturbed that you should contemplate visiting London and Bonn and not Paris.

He said that this would have a bad effect on French opinion which would resent the exclusion of France. French would understand your reasons for wishing to go to the Assembly but would find it difficult to think that the dates were so exact.

[Kindest regards, ANTHONY]

[1] This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1112 from Paris, Sept. 15, with Eden's "apologies for even giving appearance of offering advice".

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 375

*Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State* [1]

[PARIS, September 15, 1954.]

[DEAR FOSTER:] I received your message [2] just as I was on the point of leaving Rome. I shall be glad to see you in London on whatever day would suit you. The dates September 27 and 28 which you suggest for the preliminary nine power conference should, I think, prove possible. We too had hoped that the E.D.C. would be passed. But every country now agrees that as things are there is no present possibility of reviving the supranational idea. We must encourage other forms of European unity.

[Kindest regards, ANTHONY]

[1] The source text was given to Dulles by British Ambassador Makins during a meeting at noon on Sept. 15. A memorandum of this conversation, prepared by Merchant, is in Department of State file 740.5/9–1554.

[2] This is a reference to Dulles' letter of Sept. 14, p. 1192.

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110.11 DU/9–1554

*President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill* [1]

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1954.

DEAR WINSTON: Thank you very much for keeping me posted with

[1] The source text was transmitted to the Embassy in London in priority telegram 1514 of Sept. 15 with the instruction that the Ambassador personally deliver the message to Churchill.

reference to the European developments and the talks which Anthony is having.[2] As you probably know by now, Foster is leaving today to have a quick trip where he will talk with Anthony and also with Adenauer. This will help us to make our own plans. Foster will carry to you our latest thinking on these matters.

With warm regard, IKE

[2] This is a reference to Churchill's letter of Sept. 14, p. 1194.

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740.5/9–1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn*[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, September 16, 1954—10 p. m.

249. Mendes-France gives us foll summary of his talks with Eden: German membership in NATO had always been unpopular in France and had come to be regarded as that evil which EDC was designed to avoid. Accordingly he had hoped German membership in Brussels Treaty might provide satis alternative. However, other parties to Brussels Treaty, U.S., Canada and apparently all other NATO countries disagreed and felt German membership in NATO essential. He had accordingly sought with Eden ways and means of making this palatable to French opinion and they had agreed it cld best be done thru developing Brussels Treaty.

Brussels Treaty wld be utilized primarily as a substitute for EDC; it wld have two great advantages of Brit membership and that it was not supranational. Some nondiscriminatory controls over armament were essential, voluntary renunciation by Adenauer wld carry little weight in France and NATO was not structurally designed for control. Therefore Brussels Treaty shld be used. It must not be merely paper control or window dressing but must have real substance. It must also offer hope for the development of political integration in Europe and perhaps the development of supranational features in time. There wld be no question of setting up new administrative machinery under the Brussels Treaty; there wld be political discussion and decisions by Brussels Treaty Council but NATO machinery wld be utilized to administer controls. Brussels Treaty must be presented to Assembly as substitute for EDC and as an assurance there wld be no independent Wehrmacht.

This solution wld entail no delay. German membership in NATO wld of course require approval of French Assembly and Brussels Treaty modifications wld take no longer. He and Eden had agreed that

[1] Repeated to London and to the Department of State as telegram 1135, which is the source text.

experts shld be given one month to produce specific document which shld be clear, simple and not comprise more than twenty articles.

In response to question as to how tightly revised Brussels Treaty and German membership in NATO were to be linked to avoid danger of Assembly accepting one and rejecting other, he replied they wld be presented to Assembly in single document and two wld take effect simultaneously.

It had been agreed that Eden wld convoke nine-power mtg in London Sept 27 or 28 and that NAC ministerial mtg shld be held in late Oct or perhaps beginning November and that every effort wld be made to complete parliamentary action by all parliaments concerned before end of year. Mendes expressed hope this wld be satisfactory to us since action shld have been take by time Congress reconvenes.

In response to question whether he considered this solution one for which he cld wholeheartedly seek Assembly approval, he said it definitely was such a solution and that while details must still be worked out, political problems wld be difficult and he did not wish to appear too optimistic, he thought there was reasonable chance of success. He did not wish appear egotistic but felt he had better chance of getting it through than wld someone else. He said he wld need help from all concerned including U.S. He inquired whether there was any change in your plans and was advised that there had not been but that this information wld be communicated to you immed.

Before his departure for airport, Eden had time merely to tell us that he considered outcome as being as good as cld be expected and considerably better than he had anticipated yesterday.

On returning from airport Jebb gave us more detailed account which confirms that given us by Mendes. Additl points were that Eden had emphasized Gruenther's opinion that NATO machinery cld be effectively utilized for operational and logistical control. (Gruenther cabling full account.) Mendes had repeatedly indicated sensitivity to being isolated and alone and it was only late this afternoon that his apprehension as to again being alone at nine-power mtg in London had been assuaged. Eden had agreed to use his influence with other Brussels Treaty and NATO members to bring about solution along above lines. Eden wishes to discuss this personally with you.

Your announced decision to omit Paris had had very satisfactory effect but this unexpected satisfactory outcome of Eden–Mendes talks does, we believe, change situation. In circumstances, we recommend that if possible you plan to come here tomorrow evening, even if you cld only spend an hour or two. Eden and Jebb, while reluctant to offer suggestions, believe it wld be useful if you cld stop here.

DILLON

740.5/9–1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn* [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, September 16, 1954—9 p. m.

248. For Secretary and Conant. Following message from General Gruenther:

"In noon meeting today with Eden at British Embassy, he outlined proposal made during current tour. Brussels treaty to be expanded to include Italy and Western Germany. In this way British satisfy French requirement for more firm British commitment to continent. Also there will be created nucleus of organization which may eventually develop along lines EDC. Simultaneously Germany would be admitted to NATO.

Reception from Benelux Foreign Ministers exceeded expectations. They were all enthusiastic. Adenauer personally delighted. Roberts met with Adenauer's advisors regarding certain safeguards which might be expected of Germans and found them generally in a most cooperative mood. Meeting in Italy was also most satisfactory.

In all places however, Eden found certain lack of confidence in Mendes-France and his sincerity of purpose.

Meeting with Mendes-France has thus far been unsatisfactory. In first session Wednesday afternoon, Mendes-France presented a series of EDC type conditions to Brussels treaty so complicated that months of negotiations would be required. Eden told Mendes-France that they were unacceptable. In after-dinner meeting Wednesday night, he found Mendes-France slightly more receptive. After 11 o'clock Council meeting this morning Mendes-France told Eden that he had considered carefully all that Eden had said in two meetings yesterday. He had slept little last night, and early this morning he summoned his staff to consider matter further. He was now of opinion that it is desirable to consider admission of Germany to NATO. To get this by French Parliament, however, would be difficult matter. He needed Eden's help in strengthening Brussels treaty set-up to present plan in favorable light. Eden was to see Mendes-France again this afternoon to continue discussions.

Eden said he felt SHAPE could make significant contribution safeguard problem. I told him that in controlling operations German forces there was considerable we could do if decision made gives us such responsibility. If manufacture of armaments, there is nothing we could contribute. As example of logistics control we might control jet fuel oil supply through pipeline system. Similarly with respect general supplies there was much we could accomplish if authority given.

I told Eden I doubted Mendes-France has consulted French military leaders on safeguard problem. I discussed matter with Juin last night and found him in liberal frame of mind. Juin thinks controls exercised over Germans need only be modest ones.

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[1] Secretary Dulles was in Bonn for meetings with Adenauer Sept. 16–17. This telegram was repeated to London for Aldrich and to the Department of State as priority telegram 1134, which is the source text.

Eden said it was clear to him as result of yesterday's discussions that Mendes-France wants to build up Brussels treaty and soft pedal significance German admission to NATO. If his philosophy in this respect remains unchanged, problem will be difficult one. Eden told Mendes-France that only real control over German forces will come from having Germany in organization with United States. He will press this point further this afternoon.

Several times Eden told Mendes-France his one great fear is peripheral strategy and fortress American concept. At dinner last night Boris told Roberts there was no danger of United States withdrawal.

I asked Eden if decision is taken to hold nine-power meeting at London on September 28, what kind of advance agreement would Eden be able to get from Mendes-France re German admission NATO. Eden replied best he could expect would be Mendes-France would agree to discuss subject. I told him I thought this was not good enough, and I felt conditions Mendes-France would advocate should be thoroughly understood prior to conference. Eden said he thought this was not feasible. Object of conference would be to present such views. I replied I thought staff work had to be more thorough than that or there would be danger of conference failure. He gave impression he was willing take chance on that because he was almost certain of agreement of eight members. If French are again in minority of one, their position would be impossible one.

Eden also stated that in event French refused adopt reasonable point of view, British are willing proceed without them. Eden's general attitude was pessimistic. Apparently he felt his success at Brussels, Bonn and Rome justified high hopes for Paris meeting and his disappointment was manifest. Several times he stated 'isn't it a sad situation that fate of Europe should be based on considerations such as these'."

DILLON

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740.5/9–1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn* [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, September 16, 1954—10 p. m.

250. For Secretary and Conant. Foll is second message from Gen. Gruenther:

"During Eden luncheon today De Margerie said he is depressed over present situation with respect to German problem. French PriMin faces almost unsolvable difficulties. Because of bitterness which has developed in French Parliament, no solution has good chance of being approved by Parliament at this time. Because of this complication, Mendes-France considers his best strategy is to lay great emphasis on Brussels Treaty angle. This must be given extensive 'window dressing' far out of proportion real merit to secure parliamentary support.

[1] Repeated to London for Aldrich and to the Department of State as priority telegram 1136, which is the source text.

"I asked him what he meant by 'window-dressing.' He said there wld have to be certain control organs under Brussels Treaty for insuring safeguards French Parliament considers necessary. One of these wld be control of armaments, very similar to Article 107 of EDC Treaty. He is against duplicating military mechanisms and emphasizes that in final analysis real strength of controls wld lie in NATO.

"I asked De Margerie if PriMin envisaged simultaneous admission to NATO. De Margerie said he cld not answer this question definitely but he thought PriMin wld attempt secure admission of Germany to NATO simultaneously with strengthening of Brussels Treaty. He said he thought Mendes-France wld make this a confidence issue, but he personally believed the Parliament wld reject it.

"I asked De Margerie if he thought there was anything to be gained in having a NATO organization exercise certain safeguard functions. He said this wld help but that problem of gaining popular support in Parliament wld still be major one, regardless of safeguards enacted.

"De Margerie said he saw Maurice Schumann recently and Schumann greeted him with, 'What is this Brussels Treaty nonsense? We are going to shoot you down hard on this point.' De Margerie answered it was largely window dressing, and Schumann replied, 'of course it is, but we are going to shoot you down just the same.'

"De Margerie ended on a very pessimistic note expressing his low opinion of Parliament. He feels there is no solution short of new election."

DILLON

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740.5/9–1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn*[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, September 16, 1954—9 p.m.

151 [*251*]. For Secretary and Conant. Foll is third and final message from Gen. Gruenther:

"Foreign Min Lange of Norway attended Eden luncheon today. He told me he had 30-minute mtg with Mendes-France this morning in which Mendes outlined his current thinking.

"Mendes desires extension of Brussels Treaty. Lange asked if Norway wld be welcome, and Mendes replied, 'Certainly, the more the merrier.'

"Under Brussels Treaty organization he envisaged safeguards wld be imposed as folls:

"*a.* Limitation on size of armed forces of member nations.
"*b.* Common procurement system for all military supplies.
"*c.* Limitation on manufacture of arms according to zones.

"Thus there wld be a forward zone in which only very limited manufacturing wld be authorized. Limitations on zones farther to rear wld be less stringent. Much of Article 107 concept was involved.

[1] Repeated to London for Aldrich and to the Department of State as priority telegram 1137, which is the source text.

"Lange asked Mendes whether he envisaged admission Western Germany into NATO. Answer was affirmative altho not entirely convincing.

"Lange got impression Mendes sincere in desire for German participation. Mendes emphasized several times it was absolutely essential for future of North Atlantic Alliance that there not be another defeat in French Parliament and that he was bending all his efforts to avoid that unfavorable result."

DILLON

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740.5/9–1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET ROME, September 16, 1954—10 p. m.

1071. Following is composite report on Eden visit to Rome including substance my talk with Piccioni September 16:

Italian position on post-EDC situation which was agreed on by Scelba and Piccioni September 13 was as follows:

1. Italy faithfully and strongly adhered to principle of European integration which is keystone Italian European policy and it was highly important to find adequate alternative to EDC in integration framework.
2. German rearmament should be brought about with adequate safeguards and controls and this could probably best be handled by German admission to NATO.
3. Concrete means must be found to eliminate fear which French, and to lesser extent British, have regarding prospect of being dragged into another world war over German unification question. Italy did not believe French feared German rearmament as such, but linked question with possibility another world war.
4. Italy believed existing European bodies such as CSC OEEC and Council of Europe should be strengthened as part of eventual process leading to political integration.

Eden believes that interested European countries should agree on three substantive and procedural points:

1. Termination of occupation regime but with special provision for Berlin situation and immediate restoration of German sovereignty. Italians expressed full agreement with this point which they believed has great merit.
2. German contribution to Western defense must be provided within framework of such limitations and conditions as Germany might accept along line of those foreseen in EDC treaty. Important that limitations should be freely given by Germany and should not be discriminatory measures.
3. Necessary find formula to remove vacuum created by EDC failure. Eden thought best way would be revive 1948 Brussels Treaty, to provide for entry Germany and Italy, to modify it in such way as to give new direction to a Western European unity and to remove present obvious contradictions. Eden indicated that Benelux countries and

[1] Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, Luxembourg, Brussels, and The Hague.

Adenauer had expressed general agreement this idea and considered that Brussels Treaty would provide way toward new undertakings between UK and six former EDC countries. Regarding military aspect Eden thought that NATO offered best means to provide close military association herewith Western Europe and to make possible adequate controls and limitations on German rearmament. Eden said he envisaged simultaneous German entry into Brussels Treaty and NATO, but was evasive in answering Italian questions as to what he meant by simultaneous. Italians consequently wonder whether Brussels Treaty device might in fact lead to long delays in connection with German rearmament. On other hand, Piccioni told me that Italy had accepted idea of Brussels Treaty as uninitiative which "did no harm".

Eden said that key to situation lay in Paris and he hoped that if Paris would agree with his plan other countries such as Norway and Denmark might give their adherence to Brussels Treaty. Eden indicated he was not as optimistic as Adenauer regarding French attitude since unfortunately French Parliament was too ready to find negative rather than positive majority. In reply to Piccioni's questions as to what would happen if French did not agree to building up of Brussels Treaty as EDC substitute and providing for German admission into NATO, Eden said that best way perhaps would be for five former EDC countries and UK to proceed on their own but leaving door open for possible future French participation. Eden indicated that Adenauer shared his view.

Eden told Piccioni he was in close touch with Washington and was keeping Secretary Dulles advised of his soundings on this trip. He emphasized that Europe must not make mistake of believing US patience is endless and must not fall into trap of thinking that Europe is indispensable to US. Eden stressed that every effort must be made to avert possible American abandonment of Europe. Eden said he hoped that his talks in Paris would make it possible to call eight or nine power conference in London before end of September. Piccioni made point that it would be serious error to repeat Brussels conference mistake and hoped adequate advance preparations could be made to establish basis for discussions. Eden replied that he hoped French attitude would make conference possible and said he thought such conference would be useful to examine Brussels Treaty modifications and revisions. He emphasized that London conference would be only prelude to important future NAC meeting.

Italians appeared to be particularly impressed by British stress on their intention to participate fully with other Western European nations in any alternatives to EDC. In final communiqué (Embdes 516, September 16 [2]) British had insisted on use stronger Italian language to emphasize their sharing in European situation.

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[2] Not printed; it relayed to the Department of State the text of the official communiqué following the Eden–Piccioni meeting of Sept. 14 (033.4165/9–1654).

Piccioni asked me what US attitude was regarding present post-EDC situation. I told Piccioni that US position not yet definitive and referred him to Secretary Dulles statement of August 31 as representing basic US position.

*Comment:*

I believe that the Italians are genuinely pleased by Eden visit to Rome since it is useful public expression of important Italian role in continental developments. Italians are also willing to agree to almost anything which will bring about German contribution to Western defense. They frankly do not believe Eden will get very far in Paris with his plan but certainly wish him well and have authorized him to tell Mendes that British and Italian positions are in effect identical. Privately Italians are suspicious of British moves and one senior Foreign Office official has even gone so far as to suggest British are purposely procrastinating on German rearmament in effort to regain initiative in European politics. It is clear that Italians do not know what Mendes-France wants and they do not see how Brussels Treaty–NATO solution can offer acceptable way out to French. However, Italians have no proposals of their own to offer.

LUCE

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S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 5433 series

*Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council* [1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1954.

NSC 5433

## IMMEDIATE U.S. POLICY TOWARD EUROPE

### SCOPE OF THIS PAPER

1. In view of the French rejection of EDC, the U.S. is faced with a choice between:

*a.* Continuing to pursue its present objectives in Europe by means other than EDC; or

*b.* On the assumption that continued pursuit of all these objectives is no longer feasible, determining what objectives should then be pursued.

[1] According to a covering note by National Security Council Executive Secretary Lay, the source text was prepared by the NSC Planning Board and was circulated to NSC members for consideration by the Council at its meeting on Sept. 24. Attached to the source text and not printed here, in addition to Lay's note, are a cover sheet, table of contents, and two annexes (extracts from the Brussels Pact of Mar. 17, 1948, and from the North Atlantic Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949).

For a record of the NSC meeting of Sept. 24 at which the source text was considered, see p. 1263. For the text of the amended version of this statement of policy approved at the Council meeting on Sept. 24 and subsequently circulated as NSC 5433/1, see p. 1268.

2. It is recommended that the U.S. for the immediate future make further vigorous efforts to achieve the present objectives set forth below. Accordingly, this paper sets forth a program of action based on par. 1–*a* above. The paper also sets forth in par. 11 below certain questions the answers to which may assist in making the determination under 1–*b* above, if that proves necessary.

PRESENT OBJECTIVES

3. Despite French rejection of EDC, the security of the U.S. continues to require the preservation and development of Western Europe (including the UK) as an area of strength allied to the U.S. Accordingly, the U.S. should continue to pursue the following objectives:

*a.* In the cold war, to prevent further extension of Soviet control in Europe and to retain the major Western European nations as allies.

*b.* To provide for the effective defense of Western Europe (even though in the event of general war retention of that area may not be indispensable to U.S. survival and ultimate victory), by maintaining and strengthening the NATO security system, inclusive of West Germany, as a deterrent to Soviet aggression designed to provide the most suitable defense of NATO territory.

*c.* To build the requisite strength and stability in Western Europe on the basis of (1) the combined efforts of the principal nations there and (2) steady progress toward integration on the continent.

*d.* To assure the orientation of the German Federal Republic (and ultimately a united Germany) to the West by all feasible means, including institutional ties as well as treaty arrangements.

PROGRAM OF ACTION

4. Seek promptly to associate the German Federal Republic with the West by:

*a.* Restoration to the German Federal Republic of its sovereignty, including the right to participate in the defense of Western Europe without restrictions unacceptable to the Germans as discriminatory or arbitrarily imposed. This step would require agreements regarding allied rights respecting Berlin, the unification of Germany, stationing of allied forces in Germany, and other issues resulting from the war and occupation.

*b.* Admission of the German Federal Republic to full membership in NATO, without precluding German participation also in the Brussels Pact or other European defense arrangements.

*c.* Obtaining acceptable safeguards as to German rearmament. Such safeguards might include:

(1) Voluntary acceptance by Germany of limits on its initial build-up of forces;

(2) Regulations or restrictions on the production of certain types of weapons, possibly through designation of "exposed areas" or through a European arms pool;

(3) Agreement among NATO members to commit forces to NATO, under a non-discriminatory formula so designed as to include all German forces (except internal security forces);

(4) Further integration of the NATO command structure and logistics system, by protocol or administrative reform;

(5) Strengthening the authority of SACEUR regarding deployment of forces committed to him;

(6) German assurances against any attempt to modify existing frontiers by force.

*d.* Continuing to seek eventual German reunification on the basis of freedom and the maximum possibility of association with the West.

5. Seek to reverse divisive trends in Western Europe by developing political and economic strength and cohesion which will enhance the European capacity and will to resist Communist subversion and neutralism. Under present conditions, Soviet military aggression against Western Europe does not appear to be imminent and major Soviet efforts are devoted to dividing and weakening the Western alliance.

6. Foster all practical measures for a greater degree of integration of Western Europe, emphasizing political and economic aspects at this stage and encouraging European initiative and responsibility so far as consistent with U.S. objectives. Specifically, encourage closer ties between France and Germany and the greatest feasible degree of UK association with its continental allies.

7. Continue to seek the strengthening of NATO in a manner which places primary emphasis on its deterrent effect, with due regard for political and economic capabilities and for psychological factors. For this purpose we should seek the full exploitation of developing nuclear capabilities and a generally understood and accepted strategy for forward defense of the NATO area.

8. Be prepared, subject to consultation with legislative leaders of both parties and to appropriate legislative authority, to commit the U.S. to some or all of the following, only if necessary as a *quid pro quo* for commitments on the part of European nations (including the UK) necessary for the carrying out of the above program of action:

*a.* Maintain forces in Europe over a substantial period.

*b.* Accept increased NATO authority over such forces as it assigns to NATO, to the extent necessary to provide acceptable safeguards as to German rearmament.

*c.* Agree to an extension of the duration of NATO for a reasonable period.

*d.* Continue to aid NATO countries to improve their forces and share nuclear information with them.

*e.* [Transfer nuclear weapons to its NATO allies.]*

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*Defense and JCS propose deletion. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

*f.* Channel its military aid through any European arms pool in order to enhance the pool's authority.

*g.* Continue efforts to obtain U.S. objectives for the development of a sound, expanding and increasingly integrated European economy through such measures as off-shore procurement, technical assistance, and adaptation of its foreign economic policies with respect to trade, convertibility, payments, etc.

Paragraph 9 has been deleted.

10. Seek to induce France to cooperate in achieving this program of action. For this purpose, attempt to convince France (e.g., by slowing down U.S. aid to France, by letting France become aware of joint U.S.–UK military review of the possibility of alternative strategic groupings excluding France) that her rejection of such a program will present her with alternatives far less attractive to France. As a tactical matter, we should act without French approval or cooperation (leaving to France opportunity later to cooperate) [if such action appears likely]† [because such action is most likely]‡ to induce ultimate French acceptance of the program and not to jeopardize attainment of our objectives. If it appears that French reactions will defeat one or more of our objectives, our policy should be governed by the results of the reappraisal contemplated in par. 11.

REAPPRAISAL OF BASIC OBJECTIVES

*State Proposal*

11. The Secretary of State should report to the Council not later than October 28, 1954, whether in his opinion the foregoing program of action can be carried through successfully. In the event that the Council at that time believes that the above program of action no longer appears attainable, the Council should then be prepared to determine what objectives the U.S. should pursue in the light of conditions then existing and the answers to the following questions:

*JCS Proposal*

11. If within a reasonable period (approximately 30 days) it becomes evident that the foregoing program of action cannot be carried through successfully, the U.S. should act nevertheless to obtain the following three goals required for U.S. security: German sovereignty, German rearmament, and retention of a West Germany oriented toward the West. If achievement of these goals must be accomplished without the cooperation of France and/or other major allies, due consideration must be given to the following questions in the development of U.S. action:

†Proposed by State. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
‡Proposed by Defense. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

*a.* Assuming our continued purpose to maintain (1) an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression and (2) the means for effective defense of the United States and areas vital to it, could a feasible strategy be devised for the defense of Western Europe:

(*a*) Without German participation?
(*b*) Without French participation?
(*c*) Without the participation of both France and Germany?

What basic changes in U.S. military dispositions and commitment of resources would be required to carry out each strategy?

*b.* If the U.S., with or without the UK, should proceed with the rearming of Germany over a French veto, what would be the ultimate effect on (1) France, (2) Germany and (3) European stability and vulnerability in the cold war?

*c.* How would the political and economic integration of Europe be affected by French refusal to participate therein?

*d.* What is the likely course of UK policy over the next few years with respect to European integration and German rearmament?

*e.* What would be the political effect in the German Federal Republic and on the future orientation of Germany, if the raising of forces in a sovereign German Federal Republic were postponed for a substantial time with or without German admission to NATO?

*f.* If Germany were unified and neutralized with restricted armed forces, what would be the probable course of its policy, and the effect on its vulnerability in the cold war and on the stability of Western Europe?

*g.* To what extent should the U.S. require formal agreements permitting the immediate use of nuclear weapons by the NATO command in the event of aggression? To what extent would pressing for such formal agreements seriously impair allied cooperation or the prospects for successfully carrying out the agreed strategy?

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396.1 LO/9–2254

*Report on the Secretary of State's Conversations With Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Secretary Eden, September 16–17, 1954* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, September 20, 1954.]

*Members of Party:*

The Secretary of State
Mr. H. Struve Hensel, Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs
Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor, Personal Secretary

[1] The source text was drafted by Kidd on instruction by Merchant as a background report for officers in the Department of State who were primarily concerned with the matters to be discussed at the forthcoming Nine-Power Conference in London.

Mr. Ben Moore, Chief, Office of Regional Affairs
Mr. Coburn Kidd, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs
Miss Mildred Asbjornson, Secretary
Mr. Frank Madden, Security Officer

*Schedule:*

| | |
|---|---|
| Departure Washington, | 5:30 p. m., September 15 |
| Arrival Bonn, | 2:30 p. m., September 16 |
| Departure Bonn, | 10:15 a. m., September 17 |
| Arrival London, | 12:00 noon, September 17 |
| Departure London, | 8:00 p. m., September 17 |
| Arrival Watertown, | 8:00 a. m., September 18 |

The purpose of the Secretary's visit to Bonn and London on September 16th and 17th was to ascertain at first hand, from Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Eden, the results of the latter's tour through the European capitals and to obtain an estimate of the possibilities of Mr. Eden's plan and the prospects for the proposed nine-Power conference on September 28th. The following report represents the impressions received by the Secretary's party, which may be supplemented by reports received from our Embassies. The Secretary made departure or arrival statements at Washington, Bonn, London, and Watertown, which are appended hereto.[2]

*Bonn*

The Secretary was welcomed at Bonn with a cordiality which appeared to indicate that much significance was attached to his visit. Friendly crowds lined the streets to and from the airport. Chancellor Adenauer showed every mark of personal consideration and confidence. His chief advisers eagerly utilized the opportunity for frank and responsive discussions. The Chancellor had in fact excused himself from important parliamentary debates on the John case [3] with the curt remark that his conversations with the Secretary would be of decisive importance for Germany.

In the ensuing talks, which were continued from midafternoon to near midnight without interruption except for a state dinner at Schloss Schaumberg, the Chancellor touched upon general policy towards France, the personality and politics of the French premier, the continued importance to Germany of the integration policy, immediate objectives of sovereignty and German defense participation, revision of the Contractual agreements, utility and shortcomings of the Eden plan for revival of the Brussels Pact, and the importance of interim

[2] Not printed.
[3] Regarding the Otto John case, see footnote 3, p. 1027.

measures to forestall further delays.[4] En route to the airport on Friday morning the Chancellor particularly reverted to the subject of interim measures.[5] The Chancellor was assisted by State Secretary Hallstein, Under Secretary Blankenhorn, his confidential adviser Globke, Blank (head of the German defense agency), Ophuls and Grewe (legal advisers), and von Herwarth. Ambassador Conant and Mr. Dowling participated in the discussions, with Mr. Hensel, Mr. Merchant, and Mr. Bowie.

With regard to general policy toward France, the Chancellor was of opinion that the Secretary had done wisely in omitting Paris from his schedule. He felt that it was a bold move, since Mendes-France would no doubt take it personally; but on the whole he felt it would have a salutary effect. Without indicating any ill-will towards Mendes-France, the Chancellor appeared to regard him with detachment as a man who, either from his own personality or from the exigencies of French politics, was an exponent of an opportunist type of politics which could be dangerous. His dealings with the Soviets, or possible dealings with the Communists, should thus be explained, in the Chancellor's opininon, on the grounds of opportunism rather than any pro-Communist leanings. The Chancellor felt that Mendes-France was primarily interested in economic and financial matters, and could probably be most easily influenced on this side.

The Chancellor said that so much time had passed that it was imperative for the Federal Republic to be given its sovereignty and be allowed to participate in the defense effort in the near future if continued support for the policies he represented were to be expected. He felt that NATO membership was the most suitable answer to the question of defense participation. With regard to sovereignty, he thought that this might be most simply effected by declarations of the respective occupying Powers, ending the occupation status while retaining their rights founded on international agreements with respect to Berlin and matters pertaining to Germany as a whole (unification). He said that he would not wish to go back to the Bundestag for ratification of more than one document, namely an agreement on stationing of forces. He thought that the rest of the provisions in the Contractuals could be taken care of by comparatively minor revisions. Some of the provisions

[4] A 15-page memorandum of conversation of Dulles' afternoon meeting with Adenauer, drafted by Bowie, is in the PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Chronological 1954". A brief telegraphic account of that meeting is contained in telegram 796 from Bonn, Sept. 17 (662A.00/9–1754). A summary of Dulles' after-dinner conversation with Adenauer on Sept. 16, contained in Dulles' memorandum of conversation of the same date, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359. The Department of State summarized the results of Dulles' talks with Adenauer in a telegram 931 to Rome, Sept. 19, which was repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg (740.5/9–1954).

[5] Dulles' memorandum summarizing this conversation with Adenauer en route to the airport on Sept. 17, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359.

were now out of date; these could perhaps simply be dropped. Pending the conclusion of these revisions, the position of our forces would continue under existing arrangements. The Chancellor's legal adviser, Grewe, gave the impression that the revision of the Contractuals would be carried out in a conciliatory and expeditious manner at the technical level. In general we gained the impression that a good deal of the substance of the Contractuals may be retained if the more important issues of sovereignty and defense participation are resolved in the near future. If the latter are not resolved, sniping at the Contractuals may continue to increase.

The Chancellor emphasized that there should be no mistake about the continued importance of the integration policy. So long as he was in office this would remain an integral part of German policy. This suggested one of the shortcomings of Eden's plan. The Brussels Pact solution was being put forward because (*a*) it avoided any supranational features, and (*b*) it would provide for the British association which was so important to France. The combination of these two facts, he pointed out, would result in the speed and level of future integration becoming dependent upon British decision. The Chancellor hoped that means could be found to insure that adoption of the Brussels Pact solution would not preclude future progress toward integration.

A second weakness of the Eden plan was of course that it might be subject to the same fate as the EDC, namely, that after being agreed to by Mendes-France, there would be further delay or refusal on the part of the French parliament to ratify. In order to obviate the disastrous effects of such a result in Germany, the Chancellor felt that it would be of highest importance to undertake certain interim measures. These measures (which have been the subject of a State Department memorandum now being studied by Defense) would include enlarged activity of the Blank Office, German participation in build-up planning with authorization to proceed with certain preliminary measures such as construction of barracks, and recruitment and training on a limited scale (especially air-force training). The Chancellor felt that the US and UK had this leverage in their hands, as well as the power to recognize German sovereignty, and that such interim measures might be necessary in order to obtain a decision from France as distinct from discussion. The Secretary said that we would urge upon the British and French the desirability of interim measures, and that we would be prepared to proceed alone with the British to the extent feasible, if the French declined.

These were the main points covered in the discussions at Bonn. Assistant Secretary Hensel had a good discussion with Blank on the

subject of interim measures, and Mr. Dowling, Mr. Merchant, and Mr. Bowie had more detailed discussions with the Chancellor's advisers. It was evident from this visit that the Chancellor was at pains to coordinate his policy with that of the U.S., and was relying a great deal upon the common front with the U.S. to obtain the objectives important to the Federal Republic. The Chancellor told the Secretary that he would not attend the nine-Power meeting unless the Secretary did.[6]

*London*

The discussions at London proceeded in a very different atmosphere from those at Bonn. In the Secretary's arrival statement, he stressed his admiration for Mr. Eden's statesmanlike efforts and the fundamental importance of the Anglo-American alliance. The Secretary had lunch at Downing Street with Churchill and Eden. Mr. Eden and the officials of the Foreign Office extended the welcome of old friends. Nevertheless, as the discussions progressed throughout a three-hour session in Mr. Eden's office, it became apparent that the British were engaged in an uphill climb, seemed tired, and had not got as far as they hoped.[7]

Mr. Eden began with an account of his trip to the various capitals. There had been general apprehension after the breakup of EDC, and they had asked themselves what could be done. They were much against setting up another duplicating military organization under NATO. EDC had appeared tolerable because it had certain advantages, but no other had any attraction for them. They had thus asked themselves what were the possibilities which would not involve some elaborate military organization. One possibility would be to set up a new organization, but there were so many international organizations already. Therefore it had occurred to them to take a new look at the Brussels Pact, which might at least meet part of the political problem. If Germany were admitted into NATO, the Brussels Pact in its present form would be something of an anachronism, and accordingly they thought it might be revised and conformed to meet German membership. They also had Italy in mind. It had not been their intention to use the Brussels Pact except as a political instrument for extending certain guarantees to Germany and assuring the rest of Europe with regard to the EDC type of guarantees.

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[6] For Adenauer's summary of his meeting with Dulles, see his *Erinnerungen 1953–1955*, pp. 308–312.

[7] In telegram 932 to Rome, Sept. 19, which was repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Bonn, the Department of State summarized the results of Dulles' 3-hour meeting with Eden; for a copy of this summary, see Department of State file 740.5/9–1954.

Mr. Eden said he had proceeded to Brussels with no more of a plan than this in mind. He had been most gratified at the reception. He had feared that the Belgians and Dutch might take the line that the Brussels Pact was designed to be primarily a protection against the Germans, but Spaak and the Dutch were quite receptive. The Dutch had produced the idea that some of the German assurances might more appropriately be given through the Brussels Treaty than through NATO. This idea seemed to him worth examining. The French would like it. He thought that on the whole the Germans would too. In any event he had found support in Bonn and Rome as well as Brussels for this scheme plus German membership in NATO. (Sir Frank Roberts said that the Germans were "enthusiastic". He had asked twice in order not to be mistaken about the expression.)

At Paris Mr. Eden found the first day depressing. He found that Mendes-France welcomed the Brussels Pact idea with eagerness, as a means of building in a large part of the EDC controls over Germany without any supranational features. It was apparent that this would involve prolonged negotiations and difficulties with respect to the Germans. Mendes-France also thought of the Brussels Pact revision as a preliminary to German membership in NATO. Mr. Eden had replied that this was no good at all. Everyone wanted Germany into NATO, and the French would stand alone. There had been a long argument about this. On the second day Mendes-France said that he recognized German membership in NATO was inescapable, but he would have difficulties with the French Assembly. Mendes-France recalled some bothersome resolution passed by the Assembly in 1952 against German membership. Mendes-France would wish the matter to be so presented that the Brussels Pact would appear to be at least equivalent in importance to NATO. The French position would then be: we have got so much in the Brussels Pact, that we might be willing to accept the Germans into NATO. It was just the opposite for the British. Their primary interest was in NATO. In any event Eden thought that these two matters must take effect simultaneously. He had accepted Mendes-France's appeal not to represent the results of the Paris discussions as French acceptance of German membership in NATO.

This brought Mr. Eden to the question of safeguards. What would these be? One suggestion of Mendes-France might be worth considering. Mendes-France did not exclude nondiscrimination in theory, but he desired some arrangement on the manufacture of armaments as to who should make what. He also wanted some form of inspections. He would like the UK to join in this. Mr. Eden saw no reason why the British should not take some share of the responsibility. Ismay had

said that his organization could help provide inspectors. That was the sort of thing that the Brussels Treaty could do.

Another suggestion of Mendes-France had been that it was difficult for NATO to provide ceilings. It was a little odd for the same organization to have the tasks both of building up and holding down military preparedness. NATO might set the minimums and Brussels the maximums. These were the main features of Mendes-France's ideas. The French wished to make the Brussels arrangement look as important as possible in order to demonstrate the British commitment.

One disquieting thing that had occurred to Eden was to find the means of finishing up the Occupation Statute. Mendes-France had said that a Saar solution was a precondition. Eden had replied that this was impossible. There had been no more argument—perhaps no agreement either. Eden believed that Mendes-France would do his best to obtain German membership in NATO; but the more we could dress up the Brussels Pact, the better would be his chances. Mendes-France was conscious of the risks of failure; he had no taste for a second Brussels. Eden thought that Mendes-France perceived that to do nothing would be equally fatal. Mendes-France was apprehensive about France again finding herself alone.

Mr. Eden said that the UK would be willing to extend to the Brussels Pact the same assurances they had made for EDC.

In sum, Mr. Eden asked, the question is whether we should take the risk of a nine-Power meeting? The second question was whether there was anything else that could be done by way of preparation? All countries were in favor of German membership in NATO; the French were resigned to it if the Brussels Pact could be sufficiently dressed up; therefore the UK was in favor of a meeting.

With regard to preparations, Mr. Eden thought it would be an excellent idea for Mr. Merchant to go to Paris, as had been suggested.

Mr. Eden had incidentally talked with Lange, of Norway, while he was in Paris. Lange had just seen Mendes-France after Eden's first conversation. Lange had the impression that Mendes-France was sincere, and Eden increasingly felt that Mendes-France was willing to go along.

Sir Frank Roberts mentioned that the French had made one or two references to the US, not in the sense of raising new demands, but with the idea of US participation in controls, e.g. over atomic matters.

Mr. Eden said that Mendes-France was not against ending the occupation regime. One of the advantages of the nine-Power meeting was that it would provide an opportunity to wind this up.

The Secretary said that when he had expressed his admiration for

Mr. Eden's statesmanship in all that he tried to accomplish on his tour, it was no idle compliment but sincerely meant. It would be wrong however to minimize the difficulties confronting the US. The hope of European integration had had great appeal to the American people and Congress. This was reflected in speeches and legislation. Aid to Europe had been tied to consummation of the EDC. The result of the French rejection of EDC was a shock. It would be used by isolationists as justification for moving toward the type of policy they recommended. Several of the Democratic Senators who had been mainstays of the program were now about ready to quit. Many were now in favor of bringing our troops home. There was a problem in trying to sell a substitute policy. The Secretary had not yet received the views of the Joint Chiefs or of the Congress, but he might say in a general way that it was a policy of the Joint Chiefs to concentrate on mobile striking power of sea and air forces, with land forces retained in the strategic reserve at home. Mr. Eden would recall that two divisions had been withdrawn from Korea last spring; four more were being withdrawn. We were looking forward to getting our forces out of Japan. We were not prepared to build up a land power in the SEATO area, where our contribution would be primarily one of sea and air power. The presence of US divisions in Europe was thus an exception to our general policy. Certain members of our Joint Chiefs feel that we should reduce that land commitment. No decision has yet been reached, but there is also a feeling in Congress that our position should be adjusted to that strategic concept. The Secretary felt that it was highly doubtful that Congress would be willing to repeat the commitments it offered for EDC to a new concept. Our traditional policy for over a hundred years had been to avoid commitments on the European continent. The position of the US since World War II had been entirely different from this traditional policy. It was not easy to make such a turn around. Our rationalization of this course was based on the assumption that something new and stronger was being erected in Europe.

The Secretary said that it was the President's desire as well as his own to salvage as much as possible out of the existing situation. However, it could not be taken for granted that they would succeed. Continued participation of the US on the past scale was doubtful. Congress had been sold on the other idea, and it would now be difficult to sell a substitute. The Secretary foresaw that it would involve at least some loss. He hoped that it would not be material or decisive. He merely wished to point out that any plan based on the assumption that the US would go along as in the past would be a fallacy. This did not of course mean that we would pull the rug out from what was going on; it meant merely that we could not put as much into it.

Mr. Eden commented that that was worrying.

"Probably to you," the Secretary replied, "but no one else appears to take it very seriously."

Mr. Eden said that the support of the US was crucial. The British wanted Germany into NATO. They attached almost as much importance to binding Germany to the Western orbit by this means as they did to a German military contribution.

The Secretary said that he did not suggest that there was a better way. At any rate he had not thought of it. As he had remarked to Adenauer, the future policy of the US would be subject to pressures. He could not predict the outcome. He was in no position yet to make commitments. Our position must necessarily remain fluid until the views of the Joint Chiefs, the National Security Council, and the President have been taken into account, in the light of the general political possibilities. It was also necessary to see how the Congressional elections came out. This prevented us from making definitive commitments at the present time.

The Secretary said the general scheme or conception which Mr. Eden had developed seemed the best that could be devised to meet the situation which confronts us. The whole conception had been brilliant and statesmanlike.

The Secretary had a few comments on procedure. He would hope that something could be done in the way of keeping alive the idea of closer integration at least on the Continent. Adenauer had mentioned that one of his worries about the Brussels Pact scheme was that there could be no more rapid development of integration than the UK's pace. Mr. Eden had mentioned the possibility of including something in the preamble suggesting that at least other Powers could be free and should be encouraged to move in that direction. The Secretary saw no harm in this and thought it might do some good. Adenauer had said: "The Brussels Pact is being used because, first, it is not supranational, and secondly, because the UK is in it; the combination of these two factors amounts to a block against future integration."

Mr. Eden exclaimed that the last thing he desired was to stop any movement toward integration. He thought they could do something about this. Norway would like it; he was informed that Yugoslavia would like it too—although he was not quite sure that he wanted the Yugoslavs to like it.

The Secretary said that he had originally had that idea about NATO, but had come to have misgivings about Italy and Norway. NATO had ended up by becoming primarily a military alliance rather than a group of nations with common traditions. This accounted for the failure of Article 2. The Greeks and Turks were another example

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of good nations, with a strong people, which did not however have the same traditions and concept as Western Europe. If NATO could have been held to a smaller group, it might have become more effective. If the Brussels Pact could be held to a smaller group with more in common, it might be to the good.

Mr. Eden said that that was exactly their thought. The Brussels Pact did not seem to be Norway's particular place.

The Secretary said that he thought it was a sound concept to have NATO press for more defense, leaving any limitations to be imposed by another organization. He felt that it would be advisable to permit exceptions and departures from the rule to be decided by less than unanimous vote. The Versailles Treaty had been the most thorough instrument for restrictions ever devised, yet it had not worked. Give one country a veto and the results may be negative. For example, Blank was already talking about 24 divisions, 12 in being and 12 in reserve.

Broadly speaking, it seemed to the Secretary that the lines along which Mr. Eden was working were as sound as could be expected under the circumstances. However, it struck him that it was one thing to reach agreement in principle; another thing to reach agreement in writing. Who was going to redraft the Brussels Treaty? Would Adenauer participate? Would the French participate? The US was not a party to this Treaty, but if the Brussels Treaty were to become an adjunct to NATO we should have a very vital interest in it. In the past, one of the best guarantees of a successful conference had been the preparatory working parties. The Secretary felt that it would be a disaster to have the nine-Power meeting fail like Brussels. The possibility of failure would of course constitute a pressure on the conference, which would lead people to try to agree; even so, was there not need for some preliminary exchange of views on specific questions? What would Mendes-France be willing to put up to the Assembly? The Secretary said he could see Mendes' difficulty about admission of Germany as an equal partner in NATO. French preconditions might exceed what Germany or the US could take. There thus seemed to be advantages in having a working party. It would be a gamble to go into this conference with Mendes-France if we had no guidance as to what Adenauer could accept. How could this be avoided? Is Mendes-France to be left to work all alone?

Mr. Eden said that they had started with mere ideas. They had found easy agreement with Benelux, Bonn, Rome, and the US. The French would no doubt make it difficult. In answer to the question how far one proposed to go at London, he thought perhaps it would suffice to reach agreements in principle, with the working parties to set to

work thereafter. With regard to ending the occupation regime, he saw no reason why a working party of four should not start immediately.

The Secretary agreed that on that phase there was a certain amount of work to be done. He had spoken to Hoyer-Millar and Poncet about it that morning. We wished to save some of the provisions of the Contractuals, for example, with regard to Berlin, sharing of expenses, the status of forces. Working out agreements on this phase could go ahead. The Secretary said that we were of course in the position to agree to restoring German sovereignty. His earlier remarks about commitments had referred to US forces in Europe. It was reasonably certain that the Senate would accept a protocol to the NATO treaty to bring Germany in and to extend the NATO area to Germany.

Mr. Eden reverted to the point that what was worrying was the inability of the US to do for the plan under discussion what had been done for EDC.

The Secretary said that he was informed that the April 16th assurances had been difficult to obtain even for EDC. Mr. Merchant confirmed this. The Secretary added that he did not say they could not be obtained; merely that they could not before Congress reconvened; and the odds were against it.

Mr. Eden said that psychologically people would say that just because the Germans get an army, they would not want the Americans to disappear.

The Secretary said that we were much more likely to stay if there were something like a German army.

Mr. Eden said that they would try a redraft of the Brussels Treaty, omitting anything prejudicial to Germany.

The Secretary asked whether Mendes-France had not thought of adding twenty articles.

Sir Frank Roberts said that this would be a protocol.

Mr. Eden said that it would probably have to be as binding as a treaty. The British would circulate a revised text of the treaty before the meeting. Mendes-France had said that he would send around his suggestions within the next day or so, to all of the NATO countries and also Germany—not his original document, but his proposals on arms manufacture, etc.

The Secretary inquired about the possibility of increasing the powers of SACEUR.

Mr. Eden replied that General Gruenther had said that it was quite possible. With regard to logistics, everything would be operated through NATO rather than Brussels.

The Secretary said that Adenauer considered this important.

Mr. Eden acknowledged that SHAPE could not operate armament

controls. This was something the Brussels Powers would have to do themselves. The principle should be, in other words, that nothing should be taken away from NATO (SACEUR) which it was at present doing.

The Secretary asked whether it was wise to have a meeting until we had seen drafts in advance. He did not think Mendes-France was very flexible.

Sir Frank Roberts said that Mendes-France had had this on his mind and was shy about circulating a paper for that very reason, lest the others jump to the conclusion that he was repeating the Brussels situation. Consequently he intended to send out his general ideas only. His officials said it would be this weekend.

Mr. Eden said that what he had had in mind was that the nine-Power meeting would firm up what he understood to be the results of his swing around the circuit. It would confirm the understanding that Germany be admitted to NATO, sovereignty be restored, etc. On the basis of this, they could try to draft documents. Perhaps they could authorize a redraft of the Brussels Treaty. We might utilize some of our NATO people to work out the details. Eden did not feel sure about Adenauer. The British and the French might wish something more than Adenauer would be prepared to accept. Mendes-France had said that it was hard to get in contact with Adenauer at this time. That had been one of the difficulties at Brussels, the lack of contact between Mendes-France and Adenauer. However, Mr. Eden was convinced that the momentum for a solution could not be sustained without a meeting. He was a little frightened about how Adenauer might react in an exchange of papers. Mr. Eden recalled that the Germans had suggested that a meeting be held as soon as possible; the Italians, "a little later"; Mendes-France, "not too late".

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Eden intended to come to the UN Assembly. Mr. Eden said he thought not; he would stay and work on this.

"Really I am flummoxed," Mr. Eden said, "particularly about Franco-German agreement."

The Secretary asked whether Adenauer had indicated that he would come to the meeting. Mr. Eden said that he had never shown any signs of not coming. Perhaps he had cooled off. Adenauer had a meeting with the Turkish President on October 2nd. There were of course risks in a meeting—but there appeared to be equally as many in not meeting.

The Secretary mentioned Adenauer's interest in "interim measures". He supposed that these could also be dealt with on a four-Power basis.

It would be a difficult thing to revamp the Brussels Pact and find an expression of German assurances in a form acceptable to both the Germans and the French.

The British Under Secretary said that he should have thought that a condition precedent for this would be a successful meeting of Mendes-France and Adenauer.

After some further general discussion it was agreed that an effort should be made through the proposal of an agenda for the conference to obtain Mendes-France's agreement to the following program:

(1) Further progress towards European unity by expansion of the Brussels Pact so as to admit Germany and Italy;
(2) Admission of Germany to NATO.
(3) The working out of "accompanying arrangements" by the Federal Republic and the occupying Powers, who should at the same time declare their intentions with regard to restoration of German sovereignty.

A paper to the above effect was drafted by Sir Frank Roberts. After a brief discussion of this and the text of a communiqué, the meeting broke up at 6:30 p. m., when the Secretary's party left for the airport. Before bidding farewell to Mr. Eden, the Secretary again mentioned the importance Adenauer attached to interim measures in case the NATO–Brussels Pact plan miscarried. Mr. Eden assented in general.[8]

*Conclusions*

In the discussions at Bonn and London, supplemented by the reports from Paris, certain things were apparent on the surface:

The urgency of German admission to NATO and restoration of German sovereignty is a contemporary reality acknowledged by almost everyone, the UK, Benelux, the Germans, Italy, Norway, Greece, Canada, and the US. In contrast to this Mendes-France's original plan seemed as outmoded as a superannuated vehicle: increased British assurances to France, with the transfer of EDC restrictions to the Brussels Pact minus supranational features, in a manner so as to hold down German manufacture of armaments and build up French heavy industry. When Roberts remonstrated about this, Mendes' advisers, Boris and Soutout, replied that the point was to satisfy the French Assembly. The Foreign Office's annotation of this passage in the telegram is: "This is it."

Nevertheless the French have a point to which the British and most of the other countries are willing to accede in wishing for certain restrictions upon German rearmament. Adenauer has acknowledged his

[8] For Churchill's summary of Dulles' visit to London, see his letter to Eisenhower, Sept. 17, p. 1225; Dulles summarized his visit to London in a personal letter to Eisenhower on Sept. 18, p. 1227.

willingness to accept the EDC 12-division limitation, NATO controls, and other restrictions on a nondiscriminatory basis (provided that the only restrictions on the initial German rearmament are those voluntarily assumed). This appears to provide an area for negotiation. The British are hopeful that French demands may be reduced to proportions acceptable to Adenauer and the US when confronted by the united stand of eight other nations, and that Adenauer will be amenable to restrictions which appear reasonable to the US and six other nations as well as France.

It is evident that the US has one very powerful means of influence, to which at least the British are sensitive, in the suggestion that we may revise our basic strategy. The British will work hard to avoid this. An additional source of influence, which the British count on, is Mendes-France's obvious desire to avoid a repetition of his experience at Brussels, in which he found himself isolated. The British believe he will work hard to prevent this.

These are the positive elements, out of which, with a little luck, the British hope to sustain the momentum towards a solution, in Mr. Eden's phrase.

The negative elements latent not very far below the surface include the following:

(1) The British appear to have no precise plans for what should be done in case their plan goes amiss. Moreover they are taking the chance, without finding out in advance, of Adenauer and Mendes-France confronting each other at the conference with positions not sufficiently flexible to be modified in the course of negotiations.

(2) The elements in the French Assembly on whom Mendes-France must depend for approval of any plan he presents, are utilizing the situation to bring about his downfall, with the hope of forming a new Government which, when defeated, could call for general elections, which would either improve or restore the inter-party balance of forces to what it was before Mendes-France's advent.

(3) The Germans count upon an astute policy of self-restraint coupled with rigid identification of their position with the US as a means of making the French break if they do not bend.

Confronted with these mixed features in the situation, the Secretary summarized a cautious but not discouraging reaction in the following words in his Watertown statement:

"It is apparent, indeed it has long been apparent, that there is no adequate substitute for the European Defense Community. Nevertheless we must do the best that we can. Many minds are resourcefully studying what next steps are in order. We hope that sufficient preparatory work can be done during the coming week to justify a preliminary meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the countries principally concerned during the week following that.

"It would be a mistake to assume that any acceptable solution has been fully developed. It would be an even greater mistake to adopt a negative approach which would result in the disintegration of what has been built, since the war, out of the sacrifices, the efforts, the aspirations of many.

"The United States is deeply concerned with the maintenance of peace and security on the European continent. European security is intimately connected with our own. We shall, therefore, continue our association with European planning to achieve those ends. There are many European leaders who retain hope of real achievement. They know that we will support them in their creative efforts."

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740.5/9–1754 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Norway (Strong) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY OSLO, September 17, 1954—2 p. m.

195. 1. British Ambassador queried last night re Foreign Office report of Norwegian interest in possibility joining revised Brussels Pact. London telegram 1317, September 15 to Department.[2] He opined this report based on exploratory conversation at initiative Norwegian Ambassador London some days ago. Since then Norwegian Government had considered possibility joining revised Brussels Pact and related matters at Cabinet meeting September 14. British Ambassador saw Lange late that day and was given résumé Norwegian thinking.

2. Lange told British Ambassador basic premise Norwegian thinking was that new formula for participation German Federal Republic in West European Defense system must be acceptable to France. Norway believes best formula would be admission German Federal Republic to NATO with safeguards on German rearmament. If this impracticable inclusion German Federal Republic in Brussels Pact may be workable alternative. Norway foresees two possibilities here. (*a*) concomitant German membership in NATO and pact with safeguards on German rearmament provided through pact arrangements and (*b*) German adherence to pact only as transitional arrangement. In either case Norwegian Government would be willing consider adherence Norway to Brussels Pact if this would contribute to solution of problem. Norway could not however join revised pact if revisions gave it supranational character. Also, Norway would require assurance that revised pact would not alter existing NATO structure providing separate northern European command.

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, and Paris; pouched to Copenhagen.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Department of State that Norway "surprised and greatly pleased" the British by exhibiting interest in the possibility of joining a revised Brussels Agreement (740.5/9–1454).

3. Lange also told British Ambassador he had been unable consult Danish Government owing latter's preoccupation with economic difficulties. He thought Danes would follow Norwegian lead in joining pact but if not Norway was prepared act alone.

4. Later last night Skylstad, Secretary-General Norwegian Foreign Office, was queried re Norwegian attitude toward possible resuscitation of Brussels Pact as device for bringing German Federal Republic into west Europe and defense system. It was not disclosed to him that this Embassy already had information from British sources. He on his part did not disclose that this matter had been subject of recent Cabinet consideration. He did review Norwegian position along lines of paragraph 2 above.

5. Skylstad made two further points. As practical matter Norwegian adherence to Brussels Pact could hardly be of great significance as Norway had no military strength to contribute outside its own borders. Importance if any of Norwegian adherence would be psychological in terms of (*a*) allaying French fears of being associated with Germans in small group of nations and (*b*) easing German acceptance of limitations on its armaments which could be applied also to Norway and other peripheral countries. Second point was that possibility of Norway joining pact had not been discussed with Storting. Skylstad believes there would be considerable Storting resistance to this move.

STRONG

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110.11 DU/9–1754

*The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Mendès-France* [1]

LONDON, September 17, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As I leave for home I want to tell you again of my regret that I was unable to come to Paris again on this trip, and resume the talks which we had in Paris when I came there last July.[2]

I believe my meetings with Adenauer and Eden have been useful in developing means of dealing with the problem which confronts all of us of the Atlantic community. Eden gave me a full account of his talks just concluded with you. As a result of this trip I am even more impressed with the need for speedy action and I hope and trust that the projected meeting of nine will mark a definitive step in our progress. I

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[1] The text of this message was transmitted to the Embassy in Paris in niact telegram 201, Sept. 17, which was repeated to the Department of State as telegram 1391.

[2] Documentation concerning Dulles' visit to Paris, July 13–14, is presented in volume VI; for a record of the meeting on July 13 which dealt with the EDC, see the memorandum of July 13, p. 1018.

am looking forward greatly to seeing you then. All this I hoped to tell you on the telephone, but it proved impossible to establish the connection.

I am asking Murphy my Deputy Under Secretary to ask to see you in Paris on his return from Rome so that you could in this way communicate more intimately than is possible by cable. The President and I hope very much to see you later on in New York and Washington.

Sincerely yours, FOSTER DULLES

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Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower*

SECRET [LONDON, September 17, 1954.]

MY DEAR FRIEND: Thank you very much for your message of September 15.[1] I am glad I was a good reporter. I made my living as a journalist. I believe you have them in your country too.

2. Foster lunched with me and Anthony today and we had an agreeable and helpful talk. As you know, E.D.C. was very different from the grand alliance theme I opened at Strasbourg in August, 1950. I disliked on military grounds the Pleven European army plan which began with mixing races in companies if not platoons. At that time when I saw you in Paris I was talking of it as "sludgy amalgam". However, when I came to power again I swallowed my prejudices because I was led to believe that it was the only way in which the French could be persuaded to accept the limited German army which was my desire. I do not blame the French for rejecting E.D.C. but only for inventing it. Their harshness to Adenauer in wasting three years of his life and much of his power is a tragedy. Also I accepted the American wish to show all possible patience and not to compromise the chances of E.D.C. by running N.A.T.O. as a confusing rival.

3. All this time I kept one aim above all others in view, namely a German contribution to the defence of an already uniting Europe. This, I felt, was your aim too, and I am sure we both liked the plan better when the intermingling was excluded from all units lower than a division. But it was to get a German army looking eastward in the line with us that commanded my thought, and also I felt yours, with all its military authority. Although the French have rejected E.D.C. I do hope and pray that you and I will still keep the German contribution as our No. 1 target and also to get them on our side instead of on the other.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1197.

4. When Anthony recently proposed taking the Brussels Treaty of 1948 turned upside down, as a model for preserving the cause of European unity, coupled with a variant of N.A.T.O. to include Germany, I thought it was a first rate plan. I hope earnestly that it will commend itself to you. It may lead on as time passes to United Europe and also gain for us both what we have tried for so hard, namely, the German comradeship. Now Foster tells me that there is a widespread feeling in America that it has not got any, or at least enough, "supra-national" characteristics. I hope this will not prevent you giving it all the help you can. European federation may grow but it cannot be built. It must be a volunteer not a conscript.

5. After all if the realities can be achieved and if Gruenther can form a front including French and German armies by whose side we and you stand, we need not worry too much about the particular theories which are favoured or rebuffed. Above all, we should not lose more time when what we have worked so long and hard to win may now be within our grasp.

6. I have been distressed to hear talk (not from Foster) about the withdrawal of American forces from Europe and even that a German contingent might fill the gap. If the U.S. loses or seems to lose its interest in Europe there might well be a landslide into Communism or into a kow-towing to Soviet influence and infiltration which would reduce the continent to satellite status. I really do not see how we British could stay there by ourselves.

7. Forgive me burdening you with all this, but I feel it a great comfort when I am sure our thoughts are marching along the same roads. You may imagine how pleased I was by your applying the word "perfect" to my message to Adenauer.

Kindest regards, WINSTON

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662A.00/9–1854

*The Secretary of State to Chancellor Adenauer*[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 18, 1954.

I much appreciated the opportunity of talking to you and the chance to secure your views in detail on Thursday and Friday. I am sure this exchange will prove of great value for purposes of our common objectives in forthcoming international meetings. In frank discussions with Eden yesterday I was struck by his evident desire to find

[1] This message was transmitted to Bonn in priority telegram 772 of Sept. 18 with instructions that Conant personally deliver it to Adenauer.

mutually satisfactory solution in near future in spite of difficulties that can be foreseen. I stressed to him importance of careful preparation, which I feel is not yet adequate, in advance of nine-power meeting to insure basis for positive accomplishment consistent with continued progress toward genuine European unity which can alone command unreserved support of your Government and mine. Eden is hopeful that Mendes-France will concur in NATO–Brussels Pact solution acceptable to other governments consulted, but awaits more specific information promised by Mendes-France in next few days, which I understand will also be communicated to all the other interested governments.

With kindest regards, FOSTER DULLES

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740.5/9–1854

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 18, 1954.

[MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:] I had a very friendly and useful stop in London. I first lunched privately with Churchill and Eden. The Prime Minister was in fine shape and sent you his best. He expressed his relief that the "EDC tomfoolery" was over. He said he had only supported it because you wanted it but had never had faith in it. Now we could get German armies to march by our side instead of having a "sludgy amalgam".

Then we had meeting at Foreign Office first on Europe, then on China.

I was disappointed that Eden has not arrived at anything concrete, even in general principles. It seems that Mendes-France has been most evasive. He may be working out his own project on terms which profess to provide for sovereignty of Germany in NATO but attaching conditions unacceptable to Germany, U.S. and perhaps others. He could present these French terms at prospective London Conference and, if they are not accepted, attempt to pass blame to others. This was his Brussels Conference tactic. I find evidence of a rising tide of concern about Mendes-France's Russian contacts. He has killed EDC at least for now and he may be out to kill German admission to NATO.

I said I would attend London Conference. Eden wants September 28. I set in motion some preliminary planning to try to smoke out Mendes-France and concert UK–US thinking before Conference opens. I am reluctant to go into a major conference where there is so little prepara-

[1] This message was sent by telegram to President Eisenhower at the Summer White House in Denver, Colo.

tory work. But Eden thinks it necessary to maintain momentum and avoid vacuum. We are agreed a NATO Ministerial meeting would follow after short interval devoted to further preparation in detail.

On the China matter, we met on restricted basis.[2] Eden listened with intense interest but was totally non-commital which was natural. He remarked that US action to defend Formosa was understandable and would have wide approval but that the same was not true of Quemoy and other islands near the mainland. I explained large psychological and lesser material relationship of these islands to Formosa but I fear he was not totally convinced. He will let me know shortly his views re appeal to UN.

I am spending weekend on my island and then shall go to NY for UN opening.

Faithfully yours, FOSTER

[2] Documentation concerning China is presented in volume XIV.

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740.5/9–1954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, September 19, 1954—1 p. m.

1175. Department pass Defense. Department for Secretary. Noforn. From Reinhardt. Following message from General Gruenther:

"I met Mendes-France at Marly for one hour Saturday night, with Parodi present. He stated Eden had informed him Thursday of some of my ideas on controls and he desired develop this subject further. He continued: 'As you may know our approach to subject of German rearmament is somewhat different from our British friends.' He explained that when EDC presented to French public, German admission to NATO was pictured as undesirable solution. French Parliament still considers NATO unacceptable and will be difficult task convert them. That is why so necessary to build up Brussels treaty aspect and stress it constantly in presentation to French.

"He said Brussels organization must have certain important functions but essential there be no duplication in military field. How could SHAPE assist?

"I told him of logistic controls we could execute and explained with chart our possible contribution with respect to pipeline operation. I also showed how we could assist in control of supplies. Mendes said all this important and helpful but that it was in purely military operational role. Problem is mainly political one. He wanted agency to control armament manufacture and conduct inspections to insure that military equipment not being manufactured or stored illegally. He wants NATO Commander to report to Brussels organization in performing this mission. He said French still distrustful of Germans and must be assured that unauthorized German build-up cannot take place.

[1] Repeated to Bonn for Conant, Rome for Murphy, and London for Aldrich.

"I told Mendes that I felt we could give no assistance in control of armament production. We might be able help in conducting inspections for material in hands troops if that necessary, but we would be reluctant see such assignment given us. I added it was not clear to me how NATO headquarters would operate under Brussels for tasks such as those he had in mind. However, I said we would study proposal at once.

"I told him I felt he was overstressing inspection aspect; that I considered if Brussels organization was to have satisfactory future, positive aspects had to be emphasized rather than making role one of merely preventing members from violating certain restrictions. He replied he visualized Brussels would also handle common procurement for seven member countries for all military supplies on continent. In reply my query whether British expected conform strictly to this procedure in view Commonwealth relations, he said probably some exception would have to be worked out for British. He said, Brussels would also determine maximum force contributions, while NATO would deal with minimum figures. In addition it might be possible to work out a few supranational functions for Brussels organization.

"I inquired whether or not staff work had been done on French proposal and received reply which convinced me that problem not yet thought through. Mendes expects nine-power conference give instructions to working group of experts on conclusion of meeting starting 28 September. He wants working group to report in 30 days with NAC meeting late October or early November to approve. In that event French Parliament will approve prior to Christmas.

"I came away from meeting with impression that Mendes is obsessed with political difficulties he faces in getting German rearmament through Parliament. He considers his most convincing argument will be control and safeguard aspects and that is why he lays such emphasis on British participation in Brussels pact with expanded functions. He will agree somewhat reluctantly to simultaneous admission of Germany to NATO but his heart is not in it. Thursday, De Margerie told me Brussels pact concept is for 'window dressing', but I did not get that impression from Mendes, because he appears deadly serious about Brussels role. Once he said, 'NATO will be superior organization but it will not exercise all functions. Some must be handled by Brussels organization.' But his ideas on this division were extremely vague.

"It is almost impertinence for me to suggest that preparatory work for nine-power conference be thorough, because no doubt that already in hand. I am nevertheless apprehensive that meeting may convene without thorough understanding of French proposal. Such development could result in disagreement or at least very fuzzy directive to working group. Twice Mendes said, 'I can get this through French Parliament if our partners will listen to me this time as to kind of proposal which should be adopted. I don't insist that others have to bow to French opinion but it must be carefully considered'.

"Mendes was in good frame of mind but evident he is very, very tired. He does not expect any rest during next three months. I told him I consider he has too many jobs. He agreed and said he would like get rid of one of them, but he didn't specify which one."

London please convey full substance this message to Eden.

DILLON

740.5/9–2054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET LONDON, September 20, 1954—5 p. m.

1423. British views on safeguards to accompany German entry into NATO and Brussels pact briefly outlined as follows:

1. General principles. All military arrangements should be in NATO. Even if Brussels powers agree on certain military controls which will apply only to them, these controls should be implemented through NATO so that there will be no duplication of military organization.

2. Safeguards should not be in negative form as French appear to suggest but should be positive operating arrangements which can make useful contribution to common military task.

3. Safeguards should not interfere with military effectiveness of NATO.

Application of above principles to French memorandum [2] contain Mendes-France proposals raise questions regarding principle No. 5 in which French speak of important military arrangements to accompany modified Brussels pact text. British feel strongly these military arrangements should be under NATO.

As regards French proposal on controls and inspections, British believe matter can best be handled by formalizing and extending SACEUR's present inspection system of NATO forces.

Regarding armament zones and distinction between categories (as set forth in Annex 2 of Article 107 of Treaty of Paris) British still believe NATO is better framework than Brussels treaty but they are willing to negotiate this point.

British do not feel they can now state a position until they know what zones French propose in which arms manufacture would be limited. The British agree with the general principle.

Main British question regarding French plan is on proposal to distribute orders for manufacturing armaments on continent of Europe. British are skeptical on grounds of (1) practicability (2) excessively negative approach (3) doubt that it will be feasible unless undesirable supranational element reintroduced (4) belief that production planning at least could be done best on NATO basis even though executive function might have to be carried out under Brussels pact machinery.

On all of these points, however, British are willing to consider French ideas and will go as far as they can to meet them.

[1] Repeated to Bonn and to Paris, with instructions to pass to Hughes and Reinhardt.

[2] Presumably a reference to the French *aide-mémoire* whose text was transmitted in circular telegram 148 of Sept. 20, *infra*.

British are enthusiastic over General Gruenther's comments in telegram 1332 [*332*] September 19.[3]

ALDRICH

[3] Same as telegram 1175 from Paris, Sept. 19, *supra*.

740.5/9–2054 : Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 20, 1954—7 : 20 p. m.

148. Following is translation *aide-mémoire* handed Merchant by French Chargé September 18 : [2]

"The plan given below is based on the following principles:

(1) Nondiscrimination; (2) Limitation of troop strength and armaments; (3) Control (supervision) of troop strength and armaments; (4) Exclusive application of the provisions specified to the armed forces (troops and armaments) placed by the member countries at the disposal of the Supreme Command of NATO; (5) Within this framework, full participation by Great Britain.

I. The Brussels Treaty shall be changed so as to furnish the basis for an organization charged with strengthening security and peace on the European continent. Germany and Italy shall adhere by means of various appropriate modifications of the text now in force.

This text is to be supplemented by important military provisions.

II. With regard to the armed forces, both troops and armaments, placed by each member country, on the continent, at the disposal of the Supreme Command, the Council provided for in Article 7 of the Brussels Treaty will adopt the levels fixed by the Council of NATO upon the recommendations of the Supreme Command.

However, these levels considered by NATO as minima become for the members of the Brussels Treaty maxima which they pledge themselves not to exceed.

Compliance with the maxima thus fixed will be guaranteed by controls and inspections organized throughout the whole of the continental territory covered by agreement.

III. With regard to armaments, it will be necessary to set up two categories:

(*a*) The arms envisaged in Annex 2 of Article 107 of the Treaty of Paris (subject to possible revision of the list);

(*b*) Other armaments.

The manufacture of the arms in Category (*a*) will be prohibited in strategically exposed zones which will be marked off on a map annexed to the agreement. The Council of the Seven will ensure by inspections

[1] Drafted by Fisher and cleared with Merchant; sent to London, Paris, Rome, Ottawa, Brussels, The Hague, Oslo, Copenhagen, Bonn, and Luxembourg.

[2] A memorandum of this conversation between Merchant and French Embassy officials, with the attached French *aide-mémoire*, is in Department of State file 740.5/9–1854. The Embassy in Paris also reported on a conversation with Parodi concerning the French proposals in telegram 1173 of Sept. 18 (740.5/9–1854).

and controls that the regulation forbidding manufacture is fully complied with.

As for the arms in category (*b*), their manufacture on the continent and their distribution shall be directed and controlled by the Council. The latter shall especially be charged with: drawing up the manufacturing programs and assigning the orders for the various member countries; distributing arms among the various armed forces; receiving arms imported free of charge from the United States and distributing them.

The continental countries undertake not to carry out any manufacture in excess of the orders placed with them. The Council may also authorize manufactures for export. The manufacture of armaments intended for equipping forces of the member countries other than those which are placed at the disposal of the Supreme Command, shall also be authorized.

The sole purpose of the control provided for armaments category (*a*) shall be to establish that no manufacture has taken place, while the control provided for armaments category (*b*) shall be qualitative and quantitative.

In order that the quantitative control to be exercised by the Council may be effective, it shall also apply to the creation of new armament installations, industries, or factories. In that connection, authorizations shall be issued by the Council, which will take decisions on strategic considerations. The continental area covered by the agreement shall be contained within a series of zones subject to special regulations, extending, in decreasing size, from East to West. So that this system may not be in any way discriminatory and may be just, joint new arms factories may be established in unexposed zones.

The decisions of the Council shall be taken by a simple majority, a weighted majority, or unanimously, as the case may be. In the matter of control, they shall be taken by a simple majority.

IV. Whether it is a matter of troops or of arms, the Council of Seven shall insofar as possible call upon the NATO services for assistance in connection with the above-mentioned controls and inspections."

Chargé described six other arrangements outside revision Brussels Treaty text which would be necessary. In response request express in writing Chargé subsequently submitted informal memo of which following is translation.

"1. The Federal Republic shall pledge itself not to raise any other forces except those which it places at the disposal of the Supreme Commander.

2. The German forces will form part of the inter-Allied combat force, in which German and Allied divisions will be placed side by side in large common units. The arrangements pertaining to this matter shall be established by agreement between the Council of the Seven and the Atlantic Council, upon the recommendations of the Standing Group.

3. The Federal Republic shall pledge itself not to resort to force in order to settle its territorial problems. The Council of the Seven and the Atlantic Council shall take note of this commitment.

4. Furthermore, the two Councils shall specify that a violation by the Federal Republic of the various commitments undertaken by it

would immediately entail the loss of the guarantees which are granted to it, as well as the loss of all support.

5. Great Britain, participating fully in the military organization of the Seven, shall maintain a minimum force on the continent. In this connection it would give to the Brussels Organization assurances that the strength of the British forces in Germany would not be reduced below a certain level.

The Government of the United States would make a similar declaration.

6. The control exercised by the Supreme Commander over the troops placed at his disposal would be strengthened in such a way as to make the deployment and utilization of the Central-Europe forces dependent upon a decision by SACEUR."

Chargé commented that (3) pertained to declaration agreed tripartitely last winter [3] and that (4) was repetition tripartite declaration of May 1952.[4]

In making *démarche* Chargé reading from telegram said in Mendes-France's view principal objections French Assembly to EDC were too much supranationality and UK not member. He therefore believes to make German rearmament acceptable to French Assembly Brussels Treaty must be revised to meet these two objections. If this done he prepared support it before Assembly with "Full powers of his Government". His idea is that Nine Power Conference at London should agree upon certain broad principles and set experts to work, with time limit of one month, to translate agreements in principle into actual texts. These would then be submitted NAC and, assuming its approval, he would immediately thereafter present texts to Assembly. His intention and purpose would be to secure decision by Assembly before end of year.

Merchant said he did not want to comment on *aide-mémoire* until we had opportunity to study it, however French should not take for granted it would be automatically possible for US issue same assurances offered in anticipation of EDC. Situation was changed and solution now proposed quite different. He said he felt Congressional consultation needed before any statement of assurances could be issued or reaffirmed.

In response Merchant's query re omission in proposal any mention German sovereignty and membership NATO Chargé appeared uninformed and stated he could only assume Mendes would present package proposal to French Assembly of which revised Brussels Treaty would only be one element. In response Merchant's query re Saar, Chargé said he knew nothing as to what was planned or thought of in that connection.

Chargé said Mendes would speak Monday at Council of Europe outlining proposal in general terms. Merchant expressed hope it would

[3] For documentation concerning the negotiations over a tripartite security declaration, see pp. 688 ff.

[4] For the text of the Tripartite Declaration of May 27, 1952, see p. 686.

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be in broadest possible terms to avoid risk being publicly committed and therefore frozen into position from which he might claim it impossible to retreat during course impending negotiations. Chargé said he was sure Mendes intended only very general exposition. He said Mendes was most anxious have our comments as far in advance as possible of London Conference next week.

Merchant informed Chargé briefly on Secretary's trip Bonn and London, his efforts telephone Mendes and Murphy's visit Paris.[5]

SMITH

[5] For a summary of Murphy's conversation with Mendès-France in Paris on Sept. 23, see telegram 1254 from Paris, Sept. 24, p. 1256.

396.1 LO/9–2054

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 20, 1954.

Participants: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. F. J. Leishman, First Secretary, British Embassy
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR
C. Burke Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR

The Ambassador said that he had been instructed by his Foreign Office to extend a formal invitation to the United States to be represented at the forthcoming Nine Power Meeting in London which is to open on September 28. Mr. Merchant said that he would consult the Acting Secretary and give the Ambassador a formal reply as quickly as possible.[1] He said that the Secretary, anticipating the invitation to the meeting, was tentatively planning to arrive in London on Sunday, September 26. The Ambassador said that his Foreign Office would be pleased to hear this.

The Ambassador then handed Mr. Merchant a statement of position reached by Messrs. Eden and Mendes-France in Paris on September 17 and a copy of the final draft of the United Kingdom–United States understanding of the purpose of the Nine Power Conference (copies of both are attached). It was noted that the latter draft now states that the purpose of the Nine Power Conference is "to agree . . .[2] upon the measures equally for promotion of European unity and for defence of the free world through expansion of the Brussels Treaty to include German Federal Republic and Italy and of NATO so as to include German Federal Republic."

The Ambassador then referred to Mendes-France's reply to the

[1] In circular telegram 149, Sept. 20, the Department of State informed the NATO capitals and Bonn that the United States formally accepted the invitation to attend the Nine-Power meeting in London beginning Sept. 28 (396.1 LO/9–2054).

[2] Ellipsis in the source text.

British proposals, saying that the French counter-proposals seemed to differ in emphasis rather than in substance, though they left the question of NATO membership for Germany unanswered. He also mentioned the French memorandum which was communicated to the interested governments on September 18 [3] and said that he believes this memorandum provides a basis for discussion. It is true that the French appear to desire a Brussels organization solution of the German problem rather than a NATO solution, but Sir Roger believed that there was room for maneuver and that the French position is a first position which is subject to some change in negotiation. He said that the British Government is aware of the need for a rapid solution of this problem and he felt that Mendes-France was also aware of the need for haste. Ambassador Jebb in Paris had reported that Mendes-France was anxious to avoid a repetition of the situation at the Brussels Conference where France constituted a minority of one, and the Ambassador thought this seems encouraging.

In speaking of the conditions laid down in the French proposed solution Mr. Merchant said it would be a mistake to assume that the United States can automatically re-issue the assurances given by the President last April [4] when an EDC solution was envisaged. Any proposal to repeat these assurances in a new context would require consultation with Congress. The Ambassador said that he understood this and that he hoped the State Department would adopt a favorable attitude toward this particular proposal. Mr. Merchant said that another aspect of the French proposals which would require careful consideration by this Government is that part which suggests channeling all United States end item aid through the Brussels organization.

Mr. Merchant said that we are very interested in the studies which we understand are now proceeding in London regarding the possible revision of the Brussels Pact and that our Embassy in London had been instructed to keep closely in touch with the drafting group. He expressed the hope to the Ambassador that the British Foreign Office would keep our Embassy fully informed of the progress made.

[Annex 1]

STATEMENT OF POSITION REACHED BY MR. EDEN AND M. MENDES-FRANCE IN PARIS, SEPTEMBER 17, 1954

SECRET

The Foreign Secretary explained that all the Governments he had visited, as well as Her Majesty's Government themselves, were convinced that the right solution lay in the admission of Germany into

[3] The text of the French memorandum under reference is included in circular telegram 148 of Sept. 20, *supra*.

[4] For the text of United States assurances concerning the EDC, issued on Apr. 16, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 619–620.

NATO simultaneously with her entry into the expanded Treaty of Brussels Organisation, subject to the necessary accompanying arrangements.

M. Mendes-France urged that, if this was to be made acceptable to French public opinion, the accompanying arrangements, so far as possible and practicable, should be organised within the framework of the Treaty of Brussels Organisation, it being understood that the execution of any military arrangements should be carried out by the NATO machine.

For their part Her Majesty's Government, and as they believe, the other Five Governments concerned, at present prefer that most of the arrangements referred to should be organised directly by the NATO machine. Her Majesty's Government are, however, prepared to consider how much of the arrangements can in practice be confided to the Treaty of Brussels Organisation and to encourage the other Governments concerned to do likewise.

[Annex 2]

UNITED KINGDOM–UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDING OF THE PURPOSE OF THE 9-POWER CONFERENCE

SECRET [WASHINGTON, September 20, 1954.]

The purpose of the Nine-Power Conference is to agree, with a view to the forthcoming Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, upon the measures equally for promotion of European unity and for defence of the free world through expansion of the Brussels Treaty to include German Federal Republic and Italy and of NATO so as to include German Federal Republic.

The Conference would discuss how best the accompanying arrangements could be organised within the revised Brussels Treaty and within NATO.

The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France and Federal German Republic would also discuss among themselves and inform the Conference of their plans for restoring German sovereignty, which would be an essential pre-requisite to the entry of the Federal German Republic into the Brussels Treaty and into NATO.

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740.5/9–2254 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET BONN, September 22, 1954—6 p. m.

850. 1. Coalition leaders and Foreign Office and Defense officials have

[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

now had opportunity examine Mendes-France proposals on German rearmament. Their mood one of reserve and suspicion. Strauss, Krone, Blank and Dehler commented on absence mention of NATO membership for Federal Republic, some form of which regarded as essential to permit efficient US–UK–FedRep military cooperation and frustrate Fr efforts to cripple German armament, and some form NATO membership also considered domestic political necessity.

2. Blank and his military advisor Heusinger specifically criticized fact that FedRep would be only member whose entire armed forces would be subject to limitation and control of Europe defense system as compared to France and others who could declare majority their forces needed for overseas duty. More important, they said, was Fr capacity to control size of German forces through Fr veto power on NATO Council of which under Mendes-France plan FedRep apparently not a member. They insisted prior agreement on size of German army similar to EDC military protocol necessary before any subsequent system of limitations went into effect. They strongly criticized Fr proposal that Brussels Council allocate arms aid received from US.

3. Coalition leaders interpret Fr proposal as intentionally unacceptable and aimed at placing blame for breakdown London talks on FedRep or on UK (by introducing requirement of still closer British participation). Blank, Strauss and Krone stressed that London meeting must bring French agreement to effective German armament and not be allowed degenerate into ceaseless discussions on technical level. Blank and Strauss insisted that if London failed, US and UK must act immediately to rearm FedRep under limitations already agreed on. Failure to do this would discredit Adenauer completely, US–UK policy in FedRep, and lead to *de facto* neutralization of FedRep. This view shared by leading FDP deputies.

4. From our estimate political situation here we believe settlement along lines of German position paper reported Bonn tel 835 [*839*] to Dept London 130, Paris 140 [2] would probably win support of full coalition in Bundestag and of majority German public.

5. SPD has stated Mendes-France proposals present usable basis of discussion, although they will have to be further examined for discriminatory provisions. They are disappointed at omission of unity question.

6. With exception of SPD press and a few papers with neutralist tendencies such as *Frankfurter Allgemeine* and *Sud Deutsche Zeitung* German press criticized Mendes-France proposals as discriminatory and unacceptable unless immediate NATO membership included.

CONANT

[2] Not printed.

740.5/9–2254 : Telegram

*The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, September 22, 1954—7 p. m.

Polto 475. 1. At NAC restricted meeting today Ismay said some delegations had raised question as to whether there should be NATO observer at London conference. He remarked that his position at Bermuda [2] was difficult one and often he felt that he was really not wanted. Aside from opportunity confer with President Eisenhower and public relations value having NATO observer, he felt his presence there not fruitful.

UK rep said large number of technical questions must be considered at conference, such as return of German sovereignty and status of Allied forces stationed Germany, especially financial issues relating thereto which are of primary interest occupying powers and nations having forces there. These matters will require considerable study in Bonn. He said there is also series of questions re safeguards which will have considerable impact on NATO. In his opinion will be difficult prepare text on these issues by Oct 15 and for that reason NAC ministerial meeting may not be held until end of October. On question having NATO observer he said if NAC so desires he will ask his Govt as host nation whether 8 NATO members and FedRep would agree have observer. He said he did not favor idea NATO having observer and suggested as alternative that conference be requested designate one of members to give oral briefing end each day to Ambassadors or other reps 6 NATO govts not attending conference. Expressing his personal view re length of conference he opined it would probably last not more than 4 days.

2. Canadian rep speaking off record said was not quite correct use analogy of Bermuda meeting which after all was primarily meeting of 3-powers to discuss forthcoming 4-power meeting. It was of interest to NATO but not directly related to NATO or under NATO auspices. However, issues for consideration London conference so closely related to NATO his Govt had hoped conference would be under NATO auspices. He felt very strongly that NATO should send observer since conference may vitally affect future of organization. Portuguese rep said his Govt entirely shares views expressed by Canadian rep. He added question admitting FedRep to NAC is vital issue but matter regarding occupation forces is not by any means main issue as suggested by UK rep. Greek, Danish and Norwegian reps also supported Canadian view.

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[1] Repeated to all NATO capitals and Bonn.

[2] For documentation concerning the Bermuda Conference, Dec. 4–8, 1953, see pp. 1710 ff.

3. US rep said it had always been his understanding that London conference would undertake only preparatory work for later consideration at NAC ministerial meeting. He envisaged that immediately after conference permanent reps would meet here for full discussion and exchange of views. He said he was not opposed to information being made available to NATO govts not attending conference and on contrary thought they should be fully informed on conference developments. However he thought most fruitful exchange of views could take place after conference. (Portuguese rep had earlier suggested might be useful NAC perm reps meet here simultaneously to discuss conference developments.)

4. Dutch rep referring to daily briefing suggested by UK said these would be flat and with little value. He felt most desirable method for govts not attending conference to obtain information would be through close contact between their Embassies and conference delegations. This way they would be posted on conference developments and also obtain good cross section of opinions and views. Belgian rep also favored this procedure pointing out that it was most successful at Brussels conference.

5. After lengthy debate during which Canadian, Norwegian and Portuguese reps, especially latter, gave considerable vent to their feeling over restrictive 9-power conference, it was agreed UK rep would recommend his Govt request conference arrange daily briefing session for reps 6-NATO powers not attending meeting. Method suggested by Dutch rep will also be used.

6. Today's meeting gave further evidence of real concern on part those perm reps whose govts not invited London that they would not be kept fully informed developments conference. Recommend Dept support any UK initiative to ameliorate this situation.

HUGHES

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740.5/9–2254 : Telegram

*The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, September 22, 1954—10 p. m.

Polto 483. Reftel Topol 325, September 19.[2]

A. *General Considerations*

1. Question assigned to USRO in reftel has been discussed with Gruenther, Norstad and Schuyler of SHAPE, Freeman of EUCOM,

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in two sections and repeated to Bonn for Conant and London for Aldrich.

[2] Not printed; it instructed USRO that it had the major responsibility for coordinating U.S. preparations for the London Conference on those matters relating to German membership in NATO (740.5/9–1954).

Dillon and Achilles of Embassy, Bruce, Wood and Martin in USRO. This telegram and one which follows it on French proposals are largely based on these discussions. It has not been possible in time available to seek concurrence of all parties to specific language of this message. However, most of them have read and commented on it in draft and do not have major objections to broad lines of position taken though they might question individual details or emphasis.

2. It seems hardly fruitful exercise to attempt to forecast with any precision what Mendes will buy, how vigorously, if bought, he will try to sell Parliament, or what French Parliament will buy. Consequently, should relegate to strictly secondary place in development of US position, particularly initial position, nose-counting of French Parliamentarians. While not disregarding saleability in France, primary considerations should be:

*a.* Clarity and simplicity;
*b.* Positive contribution to short-term and long-term effectiveness of NATO, particularly in its military aspects;
*c.* Acceptability to OSR allies, particularly Britain, Germany, Benelux and Italy;
*d.* Keeping door wide open to and encouraging as rapid development as Europeans can agree to make toward closer unity among them, and in particular toward France-German rapprochement, taking into account set-back caused by failure of France to ratify EDC.

3. Given fact that further sponsorship of EDC is not currently practical, program sketched in broad outline in Polto 35, September 3,[3] and spelled out in documents dated September 10,[4] referred to in Topol 325, seems to us in general to meet most adequately these requirements. Believe should adopt position which can be enthusiastically defended on its own merits and which can appeal to real supporters of Atlantic alliance and what it stands for, rather than to risk failure on behalf of some compromise which few really like. Believe this program has valid selling points if there is will to use them.

B. *Procedural*

4. Consider it important that US be in position to present at least broad outlines of its proposed solution to countries invited to nine-power meeting as soon as possible, preferably before Foreign Ministers leave for London so can discuss alternatives which will be on table with other Cabinet members. Foresee serious difficulties in securing

[3] Not printed; it contained the views of USRO concerning Document 6 of the London Study Group as it had been reexamined in light of the present situation. (740.5/9–354) For the text of Document 6, which was attached to the Report of the London Study Group, July 12, see p. 1013.

[4] Presumably this is a reference to an early draft of document NPT D–8 of Sept. 27 entitled "Outline of Actions Required to Accomplish Immediate U.S. Objectives in Europe"; a copy of NPT D–8 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363. The drafts of Sept. 10 were not found in Department of State files.

successful conclusion of what is already difficult operation if at least some of this kind of preliminary discussion cannot take place.

5. Permanent representatives of NATO countries not to be represented in London feel strongly importance their countries being informed London developments. Statements this subject made at closed session this morning contained separate message.[5] Recommend that should agree at nine-power meeting to full briefing of Permanent Council immediately at close of meeting. Urge also that comments be invited on programs for working groups and that working groups themselves function in Paris, utilizing services of NATO IS.

C. *Substance*

6. Remainder this message will comment on position proposed in document of September 10, especially paras 2, 3, and 4 of Appendix C. Assume Bonn handling para 1. Do not suggest that details discussed this message would be acted upon or even discussed formally at forthcoming London meeting. However, believe it important in making final decision as to principles of US position as well as to insure that in negotiations at London there is real understanding of what agreed principles mean in practice. That US know in some detail how each specific proposal could be carried out.

7. See no special problems directly related para 2 of proposed resolution as German membership in NATO can clearly be handled through regular procedure provided in Article 10 of Treaty. However, problem does arise of situation in case of German unification, particularly in light statements made by Western Powers at recent Berlin conference. Separate message will be sent on this point.[6]

8. Specific proposals for carrying out those parts of para 3 which deal with extension of NATO authority over logistics and supply and further integration of NATO forces will be contained in response to Todef [*Defto?*] 96.[7] Would suggest, however, that should be some help to French in accepting NATO rather than Brussels solution to many of their problems if US prepared to participate on equal basis with Europeans in steps to be taken along these lines in Europe. Believe sufficient possibility exists that we could do so without real damage to US interest that this should receive careful study. Such steps by US would also be welcomed by NATO countries generally as important recognition by US of role as equal partner.

9. Response to Defto 96 will also deal in some detail with strengthening controls over deployment, assignment and level of forces. In general, believe protocol to treaty requiring forces be assigned NATO, with certain exceptions, based on items of UK document 6, is appro-

[5] This is a reference to telegram Polto 475 from Paris, Sept. 22, *supra*.
[6] The editors were unable to further identify this message.
[7] Not found in Department of State files.

priate and essential to effectiveness other measures. Should be supplemented by ministerial resolution providing that cutbacks in assignments or agreed force goals be made only after opportunity for formal council discussion of AR character and that proposed increases in assignments not previously provided by agreed force goals or proposed increases in force goals outside AR procedure be submitted to council and implemented only if no objections raised. Believe deployment of forces assigned SACEUR should be made subject to his concurrence approval, redeployments within his area be made only with his concurrence, and, if militarily significant, approval of Council. Such redeployments might bear on possible need for invocation Articles 4 and 5 of treaty and justify political discussion temporary redeployment outside his territory, presumably to meet emergency situations, should be notified to him but because of possible covert character such operations, reported to and discussed in Council only at time agreed between NATO military authorities and country concerned. Believe these arrangements would protect US freedom to reduce force commitments in Europe or to redeploy temporarily forces located in Europe without impairing effective control sought by France over German buildup and use of forces. Moreover they represent a strengthening of NATO which is desirable per se. (In addition to above on assigned forces, there is special problem of earmarked forces.)

10. As indicated earlier, believe actions taken at this time in connection with alternatives to EDC should not be of such character as to foreclose or hamper early and significant development among Europeans of further supranational institutions along lines designed particularly to improve France-German relations. Believe essential that nine-power meeting and NATO ministerial meeting encourage moves in this direction. However, do not believe US should expect positive decisions as to specific steps to be agreed immediately as part of general arrangements now being worked out. Believe it will take longer for participating countries to develop and sell steps which would have real long-range significance and should not delay agreement on other matters for this purpose. As tactical matter, urge that US maintain position of supporting European initiative in this field along lines para 4 of app C but not take lead at London.

11. While see no basic objection to efforts by continent to develop arms pool idea, and therefore to US support of any initiative they may wish to take in this connection, consider IL represents exceedingly difficult negotiating and operational problem, particularly outside EDC framework, with not much prospect of positive benefits in near future and some chance of causing serious delay in German ability to

initiate arms production for her forces. Therefore would not press for it.

12. As additional point to program in ref document, believe original UK proposal, as we understood it, that Germany and Italy be brought into Brussels Pact and thereby realize benefit of UK automatic guarantee to come to their aid in case of attack, is unobjectionable and may be useful to France as symbol of greater UK participation on continent. Therefore, believe it might be added to program described above.

13. Do not gather that question of extension of NATO to 50 years is particularly lively issue at present.

14. Assume we may wish do something about new US statement on maintenance of forces in Europe, but doubt if anything we can in fact say at this point, with rejection of EDC behind us could have important impact on informed opinion.

15. Have no strong feelings about proposal which understand both British and French endorse for establishment strategic zones in which certain types armaments would not be produced. Consider it somewhat unrealistic from military standpoint and may raise enforcement problems. However, anything Germans could accept we should probably accept. If done would be feasible and would think better from German standpoint to do it in NATO rather than Brussels Pact.

16. There has been much talk recently of need to provide control and inspection mechanisms to insure that decisions provided for in various proposed programs are in fact carried out in detail by individual countries. Believe that analogy drawn to situation in Germany in 20's is essentially false. In terms of arrangement which includes German participation in NATO and integration of German forces into NATO forces with multiplicity of channels for exchange of information, filling out of questionnaires, etc., with the stationing of Allied forces on German soil, with close scrutiny of German economic activities through OEEC and other current mechanisms and with current status of military technology, it seems to us that danger of covert German violation is negligible one. This result, however, only if all German forces are required to be assigned to NATO. No doubt does represent political factor which above explanation cannot fully deal with. Perhaps could be dealt with as political factor by NATO ministerial resolution directing international staff in cooperation with NATO military authorities to take necessary steps to enable it to report to Council on actions being taken by countries in carrying out NATO decisions in these fields. Extent to which this would be implemented by special administrative arrangements would be left for future decision. Particularly important that NATO military not be given inspection functions in production field. Should point out that it now has inspection role in connection with infrastructure, with both inspec-

tion teams visiting construction sites and board of auditors making detailed review of national infrastructure financial operations.

HUGHES

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740.5/9–2354 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Belgium (Alger) to the Department of State* [1]

TOP SECRET BRUSSELS, September 23, 1954—6 p. m.

309. In conversation this morning Spaak gave me following as his current thoughts.

Thing he least able understand is why Mendes-France returned from Brussels describing self as defeated when he could have claimed success, which Spaak believes would have enabled him put through EDC.

*Embassy comment:* Spaak continues preoccupied with Mendes-France claim others ganged up in Brussels under Spaak leadership; also obvious Spaak endeavoring formulate personal estimate Mendes-France for use as measuring stick in future.

Spaak went on to say he cannot bring self believe Mendes so evil as to be insincere in protestations devotion to Atlantic pact. Believed Mendes when he told him he is now prepared accept idea of German admission NATO if adequate safeguards within Brussels pact devised. Believes Mendes does not plan failure London talks. However, Spaak believes that Mendes would be in mood adopt neutralism if London fails, saying he had failed with five in Brussels, then with UK and US at London, France is thus alone, not understood by friends and allies, nothing positive left to do.

Spaak remarked that number French parliamentarians agree on opposing Mendes-France but not on anything positive. Also Mendes-France is not opposed by French public which is factor which will make parliamentarians hesitate overthrow him. Pro-EDC French leaders he observed especially at Strasbourg are discouraged and disorganized and at great disadvantage vis-à-vis Mendes-France who being in power knows all factors some of which they do not. Spaak described Mendes-France's Strasbourg speech as veto very clever.

Re possible success London Spaak sees three problems for Germans: Sovereignty, discriminatory provisions and Saar. For UK there will be terribly difficult question of new commitments on continent. Spaak is not sure Adenauer now prepared settle Saar yet this appears continue condition precedent for France.

Spaak believes simultaneity of following must be achieved: German sovereignty, German admission NATO and rearranged Brussels pact.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Ottawa.

Spaak said Dutch regard French control proposal unfavorably. Presumably all Dutch and Belgian effort would be controlled as well as German, yet France would retain measure freedom.

Spaak sees extremely difficult technical problems arising out of control proposal: UK would be controller, France would be controller and partly controlled, etc. One curiosity is that proposed controls would in effect put maximum limit on number British troops sent continent. Worried that even if agreement reached in principle negotiations will be difficult and plans can fail because of technicalities.

Spaak plans go The Hague September 25, London 27 and hopes sail for New York October 15.

ALGER

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740.5/9–2354: Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices* [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 23, 1954—7:07 p. m.

156. Re French request for US views on proposals incorporated Circular 148 September 20 [2] sent all addressees, difficult for us to comment in detail in absence clarification points raised Deptel 1039 to Paris repeated London 1642 and Bonn 800.[3] However, believe following general comments should be transmitted to French:

1. We note that French proposals deal primarily with Brussels Treaty arrangements. Question German sovereignty not covered and no statement that French favor German admission NATO, although some form of German association with NATO appears implied in proposed six arrangements outside Brussels context. US view is that Germany must be admitted full NATO membership promptly. Any form of German association with NATO short of full membership out of question in light of political realities in Germany. Also our understanding that apparently unanimous support for principle of German membership in NATO developing among other NATO countries.

2. We fully recognize French Government's need for some safeguards and controls in order to make German participation NATO acceptable to parliament. US does not in principle oppose making use of Brussels Treaty context as partial means for working out certain of the safeguards required by France. However, we believe such safeguards or conditions as may be necessary to France, irrespective of what context they may be worked out in, must meet certain criteria: (*a*) They must in the first instance be nondiscriminatory if they are to be acceptable to the Germans. We are pleased to note that French Government has itself recognized this principle in its *aide-mémoire*.

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden; cleared with Moore, Merchant, Bowie, and the Department of Defense; and sent to all NATO capitals and Bonn.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1231.

[3] Not printed; it provided Murphy with guidance concerning questions he could raise during his pending meeting with Mendès-France on Sept. 23 (740.5/9–2154). For a summary of meeting between Murphy and Mendès-France, see telegram 1254 from Paris, Sept. 24, p. 1256.

(*b*) They should be capable of prompt adoption. Lateness of hour regarding need for German sovereignty, association with West, and defense contribution make it essential that prolonged and complex negotiations be avoided. (*c*) Arrangements should be such as not to create new organizational machinery which will duplicate or frustrate existing machinery. In particular, we would hope that no machinery would be established under Brussels which would conflict with existing NATO functions and powers. (*d*) Generally preferable to meet French need for safeguards through positive measures, such as strengthening powers and functions NATO commanders, rather than through negative measures, such as inspection of forces and armament production. Concept of inspection is contrary to spirit of trust and mutual confidence which characterizes Western alliance.

3. French should be told that it cannot be assumed that US April EDC assurances would be reaffirmed. Much will depend on outcome of London Conference and NAC Meeting.

4. Similarly proposal channel US MDAP aid through Brussels Council is very different proposition from intended use of EDC Commissariat for this purpose and would require careful examination by US.

5. To extent that French proposals meet foregoing objectives and criteria, we believe they represent valuable contribution toward solution of problem and are prepared to consider them sympathetically.

DULLES

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S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5433 series

*Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 23, 1954.

Subject: Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe

Reference: NSC 5433 [2]

At the request of the Secretary of Defense the enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which the Secretary of Defense agrees, with respect to the reference report on the subject are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 5433 at its meeting on Friday, September 24, 1954.[3]

Also enclosed and transmitted herewith at the request of the Secretary of Defense for the information of the Council are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the related subjects of "Strategic Issues Con-

[1] At the same time that the Secretary of Defense sent the three enclosures to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council for distribution, he also sent a letter to Dulles with the same three enclosures attached. In the letter he stated his belief that the views of the two Departments were not "basically very far apart." (396.1 LO/9–2354)

[2] Dated Sept. 16, p. 1205.

[3] For a memorandum of discussion of this NSC meeting, see p. 1263.

fronting the United States in Europe" and "Preparations for the 9-Power Conference in London". The Secretary of Defense agrees generally with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in these papers.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure 1]

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 22 September 1954.

Subject: Immediate United States Policy Toward Europe—NSC 5433.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding a draft statement of policy, titled "Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe" (NSC 5433), prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Friday, 24 September 1954.

2. The draft paper sets forth a program of action for the immediate future designed to achieve present United States objectives in Europe by means other than the European Defense Community (EDC). It also sets forth certain questions the answers to which may assist in determining the United States objectives to be sought in the event that the pursuit of all present United States objectives is no longer feasible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in general with this approach and consider that, in view of the uncertain trend in the European situation, the National Security Council should direct the appropriate United States Government agencies to develop now the answers to these questions, in order to permit the timely formulation of any such changes in United States policy towards Europe as events may prove to be necessary.

3. The following comments are addressed to the specific portions of the draft statement of policy:

*a. Subparagraph 3b, page 2.* Delete the parenthetical phrase.

*Reason:* The parenthetical phrase is considered to be susceptible of misinterpretation. It tends to downgrade the major importance which the United States attaches to the successful defense of Western Europe and carries a connotation that a resolute defense of Western Europe might not be warranted. It ignores the probability that the loss of this area to the Allies would serve to prolong a general war and render eventual victory more costly.

*b. Paragraphs 5 and 6, page 4.* Delete the second sentence of paragraph 5.

*Reason:* This sentence, either separately or as a part of the paragraph, does not prescribe a course of action. Further, as now written

and in the context of paragraphs 5 and 6, the sentence appears to imply that, since Soviet aggression is not now imminent, the political and economic aspects of the European situation should receive major emphasis in the United States short-range program of action. While the recent developments in Western Europe may not have served to increase the imminence of Soviet military aggression, neither have they in any way served to lessen the threat. The Soviet divisive efforts have as an ultimate aim the reduction of Allied military effectiveness as well as the weakening of Allied political cohesion. If this sentence is to be retained, it should be reworded as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"Under present conditions, ~~Soviet military aggression against Western Europe does not appear to be imminent and~~ major Soviet efforts are devoted to dividing and weakening the Western alliance."

*c. Paragraph 8, pages 5 and 6.*

(1) Until the precise extent and scope of the proposed courses of action have been delineated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would desire to reserve their final endorsement.

(2) Delete subparagraph *e* and reletter the following subparagraphs accordingly.

*Reason:* Until, among other things, the reliability and support of the European Allies have been better demonstrated, it would be injudicious to enter into a commitment with such far-reaching implications. Certainly an offer to transfer nuclear weapons to our NATO Allies should not be used as an inducement for acceptance of the United States short-range program.

*d. Paragraph 10, page 7 (Revised).* Modify the third sentence as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"As a tactical matter, we should act *to implement the program, if necessary and as feasible* without French approval or cooperation. (leaving to France opportunity later to cooperate). ~~[if such action appears likely] [because such action is most likely] to induce ultimate French acceptance of the program and not to jeopardize attainment of our objectives.~~"

*Reason:* To provide for the early initiation of measures designed to test French reactions and which the United States, in any event, should pursue, while avoiding commitment to courses of action which might have to be abandoned or reversed in the face of strong French opposition.

*e. Paragraph 11, page 8.* Of the alternative proposals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor the "JCS Proposal."

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views be incorporated in the Department of Defense position in connection with the formulation of an immediate United States policy toward Europe.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
ARTHUR RADFORD
*Chairman*

[Enclosure 2]

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 22 September 1954.

Subject: Strategic Issues Confronting the U.S. in Europe

1. In response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 10 September 1954,[4] subject as above, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the actions required in the three situations outlined in paragraph 5 *a*, *b*, and *c* thereof follow:

*a.* Should France abstain from a program for German membership in NATO and controlled rearmament under NATO, but not withdraw from NATO or take active or passive measures of interference to the German defense contribution, no significant adjustment would be required in either NATO or U.S. strategic planning or in military programs.

*b.* Should France actively oppose German membership in NATO and controlled rearmament under NATO, and take measures of interference to hinder German rearmament short of withdrawal from NATO, adjustments in strategic planning might be necessary, depending upon the nature and degree of interference. Successful implementation of military programs would be handicapped but would not be prevented.

*c.* Should France withdraw from NATO and take all measures of interference with independent rearming of West Germany by the United States and United Kingdom short of open hostility, NATO and U.S. strategic planning for Europe, including North Africa, and military programs would require major adjustments and an immediate reappraisal by the United States of its basic policy toward Western Europe and its NATO commitments would be necessary.

2. With respect to your further request for at least tentative conclusions regarding those aspects of a strategic reappraisal having a significant impact on the development of a new U.S. approach for Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff respectfully reiterate their views contained in their statement on alternative EDC planning submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 15 September 1954, as follows:

*a.* A German contribution is essential to the defense of Europe and the free world. Therefore, the United States should seek such a German contribution, preferably with the concurrence of the French and British but if this cannot be obtained we should be willing to go as far as making a bilateral agreement with the Germans in order to get their participation and to keep them on the side of the free world.

*b.* A really sound defense of Europe depends on an adequate contribution from both Germany and France as well as the smaller nations. Failure to obtain French cooperation for a German contribution at

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

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this time will therefore require a basic change in NATO commitments and structure but this should not deter the United States from working out the best possible arrangement with Western Germany in our own interests as well as the interests of a free Europe.

3. The possibility cannot be discounted that France might not concur in any form of German rearmament and might actively oppose and obstruct Allied German efforts in this direction. French retaliatory measures, under extreme circumstances, might take the form of a withdrawal from NATO and the cancellation of all bilateral military facilities agreements. Any such action would compel a reorientation of United States strategy. On the assumption that the majority of the free nations of Europe still exhibit a resolute intent to stand in unified opposition to Soviet aggression, this would entail our support of a more extensive rearming of Germany, the increased utilization of Spanish and English naval and air bases and the strengthening as feasible, of the remainder of the West European perimeter. Under such circumstances, the rearming of West Germany should proceed without restrictions on the size and composition of forces and on her munitions production, such as contemplated in the Contractual-EDC arrangements. It should be our policy to capitalize on the potential of West Germany to the maximum extent. Her rearmament should be directed toward:

*a.* Initially, providing her with forces which, with U.S. and Allied support, could maintain an effective defense against an invasion by satellite forces, particularly those of East Germany, and which could compel the Soviets to mount an all-out attack in order to overrun Western Europe; and

*b.* Eventually, providing West Germany with forces adequate to compensate for the loss to the NATO of the French military commitment and to provide, with U.S. and Allied support, a reasonably effective defense against any external attack.

4. In the event that the support of the NATO nations envisaged in paragraph 3 above is not forthcoming, but these nations do not actively oppose such a course, the United States should nevertheless endeavor to enlist the aid of the United Kingdom in rearming that part of West Germany lying within the United Kingdom and United States zones on the order of that contemplated in the Contractual-EDC arrangement.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to keep the reappraisal of U.S. long-range policy with respect to Europe under study in the light of developments.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ARTHUR RADFORD

*Chairman*

[Enclosure 3]

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 22 September 1954.

Subject: Preparations for the 9-Power Conference in London

1. This memorandum is in response to the memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 21 September 1954,[5] subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the proposals concerning revisions to the Brussels Treaty, contained in a French *Aide-Mémoire*, and regarding certain reservations which the French propose as preconditions to the adoption of a revised Brussels Treaty.

2. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the general subject of a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe may be summarized, in part, as follows:

*a.* From the military point of view, the most desirable method of obtaining a German contribution would be the admission of the Federal Republic as a full-fledged, sovereign partner in the NATO;

*b.* Any politically feasible variant of the NATO or EDC formula would be militarily acceptable, provided it would result in a German contribution on the order of that contemplated in the EDC treaty;

*c.* It is desirable that maximum use be made of the German industrial potential for the production of munitions for Germany and for the NATO nations, consistent with and in support of the security interests of the United States; however,

*d.* If dictated by political consideration, restrictions on the composition of the military forces of West Germany and on her munitions production, approximating the safeguards incorporated in the Contractual-EDC arrangements, would be acceptable from the military standpoint, provided that such restrictions would not serve to impair the effectiveness of the German contribution.

3. As a general observation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned lest the current Allied efforts to achieve a German contribution to Western European defense become so involved, in the inhibitory and negative aspects of the proposed arrangements as to detract seriously from the military effectiveness of any organization which might eventually be evolved. They feel that, since the paramount purpose is to increase the strength and cohesion of the Western alliance, the principal efforts of the organization should be directed toward positive accomplishments, rather than to surveillance of the respective members.

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[5] Not found in Department of State files.

4. The following comments are addressed to certain military aspects of the proposals in the French *Aide-Mémoire*: [6]

*a. Section II.* This restriction could be accepted, provided that, in the face of SACEUR's recommendations, the French, through veto or other voting process, would not be in a position to delimit the German contribution substantially below that contemplated in the EDC treaty. With respect to the inspections designed to detect violations of the restrictions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these should be a function of an agency other than SACEUR—who must not be placed in a position of policing conformance of member nations to the imposed restrictions.

*b. Section III.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it desirable to locate arms manufacturing facilities in relatively unexposed positions and of coordinating arms production programs among the Brussels Treaty countries. However, they consider that the French proposal respecting the manufacture and distribution of arms on the continent of Europe is excessively rigid, would fail to take advantage of German production facilities and, in distinction to fostering the development of an adequate mobilization base for the support of the NATO armed forces, would serve to inhibit its growth; consequently it would tend to perpetuate the dependence of those forces on United States arms production. Further, while the United States might find it convenient to avail itself of the proposed machinery for the importation and distribution of arms provided by this country, it would appear inadvisable to bind ourselves to do so. The exclusive use of this channel might serve to deprive us of a potent means to accomplish the aims of our military aid programs.

*c.* The comments in subparagraph 4*a* above, regarding controls and inspections by SACEUR apply with equal force with respect to the inspections envisaged in Sections III and IV of the *Aide-Mémoire.*

5. The following comments are applicable to certain of the provisions of the Informal Memorandum:

*a. Paragraph 2.* This arrangement would be satisfactory provided it is definitely established that it would not preclude the integration of German units up to the level of a conventional army corps.

*b. Paragraph 5.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States assurances should not specify minimum forces to be maintained by this country on the European continent. In their opinion, these assurances should conform generally to the United States assurances concerning EDC transmitted by the President to the EDC signatory nations on 15 April 1954.[7]

*c. Paragraph 6.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff prefer to withhold their concurrence until the terms of reference of SACEUR in this regard are more definitely delineated.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views form the basis of the Department of Defense position at the 9-Power

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[6] There is a translation of the French *aide-mémoire* in circular telegram 148 of Sept. 20, p. 1231.

[7] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 619–620.

Conference with respect to the French proposals concerning the revisions to the Brussels Treaty and with respect to the reservations which the French propose as preconditions to the adoption of that treaty.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
ARTHUR RADFORD
*Chairman*

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740.5/9–2354

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs* [1]

SECRET [PARIS,] September 23, 1954.

RECORD OF MEETING
HOTEL TALLEYRAND, 3 P M, SEPTEMBER 23, 1954

Participants: Assistant Secretary Merchant
Ambassador Dillon, AmEmbassy, Paris
Mr. Achilles, AmEmbassy, Paris
Ambassador Hughes, USRO
Mr. Martin, USRO
General Wood, USRO
Mr. Page, USRO
General Schuyler, SHAPE
General Cook, USEUCOM
General Freeman, USEUCOM
Mr. Fessenden, Department
[Mr. Bruce]

Mr. Merchant outlined the general situation on the eve of the London Nine-Power Conference. Following the Secretary's trip of the preceding week to Bonn and London,[2] an NSC paper [3] had been prepared which set forth the basic US position. The NSC paper would be approved by the President before the Secretary left Washington. Underlying the US position was the assumption that it was crucially important to associate Germany in sovereign equality with the West. We agree with Adenauer's own estimate that he cannot go on much longer maintaining his position unless we take positive action.

At the forthcoming London conference, our general frame of mind will not be one of discouragement or defeatism. We do not believe that the conference is foredoomed to failure. We are also taking the position that primary responsibility rests with the Europeans for developing a proposal. No "made in America" plans will be presented, although we will do what we can to assist.

[1] Drafted by Fessenden on Sept. 28.
[2] For a summary of Dulles' trip, see the report of Sept. 20, p. 1209.
[3] The paper under reference is NSC 5433/1 of Sept. 25, p. 1268.

Three positions have been presented so far. The German position appears reasonable to us, and the British position is generally close to ours. The French proposal in our view has many serious difficulties. However, we have not rejected it out of hand, but have made certain general comments on it which were incorporated in circular telegram 156.[4] We have also in Washington been giving thought to what should be done if we encounter a fundamental roadblock of obstructionism and cannot reach agreement. We have been giving much thought to the so called "interim measures" for proceeding without the French, if this becomes necessary. Finally, the cables coming out of the NATO Working Group in Paris have been very helpful in Washington and it is clear that our views and those in Paris have been very close.

Mr. Merchant suggested three general questions on which he would like to have the views of the group: (1) the best guess as to the nature of the package which could be sold to the French Assembly. (It must be borne in mind, of course, that the proposal must also be acceptable to the Bundestag, the British Parliament and Congress.) (2) The nature of the steps to strengthen NATO authority, particularly with respect to SACEUR control in various fields. (3) The feasibility of an arms pool plan. Our feeling in Washington is that an arms pool has many attractions, but that its feasibility in the immediate future is another question.

In replying to the first point, Ambassador Dillon reviewed Mendes-France's conversation with Mr. Murphy (Paris' telegram 1254 to Department[5]). Ambassador Dillon then gave his own evaluation of Mendes-France's probable position at London. Mendes will probably say he has little basis for negotiation. He will claim that unless he gets what he has asked for from the other Ministers he will not succeed with the Assembly. Ambassador Dillon added that we must remember that NATO membership is poison to the pro-EDC Deputies and that these same Deputies also have great personal animosity for Mendes-France. We must therefore be prepared to face the fact that, even if some sort of agreement is reached in London, it is by no means certain that the Assembly will approve it. It is therefore questionable whether anything acceptable will be worked out. We must therefore be prepared to go ahead with the British in the rearmament of Germany. It would be very important, however, to do this in a way which will not appear to be a threat to France.

The main difficulty with the French proposals is that they would require long and complex negotiations. The situation is very reminiscent of the pre-Brussels situation. Mendes has submitted proposals which he may well claim must be accepted without change if there is to be any prospect of approval by the Assembly. It is very important,

[4] Dated Sept. 23, p. 1245.
[5] *Infra.*

therefore, that we go to London, not in a spirit of forcing Mendes to agree, but with our attention primarily focused on how our attitude will look after the conference. It is essential that Mendes not succeed in putting the blame on others for any failure. In replying to the second point raised by Mr. Merchant, strengthening NATO controls, General Schuyler described in some detail the practical controls which already exist under SACEUR and which could very easily be further developed. (General Schuyler's account followed very closely Defto 157.[6]) General Schuyler reported that General Gruenther had discussed SACEUR controls with Mendes-France during his recent talk with him, and Mendes-France was obviously not interested in NATO controls on the ground that they lack political appeal. It was generally agreed that, if Mendes-France wanted to, he could make effective use of the NATO and SACEUR controls in selling NATO membership and German rearmament to the Assembly. It was felt that his unwillingness to make any important use of NATO controls was a further reflection on his intentions.

General Cook commented that our attention was perhaps being diverted from Mendes' real purpose in his proposals. The emphasis on arms production controls in the French proposal might well reflect primary French concern over German economic ascendency, rather than military ascendency. Ambassador Dillon suggested that there might be considerable basis for General Cook's interpretation; pointing out that Mendes emphasized in his proposals that only new armaments factories would be subject to licensing. This obviously applied to Germany only.

General Cook raised the question of possible rearmament of Germany without the French. It would be quite possible that France would become "pacifically hostile" and the position of US forces in France and perhaps in Africa would become untenable. Our line of supply to our forces in Germany might then be impossible to maintain. General Schuyler pointed out that the British and US forces in Germany were in a very different position as far as their lines of supply were concerned. We have a long logistical "tail"; the UK has a very short one. Mr. Merchant explained that the primary purpose of the interim measures program for proceeding without Germany was to induce France to go along. He agreed that if our action produced an excessively hostile attitude in France, then we would certainly have to take a long, new look at our entire program to determine whether it made sense militarily. It was also our view that it would make no sense militarily to proceed on the interim measures program without the United Kingdom, and it would certainly be very doubtful whether the Germans would agree to proceeding without British cooperation.

[6] Not found in Department of State files.

Mr. Bruce made certain general observations on the forthcoming conference. He felt that, in the first place, our general attitude should be that of the nation which has the least direct interest in the conference. Second, he felt the German proposal was certainly the most meaningful of the three. It places full reliance on the NATO contact, and it is certainly to our own great long-term interest to build up NATO. The Brussels Treaty might be used to a limited extent, but only as window dressing. A third point was the grave danger of our making too many concessions and in a futile effort to win votes in the French Assembly when we were not at all sure that we will succeed. On the other hand, we must not be in a position of browbeating the French to the extent that we are made responsible for failure. We should go into the conference without "made in America" proposals and with our position essentially uncrystallized. On the arms pool, for instance, he felt that the US should remain completely aloof and let the others directly involved deal with the French proposal.

The participants generally agreed that the French proposal for a European arms pool was too complex and discriminatory. It was also agreed that full establishment of an arms pool, even if one should be worked out, should certainly not become a condition to German entrance into NATO.

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740.5/9–2454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, September 24, 1954—noon.

1254. After two days of effort we received a message at 6:15 last night, 10 minutes before Murphy was leaving for airport, that Mendes-France would see Murphy and me at Marly at 7:15. Murphy postponed his departure for London and we met with Mendes for approximately one hour.

Mendes first apologized for the delay in arranging the appointment and said that he had had a very busy day, and in particular had devoted a great deal of time to the Dides affair which he said was assuming serious proportions (full reports on this strange and highly important affair are being forwarded through other channels [2]).

Murphy then expressed the Secretary's regrets at not being able to come to Paris and said that the Secretary had asked him to stop and see Mendes and tell him how much the Secretary was looking forward

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in two sections and repeated to Bonn, London, The Hague, Rome, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

[2] Documentation concerning the l'affaire Dides, which involved accusations concerning indiscretions committed by persons acquainted with military secrets relating to Indochina, is presented in volume VI.

to seeing Mendes at London. Mendes immediately expressed surprise that the Secretary had any regrets about coming to Paris and a discussion of the Secretary's last trip thereupon ensued between Murphy and Mendes. Mendes said that the decision to omit Paris was very unfortunate not from the point of view of personal feelings, which should not be considered in matters of this sort, but because it made more difficult the task of reaching an agreement on the European problem. He said that Adenauer had not behaved well in the weeks since the defeat of EDC and had made a number of unfortunate public statements which Mendes had been careful not to answer. According to Mendes, the Secretary's trip to Bonn and his cordial visit with the Chancellor gave him impression that the US supported these extreme statements by the Chancellor which was unfortunate.

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The subject then shifted to a discussion of where we go from here. Mendes said, and repeated a number of times, that he was sure that the London conference would succeed as failure would be inadmissible. He expected the meeting to last for three or four days, but he said if there was no agreement at the end of four days, the conference must go on for six days or nine days, or whatever was necessary to reach agreement. The agreement would be in general form to be submitted to experts for final drafting. Final draft should also be relatively simple and not attempt to cover all contingencies. Mendes said that he would propose a time limit of 30 days on the drafting procedure by the experts. Mendes said that his real concern was to obtain an agreement that could be approved in the French Parliament. To do this he would require an agreement that was as close as possible to a simplified EDC treaty without the provisions unifying forces, and with Great Britain as a member. He said that a solution along the lines of the Eden proposals, as he understood them, would have no chance of approval by the French Assembly. He then explained that, as he understood the Eden proposals, they consisted of the admission of Germany to NATO after a number of unilateral renunciations and statements of policy by the German Government. In addition, Germany and Italy would be admitted to the Brussels pact more or less as window dressing for the admission of Germany to NATO. Mendes said that there was great opposition in France to the admission of Germany to NATO and it would never be accepted in this form. This opposition existed, he said, because throughout the years of the EDC debate, admission of Germany to NATO had been held up to the French people as the terrible solution which must be avoided at all costs and it was to avoid this solution that some pro-EDC people were willing to sacrifice a portion of French sovereignty.

On the other hand, Mendes said he felt there was a very good chance that if the London conference accepted the broad outlines of his proposal he could get it accepted by the French Assembly. He said that his proposal essentially meant the expansion and strengthening of the Brussels treaty for the purpose of creating a European organization to take the place of EDC. He said the Eden plan created no European organization and therefore he felt that the US would prefer the French plan, as it represented some progress toward the goal of European unity in which Mendes said he had always believed. The Brussels organization would be charged with setting maximum force limits for each country, with the procurement of all military equipment for the Brussels treaty nations and with the continuous inspection of armament production in all the countries. Finally, it would be charged with the licensing of the creation of all new armament factories in any of the Brussels treaty countries.

Mendes said that at the same time the Brussels Organization went into effect, France would be ready to accord Germany full sovereignty. He said he foresaw legal and negotiating difficulties in reaching an agreement with Germany on the stationing of forces on German territory but that he saw no difficulties in principle, as the French fully agreed in principle on the complete restoration of German sovereignty. In this connection he laid down one absolute condition which was that the negotiations for stationing of troops in Germany would have to be conducted with Germany on a tripartite basis. He said that under no circumstances would France accept separate negotiations between Germany and the three occupying powers individually on this problem. He also said that he had reluctantly agreed that Germany could join NATO at the same time as the Brussels Agreement went into effect. He said this would be difficult to put through the French Assembly, but that he felt it could be done provided the Brussels Organization had been established along the lines of his plan. The whole would be presented to the Assembly in one package.

Regarding the Saar Mendes said, as he had previously told me, that a Saar settlement remained as a pre-condition to any French agreement on German sovereignty or rearmament. He said there should be Franco-German negotiations on this subject concurrently with the meetings of the experts to draft the treaty agreed on at London. He thought that with goodwill the problem could be ironed out in two or three days. He said he recognized that the defeat of EDC created problems for Adenauer in connection with the Europeanization of the Saar, and if it would be helpful to Adenauer he would be willing to have the Saar placed under the Brussels Organization as a step toward its Europeanization.

Regarding the common procurement program Mendes said it could be operated one of two ways; either with a common budget, which he

did not appear to favor, or by giving the Brussels Organization the sole right to place orders for armament production giving it the authority to draw on national budgets for payment. In other words, the national budgets for procurement of military equipment would be made available solely to the Brussels Organization which would place all orders and distribute all equipment. Mendes apparently has not thought out any of the details of this plan regarding how and on what basis the Brussels Organization would reach its decisions. He also apparently does not contemplate preparing any drafts of articles necessary to revise the Brussels Treaty, and his statement that some 20 articles would be required was apparently not based on any work on such articles, but was only put forward as a contrast to the 140 or 150 articles in the EDC treaty.

Regarding limitations of production in strategic zones, Mendes said that such zones should be created and based solely on strategic considerations and this would not have any discriminatory aspects as regards Germany. The production of critical items would be prohibited not only througout the strategic zone of Germany, but also in the Benelux countries and in parts of Eastern France. On the other hand, there would be no objection to armament production in Germany of more or less standard items. Finally, he would suggest what creation of joint German-French, or possibly Brussels community factories in safe areas. In this connection he mentioned the possibility of airplane factories in Algeria.

It is clear that Mendes does not plan to consult with any political leaders, either among the pro-EDC or the anti-EDC groups prior to the London conference. What he plans to do after London, assuming agreement has been reached there, is not known.

DILLON

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740.5/9–2454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, September 24, 1954—8 p. m.

1269. Views contained in Depcirtel 156 [2] conveyed to Parodi and Margerie. They found them in main encouraging but expressed serious concern over point three. Parodi felt that unless US could give substantially similar assurances there was no point in trying to reach any agreement on Germany. He hoped most important words were "much will depend on outcome". We took occasion to reiterate difference as far as US was concerned between a Europe effectively integrated for defense and a Europe of discordant nationalisms,

[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.
[2] Dated Sept. 23, p. 1245.

as well as seriousness of reappraisal currently taking place in Washington.

Parodi asked our reaction to Murphy's talks with him and Mendes yesterday. We mentioned feeling that Mendes seemed uninterested in effective, positive measures of mutual control through NATO and overly preoccupied with developing negative, almost Versailles type, controls through Brussels treaty. They felt it inconsistent that US should so strongly support EDC and now question performance of some of its functions through Brussels treaty. We replied that in simplest terms difference was between positive and negative approach. They denied that current French thinking was negative in this respect and stressed importance of giving Brussels really substantive functions rather than mere window-dressing ones.

In subsequent conversation Margerie commented that Mendes' position at London would be very different from his position at Brussels. This time he was going with position approved by Cabinet but which was reasonably flexible, with Parliament in recess rather than breathing down his neck and with program in which he really believed and which he believed could be sold to Assembly. Margerie himself had serious reservations on last point and said that, while he was optimistic that mutually satisfactory agreement could be reached at London, he feared that any agreement would be rejected by Assembly for reasons having little relation to its substance.

DILLON

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110.11 DU/9–2554

*Prime Minister Mendès-France to the Secretary of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, September 24, 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I deeply regretted that the shortness of your trip to Europe did not allow you to stop off in Paris. As a matter of fact, during our meeting in July,[2] I appreciated the value of these direct conversations which, in a few hours, enabled us to overcome a lot of difficulties and a lot of misunderstandings.

The problems we have to resolve require constructive efforts from each of the members of the Atlantic Alliance in order to find quickly a solution to the problems which we have set our heart on. I deeply hope that your actions will bear fruit promptly and I will be happy to see you again soon in London, before meeting, I hope, President Eisenhower and yourself in the U.S.A.

Please accept, etc. [MENDÈS-FRANCE]

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[1] This message, translated by Embassy officials in Paris, was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1277, Sept. 25.

[2] Regarding Dulles' visit to Paris July 13–14, see the memorandum of conversation, dated July 13, p. 1018.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 24, 1954.

Subject: The Handling of Mendes-France at London

The 9-Power Conference at London must succeed. The degree of success will be determined largely by the extent to which firm agreement can be reached on a wide variety of fairly detailed arrangements and by the absence of agreements on "broad principles" and on formulas which do not represent true meetings of minds and which would open up possibilities of disagreements among the experts in their work following the conference.

The elements of difficulty, including the lack of detailed preparatory work, are obvious. There are, however, the following encouragingly positive factors: the British willingness to participate in continental arrangements to a greater extent than previously; the generally reasonable German position; and the fact that, in his talks with Eden and his subsequent acceptance of the terms of reference of the conference, Mendes-France has come a remarkably long way toward meeting the ideas of the other members of the Atlantic Alliance.

We must recognize that Mendes-France is in a difficult parliamentary position. Not the least of his difficulties in this respect is the necessity of getting the votes of the MRP and other pro-EDC deputies. The principal task in dealing with him will be to hold him firmly to his commitments and to prevent him from introducing into the agreements factors which can be exploited to produce delays in the subsequent meetings of the experts and in the final accomplishment of our objectives.

We have, since the EDC vote of the Assembly, sought to chasten and to educate Mendes-France and the French by mild shock treatment. Though he contributed to and exaggerated it, the fact is Mendes-France was in a position of relative isolation at Brussels. That he exploited this isolation for political purposes in the EDC debate does not remove the basic fact that he is keenly aware of what he feels is general—and, particularly, an American—distrust in him. There is considerable doubt as to the efficacy of relying exclusively upon the use of the stick in dealing with Mendes-France. We must at London use

[1] Drafted by West. According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this memorandum was circulated as NPT Memo 21 to officers engaged in the forthcoming Nine-Power Conference.

the carrot also and encourage and fully recognize the positive constructive action which, despite his difficult parliamentary position, he has already taken since Brussels and which we hope he will take at London.

Fortunately, we appear to be to some extent in a position to arbitrate between Mendes and the British with respect to their apparently conflicting desires as to which powers go to NATO and which to the Brussels Treaty—subject, of course, to our conviction that there should be no derogation of the military powers of NATO and that, in fact, certain strengthening of those powers is desirable. We can afford, in other words, to side with Mendes on certain issues.

The principal source of our concern and reservations about Mendes-France has been his ambivalent attitude toward the USSR which appears to stem from a different appraisal of the nature, extent and imminence of the Soviet threat. Fortunately, this issue will not arise per se at London. A firm agreement at London will, in fact, limit his capacity to make mischief in this respect.

Our conviction that Mendes-France must receive sympathetic treatment at London rests on two judgments. First, his full cooperation is a requisite to the success of the conference. Secondly, by giving him support at London we will assist him in his task of selling the agreement to the National Assembly. To the extent that we have administered slaps to Mendes, we have, as a corollary, encouraged certain pro-EDC elements hostile to Mendes to seek his downfall. Solidarity at London will render more difficult for the deputies in question a decision to vote against a 9-Power agreement and the subsequent NATO Council endorsement thereof.

*Recommendation*

While holding Mendes firmly to the road he has committed himself to follow, we should take all appropriate occasions to encourage him by showing sympathetic consideration for his problems and giving him positive support when he seeks arrangements not contrary to our interests. We should also assure him that we will do all we appropriately can to help him in his difficult task of selling to the National Assembly the package agreed upon at London.

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110.11 DU/9–2454

*The Secretary of State to the President*

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 24, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am back at the Department for a couple of days after stopping off for three days in New York to attend the

United Nations session.[1] I made my major speech there yesterday and then flew down here. I leave tomorrow, Saturday, for London for the Nine-Power Conference on a substitute for EDC.

[Here follow seven paragraphs dealing with meetings which took place in New York during the United Nations session, meetings with British, Mexican, Australian, and Indian officials.]

I am just about to go to the NSC meeting on Europe and China.[2] I have the impression that it may be possible to salvage a European military set-up which will bring the Germans in, but that the political foundation for it all will remain wobbly and unstable. However, latest advice from Paris—Murphy saw Mendes-France last night—indicate that Mendes-France is very chary about proposing to the French Parliament the admission of Germany to NATO. I fear he may attach conditions in terms of what Germany, Britain and the United States will do which will be unacceptable to us. No doubt this London Conference will be a grave affair.

Trieste again seems on the verge of settlement, but in view of past experience I must emphasize the word "verge" rather than the word "settlement".[3]

With best wishes to you and Mamie, I am

Faithfully yours, FOSTER

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[1] Documentation concerning United Nations affairs is presented in volume III.
[2] A memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting of Sept. 24 is printed *infra*.
[3] Documentation concerning Trieste is presented in volume VIII.

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

*Memorandum of Discussion at the 215th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, September 24, 1954*

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY WASHINGTON, September 27, 1954.

Present at the 215th meeting of the Council were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 3); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Acting Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Rose; Assistant Secretary of Defense Hensel; the Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows a general discussion of world developments affecting United States security.]

2. *Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe*

(NSC 5433;[1] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 23, 1954;[2] NSC Action No. 1225[3])

With respect to paragraph 8, which indicated possible U.S. commitments as a *quid pro quo* for commitments by the European nations to carry out the program of action, Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to comment on the various proposed U.S. commitments because the Joint Chiefs did not know what these commitments really involved. He believed, however, that it would be unwise for the United States to make any additional preliminary commitments such as were proposed in this paragraph.

Secretary Wilson said that he felt even more strongly than the Joint Chiefs with respect to this paragraph. If we had to buy the French into supporting the program of action, the deal wouldn't be worth anything. "None of this hit me very good."

Secretary Humphrey asked, apropos of this paragraph, whether everything didn't really depend on how wholeheartedly these Europeans supported a practical defense plan which the United States could approve of. If they come up with something that will really function, we can go quite a long way in helping them to develop their plan. It is not words that count, however, but spirit and deeds.

The Vice President expressed the opinion that the Secretary of State, who would be on the scene and would be entrusted with the negotiation, was in the best position to judge what, if anything, the United States felt it should give to the Europeans in order to get something from the Europeans. He therefore counselled against listing

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[1] For the text of NSC 5433 of Sept. 16, see p. 1205.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1246.

[3] NSC Action No. 1225 noted that the Council had no objection in principle to increasing the authority of the NATO Council, in light of the possible admission of Germany into NATO, even though it might apply to increased control over U.S. forces under NATO command. This decision took place at the 214th meeting of the NSC on Sept. 12 during the Council's consideration of NSC 160/1. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action—1954") The text of NSC 160/1 concerning U.S. policy toward Germany is printed in volume VII.

a rigid set of commitments which would bind the Secretary of State. Instead, he should be permitted discretion and flexibility.

Governor Stassen felt that nevertheless some guidance should be afforded the Secretary of State in view of the difference of opinion between the Planning Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Cutler pointed out that the United States might have to pay something in order to obtain support of the program of action outlined in this report, and the United States should therefore realize what it might have to pay.

Secretary Dulles explained that he did not believe at this time the United States was going to "sell any plan". What we would face at the London meeting was not a U.S. plan but an indigenous plan. Neither France nor Germany nor the U.K. expect at this time to be paid by the United States to take this plan. Nor will they take kindly to any plan "made in America" because of any "payments" we undertake to make.

As a result of his trip last week Secretary Dulles was convinced that the Europeans are much more concerned with a program to replace EDC as a problem of their own rather than as a U.S. problem. What the Europeans will want to know is not whether we will give them a *quid pro quo* to adopt a program of action devised by us, but rather if they devise a substitute for EDC whether we will pull out our troops next week. Or if they devise a system of controls through increasing the authority of SACEUR, will we pull our forces out of the control of SACEUR. Or if the Europeans devise a control mechanism for procurement purposes, will the U.S. go along with it or break it up.

In sum, the Europeans will say to us, "Assuming we can agree on a substitute for EDC, will the U.S. cooperate with us along the lines that you agreed to cooperate with us with respect to EDC?"

Accordingly, said Secretary Dulles, we should not try to impose a U.S. plan by dangling promises, nor will it be necessary to offer firm commitments as a *quid pro quo*. In any event, he did not expect to "scatter" U.S. commitments around the Nine-Power conference in London.

Governor Stassen expressed anxiety lest the European powers prove constitutionally incapable of a sound solution to their defense problem. Considering the great stake that the United States has in the defense of Europe, we may well find that we will have to exhibit more by way of U.S. initiative if an acceptable substitute for EDC is to be found. After all, EDC itself was originally an indigenous plan. Its successor may have to be made in America even if it does not apear to have been made there.

The Vice President inquired of Secretary Dulles whether our leader-

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ship was now so seriously resented in Europe that any defense plan openly sponsored by the U.S. would be likely to be defeated. Secretary Dulles replied that if such a plan appeared to have been devised by Europeans it would have better chance of success. He went on to point out that France and England, at any rate, have now reached a point of no longer wishing to seem tied to the U.S. coattails. They want to throw their weight around a little. We need not feel too badly about this, since one of our great objectives has been to get the Western European States to stand on their own feet. National pride may do more to assure a successful defense of Europe than U.S. tutelage. It may be wonderful to have strong United States leadership, but Secretary Dulles said that he was more interested in actual results.

Secretary Dulles then proceeded to give the Council his view as to the stakes at the forthcoming meetings in Europe. The heart of the matter was whether or not we should be able to preserve NATO. The Soviets successfully used Mendes-France to kill, or at least to maim, EDC. Will they now try to use him to destroy NATO? If they do that successfully the whole situation falls apart. There is no use talking about the U.S. proceeding unilaterally to rearm Germany. In such a situation Germany may well choose not to rearm. There would certainly be heavy pressure in these circumstances for Germany to accommodate to the Soviet Union. The latter could dangle the possibility of unification of Germany, rectification of the Polish frontier, and economic advantages. In short, there is no good alternative if the French torpedo the NATO solution, and we must not assume that we can go ahead independently to rearm Germany if the French won't agree.

With respect to the means of inducing France to cooperate, as set forth in paragraph 10, Secretary Wilson suggested that unless and until the French start to cooperate, we should make clear to them that we should be compelled to stop any new construction in France or the placing of any new orders in France.

On this same subject, the Vice President again expressed the view that this was primarily a matter of tactics, and discretion should be left to the Secretary of State, who must conduct the negotiation.

Secretary Dulles said that he had talked with Chancellor Adenauer with respect to the flow of U.S. aid to France as part of the problem of how to handle Mendes-France. Adenauer had said that Mendes-France's heart was really in the area of finance and economic reform in France. When Secretary Dulles asked if that meant that we should cut off everything to France, Adenauer had said no, not everything, but to slow down the flow to the point where Mendes-France realizes that the flow is slowing down and whose hand controls the spigot.

Secretary Humphrey thought that perhaps the sensible thing to do was to tell the French, when they came here next week, that we were simply not in a position to do anything until we see what happened in London. Secretary Dulles said that was all right, but don't say to the French that you will cut off everything at once, as Secretary Wilson suggested.

With respect to the JCS proposal in paragraph 11, Secretary Dulles said the time had not yet arrived to make the decision to go ahead and seek the goals desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was general agreement with this position.

. . . . . .

The National Security Council:

*a.* Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report and in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*b.* Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5433, subject to the following changes:

(1) *Paragraph 3–b:* Delete the parenthetical phrase.

(2) *Paragraph 4–a:* Change the word "agreements" to "understandings" in the second sentence.

(3) *Paragraph 5:* Revise the second sentence to read as follows:

"Under present conditions, major Soviet efforts are devoted to dividing and weakening, and subverting some members of, the western alliance."

(4) *Paragraph 8:* Delete, and substitute the following:

"8. If a program of action along the above lines acceptable to the U.S. is developed and genuinely adopted by the European nations (including the UK), be prepared to give U.S. assurances generally similar to those given in support of EDC, in addition to NSC Action No. 1225."

(5) *Paragraph 10:* Delete the second and third sentences and substitute therefor:

"Under present circumstances and until the situation has further clarified, slow down U.S. aid to France and make no new financial commitments to France."

(6) *Paragraph 11:* Delete the JCS proposal, and in paragraph *b* change "If the U.S., with or without the UK," to read "If the U.S. and the UK,".

*c.* Agreed that answers to the questions in paragraph 11 should be prepared for the information of the Council not later than October 28, 1954, by the following departments and agencies:

*a:* Department of Defense

*b* through *f:* Director of Central Intelligence (coordinated intelligence estimate)

*g:* First sentence: Department of Defense
Second sentence: Department of State

*Note:* NSC 5433 as amended subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5433/1.[4] The statement of policy contained therein subsequently referred to the Secretary of State to coordinate its implementation. The questions in paragraph 10 thereof subsequently transmitted to the appropriate departments and agencies for the preparation of answers pursuant to *c* above.

[Here follows a discussion of the Chinese Nationalist offshore islands, United States policy on economic defense, and United States policy toward Iran.]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

[4] The text of NSC 5433/1 of Sept. 25 is printed *infra*.

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5433 series

*Statement of Policy by the National Security Council* [1]

SECRET
NSC 5433/1

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1954.

## IMMEDIATE U.S. POLICY TOWARD EUROPE

### SCOPE OF THIS PAPER

1. In view of the French rejection of EDC, the U.S. is faced with a choice between:

*a.* Continuing to pursue its present objectives in Europe by means other than EDC; or

*b.* On the assumption that continued pursuit of all these objectives is no longer feasible, determining what objectives should then be pursued.

2. It is recommended that the U.S. for the immediate future make further vigorous efforts to achieve the present objectives set forth below. Accordingly, this paper sets forth a program of action based on par. 1–*a* above. The paper also sets forth in par. 11 [*10*] below certain questions the answers to which may assist in making the determination under 1–*b* above, if that proves necessary.

### PRESENT OBJECTIVES

3. Despite French rejection of EDC, the security of the U.S. con-

[1] Attached to the source text, but not printed here, were the following: a cover sheet, a note by Lay, a table of contents, and two annexes (extracts from the Brussels Pact of Mar. 17, 1948 and extracts from the North Atlantic Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949). A memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting of Sept. 24 at which the source text was adopted by the Council is printed *supra*.

tinues to require the preservation and development of Western Europe (including the UK) as an area of strength allied to the U.S. Accordingly, the U.S. should continue to pursue the following objectives:

*a.* In the cold war, to prevent further extension of Soviet control in Europe and to retain the major Western European nations as allies.

*b.* To provide for the effective defense of Western Europe by maintaining and strengthening the NATO security system, inclusive of West Germany, as a deterrent to Soviet aggression designed to provide the most suitable defense of NATO territory.

*c.* To build the requisite strength and stability in Western Europe on the basis of (1) the combined efforts of the principal nations there and (2) steady progress toward integration on the continent.

*d.* To assure the orientation of the German Federal Republic (and ultimately a united Germany) to the West by all feasible means, including institutional ties as well as treaty arrangements.

PROGRAM OF ACTION

4. Seek promptly to associate the German Federal Republic with the West by:

*a.* Restoration to the German Federal Republic of its sovereignty, including the right to participate in the defense of Western Europe without restrictions unacceptable to the Germans as discriminatory or arbitrarily imposed. This step would require understanding regarding allied rights respecting Berlin, the unification of Germany, stationing of allied forces in Germany, and other issues resulting from the war and occupation.

*b.* Admission of the German Federal Republic to full membership in NATO, without precluding German participation also in the Brussels Pact or other European defense arrangements.

*c.* Obtaining acceptable safeguards as to German rearmament. Such safeguards might include:

(1) Voluntary acceptance by Germany of limits on its initial build-up of forces;

(2) Regulations or restrictions on the production of certain types of weapons, possibly through designation of "exposed areas" or through a European arms pool;

(3) Agreement among NATO members to commit forces to NATO, under a non-discriminatory formula so designed as to include all German forces (except internal security forces);

(4) Further integration of the NATO command structure and logistics system, by protocol or administrative reform;

(5) Strengthening the authority of SACEUR regarding deployment of forces committed to him;

(6) German assurances against any attempt to modify existing frontiers by force.

*d.* Continuing to seek eventual German reunification on the basis of freedom and the maximum possibility of association with the West.

5. Seek to reverse divisive trends in Western Europe by developing political and economic strength and cohesion which will enhance the European capacity and will to resist Communist subversion and neutralism. Under present conditions, major Soviet efforts are devoted to dividing and weakening, and subverting some members of, the Western alliance.

6. Foster all practical measures for a greater degree of integration of Western Europe, emphasizing political and economic aspects at this stage and encouraging European initiative and responsibility so far as consistent with U.S. objectives. Specifically, encourage closer ties between France and Germany and the greatest feasible degree of UK association with its continental allies.

7. Continue to seek the strengthening of NATO in a manner which places primary emphasis on its deterrent effect, with due regard for political and economic capabilities and for psychological factors. For this purpose we should seek the full exploitation of developing nuclear capabilities and a generally understood and accepted strategy for forward defense of the NATO area.

8. If a program of action along the above lines acceptable to the U.S. is developed and genuinely adopted by the European nations (including the UK), be prepared to give U.S. assurances generally similar to those given in support of EDC, in addition to NSC Action No. 1225.[2]

9. Seek to induce France to cooperate in achieving this program of action. Under present circumstances and until the situation has further clarified, slow down U.S. aid to France and make no new financial commitments to France. If it appears that French reactions will defeat one or more of our objectives, our policy should be governed by the results of the reappraisal contemplated in par. 11 [*10*].

REAPPRAISAL OF BASIC OBJECTIVES

10. The Secretary of State should report to the Council not later than October 28, 1954, whether in his opinion the foregoing program of action can be carried through successfully.[3] In the event that the Council at that time believes that the above program of action no longer appears attainable, the Council should then be prepared to determine what objectives the U.S. should pursue in the light of conditions then existing and the answers to the following questions:

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[2] See footnote 3, *supra*.

[3] At its 220th meeting on Oct. 28, 1954, the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission agreed that, in light of events, the requirement in NSC Action No. 1227–*c* for answers to the question in paragraph 10 of NSC 5433/1 should be cancelled. (NSC Action No. 1255)

*a.* Assuming our continued purpose to maintain (1) an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression and (2) the means for effective defense of the United States and areas vital to it, could a feasible strategy be devised for the defense of Western Europe:

(*a*) Without German participation?
(*b*) Without French participation?
(*c*) Without the participation of both France and Germany?

What basic changes in U.S. military dispositions and commitment of resources would be required to carry out each strategy?

*b.* If the U.S. and the UK should proceed with the rearming of Germany over a French veto, what would be the ultimate effect on (1) France, (2) Germany and (3) European stability and vulnerability in the cold war?

*c.* How would the political and economic integration of Europe be affected by French refusal to participate therein?

*d.* What is the likely course of UK policy over the next few years with respect to European integration and German rearmament?

*e.* What would be the political effect in the German Federal Republic and on the future orientation of Germany, if the raising of forces in a sovereign German Federal Republic were postponed for substantial time with or without German admission to NATO?

*f.* If Germany were unified and neutralized with restricted armed forces, what would be the probable course of its policy, and the effect on its vulnerability in the cold war and on the stability of Western Europe?

*g.* To what extent should the U.S. require formal agreements permitting the immediate use of nuclear weapons by the NATO command in the event of aggression? To what extent would pressing for such formal agreements seriously impair allied cooperation or the prospects for successfully carrying out the agreed strategy?

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110.11 DU/9–2554

*The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Scelba*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 25, 1954.

[DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:] Your letter of August 26[2] delivered to me by Ambassador Tarchiani arrived at a particularly difficult moment for me, and therefore its expressions of friendship and cooperation were doubly appreciated. I regret that my long absences from Washington have not permitted an earlier adequate reply.

Italy and the United States now face new and grave tasks. The rejection of EDC by one of the six treaty nations places upon all western governments, which seek solidarity in opposing world

[1] This message was transmitted to the Embassy in Rome in telegram 1014, Sept. 25, with instructions that it be delivered as soon as practicable.
[2] Not found in Department of State files.

domination by communism, a burden of decision and action which will require the noblest efforts of us all. The forthcoming conferences offer us, however, a renewed opportunity to find solutions to our mutual problems in this field. In these conferences, to know that the Italian Government under your direction seeks the same security, the same defense, the same unity which the Government of the United States seeks, augurs well for the future and will maintain the solid friendship of our two nations.

I look forward to the mutual cooperation that I confidently anticipate between your new Foreign Minister Sig. Martino, and myself at London.

[Sincerely yours, JOHN FOSTER DULLES]

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*[1]

SECRET [LONDON,] September 25, 1954.

Participants: Mr. Herbert Blankenhorn, Under Secretary of the German Foreign Office
Mr. Oskar Schlitter, Counselor of German Embassy, London
Mr. Butterworth
Mr. Merchant

I saw Mr. Blankenhorn for nearly an hour at his request. First he said that if the Secretary wanted to see Adenauer before the conference he would be available between 7 and 8 and after dinner on Monday. I gave no indication that the Secretary was planning to see him in advance of the conference.

Blankenhorn then said that he was disturbed by indications from Frank Roberts that it would be impossible to terminate the occupation by declaration until all the accompanying arrangements had been concluded. He said that the Chancellor's political position was weak and that he was most anxious that there should be a declaration at the conclusion of the London conference restoring sovereignty to Germany. I said I could not see how it would be possible to consider anything beyond a declaration of intent to restore sovereignty prior to agreement on German entrance into NATO and the Brussels Pact and agreement on the treatment of the contractuals. He expressed disappointment.

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[1] This document was circulated among the U.S. Delegation at the Nine-Power Conference as NPT Memo 27.

Next Blankenhorn said that the Chancellor hoped that certain interim measures could be taken immediately following the London conference. I pointed out that the London conference was really preparatory to the North Atlantic Council meeting and that it was the latter rather than the former which seemed to me to be the crucial meeting, before the holding of which nothing along the lines he suggested seemed to be possible of consideration.

Blankenhorn asked if we were going to insist on according supranational powers to the amended Brussels Treaty. I said he knew the Secretary's views on the importance of organic union on the continent and I said we were most anxious that nothing be done which would impede its development in the future but that we would not take a position insisting on supranational powers in the Brussels Treaty.

I asked him why they had withdrawn the reference to the arms pool which was in the earlier draft of the memorandum. He said that as they understood Mendes-France's proposal it was totally unacceptable and they had finally decided that it would place them in a false position to appear to endorse it. He felt that any arms pool of a satisfactory nature would involve a complicated and extremely prolonged negotiation.

Blankenhorn asked if I knew what the French position was on the Saar as a precondition. I said all indications we had were to the effect that even if the government did not establish it as a precondition, the Assembly would. Blankenhorn first said that any solution of the Saar at this time was impossible and that this was another French effort to block progress. He said Adenauer had made the ultimate sacrifice in his agreement with Teitgen in order (as he thought) to assure the EDC passage. With no supranational community a Saar settlement along these lines amounted to a simple cession of German territory which no German government could defend. He said it was nonsense to contemplate putting the Saar executive under either the Council of Europe or the Brussels Treaty Council. I suggested that a relationship might be worked out with the Coal and Steel Community which was a supranational organism already functioning. He said they could discuss a solution along these lines.

In closing I gave him in outline form our general attitude in approaching the London conference. I agreed with him that our position was very close to that of the British and the Germans. I made the point, however, that care must be taken not to give Mendes-France the impression that he was isolated from the outset. I said, and he agreed, that we must all assume that the French came here with a flexible position and that it was a necessity for the London conference to succeed.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)* [1]

SECRET [LONDON,] September 25, 1954.

Participants: Sir Frank Roberts, British Foreign Office
Mr. Butterworth
Mr. Merchant

I saw Sir Frank Roberts for about an hour at my request. At the outset he went over in some detail the conference arrangements and the general British approach to the handling of the substance. I said I agreed with the suggestion that Mr. Eden serve as Permanent Chairman and would so recommend to the Secretary. I responded similarly to his suggestion that the conference avoid selecting any one of the three outstanding memoranda as the basis for discussion but instead deal with a functional agenda.

On the working groups envisaged for post-conference work, he felt strongly that the group on the contractuals should meet in Bonn. He said that the purely formalistic changes in the Brussels Treaty would have to be done in London by the Brussels Pact organization but that this was only an hour's work. He agreed that it would be desirable to establish in Paris, depending on the NATO international staff for administrative support, the working group or groups which would deal with the substantive safeguards to be inserted by protocol or Council action in both treaties. He agreed to my suggestion that the members of NATO not attending the London conference be invited to place representatives on this working group.

We briefly and inconclusively discussed the question of keeping the NATO non-London members informed of the progress at the London conference.

I then asked him what British thinking was on the actions which should be taken in the event that it was impossible to reach agreement on our program with the French or in the event that even after agreement was reached the French were clearly delaying progress. He said he could only speak personally on this. Mr. Eden was asked this same question, he said, at every capital and replied uniformly by saying that in the absence of any Cabinet decision he could not say what the view of the British government was but that to him it was clear under the described circumstances that prompt action would be required and he had no doubt that Britain would take it. Roberts went on to say that their thinking centered around the "empty chair" thought

[1] This document was circulated among the U.S. Delegation at the Nine-Power Conference as NPT Memo 28.

of the Prime Minister. It would be necessary with us to restore sovereignty to the extent within our power and to move ahead with actions looking to the rearmament of Germany but all on a basis which would leave the door open for the French and encourage them to take it. I said we were thinking along the same lines. I asked him if in terms of action he was thinking of such things as permitting the Germans to start building their barracks, bringing some students to the UK for pilot training and starting the training of cadres. He indicated that it was action such as this that he had in mind. I said that an idea I had had personally was that at some early point (if this conference failed) there might be value in a joint survey of the situation by the British and American Chiefs of Staff. He said he thought this would be an excellent idea and that it might be helpful if the French knew such a study were under way.

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*Editorial Note*

Secretary of State Dulles released a statement for the press upon his departure from Washington on September 25 concerning his hopes for the Nine-Power Conference in London; for the text of this statement, issued as Department of State press release 530, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 4, 1954, page 489. Dulles arrived in London at 5 p. m. on September 26. (Telegram Secto 2 from London, September 26; Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 393)

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)*

TOP SECRET [LONDON,] September 27, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary
Ambassador Aldrich
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Butterworth
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Eden and Mr. Caccia

Subject: Dinner last night [1] at the Ambassador's House

After general discussion during first half of dinner, the discussion turned to business and was continued until about an hour after dinner.

*Mendes-France's Intentions.*

Mr. Eden said that he was still unclear about the real intentions of Mendes-France. He was aware of the various rumors and hy-

[1] Sunday, Sept. 26.

potheses but felt that we must proceed for the purpose of this Conference on the assumption that Mendes-France wanted to work out an acceptable solution which he could get through his Parliament. If we act on that basis, then if these are not his purposes, that should become apparent in the course of the Conference and we should then have to decide what to do.

He felt that if the efforts to reach an acceptable solution did not succeed here then the U.S. and Britain would probably have to act without France on a program regarding Germany.

*British Participation in Brussels.*

Mr. Eden said that he had concluded that the time had come for Britain to go further in its association with the defense of the Continent. He felt that Britain should be prepared to assign specific forces to the Continent which would be subject to the control of the majority vote of the Brussels Conference. This would constitute a kind of an acceptance by Britain of the supranatural [*sic*] principle and would contribute to the movement toward European unity.

Mr. Eden felt that this should help Mendes-France with his Parliament but he stressed that it would be important to Adenauer and that this was one of the reasons for his willingness to take the step.

Mr. Eden stated that he had talked about this somewhat with the Prime Minister but that it was not yet a Cabinet decision. He emphasized that he had spoken about it only to us and it was important that it be held closely for use by the British when it might do the most good.

The Secretary said that he thought this would be most helpful for Mendes-France in meeting his preoccupation for closer British association and for Adenauer in his desire for his continued movement toward European unity.

*Arms Pool.*

The question of our attitude to the Arms Pool was discussed. All agreed that the proposals put forward by Mendes-France seemed to include features which could hardly be accepted by Adenauer or by the other countries. After discussion of the possible advantages of a genuine system of common procurement, Mr. Eden expressed the view that this might have real advantages both political and economic. It was generally agreed that it would be undesirable and unwise merely to take a negative attitude towards Mendes-France's proposals. If this were done it would enable him to return to France and to present the position that his efforts to obtain satisfactory safeguards by this means had merely been arbitrarily rejected by the others. To prevent this, it was thought desirable that a project for a bona fide Arms Pool

should be developed and presented, if possible, by one of the Benelux countries. Mr. Dulles, who was seeing Benelux late on Monday afternoon, agreed to broach the subject with them and see whether they would be interested in putting forward some positive proposal which would be more acceptable both to the Germans and themselves than the present French proposal.

*Arrangements.*

The Secretary suggested that it would be best to have a permanent chairman rather than to rotate and proposed that Mr. Eden act in that capacity. Mr. Eden was inclined to agree that a permanent chairman would be better but was not particularly anxious to serve because he would not wish to be foreclosed from presenting the British view. After reviewing the other possibility it was concluded that Mr. Eden should serve with the understanding that he would not be prevented from taking an active part in the discussion at the Conference. Mr. Dulles agreed also to suggest this to Mendes-France and the Benelux representatives when he saw them.

It was agreed that in the first day or two it would be desirable to avoid airing the respective positions in the press, especially the French and the German positions, which were likely to be negotiating positions. Any detailed reporting at the start would make it harder to make compromises to accommodate the differing points of view. The best answer seemed to be to have short formal statements from each of the Nine at the start of the Conference which could be released to the papers on the first day.

It was also agreed in the early stages it would be desirable to have a Four-Power Meeting to deal with German sovereignty and to request the High Commissioners to continue their work with the Germans on the revision of the contractuals with a view to reporting any major issues to the Conference before it adjourns, if possible.

*U.S.-British Unity.*

Mr. Dulles said that he felt that the U.S. should not take the initiative in the early stages of the meeting in putting forward any proposals. His attitude would be that the U.S. was there as a friend and counselor and was deeply interested in the results but looked to the Europeans to put forward proposals. We would probably be consulted by others and would express our views to them but would try to avoid getting out in front. Mr. Eden agreed that this was the wise approach.

Mr. Eden said that he felt that the success of the Conference depended absolutely on joint US–UK cooperation. He thought that at some point we would have to "heave" a solution through.

The Secretary said he was very glad that we were so close together in our thinking on the problems.

*Southeast Asia.*

In the course of the discussion at the table, Mr. Eden expressed his belief that it was vital that Laos and Cambodia be preserved from Communist control. At one point he seemed to say that he thought the situation in Viet-Nam was hopeless, but later expressed the view that it was important, if possible, to preserve Cochin China.

In pursuing the question of U.S. training missions for Cambodia, Mr. Merchant pressed Mr. Caccia as to why there should be any objection to this in view of the terms of the armistice agreement. Mr. Caccia's somewhat evasive answers tended to confirm the suspicions that the British had given side assurances to the Chinese Communists regarding the U.S. training missions in Laos and Cambodia.

Mr. Eden said that he had sent a long cable to Nehru explaining the Southeast Asia Pact with a view to his pending trip to Peiping. He had also cabled him to express his concern about Laos.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 389 : Telegram**

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 27, 1954—7 p. m.

Tedul 2. Eyes only Secretary. I wish to be sure you read Schwartz's memorandum of September 25 [1] to Bowie reporting Cutler's conversation with the President and the President's approval of NSC 5433 as amended by Friday's NSC meeting.[2] Believe Bowie has full memorandum but pertinent portion follows:

"General Cutler also transmitted the following points made by the President in connection with NSC 5433 and the London meeting:

1. He heartily agrees with the Secretary's view that the Europeans should make the plan and do most of the talking.
2. He believes that we should not threaten the French, but should view their rejection of EDC more in sorrow than anger.
3. He agrees that we should slow down aid to France and make no new financial commitments (as set forth in revised paragraph 10 [*9*]).
4. In connection with the JCS memorandum [3] (transmitted under cover of Secretary Wilson's letter of September 23 and Mr. Lay's memorandum of September 23), he is of the firm opinion that no bilateral arrangement between the U.S. and Germany will

[1] A copy of the Schwartz memorandum is in the S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5433 series; virtually the entire text of this memorandum is quoted in the source text.

[2] For the text of NSC 5433 of Sept. 16, see p. 1205. NSC 5433 was revised as a result of a meeting of the National Security Council on Sept. 24 and circulated as NSC 5433/1 of Sept. 25; for the text of NSC 5433/1, see p. 1268.

[3] This is a reference to Enclosure 2 to the memorandum by Lay of Sept. 23, p. 1249.

work; he considers that we would have to have at least the U.K. and the Low Countries with us.

5. He still believes that an arrangement equivalent to NATO and EDC, which provides for a German contribution, will permit the defense of Europe on the ground."

SMITH

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751.5 MSP/9–2754 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, September 27, 1954—7 : 02 p. m.

1765. For Secretary and Merchant. Limit distribution. Subsequent Saturday meeting with Secretary, FOA prepared position paper [2] for aid talks with French interpreting Secretary's policy guidance as designed to "slow down flow US aid and other extraordinary dollar payments to France so that total effect which US will endeavor realize is to gradually decrease French gold and dollar reserves rather than continue to increase them which has been effect over past year of such US payments." [3] Paper sets forth for presentation to French US position that we must review in detail specific problems connected aid program and must undertake thorough consultation with Congress before reaching any conclusions. Meantime aid payments will of necessity be delayed but we will endeavor keep delay at minimum. Paper then poses series questions for French to answer.

FOA paper states for US internal use only that in implementation this policy it is anticipated ceiling will be placed on rate of dollar flow to France from OSP and Indochina aid programs in months immediately ahead and until further decision. Also anticipated rate dollar payments to France for NATO infrastructure and US military construction will be kept at minimum until further decision. Not anticipated there should be any slowdown in flow of FOA pipeline commodities to France. Implicit in this policy is that preparations must be made for direct US aid programs to Associated States to commence promptly.

FOA paper gives breakdown $427 million extraordinary French dollar receipts first six months calendar 1954 from FOA paid ship-

[1] Drafted by Beigel; cleared with Barbour, Robertson, MacArthur, Nolting, and Jones; and repeated to Paris.

[2] The position paper under reference was not found in Department of State files; however, a letter from the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, Harold E. Stassen, to the Secretary of Defense, dated Sept. 29, outlines the highlights of the new policy on aid to France. (751.5 MSP/9–2954)

[3] The Secretary of State had responsibility for providing further guidelines on the matter of aid to France, based on paragraph 9 of NSC 5433/1 of Sept. 25; for the text of NSC 5433/1, see p. 1268. Further documentation concerning U.S. aid policies toward France is presented in volume VI.

ments, troop pay and construction, NATO infrastructure, OSP and Indochina aid.

Department notes that some portion this amount represents Defense payments to Eximbank for French deliveries under former Lisbon contracts and while reducing outstanding French obligations did not result in current cash accrual to France, and that undetermined portion FOA pipeline payments went to US banks and exporters in those cases where French did not prefinance with their own dollars. Available French Finance Ministry figures show increase in French dollar reserves by $150 million during first seven months calendar 1954 during which period French also paid off some $200 million in long-term and short-term obligations and EPU debts.

Embassy Paris study indicates if US expenditures on troop pay, construction and French OSP deliveries reach proportions predicted by US military services for 1954, French could earn $800 million this calendar year from these US military programs while flow from Indochina program would go entirely into French reserves.

If these estimates correct slowdown in US aid program might retard rate further buildup in French reserves but would not appear likely reverse trend remainder this year. Since French monthly receipts from US military programs and OSP fluctuate widely (23, 14, 24, 12 and 46 million during first five months 1954) French may not readily discover we are slowing down such payments, and desired effect could be lost. What corresponding actions US military services will have to take to slow down payments must also be examined.

On other hand slowdown in Indochina budgetary support program would directly affect internal position French Treasury and could have considerable political impact. Ramifications would appear be broadest from slowdown in reimbursements on French procurement contracts for either Indochina or NATO forces.

FOA now preparing details on how implement slowdown US military programs in France and French Morocco and how deal with immediate French requests for reimbursement under Indochina program.

Economic talks with French here now scheduled for Tuesday afternoon.[4]

Foregoing sent for your information and any comment you may have.[5]

SMITH

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[4] Documentation concerning these talks in Washington is presented in volume VI.

[5] In telegram 361 from Paris to London, not repeated to the Department of State, Achilles noted that this policy "will presumably have major impact here" and that its coincidence with the opening of the London Conference "seems to us unfortunate". Achilles recommended that every effort be made to clearly indicate that this action was "in no sense punitive" (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 372). In a memorandum to Merchant on Sept. 27, Wilson recorded that he had spoken with Achilles on the telephone and had confirmed Achilles' view that they should not make an issue of the stoppage (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 372).

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Moore)*[1]

SECRET [LONDON,] September 27, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary of State
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Moore
Ambassador Hughes
Mr. Hensel
General Gruenther
Colonel Richardson
Colonel Anderson

The Secretary said that he would like to have General Gruenther's views on the problem raised by the French in their memorandum, namely an armaments pool. He said that our preliminary thinking on this subject suggested that there were two main purposes to be serviced by such a proposal.

One would be the delimitation of certain areas, or zones, in which certain types of production would be prevented or limited, for example atomic weapons. These zones would be drawn in accordance with strategic and military considerations since the German territory would be included in the forward area. The proposal would also serve a political purpose by prohibiting or limiting German production of strategic weapons.

The second main purpose would be a rationalization of arms production within the territories covered, thereby serving an economic, as well as a political, purpose. The thought would be to lower costs of production of certain types of equipment in efficient plants, and at the same time, make it impossible for any one country to provide a balanced arms program independently of its neighbor.

As we analyzed French motives at the conference, they were concerned about two main points; they wished to involve the U.K. as deeply as possible on the Continent and they were concerned to limit German control of an independent military potential. Some form of arms pool would help to meet the second preoccupation, although it was clear that the British attitude was such that it would do little to meet the first. It was probably true also that the French had ulterior motives with a view to getting control over the allocation of arms orders for the benefit of French industry. However, it should be pos-

[1] The source text was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation to the Nine-Power Conference as document NPT Memo 29.

sible to arrange a scheme which would provide safeguards against this danger.

In reply, General Gruenther recounted his conversation with Monsieur Mendes-France,[2] in which he pointed out that an arms pool was not the most satisfactory method of meeting the French desire to control German military strength. He pointed out to Monsieur Mendes-France that, in NATO, we had a going concern already set up to provide certain safeguards for France. He listed these as follows:

1. Through the Infrastructure Program, NATO controlled the pipelines through which fuel for aircraft must flow in the event of future war, and without this fuel German forces would have no aircraft support and thus could not fight independently.
2. Under NATO, a pooling of reserve supplies and stocks was being worked out, so that no one country would be able to fight for very long in the absence of control over these reserves.
3. NATO had integrated arrangements for air defense which, for military reasons, must be operated from one source through an integrated radar network.
4. The International command structure under NATO would provide a tip-off in the event that any one Member country initiated a process of pulling out its own forces for aggressive purposes.

He said that to improve and strengthen these controls over international forces, SHAPE would need to have its powers strengthened and defined by Council action, but that this should be relatively easy to provide by international agreement. Monsieur Mendes-France had replied that a program of the kind outlined by General Gruenther would be difficult to sell politically in France. German [*General*] Gruenther said that SHAPE's experience in talking with various groups of Frenchmen suggested that such a program could be sold if it were properly explained to the average Frenchman. He said further that the EDC had failed in part because of opposition from French military officials. These same officials, including General Juin, would support a proposal of the kind General Gruenther had made. He said that Mendes-France wanted SHAPE to accept responsibility for the inspection of German factories. This would be impracticable since SHAPE had no personnel for this purpose and it would be politically impossible for them to get into this field.

The Secretary pointed out that, if SHAPE were given increased authority by Council action, the Council could only remove this authority by a unanimous vote, and that this should help to satisfy French fears. General Gruenther agreed and pointed out that a

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[2] For a summary of Gruenther's meeting with Mendès-France on Sept. 16, see telegrams 248, 250, and 251 from Paris, Sept. 16, pp. 1200, 1201, and 1202, respectively.

Frenchman, General Juin, would administer these NATO controls insofar as they relate to ground forces in the central sector. The air force commander in this sector is also a Frenchman, General Charpentier.

General Gruenther felt that the best tactic with respect to an arms pool would be to ask the French questions about their plan. The Germans, including Mr. _____,[3] have no knowledge of the details. He said that the SHAPE analysis suggested that the basis of the French proposal was the so-called Lapie Plan, developed in 1951 to deal with the need for greater integration in aircraft procurement. He suggested that this plan provided the germ of a program which would be acceptable and which could be developed by the experts. It was pointed out that any plan would require some formula for making the basic decisions, such as the voting procedure set forth in the EDC Treaty. Perhaps such a formula could be worked out under the Brussels Treaty. The Secretary felt that it was important to develop some set of counter-proposals, possibly by agreement with the Benelux countries, so that the French could not say that there was only destructive criticism of their proposal. It was agreed that we needed to develop promptly the principles of an effective scheme, so that we could use them informally in our discussion with other Delegations.

[3] The name was left blank in the source text.

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*[1]

SECRET [LONDON,] September 27, 1954.

Place: Residence of the French Ambassador, London

Participants: The Secretary
M. Mendes-France
Mr. Merchant

The Secretary called at noon today on Premier Mendes-France. The latter greeted the Secretary on the doorstep in the presence of a dozen or more press photographers who appeared out of nowhere.

The Premier escorted the Secretary to the living room and a moment later a dozen or so photographers were ushered in who took five minutes worth of pictures of the Secretary and the Premier engaged in pleasant conversation. In the presence of the photographers M.

[1] The source text was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation to the Nine-Power Conference as document NPT Special 2.

Mendes-France asked the Secretary how long he expected the conference to last. The Secretary said that he assumed it would last through this week. The Premier expressed surprise and said that he thought it should do its work in less time than that, reaching agreement on principles which would provide guidance for experts who would assemble immediately following the conference.

After the photographers had been removed from the room with some difficulty and at the cost of an upset vase of flowers, the Secretary opened the conversation by saying that he had seen Mr. Murphy on Saturday before he left and received a report of the talk he had had with the Premier.[2] M. Mendes-France said that he had been glad to receive Mr. Murphy and was sorry that his visit was so short. He had seen him at the end of a very difficult day in which he had been concentrating on the scandal in the police and the arrest of Dides. He said that there was a very curious situation of espionage and that he didn't know where it might lead. He would have wished for another week or so of investigation with no publicity because then they might have had a more successful investigation. In a week or so, however, he hopes to have further information. He said that there was no doubt that secret documents were being passed on (he did not say to whom) and said that one curious aspect was that reports of at least two meetings of the National Defense Council had been passed on but that they were extractions of the proceedings and did not contain the most precise or sensitive subject matter discussed at the meetings. In other words they had been screened before transmission. He could not account for this pattern but "policemen are terrible people" and it was a bad situation. There were a number of them who were spending large sums of money on cars, women and gambling who had no private fortunes of their own and relatively small salaries. They were connected with different circles, including political groups. The Premier indicated that he was going to get to the bottom of it but that he was unable to see the full implications as yet.

M. Mendes-France then said that he was glad of this opportunity to talk to the Secretary and that he would like to do so frankly. In order to deal with the future it was necessary to go back to the past. He remembered their July meeting with pleasure and at that time he had felt that there had been a full, friendly and frank exchange of views even though they were dealing with difficult subjects. He reminded the Secretary that at that time he had made two promises, both of which he had fulfilled. The first was that he would hold the Assembly in Paris and secure an answer on EDC one way or the other before the end of August. The second was that since there was at that time no majority in favor of the EDC in the Assembly (a point on which he

[2] For a summary of Murphy's meeting with Mendès-France on Sept. 23, see telegram 1254 from Paris, Sept. 24, p. 1256.

and the Secretary had had an argument) he would attempt to find some modification which would be acceptable to the other five countries and change 60 or so Deputies' votes to carry the treaty.

M. Mendes-France then recited at some length his experience at Brussels. He emphasized that when he arrived there he found that the other five were opposed to accepting his changes and that Mr. Bruce had told him at Brussels that the United States Government did not like his protocols either. Despite his best efforts he had been unable to secure from his partners what was necessary for him to obtain passage of EDC in the Assembly.

M. Mendes-France then explained at some length why under the French constitution and in light of the division within his Cabinet he had been unable to put the vote on the basis of an issue of confidence. He said he had fought for its passage and that he had made clear to the Assembly that the early return of sovereignty to Germany and the early rearmament of Germany under some alternative arrangement were inevitable if EDC was rejected. Notwithstanding his efforts, the Deputies sustained his earlier estimate of the situation by rejecting the treaty. He then referred in rather bitter terms to the violence of the reaction against France and against him personally in the American press and in the American Government. He indicated clearly that he felt this was unjust and whereas he disclaimed any personal feeling in the matter it was quite plain that he felt a deep and bitter resentment.

The Premier said that he came to London in the belief that it was essential that the conference succeed. He said that up until the close of his talks with Mr. Eden he had been opposed to German entrance into NATO but that he now saw that all others wished it and consequently France could not hold out. He needed, however, "weapons" to win his fight in the Parliament, which would be extremely difficult at best. The two factors about EDC which accounted for its rejection were (1) its supranational character and (2) the absence of the British. By expanding the Brussels Treaty and bringing Germany and Italy into it, it would be possible to meet these two objections. "I am proposing what is really the EDC but without supranationality and with British membership." (At no time during the conversation did M. Mendes-France mention specifically the armaments pool.)

On the matter of restoring sovereignty to Germany the Premier said that there would be no difficulty but it was essential that it be done on a trilateral basis and not be worked out on the basis of three separate bilateral arrangements with Germany. The French people, he said, were willing to accept the return of sovereignty to Germany and hence it presented no political problems to him although there were a number of very difficult legal complications. In this matter, however, we would find him completely reasonable and cooperative.

The important thing, however, M. Mendes-France said, was to give such powers to the Brussels Treaty Council and incorporate in the treaty such safeguards as would enable him to tell the French Chamber that the French were protecting against the "inconveniences" flowing from German rearmament.

M. Mendes-France said that he felt it was a mistake for the Secretary to have omitted a visit to Paris last week when he went to Bonn and London. "It had done more harm than good." However, we had all come to London to make the conference a success and he was looking forward to working cooperatively toward that end.

The Secretary replied to the Premier (who had spoken without interruption for an hour) at some length. He recalled the long and affectionate relationship between the two countries extending back to the revolution. He reminded the French Premier that since the war it had been the United States who had supported the French materially, monetarily and diplomatically at conferences. He recited a number of post-war incidents when the United States had championed French interests. He said that the defeat of EDC had been a great blow to the American people who had felt, particularly as delay followed on delay, that it had become the symbol not only of the consistency of France but of the entire concept of a European community which the American people were convinced must be developed if we were to avoid a repetition of the history of two world wars starting in Europe.

The Secretary said that we came here with no plan of our own but only the desire to be helpful. We felt that, even though there was indeed no good alternative to the EDC, nevertheless we could find a solution. A solution, however, he felt must meet three criteria. First, it must result in the prompt restoration of sovereignty to Germany; second, it must permit German participation in its own defense and in support of NATO's forward stategy (the Secretary at this point said that notwithstanding the statements of some military men, the President and he had always felt that the supranational aspect of EDC was far, far more important than twelve German divisions. He said that we had no intention of rushing into a massive rearmament of Germany but we did feel that German participation and collective defense was essential); thirdly, the Secretary said that in any solution it was important that it be made clear that the idea of ultimate unity on the continent was not dead. He said that if the American people felt the rejection of EDC meant the rejection of the European movement toward unity then there was a very real chance that the American people would be disillusioned and would withdraw to their own continent feeling another world war would ultimately start in Europe and that we had no wish to be involved in it.

The Secretary then said that there had been press stories to the effect that he and Mendes-France did not get along. He said it was a curious irony that he, who of all American Secretaries of State probably knew France better and loved France better than any other, was regarded by the French with more hostility than any other Secretary (M. Mendes-France protested this statement vehemently). The Secretary said that he had the highest regard for Mendes-France, that he felt their talk in July had established a relationship in which they could work with frankness and intimacy for the same aims. He said he still felt that way but that even if he didn't he had learned years ago the foolishness of attempting to deal on governmental matters with anyone other than the chosen head of the government. He described Woodrow Wilson's failure in his effort to go to the people over the heads of Clemenceau and other European leaders at the time of Versailles. He said no one had the influence to achieve results by this measure. (The Premier interjected that President Eisenhower had enormous influence with the people of Europe.) The Secretary assured Mendes-France that he was looking forward to working with him on a basis of close and intimate association at this conference.

In connection with the omission of Paris from his last trip to Europe, the Secretary pointed out that he had made a number of trips in the last year and a half to Paris without necessarily going to many other capitals. He also pointed out that he had had urgent messages from Adenauer of the latter's desire to see him and similarly had an urgent suggestion from Mr. Eden that he come to London directly from the Manila Conference. He had had no such intimation from Mendes-France of a desire that he come to Paris at that time. He had hoped between Manila and the United Nations to take a week's vacation but he had reluctantly sacrificed four days of it in order to meet the requests he had had from Adenauer and Eden. There had been no intended slight of France and he was surprised that this interpretation had been placed by some upon his itinerary.

By this time it was nearly 1:30 and as the Secretary rose to leave he asked Mendes-France what he would think of having Eden serve as Permanent Chairman of the Conference. He said he had given thought to other possibilities but that this seemed the best. The Premier indicated full agreement. The Premier then said that Eden had mentioned to him this morning a plan to base the discussion on an extraction of the common points conned from the French, UK and German memoranda. He felt this was unsatisfactory from his point of view and he suggested that they might open the conference by permitting him to expand and discuss in more detail his proposal. The Secretary said that that was a possibility, particularly if thereafter the British and the Germans were given a chance to expand their proposals, following which an agenda might be developed which would

draw on the common points of all three memoranda, making clear, however, that each Minister reserved his position on any particular point until the outcome of the discussion of all was seen.

Either at this point or earlier Mendes-France assured the Secretary again that if the London conference arrived at an acceptable agreement he would put it to the French Parliament immediately with the full authority of his government behind it. "This time the French Parliament will be the first to act and not the last."

As they walked to the door Mendes-France said that he needed the Secretary's help at this conference. The Secretary said of course he would help him. Mendes-France however went on to say that he had to judge what was possible of passage in the French Assembly. He said there was no point in reaching an agreement which would fail to secure Parliamentary approval by the countries concerned. That would be meaningless. Therefore he knew the Secretary would understand that there would be certain points to which he had to stick.

The Premier then saw the Secretary to his car. The parting was cordial and friendly.[3]

[3] In a separate memorandum of conversation by Merchant, which was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation at the Nine-Power Conference as NPT Memo 26 of Sept. 27, Merchant made the following observations:

"At the outset of M. Mendes-France's talk with the Secretary he seemed tense but as the conversation ran on he became increasingly relaxed. His color was worse than I have ever seen it before and he seemed to me a man suffering from deep fatigue. There was no doubt that he felt or feels a deep resentment over the reaction of the American press against France and particularly against himself as a result of the rejection of EDC. It was equally obvious that he resented the omission of Paris from the itinerary of the Secretary's trip to Europe last week." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363)

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Acting Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Martin)*[1]

SECRET [LONDON,] September 27, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Bowie
General Gruenther
Mr. Martin
Ambassador Aldrich
Colonel Silver
Mr. Merchant
Colonel Richardson
Mr. McCardle
Mr. O'Connor

Subject: SACEUR Assistance in Alternative Arrangements to EDC

General Gruenther called attention to the fact that during the morning meeting[2] he had not had an opportunity to answer the question asked by the Secretary about the feasibility of establishing a strategic

[1] The source text was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation to the Nine-Power Conference as document NPT Memo 30.

[2] For a record of this morning meeting, see the memorandum of conversation by Moore, Sept. 27, p. 1281.

zone in which it would be militarily unwise to produce certain types of munitions.

General Gruenther stated that establishment of such a zone was feasible, and his Headquarters would be willing to assist in it. However, they would prefer not to get involved, and he suggested that it might be possible to utilize, at least as a solution for the present, the arrangements in this regard agreed to in connection with the EDC negotiations.

General Gruenther expressed the opinion that the Germans were apparently willing to accept the EDC solution although he doubted the prohibition of the production in Germany of military aircraft could be maintained for long.

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**PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Chronological 1954"**

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)*

TOP SECRET [LONDON,] September 27, 1954.

Participants: Mr. Eden
Mr. Caccia and Denis Allen (British Foreign Officer)
Ambassador Aldrich
Mr. Bowie

1. Ambassador Aldrich showed Mr. Eden the text of the attached cable [1] and said that Mr. Dulles wanted to be sure that Mr. Eden concurred in the cable insofar as it concerned him. Mr. Eden said he fully concurred.

2. Mr. Allen handed us a paper [2] which he said reflected the legal opinion of Mr. Fitzmorris, supplemented by the views of some of the people in the legal section of the Foreign Office. Mr. Eden said he had not seen the paper and after reading it he expressed some concern lest it give the wrong impression about his attitude. He said he wanted it made quite clear to the Secretary (*a*) that this was merely a statement of legal views and not a policy statement, and (*b*) that as far as he was concerned he favored the use of Chapter VI rather than Chapter VII but that he also favored the use of Chapter VII rather than nothing at all.

3. Mr. Eden said he was very pleased with the talk of last night.[3] He said that he had talked today with Mendes-France and proposed to him an early meeting of the Four regarding German sovereignty in order to get work on that started. Mendes-France had told him there would be no difficulty on this since he agreed completely on the prin-

[1] Under reference is telegram Dulte 2, Sept. 27; for text, see the compilation on China in volume XIV.

[2] Not printed. A copy of this paper entitled "Quemoy", is in file 794A.5/9–2754.

[3] For a record of this Dulles–Eden meeting which occurred on the evening of Sept. 26, see the memorandum of conversation by Bowie, Sept. 27, p. 1275.

ciple; there would be merely specific points to be worked out which he was satisfied could be done and could begin promptly.

4. Mendes-France also said he could see no reason for a long conference and thought it could be pushed to reach satisfactory conclusion in a few days. Mr. Eden said he hoped this was right; and, in effect, implied to Mendes-France that it depended on him. He had outlined his idea of the agenda and Mendes-France had not seemed entirely satisfied. The Ambassador told him that in his conversation with the Secretary, Mendes-France had expressed a desire to state his program as a whole rather than piece-meal.

5. Mr. Eden said that Mendes-France wanted Mr. Eden to make some introductory remarks along the lines of the agenda paper which we had agreed with them on the last trip to London. He inquired whether the Secretary was planning on a short statement. The Ambassador told him that he would have a 5-minute statement and thought this was a useful way to keep the press in line. Mr. Eden said he would notify the others of this procedure.

6. Mr. Eden said that on further reflection he was much taken with the ideas regarding the Arms Pool which had been discussed last night. He said he had talked today to Bech about the French proposal which Bech found unacceptable. Mr. Eden had told him that the Americans had some ideas on how this might be modified into a constructive proposal. He said that he thought Bech would be receptive. The Ambassador said that the Secretary planned to raise this with the talks with the Benelux this evening.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370**

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Acting Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Martin)*

SECRET [LONDON,] September 27, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister
Mr. Beyen, Netherlands Foreign Minister
Mr. Bech, Luxembourg Foreign Minister
Mr. van Starkenborgh, Netherlands Permanent Representative to NATO
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Martin

Subject: Prospects for Nine-Power Talks

1. The Secretary suggested that it would be desirable to have Mr. Eden act as Permanent Chairman of the Conference and wondered

if one of the Benelux Foreign Ministers would care to nominate him. They agreed to do so.

2. The Secretary described Mr. Eden's idea of dealing with major items one by one rather than trying to decide which of the three different papers to discuss *in toto* first. He also described the desire expressed to him by the French Prime Minister of making a statement on the whole of the French paper before any discussion of individual subjects. He also indicated the thought that the opening session might permit any Delegation head who wishes to make a statement of a general character which might be passed to the press. These arrangements were concurred in by the Benelux Ministers.

3. The Secretary indicated that the Foreign Ministers of the three occupying powers might meet early in the Conference with Chancellor Adenauer and ask the three High Commissioners and a representative of the Chancellor to continue the talks begun at Bonn on the papers involved in granting sovereignty to Germany on a basis other than that provided in the contractuals. He indicated our desire to keep the Benelux countries informed on the progress of this work in view of their interest in the matter, and in particular to seek their views before decisions were made by Ministers. The Benelux Foreign Ministers expressed appreciation for this.

4. The Benelux Foreign Ministers all expressed concern over difficulties of solving the Saar problem. They had a definite impression it was a "condition préalable" as far as the French were concerned, but that in the absence of EDC there was no obvious way in which a European solution could be found. There was inconclusive discussion as to whether or not this problem should be dealt with before concessions are made to the French on other issues which would be fruitless if this most difficult issue proved insoluble.

5. Mr. Beyen came to the meeting direct from a talk with Mr. Mendes-France. There was considerable interchange of information about his talk and the Secretary's talk with Mr. Mendes. Mr. Beyen confessed he still did not know what French intentions really were. He also stated that despite some effort on his part, he received no real clarification on the specifics of the French proposals. He thought it clear that the French position was to accept membership in NATO provided all the arrangements under Brussels which Mendes considers necessary were accepted. He believed Mendes attached great importance to Brussels as opposed to NATO, to British participation in Brussels arrangements, and to having Brussels arrangements capable of exercising firm control and inspection of German rearmament. He was not clear that an armaments pool was an essential condition of Mendes' program. In the light of past experience, he and the other two Foreign

Ministers expressed strong suspicions of the French fundamental intentions and of the straightforwardness of their tactics. Mr. Beyen said he had gathered Mendes might submit NATO and Brussels to Parliament separately if arrangements were not entirely to his satisfaction. This would of course be fatal.

6. The Secretary suggested that if the armaments pool proved an essential point, it was desirable not to reject it outright, but rather to make clear that there was an alternative of a reasonable kind which might be acceptable to us. The more this could be made to look like merely a modification of Mendes' scheme, the more difficult it would be for him to convince his Parliament that he had been unreasonably treated at London. He also felt there were positive advantages of an economic, and possibly political, character to be gained from a good armaments pool scheme which was simple and non-discriminatory. The Benelux representatives, and particularly the Dutch, expressed great hesitancy about indicating approval of any armaments pool scheme. This seemed to stem largely from their disbelief that the French would agree with anything reasonable, anything that did not discriminate against Germany or give preference to French industry. They also felt strongly that an armaments pool arrangement was more acceptable and workable as part of EDC, which was also responsible for logistical supply of forces, than as independent institution with countries retaining logistical responsibility. They believed that negotiation of a fair scheme would be complicated and time consuming. This discussion concluded with tentative agreement to consider the matter further.

7. Mr. Beyen called attention to the fact that Mendes had indicated he would not formally sign any agreement without consulting his Parliament and Parliament leaders. This might affect future time schedule.

8. Mr. Beyen asked if we had seen a more detailed German document. We said we knew nothing of it.

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396.1 LO/9–2854

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

LONDON, September 28, 1954.

[MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:] Sunday evening and yesterday were busy times preparatory to conference convening today (Tuesday).

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[1] This message was transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State on an "eyes only" basis in telegram Dulte 3 from London, Sept. 28, with the instruction that it be passed on to the President.

Sunday evening Eden had dinner with me at Embassy. We had very satisfactory exchange of views, and I felt he was dealing with us with greater frankness and sincerity than sometimes has been the case. We dealt primarily with pending conference, but also with reference to China as to which I have reported separately.

The high point yesterday was hour and half conference I had with Mendes-France, beginning and ending with many photographs. He made passionate defense for one hour of his conduct regarding EDC, and seemed personally resentful at criticism and blame which have been placed on him for defeat. Meeting more of a post-mortem than preparatory to conference, although he repeated general indications regarding French position, finally emphasizing, however, the imperative need for solution which would contain features necessary to satisfy French Parliament that it was safe to let Germany into NATO.

I had two useful talks with Gruenther, who made it quite clear that present or possible arrangement of his command could effectively make it impossible for any one of the national forces to go to war alone. I met also with the new Italian Foreign Minister, who seemed happy about the prospects of Trieste settlement.[2]

Aldrich and I paid courtesy call on Churchill. He was in excellent shape and sent you warmest greetings. He is delighted to have at last a major conference "on the banks of the Thames".

Then the three Benelux Ministers called on me at Embassy. They are obviously very pessimistic and distrustful of Mendes-France's intentions.

Most encouraging aspect of situation is fact that it seems that the British may be prepared now to take some firm continental commitments by possibly agreeing that their forces shall remain on continent under control of majority of Brussels Treaty Council. Eden is definitely prepared for this, although he says Cabinet has not yet approved; and yesterday when I saw Churchill he expressed grave concern at possibility of having British troops committed to continent after US forces might have been withdrawn. He repeated several times "we cannot stay there alone without you". However, my impression is that UK will make this commitment if it will suffice to put settlement through and provided we reaffirm substantially what we said in connection with EDC.

Am about to go now to opening of conference.

Best regards, FOSTER

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[2] Documentation concerning Trieste, including the memorandum of conversation under reference here, is presented in volume VIII.

# B. NINE-POWER AND FOUR-POWER CONFERENCES AT LONDON, SEPTEMBER 28–OCTOBER 3, 1954

## 1. PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEETINGS

*Editorial Note*

The Nine-Power and Four-Power Conferences at London, September 28–October 3, involved a total of 14 plenary sessions of the 9 Foreign Ministers from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States and 5 meetings of the Foreign Ministers from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in addition to numerous other informal and formal bilateral and multilateral discussions. The editors have attempted to account for all the meetings which occurred during the conference, even if the subject discussed was exclusively related to non-EDC matters, in which case information is provided concerning where the document is printed if it does not appear in this compilation.

The most useful supplement to the Department of State Central files concerning this conference, especially file 396.1 LO, was the Conference files, lot 60 D 627. It included 14 folders of material relating to the meetings, the preparations, and relevant conference documents. The material is arranged as follows: folder 363—reference and position papers, CF 364–365—conference documents, CF 366–368—verbatim records of the meetings of the Nine-Power and Four-Power sessions, CF 369—the final act and annexes, CF 370–372—telegrams and memoranda of conversation, and CF 373–376—materials relating to the administrative arrangements for the conference. A principal supplementary file, not as complete as the Conference files, is the CFM files, lot M 88, box 169, which also has the preparatory papers, verbatim records, and conference documents.

The main telegram indicator series used at this conference was the Secto–Tosec series, which was utilized by the delegation for conference business between Washington and London; the first telegram in the series began with the departure of the Secretary of State for London. The Dulte–Tedul indicator series was used to transmit personal messages from and to the Secretary of State while at the conference in London.

For personal accounts of this conference by some of the major participants, see the following: Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1953–1955*, pages 328–354; Eden, *Full Circle*, pages 149–169; Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune*, pages 482–483; and Spaak, *The Continuing Battle*, pages 181–

186. For President Eisenhower's account, see *Mandate for Change*, pages 403–407.

Most of the meetings of both the Nine-Power and Four-Power sessions were attended by the Foreign Ministers of the participating countries, assisted by staffs of experts from the various delegations. Since no records are available indicating which members of the various delegations attended the individual meetings to assist their Foreign Minister, the editors have attempted to list only the principal participants at such meetings. The leading representatives on the delegations of the participating countries were as follows:

BELGIUM

| | |
|---|---|
| Paul-Henri Spaak | Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Andre de Staercke | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |
| Robert Rothschild | Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs |

CANADA

| | |
|---|---|
| Lester B. Pearson | Secretary of State for External Affairs |
| Norman Robertson | High Commissioner in London |
| L. Dana Wilgress | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |

FRANCE

| | |
|---|---|
| Pierre Mendès-France | President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Roland de Moustier | Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs |
| André François-Poncet | High Commissioner for Germany |
| René Massigli | Ambassador to the United Kingdom |
| Roland de Margerie | Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs |

GERMANY

| | |
|---|---|
| Konrad Adenauer | Chancellor |
| Theodor Blank | Member of the Bundestag and Adviser to the Chancellor |
| Walter Hallstein | Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs |
| Herbert Blankenhorn | Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs |

ITALY

| | |
|---|---|
| Gaetano Martino | Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Manlio Brosio | Ambassador in the United Kingdom |
| Massimo Magistrati | Director General for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs |

LUXEMBOURG

| | |
|---|---|
| Joseph Bech | President and Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Andrew Clasen | Minister in the United Kingdom |
| Nic Hommel | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |

NETHERLANDS

| | |
|---|---|
| Johan W. Beyen | Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Dirk Stikker | Ambassador in the United Kingdom |
| Jonkheer A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |

UNITED KINGDOM

| | |
|---|---|
| Sir Anthony Eden | Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs |
| Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick | Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office |
| Sir H. M. Gladwyn Jebb | Ambassador in France |
| Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar | High Commissioner for Germany |
| Sir Christopher Steel | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |
| Sir Harold Caccia | Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office |
| Sir Frank Roberts | Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office |

UNITED STATES

| | |
|---|---|
| John Foster Dulles | Secretary of State |
| Winthrop W. Aldrich | Ambassador in the United Kingdom |
| Robert R. Bowie | Director of the Policy Planning Staff or the Department of State |
| David K. E. Bruce | Ambassador to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation |
| James B. Conant | High Commissioner for Germany |
| C. Douglas Dillon | Ambassador in France |
| H. Struve Hensel | Assistant Secretary of Defense |
| John C. Hughes | Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council |
| Livingston T. Merchant | Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs |

A complete list of the United States Delegation is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 4, 1954, pages 489–490.

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**FIRST PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 28, 1954, 11 A. M.**

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

| | |
|---|---|
| BELGIUM | LUXEMBOURG |
| Paul-Henri Spaak | Joseph Bech |
| CANADA | NETHERLANDS |
| Lester B. Pearson | Johan W. Beyen |

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

BRUSSELS TREATY PERMANENT COMMISSION
René Massigli

396.1 LO/9–2854

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation* [1]

SECRET LONDON, September 28, 1954—4 p. m.

I. Nine power meeting opened at Lancaster House at 11 this morning. After brief period for photos, following procedural decisions were made:

(A) Eden chosen chairman with understanding will continue speak for UK.

(B) Regular sessions will be held at 11 and 3:30 each day. However today Foreign Ministers of occupying powers will meet with Chancellor at 3 on restoration German sovereignty and session will be at 4:30.

(C) Each delegation will deal with own press but urged limit information to maximum extent possible.

(D) Verbatim transcript three languages available each night.

(E) UK permanent representative to brief daily London Ambassadors six NATO countries not present.

II. Chairman made opening statement in which repeated essential points last UK document.[2] In addition emphasized this meeting was preparatory to NATO meeting and its conclusions provisional until other governments concurred. Congratulated Bonn experts on progress made on restoration sovereignty.[3] Also felt Brussels commission made

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 5, Sept. 28, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 23-page verbatim record of this meeting, which was circulated as document NPC(54)5, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

[2] The British document under reference is NPC(54)2 of Sept. 24, which is printed on p. 1334.

[3] Representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany formed a Working Group in Bonn to consider matters relating to the restoration of German sovereignty and the revision of the contractual agreements. The Working Group, which began meeting on Sept. 21 and continued through Sept. 24, was established to seek quadripartite agreement on these issues and to prepare a report on the results of their work for the Nine-Power Conference. Documentation on the meetings of the Bonn Working Group is in Department of State file 662A.00/9–2354 through 9–2554.

good progress in amending treaty to accomplish addition of Germany and Italy.[4]

Then turned to problem of agenda pointing out have these memos on table. Suggested that rather than have general unguided discussion or attempt selection of memos as basis discussion preferable list subjects on which agreement required and address them one by one. Distributed proposed agenda in accordance this principle (reported separate message [5]). Believed working parties could be set up on any subject where they could help.

Mendes-France agreed procedure by subject appropriate but thought any minister who wished should have chance make general statement giving philosophical background of position his government on particular points. French would like, for example, to do so. He also wished to make IC.2 of UK agenda ("size and character of the German defense contribution") the first item under C.1 ("arrangements to be applied to SACEUR forces on the continent"). Believe this derived from desire make sure these arrangements would apply to German contribution.

His points agreed. Chairman emphasized no government committed on any item until all work finished.

III. Chairman then asked each representative if he had anything to say. Only Mendes and Martino spoke. Mendes spoke at length but added nothing new of importance except to conclude with statement

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[4] Documentation concerning meetings of the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Treaty Organization, which met in London to consider modifications of the Brussels Treaty and a draft declaration of invitation for Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, is in Department of State file 740.5.

[5] Telegram Secto 7, Sept. 28, not printed, informed the Department of State concerning the agenda proposed by the British. The agenda items were as follows:

"A. Termination of the occupation regime in Germany and accompanying arrangements.

B. Accession of the Federal Republic German and Italy to the Brussels treaty.

C. Arrangements to accompany German and Italian accession to the Brussels treaty and German accession to NATO.

1. Arrangements to be applied to SACEUR's forces on the continent.
(*a*) deployment and movement
(*b*) integration
(*c*) logistics
(*d*) inspection
(*e*) force ceilings
2. Size and character of the German defense contribution.
3. Control of armaments production.
(*a*) strategically exposed areas
(*b*) arms pool
4. Security declarations.
5. Possible extension of the duration of the North Atlantic treaty.
6. United Kingdom and United States declarations." (396.1 LO/9–2854)

that package which French Government was willing to sell to French Parliament and chance of success included not only their proposals with respect to Brussels treaty and NATO but also solution of Saar problem and adequate guarantees with respect to maintenance US and UK forces on continent. His statement will be reported more fully in separate message.[6]

Martino welcomed restoration of German sovereignty and contribution of German to Western defense as indispensable. Thought NATO most suitable framework. Accepted extension Brussels treaty, but thought any guarantees under Brussels should be applied through NATO with its practical experiences. Wished support further developments Europe institutions and collaboration.

IV. Chairman called on Ambassador Massigli, chairman Brussels treaty permanent council, to report on its work. He indicated no difficulties in principle and agreement of present signatories on procedure for amending preamble and Article 7 and adding new article to cover future arrangements. It was agreed that these proposals should be discussed with Italian and German delegations.

V. Chairman then moved on to IC.1 in agenda, as amended, size and character of German defense contribution. Chancellor Adenauer said that his government and his people were anxious to remove past anxieties about what Germany would do with power to rearm. Wanted to assure group that this power will never be used except in Europe framework.

Stated his government prepared make binding declaration that size of German force would not exceed EDC limits.

Assured conference Germany will submit to any non-discriminatory controls considered necessary.

VI. Chairman suggested that members would wish to consider Chancellor's statement, and adjourned meeting.

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[6] Telegram Secto 6, Sept. 28. (396.1 LO/9–2854)

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## FIRST MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 28, 1954, 3 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

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|---|---|
| FRANCE<br>Pierre Mendès-France | UNITED KINGDOM<br>Anthony Eden |
| FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY<br>Konrad Adenauer | UNITED STATES<br>John Foster Dulles |

396.1 LO/9–2954

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation* [1]

SECRET LONDON, September 29, 1954—2 a. m.

First quadripartite Ministers meeting on restoration German sovereignty held 3 p. m., September 28 under chairmanship Eden.

Eden opened meeting by saying all four governments appeared agreed occupation should be terminated and that necessary arrangements should be made as soon as possible. These should include retention Allied rights re Berlin and Germany as a whole, arrangements for stationing, security, status and support of forces. Bonn discussions had been useful and he proposed that three High Commissioners and representative of Chancellor carry on discussions and recommend to Ministers how this should be worked out. There was need for speed and agreement in principle should be reached in London. However, necessary agreements would have to be made in accord with constitutional procedures of respective governments. Chancellor was entitled to show progress as result of this convention. He suggested this be done by Allies issuing declaration of intent indicating that occupation regime would be terminated as soon as possible.[2] It might also state that meanwhile, three High Commissioners would not exercise powers to be diverted except in agreement with German Federal Government. Eden said he put this forward as suggestion. It needed examination which should be done by experts.

Adenauer said he hoped restoration of sovereignty would not have to wait until all arrangements made and all treaties ratified. He welcomed British suggestion which he said German public opinion would feel meant that conference had resulted in real change and not mere words.

Re restoration German sovereignty, Mendes-France said French delegation would facilitate achievement of this objective to maximum

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 9, Sept. 29, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and to Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 12-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 367. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

[2] Eden's proposal was circulated as document NPC(54)6 of Sept. 28, the text of which reads as follows:

"The proposal is to make a declaration of the intent of the three Occupying Powers to take as soon as possible the steps necessary to terminate the Occupation regime.

"Since, however, this process must take a little time, the declaration could include a statement by the three Occupying Powers that they propose to instruct the High Commissioners not to use in the meantime powers of which it is proposed to divest them except in agreement with the German Federal Government." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364)

and would be realistic in dealing with it. After Brussels conference,[3] French Government had decided to agree to Anglo-American suggestion to put Bonn treaties in effect. He had publicly stated this and French parliament was aware of it. He said re Eden proposal it would be difficult for French Government to take position without parliamentary approval. Government could give instructions to French High Commissioner but could not enter into agreements which prejudice right of Parliament to pass on substantive issue.

Secretary said US desires German sovereignty be restored as soon as possible and that US prepared in light unanimous vote Senate to act without delay from constitutional standpoint.[4] He felt further exploration of steps needed complete restoration sovereignty. Working groups could press forward on this and report in two or three days areas of agreement and disagreement which Ministers could then consider. He hoped that agreement on steps necessary consummate termination occupation could be worked out in detail at London. These might be dependent on coming into force of other arrangements.

Re Eden proposal, Secretary said it was new idea and he wished to think it through before expressing an opinion. He felt everything possible should be done to assist Chancellor and enable him to indicate to German people that conference had taken action. He wished to think about implications of Eden proposal. While he approached it with sympathy, he thought it needed to be studied to see whether necessary rights would be maintained. He suggested it be considered by working group. Secretary renewed his proposal that High Commissioners and Chancellor's representative make comprehensive report in next two or three days. Mendes-France said problem was complex. He felt that governments probably not far apart on substance, but there was problem of procedure which he felt experts should also explore during conference. He said that French delegation had three or four questions on procedure which he would like to have considered.

Eden suggested that it would be desirable that working group have some agreed principles from Ministers on which to work and distributed paper proposing following principles: [5]

1. Arrangement for terminating occupation should be capable of being made effective in advance or independently of arrangements for German military contribution. Pending entry into force of latter, German rearmament would remain subject of restriction.

[3] For documentation concerning the Brussels Conference of Aug. 19–22, see pp. 1052 ff.

[4] For the text of Senate Resolution 295 approved on July 30, 1954, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 284.

[5] The British paper presenting the principles summarized in the source text has not been further identified.

2. Simplest method would be declaration by three Allies terminating occupation and giving Federal Republic full authority subject certain reservation, e.g. Berlin.

3. Declaration would not come into force until settlement convention, less those parts now out of date, had become effective and arrangements made to cover stationing, status and financing of Allied forces and protection their security.

4. In reviewing extent to which Bonn conventions could now usefully be brought into operation, working group should not attempt to renegotiate documents but restrict themselves to deleting provisions now out of date.[6]

Secretary said for problems immediately at hand only fourth point seemed relevant and that first three could be considered better in light of knowledge what documents would look like. However, he did not object to working group studying these points as well as new Eden proposal. All Ministers agreed to fourth point British paper and remainder of British proposals were referred to working group for study, it being specifically understood that consideration of declaration of intent was without commitment. Eden suggested that if working group felt it needed further instructions it should report to Ministers on following day.

Adenauer designated Grewe as German representative on working group.[7]

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[6] Documentation concerning the negotiation of the Bonn conventions is presented in volume VII.

[7] Immediately following this Four-Power meeting, the Working Group on German Sovereignty held its first meeting at Lancaster House. As a result of this meeting and another held the following morning at 11 a. m., the Working Group submitted a list of questions to the four Foreign Ministers seeking guidance concerning their tasks and stated that little progress could be made until this guidance was received. The questions submitted to the four Ministers were circulated in document NPC(54)15 of Sept. 29 and were considered at the second Four-Power meeting of Oct. 1; a copy of document NPC(54)15 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364. A brief summary of the first meeting of this Working Group is contained in telegram Secto 8 from London, Sept. 29 (396.1 LO/9–2954); however, no records of the subsequent meetings of Sept. 30, Oct. 1, and Oct. 2 were found in Department of State files. The U.S. representatives on the Working Group were Conant (head of U.S. Delegation), Reinstein, Hilles, and Wilson. This Working Group is presumably a continuation of the quadripartite Working Group which met in Bonn prior to the beginning of the Nine-Power Conference; for information on the Bonn group, see footnote 3, p. 1297.

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## SECOND PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 28, 1954, 4:30 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

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| BELGIUM<br>Paul-Henri Spaak | LUXEMBOURG<br>Joseph Bech |
| CANADA<br>Lester B. Pearson | NETHERLANDS<br>Johan W. Beyen |

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Konrad Adenauer

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

396.1 LO/9–2954

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation*[1]

SECRET LONDON, September 29, 1954—11 a. m.

At meeting afternoon of September 28 Eden opened by discussing agenda items dealing with German defense contribution to NATO and associated arrangements. He suggested there was no controversy about level of German contribution. It should follow formula agreed in EDC secret annex. Any subsequent necessary changes should be worked out in accordance with agreed NATO precedures. On deployment he suggested agreement to generalize principle included in US and UK assurances of last spring, namely to deploy forces in accordance with agreed NATO strategy and in response to SACEUR's command. On integration and logistics he proposed asking SACEUR for recommendations, and on inspection he suggested agreement to make annual review procedure more effective. Procedurally he proposed agreement on papers setting forth principles at this meeting. These papers would then be submitted to appropriate NATO bodies for preparation of more detailed documents and results of this work approved by NAC in October.

Only major substantive comment on Eden's statement was made by Mendes-France. He suggested need for exception to EDC principles to cover overseas forces. French have in mind something along lines French protocol to article 13 of Paris Treaty. On integration he suggested adoption of principle of mixed units below corps level along lines EDC except where declared unfeasible by SACEUR and Brussels Treaty organization for military reasons. He reaffirmed need for limit on size of forces to be worked out under Brussels. He suggested establishment of office of "Inspector General" under Brussels, function of which would be to see that agreed limits were enforced. He emphasized that such office should be separate from SHAPE in view of entirely different function of limiting forces while philosophy of NATO was to increase forces.

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 10, Sept. 29, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 26-page verbatim record of this meeting, which was circulated as document NPC(54)8, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

Spaak and several others suggested need for more careful study of both Eden's and Mendes-France's statements, and it was agreed to consider this subject at next meeting when verbatim transcripts available.

Turning to agenda item on control of production, Spaak said he had several questions to ask Mendes-France on French proposal on this subject.[2] He said problem of establishing zones for limitation of arms production was easy but pool aspect much more difficult. He wanted to know if pool arrangement applied to all forces of member country. He also wondered what position of French del was on many safeguards included in EDC Treaty but not mentioned in French plan, such as economic clauses, control of pool by Assembly, etc. Mendes-France replied by reiterating many of points already included in French memo and made by him at morning session. Only new point was reference to possibility of establishing list of items to which operations of pool would be limited. Spaak suggestion for additional safeguards of type included in EDC Treaty could be studied.

Beyen made point, which we consider principle [*principal*] one concerning Dutch, that national governments are responsible for raising and supplying forces under French proposal but have lost control over production of equipment for these forces. This principle of divided responsibility was basic difference between French plan and EDC. Dutch felt strongly that this would create difficulty. He also felt that there was confusion over whether purpose of pool was to be control or increased efficiency. He wanted to know to what extent UK would participate in pool, pointing out that one benefit resulting from failure of EDC was closer association of UK with continental countries. He emphasized need to avoid long complicated negotiations and asked if French could not find some simpler way to meet their objective of control.

Eden closed discussion by pointing out that all could agree on principle of establishing security zones and limited production therein in accordance with principle of Article 107 of EDC Treaty.

[2] The French proposal under reference is document NPC(54)1 of Sept. 27, which is printed on p. 1332.

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**THIRD PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 29, 1954, 11:15 A.M.**

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

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| BELGIUM | LUXEMBOURG |
| Paul-Henri Spaak | Joseph Bech |
| CANADA | NETHERLANDS |
| Lester B. Pearson | Johan W. Beyen |

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

396.1 LO/9-2954

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation* [1]

SECRET LONDON, September 29, 1954—6 p. m.

1. Plenary session opened at 11:15 this morning. US requested verbatim minutes no longer be taken. Felt inhibited discussion and burden on dels to revise. Suggested any del be free to request verbatim transcript for statement about to make. This was agreed.

2. Secretary stated High Commissioners and German representative dealing with restoration of German sovereignty requested meeting with Foreign Ministers and German Chancellor after afternoon plenary session. This agreed. At close of meeting working party said would not be ready for meeting today but would wish meeting tomorrow.

3. Chairman invited discussion of strengthening NATO and SACEUR powers. Spaak stated on basis verbatim text of Eden statement day before and draft French paper circulated informally, felt very close to agreement.

With respect to character and size German contribution, thought should start at EDC level. What happens next less clear, but suggested Brussels countries agree in Brussels on contribution of each and this be basis for submittal to NATO AR. Would also be agreed among Brussels powers this would be maximum for each of them. Referred to this as carryover of EDC plan (De Staercke later stated implication of Brussels AR not intended). Spaak felt remaining problems matter of detail. Belgium would support strengthening NATO control over forces.

Chairman stated there is new UK draft [2] on these points which would be distributed.

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in two sections as telegram Secto 11, Sept. 29, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 23-page verbatim record of this meeting, which, as noted in the source text, was no longer to be circulated as before and therefore was not given a document designation, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

[2] This is a reference to document NPC(54)11 of Sept. 29, which is printed on p. 1335.

Mendes-France welcomed Spaak statement. Suggested that approach to problem should be along EDC lines and each year Brussels make decision of maximum before NATO acts and then harmonize in NATO Brussels maximum with traditional NATO minimum. Promised circulate French memo. Expressed pleasure there appeared to be no contradictions between Spaak and himself.

German Chancellor agreed that start should be as in EDC with respect size of forces but type had been agreed upon three years ago and may no longer be militarily correct.

It was agreed that reference to types should be omitted.

Chairman asked dels to appoint experts to meet on call of UK to recommend to future plenary session on principles to be adopted by this conference on points covered in C.1 of UK agenda. (Secretary appointed Ambassador Hughes as US representative).

4. Chairman asked for discussion question of strategic areas, C.2[3].a in agenda. Thought there was agreement strategic plants should not be in areas exposed to first thrust of invasion. If this agreed questions arise as to what these areas are and as to what type of armament production and research should be prohibited in them.

Martino stated exposed areas concept not clear on its face. If what s meant is similar to what was discussed in EDC, Italy will have no opposition. Asked Mendes-France to explain his proposal.[3]

Mendes stated prepared to accept EDC plan if others agree. If some think more elaborate solution necessary, would be glad to hear views and might arrive at formula in French text.

Chancellor suggested that question of area and type of weapons should be turned over to experts as too complex for Ministers.

This was agreed, subject possibly to reconsideration in light subsequent Spaak statement (action situation on this point not clear). (From quick checks with dels EDC countries, appear Ministers assumption there was agreed EDC solution to area question appears erroneous.)

5. Spaak expressed fear of giving experts too much to do without adequate guidance. Thought it was difficult to separate question of arms pool from that of strategic zone. Belgium accepted idea of control of armaments production. Though NATO logical, Belgium accepted Brussels as preferable organization politically to handle this problem and noted it would not duplicate anything NATO now doing. Spaak felt proposal to go beyond control arrangements to common production arrangements created great difficulty, raised complex issues which might delay decisions, and seems unnecessary to security. If

[3] Presumably a reference to the memorandum prepared by the French Delegation, which was circulated as document NPC(54)1 of Sept. 27, printed on p. 1332.

one country produces only those heavy items that its forces need, plus exports and equipment for non-NATO forces authorized by Brussels, and there are adequate controls to enforce this principle, thought it unnecessary to do more.

Beyen said Dutch were thinking along same lines as Spaak.

Mendes-France said France did not envisage production in common but agency to establish common needs, to place orders centrally for heavy equipment to meet these needs, and to distribute equipment as decided in common. In addition, though not immediately essential to their proposal, could envisage common factories owned by community or by several countries of community which seemed to be Spaak's idea of common production. Felt these arrangements valuable to standardization. Could agree on new weapons and arrange their production in factories at interior locations. Felt larger orders would have financial advantage. Felt this collaboration in arms field important step in further cooperation in economic field. Did not feel agreement these points complex or cause for delay. This conference need only lay down principles for experts to elaborate later. Returning to substance Mendes stated that must study in common both use of existing facilities and building new ones. Principal objectives were efficiency and standardization and would not want to build new factories which duplicated those already in existence in community. Urged careful study French proposals in this field.

German Chancellor asked Mendes if he envisaged that Germany would provide soldiers but have no armaments factories. Suggested that such situation would give "uncanny feeling" to those who are to be soldiers.

Mendes-France said Germany would be expected to contribute units, armaments and arms production. Of course special question arose for exposed areas. But these need not necessarily include all of Germany or include only German territory. This question for experts. Also pointed out that Germany could share in common production in unexposed locations.

Chairman expressed view this whole question was urgent problem for conference. Believed nature of controls to be instituted must be decided in conjunction with other major issues before conference. Seemed general agreement to limit control to important items. Hoped there was agreement that it would be done by majority vote. UK agreed on use of Brussels. Invited Spaak to present paper giving his ideas on control.[4] Spaak agreed.

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[4] The Belgian Delegation presented its paper on the control of armaments at the Fifth Plenary meeting of Sept. 30; for the text of this paper, which was circulated as document NPC(54)16 of Sept. 29, see p. 1336.

Chairman suggested that question of armaments pool raised extremely complex issues on which decisions now not clearly essential to general purpose this conference, and which would be difficult resolve in course this conference. Suggested Brussels Council plan to take them up after present round of decisions and actions have been completed.

Mendes-France urged more discussion now on armaments pool idea. Again stated should not be difficult since not new. Ground gone over thoroughly in EDC discussions. Might well secure most of what is needed by lifting provisions from EDC treaty with few or minor modifications. If did not deal with this would fail to deal with most essential point and would omit constructive aspects of French proposals.

Turning to Chancellor Mendes stated that in further response to Chancellor's question he had never wished to prevent Germany from producing arms as foreseen in EDC. Perhaps even could be more arms production than foreseen in EDC as well as production in jointly owned plants in other sites. Felt this point should raise no difficulty.

Spaak said he felt unclear about some points in Mendes plan, what EDC provisions he would use, et cetera, and invited Mendes to present paper. Mendes agreed. Beyen indicated Dutch would also probably have paper on this subject.

6. Chairman announced that at plenary session at 4:00, would take up items 3, 4, 5 covering security declarations, extension of NATO treaty duration, and US and UK declarations.

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**DULLES–MENDÈS-FRANCE MEETING, AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE LONDON, SEPTEMBER 29, 1954, 3 P. M.**

PARTICIPANTS

M. Mendès-France, French Premier
The Secretary of State
Mr. Merchant

**PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Bonn–London Conference"**

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

SECRET [LONDON,] September 29, 1954.

The Prime Minister of France called on the Secretary this afternoon at 3 o'clock at the former's suggestion. He arrived unaccompanied despite the Secretary's suggestion that he might wish to bring with him one or two of his Delegation. The conversation lasted until approximately 3:50 when it was necessary to depart for the Plenary Session at Lancaster House at 4 p. m.

The Premier opened the conversation by saying that he had felt after the morning conference session that there may have been a slight misunderstanding between the Chancellor and himself which he had attempted to clear up after the session ended. He had felt that Chancellor Adenauer was under the impression that additions to existing plants or increasing existing capacity might be free from his proposed licensing requirement whereas the construction of new armaments plants would be subject to approval by the Brussels Council. He said that he had explained to the Chancellor that both expansion of existing plant and construction of new plant were equally under the same licensing requirement.

The Premier then embarked on what was clearly the primary purpose of his call. He opened by saying that German admission to NATO was extremely unpopular in France. He said that in the light of the clear desire of France's allies in this matter he had agreed to accept German admission into NATO. This, however, represented a major concession on the part of France and in consequence he hoped that the Secretary would understand the necessity for his insisting on obtaining agreement to the French point of view on other elements in the package which he would have to submit to the French Assembly. He said that the essential components of this package were German admission to NATO, strengthening of the Brussels alliance, assurances from the UK and the US concerning the retention of forces on the continent, control of armaments, inspection arrangements and a settlement of the Saar dispute with Germany. He seemed to give certain emphasis to the arms proposal which he said was lifted almost in its entirety from the EDC Treaty. He intimated that he was amazed at the opposition that he had encountered to this proposal in light of the fact that France's five partners in EDC had always professed a confidence in the perfection of the EDC Treaty.

The Secretary said that the Premier must realize that certain suspicions concerning his purposes in putting forward his arms pool ideas were prevalent. There were doubts as to whether he might not have as his intention the prevention of any armament production in Germany and the concentration in France of the armaments industry of the entire community. In light of these suspicions (which the Secretary made clear he did not share personally) the suggestion was made that it would be useful if the Premier could put down on paper with more precision his proposal on an armaments pool. M. Mendes-France said that he was doing so and that it would be circulated shortly.

The Secretary then said that he had discovered somewhat to his surprise only this morning that there had never been an agreement

reached by the signatories of the EDC Treaty as to the description of the exposed area referred to in Article 107 of the Treaty. He said that the Annex described the area within which propellents could not be produced but that there apparently was no agreement as to the more general area in which general production limitations applied. Mendes-France said that there had been no formal agreement but that there had been an agreement reached by the experts of the six countries to the effect that this area would be identical with that which had been described in connection with propellents.

M. Mendes-France then went on to repeat that he was surprised at the opposition into which he had run in putting forward his proposal for an arms pool. He felt that it was almost identical with the provisions of the EDC Treaty. He felt that it would be possible for experts to agree within the next three or four weeks on the general principles which should govern such a pool or agency. The Secretary did not comment on this expression of confidence.

The Secretary then said that he had the impression that the UK was disposed to go just as far as it felt possible in granting assurances on the maintenance of British forces on the Continent. He felt that this would be a most constructive development. The Secretary then went on to explain that if the London conference produced a success it would probably be possible for the United States to repeat in substance the assurances which it had given in this general connection on the assumption that the EDC would come into force. The French Premier expressed surprise approaching consternation, which seemed somewhat feigned, that the US would find it impossible to go beyond the EDC assurances. The Secretary then explained in great detail the constitutional aspects of this matter, on which M. Mendes-France made no further comment.

The Secretary then raised the question of the Saar. The French Premier related at considerable length the history of the establishment of a Saar settlement as a precondition for ratification of the EDC by the French Assembly. He described how his inadvertent omission of this topic in his investiture speech in the early summer of 1953 had brought a storm down upon his head. He made it perfectly clear that even if he were not personally disposed to make a Saar settlement a precondition for an arrangement for German sovereignty and rearmament, the French Assembly would do so beyond the slightest doubt. He then went on to describe his concept of how the matter should be handled. He said he had discussed it glancingly with Chancellor Adenauer in the morning. Mendes-France had no disposition (nor apparently had the Chancellor) to attempt to reach a settlement on the Saar during the course of the London conference. Neither of them

had any appetite for its injection into the discussions of the conference itself.

M. Mendes-France expressed the view that French and German experts working together could probably arrive within three or four weeks at the outline of a settlement which would not necessarily be along the lines of the Adenauer–Teitgen agreement [1] (which Mendes-France said had been severely criticized even by Bidault) and that thereafter he and Adenauer personally would have to settle the final terms of the agreement. He thought that a solution was possible under which the Executive of the Saar would be responsible to the Council of Ministers under the Brussels Treaty. He recognized that some parliamentary superstructure might be required and outlined a rather vague proposal that an Assembly might be established as a parliamentary adjunct to the Brussels Pact which would be composed of the individuals named by the seven countries signature to the Brussels Treaty as their representatives to the Council of Europe.

The Secretary did not comment on this proposal which was vague and ill-formed.

The French Premier then reverted to the question of the retention of US troops on the Continent and indicated that he would like an arrangement under which the aggregate of British, French and American divisions in Europe would bear a fixed relation to German divisions. He explained that only by such a commitment would it be possible to maintain a consistent and varied integration of divisions within the several corps at the disposal of SACEUR.

The Secretary repeated that it was beyond our constitutional competence to give long-term commitments for the maintenance of specified numbers of American military forces to be maintained outside of the United States.

As the time was approaching for the opening of the afternoon Plenary Session, the Secretary and the Premier left for Lancaster House in the Secretary's car.

[1] Regarding this agreement signed May 22, 1954, see the editorial note, p. 967.

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**FOURTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 29, 1954, 4 P. M.**

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

| | |
|---|---|
| BELGIUM | LUXEMBOURG |
| Paul-Henri Spaak | Joseph Bech |
| CANADA | NETHERLANDS |
| Lester B. Pearson | Johan W. Beyen |
| FRANCE | UNITED KINGDOM |
| Pierre Mendès-France | Anthony Eden |

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

BRUSSELS TREATY PERMANENT COMMISSION
René Massigli

396.1 LO/9–3054

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation* [1]

SECRET LONDON, September 30, 1954—7 p. m.

Fourth plenary, afternoon, September 29. Eden opened meeting for discussion of security declarations.

Adenauer recalled tripartite declaration, Paris, May 27, 1952 regarding Berlin and declarations in Bonn conventions [2] relating common aims three powers and Federal Republic bring about reunification of Germany in peace and freedom and freely negotiated peace treaty. Stressed since conventions not ratified it important declarations should be repeated.[3] Eden replied thought all parties concerned stood by the declaration and that Ministers should consider how best express such agreement in findings of conference.

Discussion extension duration NATO Treaty followed. Eden stated UK in conformity with its declaration last April continued regard it as being of indefinite duration. Suggested it would be reassuring to public opinion for Ministers to say they conceive of no circumstances in which they would wish to denounce it. Spaak suggested protocol Brussels Treaty should state it same duration as NATO. Was agreed that permanent commission of the Brussels Treaty, with Germans and Italians represented, would look into the suggestion at its meeting following day.

Secretary and Eden then discussed US and UK declarations (full text both statements carried Wireless File).[4]

Mendes-France replied those statements saying two declarations were powerful contributions to the realization of the common aim; that Secretary had reminded Ministers of US efforts to help in setting up a peace in Europe which had suffered so much and should take

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 14, Sept. 30, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 26-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

[2] For the text of the Tripartite Declaration on Berlin, see volume VII. For the texts of the Bonn Conventions, see *ibid.*

[3] Adenauer's statement requesting these declarations was circulated as document NPC(54)21, a copy of which is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364.

[4] The texts of the statements made by Dulles and Eden were subsequently included in the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference as Annexes II A and B, pp. 1357 and 1361.

back with him the gratitude which the people of Europe feel towards the US. Said that gratitude would be increased by what the US would do for Europe in the future if Europe does what it should. In commenting on Eden statement, said message would play great role in current deliberations and that he rejoiced to hear UK views toward strengthening its military contribution to the security of Western Europe.

Spaak spoke in appreciation Secretary's statement and expressed the conviction that after a moment of weakness, Europe had started once more on right road. Emphasized the great sacrifice involved in UK declaration.

Adenauer stressed that statements would make deep impressions on Germans on both sides of iron curtain and spoke of realization of obligation to a united Europe. Secretary and Eden agreed to submit edited texts for the record. Martino, Bech, and Beyen also praised two statements.

Pearson commended US and UK Foreign Ministers for statements.[5] Stated Canada accepted the continuing obligations arising out of its membership in NATO and would continue to do its best to discharge them. Said the disappearance of the EDC does not affect those obligations but that an alternative arrangement must include the association of Germany not only with the defense of Europe and the West, but with the development of the Atlantic community. Said the Canadian forces on European Continent is not only measure of military contribution to common defense but an evidence of Canadian belief in the future of North Atlantic Community. Canadians would look forward to growing relationships within the framework of NATO to the Brussels Treaty countries with whom they were bound by such close ties. A short communiqué containing substance of US and UK statements was approved.[6] The meeting adjourned with agreement to reconvene at 11 : 00 a. m., September 30.

[5] For the text of Pearson's statement, see p. 1363.

[6] The communiqué, not printed, was circulated as document NPC(54)13 of Sept. 29. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364)

## DULLES-THORNEYCROFT MEETING, AMERICAN EMBASSY RESIDENCE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 29, 1954, 9:30 P. M.

*Editorial Note*

Sir John E. Thorneycroft and Dulles held a lengthy discussion during the evening of September 29 concerning the possible revision in the embargo list for Communist China. A copy of this memorandum of conversation is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370.

578-017 O - 83 - 16 (Part 2)

## DULLES–EDEN MEETING, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 29, 1954

*Editorial Note*

On September 29 Dulles also met with Eden and the Acting New Zealand High Commissioner to discuss the Chinese offshore islands. For a memorandum of their conversation by Bowie, September 29, see the compilation on China in volume XIV.

## FIFTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 30, 1954, 11 A. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

| | |
|---|---|
| BELGIUM<br>Paul-Henri Spaak | LUXEMBOURG<br>Joseph Bech |
| CANADA<br>Lester B. Pearson | NETHERLANDS<br>Johan W. Beyen |
| FRANCE<br>Pierre Mendès-France | UNITED KINGDOM<br>Anthony Eden |
| FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY<br>Konrad Adenauer | UNITED STATES<br>John Foster Dulles |
| ITALY<br>Gaetano Martino | BRUSSELS TREATY PERMANENT COMMISSION<br>René Massigli |

396.1 LO/9–3054

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation* [1]

SECRET LONDON, September 30, 1954—5 p. m.

At plenary meeting morning September 30 Ministers agreed that no attempt would be made to adjust Brussels treaty duration provisions to those of NAT. Instead new article will be added to Brussels treaty on cooperation with NATO along lines those included EDC. Secretary suggested establishment of working group to draft final acts of conference and communiqué, which was agreed. In long discussion of Belgian and French memos [2] on control of arms production, no particularly new points were developed although issue between Benelux on one hand and France on other was further clarified. Spaak argued for control over production of arms in territories outside continental Europe, having in mind primarily Africa. Mendes-France argued that such control not necessary since Brussels agency

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 13, Sept. 30, and repeated to Rome, Bonn, Luxembourg, Brussels, The Hague, Ottawa, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 35-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366. The list of participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

[2] The Belgian memorandum under reference is document NPC(54)16 of Sept. 29, which is printed on p. 1336; the French memorandum is document NPC(54)1 of Sept. 27, which is printed on p. 1332.

would control all imports, including those from African territories. There was inconclusive discussion of problem of which Assembly would receive annual reports of Brussels agency. French argued for consultative assembly of Council of Europe since it included British delegation as well as those of other countries who might adhere to Brussels treaty. Also pointed out that Brussels Council of Ministers should receive reports in first instance.

In response to question by Secretary, Spaak replied that same list mentioned in his memo should be listed in Article 107 of EDC treaty as modified by any agreement reached by experts.

In statement on treatment of end item aid of OSP, Secretary emphasized that US would have to retain right to make final decisions in light of recommendations of SACEUR. Said he was concerned by possible conflict between Brussels recommendations and those of SACEUR. On same subject Pearson said that Canada could accept transfer of recommendations from NATO to Brussels providing role of Canada in decision remains same as at present.

Beyen stated he approved of objectives of French in looking toward standardization of arms and more economical production. However, he felt "we are heading for serious difficulties" if conference tries to settle details of meeting these objectives before adjournment this meeting. He asked Mendes-France to accept agreement on objectives and permit implementation to be worked out by Brussels treaty organization or other means at later date without holding up important decisions now necessary. He said that Dutch Parliament could not be expected to ratify promptly any detailed proposal covering these points.

Agreement was reached to refer Belgian memo to working party with question of disposition of French memo to be discussed further this afternoon.

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**SIXTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 30, 1954, 3 P. M.**

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

BRUSSELS TREATY PERMANENT COMMISSION
René Massigli

396.1 LO/9–3054

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation* [1]

SECRET LONDON, September 30, 1954—9 p. m.

1. Sixth plenary session opened at 3:00 with discussion formal amendments Brussels treaty. Draft invitation to Germany and Italy to join was agreed.[2] Draft protocol making certain other amendments [3] was referred back for further consideration in the light of future decision which might be made at this conference to increase the powers of the Brussels treaty organization. Spaak in particular wished composition, voting procedure and powers Brussels council to be spelled out further. Secretary State pointed out already appears Brussels council would be more than consultative body, of which account should be taken.

2. Working from report of working group on "German defense contribution and strengthening NATO",[4] there was long and confused discussion of means for enabling French to say that none of safeguards in EDC over future increase in size of German forces had been lost without unduly complicating NATO procedures for fixing force goals. With major assist from Belgians, French position advanced from one of having NATO goals considered as minima, adopted by Brussels as maxima which Brussels countries would not exceed without unanimous consent, to position that should be separately agreed Brussels maxima, which NATO force goals could not exceed without unanimous Brussels council decision. Chancellor urged that both increase and decrease in force goals require unanimous approval Brussels powers.

Reluctant agreement was finally reached on basis Brussels council to agree separate forces protocol along lines EDC secret protocol, that forces of Brussels powers assigned to SACEUR would not exceed this

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 15, Sept. 30, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 48-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

[2] The draft declaration inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to accede to the Brussels Treaty, which was circulated as document NPC(54)20, was eventually made an annex to the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference; for the text of this declaration, see p. 1355.

[3] The draft protocol amending the Brussels Treaty, which was circulated as document NPC(54)22, is not printed. The draft protocol, as finally approved by the Conference, became an annex to the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference; for the text of this protocol, see p. 1356.

[4] Presumably a reference to the First Report by the Working Party on German Defense Contribution, which was circulated as document NPC(54)23 of Sept. 30; this first report, as well as an earlier draft (document NPC(54)18) and a second report (document NPC(54)26), are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366. For the text of the report by the Working Party, which was circulated as document NPC(54)38 and was adopted by the Conference during the Eighth Plenary meeting of Oct. 1, see p. 1338.

level without unanimous approval Brussels powers, and that this decision by Brussels powers could take place either in Brussels council or through liaison NATO council.

In interest of simplicity, US had urged there was no real necessity for Brussels review of NATO decisions with respect maxima, since NATO operated only by unanimous agreement and each of Brussels powers thereby had veto. There seemed some danger that Brussels would have to set up competing annual review procedure, which was much to be regretted as present one complicated enough. Even in absence of that, requirement of double action seemed hardly in interest of real security for countries concerned. However, if they felt their political considerations were more important, that was primarily up to them. US did think, however, that if separate Brussels action required, should be recognition that, contrary to EDC, all Brussels members were in NATO and appropriate action could be taken either in Brussels council or through NATO.

3. In addition, was agreed with relatively little discussion:

*a.* That initial German contribution would be of size and general character agreed upon in EDC;

*b.* That all forces of NATO countries on continent of Europe would be assigned to SACEUR except as NATO has recognized, or will recognize, exceptions;

*c.* That Brussels treaty organization will fix strength and armament of internal defense and police forces of its members;

*d.* That deployment of NATO forces be in accord with NATO strategic plans that SACEUR shall determine deployment after consultation and agreement with countries concerned, and that redeployment on the continent may take place only with the consent of SACEUR subject to appropriate political guidance;

*e.* That SACEUR forces should be integrated so far as possible, consistent with military efficiency; [5]

*f.* That SACEUR coordination of logistics be made more close;

*g.* That SACEUR should inspect the levels of forces, the armaments, equipment and so forth of forces assigned to him;

*h.* That the Brussels countries will seek to arrange for SACEUR to designate a high-ranking officer to provide the Brussels treaty organization with information available in SHAPE on whether or not Brussels members have exceeded the agreed force maxima.

(Should be able send full and exact text tomorrow.)

4. Italian Foreign Minister and Chancellor both made statements of French armaments pool proposals, endorsing their objectives strongly but urging that in interest prompt action, further considera-

[5] In telegram Secto 17 from London, Oct. 1, the Department of State was informed that Mendès-France requested that the record of these decisions be amended at this paragraph in order to note the wish of the French Delegation that the integration should be taken to the divisional level. (396.1 LO/10–154)

tion of them be turned over to Brussels council. Chairman called attention to fact working group had been assigned task study Spaak paper dealing with central procedure but not Mendes paper on which perhaps more ministerial discussion required. Mendes urged that his paper also be considered by working group, but added that at working group meeting, his government would have some proposals to make to experts with respect to task to be undertaken by Brussels council. (While not entirely clear, this was generally felt to be concession in direction of move to postpone consideration here of substance French armaments pool proposals.)

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## SECOND MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 1, 1954, 10:30 A. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

| FRANCE | UNITED KINGDOM |
|---|---|
| Pierre Mendès-France | Anthony Eden |
| FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY | UNITED STATES |
| Konrad Adenauer | John Foster Dulles |

396.1 LO/10–154

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation*[1]

SECRET LONDON, October 1, 1954—11 p. m.

Ministers devoted two sessions today to question of German sovereignty and related issues raised by list of questions submitted by HICOMers for guidance of working party.[2] Good atmosphere and constructive discussion. Immediately apparent that only flat issue was between Germans and French with UK and US endeavoring steer toward compromise.

Germans preferred question of sovereignty to be settled independently of question defense contribution, i.e., "before or at same time" rather than "only simultaneously". Preferred tripartite declaration or declaration plus German undertaking instead of convention on

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 18, Oct. 1, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Berlin, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. The source text also summarizes the proceedings of the third meeting of the Four-Power Conference which took place on Oct. 1. A 23-page verbatim record of the second meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 367. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, is taken from the verbatim record.

[2] The questions from the Working Group on German Sovereignty were circulated in document NPC(54)15 of Sept. 29, a copy of which is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364. For information concerning the Working Group, see footnote 7, p. 1302.

relations. Preferred such declaration take effect when Bundestag had taken necessary action. If occupation terminated before entry into force of German defense arrangements, preferred demilitarization controls to be sustained by unilateral declaration of Federal Republic or contractual agreement rather than by reserved power of Allies. Asked that controls be applied in such way as to permit German preparatory measures in interim period and applied by Four-Power Commission acting by majority vote.

French explained impossibility committing themselves before Parliament had opportunity pass on all questions. Therefore preferred restoration of sovereignty simultaneously with entry into effect of defense contribution. Preferred implementation of all Bonn conventions as amended by protocol deleting or amending out of date provisions. Preferred declaration on sovereignty or implementation conventions come into effect when all four governments had ratified, not merely Bundestag. Preferred maintenance demilitarization controls as reserved power, with no interim measures, but agreeable to have controls applied by joint Four-Power Commission.

UK and US stressed necessity giving Adenauer something solid that he could take home from conference while not spoiling atmosphere for parliamentary action in UK, France, possibly US. Therefore proposed declaration intent (text given immediately following telegram [3]). Asked Adenauer whether he could meet French on implementation contractuals and maintenance demilitarization controls as reserved power, if declaration intent sufficiently positive and satisfactory. Adenauer very pleased with declaration intent and indicated conciliatory attitude on French points provided working party reached agreement by tomorrow on provisions to be deleted or amended in conventions. Secretary stressed that our agreement to declaration intent dependent upon clarification by Germans on how much of Bonn conventions they desired to alter.

US (followed by UK) made important reservation that if nothing accomplished by January 1, might need re-examine position with view proceeding unilaterally so far as US HICOMer and US Zone concerned. Mendes-France hoped for Assembly action by then but could not realistically expect completion Council action before March 15. US and UK qualified reservation to mean that if necessary action proceeding favorably at first of year, that would suffice. Had not intended date as hard and fast time-limit. Question of maintenance

[3] Not printed; it transmitted to the Department of State the draft declaration of intent which was subsequently approved and incorporated into the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference. (396.1 LO/10–154) For the text of the declaration of intent, see Part I of the Final Act, p. 1345. The draft declaration, which was circulated as document NPC(54)31, is also in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365.

demilitarization controls as reserved power and question re interim measures likewise decided in this sense.

Agreed that restoration sovereignty could take place "before or at same time" as entry into force of defense arrangement. Agreed that timing question re restoration sovereignty upon completion Bundestag action or Four-Power action dependent upon question of form, i.e., whether French proposal accepted for implementation of contractuals, which will be decided after report of working party tomorrow. Agreed that demilitarization controls will be applied by joint Four-Power Commission acting by majority vote.[4]

[4] Extracts from various statements made during this discussion by Dulles, Mendès-France, and two by Eden, were circulated as documents NPC(54)40, NPC(54)41, and NPC(54)37 and NPC(54)42, respectively, and are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365.

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## SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 1, 1954, NOON

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

*Editorial Note*

After briefly surveying the tasks that remained before the Conference could be ended, the representatives of the Nine Powers agreed that the general composition of the Final Act of the Conference would be as follows: an introduction, the texts of the documents approved by the Conference, and an indication of future actions. The remainder of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of various amendments to NPC(54)26; for information concerning this report and its various earlier drafts, see footnote 4, page 1316. A 14-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366; no telegraphic summary of the meeting was found in Department of State files.

## THIRD MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 1, 1954, 3:30 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

*Editorial Note*

The telegraphic summary of this meeting was combined with that of the second Four-Power meeting, October 1, page 1318. A 16-page verbatim record of this third meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365.

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## EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 1, 1954, 4:45 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

396.1 LO/10–254

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation* [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 2, 1954—5 a. m.

1. Chairman opened eighth plenary session at 1645 Friday afternoon. He noted that a text had been agreed upon between French and Italian delegations concerning strength and armaments on continent

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 20, Oct. 2, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 27-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

of internal defense forces and of police belonging members Brussels Treaty Organization.[2]

2. Chairman then turned to statement made by Adenauer at fourth plenary session September 29 concerning proposed declarations by Federal Government and by western powers. Requested that these assurances be renewed in light changed circumstances. Chairman referred document to experts to agree on appropriate language.[3]

3. Chairman then asked for report from working group on control armaments. Chairman of group stated that it had not completed discussion on Spaak paper [4] and had not yet considered paper distributed by Mendes-France on arms pool.[5] Mendes-France immediately stated, that report by chairman working group did not correspond in any way to proposals made by French delegation. He went on to say that he was under impression there had been large measure agreement on control proposals made by French Government seeking establish very strict system limitation and control aimed at reassuring public opinion. On other hand, wide divergence opinion between several delegations existed on question production. He stated that proposals of working group are disappointing concerning control and leave almost nothing of proposals for production made by French delegation.

4. Recess followed after which Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson listed main difficulties before conference in this field: (1) Definition strategic areas; (2) which arms should be prohibited from manufacture in such areas; (3) problem of establishing agency for limitation and control certain other armaments. Suggested that there be agreement in principle that (1) there must be a strategic area; (2) that manufacture certain arms in that area must be prohibited; and (3) that there must be agency for limitation and control armaments. After conference agreed to these principles it should then set up working group which will attempt convert principles into practical detail. Further proposed that during interim period commitments should be

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[2] The text under reference was contained in document NPC(54)30 of Oct. 1 and concerned a revision of paragraph 2 of document NPC(54)26, the Second Report by the Working Party on German Defense Contribution. Neither of these documents is printed in this compilation but both are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364–365. For information concerning the reports of this Working Party, see footnote 4, p. 1316.

[3] Adenauer's statement concerning these proposed declarations was circulated as document NPC(54)21, a copy of which is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364.

[4] This is a reference to the Belgian memorandum, which was circulated as NPC(54)16 of Sept. 29, printed on p. 1336.

[5] Presumably a reference to the French memorandum, which was circulated as NPC(54)1 of Sept. 27, printed on p. 1332.

taken not to manufacture certain armaments in areas where they are not now being manufactured. Suggested that interim period be defined pending coming into being Brussels organization. Suggested that decisions taken by working group should be reached by simple majority or by two-thirds. Said that if working group failed reach solution "bets would be of [*off*]" but said he felt certain this would not happen in practice.

5. Secretary Dulles then said he had been thinking broadly along same lines Canadian Foreign Minister. Pointed out all agreed desirable establish agency under Brussels Treaty generally controlling and supervising production arms. Pointed out number factors have to be dealt with which means that time must elapse before agency can be established. Secretary then suggested in response to French Parliamentary requirements that Germany undertake not to manufacture armaments listed in Annex 2, Article 107 of EDC Treaty. Further said that considerable proportion 12 German divisions would be supplied by United States and that gap remaining complete full equipment could be filled by German production limited to that purpose only. Suggested period of say two years elapse before Brussels organization established and that agency should be created on basis of either majority or two-thirds member countries.

6. Chancellor Adenauer made point that Federal Republic cannot put divisions into field unless these supplied with best of arms.

7. Netherlands Foreign Minister Beyen then pointed out that no chance whatever exists that any government or Parliament in Holland would ever agree to accepting verdict majority vote on such an issue.

8. Adenauer asked that proposal be submitted in writing and repeated his previous statement.

9. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak expressed difficulty in postponing solution problem arms control and production for two years and that such delay would weaken parliamentary position all governments. Deplored excessive pessimism on report experts on committee. Emphasized degree of agreement already reached and that difficulty due to fact that yesterday everyone had accepted principle of strategically exposed zones but could not agree as to definition. Proposed conference should consider entirely new approach instead of system based on EDC Treaty text. Suggested that continental members Brussels Pact Organization should agree not manufacture categories A, B, C unless authorized by Brussels Treaty Organization. Proposed they should only manufacture weapons necessary for their own arms and equipment and that means of control which could be devised would be amply sufficient and water tight.

## NINTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 2, 1954, 11 A. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

| | |
|---|---|
| BELGIUM<br>Paul-Henri Spaak | LUXEMBOURG<br>Joseph Bech |
| CANADA<br>Lester B. Pearson | NETHERLANDS<br>Johan W. Beyen |
| FRANCE<br>Pierre Mendès-France | UNITED KINGDOM<br>Anthony Eden |
| FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY<br>Konrad Adenauer | UNITED STATES<br>John Foster Dulles |
| ITALY<br>Gaetano Martino | |

396.1 LO/10–354

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation* [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 3, 1954—3 p. m.

Ninth plenary October 2 was confined to discussion of armaments control problem. It was followed by restricted session of Ministers with one adviser each. After a lunch break the restricted session was resumed at three. After lengthy discussion question was referred to expert group which submitted draft to plenary in course 10 p. m. meeting.

Do not believe it useful or necessary report this prolonged debate in detail. Substance of issue was insistence by Mendes prohibition of production all items in Annex 2 to Article 107 of EDC treaty by Germany and securing effective control of level of output in Brussels treaty territory on continent, most items in Annex 1 of Article 107. Initially insisted that changes could be made in future in Annex 2 prohibitions only by unanimous vote of Brussels Council. Chancellor unwilling accept imposition of control on Germany alone on grounds discriminatory from military standpoint. Belgians reluctant to accept strategic zone covering substantial portion their industrial areas. Most other Brussels pact powers very reluctant accept detailed control proposed and none of them like insistence on unanimity with respect to changes in prohibitions on the guided missiles, military aircraft, and warships paragraphs of Annex 2.

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 23, Oct. 3, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. The source text summarizes the proceedings of the 9th through the 13th Plenary meetings, some of which were restricted in attendance; information concerning the 10th through the 13th meetings follows this document. An 18-page verbatim record of this 9th meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368.

Issues finally resolved by offer of Chancellor unilateral German declaration to be accepted and enforced by Brussels treaty organization that Germany would not produce atomic, chemical or biological weapons and that she would not produce guided missiles, warships over 3000 tons or strategic bombers without approval by ⅔ vote of Brussels council and recommendation subject by NATO supreme commander concerned. Benelux countries indicated they expected join in German declaration with respect to atomic, chemical and biological weapons. France and Italy refused to do so.

Control will be exercised over items to be selected from Annex 1 by expert working group in Paris (this selection process is apt to be difficult as French wish to include all but hand weapons and Benelux countries wish to include selected items of very heavy equipment). Control will be directed to stocks to insure that they do not exceed amounts justified for NATO forces, non-NATO forces and legitimate exports. Field inspection is authorized in addition to statistical and budgetary checks. Decision of Brussels council on control matters in this field will be by majority vote.

Provision is made for Brussels council to make annual report on its activities in this field to delegations of Brussels countries to Consultative Assembly of Council of Europe. US and Canada have agreed supply information to Brussels treaty organization on military aid programs of Brussels members and to receive Brussels treaty organization comments thereon.

The whole question of positive armaments pool program was turned over to Brussels treaty council for future study in light various proposals which have been or may in future be made by members on this subject including original French proposal. It has been made clear that no one is committed to accept any part of French proposals on this subject.

This somewhat complicated arrangement with number important questions still not worked out clearly is result long and sometimes vigorous clash of opinion on both major and minor points. It is difficult to forecast with any degree of certainty its future practical impact.

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**TENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 2, 1954, 11:20 A. M.**

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

| | |
|---|---|
| BELGIUM | LUXEMBOURG |
| Paul-Henri Spaak | Joseph Bech |
| CANADA | NETHERLANDS |
| Lester B. Pearson | Johan W. Beyen |

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

*Editorial Note*

At approximately 11:20 a. m. on October 2, the Chairman of the Nine-Power Conference adjourned the Ninth Plenary meeting and called for a restricted meeting of the principal participants with only one adviser in attendance from each of the nine delegations. This Tenth Plenary meeting continued until noon and its proceedings are summarized in the telegraphic summary by the United States Delegation, October 3, page 1324. A 27-page verbatim record of the restricted Tenth Plenary meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368.

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**FOURTH MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 2, 1954, NOON**

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

*Editorial Note*

The four Foreign Ministers reviewed a draft report of the Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation and discussed the deletion of the proposed preamble and several other alterations in the text. The draft report under discussion was circulated as NPC(54)45 and is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365; for the text of the Final Report of the Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation, approved during the 14th Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference and circulated as NPC(54)50, see page 1339. A 16-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 367; no telegraphic summary of this meeting was found in Department of State files.

## ELEVENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 2, 1954, 3 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

*Editorial Note*

This meeting was a continuation of the restricted session held during the morning of October 2 and involved the same principal participants assisted by one adviser each (see page 1325). A brief summary of the proceedings of this meeting is included in the telegraphic summary by the United States Delegation, October 3, on page 1324; a 19-page verbatim record of this restricted meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368.

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## TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 2, 1954, 3:45 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

*Editorial Note*

At approximately 3:45 p.m. Chairman Eden called the 12th Plenary meeting to order without restricting attendance at the session by dele-

gations from the nine participating countries. A brief summary of the proceedings of this meeting is included in the telegraphic summary by the United States Delegation, October 3, page 1324; a five-page verbatim record of the meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368.

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**THIRTEENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 2, 1954, 10 P. M.**

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

*Editorial Note*

The proceedings of this evening session, which involved the principal participants and representatives of delegations from the nine countries, are briefly summarized in the telegraphic summary by the United States Delegation, October 3, page 1324; a 19-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368.

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**FIFTH MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 3, 1954, 10:30 A. M.[1]**

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

WORKING GROUP ON THE TERMINATION OF THE OCCUPATION
Derek Hoyer Millar

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

[1] This meeting presumably took place at approximately 10:30 a. m., immediately prior to the 14th Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference at 11 a.m., although no time is given in the verbatim record.

*Editorial Note*

The four Foreign Ministers heard a report from Hoyer Millar that the Working Group was in complete agreement on its final report and that the only outstanding issue concerning finance was settled. The report was then approved and the Foreign Ministers instructed their representatives to begin negotiations in Bonn for the conclusion of a protocol and related documents in accordance with the decisions set out in the report and annex A. They directed them to submit the protocol for approval not later than October 20, 1954. For the text of the Final Report on the Termination of the Occupation, which was circulated as document NPC(54)50 of October 2, see page 1339. A brief three-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 367; no telegraphic summary of this meeting was found in Department of State files, except for its brief mention in the summary, below on this page.

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**FOURTEENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 3, 1954, 11 A. M.**

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

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|---|---|
| BELGIUM<br>Paul-Henri Spaak | LUXEMBOURG<br>Joseph Bech |
| CANADA<br>Lester B. Pearson | NETHERLANDS<br>Johan W. Beyen |
| FRANCE<br>Pierre Mendès-France | UNITED KINGDOM<br>Anthony Eden |
| FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY<br>Konrad Adenauer | UNITED STATES<br>John Foster Dulles |
| ITALY<br>Gaetano Martino | |

396.1 LO/10–354

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation* [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 3, 1954—5 p. m.

Final four-power and nine-power sessions held today with agreement reached all points, final act signed, and general satisfaction over achievements of conference. These include British association and commitment to maintain troops on continent, assurances of US Government's continued support to extent feasible, agreement on German

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 24, Oct. 3, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, Berlin, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 24-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

membership in NATO with reasonable limitations, workable Brussels pact organization, and program for rapid liquidation of occupation and restoration German sovereignty.

Off-hand impression: (1) That Britain, Benelux and Federal Republic made impressive concessions to French. (2) Mendes-France did not obtain quite as strong a control organism in Brussels pact as he wished, nor able retain as many vestiges of occupation rights or other discriminations against Germany as he might have wished. (3) With agreed plans for Federal Republic membership in NATO, revision of Bonn conventions, and restoration sovereignty, Adenauer has in effect received a larger promissory note but smaller cash payment than he may have expected from conference. Everyone aware of latent opportunities for upsetting program (particularly by Saar issue, difficulties in working out Brussels armament controls on non-discriminatory basis, and possible Soviet moves) in intervening period between now and March 15 which Mendes-France considered realistic date for completion necessary French Parliamentary action. But all hopeful that with so much solid accomplishment to build on, Mendes-France will fully engage his ingenuity in getting program through Assembly.

Papers approved today include (1) final report of four-power working party on termination of occupation.[2] This amounts to program for revision of Bonn conventions and interim arrangements re disarmament and demilitarization controls. This will not be made public. (2) Final report by working group on control of armaments,[3] which was incorporated in (3) final act of conference.[4] Latter includes (I) declaration of intent on Germany, (II) arrangements for Brussels treaty organization and establishment thereunder of agency for control of armaments, (III) text of US, UK, and Canadian assurances, (IV) NATO arrangements, (V) security declaration by Federal Republic and joint tripartite declaration, (VI) instructions on future procedure, with annexed documents.

[2] For the text of the Final Report of the Working Party on the Termination of the Occupation, which was circulated as NPC(54)50 of Oct. 2, see p. 1339. An earlier draft of this report, circulated as document NPC(54)45, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365.

[3] The text of the Second Report by the Working Group on the Control of Armaments, which was circulated as document NPC(54)51 of Oct. 2, was incorporated into Part II of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, which is printed on p. 1346.

[4] For the text of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, see p. 1345.

## SIGNING CEREMONIES OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 3, 1954, 2:30 P. M.

*Editorial Note*

The formal signing ceremonies of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference took place at 2:30 p. m. on Sunday, October 3, 1954, at the

Lancaster House, the site of all the Nine-Power and Four-Power meetings since September 28. Anthony Eden was the first to sign, followed by Paul-Henri Spaak, Lester B. Pearson, Pierre Mendès-France, Konrad Adenauer, Gaetano Martino, Joseph Bech, Johan W. Beyen, and John Foster Dulles, representing the nine participating countries. The text of the Final Act was released to the press at 5:30 that afternoon and was published in full in the *New York Times* edition of October 4. For the text of Dulles' statement concerning the results of the London Conference, which he made at Washington National Airport upon his arrival on October 4, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 11, 1954, page 519, or *AFP*, volume I, page 1492.

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**DULLES–EDEN–MENDÈS-FRANCE MEETING, LONDON, OCTOBER 3, 1954**

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

SECRET LONDON, October 3, 1954.

Following the Signing of the Final Act, M. Mendes-France took Mr. Eden and me apart and said that there was one matter he wanted to mention to us—that was the Saar. He said that he felt that it was indispensable that the Saar agreement should be completed and part of the final package which would go to his Parliament. He said he had not wanted to discuss this matter here in London, but that we should not forget that it was part of the problem. He said that he had spoken to Adenauer about this, and Adenauer had said that he did not want to agitate [*advert*] to the Saar matter for a few days until the situation was calm following the discussion of the London Conference. Mendes-France said he understood this viewpoint, but that there could not be long delay.

Mr. Eden said that he understood that the Saar matter should be discussed, but that he could not agree that its completion should be a condition precedent. He doubted very much that it would be possible to complete a Saar agreement with all its details at any early date.

I said that I was inclined to agree with Mr. Eden, that I did not know much about the details of the Saar matter, but I felt it was highly complicated and that probably agreement in principle was all that could be obtained within the next two or three weeks.

Mendes-France reaffirmed with some petulance his position that a completed Saar arrangement must be part of the package that went to the French Parliament.

At this point I spoke privately to Chancellor Adenauer, asking

him when he would be prepared to discuss the Saar with Mendes-France. He said he would be prepared to do so on October 20.

I then returned to M. Mendes-France and Mr. Eden and reported what Mr. Adenauer had told me. M. Mendes-France said the 20th was rather late; that he would have to submit the matter to his Parliament about November 1, and he knew that Mr. Adenauer would be absent during the last week of October.

At this point Mr. Spaak joined our group. He expressed the view that two days should be sufficient to settle the Saar matter. He thought in essence it was a problem of substituting the Brussels Organization for the Council of Europe.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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### DULLES–MENDÈS-FRANCE MEETING, LONDON, OCTOBER 3, 1954

*Editorial Note*

Dulles and Mendès-France held a conversation concerning leadership problems in Indochina on October 3, presumably following the signing ceremonies for the Nine-Power Conference. Dulles' memorandum of this conversation is printed in volume XIII, Part 2, page 2115.

## 2. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364

*Memorandum Prepared by the French Delegation* [1]

SECRET [LONDON,] September 27, 1954.
[NPC(54)1]

The draft which appears below is based on the following principles:—

(1) Non-discrimination.
(2) Limitation of forces and of armaments.
(3) Control of forces and of armaments.
(4) Conditions laid down for the armed forces (effectives and armaments) to apply exclusively to those forces placed by the member countries at the disposal of the Supreme NATO Command.
(5) Full participation of Great Britain within this framework.

I. The Brussels Treaty shall be amended in such a way as to provide the basis for an organisation entrusted with the consolidation of

[1] According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this memorandum was circulated by the French Delegation during the First Plenary meeting on Sept. 28.

security and peace on the Continent of Europe. Germany and Italy shall become members, the necessary amendments being made to the Treaty as now in force.

This text shall be completed by military arrangements on a large scale.

II. As regards the armed forces (effectives and armaments) on the Continent of Europe, placed by each member country at the disposal of the Supreme Command, the Council provided for in Article 7 of the Brussels Treaty shall adopt the levels fixed by the Council of NATO on the proposal of the Supreme Command.

The levels fixed by NATO as minima shall, however, for the members of the Brussels Treaty be treated as maxima which they will undertake not to exceed.

Observance of these maxima shall be guaranteed by control and inspection organised throughout the Continental territory covered by the agreement.

III. So far as armaments are concerned, a distinction shall be made between two categories:—

(*a*) armaments covered by Annex 2 of Article 107 of the Treaty of Paris (allowing for a possible revision of the list);
(*b*) other armaments.

Manufacture of arms covered by category (*a*) shall be prohibited in strategically exposed zones to be defined on a map annexed to the agreement. The Council of Seven shall ensure by inspection and control that the rule prohibiting manufacture is observed.

Manufacture on the Continent of arms covered by category (*b*) and their distribution shall be directed and controlled by the Council, whose special task it will be to:—

(i) draw up programmes for manufacture of arms and allot the orders corresponding to these programmes to the different member countries;
(ii) allocate the arms to the different forces;
(iii) receive the arms imported free from the United States and allocate them.

The continental countries undertake not to manufacture any armaments over and above those for which orders have been allocated to them. The Council may also authorise manufacture for export. The manufacture of armaments may also be authorised if intended for the equipment of forces of member countries other than those placed at the disposal of the Supreme Command.

The sole purpose of the control provided for armaments of category (*a*) shall be to ensure that none have been manufactured, whereas the control provided for armaments of category (*b*) shall be both qualitative and quantitative.

In order that the quantitative control which the Council is to exercise may be effective, it must also be extended to the setting up of new armaments plants, industries and factories. In such cases authority must be granted by the Council, which shall base its decision on strategic considerations. The Continental area covered by the agreement shall be defined as a series of zones subject to limitations decreasing progressively from east to west. In order to avoid any discrimination under this system and to render it equitable, new armaments factories owned in common could be established in the unexposed zones.

The Council's decision shall be taken, according to circumstances, by a simple majority, a weighted majority, or unanimously. Where armaments control is concerned, they shall be taken by simple majority.

IV. Both as regards the size of the armed forces and of the armaments, the Council of Seven shall, so far as possible, have recourse to the services of NATO for the inspection and control provided for above.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364**

*Memorandum Prepared by the British Delegation* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [LONDON,] September 24, 1954.
[NPC(54)2]

GERMAN ASSOCIATION WITH THE WEST AND GERMAN DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION

During his recent tour of European capitals, Mr. Eden proposed a solution under three headings: the termination of the occupation régime, the accession of the Federal German Republic and Italy to the Brussels Treaty, and German membership of NATO with accompanying arrangements of a non-discriminatory character designed to increase the efficiency of Western defence and to determine the character and size of the German defence contribution.

2. These arrangements might cover the following subjects:

(*a*) agreement on the size and composition of the German Defence Contribution to NATO, based on the totals and types agreed for the E.D.C. Any subsequent variations would be subject to the current NATO procedure;

(*b*) agreement that the forces placed at the disposal of SACEUR on the Continent shall be:—

(i) deployed in accordance with agreed NATO strategy, and shall not be moved within his command area, nor revert to national control for use within that area, without his consent,

[1] According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this memorandum was circulated as document NPC(54)2. It was distributed to the participating delegations prior to the First Plenary meeting of Sept. 28.

(ii) integrated as far as military efficiency requires,
(iii) inspected by SACEUR, this inspection to cover the levels and effectiveness of forces, their armaments, logistics and reserve formations.

(*c*) agreement that apart from forces placed at the disposal of SACEUR on the Continent, forces will only be maintained for defined purposes (e.g. international missions, forces required to defend other parts of the North Atlantic Treaty area or other parts of the world);
(*d*) agreement that certain types of armament production and research will not take place, except by consent of the North Atlantic Council, in those parts of the North Atlantic Treaty area classified as strategically exposed areas, such areas to be subject to NATO inspection;
(*e*) agreement to extend the legal life of the North Atlantic Treaty so as to preclude denunciation before 50 years;
(*f*) declarations by the United Kingdom and United States reaffirming any of their undertakings to the E.D.C. which remain applicable and are not covered by the agreements mentioned above;
(*g*) declarations by the German Federal Republic and the Governments of NATO on the subject of European Security.

3. This list is in no sense exhaustive. Another possibility is SHAPE control of logistics; and the French Government's memorandum of September 18 contains further suggestions which are being studied in London.

4. Whilst Her Majesty's Government would prefer that these arrangements should apply to all members of NATO (including the German Federal Republic on her accession to NATO), they recognise that this may not be feasible in every case and they are very ready to consider whether some of the arrangements could be organised within the enlarged Brussels Treaty Organisation. In this connexion Her Majesty's Government would, however, underline the importance of

(*a*) not duplicating the NATO machinery or command structure, and
(*b*) ensuring, accordingly, that any arrangements agreed between the members of the enlarged Brussels Treaty Organisation shall operate within the NATO framework and be carried out by NATO machinery.

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364

*Working Draft Memorandum Prepared by the British Delegation*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [LONDON,] September 29, 1954.

[NPC(54)11]

The 9 Governments are agreed:

[1] According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this document was circulated by the British Delegation during the Third Plenary meeting of Sept. 29.

(1)

(*a*) that the German Defence Contribution to N.A.T.O. shall be 12 divisions, 1350 aircraft and naval units, of the same types as agreed for the E.D.C.

(*b*) that these German forces shall be placed under SACEUR

(*c*) that subsequent variations in the German Defence Contribution will be subject to current N.A.T.O. procedure.

(2)

(*a*) that their forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be deployed in accordance with N.A.T.O. strategy;

(*b*) that the location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR in consultation with the national authorities concerned;

(*c*) that such forces shall not be moved on the Continent nor used on the Continent without his consent.

(3) that their forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be integrated in the interests of military efficiency.

(4) that the level and effectiveness of their forces on the Continent, and the armaments, equipment, logistics and reserve formations of those forces shall be inspected by SACEUR.

(5) that their representatives, in concert with SACEUR and the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O., will draw up in Paris detailed proposals for approval by the North Atlantic Council, to give effect to the agreements recorded above.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364**

*Memorandum Prepared by the Belgian Delegation* [1]

SECRET
[NPC(54)16]

[LONDON,] September 29, 1954.

MEMORANDUM ON THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

The control of armaments should be regarded as coming under two distinct headings:

1. *Prohibition of the manufacture of certain arms in strategically exposed areas.*

*What arms?*

The arms in categories A, B, and C, and possibly in other categories as well, a list of which should be drawn up.

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[1] According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this memorandum was circulated by Spaak at the Fifth Plenary meeting of Sept. 30.

*What is meant by a strategically exposed area?*

Let us take as a provisional working hypothesis the definition of a strategically exposed area as laid down in the Treaty of Paris, that is to say, the combination of Article 107 with the decision of the Council of Ministers at Strasburg, dated 23rd May, 1952 and further defined by the letter from Chancellor Adenauer dated 27th May, 1952.

Allowance must also be made for civilian needs.

2. *Controlled limitation of the manufacture of certain arms to be applied to the continental powers members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation.*

*What arms?*

In principle, these should be heavy armaments, such as aircraft, artillery and tanks.

*What criteria should govern limitation?*

Principally, the needs of the forces assigned to N.A.T.O., taking into account in addition certain national and overseas military requirements, and the commercial and industrial needs of the countries in question.

*How should the requirements of the forces assigned to N.A.T.O. be determined?*

A dual criterion should be applied at the outset:

(1) The statistical results arising from the annual revision which determines, for at least three years, a schedule of requirements.

(2) The recommendations of the Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Powers submitted to the Council of the Brussels Treaty Organisation.

External aid should be deducted from the requirements to be met.

*How are the needs of the non-N.A.T.O. Forces to be determined?*

These needs should be notified by the State concerned to the Agency cited below and approved by the Council of Ministers on the basis of a procedure to be laid down.

Exports and imports of controlled arms should be notified to the Agency, which should approve them and, if necessary, judge of their genuineness.

*How is control of armaments to be ensured?*

By an Agency of the Brussels Treaty Organisation—an autonomous administrative organ—which would confirm the requirements according to the accepted criteria, and would submit proposals to the Brussels Treaty Council of Ministers. The action and decisions of this organ should be submitted to the Council of Ministers and agreed by majority vote.

It should also be agreed that the Brussels Treaty Agency present an

annual account of its activities to the Common Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community, to which should be added a certain number of British representatives.

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365

*Report by the Working Party on a German Defense Contribution and Arrangements To Apply SACEUR's Forces on the Continent* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [LONDON,] October 1, 1954.
[NPC(54)38]

The nine Governments represented at the London Conference agree to instruct representatives to draw up in Paris, in concert with the military and civilian agencies of N.A.T.O. through the Secretary General, detailed proposals, for approval by the North Atlantic Council, for a German defence contribution and arrangements to be applied to SACEUR's forces on the Continent. These detailed proposals shall be based on the following principles agreed between the nine Governments:

1. (*a*) The seven Brussels Treaty Powers will conclude a special agreement setting out the forces each of them will place under SACEUR on the Continent.

(*b*) The German Contribution shall conform in size and general characteristics to the contribution fixed for the E.D.C. brought up to date and adapted as necessary to make it suitable for N.A.T.O.

(*c*) The terms of this special agreement will be agreed with the other N.A.T.O. countries.

(*d*) If at any time the N.A.T.O. Annual Review recommends an increase above the figures in the Brussels Special Agreement such increase will require the unanimous approval of the Brussels powers expressed in the Brussels Council or in N.A.T.O.

(*e*) The Brussels Powers will ask that arrangements be made for SACEUR to designate a high-ranking officer who will be instructed to transmit regularly to the Brussels Treaty Organisation information acquired as indicated in 3(*f*) below in order to permit that Organisation to establish that the figures agreed among the Brussels Powers are being observed.

2. All forces of N.A.T.O. countries stationed on the Continent of Europe shall be placed under the authority of SACEUR, with the exception of the forces which N.A.T.O. has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command. The strength and armaments on the Continent of the internal defence forces and of the police belonging to the members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation

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[1] According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this report, which was circulated as document NPC(54)38, was adopted by the Conference during the Eighth Plenary meeting of Oct. 1.

shall be fixed by agreements made within this Organisation, taking into account the task for which they are intended and on the basis of existing levels and needs.

3. *Arrangements to apply to SACEUR's forces:*

(*a*) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be deployed in accordance with N.A.T.O. strategy.

(*b*) The location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned.

(*c*) Such forces shall not be redeployed on the Continent nor used operationally on the Continent without his consent subject to appropriate political guidance from the North Atlantic Council.

(*d*) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be integrated as far as possible consistent with military efficiency.

(*e*) Arrangements shall be made for the closer co-ordination of logistics by SACEUR.

(*f*) The level and effectiveness of forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent and the armaments, equipment, logistics and reserve formations of those forces on the Continent shall be inspected by SACEUR.

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365

## *Final Report of the Working Party on the Termination of the Occupation* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, October 2, 1954.

[NPC(54)50]

### I. *Introduction*

The following procedure is one which can be applied, as may be decided, either before or at the same time as the entry into force of the arrangements for the German Defence Contribution. In this report the expression "the interim period" refers to the period between the termination of the occupation and the entry into force of the arrangements for the German defence contribution, if the two events are not simultaneous.

### II. *Procedure*

It has been agreed that the Four Powers will sign, and if necessary under their respective constitutional procedures, ratify a Protocol which will bring into force all the Bonn Conventions,[2] but which will delete or suitably amend out of date provisions.

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[1] This report was approved during the 14th Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference. An earlier draft of this report, which was circulated as document NPC(54)45, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365.

[2] Documentation concerning the Bonn Conventions of May 26, 1952, and their subsequent revision is presented in volume VII.

While parts of the Convention on Relations, and of the Settlement Convention as amended (together with subsidiary documents relating or [*to*] either of them) will continue in force without time limit, the Forces and the Finance Conventions, as amended, and the Tax Agreement (together with subsidiary documents relating to any of them) will apply only during a limited period. The Forces Convention will continue in force until the entry into force of a new agreement based on the N.A.T.O. Status Agreement, supplemented by such provisions as are necessary in view of the special conditions existing in regard to the forces stationed in the Federal Republic. The Finance Convention, as amended, will continue in force until the entry into force of new financial arrangements providing support costs for the allied forces in the Federal Republic. The negotiations for the new agreements on the status of forces and on financial arrangements will begin as soon as the N.A.T.O. Council has accepted in principle the arrangements for a German defence contribution.

III. *Detailed Examination of the Conventions*

Annex A to this Report sets out a complete list of those parts of the Bonn Conventions which it has been agreed shall be considered for deletion or amendment. Agreement has been reached on a considerable number of points which in the attached list are marked with asterisks. On a number of other points further discussion is required but there is no disagreement on major matters of principle.

In addition to the matters referred to in Annex A, the German Delegation indicated that they would be raising the question of External Assets subsequently, without however suggesting any amendment to the Conventions.

IV. *Interim arrangements in respect of disarmament and demilitarisation controls*

It has been agreed that, during the interim period, controls over demilitarisation and disarmament shall be maintained by the reservation and the appropriate exercise by the occupation authorities of their existing reserved powers in these fields. The controls are however to be applied by a joint four-power commission which is to act by majority vote. In making this reservation, the protocol is to provide that the four signatories will review the problem at the end of 1954 in the light of the situation then existing with regard to the entry into force of the arrangements for the termination of the occupation. At the same time they will review the exercise of the controls with a view to permitting preparation by the Federal Republic for its future defence contribution.

V. *Declaration of Intent*

The Declaration of Intent at Annex B is to be issued at the conclusion of the Nine Power Conference.

Annex A

*Note:* Agreed proposals are indicated by an asterisk*

CONVENTION ON RELATIONS

*Amend operative words of convention to refer to four parties

*Preamble. Delete.

*Article 1. Redraft as follows:

1. On the entry into force of this Treaty the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States will terminate the Occupation régime in the Federal Republic and will revoke the Occupation Statute and abolish the Allied High Commission and the offices of the Land Commissioners in the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The Federal Republic shall have accordingly the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs.

*Article 2(1)(*a*). The right to station armed forces shall be exercisable fully only during interim period, after consultation or with consent, as the case may be, if military situation permits, thereafter only for exercise of other two reserved rights.

Outside the matters covered by the Forces Convention (which shall apply to Allied Forces stationed in the Federal Republic after it enters into force and until replaced by new agreements), the existing powers for the protection of the security of such forces especially against external threats, will continue only until the Federal Government obtains similar powers under Federal legislation; but the existing powers will only be exercised if the Federal Government has been consulted, in so far as the military situation permits, and has agreed that the circumstances (including the lack of legal powers enabling the Federal Government itself to take the necessary action) require such exercise.

Article 2(2).

*Article 3(4). (Free to have diplomatic relations with such states).

*Article 4(2). See Article 2(1)(*a*).

Article 4(3).

*Article 4(4). Delete.

*Article 5. Substitute for emergency powers reserved right in respect of security to be exercised only until Federal Government has obtained similar powers for itself and if Federal Government agrees situation involving external threat requires it. (See Article 2(1)(*a*) above).

Paragraph 7. This paragraph to be replaced by an exchange of notes.

*Article 6(2). Delete second sentence, see Annex A below.

*Article 7(1) and 7(2). Delete reference to Three Powers.

*Article 7(3). Delete.

*Article 8(1). Forces and Finance Conventions limited to period until new arrangements.

*Article 8(2). Redraft without changing the substance.

Article 9. The Three Allied Delegations wish to keep the Tribunal. The German Delegation reserves its position.

Article 9(3). Redraft with reference to Article 5 and query jurisdiction of Tribunal.

*Article 10. Improve review clause.

*Article 11. Delete, insert corresponding Article in Protocol.

*Annex A—Issue as separate declaration.

*Annex B— Review Article 11.

FORCES CONVENTION

Delete references to E.D.C. and make other consequential amendments.

Article 51 will have to be adjusted since the Convention's duration is limited to a specified period.

FINANCE CONVENTION

*Delete or suitably amend all references to E.D.C.

A list of such deletions and amendments is being prepared.

*Appropriate amendment of dates.

*Article 3—delete.

*Article 4.

The arrangements with regard to support costs should be as follows:

1. In the period between the termination of the occupation on the basis of the London understandings, and the entry into force of the arrangements for the German defence contribution, the Federal Republic will provide a monthly average contribution of DM 600 million for the support of the armed forces of other Powers stationed in the Federal territory; of this, DM 100 million a month will be earmarked for particular defence measures agreed jointly between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic. Expenditures for the N.A.T.O. Infrastructure Programme are included in this sum. Payment for claims for occupation damages can be included therein. The arrangement set out above will not in any case continue beyond June 30, 1955.

If the arrangements for the German defence contribution have not come into force before 30 June 1955 negotiations will take place between the four governments.

2.(*a*) During the first twelve months after the entry into force of the arrangements on the defence contribution of the Federal Republic, the Federal Government will make available for the support of the non-German forces stationed in the Federal territory a total amount of DM 3,200 millions. This amount shall be made available on the following schedule:

DM 400 million a month for the first two months
DM 300 million a month for the next four months
DM 200 million a month for the last six months

If the arrangements for the defence contribution of the Federal Republic enter into force after the 1st of July 1955, this undertaking shall no longer apply, but negotiations shall take place between the Federal Republic and the Three Powers on the contribution of the Federal Republic to the support of the forces referred to for a period not exceeding 12 months. (*b*) The Three Powers recognise the right of the Federal German Republic to propose that the above arrangements on support costs be re-examined should it consider that the burden imposed by the build-up of the agreed German forces justifies such re-examination. In this event, the parties concerned will examine all the relevant factors and if found necessary will agree to amend the above arrangements on support costs. (*c*) In accordance with the spirit of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty the Federal Government agrees that at the end of the period laid down in subparagraph (*a*) above they will be prepared to negotiate with other member governments of N.A.T.O. who have forces stationed in the Federal Republic in respect of questions relating to the support (for example goods and services) of those forces having regard to the requirements of the forces of the Federal Republic.

3. In view of its close connexion with support costs the Committee also discussed the question of occupation costs prior to the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic. It has been agreed that the Federal Government will provide for a period of three months from the 1st of October an average monthly sum of DM 600 million for occupation costs and mandatory expenditures. The occupying powers undertake to make a consistent effort to ensure that the present carry over of unspent funds for occupation costs and mandatory expenditures will not increase and shall be substantially reduced as rapidly as possible. To this end the occupying powers will give appropriate instructions to their respective High Commissioners and to their stationed forces. The authorities of the three occupying Powers and the German authorities will cooperate fully for this purpose and will assist each other by exchanging relevant information and in any other appropriate ways. It was agreed that this undertaking should also be applicable in respect of the carryover during the interim period.

The substance of the last part of paragraph 3 of Article 4, and of paragraph 5 of the same Article suitably amended in accordance with subsequent arrangements, should be retained.

*Article 18 (1) delete

Article 19

The German Delegation desire the omission of this Article. The other delegations agree that subparagraph (*a*) requires review in the light of the changes to be made in Articles 3 and 4, but do not agree with the complete suppression of this Article.

SETTLEMENT CONVENTION

*Chapter 2.* *Article 1. Delete. This Article to be replaced by a letter.

*Article 2. Delete.

*Article 3. Delete.

*Articles 4–9. Delete, and substitute new provisions in Chapter 1 or in a new chapter on transitional provisions, which will ensure that the programme of deconcentration shall be carried out to the end. There shall be no provision against future reconcentration, since this is covered by the Coal and Steel Community Treaty.

*Article 10. Delete. German legal opinion to be furnished.

*Chapter 3.* *Article 3(5)(a)(b)(c). Delete and exchange notes on comparable facilities.

*Chapter 7.* *Article 1(a)(b)(c). delete.

*Article 3. delete.

*Article 5. delete.

*Chapter 8 and Annex.* *Delete.

*Chapter 10.* *Article 7. List can be reviewed.

*Chapter 11.* *Delete this chapter. Insert a provision in Chapter 1 or in a new chapter on transitional provisions covering requisitioned property unless otherwise covered under German law. Exchange Notes on some of its subject matter.

### Annex B

### Declaration of Intent

Recognizing that a great country can no longer be deprived of the rights properly belonging to a free and democratic people, and

Desiring to associate the Federal Republic of Germany on a footing of equality with their efforts for peace and security,

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America desire to end the Occupation regime as soon as possible.

The fulfilment of this policy calls for the settlement of problems of detail in order to liquidate the past and to prepare for the future, and requires the completion of appropriate Parliamentary procedures.

In the meantime, the Three Governments are instructing their High Commissioners to act forthwith in accordance with the spirit of the above policy. In particular, the High Commissioners will not use the powers which are to be relinquished unless in agreement with the Federal Government, except in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation and in cases where the Federal Government has not been able for legal reasons to take the action or assume the obligations contemplated in the agreed arrangement.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 369

## Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference Held in London Between the Twenty-eighth of September and the Third of October, Nineteen Hundred and Fifty-Four [1]

The Conference of the Nine Powers, Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States met in London from Tuesday the Twenty-eighth of September, Nineteen hundred and Fifty-four, to Sunday the Third of October, Nineteen hundred and Fifty-four. It dealt with the most important issues facing the Western world, security and European integration within the framework of a developing Atlantic community dedicated to peace and freedom. In this connexion the Conference considered how to assure the full association of the Federal Republic of Germany with the West and the German Defence contribution.

Belgium was represented by His Excellency Monsieur P-H. Spaak.
Canada was represented by the Honourable L. B. Pearson.
France was represented by His Excellency Monsieur P. Mendès-France.
The Federal Republic of Germany was represented by His Excellency Dr. K. Adenauer.
Italy was represented by His Excellency Professor G. Martino.
Luxembourg was represented by His Excellency Monsieur J. Bech.
The Netherlands was represented by His Excellency J. W. Beyen.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was represented by the Rt. Hon. A. Eden, M.C., M.P.
The United States of America was represented by the Honourable J. F. Dulles.

All the decisions of the Conference formed part of one general settlement which is, directly or indirectly, of concern to all the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Powers, and which will therefore be submitted to the North Atlantic Council for information or decision.

### I.—Germany

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States declare that their policy is to end the Occupation régime in the Federal Republic as soon as possible, to revoke the Occupation Statute and to abolish the Allied High Commission. The Three Governments will continue to discharge certain responsibilities in Germany arising out of the international situation.

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[1] The source text is a certified copy of the Final Act which was transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 1933 from London, Jan. 7, 1955. The French and German texts have been omitted.
The Final Act, which was approved at the 14th Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference, was circulated at the Conference as document NPC(54)59. Earlier drafts of the Final Act are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365.

It is intended to conclude, and to bring into force as soon as the necessary parliamentary procedures have been completed, the appropriate instruments for these purposes. General agreement has already been reached on the content of these instruments, and representatives of the Four Governments will meet in the very near future to complete the final texts. The agreed arrangements may be put into effect either before or simultaneously with the arrangements for the German defence contribution.

As these arrangements will take a little time to complete, the Three Governments have in the meantime issued the following Declaration of Intent:—

"Recognising that this great country can no longer be deprived of the rights properly belonging to a free and democratic people; and

"Desiring to associate the Federal Republic of Germany on a footing of equality with their efforts for peace and security:

"The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America desire to end the Occupation régime as soon as possible.

"The fulfilment of this policy calls for the settlement of problems of detail in order to liquidate the past and to prepare for the future, and requires the completion of appropriate Parliamentary procedures.

"In the meantime, the Three Governments are instructing their High Commissioners to act forthwith in accordance with the spirit of the above policy. In particular, the High Commissioners will not use the powers which are to be relinquished unless in agreement with the Federal Government, except in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation and in cases where the Federal Government has not been able for legal reasons to take the action or assume the obligations contemplated in the agreed arrangement."

## II.—Brussels Treaty

The Brussels Treaty will be strengthened and extended to make it a more effective focus of European integration.

For this purpose the following arrangements have been agreed upon:—

(*a*) The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy will be invited to accede to the Treaty, suitably modified to emphasise the objective of European unity, and they have declared themselves ready to do so. The system of mutual automatic assistance in case of attack will thus be extended to the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy.

(*b*) The structure of the Brussels Treaty will be reinforced. In particular the Consultative Council provided in the Treaty will become a Council with powers of decision.

(*c*) The activities of the Brussels Treaty Organisation will be extended to include further important tasks as follows:—

The size and general characteristics of the German defence contribution will conform to the contribution fixed for E.D.C.

The maximum defence contribution to N.A.T.O. of all members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation will be determined by a

special agreement fixing levels which can only be increased by unanimous consent.

The strength and armaments of the internal defence forces and the police on the Continent of the countries members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation will be fixed by agreements within that Organisation, having regard to their proper functions and to existing levels and needs.

The Brussels Treaty Powers agree to set up, as part of the Brussels Treaty Organisation, an Agency for the control of armaments on the Continent of Europe of the continental members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation. The detailed provisions are as follows:—

1. The functions of the Agency shall be:—

(*a*) to ensure that the prohibition of the manufacture of certain types of armaments as agreed between the Brussels Powers is being observed;

(*b*) to control the level of stocks held by each country on the Continent of the types of armaments mentioned in the following paragraph. This control shall extend to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective.

2. The types of armament to be controlled under 1(*b*) above shall be:—

(*a*) weapons in categories I, II and III listed in Annex II to Article 107 of the E.D.C. Treaty;

(*b*) weapons in the other categories listed in Annex II to Article 107 of the E.D.C. Treaty;

(*c*) a list of major weapons taken from Annex I to the same Article, to be established hereafter by an expert working group.

Measures will be taken to exclude from control materials and products in the above lists for civil use.

3. As regards the weapons referred to under paragraph 2(*a*) above, when the countries which have not given up the right to produce them have passed the experimental stage and start effective production, the level of stocks that they will be allowed to hold on the Continent shall be decided by the Brussels Treaty Council by a majority vote.

4. The continental members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation agree not to build up stocks nor to produce the armaments mentioned in paragraph 2 (*b*) and (*c*) beyond the limits required (*a*) for the equipment of their forces, taking into account any imports including external aid, and (*b*) for export.

5. The requirements for their N.A.T.O. forces shall be established on the basis of the results of the Annual Review and the recommendations of the N.A.T.O. military authorities.

6. For forces remaining under national control, the level of stocks must correspond to the size and mission of those forces. That level shall be notified to the Agency.

7. All imports or exports of the controlled arms will be notified to the Agency.

8. The Agency will operate through the collation and examination of statistical and budgetary data. It will undertake test checks and will make such visits and inspections as may be required to fulfil its functions as defined in paragraph 1 above.

9. The basic rules of procedure for the Agency shall be laid down in a Protocol to the Brussels Treaty.

10. If the Agency finds that the prohibitions are not being observed, or that the appropriate level of stocks is being exceeded, it will so inform the Brussels Council.

11. The Agency will report and be responsible to the Brussels Council which will take its decisions by a majority vote on questions submitted by the Agency.

12. The Brussels Council will make an Annual Report on its activities concerning the control of armaments to the Delegates of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

13. The Governments of the United States of America and Canada will notify the Brussels Treaty Organisation of the military aid to be distributed to the continental members of that Organisation. The Organisation may make written observations.

14. The Brussels Council will establish a Working Group in order to study the draft directive presented by the French Government and any other papers which may be submitted on the subject of armaments production and standardisation.

15. The Brussels Treaty Powers have taken note of the following Declaration of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and record their agreement with it:

The Federal Chancellor declares:

> that the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons, as detailed in paragraphs I, II and III of the attached list;
>
> that it undertakes further not to manufacture in its territory such weapons as those detailed in paragraphs IV, V and VI of the attached list. Any amendment to or cancellation of the substance of paragraphs IV, V and VI can, on the request of the Federal Republic, be carried out by a resolution of the Brussels Council of Ministers by a two-thirds majority, if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a request is made by the competent supreme Commander of N.A.T.O.;
>
> that the Federal Republic agrees to supervision by the competent authority of the Brussels Treaty Organisation to ensure that these undertakings are observed.

LIST APPENDED TO THE DECLARATION BY THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs I to VI and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

I.—*Atomic Weapons*

(*a*) An atomic weapon is defined as any weapon which contains, or is designed to contain or utilise, nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuclear fuel, or by radioactivity of the nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes, is capable of mass destruction, mass injury or mass poisoning.

(*b*) Furthermore, any part, device, assembly or material especially designed for, or primarily useful in, any weapon as set forth under paragraph (*a*), shall be deemed to be an atomic weapon.

(*c*) Nuclear fuel as used in the preceding definition includes plutonium, Uranium 233, Uranium 235 (including Uranium 235 contained in Uranium enriched to over 2·1 per cent. by weight of Uranium 235) and any other material capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy through nuclear fission or fusion or other nuclear reaction of the material. The foregoing materials are considered to be nuclear fuel regardless of the chemical or physical form in which they exist.

II.—*Chemical Weapons*

(*a*) A chemical weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use, for military purposes, the asphyxiating, toxic, irritant, paralysant, growth-regulating, anti-lubricating or catalyzing properties of any chemical substance.

(*b*) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (*c*), chemical substances, having such properties and capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in paragraph (*a*), shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(*c*) Such equipment or apparatus and such quantities of the chemical substances as are referred to in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from this definition.

III.—*Biological Weapons*

(*a*) A biological weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use, for military purposes, harmful insects or other living or dead organisms, or their toxic products.

(*b*) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (*c*), insects, organisms

and their toxic products of such nature and in such amounts as to make them capable of being used in the equipment of apparatus referred to in (*a*) shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(*c*) Such equipment or apparatus and such quantities of the insects, organisms and their toxic products as are referred to in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from the definition of biological weapons.

IV.—*Long-range Missiles, Guided Missiles, and Influence Mines*

(*a*) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (*d*), long-range missiles and guided missiles are defined as missiles such that the velocity or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launch by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile, including V-type weapons developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof. Combustion is considered as mechanism which may influence the velocity.

(*b*) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (*d*), influence mines are defined as naval mines which can be exploded automatically by influences which emanate solely from external sources, including influence mines developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof.

(*c*) Parts, devices or assemblies specially designed for use in or with the weapons referred to in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) shall be deemed to be included in these definitions.

(*d*) Proximity fuses, and short-range guided missiles for anti-aircraft defence with the following maximum characteristics, are regarded as excluded from this definition:—

Length, 2 metres;
Diameter, 30 centimetres;
Velocity, 660 metres per second;
Ground range, 32 kilometres;
Weight of war-head, 22·5 kilogrammes.

V.—*Warships, with the Exception of Smaller Ships for Defence Purposes*

"Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes" are:—

(*a*) Warships of more than 3,000 tons displacement.
(*b*) Submarines of more than 350 tons displacement.
(*c*) All warships which are driven by means other than steam, Diesel or petrol engines or by gas turbines or by jet engines.

VI.—*Bomber Aircraft for Strategic Purposes*

The closest possible co-operation with N.A.T.O. shall be established in all fields.

## III.—United States, United Kingdom and Canadian Assurances

The United States Secretary of State set forth the willingness of the United States to continue its support for European unity, in accordance with the following statement:—

"If, using the Brussels Treaty as a nucleus, it is possible to find in this new pattern a continuing hope of unity among the countries of Europe that are represented here, and if the hopes that were tied into the European Defence Community Treaty can reasonably be transferred into the arrangements which will be the outgrowth of this meeting, then I would certainly be disposed to recommend to the President that he should renew the assurance offered last spring in connection with the European Defence Community Treaty to the effect that the United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defence of the North Atlantic area while a threat to the area exists and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defence of this area."

The United Kingdom confirmed its active participation in the Brussels Treaty Organisation and gave the following assurance about the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the continent of Europe:—

"The United Kingdom will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR, four divisions and the Tactical Air Force, or whatever SACEUR regards as equivalent fighting capacity. The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw those forces against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers, who should take their decision in the knowledge of SACEUR's views.

"This undertaking would be subject to the understanding that an acute overseas emergency might oblige Her Majesty's Government to omit this procedure.

"If the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too heavy a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom will invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the formations are maintained."

Canada reaffirmed in the following statement its resolve to discharge the continuing obligations arising out of its membership in N.A.T.O. and its support of the objective of European unity:—

"As far as we are concerned, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation remains the focal point of our participation in collective defence and of our hope for the development of closer co-operation with the other peoples of the Atlantic community. As such, it remains a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. While we emphasise, then, our belief in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, we welcome the proposed extension of the Brussels Treaty. We shall look forward to a growing

relationship, within the framework of N.A.T.O., with the new Brussels Treaty Organisation, composed of countries with whom we are already bound by such close ties."

## IV.—North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

The powers present at the Conference which are members of N.A.T.O. agreed to recommend at the next ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council that the Federal Republic of Germany should forthwith be invited to become a member.

They further agreed to recommend to N.A.T.O. that its machinery be reinforced in the following respects:—

(*a*) All forces of N.A.T.O. countries stationed on the Continent of Europe shall be placed under the authority of SACEUR, with the exception of those which N.A.T.O. has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command.

(*b*) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be deployed in accordance with N.A.T.O. strategy.

(*c*) The location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned.

(*d*) Such forces shall not be redeployed on the Continent nor used operationally on the Continent without his consent, subject to appropriate political guidance from the North Atlantic Council.

(*e*) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be integrated as far as possible consistent with military efficiency.

(*f*) Arrangements shall be made for the closer co-ordination of logistics by SACEUR.

(*g*) The level and effectiveness of forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent and the armaments and equipment, logistics, and reserve formations of those forces on the Continent shall be inspected by SACEUR.

The Conference recorded the view of all the governments represented that the North Atlantic Treaty should be regarded as of indefinite duration.

## V.—Declaration by the Federal Government of Germany and Joint Declaration by the Governments of France, United Kingdom and United States of America

The following declarations were recorded at the Conference by the German Federal Chancellor and by the Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom and United States of America:—

### DECLARATION BY FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter.

Upon her accession to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany declares that she will refrain

from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the two treaties. In particular the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other States.

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic,

Being resolved to devote their efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in particular with the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter

(i) to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;

(ii) to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations take preventive or enforcement action;

(iv) to ensure that States which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with the principles of the Charter so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Having regard to the purely defensive character of the Atlantic Alliance which is manifest in the North Atlantic Treaty, wherein they reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and undertake to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the Charter and to refrain, in accordance with those principles, from the threat or use of force in their international relations,

Take note that the Federal Republic of Germany has by a Declaration dated the Third of October, Nineteen hundred and Fifty Four accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other states:

*Declare That*

1. They consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs.

2. In their relations with the Federal Republic they will follow the principles set out in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.

3. A peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their policy. The final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.

4. The achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy.

5. The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

6. They will regard as a threat to their own peace and safety any recourse to force which in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter threatens the integrity and unity of the Atlantic alliance or its defensive purposes. In the event of any such action, the three Governments, for their part, will consider the offending government as having forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty and its protocols. They will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to taking other measures which may be appropriate.

7. They will invite the association of other member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation with this Declaration.

## VI.—Future Procedure

The Conference agreed that representatives of the governments concerned should work out urgently the texts of detailed agreements to give effect to the principles laid down above. These will be submitted where appropriate, to the North Atlantic Council, and to the four Governments directly concerned with the future status of the Federal Republic. The Conference hoped that it would be possible to hold a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the Twenty-second of October to decide on the arrangements affecting N.A.T.O. This will be preceded by meetings of the four Foreign Ministers on the question of German sovereignty and of the nine Foreign Ministers.

These agreements and arrangements constitute a notable contribution to world peace. A Western Europe is now emerging which, resting on the close association of the United Kingdom with the Continent and on the growing friendship between the participating countries, will reinforce the Atlantic community. The system elaborated by the Conference will further the development of European unity and integration.

The following documents are annexed to and form part of the Final Act:—

Draft Declaration and Draft Protocol to the Brussels Treaty.

Full text of statements by Mr. Dulles, Mr. Eden and Mr. Pearson at the Fourth Plenary Meeting on the Twenty-ninth of September.

Conference Paper on "A German Defence contribution and arrangements to apply to SACEUR's forces on the Continent."

In witness whereof the Representatives have signed this Final Act.

Done in London this Third day of October, 1954, in a single copy, in English, French and German, all three texts being equally authoritative. The original texts will be deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to each Government represented at the Conference.

For Belgium: P. H. Spaak

For Canada: L. B. Pearson

For the Federal Republic of Germany: Adenauer

For France: P. Mendès-France

For Italy: G. Martino

For Luxembourg: Jos. Bech

For the Netherlands: J. W. Beyen

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Anthony Eden

For the United States of America: John Foster Dulles

Annex I

Draft Declaration Inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany To Accede to the Brussels Treaty

The Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, parties to the Brussels Treaty of 17th March, 1948, for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for legitimate collective self-defence;

Aware that the principles underlying the association created by the Brussels Treaty are also recognised and applied by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy;

Noting with satisfaction that their devotion to peace and their allegiance to democratic institutions constitute common bonds between the countries of Western Europe;

Convinced that an association with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would represent a new and substantial advance in the direction already indicated by the Treaty;

Decide

In application of Article IX of the Treaty, to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty, as revised and completed by the Protocol and [list of agreements and documents]* of _____.[2]

DRAFT PROTOCOL TO THE BRUSSELS TREATY

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defence, signed at Brussels on March 17th, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, on the one hand,

and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany and the President of the Italian Republic on the other hand,

inspired by a common will to strengthen peace and security,

desirous to this end of promoting the unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe,

convinced that the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic to the Treaty will represent a new and substantial advance towards these aims:

Have appointed, &c. _____[2]

Have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE I

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic hereby accede to the Treaty, as revised and completed by the present Protocol and the [list of agreements and documents.]†

ARTICLE II

(*a*) The sub-paragraph of the Preamble to the Treaty "to take such

*These agreements and documents will be specified in the final text. [Brackets and footnote in the source text.]

[2] Omission in source text.

†These agreements and documents will be specified in the final text. [Brackets and footnote in the source text.]

steps as may be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression" shall be modified to read:—

"to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe."

(*b*) the following new article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IV:—

"IV. In execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation."

The present Article IV of the Treaty and the succeeding articles shall be renumbered accordingly.

(*c*) Article VIII, formerly Article VII, of the Treaty, shall read:—

"For the purpose of consulting together on all questions dealt with in the present Treaty and its Protocol and the agreements and other documents set out in Article I above and of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between member states and with other European organisations, the High Contracting Parties will create a Council, which shall be so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit.

"At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability."

ARTICLE III

The present Protocol and the agreements set out in Article I above shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government. They shall enter into force upon the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification.

Annex II A

EXTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE (THE HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES) AT THE FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Mr. Chairman, at the time when we thought that the European Defence Community Treaty would promptly be put to a vote of the French Parliament—that was some time last Spring—the United States indicated that it would be prepared to make a declaration with respect to its intentions as to the maintenance of armed forces in Europe in the event that the European Defence Community Treaty should come into force. The text of that message was communicated to

the six nations that were signatory to the European Defence Community Treaty, and also to the United Kingdom. The essence of that declaration was that the United States would continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defence of the North Atlantic area while the threat to that area exists, and that we would continue to maintain such forces in accordance with the agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defence of this area.

There were other provisions of that Declaration, in fact there were six, one of which related to treating the North Atlantic Treaty as a treaty of indefinite duration, rather than only for a fixed period of years.

I do not need, I think, to read the full text of that Declaration, because it has, as I say, been communicated to all of the Governments who are represented here. You doubtless are already familiar with, and can readily consult, the text which was sent to your at that time.

That Declaration was made, as I say, in anticipation of the coming into force of the European Defence Community Treaty. The Declaration was made after consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States. It would have been as solemn and definitive an obligation as the United States is constitutionally capable of making in this matter.

I should perhaps explain that under our constitutional system the President of the United States is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States, and as such has the right to determine their disposition. That is a right which cannot be impaired by action by the Congress. Also, while Congress has no authority to deprive the President of his right as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces to make such disposition of those forces as he believes to be in the interest of the security of the United States, it is equally the case that one President of the United States is not constitutionally able to bind his successors in this matter. Each President of the United States comes into office enjoying the right to dispose of the armed forces of the United States as he thinks best serves the interests of the United States in accordance with the advice which he gets from his military advisers. Therefore it is not constitutionally possible for the United States by treaty, by law or any other way to make a legally binding, fixed commitment to maintain any predetermined quota of armed forces in any particular part of the world for any particular period of time. It is nevertheless possible for the President to define a policy which in his opinion makes it appropriate to maintain certain elements of the armed forces of the United States in certain areas in pursuance of that policy. And if the policy is a basic and fundamental one it is extremely unlikely that that allocation of forces would be altered.

Now, this Declaration that I refer to was designed to involve an

exercise, to the fullest degree possible under our constitutional system, of the determination of our Government to support the European Defence Community by contributing armed forces which would be subject to integration with its forces, and that declaration was made with the confidence that the policy that it reflected would be pursued because of the very great interest which the United States has in the creation of unity in Europe, and the fact that our nation has historically shown its willingness to make tremendous contributions if, in its opinion, that will aid in the real unification of Europe.

I might recall that the European Recovery Plan—the Marshall Plan as it was called—was made pursuant to a Congressional Act which said that the purpose was to promote the unification of Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty was an engagement which was quite unprecedented for the United States—it was quite unprecedented for the United States to make that kind of long range alliance with other countries. That was directly contrary to our earlier policies which had been pursued for over 100 years. That action was taken only after the European countries themselves had first come together under this Brussels Treaty which we are talking about so much to-day. It was the encouragement which came from that which very largely led to our going on and joining in the commitments of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The first action taken to provide military aid to Europe was under the Military Defence Assistance Act of 1949. The language of it was that it was designed to promote the integration of the defence of Europe. I think that the history of our action, both our positive action and negative action, shows that we respond in many ways like a barometer to the climate which exists in Europe. If the climate is one of unity and cohesion, our assistance and aid of every kind goes out. If the climate is one of dissension, disunity, revival of threats of war, perpetuation of the cycle of recurrent war, then our tendency is to withdraw.

The declaration which we felt able to make in support of the European Defence Community was on the assumption that that was a permanent act which would tie together organically the countries of Europe which in the past have been separate and among whom war has been bred. We felt that it tied them together so permanently, so organically, that we could regard that old chapter as a closed chapter and could hopefully commit our strength to Europe in the confidence that our soldiers over here in Europe would be in a structure which was safe and sound; that we were not putting our troops in the midst of what has historically been the world's worst fire hazard.

Now a committal of that character is not lightly made, and I would say in all frankness that as the situation stands to-day it would not be possible for the President of the United States to renew that com-

mittal. There has been a great wave of disillusionment which has swept over the United States—and it is particularly manifest in the Congress—a great wave of disillusionment over what has happened, and a feeling that after all the situation in Europe is pretty hopeless and the United States had better not make any long-term committals to be part of it.

That conclusion is so disastrous in my opinion—both for the nations of Europe and for the United States—that I hope most ardently that what is done here will make it possible to come to a different conclusion, and that it will change the atmosphere, the feeling, in the United States to a degree which will permit of a renewal of the pledge by the United States to maintain in Europe such elements of its armed forces as may be necessary or appropriate to contribute our fair share of what is needed for the common defence of this North Atlantic area while the threat to that area exists. I cannot say at this moment that a renewal of that commitment is possible. I can say, and must repeat, that as things stand to-day it is *not* possible. But if, out of the elements of the situation with which we are dealing, if using the Brussels Treaty as a nucleus, it is possible to find in this new pattern a continuing hope of unity among the countries of Europe that are represented here, and if the hopes that were tied into the European Defence Community Treaty can reasonably be transferred into the arrangements which will be the outgrowth of this meeting, then I would certainly be disposed to recommend to the President that he should renew a pledge comparable to that which was offered in connexion with the European Defence Community Treaty.

Obviously the context of the pledge would have to be changed, because in the form which was given it related distinctively to the European Defence Community Treaty. Just what re-phrasing would be required to give it the "new look" that would be appropriate to the new situation, that is a matter which I have not studied, and which could not usefully be studied until we know whether or not a promise of genuine and durable unity will come out of the deliberations of this gathering and those which may succeed it.

That, Mr. Chairman, is as clear a statement as I can make to-day of the position of my Government in relation to this matter. We are extremely anxious to contribute all that we can from a material and constitutional standpoint to promote the kind of unification which will above all end a situation which has led to recurrent wars which have weakened and drained the Western nations so that our whole Western civilisation is in jeopardy as never before in a thousand years. In reason you can count on us. I think that what we have done since the end of the war in terms of economic contribution, military contributions, the willingness to contribute our best and ablest brains in terms of both military and economic matters, all of that I think is a proof which

cannot be challenged as to what our disposition is in this matter. You can be confident that that disposition will be reflected by genuine support to the extent that is appropriate if there is, on this side, the movement toward unity, if there is a beacon light still ahead, if we do not feel that we have come to a watershed where efforts toward unity finally are ended and we are going down on the other side into the abyss of continued disunity.

I do not think that is going to happen. I know it is within our power here to be sure that it does not happen. If it does not happen, then you can count on the United States acting in support of what the European countries do. I believe that you will find that the American flag, with all it symbolises, will continue to fly alongside of your own here in Europe.

### Annex II B

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM SECRETARY OF STATE (THE RIGHT HON. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P.) AT THE FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Gentlemen, I think we all feel that we have just listened to a statement from the United States Secretary of State of very rare quality and much valued frankness. What he has said to us, those of us who are European, is I think all that in present conditions we could possibly expect from the United States.

As we survey these post-war years we, I fear, too readily at times take for granted what this generous brother has done for us in Europe at a time when but for his help all must have collapsed in confusion and, perhaps, into Communism also. On behalf of the country I represent here, I would like to assure him that what the United States has done are not "All good deeds past, forgot as soon as done"—but will be remembered with thankfulness, and not for our own sakes alone. So I would like to tell Mr. Foster Dulles that the words he has said, so far as our Government are concerned, will be examined with gratitude and with understanding, and that we shall do our best—I believe this conference will do its best—to prove worthy of that greater confidence the United States will show as we establish our ability to prove our unity and our strength.

Now in all this I am conscious that my own country has a part to play. I do not want to go back over the full history of past declarations and past undertakings, though there are perhaps one or two that I ought to mention if the setting of what I want to say this afternoon is to be understood. We gave, as the United States Government gave, a series of undertakings to the E.D.C. We gave them by treaty, we gave them by agreement, we gave them by declarations, and as I have already informed my colleagues we stand by those undertakings, and we are ready to reaffirm them. They are not, I think, unimportant,

but some of them are, it is true, inapplicable in the absence of E.D.C. Some of those that have as a result of the disappearance of E.D.C. now disappeared may, and probably will, be covered by the proposals which this conference is now considering. The provision of automatic military assistance, for instance, which was contained in our treaty with E.D.C. will be reproduced, I trust, by the proposed enlargement of the Brussels Treaty. Co-operation between the armed forces, the deployment and integration of those forces, consultation about the level of forces, will all now take place, though perhaps within a different framework.

I am very conscious, and so are my colleagues, that there is one particular plane on which many of you here would wish us to make our position clearer, and where if we were able to do so it might assist the work of this conference. This relates to the maintenance of British forces on the continent of Europe, and in respect of that I have a new proposal to put to my colleagues. The United Kingdom will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR—four divisions and the tactical Air Force—or whatever SACEUR regards as equvalent fighting capacity.

The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw those forces against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers, who should take their decision in the knowledge of SACEUR's views. This undertaking would be subject to the understanding that an acute overseas emergency might oblige Her Majesty's Government to omit this procedure. If the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too heavy a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom will invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the formations are maintained.

My colleagues will realise that what I have announced is for us a very formidable step to take. You all know that ours is above all an island story. We are still an island people in thought and tradition, whatever the modern facts of weapons and strategy may compel. And it has been not without considerable reflection that the Government which I represent here has decided that this statement could be made to you this afternoon. I want only to add this: we are making it in just the same spirit as Mr. Dulles spoke just now, because we hope that by doing so we shall make a contribution to enable this conference to succeed, and recreate confidence on this European Continent and make it possible for us to show an example of unity to the world. Of course, you will understand that what we have just said, and the undertaking we are prepared to give, does depend on the outcome of our work. If we succeed here then this undertaking stands; if we do not, Her Majesty's Government could not regard itself as committed to what

I have said this afternoon. That applies to the whole of our work, all the work that we are doing here. So I can only conclude by saying I hope the conference will consider that what we have said will be a contribution to bring us at least a stage nearer the successful conclusion of our labours.

Annex II C

STATEMENT BY THE CANADIAN MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (THE HON. LESTER PEARSON) AT THE FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Mr. Chairman, this item on the agenda, which I apologise for returning to, item 5, is headed "United Kingdom and United States Declarations". I assume that under it I would be quite in order in expressing great appreciation for the statements which have been made by you and by Mr. Dulles this afternoon, and I hope I would not be ruled out of order if I make a short declaration on behalf of my own country.

Your statement, Mr. Chairman, if I may say so, was one of historic importance. If it is thought, as it sometimes is, that the United Kingdom looks across the Channel more intensely in war than in peacetime, that feeling certainly must have been removed by your statement earlier this afternoon. To me it was all the more impressive because I recognise that the source of the power and the glory of this island has been its vision across the seas.

The statement of Mr. Dulles was also important, not only for the development of European unity, but for that larger Atlantic Community development with which we are all concerned. Indeed, as I see it, European unity cannot be effectively secured unless the lines not only across the Channel but across the Atlantic are strong and unbroken. My country has a part to play in this Atlantic aspect of the problem. Therefore, we accept the continuing obligations arising out of our membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and we are resolved to continue to do our best to discharge them. The disappearance of E.D.C. does not, we think, affect those obligations, because E.D.C.—though we were indeed disappointed in its disappearance—because E.D.C., as we saw it, was a means to an end and not an end in itself. We are here to find an alternative method to accomplish the same purpose. That alternative method, that alternative arrangement, must include the association of Germany not only with the defence of Europe and the West, but—and this is, I am sure, equally important—with the development of the Atlantic Community; an association to be brought about in such a way that the fears that we have inherited from the unhappy past will be replaced by a new and better hope for the future.

So new methods are being discussed this week and new solutions are being sought. As far as we are concerned, however, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation remains the focal point of our participation in collective defence and of our hope for the development of closer co-operation with the other peoples of the Atlantic community. As such, it remains a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, enduring and whole-hearted support for N.A.T.O. is for us a policy above politics on which I think our friends can rely.

That support in defence matters is now worked out each year by consultation through the appropriate agencies of our organisation—that is, N.A.T.O. Apart from mutual aid, it now takes the form of naval forces, an infantry brigade group, and an air division of twelve jet fighter squadrons stationed in Europe. We will continue to assist in the common defence through the existing N.A.T.O. procedures until better ones are agreed on. The presence of these Canadian forces on the European continent is not only a measure of our military contribution to the common defence, but an evidence of our belief in the future of the North Atlantic Community.

While we emphasise, then, our belief in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, we welcome the proposed extension of the Brussels Treaty. We shall look forward to a growing relationship within the framework of N.A.T.O. to the Brussels Treaty countries with whom we are bound by such close ties.

We are sure, and I hope our confidence will be realised—I know it will—that these new arrangements through Brussels can be developed without weakening or diminishing N.A.T.O. in any way in its essential functions, because N.A.T.O., with Germany associated with it under agreed arrangements, should, we think, be a stronger force than ever against war, and for the progressive development of the Atlantic Community.

We are also certain, Mr. Chairman, that in this development the United States, which has played such a magnificent, generous and indeed essential part, will continue to be able to do so. Mr. Dulles has given us hope in that regard this afternoon.

We Canadians, being neighbours of the United States, know as well as anybody else, that that country does not fail to accept and to meet, successfully, any great international challenge which faces it. We are certain that in the days ahead it will continue to meet the challenge of assisting in the development of European unity and the Atlantic Community—and the two go together.

The work, then, which we are doing this week must, in order to succeed, make possible the continued contribution of the United States to these great objectives. If that is done, and I know it is going to be

done, it will also, I assure you, make it much easier for my own country to continue to do its share.

Annex III

CONFERENCE PAPER ON "A GERMAN DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION AND ARRANGEMENTS TO APPLY TO SACEUR'S FORCES ON THE CONTINENT"

The nine Governments represented at the London Conference agree to instruct representatives to draw up in Paris, in concert with the military and civilian agencies of N.A.T.O. through the Secretary General, detailed proposals, for approval by the North Atlantic Council, for a German defence contribution and arrangements to be applied to SACEUR's forces on the Continent. These detailed proposals shall be based on the following principles agreed between the nine Governments:—

1.—(*a*) The seven Brussels Treaty Powers will conclude a special agreement setting out the forces each of them will place under SACEUR on the Continent.

(*b*) The German contribution shall conform in size and general characteristics to the contribution fixed for the E.D.C. brought up to date and adapted as necessary to make it suitable for N.A.T.O.

(*c*) The terms of this special agreement will be agreed with the other N.A.T.O. countries.

(*d*) If at any time the N.A.T.O. Annual Review recommends an increase above the figures in the Brussels Special Agreement such increase will require the unanimous approval of the Brussels powers expressed in the Brussels Council or in N.A.T.O.

(*e*) The Brussels Powers will ask that arrangements be made for SACEUR to designate a high-ranking officer who will be instructed to transmit regularly to the Brussels Treaty Organisation information acquired as indicated in 3(*f*) below in order to permit that Organisation to establish that the figures agreed among the Brussels Powers are being observed.

2. All forces of N.A.T.O. countries stationed on the Continent of Europe shall be placed under the authority of SACEUR, with the exception of the forces which N.A.T.O. has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command. The strength and armaments on the Continent of the internal defence forces and of the police belonging to the members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation shall be fixed by agreements made within this Organisation, taking into account the task for which they are intended and on the basis of existing levels and needs.

3. Arrangements to apply to SACEUR's forces

(*a*) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be deployed in accordance with N.A.T.O. strategy.

(*b*) The location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned.

(*c*) Such forces shall not be redeployed on the Continent nor used operationally on the Continent without his consent subject to appropriate political guidance from the North Atlantic Council.

(*d*) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be integrated as far as possible consistent with military efficiency.

(*e*) Arrangements shall be made for the closer co-ordination of logistics by SACEUR.

(*f*) The level and effectiveness of forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent and the armaments, equipment, logistics and reserve formations of those forces on the Continent shall be inspected by SACEUR.

## 3. CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE MEETINGS

396.1 LO/9–2954

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, September 29, 1954.

[DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:] Have just come from today's afternoon session of Nine-Power Conference,[2] which was very impressive and moving occasion. The topic was the attitude which the US and UK would take toward the new proposed set-up. I spoke extemporaneously to the general theme of intense US interest in unity in Europe and that we supported it whenever it was a reasonable prospect and turned away when Europe showed signs of disintegration. I said that under present conditions it would be impossible for you to make the declaration which you had made with reference to EDC in terms of intention of continuing US participation in defense of Europe. I concluded by saying, however, that if new and reasonable hopes developed out of the meeting here, then I would recommend your making commitments similar to what had been projected in relation to EDC. Eden followed with appreciation of my statement and of what US had done, and then followed with an expression of willingness, subject satisfactory outcome this conference, definitely to commit for life of Brussels Treaty four British divisions and tactical air force to continental defense unless released by majority vote of Brussels Treaty Council.

This was regarded, and I think rightly, by other countries as an historical decision tying England to the continent in a way which has never been done before. The seven other countries made responses which were expressive of profound appreciation except that the

[1] The text of this message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 8, Sept. 29, with instructions that it be sent to the President; a notation on the source text indicates that this message was relayed to the Summer White House at Denver, Colorado, at 8:15 p. m. on Sept. 29.

[2] This is a reference to the Fourth Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference; see p. 1311.

response of Mendes-France, while formally correct, was somewhat grudging and lacking in the spirit which animated the others. I think he feels that our two statements, and notably the British statement, create a situation which makes it almost impossible for France to reject a reasonable settlement of the conditions which would make possible the admission of Germany to NATO and the creation of European unity with some supranational features on basis of Brussels Treaty.

Earlier today Mendes-France had come to see me privately at my residence,[3] primarily to emphasize that for him to recommend admission of Germany to NATO was a most difficult step in face of his parliament, and that if he was prepared to do this, he must in effect be able to write all other features of arrangement.

We are now at a stage where the experts are preparing various drafts. The most difficult point remains the so-called "arms pool", which many feel is desired by France in order to exclude Ruhr industrialists from participation in arms industry and to concentrate that industry in France.

Spaak, speaking for Belgium, proposed that the Brussels Treaty should be made co-terminus with the North Atlantic Treaty which is a good formula which lets us off the hook of the former proposal that we should make the North Atlantic Treaty co-terminus with the Brussels Treaty or EDC, both of which were for a minimum of fifty years as against a minimum of twenty years for the North Atlantic Treaty.

Last night Winston gave dinner for the nine Foreign Ministers and their Ambassadors. It was an intimate and cordial affair which gave useful opportunity for private exchanges of views and direct talk between Adenauer and Mendes-France. Adenauer was seated at Winston's right and Mendes-France at his left.

I think it would be both appropriate and helpful if you would send a personal message to Winston expressing appreciation at the contribution which Britain is prepared to make to advance European unity. He has been very reluctant to move without parallel commitment by US. I have explained to him that this was constitutionally impossible, but that I was confident he could count on our not abandoning Europe as long as it was moving toward unity and as long as the British troops were on the continent. If you could say something along these lines and commend him and Eden for their enlightened statesmanship, this would, I think, be desirable.

Best regards. FOSTER

[3] For a summary of this afternoon meeting between Dulles and Mendès-France, see the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, dated Sept. 29, p. 1308.

396.1 LO/9–3054

*President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill* [1]

TOP SECRET DENVER, COLORADO, September 30, 1954.

DEAR WINSTON: Foster has kept me informed on the progress of the talks now going forward in the Nine-Power Conference. Both officially and personally I am most deeply appreciative of the contribution that Britain has offered to make to advance European unity.

Of course I understand fully your reluctance to move without parallel commitment by us. However, our constitutional processes do not permit this, but I am certain that so long as Europe is moving toward unified action, you can always be sure of our effective cooperation on the continent. In this statement I know I speak for the tremendous majority of the citizens of our country.

In this often confused world, it is encouraging to witness the enlightened and courageous statesmanship exhibited by you and Anthony. In this instance, as in so many others, I have the greatest admiration for your judgments and actions.

Please give my warm regard to Anthony, and, as always, the best to yourself.

As ever, IKE

[1] This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Lowry 5003, Sept. 30, with instructions from President Eisenhower that it be forwarded to Churchill with a copy furnished the Secretary; the message was sent to London as instructed in telegram Tedul 14, Sept. 30.

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET [LONDON, September 30, 1954.]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS WITH SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL
LONDON—SEPTEMBER 27, 28, AND 30

In the course of my three talks with Sir Winston Churchill (my first call on him and then the dinner and luncheon), he repeatedly emphasized the indispensability of capacity for massive retaliation. He said that the Soviets were in a position where, by a sudden sneak attack, they could kill perhaps ten million of our people. However, the Soviets should know that if within four hours they could kill ten million of us, we could kill in the next four hours, twenty million of them. He felt that as long as they knew this that it would probably deter attack, and he did not see any other way. He emphasized that our capacity for retaliation must have many bases, some real, some decoys, so that they could not strike in a sudden way which would knock out all of our capacity to retaliate. Sir Winston felt that much more could be

done than had been done in the way of developing decoy targets which would attract an initial atomic attack and thus divert it from really vital targets.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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740.5/10–154

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, October 1, 1954.

[DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:] Thank you very much for responding so promptly to my suggestion of a message to Winston. I know he will be greatly pleased.

The last twenty-four hours have not marked any great advance. There is substantial agreement with reference to German rearmament and to giving the Brussels Treaty council power to veto increases above the North Atlantic Treaty quotas and the twelve divisions which were contemplated for Germany under EDC. However, little progress has been made in agreeing on how or when German sovereignty shall be restored or how arms production on the continent is to be controlled. The most that can be said is that the talking which must inevitably precede any decision has largely now been completed. I am hopeful that matters can be brought to a conclusion by Saturday night, but this is by no means certain. The atmosphere on the whole continues good under the impact of Eden's and my Statements of Wednesday.[2]

Faithfully yours, FOSTER

[1] This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 17, Oct. 1, with instructions that it be sent to the President; a notation on the source text indicates that it was relayed to the Summer White House at 1:15 p. m. on Oct. 1.

[2] This is a reference to the Fourth Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference which took place on Wednesday, Sept. 29; see p. 1311.

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740.5/10–354

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 3, 1954.

[DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:] Have just signed with the eight other Foreign Ministers the agreements reached here. They still have to be perfected in some detail, but an immense amount of work has been accomplished, and I believe that if what was done here is finally realized, we will have saved most of the values inherent in EDC. The Brussels Council will have many supra-national responsibilities, and while the present arrangements do not go as far as EDC in creat-

[1] This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 27, Oct. 3, with instructions that it be sent to the President; a notation on the source text indicates that it was relayed to the Summer White House at 3:55 p. m. on Oct. 3.

ing parliamentary controls, this disadvantage is to an extent offset by the British committal to continental Europe. The work has been very exacting, particularly for my advisers and experts, and they have made a tremendous contribution. In the main, I have tried personally to play a background role, believing that it was important that what emerged here should appear to be essentially an agreement among the Europeans themselves and that we should avoid even appearance of a result which reflected US pressures. Of course, our presence here has been in fact the indispensable ingredient without which the whole affair would have fallen apart, and it will be necessary for us to continue our support of the European army.

I suggest that you may think it wise quickly to make indication of your satisfaction of the results so as to prepare the way for an effective follow-up by the American people and the Congress.

The principal fly in the ointment is that Mendes-France has insisted that a Saar settlement is a condition precedent to his proceeding with his Parliament, and in that way he has preserved for himself an "out" if he should find it expedient to reverse his present position.

As you probably know, it is planned to announce a Trieste settlement on next Tuesday, and this will, I think be an important further contribution to the cause of European unity and solidarity.[2]

I am about to take the plane at 5 p. m. London time and expect to be back in Washington at 8 : 30 Monday morning.

Faithfully yours, FOSTER

[2] Documentation concerning the Trieste settlement is presented in volume VIII.

## C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE AND THE NEGOTIATION OF A SAAR AGREEMENT BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, OCTOBER 4–19, 1954

740.5/10–554 : Telegram

*The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, October 5, 1954—7 p. m.

Polto 563. Cotel.

1. In response letter from Sir Christopher Steel, acting on behalf chairman Nine-Power Conference, perm reps met this morning in restricted session.

2. SecGen welcomed French perm rep Couve de Murville, sitting for first time, and Gen Schuyler, attending on behalf SHAPE. SecGen

[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

announced that Pearson, Can FM, would meet with Council Wednesday morning to report on Nine-Power Conf.

3. Steel made few general remarks about Nine-Power Conf, particularly emphasizing rigidity of proposed Brussels regime as compared NATO, and necessity operating it to inspire mutual confidence.

Reported that SecGen of NATO had agreed put facilities and Secretariat personnel of NATO at disposal Paris WGs responsible spelling out Nine-Power agreements.

Proposed that NATO reps plus Ger Rep and NATO SecGen, SG and SHAPE reps meet informally as Working Party Nine-Power Conf immediately after this mtg. This was agreed.

4. Reps of Delegations not attending Nine-Power Conf all expressed great appreciation for efforts made keep them informed of its work.

5. Chairman requested members be prepared agree at NAC mtg Wednesday on time and place of ministerial mtg. Understood that Nine-Power mtg proposed October 22 in Paris.

Brief discussion problem attendance at this ministerial mtg indicated most reps expected foreign ministers and defense ministers only. SecGen thought it would be useful have this reported to govts.

6. Italian Rep reported agreement on Trieste and described settlement briefly.[2] Stated documents would be distributed Wednesday. Emphasized heavy sacrifices made by Italy to promote peace. Expressed gratitude to US and UK for their help in reaching settlement.

Most other perm reps congratulated Italy and in some cases Yugoslavia for statesmanship in reaching this agreement.

7. US Rep suggested that problem of release of classified NATO documents to Germans in course work to be done in Paris on Nine-Power decisions be put on agenda for formal NATO meeting Wednesday. This agreed.

HUGHES

[2] Documentation concerning the Trieste negotiations, including the so-called Memorandum of Understanding signed by representatives of Yugoslavia, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States, in London on Oct. 5, is presented in volume VIII.

740.5/10–554 : Telegram

*The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, October 5, 1954—8 p. m.

Polto 566. Cotel.

1. Perm reps from all NATO countries plus German Del, NATO SecGen, SGLO, and SHAPE Rep met at Palais de Chaillot immediately following restricted NAC mtg reported in separate tel.[2]

On nomination Can Rep, Steel took chair.

[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.
[2] *Supra.*

Chairman proposed two Working Parties: First to deal with Brussels Treaty problems, to consist of reps Nine Powers at London plus SGLO and SHAPE. The other to deal with NATO problems, to include in addition to international reps, 14 NATO countries plus Germany.

Suggested that to keep everyone informed, papers of each would be distributed to all countries and that final recommendations would be reviewed by this 15-country steering comite.

Suggested that it be left to WG to decide need for further subcommittees. Proposed that first mtg be held Thurs. As result US suggestions, agreed hold first mtg Wednesday afternoon. After considerable discussion it was agreed to accede French request that for public relations reasons first meeting of Brussels WG be held at Quai d'Orsay with understanding that for practical reasons necessary hold subsequent meetings at Palais de Chaillot but WG could change locale for any meeting as thought necessary.

Nor rep, while not wishing make issue of matter now, thought might wish have observer on Brussels Group. Meanwhile, hoped might be possible make comment on Brussels papers. Chairman stated he was sure chrmn each group would welcome arrangement for participation on points of interest.

2. Chairman emphasized time problem and urged that Working Groups complete work in time for steering comite action by Oct 15. This would give govts time to study proposals.

3. Chairman proposed that NATO WG set up group to study amendments in NATO SOF agreement to cover new problem of stationing large numbers Allied troops in Germany. Would not expect complete work before ministerial mtg but thought it should be started and preliminary results sent to occupying powers for further discussions with Germans in Bonn. US reserved right discussion substance this suggestion WG meeting Wednesday.

(Amb Hughes will represent US on steering group, Martin on NATO WG, and Page on Brussels Group, with Anderson, Wood and Ernst or their designees as advisers on each of above three bodies.)

HUGHES

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740.5/10–554 : Telegram

*The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 5, 1954—8 p. m.

Polto 567. Cotel. At NAC meeting today UK distributed draft program of work on follow-up Nine-Power Conference. Included suggestion that NATO Working Party should prepare draft protocol for

[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

entrance of Germany into NATO and draft protocol regarding forces committed to SACEUR. Also suggested that changes in SACEUR's directive not be worked out before ministerial mtg but be produced by normal NATO procedure.

Unless instructed to contrary, we propose take position at WG mtg tomorrow, Wed afternoon, on basis discussion in del at London, and NPC [*NPT*] D–8a [2] as follows:

1. It is desirable, though not legally necessary, that German entry into NATO take place through protocol to treaty.
2. That further protocol to treaty involving military matters not be proposed. Do not think it desirable have more documents than necessary which require parliamentary action. Believe these matters are subject to evolution and should not be embedded in treaty; believe council resolution which can only be amended by unanimous vote is adequate.
3. Believe it possible and desirable to have ministerial action at forthcoming meeting on changes in SACEUR's directive, in accordance para 3 of NPC (54) 38 [3] to come into effect if other parts of package agreed. Does not appear likely that these will present more than one or two major policy problems which have not been resolved at London. Failure to spell out changes in directive would leave us with little or no progress beyond London decisions and in absence spelling out, govts subject to charge that agreements in principle are facade, real impact is open to question.

UK paper also proposes development formula for association other NATO members with declaration made by US, UK and France in reply German declaration renouncing achievement of unification by force. We see no objection this proposal.

Will endeavor keep you promptly advised of all substantive proposals.

HUGHES

[2] Not printed. Document NPT D–8a of Sept. 29 was one of the position papers prepared in advance of the Nine-Power Conference and it was an outline of actions required to accomplish the immediate U.S. objectives in Europe; a copy of this position paper is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363.

[3] Dated Oct. 1, p. 1338.

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396.1 LO/10–654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 6, 1954—1 p. m.

1442. DeCourson informed Embassy Saar situation in wake London conference stands as follows:

(1) Likely Mendes-France who has heretofore given no personal attention to Saar will now turn his mind to this problem.

(2) DeCourson is generally optimistic Saar solution will be found

[1] Repeated to Bonn, London, and Strasbourg.

though had no new slant on problem beyond indicating further talks with Germans would have to take place. No specific moves yet planned by French.

(3) Saar will not embarrass Mendes-France during this week's debate on London agreements (confidence question if posed will cover only general principles agreed at London).

(4) Saar settlement will however, be required before Assembly will give final approval any German rearmament plan after NAC meeting.

(5) Saar problem obviously once more entering active phase.

DILLON

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740.5/10–654 : Telegram

*The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 6, 1954—8 p. m.

Polto 578. Cotel. Subj: NAC Mtg, October 6.

I—*Problem of Associating Western Germany with Defense of West*

(*a*) Discussion of Final Act of Nine-Power Conference

Can Fon Min Pearson, in commenting on London mtg, noted decisions provisional insofar as NATO matters concerned and final decisions would be taken at forthcoming NATO min mtg. Furthermore, conferences propose but national parliaments decide. Principal accomplishments were (1) recommendation FedRep be admitted to NATO forthwith; (2) extension of Brussels Treaty Organization to include Germany–Italy. Latter pushes forward European unity concept and largely fills gap created by disappearance EDC. He underlined strong Can view pointed up in final act that Brussels Pact should be built "within framework of developing Atlantic community" and that "closest possible cooperation with NATO share be established in all fields".

He welcomed close association of UK with continent which would reinforce Atlantic community, and at same time strengthen Commonwealth. In this connection he paid tribute to Eden's historic statement and also stressed great importance Sec Dulles' Sept 29 statement.[2] Pearson noted arms production issue extremely complicated and referred to future Working Party.

Nor Rep welcomed Pearson's statement underscoring importance developing Brussels Treaty Organization within NATO framework, and asked whether it was planned move former to Paris. UK Rep

[1] Repeated to Bonn and pouched to all NATO capitals, Wiesbaden, and Heidelberg.

[2] The texts of the speeches by Eden and Dulles at the Fourth Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference on Sept. 29 were subsequently made Annexes II B and A, respectively, of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, pp. 1361 and 1357.

stated no decision reached in London; matter will be discussed in Working Party. Neth and Belg Reps also stressed importance of closest possible links between these two bodies.

Dan Rep referred to London consensus NAT of indefinite duration and asked whether question of ultimate effect on agreement of eventual German unification had been discussed in London; Pearson replied latter point not discussed in any formal mtg. UK Perm Rep reported matter of duration two treaties had been discussed, and agreement reached a clause would go into Brussels Treaty concerning working in close cooperation with NATO.

Pearson also referred para 13 final act and stated his govt's assumption was no change would take place in existing procedure for distributing Can MDAP. The Brussels Treaty Organization may make written observations. US Perm Rep stated his govt's understanding of this para was similar to that of Can Govt.

*Item I*

(*b*) *Security Arrangements* (see sep tel to Wash, Bonn [3])

II—*Date and Arrangements for Next Min Mtg*

All perm reps accepted October 22 as opening date min mtg which might run over onto following day. Altho no perm reps had firm instructions NAC recorded general consensus only fon mins and def mins would be expected attend.

[Here follow discussion of participation by non-NATO firms in competitive bidding for infrastructure works, a report by the Infrastructure Committee on the execution of infrastructure projects, and brief comments on several miscellaneous items.]

HUGHES

[3] Not printed; it informed the Department of State concerning a discussion in the North Atlantic Council on Oct. 6 regarding the release of classified NATO information to the Federal Republic of Germany (740.5/10–654).

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396.1 LO/10–654

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Barbour)*

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1954.

Subject: London Nine-Power Conference: Possible Association of Norway with Brussels Treaty

Participants: The Secretary of State
The Norwegian Ambassador [1]
Mr. Barbour, EUR

The Ambassador congratulated the Secretary on the Nine-Power London Conference and his part in it, expressing the view that some

[1] Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne.

of the firm statements made by the United States on that occasion appeared to have been most effective in achieving success. The Secretary thanked the Ambassador and noted that he felt he had perhaps been able to dispel doubts in some people's minds as to the seriousness of US intentions to reappraise its policy towards Europe in the event it should be impossible to pick up the pieces left by the failure of EDC.

The Ambassador said he has received a telegram from his Foreign Minister stating that the Foreign Minister will discuss the Nine-Power meeting in the Storting tomorrow and with his Scandinavian colleagues in Copenhagen on Monday, with particular reference to the desirability of Norway joining the Brussels Treaty. The Ambassador asked whether the Secretary would think it a good idea for Norway to join the Brussels Pact.

The Secretary said that frankly he did not believe it would be a good idea. He pointed out that in the concept formulated at London the role of the Brussels Treaty would be principally one of control on European armament, particularly as to the limits of the size of the various military establishments. In the circumstances, he could not see advantage for Norway in joining a pact of this nature. Norway, as a member of NATO, already participated in the most advantageous instrument for defense cooperation. The Ambassador noted that it might be helpful from the standpoint of Norwegian public opinion for Norway also to participate in the control machinery to be provided by the Brussels Pact in relation to Germany. The Secretary, while making clear that he was not in a position to assess Norwegian internal opinion noted that, under the NATO structure, the powers of SACEUR would also be increased, particularly in regard to the disposition of military forces and logistics which, in the opinion of General Gruenther, would themselves constitute the most effective controls against the establishment of a German national army and that, in fact, the Brussels Treaty controls would be of peripheral importance.

The Ambassador referred to the fact that the Secretary has cancelled his proposed radio address on the Nine-Power conference. The Secretary confirmed that cancellation and said that he had done so in the thought that Mendes-France is scheduled to speak in the French Assembly tomorrow and he did not wish to run the risk of saying anything which might disturb Mendes' presentation. The Secretary added that there were considerable difficulties which still might complicate the situation, notably, the status of the Saar problem. He said he had discussed the Saar with Mendes-France and with Adenauer and that it is not clear whether Mendes-France will insist on a solution for the Saar before ratification of the London agreements. He noted that Adenauer and Mendes-Frances seemed to be scheduled to discuss the Saar on October 20 but in view of the contemplated four-power, nine-

power, and NAC meetings from the 21st to the 24th, they would not have much time.

In conclusion, the Secretary emphasized again that he could not presume to comment on or make suggestions as to courses of action for Norway and that the views he had expressed to the Ambassador were extremely informal, not official expressions of the US Government nor anything other than his personal reactions in response to the Ambassador's questions.

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*Editorial Note*

As a result of the special meeting held in Paris on October 5, as described in telegram Polto 566 (page 1371), three working groups were created to continue the work of the Nine-Power and Four-Power Conferences. The Brussels Treaty Working Party, comprised of representatives from the nine powers, SGLO, and SHAPE, held their meetings in Paris beginning on October 6. It was their responsibility to deal with the problems of armament control, the definition of conventional weapons to be controlled, and the drafting of an agreement specifying the maximum defense contributions of Brussels Pact members as well as an agreement in principle regarding forces not committed to SACEUR and police forces. (Telegram Polto 572, October 6; 740.5/10–654)

The second group, the Working Party on NATO Arrangements, was made up of representatives of the 14 NATO members and Germany. The members of this group, which also held its meetings in Paris beginning October 6, were faced with the task of drafting a protocol for the entry of Germany into NATO and a protocol embodying section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference regarding forces committed to SACEUR; they also had responsibility for devising a formula for the association of other states of NATO with the tripartite declaration of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, which was issued in reply to the German declaration renouncing the achievement of unification by force. (Telegram Polto 579, October 7; 740.5/10–754)

A NATO Steering Group, comprised of representatives of the 14 NATO members and Germany, had the overall responsibility for coordinating the work of the two Working Parties and for reviewing their final recommendations. The United States representative on the NATO Steering Group was Hughes, Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council. Documentation concerning the meetings of these three groups is in Department of State file 740.5.

578-017 O - 83 - 20 (Part 2)

*Editorial Note*

The Permanent Commission of the Brussels Treaty Organization invited representatives from Germany and Italy to join representatives from its member countries to form a Working Group on the Brussels Treaty. The Permanent Commission, comprised of the Ambassadors of the member countries under the chairmanship of René Massigli, also invited W. Walton Butterworth to serve as an observer for the United States. This Working Group, which began its meetings at the headquarters of the Brussels Treaty Organization in London on October 7, had the task of drafting a protocol inviting Germany and Italy to join its organization and resolving problems related to that change in membership. A liaison was also appointed to serve as a contact with the NATO Working Parties in Paris; for information on the NATO Working Parties, see the editorial note, *supra*. Documentation on the meetings of the Working Group on the Brussels Treaty, which was occasionally referred to as the London Brussels Treaty Working Group, is in Department of State file 740.5.

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**Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file**

*Memorandum of Discussion at the 216th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, October 6, 1954*

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY WASHINGTON, October 7, 1954.

Present at the 216th meeting of the Council were the Secretary of State, presiding; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Duncan for the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; General Twining for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows a discussion of world developments affecting United States security.]

2. *The Nine-Power Conference and the London Agreements Relating to Europe* (NSC 5433/1; [1] NSC Action No. 1227 [2])

After Mr. Cutler had briefed the Council on the background, he called on Secretary Dulles for his oral report.

Secretary Dulles indicated his opinion that while the conference was not a conclusive success, it had at least avoided the disaster of a neutralized Germany, an isolated France, and Soviet domination of Europe. Thus the conference had succeeded in saving many of the EDC objectives.

Secretary Dulles then stated that while it would take time he thought it would be useful to report to the Council on some fairly technical aspects of the proceedings. Broadly speaking, the work of the conference fell into three phases. First, negotiations between the three occupying powers and West Germany on the restoration of German sovereignty. Second, negotiation among the Brussels Treaty powers and their enlargement to include Germany and Italy. Third, arrangements affecting NATO.

On the first of these three phases, continued Secretary Dulles, agreement was reached to restore sovereignty to Germany with certain reservations affecting the City of Berlin and German unification if it should occur in the future. Adenauer had actively sought reservation of certain allied rights in Berlin. As a result of this phase of the negotiations, the three Western powers had signed a Declaration of Intent which instructed the three High Commissioners to cease exercising certain powers which were presently to be surrendered to a sovereign Germany, unless such powers were exercised by agreement with the Bonn Government. In effect this decision transferred certain powers to the Bonn Government, *de facto*, at once. Adenauer had said that he needed such a *de facto* transfer of sovereign powers to take back with him to Bonn as evidence of concrete achievement.

This phase of the negotiations obviously involved certain questions respecting the so-called "Bonn Treaty" which had been negotiated parallel with the EDC treaty. Certain provisions of the so-called Bonn Treaty had now become obsolete and unacceptable to West Germany. Accordingly, said Secretary Dulles, we had gone through the Bonn Treaty paragraph by paragraph, retaining some things, modifying others, and deleting still others. One of the most difficult problems concerned occupation costs. This whole task had been difficult, but the results were pretty specific and would probably prove satisfactory. The end of this phase of the negotiations occurred with an exchange

[1] Dated Sept. 25, p. 1268.

[2] NSC Action No. 1227 summarized the decisions of the National Security Council meeting of Sept. 24 concerning NSC 5433, "Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe," Sept. 16 (p. 1205); for a memorandum of that meeting, including a summary of the decision reached, see p. 1263. A copy of NSC Action No. 1227 is in the S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action—1954".

of declarations between the three allied powers and Germany. The latter had agreed not to attempt to use force to secure the reunification of Germany or to modify Germany's present borders. The three allied powers had declared their intention to settle such matters by peaceful means and in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.

Regarding the second phase of the London conference negotiations—namely, those involving the Brussels Treaty—Secretary Dulles pointed out that these arrangements would, of course, have to be ratified by the various parliaments and, accordingly, could not go into force at once. This immediately raised the question whether the United States should submit its part in the Brussels arrangements to the Senate. While the Executive might not legally be obliged to do this, it might be a good idea to do it anyway, the more so since German admission to NATO would certainly require the approval of the Senate.

The Brussels Treaty arrangements, said Secretary Dulles, were largely designed to replace the defunct EDC machinery, and the conference had agreed to admit Germany and Italy to the Brussels pact. The addition of the UK, predicted Secretary Dulles, would have both advantages and disadvantages. It was obviously an advantage to have Great Britain tied more closely to the Continent. Yet, by virtue of this closer tie, you bring in a country, the UK, which is not as ready to develop the supra-national agencies. This was something of a disadvantage.

Under the new Brussels Treaty the Consultative Council will not actually make decisions by a majority vote. The Brussels Council does not have the same degree of European parliamentary backing that the EDC was to have, but at least the Brussels Council will be required to report annually to the members of the Brussels Treaty Organization, which are members of the European Consultative Assembly.

One of the principal functions of the Brussels Treaty Organization will be to keep force levels under control. The annual NATO review will continue to fix the desired force levels of the NATO powers, whereas the Brussels Council will have authority to see to it that these agreed levels become the maximum levels, not to be exceeded by any Brussels Treaty power.

There had been much discussion, said Secretary Dulles, of additional controls of European armaments, both production and stocks. Indeed, the most critical aspect of the entire conference was the French demand for an armaments pool. The French had devised very tricky definitions designed to exclude Germany almost entirely from armament production to the advantage of French industrialists. There had been an extremely stubborn struggle over this issue, and it had almost disrupted the conference. The first crisis in this area was resolved by a highly statesmanlike proposal from Chancellor Adenauer in the form of a self-denying ordinance—Germany voluntarily undertaking

not to manufacture certain types of weapons—which Secretary Dulles outlined in some detail. This crisis having been overcome, the French then went on to fight for an armaments production pooling, with the objective of locating the armaments industry entirely outside of the German borders. Throughout this phase the motives of Mendes-France were widely distrusted by the others. There was also a feeling that Mendes-France was adopting rather advanced new-deal concepts regarding government control of the arms industry. However, Mendes-France had finally given in, subject to a promise of subsequent consideration of this problem by the Brussels Council.

The conference had recommended German admission to NATO. This, said Secretary Dulles, would of course require unanimous action by all present members of NATO, but no great difficulty need be anticipated in securing such agreement. The conference had also agreed to recommend greater authority for SACEUR regarding integration and deployment of forces under his command. This was the substitute for the European army contemplated in EDC. Despite its shortcomings, General Gruenther had stated his belief that this new system would in fact make it impossible for any single member nation to use its armed forces in Europe for nationalistic adventures. This effectively abolishes the danger, for example, of a revived German General Staff going off on its own. These recommendations respecting NATO would go before the NATO Council when it met on October 21.

The declarations of the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the stationing of forces in Europe certainly provided the most dramatic moment of the conference. While Secretary Dulles said that he had discussed with Eden and Churchill these commitments, he had not known until Eden's actual announcement the precise and final decision of the UK Government. Eden and Churchill had both been anxious for a parallel U.S. commitment respecting the stationing of forces on the Continent. Secretary Dulles had replied that such a commitment by the United States was not "practical", but that Churchill and Eden need not fear any hasty or unwarranted withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. This was the basis for the extemporaneous statement which Secretary Dulles made after Eden "shot the works" regarding the UK commitment. Basically, said Secretary Dulles, his extemporaneous statement confirmed the willingness of the United States to assist the European nations if they would help themselves along the road toward unity. If the European nations made progress along this road, U.S. assistance would increase; if these nations slowed up, so would U.S. assistance. Secretary Dulles had concluded by stating that he would recommend to the President that he take the same attitude respecting U.S. forces in Europe under the new Brussels arrangements as the President had taken with

respect to EDC. There could not be, however, a strict commitment as to the precise duration of the commitment.

Summing up, Secretary Dulles said that in the main the results of London looked hopeful. Much of the value of EDC had been preserved. The great loss was in terms of failure of the new arrangements to establish the same degree of inter-European parliamentary control as had been contemplated by EDC. On the other hand, the extraordinary UK commitment compensates in large measure for this loss. With strict regard for early defensive military strength on the Continent of Europe, said Secretary Dulles, the new Brussels arrangements may even be better than EDC. However, the long-range integration of Europe will be slower. But, said Secretary Dulles, we cannot always force people to do things they don't want to do, and Adenauer, at least, has great hopes of the French parliamentary elections in 1956.

Regarding the attitudes of the principal governments at the London conference, Secretary Dulles said that he had enjoyed better relations than ever before with the UK and Mr. Eden. The British were thoroughly frightened at what might happen as the result of the collapse of EDC, surrounded as Britain would be by hostile influences. This had induced the British to deal with us more frankly than ever before.

Apart from the historical UK commitment to the Continent, the greatest single contribution in terms of statesmanship was made by Chancellor Adenauer. Secretary Dulles characterized the Chancellor as a "true European who made real sacrifices to European principles." The contrast between Adenauer and Mendes-France was particularly conspicuous. Mendes-France always had his eye on little things; Adenauer always on big things. Mendes-France played an inscrutable game and a lone hand, even with his own French delegation. His motives remained unclear, and the other Foreign Ministers had distrusted him ever since Brussels. They remained suspicious and hostile at London. Eden had actually become very angry with Mendes-France at many points in the course of the meeting, and particularly because of the lack of magnanimity in the response of Mendes-France to the UK commitment. Curiously, as a result, Mendes-France seemed to feel that he got a more sympathetic reaction from Secretary Dulles than from any other of the ministers present. Mendes-France had also put the Council on notice that a satisfactory Saar settlement might be a condition precedent to French parliamentary agreement to the new arrangements. Such a Saar settlement, said Secretary Dulles, would be much more difficult to obtain in the absence of EDC—in other words, it would be more difficult now to Europeanize the Saar, and Mendes-France can use the Saar as an excuse for scrapping the London program if he wishes to.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that he himself had tried throughout "to play it cagey" from the U.S. viewpoint. He had early taken the

position that what was to be done at London was up to the European powers. If these powers could find a means of salvaging EDC, we would go along. But Secretary Dulles had avoided so far as possible any idea that the new settlement had been "made in the USA". We should know, added Secretary Dulles, pretty quickly whether this new program will work. The French Parliament will have an opportunity this week to give its approval in principle to what Mendes-France has done. Approval or disapproval by the French Chamber of Deputies could be expected before the end of the year. Our own American action probably will not be final until some time in February, but the United States should not ratify the new arrangements until the European powers have ratified them, in order to avoid any stigma that this is a U.S. package, as had been the case when Congress approved the EDC arrangements prior to the European powers. Secretary Dulles concluded by stating the hope that the results of London would really work. If not, the U.S. would face a real and thorough reappraisal of its policy in the face of a neutralized, if not a Soviet-controlled, Continent of Europe.

Mr. Cutler expressed the view that the real danger to the new program would be posed by Soviet action during the interval prior to ratification. Secretary Dulles agreed and, predicted that the Soviets would do all they could to destroy the London program, bringing pressure to bear both on Germany and on France. He pointed out that the Soviets may be willing to pay a very high price to prevent this settlement, and that is why we shall have to move fast on the followup to the London conference.

Secretary Humphrey inquired as to the real difference between having certain decisions made by the Brussels Treaty powers and other decisions by NATO. Secretary Dulles replied that NATO had been primarily designed to build up the armed strength of Western Europe. Accordingly, it should not be assigned the task of putting on the brakes to European armament. The Brussels arrangements can, if necessary, apply the brakes.

Governor Stassen and Dr. Flemming at this point complimented the Secretary of State warmly on his achievements at London, and at the suggestion of Mr. Cutler the entire council agreed that the record of the meeting should express the thanks and esteem of the National Security Council to the Secretary of State.

At the conclusion of the discussion, Mr. Allen Dulles asked if it might not now be possible to postpone or revise the various reports which the intelligence community had been asked to prepare against the contingency of a failure of the Nine-Power Conference. Mr. Cutler, however, suggested that it would be desirable that the proposed reports be completed by the time when they were due—namely, October 28.

The National Security Council:

*a.* Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral report by the Secretary of State.

*b.* Expressed the thanks and esteem of the National Security Council to the Secretary of State for his achievements at the Nine-Power Conference.

[Here follows discussion of United States policy in the Far East, Chinese Nationalist offshore islands, United States policy toward Formosa, foreign military assistance, and the redeployment of United States forces in Trieste.]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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**396.1 LO/10–854 : Telegram**

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BONN, October 8, 1954—3 p. m.

995. Thursday's Bundestag debate on London conference dealt mainly general issues; SPD avoided detailed criticism London agreements on sovereignty except for contention they tended establish Federal Republic as separate State, and insinuation that allied agreement to give up emergency and other occupation powers not genuine. Coalition also avoided detailed commentary London agreements, preferring wait until details worked out. Coalition laid main weight its argument on contention that agreements ended link between Federal Republic's military contribution and restoration of sovereignty contained in former treaties, overcame danger US withdrawal from Europe brought closer British commitment to continent, provided basis toward further development Europe unity and reestablished western commitments on reunifications and security of Berlin. Emphasis of debate gradually drawn away from London talks through SPD concentration on reunification issue. Debate made public what already apparent in private talks, that SPD and coalition analysis international situation differ so widely that foreign policy cooperation out of question for foreseeable future.

Coalition arguments this subject similar those of four-year EDC debate, claiming no progress reunification possible before Federal Republic brought western powers to accept reunification as one of their own major policy aims and Western Europe became strong enough compel Soviet respect. SPD did not attack NATO and Brussels pact solutions as such, as it did EDC, but insisted present best moment for negotiations with USSR on unity in light current relaxation international tension and contention future will bring greater increase in Soviet than in western power.

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

Chancellor in top form, gave possibly his best Bundestag speech. Through adroit maneuvering he forced SPD to discuss in detail its concepts of "allianceless" foreign policy for a united Germany and its membership in a security system with Soviet Union. While informed public aware these SPD views and many intellectuals share them, general public not yet prepared such far-reaching approach and coalition now in position demonstrate absurdity SPD's thesis (as simplified by Chancellor) that United Germany should be defended by Soviet Union. Chancellor's success in drawing SPD into position where he could tar them with neutralist sentiments also permitted coalition send SPD motion asking for four-power talks to set up European defense system to committee, thus avoiding situation in which coalition would have had to vote against having talks on unity.

Other points of interest included in debate were Dehler's complete capitulation and return to coalition fold as loyal member (for moment). Unanimity of Bundestag on Saar also noteworthy—economic concessions yes, political concessions no.

Frequent coalition statements concerning continued interest in progress towards European unity appeared be more than lipservice, especially those of CDU. Coalition clearly showed new confidence and solidarity from restoration momentum in foreign policy matters resulting from London conference.

CONANT

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*Editorial Note*

To implement the decisions of the Four-Power Conference in London as they pertained to Germany, the Bonn Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation Regime was appointed comprising representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Beginning on October 8 with daily meetings through October 14, the Working Group met in Bonn to draft the text of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime and its related supporting documents, based on the proposals contained in the Final Report of the Working Party on the Termination of Occupation circulated as document NPC(54)50 of October 2, page 1339. In addition to drafting the text of the Protocol, the Bonn Working Group continued to meet for discussions concerning other matters relating to Germany, such as Allied policy toward the status of Berlin. Documentation concerning the meetings of the Bonn Working Group is in Department of State file 762A.0221. For the text of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, which was included in the Paris Agreements signed on October 23, see page 1435; for the text of the Report by the Bonn

Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, see page 1426.

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762.022/10–1254 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BONN, October 12, 1954—7 p. m.

1040. I saw Chanc this afternoon to confirm final arrangements his trip to U.S.[2] He was in excellent spirits and believes vote of confidence for Mendes-France now makes successful outcome of plans initiated at London 95 percent certain.[3]

On Saar he has in mind wide economic concessions which he believes will satisfy Mendes-France, the emphasis being that no final disposition on Saar can be determined except by peace treaty and free election of new chamber of Saar Parl. He was considering possibility of suggesting a three-membered commission to supervise govt but on this point was still uncertain. In answer to direct question he said he had given up all thoughts of European solution of Saar for time being. He felt an agreement with Mendes-France would be readily reached and emphasized that neither France nor Germany could afford new plans shipwrecked on Saar question. I assured him that US public opinion would certainly not understand any such last minute failure on this point and would probably blame both nations equally, to which he readily agreed.

In response to query as to points to be considered in Washington, Chanc replied that if Paris talks successful he would have nothing on his mind to discuss. Nevertheless, I venture to suggest that we would be well advised to be prepared for this raising question of external assets in connection with chapter six of Bonn treaties and Ger assets in US.

Chanc is planning to arrive Paris Tuesday, 19th, for talk with Mendes-France on Saar and understands four-power talks will begin Wed Oct 20, and Nine-Power talks will proceed 21st and 22nd. He will return to Germany before departing for US Tues, Oct 26, arriving Washington Wed, October 27, as scheduled.

CONANT

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] For a summary of Adenauer's talk with Dulles on Oct. 28, see telegram 1177 to Bonn, Oct. 28, p. 1465; further documentation concerning Adenauer's visit to Washington is presented in volume VII.

[3] For information concerning the vote of confidence in France under reference here, see footnote 2, *infra*.

751.5 MSP/10–1454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, October 13, 1954—5 p. m.

1558. Mendes-France asked me to come and see him this morning. He said he was happy about the vote [2] and while he did not expect the final vote on ratification to be quite as good he thought that if there were no unexpected difficulties he would not lose more than 30 or 40 votes at the outside. In other words, there would be a minimum of 310 to 320 votes for ratification. He then pointed out that the debate showed very clearly that the French Assembly was preparing to accept German rearmament in a spirit of resignation in order to preserve the Atlantic alliance, and that there was no enthusiasm whatsoever behind the support for the London accords.

Mendes then said that there were two items in the London accords which had been particularly criticised by all shades of opinion in the French Assembly. One was the lack of definite progress towards the arms pool concept, and the second was the provisions for distribution of American military aid. Regarding the first problem, Mendes said he realized that there was nothing that could be done at this time and this was something that would have to be taken up by the Brussels Treaty Council after the new accords had been ratified and had come into being. Regarding the question of American aid, Mendes said he would like to register a most serious plea with the US Govt that we modify the position we took at London and agree to have our military aid distributed by the Brussels Council. Mendes said that if it was not possible for us to go the whole way at this time, he hoped that at the very least we could agree to some sort of compromise solution which would represent a definite modification of the position which we had so firmly taken in London. Mendes pointed out that it was very difficult and in fact impossible for him to explain logically to French Assembly why US was not willing to make an arrangement with the Brussels Organization similar to that which we had been willing to make with EDC Commissariat. I pointed out to him, as I had yesterday to De Moustier, that they were very different organizations and that Brussels Organization was in no sense a supranational body.

Mendes said he could not accept this line of reasoning as it was his desire to give as much supranationality as possible to Brussels Organi-

[1] Repeated to London and Bonn. Attached to the source text was a memorandum by MacArthur, dated Oct. 14, in which he summarized Dulles' view that since an objective of the Brussels Pact was supposedly greater European unity, then perhaps the Department of State "might be able to link this objective in some way with a statement regarding our policy with respect to our military aid program."

[2] On Oct. 12 the government of Mendès-France won a vote of confidence by a margin of 350–113, although Dillon immediately warned against overconfidence on the part of the United States (telegram 1562 from Paris, Oct. 13; 751.00/10–1354). A breakdown of this vote and an analysis of why it happened is provided in telegram 1565 from Paris, Oct. 13, not printed (751.00/10–1354).

zation in order to make it a vehicle with which to work towards European unity. He said he felt that the fact that agreement had been reached that the Brussels Treaty Organization could act by majority decision which would be binding on all the governments concerned gave the organization a real measure of supranationality.

He clearly implied that he would be willing to have any decisions regarding American military assistance that might be distributed through the Brussels Organization taken by majority vote.

It is clear both from the results of the debate which Mendes correctly described, and from my interviews with De Moustier and Mendes, that Mendes' major effort in the coming talks will be to obtain some modification in US position regarding distribution of US military aid. It is also clear that any modification giving greater authority in this matter to the Brussels Organization will be well received by the French Assembly and will assist Mendes in obtaining ratification.

Hughes and Collins have been kept fully informed on this development. I would like to suggest the possibility that this subject which seems to be of primary interest to France and the US might be profitably discussed, on a bilateral basis with the French prior to the Nine Power meeting.

Mendes then said there was one other real difficulty facing him which was the Saar. He repeated what he had told me previously that a Saar settlement would have to be signed simultaneously with the signature of the NATO agreements at the end of next week. He said he "would be fired" if he signed any definite NATO and Brussels Treaty accords without signing a final agreement on the Saar at the same time. Mendes said that he was meeting with Adenauer on the 19th and he hoped they could reach an agreement in principle prior to the opening of the Four Power Conference which would then be signed at the same time as all the other agreements.

Mendes then said he had been very much concerned by the debate in the German Bundestag indicating that there should be no settlement of the Saar at this time and by certain remarks that Adenauer had made in the Bundestag which indicated that he might be in agreement with the idea of postponing a final settlement. Mendes said that it had always been a French prerequisite for agreement that the Saar Agreement be definitive. He recognized that account must be taken of German problem regarding their eastern territories and that settlement must be made technically dependent on the final peace treaty. However, it must equally be definitely understood that the settlement which would be arrived at would be the settlement in the eventual treaty of peace.

Mendes said that he intended to talk to Adenauer also about broad Franco-German economic relations. He said France wished to find a larger market in Germany for her surplus wheat and the French were

prepared to open their overseas territories to German trade which would be very valuable concession. Mendes said that if Adenauer should turn out to be adamant against making a definitive Saar settlement at this time he would have to rely on US to convince Adenauer of the necessity of reaching an agreement.

Prior to seeing Mendes I had read Bonn's 1040 to Dept [3] which was very disturbing to me. I fully agree with Mendes that French Parliament will not accept any solution which is not in fact a final one and that if such a solution cannot be reached the London accords will not be ratified. The French will accept any wording which may be suggested to indicate that the final settlement of the Saar depends upon peace treaty arrangements, provided it is very clear that the settlement reached will be the actual settlement placed in the peace treaty.

DILLON

[3] Dated Oct. 12, p. 1386.

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762.022/10–1454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 14, 1954—7 p. m.

1578. As follow-up Ambassador's talk with Mendes-France (Embtel 1558 [2]) Emb officer visited FonOff for discussion details French position Saar. Following was substance FonOff remarks:

1) PriMin is now for first time addressing himself to Saar problem and he has not got into technicalities. However, he is firm on general principles: *a*) maintenance Franco-Saar economic union; *b*) political attachment Saar in some form to Brussels Organization; and *c*) any settlement be given greatest possible air of permanence.

2) Present talks with Hoffman and Saarlanders in Paris primarily devoted to "internal" Franco-Saar economic problems but political questions also being discussed and full agreement expected tonight on position to be presented to Germans.

3) General outlines Van Naters plan [3] as amended in Teitgen–Adenauer agreement [4] still valid insofar as French concerned.

4) Modifications required in earlier understanding caused primarily by disappearance EDC. French now would have Council of Ministers of Brussels Treaty Organization employ an administrator for the Saar. Representatives of these seven nations in Assembly of Council of Europe at Strasbourg would be "democratically chosen

[1] Repeated to Bonn, London, and Strasbourg.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] For information concerning the Van der Goes van Naters report, see the editorial note, p. 803.

[4] For information concerning the Teitgen–Adenauer Agreement signed in Strasbourg on May 22, see the editorial note, p. 967.

assembly" to which Council of Ministers Brussels Organization would be responsible. This is French negotiating position which we gathered was subject modification depending German views which French believe may favor attachment Saar to CSC.

5) French believe Saarlanders will agree to formula which will be presented Germans permitting increased German imports into Saar without destroying French market or permitting re-export German goods from Saar into France.

6) It is recognized Saar settlement cannot be binding on Germans beyond peace treaty, but it should be possible for French to present it as virtually definitive to Assembly.

7) French expect US to guarantee settlement from time its conclusion to time of German Peace Treaty and to promise our support at peace treaty as previously worked out. UK position now somewhat different because UK member Brussels Organization. Accordingly UK guarantee would cover merely promise of support at time of peace treaty.

DILLON

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762A.0221/10–1554

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 15, 1954.

Subject: Proposed Statement on Berlin by Allied Foreign Ministers in Paris.

*Discussion:*

In order to encourage and strengthen Berlin and to improve the relationships between the Allies and the Berlin authorities it is desirable for the Allies to formulate a new Declaration on Berlin. This Declaration would manifest the Allies' intent to relax their exercise of authority over all matters except those of a military, security or emergency nature.

The old Declaration on Berlin,[2] signed in May 1952 and intended to come into effect simultaneously with the West German Contractual Agreements, is outmoded. Authorities of both Berlin and the Federal Republic, have indicated a desire for a new Berlin control document. During the Allied negotiations with the Federal Republic concerning

[1] Drafted by Delmar R. Carlson. A handwritten notation in the margin of the source text reads as follows: "Sec saw and generally approved." The notation, however, does not bear a date. When Merchant's memorandum was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation to the Nine-Power Conference as document PMO R–11 of Oct. 16, 1954, the cover sheet indicated that the proposed statement had not been approved by the Secretary. Document PMO R–11 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 377.

[2] Documentation relating to the Tripartite Declaration on Berlin, including its text approved at Bonn on May 26, 1952, is presented in volume VII.

implementation of the decisions of the London Conference,[3] the German representatives requested on behalf of Berlin, tripartite assurance that the present document of control for Berlin would be revised and would come into force when the Conventions do. A further request was made that the Berlin authorities be consulted in revising the control document.

The UK and French representatives in Bonn indicated a willingness to have the subject discussed with Berlin authorities but were apparently not in a position to commit their Governments to a decision to revise the present control document. It is believed, however, that if approached at the governmental level the British and French would probably support such a decision, although the French may display some reluctance.

Although the Berlin Government favors Allied retention of supreme authority in the city, a liberalization of Allied–Berlin Government relationships and, where possible, more self-determination is desired. While Berlin authorities realize that a new document of control cannot be negotiated on a contractual basis, they wish to be consulted concerning the formulation and operation of a new document. Attached (as Tab A [4]) is a more detailed discussion of the need for a new Declaration on Berlin and a liberalization of Allied–Berlin relationships.

*Recommendation:*

That the three Allied Foreign Ministers issue in Paris a joint statement on Berlin which would

(1) note their satisfaction with the cooperation between Allied and Berlin authorities,
(2) declare their intention to bring about the greatest degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation,
(3) instruct Allied representatives in Berlin to consult with the city's authorities with a view to implementing jointly and to the fullest degree possible the foregoing principle.

Attached (as Tab B) is a copy of a suggested text of a communiqué on Berlin.

Tab B

*Draft Tripartite Statement on Berlin*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, October 15, 1954.]

With respect to Berlin, in addition to the reaffirmation of Allied security guarantees for the city as indicated in the London communiqué of October 3, 1954, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United

[3] The negotiations under reference presumably took place during the meetings of the Bonn Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation. For information concerning the Bonn Working Group, see the editorial note, p. 1385.
[4] Not printed.

Kingdom and the United States have noted with deep satisfaction the close and friendly cooperation between Allied and Berlin authorities. The Three Powers now declare their firm intention to bring about the greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation. Accordingly, the three governments have instructed their representatives in Berlin to consult with the authorities of that city with a view to implementing jointly and to the fullest degree possible the foregoing principle.

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740.5/10–1454 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State*[1] *to the United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes), at Paris*[2]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 16, 1954—1 : 16 p. m.

Topol 466. Re Polto 652.[3] Our general concept regarding forthcoming meetings is as follows:

(1) Four Power meetings October 20–21 would settle unagreed points and reach agreement on text protocol.

(2) Nine Power meeting October 21 (and morning 22 if necessary) would have primary task resolving unagreed points and reaching agreement on Brussels Treaty instruments. These would include (*a*) declaration on accession of Germany and Italy; (*b*) protocol No. I modifying Treaty; (*c*) protocol No. II on arms control; (*d*) agreement on force ceilings.

(As extension of London Nine Power conference, this meeting would theoretically also consider other elements in London Final Act. However, we believe it preferable confine meeting to Section II problems, although it may be desirable to use meeting as means obtaining German approval NATO arrangements resolution, since Germans will not attend NATO meetings.)

(3) NATO meeting October 22 (and 23 if necessary) will be responsible for agreeing on: (*a*) Protocol on accession Germany to NATO; (*b*) NATO arrangements resolution; and (*c*) resolution for NATO-wide association with tripartite security declaration.

(4) *Ad Hoc* 15-Power public meeting would be held October 23 to perform signing of all documents for which this necessary. Believe this meeting should be held Palais de Chaillot. This would appear involve: (*a*) signing by Four Powers of protocol terminating occupation regime; (*b*) signing by present Brussels Treaty Powers of Brussels Treaty Protocols and agreements; (*c*) signing by all NATO powers of protocol on accession Germany. NATO resolutions would not require signing.

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[1] Herbert Hoover, Jr., replaced W. Bedell Smith as Under Secretary of State on Oct. 4, 1954.

[2] Drafted by Fessenden and cleared with Moore, Auchincloss, McCardle, and Elbrick; repeated for action to Bonn and for information to London.

[3] Not printed; it informed the Department of State concerning an informal meeting of representatives of the Four Powers during which arrangements for the Four-Power meeting of Oct. 20 were discussed (740.5/10–1454).

Re chairmanship, agree that Eden should chair 9-Power Meeting on basis extension London Conference. Would also prefer have Eden chair Four Power meeting, again on basis extension London. However would not object Mendes chairmanship if French so desire as host country.

Would suggest limiting publicity to absolute minimum during meetings (1), (2), and (3) above. Ministers will have very tight timetable if above schedule to be maintained. Would suggest only short period for pictures at opening conference. Final signing meeting would of course receive fullest publicity treatment.

Re numbered points Polto 652 not covered above, following comments:

1.[4] This has already been partly done by Bonn Working Group. See Bonn's 1079 to Department, repeated Paris 210.[5] Assume Bonn will also do what remains to be done. Believe Four-Power Ministers might report to NATO on agreement reached, but this presumably could not be done until completion Four-Power meeting. See no necessity for NATO action other than to take note of report.

2. and 4.[6] Bonn responsibility.

HOOVER

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[4] Numbered point 1 of telegram Polto 652 (see footnote 3 above) concerned a list of documents and requested what action would be required at the Four-Power, Nine-Power, and NATO meetings, and what type of report on the Four-Power talks should be made to the NATO ministerial meeting.

[5] Not printed; it summarized the work of the Bonn Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation Regime and outlined the outstanding issues. (762A.0221/10–1554)

[6] Numbered points 2 and 4 of telegram Polto 652 (see footnote 3 above) concerned the provision of ample copies of documents needed at the Four-Power meeting and whether there would be a formal agenda.

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751.5/10–1654: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*[1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, October 16, 1954—5 p. m.

1615. Eyes only Secretary. I have not commented so far on slow down of dollar transfers to France including complete freeze on military construction because, except for information in Deptel 1765 to London, repeated information Paris 1124.[2] I have never been informed regarding policy decision, reasons for which it was taken or objectives it was meant to achieve.

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[1] Attached to the source text was a memorandum by O'Connor to Merchant, dated Oct. 18, which reads in part: "I think the Secretary's thought is that he would like to be in a position to give in gracefully on this matter to a request from Mendès-France and gain a little credit by so doing."

[2] Dated Sept. 27, p. 1279.

It appears to me that irrespective of reasons which led to decision, at least one aspect of this policy should be reconsidered promptly. I refer to the freeze on all new military construction contracts. This freeze as presently applied seems to me to be far more painful to US forces than to French. Its effect on French dollar position is long term and will not be felt in time to have any influence on parliamentary debate on London accords. Effects of freeze on US forces and fact that the longer freeze continues the more it will cost us if and when construction is resumed has been fully reported to Defense by Gruenther.

For my part, I wish to state that under present circumstances, I believe that this rigid freeze on construction which is now fully known to French, is totally ineffective in furthering result which I assume US has in mind, namely, ratification of London accords by French parliament. French Government has so far kept knowledge of this freeze secret presumably because it feels that public knowledge of freeze would substantially increase difficulties of obtaining ratification.

I strongly recommend that this freeze be modified as soon as possible and that CINCEUR be given authority to pursue a flexible policy on new military construction.

DILLON

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762.022/10–1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, October 16, 1954—6 p. m.

1617. Mendes-France–Adenauer talks on Saar are scheduled begin 19th (probably afternoon) and presumably can continue morning 20th since Four-Power talks will not open until afternoon. Outcome is obviously critical future not only London accords but entire Franco-German relationship.

I realize German situation has changed and Adenauer will take position political detachment no longer realistic possibility in Germany since demise EDC and that accordingly while accepting administration Saar by Brussels Council of Ministers it must be clear Saar remains German territory. I am concerned Mendes-France will feel he cannot sell this formula to Assembly and in fact such task may well be beyond even his large prestige.

Best chance for Mendes persuade Parliament accept some political concessions on Saar would seem be clear statement from British and ourselves we are willing make promise of support for present settle-

[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

ment at peace treaty with additional declaration from US we will guarantee settlement from now until time of peace treaty (UK guarantee on this point presumably not required since UK is party Brussels Treaty).

French officials who are handling problem are deeply concerned that Saar may upset the applecart. Heretofore when German situation was more malleable we have felt that given goodwill on both sides settlement could be quickly reached. Now although we must postulate goodwill that may not be sufficient. In past US and UK have traditionally played somewhat secondary role in Saar controversy but time now seems to have come when we should take whatever action possible that would assist both sides in reaching settlement. From French side most helpful step would be in our opinion categoric statement to Mendes-France of our guarantee of settlement and our promise to support it at peace treaty. Such action if taken promptly might assist Mendes in making necessary political concessions to Chancellor on 19th and 20th.

Accordingly I would recommend that Department instruct me to see Mendes-France, who will return from Radical-Socialist Congress Marseille over weekend, on Monday evening or Tuesday morning and inform him US position in sense outlined above, stating that we hope this will help him to adopt flexible position on political problem because of present political situation in Germany.

Such action should of course be closely coordinated with British. Inasmuch as British position no longer entirely parallel to US do not believe Jebb would need make *Démarche* at same time as myself. However it would be essential that British undertake same position as ourselves re support at time of peace treaty.

I believe such a course would be vastly preferable to letting French and Germans run into serious trouble—forcing an appeal to US for help when they already have reached impasse and adopted positions from which they can only retreat with great difficulty. It might then be too late and could delay signature London accords since Mendes-France has indicated he plans sign London agreements only if Saar settlement signed simultaneously.

I would hope Secretary might be fully briefed on Saar before leaving next week in event his personal mediation should become indispensable. In this connection it seems clear Secretary and Eden would be only possible persons who might mediate in event French and Germans unable settle Saar question between themselves.

In view critical importance of Saar problem I would hope we would do everything possible to help French make political concessions (we are informed both sides are willing make necessary concessions on

economic problem) which apparently are needed to meet present situation in Germany.

DILLON

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762.022/10–1754 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, October 17, 1954—6 p. m.

260. Re Paris tel to Dept 1558, rptd London 432, Bonn 321.[2]

I am concerned at Mendes-France's insistence during his talk with Dillon that any Saar settlement reached with Chancellor be definitive and "would be the settlement in the eventual treaty of peace," (Ref Paris tel 321), and reports in press he is considering European solution through Brussels Treaty. Question is not merely one of finding formula that would permit French to claim settlement permanent and Gers to say it was provisional. With intensified interest in reunification which has followed failure of EDC, Ger political and popular opinion far more sensitive to implications of Saar settlement for Eastern border question, and leaders of Bundestag parties are unanimous in their rejection of settlement which would prejudice outcome of final peace treaty negotiations. In present state of Bundestag opinion, Chancellor, who is having increasing difficulties with his own party and coalition partners on domestic issues, cannot consider any solution which can be branded as a sham European solution. FDP leaders raised this point with me Friday at lunch. With hopes for a united Europe now so dim, they cannot consider commitment Saar as future European capital and therefore specifically reject Van Naters plan. Maximum Chancellor can achieve, in my opinion, is FedRep agreement to principle that any settlement will remain in force up to peace treaty, when question will again be negotiated.[3]

CONANT

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Paris, and London.

[2] Dated Oct. 13, p. 1387.

[3] In telegram 1123 from Bonn, Oct. 18, Conant recommended that if the United States and the United Kingdom must give France a guarantee of support at the peace treaty negotiations, such a guarantee must be phrased in terms which would not imperil Adenauer's "uncertain chances of finding majority on Saar issue in Bundestag." Conant suggested that any guarantee contain two conditions: 1) no political detachment of the Saar from Germany unless the area became a part of an effective European political community, and 2) the settlement must guarantee political freedoms for the Saar population. (762.022/10–1854)

The same day Dulles informed Dillon, in telegram 1439 to Paris, that "I do not consider it advisable or even feasible to give French guarantee or advance assurance of our support at peace conference" and that, in light of the French rejection of the EDC which offered prospects of a true European framework, "I am not inclined to go as far in statement of support as envisaged last spring." (762.022/10–1654)

762.022/10–1854 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, October 18, 1954—5 p. m.

1942. Embassy shown today Foreign Office instructions on Saar which confirm no British mediation contemplated for present. Indeed British Ambassadors Bonn and Paris not to approach Adenauer or Mendes-France on subject. In Foreign Office view Mendes should concentrate on obtaining economic concessions which Adenauer reportedly ready to grant and avoid attempt obtain political provisions of Strasbourg agreement [2] which Adenauer no longer able to grant.

Foreign Office Representative added in confidence advisability of mediation would have to be restudied after October 19 meeting. Should Saar be linked to Brussels Pact and Franco-German agreement not reached UK as member probably would have to intervene even if US refrained. If impasse still resulted US would probably have to throw its influence into scale.

BUTTERWORTH

[1] Repeated to Paris and Bonn.

[2] For information concerning the Strasbourg Agreement, also referred to as the Teitgen–Adenauer Agreement, signed on May 22, 1954, see the editorial note, p. 961.

396.1 PA/10–1854 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Matthews) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL THE HAGUE, October 18, 1954—6 p. m.

596. I asked Secretary General Van Tuyll today concerning press report from Paris that Benelux countries are about to issue the expected voluntary statement renouncing production ABC weapons similar to Adenauer's statement at London conference, which report was subsequently denied by Dutch Foreign Office. Van Tuyll said they are running into difficulties. The statement could not be in the same terms as that of Adenauer and latter seemed to prefer that no statement be issued by Benelux if it was not complete as his own since comparisons might hurt him in Germany. On other hand, Dutch and Belgian industry are considerably worried since production possibilities in ABC fields could have dual purpose, that is the output could be both for peaceful uses, but with possibilities for utilization in war. This

[1] Repeated to Paris, Brussels, London, Bonn, Rome, and Luxembourg.

production Benelux would not wish to renounce and hence the complications in drafting statement.

He also reported British as being extremely optimistic over outcome of Paris meetings. While Dutch too are optimistic they believe that everything will not be buttoned up in few days this week and that further discussions on detailed implementation of agreements may be necessary thereafter.

Beyen returned to his office today much restored in health.

MATTHEWS

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762A.0221/10–1854 : Telegram

*The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Parkman) to the Department of State* [1]

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BERLIN, October 18, 1954—6 p. m.

263. Both British and French Foreign Mins have now answered Mayor Schreiber's congratulatory msg (Berlin's 268 to Bonn rptd to Dept 246 [2]).

Brit answered in terms of praise for spirit of Berliners. French reiterated London guarantee and referred vaguely to fulfillment of Berlin's hopes for the future.

One possibility would be that Secretary express in his reply US desire see development of new status for Berlin resulting from friendly consultation with Berliners and giving them greatest possible measure of self-govt consistent with the special status of city. However, in final analysis we conclude that the parties with whom we will be negotiating re Berlin's future status will be fundamentally our allies—and particularly French—and not the Berliners. Therefore, it may be unwise to answer Schreiber in terms which wld irritate certainly the French and perhaps to some extent Brit as well, while at same time not achieving sufficient compensating good-will advantages from Berliners. Indeed, not likely this letter will receive major publicity since Berliners have few doubts about sincerity US intentions re Berlin.

In conclusion we, therefore, favor a brief answer re-affirming our admiration for the spirit of the Berliners and giving the assurance that those occupation responsibilities which must be retained in the common interest of the Gers and the Allies will be exercised in a manner which recognizes both this community of interest and the desire and capacity of the Berliners to govern themselves insofar as the unfortunate isolation of their city allows.

PARKMAN

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[1] Repeated to Bonn.
[2] Not printed.

762A.0221/10–1954 : Telegram

*The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Parkman) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, October 19, 1954—4 p. m.

Unnumbered. In course long private talk between Michael Rose and Knight became apparent that British position with regard change status of Berlin very close to fundamentals our position as agreed between Bonn and Berlin.

First step. Liberal and brief declaration of intent to be issued very soon. Second step. Negotiations between US, UK, and France as to implementation thereof. Third Step. Genuine consultations with Germans. Fourth step. Promulgation of new status of Berlin which would closely follow but be slightly more liberal than 1952 text never promulgated.

In course conversation Michael Rose stated that above position represented his views completely and that he had "every hope" of receiving further instructions from London along these lines in near future, perhaps in time for next Deputies' meeting, October 20. Since Rose efficient and cautious officer, we can only conclude he would not have gone this far without concrete indication from Foreign Office that he is not out of step therewith. Furthermore, not inconceivable that UK may try seize ball and run with it, especially re prompt issuance declaration of intent with its public relations appeal for Germans.

As result above believe agreement at Paris re issuance Berlin declaration of intent should be not only useful but well in realm of the possible.[2]

PARKMAN

[1] Repeated to Bonn, London, and Paris.

[2] For information concerning the declaration on Berlin, which was issued on Oct. 23, see the editorial note, p. 1461.

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740.5/10–1954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Embassy in France* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, October 19, 1954—7 p. m.

287. Paris for Merchant and Reinhardt.[2] Eden's initial predisposition to admit other nations to enlarged Brussels Treaty has been dissipated by Foreign Office opposition and cautious second thoughts on

[1] Repeated to Ankara and the Department of State as telegram 1965, which is the source text.

[2] Merchant and Reinhardt were members of the U.S. Delegation which accompanied Dulles to Paris for the Nine-Power, Four-Power, and North Atlantic Council ministerial meetings.

part of Norway and diffidence on part of Denmark. At present only Turkey is showing embarrassing signs that it may wish to join, though Greece and Yugoslavia are said to have been keeping door open.

It is to be expected that British will be very careful and gentle in manner in which they discourage Turks and all more so because of part they played initially in opposing Turkey's entrance to NATO, but they will nevertheless, if pressed, refuse.

Dominating reason why HMG has come to this view is no doubt undesirability of possibly weakening NATO and therefore United States participation by creating parallel organization to include most Western European countries now members of NATO.

ALDRICH

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 380

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Nine-Power Conference, at Paris* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 19, 1954—7 p. m.

Tosec 3. British Embassy representative under instruction today informed Department following re atomic energy limitations:

Adenauer told Kirkpatrick at London, in response suggestion nuclear fuel limitation be raised to 1,000 grams, he could not accept specific quantitative limitation because his experts not present but willing agree limit German production nuclear fuel for five years to reasonable amount. British followed this up in Bonn with Hallstein and Germans agreed as result Eden could say in Parliament (today) if questioned Adenauer had agreed limit production nuclear fuel to amount to be worked out by experts not in excess requirements for normal peaceful use.

In view above British intend raise matter Paris with view to agreement that appropriate limitation nuclear fuel production will be worked out by experts at later date. Embassy has received no indication British Government has any particular scheme or framework in mind and believes question open whether limitation to be accomplished in purely German or Brussels organization or some other contexts.

British Embassy Paris instructed similarly inform French.

While we regret emergence this last minute problem recommend Secretary support British general approach to problem and agree to appropriate US participation in experts exercise.

FYI problem is rather more complex than appears from British report and we believe exercise will probably develop into finding

[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

solution problem reporting on and justifying production nuclear fuel as result non-military activities plus problem disposing of quantities nuclear fuel excess to non-weapon needs produced incidental to peaceful atomic activities. US interest these problems is wider than US interest what is done in Germany and it may be possible find means serving our interests continental Europe.

Necessity further study here and difficulty negotiating this problem during crowded Paris schedule make British proposal, in which Germans have apparently concurred, most acceptable presently practicable means agreeing on limitation nuclear fuel production although appreciate French might make firm agreement experts condition precedent to ratification. We believe "appropriate limitation" may turn out to be provisions to deal with problems discussed previous paragraph rather than any quantitative limit.

Defense informed. If they have further comments will send soon as possible.[2]

[HOOVER]

[2] In telegram Tosec 14 to Paris, Oct. 21, the Department of State informed the U.S. Delegation that the Department of Defense had reviewed the source text and had no comments. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 380)

762A.0221/10–1854

*The Secretary of State to Mayor Walter Schreiber of Berlin*[1]

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1954.

DEAR MAYOR SCHREIBER: After a few days away from the Department, I returned to find your generous message[2] in the name of all Berliners concerning the outcome of the London Conference and your hopes regarding the future of relationships in Berlin. I can assure you that we retain a strong interest in Berlin's problems and welfare. We expect that future developments will include a growing spirit of partnership and mutual confidence between Berlin and Allied authorities.

Sincerely yours, JOHN FOSTER DULLES

[1] This message was transmitted to Berlin in telegram 195, Oct. 19, with instructions that Parkman should deliver the text to Mayor Schreiber. It was noted on the source text that this message was approved prior to receipt of telegram 263 from Berlin (p. 1398). In telegram 270 from Berlin, Oct. 21, Parkman informed the Department of State that Dulles' letter was delivered on Oct. 21 as instructed and was subsequently released to the press. (762A.0221/10–2154)

A memorandum from Merchant to Dulles, dated Oct. 15, contains the original proposal concerning the drafting of a reply to Mayor Schreiber and it bears a handwritten notation which reads: "Sec approved." (762A.0221/10–1554)

[2] Not printed.

762.022/10–2054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 20, 1954—3 p. m.

1655. French and German accounts of yesterday's Mendes–Adenauer meeting agree that meeting went well, that atmosphere was good and that only major difficulty encountered as with respect to French insistence political agitation in Saar for return to Germany be prohibited. Only difference is as to which side will yield on this point.

Experts of two delegations are working intensively on Saar and overall Franco-German economic relationships and Adenauer has summoned his coalition leaders to meet with him here tomorrow. We understand from Germans that he had planned to summon them in any event.

Following account given us by Soutou. German account being cabled separately: [2]

Soutou states that agreement was reached to use Van Naters' report [3] as basis with such modification as might be necessary in light of present difficulties in carrying out Europeanization by precise states. He states, and Germans confirm, that agreement was reached on formula that Saar statute could not be changed except by peace treaty. French had agreed there should be referendum on the statute but that thereafter it would, except for peace treaty or action by some future Saar referendum, be definitive. Soutou states French position is due to conviction Saar settlement must make real contribution to Franco-German *rapprochement* and that continued agitation following referendum for return to Germany would provide constant irritant. French were willing to give up right of prior authorization for political parties but insist their activities be within framework of Saar statute. (In this connection he cited freedom of US parties within framework of US Constitution.)

Soutou said that complete deadlock had been reached on this point and, in answer to question as to what solution he envisaged, he said that he saw none unless Adenauer would yield following consultation with his coalition leaders. Germans on other hand thought Mendes might modify his stand on this point.

With respect to US and UK commitments, Soutou stated French no longer desired commitment to support settlement in peace treaty negotiations but still desired guarantee of agreement until peace treaty.

With respect to administration, French were prepared to accept one commissioner who would be appointed by Brussels Treaty Council with agreement of France, Germany and Saar but not national of any of three. His deputy would be Saarlander. French state Germans had suggested two formulas: (1) single commissioner appointed by Coun-

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] *Infra.*

[3] For information concerning the Van der Goes van Naters report, see the editorial note, p. 803.

cil of Europe or (2) tripartite commission composed of one French, and one German and with neutral chairman. Soutou said that Adenauer preferred first while his delegation preferred second and that there should be no particular difficulty in getting together on single commissioner. French could not accept tripartite commission. Provision would be made for evolution of administration in accordance with progress made toward European integration.

Both sides indicated that agreement on economic questions should be relatively easy.

While each side seems overconfident that other will yield on political parties, it is apparent that each side recognizes absolute indispensability of reaching agreement this week and anticipates it will be reached. Soutou commented that German thinking, including that on relations east and reunification, already considers German NATO membership in the "bank" and we believe Mendes has same feeling about London accords.

DILLON

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762.022/10–2054 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 20, 1954—3 p. m.

1656. Re Embtel 1655.[2] German accounts of yesterday's Mendes–Adenauer meeting agree that it went reasonably well. Von Walther, Minister-Counselor of German diplomatic mission, said that although warmth which characterized Adenauer–Schuman meetings was lacking, atmosphere was good. He described it as that of "two bankers discussing detailed matters of business."

Von Walther said talks opened with French raising practically all "secondary" points at issue between France and Germany with exception war criminals and foreign legionnaires. Asked whether French offered any "concessions" on these points or whether any agreements reached, Von Walther said no that points merely discussed. Talks then proceeded to cultural and economic questions on which French outlined prospects of extensive France-German exchanges and cooperation. On economic side, Von Walther commented that it was obvious French were anxious to dump their surplus wheat and sugar by sales to FedRep.

On Saar Germans confirm French have agreed that peace treaty rather than present settlement will be definitive. Re economic issues, Von Walther said that so far there appeared to be little difficulty but on political side talks had run into snag over Mendes proposal Saar agreement should contain paragraph banning any agitation in Saar

[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.
[2] *Supra.*

for return to Germany. He characterized this idea as unacceptable to Chancellor but indicated there was hope French would at least modify it.

Blankenhorn in separate conversation phrased this as French insistence upon some sort of legal guarantee that would preclude any change of Saar status before peace treaty.

Blankenhorn also stated German position was that agreement of French, Saar and German governments was in itself the foremost guarantee which could not be upset by mere talk among the respective populations. In any event he could not support in Bundestag any continued restrictions on political liberties of Saarlanders, including opposition to France-German Saar agreement if that was their feeling. French reported agreeable to plebiscite but Adenauer against it on grounds poisoning of atmosphere and impossibility maintaining any party discipline which could be maintained in free elections for Landtag which would confirm France-German agreement.

Von Walther said French strongly desired attachment Saar to Brussels and that while Chancellor preferred Council of Europe he did not think latter would stick on this point. He added Germans had proposed three-man commission (one German, one French and one "neutral" along lines Mommer Plan) to supervise Saar and report to international body ultimately given responsibility for area.

Blankenhorn reported Chancellor not basically inclined to three-man commission since in his view French and German representatives would be in constant opposition which would tend exaggerate difficulties and could be avoided by single commissioner whose loyalties would tend to gravitate towards Saar.

DILLON

## D. NINE-POWER, FOUR-POWER, AND NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETINGS AT PARIS, OCTOBER 20–23, 1954

### 1. PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEETINGS

*Editorial Note*

In the four days between October 20 and October 23, the Four-Power Conference held three meetings, the Nine-Power Conference met twice, and the Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization held one meeting, all for the purpose of reaching final agreement on the instruments through which the Federal Republic of Germany could be integrated into NATO. In the compilation that follows, the editors have attempted to account for all the meetings mentioned

above, as well as the informal bilateral and multilateral discussions between leading officials of the various participating countries that were held during the conference.

In addition to the Department of State central files, especially file 396.1 PA, two lot files were particularly useful in preparing this compilation. The first was the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, which includes 16 folders of material relating to the meetings. The material is arranged as follows: folder CF 377—preparatory and position papers; CF 378–380, 382–389, and 393—telegrams and memoranda of conversation; CF 381—press releases; CF 390–391—verbatim records of the Nine-Power meetings; and CF 392—documents relating to the North Atlantic Ministerial Council meeting. The other lot file was the CFM files, lot M 88, which largely duplicates the materials listed above except that its holdings of telegraphic correspondence relating to the conference is less extensive.

The main telegram indicator series used during the conference was the Secto–Tosec series, which was utilized by the delegation for conference business between Washington and Paris beginning with the Secretary of State's departure for Paris. The Dulte–Tedul indicator series was used when transmitting personal messages from and to the Secretary of State while at the conference in Paris.

For personal accounts of this conference by some of the major participants, see the following: Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1953–1955*, pages 355–383; Eden, *Full Circle*, pages 169–174; Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune*, pages 482–483; and Spaak, *The Continuing Battle*, pages 186–188. See also British Command Paper 9304, *Documents agreed on by the Conference of Ministers held in Paris, October 20–23, 1954*. For the text of Dulles' statement made on his departure from Washington on October 19, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1, 1954, pages 638–639.

Since the records are incomplete concerning which members of the various delegations attended the meetings included in this compilation, the editors have attempted to list only the principal participants present at each meeting. The leading representatives on the delegations of the participating countries were as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| | BELGIUM |
| Paul-Henri Spaak | Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Antoine Spinon | Minister of National Defense |
| Andre de Staercke | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |
| | CANADA |
| Lester B. Pearson | Secretary of State for External Affairs |
| L. Dana Wilgress | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |

| | |
|---|---|
| | **DENMARK** |
| H. C. Hansen | Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Rasmus Hansen | Minister of Defense |
| Anthon Vestbirk | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |
| | **FRANCE** |
| Pierre Mendès-France | President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Roland de Moustier | Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs |
| André François-Poncet | High Commissioner for Germany |
| René Massigli | Ambassador to the United Kingdom |
| Alexandre Parodi | Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| | **GERMANY** |
| Konrad Adenauer | Chancellor |
| Theodor Blank | Member of the Bundestag and Adviser to the Chancellor |
| Walter Hallstein | Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs |
| Herbert Blankenhorn | Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| | **GREECE** |
| Stephanos Stephanopoulos | Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Panayotis Kanellopoulos | Minister of National Defense |
| Georges Exintaris | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |
| | **ICELAND** |
| Kristinn Gudmundsson | Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Petur Benediktsson | Minister to France |
| Hans G. Andersen | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |
| | **ITALY** |
| Gaetano Martino | Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Paolo Emilio Taviani | Minister of Defense |
| Adolfo Alessandrini | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |
| | **LUXEMBOURG** |
| Joseph Bech | President of the Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| André Clasen | Minister to the United Kingdom |
| Nic Hommel | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |
| | **NETHERLANDS** |
| Johan W. Beyen | Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Cornelius Staf | Minister of Defense |
| Jonkheer A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |

NORWAY

| | |
|---|---|
| Halvard M. Lange | Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Kai Knudsen | Minister of Defense |
| Arne Skaug | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |

PORTUGAL

| | |
|---|---|
| Paulo Cunha | Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Santos Costa | Minister of National Defense |
| de Tovar | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |

TURKEY

| | |
|---|---|
| Fuad Köprülü | Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Nuri Birgi | Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Fatin R. Zorlu | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |

UNITED KINGDOM

| | |
|---|---|
| Sir Anthony Eden | Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs |
| Harold Macmillan | Minister of Defense |
| Sir Gladwyn Jebb | Ambassador in France |
| Sir Christopher Steel | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |
| Sir Harold Parker | Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense |
| Sir Harold Caccia | Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office |
| Sir Frank Roberts | Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office |
| Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar | High Commissioner for Germany |

UNITED STATES

| | |
|---|---|
| John Foster Dulles | Secretary of State |
| Robert B. Anderson | Deputy Secretary of Defense |
| Livingston T. Merchant | Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs |
| David K. E. Bruce | Ambassador to the European Coal and Steel Community |
| James B. Conant | High Commissioner for Germany |
| C. Douglas Dillon | Ambassador in France |
| H. Struve Hensel | Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs |
| John C. Hughes | Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council |

For documentation concerning the negotiations between France and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Saar, which took place in Paris between October 20 and October 23 and culminated in the signing of a Saar Agreement on October 23, see pages 1458 ff.

## FIRST MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, OCTOBER 20, 1954, 5:20 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

| FRANCE | UNITED KINGDOM |
|---|---|
| Pierre Mendès-France | Anthony Eden |
| FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY | UNITED STATES |
| Konrad Adenauer | John Foster Dulles |

396.1 PA/10–2054

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation* [1]

SECRET PARIS, October 20, 1954—11 p. m.

At Four-Power meeting of Foreign Ministers to consider report of Bonn Working Group,[2] Eden elected chairman and proposed signing ceremony at 2:45 p m Saturday at Quai d'Orsay. Noted agreement reached by Working Party as of today on all subjects except paras 2 and 4 re stationing of troops and additional sentence Germans wished to add to letter from Chancellor re demilitarization controls annex b(1). Agreement reached on review clause (article 10 relations convention) by insertion phrase "being reached with the participation or consent of the states parties to this convention" after words "or an international understanding."

Re deconcentration (article 10 settlement convention) Adenauer made statement for record to effect that if difficulties arose re disposition of securities which were not solvable within framework present agreement, he would request discussion with the other Foreign Ministers with view to finding solution. Statement noted by UK, US, and French.

Adenauer states willingness forego proposed additional sentence in demilitarization letter annex B(1) stipulating that review at end of year would have effect of excluding civilian research and production from disarmament controls, provided it clearly understood that review would cover this point. Assurances given by UK, US and French and noted in record.

Re stationing troops (articles 2 and 4) Eden and Mendes-France supported allied text in Working Party report on grounds of possible prejudice vis-à-vis Soviets if Allies renounced right as distinct from qualifying exercise of right. Adenauer stressed inconsistency of granting sovereignty while retaining right station troops anywhere in Fed-

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 2 and repeated to Bonn and London. A 35-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 378. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

[2] For the text of the Report by the Bonn Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, see p. 1426.

eral Republic. Pointed to language of Allied declaration June 5, 1945 [3] which speaks of right to station troops in any or all parts of Germany as showing divisibility of right.

Secretary stated that provided rights re Berlin were covered, as they appeared to be in article 2, US inclined favour German proposal of contractual grant as source of right station troops in Federal Republic rather than retention occupation right. Cited advantages Japanese example of basing rights on grant ratified by Diet and clean break with occupation for purposes disproving communist propaganda that treaty amounted merely to occupation in another form. Adenauer quickly associated himself with Secretary's views, but in face continued UK and French reservation agreed on compromise formula suggested by US.

Compromise formula envisages retention article 2 and article 4(1) as they stand. Allied text of article 4(2) modified to read "forces of same nationality and effective strength as at that time may be stationed" etc. Add new sentence based on German (2) to effect "in view of status accorded to Federal Republic in article 1(2) of relations convention and in view fact that three powers do not desire exercise right station forces in Federal Republic except in full accord with Federal Republic, there will be separate convention dealing with status forces in Federal territory".

Working Group will revise text accordingly tonight and text separate convention (annex D of report) for consideration by Ministers Thursday 3 p. m.[4] Working Group also considering revised draft of emergency letter annex B(a) submitted by US, and draft letter from Three Powers clarifying words "similar powers" in article 5 for consideration tomorrow.

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[3] For information concerning the Declaration of June 5, 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. III, pp. 326–327; for the text of the Declaration, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1520, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1649.

[4] In telegram Secto 3, Oct. 21, Dulles informed the Department of State that the four Foreign Ministers tentatively agreed to include contractual agreements relating to the stationing of foreign forces in Germany in a separate convention which was in the process of being drafted. It was proposed that this convention would be signed at the same time as the protocol on the termination of occupation. Dulles requested full powers from the President to sign this convention. Dulles was informed that he was so empowered in telegram Tosec 16, Oct. 22. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 380)

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## DULLES–EDEN MEETING, AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, PARIS, OCTOBER 20, 1954

*Editorial Note*

Immediately after the first meeting of the Four-Power Conference, Dulles and Eden held an informal meeting during which they dis-

cussed the redeployment in Austria of British troops presently stationed in Trieste and the problem of the Chinese offshore islands. Summaries of the discussion of these two topics were transmitted to the Department of State in telegrams Dulte 3 and 6 from Paris, October 21; telegram Dulte 3 is not printed (110.11 DU/10–2154); telegram Dulte 6 is printed in the compilation on China in volume XIV.

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## DULLES–MENDÈS-FRANCE MEETING, HOTEL MATIGNON, PARIS, OCTOBER 20, 1954

PARTICIPANTS

| UNITED STATES | FRANCE |
|---|---|
| John Foster Dulles | Pierre Mendès-France |
| Robert B. Anderson | Alexandre Parodi |
| H. Struve Hensel | Maurice Couve de Murville |
| C. Douglas Dillon | Roland de Moustier |
| John C. Hughes | Georges Boris |
| Theodore C. Achilles | Roland de Margerie |
| Livingston T. Merchant | Jean Soutou |

**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 379**

*Telegraphic Report by Secretary of State Dulles* [1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, October 21, 1954—3 a. m.

Dined with Mendes-France at Hotel Matignon this evening in friendly, informal atmosphere. For French, Parodi, De Murville, Moustier, Boris, Margerie and Soutou were present. On our side, Anderson, Hensel, Dillon, Hughes, Achilles and Merchant also present.

Conversation during and after dinner covered wide range, Indochinese aspect of which I have reported separately.[2]

Mendes-France asked me my present estimate Soviet intentions. I replied at length pointing out inherent conflict between Party and State for control foreign policy. I also noted post-Stalin increased attention consumers' goods as reflection need for even despotism to take into account popular pressures, which tendency, however, should not be regarded as basis for immediate optimism but which nevertheless was encouraging sign.

I underlined heavy burden US reluctantly bearing for defense effort and commented on irony criticism certain quarters of our defense effort which was to so large an extent responsive to historical arguments that

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State as telegram Dulte 4, Oct. 21, "eyes only Acting Secretary," and repeated to London and Moscow as "eyes only Ambassador."

[2] The message under reference is telegram Dulte 5, Oct. 21; it is printed in vol. XIII, Part 2, p. 2147.

first two World Wars might have been avoided had US been militarily strong and had made clear in advance its intention to resist aggression.

I then emphasized importance I attach to progress on disarmament front, although I held out no hopes that early progress was possible. Mendes-France, during entire conversation, listened with close attention, and periodically indicated general agreement. I had impression throughout that ears of Boris were flapping.

Conversation then turned to Far East and I took pains to explain at some length dangers inherent in bombardment and harassment offshore Chinese islands in past six weeks.[3] I pointed out they were stepping stones to any invasion Formosa, and said that we had reached no final conclusion as to action which we would take in event Communist effort to subdue them was launched. I said beyond question we would resist with all our force any effort attack Formosa and Pescadores.

In later turn of conversation Mendes-France elaborated at great length his conviction Soviets would make some spectacular move to prevent consummation London Agreement. We discussed various possibilities this direction and difficulties in path effective Soviet effort. He made clear, however, his belief that Molotov's recent effort at East Berlin [4] was not final shot in Soviet locker.[5]

[3] Documentation concerning the offshore Chinese islands is presented in volume XIV.

[4] Presumably a reference to Molotov's speech in Berlin on Oct. 6; for information concerning Molotov's speech, see telegram 582 from Moscow, Oct. 21, p. 1459.

[5] During Dulles' meeting with Mendès-France, plans for Mendès-France's visit to Washington in November were also discussed; a summary of this discussion was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 10, Oct. 21. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 379) Documentation concerning this November visit to Washington is presented in the compilation on France in volume VI.

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**FIRST MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, OCTOBER 21, 1954, 11:10 A. M.**

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

| | |
|---|---|
| BELGIUM | LUXEMBOURG |
| Paul-Henri Spaak | Joseph Bech |
| CANADA | NETHERLANDS |
| Lester B. Pearson | Johan W. Beyen |
| FRANCE | UNITED KINGDOM |
| Pierre Mendès-France | Anthony Eden |
| FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY | UNITED STATES |
| Konrad Adenauer | John Foster Dulles |
| ITALY | NATO OBSERVER |
| Gaetano Martino | Lord Ismay |

396.1 PA/10–2154

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation*[1]

SECRET PARIS, October 21, 1954—10 p. m.

1. First nine-power meeting opened Palais de Chaillot with nomination by Mendes-France of Eden as chairman and invitation of Ismay to attend.

2. Eden reported briefly on four-power meeting yesterday afternoon.[2] He said agreement had been reached in principle on all points. He summarized Bonn convention on right to station forces in Germany and pointed out this would be signed at present meeting by three occupying powers and Federal Republic. However, it would be open for accession by other governments with forces in Germany.

3. Massigli reported results London working group on Brussels treaty listing unagreed points. These were decided as follows:

*a.* Title of Council would be "Council of Western European Union".

*b.* At Spaak's suggestion paragraph 4 of Article 4 of Protocol I will be reworded to provide that where no particular voting procedure is otherwise provided for the Council shall have power to decide whether it will vote by unanimity, qualified majority, or simple majority.

*c.* As a result of further suggestion by Spaak Article 5 of Protocol I will be revised to provide that Council shall make annual report to delegations of Brussels treaty powers to Consultative Assembly of Council of Europe on all its activities and in particular control of armaments. Martino suggested that Council should report to CSC Assembly and was supported by Adenauer. However, other Brussels Foreign Ministers opposed this suggestion and it was dropped. Objections mentioned included fact that CSC Assembly did not include UK and was based on principle of supra-nationality while Brussels treaty was association of sovereign states. It was agreed that parliamentary dels of Brussels treaty powers at Strasbourg would constitute separate assembly and not subcommittee of Council of Europe Assembly.

*d.* It was agreed to eliminate commission between Brussels Treaty Council and any subordinate bodies including Armaments Control Agency.

*e.* It was agreed to establish seven-power working group in London to deal with such problems as could be effectively handled between signing of Brussels documents and their ratification.

*f.* It was agreed that expenditures of Brussels Treaty Organization would be met by dividing them into five equal parts—UK, France, Germany, Italy and Benelux.

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 7, Oct. 21, and repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Ottawa. A 46-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 390. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

[2] For a telegraphic summary of the first meeting of the Four-Power Conference on Oct. 20, see p. 1408.

*g.* Secretary pointed out that US had interest in relations between Brussels treaty organization and NATO and proposed addition of following text: "Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters." It was agreed to add this language to Article 3 of first protocol.

*h.* It was agreed that Armaments Control Agency should be located in Paris but that permanent headquarters of Brussels Treaty Organization would continue in London.

Steel then reported results of Paris working group on Brussels, again listing unagreed points.[3] There followed rather intense discussion between Adenauer and Mendes-France of table-listing maximum force levels. Adenauer pointed out that table as submitted by working group resulted in manpower totals for France and Italy [that] were considerably higher than those for Germany. He argued that effective manpower ceilings were more important than ceilings on number of divisions which should be subject to modification as military requirements changed and proposed deleting division ceilings and substituting manpower figures tabled by each country at first meeting of working group which would provide 585,000 for French and 500,000 for Germany. Mendes-France pointed out that problem was to set maximum force limits and not to forecast forces which countries would actually raise. He argued that requirements for flexibility were met better by formula in working group table than by ceiling on manpower. He urged Adenauer to withdraw his proposal in view of very delicate nature of this question. Eden then proposed formula whereby Germany would be limited to forces provided in Paris treaty and other countries would be limited to forces agreed in 54 AR. He then suggested adjournment for lunch to give Ministers time to consider difficult problem.

[3] The document under reference is NPC/Paris–D/2 of Oct. 19, not printed, which contained the drafts of the four protocols to the Brussels Treaty under consideration by the Nine-Power Conference. The first protocol was drafted by the Brussels Treaty Working Group in London, while the last three were written by the Brussels Treaty Working Party in Paris and approved by the Paris Steering Group. Protocol II was circulated separately because of its security classification. The texts of NPC/Paris–D/2, its addendum (Protocol II), and NPC/Paris–D/2 (Final) as approved on Oct. 22 are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 391. For the final texts of the four protocols, as they were included in the Paris Agreements, see p. 1441.

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## DULLES–EDEN LUNCHEON MEETING, PARIS, OCTOBER 21, 1954

*Editorial Note*

During an informal luncheon meeting following the first session of the Nine-Power Conference, Dulles and Eden discussed the possible

stationing of British troops in Austria after their withdrawal from Trieste, United States plans to negotiate a mutual security treaty with Formosa, and the problem of ensuring that the Suez Canal remain open to all traffic. Summaries of the discussion of these three subjects were transmitted to the Department of State in telegrams Dulte 7, 8, and 9, respectively; none are printed here. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 379)

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**SECOND MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, OCTOBER 21, 1954, 3:00 P. M.**

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

| FRANCE | UNITED KINGDOM |
|---|---|
| Pierre Mendès-France | Anthony Eden |
| FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY | UNITED STATES |
| Konrad Adenauer | John Foster Dulles |

396.1 PA/10–2154

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 21, 1954—6 p. m.

Reference: Secto 2[2]

Agreed texts on all outstanding points presented by Working Party to four Foreign Ministers, who gave approval at short meeting 3 p. m. Four Ministers will meet again at 10:45 October 22 to consider text of Allied letter on "similar powers" in article 5 in order give Adenauer opportunity to make statement if this should be necessary. Text of letter and coordination of Four Power texts with Nine Power texts at present under consideration by Working Party.

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 5 and repeated to Bonn and London. A six-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 378. The list of principal participants, not provided by the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

[2] Secto 2 transmitted the summary of the first meeting of the Four-Power Conference, Oct. 20, p. 1408.

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**SECOND MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, OCTOBER 21, 1954, 4:05 P. M.**

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

| BELGIUM | LUXEMBOURG |
|---|---|
| Paul-Henri Spaak | Joseph Bech |
| CANADA | NETHERLANDS |
| Lester B. Pearson | Johan W. Beyen |

| | |
|---|---|
| FRANCE | UNITED KINGDOM |
| Pierre Mendès-France | Anthony Eden |
| FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY | UNITED STATES |
| Konrad Adenauer | John Foster Dulles |
| ITALY | NATO OBSERVER |
| Gaetano Martino | Lord Ismay |

396.1 PA/10–2254

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation*[1]

SECRET PARIS, October 22, 1954—3 p. m.

In final three and one-half hour session, nine power meeting reached agreement on all Brussels treaty protocols.[2]

Meeting characterized by French efforts obtain concessions on all points in which they had shown major interest, including long list controlled arms, early consideration arms pool, and channeling United States aid through Brussels organization. French also made new proposal for common schools under Brussels.

One highlight was discussion future ratification plans. Mendes made clear French plan initiate Assembly action November 3, with Assembly approval completed by end year, at latest. Doubted action by Council of Republic possible until January. Spaak hoped complete ratification by end second week January at latest. Martino, however, said impossible complete Italian ratification before end of February at earliest, citing lengthy parliamentary procedures in Italy. Spaak expressed regret Italian timetable and made strong plea for expeditious approval by all.

Below were principal points in substantive discussion:

1. Dispute over force table in Article I Protocol number II finally resolved by stating that air and ground forces which parties would place under SACEUR would not exceed limits specified in EDC

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 8, Oct. 22, and repeated to London, Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Ottawa. A 96-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 390. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

[2] The documents under consideration which dealt with a modification of the Brussels Treaty were the following: Declaration Inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to Accede to the Brussels Treaty; Protocol I Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty; Protocol II on Forces of Western European Union; Protocol III on the Control of Armaments; and Protocol IV on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments. Protocol I was drafted by the Brussels Treaty Working Group in London, while Protocols II through IV were drafted by the Brussels Treaty Working Party in Paris and approved by the Paris Steering Group of NATO. For information concerning these drafting groups, see the editorial notes, pp. 1377 and 1378. For the text of the Declaration and the four Protocols, which were signed in Paris on Oct. 23, see pp. 1440–1457.

special agreement. Special agreement would not be made public, hence avoiding public release force figures for continental Belgian countries. Limits for United Kingdom stated in Article I itself as four divisions and second tactical air force. Problem of planned increase in Italian air force to 1350 needed for interior air defense handled by ministerial understanding that exception be made for Italy to exceed EDC special military agreement figure.

2. Discussion list major weapons subject to control (Protocol III, Article 4), opened with strong pleas by Adenauer, Beyen, and Spaak for keeping list to barest minimum in order insure effective control. Agreement finally reached after item–item consideration. Agree that list would include following: All guided missiles with no exception for smaller anti-aircraft missiles (item 3 on original list), aircraft bombs of more than 1,000 kilograms (item 10), ammunition for weapons described in paragraph 2 of list (item 11) and jet engines, turbo-propellor engines and rocket motors (item 11C). Agreed to drop flame throwing equipment (item 3), propellants and explosives (item 12), and machines used only for manufacture of weapons (item 14).

Mendes made special effort retain last item. Other ministers, principally Adenauer, opposed strongly, contending item 14 went beyond London agreement and pointing out great difficulty defining machinery used for weapons production. Mendes finally agreed omission this item, but on understanding question would be discussed by later working group.

2. [*sic*] Re definition A, B, C, weapons agreed present text Protocol III would not be changed, but that council would be charged with responsibility for more closely defining and up-dating definitions these armaments. No specific agreement on body to undertake this work, but presumably working group intended.

3. Re Protocol IV on agency, French proposed and others accepted new draft Article 10 stating agency "shall direct its attention to production end-items and components listed Annexes 2, 3, and 4 Protocol III, and not to processes. It shall insure that materials and products destined for civilian use are excluded from its operations". Second sentence Article 7 (1) (A) Protocol IV dropped.

4. Spaak objected to Article 19 Protocol IV as inadequate. Complained Article very important one which had no teeth. Article strengthened to provide: That in case more important infractions, council would invite member concerned to provide necessary explanation. If explanation unsatisfactory, council would take measures it deems necessary in accordance with an agreed procedure. Decision of council under article as revised to be taken by majority vote.

5. Separate cable being sent on discussion United States aid to Western European Union.[3]

6. Re further consideration arms pool, French introduced new proposal in form of draft resolution citing importance of national organization arms production and calling for conference in Paris December 1 of seven Brussels powers.[4] Eden, Spaak and Beyen opposed

[3] *Infra.*

[4] The text of this resolution, which was tabled by the French Delegation during this meeting and amended as indicated in the source text, was circulated as document NPC/Paris–D/11 (Final) and is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 391. The text is printed on p. 1429.

resolution on grounds both procedure and timing. Eden stated his definite understanding at London that French arms pool proposed would be studied by expanded Brussels Council after it had been formed. Beyen concerned over early date, pointing out this would inevitably produce wait-and-see attitude among parliamentarians process ratifying London agreements. After lengthy discussion, French resolution finally accepted with two changes: (1) Date advanced to January 17; (2) Only working group to be convened, not full conference.

7. In discussion NATO resolution implementing Section IV London act, Mendes introduced new draft protocol providing that Brussels Council may organize schools and consider other steps for fostering common doctrine and training.[5] Other ministers had little sympathy for Mendes explanation that this proposal merely reintroduced EDC provisions. Other ministers also strongly opposed Mendes resolution on grounds competition with NATO. Mendes withdrew proposal.[6]

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[5] For the text of the NATO resolution, approved at the Oct. 22 meeting of the North Atlantic Council, see p. 1431.

[6] For two additional reports of this meeting, see the telegraphic summary *infra* and the telegraphic report by Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson, p. 1419.

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396.1 PA/10–2254

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation*[1]

SECRET PARIS, October 22, 1954—5 p. m.

This is separate cable reporting discussion at final nine-power of channeling US aid through Brussels.[2]

Mendes introduced subject by handing US delegation during meeting proposed revision Article 22 of protocol IV concerning armaments control agency. Translation French proposal as follows:

"While fully reserving to itself the ultimate right to decide the distribution of end item aid, the US Government declares that it is ready to participate with the agency in a procedure for consultation which would permit an examination on a multilateral basis of the problems posed by the distribution of that aid. French explained they had in mind procedure similar to consultation with OEEC re distribution ERP aid. Secretary pointed out that it would not be possible add much to what had been said at London. With more time, might be possible make declaration which would be somewhat more specific than London remarks and conform more closely to French suggestion."

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 9, Oct. 22, and repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Ottawa.

[2] This is a further report on the discussion which took place during the second meeting of the Nine-Power Conference on Oct. 21; for two additional reports of this meeting, see *supra* and *infra*.

Secretary then made following points:

(1) US would have to retain right to decide ultimate disposition aid, which appears to be recognized in French suggestion.

(2) US wants to cooperate with new program and see it succeed, we have no desire through our aid program to bring about an armament in excess of that agreed by Brussels powers and no purpose enticing any country into violating its agreements.

(3) At same time, we do not want cumbersome and complicated formal consultative machinery superimposed on what exists. This important practical problem for US from point of view appropriations. Hard enough to get funds obligated before end fiscal year, and if they are not obligated they disappear. Hence essential we not go through unnecessary and time-consuming consultations.

(4) US of course has full desire keep council and through council agency informed so that what we do will be fully taken into account and weighed in relation to total program of armament.

(5) If more complete consultation required, it could be worked out gradually as we go along.

(6) In conclusion, US enthusiastically supporting new project, although we do not want duplication processes already in effect so as to frustrate effort we are making to help build defensive strength Western Europe.

Mendes replied he was fully aware validity of argument that US as distributor aid, must be free to distribute equipment as it wishes. On other hand agency, when it deals with armament problems—which French hope will involve widest scope—will have to take into account equipment which various countries receive from US. Agency cannot make its decisions as to production, standardization, and distribution common orders if it does not take into account what each country receives from US.

Two approaches possible: (1) Agency could itself distribute aid received, which does not appear acceptable to US; or (2) system of coordination and consultation could be established. Although recognizing need to avoid duplication, also clear would not be efficient if there were no close liaison between equipment coming from outside and that being produced on continent. Hence would like to see established procedure comparable to that for OEEC in distribution ERP aid.

Beyen expressed obvious interest of other receiving countries in French proposal and asked that they have better opportunity consider it. Eden raised question whether Article 22 protocol IV, which states only that agency will receive from council information re aid received from US and Canada, will remain unchanged. Mendes stressed importance which Assembly attaches to Brussels role re US aid and urged again acceptance OEEC-type consultation, if channeling aid not possible.

Adenauer stated that questions raised by Mendes come within framework of functions of arms pool, not within functions control agency. Agreed at London that questions relating arms pool should be discussed within expanded Brussels framework as soon as necessary prerequisites established. Adenauer agreed, however, that every receiving state had interest in knowing what other Brussels states receiving in way of US aid.

Secretary replied that he would not be able to elaborate much further. However, wanted to make clear that it was our eager desire see common agencies develop to maximum extent possible, and to extent we can help in such development, are glad to do so. However, we already have close relationships through MAAGs and through NATO; we do not want to pile machinery on machinery. Once Brussels council and agency get to operating and we see relationship it develops with NATO and member countries, US will certainly be disposed to adapt its processes to that. However, in advance of knowing how Brussels organs will work out, US would prefer letting general statement of our purpose stand. US would be very glad to consider problem further in connection with studies which council is making and to participate in those further studies.

Mendes stressed again importance aid question and of US willingness consider again French proposals after Brussels studies. Eden pointed out that it had been very welcome practice for US and Canada to attend Brussels treaty meetings as observers. Therefore, assumed that US and Canada would continue to participate in observer role when future studies undertaken.

Mendes asked that whole of above discussion be on record because of its importance.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 386**

*Telegraphic Report by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson)*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 22, 1954.

Defto 242. Nine power meeting which Hensel and I attended with Secretary Dulles yesterday was successful and NATO meeting to be held this afternoon should proceed smoothly. State Department has reported details in full.[2]

During discussion of protocol establishing arms agency Mendes-France approached U.S. delegation with proposal that U.S. agree to distribution of military aid by Brussels Treaty agency, along lines

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of Defense as telegram Defto 242, Oct. 22, with instructions that it be delivered to Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford; copies were also sent to the Department of State and the Foreign Operations Administration.

[2] For two telegraphic summaries of this meeting by the U.S. Delegation, see *supra* and p. 1415.

employed in Marshall Plan. Secretary Dulles ably presented U.S. position, indicating that U.S. Government had to retain full authority over distribution and utilization of end items provided by U.S. taxpayers. In addition he could see no reason for establishment of additional elaborate machinery to be superimposed on existing MAAG structure and NATO relationships. Mendes-France attempted to obtain U.S. acquiescence to future acceptance of French proposal, and Secretary Dulles skillfully rebutted by indicating only that U.S. was, as always, prepared to adapt its processes and procedures for the administration of end item aid, when and if an effective agency was developed and after we saw what its role would be and how it would relate to the existing NATO procedures.

Final text adopted indicates only that the Brussels Council shall transmit to its arms agency "information received from the governments of the U.S. and Canada respecting military aid to be furnished to the forces on the mainland of Europe of members of the Western European Union". Ambassador Dillon indicated that he felt this statement, which will be made available in the record, represented a sufficient additional expression of U.S. position for Mendes-France's purposes.

Protocol establishing maximum force levels for Brussels nations was recast to refer to force levels stipulated in EDC protocol. After uneasy discussion between French and Germans as to nature of proposed protocol. Germans desired inclusion of maximum manpower figures whereas French wanted to include figures of maximum numbers of divisions which would show an eighteen dash twelve ratio between France and Germany. Believe end product most satisfactory from all points of view, especially since it obviates security problem which would have been raised by the publication of actual maximum force figures.

On General Collins' suggestion Secretary Dulles proposed and the Nine Powers agreed to include in the protocol modifying the Brussels treaty a phrase as follows: "Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staff of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters".

The French dragged out their arms pool proposal once again and after tough discussion, with Dutch taking the lead, it was agreed that a Working Group would be convened on January 17 to consider the French proposals made in London on this matter. French had originally desired conference to be called on December 1 which, as the Dutch rightly pointed out, would have placed parliamentary action in ratifying the various protocols in the shadow of the action by said conference.

In consideration NATO resolution, which was eventually passed

without difficulty, French proposed establishment common schools and training under the Brussels Council. This proposition was defeated by Secretary Dulles referring to the point earlier agreed for inclusion in the protocol to the Brussels Treaty as reported above and to paragraph 13 of the resolution strengthening NATO, which paragraph had been inserted on the insistence of the French in the Working Group.

Mendes-France indicated that he will commence the ratification process with his parliament on three November with a prospect of completion before the end of the year. Martino, Italian Foreign Minister, stated that even with an ordre d'urgence he could not complete Italian parliamentary action before the end of February. Spaak stated he hoped to complete Belgian process in first half of January.

While NATO meeting remains to be completed, signature of various documents has been scheduled for Saturday afternoon and pending unforeseen and unfortunate circumstances entire package should be concluded by late tomorrow afternoon.

[ANDERSON]

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### DULLES–MARTINO MEETING, PARIS, OCTOBER 22, 1954

*Editorial Note*

On Friday morning, October 22, Dulles held a half-hour meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Martino during which a general discussion took place concerning problems of interest to both Italy and the United States, such as the Trieste settlement, the question of associate membership in the United Nations, and the negotiations over the Saar issue. A summary of this meeting was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 12, October 22. (110.11 DU/10–2254)

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### THIRD MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, OCTOBER 22, 1954, 3 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

| FRANCE | UNITED KINGDOM |
|---|---|
| Pierre Mendès-France | Anthony Eden |
| FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY | UNITED STATES |
| Konrad Adenauer | John Foster Dulles |

*Editorial Note*

The four Foreign Ministers held a brief meeting at which they noted that the remaining unresolved points in the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of

Germany and its five attached schedules had been resolved by a Working Group made up of members of each of the four participating countries' delegations. For the text of the Protocol, see page 1435. A three-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 378; no telegraphic summary was found in Department of State files.

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## NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING, PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, OCTOBER 22, 1954, 3:15 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

*Chairman*

Stephanos Stephanopoulos

*Vice-Chairman and Secretary General*

Lord Ismay

BELGIUM

Paul-Henri Spaak
Antoine Spinon
Andre de Staercke

CANADA

Lester B. Pearson
Charles Foulkes
L. Dana Wilgress

DENMARK

H. C. Hansen
E. J. C. Qvistgaard
Anthon Vestbirk

FRANCE

Pierre Mendès-France
Emmanuel Temple
Roland de Moustier

GREECE

Panayotis Kanellopoulos
Georges Exintaris

ICELAND

Kristinn Gudmundsson
Petur Benediktsson
Hans G. Andersen

ITALY

Gaetano Martino
Paolo E. Taviani
Adolfo Alessandrini

LUXEMBOURG

Joseph Bech
Nic Hommel

NETHERLANDS

Johan W. Beyen
Cornelius Staf
Jonkheer A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer

NORWAY

Halvard M. Lange
Kai Knudsen
Arne Skaug

PORTUGAL

Paulo A. V. Cunha
Santos Costa
Comte de Tovar

TURKEY

Fuad Köprülü
Nuri Birgi
Fatin R. Zorlu

UNITED KINGDOM

Anthony Eden
Harold Macmillan
Christopher Steel

UNITED STATES

John Foster Dulles
H. Struve Hensel
John C. Hughes

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Konrad Adenauer

740.5/10-2254

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation*[1]

SECRET PARIS, October 22, 1954—midnight.

At beginning of meeting, Chairman asked whether there would be any objections to Chancellor's participation as observer. There were no objections. In brief opening statement under item I of agenda (C–A(54)39 (3rd revise)[2]) chairman emphasized significance Atlantic character of alliance specifically mentioning United States and Canada. In addition, applauded admission of Germany into Western family and settlement of Trieste issue.[3]

Under item II, Eden as Four-Power chairman, reported results Four-Power meeting (C–M(54)91).[4]

Under item III, Eden as chairman of Nine-Power meeting, reported briefly on its accomplishments, noting that Brussels Treaty Organization had been strengthened particularly through accession of Germany and Italy and would provide focus for European unity. Emphasized new organization was not set up as rival to NATO, would not duplicate NATO machinery, but would maintain closest cooperation with NATO. Expressed hope NAC would permit NATO machinery and staff to cooperate with Western European Union. Eden then suggested NAC adopt resolution signifying its approval of Four-Power arrangements re termination of occupation regime and new arrangements worked out by Brussels Treaty powers. Suggestion was accepted and drafting committee prepared draft resolution which was subsequently approved with minor amendments at end of meeting. (Text of resolution will be published tomorrow with other documents.[5]) During course above discussion Lange (Norway) said since Council being asked approve Nine-Power protocols would be necessary circulate EDC special agreement to NATO members since had not been previously circulated and since it was specifically referred to in para 1(A) of article I of protocol II. Was agreed by EDC countries special agreement could be circulated on confidential basis to members NAC.

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 12, Oct. 22, and repeated to all NATO capitals, Wiesbaden, and Heidelberg. A 10-page summary record and a 27-page verbatim record of this 39th meeting of the Council are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the summary record.

[2] Not printed. A copy of this revised agenda of Oct. 22 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392.

[3] Documentation concerning the Trieste settlement is presented in volume VIII.

[4] Document C–M(54)91 contains the text of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany with its five attached schedules along with a covering note by Lord Ismay which indicated that it had been approved by the four Foreign Ministers for signature; a copy of this document is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392. For the text of the Protocol, see p. 1435.

[5] The proposal recommended by Eden is the Resolution on Results of the Four- and Nine-Power Meetings; for the text of this resolution, see p. 1429.

Re Nine-Power resolution concerning study of proposals relative to production and standardization of armaments (C–M(54)89 (revised)[6]), Pearson (Canada) suggested Working Group studying these proposals should ask representative NATO international staff assist them in line with Eden's earlier suggestion re cooperation with NATO. Italian and Greek Foreign Ministers supported Canada's suggestion. Greek also suggested that any proposals Working Group might make should be submitted not only to W.E.U. but to NAC as well. No one objected.

During course discussion item III, Turkish Foreign Minister praised Eden, Secretary, Mendes-France, and Adenauer for results which had flowed from London conference. Noted Turkey had always been attached to idea of European integration. Said "when time comes" Turkey will be ready to occupy place in new organization. (This connection Hughes saw Zorlu this morning. In this afternoon's NAC meeting, Turkish Foreign Minister did not make proposal indicated first para Tosec 12, October 21.[7])

Re item IV, only comment came from Portuguese Foreign Minister who wanted it placed on record that Portugal was not included in area of Allied Command Europe. Resolution was adopted without change.[8]

Re item V, eleven other members of NATO associated themselves in brief statements containing varying minor reservations with Three-Power London Declaration re FedRep and draft resolution of association was adopted without change.[9]

Re item VI, protocol of accession of FedRep to NATO was adopted without change after brief statements by Italian, Danish, Norwegian, and Greek Foreign Ministers.[10] Danish Foreign Minister expressed hope German entry in NATO would prove to be forerunner satisfactory solution Danish minority problem in Schleswig-Holstein. Was

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[6] A copy of this draft resolution is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392; for the text of this resolution, see p. 1430.

[7] Not printed; it informed the U.S. Delegation in Paris that the Turkish Embassy had advised the Department of State on Oct. 20 that the Turkish Government desired to accede to the Brussels Treaty and was therefore concerned about the decision that future accessions were dependent upon unanimous consent of all treaty signatories. They intended to propose during the present Council meeting that any NATO member could accede to the Brussels Treaty without unanimous consent. (396.1 PA/10–2154)

[8] The item under reference is the Resolution To Implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference Concerning the Powers of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. A draft of this resolution, which was circulated as document C–M(54)85, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392; for the approved text of this resolution, see p. 1431.

[9] For the approved text of the Resolution of Association with the Tripartite Declaration of Oct. 3, 1954, see p. 1435; the draft of this resolution, which was circulated as document C–M(54)82, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392.

[10] The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany is printed on p. 1456; earlier drafts of this protocol, which were circulated as documents C–M(54)83 and C–M(54)83(Revised) of Oct. 16 and Oct. 19, respectively, are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392.

agreed protocol would be signed in Palais at approximately 4:30 Saturday afternoon.

Re item VII, Chairman noted annual review report and capabilities study would be ready for consideration by Ministers by mid-December and proposed that NAC agree in principle meet about that time. Suggested exact date could be recommended later by permanent reps. This was agreed.

Under item VIII (any other business) Italian Foreign Minister commented briefly on Trieste settlement expressing appreciation for sympathy from France and assistance from U.S. and U.K. Portuguese Foreign Minister invited attention to Goa situation saying might be necessary some day raise matter before Council under article IV of N.A. Treaty. Secretary, Mendes-France and Eden then made statements commenting on significance of developments during past several weeks. (See separate tel reporting their remarks *in extenso*.[11])

Meeting then adjourned for thirty minutes since drafting groups on communiqué and resolution suggested by Eden had not finished their work. Meeting then reassembled and adopted resolution suggested by Eden. As drafting group had still not finished communiqué, chairman suggested that meeting consider itself Fifteen-Power conference to enable it to hear remarks from Chancellor. Adenauer then made very brief statement commenting on importance which German people as whole would attach to today's decisions. Meeting then reconstituted itself as NAC and approved communiqué with a few drafting amendments suggested by Secretary and by Eden.[12]

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[11] The editors were unable to identify further the telegram under reference.

[12] For the text of the NATO communiqué issued on Oct. 22, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 732.

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## DULLES–EDEN MEETING, PARIS, OCTOBER 23, 1954

*Editorial Note*

During the morning of Saturday, October 23, Dulles, accompanied by General Gruenther, spoke with Eden and Macmillan concerning the stationing of their troops in Trieste, and the British gave the impression that these troops would not be sent to Austria but would be brought home. Dulles then spoke with Eden about the British pledge to help finance UNRRA. Summaries of the discussion of these two subjects were transmitted to the Department of State in telegrams Dulte 14 and 15 from Paris, October 23; telegram Dulte 14 is printed in the compilation on Austria in volume VII. Telegram Dulte 15, not printed, is in Department of State file 357.AD/10–2354.

578-017 O - 83 - 23 (Part 2)

## SIGNING CEREMONIES FOR THE PARIS AGREEMENTS, PARIS, OCTOBER 23, 1954

*Editorial Note*

At 2:45 p. m. on Saturday, October 23, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany met in the traditional Clock Room of the French Foreign Ministry to sign the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in Germany. A photograph of the signing is printed on page 570.

Immediately following this ceremony, the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg gathered in the same room to sign the Declaration Inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany To Accede to the Brussels Treaty and its four Protocols.

At 4:30 p. m. that afternoon, the 14 Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries met at the Palais de Chaillot for a formal signing ceremony for the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany. A photograph of the signing is printed on page 569. For the texts of all the documents noted above, which were subsequently referred to collectively as the Paris Agreements, see pages 1435 ff.

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## DULLES–EDEN–MENDÈS-FRANCE MEETING, PARIS, OCTOBER 23, 1954

*Editorial Note*

Following the signing ceremonies, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France held an informal meeting during which they discussed the role of Jules Moch at the United Nations, how they should respond to the Soviet note of October 23, and the situation in Indochina. A summary of the discussion of these three subjects was transmitted to the Department of State in telegrams 1715, 1716, and 1717 from Paris, October 23; telegram 1715 is not printed (396.1 PA/10–2354), telegram 1716 is printed on page 1462, and telegram 1717 is printed in volume XIII, Part 2, page 2165.

## 2. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 378**

*Report by the Bonn Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany* [1]

BONN, 16 October 1954.

The Committee of representatives of the Governments of the Federal

[1] Attached to the source text, in addition to a cover sheet and list of contents, were five annexes totaling approximately 110 pages. The annexes, not printed

Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States established in accordance with the Final Act of the Nine Power Conference, signed in London on the 3rd of October, to complete the final texts of the necessary Instruments for the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany has met in Bonn and submits the following report.

*Recommendations*

2. There is submitted herewith at Annex 'A'[2] and recommended for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, a draft Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany together with five Schedules annexed to it, setting out amendments to the Agreements between the four Governments signed at Bonn on the 26th of May 1952.

3. There are also submitted at Annex 'B'[3] certain draft Exchanges of Letters which it is recommended should be signed on the occasion of the signing of the Protocol. The Foreign Ministers will note that this Annex includes an Exchange of Letters concerning the affirmation, deletion or amendment, as appropriate, of the various published letters which related to the signing of the Bonn Conventions. The draft Exchange of Letters also includes one relating to certain other documents written at that time but not published.

4. In the preparation of Annex 'B', no action has been taken with regard to the Letters connected with the signature of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community, which are set out in the Federal Government's *Official Gazette* (*Bundesgesetzblatt*) 1954, Part II Number 3 at pages 416 to 418 inclusive, but it was agreed that this did not preclude discussion of their subject matter at some other time.

5. It is recommended that the Foreign Ministers note the agreed comments in Annex 'E'.[3]

*Request for decision*

*The Stationing of Forces in the Federal Republic*

6. Annex 'C'[3] to this Report sets out texts of Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the Relations Convention, with annotations showing the differences of opinion. Annex 'D'[3] sets out a German proposal for the separate Con-

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here, contain the following: Annex A—Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime (with five schedules); Annex B—Draft Exchanges of Letters; Annex C—Disagreed Articles 2, 4 and 5 of Convention on Relations; Annex D—German Proposal on a Separate Convention; and Annex E—Agreed Comments. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 378) The source text with its five annexes was submitted to the Four-Power Conference for consideration at the first meeting in Paris on Oct. 20; for a telegraphic summary of the first Four-Power meeting, see p. 1408. For information concerning the Bonn Working Group, which drafted this report, see the editorial note, p. 1385.

[2] Not printed. For the text of the final Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime, see p. 1435.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 1 above.

vention referred to in the Note to the German text of paragraph 2 of Article 4 in Annex 'C'. The essential difference between the various positions is the following. The U.S., U.K. and French Delegations feel that the right to station forces in Germany deriving from the instruments to which their Governments and the Soviet Union are parties relate to Germany as a whole and that this right is indivisible. While they feel that any language casting doubt on the maintenace of this right would weaken the Western position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union with respect to Berlin and in negotiations on the reunification of Germany, they agree that the *exercise* of the right in the territory of the Federal Republic should be on a contractual basis after the entry into force of the arrangements for the German defence contribution. The German delegation feels that the right to station forces cannot be a reserved right and at the same time be based on a contractual relationship. They consider that it is not indivisible but can be relinquished for the western part of Germany, and that it is not needed vis-à-vis the Soviets, who themselves base the stationing of their forces in Eastern Germany on the contractual consent of the G.D.R. The other three delegations do not agree that the Soviet Declaration on Relations with the G.D.R. places the Soviet forces in the East Zone on a contractual basis. This difference of opinion is submitted to Ministers for decision.

*Note*

The following action will be required when Ministers have agreed the texts of Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the Relations Convention:

(i) Insert the agreed texts of those Articles in Schedule I to the Protocol.

(ii) Amend the references in Article 9(3) of the Relations Convention.

(iii) Amend the reference to Article 2(1) (*c*) of the Relations Convention in Letter No. 2 in *Bundesgesetzblatt* 1954, Teil II, Nr. 3, page 244, by completing the Schedule to Letter (*h*) in Annex 'B' to take account of the change of numbering of the provision relevant to Letter No. 2.

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## *Tripartite Statement on Berlin by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France* [1]

PARIS, October 23, 1954.

With respect to Berlin, in addition to the Allied security guarantees for the city in the London communiqué of October 3, 1954, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have noted with deep satisfaction the close and friendly cooperation between

[1] Reprinted from the Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 732. For information concerning the issuance of this statement, see the editorial note, p. 1461.

the Allied and Berlin authorities. The Three Powers are determined to ensure the greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation. Accordingly, the three Governments have instructed their representatives in Berlin to consult with the authorities of that city with a view to implementing jointly and to the fullest degree possible the foregoing principles.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 391**

*Resolution on Production and Standardization of Armaments* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, 22 October, 1954.

The Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

*Anxious* to increase the effectiveness of their common Defence forces to the maximum,

*Desirous* of ensuring the best possible use of their available armament credits by means of the rational organization of production,

*Noting* the importance in this connection of standardising weapons and weapon components,

*Desirous* of facilitating any agreements to this end between all or certain of the Seven Powers:

(1) *Recall* the decision taken at the London Conference to set up a Working Party to study the draft directives submitted by the French Government on 1st October 1954 and such other documents as might subsequently be submitted on the problem of the production and standardisation of armaments.

(2) *Agree* to convene a Working Group in Paris on the 17th January 1955 of the Representatives of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, to study the draft directives and other documents referred to in the foregoing paragraph, with a view to submitting proposals to the Council of Western European Union when it comes into being.

[1] This resolution, which was circulated as document NPC/Paris-D/11(Final), was approved by the Nine-Power Conference during its second meeting on Oct. 21; see p. 1414.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392**

*Resolution on Results of the Four- and Nine-Power Meetings* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, 22 October, 1954.

*The North Atlantic Council:*

*Recognising* that all the arrangements arising out of the London

[1] This resolution, which was circulated as document C-M(54)93(Final), was approved by the North Atlantic Council during its meeting on Oct. 22; for a record of that meeting, see p. 1422.

Conference form part of one general settlement which is directly or indirectly of concern to all the NATO Powers and has therefore been submitted to the Council for information or decision;

*Have learnt* with satisfaction of the arrangements agreed between the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and of the Federal Republic of Germany for the termination of the occupation régime in the Federal Republic as set forth in the Protocol communicated to the Council;

*Welcome* the decision of the Brussels Treaty Powers to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty as modified and completed by the Protocols and other documents communicated to the Council, and hereby record their agreement with the provisions of those Protocols and documents insofar as they concern action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

*Welcome* the extension of the Brussels Treaty as an important step toward the achievement of European unity; and express confidence that there will be the closest co-operation between the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which remains the foundation of the security and progress of the Atlantic Community.

*Take note* with satisfaction of the statements made on 29th September 1954 in London by the United States Secretary of State and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, and of the declaration by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom concerning the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the continent of Europe;

*Finally*,

*Record* their deep satisfaction at the happy conclusion of all the above arrangements which together constitute a decisive step in fortifying the North Atlantic Alliance and uniting the Free World.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392**

*Resolution Concerning a Study of Proposals Relative to Production and Standardization of Armaments* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 21, 1954.

The Governments of [Signatories of Protocol No. 1],[2]

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[1] This resolution, which was circulated as document C–M(54)89(Revised) along with a covering note by Secretary-General Ismay, was discussed by the North Atlantic Council during its meeting on Oct. 22; for a record of that meeting, see p. 1422.

[2] The signatories of Protocol I (modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty) are Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom. Brackets in the source text.

*Anxious* to increase the effectiveness of their common defence forces to the maximum,

*Desirous* of ensuring the best possible use of their available armament budgets by means of a rational organization of production,

*Noting* the importance in this connection of standardising weapons and weapon components,

*Desirous* of facilitating any agreements to this end between all or certain of the Seven Powers:

(1) *Recall* the decision taken at the London Conference to set up a working Party to study the draft directives submitted by the French Government on 1st October, 1954 and such other documents as might subsequently be submitted on the problem of the production and standardisation of armaments.

(2) *Agree* to convene a Working Group in Paris on 17th January, 1955 of the Representatives of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to study the draft directives and other documents referred to in the foregoing paragraph, with a view to submitting proposals to the Council of Western European Union when it comes into being.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392**

## *Draft Resolution To Implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 19, 1954.

*The North Atlantic Council:*

1. *Recognising* the necessity of strengthening the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of reinforcing the machinery for the collective defence of Europe, and desirous of specifying the conditions governing joint examination of the defence effort of member countries,

2. *Recalls* that:

(*a*) the resources which member nations intend to devote to their defence effort as well as the level, composition and quality of the forces which the member nations are contributing to the defence of the North Atlantic area are each year subject to collective examination in the NATO Annual Review for the purpose of reaching agreement on force goals, taking into account expected mutual aid;

(*b*) the defence expenditures incurred by the member nations and the extent to which the recommendations emerging from the Annual

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[1] This draft resolution, which was circulated as document C–M(54)85 along with a covering note by Secretary General Ismay, was approved without change by the North Atlantic Council during its meeting on Oct. 22; for a record of that meeting, see p. 1422.

Review have been carried out are the subject of periodical review during the year.

3. *Agrees* with the terms of the Agreement on Forces of Western European Union; and that with respect to the forces which the members of Western European Union will place under NATO Command on the mainland of Europe and for which maximum figures have been established in that Agreement, if at any time during the NATO Annual Review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the limits established in this Agreement, the acceptance by the country concerned of such recommended increases shall be subject to unanimous approval by the members of Western European Union, expressed either in the Council of Western European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

4. *Decides* that all forces of member nations stationed in the area of the Allied Command Europe shall be placed under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe or other appropriate NATO Command and under the direction of the NATO military authorities with the exception of those forces intended for the defence of overseas territories and other forces which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command.

5. *Invites* member nations to make an initial report for consideration and recognition by the Council on those forces which they plan to maintain within the area of Allied Command Europe for the common defence, but not to place under the authority of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, taking into account the provisions of relevant NATO directives bearing on that subject; the initial report will include a broad statement of the reason for which the above forces are not so placed. Thereafter, if any changes are proposed, the North Atlantic Council action on the NATO Annual Review will constitute recognition as to the suitability and size of forces to be placed under the authority of the appropriate NATO Command and those to be retained under national command.

6. *Notes* that the agreements concluded within the framework of the Organization of Western European Union on the internal defence and police forces which the members of that Organization will maintain on the mainland shall be notified to the North Atlantic Council.

7. *Agrees*, in the interest of most effective collective defence, that in respect of combat forces in the area of Allied Command Europe and under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe;

(*a*) all deployments shall be in accordance with NATO strategy;

(*b*) the location of forces in accordance with NATO operational plans shall be determined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned;

(*c*) forces under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and within the area of Allied Command Europe shall not be redeployed or used operationally within that area without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, subject to political guidance furnished by the North Atlantic Council, when appropriate, through normal channels.

8. *Decides* that:

(*a*) integration of forces at Army Group and Tactical Air Force level shall be maintained;

(*b*) in view of the powerful combat support units and logistic support organization at Army level, integration at that level and associated Air Force level will be the rule, wherever formations of several nationalities are operating in the same area and on a common task, provided there are no overriding objections from the point of view of military effectiveness;

(*c*) wherever military efficiency permits, in light of the size, location and logistic support of forces, integration at lower levels, both in the land and air forces, shall be achieved to the maximum extent possible;

(*d*) proposals to the North Atlantic Council, indicating any increases in commonly financed items of expenditure, such as infrastructure which might be entailed by the adoption of such measures, should be submitted by the NATO military authorities.

9. *Agrees* that, in order to improve the capability of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to discharge his responsibilities in the defence of Allied Command Europe, his responsibilities and powers for the logistic support of the forces placed under his authority shall be extended.

10. *Considers* that these increased responsibilities and powers should include authority:

(*a*) to establish, in consultation with the national authorities concerned, requirements for the provision of logistic resources;*

(*b*) to determine, in agreement with the national authorities concerned, their geographic distribution;

(*c*) to establish, in consultation with these authorities, logistic priorities for the raising, equipping and maintenance of units;

(*d*) to direct the utilisation, for meeting his requirements, of those portions of the logistic support systems made available to him by the appropriate authorities;

(*e*) to co-ordinate and supervise the use, for logistical purposes, of

*By logistic resources should be understood all the matériel, supplies, installations and parts thereof necessary for the prolonged conduct of combat operations. [Footnote in the source text.]

NATO common infrastructure facilities and of those national facilities made available to him by the national authorities.

11. *Agrees* that in order to ensure that adequate information is obtained and made available to the appropriate authorities about the forces placed under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe including reserve formations and their logistic support within the area of Allied Command Europe, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe shall be granted increased authority to call for reports regarding the level and effectiveness of such forces and their armaments, equipment and supplies as well as the organization and location of their logistic arrangements. He shall also make field inspections within that area as necessary.

12. *Invites* nations to submit to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe such reports to this end as he may call for from time to time; and to assist inspection within the area of Allied Command Europe by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of these forces and their logistic support arrangements as necessary.

13. *Confirms* that the powers exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime extend not only to the organization into an effective integrated force of the forces placed under him but also to their training; that in this field, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe has direct control over the higher training of all national forces assigned to his command in peacetime; and that he should receive facilities from member nations to inspect the training of those cadre and other forces within the area of Allied Command Europe earmarked for that Command.

14. *Directs* the NATO military authorities to arrange for the designation by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of a high-ranking officer of his Command who will be authorised to transmit regularly to the Council of Western European Union information relating to the forces of the members of Western European Union on the mainland of Europe acquired as a result of the reports and inspections mentioned in paragraphs 11 and 12 in order to enable that Council to establish that the limits laid down in the special agreement mentioned in paragraph 3 above are being observed.

15. *Agrees* that the expression "the area of Allied Command Europe" as used throughout this resolution shall not include North Africa; and that this Resolution does not alter the present status of the United Kingdom and United States forces in the Mediterranean.

16. *Directs* the NATO Military Committee to initiate the necessary changes in the directives to give effect to the above policies and objectives of the North Atlantic Council.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392

*Draft Resolution of Association* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 16, 1954.

*The North Atlantic Council,*

*Welcoming* the declaration made in London by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on 3rd October, 1954 (Annex A [2]), and the related declaration made on the same occasion by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic (Annex B[2]),

*Notes with satisfaction* that the representatives of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have, on behalf of their Governments today associated themselves with the aforesaid declaration of the Three Powers.

[1] This draft resolution, which was circulated as document C–M(54)82 along with a covering note by Secretary General Ismay, was approved without change by the North Atlantic Council during its meeting on Oct. 22; for a record of that meeting, see p. 1422.

[2] Not printed here, but see Part V of the Final Act of the London Nine-Power Conference, p. 1352.

*Editorial Note*

The following documents, which were signed in Paris on October 23 by representatives of the Four-Power Conference, the Nine-Power Conference, and the North Atlantic Ministerial Council, were commonly referred to as the "Paris Agreements": Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in Germany, Declaration Inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany To Accede to the Brussels Treaty, Protocols to the Brussels Treaty, and Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany. Information concerning the drafting, approval, and signature of these documents is given in the annotation provided with each text.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392

*Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 21, 1954.

The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Brit-

[1] According to a covering note by Secretary General Ismay attached to the source text, this protocol, which was circulated as document C–M(54)91, was approved by the Four-Power Conference during its third meeting on Oct. 22 and was placed on the agenda of the Nine-Power Conference and the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting for information; regarding the third meeting of the Four-Power Conference, see p. 1421.

ain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany agree as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Finance Convention, the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation, signed at Bonn on 26 May 1952,[2] the Protocol signed at Bonn on 27 June 1952 to correct certain textual errors in the aforementioned Conventions, and the Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Members signed at Bonn on 26 May 1952, as amended by the Protocol signed at Bonn on 26 July 1952, shall be amended in accordance with the five Schedules to the present Protocol [3] and as so amended shall enter into force (together with subsidiary documents agreed by the Signatory States relating to any of the aforementioned instruments) simultaneously with it.

ARTICLE 2

Pending the entry into force of the arrangements for the German Defence Contribution, the following provisions shall apply:

(1) The rights heretofore held or exercised by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic relating to the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation shall be retained and exercised by them, and nothing in any of the instruments mentioned in Article 1 of the present Protocol shall authorise the enactment, amendment, repeal or deprivation of effect of legislation or, subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this Article, executive action in those fields by any other authority.

(2) On the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Military Security Board shall be abolished (without prejudice to the validity of any action or decisions taken by it) and the controls in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation shall thereafter be applied by a Joint Four-Power Organization to which each of the Signatory States

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[2] Documentation concerning these Conventions and Protocols signed at Bonn on May 26, is presented in volume VII.

[3] The five Schedules attached to the source text, not printed, are as follows: Schedule I—Amendments to the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany; Schedule II—Amendments to the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany; Schedule III—Amendments to the Finance Convention; Schedule IV—Amendments to the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation; and Schedule V—Amendments to the Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Members. The texts of these Schedules are printed in 6 UST (pt. 4) 4117.

shall appoint one representative and which shall take its decisions by majority vote of the four members.

(3) The Governments of the Signatory States will conclude an administrative agreement which shall provide, in conformity with the provisions of this Article, for the establishment of the Joint Four-Power Commission and its staff and for the organization of its work.

ARTICLE 3

(1) The present Protocol shall be ratified or approved by the Signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The Instruments of Ratification or Approval shall be deposited by the Signatory States with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

(2) The present Protocol and subsidiary documents relating to it agreed between the Signatory States shall enter into force upon the deposit by all the Signatory States of the Instruments of Ratification of Approval as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article.

(3) The present Protocol shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which will furnish each Signatory State with certified copies thereof and notify each State of the date of entry into force of the present Protocol.

*In faith whereof* the undersigned Representatives duly authorized thereto have signed the present Protocol.[4]

DONE at Paris this ———— day of October, 1954, in three texts, in the English, French and German languages, all being equally authentic.

[4] During the ceremonies in Paris on Oct. 23, the source text was signed by John Foster Dulles, Anthony Eden, Pierre Mendès-France, and Konrad Adenauer.

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*Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 22, 1954.

In view of the present international situation and the need to ensure the defence of the free world which require the continuing presence of foreign forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany agree as follows:

[1] The source text was circulated as document C–M(54)92 along with a covering note by Secretary General Ismay.

ARTICLE 1

1. From the entry into force of the arrangements for the German Defence Contribution, forces of the same nationality and effective strength as at that time may be stationed in the Federal Republic.

2. The effective strength of the forces stationed in the Federal Republic pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article may at any time be increased with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic.

3. Additional forces of the States parties to the present Convention may enter and remain in the Federal territory with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic for training purposes in accordance with the procedures applicable to forces assigned to the Supreme Allied Command, Europe, provided that such forces do not remain there for more than 30 days at any one time.

4. The Federal Republic grants to the French, the United Kingdom and the United States forces the right to enter, pass through, and depart from the territory of the Federal Republic in transit to or from Austria (so long as their forces continue to be stationed there) or any country Member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on the same basis as is usual between Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty or as may be agreed with effect for all Member States by the North Atlantic Council.

ARTICLE 2

The present Convention shall be open to accession by any State not a Signatory, which had forces stationed in the Federal territory on the date of the signature of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany at Paris on ———— October 1954. Any such State, desiring to accede to the present Convention, may deposit with the Government of the Federal Republic an Instrument of Accession.

ARTICLE 3

1. The present Convention shall expire with the conclusion of a German peace settlement or, if, at an earlier time the Signatory States agree that the development of the international situation justifies new arrangements.

2. The Signatory States will review the terms of the present Convention at the same time and subject to the same conditions as provided for in Article 10 of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany.

ARTICLE 4

The present Convention shall be ratified or approved by the Signatory States and Instruments of Ratification or Approval shall be

deposited by them with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. It shall enter into force when all the Signatory States have made such deposit and the Instrument of Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty has been deposited with the Government of the United States of America.

It shall also enter into force on that date as to any acceding State which has previously deposited an Instrument of Accession in accordance with Article 2 of the present Convention and, as to any other acceding State, on the date of the deposit by it of such an Instrument.

The present Convention shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which will furnish each State party to the present Convention with certified copies thereof and of the Instruments of Accession deposited in accordance with Article 2 and will notify each State of the date of the entry into force of the present Convention and the date of the deposit of any Instrument of Accession.

*In faith whereof* the undersigned Representatives duly authorised there have signed the present Convention.

DONE at Paris this ———— day of October, 1954, in three texts, in the English, French and German languages, all being equally authentic.[2]

[2] During the ceremonies in Paris on Oct. 23, the source text was signed by John Foster Dulles, Anthony Eden, Pierre Mendès-France, and Konrad Adenauer.

*Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in Germany* [1]

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic agree as follows:

1. The rights retained by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic after the entry into force of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, which are referred to in the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany as amended by the said Protocol, will be exercised by their respective Chiefs of Mission accredited to the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The Chiefs of Mission will act jointly in the exercise of those rights in the Federal Republic of Germany in matters the Three Powers consider of common concern under the said Protocol and the instruments mentioned in Article 1 thereof.

3. Those rights which relate to Berlin will continue to be exercised in Berlin pursuant to existing procedures, subject to any future modification which may be agreed.

[1] Reprinted from *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 6 (pt. 5), pp. 5703–5704.

4. This agreement shall enter into force upon the entry into force of the said Protocol.

DONE at Paris on the twenty third day of October, Nineteen hundred and fifty-four in two texts, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America: JOHN FOSTER DULLES

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: ANTHONY EDEN

For the Government of the French Republic: MENDÈS-FRANCE

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392**

*Draft Declaration Inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany To Accede to the Brussels Treaty* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 20, 1954.

The Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Parties to the Brussels Treaty of March the 17th, 1948, for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for legitimate collective self-defence;

*Aware* that the principles underlying the association created by the Brussels Treaty are also recognised and applied by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy;

*Noting* with satisfaction that their devotion to peace and their allegiance to democratic institutions constitute common bonds between the countries of Western Europe;

*Convinced* that an association with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would represent a new and substantial advance in the direction already indicated by the Treaty;

*Decide*,

in application of Article IX of the Treaty, to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to this Treaty, as modified and completed in accordance with the decisions of the Conference held in London from September the 28th to October the 3rd 1954, which are recorded in its Final Act.

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[1] This draft declaration, which was circulated as document C–M(54)90 along with a covering note by Secretary General Ismay, was approved by the Nine-Power Conference during its meetings on Oct. 21; once approved, it was placed on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council meeting on Oct. 22 for information.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392

*Protocols to the Brussels Treaty* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 22, 1954.

PROTOCOL [No. I] MODIFYING AND COMPLETING THE BRUSSELS TREATY

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on March the 17th, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, on the one hand,

and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany and the President of the Italian Republic on the other hand,

*Inspired* by a common will to strengthen peace and security;

*Desirous* to this end of promoting the unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe;

*Convinced* that the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic to the Treaty will represent a new and substantial advance towards these aims;

*Having taken* into consideration the decisions of the London Conference as set out in the Final Act of October the 3rd, 1954 and its Annexes;

*Have appointed* as their Plenipotentiaries: ————

Who, having exhibited their full powers found in good and due form,

*Have agreed* as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic hereby accede to the Treaty as modified and completed by the present Protocol.

The High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol consider the Protocol on Forces of Western European Union (hereinafter referred

[1] The source text, which was circulated as document C–M(54)84(Revised) along with a covering note by Secretary General Ismay, was approved by the Nine-Power Conference during its second meeting on Oct. 21. Each of the four Protocols was signed during the ceremonies at Paris on Oct. 23 by Paul-Henri Spaak, Pierre Mendès-France, Konrad Adenauer, Gaetano Martino, Joseph Bech, Johan W. Beyen, and Anthony Eden. For a record of the second meeting of the Nine-Power Conference, see p. 1414. During the Nine-Power Conference, the source text was circulated as document NPC/Paris–D/2(Final); earlier drafts of the Protocols to the Brussels Treaty are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 391.

to as Protocol No. II), the Protocol on the Control of Armaments and its Annexes (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. III), and the Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. IV) to be an integral part of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE II

The sub-paragraph of the Preamble to the Treaty: "to take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression" shall be modified to read: "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe".

The opening words of the 2nd paragraph of Article I shall read: "The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Council referred to in Article VIII . . .".

ARTICLE III

The following new Article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IV: "In the execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization".

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

Articles IV, V, VI and VII of the Treaty will become respectively Articles V, VI, VII and VIII.

ARTICLE IV

Article VIII of the Treaty (formerly Article VII) shall be modified to read as follows:

"1. For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between Them and with other European organizations, the High Contracting Parties to the Brussels Treaty shall create a Council to consider matters concerning the execution of this Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes.

"2. This Council shall be known as the 'Council of Western European Union'; it shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously; it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary: in particular it shall establish immediately an Agency for the Control of Armaments whose functions are defined in Protocol No. IV.

"3. At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.

"4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols II, III and IV it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Armaments."

ARTICLE V

A new Article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IX: "The Council of Western European Union shall make an Annual Report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe."

The Articles VIII, IX and X of the Treaty shall become respectively Articles X, XI and XII.

ARTICLE VI

The present Protocol and the other Protocols listed in Article I above shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

They shall enter into force when all instruments of ratification of the present Protocol have been deposited with the Belgian Government and the instrument of accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty has been deposited with the Government of the United States of America.

The Belgian Government shall inform the governments of the other High Contracting Parties and the Government of the United States of America of the deposit of each instrument of ratification.

*In witness* whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE at Paris this ———— day of October 1954 in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

PROTOCOL NO. II ON FORCES OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other

Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

*Having consulted* the North Atlantic Council,

*Have appointed* ————————,

*Have agreed* as follows:

ARTICLE 1

1. The land and air forces which each of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall place under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime on the mainland of Europe shall not exceed in total strength and number of formations:

(*a*) for Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the maxima laid down for peacetime in the Special Agreement annexed to the Treaty on the Establishment of a European Defence Community signed at Paris, on 27th May, 1952; and

(*b*) for the United Kingdom, four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force;

(*c*) for Luxembourg, one regimental combat team.

2. The number of formations mentioned in paragraph 1 may be brought up to date and adapted as necessary to make them suitable for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, provided that the equivalent fighting capacity and total strengths are not exceeded.

3. The statement of these maxima does not commit any of the High Contracting Parties to build up or maintain forces at these levels, but maintains their right to do so if required.

ARTICLE 2

As regards naval forces, the contribution to NATO Commands of each of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall be determined each year in the course of the Annual Review (which takes into account the recommendations of the NATO military authorities). The naval forces of the Federal Republic of Germany shall consist of the vessels and formations necessary for the defensive missions assigned to it by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization within the limits laid down in the Special Agreement mentioned in Article 1, or equivalent fighting capacity.

ARTICLE 3

If at any time during the Annual Review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the limits specified in Articles 1 and 2, the acceptance by the country concerned of such recommended increases shall be subject to the unanimous approval of the High Contracting Parties to the pres-

ent Protocol expressed either in the Council of Western European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ARTICLE 4

In order that it may establish that the limits specified in Articles 1 and 2 are being observed, the Council of Western European Union will regularly receive information acquired as a result of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Such information will be transmitted by a high-ranking officer designated for the purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

ARTICLE 5

The strength and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall be fixed by agreements within the Organization of Western European Union, having regard to their proper functions and needs and to their existing levels.

ARTICLE 6

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. She undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the High Contracting Parties who should take their decision in the knowledge of the views of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. This undertaking shall not, however, bind her in the event of an acute overseas emergency. If the maintenance of the United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too great a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, she will, through Her Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the United Kingdom formations are maintained.

*In witness* whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE at Paris this ———— day of October, 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authorizative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

## PROTOCOL NO. III ON THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

*Have appointed* ————.

*Have agreed* as follows:

### PART I—ARMAMENTS NOT TO BE MANUFACTURED

#### ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties, members of Western European Union, take note of and record their agreement with the Declaration of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (made in London on 3rd October, 1954, and annexed hereto as Annex I) in which the Federal Republic of Germany undertook not to manufacture in its territory atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The types of armaments referred to in this Article are defined in Annex II. These armaments shall be more closely defined and the definitions brought up to date by the Council of Western European Union.

#### ARTICLE 2

The High Contracting Parties, members of Western European Union, also take note of and record their agreement with the undertaking given by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in the same Declaration that certain further types of armaments will not be manufactured in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, except that if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a recommendation for an amendment to, or cancellation of, the content of the list of these armaments is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany submits a request accordingly, such an amendment or cancellation may be made by a resolution of the Council of Western European Union passed by a two-thirds majority. The types of armaments referred to in this Article are listed in Annex III.

### PART II—ARMAMENTS TO BE CONTROLLED

#### ARTICLE 3

When the development of atomic, biological and chemical weapons in the territory on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting

Parties who have not given up the right to produce them has passed the experimental stage and effective production of them has started there, the level of stocks that the High Contracting Parties concerned will be allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe shall be decided by a majority vote of the Council of Western European Union.

ARTICLE 4

Without prejudice to the foregoing Articles, the types of armaments listed in Annex IV will be controlled to the extent and in the manner laid down in Protocol No. IV.

ARTICLE 5

The Council of Western European Union may vary the list in Annex IV by unanimous decision.

*In witness* whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in Paris on the _____ day of October 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other signatories.

Annex I

*The Federal Chancellor declares:*

that the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons, as detailed in paragraphs I, II and III of the attached list;*

that it undertakes further not to manufacture in its territory such weapons as those detailed in paragraphs IV, V and VI of the attached list.† Any amendment to or cancellation of the substance of paragraphs IV, V and VI† can, on the request of the Federal Republic, be carried out by a resolution of the Brussels Council of Ministers by a two-thirds majority, if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a request is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

that the Federal Republic agrees to supervision by the competent authority of the Brussels Treaty Organization to ensure that these undertakings are observed.

*Reproduced in Annex II. [Footnote in the source text.]
†Reproduced in Annex III. [Footnote in the source text.]

Annex II

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs I to III and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms, which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

I. *Atomic Weapons*

(*a*) An atomic weapon is defined as any weapon which contains, or is designed to contain or utilise, nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuclear fuel, or by radioactivity of the nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes, is capable of mass destruction, mass injury or mass poisoning.

(*b*) Furthermore, any part, device, assembly or material especially designed for, or primarily useful in, any weapon as set forth under paragraph (*a*), shall be deemed to be an atomic weapon.

(*c*) Nuclear fuel as used in the preceding definition includes plutonium, Uranium 233, Uranium 235 (including Uranium 235 contained in Uranium enriched to over 2.1 per cent by weight of Uranium 235) and any other material capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy through nuclear fission or fusion or other nuclear reaction of the material. The foregoing materials shall be considered to be nuclear fuel regardless of the chemical or physical form in which they exist.

II. *Chemical Weapons*

(*a*) A chemical weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use, for military purposes, the asphyxiating, toxic, irritant, paralysant, growth-regulating, anti-lubricating or catalysing properties of any chemical substance.

(*b*) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (*c*), chemical substances, having such properties and capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in paragraph (*a*), shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(*c*) Such apparatus and such quantities of the chemical substances as are referred to in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from this definition.

III. *Biological Weapons*

(*a*) A biological weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus

expressly designed to use, for military purposes, harmful insects or other living or dead organisms, or their toxic products.

(*b*) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (*c*), insects, organisms and their toxic products of such nature and in such amounts as to make them capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in (*a*) shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(*c*) Such equipment or apparatus and such quantities of the insects, organisms and their toxic products as are referred to in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from the definition of biological weapons.

### Annex III

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs IV to VI and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms, which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

IV. *Long-range Missiles, Guided Missiles and Influence Mines*

(*a*) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (*d*), long-range missiles and guided missiles are defined as missiles such that the speed or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile, including V-type weapons developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the speed.

(*b*) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (*d*), influence mines are defined as naval mines which can be exploded automatically by influences which emanate solely from external sources, including influence mines developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof.

(*c*) Parts, devices or assemblies specially designed for use in or with the weapons referred to in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(*d*) Proximity fuses, and short-range guided missiles for anti-aircraft defence with the following maximum characteristics are regarded as excluded from this definition:

Length, 2 metres;
Diameter, 30 centimetres;
Speed, 660 metres per second;
Ground range, 32 kilometres;
Weight of war-head, 22.5 kilogrammes.

V. *Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes*

"Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes are:

(*a*) Warships of more than 3,000 tons displacement;
(*b*) Submarines of more than 350 tons displacement;
(*c*) All warships which are driven by means other than steam, Diesel or petrol engines or by gas turbines or by jet engines."

VI. *Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes*

**Annex IV**

LIST OF TYPES OF ARMAMENTS TO BE CONTROLLED

1. (*a*) Atomic
(*b*) biological, and
(*c*) chemical weapons.

In accordance with definitions to be approved by the Council of Western European Union as indicated in Article I of the present Protocol.

2. All guns, howitzers and mortars of any types and of any rôles of more than 90 mm. calibre including the following components for these weapons, viz., the elevating mass.

3. All guided missiles.

*Definition:* Guided missiles are such that the speed or direction or motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile; these include V-type weapons developed in the recent war and modifications thereto. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the speed.

4. Other self-propelled missiles of a weight exceeding 15 kilogrammes in working order.

5. Mines of all types except anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

6. Tanks, including the following component parts for these tanks, viz:

(*a*) the elevating mass;
(*b*) turret castings and/or plate assembly.

7. Other armoured fighting vehicles of an overall weight of more than 10 metric tons.

8. (*a*) Warships over 1,500 tons displacement;
(*b*) submarines;
(*c*) all warships powered by means other than steam, diesel or petrol engines or gas turbines;
(*d*) small craft capable of a speed of over 30 knots, equipped with offensive armament.

9. Aircraft bombs of more than 1,000 kilogrammes.
10. Ammunition for the weapons described in paragraph 2 above.
11. (*a*) Complete military aircraft other than:

(i) all training aircraft except operational types used for training purposes;
(ii) military transport and communication aircraft;
(iii) helicopters;

(*b*) air frames, specifically and exclusively designed for military aircraft except those at (i), (ii) and (iii) above;
(*c*) jet engines, turbo-propeller engines and rocket motors, when these are the principal motive power.

## Protocol No. IV on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

*Having agreed* in accordance with Article IV of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, to establish an Agency for the Control of Armaments,

*Have appointed* ————————,

*Have agreed* as follows:

### Part I—Constitution

#### Article 1

The Agency for the Control of Armaments (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") shall be responsible to the Council of Western European Union (hereinafter referred to as "the Council"). It shall consist of a Director assisted by a Deputy Director, and supported by a staff drawn equitably from nationals of the High Contracting Parties, Members of Western European Union.

#### Article 2

The Director and his staff, including any officials who may be put at the disposal of the Agency by States Members, shall be subject to the general administrative control of the Secretary General of Western European Union.

ARTICLE 3

The Director shall be appointed by unanimous decision of the Council for a period of five years and shall not be eligible for reappointment. He shall be responsible for the selection of his staff in accordance with the principle mentioned in Article 1 and in consultation with the individual States Members concerned. Before filling the posts of Deputy Director and of the Heads of Departments of the Agency, the Director shall obtain from the Council approval of the persons to be appointed.

ARTICLE 4

1. The Director shall submit to the Council, through the Secretary General, a plan for the organization of the Agency. The organization should provide for departments dealing respectively with:

(*a*) the examination of statistical and budgetary information to be obtained from the members of Western European Union and from the appropriate NATO authorities;
(*b*) inspections, test checks and visits;
(*c*) administration.

2. The organization may be modified by decision of the Council.

ARTICLE 5

The costs of maintaining the Agency shall appear in the budget of Western European Union. The Director shall submit, through the Secretary General, to the Council an annual estimate of these costs.

ARTICLE 6

Officials of the Agency shall be bound by the full NATO code of security. They shall in no circumstances reveal information obtained in connexion with the execution of their official tasks except and only in the performance of their duties towards the Agency.

PART II—FUNCTIONS

ARTICLE 7

1. The tasks of the Agency shall be:

(*a*) to satisfy itself that the undertakings set out in Protocol No. III not to manufacture certain types of armaments mentioned in Annexes II and III to that Protocol are being observed;
(*b*) to control, in accordance with Part III of the present Protocol, the level of stocks of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III held by each member of Western European Union on the mainland of Europe. This control shall extend to production

and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective.

2. For the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Agency shall:

(*a*) scrutinise statistical and budgetary information supplied by members of Western European Union and by the NATO authorities;
(*b*) undertake on the mainland of Europe test checks, visits and inspections at production plants, depots and forces (other than depots or forces under NATO authority);
(*c*) report to the Council.

ARTICLE 8

With respect to forces and depots under NATO authority, test checks, visits and inspections shall be undertaken by the appropriate authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the case of the forces and depots under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Agency shall receive notification of the information supplied to the Council through the medium of the high-ranking officer to be designated by him.

ARTICLE 9

The operations of the Agency shall be confined to the mainland of Europe.

ARTICLE 10

The Agency shall direct its attention to the production of end-items and components listed in Annexes II, III and IV of Protocol No. III, and not to processes. It shall ensure that materials and products destined for civilian use are excluded from its operations.

ARTICLE 11

Inspections by the Agency shall not be of a routine character, but shall be in the nature of tests carried out at irregular intervals. Such inspections shall be conducted in a spirit of harmony and co-operation. The Director shall propose to the Council detailed regulations for the conduct of the inspections providing, *inter alia*, for due process of law in respect of private interests.

ARTICLE 12

For their test checks, visits and inspections the members of the Agency shall be accorded free access on demand to plants and depots, and the relevant accounts and documents shall be made available to them. The Agency and national authorities shall co-operate in such checks and inspections, and in particular national authorities may, at their own request, take part in them.

PART III—LEVELS OF STOCKS OF ARMAMENTS

ARTICLE 13

1. Each member of Western European Union shall, in respect of its forces under NATO authority stationed on the mainland of Europe, furnish annually to the Agency statements of:

(*a*) the total quantities of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III required in relation to its forces;
(*b*) the quantities of such armaments currently held at the beginning of the control years;
(*c*) the programmes for attaining the total quantities mentioned in (*a*) by:

(i) manufacture in its own territory;
(ii) purchase from another country;
(iii) end-item aid from another country.

2. Such statements shall also be furnished by each member of Western European Union in respect of its internal defence and police forces and its other forces under national control stationed on the mainland of Europe including a statement of stocks held there for its forces stationed overseas.

3. The statements shall be correlated with the relevant submissions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ARTICLE 14

As regards the forces under NATO authority, the Agency shall verify in consultation with the appropriate NATO authorities that the total quantities stated under Article 13 are consistent with the quantities recognised as required by the units of the members concerned under NATO authority, and with the conclusions and data recorded in the documents approved by the North Atlantic Council in connexion with the NATO Annual Review.

ARTICLE 15

As regards internal defence and police forces, the total quantities of their armaments to be accepted as appropriate by the Agency shall be those notified by the members, provided that they remain within the limits laid down in the further agreements to be concluded by the members of Western European Union on the strength and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe.

ARTICLE 16

As regards other forces remaining under national control, the total quantities of their armaments to be accepted as appropriate by the Agency shall be those notified to the Agency by the members.

ARTICLE 17

The figures furnished by members for the total quantities of armaments under Articles 15 and 16 shall correspond to the size and mission of the forces concerned.

ARTICLE 18

The provisions of Articles 14 and 17 shall not apply to the High Contracting Parties and to the categories of weapons covered in Article 3 of Protocol No. III. Stocks of the weapons in question shall be determined in conformity with the procedure laid down in that Article and shall be notified to the Agency by the Council of the Western European Union.

ARTICLE 19

The figures obtained by the Agency under Articles 14, 15, 16 and 18 shall be reported to the Council as appropriate levels for the current control year for the members of Western European Union. Any discrepancies between the figures stated under Article 13, paragraph 1, and the quantities recognised under Article 14 will also be reported.

ARTICLE 20

1. The Agency shall immediately report to the Council if inspection, or information from other sources, reveals:

(*a*) the manufacture of armaments of a type which the member concerned has undertaken not to manufacture;
(*b*) the existence of stocks of armaments in excess of the figures and quantities ascertained in accordance with Articles 18 and 21.[2]

2. If the Council is satisfied that the infraction reported by the Agency is not of major importance and can be remedied by prompt local action, it will so inform the Agency and the member concerned, who will take the necessary steps.

3. In the case of other infractions, the Council will invite the member concerned to provide the necessary explanation within a period to be determined by the Council; if this explanation is considered unsatisfactory, the Council will take the measures which it deems necessary in accordance with a procedure to be determined.

4. Decisions of the Council under this Article will be taken by majority vote.

ARTICLE 21

Each member shall notify to the Agency the names and locations of the depots on the mainland of Europe containing armaments

[2] According to corrigendum to document C–M(54)84(Revised), the words "Articles 19 and 22" should replace "Articles 18 and 21" at this point in the source text. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392)

subject to control and of the plants on the mainland of Europe manufacturing such armaments, or, even though not in operation, specifically intended for the manufacture of such armaments.

ARTICLE 22

Each member of Western European Union shall keep the Agency informed of the quantities of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III, which are to be exported from its territory on the mainland of Europe. The Agency shall be entitled to satisfy itself that the armaments concerned are in fact exported. If the level of stocks of any item subject to control appears abnormal, the Agency shall further be entitled to enquire into the orders for export.

ARTICLE 23

The Council shall transmit to the Agency information received from the Governments of the United States of America and Canada respecting military aid to be furnished to the forces on the mainland of Europe of members of Western European Union.

*In witness* whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE at Paris this _____ day of October 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392**

*Draft Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 19, 1954.

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on 4th April, 1949,

*Being satisfied* that the security of the North Atlantic area will be

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[1] This draft protocol, which was circulated as document C–M(54)83(Revised) along with a covering note by Secretary General Ismay, was approved without change by the North Atlantic Council during its meeting on Oct. 22; for a record of that meeting, see p. 1422. The approved text was signed during the ceremonies at Paris on Oct. 23 by Paul-Henri Spaak, Lester B. Pearson, H. C. Hansen, Pierre Mendès-France, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Kristinn Gudmundsson, Gaetano Martino, Joseph Bech, Johan W. Beyen, Halvard Lange, Paulo Cunha, Fuad Köprülü, Anthony Eden, and John Foster Dulles.

enhanced by the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to that Treaty, and

*Having noted* that the Federal Republic of Germany has by a declaration dated 3rd October, 1954, accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken upon its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty to refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of that Treaty, and

*Having further noted* that all member governments have associated themselves with the declaration also made on 3rd October, 1954, by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic in connection with the aforesaid declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany,

*Agree* as follows:

ARTICLE I

Upon the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall on behalf of all the Parties communicate to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thereafter the Federal Republic of Germany shall become a Party to that Treaty on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified to the Government of the United States of America its acceptance thereof, and when all instruments of ratification of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty have been deposited with the Belgian Government. The Government of the United States of America shall inform the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each notification of acceptance of the present Protocol and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE III

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

*In witness whereof*, the undersigned Representatives, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Protocol.

Signed at Paris the _____ day of _____.

## 3. CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE MEETINGS AND THE CONTINUING NEGOTIATION OF A SAAR AGREEMENT

762.022/10–2154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, October 21, 1954—4 p. m.

1680. Decourson summarized status Saar negotiations as of noon today as follows:

1) French request Saar agreement contain specific ban on subsidization Saar political parties from outside was apparently causing Germans serious trouble. Final German position would not be known until after Adenauer's consultations with German parliamentary leaders. French willing legalize pro-German parties only if stipulation to prevent German parties from subsidizing their Saar counterparts accepted.

2) While French had abandoned insistence on definitive settlement, they now proposed language to effect settlement irrevocable until peace treaty. German reaction to this language unknown but there seemed to be hope Germans could accept it since French had abandoned word "definitive" even for period prior peace treaty.

3) French still strongly favored Council of Foreign Ministers of Brussels organization as umbrella over Saar while Germans favor Council of Ministers of Council of Europe. French think Germans oppose putting Saar under Brussels organization because it would mean Saar adherence to one more international body (Saar is already in Council of Europe). Decourson said however French would probably yield on this if necessary. Both sides agree use representatives of seven Brussels Powers at Council of Europe Assembly as "popularly chosen body" to which Ministers would report.

4) French consider idea of three-man commission (one French, one German and one neutral) for Saar utterly unacceptable, but Chancellor has said he doesn't favor it either though his advisors do. French consider Germans have in effect dropped commission idea in favor single commissioner to be neither French, German nor Saarlander.

5) While many economic details settled, common Franco-German market idea for Saar taken from Van Naters plan still being stressed by Germans. While this might be accepted if French were ready for single Franco-German common market, otherwise this idea was unacceptable. French had proposed specific annual increase in German exports to Saar from 2½ to 5 billion francs instead and hoped this would be accepted.

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, and Strasbourg.

6) Soutou and Blankenhorn are meeting again on Saar this evening and it was hoped something would come out of this.

7) In spite of difficulties French remain optimistic because Mendes-France absolutely determined reach agreement and French realize failure reach Saar agreement would be catastrophic since Mendes position that signature London Accords cannot precede such settlement remains firm.

DILLON

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**396.1/10–2154 : Telegram**

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET Moscow, October 21, 1954—9 p. m.

582. Soviet press treatment of London agreements and subsequent developments continues to be relatively restrained in standard opposition to any form of German rearmament.[2] As previously indicated (Embtel 520 [*550*], October 15 and 551, October 16 [3]), there has been tendency to present certain parts of Molotov's Berlin speech as constituting official "proposals" of Soviet Government. This impression is strengthened by following paragraph in Ratiani article published in *Pravda* today:

"There are proposals of Soviet Government to governments of US, England and France, to reach agreement concerning withdrawal of occupation forces in territory of East and West Germany and to decide this question right now without any delay. Acceptance of this proposal would create favorable conditions for *rapprochement* between West and East Germany and thereby for unification of Germany. There is also the possibility for the achievement of agreement between the powers on question of free all-German elections if the premise is accepted that chief task is the unification of Germany on peace-loving and democratic bases. Soviet Government has expressed its readiness to examine not only proposals made earlier by the participation of the Berlin Conference of the four powers but also any proposals on the question of free all-German elections."

Since Soviet Government can hardly believe that statements in Molotov's speech could be accepted as formal official proposals either

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

[2] In telegram 1688 from Paris, Oct. 21, the Embassy gave a similar description of the "half-hearted manner" in which the Communist press was attacking the London Accords (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 386).

[3] Neither printed; both telegrams 550 and 551 concerned Molotov's speech in Berlin on Oct. 6 and suggested that it contained counterproposals to the tripartite Western note of Sept. 10 (see footnote 4 below) concerning Germany (396.1/10–1554 and 396.1/10–1654, respectively).

by Western Governments or non-Commie public opinion, the reasons for this presentation must be sought elsewhere. Soviet Government might prefer to await developments on London agreements before committing itself to a definite set of positions as would inevitably be involved in formal reply to September 10 note.[4] By treating Molotov's speech, without so stating, as at least interim reply and attempting to create impression that ball is now in Western court, Soviet Government may hope to gloss over awkward fact that it has not replied to Western note. In addition to element of timing, hesitancy in this respect may result from realization by Soviet Government that given limits of its policy towards Germany it has nothing new or tempting to offer and that mere reiteration of old Berlin proposals would be detrimental to Soviet efforts to bloc implementation of London agreements. In circumstances it may have been concluded hence that the holding out of vague hopes, as represented by Molotov's speech, is the best posture for the Soviet Government to adopt at this particular juncture.

While in dictatorships of this character radical changes of policy can never be completely dismissed, substantive Soviet policy towards Germany still appears to be rooted in a determination to safeguard to all costs control over Eastern Germany. Their diplomacy and even propaganda are still operating within limits imposed by this dominant consideration. Judging from press reports the East German elections of October 17 were a standard Commie-type fraud with no element of choice whatsoever given to population which is hardly preparation for any substantive change in direction of free elections for all Germany.

It is difficult of course to judge from here to what extent pressures for 4-power conference generated by Commie and front organizations abroad have or will become a factor in eventual ratification of London agreements. But if this becomes a real difficulty, rigidity and lack of maneuver in basic Soviet policy towards Germany might be turned to advantage in offsetting any such trend. Soviet attempt to depict Molotov speech as official proposals could afford opportunity for three Western powers to issue statement pointing out that no reply had been received to September 10 note and calling on Soviet Government to state clearly in official form its so-called proposals on Germany. This might force Soviets to show their true position on Germany and de-

[4] Under reference here is the tripartite Western note of Sept. 10, which accepted the Soviet invitation to a Four-Power Foreign Ministers meeting on Germany and European security provided the Soviets signed the Austrian Treaty on the basis of the previously agreed text and agreed to free elections in Germany. For the text of this note and the Soviet proposals to which it was a response, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 20, 1954, pp. 397–402.

prive them of present advantage of hiding behind vague hints of possible future concessions. If no reply is received, that in itself is good propaganda material.[5]

BOHLEN

[5] In telegram 1762 from Paris, Oct. 22, the Embassy agreed with the analysis in the source text but recommended that the United States "refrain from needling Soviets over their failure thus far to reply to September 10 note" (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 386).

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*Editorial Note*

According to telegram Secto 4 from Paris, October 20, Dulles discussed separately with Eden and Mendès-France on Wednesday, October 20, the value of a tripartite statement on Berlin. Both reacted favorably and told Dulles that they would give an answer by the following day. Telegram Secto 6 from Paris, October 21, briefly notes that Dulles, Eden, and Mendès-France, after consultation with Adenauer, agreed to the text of a tripartite statement which would be issued on the same day as the final communiqué at the end of the conference. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 380) For the text of the statement on Berlin, which was subsequently issued on October 23, see page 1428.

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762.022/10–2254 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 22, 1954—1 a. m.

1691. At Mendes's request, Parodi has just given British Embassy and ourselves following account of state of Saar negotiations:

Despite apparently conciliatory German attitude on Tuesday, Adenauer's position following his talk with political leaders yesterday morning hardened all along the line, principally on three points. The first was that he was no longer prepared to speak of Saar "statute" but only of "reglement", a much weaker word denoting temporary arrangement subject to change at any time. Second, was German insistence on Landtag elections as substitute for referendum. Third, was German rejection of French proposals for increased German-Saar trade and insistence on measures to expedite German participation in management of mines, banks, and insurance companies with view to developing German-Saar relationship approximating present French-Saar relationship. He concluded that Adenauer this morning indicated reluctance even to discuss the Saar further.

[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

We are seeking German version.[2] French Cabinet is meeting at noon on Saar. Eden is lunching with Mendes and is having Mendes and Adenauer for dinner this evening.

DILLON

[2] In telegram 1696 from Paris, Oct. 22, Dillon informed the Department of State that Blankenhorn generally confirmed the account given by Parodi. Dillon noted that while Adenauer did not attach too much importance to the Saar Agreement being reached immediately, Mendès-France told the French press that he would sign nothing unless the Saar accord was reached. (762.022/10–2254)

740.5/10–2354 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris* [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, October 23, 1954—11 : 56 a. m.

Tedul 17. Eyes only for Secretary and Merchant. News of receipt by Bohlen of Soviet note today [2] poses question of our official reaction and we will probably be under some pressure from press for statement. Although we have not received text note or a summary from Bohlen would assume it is obvious attempt to confuse opinion and detract from success of Paris meetings. We feel that any attempt to comment on note prior to your arrival Washington and your report on Paris meetings would be premature and would reduce impact of Paris agreements. In any event we feel no comment should be made until after adequate consultation with British and French whose preliminary reaction you may be able to get in Paris. If French and/or UK comment is sound we would see some advantage in having their reaction announced prior to ours.

If you agree with this view we shall act accordingly.

HOOVER

[1] Drafted by Elbrick.

[2] For the text of the Soviet note of Oct. 23, which called for a Four-Power conference in November to consider the reestablishment of German unity, the withdrawal of the occupation forces, and the question of calling an all-European security conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 902.

396.1 LO/10–2354 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, October 23, 1954—10 p. m.

1716. Limit distribution. During conversation which Secretary had with Mendes-France and Eden after signing ceremonies, it was agreed

[1] Repeated to Moscow eyes only for Bohlen.

that nothing should be said to press concerning Soviet note. It was agreed to say merely that conversation of the three had been of a general nature in accordance with their past practice of having a go-around before separating after conferences. It would be admitted to press, however, that we had discussed Far Eastern in addition to European questions but no reference would be made to Soviet note.

Mendes stated that the Russian reply would have a strong impact in France where the possibility of East-West talks had impressed a lot of people who were not necessarily Leftist. He referred specifically to recent declarations in the Assembly by Gaullists and Radicals on the subject. He felt that the stronger we got the more proposals of this sort we were bound to receive from the Russians. The Secretary called attention to the fact that Soviet moves in sending and replying to notes were now settling into a fixed mould, being timed to minimize the effects of anything constructive the West accomplished as in the present instant.

DILLON

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 379**

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, October 23, 1954.

[DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:] We are waiting here Saturday morning not knowing whether or not documents in relation to German sovereignty, Brussels Treaty and NATO will or will not be signed this afternoon. Everything hinges on Saar matter, which Adenauer and Mendes-France discussed last night until nearly three. They are apparently in agreement on political issues, but certain economic issues remain unsolved. They meet again at 11:30 Paris time. It seems to me incredible that the margin of difference now remaining should wreck this whole affair, but it is possible because Adenauer has gone close to the tolerable political limit and Mendes-France can be very stubborn.

Everything else has gone extremely well, and the NATO atmosphere is one of strengthened fellowship.

Faithfully yours,

FOSTER

[1] This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 17, Oct. 23, with instructions that it be sent to the President.

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*Editorial Note*

Mendès-France and Adenauer engaged in discussions on the Saar following dinner on October 22, discussions that lasted until

3 a. m. the following morning. Telegram 1711 from Paris, October 23, briefly noted that "agreement had been practically reached on political points with only one or two economic problems (coal mines and steel works) outstanding" (762.022/10–2354). They met again at 11 : 30 a. m. on October 23 and completed their negotiations on the Saar by reaching an agreement. No records of the meetings on October 22 and 23 were found in the Department of State files which would provide information concerning the details of these negotiations. For the text of the Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the French Republic on the Saar Statute, Paris, October 23, 1954, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pages 116–118. For the accompanying exchange of letters, see *Notes et Etudes Documentaires No. 1951*, 23 Novembre 1954.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 379**

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

PARIS, October 23, 1954.

[DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:] I am happy to inform you that everything including Saar has now been signed sealed and delivered. I know you will rejoice with me that the unity and freedom of Europe to which you contributed so indispensably seems likely now to be preserved.

Faithfully yours, FOSTER

[1] This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 20, Oct. 23, with instructions that it be sent to the President.

## E. EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE RATIFICATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS AND THE SAAR AGREEMENT, OCTOBER 24–DECEMBER 31, 1954

*Editorial Note*

On the evening of October 25, shortly after his return from Paris, Secretary of State Dulles presented a report on the outcome of the Four-Power, Nine-Power, and North Atlantic Council meetings to President Eisenhower and the Cabinet. This was the first open session of the Cabinet during the Eisenhower Administration in which national press, radio, and television coverage was allowed. For information concerning this Cabinet meeting, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, November 8, 1954, page 677; the text of Dulles' remarks and the question period that followed is in Department of State file 396.1 GE/3–2354.

762.022/10–2854 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 28, 1954—7: 59 p. m.

1177. Secretary and Department officials including Dr. Conant had meeting with Adenauer and advisers this morning.[2] In addition subjects covered in press statement issued by Chancellor and President following points discussed.[3]

*Saar Agreement.* Chancellor stated he attached great importance to issuance US statement of willingness guarantee Saar settlement. This would imply France and Federal Republic should conduct their affairs in accordance Saar Agreement until conclusion peace treaty. Guarantee should include undertaking to make representations if free expression wishes Saar population were prohibited.

Secretary replied it would not be practical make statement this subject while Chancellor in Washington and that guarantee involves constitutional difficulty in US. Matter was left that, if Chancellor considered statement US interest would be helpful in course Bundestag debate ratification, he would notify US so that appropriate language could be agreed upon at that time.

*US Relation to Western European Union.* Chancellor stated many questions to be considered in Western European Union would affect US security and NATO. Arms control arrangements are example of this. He hoped US could establish official mission to Western European Union as soon as possible, which might be same as US Mission to CSC. Secretary replied US would be disposed accept invitation, if one were extended, to establish Mission accredited to Council to keep in touch so far as Council desired it.

DULLES

[1] Drafted by Auchincloss, cleared with Lyon, and repeated to London, Paris, and Berlin.

[2] Chancellor Adenauer arrived in Washington on Oct. 27 for several days of consultation with the President and Secretary of State; further documentation concerning these talks is presented in volume VII.

[3] For the text of the joint statement issued by Adenauer and Eisenhower on Oct. 28, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 8, 1954, pp. 680–681.

740.5/10–3054 : Telegram

*The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, October 30, 1954—3 p. m.

Polto 782. Ismay has sent personal memorandum to PermReps on question associating Germany with NATO work pending her accession

[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

to NATO which he raised orally at NAC meeting October 27 (see Polto 753 rptd Bonn Polto 124[2]). Stated purpose of memorandum is set out certain relevant considerations and to suggest some possible courses of action, but Ismay notes that he is not himself wedded to anything suggested therein and that political considerations may outweigh what otherwise desirable and practicable. Memorandum then continues

"2. I think it would be well to recall the following facts which bear on this problem:

(*a*) An interim commission of the EDC sat for some two years to enable the Germans and their potential colleagues to collaborate in advance of ratification;

(*b*) This created a mechanism through which SHAPE was authorized to give military advice to the Germans and to release to them certain classified information;

(*c*) Ministers have agreed that an interim Seven-Power Working Group should operate in London with the Germans as a member, pending accession of Germany and Italy to the Western European Union.

3. The following possible courses of action which might be taken to associate Germany with the work of NATO are put forward as a basis of discussion. The putting into operation of certain of these would, of course, depend on a satisfactory outcome of the inspection of German security which the Council has in mind to institute.

(*a*) Continuation of the work of the special civil defence committee, which is in existence, and which was in no way related to the interim commission of the EDC;

(*b*) The release of classified NATO information, particularly insofar as military advice from SHAPE is concerned, under the procedure agreed with the Germans for the handling of NATO information through the Paris steering group series of documents;

(*c*) Association of German representatives with such planning work as will obviously have repercussions beyond the first quarter of 1955, e.g. the preparation of the questionnaires for the 1955 annual review;

(*d*) The establishment of a Fifteen-Power *ad hoc* committee, to include the Germans, with appropriate Fifteen-Power *ad hoc* subordinate committees."

First three Ismay proposals above seem acceptable, but we are not entirely clear as to what he has in mind in proposing Fifteen-Power *ad hoc* committee. Next NAC meeting should provide opportunity obtain amplification his thinking. We know Ismay is concerned about possibility that interim Seven-Power Working Group to be established

[2] Not printed; it informed the Department of State that Ismay intended to raise this subject at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council (740.5/10–2754).

London will begin to nose into areas appropriately reserved to NATO unless similar body established by NATO in which Germans formerly participated. During discussions which we have had this week with delegations in Paris, general feeling (in which we share) is that we should not act precipitously in attempting formalize relations with FedRep at this early stage, but should retain flexibility to deal with specific problems requiring liaison as they arise. At time of December ministerial meetings, when ratification situation should be clearer, we can consider whether more formal modes of association are desirable. Ismay's concern about encroachments by London Working Group is generally considered exaggerated.[3]

HUGHES

[3] In telegram Topol 541 to Paris, Nov. 2, the Department of State noted its general agreement with the views expressed in the source text (740.5/10–3054).

740.5/11–254 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State*

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, November 2, 1954—6 p. m.

2175. Re Deptel 2402 [1] and para three Embtel 2123.[2] Brussels Treaty Working Group to the post Paris meetings of which we have not been asked to attend is proceeding slowly with plans for new organizational setup after ratification of protocols. Present tentative thinking is that member countries should employ same representation in London after ratification as now, namely, Chiefs of Mission serving as permanent reps. If new functions cause substantial increase in work-load, thinking is that additional official, rank of Minister-Counselor or possibly Counselor, shld be appointed to London Missions of member states for work exclusively on Brussels Treaty. If new Brussels Treaty functions bring on still more work, Working Group believes it may be necessary at some stage to establish permanent Brussels Treaty delegations separate from dipl Missions. This, however, is regarded as very much last step and will not be taken unless work-load becomes exceedingly heavy. In this framework, appointment of Amer Mission as suggested by Adenauer in reftel is at very least premature.

[1] Same as telegram 1177 to Bonn, Oct. 28, p. 1465.

[2] Not printed; in it Aldrich reported a conversation with Eden on Oct. 28 during which Eden expressed the view that U.S. representation to the Western European Union should be in London. Aldrich also stated that he did not think that the Department of State should adopt a policy of representation that would parallel that of the U.S. Mission to the Coal and Steel Community. (611.41/10–2954)

Working Group has considered question of Amer and Canadian association with Council and tentative thought is that US and Canada shld be invited to send observers on *ad hoc* basis when topics of direct concern to them are to be considered, particularly mil aid, but according to FonOff no decision has been reached pending receipt by FonOff of US views as to form its association might take.

Reason given by FonOff for proposing limited association for Canada and US is in order avoid precedent which cld give Turks further excuse to request close association with WEU Council. Real reason which FonOff gave to Canadian High Commissioner, is that not a few members of Working Group were reluctant include a permanent US observer because they felt that members of US observer team to European defense Communism [*community*] under somewhat similar circumstances, failed to restrict themselves to role of observers, particularly in connection with efforts to bring about adoption of EDC.

I believe *ad hoc* observer status wld prove to be insufficient. Addition of new functions may make Council deliberations of interest to US in many fields beyond those which might be said to be of direct concern. Council is also supervising body for arms control agency and will have responsibilities for Saar under new agreement. When military aid problems are discussed, observer will have to take active part and shld, on those occasions, be considered non-voting participant. Therefore, I recommend that permanent observer from Embassy, either myself or appropriate member of my staff (depending on level of meeting) be proposed, such observer to take active part as non-voting participant in connection with discussion of military aid problems.

I wld appreciate Dept's views soonest so that they may be fully considered in Brussels Working Group decision on question.[3]

ALDRICH

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[3] In telegram Polto 820 from Paris, Nov. 5, Hughes presented "strong reasons" for bringing primary responsibility for representation with the WEU under USRO control. His position was that the United States should seek a role in WEU broadly analogous to that of its present representation to the European Coal and Steel Community in Luxembourg (740.5/11–554). The Embassy in London responded, in telegram 2269 of Nov. 9, that the WEU is an essentially European enterprise which does not cross vital lines of U.S. policy and which would not benefit from an excess of U.S. presence. Its position was that U.S. representation should be informal, flexible, and unobtrusive, without the appointment of a mission to the Brussels Treaty Organization (740.5/11–954).

In telegram 2861 to London, Nov. 23, the Department of State informed the Embassy that final decisions regarding U.S. relations with WEU could not be made until the future character of the WEU was more clearly discernible. In the meanwhile, Ambassador Aldrich should serve as observer whenever U.S. interests were involved in discussions at meetings of the WEU. USRO would have responsibility for liaison with the Arms Control Agency in Paris. (740.5/1–254)

396.1 PA/11-954 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BONN, November 9, 1954—2 p. m.

1373. In conversation 8 November, State Secretary Globke stated that plan now drawn up for ratification Paris agreements. Foreign policy debate scheduled for Thursday will be postponed, Cabinet will approve treaty laws in special session Friday (there will be four separate bills for NATO, sovereignty, Brussels pact, and Saar agreement.) Laws will then be submitted to Bundesrat, which has period of three weeks to consider them. Following Bundesrat session beginning December, probably December 3, treaty laws will be submitted to Bundestag for first reading. Foreign policy debate and first reading tentatively scheduled for 16–17 December but might take place week earlier. Following first reading, laws will be sent to committee. Second and third readings will take place in January. Final Bundesrat reading will probably follow at end of January or beginning of February.

Regarding Saar dispute in coalition, Globke said working party including Blankenhorn and Ophuels and two or three deputies from each coalition party now going over text of treaty in detail. Globke implied this scrutiny was intended take sharp edge off FDP and BHE criticism of Saar. He said Chancellor intended negotiate with French on those subjects already agreed on with French, i.e., economic agreements, but indicated that Chancellor would not push hard to reopen discussion on questions of principle. Globke said government was launching large-scale propaganda campaign this week to emphasize advantages of Paris Saar agreement over 1945 situation and over *status quo*. He felt BHE only opposing Saar agreement because of pending Landtag elections and would come around afterward. This was important reason postponement foreign policy debate. Most internal differences with BHE settled, he said, and Chancellor will discuss election law with BHE, FDP and DP Wednesday's meeting on coalition problems. Chancellor plans to guarantee smaller parties that election law will not damage their interests, and draft law should be ready in December. Globke said it improbable that whole FDP could be brought around on Saar issue, but predicted party would split three ways in vote with one group opposing treaty, one abstaining and one voting for it. He said possibility of constitutional court case on Saar could not be excluded, but hoped Hesse Landtag elections would dissolve only SPD Land Government which might bring constitutional suit.

CONANT

[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I

I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to transmission to the Senate for its advice and consent to the ratification thereof,[2] (1) a Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, to which are annexed five schedules; and (2) a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty providing for the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954.[3]

II

The protocols above referred to are a part of a series of interconnecting arrangements designed to solidify the security structure of Western Europe. Because of such interdependence, I also submit herewith the other arrangements, although they do not themselves require Senate action. I recommend that these documents, which are listed in the annexed schedule, be submitted to the Senate for its information.

III

The foregoing arrangements, when they become operative, will, in combination, establish basically new conditions in Western Europe. They will realize a result for which the United States has long hoped.

The two world wars of this century have made it evident that western civilization, with its dedication to human liberty, cannot survive if the members of the western world continue to make war on each other. Already they have so expended their blood and treasure in fighting that they have gravely depleted their strength, and they have brought upon themselves the moral condemnation of all humanity because of their failure to establish, even as between themselves, a peaceful order.

Realization of the foregoing brought the Western European nations to seek such a measure of unification, particularly in terms of military establishments, as would make it hereafter both militarily impractical and politically unlikely that their military forces would be used against each other, or indeed against anyone else for other than clearly defensive purposes.

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[1] Reprinted from the Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 6, 1954, pp. 849–856.

[2] For the text of President Eisenhower's message of transmittal addressed to the U.S. Senate on Nov. 15, see *ibid.*, pp. 847–849.

[3] The two protocols under reference are part of the Paris Agreements; for texts, see pp. 1435 and 1456.

The need for this coincides with new dangers born out of the expansionist policies of Soviet Russia, inspired by the worldwide ambitions of Soviet communism and backed by a vast Red military establishment. This creates for Western Europe a threat which can only be effectively deterred by the achievement of a large degree of practical unity among the European nations themselves, including the Federal Republic of Germany, and, we hope, a unified Germany.

It was originally sought to achieve these objectives by the establishment of a European Defense Community, consisting of six continental countries—Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. They would have created an international organization having supranational powers in defense matters. This would have constituted a hard and dependable core at the critical center of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This plan had been proposed on October 24, 1950, by Mr. Pleven, the then French Minister of Defense. After about a year and a half of negotiation, it was embodied in two interconnected treaties—the Bonn Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany of May 26, 1952,[4] designed to restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic, and the Paris Treaty of May 27, 1952,[5] designed to establish the European Defense Community.

The Bonn convention was signed by the United States, and on July 1, 1952, the United States Senate advised and consented to its ratification. The Senate at the same time consented to an extension of the North Atlantic Treaty area to include that of the European Defense Community, the significant addition being Western Germany. However, the Bonn convention and the related Paris Treaty never became effective because they were not ratified by all the signatories.

This failure to realize the European Defense Community and to restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany created a highly dangerous situation. It seemed that Europe might be doomed to continue divisions which would be disastrous both because such divisions would perpetuate the cycle of recurrent war as between the Western European countries themselves, and because a divided Europe would automatically be dominated by Soviet despotic power.

## IV

I desire at this point to refer to the action which the United States Senate took on July 30, 1954. It was then predictable that the French Chamber of Deputies might fail to ratify the Bonn and Paris Treaties, above referred to, and the consequences of that failure could measur-

[4] For the text of the Bonn Convention on Relations, see volume VII.

[5] For the text of the Paris Treaty, see *AFP*, vol. I, pp. 1107–1150; for documentation concerning the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a European Defense Community, see pp. 571 ff.

ably be foreseen. In anticipation of that situation there occurred consultations between the Executive and the Senate, as a result of which the Senate, by a vote of 88 to 0, adopted a resolution which asked you in your discretion and within the limits of your constitutional powers to seek—

to restore sovereignty to Germany and to enable her to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

This act of cooperation between the Executive and the Senate, and the unanimous bipartisan action of the Senate itself, had a steadying and sobering effect at a time when there was much confusion and division of counsel. The Senate action enabled me, as your representative, to speak with authority in the subsequent negotiations which I conducted on your behalf.

The forward-looking "advice" thus given by the Senate in pursuance of its constitutional prerogative has in fact been successfully transmuted into Executive action. The first protocol referred to in I above will "restore sovereignty to Germany" and the second protocol referred to in I above will "enable her to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security."

V

The Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany is not linked to the entry into force of the arrangements for a German defense contribution, as was the case of the original Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic. It could come into force before it becomes possible to bring the arrangements for the German defense contribution into force. If there is an intervening period, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States will retain their existing powers in the field of disarmament and demilitarization in the Federal Republic. These powers will be exercised through a Joint Commission, consisting of representatives of the three powers and the Federal Republic, who will function by majority vote. These arrangements will be reviewed at the end of 1954 in light of the situation then existing with regard to the entry into force of the protocol and, at the same time, the four Governments will review the exercise of the controls with a view to permitting preparation by the Federal Republic for its future defense contribution.

In addition to the differences above mentioned, several changes of substance have been made in the Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic, as concluded in 1952. However, these changes neither increase the obligations of nor diminish the benefits to the United States as against those reflected in the Bonn convention which was approved by the Senate on July 1, 1952. The changes, which are

significant primarily from the standpoint of the Federal Republic of Germany, may be summarized as follows:

(1) In article 2 of the convention as originally concluded, the three powers retained their rights relating to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security, to Berlin, and to Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement. These powers were to be held in reserve for special use, related to the Soviet position in Eastern Germany, and were not intended for exercise in ordinary German affairs, either domestic or foreign. It seemed preferable, therefore, that insofar as the territory of the Federal Republic was concerned, the arrangements for the stationing of foreign forces should be put on a contractual basis. Accordingly, the forces in the Federal Republic after the entry into force of the arrangements for the German defense contribution will be governed by a separate convention under the terms of which the Federal Republic agrees to the stationing of forces of the same nationality and effective strength as may be stationed in the Federal Republic at that time. Any increase in the effective strength of these forces may be made only with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic.

The German representatives recognized that the three powers should preserve their rights to protect the security forces stationed in the Federal Republic until the Federal Government itself were able to take the necessary measures. This depends on the Federal Government obtaining new legislative powers. The termination of the general right of the three powers in this field will not affect the right of a military commander, if his forces are imminently menaced, to take such immediate action (including the use of armed force) as may be appropriate for their protection and as is requisite to remove the danger.

(2) A second change in the Convention on Relations relates to the Arbitration Tribunal to be established for the settlement of disputes arising between any one of the three powers and the Federal Government. Under the Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal as originally concluded, the Tribunal was given power to take action directly on legislative and administrative measures or judicial decisions applicable within the Federal Republic. These powers, which are not normal to a body created to arbitrate disputes between sovereign states, have been eliminated from the charter.

(3) A third change in the Convention on Relations relates to the situation which will arise on the reunification of Germany. The Convention on Relations as concluded in 1952 provided for its review in the event of reunification (art. 10). The new protocol provides for review of the convention and the related conventions not only in the event of actual reunification of Germany, but also in case an international understanding is reached with the participation and consent of the four Governments parties to the conventions on steps toward bringing about the reunification of Germany. The Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in Germany will also be subject to review in these circumstances. There must, of course, be agreement by all the signatory governments to any changes made in the conventions.

(4) Changes have also been made in the related conventions. These changes for the most part involve bringing the conventions up to date by eliminating clauses referring to the EDC Treaty, by taking into

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account the lapse of time since the conventions were concluded, and by taking into account progress made toward the completion of certain Allied programs in Germany. They also alter certain clauses in the conventions which were not felt to be in harmony with the status of equality being accorded the Federal Republic. Finally, the arrangements for the financial support of foreign forces stationed in Germany have been brought into harmony with more recent agreements with the Federal Republic in this field.

The related conventions were executive agreements implementing the Convention on Relations. For these, Senate action was unnecessary and, furthermore, recognized by the Committee on Foreign Relations to be undesirable, inasmuch as it was foreseen that they might require technical revision from time to time to meet changing conditions. The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate (Ex. Rept. No. 16, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), stated:

Some of the technical provisions in the [related] [6] conventions are temporary in nature and as the situation in Germany changes, it may be necessary to make modifications in them from time to time. Under such circumstances it would seem impractical to require resubmission of the conventions to the Senate before each such modification could go into effect.

The ratification of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany will not change the nature of those related conventions.

## VI

The arrangements for the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic do not affect the status of Berlin. In a declaration made by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France at the London Nine Power Conference of September 28–October 3, 1954, they reaffirmed the declaration made by them in Paris on May 27, 1952, that they would maintain armed forces in Berlin as long as their responsibilities required and that they would treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves. In addition, the three powers issued a statement in Paris on October 23, 1954,[7] in which they affirmed their determination to insure the greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation and stated that they had instructed their representatives in Berlin to consult with the German authorities in the city with a view to implementing these principles jointly and to the fullest degree possible.

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[6] Brackets in the source text.
[7] For the text of the Tripartite Statement, see p. 1428.

## VII

The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty Providing for the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, referred to in I above, has no precise counterpart in the documents which were submitted to the Senate in 1952, although, as mentioned, there was then a protocol, approved by the Senate, which extended the treaty area to include that of the EDC. It was, however, not then contemplated that the Federal Republic of Germany would itself become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty. The German defense contribution would have been made solely through the European Defense Community. Under the arrangements now contemplated, it is essential that the Federal Republic of Germany should become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A protocol to that effect was signed in Paris on October 23, 1954, by the representatives of the 14 nations now parties to that treaty, and is one of the two documents referred to in section I hereof which it is recommended should be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The protocol is framed so that its entry into force is tied to that of the other arrangements relating to German participation in the common defense.

## VIII

One of the documents above referred to in section II hereof, is a resolution concerning the powers of the supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR) approved by the North Atlantic Council on October 22, 1954.[8] The general effect of this resolution is to strengthen the role of SACEUR over the forces under his authority. One result of these changes will be to enhance the effectiveness of the NATO forces in Europe, with consequent benefits to the entire NATO effort. Increasing the authority of SACEUR will also mean that the national forces assigned to SACEUR will become integrated and interdependent to an extent that will minimize the possibility of individual nations exercising an independent military initiative in Europe.

## IX

Another of the resolutions of the North Atlantic Council suggested to be submitted to the Senate for its information is that of October 22, 1954, which took note of an exchange of declarations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on October 3, 1954, in London and

[8] For the text of the Resolution To Implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference Concerning the Powers of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, see p. 1431.

associated all members of the North Atlantic Treaty with the tripartite declaration issued by the three Governments last named.[9]

In its declaration, the Government of the Federal Republic declares that it has agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in article 2 of the charter. The Federal Republic also declares that, upon its accession to the North Atlantic and Brussels Treaties, it will refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the treaties. In particular the German Federal Republic undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic.

In the tripartite declaration, the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France respond appropriately to this declaration, reaffirming in relation to this situation the principles of article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, condemning the use of force as between nations.

## X

A major element in the new arrangements signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, are the four protocols designed to modify the Brussels Treaty.[10] This treaty, signed on March 17, 1948, by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, was the first major step toward the military integration of postwar Europe, antedating the North Atlantic Treaty by more than a year. Under the terms of the Brussels Treaty all countries were pledged to give full and immediate military assistance to any party against which aggression might occur. The treaty also provided for consultative machinery for the development of common defense plans. With the advent and growth of NATO, the organizational machinery under the Brussels Treaty became relatively inactive, but the treaty remained in full force and has now afforded a basis for realizing certain major political and security objectives.

The first of the protocols will bring about several important changes in the Brussels Treaty. First, it provides for the accession of Germany and Italy to the Brussels Treaty so that the membership will correspond to that of the proposed European Defense Community, plus the United Kingdom. Second, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty will be transformed into a new "Council of Western European Union" for the purposes of strengthening peace and security and promoting unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Western Europe and closer cooperation between them and with other European

[9] For the text of the Resolution of Association with the Tripartite Declaration of Oct. 3, 1954, see p. 1435.

[10] For the texts of the four Protocols, see p. 1441.

organizations. Special provision is made for votes by two-thirds majority or simple majority on specific questions. Provision is made for close cooperation between the Brussels Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. There is a clause stating the undesirability of duplicating the work of the military staffs of NATO and stipulating that the Council and its Agency for the Control of Armaments will rely on the military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

The second protocol is concerned with the size of the forces of Western European Union. It provides that the total strength and number of formations of the land and air forces of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands placed under SACEUR shall not exceed those laid down in the special agreement annexed to the European Defense Community Treaty. The forces of the United Kingdom under SACEUR shall not exceed those presently under SACEUR command, and Luxembourg's forces shall be set at one regimental combat team. Naval forces are to be set by the NATO annual review process. Any increase in the agreed maximum forces will be subject to the unanimous approval of all parties to the Brussels Treaty.

An important feature of this protocol is the commitment by the United Kingdom to maintain on the mainland of Europe the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR, i. e., four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force or such other forces as SACEUR regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of a majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers. The protocol provides that this undertaking does not bind the United Kingdom in case of an acute overseas emergency. It further provides that if maintenance of forces on the Continent at any time places too great a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, the Government of the United Kingdom will invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions under which the United Kingdom forces are maintained.

This commitment is in addition to the commitment implicit in the United Kingdom's membership in the new Council of Western European Union.

The third protocol relates to the control of armaments. It is concerned both with armaments which are not to be manufactured in the Federal Republic and those which are to be controlled within the Brussels Treaty countries on the mainland. The prohibited arms, which the Federal Republic of Germany has renounced the right to produce, are atomic, biological, and chemical weapons and guided missiles, larger naval vessels, and strategic bombing aircraft. Unanimous vote of the Council of Western European Union is required to give Germany the

right to produce atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. A two-thirds majority of the Council can give Germany the right to produce guided missiles, larger naval vessels, and strategic aircraft, provided that SACEUR recommends that Germany be given this right.

The armaments subject to control throughout the territory of the six Continental countries include both the weapons which are prohibited and a number of other major weapons. These include mines, tanks, large artillery and ammunition therefor, aircraft bombs and most types of military aircraft.

A fourth protocol creates an Agency for the Control of Armaments. With respect to controlled items, the Agency is to exercise its control over stocks of armaments rather than over production. It will also ensure that prohibited items are not produced in Germany.

The United States will give the Council of Western European Union information with respect to military aid to be furnished to the forces of the Brussels Treaty countries on the mainland of Europe. This information will be transmitted to the Agency for Armaments Control by the Council. The United States retains full authority to determine the allocation of United States military assistance.

The Agency does not have responsibilities with respect to the production and procurement of armaments or with the allocation of military equipment. However, the Brussels Treaty countries did agree in a resolution approved at Paris October 21, 1954, that they would convene a Working Group in Paris January 17, 1955, to consider proposals for development of rationalized production programs.

## XI

The arrangements which I have discussed impose no treaty engagements and obligations upon the United States other than those incident to restoring to the Federal Republic of Germany sovereign powers which the Allies had assumed after the defeat of the Nazi Government; and the acceptance of the Federal Republic as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nevertheless, the prospective attitude of the United States toward the whole arrangement is a matter of profound, even decisive, significance.

In this connection, I made a statement at the London Conference at its meeting of September 29, 1954, the full text of which is reproduced in an annex to the final act of the London Conference, transmitted herewith.[11] By that statement I sought to make clear the desire of our Nation to encourage and support measures which unify and strengthen Western Europe, whereas we would be disposed to draw away from a Europe which persisted in divisions and weakness. In this connection I said that if new arrangements were made by the Western European

[11] The text of Dulles' statement was made Annex II A of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, p. 1357.

countries, which, in replacement of the European Defense Community, provided unity and strength, so that the hopes which we had placed in EDC could reasonably be transferred to these new arrangements, then I would recommend to you, Mr. President, that you should make a declaration of policy comparable to that which you offered, after consultation with congressional leaders, in connection with the prospective European Defense Community Treaty, including an expression of intention by the United States—

to maintain in Europe such elements of its armed forces as may be necessary or appropriate to contribute our fair share of what is needed for the common defense of this North Atlantic area while the threat to that area exists.

I was careful to point out that such a declaration would constitute no more than a policy declaration and that it would not be a legally binding commitment. I pointed out:

under our constitutional system, the President of the United States is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and, as such, has the right to determine their disposition. One President of the United States is not constitutionally able to bind his successor in this matter. Each President of the United States comes into office enjoying the right to dispose of the Armed Forces of the United States as he thinks best serves the interests of the United States in accordance with the advice he gets from his military advisers.

I nevertheless pointed out that basic and fundamental policies were, as a practical matter, not likely to be altered and that our policy to cooperate with a Western Europe which was itself acting effectively to make itself united and strong was, I felt, basic and fundamental United States policy, as both the Executive and the Congress had clearly made manifest.

In pursuance of the statement which I made in London, I expect, Mr. President, to make a recommendation to you as thus indicated, if the arrangements which were entered into at Paris have been, or appear likely to be, realized. I understand that you would be disposed to act favorably on such a recommendation.

## XII

It is evident that the foregoing agreements, if they come into force and are implemented, will have far reaching and benign consequences.

They will fulfill the aspirations of the people of the Federal Republic of Germany for a position of equality in the family of free nations.

They will increase substantially the defensive potential of the Atlantic alliance.

At the same time, they will afford protection against excessive militarism as a tool of aggressive nationalism. This protection will go not only to the members of the Atlantic alliance, but to all.

They will offer strong assurances against a renewal of fratricidal strife among the free nations of Europe and will afford a framework of practical cooperation which should encourage further advances toward political and economic unity among the Western European states.

Because of the importance to this Nation of achieving these results, I recommend, Mr. President, that you request early consideration by the Senate of this matter, and, in particular, the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the two documents of treaty status which the United States has signed, namely, the protocol which will restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany and the protocol which will admit the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Respectfully submitted, JOHN FOSTER DULLES

*Schedule* [12]

(1) The Final Act of the Nine Power Conference held at London, September 28–October 3, 1954, with annexes; (2) three resolutions adopted by the North Atlantic Council on October 22, 1954; (3) four protocols to the Brussels Treaty of March 17, 1948, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, together with the text of treaty itself; (4) a declaration dated October 23, 1954, of the states signatory to the Brussels Treaty inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to accede to the treaty; (5) a resolution on the production and standardization of armaments adopted by the Nine Power Conference at Paris on October 21, 1954; (6) the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954; (7) the Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954; (8) certain letters relating to the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, dated October 23, 1954, together with the texts of letters exchanged in 1952 referred to therein; and (9) a statement on Berlin made by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom in Paris on October 23, 1954.

An agreement on the Saar was also signed at Paris by the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on October 23, 1954.[13] When an authentic English translation of this agreement is obtained, it will be made available to the Senate for its information.

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[12] All the documents listed in this schedule are printed in this compilation except for the letters enumerated as (8). For the text of (1), the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, see p. 1345; for the texts of (2) through (7), which were collectively known as the Paris Agreements, see pp. 1435 ff.; and for the text of (9), the Tripartite Statement on Berlin, see p. 1428.

[13] For information concerning the Saar Agreement, see the editorial note, p. 1463.

**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 398**

*United States Minutes of the Opening Meeting With French Prime Minister Mendès-France at the White House, Thursday, November 18, 1954, Noon* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 22, 1954.

| Participants: | *United States* | *France* |
|---|---|---|
| | The President | Premier Mendes-France |
| | The Secretary | Ambassador Bonnet |
| | Ambassador Dillon | M. Seydoux |
| | Mr. Merchant | M. Soutou |

The meeting began with the exposé by M. Mendes-France of the ratification prospects for the Paris accords. M. Mendes-France said that the treaties had been submitted to the National Assembly and that the Foreign Affairs Committee had appointed as *rapporteur* General Billotte, who was favorable to ratification. M. Mendes-France said that he had set a deadline for Assembly ratification before the end of the year, although he could not guarantee the exact date on which it would take place. He emphasized that action by the Assembly would in effect be final action, as the Assembly has the final authority in France. M. Mendes-France said that the French Senate would take the treaties up immediately after the Christmas vacation and would vote on them before the 15th of February. He said there would be a large favorable vote in the Senate. In the Assembly he said that the debate would be difficult and there would be active opposition but there would be no doubt on the result. He estimated that he would lose not more than 40 votes, compared to the preliminary vote in October when there were 360 favorable votes. M. Mendes-France said he was sure that he would receive an absolute majority, which would be in the neighborhood of 320 to 325 votes in favor of the treaties. The maximum of the vote against the treaties would be 260 provided the MRP voted against the treaties. If they merely abstained, the vote against the treaties would of course be much smaller.

The President asked why the MRP were opposed to the treaties, and M. Mendes-France answered that their opposition was primarily based on internal political reasons, namely their opposition to his government, but that it was also based to a lesser extent on their great attachment to the EDC.

The Secretary then asked for M. Mendes-France's views about the

[1] The source text, including a cover sheet, was circulated as document MFT MIN 1. A summary of this conversation was sent to Paris in telegram 1873, Nov. 21, repeated to Bonn and London. (396.1 PA/11–2154) On Nov. 23, Dulles informed British Ambassador Makins concerning the talks with Mendès-France, including the discussion of the Saar and ratification of the Paris Agreements. (Memorandum of conversation by MacArthur, Nov. 23; 740.5/11–2354) Further documentation concerning Mendès-France's visit to Washington, Nov. 17–19, is presented in volume VI.

ratification situation in Germany. M. Mendes-France replied that he thought the situation in Germany would be satisfactory. He said that Adenauer was having some trouble on the Saar but that that had been expected. M. Mendes-France said that the French were trying to help Adenauer and in the recent talks between Blankenhorn and Soutou they had given the Germans a number of things which they had requested. For instance, they had agreed to international supervision of the referendum by a commission composed of all the representatives of the Western European Union treaty, except France and Germany. Mendes-France said it was impossible to change the basic Saar agreement but that they were doing everything they could to help Adenauer on procedural questions connected with the implementation of the agreement.

The Secretary then commented that he had observed a better atmosphere of Franco-German understanding at the London and Paris conferences than he had seen in the past. M. Mendes-France said it was necessary not only to have a complete Franco-German reconciliation but that it was also necessary to have close Franco-German cooperation in all fields, particularly the economic. In this connection, Franco-German economic negotiations would start on November 23.

The President then stated his belief in Western Europe and said that it should be the third great force in the world. All that was necessary was close cooperation between the various countries of Western Europe. He said that the US was related by culture and blood to countries of Western Europe and in this sense was a product of Western Europe. For this reason we favor a strong Western Europe.

The President then said that within Western Europe the one major problem has been the age-old Franco-German problem. He said that he was all for Franco-German *rapprochement* and had been very pleased at the London and Paris accords. He said that he applauded them and particularly the fact that Great Britain had thrown in her lot with the Continent.

M. Mendes-France then said that he would like to mention two items concerning the Saar. First, the Saar agreement with Germany [2] provided that the two countries would jointly ask the US and the UK to guarantee the agreement up to the peace treaty. The Prime Minister said he realized that there were some Constitutional problems involved but he understood that a wording somewhat along the following lines might be possible: "Any violation of this agreement would be a grave threat to the peace and we would have to consider the situation arising from such a violation". The Secretary said he thought it would be possible to work something out along this line. The Prime Minister then emphasized that it was not only a question of aggression against

[2] For information concerning the Saar Agreement signed in Paris on Oct. 23, see the editorial note, p. 1463.

the Saar but would cover the whole of the treaty. The President then said he saw no reason why something satisfactory could not be worked out by the experts. Mendes-France said that this was satisfactory to him.

M. Mendes-France then took up the second Saar problem and said that France would like the US to agree to support the present Saar settlement at the peace treaty. He said that the US and the UK had agreed on such a course in the past and in particular he cited statements by Dean Acheson on January 18, 1950, and by Ambassador Dillon on June 8, 1954. The Prime Minister said he would like these to be confirmed by the US. The President asked what the Prime Minister's idea of a time limit would be on this commitment and Mendes-France replied that the commitment might last 100 years or so. He said that he had no idea how long it would last and it would have to be regarded as indeterminate. However he pointed out that it was most important that the US take such a commitment, as otherwise the French Assembly would feel that the Saar settlement was precarious and fragile instead of a permanent settlement. He admitted that such a pledge by the US might be difficult for Germany, but he said that the Germans knew that France intended to make this request. He then pointed out that the settlement at the peace treaty would be subject to agreement by the population of the Saar in a referendum and stated that this provision meant that we would not be forcing a solution on the Saar population if we agreed to the French request.

The President said that this raised a real Constitutional problem, as he could not make a commitment of this nature which was not approved by the Senate and which would be binding on his successors. The Prime Minister said that he had never heard before that there was a Constitutional problem involved here, and he read the statement made by Dean Acheson on January 24, 1950. The Secretary then pointed out that Dean Acheson's statement was the reason why a Constitutional issue had been raised. He pointed out that Dean Acheson's statement was not binding on the present Administration, that was presumably why the French wanted a new statement, but any new statement that we would make would not be binding on future Administrations. The Prime Minister then reiterated the importance of this matter and said that it would be raised certainly in the French Parliament during the course of the ratification debate. M. Mendes-France then read from a Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Dillon and Maurice Schumann covering a conversation held on June 8, 1954 [3] in which, according to Mr. Schumann, Ambassador Dillon had given assurances that the US would support the Saar agreement at the peace treaty, provided the EDC came into being. M. Mendes-France also pointed out that such an agreement to support the

[3] Regarding this conversation, see telegram 4764 from Paris, June 9, p. 968.

settlement at the peace treaty was a basic part of the Van Naters report on the Saar, which had greatly influenced the present Saar agreement.

The Secretary then pointed out that the situation was different at that time under the EDC. The Germans and the French then both wanted the Saar to be permanently fitted into the European framework. The present settlement, he stated, was good but not as good, and the present agreement asked only for a US and UK guarantee up to the time of the peace treaty. M. Mendes-France interrupted to say that the French have always and still do want a definite settlement. He pointed out that their original position had been a flat one that the settlement would have to be definite and final and that they had only modified this position to accommodate the Germans so as not to prejudice the consideration of the German frontiers in the East at the peace treaty. However the French attach great importance to the present settlement being definite.

The President then said that while he felt the French certainly had the right to take our past statements at face value he thought it was most important that we do not make Adenauer's task more difficult. M. Mendes-France said that he agreed that we must make things as easy as possible for Germany, but on the other hand he felt it was vital that the Saar be permanently removed as a bone of contention between France and Germany. The Saar must be a finished subject that would not rise up again to plague Franco-German relations.

The President closed the discussion by saying that he agreed in general that it was better to tidy things up and settle them but that in this case we must look out for Adenauer's interests and must try to be helpful to both sides.[4]

[4] For a record of Dulles' meeting with Mendès-France on Nov. 19, during which the Saar was again discussed, see the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Nov. 19, *infra*.

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762.022/11–1954

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1954.

Subject: Saar

Participants: Premier Mendes-France
Ambassador Bonnet
The Secretary
Livingston T. Merchant

The Secretary told M. Mendes-France that since the talk at the White House [1] we had given this matter further consideration and that

[1] For a record of Mendès-France's meeting with President Eisenhower on Nov. 18, see the U.S. Minutes, *supra*.

he felt the Premier was entitled to know that our preliminary thinking was to the effect that it would not be possible to give a fresh committal to support the Saar settlement in the Peace Treaty except under the unlikely circumstances that the Germans as well as the French ask for such a committal. He mentioned the fact that provision had been made in the Teitgen–Adenauer agreement [2] last spring for the French to approach us and the British on this subject. Mendes-France pointed out that this had been merely a reservation by the French Delegation of its right to request such a guarantee.

Mendes-France spoke of the delicacy of this matter and the importance of a satisfactory response by us to the ratification by France.

The Secretary replied that the scales were so delicately balanced in the matter of the Saar as between France and Germany that we were not disposed to take any action which might be disturbing.

Mendes-France argued that there should be no difficulty for us if we made our committal subject to our support conforming to the wishes of the Saar population as expressed at the time of the peace conference. He also expressed the hope that we might be able to do something after ratification if not before.

The Secretary said that we had not of course fully explored the matter yet but he didn't want the Premier to be in any doubt as to our thinking. He added that apart from legal and constitutional questions, the controlling consideration in his mind would be the avoidance of any risk of an action on our part being responsible for failure of ratification of the complex of Paris agreements by all the countries.

[2] For information concerning the Teitgen–Adenauer Agreement, signed in Strasbourg on May 22, 1954, see the editorial note, p. 967.

740.5/11–1954 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, November 19, 1954—7 p. m.

2439. In full-dress, two-day debate, Commons, as anticipated, passed government motion approving UK policy toward Western Europe expressed in London–Paris Agreements by large margin.

Following Eden's comprehensive and persuasive introduction, debate centered mostly around questions such as whether new agreements will contribute to European military unity and to holding successful talks with USSR on German unification and how effective new limitations on German military forces will prove. There was little discussion of value German military contributions to NATO (except by Defense Minister Macmillan), of US European policies and reactions to agree-

[1] Repeated to Paris, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Ottawa.

ments, or of merits of maintaining UK troops on Continent (which were largely taken for granted). Few tears were shed for EDC and many speakers, including Julian Amery and Sir Robert Boothby, stated preference for new arrangements in which UK could participate. There was no expectation that Brussels Treaty would afford basis for supra-national structure and speakers praised it largely as successful device for permitting participation of both France and Germany in Western European defense. Interesting development, however, is that Morrison advocated acceptance of French plan for arms pool, apparently as added restriction on Germans.

Regarding cost of UK forces on Continent, Gaitskell suggested burden-sharing under common NATO budget as possible means of relieving UK of entire cost after cessation of German support, but Macmillan replied NATO annual review would suffice to achieve equitable burden-sharing. Strong possibility exists that Labor Party will continue to press for some cost-sharing formula which will shift part of burden of maintaining UK troops on Continent to other nations.

Labor Party opponents of agreements, only handful of whom spoke in debate, offered no new arguments, but Bevan made emotional appeal by stating UK would require more US aid if it had to support troops on Continent and by posing question of German Army with Nazi officers in possession of A-bomb. After calling treaties "most ignominious surrender" in modern British diplomacy, he asked only that government meet with USSR before German divisions all in field. Bevan arguments, skillfully answered by Eden, did not create deep impression.

Official Labor opposition accepted agreements and Parliamentary Labor Party voted in first instance to vote with government. Large majority of Labor speakers favored agreement and excellent speeches were delivered by Orrion, Gaitskell, Attlee and Healey supporting government. However, Bevanites, pacifists, Crypto-Communists and cranks on party fringe, as well as pressure from constituencies caused party leadership to back down and members were directed to abstain but not to vote against agreements. Nevertheless, six Labor members, including Silverman and Emrys Hughes, did oppose in final vote, even after threat of strong party disciplinary action.

Although government would certainly have preferred Labor to vote for agreements, Parliamentary consensus was clearly in their favor. Government is expected to proceed with ratification when remaining procedural formalities are completed and when notice has been received from Federal Republic concerning their reservations to acceptance of World Court jurisdiction under Brussels Treaty.

Copies of debate will be pouched soonest.

ALDRICH

740.5/12–954

*Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs (Kidd) to the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lyon)*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 9, 1954.

Subject: Some Thoughts on Rising Public Resistance to Rearmament in Germany and the Practical Effects that may be expected therefrom.

*Summary and Conclusions*

Recent reports from Germany indicate the presence there of strong and possibly growing sentiments against rearmament. GPA believes this to be the result of a combination of Communist pressures, tactical maneuvers of the Socialist opposition to Adenauer and general doubt and disillusion over the substitution of a German national army for the integrated German-Allied forces foreseen under EDC arrangements. The effectiveness of each of these forces is increased by various historical, psychological factors which affect German public opinion deeply.

To offset these things, there are other substantial forces, including the fully committed and firmly entrenched Adenauer Government, the leadership of the booming community of German industry and commerce, the bulk of the middle, upper-middle and professional classes, the veterans organizations, the refugee and expellee organizations, etc.

Given the paternalistic nature of a German society and its reaction to the voice of authority, it seems most unlikely that the scattered sources of opposition to rearmament will coalesce in any way that will pose a threat to the carrying out of Federal Republic commitments under the London and Paris Agreements. GPA expects that there will be some difficulty, possibly even including rioting on a minor scale in the early stages of bringing German manpower under arms. The degree of such difficulty will depend a good deal on whether the government shows ineptitude in handling the problems that arise or whether it will be able to act smoothly and quickly to take care of smaller troubles before they become larger.

We have recently observed a marked increase of agitation in Germany over the subject of rearmament. In July at the SPD convention in Berlin an overwhelming majority of delegates gave enthusiastic support to anti-rearmament and "negotiation first" policies. In October the Trade Union convention adopted a strongly worded resolution against taking up arms with only three or four dissenting voices. The state election campaigns in Hesse and Bavaria, coming not long after the completion of the London and Paris Agreements, were regarded as a first test of German public reaction to the new arrangements

[1] Drafted by Elwood Williams.

designed to replace the defunct EDC. Not only was there much talk during these campaigns of the folly of rearming without talking first to the Russians (a straight SPD line), but even more remarkable, there were a number of youth demonstrations against rearming and against military service, culminating in a fracas in Augsburg where Herr Blank, the Minister in charge of defense arrangements for the Adenauer Government, was first shouted down and then physically injured. This last incident served greatly to enlarge the already substantial German press comment on the entire subject and there appears now to be doubt in some quarters whether the Federal Republic Government can draft and train troops and establish an army without considerable difficulty.

In the GPA view, there is probably some difficulty to be expected, but it should not be "considerable." In the area of physical violence, we think that the most to be expected would be draft rioting on a sporadic basis and demonstrations, marchings, or hecklings at the speeches or appearances of prominent government figures. We would expect such physical disturbances to occur usually on the initiative of Communists or crypto-Communists who would use local disaffected elements, especially draft-reluctant youth, to add mass and weight to the effort. We think any chain reaction of such incidents, starting in one community and spreading from town to town across any large part of the country, an extremely remote possibility.

We would also expect that on paper the opposition to arming would look a good deal stronger and the dissension seem much greater than will actually be the case. The SPD can be expected to use the subject to underline its demands for negotiations with the USSR and, for purely German reasons, the whole matter of rearmament is one which provides excellent copy for the German newspaper and magazine world.

It must be understood that the problem of German rearmament, as seen by the Germans, is a very complex and difficult one. There are wrapped up in it any number of lesser subjects which have, at one time or another, played a real and agonizing part in German life and opinion and which continue to affect them. In listing a few, one might include: the Socialist doctrines of internationalism and pacifism beaten down in 1914, but later reappearing at many times and places; the long dynamic force of Prussian militarism beaten down in 1918, revived and then smashed in 1945; the militaristic trappings and adventures of National Socialism so disastrously discredited in the most recent war; the sincere efforts of the post-war period to outlaw the military idea by provisions in the Basic Law (constitution), and, when it became necessary to amend that, to arrange for rearmament only under the safeguards of a European Defense Community. The attitudes engendered among several generations of Germans by these thoughts are

a real part of their total make-up and can be played upon with some effect. We have seen how, when German rearmament became a real subject in 1950 and 1951, a wave of "ohne mich" feeling swept widely through the country. Now, to play on these attitudes, there are several substantial forces.

The first is the Communist Party, its front organizations and its hidden followers. By definition, the party and every instrument it can command or influence will use every means available to stir up anti-armament and anti-enlistment feeling. Because of the almost total distrust of the Germans for the Communists, the antidote for these efforts is obviously exposure. This is a task the Federal Government and the various Laender Governments are well equipped to do. The Verfassungsschutz organizations are well organized and have effectively penetrated the Communist Party and its affiliated organizations.

The second is the Socialist Party (SPD) which does not oppose rearmament as such, according to its latest (July) official platform, but which does hold as axioms of policy that the reunification of Germany must be the first aim of the Federal Republic, that rearmament will stiffen Russian resistance to reunification, and that, consequently, rearmament should be delayed until the matter of reunification has been re-explored in international conference negotiation with the Russians. In feeding fuel to the fire of this argument, the SPD has, and will, make use of a good many others. There is, for example, no doubt in the light of the elections of September 1953 that a large majority of the German population had accepted the idea of rearmament within EDC. To arm within an international framework with automatic checks established against a revival of German militarism old-style was a cardinal point in the successful appeal of Chancellor Adenauer's CDU/CSU. Again and again before August of 1954, the Chancellor and his party specifically rejected the idea of a German national army as a solution to the German problem. The collapse of EDC was a severe shock to the Germans. The amazing recovery of the situation by Western statesmen, using the devices of NATO and WEU, did much to offset this shock, but the fact that the new scheme called for a German national army, left many Germans doubtful and upset. There is an evident fear in many that the forces of German militarism, Prussianism, and political influence by a military cast will be more than the democratic forces or the Federal Republic can keep under control. The SPD is fully cognizant of the depth and extent of this feeling and is not failing to make use of it in political speeches, even though SPD parliamentarians are participating in Bundestag committee activities designed to keep civilian and democratic control of the armed forces which are to be established.

Thirdly, one must reckon with the German Trades Union Group (DGB) which, in its policies and pronouncements, parallels the SPD

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in large measure, but which has several specific reasons for looking on rearmament with a dubious eye. The DGB has a number of influential members who are old Socialists of the pacifist stripe. It has a vast number of others who hold tightly to Marxist-Socialist doctrines of worker exploitation by the capitalist class and fear the capitalists who produce munitions and weapons above all others. The DGB also includes a substantial element of younger workers, who are pleased to have good jobs in an expanding economy and have an understandable reluctance to spend 18 months or two years away from their families working with a gun instead of a lathe. This group has the further concern that their places will be filled from the ranks of the unemployed or even by labor imported from Italy, thus increasing the competition they will face when they leave military service.

As a fourth factor, one must consider the subject of neutralism. Besides being promoted by the Communists as something useful to them, neutralism has two sources of strength that have nothing to do with Communism. The first is Protestant pacifism. The second is a sort of psychological retreat from reality which rationalizes its position by concluding that Germany is indefensible from Russian assault or that the secret plans of the Allies (especially the French) call for using West German territory only as the foreground of a defense in depth strategy which will make no serious effort to fight east of the Rhine. The pacifist group of neutralists is very small, but the impact of its arguments is much greater than its size would suggest, particularly because many of them are spread by prominent Protestant clergymen and lay leaders. Gustav Heinemann is the most prominent political figure in this group. The other group of neutralists is too scattered to have any coherence at all. It includes writers, professors, some ex-military figures, etc., who do not act together, but who do have an effect because their better argued points achieve wide circulation in the German community and frequently appear in the arguments of organized groups who actually oppose rearmament on other grounds.

This rather long exposition of the forces opposed to rearmament suggests immediately why they can be expected *not* to succeed. If they were a coherent, unified, well directed force, it would be possible to describe the opposition much more briefly. However, it must not be forgotten that these forces, though often shadowy, are real, and that if they should manage to coalesce under some leadership, the trouble they could cause would be very great indeed.

The job of seeing that they do not coalesce, falls to the forces favoring rearmament in general and the carrying out of the London and Paris Agreements in particular. These forces are powerful, well organized, capable of integrated action, and already, under the leader-

ship of Chancellor Adenauer, have political leadership of Western Germany by a wide margin. The principal elements in these forces are:

1. The Federal Government with its two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. Overwhelmingly successful in the 1953 national elections, it has lost some prestige through the events of 1954, including the failure of EDC and a diminished vote in local elections, but it still has firm control of the internal political situation and shows no sign of losing it.
2. The almost unanimous support of the business community, industrial and commercial. West German business is firm in its support of Adenauer and in its opposition to all things Communist or even Socialist. It also includes large numbers of German community leaders who lean toward the traditional attitudes of respect for the military idea and a belief in the virtues of military strength.
3. The professional and upper middle classes, including the widespread and immensely powerful Civil Service. Here again is a tradition-bearing element of German society firmly convinced that its future lies in a position of German strength, aligned with the West.
4. A variety of influential organizations, including veterans groups and associations of refugees and expellees who are animated as much by a profound hatred (and even fear) of Russia, as by any attachment to the glories of militarism.

The German disposition to respect the voices of those in positions of leadership and authority is well known. It may have been diminished by the events of this century, but it is still a major factor in German social structure. With Adenauer himself and the overwhelming proportion of German upper and middle class leadership lined up in favor of rearmament, there is little doubt that opposition will prove futile, unless some radical change of international cirumstance intervenes. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that through poor handling of potentially troublesome situations, the progress of rearmament may be made noisier and somewhat more difficult than it need be.

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**740.5/12–1054 : Telegram**

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 10, 1954—7 p. m.

2486. Reference Embassy telegram 2475.[2] Narrow margin by which Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee approved favorable Bilotte report on German rearmament and membership in NATO is now revealed. Official tabulation 16 votes for included 8 Socialists, 2 ARS, 2 Independents, 2 Peasants, 1 Radical, 2 Independent Peasants and 1 Peasant. Socialists voting for included Mayer and Moch, both of

[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it reported that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly approved three favorable reports on the Paris Agreements, which meant that the "first hazard on parliamentary road to ratification [had] been successfully overcome" (740.5/12–1054).

whom have heretofore been opposed to EDC and German rearmament in any form. They are said to have informed committee that their group had voted unanimously in favor of treaty in committee but they reserved their position on final vote on floor. In this connection, it is recalled that last Socialist Congress decided that group should vote unanimously for ratification and that any dissenting members will be subjected to party discipline.

Votes against included 6 Communists, 5 Gaullists, 1 Progressist, 2 Independents and 1 Radical. 11 abstaining included MRP.

Of 2 Independents voting for, Delbez and Paternot, latter later attempted to switch his vote to an abstention but he was overruled on basis final vote had already been recorded. If switch had been accepted, whole process of passing bill from committees to Assembly floor in time to meet December 20 opening date for debate might have been jeopardized.

Bouhey (Socialist) spoke on behalf those voting for to effect favorable vote had been granted on understanding that "parallel negotiations" with Soviets would proceed. Also expressed concern over "Adenauer's declarations on Saar" and indicated that he and some of colleagues might find reason vote differently on floor than they had in committee if their conditions for parallel negotiations and accepted Saar Agreement were not satisfied. Rosenblatt (Communist) speaking for opposition explained hostility on well-worn Communist ground of objection to German rearmament in any form.

DILLON

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762.022/12–1354 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT BONN, December 13, 1954—1 p. m.

1713. I called on Chancellor this morning eleven o'clock. He had just received from Blankenhorn copy German translation Mendes-France's proposed explanation Saar Treaty, scheduled for printing and distribution members National Assembly Tuesday morning.[2] Chancellor glanced through it for first time in my presence and was incensed at number statements contained in document. On several points he declared Mendes-France's statement contrary to agreements reached between them in Paris. He stated publication this document would make his position impossible in forthcoming debate first reading Wednesday and Thursday Bundestag. He would be obliged to make public denial of number of points in this declaration. Consequence of

[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] A summary of the salient features of the French *Exposé des Motifs*, which was to be printed and distributed along with copies of the draft law authorizing the President to sign the Saar Agreement, is in telegram 2509 from Paris, Dec. 13 (762.022/12–1354).

public dispute between Mendes-France and Adenauer on interpretation their agreement in Paris would wreck possibility ratification in Paris and Bonn. I have telephoned Dillon to alert him to this danger. Immediate objective must be avoidance publication this document, but beyond this before French debate opens some degree reconciliation between Mendes-France's explanation and Chanc's position must be reached.

Chancellor did not intend in his statement Wednesday to stress Saar issue. On contrary, he intended to treat it as lightly as possible, he said to me that unfortunately Mendes-France seemed intent on focusing attention on Saar issue and forcing him to do same.

Chancellor cannot help entertaining suspicion that Mendes-France wishes have treaties fail because of German intransigence on Saar issue and this is reason for his desiring publish his explanation before Bundestag debate and many days before his own debate.

In particular, reference to U.S. and U.K. in this statement made Chancellor feel he must ask officially for statement from Washington. Therefore I am officially requesting from Department answer to question which he raises, namely is following statement which Mendes-France proposes to make correct or not:

"We have before us international pact which gives European status to Saar and there is no doubt that French Govt during negotiations for peace treaty (which will finally fix boundaries Germany and which, in so far as it affects Saar, will be submitted to Saar population for approval) will demand that this status be confirmed. During negotiations the French Govt will ask for support of British and American Govts in accordance with express assurances which French Govt received from these two govts as early as April 10, 1947, and which have meanwhile been reaffirmed."

Please instruct urgently.

CONANT

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762.022/12–1354 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 13, 1954—8 p. m.

2526. Reference Embassy telegram 2519.[2] Parodi sent for me urgently late this evening at direct request of Mendes to talk about the Saar. He said that Berard had had an interview with Blankenhorn today in which Blankenhorn had protested violently against the French *Exposé des Motifs* on the Saar and in particular against the paragraph discussing possible attitude of the U.S. and Great Britain at a future peace conference. Berard had replied outlining the French

[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it discussed the release of the French *Exposé des Motifs* to all members of the French National Assembly and the fact that no French newspapers had published it as yet, although that would soon happen (762.022/12–1354).

position, which was French Government at first introduced Saar bill as a simple annex to Paris Treaty so as not to require any *Exposé des Motifs* and had only been forced to change their tactics upon publication of the German *Exposé des Motifs*, which they had found most misleading and which had caused an uproar in the French Assembly. Blankenhorn told Berard that German *Exposé des Motifs* was regrettable and had been dictated by electoral considerations. He then said that the question was what should be done now. Blankenhorn told Berard that the Chancellor considered that it might not be possible for him to go through with presentation of Paris accords and Saar agreement to Bundestag on 15th, and that he was considering instead appealing to U.S. and Great Britain asking that a 4-Power conference (U.S., U.K., France and Federal Republic) be convened immediately to discuss the Saar.

Parodi's instructions from Mendes were to tell me clearly and firmly that under no circumstances would the French Government attend such a 4-Power conference on the Saar, the only purpose of which could be an attempt by the Germans to renegotiate the agreements signed at Paris. Parodi pointed out that Blankenhorn had suggested this 4-Power conference while in London on his recent visit. French feel that Germans are blowing incident up out of all proportion and are using it as excuse to try and get the Saar agreement re-opened before a 4-Power conference.

Parodi said that French *Exposé des Motifs*, while firm, was not at all violent, and that several paragraphs desired by Grandval had been omitted completely. From brief reading, I feel this is fair characterization of French presentation. Parodi also said that French Govt was making every effort to keep subject out of the newspapers, but could not guarantee success, as document was now in hands of all deputies, including Communists.

As I left Parodi's office, I found Jebb in outer office, and he told me that he also had been sent for urgently, presumably to receive the same message.

DILLON

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**762.022/12–1354 : Telegram**

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, December 13, 1954—8 : 24 p. m.

3194. Re Bonn's 1713 (rptd Paris 396 London 406)[2] and telephone conversation Dillon to effect French have already distributed explana-

[1] Drafted by Merchant and Dulles, cleared with Phleger, Lyon, and John W. Jones, and repeated for action to Paris as niact telegram 2190 and to Bonn as niact telegram 1638.

[2] Dated Dec. 13, p. 1492.

tion Saar Treaty I believe we should reply to Adenauer's question along following lines:

"Questions have recently arisen regarding the position which the United States would take at a German peace conference with reference to the status of the Saar. The United States has long had a deep and abiding interest in a just and permanent settlement of the Saar problem. Such a settlement, in its view, should rest upon willing acceptance by the people of the Saar and of the Governments concerned. In 1947, and again in 1950, the United States Government indicated the position which, in the light of the then circumstances, it would be prepared to take at the peace conference. Since that time, the situation has materially altered, notably by the opening of direct negotiations on this subject by France and Germany. In June 1954, in relation to a prospective Franco-German agreement of a permanent character, the United States indicated that, on the assumption that such an agreement was concluded and commended itself to the people of the Saar, the United States would support that agreed settlement in the Peace Conference. That agreement failed of conclusion. On October 23, 1954, the Governments of France and Germany finally reached an agreement with reference to the Saar, which the United States understands is designed to endure 'until the conclusion of peace treaty'. It further appears that the provisions of the peace treaty affecting the Saar will require the approval of the Saar population by a referendum. The Government of the United States does not feel that in the absence of agreement by the parties on the permanence of this agreement, it can consider giving a commitment running beyond that contemplated in Article 8 of that agreement. It does, however, believe that it can reasonably be assumed that when the question of the Saar is raised at a Peace Conference, the United States will be disposed to support a permanent solution of this matter which rests upon the willing acceptance of the people of the Saar and the Governments concerned."

London should urgently seek UK views on foregoing and intentions regarding British issuance similar statement. Hope US statement can be given Adenauer by close of business Dec. 14, i.e. prior Bundestag debate. Upon receipt UK views and on assumption they agree with us, we intend instruct Conant inform Adenauer and Dillon inform Mendes-France.

DULLES

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762.022/12–1454

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant), at Paris* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY BAD GODESBERG, December 14, 1954.

DEAR LIVIE: I am taking advantage of Reinstein's going to Paris tonight to send you a few lines about the present status of the mix-up

[1] Merchant was in Paris as part of the U.S. Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting scheduled for Dec. 17–18; for documentation, see pp. 549 ff.

on the Saar. As of this writing (6:00 p. m. Tuesday evening), it looks as though tomorrow in the Bundestag would be relatively quiet. The excitement may come on Thursday. A great deal depends on how much of the French "explanation" is published in the press tomorrow (Wednesday morning) and Thursday morning, and whether or not the opposition speakers get hold of the full document.

As I understand it, the Chancellor will make very little of the whole Saar problem and say, in effect, that the "justification" now in the hands of the French Assembly does not agree with his own views on several points and the subject will have to be further discussed. Whether he can get away with this simple statement or not remains to be seen; and you will know by the time you see this letter whether what he says and what other Germans say tomorrow or Thursday will have upset the French so that their time-schedule is altered.

On the subject of the U.S. and British position, it is our view here now that almost certainly there will be no need for the Chancellor to volunteer any statement about U.S. intentions; but if he is challenged because of a "leak" of the French "justification," then he may be in a very difficult position on Thursday if he cannot reply. Therefore I am still of the opinion that if possible the Chancellor should be given a statement on behalf of the U.S. and the British. I understand the British High Commission is of a somewhat different opinion.

I hardly need point out that one of the basic troubles is that from the start the German and French "explanations" of what was agreed have differed markedly. In a few words, the Chancellor has always maintained the solution was not a European solution, but was a provisional one, whereas the French seem to insist that it is a European one and is not provisional!

As to who was to blame for forcing this issue by printing "explanations" and distributing them, I am not prepared to argue at this time. Clearly the French are blaming the Germans and the Germans the French. But knowing the difficulty the Chancellor is having here, it does seem that his point is well taken; namely that if the French "explanations" were to be adopted as official by the Germans, he could not get the Saar Treaty through the Bundestag. Beyond that statement, I would not care to make any predictions or forecasts at this moment. If it would be of any assistance to you or The Secretary for me to come to Paris, of course I should be glad to do so, but I hope that this Saar problem will not come up to bother you further at this time.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

JIM

740.5/12–1454

*Memorandum for the President by the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, [undated].

Subject: Assurances to French on Maintenance of U.S. Troops in Europe

Mendes-France has sent me word that he would like to have the assurances on the above subject, to which I referred in my statement at the London conference,[2] in time for his use in the French Assembly debate on the Paris Agreements, which begins December 20. I intend to attempt to persuade Mendes-France that the text of my London statement itself, together with the statement in my letter to you of November 12,[3] transmitting the Paris Agreements, that you would be disposed to act favorably on a recommendation from me regarding assurances, should be sufficient for his purpose.

I suggest, however, that you mention this matter in your briefing of the Congressional leaders on Tuesday. You might call their attention to the text of my London statement and point out that as the Europeans appear to be proceeding in good faith to ratify the Paris Agreements, it will be necessary for us to proceed along the lines I indicated in London. We will, of course, consult with them on the content of any statement which you may make prior to its release as we did in the case of the EDC.

I attach copies (*a*) of my statement in London and (*b*) the passage in my letter transmitting to you the Paris Agreements.[4]

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[1] A handwritten notation on the source text reads as follows: "Discussed with the President at lunch 12/14/54". Merchant recommended the position taken in the source text in a memorandum which he sent Dulles on Dec. 11 (740.5/12–1154).

[2] This is a reference to Dulles' statement made during the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Nine-Power Conference on Sept. 29; for the text of this statement, which is included as Annex II A to the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, see p. 1357.

[3] *Ante*, p. 1470.

[4] Neither printed here, but see footnotes 2 and 3, above.

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396.1/12–145 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, December 14, 1954—2: 53 p. m.

2194. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Just lunched with President reviewing problems which may arise in Paris in relation to London–Paris Accords. We both have impression that US is being subjected to undue pressuring. Yesterday we were told that we must

go down the line with the French on the Moroccan issue at UN [1] and we did so, even voting against a resolution to postpone debate. This has cost us heavily in Arab relations.

Today Bonnet reports SOS message from Mendes-France that he must have in hand the actual declaration of the President which in London I promised would be forthcoming if appropriate agreements were adopted to retain the basic advantages of EDC:

We anticipate there will be similar demands in relation to Saar and perhaps in relation to Indochina.

The disposition of the President, in which I concur, is not to give in to these demands and to insist that the French must rely upon us in good faith to carry out whatever we have promised, but that we do not have to anticipate these promises and make new ones in order to induce the French to take action which presumably is primarily in their own interest rather than ours. If the French do not believe that the London–Paris Accords with all the protections they carry are in the French interest, then we doubt that any marginal assurances we can give will be successful. On the other hand, it would be most embarrassing politically and indeed humiliating if for a second time we go through the process of giving the French all the assurances that they want and then have them reject the program. We feel that this time the French should place some trust in us and not require us to make advanced delivery.

This is sent so that you can be thinking about the general policy prior to my arrival tomorrow.[2]

DULLES

[1] Documentation concerning French North Africa is presented in volume XI.
[2] Dulles was going to Paris to attend the NAC Ministerial meeting scheduled for Dec. 17–18; for documentation, see pp. 549 ff.

**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 422**

*President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 14, 1954.

DEAR WINSTON: You have given a flawless exposition of Red China's relative weakness if we have under consideration only the possibility that she might launch aggressive war against either of our two countries.[2] However, it is clear that our vital interests can be seriously damaged by operations that she is capable of carrying out against weaker areas lying along the boundaries of her territory. We saw what she tried to do in Korea and was foiled only by the intervention of strong Allied Forces, and we likewise saw what gains she made in the

[1] This message was transmitted to the Embassy in London in telegram 3225, Dec. 14, with instructions that the Ambassador deliver it to Churchill.
[2] The editors were unable to further identify the "flawless exposition" to which President Eisenhower refers in this sentence.

Indo-China region due to the political and military weakness of one of our allies. She can pay any price in manpower, with complete indifference to the amount. Consequently, she is a distinct threat to the peace of the world as long as she may be sufficiently irresponsible to launch an attack against peoples and areas of tremendous importance to us. This imposes on us the burden of supporting native forces in the region and of supplementing these with some of our own units.

Here I shall not outline the importance to the western world of Japan and the island chain extending on to the southward, as well as the bits of mainland on the Pacific that still remain in the possession of the free world. The moral, political and military consequences that could follow upon the loss of important parts of this great chain are obvious to both of us and to the staffs that work for us in the military, economic and diplomatic fields.

So I think it dangerous to dismiss too complacently the risks that the bad faith, bad deportment and greed of Red China pose to our world. Some of our citizens are particularly sensitive to this threat and openly argue that it would be a mistake to allow this threat to endure and extend until the day comes when Red China may actually achieve the capacity to endanger us directly. I know that neither of us is blind to this possibility, even though we consider that such a development is somewhat doubtful and in any event its attainment would involve such a long time that world conditions and balances of power could well have been radically changed in the meantime. But, of course, I agree with you that our attention and watchfulness should be directed mainly to Moscow.

Incidentally, I was interested in your renewed suggestion of a top-level meeting with the regime in Russia. I have always felt, as you know, that it would be a mistake for you and me to participate in a meeting which was either essentially social or exploratory. A social meeting would merely give a false impresssion of accord which, in our free countries, would probably make it more difficult to get parliamentary support for needed defense appropriations. Within the captive world it would give the impression that we condone the present state of affairs. And if these are to be exploratory talks, should they not be carried out by our Foreign Ministers, so that heads of government would come in only if some really worthwhile agreement is in likely prospect?

The latter, I fear, is not an early possibility. There are still several months to go before we shall know where we are on the London and Paris Accords and all the indications are that if they go through, the Russians will probably "play tough", at least for some little time. Therefore, I do not see the likelihood of our Foreign Ministers usefully meeting for some considerable period. So, I am bound to say that, while I would like to be more optimistic, I cannot see that a top-

level meeting is anything which I can inscribe on my schedule for any predictable date. I regret this the more because if a top-level meeting were to take place, and if it led to a personal visit to London, I would indeed be very happy.

I hope you will find some way of letting the Queen know how deeply I appreciate her gracious reference to the possibility of such a visit.

Foster and I have just had luncheon together [3] and now he starts immediately for the NATO meeting. We discussed a number of matters, including a series of urgent requests that in our view practically amount to demands received from Mendes-France. He wants us to make public pronouncements supporting his statements affecting the Saar, Morocco and commitments of American troops to Europe. Important as French cooperation is to the great NATO plan, Mendes-France seems to forget that the safety, security and welfare of France are far more directly and intimately involved in the projects now under discussion than is the future of this country or of yours. One of the virtues of EDC was that it contained an acceptable solution of the Saar problem and it was French desertion of that plan that insured its defeat.

I see no good reason for this government to re-state its intentions about the stationing of American troops in Europe or take a position as to the Saar arrangement at least until the French Parliament has by some positive action shown itself capable of making decisions in keeping with the responsibilities of a great European power. I have asked Foster to confer with Anthony on these matters. Likewise, I have asked him to avoid any rigid position of refusal in considering the seemingly unreasonable requests of Mendes-France, but I am determined that we shall begin to realize some dividends on the constant pledges and pronouncements that seem to be expected of us.

I like your phrase "tyrannical weakness". It sharply defines the situation.

As you know, I occasionally flatter myself by attempting to paint likenesses of friends. I would be tremendously intrigued by the effort to paint one of you. Would it be an intolerable burden on you to allow an artist friend of mine to visit you long enough to take a few photographs and draw a few hasty color sketches that I could use in such an attempt? The final result would, of course, not be good, but also it might not be so bad as to be unendurable. If you feel this would not make an unjustified demand upon your time, I could send my artist friend over soon after the first of the year. I should think that something about thirty minutes to an hour would be sufficient for what I would need from him.

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[3] For a summary of the discussion which occurred at the Eisenhower–Dulles luncheon meeting on Dec. 14, see telegram 2194 to Paris, Dec. 14, *supra*.

This is just an idea and I shall not be at all offended by your inability to entertain it.

With warm personal regard,

As ever,

IKE

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762.022/12–1554 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Embassy in France* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, December 15, 1954—11 a. m.

407. For Secretary [2] from Conant. Your message (Dept to Bonn 1643 rptd Paris 2195 [3]) transmitted to Chanc through Blankenhorn on receipt 11 p m last night. By this time Chanc had formulated his reply to opposition for today's debate and met with Cabinet. It was clearly too late for him to make drastic change in his presentation. That he was correct in his premise as to opposition's argument is clear from opposition speaker's statement this morning in Bundestag at 9 : 00 a m, which pointed out serious discrepancy of justification for Saar Treaty presented officially by Ger Govt and presented officially by French Govt to members of French Assembly and published in morning papers. Chanc, in brief reply this morning in Bundestag debate committed himself to later discussion during debate of difference of opinion. Blankenhorn, in reporting Chanc's reaction to your message and Brit proposals along similar lines, stated that it was impossible for Chanc to change his proposed declaration at this late hour and that most he could do to accommodate our viewpoint was to adopt Eden's suggestion to effect that if exploratory talks with Mendes-France did not lead to agreement he would suggest to Mendes-France that approach be made to US and UK govts with view to obtaining their good offices (you will recall that in original text contained in our 1732 [4] he had said that he would approach American and Brit govts directly.)

It is our view in Bonn that discrepancies between Ger and French published justifications are so serious that it would be impossible for Chanc to keep even his own party in line unless he undertakes some clarification of these basic differences with Mendes-France. Therefore,

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 414 and to the Department of State as telegram 1749, which is the source text.

[2] Dulles was in Paris to attend the NAC Ministerial meeting scheduled for Dec. 17–18; for documentation, see pp. 549 ff.

[3] Not printed; it contained Dulles' instruction that Adenauer be urgently informed that Dulles believed he should at all costs avoid creating a situation where further agreement must be reached on the interpretation of the Saar agreement prior to French and German ratification of the present text (762.022/12–1454).

[4] Not printed; it transmitted to the Department of State a translation of the text of Adenauer's proposed statement to the Bundestag concerning the Saar Agreement (762.022/12–1454).

I believe Chanc is not being stubborn or unreasonable in insisting that there must be clarification on a few vital points before he can proceed with comite discussion of Saar Treaty. We assume debate will be terminated tomorrow afternoon with treaties being sent to comite and matter will not be discussed again in Bundestag until sometime in January.

CONANT

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762.022/12–1554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, December 15, 1954—1 p. m.

2550. Following is summary note which Jebb is delivering to Mendes-France this afternoon on Saar:

Reference is made to Jebb-Parodi talk on December 13 regarding French *Exposé des Motifs* on Saar and to information received from UK HICOM Bonn re Adenauer's planned statement asking for Four-Power talk on Saar if direct talks with Mendes-France failed.

British note then states UK HICOM Bonn was instructed inform Adenauer of unfortunate effect such statement would have. Note adds that Adenauer was told if he feels bound to say something he should limit himself to saying that as first step he would wish discuss possibility and timing of Four-Power talks with Mendes-France. British note then says HICOM reported Blankenhorn reacted favorably and thought Chancellor might recast his statement.

British note makes further point that Eden somewhat embarrassed by fact UK not consulted about passage in French *Exposé des Motifs* concerning UK assurances, and concludes this is incorrect statement their position since UK not committed beyond period up to German Peace Treaty and Eden not prepared enter into commitment beyond this period.

DILLON

[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

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762.022/12–1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 16, 1954—7 p. m.

2576. Four developments yesterday seemed make position Mendes-France Government more difficult.

First was tenor of Bundestag debate Paris agreements with particular reference to Saar, which is giving rise to some uncertainty here. Since it is certain French will not implement Paris Agreements sep-

[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

arately from Saar Accord (Embtel 2547 [2]) and since ratification Saar settlement in Germany appears doubtful some French are beginning to wonder whether there may not be unforeseen delays in getting operation under way. On assumption Assembly will ratify next week, Franco-German talks on Saar could take place thereafter but before Council of Republic action and second reading Bundestag. Nevertheless progress German debate thus far not helpful to Mendes-France in that spotlight is thrown on fact his European policy as exemplified by Paris Agreements may be in some danger.

Second, Assembly coordinating committee for Indochina yesterday advised Le Troquer of Committee's desire for full-scale debate on Indochina end this week when civil budget for associated states which has already been rejected by finance committee is scheduled for discussion. It is reported Mendes-France will pose question of confidence this issue, as authorized by Cabinet, before debate on ratification Paris Agreements. Consensus seems to be that if steering committee proposes tomorrow Indochina debate be held before ratification debate, opposition may attempt stave off proposal on technical grounds. We believe opposition would prefer face government with difficult and possibly fatal Indochina debate after ratification accomplished and Mendes-France identified with it, rather than before.[3]

Third, bombing attacks against nationalist elements Tunisia have been unfortunate anti-climax to successful Fellagah amnesty campaign and will, as its unknown authors undoubtedly intended, largely nullify good effect this bold effort. Furthermore questions are beginning to be asked as to whether any progress Tunisian negotiations can be expected soon, and rightwing elements continue harass government heavily on this issue. Members of Mendes-France entourage have even alleged to us Gaullist and independent elements are supporting terrorism in Tunisia to create atmosphere where government can no longer negotiate.

Finally, Bidault–Mitterand feud which has been smoldering for months burst into public view yesterday when Mitterand took step of proposing "jury of honor" examine accusations made against Minister of Interior by Bidault when latter made his deposition on "leaks case". While if all dirty linen were washed in public, opposition might well be just as embarrassed as Government, effect Mitterand's step at this time will be to start up political gossip again on major scale and incumbent regime presumably always suffers more from such public scandal than the "outs".[4]

None of above elements is decisive but their occurrence all one day cannot but further add to Mendes-France discouragement. Postponement Indochina debate would be ominous for life of government in

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[2] Not printed; it reported that as a result of Adenauer's presentation of the Saar Agreement to the Bundestag on Dec. 15, Mendès-France now considered it essential that the French National Assembly make ratification of the Paris Agreements and the Saar Agreement "one package" (762.022/12–1554).

[3] Documentation concerning Indochina is presented in volume XIII.

[4] For further documentation on this subject, see volume VI.

sense it would add further difficult debate to already dangerous budgetary debates, though it would remove one hurdle between now and ratification debate.

DILLON

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 423**

*The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Mendès-France* [1]

PARIS, December 16, 1954.

[MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:] When I was in London I made a statement (September 29, 1954) which was annexed to the Final Act of the London Conference,[2] in which, among other things, I made the following statement:

"If, out of the elements of the situation with which we are dealing—if, using the Brussels Treaty as a nucleus, it is possible to find in this new pattern a continuing hope of unity among the countries of Europe that are represented here, and if the hopes that were tied into the European Defense Community can reasonably be transferred into the arrangements which will be the outgrowth of this meeting, then I would certainly be disposed to recommend to the President that he should renew a pledge comparable to that which was offered in connection with the European Defense Community Treaty."

I am glad to advise you that I have in fact made to the President the recommendation referred to, and the President has indicated that he is disposed to act favorably on that recommendation, if action to ratify the London–Paris Accords promises realization of the assumptions above stated. The President has communicated his position in this respect to the United States Senate for its information in connection with seeking the consent of the Senate to the ratification by the United States of the protocol amending the Bonn contractual agreement and the protocol admitting the Federal Republic of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty.

As I stated on September 29 in the passage above quoted, the President's declaration would be "comparable to that offered in connection with the European Defense Community Treaty" the text of which declaration was issued on April 16, 1954 on the condition and assumption that the European Defense Community Treaty would be ratified

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[1] The U.S. Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Paris transmitted the text of this message to the Department of State for information in telegram Secto 3, Dec. 16, and noted that it was delivered to Mendès-France by Dulles during the afternoon of Dec. 16. The telegram also informed the Department that the text of the message was cleared with Anderson and Radford, with copies distributed to the Foreign Ministers of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, and to Lord Ismay.

[2] Full text of this statement is included as Annex II A, p. 1357.

and come into force. I also pointed out that my statement of September 29 would have to have certain changes in language.[3] Thus, it would be appropriate to reflect the fact that it was made in relation to the Paris Accords rather than the European Defense Treaty. Certain other minor changes would be required to take account of intervening developments.

I am transmitting a copy of this communication to all present and prospective members of the Brussels Treaty and to the North Atlantic Treaty Council.

[Sincerely yours, FOSTER DULLES]

[3] According to telegram Secto 22 from Paris, Dec. 18, the wording of this sentence was changed before delivery to Mendès-France to read as follows: "I also pointed out in my statement of September 29 that the declaration would have to have certain changes in language" (740.5/12–1854).

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740.5/12–1654

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*[1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, December 16, 1954.

Participants:

| *France* | *United States* |
|---|---|
| Pierre Mendes-France | John Foster Dulles |
| Alexandre Parodi | Robert B. Anderson |
| Maurice Couve de Murville | John C. Hughes |
| Jean Soutou | C. Douglas Dillon |
| Roland de Moustier | Livingston T. Merchant |
| *United Kingdom* | |
| Anthony Eden | |
| Harold Macmillan | |
| Gladwyn Jebb | |
| Christopher Steel | |
| Harold Caccia | |
| R. R. Powell | |
| Anthony Rumbold | |

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

*Second Saar Period*

Mendes-France then referred to the second Saar period (support at the Peace Conference) and said he had promised to return to it. He

[1] A summary of this conversation was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 9, Dec. 17 (740.5/12–1754).

stated he was told in Washington that the U.S. wanted "to go back" on statement of Ambassador Dillon in June.[2] The Secretary then reviewed the past on this point and stated his belief that this present arrangement was not a permanent solution nor do both the Germans and the French want US–UK support for it at the Peace Conference. (Mendes-France read to the meeting a French memorandum of Ambassador Dillon's remarks last June.) He said he hoped that after looking at this 1954 statement the Secretary would change his mind. He then read the Marshall 1947 statement and said he would accept a private assurance to support him at the Peace Treaty Conference.

The Secretary said he was not saying he wouldn't support him. Adenauer last spring in connection with his agreement with Tietgen had accepted the principle of our guaranty. This is now an acute problem in Germany and there is no change in the U.S. basic position sympathetic toward France in his matter. The Secretary went on to say that it is one thing to have an attitude but another thing to give formal understanding, but it was probable that we will support the French position at the Peace Treaty conference.

Mendes-France remarked that that "won't help a lot!" and went on to say that all France got from the war was the Saar. The Secretary asked if Mendes-France realized that to give the guaranty and publicize this might wreck the entire WEU project. Mendes-France suggested that the Committee Chairman could be told privately. Sir Anthony then went over the record of the Saar problem up to 1950 and said that the attitude was unchanged but they could not give any formal undertaking.

Mendes-France then mentioned a tripartite letter of August 3 [*2*], 1951 to Chancellor Adenauer reiterating the US–UK position.[3]

The Secretary remarked that the U.S. attitude toward France was well-known but that he himself couldn't bind his successors. What will bind them is past history and our fundamental attitude toward France. He went on to say that to give assurances publicly would be disastrous, and to do it privately, dishonorable. He stated he saw no chance of our being able to change our position on this matter.

Mendes-France suggested that this perhaps might be possible in the future—after ratification. He went on to say that this would be raised in the Assembly. The Secretary said that if the US is formally asked

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[2] Presumably a reference to Dillon's meeting with Schumann on June 8 concerning a joint United States–United Kingdom statement on a Saar agreement; Dillon informed the Department of State concerning this meeting in telegram 4764 from Paris, June 9, p. 968.

[3] For the text of the tripartite letter, which was circulated as document AGSEC(51)1274 of Aug. 2, see *Documents on the Saar*, p. 304.

for their position, they will give it but that he advised Mendes-France not to ask.

Mendes-France suggested that he refer to former commitments and say he has no reason to believe the position has changed. The Secretary stated he would not be agreeable to this since it would give the impression that the U.S. had committed itself. Mendes-France said he wouldn't object if the Secretary wanted to think it over for a few days. The Secretary said he felt he should not give a final answer here and now but stated it would be in general along the lines of what he had said.

*Letter of Troop Assurances*

Mendes-France inquired when the President would make his declaration and the Secretary replied that this would come when the ratification process had advanced to a point where the program was substantially assured. Mendes-France said he assumed this meant after the debates in the French Assembly but before deposits of instruments of ratification. The Secretary stated that it might be before all 14 nations had ratified but after essential action had been taken by the French and Germans. Mendes-France asked if it could come before signature and deposit by France of the ratification instrument. The Secretary said this would probably be all right and quite possibly it would be before the formal French deposit of instruments of ratification. The Secretary suggested that they recess. Mendes-France thought they should meet again and it was agreed to meet on Saturday afternoon if there was no NATO meeting.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 419**

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

SECRET [PARIS,] December 16, 1954.

Subject: Saar

Participants: The Secretary
Sir Anthony Eden
Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Merchant

Following dinner the Secretary and Mr. Eden briefly discussed the Saar in the light of the meeting with Mendes-France that afternoon. They were each agreed that it would not be possible to give Mendes-France a renewed commitment to support at the peace conference the

detachment of the Saar from Germany. They both desired to explore, however, the possibility of giving him some statement which in limited degree might satisfy him and which might not do damage to Adenauer. Sir Harold Caccia was asked to draft something overnight and confer the next morning with Mr. Merchant. Mr. Merchant was instructed to prepare a draft for Caccia's consideration at the same time of a letter of intent which could be sent to Mendes-France before the Secretary and Mr. Eden left Paris on the subject of US–UK support of the Franco-German Saar Agreement of October 23, 1954.

LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT

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**740.5/12–1754 : Telegram**

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BONN, December 17, 1954—7 p. m.

1789. Bundestag foreign policy debate on first reading Paris Treaty produced few new arguments or surprises. Debate can perhaps best be characterized by cartoon in "Welt" which showed Chanc and Ollenhauer entering Bundeshaus, each concealing large phonograph records. As is customary in first readings, argumentation remained general. Most observers feel neither coalition nor opposition gained ground as result debate. Good showing by Chanc and Kiesinger on first day of debate against uninspired Ollenhauer cancelled out by Chanc's poor handling of SPD attacks on Saar and rearmament cost yesterday, when Chanc seemed fatigued and dispirited.

SPD attack deliberately avoided discussion of content of treaties, except Saar (there was very little criticism of other treaties from any side during course of debate). SPD speakers concentrated on Saar, reunification, high rearmament cost, resistance of youth to military service and doubt as to ability of NATO, even if augmented by German divisions to prevent Sovs from overrunning FedRep in event all-out attack. SPD arguments on Four-Power necessity for conf before ratification had no effect on Bundestag. Party's theories on Sov willingness to permit reunification of united Germany without Western alliances were rejected by all coalition speakers who seemed even less impressed by alleged changes in Sov policy than during October foreign policy debate.

Mende (FDP) and Schneider (DP) asked for release remaining war criminals held by Western powers, but their arguments were fa-

[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

miliar and aroused no real interest in house. Mende recommended large increase in Grenzschutz.

Noteworthy that no coalition speaker defended Saar agreement as such. Merkatz said DP could not support treaty in present form; Dehler and Becker (FDP) and Seibold (BHE) rejected treaty in name of their factions. Even Chanc failed make any effort defend substance of treaty, limited self to explaining necessity of agreement with France on Saar, his displeasure at official French interpretation of treaty was clear in his sharp rejection of it and demand for meeting with US and UK to clarify disputed points. We feel he may have created exaggerated expectations in coalition as to extent of clarifications he will be willing get from France. FDP and BHE speakers followed Chanc's request to exercize moderation in discussing Saar in light coming French debate. They generally followed main SPD argument that treaty should not be supported because signatories could not agree what they meant. Freedom for political parties to campaign for eventual return to Germany while respecting statute and agreement that second plebiscite shall contain opportunity for Saar population vote for return to Germany and that plebiscite results shall determine final disposition of Saar were main points in criticism. On basis their conduct in debate, it believed majority of both BHE and FDP will vote against treaty unless major changes made. It still appears Chanc would have small majority for treaty.

SPD capitalized on Chanc's inability give overall estimate of cost of military build-up, claimed rearmament would cost up to 100 billion DM. Rasner (CDU) said FedRep defense costs would be kept within nine billion DM annual limit or military build-up would have to take place over longer period. Chanc also unable answer persistent SPD questions on extent and quality of armaments to be supplied by US.

There was long discussion by Rasner, Mende and Manteuffel of democratic control of army, each of them asked govt take steps establish personnel selection committee for officers.

Chanc, Kiesinger, Merkatz, Jaeger (CSU) Haasler (BHE) gave strong support with strong CDU applause, to necessity for continuation of attempts to unify Europe (CDU speakers said govt would be willing integrate FedRep army EDC-style at any time.) Dehler and Becker (FDP) on other and expressed strong doubts about possibility or value of supranational integration, commended national self-interest as most lasting and natural element in international politics.

Chanc omitted most refs to settlement with Sovs contained in first draft his speech.

CONANT

740.5/12–1754 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Embassy in France* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, December 17, 1954—8 p. m.

146. Limited distribution. For the Secretary. Since my return I have carefully examined all material affecting present Soviet attitude,[2] initiated by Soviet note of November 13,[3] concerning the question of Paris and London agreements. Everything I have read and heard since I have been back has more than confirmed view I expressed to you in Washington that Soviet Government takes the entry into force of these agreements with great seriousness and their present attitude and warnings should not be dismissed as propaganda only. While obviously the intensive campaign of pressure directed primarily at France is to large extent based on Soviet hope of defeating ratification, I am inclined to believe that Soviet Government itself regards this hope as somewhat forlorn and campaign is at least equally if not primarily motivated by desire to prepare ground and justify Soviet "counter measures" in event that these agreements are ratified. Soviet Government has committed its prestige so deeply in this respect that it could not without great loss of face, and particularly with Satellites, merely do nothing when and if ratification occurs. In effect, Soviet Government is now face to face with dilemma which has been inherent in its German policy since the end of the war. Having been unwilling for reasons which have been frequently reported from here to make the necessary concessions in regard to East Germany which might have, by permitting unification through free elections, frustrated West German rearmament and military association with West, Soviet Government has in past month embarked on policy of threat and intimidation in regard to consequences of final adoption London and Paris agreements.

There is no sign that we can detect here that they are contemplating direct military action in event of ratification Paris and London agreements and key question of full extent of measures they may take in military preparation field is not yet clear. Soviet Government, however,

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[1] Repeated to the Department of State in telegram 936, which is the source text. In telegram Dulte 7, Dec. 17, the Secretary instructed the Acting Secretary of State to hold the source text closely and to restrict distribution "as leakage might be distorted into alarm in France" (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 422).

[2] For background concerning the drafting of this telegram, see Bohlen, *Witness to History*, p. 366.

[3] For the text of the Soviet note of Nov. 13, which invited 23 European nations and the United States to a conference on Nov. 29 to discuss the creation of a system of collective security in Europe, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 905.

appears committed rather definitely to following minimum measures in reaction to ratification London and Paris agreements:

1. Consolidation of Eastern European military system with open creation of some form of centralized staff and command, probably along lines NATO organization. In addition, inside general framework this system, probably an inner group composed of Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany, which would involve creation of East German Army. If Soviet measures are confined to purely organizational matters, involving consolidation of Soviet military bloc, only possibly serious feature would be creation of East German Army with its possible effect on position Western sectors Berlin. To this should be added abrogation of Franco-Soviet treaty threatened in yesterday's note and probably for sake consistency similar action re Anglo-Soviet treaty at later date.[4]

2. Soviets appear committed to some increase in bloc military expenditures but extent of such increase will be decisive factor. They have stated definitely both publicly and privately that entry into force of Paris and London agreements will accelerate "arms race" and they are virtually committed to some measures in this field. It is by no means clear, however, whether or not this increase would be *pro forma* and in the shape of a gesture primarily related to organization measures indicated above or to a serious increase in existing military programs and expenditures. Any real increase in this field in Soviet Union and Satellites would inevitably affect and possibly reverse economic trends inaugurated since Stalin's death. If these are to be abandoned or radically modified, this could affect entire political situation including principle of collective leadership in Soviet Union. As I have previously indicated, time to look for substantive disagreement or split in top leadership would be when confronted with issues, either foreign or domestic, of such dimensions as to bring about genuine and deep-seated difference of opinion. I have already reported my belief (Embtels 740 [5] and 912 [6]) that the German rearmament question might be just such an issue. While entire leadership is undoubtedly united in their desire to defeat these agreements, differences and even division might well develop around degree of increased military build-up which should be undertaken when these agreements are formally adopted. This is a question which only the future can answer and I merely indicate it here as a possibility and a factor which must be present in minds of present Soviet leadership.

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[4] The Soviet Union on numerous occasions issued warnings to the West about the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany, including threats to annul the Franco-Russian and Anglo-Russian treaties of 1944 and 1942 respectively if the Paris Agreements were ratified. Documentation concerning the policies of the Soviet Union to counter German rearmament is presented in volume VIII.

[5] Not printed; it informed the Department of State about a meeting between French Ambassador Joxe and Soviet leaders in Moscow on Dec. 13 during which the Soviets emphasized the seriousness with which they viewed the entry into force of the Paris Agreements (651.61/12–1354).

[6] Not printed; in it Bohlen informed the Department of State about a meeting between French Ambassador Joxe and Khrushchev on Nov. 9 during which Khrushchev told Joxe that "the Soviet government would not take lying down the entry into force of Paris agreements but would 'react vigorously'" (651.61/11–1054).

It should be emphasized here that theme of danger of German militarism is one which strikes responsive chord with Soviet people who remember World War II experiences and we have been impressed by degree to which Soviet Government has been stressing this danger as inevitable consequence of entry into force Paris and London agreements throughout Soviet central and provincial press. There are other signs which appear to reflect a certain degree of domestic mobilization in anticipation of measures which Soviet Government may undertake following ratification including particularly involvement of orthodox church in support of Soviet position on Paris and London agreements and consequences which might flow therefrom expressed in declaration by Patriarch and three other leading orthodox clerics followed by reception Patriarch by Malenkov. To this factor might be related Khrushchev statement published November 11, calling on party workers to abstain from anti-religious excesses against believers. It is not characteristic of Soviet regime to play up to church unless its services are needed in order to help persuade population to certain sacrifices. Real danger of present Soviet attitude if translated into action, as observed from here, is not that Soviet Government will undertake any immediate military or even risky actions in foreign field but that in order to justify military build-up to which it is at least on paper committed it will be forced in order to obtain popular support to adopt and stress the theme of imminent war danger as a domestic political necessity with consequent increase international tension.

While understandable as a public position to reassure Western European opinion, I do not believe that we should seriously count on any prospect of Soviets accepting four-power negotiations for some time following ratification of agreements. While Soviet Government never fully closes door to negotiation, nevertheless at present juncture they have committed themselves so definitely to thesis that negotiations on Germany and Austria following ratification would be "pointless" that for reasons of prestige alone they would probably reject any such proposal as that outlined by Mendes-France at UN conference next spring. In face of Soviet pressures and threats it is more than ever necessary to go through as expeditiously as possible with ratification of London and Paris agreements, but I think we should recognize that we will probably be entering phase of greater international tension with real possibility of reversals of many trends both foreign and domestic, which have been inaugurated and pursued by Stalin's successors.

It may be sometime after ratification before full significance of Soviet counter measures and their corresponding relationship to our

policies and purposes can be fully assessed. We will of course follow developments with closest attention here.

Department repeat if desired.

BOHLEN

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 419 : Telegram**

*The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, December 18, 1954—2 : 30 p. m.

Polto 181. At tripartite Ministers meeting afternoon 16th,[2] Mendes-France pressed hard on Saar issue. He insisted upon receiving text US–UK statement of support for October agreement that evening or morning of 17th. Secretary told Mendes that while we would work on it, doubtful whether would be ready before end of next week. Eden and Secretary agreed could say they were in principle prepared give assurances if requested and agreement executed.

Following tentative text such letter of intent drafted for simultaneous presentation Mendes and Chancellor:

"I am happy to inform you that if the agreement of October 23, 1954 between the Republic of France and the Federal Republic of Germany with respect to the Saar comes into force and if thereafter the United States Government is requested by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and of France in accordance with the terms of Article 8 of the agreement to give assurances of support pending the conclusion of a peace treaty, the United States Government is prepared in principle in accord with the Government of the United Kingdom to give an appropriate indication of its support."

Bonn should be prepared show text message to Adenauer when notified Paris showing text to Mendes. Signed letter will be pouched Bonn for later forwarding.[3]

Mendes also pressed for reaffirmation old pledges support at peace conference. Secretary supported by Eden, resisted firmly. Told Mendes

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[1] Repeated to the Department of State as telegram Secto 19 and to London as telegram Polto 302.

[2] For a record of this meeting, see the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Dec. 16, p. 1505.

[3] In telegram Polto 182 to Bonn, Dec. 18, repeated as Secto 20 to the Department of State, HICOG was authorized to show Adenauer the text of this letter of intent in concert with the British (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 419). HICOG informed the U.S. Delegation in Paris that Adenauer was shown the text as instructed and had expressed satisfaction (telegram 417 to Paris from Bonn, Dec. 18, repeated to the Department of State as telegram 1794, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 419). The U.S. Delegation in Paris informed the Department of State in telegram Secto 25, Dec. 19, repeated to Bonn, that Mendès-France was also shown the text of the letter of intent on Dec. 18 and had agreed with its text except for a few minor word changes (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 423).

that while he would give it more thought, in event French formally made request, response would be in general context his remarks.

In event we are pressed further re our peace treaty position, we may make statement along following lines:

"Questions have arisen concerning the position the United States Government will take regarding the status of the Saar at a future peace conference with Germany.

"The United States Government has long had a deep and abiding interest in a just and permanent settlement of the Saar question. Therefore, it believes that it can reasonably be assumed that when the question of the Saar is raised at a peace conference, the United States will be disposed to support a solution which rests upon the willing acceptance of the people of the Saar and of the governments concerned. In this way, the United States Government would hope that the Saar question could be permanently removed as a possible obstacle to continuing European amity and confidence."

Eden has sent this text to FonOff for comments. Would appreciate views Bonn re effect such statement would have Germany.[4]

[4] In telegram 1795 from Bonn, Dec. 19, Conant advised the U.S. Delegation in Paris that his staff could see no objection to the text of the draft statement on the Saar as far as the Germans were concerned (762.022/12–1954).

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740.5/12–1954 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, December 19, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 26. Blankenhorn called on Secretary this morning and delivered letter from Adenauer [2] stating he hoped second and third readings of Paris Agreements would take place at end January and early February and that he had no doubt Bundestag would then also pronounce favorably on Saar agreement, especially if it should be possible in the meantime to clarify certain implementing provisions of agreement with regard to referendum, to the commissioner and to arbitration. Adenauer stated it was particularly encouraging that debate had clearly demonstrated considered opinion of overwhelming majority of Bundestag that Franco-German relations should be placed on new and good-neighbourly basis and that there was no differences of view on this point between government and opposition.

Blankenhorn elaborated that critical point concerning implementation related to freedom of political expression in connection with referendum at time of peace treaty. Germans had definitely accepted that

[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.
[2] Not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 419)

no Saar parties could question statute itself and, while agreement was silent on political expression in connection with referendum, it was most important to Chancellor to be able to state that such freedom would exist. Secretary feared this might provide constant source of irritation during coming years and asked whether such freedom of expression might not be limited to period peace treaty actively under negotiation. Blankenhorn felt this would not help Chancellor, that there would not be agitation for return to Germany unless it were understood to be forbidden. He did not elaborate point on commissioner but said Germans hope arbitral authority would be centered in WEU rather than ICJ.

Blankenhorn stated he and Soutou had just agreed Mendes would meet Adenauer to discuss these points enroute back to Paris from Rome about January 14 if still in power. Soutou states that although meeting should not be considered definite until after French debate, it would in all probability be arranged. Both express hope this meeting could be kept secret for time being and particularly until after French debate.

Letter to Adenauer given in Secto 19 [3] given Blankenhorn.

DULLES

[3] Same as telegram Polto 181, *supra*. The text of the letter of intent was slightly altered before it was sent to Adenauer (see footnote 3, *supra*). A copy of the letter sent to Adenauer on Dec. 19 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 419.

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740.5/12–2354 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 23, 1954—noon.

2666. Limit distribution. Mendes telephoned me last night at quarter past twelve, immediately after the end of the night session.[1] He said that things were not going well in the debate and he sounded discouraged. He said that he wanted my frank personal advice on the possibilities of obtaining additional assistance from the US. What he had specifically in mind was the distribution of US military aid and he wondered if, in view of his parliamentary difficulties, it would not be possible for us to go further than we already had and agree to give our aid to the Arms Agency of the WEU for distribution.

I told him that there were serious difficulties of substance and procedure which I was afraid would prevent us from acceding to his

[1] Reports concerning the first 2 days of the ratification debates in the French National Assembly, debates which began on Dec. 21, are in telegrams 2648 and 2663, Dec. 21 and 22, respectively (740.5/12–2154 and 740.5/12–2254).

request. I explained to him as gently as possible that rightly or wrongly the US Government had considered that the EDC was a supranational organization with its own army and that under the EDC, national armies no longer existed. Therefore, we had been forced to agree to give our aid direct to the EDC commissariat for further distribution, not to member states, but to the EDC's own troops. That situation no longer existed under the Paris Accords, and I told Mendes that it was inconceivable to me that Congress would agree to allow a foreign organization, in this case the Arms Agency of the WEU, to decide how US aid should be distributed. I then told Mendes that the procedural difficulty was, to my mind, even more serious and would make any action impossible, even if we were disposed to take it. The difficulty was, as I told Mendes, that the Secretary could not make any such commitment affecting the future distribution of US aid without first clearing the matter with the responsible committee heads in Congress. These men were not now available in Washington and in any case clearance with them would be a protracted process.

Mendes understood and acknowledged the procedural difficulty and said that in such an event, he thought it was probably better for me not to bother Washington at all about this matter. He would proceed and do his best with what he had. He said the reason he had raised this subject was that many of the speeches in the Assembly bore on this problem. In particular, he said that Maurice Faure, who had spoken previously and indicated he would vote for ratification, had told him during the evening session that he now intended to propose a reservation to the effect that the treaties would not take effect until the US negotiated an agreement to deliver their military aid through the WEU. Mendes said that he had talked Maurice Faure out of submitting this amendment last night but that it might come up again today, and that it would be a very difficult matter for him to combat. He said he realized that such an approach would be utterly unacceptable to the US and therefore he would never accept it himself.

I then asked Mendes if the last paragraph of the letter which the Secretary had given him on the subject would not be of considerable help. Mendes acknowledged that this letter represented real progress, but said that it was not sensational and what was needed now in the present temper of the Assembly was some new sensational fact that could change the tone of the Assembly.

Mendes said that he planned to make his speech this afternoon and would wait and see how it was received before deciding on further tactics. He said there were two possibilities. He was sure that a vote of confidence would be necessary to prevent dangerous amendments to the ratification law, and the question was whether he could force things

tonight and have the vote take place late Friday night and early Saturday morning, or whether he should allow the vote to be put off till Monday morning. He said he saw dangers in both courses. On Friday night many deputies would be absent and would be voting by proxy. These proxies were inflexible and as a general rule proxies were apt to be unfavorable to the government. On the other hand, if he waited until Monday, deputies would be exposed to extreme pressure in their constituencies over the week end, which might be dangerous and also further time would be allowed for additional moves by the Soviets. I naturally could not be much help to him in this problem of internal political tactics and our telephone conversation ended on this note.

*Comment:* Mendes has reason to be disturbed by the course of events in the Chamber. The debate so far shows clearly that there is no one in the Assembly enthusiastically in favor of the Paris Accords. This lack of enthusiasm will probably be translated into massive abstentions which might even approximate the number of favorable votes. Consensus of French political reporters now is 240 votes for, 170 against, and approximately 220 abstentions or absences. Such a vote would be a real defeat for Mendes personally, and would be extremely upsetting to him in view of the thesis that he has continually upheld, that the question of German rearmament must be solved by a massive national majority. Such a vote will also make more critical the next two months prior to the vote in the Council of the Republic, and it will give added importance to that vote when it takes place. I regret that I can't think of any action on our part that would be helpful at this late date.

DILLON

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**740.5/12–2354 : Telegram**

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET Moscow, December 23, 1954—8 p. m.

969. Since Soviet Government has committed itself to take certain actions, i.e., under Moscow declaration of December 12 and notes to British and French concerning abrogation treaties when Paris Agreements are ratified,[2] there is considerable speculation as to exactly when Soviet Government for purpose of undertaking these actions would consider that agreements had, in effect, been ratified. At press confer-

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Documentation concerning these Soviet notes threatening to abrogate the Franco-Russian and Anglo-Russian treaties of 1944 and 1942, respectively, is presented in volume VIII.

ence on December 20, following delivery of note to British Ambassador here, chief of press section Foreign Office received several inquiries on this point. His answer while not entirely clear seemed to indicate that by "act of ratification" used in British and French notes, Soviet Government had in mind final completion of process of ratification in either country and that therefore it did not choose to consider approval of British Parliament as representing such act which still presumably requires some formal action by Queen. Stories to this effect I am informed by correspondents were passed without objection by censor.

If this version is correct it would mean that Soviet Government is not committed to take any of the provisional actions which it has threatened in immediate future as result of action French Assembly but at some later date when in either France or England act of ratification is signed or otherwise executed by head of state, which according to information available here in case of France might not be until middle of February. This would give Soviet Government an additional six weeks in which to continue its campaign of threat and intimidation without being called upon to put into effect the threatened countermeasures.

Since campaigns of the type which Soviet Government has been carrying on since its November 13 note [3] are difficult to maintain on a steady basis over a protracted period, assuming favorable vote in French Assembly in next few days, manner in which this campaign is handled by Soviet Government during period before final act of ratification will be important evidence as to nature and magnitude of Soviet countermeasures. Iliychev reply of course on this point is not conclusive and there is nothing to prevent Soviet Government, if it so desires, from regarding adoption by French Assembly as point of departure for at least interim implementation of some of the measures forecast by Moscow declaration; but at least this interpretation of what constitutes "ratification" gives Soviet Government additional period of time to determine exact courses of action to be followed.

BOHLEN

[3] Regarding this note, see footnote 3, p. 1510.

*Editorial Note*

On December 23, the Italian Chamber approved the law ratifying the Paris Agreements by a vote of 335 to 215, making a total of 550 deputies out of 590 participating in the vote. Information on the Italian vote of ratification was transmitted to the Department of State

in telegram 2336 from Rome, December 23, and despatch 1314 from Rome, December 30 (765.00/12–2354 and 765.00/12–3054, respectively).

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740.5/12–2454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 24, 1954—noon.

2687. For Secretary from Dillon. Assembly's unfavorable vote last night on key section of Brussels Treaty poses very serious but not insurmountable problem.[2] General consensus is that vote represented a miscalculation by MRP and other former backers of EDC who, in trying to hold government to narrowest possible majority, overdid the thing. They took this action in knowledge that there would be a second chance on Monday when question of confidence would be posed. However, effect of vote on public opinion over week end may be very serious and could cause further Socialist defections on Monday so that favorable result on Monday, although possible, is by no means assured. Consensus of French political commentators is that U.S. and U.K. reaction will be so severe as to bring Parliament to their senses. It is clear that Parliament expects some such reaction from both U.S. and U.K. In view of the seriousness of the situation I recommend that the President and Churchill make similar statements today prior to ten o'clock this evening Paris time so as to get full coverage in French morning press Saturday.

These statements should cover following points: (1) emphasize seriousness of situation for Western allies; (2) state clearly that if treaty is rejected by French Assembly France can in future expect no further concessions; (3) state that result of rejection will be immediate unilateral rearmament of West Germany by U.K. and U.S.; (4) state that without ratification there is no possibility of Four-Power conference with Soviets. During debate yesterday Mendes-France made point regarding unilateral rearmament of Germany and no Four-Power conference if ratification failed. Assembly reaction was clearly to doubt his statement regarding German rearmament. U.S. and U.K. statements could therefore be pegged to Mendes-France's own statements before the Assembly.

I have conferred with Jebb and his views are identical and he is making same recommendation to London. We both feel that action of French Assembly requires reaction by U.S. and U.K. at highest level and that to be effective such reaction must be prompt and clear-cut. To

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] A summary of the first 4 days of debates concerning ratification of the Paris Agreements is contained in telegram 2692 from Paris, Dec. 24 (740.5/12–2454).

have political effect reaction must appear in French press tomorrow morning and so must take place on time schedule indicated.[3]

DILLON

[3] Five hours later, Dillon informed the Department in telegram 2689 from Paris, Dec. 24, that British Ambassador Jebb had just phoned the Embassy to report that Eden had an unfavorable reaction to the recommendation in the source text (740.5/12–2454).

At 6:45 p. m. Dillon and Jebb went to see Mendès-France at the Prime Minister's request. Mendès-France told them that they should not lose courage and that he hoped their governments would limit any statements on the subject to the minimum. When reporting this conversation to the Department in telegram 2693 from Paris, Dec. 24, Dillon withdrew his previous recommendation concerning a need for a statement, a decision Jebb concurred in. (740.5/12–2454)

Just before the Department of State received telegram 2693 from Paris, which withdrew Dillon's recommendation, it informed the Embassy in Paris that it was inadvisable for the President to make a formal statement and that any appearance of external pressure would be counterproductive (telegram 2321 to Paris, Dec. 24; 740.5/12–2454).

Eisenhower Library, James C. Hagerty papers

*Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty)*

AUGUSTA, December 24, 1954.

*Friday, December 24, 1954*

I told the President about the vote at 8:15 in his office.[1] His immediate reaction was, "Those damn French! What do they think they're trying to do? This could really upset the apple cart in Europe."

The President asked me to call Foster Dulles and have the Secretary call him back with a full report on the situation. This I did from the President's office at about quarter of 9. Dulles called back at eleven o'clock to tell me that he had just received reports from Ambassador Dillon in Paris. Dillon reported to Dulles that the situation was very serious and that he and the British Ambassador to Paris thought that drastic action was necessary to impress upon the French Deputies over the weekend, and the French people themselves, how concerned America and the United Kingdom were over the adverse vote. Dulles said that Dillon also proposed—although he, Dulles, did not agree, that a formal statement be issued jointly by the President and Churchill which would say in effect that despite French ratification or not, the United States and Britain were going ahead with the rearmament of Germany.

Dulles said that he did not think that was necessary but that he did believe that both the President and himself should issue statements expressing their grave concern about the matter.

Dulles also said that the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Roger Makins, was coming to his house for a conference at noon, and he thought he should talk to the President prior to the arrival of

[1] Regarding this vote, see telegram 2687, *supra*.

Sir Roger. I told him I would have the President call back within fifteen minutes and went out to the Club to get him.

The President was on the ninth green, practicing putting with Ed Dudley. When I came over, he said to Ed, "Excuse me, Ed, but I've got to go to work. The French have not only disturbed the whole free world but they're cutting in on my lessons."

As the President and I were walking to the office, I told him of Dulles' conversation, of the British suggestion of a joint statement and Foster's opposition to it. He said that he did not believe that a strong formal joint statement was in order. I told him about the British Ambassador calling on Dulles and recommended that if Dulles would approve, it would be a good thing for me to announce from here. He said to remind him to ask Dulles that when he got on the phone.

When the Dulles call came through, the President and I were alone in his office. He opened the conversation with, "Well, Foster, they surely have gotten things in an awful mess, haven't they?" The President agreed with Foster that we should not issue a joint statement and gave Foster the task of relaying that to Churchill through Makins.

Dulles gave the President the Dillon report and filled him in with other details. The President told the Secretary that he should get the State Department busy on putting out some information and we would do the same thing down here. "What is needed here I think, Foster, is a stern expression of the seriousness of the situation, but I think we must leave the door open to the French, and particularly to Mendes-France so that he can operate over the weekend and get a majority vote on Monday or Tuesday. We must let them know that we don't like this one bit but we must also tell them in effect that we are sure they will vote right on Monday."

Dulles then apparently told the President that he was meeting with the British Ambassador, and the President told the Secretary that he would talk to him on the phone anytime Dulles returned the call.

When the President got off the phone, I talked with Dulles and agreed that I would say first that this was viewed as a very serious thing; that the Secretary of State was conferring with the British Ambassador; and that the Secretary would call the President later on and report back to him. Dulles particularly emphasized the necessity for getting something out today because the French have no Sunday papers and the deadline for making the French Saturday papers was four o'clock this afternoon.

When the phone call was concluded, the President briefly discussed this situation and said, "You know, here this plan like EDC was devised to protect all of Europe, the French included. They are really endangering the whole safety of Europe by such votes, but you see, I honestly believe what they are trying to do is this: They know we are going to have to keep bases and troops on the continent of Europe for a

long time. They know we must work somehow or other to get a strong alliance of free nations of Europe. Now, what the French would like would be to act in that concert of nations in Europe very much like we do and like the British do. We are not a member of the European union and neither are the British. The French would like to be part of it without having the responsibility of being in it. It's the old French game of diplomatic doodling to see how much they can get out for themselves and never mind the rest of the world."

I left the President's office at quarter till twelve and had a press conference at twelve o'clock. I deliberately made it as somber as I could and told the newsmen to stand by for the afternoon.

Dulles called back shortly before one and I took the call at the office at the Bon Air Hotel. He told me that the British had put out a really rough statement which said in effect that the question of arming Germany had been agreed on in Paris and that if the French didn't want to go along, Germany would be armed nevertheless. Dulles said he did not think we should join with that statement and that it was a good idea anyway for them to make a strong official protest since they were nearer the French than we were and since they would, in case of war, be subject to attack just as fast as France.

I told the Secretary that the President could get to the phone within five minutes and I called Ann Whitman to tell her that the Secretary wanted to talk to the President again. Then I drove out to the Club and arrived there just as the President took the call from Dulles.

Dulles reported that the British Government had issued the strong note and was still requesting that we join them. The President firmly disagreed with that step, and we agreed then and there to the language of the statement that I would put out. It read as follows:

The Paris agreements are still in the process of debate in the French Chamber of Deputies. The President regards the adverse vote of yesterday as one of utmost seriousness. However, we cannot believe that this represents the final French decision in this matter.

I then returned to the Bon Air Hotel and had another press conference at about 1:45.

The British are a determined people and about ten o'clock that night Dulles called the President again. Churchill had sent a message to the President urging him to join personally with Churchill in a joint declaration.[2] The President told Dulles that he had his authority to get in touch with the Prime Minister and tell him what we would put out and that was as far as we were going to go.

Dulles had also called me at 4:30 and said that he had just talked to Dillon by long distance phone. Dillon had had a private meeting with Mendes-France and Mendes-France had strongly urged the Presi-

[2] The text of Churchill's message and the annexed British statement are printed on p. 1524.

dent not to go into any formal statement with Churchill on this situation. Mendes-France, who wants pressure from the United States and Great Britain put on the French over the weekend, said that a formal statement from the President and Churchill along the lines of the tough British attitude would do more harm than good. Dulles said he did not want to talk to the President on this but merely asked me to give him the report and I told him I would, that I was seeing the President at six o'clock when we were going out with the newsmen and photographers to get the usual Christmas pictures.

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740.5/12–2454 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT BONN, December 24, 1954—1 p. m.

1846. I saw Chancellor 10:45 this morning at his request. He was much upset by new Paris developments but agreed that nothing should be said until matter was finally settled. He had done what he could to have the German press take a quiet attitude and was making no comment. I believe through his own channels he will try to persuade MRP to sustain Mendes-France on vote of confidence Monday but he was by no means confident of what would happen.

Chancellor proposes to call a Cabinet meeting for Wednesday morning if Mendes-France should fall Monday evening. He wishes me to impress on Washington the seriousness of the situation which would result in Germany if the treaties are not rescued in Paris by vote of confidence on Monday. He believes unless prompt action were taken along line of the theory of the empty chair, public opinion in Germany would move rapidly into a completely neutralist attitude and perhaps shortly to one desiring negotiations with Russia on neutralist basis.

Above all, the Chancellor expressed the view that failure of this attempt to settle German-French relations would end possibility of good French-German relations for some time to come and would kill any idea of European integration.

If matters should go badly in Paris on Monday, I propose to see the Chancellor again on Tuesday and could deliver any message the Dept wishes to transmit to him at that time.

In view of stories in press about Chancellor's health and his difficulties in the debate last Thursday, can report his health seems good although he plans vacation after the new year. He seems perfectly able to handle any crisis that may arise. Though his anxiety is great, his spirits are good.

CONANT

[1] Repeated to Paris.

740.5/12–2454 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 24, 1954—9 p. m.

2694. Limit distribution. During talk with Jebb and me, Mendes after delivering message in Embtel 2693 [1] philosophized on general situation, he said that France today was clearly the main battlefront of the cold war and that US and UK had not given his government enough support. Crucial moment according to Mendes was failure of either US or UK to support his arms pool proposal at London against attacks by Beyen. He felt that if arms pool had been accepted, it would have meant at least fifty additional votes. Finally he said that neither US or UK had given him vitally needed help on Saar last week or on distribution of US military aid.

He then said that he had not called us in to give us such a speech as bygones were bygones and all that mattered was the present but that he could not help letting us personally know his feelings. He said that he was not asking us to report this part of his conversation to our governments. He mentioned that he had already talked to Secretary along these lines.

Mendes then said that his right wing opponents were ashamed of their nights work. He said that in a fit of anger he had told Reynaud as session broke up that Reynaud had put in a good night's work for Moscow and that Reynaud instead of getting angry had accepted the rebuke rather shamefacedly. Mendes said that personally he was not going to make any further public statements but was going to confine his work to lobbying with individual deputies which he described as dirty business. His weekly broadcast will take place tonight and will be a Christmas message with no mention of Paris Accords or other political matters.

DILLON

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1520.

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower* [1]

TOP SECRET [LONDON,] December 24, 1954.

MY DEAR FRIEND: Anthony and I felt it right to make the attached statement through a spokesman of the Foreign Office, with which we

[1] The source text was delivered to the White House on Dec. 24 by Ambassador Makins, with a copy sent to the Department of State at the same time, according to a covering memorandum.

feel sure you will agree. Can you do anything of this sort to help? It is always a good thing when you and we are seen to be in full accord.

Christmas greetings to all. W.

[Annex]

TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED THROUGH A SPOKESMAN OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON DECEMBER 24TH, 1954

The Paris treaties are still under discussion in the French Chamber, and there is to be a further vote on Monday. It is clear that what is at stake is the unity of the Western Allies.

2. The rejection of the Paris agreements would not mean that German rearmament would not take place.

The issue is not whether the German Federal Republic will rearm, but how.

3. The United Kingdom commitment, offered at the London conference, to maintain British forces on the Continent of Europe depends on the ratification of the Paris agreements by all the parties.

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740.5/12–2754

*Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET [LONDON,] December 27, 1954.

[DEAR FOSTER:] If French vote goes wrong, we shall have to act great speed if we are to hold position not only in Germany but also in other WE countries. You may like to have my preliminary thoughts now.

It seems to me that immediate meeting will be necessary. In addition to us two and Dr. Adenauer participants should be representatives of Benelux, Italy and Canada. In view Dr. Adenauer's age and health I think meeting should be held Europe. I should be happy to hold it London. Failing that, the Hague, Rome or Brussels, but not Bonn, are possibilities.

I suggest that agenda should be:

(*a*) Termination of occupation of FedRep;
(*b*) German association with West and a German defence contribution;
(*c*) Part to be played in new situation by NATO and WE Union.

As at London Conference, Item (*a*) would be for restricted UK/US/Ger discussion running parallel with Eight Power discussion of other items.

[1] This message was delivered to Dulles by Ambassador Makins on Dec. 27. It was transmitted to London for the information of the Ambassador in telegram 3378, Dec. 27, which is the source text.

I think there would be great advantage in preliminary meeting between you and me immediately before main conference opens.

[Kindest regards, ANTHONY]

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740.5/12–2754

*The Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Eden*[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 27, 1954.

[DEAR ANTHONY:] Thanks for your message.[2] I have been thinking along the same lines. It looks at the moment I dictate this as though the treaties would squeak through, but I suppose we shall not know definitely for a couple of days. In the meantime, we should be ready. The President is in Augusta and would immediately return here if the vote goes wrong. I have talked with him by phone and he agrees in principle that there must be quick action. I would be prepared, as you suggest, to come to Europe, and in general my ideas harmonize with yours. While I would enjoy seeing you again, I hope it will not be necessary on this occasion.

FOSTER DULLES

[1] This message was transmitted to the Embassy in London in telegram 3377, Dec. 27, with the request that the Ambassador personally deliver it to Eden.

[2] *Supra.*

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740.5/12–2754

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

SECRET BAD GODESBERG, December 27, 1954.

DEAR LIVIE: I am writing to you rather than to Cecil Lyon because I would like to have this letter highly restricted in its distribution. Indeed, if when it arrives the French Assembly have approved the Paris Treaties, it will be unnecessary for you to read it and you might well destroy it; for I am writing it in contemplation of the really desperate possibility that Mendes-France will not succeed in gaining the necessary votes today or tomorrow and therefore by the end of the week France may be without a government and the Assembly have rejected the essential part of the Paris agreements.

You will already have known how upset the Chancellor was the day before Christmas at such a possibility. As to his suggested remedy, namely that we should proceed at once along the lines of the "empty chair" philosophy, I have grave doubts. I think that some careful "readings" should be taken on the German situation before any precipitate action along these lines is set in motion, for unless our obser-

vations are all wrong here, the German mood is far less satisfactory than it was even last September. This the Chancellor is well aware of, for in my conversation with him on Thursday last when the prospects in Paris seemed good, he was worried lest Mendes-France should delay the *depositing* of the treaties and start bargaining with the Russians. He said that as soon as the treaties were ratified by the *parliaments concerned*, we should proceed at once with providing arms for the German troops so there would be no delay in getting underway with the rearmament. In his conversation with me the day before Christmas when we were all so upset about the news from Paris, he emphasized the danger of German sentiment shifting to neutralism followed by a naive expectation of the outcome of negotiations with Russia.

On the other hand, I think the Chancellor quite naturally fails to realize the extent to which his own prestige and policy have been shaken by the events of the last few months and about how far the damage would have gone if Paris once again fails to take proper action. I am very worried lest the Chancellor's prestige and that of his party will have suffered so serious a blow that we can no longer count with certainty on his effective leadership.[1] In this connection a conversation I had a few weeks ago with the new Minister President of Hamburg, Sieveking, is of considerable significance. Sieveking is a newcomer on the German political scene, but a man of great experience and ability. Indeed, from what I have heard of him and what I have seen of him, he would be one of my leading candidates to succeed the Chancellor,—though whether he has as yet acquired sufficient standing among the politicians among his own party (CDU), I do not know. At all events, he said to me that there could be no question of the rearmament of Germany without full cooperation of the SPD. And remember that this was from a man who had successfully beaten in a recent and rather bitter campaign an outstanding SPD man, namely Max Brauer.

A dispatch in Saturday's *Herald Tribune* from Gaston Coblenz I think very well sums up the situation here in Germany. If we are going to keep the Germans on our side, I feel we must be very careful not to do anything precipitously about rearmament. For the Social Democrats and some members of other parties might be quick to attack us and the Chancellor in a variety of ways. And when I say us, I mean both the United States and Great Britain. Of course, there would be a group of Germans who might be anxious to go down the road of a rearmament policy backed only by the U.S. and U.K., at once, but I

[1] Opposite this sentence in the source text there is a handwritten marginal notation, presumably by Conant, which reads as follows: "Not that the Chancellor would be overthrown but merely that he would no longer get enthusiastic response to his proposals; the opposition would drag its heels and make difficulties at every turn including the passage of various bills necessary if an army is to come into being."

doubt if they represent the forces in Germany with whom we can cooperate for the long pull.

The strange thing about the present situation is that we are no longer concerned primarily with taking off the Allied ban against rearmament. We are concerned with the best way we can get the German *people* to cooperate with Great Britain and the United States in rearming.

The return of essential sovereignty is quite apart from this question of getting forward precipitously with rearmament. On this point I believe we would have the support of almost all the parties if the United States and United Kingdom were to find some method of putting the Paris Protocol into effect at once and simply walking out on the French insofar as the occupation was concerned. I should be inclined, then, to see if we could not get the SPD in some way committed to whatever policy of rearmament seemed appropriate in the altered circumstances (remembering how vulnerable we are with our establishments in the French Zone, not to mention our lines of communication in France itself). It will be difficult for us to make contact officially with the SPD without deserting the Chancellor, yet I feel strongly that if we are in a terrible second crisis, some sort of dealings with the leaders of all the parties in the Bundestag will be required. I am not prepared to make a definite recommendation on this point—certainly not at this time when the terrible prospects I am considering are purely hypothetical. The purpose is to try to tell you, and through you The Secretary, some of the complications in the German picture and some of the ways in which the situation seems to me to have become worse since the crisis in September.

I never wrote a letter which I hoped would be so much out of date when it was received. If the news from Paris has been good, I hope you will never have read as far as these few lines.

Sincerely,

JIM

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740.5/12–2854 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 28, 1954—noon.

2712. For Secretary from Dillon. Last night's favorable vote should practically assure ratification by Assembly late Wednesday night.[2] Difficulties in Foreign Affairs Committee were to have been expected as committee membership has always been more opposed to German

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] A summary of the National Assembly debate on ratification of the Paris Agreements which began on the night of Dec. 27 and continued through until the early morning of Dec. 28 is contained in telegram 2711 from Paris, Dec. 28 (740.5/12–2854).

rearmament than has Assembly itself. Important thing is that procedural difficulties have been surmounted and way has been cleared for final vote. It is most important that US make no statements of any sort today that could affect tomorrow's vote.

If as expected tomorrow's vote is favorable, we must realize that although toughest hurdle will have been passed, there still remains the Council of the Republic which will not act until late February or early March. We must talk and act during coming two months in a way that will make it as easy as possible for Council of Republic to take favorable action.

Reaction here since Friday and in particular, bitterness of comments regarding British statement make it clear that large majority of French opinion, even MRP circles which oppose Paris accords, is thoroughly ashamed of last Thursday night's performance and wishes to forget it as soon as possible.

Though I realize that this is a mighty tall order, best policy for US will be to minimize antics of National Assembly once it has voted ratification. The Council of the Republic is equally or possibly more sensitive to foreign criticism than the Assembly. Criticisms of French institutions and French people in next two months will only make job harder in Council of Republic. I am sure there will be strong tendency in Council of Republic to act in dignified manner so as to offset shameful impression made by National Assembly. Seriousness of matter is well known here and does not need to be reemphasized for Council of Republic. I fully realize how hard it will be for US to react in this way immediately after last week's performance, but I feel it is most important and is worth a great and concerted effort on our part.

DILLON

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740.5/12–2854 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, December 28, 1954—6 p. m.

1861. We saw Blankenhorn this morning who told us that the Chancellor would call a Cabinet meeting immediately after an unfavorable vote in the French Assembly. While Blankenhorn was cautiously optimistic over Mendes-France's chances tomorrow, he was nevertheless apprehensive over the next step to be taken in the event of an adverse vote. He reiterated what he considered were the necessary steps to be taken in the event of failure; namely (1) a joint US–UK declaration regarding German sovereignty, (2) a joint US–UK guarantee of Fed-Rep territory, (3) provision for maintenance of US–UK troops

[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

on Fed-Rep soil as defense forces, (4) the necessity to go ahead with the Western European Treaty arrangement, leaving an empty chair.

He stressed the danger for Adenauer in terms of his domestic situation which would result from a second failure of Adenauer's foreign policy. On the other hand, he believed that whatever gesture was made by Adenauer or the German Government as a result of the French Assembly's adverse decision should not be directed against France and that every effort should be made to keep a conciliatory atmosphere.

Blankenhorn also raised the question of how the Chancellor could get together with US and the British in the event of bad news. We suggested the possibility of talks with the Secretary and Eden. Blankenhorn said that he had thought of such an idea and that the Benelux countries might be included in such talks. On balance, however, he favored talks with Mr. Dulles and Eden and would leave it to US as to how best to proceed when and if it was decided to hold such a meeting.

CONANT

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**740.5/12–2954 : Telegram**

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET NIACT BONN, December 29, 1954—1 p. m.

1870. For Secretary from Conant. Saw Chancellor at his house this morning. He and Blankenhorn relatively optimistic about outcome Paris vote. He spent some time combatting any idea that if vote is satisfactory, nevertheless French have proved themselves so unreliable there will be difficulties in future. He feels this point view wrong and believes once present hurdle is overcome development Western European Union will proceed satisfactorily. In this connection he foresees no difficulty with treaties either in his committees or in Bundestag. This optimism of Chancellor was premised on assumption that all goes well in Paris tonight.

If vote is negative, situation will be completely altered here in Germany. Under these conditions, as Chancellor pointed out, mood of Germans will be one of great disillusionment and his own position extremely difficult. In discussion of what dramatic moves might be made at once if negative vote in Paris, idea developed that if Chancellor, you and Eden could meet in London Monday, the announcement of this meeting would have highly salutary effect on German public and Parliamentary opinion. Decision to hold such 3-Power meeting should come within twelve hours of bad news from Paris. Chancellor under these conditions would not call Cabinet meeting until after

[1] Repeated niact to London and to Paris for Reinhardt and Wallner.

London meeting Monday, which presumably would be followed by larger meeting Western European Union countries and U.S. Idea would be to have no statements made by British, U.S. or German Governments prior to 3-Power meeting. The more we talked about this idea, the more it appealed to Chancellor and it seems to me it has many merits from psychological point view here in Germany. From my point view, if result in Paris is negative it is essential to do something at once to strengthen position Chancellor. Having him meet on equal basis with you and Eden and no others would be clear sign to Germany of your recognition Chancellor's equal status.

In separate telegram, I am reporting some of ideas Chancellor would present at such meeting if it occurs.[2]

CONANT

[2] Presumably a reference to telegram 1872 from Bonn, Dec. 29, not printed, in which Conant reported Adenauer's idea of strengthening the federal border police; according to Adenauer, some immediate strengthening of the military situation was necessary in order to prevent inhabitants of the East Zone from losing heart and to keep people in West Germany from rapidly moving to a neutralist position (740.5/12–2954).

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740.5/12–2954

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lyon)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1954.

Subject: Plans for US–UK action in the event of failure by French to approve Paris pacts.

Participants: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
The Secretary of State
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant—EUR
Mr. F. J. Leishman, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Cecil B. Lyon—GER

Sir Roger opened the conversation by indicating that he had received a report from the British Embassy at Paris that a M. Brusse, a political prognosticator ("sort of a French Mr. Gallup", Sir Roger thought), had said that the vote in the French Assembly today on the Paris Agreements would be favorable by a margin of between 15 and 25.

The Secretary said that in spite of this it was necessary for us, however, to be prepared for an adverse vote. Were this to occur, the President planned to return immediately to Washington. He had asked the Secretary and other Government officials concerned to be prepared to confer with him on Friday.

The Secretary said that the President had also approved in the first instance the plans for the Secretary's going to London to confer with

Dr. Adenauer and Sir Anthony Eden. The Secretary then explained Adenauer's proposal for a tripartite meeting in London on Monday (as set forth in Bonn's 1878 [*1870*], December 29 to Department [1]). The Secretary continued that he thought such a meeting should be followed by a larger meeting but that it would be wiser not to schedule this meeting until we knew more exactly what course we should take. The Secretary also questioned whether having the meeting in London on Monday was not rushing it a bit. He said that he didn't think it would be possible to delay as long as had been the case following the French defeat of EDC when Sir Anthony traveled about Europe discussing ways and means of saving the situation, and the first formal meetings between the Secretary and Sir Anthony were only held several weeks after the action of the French Assembly.

The Secretary remarked that a good deal of thinking had already been given to the matter of what we should do, and he referred to the Churchill–Eisenhower memorandum of June 27, 1954 [2] and the proposals of the London Working Group of July 5–12, 1954.[3]

The Secretary also said that he had been giving some thought as to whether a possible solution might not be to alter the Protocol amending the Brussels Pact so that the Pact could be put into effect upon the deposit of ratifications by six instead of seven countries.

The Secretary likewise said that he had asked the Legal Adviser to give him a legal opinion as to whether the fact that France was in Germany due to the US and UK having invited her in, so to speak, might not constitute a legal basis for the US and the UK restoring sovereignty to Germany without French consent. In other words, we were guardians of German sovereignty as a result of our conquest (unconditional surrender) and occupation of Germany. We, so to speak, gave a share of this to France. Could we not give back to Germany the whole which had originally been ours, irrespective of French views? (The Legal Adviser has now indicated that there is no sound legal basis for this proposition. The British have been so informed.)

The British Ambassador suggested that if France did not ratify the agreements it might be better to tackle the problem *de novo* without France.

It was also suggested that it might be better to defer any decisions as to what the next steps were to be until the tripartite meeting in London in order that Adenauer's views might be ascertained in the light of the existing situation.

The Secretary indicated that the London meeting would undoubtedly indicate what the next move should be, whether it should be a con-

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] This is a reference to the U.S.–U.K. secret minute agreed to by Churchill and Eisenhower; for the text of this secret minute, see p. 988.

[3] For the Report of the London Study Group, July 12, see p. 997.

ference with the Benelux countries, a NATO meeting or which course of action, and he reiterated his feeling that it would be unwise to meet with these countries until we have a course fairly well charted.

Mr. Merchant stressed the importance of avoiding giving the NATO nations the feeling that they were being left out of the planning—i.e. that the US and UK were deciding what to do and then would present them with a *fait accompli.*

Sir Roger then raised the question of a possible statement by the President in the event of French approval. He indicated that the Foreign Office wondered whether it was not rather "overdoing it" to have the Chief of State make a declaration since probably the agreements, if approved by the French Assembly, will only just pass by a slight margin. His Government also felt that there were more hurdles to come. In fact there were reports from Paris that the Council of State would probably insist on many changes in the treaties and the whole matter would have to be taken up again in the Assembly in February. Sir Roger said that his Government had instructed him to point this out to the Secretary.

The Secretary replied by indicating that both the President and the British had made statements at the time of the unfavorable vote in the French Assembly a few days ago, that the President was under great pressure from the Press at Augusta and that the President wanted to make a statement. The Secretary then said that the fact that the President was in Augusta made it difficult for the Secretary to talk things over with him as easily as if he were here and consequently he thought it inadvisable to attempt to alter the plan for the President to make this statement.

Sir Roger indicated that his Government was quite prepared to accept this. The Secretary explained that the two statements, one unilateral by the President, and a joint Anglo-American statement, were not mutually exclusive. After the Secretary had communicated with Mr. Hagerty by telephone, the text of a joint statement was agreed upon.

It was decided that copies of this text would be transmitted to the British and the US High Commissioners in Bonn, who would be instructed to show it to Adenauer and to explain to him that it was impossible to make no statement, as Adenauer had suggested.[4]

It was also agreed that as far as the United States was concerned, the President would issue his statement in Augusta before coming north, and upon his arrival at the airport in Washington he would issue the US portion of the joint statement.

A new fourth paragraph for the President's statement was drafted.

Copies of both statements are attached.

[4] The text of the joint statement was sent to Bonn in telegram 1767, Dec. 29, repeated to London and Paris for information (396.1/12–2954).

[Attachment 1]

*Draft Statement for the President*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1954.

It is a matter for grave concern that the French Assembly has rejected the arrangements agreed to in Paris last October for the entrance of the German Federal Republic into Western defense arrangements. The result sought was a strengthening of the collective defense of Western Europe with effective safeguards against excessive armament by any single nation.

The French action does not, however, relieve the United States of its responsibilities in the matter. We are in Germany as one of the occupying powers and we are a member of NATO. We shall discharge our responsibilities despite the difficulties created by the French rejection.

Last July, the United States Senate, without dissent, passed a resolution requesting me to take such steps as I deemed appropriate to bring about the restoration of German sovereignty and to permit the Federal Republic to contribute to international peace and security. That resolution had at the time my full approval, and I shall strive to carry out its recommendation.

I expect shortly after my arrival at Washington to be able to indicate the initial procedures which the US will plan to follow.

[Attachment 2]

*Draft Joint United States–United Kingdom Statement*

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, December 29, 1954.]

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom will promptly enter into consultation with the Government of the German Federal Republic and with the Governments of other countries prepared to cooperate with a view to concerting action to enable the people of the Federal Republic to assume their proper role as a free and equal partner in the Western Community and to play their part in filling a vital gap in the defensive strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

As an initial step toward the solution of these problems, the Secretary of State is proceeding to London to confer there Monday with Sir Anthony Eden. They will be joined by Chancellor Adenauer. Later there will be meetings with the representatives of other interested Governments.

We shall insofar as practicable, seek arrangements which would permit the eventual participation of the French Government. We do

not believe that the French Nation will indefinitely disassociate itself from constructive measures to assure the security and increasing well being of Western Europe.

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**740.5/12–3054 : Telegram**

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PARIS, December 30, 1954—11 a. m.

2742. As reported Embtel 2741 [2] vote on article I Billotte report now embodied in new draft law postponed until 5 p. m. today. In last night's vote on "project as a whole", Government won 287–256, or seven less than 38-vote majority on identical issue Monday. Increase of five in hostile votes due primarily to four opposing MRP votes shifted from abstentions. Otherwise vote virtually carbon copy Monday's results in spite impassioned oratory on both sides. Breakdown shows gain on one ARS vote, and loss of one each in radical, MRP and uninscribed groups. In addition to four more opposing MRP votes, there were two more Social Republicans and one additional Socialist voting against, while one less Radical and one less UDSR voted against.

Following vote last night, before session closed several deputies notably Triboulet (Social Republican) expressed fervent hope France would not be subjected to further humiliation in eyes of world by spectacle of Assembly wrangling over procedural matters and refusing to face up to its responsibilities. Before vote Mendes-France had stated no Frenchman would permit these delays if he had to read reactions in foreign press to sorry figure Assembly was cutting. This latest delay in final vote is clearly due to Communist filibustering and Assembly as whole seems fed up with debate by this time.

Assembly will meet on budget this morning and from 3 p. m. to 5 p. m. at which time Letroque[r] intends to open voting immediately. However Communists will try every possible delaying tactic and may succeed in forcing new explanations of vote first on grounds yesterday's lengthy explanations of vote were directed to double vote of confidence and not to this single issue.

As result Mendes-France outburst mentioned Embtel 2741,[3] general fatigue and continued intrigue on part opposition, atmosphere in

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[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Department of State that parliamentary procedures had forced a postponement on article I of the Billotte report (740.5/12–2954).

[3] Telegram 2741 (see footnote 2, above) reported that Mendès-France "who is obviously near breaking point" was the object of an insulting attack by Claudius-Petit of the UDSR who questioned Mendès-France's good faith and honesty on the Paris Agreements. In reply, Mendès-France indulged in sharp polemics with Claudius-Petit which detracted from the government's presentation in the Embassy's opinion.

Assembly is heavy. Barring some new disaster, predictions here are to effect Mendes-France will get less votes for article I than in last night's vote but will scrape through. Parliamentary correspondents give him from eight to twenty-vote majority.

Letroquer also announced last night that immediately after vote on article I three resolutions pertaining to Paris Agreements will be discussed. These are:

1) Loustaunau-Lacau (Peasant) resolution along lines his amendment which was withdrawn as result pressure from government. It calls for "strict application" Paris Agreements. Meaning is unclear to everyone and since author is a crackpot, it is unlikely we will ever know exactly what he wants.
2) Maurice Faure (Radical Socialist) resolution on arms control agency. Faure feels strongly on this subject and did not introduce formal amendment in debate only because of his feeling agreements must be ratified at once. His resolution may well be passed.
3) Resolution introduced by Pierre Courant (Independent) which we have not seen but we understand relates to Four-Power talks.

Talk on these resolutions may take some time although Letroquer optimistically hopes to get back to budget debate by tonight. Passage these resolutions probably not too serious in sense they have no binding force on government and merely express desire of Assembly. Maurice Faure resolution is of course potentially most troublesome and relates to issue on which considerable feeling has been shown by elements which have supported Mendes-France during debate and which government can use later if it wishes.

DILLON

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740.5/12–3054

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lyon) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 30, 1954.

Mr. Leishman has just visited me on a matter which we both hope is now academic.

The British Embassy here has received an urgent telegram from London which indicates that Sir Anthony Eden does not agree to the Secretary's proposal for an immediate meeting between himself, the Secretary and Adenauer in the event of failure by the French Parliament to approve the Paris Agreements.[1] In the message from London, Sir Anthony refers to his personal message to Mr. Dulles in which he proposed "in addition to Adenauer I suggest that representatives of

[1] The Secretary's proposal was contained in his letter to Eden of Dec. 27, p. 1526.

other interested countries participate" or words to that effect.[2] The instruction to the British Embassy makes it clear that what Sir Anthony Eden had in mind was a meeting between him and the Secretary followed "a day or two after" by an 8-Power meeting either in London or some other European capital. He also indicates that he had hoped such a meeting would have taken place with the greatest of urgency.

Sir Anthony adds that if Mr. Dulles concurs in his views in this matter certain textual changes would be required in the various proposed statements and in this event he would have no objection to having Adenauer shown the proposed joint US–UK declaration.

The British telegram made it apparent that the Foreign Office had not as yet paralleled to Hoyer-Millar our instructions to Dr. Conant.

[2] This is a reference to Eden's letter to Dulles of Dec. 27, p. 1525.

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**Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"**

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower* [1]

SECRET [LONDON, December 30, 1954.]

[MY DEAR FRIEND:] I am very glad you are intervening personally in this major issue. But Anthony and I both feel the terms of your suggested message [2] might be given a less sanguine emphasis. I therefore venture to suggest a modified version (appended) in which I have followed your language but endeavored to preserve the feeling that France has more to do, and that quickly, before she is in line with her allies. Perhaps you would consider this? I should be quite ready to sign it with you, or alternatively we could issue an official statement that we were in full accord with this message.

[WINSTON]

**[Annex]**

*Draft British Statement*

SECRET [LONDON, December 30, 1954.]

Text of alternative Joint Statement to be made by the President and Prime Minister referred to in the Prime Minister's Message:

If the series of actions taken by the French Assembly is the prelude to the speedy ratification of the new treaties signed in London and

[1] This message was delivered to the White House on Dec. 30 by British Ambassador Makins, according to covering memoranda attached to the source text; the White House staff sent a copy to the Department of State the same day.

[2] Presumably a reference to the joint U.S.–U.K. statement which is attachment 2 to the memorandum of conversation by Lyon, Dec. 29, p. 1534.

Paris last October, it would be a matter of great gratification not only to the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, but to the entire free world. We earnestly trust that this hope will be fulfilled without undue delay. The restoration of sovereignty to the Federal Republic and German participation in N.A.T.O. will add to the defensive strength and solidarity in Western Europe. This progress will reinforce the vote on ratification taken last week by the Italian Assembly which approved Western defence plans by an overwhelming and splendid majority. When decisive cooperation supplants age-old antagonism the prospects for a general and lasting peace will be definitely improved, and a measure of encouragement may therefore even now be felt by all who are earnestly striving to maintain and improve the unity and harmony of the free world.

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751.13/12–3054

*President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Mendès-France* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 30, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: My hearty personal congratulations on the result of the hard fought battle for the ratification by the French Assembly of the Paris Agreements. You and those who voted for ratification have won a victory for French security and for the advance in unison of the nations of the Western world.

I know that this victory could not have been achieved without your own valiant efforts, in the face of arduous difficulties and exhausting strains.

I would like you to know that I have been conscious of the momentous character of the decision which the French Assembly has taken.

Sincerely, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

[1] This message was transmitted to Paris at 1:15 p.m. in niact telegram 2363, Dec. 30, with instructions for the Ambassador to deliver it as soon as ratification was official. It was requested that this not be made public.

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751.13/12–3054

*The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Mendès-France* [1]

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE WASHINGTON, December 30, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I extend to you my warmest congratulations on the successful struggle you have led. I think I can appreciate how arduous the task has been. I followed every phase with intense interest and if we here said little it was because we felt that silence was the best contribution we could make. I am sure, however, that you

[1] This message was transmitted to Paris at 3 p.m. in niact telegram 2364, Dec. 30, with instructions for the Ambassador to communicate it to Mendès-France.

and others in France must have realized the intensity of our concern. With best wishes to you and your wife for the New Year, I am

Sincerely yours, FOSTER DULLES [2]

[2] In telegram 2767 from Paris, Dec. 31, Dillon reported that he had received a telephone call from Mendès-France that morning thanking him for the letters from President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. Mendès-France then said that the restraint exercised by the United States during the past week had been of the utmost help and he was appreciative of the U.S. Government's silence. (751.13/12–3154)

740.5/12–3154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, December 31, 1954—1 p. m.

2769. Final vote on article I (Embtel 2760 [2]) gave government slightly larger majority than expected. Before result announced after vote deputies with whom we talked generally predicted 10 to 20 vote majority. Shortly before result known, figure of 18 was being circulated and somewhat later 20. There was little unusual delay in announcing outcome though it is understood efforts were made to verify absentee ballots by telephone where possible. Also some uncertainty existed until the end as to final disposition some 70 absentee ballots which could of course have turned tide. However final outcome shows absentee ballots played little role. Widely distributed rumors that considerable number deputies would never commit last action permitting German rearmament likewise proved false and final result of 287–268 very similar to Wednesday night's 287–256 score. Only two changes were noted in those voting for with one additional Radical voting for government and one less Social Republican. Total of three more Social Republicans voted against government as well as one more Radical and one more ARS and one less MRP. Robert Schuman who abstained in vote last Friday when government was defeated and voted for on Monday and Wednesday of this week abstained yesterday as result agreement with Bidault who also abstained. MRP total of 16 for government remained intact as Ivory Coast Deputy who had previously abstained voted in favor yesterday. Full analysis voting records follows by despatch [3] (Deptel 2361 [4]).

[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Department of State that the French National Assembly voted 287–260 in favor of a resolution giving the government a vote of confidence on article I of the Billotte report. This vote completed Assembly action on the Paris Agreements (740.5/12–3054).

[3] Presumably a reference to despatch 1410 from Paris, Jan. 11, 1955, which analyzed the voting records of the French Deputies during the ratification debates (740.5/1–1155).

[4] Not printed; it requested the names of the French Deputies in the National Assembly who switched votes (740.5/12–3054).

Responsible pro-American deputies such as Rene Mayer, Bourges-Maunoury and Maurice Faure believe that favorable vote by narrow margin following such extensive bitter oratory is not enough and Maurice Faure and Pierre Courant (Independent) have combined their resolutions (number 2 and number 3 in Embtel 2742 [5]) and altered it somewhat to make net effect a resounding reaffirmation of France's solidarity with West and Atlantic Alliance. However, Loustaunau-Lacau has maintained his resolution (now in partnership with Palewski) and Cayeux (MRP) has put in another on Four-Power talks. As result Daniel Mayer reported to Assembly last night Foreign Affairs Committee had decided by 22–11 vote to postpone discussion of resolutions because of their number, variety and complexity. Something along lines Faure Resolution which still includes mention of WEU arms distribution agency but is more slanted towards Western solidarity generally may come later but grand scheme of strongest supporters of Atlantic Alliance who favored Paris Accords to push through resolution last night beame impossible.

Weary Assembly will continue budget discussions today after having already begun examination national defense budget last night. Budget debates are late as result prolongation debate Paris agreements.

Press reports Council of Republic has already appointed four *rapporteurs* for Paris Accords:

1) Michel Debre (RPF) for WEU.
2) Marius Mouter (Socialist) for cessation occupation statute.
3) Rene Pinton (Radical Socialist) for Saar.
4) Jacques Maupeou (Independent) for military aspects protocols and conventions.

Press adds these *rapporteurs* are all favorable and that Senate situation looks bright though Embassy will commence checking this with its Council of Republic contacts next week. Press finally predicts Council may begin its action in late January or early February though we think anything more than guess on this not possible at this early date.

Other principal development as backwash Assembly debate is announcement today that sanctions previously envisaged after EDC debate but suspended have now been taken against seventeen Socialist Deputies who voted consistently against agreements in all four votes. These include Naegelen and Max Lejeune (complete list will follow). Sanctions mean these deputies cannot represent party on assembly committees or party delegations.

[5] Not printed; it reported *inter alia* on three resolutions pertaining to the Paris Agreements which would be discussed in the Assembly after the vote on article 1 of the Billotte report. (740.5/12–3054)

Atmosphere following debate is one of relief and considerable resignation and sobriety rather than elation. It is too early to tell overall effect on position Mendes-France. Preliminary guess judging from corridor consultation with many deputies would be his stock has not risen and result debate has if anything increased personal bitterness towards him. Parliamentary correspondents were predicting yesterday his fall during last week January but this is probably hasty guess and certainly requires careful analysis.

DILLON

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*Editorial Note*

During the evening of December 30, Secretary Dulles issued the following statement:

"The news from France is good. The French Assembly voted to ratify the treaties which will carry into effect the accords reached last October in London and Paris. The vote indicates that of all the parties only the Communist bloc of about 100 deputies voted mechanically against all constructive measures. In the other parties there were differences, but they were differences of opinion as to how best to proceed to achieve Western European unity under conditions which would assure increased strength to protect national and individual freedom. It is understandable that these differences should have existed. The issues were both complicated and momentous. Now that the French Assembly has spoken, we can justifiably hope that the remaining ratification procedures in France and elsewhere will soon be concluded.

"A special tribute is due to those in France who saw that patriotism required the burying of age-old hostilities. That this could happen is a good augury for the years ahead." (Press release 737; Department of State *Bulletin*, January 10, 1955, page 43)

President Eisenhower also issued a statement on December 30 which reads as follows:

"The recent series of actions taken by the French Assembly is a matter of great gratification, not only to the United States but to the entire free world.

"There are, of course, further steps to be taken, both in France and elsewhere, before a satisfactory foundation for Western defense has been achieved. But of particular importance is the fact that the French Deputies, after initial hesitations against bringing Germany into Western defense arrangements, have now voted to ratify the new treaties signed at Paris last October.

"The French action is all the more significant since it follows the vote on ratification taken last week by the Italian Assembly, which approved Western defense plans by a decisive majority.

"Once sovereignty is restored to the Federal Republic, with German participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there will be added defensive strength and general solidarity in Western Europe. As decisive cooperation supplants age-old antagonisms, the prospects for a general and lasting peace will be definitely improved, and a meas-

ure of encouragement may therefore even now be felt by all who are earnestly striving to maintain and improve the unity and harmony of the free world." (White House press release; Department of State *Bulletin*, January 17, 1955, page 80)

# IV. MAJOR MEETINGS OF UNITED STATES OFFICIALS WITH EUROPEAN HEADS OF STATE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS REGARDING PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL CONCERN

## A. TRIPARTITE AND QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS AT LONDON, FEBRUARY 1952

*Editorial Note*

Prior to the Lisbon Session of the North Atlantic Council, Secretary of State Acheson was in London from February 12 to February 19 during which time he held preliminary conversations with Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden and tripartite conversations with Eden and Foreign Minister Schuman. These conversations were mostly concerned with problems arising out of the negotiations for a European Defense Community and those "contractual arrangements" being negotiated in Bonn for the creation of a new relationship between the Western powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. The conversations culminated in meetings of Secretary Acheson, Foreign Secretary Eden, and Foreign Minister Schuman with Federal Republic Chancellor Adenauer in London, February 18–19. For documentation on Secretary Acheson's meetings, see pages 36 ff.

## B. SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON'S VISITS TO EUROPE, MAY AND JUNE 1952

### 1. FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS AT BONN AND PARIS, MAY 1952

*Editorial Note*

Secretary Acheson traveled to Bonn and Paris May 23–28, 1952 to participate in bilateral, tripartite, and quadripartite negotiations with the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany which led to the signing at Bonn on May 26 of the Convention on General Relations between the Federal Republic and France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and related conventions, and to the signing at Paris on May 27 of the treaty estab-

lishing a European Defense Community and related conventions, protocols, and declarations.

Regarding the Secretary's trip to Bonn and Paris in May 1952, see pages 675–688 and volume VII.

## 2. SECRETARY OF STATE ACHESON'S TRIP TO LONDON, BERLIN, VIENNA, AND RIO DE JANEIRO, JUNE 1952

*Editorial Note*

During the North Atlantic Council meeting at Lisbon in February 1952, British Foreign Secretary Eden transmitted to Secretary Acheson an invitation from Oxford University to receive an honorary degree. The Secretary of State decided to accept this invitation and similar ones that had been pending from Mayor Reuter to lay the cornerstone of the American Memorial Library in Berlin, from Chancellor Figl to visit Vienna, and from Foreign Minister Neves da Fontoura to come to Brazil.

Secretary Acheson and his principal advisers, Ambassador Jessup, Assistant Secretary Perkins, Paul Nitze of the Policy Planning Staff, and his special assistant, Lucius Battle, left Washington aboard the presidential plane, the *Independence*, on June 22, and arrived in London on the following day where they were joined by Ambassador Dunn from Paris and Ambassador Kennan from Moscow. For the text of the Secretary's remarks at National Airport before his departure, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 7, 1952, page 6. On June 24, four bilateral conversations were held with British officials on subjects that had been suggested by both sides. At the first session, Eden and Acheson discussed the ratification of the agreements which had been signed at Bonn and Paris in May, the response to the Soviet note of May 24, the situation in Berlin, the Saar, Trieste, and Egypt. In the remaining sessions, the Foreign Ministers and their advisers considered the Middle East, Egypt, and Iran. For documentation on the interest of the United States in the ratification of the Paris Agreements, see pages 1464 ff.; documentation on the contractual arrangements signed at Bonn on May 26, on the exchange of notes with the Soviet Union concerning German unity, on the situation in Berlin, and on the status of the Saar is presented in volume VII; documentation on the policy of the United States with respect to the Middle East including United States concern over British controversies with Egypt is presented in volume IX; documentation on the concern of the United States over the British controversy with Iran is presented in volume X.

On June 25 Secretary Acheson attended Encaenia at Oxford and received an honorary degree of Doctor of Civil Law. The following day, two more bilateral sessions were held with the British. At the first, the Middle East, Korea, and Indochina were considered; while

at the second, Secretary Acheson spoke briefly to a British-American Parliamentary Group on subjects concerning various areas of the world. Documentation on the policy of the United States with respect to Korea and Indochina is presented in volumes XV and XIII, respectively. That section of the Secretary's remarks to the Parliamentary Group which deals with Korea is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 14, 1952, page 60.

Trilateral Foreign Ministers meetings were held on June 27. In the morning session, Eden, Schuman, and Acheson discussed the Soviet note of May 24 and the German situation; in the afternoon session, they considered further what reply should be sent to the Soviet note and dealt with the situation in Korea and Indochina.

June 28 was given over entirely to bilateral discussions. In the morning, Acheson talked with Foreign Minister Kraft of Denmark about the delivery to Poland of a tanker built by the Danes, and with Foreign Minister Schuman concerning Ambassador Kennan's views on the Soviet Union, the Soviet note, Southeast Asia, Tunisia, Morocco, and the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). Documentation on Ambassador Kennan's views on the Soviet Union is presented in volume VIII; documentation on the interest of the United States in the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) is presented in volume IX; documentation on the interest of the United States in the situation in Tunisia and Morocco is presented in volume XI.

Documentation on the Ministerial talks in London, designated by the series indicator MTL, including records of all the meetings enumerated above, telegrams to and from the Secretary of State while in the United Kingdom, and various briefing and background papers prepared for the talks is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CFs 111–113 and in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 162. Incomplete records of the meetings in London are also available in decimal files 396.1 LO and 110.11 AC. Secretary Acheson reported to President Truman on this part of the trip by letter, June 28, *infra*.

Acheson, Jessup, Perkins, and Battle left London on the afternoon of June 28, arriving in Berlin later the same day. Following a reception by General Mathewson, United States Commandant for Berlin, the Secretary of State attended a dinner given by Mayor Reuter and presented a bound volume of the correspondence between Karl Schurz and President Lincoln. On the following day, he had breakfast with High Commissioner McCloy and German State Secretary Hallstein, at which the tripartite reply to the Soviet note of May 24 was discussed, held a press conference, and spoke at the ceremonies for the laying of the cornerstone of the American Memorial Library in Berlin. In his speech, Secretary Acheson stated *inter alia* that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France would remain in Berlin until they were satisfied that the freedom of the city was secure.

For the text of Secretary Acheson's remarks at Mayor Reuter's dinner and at the site of the library, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 7, 1952, pages 3–6. A record of the breakfast with McCloy and Hallstein was transmitted in Secto 50 from Vienna, June 29, not printed. (110.11 AC/6–2952) A verbatim text of the press conference, not printed, was transmitted in telegram 1574 from Berlin, June 29. (662A.00/6–2952) For further documentation on the Secretary's visit to Berlin, see volume VII.

Secretary Acheson and his advisers departed Berlin early in the afternoon of June 29 and arrived in Vienna later the same day, where they were greeted by Chancellor Figl and Vice Chancellor Schaerf. June 30 was devoted to conversations with the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor, President Körner, Foreign Minister Gruber, and other Austrian officials; a press conference; and a formal state dinner. A transcript of the press conference, not printed, was transmitted in an unnumbered telegram from Vienna, July 1. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 113) Further documentation on Secretary Acheson's visit to Vienna is presented in volume VII. For Secretary Acheson's report to President Truman on his visits to Berlin and Vienna, see the letter, June 30, page 1548.

Secretary Acheson left Vienna on July 1, stopped overnight at Dakar where he talked with French High Commissioner Cornut-Gentille, and flew on to Brazil, pausing briefly at Recife to pick up Assistant Secretary Miller. The Secretary of State spent 4 days in Rio de Janeiro, flew to Sao Paulo on July 7 and departed for the United States on July 8. For the text of Acheson's speech on United States-Brazilian relations at a banquet given by Brazilian Foreign Minister Joao Neves da Fontoura on July 3, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 14, 1952, pages 47–51; for text of his address to the Brazilian Senate, and excerpts from his remarks to the Chamber of Deputies on July 4, and his speech at a banquet given by Lucas Garces, Governor of the State of Sao Paulo on July 7, see *ibid.*, July 21, 1952, pages 87–91.

For Secretary Acheson's own account of this trip, see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pages 658–670.

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**110.11 AC/6–2852**

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

SECRET LONDON, June 28, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As we prepare to leave on a series of one-night stands I want to give you a few thoughts and views of the series of meetings and events here in London.

[1] The source text was transmitted in Actel 2, June 28, from London. According to a handwritten notation on the source text, a copy of the message was sent to the White House on June 28.

The meetings with Mr. Eden and Mike [*M.?*] Schuman have been useful, unspectacular and not very exciting. In the tripartite talks we have discussed Southeast Asia and Indochina, Berlin, the ratification of the German and EDC agreement and the proposed reply to the recent Russian note. You will have received by now a telegram I sent you regarding the agreement on this note as well as the text of the note which we telegraphed back to Washington immediately following the last tripartite meeting yesterday.[2] I think you will be satisfied with the note as drafted and it is within the lines of your instructions to me. The talks on Southeast Asia and Indochina with Mr. Eden and Mike [*M.?*] Schuman resulted in some progress. I think that both the French and British agree on the necessity for political guidance to the military authorities of the three countries before these authorities go further with their talks on possible steps we can take in that area of the world. Paul Nitze and Frank Nash will be meeting here and again in Paris with the British and French in the hope of getting some preliminary assumptions agreed to and of laying the way for further discussions.

I have talked to Mr. Eden privately about many subjects. The most important of them are Iran and Egypt, of which we will have a further meeting this morning just before departing for Berlin. The approach of the British to these problems has changed very little. I will also be seeing Mike [*M.?*] Schuman today for our first and only meeting alone together. I do not know what he wishes to discuss but I am told he does not intend to bring up Tunisia or Morocco.

On the lighter side, I have been whisked from dinners to speeches, to receptions and in and out of caps and gowns at an astounding rate. The award of degrees at Oxford was extremely interesting and I look forward to telling you about it.

I have also been admitted to Lincoln's Inn which was an equally pleasant experience. My talk and response to questions before the inter-parliamentary groups went very well. There were some tricky shots fired during the question period, but I managed to dodge them or let the bullets glance off me and escaped without serious bloodshed. I gather that the troubles in Washington based on erroneous press reports have been cleared up.

From here on out my trip will be a series of speeches, public appearances and related activities. I will send you reports from time to time when I have anything significant to report.

Respectfully, DEAN ACHESON

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[2] Documentation on the reply to the Soviet note of May 24 is presented in volume VII.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 113

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

SECRET VIENNA, June 30, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Just a word to report to you on the two most recent laps of my trip. I was very glad that I went to Berlin and was pleased with the reception we got there. I spoke at the dedication of a new library, made a few brief remarks at a dinner which Mayor Reuter gave for us and had press conference. The text of these will be supplied to you by the Department in the event you care to read them. While I said nothing new at my press conference, my remarks regarding our intention to remain in Berlin were what the Berliners appeared to want to hear and do not mind having repeated frequently.

Vienna is lovely. The weather has been beautiful and I have enjoyed seeing the city. We have had a very warm spontaneous welcome from crowds wherever we go even in the Soviet Zone as we passed through on the train from the airport. We have transacted no business whatsoever but have had a very heavy schedule of official calls, receptions and the like. Last night we went to a gala performance of the Marriage of Figaro. I thought of you and Margaret and wished that you could have heard it. It was magnificent. Everyone here from the President and the Chancellor down are thrilled at Margaret's coming. Visits such as Margaret's and ours to places like Berlin and Vienna are far more important than we at home can believe.[2]

People at both places have a tendency to feel abandoned. The fact that someone takes the trouble gives them the encouragement that they are not abandoned and that their situation is not as dangerous as alarmists might have them believe. We leave tomorrow morning for Brazil via Dakar where we will spend the night. This involves two full days on the plane and I hope to be asleep most of the time. I cannot begin to tell you what a convenience it is to have the *Independence*. It is the only thing that makes a schedule such as ours bearable. I hope you are well.

Respectfully, DEAN ACHESON

[1] The source text was transmitted in Actel 3, June 30, from Vienna.

[2] Margaret Truman traveled in Europe during July and August 1952, visiting Vienna and Berlin at the beginning of August.

## C. VISIT TO WESTERN EUROPE BY SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES AND MUTUAL SECURITY AGENCY DIRECTOR STASSEN, JANUARY 31–FEBRUARY 8, 1953

*Editorial Note*

On January 12, 1953, the Department of State informed the Embassies in the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Belgium, and the Neth-

erlands, and HICOG offices in the Federal Republic of Germany, that John Foster Dulles was contemplating a trip to their countries in order to confer with leading government officials on "present important problems and in particular with reference to EDC." (Telegram 4623 to London, January 12, repeated to Rome, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, and HICOG in Bonn; 110.11 DU/1–1253) In the following two days, Ambassadors Gifford, Dunn, Bunker, Cowen, and Chapin, and Acting High Commissioner for Germany Reber replied enthusiastically to the proposal; their replies are in Department of State file 110.11 DU/1–1353 and 1–1453.

Preliminary arrangements were begun on January 14 when the Department of State transmitted three circular telegrams to Western Europe in which the general information-gathering purpose of the trip was outlined, a proposed itinerary was provided, and a request was made that the countries in Western Europe not on the schedule be informed "in such a way as to avoid any heartburn." (Circular telegrams 761, 762, and 763, January 14; 110.11 DU/1–1453) The schedule of formal meetings with leading government officials in each country was as follows:

*Washington*

January 30–Friday

| | |
|---|---|
| 9:30 a. m. | Depart from Washington |

*Rome*

January 31–Saturday

| | |
|---|---|
| 9:30 a. m. | Arrive in Rome |
| 12:45 p. m. | Courtesy call on President Einaudi |
| 4:30 p. m. | Private meeting with Prime Minister De Gasperi |
| 5:15 p. m. | Meeting with Italian officials |

February 1–Sunday

| | |
|---|---|
| 9:40 a. m. | Depart from Rome |

*Paris*

February 1–Sunday

| | |
|---|---|
| 12:30 p. m. | Arrive in Paris |
| 3:15 p. m. | Meeting with U.S. Chiefs of Mission; followed by Stassen's meeting with SRE and MSA officials |

February 2–Monday

| | |
|---|---|
| 10:00 a. m. | Meeting with French Ministers |
| 3:30 p. m. | Courtesy call on President Auriol |
| 4:00 p. m. | Meeting with French officials |

February 3–Tuesday

| | |
|---|---|
| 11:00 a. m. | Meeting with Lord Ismay |
| 11:30 a. m. | Attend the North Atlantic Council meeting |
| 12 noon | Meeting with OEEC officials |
| 3:30 p. m. | Depart from Paris |

*London*

| | |
|---|---|
| February 3–Tuesday | |
| 3:40 p. m. | Arrive in London |
| February 4–Wednesday | |
| 10:30 a. m. | Meeting with British officials |
| 3:30 p. m. | Meeting with British officials |
| February 5–Thursday | |
| 9:35 a. m. | Depart from London |

*Bonn*

| | |
|---|---|
| February 5–Thursday | |
| 12 noon | Arrive in Bonn |
| 12:45 p. m. | Courtesy call on Chancellor Adenauer |
| 4:30 p. m. | Courtesy call on President Heuss |
| 5:30 p. m. | Meeting with SPD officials |
| 6:30 p. m. | Meeting with German officials |
| February 6–Friday | |
| 9:25 a. m. | Depart from Bonn |

*The Hague*

| | |
|---|---|
| February 6–Friday | |
| 10:15 a. m. | Arrive in The Hague |
| 12 noon | Courtsey call on Prime Minister Drees |
| 3:30 p. m. | Meeting with Foreign Minister Beyen |
| 4:30 p. m. | Meeting with Minister without Portfolio Luns |
| February 7–Saturday | |
| 9:45 a. m. | Depart from The Hague |

*Brussels*

| | |
|---|---|
| February 7–Saturday | |
| 10:15 a. m. | Arrive in Brussels |
| 1:00 p. m. | Meeting with Belgian Ministers |
| February 8–Sunday | |
| 9:30 a. m. | Depart from Brussels |

*Luxembourg*

| | |
|---|---|
| February 8–Sunday | |
| 10:00 a. m. | Arrive in Luxembourg |
| 11:30 a. m. | Courtesy call on the Grand Duchess |
| 11:45 a. m. | Meeting with Luxembourg Ministers |
| 3:00 p. m. | Meeting with U.S. Observers to the Coal and Steel Community High Authority followed by a meeting with Jean Monnet |
| 6:35 p. m. | Depart from Luxembourg |

*Washington*

| | |
|---|---|
| February 9–Monday | |
| | Arrive in Washington |

For a complete schedule of Dulles' and Stassen's activities, including briefings, dinners, and meetings with Embassy personnel, see the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 136. Prior to his departure from Washing-

ton on January 30, Dulles stated that the purpose of his trip, which was being undertaken at President Eisenhower's request, was "to gather information about problems which we and other nations of the Atlantic community must deal with in our common effort to attain peace, security, and economic health." For the complete text of Dulles' statement, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, February 9, 1953, page 217.

A useful supplement to the Department of State central files in the preparation of this compilation was the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, which includes two folders of material relating to the Dulles–Stassen trip. Folder CF 136 contains position papers prepared on each country to be visited as well as topical papers on subjects such as European regional organizations; folder CF 137 includes telegrams and records of the various meetings, correspondence exchanged between the Heads of Government of each country visited and President Eisenhower, and press releases with the texts of Dulles' arrival and departure statements given at each stop on his trip. Position papers on German problems, prepared for the Dulles–Stassen trip, are also in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 164.

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**110.11 DU/2–153 : Telegram**

*The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, February 1, 1953—4 p. m.

4275. From the Secretary. Following is summary of our meetings and conversations with Italian Government in Rome January 31:

1. Mr. Stassen and Secretary met alone with De Gasperi at 4:30 p. m. Following is summary of conversation: [2]

De Gasperi first discussed status of EDC.[3] Expressed his strong support but also concern over nature of prospective French additional protocols,[4] as to which he said he was completely in the dark. Had heard that one might relate to incorporating the French Union or at least African part of French Union into the defense area. He said this might not be particularly objectionable to his government, but he foresaw it might raise some difficulties. Dulles said that one of the reasons why he and Stassen had come first to Rome has been because of the knowledge that Mr. De Gasperi had the conviction about the necessity for European political unity and they knew they would be talking with a friend who could advise them wisely.

There was considerable discussion as to the undependability of a purely military alliance under NATO unless it was brought within the framework of a considerable measure of political and economic unity.

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[1] Repeated to Rome.

[2] Dulles' memorandum of this conversation, which took place in De Gasperi's office, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 137. A photograph of Dulles and Stassen with De Gasperi is printed on page 566.

[3] For documentation concerning the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a European Defense Community, see pp. 571 ff.

[4] For a summary of the French protocols, see telegram 3975 from Paris, Jan. 15, p. 702.

De Gasperi said that he thought that Dulles should politely but nonetheless definitely make known to the leaders of France and Germany that a collapse of EDC would have serious repercussions in the United States. He felt that the suggestions along this line already made by President Eisenhower and Dulles were helpful and should be reinforced in private discussions.

Dulles asked when De Gasperi would himself seek ratification of treaties. De Gasperi said that it was difficult to do so while question of protocols was in the air. Mr. Dulles suggested that if the Italian Parliament proceeded to ratify the treaties without protocols that would tend to promote ratification everywhere and create a climate less receptive to protocols which might have a disturbing influence. Mr. De Gasperi seemed receptive to this suggestion and indicated that he might seek ratification within two or three weeks unless the protocols situation had been so brought into the open that it would have to be taken into account.

Mr. De Gasperi then took up the question of Trieste,[5] as a matter of the utmost importance and of the utmost secrecy. He stated it would be difficult to work out a Balkan defense program including Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia unless this were done within the framework of NATO and this in turn would be difficult so long as there was an outstanding territorial controversy between Italy and Yugoslavia.

Mr. De Gasperi suggested that it might be possible to arrive at a "provisional" solution which would involve giving Italy administrative control of Zone A and Yugoslavia administrative control of Zone B, provided that both agreed that this did not foreclose the possibility at some future date of adjustments pursuant to plebiscite or mutual agreements. Mr. De Gasperi recognized that the "provisional" solution would in all probability become the definitive solution in fact, although there might be some minor exchanges of territory on a mutual acceptable basis.

Mr. De Gasperi said that his suggested solution would be totally unacceptable if Tito should move to unilateral annexation of Zone B. Mr. De Gasperi also pointed out that his suggestion would be ruined if there were any publicity and that he had not even discussed the matter with his Cabinet.

Mr. De Gasperi urged that NATO should take over and unify cold war propaganda. He expressed concern over United Kingdom attitude toward OEEC and EPU. He urged that United States and United Kingdom do all possible to reassure France as against fear of Germany.

2. Following above meeting De Gasperi, Secretary and Stassen were joined by Pacciardi, Pella, Ambassador Bunker, Parker and other United States and Italian officials.[6] De Gasperi explained he had had a general talk with Secretary and Stassen and he would now ask Pella and then Pacciardi to explain in greater detail certain of Italy's economic and defense problems. Before doing so he wished to read aloud

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[5] Documentation concerning Trieste is presented in volume VIII.

[6] A memorandum of the conversation which is summarized in the following paragraphs is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137; this memorandum is not an official record of conversation but is based on the recollection of several participants of the U.S. Delegation.

a letter from President Eisenhower for which De Gasperi was most appreciative.[7]

Pella then gave Secretary and Stassen a paper on Italy's economic and financial problems [8] (Embassy and MSA Rome will analyze and comment to Department on paper) and outlined paper verbally. Pacciardi followed with a brief verbal report on status of Italian armed forces. Pacciardi indicated that level of Italian forces by end of 1953 would exceed Lisbon goals,[9] but added that forces would lack certain supporting elements, as well as equipment and therefore would not be fully effective.

3. Meetings with Italians concluded last evening with official dinner offered by De Gasperi.[10]

DUNN

[7] Not printed here; a letter of greetings expressing the hope that the European nations would continue their progress toward a more complete unity (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137).

[8] Not printed.

[9] For documentation concerning the defense capability goals established at Lisbon, see pp. 107 ff.

[10] In telegram 4432 from Paris, Feb. 7, Dunn reported that Malfatti, head of the Italian EDC Delegation, had stated that he cabled Rome asking what action the Italian Government contemplated to carry out De Gasperi's statement to Dulles that he would seek immediate ratification of the EDC Treaty. De Gasperi replied that he intended to set up a special parliamentary commission to help push ahead. Since there was "considerable resistance to De Gasperi's decision among all echelons in Italian Government," Malfatti suggested that U.S. representatives in Rome keep in close touch with De Gasperi himself. (740.5/2–753)

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110.11 DU/2–153

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

SECRET PARIS, February 1, 1953.

[DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:] Stassen and I met in Rome with De Gasperi and his principal Ministers, notably Defense Minister Pacciardi and Finance Minister Pella. We had a talk alone with De Gasperi.[2] Your personal letter [3] greatly appreciated and very helpful. Believe these meetings constructive in lending our support to very evident desire Italian Government to advance European unity. Their need for financial assistance appears moderate and based on realistic study their needs. We also discussed possible solution Trieste problem and will pursue this matter further. Entire visit in most cordial official and public atmosphere.

[Best regards, FOSTER]

[1] This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 4274 from Paris, Feb. 1, with instructions that it be forwarded to the President and that there be no distribution except for Acting Secretary Matthews.

[2] For a record of Dulles' and Stassen's meetings with De Gasperi and other leading government officials, see telegram 4275 from Paris, Feb. 1, *supra*.

[3] Concerning Eisenhower's letter to De Gasperi, see footnote 7, *supra*.

740.5/2–153

*Memorandum of Conversation*[1]

SECRET [PARIS,] February 1, 1953.

Subject: The Secretary's Meeting with Country Ambassadors at Ambassador Dunn's Residence, February 1, 1953, at 3:30 p. m.

1. The following persons attended the conferences:

The Secretary
Mr. Stassen
Ambassador Dunn
Ambassador Draper
Mr. Labouisse, MSA Paris
Ambassador Merchant, NATO
Mr. Chauncey Parker, MSA Rome
Mr. Robert Matteson, Assistant to Mr. Stassen
Mr. Harris, MSA Germany
Ambassador Anderson, SRE
Mr. Lincoln Gordon, MSA London
Ambassador Bunker, Italy
Mr. Theodore Achilles, Paris
Mr. Samuel Reber, Germany
Minister Holmes, Chargé, London
Mr. Roderic O'Connor, Assistant to the Secretary
Mr. Douglas MacArthur

2. *Dulles* outlined what he called our domestic political problem in connection with EDC. If there is no real evidence of progress towards European unity by the time Congress considers appropriations for European aid, which he estimates will start in April, he does not think the Congress will grant anything like the large sums that have been appropriated in past years, nor does he feel that the Administration would be justified for asking for such sums. He stated Congress has felt for some time they have granted monies for European aid on the basis of vague and illusory promises of European unity which have not been fulfilled. Mr. Stassen concurred. Mr. Dulles stated that his purpose in calling this meeting was to seek guidance of those assembled on how best to produce results in unification efforts.

3. *Dunn.* In reference to France, he was optimistic. He felt that the new French Government was really determined to push EDC in contrast to the previous government. As to any timetable, he stated that German ratification would have to come first. We should and could present our problem realistically and bluntly to the French. In response to the Secretary's question whether the French Government talked one way to us and another to their coalition parties, he replied "no". He felt that the present government was more favorable to EDC than any foreseeable future government.

[1] There is no indication on the source text who drafted this memorandum of conversation or whether it is an official record.

4. *Reber.* The timetable in Germany depends on the court decision.[2] The court opens hearings on February 20 on the question of whether or not it has jurisdiction. The consensus of opinion was that the jurisdictional issue will be decided affirmatively, that the court would accept the case but will reach no decision on it until mid-March. No vote in the Upper House could be expected until after the Easter recess—i.e., the end of April.

5. *Dunn.* Raised the question of protocols,[3] explained they were agreed interpretations of various aspects of the treaty. Believes they will be accepted quickly by the French and that no more will be added to those now contemplated.

6. *Reber.* In response to the Secretary's question as to what the decision of the German court will be on the constitutional issue, he did not believe this could be forecast but said that the Chancellor is convinced that the decision will be favorable. He stated that the opposition has believed that the new United States Administration might find ways other than EDC to bring about German participation in European defense. Therefore, the Chancellor hoped that the Secretary will reinforce Adenauer's statements that there is no alternative. In regard to the protocols, there is danger that, if they modify the sense of the EDC treaty, the Bundestag will react either by refusing to ratify or by insisting on introducing their own modifications.

*Secretary.* He reviewed the two telegrams sent by the President to Ridgway and Adenauer on EDC [4] and stated that the President did not feel that these messages had been very well received by Adenauer.

*Dunn* does not believe that the present protocols as contemplated would change the sense of the treaty. However, the protocols are not yet in final form. They should be in a very short time.

*Draper* raised the question of the right of withdrawal of troops as a bothersome one. The Dutch were now getting excited about it and it has long bothered the French and Germans. The Germans feel that the right to withdraw troops would be tending towards national armies and Adenauer is strongly opposed to any such tendency. Another bothersome point is the question of integrity of troops (?).

*Secretary* said that in conversations with the joint chiefs,[5] only two alternatives appeared if EDC failed. These were: (1) Perimeter defense which he believed we all regarded as equally disastrous and (2) bringing Germany independently into NATO (which the Secretary believed to be impractical on the theory that the French certainly

[2] Documentation concerning the proceedings of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany and its deliberations regarding the legality of the government's attempt to raise an army is presented in volume VII.

[3] For a summary of the French protocols under reference, see telegram 3975 from Paris, Jan. 15, p. 702.

[4] For information concerning the telegrams under reference, see the editorial note, p. 700.

[5] For a record of the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting under reference, which took place on Jan. 28, see p. 711.

would and could veto). *Dunn* felt this was not certain, that it was possible that after a Parliamentary debate on EDC and defeat of the treaty, that some new and hard-headed thinking might emerge in French popular opinion.

*Bunker* said that De Gasperi originally had wanted to wait until the French ratified the treaty but that De Gasperi had in his latest conversations with Bunker and the Secretary[6] mentioned that he might introduce the treaty to his Parliament in the next few weeks. The Secretary stressed that this was a casual statement by De Gasperi and in no way a commitment.

*Holmes* stated that British opinion, particularly that of Eden, had changed much in the last eighteen months. They all recognize that their own participation is out of the question, but they no longer oppose and, in fact, are prepared to actively support EDC. In reply to the Secretary's description of Churchill's apparent opposition as expressed when Churchill was in New York, Holmes stated that Churchill stood alone among the British in this position, and that the Prime Minister would complain but in the last analysis would not actively oppose. Holmes said that Eden was convinced that this was the case. The British are ready for the closest functional association with EDC but stop short at any constitutional association.

*Gordon* noted that it was most important to the British that their action would not appear to be the result of U.S. pressure.

*Draper* said the Belgians had introduced the EDC treaty in their Parliament and that if pressure could be placed on Van Zeeland, he felt the treaty could be passed very quickly once the protocols were settled. Said the Prime Minister—Van Hantle [*Houtte*]—was o.k. Stated that Luxembourg would follow Belgians and that the Dutch were very strongly in favor of the entire project. Draper reflected overall optimism on the whole situation.

*Stassen* restated the subordinancy of MSA to the State Department on foreign policy. Stressed necessity for all efforts of MSA offices being coordinated at this time to promote the EDC.

*Secretary* posed the question what would be the result among the EDC countries if congressional appropriations for them were made contingent upon the actual creation of the EDC. There was a passing discussion but no direct answer on this point.

The discussions went on from this point without the MSA contingent (including Ambassador Draper) which went into a separate meeting with Governor Stassen.[7]

*Secretary* stressed the need for some action to be taken in the EDC

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[6] For a summary of Dulles' and Bunker's meeting with De Gasperi, see telegram 4275 from Paris, Feb. 1, p. 1551.

[7] No record of this meeting between Stassen and Mutual Security Agency officials, which took place at the office of the Special Representative in Europe, was found in Department of State files.

picture in order to get the psychology of a rolling bandwagon. If De Gasperi could get the treaty passed, followed by the Dutch, pressures would be built up and then the whole project would move forward. He asked Bunker to discuss this with De Gasperi and stress to the latter that here was a real chance for Italy to show leadership to Western Europe.

*Secretary* then asked generally as to what line he should take in the forthcoming discussions. He was advised by those present to speak frankly when in private and outline our domestic political problem. However, in public he should not stress this aspect but should speak in terms of a joint project of European nations in which the U.S. took a continuing interest.

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**110.11 DU/2–353 : Telegram**

*The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 3, 1953—4 p. m.

4303. Following is summary of Secretary's and Mr. Stassen's meetings with French Government leaders February 2. Morning meeting was with Bidault and senior US and Foreign Office officials, afternoon meeting with Mayer, Bidault, Bourges-Maunoury.

I. *Morning meeting.*[2]

A. Bidault statement.

1. Introductory. French Government considers Europe, Africa, Asia constitute single problem occasioned by Soviet pressure. Strengthening of NATO is basic element French foreign policy.

2. Europe and EDC. French Government has no alternative policy and firmly intends pursue course to European unity. Principal purposes of EDC are (1) augmenting European defense by German contribution; (2) diminution national antagonism. This best brought about by direct dealings between parties concerned and "intercessions and outside advice best limited to strict minimum". Useless to try to create a perfect EDC if by so doing it would fail ratification or be long delayed.

3. Factors disturbing French public and Parliament are

(*a*) Preservation French world position. French Government needs assurances EDC will not impair present relationship with US and UK.

(*b*) Endanger integrity French Union.

(*c*) Tend to split French Army.

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, and Rome.

[2] Minutes of the morning meeting between Dulles, Stassen, Dunn, Achilles, MacArthur, Matteson, O'Connor, and Herz, on the American side, and Bidault, M. Schumann, Parodi, LaTournelle, Alphand, Charpentier, de Margerie, Seydoux, Burin des Roziers, and Falaize, on the French side, drafted by Herz on Feb. 7, are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137. There is also an informal memorandum of conversation for this meeting based on the recollection of several participants in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137.

(*d*) Create a situation where German army may come into being after all.

(*e*) Also absence British counter-weight is real problem psychologically which Bidault has discussed in detail with UK Ambassador. British problems not really different from those of France which also has world-wide commitments.

(*f*) Present association too vague and plays into hands of EDC opponents.

(*g*) Uncertainty re May 27, 1952, protocols [3] concerning US and UK presence in Europe. Furthermore there is need bilateral settlement Saar issue. Bidault here recalled US and UK recognition French Saar policy.

4. North Africa. France cannot make effort in Europe to abate nationalism and create unity, and at same time see nationalism encouraged in Africa and efforts made to undo unity there. Reform program will be carried forward leading to internal autonomy and association within French union. Stressed strategic aspect and compared French readiness grant bases to reluctance of Libyan Government.[4]

5. Asia. Bidault welcomed "belated" recognition France's contribution in Indochina as part world-wide struggle. Indirect reference to deneutralization of Formosa: Any US decisions bearing on China should be discussed with French in view their bearing on Indochina and China might use US action as pretext for move against Indochina where France has serious manpower problem but China has none.[5]

6. Atlantic cooperation. French armament effort at present constitutes "annual improvisation" whose effectiveness seriously impaired by absence long-term coordination. Long-term plan is needed. Effort on three continents requires continuation of economic and financial support proportionate to that effort.

B. Dulles statement.

1. General. Present mission is fact-finding to allow full review policies by new administration. Certain basic policies, notably NATO cooperation, not in question. President's State of Union message [6] gives assurance no intention revert to isolationism. Full recognition global nature of threat and need for global policies to deal with it.

2. Europe and EDC. US opinion and Government attach greatest importance to healing breach between France and Germany and would be greatly disappointed if present policies unsuccessful. No intention to intrude into situation, successful completion of EDC depends upon European efforts. Congress, however, will require information when called upon to appropriate funds and therefore information on EDC ratification schedule, and protocols would be very helpful.

3. North Africa. US does not wish to see disintegration French union which would impair both defense of free world and local inter-

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[3] For information concerning the protocols signed in Paris on May 27, 1952, see the editorial note, p. 684.

[4] Documentation concerning French North Africa is presented in volume XI.

[5] Documentation concerning Indochina is presented in volume XIII; documentation concerning China is presented in volume XIV.

[6] For the text of President Eisenhower's first Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union, Feb. 2, 1953, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 12–33.

ests. While Soviets encourage nationalists we cannot close our eyes to fact that there is real nationalist feeling and responsibility exists for genuine progress toward self-government or giving peoples genuine hope of autonomy and self-government within framework French Commonwealth.

4. Asia. US fully recognizes interrelation Asiatic theatres and we prepared later to listen to French views re action which might make successful conclusion IC war more likely. (Discussed recall Seventh Fleet in light President's State of Union message.)

C. Bidault reply. Point about closer NATO cooperation reserved for afternoon. Confirmation basic US policy appreciated. Text of protocols will be communicated to US same time as to EDC governments (possibly before Secretary's return to Washington). Ratification schedule will also then be clearer. French Government also has Adenauer's problems in mind. Bidault said Adenauer acting with courage. French Parliament will also be given opportunity to express views, but neither EDC treaty nor its concept will be changed by protocols which represent interpretations. Better, however, to have imperfect treaty than none at all. On the whole, as regards ratification, "I am not without hope".

II. *Afternoon meeting.*[7]

A. Mayer statement.

1. Burden-sharing. Implementation NAC December statement[8] (recognizing France's Indochina effort requires NATO support) could be by two methods:

(*a*) Compensating France in Europe for effort in Asia, through common NATO fund;

(*b*) Probably more realistically, by giving France increased assistance for Indochina war.

2. NATO program coordination. Present program only theoretically long-term because national financial policies must be conducted on short-term basis. Information on weapons development needed so large-scale production not developed for obsolescent.

3. Need for NATO economic program. State of Union message mentions raw materials imports into US, which raises question (*a*) need for international allocations mechanism, and (*b*) common development new sources in underdeveloped areas with US help. Better application Article 2 NAT required. Trade could partly replace aid particularly if loans were granted or increased exports to US rendered possible by tariff reductions.

4. Monetary aspects European integration. State of Union message reference to "broader markets and more dependable currencies" raises

[7] Minutes of the afternoon meeting between Dulles, Stassen, Draper, Dunn, Achilles, Labouisse, MacArthur, Matteson, O'Connor, and Herz, on the American side, and Mayer, Bidault, Bourgès-Maunoury, M. Schumann, Parodi, LaTournelle, Alphand, de Margerie, Laloy, and Falaize, on the French side, drafted by Herz on Feb. 7, are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137. There is also an informal memorandum of conversation for this meeting based on the recollection of several participants in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137.

[8] For information concerning the Tenth Session of the North Atlantic Council held in Paris during December 1952, see the editorial note, p. 348. For the text of the resolution under reference, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 5, 1953, pp. 4–5.

question convertibility. France firmly attached to OEEC and EPU for without them neither CSC nor EDC could function.[9] Bretton Woods should be re-examined to facilitate European return to convertibility. National aspects cannot be treated singly.

B. Stassen reply. Outlined procedures for consideration problems raised within US Government. French will appreciate long-term approach program coordination difficult during interim before EDC becomes reality. When it comes to implementation President's speech particularly re Indochina we will be very interested in what French Government plans are for the training of Vietnamese forces. Re raw materials developments, we will consider proposals with interest. Re currency convertibility, US Government will act through US Secretary Treasury and will appreciate national aspects cannot be dealt with in isolation.

DUNN

[9] Documentation concerning the OEEC, EPU, and CSC is presented in volume VI.

110.11 DU/2–453 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET LONDON, February 4, 1953—3 p. m.

4294. For Acting Secretary Matthews from Secretary. Reference Paris telegram 4303, repeated London 929, Bonn 615, Rome 333.[2]

In addition to the two plenary meetings with French referred to reference telegram, the Secretary met alone with Prime Minister Mayer, Foreign Minister Bidault and Defense Minister Pleven late afternoon, February 2.

Following is summary of this meeting:

"Mr. Mayer pointed out that his government, now only about three weeks old, was the first government seriously to undertake the task of seeking ratification of the EDC treaties. He pointed out that the political obstacles were very great and could only be removed by careful and skillful planning. He made the following four points:

"1. There must be protocols interpreting the treaty. These protocols, he said, would not involve any change in the treaty but would, I gathered, constitute agreed interpretations of the treaty in a sense favorable to, or desired by, France. Mr. Mayer professed to believe that the protocols would not cause serious difficulty with the other associate nations.

"2. United Kingdom association. Mr. Mayer said it was necessary that there should be United Kingdom association in some substantial form although he recognized that full partnership was impractical. However, it would not be possible for France to proceed if it seemed that the United Kingdom was likely to disassociate itself from continental defense.

[1] Repeated to Paris for the Ambassador.
[2] *Supra.*

"3. Saar. It would be necessary to settle the future economic status of the Saar with the coming in force of the EDC treaties. Mr. Mayer professed to believe that Adenauer was sympathetic but did not know what his political position would be.

"4. Indochina. There must be some understanding, principally with the United States, for sharing the burden of the war in Indochina so as to make it possible for France to make a military continental contribution which would at least match that of the Germans so that France would not be submerged by German influence on the continent.

"Mr. Dulles brought up the lack of alternatives to EDC. He pointed out that there could be no successful defense of the continent either in terms of depth or of strength without substantial German contingents. He said he assumed that the French would never permit Germany to recreate a national army as a full partner under NATO and Mr. Mayer affirmed most emphatically that France would use its veto power in NATO to prevent this and, if the veto was overridden, would destroy the effectiveness of any German national army by being so strongly in opposition that in practical effect the lines of communication between Germany and the Atlantic were broken. Mr. Dulles pointed out that if this were so, it logically followed that there must either be a European army with German contingents or that adequate defense of the continent became militarily impossible and that the best that could then be worked upon would be a peripheral defense.

"Mr. Mayer said he recognized the logic of this position and that because of that his government would do everything possible to put through the EDC treaties but that he needed maximum help from the United States. He suggested that in talking about this problem, the United States should stress primarily the need of integrating Germans into the defense of Europe rather than to talk in somewhat airy terms about a 'United States of Europe'."

HOLMES

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740.5/2–353: Telegram

*The United States Special Representative in Europe (Draper) to the Department of State*

SECRET PARIS, February 3, 1953—1 p. m.

Polto 1325. Subject: Attendance Messrs. Dulles and Stassen at NAC February 3.[1]

At opening of meeting and following Secretary's and Mr. Stassen's conversation with Lord Ismay, Lord Ismay introduced both guests to individual permanent representatives. Lord Ismay then introduced them briefly but graciously. Secretary responded in short statement (full text going forward by airgram [2]) in which he paid tribute to chairman, staff and permanent representatives as driving force behind NATO which possesses so important mission for security and world

[1] For documentation concerning the participation of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see pp. 1 ff.

[2] The editors were unable to further identify the airgram under reference.

peace. Secretary expressed regret brevity of trip prevented call at this time at capitals of all members. He then referred to importance German contribution the EDC. He concluded by referring to significance of fact NATO never entered into discussion in hard-fought US campaign for reason it rested securely on bi-partisan foundation and added that he was confident NATO would continue to play its vital role provided only it maintained momentum and continued process of growth and strength.

Mr. Stassen, on call from chairman, spoke briefly supporting Secretary's comments.

Parenthetically, comment of other representatives and delegations after meeting without exception spoke of inspirational reassurance in Secretary's remarks. There is no doubt that his presence and words had an immensely effective response.

Alphand then spoke of distress of all NATO members at devastation of floods in three member countries and suggested NAC, as it had done at Rome at time of Italian floods, should show practical sympathy by contributing in all possible ways to relief of distress. He suggested chairman draft resolution in this sense which Lord Ismay immediately agreed to do. Italy, US and others warmly supported Alphand's remarks and representatives Netherlands, UK and Belgium expressed appreciation.

Next and last item of business before departure Secretary and Mr. Stassen was agreement by Council on April 23 as date for ministerial meeting with expressed clear understanding it would conclude Saturday April 25. It is accepted by all that principal business will be final conclusion 1952 annual review and laying of plans for 1953 AR.[3]

DRAPER

[3] For documentation concerning the North Atlantic Council meeting in April 1954, see pp. 368 ff.

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Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137 : Telegram

*The United States Special Representative in Europe (Draper) to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, February 4, 1953—10 p. m.

Repto 2395. Cotel. Subject: Dulles–Stassen meeting with OEEC Delegates.

1. February 3 Dulles and Stassen received OEEC Delegates comprising Ellis-Rees, Cattani and Marjolin in Ambassador Dunn's office. Draper, Porter, and Blum present from SRE.

2. Ellis-Rees as spokesman for OEEC group described OEEC activities in rather elementary terms. He emphasized that OEEC, originally

[1] Repeated to London, Rome, Brussels, and The Hague.

a creation of Marshall Plan, now represented common determination of Europeans to cooperate in economic fields. Spoke of its usefulness and indicated that it provided broad basis for economic cooperation from which other organizations, e.g. NATO and CSC, drew support and benefits. Concluded by expression hope that it might be possible for OEEC Delegates go to Washington in near future to discuss common problems arising out of fourth report.

3. Secretary Dulles responded that US was well aware of work of OEEC and EPU and recognized that to extent that any progress had been made in economic cooperation in Europe OEEC was largely responsible. He went on to say that degree of international economic cooperation was not adequate and that unless European countries could improve this situation it would be premature to expect early reduction in US tax barriers. Then brought up question forthcoming international economic talks [2] to which Ellis-Rees had made no reference. Secretary Dulles said he assumed this problem was very much on minds of European countries and he wished give assurance that US would enter into no commitments with UK without full opportunity for consultation with OEEC. Pointed out that US had no knowledge of contents UK proposals and might simply reject the whole lot but certainly no agreement would be reached without full consultation.

4. Stassen referred to Ellis-Rees suggestion for OEEC delegation to go Washington and said he supported this idea and thought it would be very helpful. Then indicated this his point of view and the principle and timing would have to be reviewed with Treasury, etc, and confirmed. Secretary Dulles agreed such talks should be helpful following UK talks and suggested OEEC prepare memo outlining points such a delegation would wish discuss in Washington. This was agreed. On Stassen's suggestion it was agreed that best time for such delegation to go, once principle is agreed upon, would be sometime between March 15 and April 15.[3]

5. Stassen went on to ask about relations between OEEC and NATO to which Marjolin replied by explaining why relationship had to be informal one and ways in which OEEC economic analyses were made available to NATO and provided the raw material for the latter's more specialized studies. Stassen said he hoped OEEC memo mentioned above would include reference to the role of OEEC in relation to NAC. He also expressed hope that OEEC economic capabilities analyses made for the fourth report and for first phase of 1952 Annual

[2] Presumably a reference to the Eden–Butler visit to Washington, scheduled for early March 1953; documentation concerning this visit is presented in volume VI.

[3] After coordination with the British concerning their proposed visit to Washington in early March 1953, the Department of State was informed in telegram 4306 from London, Feb. 4, that the OEEC Delegation's visit to Washington was tentatively scheduled for the third week in March (840.00/2–453). Documentation concerning the OEEC is presented in volume VI.

Review would be brought up-to-date for second phase. Marjolin said he was sure this would be done.

DRAPER

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110.11 DU/2–353

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

SECRET PARIS, February 3, 1953.

[DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:] Have had useful visit at Paris. Yesterday devoted wholly to talks with top French officials largely in relation to EDC.[2] While political difficulties are great, Stassen and I feel that there is real determination on part of present government, particularly Mayer and Pleven, to push this to a successful conclusion. There is still a hard road ahead, but we feel that ultimate success is possible and even probable.

Your State of Union message was very well received and slight initial concern about Formosa was quickly dissipated, so that French press this morning takes sympathetic non-critical view.

Today we met at SHAPE with Ridgway, Gruenther and many of your former associates,[3] and then with Ismay, NATO Council [4] and OEEC [5] and believe we contributed to their morale and to understanding of your administration's friendly policies.

[Best regards, FOSTER]

[1] This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 4308 from Paris, Feb. 3, with instructions that it be delivered to the President and that no distribution be made except to the Acting Secretary. A memorandum by Matthews attached to the source text noted that a copy of this message was delivered to the White House on Feb. 3.

[2] For a record of Dulles' and Stassen's meeting with French officials during the morning and afternoon of Feb. 2, see telegram 4303 from Paris, Feb. 3, p. 1557, and telegram 4294 from London, Feb. 4, p. 1560.

[3] No record of Dulles' and Stassen's meeting with SHAPE officers on Feb. 3 was found in Department of State files.

[4] For a record of their meeting with Lord Ismay and their attendance at the North Atlantic Council meeting of Feb. 3, see telegram Polto 1325 from Paris, Feb. 3, p. 1561.

[5] For a record of their meeting with the OEEC delegates, see telegram Repto 2395 from Paris, Feb. 4, *supra*.

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110.11 DU/2–553 : Telegram

*The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Reber) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, February 5, 1953—7 p. m.

3654. Following is summary of Secretary's and Stassen's meeting February 4 (morning and afternoon) with Eden, Butler, Alexander and other US and UK officials: [2]

[1] Repeated to London.

[2] Informal memoranda of conversation for the morning and afternoon meetings summarized in the source text are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137; these informal memoranda of conversation are based on the recollection of several participants and are not an official record.

1. EDC [3]

(*a*) After short statement by Eden and Alexander that British doing all possible to achieve closest possible association with EDC in military and other fields, Secretary said he had impression that if British measures dressed up, dramatized and announced at proper moment they would be great psychological aid to EDC ratification.

(*b*) Secretary outlined following points made by Mayer and Pleven during Paris talks: [4] (1) Protocols would not change treaty but only involve interpretations; (2) UK association must be substantial in form although not going so far as actual membership; (3) Saar, which must be settled (Eden commented that while we must push as hard as possible for Saar settlement within next couple of months we must not allow such settlement to be made a condition to EDC ratification as this might cause serious political difficulties in Germany and might greatly delay EDC ratification; (4) Indochina (see 2 below).

(*c*) Secretary then explained great importance from viewpoint of US congressional and public opinion of tangible evidence before April NAC meeting that EDC is in fact moving towards ratification. This was very important in connection with timing of congressional hearings on foreign aid program. Secretary suggested if Italy and Netherlands could ratify in next several weeks it would serve purposes of getting EDC off dead center, providing evidence it was not bogged down and bringing additional pressure on France and Germany to get on with ratification. Secretary said he had discussed this with De Gasperi who while not committing himself had indicated he might be able to do something in next several weeks if French protocols did not create additional obstacles.[5] De Gasperi did not make any mention of Trieste in this connection nor did he try to tie it in with EDC. In response to Eden's questions Secretary said French did not make either EPC [6] or extension of NATO commitment by UK or US for 50 year period condition to EDC ratification.

Secretary asked whether UK and US could not each urge Italians and Dutch to ratify. He believed that UK might be particularly helpful with Dutch. Eden said he agreed this well worth trying and UK would instruct its Embassies accordingly.

(*d*) Butler raised question of German contribution to British troop costs. He said that Germans (particularly Schaeffer were not willing to accept a reasonable level of financial effort for defense and asked US help in persuading Germans to carry defense burden comparable to that of France and Britain which he defined as at least Wisemen's formula.[7]

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[3] For documentation concerning the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a European Defense Community, see pp. 571 ff.

[4] For a summary of Dulles' meeting with Mayer and Pleven, see telegram 4294 from London, Feb. 4, p. 1560.

[5] For a summary of Dulles' meeting with De Gasperi, see telegram 4275 from Paris, Feb. 1, p. 1551.

[6] Documentation concerning the European Political Community is presented in volume VI.

[7] For documentation concerning the work of the Temporary Council Committee, commonly known as the "Wisemen," see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 272 ff., and pp. 203 ff., herein.

2. Indochina.[8] (See above 1(*b*) (4).) Secretary said Rene Mayer asked US help in IC so that French would be able to maintain position in Europe to balance Germany to which Secretary replied we would be glad to hear French views on how Indochina conflict could be brought to successful conclusion and believed Mayer might bring this up for discussion when he visits Wash.[9] Secretary added that French had most serious military manpower problem with respect to IC and that answer might well be in more effective French action in raising and training Vietnam forces. There was then a general discussion of situation in Southeast Asia. Lord Alexander commented that British have equivalent of one division plus in Malaya and that providing IC situation not worsened he was optimistic that Malaya might be cleaned up in about a year when ground force responsibilities could be assumed by Ghurkas and other native troops. Eden agreed with reasoning on IC and guessed that financial burden is basic problem for France there.

3. Trieste.[10] Eden stated view that Zone A to Italy and Zone B to Yugoslavia settlement was only practicable solution and that Italy and Yugoslavia both realized this. Great difficulty is timing. So-called interim solution was then discussed by Eden who felt strongly that Tito would probably annex Zone B immediately Zone A was turned over to Italy. There was inconclusive discussion re possibility of making some statement of intent, prior to elections, to turn over Zone A to Italy as a means of helping De Gasperi in elections. Eden said UK would probably have to talk about Trieste during latter's visit but exact line to take could be considered by British and US in next few weeks.

4. Spain. Eden asked if Secretary could give him information on status of US–Spanish base negotiations.[11] Secretary replied he was not familiar with exact details.

5. UN. (*a*) Secretary expressed opinion little good would be served by raising Korea issue again.[12] Selwyn Lloyd stated Communist rejection of Indian resolution was transmitted to first committee so subject will be on agenda but might be possible for committee only to "note with regret" or take some similar action. Polish resolution on POWs may also come up and it may not be possible avoid controversy since Communists will doubtless try to exploit it for propaganda. Eden mentioned suggestion of Reugger (chairman IRC) that attempt be made exchange wounded prisoners under Geneva Convention. It was agreed US and UK consult further in New York, on this matter.

6. Hong Kong. Alexander said Hong Kong is well defended; only

[8] Documentation concerning Indochina is presented in volume XIII.

[9] Documentation concerning Mayer's visit to Washington in March 1953 is presented in volume VI.

[10] Documentation concerning Trieste is presented in volume VIII.

[11] Documentation concerning U.S. base negotiations with Spain is presented in volume VI.

[12] Documentation concerning Korea is presented in volume XV.

weak spot being air because all fields are within artillery range. Carrier borne aircraft would therefore be necessary for effective defense. Assuming this, Hong Kong could be held against all but sustained major offensive. Subversives would be a danger but only in connection with possible attack. In reply to questions on trade with China and British ships reported sold to Communists, Eden said he hoped Britain would be informed of any irregularities so that they would be corrected. Re Hong Kong–Red China trade he said UK was carrying out some controls for UK–China trade and recently a US–UK group had checked this on the spot.

7. Eden expressed hope US could support UK with Japanese re status of Commonwealth troops in Japan which are not accorded same status as other UN forces. Secretary indicated he would look into this to see what could be done.

8. Egypt. (See separate telegram.[13])

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10. Arabs–Israel.[14] Eden said he felt Arabs–Israel peace could not be achieved until refugee problem settled and that Syria was key to this problem. If a settlement could be made with Egypt this might be very important in an eventual Israel–Arab settlement. Also, if we can get Arab states into MEDO,[15] this may help calm their fears and improve atmosphere.

REBER

[13] Telegram 4308 from London, Feb. 4 (745W.00/2–453). For text, see volume IX.

[14] Documentation concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict is presented *ibid.*

[15] Documentation concerning the Middle East Defense Organization is *ibid.*

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110.11 DU/2–553

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

SECRET BONN, February 5, 1953.

[DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:] Our visit in London was highly satisfactory so far as establishing cordial relations with UK Government and we believe it will help allay public distrust re Formosa largely stirred up by Labor Party and sensationalist press. Labor Party will try to exploit Formosa issue to maximum as part of opposition tactics. Our visit and Eden's statement [2] will greatly strengthen hand of government in today's parliamentary debates.

[1] This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 3642 from Bonn, Feb. 5, with instructions that it be delivered to the President and that there should be no distribution except to the Acting Secretary of State. A memorandum by Matthews attached to the source text indicates that the message was delivered to the White House on Feb. 5.

[2] In telegram 4296 from London, Feb. 4, Dulles sent the Department of State a statement which Eden proposed to make in the Commons concerning references in President Eisenhower's State of the Union message relating to policy toward Communist China. Dulles asked if President Eisenhower had any objections to the proposed statement. (711.5890/2–453)

Stassen and I had cordial luncheon with Churchill and Eden and the talks at Foreign Office which preceded and followed developed unity of purpose re EDC which the government now clearly accepts as indispensable.[3] Several avenues of coordinated action were developed.

Discussions also covered Egypt, Iran, Formosa and economic matters all in an atmosphere of complete confidence.

Eden's dinner for us last night served to further cement personal relations.

[Best regards, FOSTER]

[3] For a record of Dulles' and Stassen's meetings with British officials during the morning and afternoon of Feb. 4, see telegram 3654 from Bonn, Feb. 5, *supra*.

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662A.00/2–653 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY THE HAGUE, February 6, 1953—1 p. m.

1046. At Chancellor's suggestion it had been arranged that I should see Ollenhauer and other members of SPD during my visit to Bonn. Accordingly latter called in company with Carlo Schmid and Wehner.[2]

Ollenhauer outlined in some detail objections of his party to present form of Contractuals and EDC,[3] stressing, however, that SPD recognized Germany had positive contribution to make to common defense and to integration of west. SPD objection to present system was not therefore based on principle but on form of agreements which contained too many remnants of occupation spirit and did not give Germany equality. He went on to say that German defense contribution to be effective must be based on genuine support great majority German people which could only be effected if there were feeling that agreements would not widen gulf between Federal Republic and East Germany thus making hope of German unification more remote. Only when German people could be convinced, according to Ollenhauer, that all possibilities of reaching agreement with Soviets had been exhausted would they be prepared for full integration with West. Ollenhauer, however, offered no alternative to EDC except to repeat previous SPD arguments favoring vague form of coalition army.

In reply I made it quite clear that new American administration, which was in process of reviewing foreign policy of previous administration, had given most careful study to EDC concept. It had come to conclusion that there was no alternative possible which would bring

[1] Repeated to Bonn, Paris, and London.

[2] An undated, unsigned memorandum of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137.

[3] Documentation concerning contractual relations is presented in volume VII; for documentation concerning the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a European Defense Community, see pp. 571 ff.

about effective contribution to common defense and at same time create foundations for genuine Franco–German understanding through elimination of national jealousies and rivalries. Past experience has shown these led to conflict.

As to reunification of Germany and any hesitancy to do the right thing because it might endanger this, I pointed out that if Soviets felt that their control over East Germany could be used to prevent West Germany from associating itself with West, they would surely hold on to East Germany. Best hope was to demonstrate that East Germany was not a means of blackmailing the West.

[DULLES]

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**662A.00/2–653 : Telegram**

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY THE HAGUE, February 6, 1953—1 p. m.

1045. In conversation with Chancellor Adenauer Thursday afternoon,[2] which followed informal discussions and my talk with Ollenhauer, I gave him substance of my talk with SPD leaders, which seemed to please him greatly.[3]

Adenauer expressed his confidence that German ratification of contractuals and EDC would be forthcoming without great delay. In case Constitutional Court decides against admissibility of declaratory judgment, third reading will be pushed through end of February or beginning of March. In case court rules favorably on admissibility of coalition suit, third reading will also be pushed through, though possibly a few days later than in foregoing case. At third reading majority would be larger than at second reading because Bavarian Party has meanwhile promised Chancellor its support. Chancellor conceded that SPD would request injunction from Constitutional Court after third reading but he did not think that too great a time delay would be caused.

Although Chancellor said he had no detailed information re French protocols, he felt they might be of a nature to require renegotiation or a new process of ratification by all signatories, which could only create further delays.

As far as substantive aspect of German defense contribution is concerned, Chancellor maintained all preparations on paper which are within German power to make at this stage have already been made. A start would be made with 50,000 to 100,000 volunteers around which cadres of future army would be built. Turning to Saar problem,

[1] Repeated to Bonn, Paris, and London.

[2] An informal memorandum of this conversation, based on the recollection of several of the participants, as well as another unsigned, undated record of the same meeting, are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137.

[3] For a record of Dulles' meeting with SPD leaders, see telegram 1046 from The Hague, Feb. 6, *supra*.

Chancellor expressed strong hopes that French would not make settlement of this issue a condition of ratification. He recalled his previous negotiations with Schuman on this subject and said that whereas agreement had been reached on political side, economic aspects of Saar solution still remained open for settlement. He had been prepared to accept a joint solution which would take into consideration special interests of French in Saar, special relations between Germany and Saar, and interest of Saarlanders themselves, but French had insisted upon only modifying present Franco-Saar economic conventions.[4] Chancellor said this was where matter stood at present but he was prepared at any time to engage in further discussions.

He then turned to serious problem presented by influx of refugees in Berlin and said that in addition to recent emergency, refugee problem of West Germany had assumed such proportions that it could not be settled by German efforts alone. For example, even before present influx of farmers from East Zone there were still 250,000 refugee farmers who had not yet been absorbed by West German economy. He cited Sonne report which had proposed annual expenditure of approximately 3.6 billion marks on refugee problem and had pointed out maximum German effort possible would fall short of this figure by approximately 1 billion marks.[5]

Chancellor said he was not asking for continued American subsidies but for removal of remaining barriers to private American investment in Germany. He expressed hope that, with expected winding up of debt negotiations in near future, German credit standing would be restored and private American capital facilitated by United States Government would flow into Germany.

Chancellor gave assurances that despite Arab objections Jewish restitution agreement would be submitted for ratification to Bundestag next week and was confident treaty would be approved by overwhelming majority.

In conclusion Adenauer remarked that after Kirkpatrick had explained situation, he had approved British arrest two Nazis and felt this action, to be supplemented by somewhat smaller but similar action on part of Federal Government in Bremen, would eliminate all danger of any incorrigible Nazi resurgence.

In reply to Chancellor I said I was pleased by optimistic time table on ratification which he had outlined and I stressed importance of going ahead with ratification as speedily as possible. As long as none of EDC states had ratified, pressure was not on French or any other signatory, but as soon as ratifications began to come, momentum would be created which could push matter through to successful conclusion. I

[4] For documentation concerning the Convention between France and the Saar signed on Mar. 3, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 927 ff.

[5] Documentation concerning Berlin is presented in volume VII.

pointed out that French had insisted protocols involved no change of treaty texts. I also pointed out United States was under time pressure since it was important at next NATO Council meeting April 23 that United States representatives submit fairly concrete figures on future United States contributions. In order to enable United States to present such figures congressional leaders would have to be convinced that concrete progress in bringing EDC into being had been achieved.

With reference to Saar, I agreed with Chancellor that every effort should be made by France and Germany to remove this source of friction and added I hoped French would not get impression Chancellor was holding back on Saar negotiations until after ratification.

Stassen and I took occasion to point out to Chancellor and to repeat to Finance Minister Schaeffer and Economic Minister Erhard that it was important that no internal commitments in Germany either of a political or budgetary nature should be made which would prevent Germany from making its defense contribution on a basis comparable to contributions of others such as France and the UK.

Finally, I told Chancellor President would be pleased if Adenauer found it possible to visit United States sometime this spring. As Chancellor has to be back for CDU congress middle of April, we tentatively agreed to a date during first half of April.[6]

Brief conversation was held with Ministers of Finance and Economy, Blank and Vice Chancellor. Latter expressed concern over discernible trend toward bilateral and partial solutions of currency convertibility problem and stated German view was that convertibility should include not only Europe but United States, Canada and British Commonwealth as well. Bluecher promised to present in near future concrete German proposals respecting convertibility, Berlin and refugees. Immediately following cable contains summary Dulles' meeting with Ollenhauer.

[DULLES]

[6] Documentation concerning Adenauer's visit to Washington in April 1953 is presented in volume VII.

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110.11 DU/2–653

*The Secretary of State to the President* [1]

SECRET THE HAGUE, February 6, 1953.

[DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:] Our trip to Bonn was, I believe, constructive and useful. Adenauer believes he will be able to push ahead with EDC despite tactics of opposition and difficult legal question involving

[1] This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1043, Feb. 6. with instructions that the Acting Secretary forward it to the President. A handwritten notation in the margin of the source text reads as follows: "Copy sent W[hite] H[ouse] Feb 6, 1953."

German court. There is no flagging in his determination to move ahead as rapidly as he possibly can.[2]

Adenauer deeply appreciated your letter [3] and showed us with pride the landscape which you gave him.

We discussed his desire to come to the United States, and he indicated the first week in April would be best from his point of view, if it were agreeable to you, as he must be back in Germany about mid-April for his party's national congress.

If the first week in April is agreeable to you it would mean that Mayer and Bidault would come during fourth week in March and then Adenauer early in April.[4]

[Best regards, FOSTER]

[2] For a record of Dulles' and Stassen's meeting with Adenauer on Feb. 5, see telegram 1045 from The Hague, Feb. 6, *supra*.

[3] This is a reference to a letter from President Eisenhower which Dulles delivered to Adenauer on his arrival in Bonn; a copy of this letter, which generally explained the purpose of the Dulles–Stassen trip, is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137.

[4] Documentation on Adenauer's visit to Washington in April 1953 is presented in volume VII; documentation on Mayer's visit to Washington in March 1953 is presented in volume VI.

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740.5/2–853 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET LUXEMBOURG, February 8, 1953—2 p. m.

191. Following is summary of Secretary and Mr. Stassen's conversations with Dutch officials February 6:

Secretary and Stassen called on Prime Minister Drees and Defense Minister Staf at 3 p. m.[2] At Drees' suggestion Secretary set forth US position re EDC emphasizing European unity essential if US assistance is to be meaningful in creating European security. He pointed out the feebleness of alternatives, necessity for German military contribution if Europe is to be successfully defended and necessity for a framework within which ancient Franco-German jealousies and rivalries could be reconciled, for without Franco-German understanding there can be no strength or unity in Europe, etc. Secretary concluded by brief résumé of his discussions at Rome, Paris, London, and Bonn and said that on the whole he was encouraged by his talks with European leaders.

Drees said he was more pessimistic than Secretary. He was critical of French for injecting new issues by proposing protocols; he was not satisfied with the extent of UK association with EDC; and doubted that Germany would be able to ratify until after German elections next autumn (his arguments were along same lines as those of German

[1] Repeated to Paris, The Hague, London, and Bonn.

[2] No memorandum of this conversation was found in Department of State files.

SPD). Drees concluded by suggesting that German entry into NATO was preferable alternative to EDC. Commenting on UK association with EDC Defense Minister Staf expressed view that association in military field envisioned by UK was not very meaningful. While UK willing to have British officers on EDC military staffs, prepared to cooperate in training, and also willing to have EDC divisions incorporated in UK corps, UK was not willing to have UK units incorporated in EDC corps. This was a very important omission from the continental viewpoint. If UK could assign British division to an EDC corps, Dutch and most other continental EDC members would be glad to have such a corps commanded by a British general.

Secretary and Stassen then met with Foreign Ministers Beyen and Luns and other US and Dutch officials.[3] Beyen opened with discussion of EDC saying Dutch realize necessity for Europe to unite since it cannot become strong if it is a series of separate entities. While defense is most urgent question Dutch believe that in developing European unity emphasis should be placed also on economic and political aspects. Beyen then reviewed original Dutch objections to EDC and original desire to have Germany in NATO. Since then there has been great evolution in Dutch parliamentary opinion and Dutch now fully accepted EDC concept. Dutch had been preparing to try to get parliamentary approval of EDC when French had proposed new protocols. Until Dutch knew what was in protocols Dutch Parliament could not be expected to take further action on EDC legislation. Secretary outlined US position on EDC along same lines as he had to Drees. Secretary suggested that despite delays in France and Germany if other nations went ahead and ratified EDC responsibility would then be sharply focused on those countries which had taken no action and suggested Dutch might take lead in this with Italians. Beyen replied that until Dutch knew nature of protocols Government could not urge Parliament to act. He reiterated, however, Dutch support of EDC concept and desire to see it brought into being as soon as possible.

Beyen reverted to need for economic integration and said Dutch position is being set forth in a memo which will be delivered at the Rome meeting of CSC Ministers on February 24.[4] He promised furnish Ambassador Chapin with copy. He also stressed importance of supra-national authority in connection with tariff reduction citing traditional protectionist policy particularly in France.

Luns then said Dutch wish to resist Soviet aggression but are sometimes uneasy over steps which might provoke Soviet aggression. Secretary replied he believed there had been some misrepresentation regard-

[3] An informal memorandum of this conversation, based on the recollection of several of the participants, is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137.

[4] Documentation concerning the European Coal and Steel Community is presented in volume VI.

ing US policy and that no one could doubt that whole basis of US policy is to work for peace. The idea of a war of liberation or a preventive war was repugnant to American people and government. Luns then referred to Japanese assurances regarding compensation to Dutch nationals and expressed hope that US would "hint" to Japanese that latter should compensate Dutch.[5] He next turned to Far East and Korea saying while Dutch Government not really concerned about change of orders of Seventh Fleet because Chiang not strong enough to launch offensive against Chinese mainland, Luns most earnestly hoped that since Dutch have forces in Korea, they would be consulted before any action is taken which might spread the conflict in FE.[6] He next discussed Indonesia explaining how deterioration in economic situation in Indonesia had paradoxically increased Netherlands dollar receipts.[7] He expressed disappointment that Indo had failed to carry out commitments of round table conference and criticized Indo desire to terminate federal concept agreed at round table. Regarding New Guinea he said talks with Indos had twice failed and Dutch do not believe further conversations with Indos regarding status of island to which "Netherlands feels it has both *de jure* and *de facto* sovereignty" would be useful.[8] He then mentioned US anti-trust action against oil companies and hoped US would proceed with "great caution" since just the announcements of original action had led Indos to take steps against Dutch oil companies in Indonesia. Secretary pointed out that new administration had requested suspension of court action for 90 days to permit full study of problem. Luns concluded by saying that if other nations are invited to join or become associated with ANZUS[9] Netherlands would like very much to be considered. Secretary replied that for present at least there seemed to be no question of extending ANZUS treaty.

Mr. Stassen said he would welcome Dutch suggestions regarding measures further to control shipments of strategic materials to Soviet bloc including trans-shipments.[10] He would also appreciate any information Dutch might wish to give regarding economic situation in Indonesia as well as Indo trade with Netherlands and Western Europe. Finally MSA would carefully analyze Netherlands desires for counterpart funds in connection with defense commitments and storm damages.

[DULLES]

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[5] Documentation concerning Japan is presented in volume XIV.
[6] Documentation concerning Korea is presented in volume XV.
[7] Documentation concerning Indonesia is presented in volume XII.
[8] Documentation concerning Western New Guinea is *ibid.*
[9] Documentation on U.S. participation in the ANZUS Pact is *ibid.*
[10] Documentation concerning East–West trade is presented in volume I.

*Editorial Note*

During the afternoon of Saturday, February 7, Dulles and Stassen, accompanied by Ambassador Cowen and several other United States officials, met in Brussels with Belgian Prime Minister Van Houtte and Foreign Minister Van Zeeland and their advisers. The majority of the meeting involved a discussion of the European Defense Community and the related problem of the length of the military service term; other topics discussed were European unity, currency convertibility, and offshore procurement. Following this meeting, Stassen, accompanied by Matteson and Fox, met with Prime Minister Van Houtte and his advisers to continue the discussion of offshore procurement. Informal memoranda of these two conversations, based on the recollection of several of the participants, are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137; no telegraphic summaries of these meetings were found in Department of State files.

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**Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 137**

*Informal Memorandum of Conversation*[1]

SECRET — LUXEMBOURG, February 8, 1953.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Participants: | Luxembourg | Prime Minister Dupong<br>Foreign Minister Bech |
| | United States | Secretary Dulles<br>Mrs. Mesta, US Minister<br>Mr. MacArthur<br>Mr. O'Connor |

After the usual amenities Secretary Dulles opened the conversation by saying that he was particularly glad to have the opportunity to visit Luxembourg so that he could talk with Mr. Dupong and Mr. Bech about common problems and also because Luxembourg was the seat of the Coal Steel Community which was the first European supranational organization which had come into existence.

With respect to common problems he wished particularly to talk about the European Defense Community.[2] He outlined the US position with respect to the EDC, emphasizing that European unity is essential if US assistance is to achieve its purpose in assisting in the creation of European security. He pointed out the necessity for a German military contribution if Europe is to be successfully defended and the fact that

[1] This memorandum, presumably prepared by O'Connor, was unsigned with no indication of the drafter; a notation on the source text explained that this record was based on the recollection of several of the participants and should not be considered an official record.

[2] For documentation concerning the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a European Defense Community, see pp. 571 ff.

it is essential that this German contribution be within a framework which will bring France and Germany together and at the same time prevent such German participation from resulting in a German national army of some sort which some years hence might be used in ways inimical to the free democratic West. He pointed out that Franco–German relations are at the heart of the problem of whether Europe will become strong or remain weak and divided, and that without a Franco–German understanding there can be no unity or strength in Europe.

Foreign Minister then launched into a long exposition, the main points of which were as follows: Luxembourg has no cause to love Germany. It is a small country and historically has been the victim of the conflict between France and Germany. Nonetheless, Luxembourg realizes that a German contribution is essential if Europe is to be defended as far to the East as is necessary. Although Luxembourg still has apprehensions about Germany, particularly that a non[*neo*]-Nazi or similar movement may replace the present leadership of Adenauer, it is willing to go ahead with EDC since it sees no real alternative. However, there have been disquieting signs in Germany in the past year that important sectors of the German people are becoming "arrogant and are once again beginning to behave like Prussians." As a close neighbor to Germany and also speaking their language, both he and Prime Minister Dupong have been in a position to notice this changing attitude on the part of many Germans.

With respect to ratification of the EDC, Luxembourg will most certainly ratify the treaty but can only do so after the other countries have acted. He explained that although the Luxembourg Socialists are in the opposition, they had voted for and supported Luxembourg's entry into NATO. With respect to EDC, however, they are strongly influenced by the French Socialist Party and the President of the Luxembourg Assembly, a good Socialist, has indicated to Bech and Dupong that until France and other countries act he could not persuade his party to vote for EDC ratification. Mr. Bech also mentioned in passing that while the Luxembourg Socialists were primarily influenced by the French Socialists they were also influenced by the German Socialists who were steadfastly opposing the EDC.

Another reason why Luxembourg could not move first in EDC ratification was the fact that it was contributing only a brigade to the EDC forces. The people and Parliament would, he said, feel that it was ridiculous for Luxembourg, the smallest participant in the EDC, to move first in a matter of such importance when the other larger members of the proposed EDC community had taken no action with respect to ratification. Mr. Dupong echoed the above views of Mr. Bech and said that many Luxembourgers probably preferred German

entry into NATO. This seemed to be the only alternative if EDC failed.

The Secretary said that he fully understood that only Luxembourg could be the judge of when it took action with respect to the EDC. In so far as NATO being an alternative, Rene Mayer and other French leaders with whom he had talked in Paris had assured him that no French Government could last twenty-four hours that voted for German entry into NATO. It seemed certain that now and in the foreseeable future the French would veto any such action. Furthermore, German entry into NATO would not seem to meet the European fears regarding a resurgent national Germany with an independent German army. In other words, if Germany entered into NATO it would be free like all the other NATO partners to withdraw its forces whenever it wished. Any such action along these lines would, the Secretary believed, place Germany's Western European neighbors in a position of very considerable peril. The Secretary then said the trouble with the present situation is that there is no responsibility focused on anyone for failure to ratify the EDC treaty. None of the six countries has ratified and each says that it is waiting for the others to act first. Nine months have passed since the treaty has been signed and if each country insists on waiting it seems obvious that the whole project will remain indefinitely bogged down. This will be most serious in terms of continuing US support in the general order of magnitude as has been given to Europe in the past several years. In other words, if the European countries do not give some visible indications that EDC is not dead and if there are not concrete evidences of the fact that progress is being made, it will be extremely difficult to convince American governmental, Congressional and public opinion that it should continue to pour its treasures and resources into Europe when the Europeans themselves cannot even move forward with a treaty which they not only proposed but which they signed many months ago. The Secretary said that only the Europeans could decide whether or not they were going to move forward but if they did not the whole concept of the North Atlantic Treaty, in so far as creating security for Europe was concerned, would seem to be jeopardized.

Mr. Bech said that he understood the gravity of the situation. If the Benelux countries could agree to act together and all three of them move toward ratification, Luxembourg, he felt, would be willing to move with them. He could see the great advantage in focusing responsibility on non-signatories and he agreed that if it were possible for other countries to begin the process of ratification it would have a very considerable influence in France. Not only would the French Parliament be faced with possible responsibility for the failure of European security but if other countries ratified he felt that a number of French parliamentarians who were now opposing EDC would find a pretext

to give it reluctant support or at least not oppose it. With this in mind, he suggested that at the Rome meeting of the EDC ministerial committee on February 24 he might endeavor to get the other Benelux countries to agree to press forward rapidly with EDC ratification. He also said that from the Luxembourg point of view it would be helpful if the French government or one or two of the French leaders, officially or unofficially, could suggest to Luxembourg that ratification by Luxembourg prior to that of France would be helpful. He said he would be seeing Robert Schuman within the next week or so and he would talk to him privately about this. He also said that a number of the continental EDC countries were criticizing the UK for not associating itself more closely with the EDC. He had been informed of the measures of association which the UK envisaged and he felt that they went very far toward meeting the desire of the continental EDC countries. It was perfectly obvious that the UK could not join the EDC and he did not see how the British could go much further than they had already agreed to go in association with EDC.

Mr. Bech said he had been informed several days ago of the substance of the protocols which the French would propose. He felt that they were satisfactory and he had already sent word to Bidault that he would support the protocols and urge the other EDC countries to accept them. He said that he would keep this promise to Bidault.

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*Editorial Note*

Upon his arrival at Washington National Airport on February 9, Dulles gave a brief summary of the results of his trip to Western Europe including a strong statement of support for the European Defense Community. For the text of this statement, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, February 23, 1953, pages 289–290. Three days later on Thursday, February 12, Dulles addressed the nation over radio and television networks to report on his trip and to give his impressions of the European unity movement. For the text of this address, see *ibid.*, pages 287–289.

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Secretary's Staff Meetings, lot 63 D 75, "Notes 61–120"

*Notes of the Secretary's Staff Meeting, February 10, 1953, 9: 30 a. m.*

Extract[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, February 10, 1953.]

. . . . . .

[1] The omitted sections of the source text summarized discussion of such topics as British reaction to U.S.–Formosa policy, French *rapprochement* regarding the

*The Secretary's Trip*

3. The Secretary stated that on the whole his trip with Mr. Stassen had been very successful. The talks with the officials of other governments had been cordial and extremely satisfactory. The Secretary said that he was hopeful that they had breathed some life into the progress of EDC. He noted that in certain instances an unfortunate picture had been given by the press in playing up less favorable but minor events.

4. Mr. Matthews asked about the French reaction to the appointment of Jules Moch as *rapporteur* of the French Parliamentary Committee on the EDC. The Secretary said that he was not too concerned about this event. He went on to explain that the strategy of the trip was to urge immediate ratification in countries other than France in order to reduce the current buck-passing of responsibility among the EDC signatories. The responsibility could then be placed solely on France for ratification, and particularly on the party in France principally causing delay in ratification.

5. The Secretary said that the smaller countries he visited particularly had felt that they had been brought in on U.S. thinking more closely than had heretofore been the case. This, he believed, had a good effect on our relations there. Although he hesitated to forecast, he believed that the odds were 60 percent in favor of ratification of the EDC.

6. In reply to a question, the Secretary said that he believed that Ollenhauer had received the U.S. arguments with an open mind and appeared to be persuaded. The others around Ollenhauer, however, seemed to be unshaken in their views.

7. The Secretary noted that Mr. MacArthur was writing a summary of the trip which would be distributed to all those interested.[2]

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Contractual Agreements, the OEEC talks, immigration legislation, and General Juin's pending visit to Korea to observe U.S. training of Korean troops.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

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**Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file**

*Memorandum of Discussion at the 131st Meeting of the National Security Council on Wednesday, February 11, 1953*

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY WASHINGTON, February 12, 1953.

Present at the 131st meeting of the Council were The President of the United States, presiding, The Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters, the Military

Liaison Officer, the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

[Here follows a general discussion of world developments affecting United States security and United States policy toward the Korean war negotiations.]

3. *The European situation*

Secretary Dulles described briefly his visits to the various capitals of Western Europe, during which trip he had emphasized the importance of our knowing the intentions of the several governments as to ratification of the EDC treaties. He felt that on the whole his and Mr. Stassen's trip had at least taken this project out of mothballs. It has come alive again and there is at least a good chance that some of these countries will now initiate steps to secure ratification. Prime Minister De Gasperi will certainly try, while Churchill was unenthusiastic; Eden was strong for the experiment, and the British Government had stated its willingness to put its power behind ratification. Chancellor Adenauer was a strong believer in the whole idea and thought he could find ways and means of moving toward ratification. The Benelux countries will also take stronger initiatives. The French situation was the most difficult, but there was always a chance there too. Mayer and Pleven intend to do their best to get the treaty through, but they are skating on very thin parliamentary ice. Neither the French nor Adenauer were at all hospitable, continued Secretary Dulles, to the alternative course of German membership in NATO and a German national army. In conclusion, Secretary Dulles guessed that the odds were now about 60–40 that the EDC treaties would be ratified. This was a marked improvement over the situation a few weeks ago.

The President stated with great warmth that we must, here in Washington and in this country, do everything to help and encourage the European statesmen who are attempting this difficult job. We should sit down—Cabinet members, Senators, Government officials, and everybody—to scan every possibility of American support.

[Here follows a short paragraph not declassified by the NSC Staff at the time this volume was published.]

Mr. Stassen discussed very succinctly the half dozen major problems regarding the European economic situation and American aid. He stressed the fact that the French were now seriously over-extended and in grave economic difficulties. This he pointed up by comparison with statistics on other countries in the European payments union. Mr. Stassen then turned to the problem of end-item military supplies to NATO countries. He said that he had a list of such items which were in critically short supply, including tanks, Howitzers and all other

guns, and all kinds of ammunition. The 105-mm. and 155-mm. Howitzers were in the very worst case; in fact, not one such Howitzer had been made in this country, continued Mr. Stassen, since the end of the second World War. This was a situation which certainly required immediate action.

The National Security Council:

Discussed the subject in the light of an oral report by the Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security, based upon their trip to Europe.

[Here follows a discussion of the use of radio as a medium for psychological operations, Korean payments for United States forces, and basic national security policies.]

S. EVERETT GLEASON
*Deputy Executive Secretary*

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110.11 DU/2–1353

*Memorandum by Douglas MacArthur II of the Office of the Regional Planning Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs, to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)*[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 13, 1953.

As a matter of record, I would like to bring you up to date regarding General DeGaulle's overtures to Secretary Dulles. You will recall that Gaullist Terrenoire originally approached our Paris Embassy indicating DeGaulle wanted to see Secretary Dulles when the latter was in Paris.[2] I sent a message to Paris saying that the very tight schedule would not permit such a meeting.[3] While we were en route from Washington to Rome, Secretary Dulles reopened the question with me. He said that he would be willing to see DeGaulle if Prime Minister Rene Mayer thought it would be useful. Accordingly, I sent a telegram to Paris Embassy from Rome and Jimmy Dunn took it up with Rene Mayer.[4] Rene Mayer, much to our surprise, said that if DeGaulle wished to call on the Secretary, he not only saw no objection to it but thought some good might come out of it since the Secretary could set forth the US position with respect to the EDC.

The Paris Embassy got in touch with Palewski[5] and told him that the Secretary would be willing to see General DeGaulle the evening of

[1] Copies were sent to Knight and McBride.
[2] The Department of State was informed of De Gaulle's request for an interview in telegram 4084 from Paris, Jan. 22, not printed. (110.11 DU/1–2253)
[3] A handwritten notation in the margin of telegram 4084 from Paris (see footnote 2 above) read as follows: "Jan. 22, 1953—Achilles advised by phone that schedule would not permit meeting. D[ouglas] MacA[rthur]"
[4] The editors have been unable to identify this telegram further.
[5] Matthew Looram summarized his conversation with Gaston Palewski in a memorandum dated Feb. 2, not printed. (110.11 DU/2–253)

Monday, February 2nd if the General wished to call. Palewski said the General was in the country but he would be glad to come to Paris that evening. However, he was recovering from an eye operation and it would be a long trip up from the country; therefore he asked if it would not be possible for the Secretary to call on General DeGaulle at his quarters in the Hotel La Perouse. He said that it was bad for DeGaulle's eye to travel around in the night air! He added that there was no protocol involved since DeGaulle was a former President!

On our instructions Palewski was informed that the Secretary's schedule was so tight that it would be impossible for him to call on DeGaulle that evening, but if DeGaulle wished to see the Secretary we would endeavor to arrange it so that he could come to the residence Tuesday after our morning meetings were concluded.

It was left that if DeGaulle cared to come to Paris the following morning, we would endeavor to complete these plans. However the final upshot of all this was that DeGaulle was unwilling to call on the Secretary but wished to see him only if the Secretary would call upon him.[6]

I attach some memos [7] prepared by Mr. Looram of the Paris Embassy staff as of possible interest. My only comment is that DeGaulle has not changed one bit.[8]

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[6] Looram summarized Palewski's telephone conversation during which Palewski informed the Embassy of De Gaulle's decision not to come to Paris in a memorandum dated Feb. 3, not printed. (110.11 DU/2–353)

[7] For information concerning the two memoranda by Looram under reference here, see footnotes 5 and 6 above.

[8] Bonbright wrote in the margin of the source text at this point: "And he never will."

## D. TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS AT WASHINGTON, JULY 10–14, 1953

### 1. PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETINGS

396.1 WA/6–2753 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY NIACT WASHINGTON, June 27, 1953—12:47 p. m.

6228. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. In informing Pres necessity postponement Bermuda [2] Churchill has suggested Salisbury

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Secretary Dulles, was repeated to London.

[2] Regarding the postponement of the Bermuda Conference due to Prime Minister Churchill's illness, see the editorial note, p. 1710.

come to Wash near future, a suggestion which I welcome, as affording opportunity quietly comprehensive review UK–US problems. We obviously wish avoid giving French impression we are taking advantage Bermuda postponement to engage in bilateral talks with British to exclusion of French. Accordingly, please deliver following message from me to the Foreign Minister:

"As Pres Eisenhower indicated in letter of sympathy to Churchill,[3] we regret that Churchill's indisposition has led to a postponement of contemplated tripartite meeting. Churchill has suggested that Lord Salisbury who will assist him on foreign affairs come to Wash in about two weeks. Naturally, we accept this suggestion. There are some matters of purely bilateral concern which we can usefully discuss. We would not, of course, deal with matters of tripartite concern, of which perhaps the most important is the possibility of a four-power conference. We would expect that any decision on this matter would be reached only after the full exchange of views between the three Western powers."

DULLES

[3] For the text of this letter, dated June 27, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 459–460 or the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 13, 1953, p. 49.

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396.1 WA/6–2853: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, June 28, 1953—noon.

6669. For the Secretary. Reference Deptel 6228.[2] Your message delivered through De Margerie who was sure Bidault would much appreciate it. De Margerie stated that although Foreign Office was distressed at reason for postponement it was greatly relieved by fact of postponement. He expressed gratification that Salisbury would be in charge of Foreign Office and no concern at idea of his going to Washington, saying he understands Salisbury's views are much closer to French and ours than Churchill's. He had impression, which after talking to Aldrich we share, that it was not question merely of postponing Bermuda meeting by approximately month, but rather that Churchill's condition was such that no timing for meeting could be estimated, even tentatively. With reference to last sentence of your message he wondered what means we envisaged for "full exchange of views" between three Western powers. He felt such exchange in less spectacular form than Bermuda meeting would be most useful.

DILLON

[1] Repeated to London.
[2] *Supra.*

396.1 WA/6–3053 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Secretary of State*[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, June 30, 1953—1 p. m.

6691. For Secretary from Ambassador. I saw Bidault this morning re Department telegram 6234.[2] Bidault personally and rest of French Government are quite annoyed by the way the arrangements for the meeting have been handled in the press. They are particularly annoyed at Butler's statement in the Commons on Monday[3] which occurred before the French had received any official notification of the possibility of a three power conference. They also are not happy over Hagerty's announcement which stated that no reply had been received from the French, and which gave the implication that they were slow to act when, as a matter of fact, they had not as yet received any formal invitation.

Bonnet reported the results of his informal conversation with you at luncheon on the 28th and stated that in due course a formal invitation would be forthcoming through me which would indicate dates, et cetera.

Deptel 6234 received here last evening, and contents communicated to Bidault informally about midnight after checking with Merchant to make sure Butler announcement had not changed plans.

With this as background, Bidault stated that Foreign Office, including himself, were very much adverse to the idea of British-American bipartite talks preceding tripartite meeting. They feel that this would give appearance that French only being invited in to sign on the dotted line after decisions had been taken by US and British acting alone. They would much prefer to have French and British delegations arrive Washington at same time. They do not care how the schedule is then arranged and would have no objection to bilateral talks taking place first with the British and then with themselves, provided it was clear to the public that they were in on the ground floor of the meetings.

Any date will suit them except the seventeenth. Reason for aversion to the seventeenth is that this date has been announced by all the papers as the prospective date for the meeting. Specifically, they would be prepared to arrive on July 10.

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[1] Repeated to London.

[2] Not printed; it reported that Dulles had lunched with Ambassador Bonnet on June 28 and had suggested that Bidault might arrive in Washington for the last two days of Lord Salisbury's visit. Ambassador Dillon was instructed to discuss this with Bidault as supplementary to the message in telegram 6228, June 27, p. 1582. (396.1 WA/6–2953)

[3] On June 29, Butler, presiding over the Cabinet in the absence of Churchill and Eden, announced in the House of Commons that the British would be attending a Foreign Ministers meeting in Washington in July in lieu of the Bermuda Conference.

Suggest you ask Merchant to telephone us your decision so we can advise Bidault soonest.

British Embassy has heard nothing whatever from London except through press.

DILLON

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033.4111/6–3053 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn* [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 30, 1953—6: 23 p. m.

5673. Bonn personal for Conant.

(1) Although Bermuda postponed, Lord Salisbury and Bidault are expected in Washington on July 10, which will give opportunity for bilateral and trilateral talks at Foreign Minister level on subjects previously scheduled for Bermuda. Germany certain to be important subject for discussion, both within context of possible quadripartite talks with Soviets and in view recent developments in Germany which may decisively affect Adenauer's position (urtels 5485 and 5486 [2]).

(2) In talks with Salisbury and Bidault, Department will take position that it is out of question to plan for quadripartite talks with Soviets unless firm tripartite agreement reached in advance re (*a*) scope of conference, (*b*) substantive positions to be taken by three West powers in such conference, and (*c*) timing calculated to minimize risks connected with Ger elections and legislative action on EDC during September–October period.

(3) Re scope of quadripartite conference, we should propose to restrict agenda to European questions and endeavor obtain acceptance our view that Far Eastern issues and disarmament better handled through other available diplomatic mechanisms. In conference with Soviets on European issues we would take position that first question for discussion and prompt settlement is Austria, after which other matters, such as Germany, might be discussed. Desirable also to include in agenda, possibly in relation to proposals free elections in unified Germany, question of free elections and independent governments in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe.

(4) Re substantive position on Germany, we have under consideration proposing to British and French desirability of three powers reaching agreement on Declaration of Intent respecting Germany, which could be used in connection with subsequent four-power talks

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Kidd (GPA) and cleared by Secretary Dulles, MacArthur, Bowie, and Merchant, was repeated to London and Paris, personal for the Ambassadors, and to Moscow, eyes only for Bohlen.

[2] Telegram 5485, not printed, transmitted extracts from various German papers concerning the question of German reunification. (762A.00/6–2653) Telegram 5486 transmitted the text of telegram 1881 from Berlin, which reported on events in the Soviet Zone of Germany, June 16–18; telegram 1881 is printed in volume VII.

and would embody West principles for German settlement and peace treaty contrasting favorably with Soviet draft of March 1952.[3] Although unlikely reach tripartite agreement in limited time of Washington talks, it may lay groundwork on which to work during succeeding weeks. We would not of course anticipate any announcement on this prior to further consultations with Federal Republic.

(5) We would like you to consult informally with Adenauer to obtain his views. Foregoing summary of tentative US position should be put forward as your own personal thoughts as may be required to develop Adenauer's comments on following points:

(*a*) In view of election, possible effects on EDC ratifications, and in light of recent events in Germany, is it in Chancellor's opinion desirable from Ger point of view to undertake quadripartite discussions with Soviets? If so, what would be best date, and at what level?

(*b*) If Chancellor recommends quadripartite talks, or if force of British and French desire for talks and support of world opinion make it questionable whether four-power meeting can be avoided, is it desirable for West to take initiative first in proposing meeting with Soviets, and secondly in raising Ger question before or at such meeting?

(*c*) In Chancellor's opinion what should any Allied proposal on Ger attempt to cover? Should it be limited to five points Bundestag resolution, eight points Chancellor's letter to President,[4] or cover complete Ger peace settlement and unification, which would necessarily include additional points such as termination occupation, economic provisions, return of PW's, membership in UN. In this connection, has Adenauer made eight points known to British and French? If so, what was their reaction?

(6) Developments in Ger arising out of events June 17 introduce new factor of which we wish to take due account. In light urtel 5485, Chancellor's views should be supplemented by your independent judgment re adequacy of his estimate of situation. Specifically from point of view of German attitudes, do you believe it will be necessary, desirable, or important for us to initiate or accept four-power meeting in near future, and if so should we make every effort to do so this summer or wait until after Bundestag elections? Would another tripartite note restricted like September 23, 1952 note[5] to free elections theme be feasible substitute for Conference? Meanwhile do you believe interim tactics outlined Deptel 5625 [*5626*][6] will be sufficient to meet Ger requirements, particularly in view Bermuda postponement?

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[3] Documentation relating to the Soviet note, dated Mar. 10, 1952, which enclosed a draft peace treaty with Germany, is presented in volume VII.

[4] Documentation relating to the five point resolution adopted unanimously by the Bundestag on June 10 and Chancellor Adenauer's eight point memorandum to President Eisenhower, dated May 29, both dealing with the question of the reunification of Germany, is presented *ibid.*

[5] Documentation on the tripartite note, Sept. 23, 1952, in which the Western Powers stated that free elections were the prerequisite for the formation of an all-German Government and the negotiation of a peace treaty with Germany, is presented *ibid.*

[6] This telegram, dated June 25, is printed *ibid*, chapter III.

(7) In connection with para 5(*b*), if firm tripartite agreement could be reached on subject of Ger, West could state their position either in note to Sovs or in four-power talks. As an alternative method of raising Ger question, we have also considered possibility of Chancellor's addressing identical notes to four powers stating conditions of feasibile Ger settlement which three West powers could endorse, and which likely to expose insincerity of Sov proposals for unification and peace treaty. In order to stand up to possible Sov proposals like those of March 1952, Ger points would need a little more flesh than five points of Bundestag resolution, while sufficiently pliable to permit development of tripartite accord. If Gers rather than Big Three put forward proposals which West could endorse, we could not be primarily blamed for blocking reunification if Sovs refuse them. We do not wish you to discuss this Point 7 with Adenauer, but desire your comments.

DULLES

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396.1/7–253 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BONN, July 2, 1953—9 p. m.

53. Eyes only for Secretary and Riddleberger. Explored with Chancellor informally points raised by your telegram 5673,[1] paragraph 5. Chancellor is strongly opposed to quadripartite discussions at any level during month of August and is opposed to such discussions at any time unless there is reasonable certainty that they will have positive results. He would not consider it acceptable result if conference merely provided another demonstration of Soviet unwillingness to come to genuine solution of European or German problem. He was fearful that any four-power discussions, unless there was reasonable assurance of success, would merely provide a propaganda platform for Russians and lead to never-ending talks.

Answering 5(*b*), Chancellor believes initiative should be seized now by three-powers by issuing as soon as possible, after Washington conference, strong note to Soviets sharply protesting tyrannical procedures of government in East Zone pointing out that their authority in East Zone derived from four-power agreements and original arrangement of dividing Germany into four zones did not contemplate turning over any zone to such dictatorial and oppressive government. He felt psychological value of this note would be very great in Germany and in satellite countries. Conversely, if West showed no reaction to East Zone event, psychological repercussions in East Germany and satellites would be very bad. He hopes that in same note a renewed protest about prisoners of war held in Russia would be included.

[1] *Supra.*

As second part of initiative, Chancellor suggests three-powers should renew their offer of September 1952 to Soviets to take steps towards reunification on basis of five points of Bundestag resolution June 10 but feels conditions of free elections should be spelled out in detail somewhat along lines of six demands of Chancellor in Bundestag debate yesterday supplemented by some international mechanism for supervision of elections.[2] He pointed out such proposal would undoubtedly evoke counterproposal from Soviets and this would ensure discussion of this matter by note exchange beyond date of September elections.[3] If bare five point Bundestag resolution was presented, Soviets might immediately come back asking for prompt four-power conference to discuss free elections, a conference which should be avoided at this stage.

In connection with this discussion, I asked Chancellor about relation of eighth point in his letter to President to fifth point in the Bundestag resolution.[4] Inconclusive discussion followed. Chancellor's view is that Article 7, section 3 of general treaty[5] confines future all-German Government to alternatives of accepting EDC or remaining in occupation status. Latter alternative he considers out of question. He feels that an all-German Government will not be free to have a national army and make an alliance with Russia, for example. When I pointed out this was not what was said by Bundestag in point 5, which speaks of "complete freedom of alliance for the new German Government" he replied Bundestag resolution was not to be read too literally. I feel sure, however, that his opposition would challenge any statement by three-powers which spelled out what Chancellor feels is limitation on an all-German Government. This difficulty seems to me to present serious obstacle to full utilization of Bundestag resolution as basis for proposal. Chancellor stated that he had made the eight points known to British but not French.

While Chancellor is strongly opposed to actual meeting of four HICOMers he would be glad to see AHC take initiative by making proposals to Semenov about specific issues followed by meeting between any one Commissioner and Semenov. But he and his staffs fear of any restoration of Allied Control Council is very great. In particular, he suggested that if funds available Allied HICOMers might propose to Semenov shipping of food to Protestant and Catholic

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[2] For the text of these six demands concerning free elections, see *Papers and Documents*, pp. 122–123.

[3] General elections in the Federal Republic were scheduled for Sept. 6.

[4] The eighth point of Adenauer's memorandum stated that the EDC Treaty would limit the armed forces of the Federal Republic and, hence, safeguard its neighbors. Point five of the Bundestag resolution stated that an all-German Government should have freedom of action consistent with the principles of the United Nations. (*Papers and Documents*, pp. 117–118)

[5] The text of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, is printed in volume VII.

churches in East Zone for distribution. This he considered would have great propaganda value. He believes distribution through churches would ensure food going to the people without further inspection safeguards. This differs from proposal presented by Economic Ministry (reference our telegram 52 to Department 02 July 1953 [6]) in that it would be quite open and not secret shipment of food packages. I raised a fear expressed here earlier namely that any public offer might lead Soviets to cut off present supply of private packages from West Germany. Chancellor answered by saying that situation in East Zone so desperate that Soviets would not dare to do this.

Chancellor raised again war crimes issue and I told him that I hoped we could have an answer before end of July at latest. This he considers of great importance. He expressed grave doubts British and French would go along. He further urges that we consider other steps toward normalization of relations between three Allied powers and Federal Republic before contractuals come into effect. To this end, he suggested that each HICOMer appoint a member to a committee of four to which he would name one German, this committee to consider what further steps might be taken toward normalization of relations. Such measures as our recent decision in regard to courts in US Zone could then be effected on three zonal basis. He implied that announcement of appointment of such a special committee or commission operating under AHC would have great political advantage in coming weeks and would not have to report before elections. He said optical effect would be very favorable.

Chancellor is optimistic about French situation because of composition of new Cabinet. He hopes and believes that French ratification possible during this year if sufficient pressure applied at Washington conference. In this connection, may I urge that a re-statement after Washington of adherence to EDC treaty would be of greatest value here, particularly if French could give some indication that matter would not be postponed, as recent Paris telegrams indicate, until calendar year 1954.

Chancellor's view of situation in East Zone and satellites is that economic situation will continue to deteriorate and that we must not overestimate internal economic strength of Russians. He thinks desperate economic situation forces Russia to restore economic trade with free world. Chancellor seems to believe that they would accept something along lines of five-point Bundestag resolution as basis for reunification of Germany and that no concessions are needed in order to get them to accept this proposal. With this extreme optimistic view neither I nor staff here are in accord, though we agree situation in East Zone will be increasingly difficult for Russians. Referring your

[6] Printed in volume VII.

paragraph 6, my independent judgment regarding situation here in Germany follows soonest.[7]

Chancellor will go on much needed two week vacation Monday morning. Do not plan to see him again unless very urgent. He can be reached by secure telephone, he maintains, next week.

CONANT

[7] Telegram 89 from Bonn, July 6, p. 1591.

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396.1 WA/7–353 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 3, 1953—6 : 19 p. m.

83. We have combined UK and French suggestions for subjects for discussion tripartite meeting [2] and this morning handed Ambassadors here for comment suggested list subjects as follows:

1. Europe:

   *a.* Evolution of Soviet policy and situation in satellite countries;

   *b.* European policy and German problems.

2. Far East:

   *a.* Korea and questions relating to Communist China;

   *b.* Indochina.

French had suggested "Common Policy with Regard to Middle East" as item for tripartite discussion but we informed them we would prefer discuss this bilaterally if Bidault agreed (UK did not suggest this item for tripartites and Makins told us privately he did not believe UK would have much to say in tripartites on this.) Later today Bonnet informed us Bidault desires Middle East retained on tripartite agenda. We have concurred and have added item 3, "Near East Questions", subject UK concurrence. Makins informed.

French suggestion re item 1 *b* was "German problem, European policy and consequences notably on military plans of envisaged solutions". Revised wording above intended be sufficiently broad to allow Bidault present views any way he desires; however, Bonnet vague on

[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Galloway and cleared in substance by Knight and Hamilton, was also sent to Paris.

[2] On July 1, MacArthur had discussed with Sir Roger Makins the composition of the British Delegation and the agenda for the upcoming meetings. The British Ambassador had suggested a two-part agenda for the trilateral talks: (1) Europe, including the Soviet Union, Germany, and European organizations, and (2) the Far East and Southeast Asia, including Korea and Indochina. For the bilateral talks with the British, Makins had only one suggestion and that was Egypt. A memorandum of MacArthur's conversation with Makins is in file 396.1 WA/7–153. Presumably a similar conversation took place with a representative from the French Embassy, but no record of it has been found in the Department of State files.

just what FonOff had in mind re European policy, etc. Would appreciate any light Embassy Paris may be able shed this and other items.[3]

We told British and French Ambassadors we expected Austria to be touched on briefly in context European policy and hoped have some reference Austria in communiqué. Also we indicated Secretary would wish raise in context German problems specific question war criminals.

Tentative schedule for meetings envisages tripartite afternoon July 10, morning July 11, afternoon July 13, and afternoon July 14; and bilaterals afternoon July 11, afternoon July 12, morning July 13, morning July 14. Makins put in bid for UK bilateral afternoon July 11 and Bonnet is inquiring if French bilateral July 12 satisfactory. Owing Bastille Day reception French Embassy morning July 14, we suggested French bilateral July 13 and UK bilateral July 14, which both Ambassadors thought acceptable. (Re bilaterals, UK suggested only Egypt and we added Buraimi.)

(So far, Indochina only subject we sure French wish discuss bilaterally.)

SMITH

[3] In telegram 59 from Paris, July 4, Ambassador Dillon reported that the French wanted to be able to discuss under this item the possible repercussions on the Western European situation and the satellites if German reunification came suddenly. (396.1 WA/7–453)

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396.1 WA/7–653 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BONN, July 6, 1953—3 p. m.

89. For the Secretary and Riddleberger. My personal estimate of adequacy of Adenauer's analysis reported in our telegram 53 of July 2.[1] (See Deptel 5673 [2]) In answer to questions put to paragraph 6 of Deptel 5673, my opinion is that it would be inadvisable to hold a Four-Power conference prior to German elections. A declaration and broad statement of policy by three Foreign Ministers at conclusion of Washington Conference along lines indicated in following paragraphs would be preferable to another tripartite note. Additional tactics supplementary to those outlined in Deptel 5625 [*5626*] [3] are suggested below.

In light of my recent conversation with Adenauer and political temper here, I believe it might be helpful to set forth my personal ideas as to effective results, from point of view of German considerations, which might come out of Washington conference. I should welcome

[1] *Ante*, p. 1587.
[2] Dated June 30, p. 1585.
[3] Dated June 25; for text, see volume VII, chapter III.

declaration or series of declarations at the end of conference along following lines.

(1) A reaffirmation of principles of EDC forcefully stated by three Foreign Ministers. Such a statement would be most valuable if it contained an assurance on part of French that EDC ratification would be made first order of business when French National Assembly reconvenes in fall. Such an assurance would help to counteract most effective arguments of German opponents of Chancellor who are claiming with more and more telling effect that the keystone of Adenauer foreign policy will never be set in place because French will never ratify EDC.

(2) A broad statement of policy by three Foreign Ministers on Germany. This should commence with protest against oppressive tyranny imposed by force in East Zone, which was revealed to world by uprisings of June 17–18. It should demand the immediate termination of these intolerable conditions. Declaration might follow suggestions of Chancellor (see our reference telegram) by declaring that division of Germany into four zones assumed development of free and democratic government in each zone not the creation of dictatorial and brutal government.

Declaration should then deal with subject of German unity. It should reaffirm strong support by Allied Powers of German unity and should take as its point of departure five-point Bundestag resolutions of June 10, as follows:

(I) Holding of free elections in all of Germany;
(II) Formation of a free government for all of Germany;
(III) Peace treaty freely negotiated with this government;
(IV) Settlement of all outstanding boundary questions in this peace treaty;
(V) An all-German Parliament and an all-German government must have right of freedom of action within framework of principles and aims of United Nations.

Declaration should not develop in any detail position of Three Governments upon later [*latter*?] points of resolution and in particular should avoid at this time discussion of thorny problem contained in fifth point. Declaration should, of course, emphasize that June 10 resolution was adopted unanimously by Bundestag with exception of KPD deputies. This Bundestag resolution is clear statement of what majority of Germans consider to be minimum conditions acceptable for German reunification. Declaration should then state that obviously no free elections could take place as long as present conditions continue in East Zone. Following four steps must be taken:

(*a*) Opening of all zonal border crossing points and restoration of free circulation in Berlin and in all of Germany.
(*b*) Elimination of "dead zone" along borders.
(*c*) Freedom of press, assembly and activity by all political parties.
(*d*) Restoration of democratic laws for protection of human beings against arbitrary acts and terror. When these measures have been carried out, Three Powers will direct their HICOMers to meet with Soviet HICOMer to plan for all-German elections.

This declaration would put Kremlin squarely on spot by requiring it either to discredit itself by refusing to accept this offer or to make sweeping political concessions in East Zone which would seriously compromise Soviet control throughout the satellites.

Secondly, conditions could not be met in time to require a meeting of four HICOMers prior to German elections. Since any Four-Power conference prior to German elections seems inadvisable from viewpoint of our interests in Germany and since silence and inaction on part of Allies on basic issue of German unity would place both Allies and coalition in indefensible position in eyes of German and European public, I believe proposal outlined above is best line of action open to us.

It seems to me above is preferable to proposal of Chancellor for an exchange of notes for two reasons.

(1) Because of the long and inconclusive battle of notes last year,[4] German public has become especially cynical about this procedure.

(2) Chancellor's thought that conference could be delayed by note exchange might cause an unfavorable reaction by reminding German public of notes of last year.

In my opinion if line of action suggested above is followed in conjunction with steps suggested in our telegrams 86 of July 3 and 84 of July 3,[5] some of efficacy of SPD attacks on Chancellor's foreign policy could be neutralized. At this time, it is important to emphasize cordial relations between German Government and West Allies so that former appears to be effectively representing German views and interests with Allies who can be counted upon to defend them.

Referring to Chancellor's recommendation special committee to work toward normalization relations between contractuals, I endorse his suggestion but doubt willingness of French and British to go along.

It is general opinion here in HICOG, which I share, that if elections were held tomorrow coalition would be returned to power. Greatest danger to my mind is that Soviets may make an offer on German unity which would be a golden apple of discord. This danger may be just over the horizon and urgent action by us is required. Another danger is that failure of Allies to seize the initiative may be used effectively by SPD against Allies and Chancellor as supporting Allies' policy. This point goes beyond election. Believe events in East Zone put us in position to lead from strength and we should move boldly and rapidly.

CONANT

[4] Documentation on the eight notes exchanged between the three Western Powers and the Soviet Union in 1952 is presented in volume VII.

[5] Neither printed; the former discussed the quantity and type of food being considered for aid to the Soviet Zone of Germany, while the latter discussed possible action which could be taken on a variety of access and communication problems in Berlin. (862B.49/7–353 and 762.0221/7–353)

396.1 WA/7–653 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BONN, July 6, 1953—3 p. m.

90. For the Secretary and Riddleberger. In connection with recommendations made in our telegram (89, July 6, 3 p. m.[1]) that at conclusion of Washington conference three Foreign Ministers should issue joint statement on German unity which would take as a point of departure five point Bundestag resolution of June 10, I wish to add certain additional comments. I believe that in following this line of action we must be prepared to face squarely at a later date issue of freedom of alliance for a future all-German government which is demand made in fifth point of resolution. Although many will feel there is some danger in release of an all—German government from controls of occupation unless she is contractually obligated in advance to enter an integrated European defense system, under present circumstances this seems to me a calculated risk which we must take. This risk seems remote as before any discussion with an all—German Government will be possible, EDC will have been ratified or other developments involving relations of Allies and Federal Republic will have taken place. Failure to do so would place us in weak position vis-à-vis Russians because it would be public evidence of a lack of faith in Germany and because it is hard to imagine this point not coming up at a later date in public discussion in such a way that Allies would be required to take a stand on it. In my opinion, majority of Germans fear USSR sufficiently strong so that they would recoil from prospect of being left alone on borders of Soviet world; if given free choice they would opt for joining western defense system rather than surrender their right to freedom of alliance and be faced with immediate withdrawal of western defense forces before creation of an adequate German military establishment. However, in order to dispel wishful thinking which exists in many German minds that US would guarantee a neutralized Germany, i.e., that they can have the best of both worlds, there might be value in statement by a high American official that US would not surrender its freedom of action by guaranteeing in advance that it would defend a neutralized Germany from attack. Such a statement involves high military strategy and its advisability might be overruled by other considerations but it might be effective in undermining position of German neutralists.

CONANT

[1] *Supra.*

396.1 WA/7–753 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET LONDON, July 7, 1953—5 p. m.

100. Following is our best judgment British position on topics likely to be discussed in Washington. We limit ourselves to attempting to convey British atmosphere, preoccupations, and reasoning. We make no attempt in this telegram to assess their validity.

1. *Western unity*

British view with concern signs of slackening in Western unity, including growing evidence of priority in Western German thinking to reunification over Western integration, French balkiness over EDC as evidenced most recently by Socialist insistence on impossible US guarantees, new doubts of Italian ratification, growth of neutralism and wishful thinking as to Soviet policy, and cutback of defense effort in all Western powers. They hope that the strongest possible reaffirmation of Western unity and purpose can come out of Washington meetings.

2. *NATO*

British consider NATO cornerstone of Western policy and essential to Western security. They want the strongest possible reaffirmation of continued Western adherence to this concept and Western determination to continue building on this foundation to come out of Washington conference. They have been concerned by implications Senator Taft's recent remarks about termination of military aid [2] which seem to raise question as to US determination to stick by NATO and particularly raise doubts as to implementation Article 3 of NATO treaty. It is quite possible that Salisbury will mention these misgivings in Washington.

3. *EDC*

British are all-out in their determination that EDC must be brought into force. They are prepared to join US in confronting French with basic realities of their position, namely, that it will be impossible to maintain *status quo* in Germany much longer, that US and UK will not lend themselves to any French effort to keep Germany divided and under occupation, and that only alternative to a Germany rearmed under EDC is a Germany rearmed independently and subject to weaker

[1] This telegram, which was transmitted in three sections, was repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

[2] In a press interview on July 4, Senator Taft had stated that he believed Congress was through with foreign aid unless there was a big change in the world. Regarding Taft's remarks on foreign aid, see the *New York Times*, July 5, 1953, p. 1.

ties with West and less satisfactory safeguards against remilitarization and possible deal with Soviets. We believe that British would be prepared to join US in a strong attempt to pin French down to firm timetable. They are not prepared to consider alternatives to EDC until US and UK have exhausted every possibility of getting French ratification. They are not prepared to accede to possible French insistence on four-power talks prior to ratification. They are not yet prepared to admit that EDC is unattainable.

4. *Four-power talks*

Salisbury will confine himself in Washington to trying to keep door open for possibility four-power "fishing expedition" talks along lines Churchill's proposal May 11.[3] Whether British will press Churchill's proposal when and if a "Bermuda meeting" is held, will depend on situation at that time. But this should not be interpreted as willingness to let Churchill proposal die of neglect. They feel very strongly that if at any time Western powers have to make any hard decisions, such as facing up to possibility of war, or even continued heavy burden of armaments, there is very great danger that we may not be able to bring public opinion along with us unless Soviet intentions have been thoroughly tested. As indicated below, they do not think that Soviet strategy has changed or that Kremlin is prepared to yield anything of substance. They therefore believe that four-power talks will end in failure and they regard this as their chief merit and as essential to consolidating Western public opinion behind maintenance of policy of strength and firmness toward Soviet Union. The only exception to this is the lingering belief of P.M. that contact at highest level with his personal participation might produce some easing of tension and progress toward better relationship with USSR. Churchill speech clearly caught temper of public opinion in Britain and Western Europe and the events in East Berlin, the changes in Hungary,[4] the new moderation in Soviet domestic policy, and the prospects of truce in Korea have all fed the public mood of wishful thinking which in British view makes it essential that in the not-too-distant future the Kremlin be put to the test of four-power talks. Failing such a demonstration they fear that neutralism and infirmity of purpose will grow in the West with consequences that could ultimately be disastrous. But as to timing, they are definite that German elections and French ratification EDC must come first.

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[3] For the text of Prime Minister Churchill's speech to the House of Commons on May 11, see *H.C. Debs.*, 5th series, vol. 515, cols. 883–898.

[4] Presumably this is a reference to the election of a new politburo of the Central Committee of the Workers Party in Hungary at the end of June and to the formation of a new government under Imre Nagy on July 4. Further documentation on these developments is presented in volume VIII.

5. *Germany*

One of principal British objectives at Washington will be to (*a*) "confirm and reaffirm publicly our existing policies toward Germany" and (*b*) "continue our support of Adenauer in pursuit of those policies." British think it likely Adenauer will be in power another four years as result of elections, though coalition may be oriented more to right if, as they foresee, he has to take in refugee party.

6. *Korea*

On assumption that there will be an armistice, British will urge that India be included in "special status" in political conference to follow, because of India's importance as Asian nation and its contribution to bringing about armistice. British assume some sort of *de facto* temporary division of Korea must be accepted, without sacrificing UN's declared objective of unification by peaceful means. They would not exclude consideration of other Far Eastern issues at such conference provided Communists show good will and desire to reach reasonable compromise on problems relating to Korea. They think that West must give Chinese Communists some hope of eventual admission to UN. If political conference is successful they anticipate that trade with China would be put on same level as trade with USSR and they think we should be ready, acting in close consultation, to make some trade concessions to Chinese Communists in return for concessions from them in other fields. British do not wish to commit selves indefinitely to present level of controls. They agree that Formosa must be kept out of Chinese Communist hands and cannot be used as bargaining counter. They expect French to insist on putting Indochina on agenda of political conference. If an armistice has not been reached by time they get to Washington they will probably press for convocation of General Assembly.

7. *Indochina*

British will express pessimistic view of military and political situation in Indochina which they think can only result in further deterioration and perhaps disaster if allowed to drift much longer. While conscious of their minor role and of limited assistance they can give, they will urge need for more aggressive military action concurrent with concrete proof French readiness concede widest autonomy within French Union. They think recent offer of new French Government [5] has probably come too late, and that it does not go far enough; it will certainly not satisfy Cambodia, and in fact it merely is an offer to negotiate full implementation of something promised over 4 years

[5] On July 3, the French offered to begin simultaneous but separate negotiations with the three Associated States for a review of their status within the French Union. Documentation on the situation in Indochina is presented in volume XIII.

ago (March 8, 1949 agreements). They will probably follow our lead in any representations to French along these lines. They hope O'Daniel's recommendations will have been received in time for consideration at conference.[6]

8. *Egypt*

British are likely to maintain that no agreement possible with Egypt unless United States and United Kingdom firmly support common line of action. They will undoubtedly press for essentials of Case A[7] as basis of United States–United Kingdom agreement relying on Robertson belief that Case A can be obtained with concessions of form and arguing that it cannot be said that Case A is unobtainable, since British never got to point of putting details to Egyptians during last negotiations, so that we do not know Egyptian reactions. British probably will not agree to take initiative in reopening negotiations, but will probably be willing for United States try to bring parties together provided United States and United Kingdom can agree to common line of action.

In any new negotiations with Egypt, though probably not as initial position, British might be willing make some concessions which would move Case A substantially toward Case B, including:

(1) Agreement valid for 5 years;
(2) 3,000 to 4,000 British technicians;
(3) Technicians under Egyptian command, but subject British technical control;
(4) Certain equipment from base might be available for use of Egyptian army free of charge.

British will probably stand adamant on following points:

(1) Total number British technicians agreed with Egypt must remain on base for duration of agreement, there being no question of their gradual replacement by Egyptians as latter are trained fulfill their functions.
(2) Technicians must be subject to direct technical control by War Office and receive instructions directly.

There will be no objection to simultaneous notification of Egyptian authorities, with provision for consultation if latter question any orders.

(3) Technicians must wear uniforms and be free carry sidearms. (In last analysis British would probably not insist on uniforms.)
(4) Egyptians must guarantee re-access to base in event of war or threat of war by outside power affecting ME areas.

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[6] Documentation relating to the recommendations of Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, head of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam, is presented in volume XIII.

[7] Documentation on the three British proposals for settling the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, Cases A, B, and C, is presented in volume IX.

British will probably also ask for reaffirmation of US undertakings about supply of arms to Egypt. They will undoubtedly make strongest effort to get assurances of a continuing common front toward Egyptians.

9. *Middle East oil policy*

British considering raising subject of ME oil policy. They continue feel strongly that some means must be found to permit US and UK oil companies to consult directly or indirectly regarding proposed solutions to similar problems in ME. They are also anxious establish some medium for regular US–UK Government consultations, both on specific problems relating to ME oil and for purpose developing agreed oil policy for area.

10. *Buraimi* [8]

British are likely make strong plea for US support for complete mutual withdrawal from Buraimi area with neutral supervision during period of arbitration. Alternatively, if Saudis adamant, British might agree to maintenance of *status quo* in area with mutual undertakings refrain from aggressive acts. They are likely strongly to oppose Saudi suggestion for equalization of forces or any other solution which involved Turki's [9] remaining in Buraimi while UK withdrew substantial forces.

11. *Evolution of Soviet policy and situation in satellite countries*

British believe new Soviet tactics do not indicate any change in basic Kremlin objectives, which remain: In short term disruption of Western alliance and promotion revolution in colonial territories, in long run, establishment its brand Communism in Soviet Union and its extension, under Moscow domination, throughout world. They do not believe that new tactics impelled by feeling of weakness, either at home or abroad. New leadership seems plainly collective and although possibility of discord not excluded no evidence yet that it will not maintain unity and control over Soviet and satellite structures. Also seems to be no reason for it to think that it is any more imminently threatened by Western strength than for some time past. Nevertheless, British believe that Soviet has been undergoing period of relative stress, both before and since Stalin's death. New regime assumed power smoothly and without apparent difficulty, but its first concern has been consolidate position at home and with satellite countries. For this, it may wish respite from tension, both at home and abroad, and to obtain this it is trying tactics both more flexible and more cautious than Stalin's. Internally these shown in measures of relative moderation toward Soviet peoples. In external affairs Soviets have now put for-

[8] Documentation on the U.S. interest in the Anglo-Saudi dispute over Buraimi is presented in volume IX.

[9] Turki bin Ataishan, the Amir of Buraimi.

ward considerable number minor conciliatory gestures which, though sacrificing nothing of vital interest, seem designed to try to relax tension.

Furthermore, Soviet may well, and with reason, reckon that more subtle approach in foreign policy will not only be safer but better calculated divide Western Governments and lull people of West into false sense of security. New tactics may be directed to this end.

This presents West both with opportunity and caution. We should overlook no opportunity to meet Soviet conciliatory moves, on chance we may be able reach agreement specific issues. We should avoid any unnecessary provocation. But we must continue improve our united strength. Firmness on part of West over long period of time might make it more difficult for Soviet revert to earlier aggressive tactics and compel them to negotiate on issues of real substance.

British consider that recent disturbances in Eastern Germany and other satellites, and fact that Soviets had to use troops to control uprisings in Germany, have been serious setback to them. They think these events show stronger potential for resistance and of instability in satellite area than previously supposed. They do not however believe that Soviet control is shown to be any less secure. Danger to dictatorship in relaxing grip has been demonstrated but this does not mean "Soviet power crumbling".

British now believe that new Soviet policy of greater moderation in Eastern Germany is primarily tactical maneuver with view to effect on Western Germany and our own efforts integrate German strength into Western alliance. They do not believe that Soviets contemplate any real loosening of hold on Eastern Germany or intend to modify terms for settlement of German problem. In easing pressure on East Germany Soviets may have decided take calculated political risk. As it turned out maneuver got out of hand; their prestige throughout satellites suffered severe blow and they were probably set back in efforts confuse and divide Western Germany. They were faced with dilemma of whether to continue new tactic of moderation or reimpose most severe repression. Their actions thus far seem to indicate that they intend continue measures of economic moderation in Eastern Germany.

Reason for change of government and announcement of concessions to people in Hungary have not yet been appraised by British.

Please have copy available for Ambassador Aldrich when he arrives Washington.[10]

ALDRICH

[10] On July 8, Holmes reported that the positions outlined in paragraphs 1 through 5 and paragraph 11 had been approved by the Cabinet and Prime Minister Churchill, while paragraphs 6 and 7 had at least ministerial approval (telegram 140 from London; 396.1 WA/7–853).

396.1 WA/7–653 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn* [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, July 8, 1953—3 : 47 p. m.

80. Limited distribution. For Conant. For your information, we shall probably submit following draft tripartite declaration for consideration British and French Foreign Ministers this weekend, with view to publication in course of or at conclusion conference if tripartite agreement and Adenauer's approval can be obtained. We believe draft embodies substance views urtel 89,[2] but would appreciate soonest any comments you may care to make. Draft declaration should not be discussed with Adenauer pending further notice from Department.

"The Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France and the United States have considered the problem of German unity, with particular reference to the recent demonstrations in Eastern Germany and their harsh repression by the Soviet authorities. They have consulted with Chancellor Adenauer regarding this matter which is of such vital importance, not only to the people of all Germany, but to the future peace and security of all Europe and the North Atlantic community.

They hereby protest, in the name of their Governments, against the oppression which has been imposed by force in Eastern Germany and East Berlin, and which led to the powerful demonstrations of June 17 and 18. This spontaneous rising of the German people gives living proof of their courage and determination, and of the fact that totalitarian communism cannot extinguish man's basic desire for freedom and liberty. These demonstrations should once and for all give the lie to communist pretensions regarding the degree of popular support which lies behind the regime headed by Wilhelm Pieck, Otto Grotewohl and the SED.

When in 1945, with the defeat of Hitler's armies, Germany was divided into four occupation zones, the Soviet Government, like those of Great Britain, France and the United States, assumed the obligation of developing free democratic processes and restoring those basic human rights and liberties which had been suppressed by the years of Nazi tyranny. Instead, the Soviets have set up a dictatorial regime, the political bankruptcy and popular hatred of which were fully revealed by the events which began on June 17. In the name of the oppressed Germans and the entire free world, the British, French and American Governments call for the immediate termination of the present intolerable conditions and for performance by the Soviet Government, of the obligations it unquestionably incurred as one of the four occupation powers.

The three Western Governments consider it essential to proceed as promptly as possible with the unification of Germany in the only practical way this may be achieved on a representative basis. In this connection they strongly endorse the five-point program adopted by the

[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Kidd and cleared in draft by MacArthur, was repeated niact to Berlin.

[2] Dated July 6, p. 1591.

Bundestag of the Federal Republic on June 10, with the unanimous vote of all political parties represented except the handful of communist deputies. The first and most fundamental of the Bundestag points is that calling for genuinely free elections. It is clear, however, that the unification of Germany cannot be seriously undertaken or free elections be held throughout the country so long as the authorities of Eastern Germany seek to intimidate the workers by police action and Soviet tanks and other existing repressions.

The British, French, and American Governments accordingly invite the Government of the Soviet Union to take the following steps forthwith:

A. The opening of all zonal border crossing points and restoration of free circulation for persons in and throughout Berlin and all of Germany;

B. The elimination of the present 'dead zones' along the borders of the Soviet occupation zone;

C. The establishment of complete freedom of the press, assembly and activity by all political parties; and

D. The restoration and effective application of laws for the protection of human beings against arbitrary acts and terror.

The three Western Governments earnestly hope that these four steps be taken without further delay and stand ready to direct their High Commissioners, as soon as this has been accomplished, to meet with their Soviet counterpart in order to plan for all-German elections. In this manner they are convinced that the goal of a unified democratic Germany, which both they and the German people so ardently desire, may be achieved." [3]

DULLES

[3] On July 9, Conant replied that this draft seemed excellent and he believed it would "have enormously good effect in Germany and particularly in Berlin" (telegram 146 from Bonn; 396.1 WA/7–953).

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396.1 WA/7–953: Telegram

*The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, July 9, 1953—8 p. m.

134. We have noted statement in London's 100 to Department [2] just received by pouch that British would be prepared to join us in strong attempt to pin French down to firm EDC timetable. We have following comment:

We believe it highly unlikely treaty debate can begin in Assembly before January because of (*a*) French insistence on some degree of Saar settlement, which presumably can not be sought before September German elections and which will at best take some time to reach, (*b*) strength of pressure for some specific exploration of Soviet intentions prior to ratification, and (*c*) forthcoming presidential elections

[1] Repeated to London.

[2] Dated July 7, p. 1595.

in December. There could of course be much longer delay. We fully agree as to importance of preventing indefinite procrastination. However, facts cited above plus importance of prior ratification by other governments make it doubtful we could obtain serious French commitment to begin debate before January.

On other hand, we doubt it would be wise to give French satisfaction of accepting at this time impossibility of action before January. It is not completely ruled out for instance that Assembly may be brought to consider treaty after presidential election, but still prior to Christmas recess. Therefore, it may be less desirable to obtain firm timetable commitment, which may not be kept, than to impress French with fact that time is running out and that we consider earliest possible action essential.

British willingness to join in attempt to pin French down is welcome new factor in view of widespread feeling here that United States alone is constantly pressing for ratification. Bidault pleaded before and during April Washington visit [3] for patience from United States. Believe most helpful course would be for British and ourselves to make clear to Bidault that we have long been patient and naturally do not wish to push for debate before he thinks time ripe, if that time is reached within next few months, but that our patience is wearing thin, that developments in Germany and in Soviet strategy are dangerously shortening available time for tying Western Germany into West and that time for major decisions not merely by France, but also by United States and United Kingdom may be nearer than we realize. Occasion might also be taken to urge upon Bidault importance of French Government undertaking aggressive campaign of selling treaty to country well in advance of Assembly debate.

ACHILLES

[3] For a record of a United States-French discussion of EDC ratification at the end of March 1953, see telegram 4992 to Paris, Mar. 26, p. 781. Further documentation on the visit of Prime Minister Mayer and Foreign Minister Bidault to the United States is presented in volume VI.

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Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 157

*Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1953.

Subject: Major Objectives in U.S.–U.K.–French Talks

*Europe*

1. A public statement reaffirming governments' strong support of NATO, EDC and the policy of European integration. (To be referred to in initial remarks and tabled at first meeting.)

2. Private commitment by M. Bidault that the French Government will make ratification of the EDC a priority matter.

3. A public declaration on Germany. (To be referred to in initial remarks and tabled at first meeting.)

[1] The memorandum was drafted by Galloway.

4. Agreement that a four-power meeting should not be held unless three powers are fully agreed on scope of talks and on the substance of allied positions. (U.S. should not raise question of four-power meeting.)

5. Agreement that in any event a four-power meeting must not take place prior to German elections, now scheduled for September 6.

6. In any event, discussions between the Three Powers should be commenced in the immediate future to establish allied positions on German unification in order to be prepared for any Soviet action in this field. (U.S. should propose small delegations or deputies meet for this purpose in two weeks or thereabouts in one of the three capitals.)

7. Agreement on the war criminals issue. (Mixed Board as provided in contractuals.)

8. Reaffirmation of tripartite position on Austria as of break-off of Deputies' talks.

*Far East*

*Korea and Communist China*

9. Agreement that political conference following an armistice in Korea should be limited to Korea.

10. Agreement to maintain existing embargo level on trade with Communist China.

11. Agreement to maintain moratorium on UN membership for Communist China.

*Indochina*

12. Rapid implementation by French of promises embodied in their recent notes to Associated States.

13. Clear statement in tripartite communiqué that French proposals mean independence for Associated States.

14. French agreement to undertake more vigorous military measures involving stepped-up recruitment and training of local forces.

15. French agreement not to make any hasty or rash decisions leading to negotiations with the Communists or withdrawal from Indochina.

*Near East*

*Egypt*

16. Softening of British position on Suez Canal Zone base.

17. Resumption of negotiations with Egypt.

*Buraimi*

18. British agreement to send neutral observer right away; equalization of forces or maintaining *status quo;* early arbitration.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II

396.1 WA/7–953 : Telegram

*The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State* [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, July 9, 1953—5 p. m.

Coled 12. Limited distribution only and Ambassador Dillon.

Understand at yesterday's French Cabinet meeting preceding Bidault's departure Washington accord was reached and Bidault has authority to join in any statement strongly endorsing European integration projects. Therefore very important seize this occasion put French Government on record with British and ourselves in unequivocal terms this regard. Suggest appropriate text to be embodied in communiqué be presented and discussed privately by Secretary with Bidault and Salisbury together or separately.

Matter of Foreign Ministers meeting August 7 at Baden Baden [2] should be specifically referred to in communiqué and assurance of Bidault given that this will not be a *pro forma* affair but participating Foreign Ministers will remain together for whatever period of time is necessary to make fundamental decisions. It is essential from standpoint German elections, as well as for other evident reasons, that vital and continuing interest be shown in European political federation as the final step proposed to organize a prosperous Europe on a peaceful basis.

The present meetings in Washington seem to offer unusual opportunity to stimulate the somewhat enfeebled idea of making [*uniting*?] Europe. The setting of a date for debating EDC by the Netherlands Parliament, the announcement yesterday that the Belgian Parliament will not recess as previously planned but will continue to consider the EDC treaty, and the vigorous and effective reaffirmation by the President of our policy regarding European integration combine to make this a propitious time for the three powers, and especially France, to still the harmful rumors that there is vacillation and division amongst us on this essential point.

Our key objective now must be to do everything reasonable and possible to assist Adenauer's re-election. I have been assured that what I have suggested above would in his opinion be helpful and conducive to this end, especially the playing up of a really constructive conference at Baden Baden.

BRUCE

[1] Repeated to Bonn, eyes only for Conant.

[2] A reference to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Schuman Plan countries, scheduled for Baden-Baden on Aug. 7.

396.1 WA/7–1053

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Riddleberger)*

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 10, 1953.

Subject: German Chancellor's Proposal to Foreign Ministers

Participants: Herr Herbert Blankenhorn
GER—James W. Riddleberger

Upon Mr. Blankenhorn's arrival, I saw him at his request this afternoon at which time he presented the Chancellor's letter to the Secretary as Chairman of the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Washington.[1] Mr. Blankenhorn said that this letter was animated by the Chancellor's conviction that the Soviets would make an important gesture towards Germany before the elections which might include their own proposal for free elections throughout Germany and possibly other proposals of a sweeping character. The Chancellor was convinced that the Soviets would make important moves to defeat him in the election and this was confirmed by information that discussions had been going on with Semenonov [*Semenov*] as to what kind of offer the Soviets might make. This information was received through SPD members who had been in touch with SED members in the East Zone.

The Chancellor is now convinced that the Western powers must seize the initiative and ask for a four-power conference. I asked Mr. Blankenhorn at this point whether the Chancellor contemplated such a conference before or after the German elections. He replied that, of course, the Chancellor meant after the German elections. The proposal would, of course, be based upon the five points of the Bundestag resolution with the point on free elections somewhat amplified to require certain guarantees that the elections would be really free. In addition, the Chancellor thought that the EDC could be utilized as a starting point for a security system for all European peoples. I questioned with [*sic*] Mr. Blankenhorn on the precise meaning of this and pointed out how the Western powers had always described EDC as solely a decisive system with no aggressive intent. Mr. Blankenhorn said that was the case but the Chancellor's idea would be to take advantage of certain of the limitations of armament inherent in the EDC system which could perhaps reassure the Russians respecting any aggressive intent.

I asked Mr. Blankenhorn whether the Chancellor thought that the Soviets would accept such a conference. The answer was affirmative and furthermore, that the Chancellor was convinced that the first item the Soviets would insist upon discussing would be the postponement of EDC. At this point, Mr. Blankenhorn expressed in the most categorical terms the Chancellor's devotion to EDC and his intent to continue with this policy. To encounter [*sic*] Soviet arguments about EDC, he wished

[1] Not printed.

to utilize the community as a starting point for a wider security system. In other words, EDC becomes one pillar of a security system because it does embrace for Germany a certain limitation of armaments.

Mr. Blankenhorn then emphasized that the Chancellor's present feeling is that his whole position is in danger because of the prevalence of the idea that he is somewhat against German unification. Therefore, the Chancellor must demonstrate his support of German unification and he would very much like to publish eventually the letter which he has addressed to the Secretary.

I then showed Mr. Blankenhorn a copy of our draft Tripartite Declaration on Germany.[2] He did not dissent from the ideas expressed therein but gave it as his opinion that it was not strong enough to meet the problem of public opinion in Germany. Specifically, he stated that it lacked the invitation to a four-power meeting and that there was, furthermore, no implication that a four-power meeting would result from such a conference. He emphasized that the Chancellor's proposal was a tactical move designed to improve his position in the election campaign and that our proposed declaration did not go far enough in meeting the problem that the Chancellor was not sincere in his desire for German unification.

I pointed out to Mr. Blankenhorn the possible dangers of a four-power conference before the Western powers and the Federal Republic had agreed upon firm positions which could be taken at any meeting with the Soviets. I said I thought it would be a serious danger if we were to go into a meeting without having agreed positions. Mr. Blankenhorn thought that was good logic but believed that we would have sufficient time to prepare these positions before any four-power meeting took place.

In conclusion Mr. Blankenhorn expressed the strong desire to see the Secretary but I was evasive as to when this could be arranged.

[2] Presumably Riddleberger is referring to the draft transmitted in telegram 80, July 8, p. 1601.

## 2. MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

*Editorial Note*

In preparation for the Foreign Ministers meetings the Department of State drafted three series of papers. The first, designated ST D–1 through ST D–5, covered topics that might be considered at tripartite meetings including Europe (ST D–1), the Far East (ST D–2), trade (ST D–3), the Middle East (ST D–4), and disarmament (ST D–5). The second, designated STB D–1 through STB D–4, covered topics that might be discussed with the British including ANZUS, aid to the United Kingdom, and problems of the Middle East. The third series, designated STF D–1 through STF D–4, covered topics that might be

discussed with the French including North Africa, Indochina, NATO status of forces agreements, aid to France, and a general paper (STF D–4) on secondary problems that might be raised in discussions with the French. None of these papers is printed, but copies are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158.

The documentation that follows presents first a record of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers and then the documents which they discussed and/or approved. Material on every meeting for which a record has been found in the Department of State files is included. The Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CFs 157 and 158 and the CFM files, lot M 88, box 165 contain the most extensive and most nearly complete records for the meetings including minutes, copies of talking papers, materials dealing with the preparations for the meetings, and related documentation. Telegraphic summaries of the meetings and some cables dealing with the preparations for them are in 396.1 WA. For the texts of the statement made by Secretary Dulles and the replies by Lord Salisbury and Bidault upon their arrival in Washington, July 9, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1953, pages 70–71.

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**FIRST TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SUITE, 1778 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, WASHINGTON, JULY 10, 1953, 3 P. M.**

PARTICIPANTS

| UNITED STATES | BRITISH |
|---|---|
| Secretary Dulles | Lord Salisbury |
| Ambassador Aldrich | Ambassador Makins |
| Mr. Matthews | Sir Frank Roberts |
| Mr. Merchant | Mr. Allen |
| Mr. MacArthur | Mr. Gore-Booth |
| Mr. Riddleberger | Mr. Leishman |
| Mr. Bowie | Mr. Porter |
| Mr. Phillips | Mr. Watson |
| Mr. Knight | Mr. MacGinnis |
| Mr. Kidd | |
| Mr. O'Connor | |
| Mr. Kitchen | |
| Mr. McBride | |
| | FRENCH |
| | Foreign Minister Georges Bidault |
| Mutual Security Director Stassen | Ambassador Bonnet |
| | M. de Margerie |
| Mr. Nash | M. Falaize |
| Col. Black | M. François Seydoux |
| | M. Daridan |
| | M. Roger Seydoux |
| | M. de Juniac |
| | M. Vimont |
| | M. Sauvagnargues |
| | M. Martin |
| | M. Carraud |
| | M. Andronikov |

**Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158**

*McBride Minutes* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 11, 1953.

ST MIN-1 (Draft)

[Here follows a list of subjects discussed by the Foreign Ministers.[2]]

Secretary Dulles asked if there were any suggestions as to procedure. Lord Salisbury suggested that the Secretary speak first, followed by Mr. Bidault and himself. Secretary Dulles stated:

*Soviet Problems and Policies*

The first of the topics which we may discuss relates to Soviet policy, the situation in the satellite countries and the related problem of Germany and European unity. This subject is dramatized by the official revelation regarding Beria.[3] This event and the *Pravda* editorial dealing with it are reminiscent of the purges of 1936 and 1937. Some of the language of the *Pravda* editorial repeats almost verbatim Stalin's report on the purges.

The accusation that the leaders to be purged were the spies and agents of foreign capitalists may be again, as it was then, the forerunner of a more nationalist, aggressive policy. The report of Stalin which I mentioned was made to the Eighteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party of March 10, 1939 that shortly preceded the Non-aggression Pact with Hitler, the seizure of the Baltic States, and the move to divide the world with Germany and Japan, a plan which collapsed with the Hitler attack of 1941. It is difficult to see how anti-foreign charges such as were leveled at Trotsky and Bukharin, and now are leveled at Beria, can be reconciled with policies which we identify with the "peace offensive." If the past is a guide to the present, we may have to anticipate some hardening, rather than a general softening, of Soviet policies. On the other hand, we should not count upon

[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that these minutes had been prepared by McBride and checked with notes taken by Knight and Kitchen, but that they had not been cleared or approved. No copies of these notes have been found in the Department of State files. A summary of the first tripartite meeting was transmitted to London in telegram 197, July 11 (396.1 WA/7–1153). This telegram was repeated to Paris, Bonn, Vienna, The Hague, Moscow, Brussels, Rome, and Luxembourg.

[2] According to the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1953, p. 72, each Foreign Minister made a statement at the opening of the first meeting. No mention of these statements is in the source text, but it does state that the meeting began at 2:30 p. m. (rather than the 3 p. m. ascribed at the start of the minutes), and, presumably, these statements were made in the interval. The texts are printed *ibid.* A photograph of the three Foreign Ministers at the beginning of this meeting is printed on p. 567.

[3] On June 28, Beria's name had been omitted from the list of eminent Soviet officials attending the opening of the opera, *Dekabristi*, but the first official acknowledgement of his fall appeared in an announcement in *Pravda*, July 10, which stated that he had been removed from his posts as Deputy Chairman and Minister of the Interior, and that the subject of his criminal activities was being submitted to the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union. Further documentation about the fall of Beria is presented in volume VIII.

the future being a precise repetition of the events of fifteen years ago. For one thing, there does not appear to be any personality comparable to Stalin to carry on. Also, there is some reason to surmise that Beria and the police forces he controlled could not have been successfully challenged unless the challengers felt confident of the support of the army. This may presage greater influence of the army in political affairs. This, in turn, might mean a greater emphasis upon Russia as a national state and less emphasis upon Communism as a world revolutionary movement.

It would doubtless be premature today to attempt to arrive at any conclusions. What we can say is that the policies which the free world has been pursuing have stood up and proved their worth, whereas the Soviet policies of the same period seem to have ended in failure, a failure which is admitted and most conspicuously dramatized by the Beria affair. But this affair I feel was, in turn, caused by the growing unrest in the Eastern European areas controlled by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has been unable to consolidate its position in these areas. That has been primarily due to the inherent patriotism and religion of the captive peoples. It has been in part due to the fact that the captive peoples have been impressed by the growing vigor and solidarity and military and economic power in Western Europe. These act as a magnet. Also the constant propaganda, which primarily through radio, has been carried to the captive peoples, has undoubtedly been an important element in keeping alive their hopes and their aspirations. We have asked Ambassador Bohlen, who had given us advance advice re Beria, to return and we hope he will be here tomorrow.

If there is any one lesson to be learned from the events of recent weeks, it is that we should not abandon the basic policies which have served so well. We should pursue, and pursue with increased vigor, the policies represented by NATO, EDC, the OEEC and our efforts to unify Germany and to free Austria from occupation. We should also, I suggest, adhere strongly in all that we say, keep alive the hope of captive peoples and not accept Soviet domination of the Eastern European nations as a permanent fact. Of course, we should not, indeed we have not, sought to promote any open rebellion which would lead to massacre. We have kept hope alive and we should continue to seek to keep alive the love of God, the love of country, and respect for personal dignity which are incompatible with Soviet Communism. I feel confident that by passive action perhaps even more than by affirmative action on the part of the captive peoples the Soviet rulers will be taught that they are over-extended and that they must grant genuine independence to the historic countries of Eastern Europe.

Already the developments in the satellite areas give a large measure of assurance to Western Europe. It seems that there is today less risk than ever of an armed invasion of Western Europe because it is now

apparent to the leaders of Russia that any such invasion would involve long lines of communication in territory that was hostile. We are now getting dividends from our policies.

I note this point not to suggest that we can now relax. We have proved our policies are right. We should press with renewed vigor the past policies which by strengthening it must have as an important by-product prevented such a consolidation of the Soviet bloc as would make further aggression seem to be a tempting adventure.

M. Bidault said that he had nothing to contradict what Secretary Dulles had said regarding the correctness of the policies which we have pursued and the dividends which they are paying. He noted that these were the agreed policies of the free world and of the NATO countries, but cautioned that we had not made important gains in the military field as yet. We must continue to assume that there existed the greatest danger, though we must not be immobilized by fear. He added that even if we overcome our fear, however, we should not think that the danger was any the less.

He said it was coincidental that we should meet today when such important events in the Soviet Union had just been announced. Some months ago we covered somewhat the same ground, and Foreign Minister Bidault noted that at that time he had said little change in Soviet policy was to be expected since all of their leaders had had 37 years of Soviet training, adding that perhaps he had been somewhat dogmatic. The Beria case was not the first purge, however, nor the first time an important Soviet leader had fallen from grace, but it was the first time events had moved so fast, and already in the six months since Stalin's death fissures had begun to appear in the Soviet monolith. Nevertheless there was no substantial change in Soviet policy though a few prisoners had been released and a few wives of foreigners had been permitted to leave Russia. It is possible the Soviet structure might crumble but we cannot really predict this.

Mr. Bidault said we were all glad Ambassador Bohlen was returning to the United States, and noted that the French had the same warnings which we had received regarding Beria's absence from recent important events. Even rumors, which were not usually present in the Soviet Union, had been heard about this, and there had been other echoes and echoes of echoes from various diplomatic sources.

The Foreign Minister said that Soviet policy followed many twists and turns. He noted that it had toughened between the Mayer talks in March and the NATO meeting in Paris.[4] He said that Soviet responses had been negative to the appeals of President Eisenhower and Sir Winston Churchill, though the tone had been polite for the first

[4] Documentation on Prime Minister Mayer's visit to the United States at the end of March 1953 is presented in volume VI; for documentation on the NAC Ministerial meeting at Paris at the end of April 1953, see pp. 368 ff.

time. He said the month of June had been characterized by an accentuation of good manners on the part of the Soviet. He said he felt the relatively moderate tone which the Soviet Union had taken and certain other steps were due to internal and public opinion problems.

Mr. Bidault said he didn't know whether the recent events in Russia meant an increase in the army's role or not. He said we have no proof of this kind, though previous experiences, such as with the Vichy Government, did not appear particularly happy precedents for having the Army take over. He thought Beria had reached the point where he could no longer trust his own appointees, and that his downfall might be partly due to a revenge by the Communist Party. He said that, insofar as could be ascertained, there had been some enthusiasm in Russia for the new policy of moderation but that the more extreme elements felt things had gone too far so brakes must be applied. He said that while we can neither set aside nor confirm speculation regarding the army's role, neither can we entirely ignore the part public opinion plays.

He reiterated that changes were occurring at an unprecedented rhythm for a Communist state, and predicted we would see more purges. He agreed with Secretary Dulles that we might expect a harder policy from the Russians, and indicated that because of the speed of developments we must work together to take the best advantage of opportunities created and constantly keep our Soviet policy under revision.

Lord Salisbury opened his remarks by agreeing with Secretary Dulles in his assessment of the new Soviet developments and said that this was the biggest of many big question marks. He said that many important changes had occurred in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death—both internal and external. The internal were less spectacular but may prove to be more important. He characterized these changes as giving greater incentive to the people and lessening repression. He said a policy of this type once started was hard to reverse, and noted that the same policy shift had occurred in the satellites. The immediate result had been an evolution of feeling, later leading to disturbances in East Germany. Even after the revolt, the milder policy had been continued, presumably with an eye on the German elections and 4-power talks. He said that in the Soviet Union it was impossible to tell where ultimate authority might eventually lie. In any event, he thought the Soviets might be weakened by the results.

It was too soon to know why Beria had been arrested, but the bad results of the milder policy might have been responsible, or domestic considerations, or both. Anyway we know this is an important development but it should not, as Secretary Dulles had already pointed out,

cause us to alter our policies. On the contrary we should take advantage of changes in the Soviet Union, and our policy should continue to be flexible.

When the British Prime Minister on May 11 had discussed the 4-power talks, his purpose had been to make contact with the new Soviet leaders whose aims were unknown to us.[5] He thought this contact would help us to know what is happening in the Soviet Union. However, events since May had caused delays, bringing us near the point of German elections; therefore it was agreed that immediate 4-power talks would provoke uncertainty in Germany which might impair Adenauer's chances. Lord Salisbury repeated that Great Britain was firmly attached to such talks after the German elections. However, as of today the UK was not pressing for talks on Germany, particularly since the Beria incident and the increasing uncertainty of the whole situation.

Lord Salisbury urged that in the communiqué which might follow this conference, we should reaffirm the desirability of holding 4-power talks at the right time as a policy objective. He said this point was of basic importance in Europe. He proposed that the communiqué also announce a higher-level 3-power meeting in about three months to study the post-election situation in Germany, and to see if we should not make firmer plans at that time for an announcement of a 4-power meeting. He thought an announcement at this time along these lines would prevent a feeling of frustration in Europe, and retain the initiative for the Western powers.

He agreed with Secretary Dulles that we of course desired to have freedom for the states of Eastern Europe, and that we should keep alive the hopes of the captive peoples but not stir up a revolt which would lead to a massacre. Above all, he concluded, we must continue to build up the material strength of the West so that we can negotiate from strength not weakness. Faltering would undo all, while on the other hand the growing strength of the West has already helped to change Soviet policy.

*Four-Power Talks*

Lord Salisbury summed up the British proposal as (1) an announcement that 4-power talks would be held when practicable, and were accepted in principle, (2) we should announce a high-level 3-power meeting for early autumn to firm up our policy on this point, and (3) continue to strengthen the defense of the West as much as possible.

M. Bidault, in commenting on Lord Salisbury's proposals, said that he had nothing definite to say at this time since he must consider and reflect on these suggestions. He recalled that the 4-power talks had

[5] Regarding Churchill's speech in the House of Commons on May 11, 1953 concerning a four-power meeting, see footnote 3, p. 1596.

originally been proposed in the House of Commons by the British Prime Minister, and that the French Government crisis had delayed France's taking a definite position. He recalled that in April he had proposed that we should suggest disarmament talks with the Soviet first, not because this was an easier problem to solve, but because it was the key one. He felt that this would be an effective blow to Communist propaganda. He admitted that an arrangement on Germany had also always been a key to an agreement on other problems, and noted that German neutralization was an idea which had certain popular appeal in Germany and France, though it was rejected by the French Government. He said the German problem was the most difficult of all but that the situation was now such that unfortunately we must now tackle it first because of the events of the past few months. He said that public opinion felt that a *détente* was possible because of events that were occurring in the Soviet Union, and therefore would not accept a passive approach to the Soviet problem, but would want 4-power talks. He said there was a childish feeling that an agreement could always be reached around a table.

Mr. Bidault said that, if there were not the problem of public opinion, i.e., if we were still in the days of Metternich, we might be able to wait until later to have discussions with the Soviet Union, and that such a delay might be advantageous to the West. However, because of the strong pressures in Western Europe for having these talks and because it was difficult to continue with rearmament of the West until after all possibilities had been exhausted in this field, we should hold talks with the Russians.

However, Mr. Bidault pointed out that the following dangers existed in going ahead on this line: it would crystallize the Soviet position and perhaps force them to take a harder line; the European press and public opinion would expect an agreement on Germany and the Russians would presumably propose neutralization; and finally an abyss existed between the September 23, 1952 declaration[6] of the three Western Powers and the Russian position, as well as between Adenauer's five points and the Russian view. However, in spite of those disadvantages, the psychological attraction is so strong that it would be desirable to have the talks. The political-military integration of Germany into the West will not be accepted until the Soviets are faced squarely across the table and it is evident that a solution cannot be reached by negotiation. He noted that the problem of the German frontiers on the east and the Saar on the West remained, and that France had both a solution of the Saar question and the Indochina problem on her hands. He thought

[6] Documentation on the tripartite note to the Soviet Union, Sept. 23, 1952, is presented in volume VII.

that substantial progress on all of these problems was required before EDC ratification could occur. He stressed that he is strongly for the EDC, and that the project is not buried even though the recent action of the Socialist Party Congress had not been favorable. Therefore, it is not believed there will be a European army before the date is fixed for 4-power talks.

Mr. Bidault said that the new French Government remained firmly committed to European integration. He added there remained considerable skepticism as to whether 4-power talks will settle the German problem, but added that no French Government could successfully oppose the talks. He said that this does not mean any decline in French sympathy for EDC, but rather that the talks were essential to prove to the French people that they must accept the EDC. He said the new Soviet policy worked both ways, and caused difficulties in the West as well as in the East, the public opinion demand for 4-power talks being one of the results in the West.

Mr. Bidault thought we could not determine now the time when 4-power talks should be held, but that as a first step the three powers should establish an agenda, and propose to the Soviets a conference of fixed duration to cover only questions that were "susceptible of settlement," as outlined in the September 1952 note, which incidentally is still unanswered. He said that a second and later step should cover a German peace treaty, including of course free elections in Germany and a free German Government, as well as eventual disarmament, and freedom in the satellites. He said that any united Germany should of course be integrated with the West.

He said we should not leave out Austria, but noted that the Russians will not, in his opinion, ever settle the Austrian question separately. He concluded noting that Lord Salisbury's proposal would require further reflection and that we must also discuss the question of how to keep the Germans, as well as the Brussels Pact and NATO countries, fully informed of this meeting.

Secretary Dulles said that the statements of the British and French delegates had opened the way to getting down to concrete problems which require agreement. He said that this complex of problems comprised the following: 1) an estimate of Soviet intentions; 2) our attitude toward unrest in the satellites; 3) the unification of Germany; 4) an Austrian treaty; 5) the EDC; and 6) 4-power talks, perhaps preceded by another high-level 3-power meeting. The Secretary said he would take up these problems one by one, and of course all of us reserved the right to discuss these questions further later on. He asked if there was agreement that recent developments in the Soviet Union should more than ever make us continue the policies we have pursued in the past. Lord Salisbury and Mr. Bidault agreed.

*Captive Peoples*

The Secretary repeated his earlier remarks that we should show the captive peoples they are not forgotten, and thus help to prevent the consolidation of the Soviet position. However, we should not promote any open disturbances. Lord Salisbury agreed that we should keep alive the hopes of these people, without fostering any open revolt. He thought that the constant restatement of our aims and continuing evidences of Western strength, plus avoiding irritating the Russians needlessly, represented the best policy to follow. Mr. Bidault said that the continuation of the propaganda campaign to the captive peoples was probably desirable even though probably only a small number of people heard our radio programs. He thought a better form of propaganda was the factual situation in the world. He noted that the Soviet softer policy had been intended for export but that within the Soviet Union the fall of Beria had resulted as an internal repercussion of this policy.

The Secretary said he could not minimize the desire of these peoples in the satellite countries for a better life and for freedom. A few weeks ago, he noted, the recent German events would have seemed impossible but people react to the frustrations of tyranny. He thought we should continue the methods which we have been using, and should utilize the tremendous potential attraction of freedom. Lord Salisbury agreed that it was encouraging that at the present time Communism did not seem to be advancing in Europe but rather that the wise policies of the West were forcing it to withdraw. Mr. Bidault agreed that it would be most unfortunate to stir up a revolt which could fail.

*German Question*

Secretary Dulles said we might now pass to the German question which was of first importance and bears on the 4-power talks. He said we must not go into any 4-power talks with the Soviets without an agreement on the German question, which would certainly be raised there.

Lord Salisbury said that the British Prime Minister had thought of the 4-power meeting as largely aimed at establishing contact, since the new Russian leaders were unknown to us, and we wanted to find out about them. He said it should not be a conference with a detailed agenda, to which it would be difficult to obtain agreement. He said the three powers must of course agree in advance on some basic things, and he admitted that Germany must be one of these. However it would not be a conference with everything arranged in advance, since we didn't know what the Russian reactions would be. In closing, Lord Salisbury concurred that there could be no conference until after three-power agreement on Germany had been reached.

Secretary Dulles said that our provisional views were not wholly in accord, but we could leave this until later since Germany was one of the most important things to reach agreement on. He noted that Mr. Blankenhorn had arrived today in Washington, having been sent by Chancellor Adenauer, but stressed that he had not been invited by us.

The Secretary said we all believed we must strengthen the forces in Germany which favor European integration, and the non-nationalist elements in that country. He said Chancellor Adenauer has a difficult problem because his opponents have said that he subordinates German unification to European integration. He said the problem had been made more difficult because of the revolts, and the possibility that the Soviets might propose a united neutral and de-militarized Germany in order to keep West Germany out of the EDC. He said he would circulate a paper which we have prepared giving the general lines of what we might say and noted that the French and British delegates might also have concrete ideas.

Secretary Dulles agreed that, while we certainly could not have a 4-power conference before the German elections, it might be desirable to announce before the German elections that we would hold such a meeting. He asked whether the French would limit the 4-power meeting to the disarmament question or whether they would also discuss Germany. He noted that such a meeting should be at the Foreign Ministers level.

Mr. Bidault said that the idea of having a four-power talk on disarmament was an earlier one, and that it was no longer current since Germany was now the number one problem and accordingly the one which we could not avoid discussing at a four-power meeting. He thought now that the problem of German unification would have to be faced before any progress could be made on disarmament. Mr. Bidault was displeased by Mr. Blankenhorn's arrival, since at the recent meeting of the Schuman Plan Foreign Ministers in Paris the six representatives had given him a message to bring to the Washington Conference. He said he was not the representative of the six countries, but he was at least their messenger. Blankenhorn's trip therefore showed lack of confidence in him, though he thought it was a result of the election fever in Germany. He noted that another meeting of the Schuman Plan countries would be in Baden-Baden on August 7. He added his original message had included the five points in the Bundestag resolution, stating the Germans had apparently now added six new points all of which did appear, however, to be reasonable.

Lord Salisbury indicated that he interpreted the U.S. idea as being that before the German elections we should let it be known that we are thinking of a 4-power meeting. He wondered if this would be helpful to Adenauer and thought it was not necessary since the policy of the three powers on Germany had so often been reaffirmed. He said that

German unification could best take place on the basis of the September 1952 note which represented an agreed Western policy and had been accepted by Adenauer. He said we should reaffirm our previous statements, but should not indicate that we would hold 4-power talks on Germany on some unspecified basis. He noted that he realized Blankenhorn had not been invited but had merely turned up. He said this was unfortunate, and that we should continue to inform the Germans of this meeting through the normal channels.

Mr. Bidault said that he thought it was correct to ignore Blankenhorn, and that the French also hoped publicity could be avoided on this visit. He confirmed that he also thought we should continue to deal with the Germans in the regular way through our Ambassadors in Bonn.

Returning to an earlier point, Mr. Bidault said that he was perplexed by Lord Salisbury's indication that if we announce we will discuss the German problem with the Soviets, the Germans will be upset. In this event, what could we say we would discuss? It would be obvious that in fact Germany will form the cornerstone of such discussions; therefore, we should so state. Furthermore, if it is not publicly announced that we will discuss the German problem, how can he convince the French Assembly that there is no alternative to the EDC. He indicated he would submit the French thoughts on this point in greater detail at a later time.

Secretary Dulles stated that he had just received a letter from Chancellor Adenauer saying that a 4-power conference on Germany should be held this fall on the basis of the five points of the Bundestag resolution, and that the EDC should be a starting point for a European security program which ideally should later include other states, including the Soviet Union. Secretary Dulles noted that this indicated that Chancellor Adenauer was in favor of 4-power talks. (See Attachment A for text of Adenauer letter.[7])

Lord Salisbury said there was no objection to a meeting of the four powers on Germany since if we did not discuss this problem, we would leave out the principal European difficulty. He continued to think that if such a meeting were announced before the German elections, it would create difficulties in Germany. Thus he believed it essential to reaffirm our present policy, which was accepted by Adenauer.

Secretary Dulles agreed that the basis should be the five points of the Bundestag resolution and added that we would circulate a paper on our views, noting that our present draft did not reflect the points in Adenauer's letter, and therefore does not refer to 4-power talks.[8]

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[7] Not printed.

[8] Presumably Dulles is referring to the draft transmitted in telegram 80, July 8, p. 1601.

Mr. Bidault said there were discrepancies in Adenauer's position and that furthermore, while he was entirely desirous of helping Adenauer with his political problems, there were other things on the French mind as well. He noted that we would continue with a further discussion on Germany tomorrow.

*Congressional Restriction on MSA Funds Until EDC Ratification*

Secretary Dulles stated that we would also circulate a paper on the problem of European unity which was of course related to the German problem. He noted the strong congressional insistence on tying part of the military aid under MSA to the completion of the EDC. He said the Administration opposed this idea but that he believes a law will emerge from the House-Senate conference which will provide that half of the 1954 military part of the MSA appropriation for the six EDC countries may be obligated but may not be delivered when it becomes available (a period of 18–24 months) until the EDC is ratified.

Mr. Stassen added that the first proposal of the House would have permitted the obligation of these funds only to the EDC, but that the present proposal was an improvement in that the funds could be obligated and that it was the future deliveries which could only be made to the EDC. Therefore he said there would be no operating restriction for 18 months. If the EDC were still not in operation, the Executive Branch would have to go back to Congress regarding the disposition of the material and the Funds involved.

Mr. Bidault thanked the Administration for trying to avoid these restrictive measures. He said his own problem with the Assembly was somewhat similar in that he was trying to get an unfavorable majority to vote favorably. He said that if the majority of the Assembly were favorable, we would have the pleasure of having Mr. Schuman here instead of himself. He said he still hoped after a reasonable delay to get the EDC ratified, along with the additional protocols, which he said, coupled with UK association with the EDC, as was now provided for, would help. He said that the Administration had performed a good service for the EDC in getting the restrictive legislation modified.

*Austria*

Secretary Dulles asked if it was the feeling that Austria should be discussed at a 4-power conference, noting that Mr. Bidault had not been hopeful that this problem could be settled separately. Mr. Bidault said he was entirely in agreement that Austria also should be taken up but that there was no hope for a prior solution to a German settlement. Lord Salisbury also agreed that Austria should be discussed during a 4-power conference. Secretary Dulles said there had been a Soviet suggestion for discussing Austria through diplomatic channels, but he thought that this was merely a dilatory move.

He added we had hints the Soviets were proposing the unification and neutrality of Austria and that this would be a forerunner of their ideas on Germany. Mr. Bidault said that the French had likewise received reports that the Soviets were thinking of proposing some such move regarding Austria, as a precursor to a similar solution on Germany. He added the latest information was that the Russians wanted "benevolent neutrality," more "neutrality" not being sufficient. Lord Salisbury said that the British had received similar rumors but he still believed we must discuss Austria in the 4-power talks though the conclusion of an Austrian treaty should not be a pre-condition for having the meeting.

Secretary Dulles said that it was of course most undesirable that the Austrians should start negotiations directly with the Russians and we should try to prevent their reaching an arrangement in desperation to end the occupation which would undermine the Western position and set a bad example regarding Germany. Lord Salisbury said that the UK has already made this clear. Mr. Bidault also agreed and said that all Soviet good-will gestures were merely divisive in purpose, but have brought some results as can be seen by the recent statement of the Austrian Chancellor.

*EDC*

Passing to a discussion of the EDC, Lord Salisbury said he appreciated the French domestic problem, and the fact that 4-power talks must be held, but added that the UK could not accept the fact that EDC ratification must await talks with the Russians. On the contrary he thought if we meet with the Russians before EDC ratification, the Russians would discuss this very problem and we would never get any further. He said that this remained an important gap in our defenses and that no alternative thereto had been found. Since talking with the Russians before EDC ratification would represent weakness, he felt the UK must reserve its position on this point.

Mr. Bidault said the French also reserved their position but that unfortunately the idea of a 4-power meeting has now captured Europe. He noted both that this had originally been a British proposal, and that if there were any way to ratify the EDC before meeting the Russians, he would do so. Unfortunately this was impossible.

Secretary Dulles said we would discuss EDC more fully tomorrow but he wanted to say we were fully convinced of the French sincerity on the EDC, and particularly Mr. Bidault's determination to carry it through. He realized the difficult political problem which only French leaders can solve, but felt he should point out the situation in the US if we do not get an EDC solution and no alternative is found. He said the result would be great discouragement in this country. Accordingly, he wished to strengthen Mr. Bidault's position by telling

him candidly of the problem here. He admitted it was easier for the US and UK who were on the sidelines, and said we would of course be patient but felt that serious efforts to go ahead must be made in this connection. He said that the President's prestige was committed to the EDC while elements in Congress and elsewhere remained skeptical there would be a European army. He concluded that a failure in this field would be very serious indeed, and that the US, and he was sure the UK also, would be of every possible assistance.

In concluding it was agreed that each of the Ministers would name a representative to discuss briefly the press in order that the same story might be handed out by all three participants. It was noted that the three Ministers would call at the White House at 10:00 a. m. on Saturday and would meet for another plenary session at 10:30.[9]

[9] No record of the meeting at the White House on July 11 has been found in the Department of State files; regarding the Foreign Ministers meeting at 10:30, see ST MIN–2 (Draft), *infra*.

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**SECOND TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SUITE, 1778 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, WASHINGTON, JULY 11, 1953, 10:30 A. M.**

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES

The Secretary of State
Ambassador Aldrich
Mr. Merchant
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Riddleberger
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Phillips
Mr. Morris
Mr. Knight
Mr. O'Connor
Mr. Kitchen
Mr. McBride
Mutual Security Director Stassen
Mr. Matteson
Mr. Nash
Col. Black
Col. Gerhardt

BRITISH

Lord Salisbury
Ambassador Makins
General Robertson
Sir Frank Roberts
Mr. Allen
Mr. Gore-Booth
Mr. Tomlinson
Mr. Leishman
Mr. Watson
Mr. Porter
Mr. MacGinnis

FRENCH

Foreign Minister Bidault
Ambassador Bonnet
M. de Margerie
M. Falaize
M. François Seydoux
M. Daridan
M. Roger Seydoux
M. de Juniac
M. Vimont
M. Sauvagnargues
M. van Laethem
M. Martin
M. Carraud
M. Andronikov

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158

*McBride Minutes* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 11, 1953.

ST MIN–2 (Draft)

*European Integration*

Secretary Dulles suggested that the meeting open with a discussion of the European unity theme, mentioning in this context the US draft which had been circulated.[2] He noted that Foreign Minister Bidault said his Government was committed to the EDC, within the NATO setup, but could not set a date for ratification. The Secretary said that we were fully sympathetic to the problems of the French Government, and realized the difficulties in the National Assembly which were of considerable magnitude and involved France's relations with Germany and her situation in Indochina. Nevertheless, he added, he felt it was incumbent upon him to state, from the standpoint of the formulation of US policy, how important it was to have the assurances which Foreign Minister Bidault had given yesterday. He said US did not ask a fixed time-table be established in this connection but we were glad to see the genuine determination of the French Government to push ahead. He noted there might be some parliamentary action in the Netherlands on EDC this month, and that the Belgians would finish up the work in the parliamentary committees on EDC this month and would take up ratification as the first order of business when the Parliament reconvened in September. He added it was our understanding de Gasperi would also make EDC ratification an early item for consideration of the new Italian Parliament, where we believe the composition is such that he can get it through.

Secretary Dulles added he hoped the French Government would think it in order for the other EDC countries to move ahead, since it was important to mantain momentum and to have some concrete developments to point to from time to time. He noted that the press and some elements of public opinion throughout the free world had been pessimistic on the future of European integration, but added that he and the President thought the EDC was a step which must be taken now for reasons of security against the Soviet Union. He added it was imperative to draw on German military strength. The history of the past two hundred years in Europe showed that Western Europe would

[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that the minutes were prepared by McBride and had been checked with notes taken by Knight and Kitchen, but that they had not been cleared or approved. No copies of these minutes have been found in the Department of State files. A summary of the second meeting was transmitted to London on July 11 in telegram 196. (396.1 WA/7–1153) This telegram was repeated to Paris, Bonn, Vienna, Moscow, The Hague, Brussels, Rome, and Luxembourg.

[2] The draft under reference here has not been identified further.

tear itself to pieces unless the Franco-German problem were resolved. He said the results of the European wars had been a decline in the power and influence of Western civilization. At present it almost looked as if this were our last chance which would be followed by a return to the Dark Ages if we failed. The Secretary concluded, saying it was impossible to exaggerate the importance which we attach to European integration, and the tragic effects which would result if it appeared the movement were dead. In conclusion he suggested that if the US draft appeared generally satisfactory, a committee might be established to devote more detailed attention to it.

*French Position on EDC*

M. Bidault said the French delegation was also tabling a draft based in part on his statements yesterday, and suggested that the text be gone over together.[3] He said this document reflected the permanence of France's attachment to European integration. He said he would prefer to cover the EDC in the final communiqué rather than to have a special interim declaration along the lines of the US draft or any other. We must not forget that France is the only one of the three powers at the table which is a member of the EDC. He said he fully understood the importance which the US and UK give to the matter, and is appreciative of US aid to the continent of Europe. Furthermore, it is quite normal that this conference would discuss European integration in detail, but the direct effects thereof will be felt only in France, and France is the only one of the three which will give up any sovereignty. He questioned whether public opinion in France would fully understand if there were a special lengthy communiqué on this subject.

M. Bidault said that European integration was not a new problem and that we had attempted to integrate the Weimar Republic into the western system. However, France is vividly aware of the recent unhappy history of Western Europe, and of the need for integration to prevent further Franco-German wars. He noted that France in the past had not been able to avoid these conflicts, and had merely defended herself when attacked. He said we must now try to make "the Europe of the possible", full European integration having become impossible the day Molotov rejected the Marshall Plan. Therefore, we are limited to the peoples outside of Soviet control.

Bidault said there was opposition to integration from many sources in Europe. Some say it is a Vatican plan, while others characterize it as "the Axis plus France." Nevertheless, we must not shy away from this concept because of the opposition which exists, but must push ahead with both the EDC and the EPC. He said the French Government was resolved to push ahead, and he agreed we should not leave this conference without reaffirming our solidarity on European integration,

[3] No copy of the French draft has been found in the Department of State files.

both political and military. In this connection he said he had agreed to the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Schuman Plan at Baden-Baden on August 7, although it would be held at a dangerous time, only three weeks before the German elections. He said the problem of having French views taken into account was difficult, and he fully realized that many circles in the US had been critical of France because of the delays in getting ahead with EDC. He said he knew that France had been accused of lack of good faith and of dilatory tactics. He said the French Government was very glad that the US Government had confidence in France's intentions as Secretary Dulles had stated yesterday.

He said his remark to Lord Salisbury yesterday to the effect that a 4-power conference was the only way to prove to the French people the necessity for the EDC still seemed valid to him.

He said that the difference between the French and the UK position was in the order of events. He said he did not agree we would be in a weaker position to face the Russians if EDC had not been ratified, and he believed we could perfectly well confront the Russians under these circumstances without being in a disadvantageous position since the Russians are aware of our growing strength. He said furthermore it must be realized that an important segment of French prestige in the world is based on her position as the leader of the European integration movement and that it was his intention to guard and preserve this position. He declared that in order to pass through certain difficult passages we must, however, have calm pilots.

He repeated again he agreed with Chancellor Adenauer that what we must make was "the Europe of the possible." He said we should proceed logically from the Schuman Plan, which was already in operation, to the EDC, which was also fairly well along, and then to the EPC, for which considerable time and study was still required. He concluded, saying he was not yet ready to comment definitively on the desirability of a special declaration on European integration, as against covering this subject in the final communiqué.

*British Position on EDC and Four-Power Talks*

Lord Salisbury prefaced his remarks saying he agreed entirely with Secretary Dulles that this was a critical moment in Europe and Western Europe might well tear itself to pieces unless integration took place. He said this was the obvious lesson of two wars. Therefore he would welcome a declaration on European unity, and agreed in principle with the US draft although his delegation would wish to discuss drafting details with us in a small committee.

Giving a preliminary reaction to the French paper concerned Lord Salisbury declared he was glad to see the French readiness to reaffirm

the agreed tripartite German policy. He added it was also gratifying to note the three-power agreement on the principle of 4-power talks, though the question of timing and level required further study. In commenting on Adenauer's letter,[4] with which he noted Foreign Minister Bidault agreed, he said it appeared that Adenauer wished a 4-power meeting to discuss the question of German unity only, on the basis of the five points of the Bundestag resolution.[5] He said that the UK would prefer to discuss Germany with the Soviets on the basis of the Allied declaration of September 1952, but pointed out the differences in substance between the two documents were few.

He said that his statements were not binding, but that he was very willing to put the proposal up to his Government. He expressed the hope that we could get over the difficulty of German military association with the West as soon as possible, noting that M. Bidault had said EDC ratification was not feasible until after 4-power talks were held. In this connection, he repeated his feeling that some tripartite agreement on Germany was an essential prerequisite to 4-power talks.

Continuing, Lord Salisbury repeated that recent events in the Soviet Union represented no real change of policy, nor of the aims of preventing the rearmament of the West and the integration of Germany with the Western powers. The Soviets have struggled against these developments since 1949 since they know that the Western powers without German military association cannot permanently hold their present positions in Central Europe. He said to meet this problem the French had originated the idea of the European army which the British did not criticize but on the other hand thought would give us the most effective possible control over German forces.

However, Lord Salisbury still thought it was important to obtain German military integration with the West before discussing the German problem with the Soviets, since otherwise the Soviets would have a chance to wreck the meeting and to gain their objectives. Undoubtedly the Soviets would propose free elections and presumably the unity of Germany, but as a price would prohibit the linking of Germany to the West. Accordingly, there was a great danger in proceeding along these lines. Furthermore, he added, this danger might arise whether or not 4-power talks were held unless we act quickly, since the Germans would become more and more disillusioned and tempted to look elsewhere for a solution to the unification of their country.

Discussing British association with the EDC, Lord Salisbury pointed out that the UK has indicated its readiness to be associated with the European army project at all stages, has signed and ratified

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[4] Not printed.
[5] For a summary of the five points, see telegram 89, July 6, p. 1591.

the UK–EDC treaty [6] providing for automatic military assistance, signed the May 1952 declaration with the US extending NATO assistance to EDC,[7] has agreed to station troops on the continent as necessary, and finally has now agreed to form a political association with the EDC which is believed to be satisfactory to all six members.

Additionally, the UK is willing to go further if it will assist the French and the other powers in their ratification problem, by such steps as extending the North Atlantic Treaty for an additional 30 years so that it would be co-terminus with the EDC treaty, and by making a further declaration rehearsing British engagements to the EDC. If, as appears likely, the EDC Governments prefer to have the British engagements put in a formal document of some sort, this was also agreeable to HMG. He concluded that these were not negligible contributions, but were ones which the British were very happy to make because of the importance of the problem. He reiterated that the British Government also realized the magnitude of the French political problem, but pleaded for continued efforts to obtain ratification of the EDC because of the danger of unfavorable reactions if this did not occur.

Lord Salisbury stated that he still felt German talks with the Soviets were unwise if Germany were not previously militarily tied to the West in some way, and would he thought be unpopular in the UK if held on this basis.

*Priority of Four-Power Talks vs. EDC*

M. Bidault thanked Lord Salisbury for outlining these steps which the UK had taken regarding EDC association, and said they represented an important contribution. He stressed, however, that the situation was quite different in France where the problem is integration itself, and not just association. Nevertheless, France would move ahead in spite of the obvious fact that the majority of the National Assembly was basically unfavorable to the EDC. He said that if his Government did not move carefully though, there might be a dramatic setback.

Continuing, M. Bidault said he was perplexed by the UK view that there should not be 4-power talks before the EDC was in effect. He repeated his statement that the idea of 4-power talks had been originated by Sir Winston Churchill. He had thought these talks held a high priority, but was now told that the German question should be settled first. The French thought that the best way to solve the German

[6] For the text of the treaty between the United Kingdom and the member states of the European Defense Community, signed May 27, 1952 at Paris, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 167–168.

[7] For the text of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty extending guarantees of assistance to the European Defense Community, signed May 27, 1952 at Paris, see *ibid.*, pp. 165–167 or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 9, 1952, pp. 896–897.

problem was to have 4-power talks first, and demonstrate the impossibility of this approach as a solution, after and as a result of which the French Government could get the EDC through Parliament. He noted that the time-table of this whole complex had been held up by the long French government crisis.

Secretary Dulles asked for a clarification from M. Bidault on his views regarding a 4-power meeting. Had the French Foreign Minister said that such talks might demonstrate that radical solutions such as the EDC were not necessary, or rather that the failure of such a meeting to produce results would show that the EDC was essential.

M. Bidault replied that frankly the difficulty of discussing Germany with the Russians was that the latter might make tempting proposals. France, however, was certainly not, he said, attempting to find excuses for abandoning European integration. He said he himself had given five years of his life to this concept, which he had helped to found. He added it was essential for our defense to have European integration, and we would have to go ahead on this concept even if there were no defense problem involved.

Secretary Dulles said the French viewpoint was clearly that if a 4-power meeting were held we would not go into it with the idea that the EDC was up in the air, and subject to change as a result of whatever the meeting might bring. He noted the British position was that the EDC should be ratified before 4-power talks were held. Both the French and British, however, were agreed that we should enter the discussions with the Soviets with continued firm agreement among ourselves on the essentiality of the EDC. He remarked the French delegation preferred not to have a special declaration during the talks on the subject of European integration but would rather have the subject covered in the final communiqué.

The French Foreign Minister said he was not convinced of the utility of a special declaration, but that neither was his mind closed on this point. It was not of course necessary to reach a final decision on this question today. In response to Secretary Dulles' question, the French Foreign Minister indicated that by the end of the day he would be in a position to give us his views on this point in a paper which the French Delegation would circulate.

Lord Salisbury said he thought the question as to whether a special declaration should be issued, or the subject covered in the final communiqué was not of great importance, but the question of getting the substance of the US paper put out in some form was vital. He said it was clear to him France would enter into any 4-power talks firmly committed to the EDC, even if the Assembly had not ratified it.

M. Bidault reiterated that 4-power talks were not a formal prerequisite which the French Government had established for EDC

ratification, but rather a reflection of the actual situation in Western Europe. He said the aim of 4-power talks would be the creation of a free Germany and, certainly not to re-examine such basic and agreed policies as the European army.

Lord Salisbury said that he was ready to put to his Government the Adenauer proposal, and that it had of course been vital to know the French position on the EDC before submitting the Adenauer suggestion. He said the UK continued to feel strongly that the EDC question should be settled before the holding of 4-power talks. He said he took it the US was in general support of the Adenauer proposal for 4-power talks on Germany.

Secretary Dulles said that, in the light of what Chancellor Adenauer had said on the subject of a 4-power meeting, he thought proposals for such a conference should be formulated. He noted the Chancellor believed his position would be better if such a conference were announced. Because of this reason and the French position that it was not possible to ratify the EDC before such a meeting were held, we are disposed to go along with the French and German views on having the meeting, on the assumption that the question of European integration through the Schuman Plan, the EDC, and the EPC would of course not be reopened. If these various parts of the European integration scheme, which were to be discussed at the Foreign Ministers' meeting at Baden-Baden, were not in question, then the US was disposed to announce promptly an invitation to the Soviet Union to hold a 4-power meeting at some date very soon after the German elections, such as September 15. The Secretary concluded that while we had not previously been enthusiastic about this subject, he felt that the circumstances were now such that we should go ahead.

After a brief recess, Secretary Dulles suggested that each delegation name someone to work on the problem of putting together a single paper on Germany from the three which were now circulating—the Adenauer proposal, and the US and French drafts. He said we would have to decide how much we would base our position on the September 1952 declaration, and how much on the Bundestag five points. He stressed that there was not much substantive difference between the two. The British and French Foreign Ministers agreed. Sir Frank Roberts, Mr. Francois Seydoux and Mr. Riddleberger were designated for this committee.

Secretary Dulles said that on the EDC he did not believe much more could usefully be said until the French paper, which would be ready at the end of the day, had been circulated. He suggested the US and UK delegations study this paper tomorrow and that it be the first item of business at the Monday morning tripartite meeting.

*German War Criminals*

Secretary Dulles said that he would like to discuss one specific topic, that of German war criminals. He said he hoped a decision could be reached on this matter which would be helpful in our relations with Germany.

M. Bidault said that the subject was not a pleasant one for him, but that he was willing to conform to the Secretary's wishes and discuss it. He said that there remained about five hundred persons in this category, and that a more flexible arrangement to handle the problem of the war criminals had been worked out in the French Zone, already having produced good results there. He said the French system would give Adenauer what he wanted, and at the same time avoid an action of the type which would cause a furor in France. He noted the formidable public opinion uproar in France at the time of the Oradour trials.[8] He added the three High Commissioners apparently all agree that the French plan is a good one.

Lord Salisbury said that the British preferred the idea of a single mixed board on war criminals, but that the French idea of a bilateral board in each of the three zones of Germany was not unacceptable. Secretary Dulles asked M. Bidault if he could consider this point further in order to meet the US and UK views, or whether the French position was inflexible. He remarked that the US also preferred the idea of a single mixed board as envisaged by the contractual agreements.

M. Bidault said that this subject had come up three months ago, and that he was not at liberty to change his position at this time. He stressed Adenauer would actually derive all the benefits from the French plan politically speaking that he would from the mixed board. He said this matter must be handled so that it does not appear to be a triumph for the war criminals. The French plan was as far as he could go.

Secretary Dulles said that in view of the French position, we accepted their viewpoint and would be prepared to adopt procedures along the lines of those acceptable to the French. He added we would like to cover this point in the final communiqué.

M. Bidault said that if this subject were covered in the communiqué there would be unfortunate repercussions in France as well as in the other countries formerly occupied by Germany. Furthermore, he said, he thought since the German elections were still two months off, it was too soon for such a move to be of any assistance to Chancellor Adenauer. Accordingly he believed this decision should be announced nearer to the actual election date.

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[8] Bidault is referring to the trial at the Bordeaux Military Court in January and February 1952 of 8 Germans and 14 Alsatians for the massacre of the residents of Oradour-sur-Glane in 1944.

Lord Salisbury said he believed there was substance in what M. Bidault said regarding the desirability of not having too much publicity on this point, particularly in the favored election atmosphere in Germany. He recommended that the High Commissioners cooperate so that the terms of reference of the three boards in the separate zones will be as uniform as possible.

Secretary Dulles said we would withdraw our suggestion regarding covering this question in the communiqué, and we certainly agreed with Lord Salisbury that the High Commissioners should try to work for as much uniformity as possible in the way the three separate boards operate. M. Bidault also agreed that the terms of reference of the three boards should be as similar as possible.

*Other Secondary German Problems*

Secretary Dulles said the US had a paper on the conduct of current relations with Germany [9] which he did not believe needed to be discussed in this forum but could be discussed by the small committee. He said in our view we should have as much flexibility as possible in our relations with Germany, particularly on a variety of relatively minor problems. He said he understood, for example, there had been differences of opinion among the Allies as to whether their flags should be flown at half-mast in honor of the persons who were killed in the Berlin riots, and also as to who should attend the funerals of the victims. He said there were many of these small problems, but that if their handling could be smoother, in the aggregate it would be helpful for our relations with Germany. He said Mr. Riddleberger would mention to the British and French experts exactly what these problems were and how we thought they might be handled.

*Press Coverage*

Secretary Dulles said unfortunately there was apparently little we could say about this morning's meeting to the press but we must have some announcement to make to avoid undesirable speculation. He suggested perhaps we could simply say we had carried foward our discussions on Germany, and had appointed working and drafting groups to prepare additional material, adding frankly to the press that we

[9] Not printed. This paper, ST D–1/5, stressed that the French had for some time taken an extremely negative and rigid attitude on most subjects that had arisen in relations with Germany, while the British had been neutral or passive. The paper stated that the United States should take the following talking points on this subject:

"1. Stress delicacy of relations with Germans in forthcoming months in light of election and Soviet moves.

"2. We must do everything possible to support Adenauer.

"3. Non-ratification by countries other than Germany should not prevent continued development of our relations with Germany in spirit of contractuals.

"4. Allied representatives in Germany need greater flexibility." (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158)

were at a stage in our talks where there was little spectacular to say. Lord Salisbury said it was his view the less said the better at this time.

Secretary Dulles announced the next tripartite meeting for 10:00 on Monday and the meeting concluded with the appointment of a working group on the EDC, consisting of Sir Frank Roberts, Mr. Sauvagnargues and Mr. Knight.

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**FIRST MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, ROOM 5104, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, JULY 11, 1953, 2:45 P. M.**

PARTICIPANTS

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM |
|---|---|
| Secretary Dulles | The Marquess of Salisbury |
| Mr. Stassen | Sir Roger Makins |
| General Smith | General Sir Brian Robertson |
| Ambassador Aldrich | Sir Frank Roberts |
| Mr. Douglas MacArthur II | Mr. Harold Beeley |
| Mr. Henry A. Byroade | Mr. Ronald W. Bailey |
| Mr. Livingston T. Merchant | Commander K. H. Derwent |
| Mr. Frank C. Nash | |
| General Hull | |
| Colonel Black | |
| Mr. Robert R. Bowie | |
| Mr. Thomas Beale | |

**Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158**

*Beale Minutes* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 11, 1953.

STB MIN 1

Lord Salisbury opened the discussion by stating that he would like to say a few words on the subject of Egypt, setting forth his Government's point of view and outlining the proposals they have in mind. He said he would ask Sir Brian Robertson to discuss certain details concerning the base, as Sir Brian had the latest information of a technical character.

Lord Salisbury stated that the Prime Minister was grateful for the understanding tone of the President's message of June 19.[2] He mentioned the thought that the essential features of Case A might be reached and the suggestions that the negotiations should be renewed

[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that these draft minutes were prepared by Beale. A summary of this meeting was transmitted to London (repeated to Cairo) in telegram 203, July 12 (641.74/7–1253).

[2] Documentation on President Eisenhower's message to Prime Minister Churchill, transmitted to London on June 17 and delivered June 19, concerning Egypt and Case A, is included in volume IX. The essential features of Case A are outlined below.

promptly, and that an understanding on the minimum conditions should be reached first. He expressed the hope that understanding might result from the present discussions.

He referred to Secretary Dulles' recent visit to the area [3] and the special knowledge and authority which he possessed as a result. He recalled that the President's message had referred to the agreement reached in March and expressed the thought that it might form the basis for agreement with the Egyptians, while emphasizing that the negotiators should have flexibility.[4] On this aspect he wished to make two comments. First, it was obviously useless to enter into complicated negotiations in a rigid state of mind. Second, while considering the base as immediately operable was obviously the right answer, it must be recognized that a threat might take some time to develop.

He remarked that much has happened since the March document was agreed, and that better promise might be found in a formula which did not correspond to any of these cases. They had given much further thought to the problem and had come up with a new form. This was evolved from the package deal, but they hoped that it would be easier for the Egyptians to accept.

The outline of the plan provided by the British Delegation following the meeting is quoted below:

*Outline of Plan*

*Evacuation:* Withdrawal within 18 months. Not yet discussed with the Egyptians, but we think they may accept it in spite of their statements about a shorter period. We cannot accept less.

*The Base:* For practical reasons we cannot accept an agreement which does not retain the essential features of what was described as Case "A", namely, that the technical control of the main installations in the Base should remain in British hands. As to how that is done, there is room for a certain variety of treatment, but the effective result is a matter on which we feel certain that we cannot compromise.

A connected question of very great importance is that of our right to get back into our Base and re-activate it when we need it. This has not yet been discussed formally with the Egyptians, but it is certain that they will make difficulties about giving us a sufficiently categoric and wide assurance. They will ask us to have confidence in their good intentions, but that is not good enough. It is no use to us to preserve our Middle East base in being unless we can have full access to it when we want it. We cannot accept vague verbal assurances from the present rulers of Egypt as adequate guarantees of Egyptian behaviour in the

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[3] Documentation on Secretary Dulles' trip to the Middle East, May 9–29, is presented in volume IX.

[4] Presumably this is a reference to the agreement reached by President Truman and Foreign Secretary Eden on Mar. 6 during the latter's visit to Washington. Regarding this agreement, see UKPT MIN–2 and the memorandum of conversation, both dated Mar. 6, in volume VI.

future on such a critical matter. The formula which we propose to put forward to cover this point is as follows:

> "In the event of a major war, or aggression or threat of aggression against Egypt by an outside power, the base area shall be at the full disposal of both the contracting parties. An aggression, or threat of aggression, by an outside power against Turkey, Persia, or any Arab state shall be regarded as a threat of aggression against Egypt for this purpose."

*Air Defense:* The proposals upon which we agreed originally stipulated that the agreement should provide for an integrated Anglo-Egyptian Air Defense Organization, including the stationing of British Squadrons in Egypt. This was a feature of both Case "A" and Case "B". It was an eminently sensible requirement; but in view of the very clear Egyptian resistance to it we have decided to drop it. We shall offer the Egyptians such help in air defense as they wish to accept. We think that they will be glad to have some technical advisers and to co-ordinate their air defense arrangements with ours in other parts of the Middle East. They will agree to British squadrons coming to Egypt occasionally to take part in joint training. We shall not press them to accept anything more.

*Military Aid:* The ideas previously discussed between us still hold good. There have been suggestions made recently that we might try to buy Egyptian agreement by offering to give them large quantities of material free of charge. We do not consider that such action is justifiable or even wise.

*M.E.D.O.:* This formed the fifth article of the "package deal". We agree with the view expressed by Mr. Dulles that there is no hope of getting the Egyptians to agree at this time to join either M.E.D.O. or any variation thereof. Yet it is very important that such an organization should come into existence at an early date, and Egypt's accession to it is essential. We feel that there will be a lot of reasonable criticism among the NATO countries, including our own, if we conclude an agreement with Egypt which, by the withdrawal of our forces, leaves a vacuum in the defence of this important area without anything being proposed to fill it. With this in mind we have taken up a suggestion voiced by Mr. Dulles when in Cairo that this Anglo-Egyptian agreement should be regarded as a stage on the road towards the establishment of a joint defence agreement. The question of the period of duration of our new agreement with Egypt is obviously a most important one. It was only discussed superficially at the Cairo talks. It has assumed all the more importance from the fact that we have insisted that the duration of stay of our technicians shall be the same as the duration of the agreement. We now propose to offer the Egyptians the following formula:

> "The agreement to remain in force until the countries' members of the Arab Security Pact are organised (with the assistance and participation of other friendly powers) in a manner to ensure their effective defence against external aggression. It shall in any case remain in force for an initial period of five years, after which date either party shall be entitled to request discussion of its revision on the grounds that the condition of principle referred to above has been fulfilled."

Following presentation of the plan outlined above, Lord Salisbury said that they hoped they would have United States support in pressing acceptance of this formula. He said the plan had been produced with a desire to go as far as possible. He stated that every point had been carefully considered. He emphasized that it was impossible from a political viewpoint to go materially further, and indeed it would be quite difficult for them to get political acceptance of the plan as presented.

Secretary Dulles asked whether the pact was formulated in relation to the Base?

Lord Salisbury replied that it was designed also to avoid a vacuum. He said that they felt that the present time was auspicious. He pointed out that the Egyptians have shown signs of less intransigeance and there had been some slight improvement in their attitude due in part to Britain's firmness and in part to the views expressed by recent visitors to Cairo. He said he felt that there was a fair chance of agreement with the Egyptians provided they came to realize during the discussions that the British proposals have the full support of the United States. He expressed the hope that the United States would send a special representative to Cairo—General Hull if he were willing—to lend the weight of the United States to the discussions. He realized that the Egyptians were not going to say "yes" immediately, but he felt that they would eventually if they realized that the British were not going further and that they (the British) had the full support of the United States. If the Egyptians did not accept the plan, then there would be no agreement and the British Government would have to determine its own course. They were prepared to face the unpleasant possibilities rather than put their name to an agreement in which they had no faith.

He pointed out that if an agreement were reached they would have deprived themselves of the means to enforce the agreement. They would therefore like to have more solid assurances that the terms of the agreement would be fulfilled, and therefore hoped that the United States would be as firm in insisting on fulfillment as they themselves would be.

He noted that the present situation was that the negotiations were suspended. Since the Egyptians had broken off the negotiations, if they wished to resume they should say so. He said that if agreement were reached in Washington, they proposed that Sir Brian should return to Cairo. They had no objection to the United States encouraging the Egyptians to resume negotiations.

Lord Salisbury said that finally he wished to stress that it was not a question of imperialism and national prestige, but the fact that they regarded this strip of land—with the canal—as one of the most vital strategic points in the world. He said that the position was equally as

important as it ever was. He emphasized that this remains the principal consideration from their viewpoint. He said that they would rather hand over responsibility for protecting the Canal to an international body, but, lacking that solution, they felt that Egypt must not be left without defenses.

Sir Brian said that he would like to bring out certain detailed matters, particularly of a military nature. On evacuation, he said that the period of 18 months had been arrived at after much hard work. The figure was accepted with the greatest reluctance. It was conditioned by many factors, including the movement of men and stores, and the re-erection of communications. It was felt that a shorter period would result in great disorganization. If the period were less than 18 months they would be in no position to play a part in a war if it came during the period of evacuation.

On the problem of the Base, the difficulty arose from differing attitudes over technical control. During the discussions it was impossible to convince the Egyptians that they (the British) wished to retain control simply because the vast collection of stores, etc. can only be looked after properly by men who understand the problems of handling such stores and equipment and who have responsibility towards British authority. He cited two examples: One, the difficulties involved in reactivating the largest workshops the British Army has anywhere, if they were moth-balled; and two, the fact that the base provided mobilization packs which must be kept up-to-date and readily available, since many units would wish to draw on the base in event of war. He stated that it was completely impracticable to trust supervision of the base to any nationality other than British. He said that General Hull and his colleagues would probably agree that the same thing would be true if American stores and equipment were involved.

Sir Brian said that the question of numbers of technicians had not been discussed with the Egyptians. However, they (the British) were not intending to ask for great numbers and he doubted that the question would be too difficult.

On the matter of instructions, they (the British) had asked for instructions direct from Service Department to British officers in charge of installations. They were prepared to go some way to meet the Egyptians on this question. They will agree to an Egyptian base area commander and will agree to give him a copy of all instructions, so that if they (the Egyptians) claim something is being done contrary to the agreement they can do something about it.

Sir Brian said that the question of status had not been discussed with the Egyptians. He had in mind something along the same lines as in the NATO arrangement. In any event, Egyptian sovereignty would be fully respected.

On air defense, Sir Brian noted that the United States would have in mind its interest in Abu Sueir. He added that the British would require certain transit rights.

As regards MEDO, Sir Brian noted that they had tried to use the duration paragraph as a means of slipping MEDO into the agreement. He said that they hoped by that means to get a wedge in.

Secretary Dulles opened his remarks by saying that a few days ago, anticipating that the subject of Egypt would come up in the discussions, Ambassador Caffrey was asked to press the Egyptian Government for a statement of their position which might be useful for the talks and which would go as far as possible to meet the position of the two governments.

He stated that "we have basically the same objectives as you do. We have not consciously disclosed views of ours which differ from yours". He pointed out that there might be some difference in view as to the degree of resistance which the Egyptians might put up, but there was no difference as to what our two countries want to get. He said that our solidarity of position had been made known. He recalled that the statement he had made when in Cairo had been interpreted as supporting the position the British were taking.[5]

Secretary Dulles said that as a result of the approach made to the Egyptians, a letter had been received last night from Naguib to the President. The letter was accompanied by an Egyptian formula which seemed a considerable advance over anything that the United States knew as to the position of the Egyptians, though unacceptable in some respects.

(Copies of the letter and Egyptian formula were handed to the British Delegation. See Tab A and Tab B.[6])

Secretary Dulles stated that the formula contained obviously unacceptable features. He mentioned that three years was too short a period. He noted that the reference to immediate withdrawal was not clear and said it might mean immediate agreement to evacuation. He said that the formula seemed to represent some progress over what was previously known.

Lord Salisbury replied that the formula represented some progress but there were things in it which were not practical for them. They do not believe that the Egyptians could maintain British supplies as they should be maintained.

Sir Brian said that the Egyptians do not realize that the stores are irreplaceable. He pointed out that the British cannot afford to keep the stores where they are not looked after properly. If these conditions are not met, it would be necessary to take the stores away. He noted

[5] Documentation on Secretary Dulles' visit to Cairo in May is included in volume IX.

[6] Prime Minister Naguib's letter and the Egyptian formula, attached to the source text as Tabs A and B, respectively, are printed on pp. 1696 and 1697.

that the formula confirms their understanding that the principle of technical control is acceptable to the Egyptians.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that the Egyptians accept the presence of 4000 technicians.

Sir Brian noted that the letter to the President put the proposal on a "take it or leave it" basis and said that if that were the case, the answer would be "leave it".

General Smith observed that the particular sentence seemed to be the usual final sentence in all Middle Eastern communications. He suggested that the phrase should be translated as "what is your next bid?" He then asked Sir Brian if in his opinion the Egyptians had any conception whatever of the difficulties of maintaining electronic or other equipment.

Sir Brian replied that in his opinion Naguib did not understand the problems, and "the boys" were not up to the level of the average British or American major in their comprehension of the problems involved.

Secretary Dulles noted that the Egyptian formula makes it clear that they do not expect to maintain the base.

Mr. Byroade noted that the wording provided that British technicians would be retained and was close to the wording of the British in using the phrase "efficient operation of the base".

Lord Salisbury noted that the formula took too local a view regarding the threat of war. He said that they (the British) had included Turkey and Persia in their formula in order to broaden the area.

Lord Salisbury said that he did not feel empowered to go further than the proposals they had just made but they were prepared to study the Egyptian formula.

General Smith said that he wanted to point out that the United States took a practical view of the conditions under which the base might be reactivated, because our common national interests would obviously be affected.

Secretary Dulles suggested that the point might be covered by an exchange of letters.

Lord Salisbury said that copies of their plan would be provided. He noted that two questions arose of immediate concern. First, it would be most unfortunate if the Egyptians published their formula at this stage and it would be helpful if the United States side could give them a hint not to do so. Second, presumably the United States would have to reply to Naguib's letter and proposal, and it would be helpful if there could be consultation before the answer is given.

Secretary Dulles said that he would not think of not consulting with Lord Salisbury before replying.

He noted that the Egyptians had indicated that they would expect to have firm undertakings on military equipment. He said that this could obviously run into a very high figure. He had no idea how much

the Egyptians would want and they might have exaggerated ideas. He said that the United States could probably provide a modest amount of military and economic assistance.

Secretary Dulles said that he wanted to give the British Delegation a little bit of his thinking regarding the Middle East area. He noted that the thinking on the United States side had tended to change somewhat, partly as a result of observations he and Mr. Stassen had made during their recent trip. They had been impressed by the fact that the Arab States nearest to Israel and the Suez and those which had had more recent experiences with colonialism, specifically Syria and Lebanon, were not preoccupied with the threat from Soviet Russia. They had received the impression that these countries had no deep feeling about the Soviet threat and were immediately concerned with other problems, such as getting the British out of the Suez Base, getting the French out of Tunisia, the friction between Saudi Arabia and the British over Buraimi, the refugee problem and the subject of Israel. He said that while Egypt professes that the settlement of the Suez Base dispute would lead to a settlement of the dispute with Israel, he was skeptical that one would follow the other.

Secretary Dulles explained that they had returned from their trip with the feeling that the area was not dependable from the security standpoint and that more dependable strength could be had from the northern tier of countries, specifically Turkey, Syria and Iraq, which took a more realistic view of the situation. He noted that Iran was a problem, but not an insoluble one. He said that Pakistan was a strong point which cannot be developed militarily until the matter of Kashmir was settled.[7] He said that there appeared to be greater hope of a settlement of the Kashmir dispute than was the case before the recent Commonwealth meeting, and he looked forward to a solution in a year or so. He said that the building of strength in the northern area among the countries that come together geographically seems to offer greater hope than a pact which includes all the Arab states and which would be dominated by Arab states which are preoccupied with problems other than the Soviet threat.

Secretary Dulles said that if agreement is reached with the Egyptians, he would anticipate that there would be constant friction, and it would be desirable to exercise caution as to the amount and character of the military equipment to be supplied to the Egyptians. He said that he foresaw a lot of problems in making Egypt the military center of a defensive pact. Hence, the United States is tending to think more of the northern group of countries which are more alert to the same danger the United States and United Kingdom feel and are less preoccupied with the colonialism aspects of the past and the existing feud with Israel.

[7] Documentation on the interest of the United States in a resolution of the Kashmir dispute is presented in volume XI.

Secretary Dulles said that he welcomed the opportunity to indicate the United States thinking about the security of the area. He noted that it was unlikely that any defense arrangement for the Middle East would be formalized in the near future. He pointed out that neither Pakistan nor Iran were ripe for inclusion in such an arrangement. He thought that it might be possible to make military arrangements with individual states, principally Syria and Iraq.

Lord Salisbury said that he was most grateful for the extremely interesting and thought-provoking presentation of the Secretary's thinking, and would like to think over the ideas put forward about the northern tier. He noted that there were gaps, such as Iran and Kashmir, the latter in part because of the personal feeling of the Indian Prime Minister. He referred to Turkey as a splendid ally.

Secretary Dulles observed that he had had a good impression of Shishikli.[8]

Lord Salisbury said that they would differentiate between building up Egypt and making use of a base which is a geographical fact.

Secretary Dulles replied that he did not want to suggest that the Suez Base is not important.

Lord Salisbury noted that they have special treaty obligations in Jordon.

Secretary Dulles replied that he had received a good impression of what had been done in a military way in Jordan. He then said that we would all expect and hope that there could be forces interposed between the Suez base and the Soviet Union to check an invader-aggressor, and he noted that in the event of war such forces would have to be primarily supported from the Suez base.

Lord Salisbury observed that under modern circumstances the defense of the Canal would have to be widely based. He said that he would like to look into the question and consider it further.

Secretary Dulles concluded the discussion of Egypt by stating that the receipt of Naguib's message would be acknowledged on behalf of the President and the strong hope would be expressed that there would be no publicity given to the Egyptians' proposals.

It was agreed that the discussion would be resumed after study of the British and Egyptian plans.

Secretary Dulles said that the French had asked to put the subject of the Middle East on the tripartite agenda. He said he thought they might perhaps want to raise the matter of transit rights through the Canal. Mr. MacArthur suggested that the French might have in mind bringing up the subject of North Africa. Sir Roger Makins indicated that they would prefer not to discuss the Middle East trilaterally, and he pointed out that the subject was in any event already the subject of bilateral talks.

[8] Deputy Prime Minister and Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army, General Adib Shishikli.

Regarding the question of what should be said to the press, it was agreed that they could be given a list of the participants and could be told that they had discussed Egypt and the Middle East in general terms. It was further agreed that there should be no further discussion with the press of what had been considered at the meeting.

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**Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158**

*Beale Minutes* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 13, 1953.

STB MIN 1/1

Secretary Dulles suggested that the meeting turn to the subject of Buraimi.[2] He noted that "we seem to be allies of opposing forces".

Lord Salisbury said that they had recently put forward the suggestion that the President should suggest mutual withdrawal with supervision. He noted that it was their thought that the supervisory group should consist of one Saudi, one British nominee and one American, if possible, or alternatively, a Scandinavian of neutral character. He said that they would like to see a supervisory body set up to keep the peace.

Secretary Dulles asked whether it would not be possible to have a supervisory body without the necessity for withdrawal. He suggested that it should be possible to have a standstill with supervision. He said that it was his impression that Ibn Saud is in good faith disturbed because of the reports he receives. He commented that it was doubtless easy for untrained observers to draw the conclusion, when mortars and an observation plane were used, that there had been bombings.

Lord Salisbury said that they felt strongly that Turki has no right to be where he is.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that the Saudis claim he does have, and General Smith observed that there appeared to be a certain difference of opinion.

Lord Salisbury said that he thought withdrawal on both sides was the best way out, and if that was not possible, they would have to give the matter further thought.

Secretary Dulles hoped they would do that.

Mr. Byroade said that he felt almost certain that the King would

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[1] In the records of the Department of State the discussions on Egypt and Buraimi were designated STB MIN 1 and STB MIN 1/1, respectively, and were filed as separate documents. Attendance at the latter discussion was the same as at the former with the following exceptions: Ambassador Aldrich was not present for the discussion of Buraimi and Fritzlan was. A summary of this second part of the meeting was transmitted to London on July 16 in telegram 283 (repeated to Jidda), 786A.00/7–1653.

[2] Further documentation on the United States interest in the Anglo-Saudi dispute over Buraimi is presented in volume IX.

not accept withdrawal. He pointed out that Turki is a "real vote-getter". He also noted that Turki would have to withdraw some 500–600 miles to Ridayh or Dammam and such a withdrawal would involve serious loss of face for the Saudis. He expressed the view that it was better to get rid of the problem and to start arbitration as quickly as possible.

Mr. Beeley asked for a restatement of the United States position.

Mr. Byroade explained that the United States proposal was as follows: (1) Both sides agree arbitration should take place with present strength Saudi and British forces remaining in the area on the understanding that the blockade would be lifted and that the Saudis would engage in no further suborning activities. (2) Observation commission consisting of one Saudi, one British and one neutral representative to be set up immediately to proceed to the area to insure adherence to the foregoing. The commission is to remain as long as the situation required and is to have freedom of movement and the right of access to Saudi, British and other authorities in the region. (3) Both sides to conclude arrangements without delay for arbitration.

Lord Salisbury said that he would like to think the United States proposal over. He pointed out that the fact that Turki would have to withdraw 600 miles showed how far outside his own territory he was.

General Smith said that he had sensed a modest pride on the part of the British in the fact that strong measures had induced the Saudis to accept arbitration. He said that he wished to point out that the Saudis had not reached that conclusion until after many hours of discussion in which he had participated and after they had failed to receive any encouragement on the proposal for a plebiscite as opposed to the idea of arbitration. If they had received such encouragement they would not have accepted arbitration.

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## TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS DINNER MEETING, WASHINGTON, JULY 11, 1953

PARTICIPANTS

| UNITED STATES | BRITISH | FRENCH |
|---|---|---|
| The Secretary of State | Lord Salisbury | Foreign Minister Bidault |

**Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158**

*Memorandum by Douglas MacArthur II* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 15, 1953.

On July 11 Secretary Dulles had French Foreign Minister Bidault and Acting UK Foreign Minister Lord Salisbury for dinner.

[1] Copies of this memorandum were sent to Secretary Dulles, Under Secretary Smith, Matthews, Merchant, Wolf, Riddleberger, Arneson, and General Collins.

Secretary Dulles mentioned to both Lord Salisbury and M. Bidault that the US was now willing to send a few 280 mm. artillery battalions to Europe in support of the NATO forces. The Secretary explained that these artillery pieces fired both regular and atomic ammunition, but that atomic arms would not be shipped to Europe with the guns. Regular ammunition, however, would be supplied.

Both M. Bidault and Lord Salisbury indicated agreement, and Lord Salisbury commented that since the guns used regular ammo, it would be well to treat this as a routine deployment of units. He implied a reluctance to emphasize or point up the fact that the guns could also fire atomic shells.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II

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**FIRST MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE, SECRETARY DULLES' RESIDENCE, WASHINGTON, JULY 12, 1953, 3 P. M.[1]**

PARTICIPANTS

| UNITED STATES | FRENCH |
|---|---|
| The Secretary of State | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Ambassador Dillon | Ambassador Bonnet |
| Mr. Merchant | M. de Margerie |
| Mr. MacArthur | M. Falaize |
| Mr. Bowie | M. Roux |
| Mr. Bonsal | Colonel de Brebisson |
| Mr. Knight | M. Andronikov (Interpreter) |
| Mr. Glenn (Interpreter) | |
| Secretary Humphrey | |
| Mutual Security Director Stassen | |
| Mr. Nash | |

**Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158**

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Philip W. Bonsal*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 16, 1953.

[STF Special MIN 2]

Before taking up the matter of Indochina at the bilateral Franco-US meeting on Sunday, July 12, M. Bidault brought up the following extraneous subjects:

*Banditry in the USSR*

He informed the Secretary that he had received word from the French Embassy at Moscow to the effect that banditry was growing in

[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that it had been prepared by Bonsal and was being circulated as STF Special MIN 2. No participants are enumerated in the source text, but the list printed here is that which appears in the record (STF MIN 1, p. 1643) of the discussion on Indochina and would presumably be the same for both discussions.

the USSR and had assumed large-scale proportions in certain areas. M. Bidault reported that the Soviets were taking special precautions to protect shipments consigned by rail from Leningrad to the French Embassy at Moscow.

While not wanting to draw any conclusions therefrom, M. Bidault added that he could not help but mark the similarity with the situation in France at the end of the revolutionary period when many parts of France were infested with bandits.

*Soviet Approach to the Swiss re Conference Site*

M. Bidault also reported that the French Ambassador at Bern, Mr. Chauvel, had informed him that a director of the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs had told the French Ambassador that Mr. Petitpierre had received (in an unspecified manner) indications from the Soviet Government that it would wish to have a 4-power conference held in Switzerland preferably, and in Switzerland in the neighborhood of Lucerne. The Secretary requested if at the same time the impression had been obtained that the Soviets were favorably disposed toward a 4-power conference. M. Bidault answered that Mr. Chauvel had derived such an impression.

(This was not discussed with the British.)

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**Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158**

*Bonsal Minutes* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 12, 1953.

STF MIN 1

M. Bidault opened his statement on Indochina [2] by saying that he would not conceal that his government is very much concerned at the situation, and particularly by the state of public opinion in France. He recalled that Mendes-France failed of approval as Prime Minister by only 12 votes on an investiture statement which included a proposal for the opening of negotiations in Indochina. It is true that his proposal was an extremely vague one. Nevertheless the French Government is confronted with the war weariness resulting from seven years of efforts and sacrifices. Especially in view of the probability of a Korean armistice, the situation confronting the new government is most delicate. The French people want the same for Indochina that is being achieved in Korea. The government is also faced with serious

[1] Attached to the source text, which was filed separately as STF MIN 1 in the records of the Department of State, was a cover sheet which stated that Bonsal had prepared the minutes and had discussed them with Knight, but that they had not been cleared or approved. A summary of the discussion of Indochina was transmitted to Paris in telegram 180, July 15. (396.1 WA/7–1553) This telegram was repeated to Saigon, London, and Moscow.

[2] For further documentation on Indochina, see volume XIII.

financial difficulties. The government wishes to fulfill its obligations to the Associated States and to be faithful to the international task which it has undertaken but it is faced with the difficulties mentioned. Peace, too, is contagious.

M. Bidault said that he would speak first of the political situation as it has developed following the July 3rd Declaration,[3] then of the military situation and finally of the financial problems.

On the political side, M. Bidault recognized that large sectors of foreign public opinion—especially in the US—had believed that the independence granted the Associated States by France was not as represented. M. Bidault said that he did not agree with this analysis but recognized that there might have been some slowness in the transfer of powers to the Associated States. He referred to the conservatism of local officials and to the difficulty of carrying out certain gestures. For that reason the new French Government, in view of difficulties in Cambodia and of other considerations, resolved to make the declaration of July 3rd. The declaration was well received by Bao Dai, by Tam and by the Vietnamese leaders in general. This had been also true in Laos. In Cambodia, except for certain reservations, there had been improvement. The attitude of the King had changed but he had gone from one extreme to another, passing from complete discouragement to megalomania, as shown by his talk of raising an army of 150,000 men.

The conversations with each of the Associated States are to begin almost immediately and will take place with each state "with full respect for their independent status". The Associated States will be able to place what they wish on the agenda and they will get what they ask for. M. Bidault mentioned briefly some of the problems which will have to be solved, such as those in the economic-financial field (the bank of issue), the control of the traffic in piasters, the judicial problem—particularly that arising in Cambodia. He indicated in this connection that the French would not stand on the 1946 Treaty with China, but would try to find some way of giving the Associated States complete judicial independence. He said that the number of French functionaries in the Associated States has been decreasing and those to remain would be chosen by the Associated States. He intimated that the Associated States would probably be more anxious to keep these people than the French to withdraw them. M. Bidault expressed full understanding of the "problem of symbols". With regard to the Norodom Palace, he said that there might have been some slowness in French relinquishment of this symbol of sovereignty. He recalled, however, that when the French did offer to abandon the Palace over a year ago and requested other accommodations they received no reply

[3] For a free translation of the French note of July 3 promising negotiations with the Associated States for a review of their status in the French Union, see telegram 52, July 3, in vol. XIII, Part 1, p. 634; for the official French text, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 470–471.

from the Vietnamese authorities who probably preferred to continue to reside in the cool of the Highlands. They did receive an unsolicited letter from the King of Cambodia, stating that the Palace belonged in fact to all the States of Indochina and that therefore the French had no right to turn it over to the Vietnamese alone.

M. Bidault also recalled that M. Letourneau had been replaced as Commissioner General by M. Dejean, a diplomat well known to many Americans. He said this change also symbolized a new regime.

M. Bidault referred to the agreement made by Letourneau and Bao Dai, for the turn-over to the Vietnamese of military control of certain provinces. He said that this agreement had been much criticized in France (and by President Auriol) because of the reluctance of the Vietnamese to take over provinces where hostilities were still in progress and their tendency to confine their control to completely pacified areas.

In reply to the Secretary's question, M. Bidault said that he thought that the Vietnamese would wish to negotiate in Paris and the Laotians also. He said he had no idea what the Cambodians would wish to do, but he added that the French placed no absolute condition in this respect.

Turning to the military aspect of the situation, M. Bidault recalled the Letourneau-Allard plan involving increased military effort by the Associated States at a rate of 54 new light battalions in 1953 and in 1954 plus 27 such new battalions in 1955, making a total of 135. He said that this plan remains in force and is being carried out as scheduled. Acceleration is desired, but this means a re-examination of financial aspects.

M. Bidault said that General Navarre, the new Commander in Chief in Indochina, had been selected because of the outstanding qualities he had shown as Marshal Juin's Chief of Staff and because of the fact that he was not routine-minded. General Navarre has now evolved a new plan which involves not only the acceleration of the former plan but also an increase in the means to be made available to the French High Command in Indochina. This plan reached Paris at about the time of M. Bidault's departure. While this plan is now being studied by the Conseil Superieur de la Defense Nationale, M. Bidault was authorized to mention it to the Secretary and to describe its major features. These are as follows:

*a*) A modification in the present organization of the expeditionary corps so as to produce a new type of mobile combat group for offensive action. Such groups are to be adapted to the special conditions prevailing in Indochina and are designed for the carrying out of strategic offensive operations, not just to counterattack when the enemy assumes the initiative.

*b*) An increase in the potential of the French Union forces in Indochina amounting to 12 French Union battalions with 50 helicopters. The naval forces are to be increased by 3 LST and 2 pocket Liberty

ships. The Air Force is to be given an additional 30 C47's and 6 Beavers.

M. Bidault said that the furnishing of 12 battalions from the French Union involves serious consequences from the political and psychological points of view. He said that the French Chiefs of Staff had been consulted and had given an opinion that unless conscripts are sent to Indochina, the furnishing of these 12 additional battalions would involve the deactivation of important elements in the French forces in Europe and Africa because it would be necessary to strip officer, non-commissioned officer and professional soldier cadres from these units. The French Chiefs of Staff estimate that the following units would have to be dissolved or deactivated: 8 to 9 artillery groups, 6 to 7 engineer battalions, 4 tank regiments, 3 to 4 Signal Corps companies and 8 to 9 ordnance companies. M. Bidault stated that General Navarre has put forward this proposal as necessary under present conditions to regain the initiative for the Franco-Vietnamese forces. His proposal is not related to a possible Chinese Communist aggression.

M. Bidault stressed the unfortunate political and psychological effects of sending conscripts to Indochina, specially in an atmosphere of armistice in Korea.

Turning now to the military prospects in Indochina, M. Bidault said that enemy units are engaged in resting, training, and improving their offensive capabilities. They now have anti-aircraft and 105 MM artillery. Chinese aid is being sharply increased. M. Bidault estimated the amount of Chinese aid for the past three months at 10,000 tons monthly. He said that the enemy would be ready by September 15 and that they might direct their attention either to the Tonkin Delta or to upper Laos or to middle Laos and central Annam with the idea of cutting Indochina in two. He said that an enemy offensive aimed at Hue and Tourane in Central Annam would be most dangerous. From the French point of view even with the increases asked by General Navarre, the situation is one of a vast country where there is no frontier, where guerrilla activities are universal, where the French forces are widely dispersed and where there is a constant absorption of the combat reserve available to the French High Command. The latter is doing its best but is confronted with extremely heavy burdens. It must defend Laos, which is the size of Korea although it has but a million inhabitants, in order to meet French commitments to the government of Laos. It is essential to resume the strategic offensive and to increase the mobility of the units. M. Bidault said that more air and naval forces are needed. He emphasized that the French authorities have a plan, adding that it is essential to rethink the methods of war in Indochina.

With regard to finances, M. Bidault said that France was estimating 482 billion francs for the period January 1 to December 31, 1954. This

does not include end-item assistance from the United States. M. Bidault estimated United States budgetary support for the period in question at $400 million or 140 billion francs, which has been authorized but not yet appropriated. As a further conjectural amount he indicated $40 million or 14 billion francs which the United States Government might be able to supply. He said that if the complete Navarre plan were accepted, the cost for 1954 above the figure which he had given would be about 20 billion francs additional. M. Bidault drew the Secretary's attention in the strongest terms to the concern of the French Government over its financial problem, particularly in the light of French public opinion and of the state of the French Treasury.

M. Bidault pointed to the basic and delicate political problem in the National Parliament where, generally speaking, those who support the Indochinese war (i.e., nationalistic elements) oppose the EDC and vice versa.

M. Bidault concluded with the suggestion that there should be made a joint examination of financial possibilities in connection with the Indochina enterprise. This would include a statement from the French as to the maximum they could supply plus a statement of what additional aid would be needed. He said that he was not asking for anything specific at this time.

Turning to the French Union, M. Bidault said that some people described the French Union as a prison and as a substitute for a colonial empire. It is in fact a community which does not prevent independent diplomatic relations on the part of its members or the form of government desired by each. Without this concept it would not be possible to retain parliamentary support for a war 12,000 kilometers from home. It is a necessary framework for the coordination of the various forces fighting in Indochina.

M. Bidault then referred to the NATO resolution of December 18 [4] "that the campaign waged by the French Union forces in Indochina deserves continuing support from the NATO governments". He wondered in this connection if France could get assistance from Britain or the United States vis-à-vis the King of Cambodia, who thinks that simply because he is anti-Communist he may be able to get the help he needs to remain independent elsewhere than from France. M. Bidault asked whether it would be possible for Britain and the United States to tell the King of Cambodia that the general interest would be served by his achieving independence within the French Union along the path indicated by the July 3rd Declaration of the French Government, and that this would be a great contribution to the defense of Southeast Asia from Communism.

M. Bidault then stated his hope that one theater of war in the Far East was to be closed—that in Korea. He recalled in this connection

[4] For the text of the resolution on Indochina, adopted by the North Atlantic Council on Dec. 18, 1952, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 4.

the Franco-American talks last March including the communiqué regarding the inter-dependence of the struggle in Korea and in Indochina, and also President Eisenhower's speech of April 16 in which the President gave the cessation of hostilities in Indochina as one of the hoped-for signs of a Communist desire for peace.[5] M. Bidault stated that the French Government has been approached by a "professionally" neutral power suggesting that certain steps might be taken by the French at Peking in connection with the Indochina situation. M. Bidault stated that this suggestion had been rejected.

M. Bidault said that some way should be found of making clear at the forthcoming Korean political conference the inter-dependence of the war theaters in Asia. He recognized that this would be extremely difficult and he recalled recent Soviet and Chinese declarations regarding the situation in Indochina. M. Bidault, however, directed the Secretary's attention to the fact that the Indochina war must not be allowed to continue after the Korean situation has been settled. He referred to the possibility of aviation being supplied to the enemy in Indochina as a result of capabilities made available by the cessation of the war in Korea. He concluded with a plea for a vigorous attempt to stop the seven years' war in Indochina if the war is stopped in Korea, although he recognized the great difficulties involved.

The Secretary expressed great appreciation of M. Bidault's statement. He said that Indochina is an area which we recognize is of profound concern to the United States, and that otherwise we would not have made the contribution which we have made there. He recalled that the subject has been discussed by him with the French on two previous occasions since the Eisenhower Administration came into power: in March in Washington and in April in Paris at the time of the NATO discussions.[6] The Secretary expressed his pleasure at being in continuing contact with M. Bidault on this important subject.

The Secretary recalled that M. Bidault's first topic was the political aspects. The Secretary stated that we are happy to recognize genuine and substantial progress along lines to which we have attached great importance. It must be made clear that this is not a colonial war but that it is an attempt by the enemy to destroy the liberty of free peoples.

The Secretary referred to the Norodom Palace as a symbol and hoped that a way would be found of making the proper symbolic gesture in spite of difficulties involved. The Secretary described the problem which we ourselves have faced in a similar context in Tokyo.

The Secretary stated that he had known Ambassador Dejean for

[5] For documentation on the visit of Prime Minister Mayer and Foreign Minister Bidault to the United States at the end of March, see volume VI; for the text of President Eisenhower's address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on Apr. 16, entitled "The Chance for Peace", see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 179–188 or Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 599–603.

[6] For documentation on the bilateral discussions with the French in Paris at the time of the North Atlantic Council meeting, Apr. 23–25, see pp. 369 ff.

many years and that he shared the high opinion of him expressed by M. Bidault.

The Secretary expressed the hope that something could be done to make clear and dramatic to the American people the important steps which have been taken by the French Government. The invitation contained in the July 3rd Declaration to the three governments of the Associated States to write their own ticket regarding continued association with France did not receive enough publicity here. It should be underlined. The Secretary said that even the President had not been aware of the true nature of the Declaration when it was issued. He added that this is a subject upon which we are frequently queried by Congress, and he stressed that the important step taken by the French had not been sufficiently dramatized. He hoped that the current meetings might provide some opportunity of restating what has taken place.

On the military side, the Secretary said that the analysis of the Navarre plan was one on which we could not yet pronounce ourselves. General O'Daniel is completing his report and the whole subject is being studied by the Pentagon.[7] He said, however, that we welcomed the plan as one designed to take the initiative and to give greater mobility. He recalled that limited forces can be more effective when they are on the offensive than when they are waiting for the other side to assume the initiative. The Secretary recognized the guerrilla problem, of which M. Bidault had spoken, but recalled that in addition there are substantial organized enemy forces whose destruction is the aim of the Navarre plan. He added that with the necessary strength and spirit of initiative this result seems obtainable. It would change the whole complexion of the struggle, reduce its cost, and reduce it to proportions with which the armies of the Associated States could cope.

On the subject of further Chinese aggression, the Secretary said that there was a possibility that the Viet Minh forces might be strengthened either by Chinese volunteers or by aviation based on China. This would mean that the task ahead would be quite a different one from that which now confronts us. It would create a situation comparable to that which existed when the Chinese volunteers came into Korea and had aviation bases on fields north of the Yalu River. The Secretary stated that it seemed reasonable to him to make plans in Indochina on the basis that there would be no such development there because it is probable, and the Communist know that it is probable, that such an operation would lead to a rather general war in the Pacific area and that sea and air forces from the United States might be brought to bear in areas other than Indochina.

[7] Further documentation on the reaction of the United States to the Navarre Plan including the recommendations by General O'Daniel is presented in volume XIII.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Nash stated that General O'Daniel is working on his report and has sent in a preliminary view of the Navarre plan, expressing the hope that the French may act favorably upon it. It appears to involve an effective use of available forces. Mr. Nash said that he hoped to have General O'Daniel come to Washington to present his views and his plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that we will then have an appraisal of the situation.

Mr. Nash recalled that the United States is providing the arms needed for 54 light battalions being raised in Viet Nam in 1953 and that we have made certain arrangements requested by the French for C–47's and C–119's. He also mentioned the favorable developments in connection with the legislation for an added aircraft carrier which the French desire to borrow.

The Secretary at this juncture said that President Eisenhower had once remarked that in his military experience, "after you get through thinking of your own troubles, it is well to remember that the enemy has just as many." The Secretary then turned to M. Bidault's discussions of the financial prospects and to M. Bidault's statement that budget-supporting aid which the French could anticipate from the United States in calendar 1954 would be $400 million plus a conjectural $40 million.

Mr. Stassen interjected that this $40 million figure was probably $25 million. He said that legislation calls for not over $400 million for Indochina but that it also has in it an additional amount of not over $100 million to be expended on artillery for NATO forces. Mr. Stassen recalled that these figures exactly carry out the Franco-American discussions at Paris in April. He concluded that he expected within two weeks' time that we would know exactly how much Congress will appropriate.

The Secretary then stated that on the basis that the French Union is not a precise juridical concept but rather a broad idea, and that we looked with favor upon such broad concepts which hold different peoples in different parts of the world together in security and fellowship. No nation can be totally independent under present conditions. The Secretary mentioned the British Commonwealth and the Organization of American States and concluded that the French Union is a very admirable concept.

The Secretary stated that we had "had the honor of the acquaintance of the King of Cambodia and had been able to form an estimate of his statesman-like qualities." He said that we would be glad to consider any way in which we can help to channel his energies into more constructive channels.

Turning to the question of a possible end of the war in Korea, the Secretary said that he did not know yet whether there would be such

an ending. He said that we are trying hard and doing all that we honorably can do but that he refuses to make any predictions.

If the war does end, continued the Secretary, it will not be because we merely wished it to end, but because we had developed and were prepared to take alternative measures which we believed would not be to the liking of the Communist enemy. He recalled that on the occasion of his return from the Pacific with the President and Secretary Humphrey last December, it was agreed that the way to end the war in Korea was to make the other side want to end it. We developed, and perhaps this came to the knowledge of the enemy, the measures which we are disposed to take.

The Secretary added that he would like to suggest that the way to bring the war in Indochina to an end, at least so far as the formally organized campaign is concerned, would be to take measures, or at least to have the will to take the measures outlined in the Navarre plan. The Secretary agreed with M. Bidault that peace is contagious and that it was natural for the people and Parliament of France to say that if there is peace in Korea why not in Indochina, but the Secretary stated that he could see no way less likely to end the war than to attempt to negotiate a settlement if the Franco-Associated States side has neither the will nor the capability to take steps to make the enemy want to bring the conflict to an end. The Secretary said that in our case we have not had to take the measures we had contemplated in Korea but the enemy's knowledge of the existence of those measures has undoubtedly helped to inspire the will in him to end the conflict.

The Secretary continued by stating that for the reasons which he had indicated rather than for merely diplomatic or technical reasons, he doubted if the Korean political conference would be either the time or place to negotiate on Indochina. The conference might, however, be both the time and place to reaffirm to the Chinese Communists that which was expressed in the Mayer Communiqué of last March and in the President's April 16 speech, and that the Chinese Communists might well be put on notice of the fact that, if ending the war in Korea is for them merely a means of releasing assets for aggressive use elsewhere, the armistice in Korea would be a fraud and would be treated as such. Unless the enemy proposes to negotiate a settlement in Indochina, the Secretary doubted the wisdom of our asking for the inclusion of the item on the agenda of the Korean political conference even if we could get the other parties to agree. Such agreement appeared most doubtful to the Secretary.

M. Bidault stated that he had underlined the difficulties involved in including Indochina in the Korean conference but he added that since peace is indivisible it seemed incongruous to make peace in Korea and not in Southeast Asia. He directed attention to the recent declarations of Reynaud favoring negotiations with the Chinese Communists and

of Mendes-France which implied negotiations with Ho Chi Minh.[8] M. Bidault recalled that his own position had been "negotiations if possible, victory if necessary". M. Bidault said that the French Government would be in an absolutely impossible position if there were no prospects for peace in Indochina after a cease fire in Korea. He strongly reiterated the importance of exploring all means to bring peace to Indochina.

Secretary Dulles recalled that the war in Korea is being conducted under UN auspices and said that it was quite complicated to bring into a UN negotiation another war with which the UN had never concerned itself. He recalled that we had several times suggested that the Indochina situation be brought to the UN and treated as an act of concerted aggression but that the French Government had preferred not to do this.

M. Bidault rejoined that France had preferred not to bring Indochina before the UN because experience has shown, and the French are sure that this would be the case, that if Indochina were brought before the UN the case would degenerate into an attack on French policies in North Africa, Madagascar, etc. He said that France had no desire to be put into a position of a defendant before the UN.

M. Bidault said that he would remember what the Secretary had said regarding a warning to the Chinese Communist, including the substance of the March Communiqué and the President's speech, but he said that he regarded this as an insufficient minimum. He said that there was already taking place a transfer of capabilities from Korea to Indochina and he referred to the fact that Chinese aid to the Viet Minh has been running for the last three months at the rate of 10,000 tons per month. He also referred to the probability that the enemy in Indochina will have aviation support.

The Secretary said that the figures which M. Bidault had brought forward regarding Chinese aid were much greater than those which we had received. There is however agreement that aid is increasing. M. Bidault confirmed his figures.

The Secretary then said that if there is a political conference on Korea and if conditions at the time indicate that talks on Indochina would be fruitful, the Secretary would be glad to include that topic and would not refuse to do so on purely technical grounds, but he expressed the view that to insert the question now would involve a show of weakness and would not obtain the results which we all desire.

M. Bidault reiterated that French public opinion will demand that peace in Indochina be discussed. If it is not, the result will be to make

[8] Presumably these references are to statements on Indochina by Paul Reynaud and Pierre Mendès-France on May 27 and June 3, respectively, when each was trying to form a government in France. For the texts of the statements, see *Journal Officiel, Débats*, May 28, 1953, pp. 2846–2850 and *ibid.*, June 4, 1953, pp. 2906–2912.

insurmountable the difficulties with which the French Government is presently confronted. These difficulties are political as well as financial and economic.

The Secretary then asked M. Bidault whether the latter had given thought to what might be the basis for a negotiated peace in Indochina.

M. Bidault in turn asked whom the negotiation would be conducted with. He said that of course there could be no negotiation without agreement of the Associated States and of France's allies. He said that he did not want peace at any price. He pointed out that there are no frontiers involved. He suggested that perhaps a negotiated peace on the basis of free elections, perhaps under UN control, might be worth trying. M. Bidault said that he himself had prevented negotiations heretofore, but he stated that if there is a conference in Korea and if the scope of that conference cannot be stretched to include Indochina, might it not be posssible to set up a special conference on Indochina with the support of our allies and of course including the Associated States?

The Secretary answered that there was no desire on the part of the United States to keep the war going on in Indochina except for the purpose of protecting interests vital to all concerned. He added that if a Korean conference takes place and the mood of those who are there indicates that a conference on Indochina would be a profitable affair, the United States would not oppose such a conference. The Secretary added however that the forthcoming Korean political conference would be dominated by Korean problems and personalities. Those present would include the representatives of both Koreans and of the UN. He did not think that it was practical to try to get these people to busy themselves with the Indochina problem.

The Secretary gave it as his opinion that a negotiation conducted under circumstances where our side would have no alternative, and would be "bankrupt" could only end in complete disaster. The Secretary said that if we can work out the Navarre plan and make progress demonstrating that we have the will and capability to sustain that plan, there might then be a prospect of success in negotiations.

M. Bidault stated energetically that he would never propose negotiations which would be equivalent to capitulation. Peace is something which must be worked at. The French Government does not plan to stab the expeditionary corps or the Associated States forces in the back. M. Bidault said that that is not what he is talking about at all. He added, however, that it would be easier to send troops to Indochina if the people in France see a possible end to the war, such as an end secured through negotiations at a conference. He added that negotiations of course should not be behind the back of the Associated States.

M. Bidault said that he thought the Chinese Communists and the Russians would now close up shop in Korea but that they would con-

tinue their Indochina enterprise, refusing any conference on Indochina because of their wish to leave this "colonial sore" running in the side of the West and thereby excite social hatred of the West. M. Bidault stressed the need of finding a way to do something about Indochina and asked that the question not be dropped. He said that what France wanted was a peace which would be fair to the fighters and to the whole world of free men. He added that there are on our side 532,000 men fighting in Indochina; we can't hand them over to the enemy or have them thrown into the sea.

The Secretary stated his thought that before we can get peace in Indochina, we must develop a capability to make the enemy shut up shop in Indochina too.

M. Bidault agreed to this concept. However he contrasted the threat in sending 20,000 more men to Indochina, with the US capacity for atomic destruction of Manchuria. The problem is most difficult; it is one which we must keep to ourselves. M. Bidault said that he did not know whether the Navarre solution would be a sufficient one.

It was generally agreed that there would be no revelation to the Press or discussion with the Press on the aspect of the conversation dealing with negotiations.[9]

[9] At 9:30 Lord Salisbury and Ambassador Makins called at Dulles' house. He reported to them the substance of this meeting with the French. Salisbury indicated that he believed it would be impractical to include Indochina in the agenda for a Korean political conference, but that a political talk on Indochina with somewhat different membership might grow out of the political conference. Dulles expressed his agreement with these views. On Monday, July 13, Salisbury advised Dulles that he had had a private meeting with Bidault prior to his meeting with Dulles at 9:30. (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles, July 13; 396.1 WA/7–1353)

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**THIRD TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SUITE, 1778 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, WASHINGTON, JULY 13, 1953, 10:30 A. M.**

PARTICIPANTS

| UNITED STATES | FRANCE |
|---|---|
| Secretary Dulles | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Ambassador Dillon | Ambassador Bonnet |
| Ambassador Aldrich | M. de Margerie |
| Mr. Matthews | M. Falaize |
| Mr. Merchant | M. François Seydoux |
| Mr. MacArthur | M. Daridan |
| Mr. Bowie | M. Roger Seydoux |
| Mr. Phillips | M. de Juniac |
| Mr. Johnson | M. Roux |
| Mr. Bonsal | Col. de Brebisson |
| Mr. Knight | M. Vimont |
| Mr. O'Connor | M. Sauvagnargues |
| Mr. Kitchen | M. Martin |
| Mr. McBride | M. Carraud |
| Mr. Trulock | M. Andronikov |

Mr. Nash
Col. Black
Mutual Security Director Stassen
Mr. Matteson

UNITED KINGDOM

Lord Salisbury
Ambassador Makins
Sir Frank Roberts
Mr. Allen
Mr. Gore-Booth
Mr. Tomlinson
Mr. Watson
Mr. Leishman
Mr. Porter
Mr. MacGinnis
Mr. Marshall

**Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158**

*Trulock Minutes*[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 15, 1953.

ST MIN 3 (Draft)

[Here follows a list of the subjects discussed by the Foreign Ministers.]

*The Far East*

*The Secretary's Report on the Status of the Korean Situation.*[2]

The Secretary opened the meeting with a report on the status of the negotiations in Korea.[3] He said that about a month ago it seemed as if the Communists were prepared to sign the armistice agreement. The first indication of this was the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.

Throughout this period there had been mounting opposition by President Rhee to an armistice under the proposed terms. As the likelihood of an armistice increased, Rhee's resistance became more open and culminated with the release of the non-Communist North Korean prisoners by South Korean police under direct orders of Rhee. This act made it impossible for the U.N. Command to fulfill the terms of the armistice agreement. It came without warning and in spite of Rhee's assurances that he would take no unilateral action without consulting U.N. Command. Subsequently Rhee said that his assurances had related only to the withdrawal of ROK troops.

As Rhee's opposition became more open the U.S. Government under-

[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that the minutes had been prepared by Trulock, but had not been cleared or approved. The Department of State transmitted to London a summary of the third meeting in telegrams 230 and 232, July 14. (396.1 WA/7–1453) The first telegram, which summarized the discussion on European unity, was repeated to Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, and Bonn. The second telegram, which summarized the discussion on the Far East, was repeated to Paris, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Taipei, Pusan, and New York.

[2] Further documentation on Korea is presented in volume XV.

[3] Documentation on the armistice negotiations between the United Nations and Communist Commands in Korea is presented *ibid.*

took such measures as it could. The Secretary said that negotiations between Assistant Secretary Robertson and Rhee have been the most difficult he could recall. He said that Mr. Robertson had conducted these most difficult discussions in an able and skillful manner, matching patience against impatience and reason and persuasion against emotion. As a result Rhee has apparently agreed to go along with the armistice. We have agreed to negotiate a security treaty with the Republic of Korea similar to the treaties now in existence with Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The area covered by the security treaty will be limited to that under the control of the Republic of Korea. We have also agreed to aid in the reconstruction of South Korea. This will probably involve a substantial sum over a period of about three years. The security treaty, of course, will be subject to the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate and the funds for the rehabilitation of Korea will be subject to Congressional action. We also agreed to attempt to obtain the peaceful reunification of Korea in the post-armistice conference. This is in line with the initial objectives of the U.N.

The Secretary believed that the situation is in shape so that we can reasonably proceed to consummate an armistice if the Communist are willing to do so. If they are not, we are prepared to carry on the war.

Our contacts with them since the talks have been reopened have been inconclusive. The Communist wish the U.S. to: (1) guarantee observation of the armistice by the ROK and (2) agree to attempt to recapture the North Korean prisoners released by Rhee. They had previously dropped this last demand, but it reappeared during last night's session.

The Secretary said that the U.S. had made it clear that we were not prepared to enforce the observation of the armistice terms by any other government. We have told the Communists that we would not use the U.N. forces against the ROK forces. We have, however, taken measures and obtained assurances which lead us to believe that there is little likelihood that the ROK will attempt in the near future to carry on the war independently.

The Secretary said that in any political conferences following an armistice, the U.S. would expect to maintain a strong front with Rhee on peaceful reunification with Korea. We would assume that the rest of the U.N. delegation would support this but in any event the U.S. would do so.

*Policy Toward Communist China in the Event of an Armistice.*[4]

The Secretary hoped that the economic measures on trade against Communist China would be continued and that there would be no

[4] Documentation on the policy of the United States with respect to China is presented in volume XIV.

relaxation of these restrictions.[5] He said that there were two important reasons for this: (1) as a pressure on the Communist during the political conferences and (2) as a measure against increased Chinese aid to the Communists in Indochina. In view of the importance of the latter the Secretary hoped that the French would add to their embargo list certain items which were now on the U.S. and U.K. lists, i.e., certain iron and steel products.

The Secretary hoped that the U.K. and France would adhere to the present policy with respect to non-admission of Communist China to the U.N.

He said that the U.S. attached great importance to the Greater Sanctions Statement which had been agreed to by all U.N. countries with forces in Korea. He said that the additional French language had been agreed to by all except the Philippines. He wondered if it would be desirable to consider making public the Greater Sanctions Statement.

Lord Salisbury congratulated the Secretary on his statement and said that he was much encouraged by it. He paid tribute to the skill, patience and tenacity of the U.S. negotiators whose task had been made doubly difficult by an intransigent enemy and a stubborn ally.

The Secretary asked if he could interrupt to express his government's appreciation for the confidence which our Allies had shown in us during the difficult period of negotiations. He referred particularly to the U.K. and French support on the matter of calling a special session of the General Assembly during the delicate negotiations with Rhee and the Communists.

Lord Salisbury said that the U.K. felt—and still feels—very strongly that it would not be helpful for the General Assembly to meet on Korea during the very delicate negotiations now taking place. He said that he had been immensely interested in the Secretary's remarks re: (1) the security treaty; (2) economic assistance and (3) peaceful reunification of Korea. On the latter point he said that it might not be able to attain this goal immediately, but said that it was an aim with which "we all have sympathy."

The Secretary wished to clarify some of the references in the press to "the 90-day guarantee". He said that Rhee was afraid that the political conferences might be used by the Communists solely for propaganda purposes and as a cover for further build-up. We had assured Rhee that, if after 90 days we believed that the conference was being used by the Communists as a strategem for strategic or propaganda purposes, we would be prepared to discuss with Rhee the termi-

[5] Documentation on trade with China including material on the Greater Sanctions Statement is presented in volume XIV.

nation of the conference. We pointed out we could only speak for the U.S. in this matter.

With respect to economic sanctions, Lord Salisbury said that he thoroughly agreed with the Secretary that there could be no automatic relaxation of trade controls following an armistice in Korea. He felt that the present controls should be maintained and that this matter should be re-examined later in the light of the Communist Chinese behavior. He felt the same way with respect to the question of Communist Chinese representation in the U.N. The Secretary replied that the differences between the U.S. and U.K. on this matter were differences of degree not in kind.

Lord Salisbury doubted the utility of publishing the Greater Sanctions Statement during this period when we are attempting to create a harmonious atmosphere in order to conclude an armistice. He said, however, that his government would be glad to give further consideration to this question.

The Secretary said that it had been felt that publication of this statement might give certain reassurances to the ROK but that this might now be accomplished by the Security Pact. He said that it might be useful if the Communist Chinese knew that there was such an agreement as the Greater Sanctions Agreement in existence, but that it might be well not to release it publicly until it would be useful to do so.

M. Bidault expressed his appreciation and admiration for the perseverence shown by the U.S. during our negotiations with "the enemy and the ally". He felt that the result is not beyond hope and that the successful conclusion would be a tribute to those whose efforts had obtained the truce. He felt that publication of the Greater Sanctions Agreement should not precede the certainty of an armistice but he did not feel that this statement should be relegated to oblivion and he put in a strong plug for the additional French language.

With respect to trade controls he said that when the French Delegation had been in Washington 3 months ago they had reported certain logical progress. He pointed out that there was some feeling in France against reducing exports of iron and steel products in view of the expanding German shipments. He said that it was entirely logical that the economic and military potential of Communist China should not be increased by those who were fighting the Chinese. He agreed in principle with the Secretary's remarks regarding control of iron and steel shipments and stated that he was forced to say "in principle" because there were ships on the way that he could not stop. He said that before leaving Paris he had instructed that further shipments of these materials be halted.

*Indochina.*

M. Bidault warned that "peace in Korea might mean war in Indochina". He referred to Indochina as the wound in the side of Southeast Asia and suggested that the three Ministers should probe all possible means of improving the situation in the essential area of Southeast Asia. He said that he had nothing specific to propose at the moment but simply wished the other Ministers to reflect on this problem. He added that he might have more to say on this subject later.

M. Bidault pointed out that his concern with Indochina did not grow out of a French desire to pull out, but because the French desired to liquidate the war with honor. He urged that the Ministers not neglect the possibility of preventing in Indochina the loss of "the good that might come elsewhere".

The Secretary said that he had listened attentively to M. Bidault's remarks, especially his inference that Indochina might be discussed in any political conference following a Korean armistice. He pointed out that the UN had never taken any part in Indochina nor had it been invited to do so. He agreed that no opportunity should be thrown away to explore ways to extend the areas of peace in the world. He said that to attempt to agree that Indochina should be on the agenda of the post-armistice political conference would raise many difficulties.

Lord Salisbury said that the point raised by M. Bidault was most important, but very complicated. He said that Indochina had never been before the UN and that it was his understanding that the French had not wanted this. He said that since the political conference was a matter of UN concern and would be called on an *ad hoc* basis to deal with Korea, it would not be appropriate to put Indochina on the agenda. However, if Korea was dealt with satisfactorily in the conference and if it were found that a favorable atmosphere existed, then we should keep an open mind about other matters to be explored. The policies of the Soviet Government and its satellites are unclear at the moment, but it might be that they will wish to liquidate all of their wars.

M. Bidault agreed with the U.S. and the U.K. that procedural difficulties existed, but pointed out that procedure was not always a factor uppermost in the public mind. He added that he had not stated that the conference should deal with Indochina but only that the Indochina situation should be dealt with. He was not very optimistic about the atmosphere in the political conference. Since Indochina is of great interest, not only to France, but also to the U.S. and the U.K., he might have some specific proposals to make to the two governments through normal diplomatic channels, provided a Korean armistice is achieved.

The Secretary asked M. Bidault if he wished to report further on Indochina, particularly with respect to the recent French notes [6] to the

[6] See footnote 3, p. 1644.

Associated States.

M. Bidault said that the steps taken by the French had been welcomed by the Associated States, especially Laos and Viet Nam. He said there had been a less favorable reaction from Cambodia.

"What did we say? We said that independence, not something else, would be granted". He said that the Associated States would determine the nature of the negotiations, which would be conducted immediately and rapidly with all States. The negotiations will deal with political, economic and military matters as well as symbols which, M. Bidault said, are more important than at first glance. He referred to the problem of the rights of the Chinese population under existing Treaty arrangements. He said that military commands would be transferred under existing agreements. As for state officials, the French would keep only those requested by the Associated States, but he predicted that the Associated States may ask for more French officials rather than less. He referred to the new French Ambassador as a man well known to the U.S. and U.K. representatives, a man of great prestige and merit. He said that no one could believe that he would have a "proconsular state of mind".

He said that many people wondered why the situation in Indochina had appeared to deteriorate, particularly by comparison with de Lattre's statements. He said that "the front is nowhere and the enemy is everywhere". While the enemy has no large quantities of heavy weapons, it was extremely difficult to conduct a war against people who appeared to be peasants by day and were soldiers by night. In Indochina, he said, there was always the "burglar-policeman" relationship, that is, the policeman must always wait for the burglar to make the move. He said that it was impossible to find large concentrations of the enemy against which military maneuvers could be conducted. The foe was extremely mobile and operated principally in small groups by night.

He referred to the new plan devised by the French Government which involved: (1) an acceleration of the U.S. [*use*?] of Associated States troops and (2) expansion of "means". He said that an expansion of means would involve increased expenditures and that, while France had received considerable aid from the U.S., the increased expenditures could not be carried out on the basis of the present level of aid. He said that a new French plan envisaged gaining superiority over the Vietminh in quality and means, if not numerical superiority. He said that he had discussed the details of this program previously with both the Secretary and Lord Salisbury.

He asked that the action taken by the French with respect to the Associated States be recognized by the conference and referred to the final communiqué. He said that this would encourage his Government and the Associated States and call the attention of the world to this

recent action. He added that the French delegation would table a suggested statement on this for inclusion in the communiqué.

Lord Salisbury said that his government was most interested in the steps being taken by the French toward the Associated States. He said that M. Bidault had referred to them as independent and sovereign states and he wondered if they would be analogous to members of the British Commonwealth. With respect to the military situation, he said that the British experience in Malaya made it easy for them to understand and appreciate the French difficulties in Indochina. He referred to the new French military program and asked if it were true that the French Government was prepared to initiate new measures at considerable sacrifice in Indochina. He asked this not from idle curiosity or because of the British interest in Southeast Asia, but with reference to M. Bidault's earlier remarks regarding negotiations. He stressed that if the French Government were considering negotiation, they should negotiate from strength. If the French negotiated from weakness, it would do far more harm than good.

M. Bidault said that the situation in Indochina was not deteriorating in any deep or inevitable way. He stressed that the French were holding the vital points and areas. He pointed out that there was the question of whether it was advisable to decrease strength in Europe in order to increase strength in Asia, and he touched briefly on the problem of sending conscripts to fight 2,000 kilometers from home.

In answer to Lord Salisbury's question, he said that the relation of each member of the French Union is determined by "statutes" agreed between states concerned. He referred to the chapter on the French Union in the text of the French Constitution.

Lord Salisbury hoped that it would be possible to return to Far Eastern questions later in the conference.

The Secretary suggested that each delegation nominate a member to work on the Far Eastern section of the communiqué. He designated Mr. Johnson for the U.S.; Lord Salisbury named Mr. Tomlinson; and the French named M. Roux.

(It was agreed that the meeting would recess for 15 minutes and reconvene to discuss the draft declaration on European Unity.)

*Draft Tripartite Statement on European Unity*

The Secretary referred to the "Draft Tripartite Statement on European Unity" [7] and said that in many respects it was an admirable paper, but there were two ideas expressed in the U.S. draft [8] (Annex A to draft Communiqué VI) which had been omitted. He read the two passages:

"These constructive efforts to build a stable, secure European Community are a major contribution toward world peace. This success is

[7] Not found in the Department of State files.
[8] Dated July 9, p. 1699.

essential for the security and prosperity of Europe and the world." and "Since the Community is an answer to long-term needs and interests, a reduction in tensions between the Soviet Union and the West would in no way remove the necessity for carrying it forward expeditiously."

The Secretary strongly urged that these two *ideas*, not necessarily the specific language, be incorporated in the Communiqué.

He said that the U.S. has felt that since the end of World War II that the war would have been fought and won in vain unless there could be organic unity on the continent of Europe. This feeling has been expressed over the years by a whole series of statements by members of the Executive Branch and members of Congress. It underlay the Marshall Plan idea and this sentiment is now reflected in the strings attached by the Congress to the present Mutual Security bill which provides that end-items are to be deliverable to the EDC or its members and that, if EDC is not in existence within 8 months, the matter must be referred back to the Congress. He pointed out that the Executive Branch had tried very hard to leave this matter in the hands of the President but had not been successful in this.

He said that our whole strategy in Western Europe depends on the availability of the German contingency and that the whole question of future peace and security rests on this. He added that the President feels very strongly about this.

He stated that the consummation of EDC would not come about unless it was believed that its ratification is indispensable to peace and security in Europe. If, on the other hand, it is believed that it is not essential or that it is simply a response to tensions created by the Soviet threat then we should resign ourselves to the fact that it will never come into being. This is true because Soviet tactics, by words costing them nothing, can seem to relax existing tension and if the proponents of EDC believe that it is merely in response to those tensions, they will abandon the project.

The Secretary said that the U.S. has a large part of its military forces on the continent of Europe and that he could only express the views of his government and the probable position of this country. He expressed those views as a friend and as a helper. The delay in ratification of EDC is causing difficulties in this country. Many believe that the assurances that EDC would come into being has caused us to take strong steps and that unless we can soon give reasonable indication that there will be an EDC, these steps will have to be re-examined. The Secretary said that unless the three Ministers could make a strong statement re EDC at the conclusion of this meeting, it would be better to say nothing at all. He felt that the omission of the two points referred to above would be interpreted as an abandonment of EDC.

He knew that M. Bidault did not wish this, because since the war he had been a strong advocate of European unity. The Secretary said that he knew EDC was close to M. Bidault's heart and said that we depend strongly on him for French action. He strongly urged M. Bidault to agree to language which would indicate the two ideas referred to above. The Secretary said that if the French Foreign Minister was unable to do this at this time, this country would have to conclude that the future of EDC is problematic. The Secretary did not wish to predict what the consequences of this would be, but said that Ambassador Bonnet could advise the French Government of these consequences. The Secretary said that the President would be no more able to prevent such consequences than he was to prevent the EDC restriction in the Mutual Security Bill.

M. Bidault expressed his gratitude for the Secretary's remarks about his personal role in regard to European unity. However, he was embarrassed at present circumstances because he was doubtful about the wisdom of coming out with a strong statement on EDC as a result of this meeting. He feared that it might have unfortunate repercussions in the French Parliament. He said that the language of the draft tripartite statement represented an attempt by the working group to take up the text of the U.S. draft. He referred to paragraphs (4*a*) and (4*b*) of the tripartite draft and said that this language seemed to take into account the facts which can be achieved. He pointed out that this language was further than his instructions allowed him to go. He did not feel that this language was weak and incompatible.

He said that this was a real problem in his own Parliament. His enemies would say that he went to Washington to get a mandate on something against which there is a majority at the present in the French Parliament. He said that this was not his last word and he had come this far because he wished to reach agreement. He said that all of this was a question of balance with the other papers to be discussed.

Lord Salisbury said that he had just received a reply from London in response to his cable asking for instructions re the proposal discussed on Friday and Saturday. Her Majesty's Government is ready to join in an early 4-Power meeting in advance of ratification of EDC. The date suggested was the same considered in the meetings on Friday and Saturday, i.e., late September or early October. His government took the view that careful consideration should be given to: (1) the agenda and (2) the terms of reference of such a meeting, in view of the effect on public opinion or a failure of the 4-Power meetings. His government believed that the principles with respect to Germany should be those contained in the note of September 23, 1952. There should be no question of reopening agreed policy such as the EDC. There should be no question of deciding that there was no need for EDC. He stated that firm reaffirmation of the attached three governments to the EDC

was absolutely necessary and that the present draft was hardly firm enough. There was little reference to the EDC as an immediate objective and there was no sense of urgency expressed. Failure to recognize this urgency would be disastrous.

If Germany is on the edge of unification, Lord Salisbury felt that this might be the last chance to assure German alignment with the West. Lord Salisbury said that if he was told that he had no right to say all of this he would reply that the U.K. has done everything possible to assist in the consummation of EDC and that—along with the U.S.—his government has maintained large forces in Germany without which the Soviets might have swept across Europe. Germany must be given every opportunity to share in the burden of defense in Europe.

He said that he knew that M. Bidault would agree with all of this and he recognized M. Bidault's dedication to EDC and integration. He hoped that M. Bidault would agree to strengthen the language of the present draft. He added that he had some suggested language to table for the experts' consideration. He concluded that, since the three governments had made great progress toward an agreed position regarding a 4-Power meeting, he was sure they would be able to agree on this matter.

The Secretary welcomed the views of Her Majesty's Government. He said that his own government had been inclined toward the earlier view of the U.K. that no 4-Power meeting should be held before EDC is ratified, but that our advice from Germany indicated that this might not be the wisest position. He said, however, that when he indicated that the U.S. was prepared to agree to a 4-Power meeting, it was with the understanding that it would be made quite clear that there was no question about a strong statement to the effect that such a meeting would have no effect on the urgent need for EDC ratification. If there was to be a question about this, then the U.S. might wish to revert to the position held by the U.K. earlier.

The Secretary asked M. Bidault to look at the U.K. suggestions and to consider the two points outlined by the Secretary and to see if the language could be strengthened without creating an unfavorable reaction in the French Parliament.

M. Bidault said that he was ready to consider any revision within his terms of reference. He said, however, that the whole of this document (the draft tripartite statement) was related to EDC. He said that all of the documents to be considered were related to each other. With respect to the question of freedom of the German Government, he referred to article VII of the Contractual Agreements.[9] He stated that European integration was certainly not a question to be negotiated

[9] The text of the convention on relations between the three powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, is printed in volume VII.

with the Soviets and this should be stated in such a way not to disturb those that do not believe it.

He proposed that this matter be referred to the experts. He also suggested that it would be preferable to shorten the plenary sessions.

Lord Salisbury agreed with M. Bidault that these documents should be given to the experts. He suggested that the tripartite meeting scheduled for this afternoon might be at the expert level and that the principals should instruct their experts. The Secretary suggested that the three Ministers should meet again at 5:00 p. m. to consider all three of the documents. M. Bidault agreed and suggested that if after examining the products of the expert working group, the Ministers could not agree, they should meet in a small room with only a few advisers. This was agreed.

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**MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ASSOCIATED STATES, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SUITE, WASHINGTON, JULY 13, 1953, 2:45 P. M.**

PARTICIPANTS

| UNITED STATES | FRANCE |
|---|---|
| The Secretary of State | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Mr. Bonsal | Ambassador Bonnet |
| Mr. Kitchen | M. Louis Falaize |
| Mr. Hoey | M. Roger Seydoux |
| Mr. McBride | M. Jacques Roux |
| Mr. Matteson | Colonel de Brebisson |
| Col. Black | M. Jacques Vimont |
| | M. Jacques Martin |
| | M. Pierre Carraud |
| | M. Pierre Pelletier |
| | M. Constantin Andronikov |

| VIET NAM | LAOS |
|---|---|
| Miss Nguyen de-Nguyen-xuan-Dung | Ourot Souvannavong |
| | Inpeng Suryadhay |

CAMBODIA

Ambassador Nong Kimny
H. R. H. Kantol Norodom

**Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158**

*United States Delegation Minutes* [1]

**SECRET** WASHINGTON, July 16, 1953.

STFA MIN 1

Foreign Minister Bidault opened with a welcome to the representatives of the Associated States and said he wished to repeat the as-

[1] The Department of State transmitted to Paris a summary of this meeting in telegram 153, July 14 (396.1 WA/7–1453). The telegram was repeated to London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane.

surances which had already been given to them regarding the full independence of their countries within the framework of ("au sein de") the French Union. He said that an outstanding career diplomat who was also an expert on Far Eastern questions and noted for his liberal spirit had been appointed as High Commissioner in Indochina. He added there should be no delay in getting the talks underway, and that the three Associated States are free to indicate exactly what they want in the economic, financial, administrative, judicial, and even military fields. He noted that no French civil servants would remain in any of the Associated States unless requested to remain by one of the States.

He declared that the French Union and Associated States troops now fighting in Indochina form the principal effective barrier to Communism in Southeast Asia already, and that efforts would certainly be made to raise additional French Union forces. He stressed that the entente among the four nations must be harmonious and they must also work closely with the US which has furnished such important military and moral assistance. M. Bidault stated that the French desire is for the full independence of the three States, and that the purpose of the July 3 statement [2] was to remove the uncertainty which apparently existed in some minds as to French policy.

Secretary Dulles, after welcoming the Associated States representatives, said that the future of these three countries was symbolic in the world today. He stated that occasionally the three powers at this conference—the US, UK and France—had been accused of not being interested in promoting independence in the world. He said that no charge was so false and misleading, and cited the record of the past ten years during which political independence has been given by these three powers to former colonial and dependent areas, comprising about 600,000,000 people, and representing nearly 25 percent of the population of the world. He said these former dependent territories now formed nearly a score of free states, and stressed that all of this had occurred as a result of voluntary action by these three powers. He also mentioned that the history of all three had long been characterized by the belief in the rights of man and human dignity. All three also believed in the natural evolution of peoples in a non-self-governing status towards independence.

Secretary Dulles said that the impediment to independence today had nothing to do with the desires of the US, UK or France, but rather that the great danger in the world today to small weak states, relatively inexperienced in self-government, was the aggressive policy of the Soviet Union. He noted Stalin had stated that nationalism is a slogan which is to be used to break up the unity of the free world, and to obtain independence for various areas which the Soviet Union

[2] See footnote 3, p. 1644.

would then try to absorb into its own orbit, where no freedom exists. The Secretary remarked that the Soviets have already grabbed almost twenty states and now control 800,000,000 people.

The problem is not one of theoretical independence, Secretary Dulles added, since the three governments represented at the conference have already made clear their position on this matter, but rather how much independence can be granted that won't immediately be snatched away by the Communists. It was as a result of this situation, the Secretary noted, that a collective security policy had been started. Today no one country, even one of the so-called Big Three, is safe. Secretary Dulles noted that this was the doctrine he had preached to Congress, i.e. that it was not safe to stand alone, even for the US. He continued that this conclusion would apply even more to the Associated States.

Continuing, Secretary Dulles said no condition in the world was so dangerous today as to be totally independent. We must have associations and the responsibilities that such a cooperative effort entailed. Certainly he favored a high degree of autonomy but coupled with ties that bind and give strength. He said the evolution of such an arrangement, as in the case of the British Commonwealth or the French Union, was one of the signs of the genius of free peoples. He said that independence must be coupled with inter-dependence.

In closing Secretary Dulles expressed a high appreciation of the recent French proposal, which he regarded as essential. He said the peoples of the Associated States must have as much independence as possible to give them something to fight for. They should manage all the essentials of their own affairs, and accordingly we applauded most strongly the French effort which was made with great sincerity. He urged the Associated States and France to work out their destiny, giving independence to the three States and assuring sufficient cooperation among the four to preserve that independence.

The Cambodian Ambassador, after thanking Secretary Dulles for the invitation to attend the conference, said he was glad the French have invited the Associated States to negotiate. He noted the danger of Communism to independence, and Secretary Dulles' statement that the three powers represented at the conference have always done their duty in the world and given independence freely to other states.

The Ambassador remarked that Franco-Cambodian relations had just passed through a rather bad phase, and expressed appreciation that the French Government, even though it has just been installed, had already attempted to solve the problem. French policy has certainly taken a step forward in the July 3 declaration which sought a solution agreeable to Cambodia. The Ambassador said he had been authorized by his Government to say that the Cambodian situation was a special one, and that, while France had stated the existing accords should form the basis for negotiations, this suggestion does not respond to the wishes of the Cambodian people. He added that a note had been

delivered on July 12[3] to the French High Commissioner in Phnom Penh giving the details as to how the Cambodian Government wished to conduct the talks. He said the details were secret but that in general what was required was an unequivocal declaration of independence by France and by Cambodia. Subsequently he said special concessions would be given to France.

The Ambassador stressed that the Communist danger was real and visible, and that Cambodia had never sought the French departure from Cambodia nor to leave the French Union. He said Cambodia had accepted French aid and was grateful to France for sacrificing the flower of her army and billions of francs in Indochina. He said his country had been devastated by seven years of war, and of course welcomed any initiative to end that war. He said Cambodia's demand for full independence is primarily for the purpose of giving the people a reason and desire to fight Communism and thus to show the enemy the Cambodian determination to pursue the struggle. He continued that the King of Cambodia himself had been active in the campaign against Communism, and that the Viet-Minh had caused too much ruin in Cambodia not to be hated. He said Communism is the negation of the monarchy, religion and society of his country. Accordingly, the King of Cambodia had wished to mobilize the country fully to fight with the French against Communism. He concluded, indicating he thought a solution to the problems of his country was possible.

The Chargé d'Affaires of Vietnam thanked Secretary Dulles for his invitation, and stated that she had not had time to get a message from her Government for the conference, but wished to express gratitude for the military and moral aid of both the US and France to her country. She said that the French declaration of July 3 would assist in resolving the troubles in her country and in meeting its needs. She concluded stating she felt it was important to begin negotiations as soon as possible since they represented a vital step forward in the cause of independence and peers. The whole country of Vietnam was anxiously awaiting the results of these meetings, she said.

The Minister of Laos said that the Secretary's advice regarding independence versus inter-dependence would be hard not to follow. He also said that it was important to give the Laotian people a feeling they were fighting for a cause, and he noted that his country had just given proof of its determination to fight. He thanked the US for aid given to his country and stated that since the war France had substituted friendship for colonialism. The Minister expressed thanks to France for the July 3 declaration, which he indicated was a proof that France was carrying out her promises. He said his Government greeted with satisfaction the declaration, and the King and most of the principal Laotian Ministers were already in France where they would hold a

[3] For the text of the Cambodian note of July 12, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 472–474.

cabinet meeting after which a note would be sent to the French Government, and the Laotian officials would be ready to begin the talks.

The Laotian Minister agreed that independence cannot be absolute today and that his country desired inter-dependence and was content with the steps which France had already taken. In conclusion he said that the important problem for his country was to consolidate the steps which had been taken and those which were about to take place.

In closing the meeting, Secretary Dulles said that he felt it was fortunate that the US happened to be the host at this conference so that we could participate in this meeting with the representatives of the other four states. He said he considered the negotiations which were about to take place as an historic event. He noted that we are only indirectly concerned of course but that these talks carry the hopes of millions of Americans, and we are sure that the negotiations will result in strengthening the citadel of freedom.

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**FOURTH TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SUITE, 1778 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, WASHINGTON, JULY 13, 1953, 5 P. M.**

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES

Secretary Dulles
Ambassador Aldrich
Ambassador Dillon
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Merchant
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Riddleberger
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Bonsal
Mr. Phillips
Mr. Knight
Mr. Morris
Mr. Kidd
Mr. Kitchen
Mr. Trulock
Miss Wilson
Mr. Gordon
Mutual Security Director Stassen
Mr. Matteson
Mr. Nash
Col. Black

BRITISH

Lord Salisbury
Ambassador Makins
Sir Frank Roberts
Mr. Allen
Mr. Gore-Booth
Mr. Tomlinson
Mr. Leishman
Mr. Porter
Mr. Watson
Mr. MacGinnis
Mr. Marshall

FRENCH

Foreign Minister Georges Bidault
Ambassador Bonnet
M. de Margerie
M. Falaize
M. François Seydoux
M. Daridan
M. Roger Seydoux
M. de Juniac
M. Roux
Col. de Brebisson
M. Vimont
M. Sauvagnargues
M. Martin
M. Carraud
M. Andronikov

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 188

*Wilson Minutes* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 14, 1953.

ST MIN 4 (Draft)

[Here follows a list of subjects.]

*Far East Communiqué*

Secretary Dulles opened the meeting by suggesting that discussions be undertaken on that part of the draft communiqué [2] having to do with the Far East with a view to publishing it separately Monday night. He suggested that if this could be done the Far East section of the communiqué, particularly with regard to Indochina, would attract more public attention than if it were merely part of the general communiqué where it would be overshadowed by the sections on Germany and the four-power meeting.

Lord Salisbury observed that this Far East communiqué contained far-reaching political statements and that it might be necessary for him to consult his Government before he could agree. He noted the statement concerning maintenance of common policies toward Communist China, pointing out that in the morning meeting [3] he had expressed his view that there should be no automatic relaxation of controls against Communist China nor was there any immediate question of admittance of Communist China, to the United Nations. However, he believed that future policies in this regard should depend on the behavior of the Communists after a Korean armistice and that these policies might be reviewed after a few months. He believed that the phasing of this question in the communiqué freezes the action which might be taken by the three powers and said he found it too rigid to accept in its present form.

With regard to the statement of proposed action by the three Governments in the event the Communists renewed their aggression in Korea after an armistice, Lord Salisbury remarked that this was in effect a restatement of the "warning statement" and asked if it was considered an alternative or supplementary.

With regard to the statement that: "Any armistice in Korea accepted by the United Nations would only be concluded in the hope of

[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that the minutes had been prepared by Florence Wilson of the Policy Reports Staff, but had not been cleared or approved. The Department of State transmitted to London a summary of this meeting in telegram 239, July 14. (396.1 WA/7–1453) This telegram was also sent to Paris, Bonn, Berlin, Vienna, Moscow, The Hague, Brussels, and Rome.

[2] The draft communiqué under reference here has not been identified further. For the text of the final communiqué, see p. 1703.

[3] For a record of the third tripartite meeting, held at 10:30 a. m., July 13, see p. 1654.

making a step forward in the cause of peace everywhere", Lord Salisbury expressed the view that this statement did not exactly represent the position since an armistice was actually being concluded because both parties think the fighting should be stopped. He suggested that the phrase read: "Any armistice in Korea accepted by the United Nations should therefore constitute a step forward in the cause of peace everywhere".

With regard to the statement "the French Union offers a flexible and harmonious framework" Lord Salisbury pointed out that this was particularly a French view and should be so indicated.

Mr. Bidault explained that he was satisfied with the general draft subject to certain small wording modifications but that he understood the position of the UK.

Secretary Dulles suggested that the three Foreign Ministers with one adviser retire in an attempt to reach agreement on wording of a draft.

Mr. Bidault and Lord Salisbury agreed, with the latter commenting that he might still have to refer an agreed text to his Government.

The Foreign Ministers retired for 20 minutes.

Secretary Dulles, on reconvening the meeting, stated that agreement had been reached on a satisfactory text but there would be no attempt to publish it Monday night. Rather, it was planned for Tuesday morning publication as a separate communiqué in order to obtain the benefit of the full impact of the section on Indochina.

The Foreign Ministers then took a recess for 15 minutes to consider the text of the communiqué on European unity.[4]

*European Unity*

Secretary Dulles, on resuming, said that this latest European unity statement represented an effort to reflect the views of the morning meeting on the earlier draft.[5] While the US would prefer to see a stronger statement, the Secretary realized the difficulties existing in the French Parliament and recognized that US public and Congressional opinion may conflict with Mr. Bidault's judgment as to the most effective case he could present before his Parliament. Therefore, the Secretary believed some compromise on both sides was necessary.

Lord Salisbury remarked he was quite satisfied with the draft and, while he would have to request the views of his Government, he had no further amendment to suggest.

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[4] No record of the Foreign Ministers consideration of this part of the text of the communiqué has been found in the Department of State files.

[5] The draft statement on European unity under reference here has not been identified further. For the text of the statement on European unity, incorporated in the final communiqué as part III, see p. 1704.

Mr. Bidault said he wished to go as far as possible in affirmation of the EDC and of European organisation in general, commenting that while the French have perhaps not taken all steps which the US would desire, still they have made great concessions. He said he would cable his Prime Minister for authority to endorse the present text.

Secretary Dulles suggested that the phrase "will be pursued" in connection with the work of creating a European Political Community be changed to "is being pursued". Subject to this change and to authorization from the French Government he said the text would now be considered agreed.

Lord Salisbury stated that he also would ask for authorization from his Government to approve the text.

*Four-Power Conference*

Secretary Dulles then turned to the draft tripartite note to the Soviet Government regarding Germany and a four-power conference,[6] noting that he understood the Ministers would not wish to agree to this note without clearance from their Governments. He said the note should then be sent to Chancellor Adenauer to make certain that it would be helpful to him in his present political situation and that, therefore, it might take three or four days for the note to be agreed upon, delivered to the Soviets and published. In view of the time factor, therefore, the note could not be published while the Foreign Ministers were in Washington.

Mr. Bidault stated that if this document were reserved for examination by the Governments, then the Governments must examine all documents emerging from this meeting. He said he could not go back after these lengthy talks in Washington and present something to his Government and Parliament on European unity which represented only affirmation of a constant policy and not a declaration of something new and constructive. He said the French would be extremely disappointed and that EDC would face even greater difficulties in France if something new was not forthcoming from this meeting.

In clarification, Secretary Dulles explained that while the actual text of the note could not be finalized before the Ministers left Washington and before the communiqué had been published, it was still planned to include, as the central aspect of the communiqué, the substance of what the three Governments plan to do. He considered it indispensable that the communiqué contain a reference to the decision of the three Governments on a four-power meeting on Germany and Austria and commented that the only difficulty was that it could not

[6] For the text of the tripartite note to the Soviet Union as agreed by the Foreign Ministers, see p. 1701.

be dealt with as elaborately in the communiqué as it could if the text of the note were ready for publication.

Lord Salisbury said he would have to refer the text to his Government but promised a reply by Tuesday morning. The text could then be sent to Adenauer and he could be asked to agree by Tuesday night. He noted that he shared Mr. Bidault's views on the question of any delay.

Secretary Dulles expressed US agreement, suggesting that if the text was substantially acceptable it might be sent to Bonn immediately, telling Adenauer that this is what had been proposed and that there might be slight changes depending on the views of the Governments which were being obtained.

Lord Salisbury remarked that since British High Commissioner Kirkpatrick was in the chair at Bonn for the month of July, the text might be sent to him with instructions that he not present it to Adenauer until it had been approved by the Governments.

Secretary Dulles asked if the approvals could be sent to Bonn directly from Paris and London to which Lord Salisbury and Mr. Bidault agreed.

Lord Salisbury then remarked that he had several small amendments. With regard to the phrase: "While recognizing the fact that enduring peace can only be so established when certain basic problems, such as controlled disarmament, can ultimately be settled . . ." he expressed the view that the Soviets might pick up this phrase and suggest that discussions on such questions as controlled disarmament be begun immediately if it is true that peace can be established only when such problems have been settled.

With regard to the phrase "no real progress can be made toward a general relaxation of tension so long as this problem [conditions for formation of a German Government] [7] remains unsolved", Lord Salisbury suggested that "in Europe" be added after "tension". He also noted that the communiqué referred to a four-power meeting of "Foreign Ministers", commenting that the original conception had been for a meeting on a higher level. While he had no doubt that any resulting meeting would in fact be a meeting of Foreign Ministers, he said he would prefer that the communiqué read "representatives of the French, United Kingdom, United States and the Soviet Union."

Secretary Dulles stated that the US could not agree to extending an invitation for a four-power meeting except in the terms of a Foreign Ministers' meeting. He commented that President Eisenhower will not attend a meeting to discuss such matters as Germany and Austria. He explained, however, that this would not exclude the

[7] Brackets appear in the source text.

possibility of a meeting of heads of Governments, perhaps combined with or added to the Foreign Ministers, if the Foreign Ministers' meeting appeared to be producing results which would justify a higher level meeting. He suggested that Lord Salisbury make clear to his Government that a Foreign Ministers' meeting does not rule out a meeting of heads of Governments but reiterated that the only invitation in which the US would concur would be in terms of "Foreign Ministers" or "Foreign Ministers or their deputies".

Lord Salisbury said, in view of this explanation, he would accept "Foreign Ministers".

Mr. Bidault said he found no difficulties in the draft saying that he considered Lord Salisbury's proposed amendment on the controlled disarmament phrase unnecessary but, since it contained no substantial difference, he would try to amend the French version to coincide with Lord Salisbury's view. With regard to the level of the meeting, he said the French were agreeable to a Foreign Ministers' meeting. He then questioned whether it was useful in the draft communiqué to mention Vienna as a possible site for the meeting, suggesting that such specific mention might entail the risk of encouraging certain tendencies on the part of the Austrian Chancellor and Foreign Minister to engage in negotiations with the Soviet Government looking toward a separate settlement on the Austrian question. He saw the possibility that the Soviets might point out that everything was going well in Austria and might suggest that the same solution be applied to the German problem.

Secretary Dulles noted that a specific site has been named in order to avoid the possibility that the Soviet Government might propose that the meeting be held in Moscow. He suggested, however, that the communiqué might read "at some convenient place to be mutually agreed" which Lord Salisbury and Mr. Bidault accepted.

Lord Salisbury then suggested that the communiqué read "the second half of September" rather than "September 15th" for the possible date of the meeting.

Secretary Dulles suggested "to begin about September 15" to which Lord Salisbury and Mr. Bidault agreed.

Secretary Dulles then returned to Lord Salisbury's questions regarding the statement on controlled disarmament and, following some discussion on wording, it was agreed that the paragraph in question would read: "While recognizing the fact that enduring peace can only be ultimately assured when certain basic problems, such as controlled disarmament, can be dealt with, the United States Government desires to dispose now of those problems which are capable of early solution".

Secretary Dulles then affirmed his understanding that the French and British representatives will transmit the draft text tonight to their Governments for approval. At the same time, the UK will transmit the draft to its High Commissioner at Bonn instructing him upon approval from Paris and London, to take up the note with Chancellor Adenauer emphasizing the necessity of prompt action and to report his conclusions immediately. Mr. Dulles also noted that the note was to be cleared with both Bonn and Berlin.

Lord Salisbury said this could be done through their High Commissioner at the same time and it was agreed that this would be the case.

Mr. Bidault then circulated a new French text of the section of the communiqué on Germany but it was agreed to wait until an English text was available before discussing the matter further.[8] The Ministers agreed that the experts might consider the draft on Tuesday morning with the Ministers discussing it again in the Tuesday afternoon tripartite meeting.

In conclusion Secretary Dulles said he thought it might be useful to consider a preamble to the communiqué indicating the spirit of the suggestions which the three Foreign Ministers were making. He pointed out that all decisions which the Ministers were making were in the interests of peace and that this is the basic theme in all their efforts to reach settlement of such matters as Korea, Indochina, EDC, Germany and Austria. The Secretary said he would present a draft of such a preamble in the Tuesday afternoon tripartite meeting for comment from the Ministers.

[8] No copy of the French text under reference here has been found in the Department of State files.

## SECOND MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, WASHINGTON, JULY 14, 1953, 10:30 A. M.

### PARTICIPANTS

| UNITED STATES | BRITISH |
|---|---|
| The Secretary of State | Lord Salisbury |
| Ambassador Aldrich | Ambassador Makins |
| Ambassador Hare | Mr. Allen |
| Mr. Byroade | General Robertson |
| Mr. Merchant | Mr. Beeley |
| Mr. Bowie | Mr. Bailey |
| Mr. Kitchen | Commander W. Derwent |
| Mr. Raynor | Mr. Leishman |
| Mr. Hart | Mr. MacGinnis |
| General Hull | |
| Colonel Black | |
| Mr. Nash | |

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158

*Raynor Minutes*[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 16, 1953.

STB MIN 2

Lord Salisbury opened the discussion by inquiring as to the nature of the reply which it was contemplated the President would make to General Naguib.[2]

Secretary Dulles said that as he saw it we could take one of two lines; the first alternative would be to indicate approval or disapproval and the second alternative would be to send a non-committal response. He thought the latter course might have certain disadvantages.

Lord Salisbury stated that he also saw two possible courses and that the first of these courses would be for the President to comment in detail on the proposals. He said although this was what the Egyptians might prefer he thought it would be unwise as it could cause embarrassment to the U.S. and the U.K. as it would in effect place the U.S. in the position of being an active mediator. This in turn he felt would offer to the Egyptians innumerable opportunities to play us off one against the other in which practice he stated the Egyptians were experts. He thought it would open up possibilities of driving a wedge between the U.S. and U.K. and he did not think this course would be likely to result in rapid progress.

He said he did not mean by this that U.S. participation in this matter was unwelcome. In fact, the U.K. had welcomed it and it was the Egyptian side which had rejected the idea of the U.S. participating in the discussions. He said in view of the circumstances he thought perhaps the U.K. should handle the matter as approaches to the Egyptian Government through two channels could very easily "cross wires". For these various reasons he felt the President should not make detailed comments to Naguib on his proposal. On the contrary, he felt the reply should contain the following elements: (*a*) warm thanks, (*b*) indication that we felt the reply constituted an advance in certain respects, (*c*) that the U.S. will transmit the Egyptian proposal to the U.K. and (*d*) a suggestion that the Egyptians might take it up with the U.K.

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[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that the minutes had been prepared by Raynor, but had not been approved or cleared. The Department of State transmitted to London a summary of this meeting in telegram 252, July 15. (641.74/7–1053) This telegram was repeated to Cairo. The minutes of the first part of this meeting were designated STB MIN 2 in the records of the Department of State. The minutes for the second part were designated STB MIN 2/1, and are printed *infra*.

[2] For the text of Prime Minister Naguib's message to President Eisenhower, July 10, see p. 1696.

Lord Salisbury repeated that this would avoid creating opportunities for the Egyptians to play us off one against the other.

Secretary Dulles observed that if the U.S. in effect advised the Egyptians to resume contact with the U.K. the Egyptians might attach to this the implication that conclusions had been reached at this meeting. He inquired if Lord Salisbury meant that the U.S. should indicate in its reply that the U.S. had no responsibility in the matter.

Lord Salisbury said he felt that the major responsibility must continue to rest with the U.K. and that he felt it was important that in our reply Naguib not be given the impression that the U.S. feels that the U.K. should accept the Egyptian proposals. He felt as far as we should go would be to indicate that the Egyptian proposals in our opinion contain features which we believe may make agreement easier. He again referred to the Egyptian skill at playing one party off against the other and also at "clutching at straws". He said the U.K. had made certain proposals (handed to us Saturday) which General Robertson felt could lead to a satisfactory result. He observed that the U.K. proposals and the Egyptian proposals contain certain common elements. He asked General Sir Brian Robertson to elaborate on this point.

Sir Brian stated that the portion of the Egyptian proposals relating to technicians and management of the base seem generally satisfactory and appear to reflect Egyptian acceptance of what the British have been trying to obtain on this side of the question for some time. He observed that this perhaps reflects the results which can be obtained by the utilization of patience and firmness. He said that the proposal that the technicians be in civilian clothes was awkward as the U.K. feels they should be in uniform. He implied, however, that he felt this question should be susceptible of resolution without undue difficulty. He said that if the technicians were in civilian clothes they would have no special status. They would be at the mercy of any Egyptian policeman, they would be difficult to administer and control and he thought less incidents would be likely to arise if the men were in uniform. He pointed out that a majority of the technicians would, in fact, be soldiers.

Secretary Dulles inquired as to what was meant by uniform, whether it was meant in a generic sense or in the uniform of the British Army.

Sir Brian replied that the first position of the U.K. would be that they should wear the uniform of Her Majesty's Army. He repeated that he felt this question could be worked out with the Egyptians.

Sir Brian then turned to the subject of availability or as he put it the reactivation of the base. He commented that the Egyptian phrasing was fairly ingenuous and seemed to indicate that they were trying to

do something on this question. He felt, however, that the Egyptian formula was inadequate. He said there must be no doubt whatsoever with respect to the availability of the base and that politically the British Government must have a good answer for Parliament on this point. He indicated that at the moment he would not take a hard line on this point but that he much preferred the U.K. formula.

Sir Brian then referred to the question of duration and said this was the most difficult issue as it involved not simply the agreement but the period of time their men could remain at the base. He said three years was far too short. We cannot assume that the world situation will change materially in such a short period. From the political point of view it would not be possible for the U.K. to exchange for the same time period; i.e., three years, the substantial treaty rights they now have for substantially less rights. As to the U.K. formula he particularly liked the insertion therein of the wedge, as he described it, on the subject of a regional defense organization. He said at first blush this might seem to be at variance with the Secretary's proposal with regard to the grouping of the northern tier of countries but he did not think this was necessarily so. He said the important thing was to commit Egypt in some way and he added he felt there did not have to be a single regional organization or arrangement covering the entire area. He said he realized the U.K. formula would be difficult for the Egyptians to accept but he didn't think its prospects were hopeless and he would like to "give it a try". Furthermore, he doubted if the U.K. could accept less in substance. He added that if a precise time limit proved to be absolutely necessary ten years would be the correct figure.

General Hull asked how soon, in the event agreement could be reached, evacuation could start.

Sir Brian replied immediately subject only to the limitation of the arrival of ships.

Lord Salisbury commented that under the U.K. formula the Egyptians obtained "an enormous amount". Most of the U.K. troops would be evacuated and the only real right the U.K. would retain would be the control of stores and technical base facilities. He said the Cabinet had gone into this matter very thoroughly and he felt the U.K. formula constituted the limit to which the U.K. could go politically.

Secretary Dulles inquired if the British claim any rights other than the rights under the treaty which he observed would expire in three years.

Sir Brian said it was not accurate to state that the treaty would expire in three years. He said as he recalled it the provision in essence was that at the end of three years either side could request revision for the purpose of developing a renewed agreement of similar character. If

agreement cannot be reached as to revision the treaty provides that the matter should be arbitrated by the League of Nations. He added that British lawyers are not clear on this specific function of arbitration whether the UN is or is not the successor to the League.

Secretary Dulles then asked if the British felt it will be possible to reach a settlement with the Egyptians without the U.S. promising aid, probably economic and military.

Sir Brian replied that certainly this would be a very great assistance and he thought it would "possibly be necessary".

Secretary Dulles said he had asked this question wondering if it was practical for the U.S. to take a position of aloofness on this question.

Lord Salisbury observed that while he thought the U.K. proposal constituted a hand which the U.K. could play, that it would be helpful, of course, to play with an assist from the U.S. He added that, of course, the U.S. was interested in the sense that the matter under dispute involved a vital strategic area of the world.

Secretary Dulles said he was wondering what the President should say to General Naguib in response to the portion of Naguib's letter referring to the question of aid. He wondered what we could say or whether that portion of Naguib's communication should be ignored.

Lord Salisbury commented that the U.K. would have been very happy indeed for the U.S. to have participated in the actual discussions but that as we know the Egyptians had been the ones who had made this impossible.

Secretary Dulles said there had been another difficulty with respect to this matter which had not clearly emerged as the Egyptian refusal of U.S. participation had obscured it. He said he thought there had been a certain amount of misunderstanding between our two Governments on the question of the degree of flexibility which the negotiators should possess. The Prime Minister apparently had a different view on this from the President. We would have wanted to be certain that there was more flexibility than the U.K. had apparently given their negotiators.

Sir Roger Makins said that the point as he recalled it was how much flexibility the negotiators would have without the necessity of referring matters back to Governments.

Mr. Byroade said that we had understood that the negotiators were to be given flexibility without reference back to work out arrangements under which the base could be reactivated in from zero to sixty days.

Sir Brian said that the area in which he had not had great flexibility was on the question of technicians which now, however, appeared to be in fairly good shape. He said on other questions such as air defense and regional defense he had had considerable flexibility which

he had not yet been in a position to use as these questions had not yet been discussed in any detail with the Egyptians. The question had also not arisen to date in the negotiations on availability or duration.

Lord Salisbury commented that he didn't mean that we shouldn't keep in touch with each other while the U.K. was playing its hand with the Egyptians but he did feel that both of us should not be simultaneously approaching the Egyptians.

Mr. Byroade inquired if Sir Brian believed that the Egyptians would be willing at this time to enter formal negotiations indicating that our information is that they would be willing to meet formally only to approve arrangements worked out informally.

Sir Brian replied that he agreed informal discussions must precede any further formal meetings.

Lord Salisbury also expressed his agreement adding that informal negotiations were much better as it made it easier to avoid either side assuming frozen positions.

Sir Brian said that perhaps the U.S. could tell the Egyptians that he was being sent back to Cairo which would afford an opportunity for contact and that we might suggest that they endeavor to make such contact.

Mr. Byroade said that he was searching for some way in which use could be made of the concessions in the recent Egyptian proposal which he hoped would not be thrown away.

Lord Salisbury suggested that this could be managed by our informing the Egyptians that we had transmitted their proposal to the U.K. and they appeared to contain certain views common to those held by the U.K.

Secretary Dulles said he wanted to talk frankly for a few moments with respect to some of the background of U.S. thinking on this problem. He said some people in the U.S. Government have the impression that the U.K. in this case has reverted to the old type hardboiled approach formerly employed in dealing with Arab States. He repeated in this discussion several times the point that we realized the U.K. has had more experience in dealing with that part of the world than has the U.S. He stated, however, that as the U.S. may have to provide one of the assets in this settlement (i.e. aid) it is necessary for us to form some judgment of our own. In our view times have changed and this old type of policy will not succeed. We are apprehensive that it will only create a wave of anti-Western feeling affecting all of our interests adversely and that the final result might be the undermining of the entire Western position in the Arab world. The result then might be that Western objectives in the Arab world would be lost as the Arabs might turn to the Communists for help. He inquired if a fundamental difference of approach such as he described did in fact exist. He added that one of the reasons the U.S. hesitated in this matter is that it seems

to us that the U.K. is more uncompromising than the conditions in the area warrant and that there is need for more recognition that the new forces in the area can't be suppressed by force or by the old way of dealing with these people.

Lord Salisbury replied that he didn't feel this line of criticism was in accord with the facts. He cited the U.K. post-war record of dealing with its colonial possessions referring to India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the evolutionary process now going on in the African colonies.

Secretary Dulles said he appreciated all of that but in this particular area, i.e., the Near East, he sensed a tendency to swing back to the old methods which perhaps could be characterized by Churchill's statement a few years ago to the effect that he was not His Majesty's principal Minister for the purpose of liquidating the British Empire. Despite the various steps which Lord Salisbury had mentioned the Secretary wondered if a politically uncompromising position might not have been assumed with respect to the remainder of the Empire. He said he recalled during the discussions on the Sudan domestic political considerations were cited as inhibiting U.K. freedom of action.

Lord Salisbury again referred to the steady political evolution in the British Colonial Empire. He said the problem in Egypt was a different one. The British were in Egypt under a freely negotiated treaty. He said he knew the Egyptians said it was a treaty made under duress but that he had been in the Foreign Office himself at the time and could vouch for the fact that it was freely negotiated. He said the troops the U.K. had in the zone at the moment were the minimum required to protect British rights and interests under the treaty which Egypt had repudiated. He said the U.K. had no imperialistic designs on Egypt. The British were in Egypt to protect a vitally strategic area. If the British were to walk out it would not be in the interest of the U.K. or of the entire free world.

Lord Salisbury added that on the Sudan the anxiety in Commons arose because of a desire not to let the Sudanese down. He said they were tried and long friends of the British and that there had been good feeling between the two and he thought on the part of the Sudanese rather a contempt for the Egyptians. The feeling in Commons constituted an expression of a fear that the Sudanese were being sacrificed.

Lord Salisbury continued that he personally could be described as a "natural evolutionist". He felt strongly that the U.K. was moving with the times much more so, for instance, than the French. He said the British position in Egypt is *sui generis*. He said the British position in the Zone area was considered vital by all of the Commonwealth. He suggested that we make an inquiry of the Australians on this point if we had any doubt on this score.

Secretary Dulles said that our military agreed with the U.K. with

respect to the importance of the availability of the base. He said, however, that we are worried that the British may lose out because political considerations may limit what the U.K. otherwise would do on the merits of the case.

Lord Salisbury replied that political and strategic considerations in the case of Egypt were mixed. He said, for instance, he was certain that Conservative M.P.'s would stress the strategic side of the problem. He reviewed the facts that many English people have fought in the area, know first-hand its strategic importance and also had not formed very high impressions of the Egyptians. He concluded by saying that a large body of British opinion holds that the Suez Zone base is a bastion of the free world for which the British have fought and that the British should not abandon all that they have fought for in that area.

Sir Brian stated that as he saw the situation we were nearly in agreement on a wide field in regard to happenings of the immediate future (i.e., evacuation, the matter of technicians, etc.). He added this is the result of immense U.K. concessions. He said there seemed to be three differences only one of which, the question of wearing uniforms, was immediate and he did not feel insolvable. The other two differences related to the future and were critical ones. He inquired if the Secretary meant that he felt the U.K. was uncompromising because it was unwilling to accept the Egyptian position on these two further points (availability and duration).

Secretary Dulles replied that he agreed that the Egyptian proposal on duration was not acceptable. He said he didn't know what might be acceptable. He felt that the U.K. formula on duration could be criticized on the ground that it could work out to be perpetual. He doubted, therefore, if the U.K. formula was practical although it might be desirable. He felt the availability provision of the U.K. proposal was also quite broad. He inquired, for instance, what is a threat? He said, for instance, would the building by the Soviets of a new air base near Turkey constitute a threat and if so would that appear to be reasonable to the Egyptians.

Secretary Dulles said he agreed on this matter of interdependence U.S. support cause the U.K. to take an uncompromising position on the present formula. He thought under such conditions U.S. support would not be useful as he doubted if success would result and on the contrary thought the situation then might end up in guerrilla warfare. He said that when he arrived in Cairo many observers on the scene there thought guerrilla warfare was then imminent.[3] He said he had worked hard in talking with the Egyptians to restrain them from such action until after the U.S. and U.K. had held further talks. He said he

[3] Documentation on Secretary Dulles' trip to the Middle East, May 9–29, during which he visited Cairo, is presented in volume IX.

realized that some people thought that the absence thus far of a renewal of guerrilla warfare had been due to the fact that the Egyptians had been bluffing on this score or that they had been intimidated by a greater U.K. show of strength. He doubted the complete accuracy of either of these explanations.

Secretary Dulles said that he doubted if the U.S. Government should take a step, in the light of our political advice, which we felt might result in an uncompromising attitude on the part of the U.K. which in our judgment in turn would be likely to lead to a breakdown, to guerrilla warfare and to possible reprisals including such action as the reoccupation of Egypt. He added that the U.K. at one time had seemed to realize these possibilities as he understood at one stage they had been quietly arranging the removal of civilians from Egypt.

Secretary Dulles said that he was assured by Sir Brian's explanation as it showed that some flexibility existed but he wanted to know how much real flexibility in fact existed.

Lord Salisbury replied that he felt the U.K. has not adopted a rigid attitude. He said the U.K. had made concession after concession. He felt, however, that the point had been reached where further concessions would mean giving away everything. He would have thought it was in the U.S., as well as the U.K. interest that this not be done.

Secretary Dulles said that he agreed with this but wondered what benefit there might be in it if the result was a conflagration in Egypt.

Lord Salisbury said he would agree with that statement but that General Robertson felt that he had a chance of reaching a settlement. This chance would be a better chance if the U.S. stood with the U.K. and not in the middle. He commented that imperialism is dead but there is now a good deal of interdependence and that complete independence is therefore in a sense also dead.

Secretary Dulles said he agreed on this matter of interdependence and had so stated to the representatives of the Associated States yesterday.[4] He said that he had described to the Egyptians the U.S. bases in the U.K. and said to them that this in no way placed the British in a colonial status vis-à-vis the U.S. He had said to them that any nation attempting in these times to practice complete independence almost surely will lose its independence. He said George Washington had put this very well at the time this country was created when he said in essence that in every society it is necessary to judge how much liberty must be surrendered in order to retain the balance.

Secretary Dulles said, however, that in talking with the Egyptians he had been disturbed by their attitude. Their objective appeared to be to wipe out the last vestige of U.K. influence before being willing to cooperate with the West. He said they appeared to have no realization of the present dangerous international situation or of the strategic

[4] For a record of Secretary Dulles' meeting with Bidault and the representatives of the Associated States, see STFA MIN 1, p. 1665.

importance to the West of the base. He said it didn't do much good to say they were wrong because their attitude was one of facts of the case and therefore it seemed necessary to revise strategy to take this fact of the case into account.

Lord Salisbury said that he had put to us on Saturday formulae on these two points of availability and duration which the U.K. felt represented the limit to which they could go.[5] He was asking for U.S. support thereon. He understood, however, the difficulties facing us and, therefore, felt it was unfair to ask for support of everyone in these formulae. He would, however, like to feel that he had our support for the broad principles underlying the formulae—to get back quickly in case of war to something in good enough condition to be worth getting back to and a duration long enough to permit proper military planning for the area.

Secretary Dulles said that we were certainly in agreement on the principle covered by the first formula (availability) but he felt even a reasonable person could take exception to the precise wording. He referred again to the "threat" feature. He said while it would be desirable to get this in it was always difficult to define "threat" and referred to the difficulties this raised at the San Francisco Conference on the UN where it was decided not to attempt to formulate a definition.

As to the second formula (duration) Secretary Dulles said that he felt as he had said previously that the wording could be interpreted as granting a perpetual right. He said as a matter of detail, he didn't particularly like the reference to the members of the Arab Security Pact being organized with the assistance and participation of other friendly powers if this meant MEDO as it was defined last January. Secretary Dulles said that he was quite convinced that MEDO in that form was unattainable. He said this concept included so many Western participants that he felt it would remain a non-starter with the Arabs as he felt they would feel they would inevitably be placed in a subordinate position under such an arrangement. He said as to an area pact he was openminded as to whether it should be oriented on an Egypt or on a Moslem nucleus (Turkey, Pakistan or Iran) which he thought might be better.

Secretary Dulles said that it was still our goal to have an area defense organization but it would have to be a MEDO without the capital letters.

Sir Brian stated that he had chosen these words in an effort to get away from using the expression "MEDO". He also had felt the expression "Middle East" should be avoided as no one agreed exactly on what this term embraced. He also had felt it was important not to mention Israel as this would almost certainly be unacceptable to the Egyp-

[5] For a record of the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the United Kingdom, July 11, see STB MIN 1, p. 1631.

tians. He said his use of the phrase "other friendly powers" was intended to mean U.S. and U.K.

Secretary Dulles commented that as we had misinterpreted the formula it was certainly probable that Egypt would also misinterpret it.

Lord Salisbury replied that he was only empowered to discuss the wording of the proposals he had given us on Saturday. He said, however, he would seek authority for elasticity in the wording within the concept of these principles. He was certain that he could not go beyond the limits of the principles. He repeated that it was important that this matter be played as a single hand by the U.K.

Sir Roger Makins commented that the trouble is that while the U.K. may have or have had in the past general U.S. support that the other side has never believed this and that the lack of this understanding on the part of the other side has been a major cause of some of the U.K. difficulties in the area.

Secretary Dulles replied that he was quite prepared to admit the force of Sir Roger's point and that the result may have been on occasion to afford opportunities to the other parties to maneuver between us. While this was a sound idea, it was difficult to express without implying on our part a complete surrender of our judgment.

Mr. Byroade said that he was convinced that it was wrong to tell the Egyptians that they would have to buy MEDO.

Secretary Dulles said we would try our hand at drafting a reply which the President might make to General Naguib taking into account the points made in this discussion that he would go over this with Lord Salisbury before he left the City.[6] He commented that he felt on the question of duration that a ten year limit would be easier to obtain than the present rather open-ended formula.

Lord Salisbury indicated that he was prepared to discuss such an alternative in London.

Ambassador Aldrich expressed his concurrence with the point just put by Secretary Dulles.

Lord Salisbury observed that the ten year formula would be more difficult for the U.K. than the present wording.

Ambassador Aldrich suggested perhaps both ideas could be presented to the Egyptians.

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[6] On July 15, Secretary Dulles sent a memorandum to President Eisenhower, enclosing a draft reply to General Naguib, which he stated had been worked out "in consultation with Lord Salisbury and General Robertson" and which had their full concurrence. (Memorandum for the President, July 15, 641.74/7–1153) The enclosed draft reply, subject to minor changes, was then transmitted to Cairo in telegram 69, July 15 (641.74/7–1553) and delivered at 1 p. m. July 16. The text of President Eisenhower's message, which stated that the duration of the agreement and the availability of the base would adversely affect U.S. security, that Lord Salisbury had been apprised of the correspondence, that the British and Egyptians should resume negotiations, and which promised economic assistance as part of an overall solution, is printed in volume IX.

Secretary Dulles added that this was the type of point on which elasticity was needed.

Lord Salisbury observed that in the answer to Naguib he felt it was important not to give a detailed reply as this would place the U.S. in the position of a mediator. He also hoped the U.S. would not lead the Egyptians to believe that their draft constituted an acceptable basis for further negotiations although it did constitute an advance in some directions.

Secretary Dulles indicated that we might say it constituted substantial progress (and Lord Salisbury did not dissent).

Lord Salisbury said that what he would like to try to do was to marry the two proposals and he felt that they contained much that could be married.

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Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158

*Raynor Minutes* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 16, 1953.

STB MIN 2/1

*Buraimi* [2]

Lord Salisbury reported that he had consulted London with respect to the proposal made by the U.S. at Saturday's meeting.[3] He found London "not happy about it". He said the real difficulty involved the provision on the withdrawal of forces. The U.K. was ready to withdraw its forces and thinks Turki should also withdraw. He said the British feel that as long as Turki remains the feeling in Saudi Arabia that he has a right to be there will be reinforced.

Lord Salisbury said there had been a further development in the form of the receipt by the U.K. of a Saudi note to which the U.K. had already replied proposing the withdrawal of all forces to be followed at once by arbitration. He said that the U.K. had had intimations from Saudi representatives in London that this might possibly be acceptable if it were supported by the President. In summary the British do not wish to accept a plan which would give any credence to the belief that Turki is where he is by any right because they believe such a position to be without foundation.

Secretary Dulles said he wished to renew the suggestion he had made on Saturday and requested that it be considered further by the British.

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[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that these minutes were prepared by Raynor, but had not been cleared or approved, and had been designated STB MIN 2/1 in the records of the Department of State. The cover sheet also shows that the participants in this part of the second meeting were the same as those in the first part; see the list on p. 1675.

[2] Further documentation on Buraimi is presented in volume IX.

[3] For a record of this meeting, see STB MIN 1, p. 1631.

He explained that the U.S. has extremely important relations with Saudi Arabia; i.e., the military base and oil (ARAMCO). He said we have had good working relationships with the Saudis, better than we have with any Arab country. . . .

Secretary Dulles recalled that the U.S. had persuaded the King to give up his position of solving this question by a plebiscite. The Secretary added that by suborning and similar methods the Saudis might well have won a plebiscite. As the function of suborning in preparation for a plebiscite was perhaps the real purpose of Turki's presence, this objective seems to have already been frustrated and hence his remaining in the area seems to us now to be fairly innocuous.

Secretary Dulles appealed for British understanding and help on this question stating that our interests at stake were more important than the Turki question. He could not see that the British prestige involved could be as important as the U.S. relationship with Ibn Saud. He said the King had a simple outlook on things; I am your friend, you are my friend, and he couldn't understand our lack of support on a question of this type. The Secretary added that he did not feel we would be able to move the King any further on this matter. He expressed the view that this was a relatively little thing from the U.K. standpoint and a relatively big thing from the U.S. standpoint.

Lord Salisbury replied that he could understand the above considerations and he would, therefore, have the matter considered further. He pointed out, however, that the Sheiks in the area who are under U.K. protection trust the U.K. and are old friends and that furthermore, the U.K. has definite treaties with the Sheiks under which they are obliged to protect them. He said this relationship in the Persian Gulf area was an important matter to the U.K.

Secretary Dulles said we also have an obligation to protect the Saudis.

*Yarmuk development* [4]

Lord Salisbury said he understood it to be the U.S. view that it would be more economical to combine the two schemes including the one involving Jordan. He said that under such a proposal Jordan would have to agree that their water be stored in Lake Tiberias which is under the control of Israel. He said this was an extremely difficult thing to ask them to do now and it would be awkward for them at any time. He believed, therefore, that political considerations in this case rather than economic would perforce have to be overriding.

Mr. Byroade said we had not yet reached a firm decision on this matter as we were awaiting the results of engineering studies.

Secretary Dulles said he did not know enough about this question to reach a decision at this meeting but that he would "take note" of what

[4] Documentation on the Yarmuk River development program is presented in volume IX.

Lord Salisbury said. (This was in reply to a request by Lord Salisbury seeking agreement to the position he had put forward.)

*Removal of Israeli Foreign Office to Jerusalem*

Secretary Dulles said that we were taking a position on this matter which he understood was similar to that of the U.K. We do not intend to move our Embassy to Jerusalem and we will probably wait for Israeli officials to come to our Embassy rather than to send Embassy representatives to Jerusalem for the conduct of business. He said after all we were considerably more important to them than they to us.

Lord Salisbury made no particular comment except to indicate that the British also do not plan to move their Embassy.

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**FIFTH TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SUITE, 1778 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, WASHINGTON, JULY 14, 1953, 2:45 P. M.**

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES

Secretary Dulles
Ambassador Aldrich
Ambassador Dillon
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Merchant
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Byroade
Mr. Riddleberger
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Bonsal
Mr. Phillips
Mr. Montgomery
Mr. White
Mr. Morris
Mr. Knight
Mr. Kidd
Mr. O'Connor
Mr. Kitchen
Mr. McBride
Mr. Trulock
Miss Wilson
Mr. Gordon
Mr. Matteson
Mr. Nash
Col. Black

BRITISH

Lord Salisbury
Ambassador Makins
Gen. Sir Brian Robertson
Sir Frank Roberts
Mr. Allen
Mr. Beeley
Mr. Gore-Booth
Mr. Tomlinson
Mr. Leishman
Mr. Bailey
Mr. Porter
Mr. Belcher
Mr. Watson
Mr. MacGinnis
Mr. Marshall

FRENCH

Foreign Minister Georges Bidault
Ambassador Bonnet
M. de Margerie
M. Falaize
M. François Seydoux
M. Daridan
M. Roger Seydoux
M. de Juniac
M. Roux
M. Vimont
M. Sauvagnargues
M. Benard
M. Martin
M. Carraud
M. Andronikov

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158

*Wilson Minutes* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 16, 1953.

ST MIN 5 (Draft)

[Here follows a list of subjects.]

Secretary Dulles opened the meeting with an announcement that he had invited the Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg representatives to meet with the Foreign Ministers at 5:00 p. m. so that they might be informed of decisions which had been taken in the meeting affecting the Benelux countries. He then suggested that the Ministers consider the Far East Communiqué, issuance of which was still delayed by certain differences of opinion.

*Far East Communiqué*

Lord Salisbury commented that he was satisfied with the draft [2] except for paragraph 4 which the British felt was too strong. He introduced a new paragraph 4 which they felt was more restrained which omitted the reference to the "interrelation of Communist aggressive moves in the Far East" and made other modifications.

Mr. Bidault said he could support the new UK paragraph although he considered it a weakening of the text. He suggested that this might be compensated for if the UK would reconsider its views on the statement regarding the French Union and would agree to the original "the French Union is a harmonious and flexible framework . . ." rather than "can be" as proposed by the UK.

Lord Salisbury commented that the two passages bore no relation to each other and that he could not bargain on this basis.

Mr. Bidault assured Lord Salisbury that he was not offering a bargain but was merely suggesting that the weakening of paragraph 4, which he had accepted, be compensated for by a strengthening elsewhere in the draft, namely in the wording of the French Union sentence.

Secretary Dulles suggested that the first sentence of paragraph 4, which had been omitted in the new British draft, be retained but that the adjective "aggressive" describing moves in the Far East be dropped so that the sentence would read: "The Foreign Ministers recognized the interrelation of Communist moves in the Far East." He also suggested that the word "offers" be substituted for the words "can be"

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[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that these minutes had been prepared by Florence Wilson of the Policy Reports Staff, but that they had not been cleared or approved. The Department of State transmitted to London a summary of this meeting in telegram 264, July 15. (396.1 WA/7-1553) This telegram was repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, Luxembourg, and Saigon.

[2] The draft communiqué under reference here has not been identified further; for the text of the final communiqué, see p. 1703.

in the French Union sentence so that the sentence would read: "They noted that the French Union offers a harmonious and flexible framework." He explained that "can be" contained the implication that the French Union "can be" but is not a "harmonious and flexible framework" and that he was seeking words to avoid that implication.

After further discussion the three Ministers agreed to accept the UK wording of paragraph 4 and to accept the French Union phrase with the replacement of "can be" by "offers".

Secretary Dulles explained that he was accepting the new UK paragraph 4 only in the interest of quick issuance of the Far East section of the communiqué but that the US strongly preferred the retention of the original first sentence in paragraph 4 with the dropping of the word "aggressive". It was agreed that the Far East section of the communiqué could be released by 4:00 p. m. Tuesday and on this condition the Secretary accepted the British paragraph.

*European Unity*

Secretary Dulles next asked for consideration of the European unity section of the communiqué.[3] He suggested that the word "democratic" used in the last sentence to describe those European countries which might become members of the European Community, might be dropped since the word had been so abused in Communist parlance.

Mr. Bidault noted that it might be found advisable at some later time for certain non-democratic European countries, such as Poland, to enter the Community but it was finally agreed by the three Ministers that the word "free" would be substituted for "democratic".

*Four-Power Meeting*

In connection with the draft note to the Soviet Government with regard to a four-power Foreign Ministers meeting,[4] Lord Salisbury commented that his Foreign Office was concerned about items 2) and 3), listed as subjects for discussion in such a meeting, since they thought these items might raise questions as to the actual extent of freedom enjoyed by the German Government.

The three Ministers agreed to consolidate items 2 and 3 so that they would read: "2) Conditions for the establishment of a free all-German Government with freedom of action in internal and external affairs."

Lord Salisbury then suggested certain changes in the immediately following sentence which described the topics to be discussed by the four Foreign Ministers as "essential steps which must precede the opening of discussions with the Soviet Government for a German peace treaty . . ."

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[3] The draft communiqué under reference here has not been identified further; for the text of the final communiqué, see p. 1703.

[4] For the final text of the tripartite note to the Soviet Government, see p. 1701.

Mr. Bidault countered with a slightly different French version of the sentence.

Secretary Dulles noted that the new language proposed by the British and French involves three choices: 1) that more discussions of free elections in Germany and the conditions for the establishment of an all German Government would be sufficient preliminaries to the discussions of a peace treaty and that it would not be necessary to reach agreement; 2) that there must be both discussion and agreement on these conditions before discussion of the peace treaty; and 3) that there should be discussion, agreement and consummation of these conditions before a peace treaty could be discussed.

He suggested that the sentence should read "At least agreement on these matters must precede the opening of talks with the Soviet Government for a German peace treaty . . ."

Mr. Bidault recalled the tripartite note of September 23, 1952[5] which made it clear that the US, UK and France could not accept a peace treaty without the participation in negotiations of a unified German Government and that a peace treaty could not be imposed on Germany. He stated that discussion was not a sufficient factor and that it would be necessary to have results on these preliminary conditions.

Lord Salisbury said in view of this discussion he would agree to go back to the original text to which Secretary Dulles and Mr. Bidault agreed.

Lord Salisbury then said that UK High Commissioner Kirkpatrick had informed Chancellor Adenauer unofficially of the terms of the proposed note and that in addition Mr. Blankenhorn had telephoned the Chancellor. He said Adenauer had made two points. First, for electoral reasons, he suggested that the communiqué make clear that the proposal has Adenauer's support and that it, therefore, indicate that this decision had been taken "in consultation with the German Federal Government" rather than "after consultation". Lord Salisbury said he realized that this would constitute a weakening of the formal position that the three powers rather than Adenauer would negotiate with Moscow on German matters and that he felt this position should be maintained in the note to the Soviets but that it might be relaxed in the communiqué.

Adenauer also believed that September 15 was too early for the four-power meeting since full election results would not be known until the second week of September and, since the formation of a Cabinet would take some time, no German Government could be in being by September 15. Adenauer had suggested October 1.

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[5] Documentation relating to the tripartite note of Sept. 23, 1952 is presented in volume VII.

After some discussion it was agreed to use the phrase "the end of September" in the note and to leave the phrase "early autumn" in the communiqué.

After further discussion, the Ministers agreed to issue the communiqué Tuesday night, to deliver the note to the Soviet representatives in the three capitals on Wednesday noon Washington time and to release the note to the Thursday morning papers. (See Annex I for final text of note)

*Final Communiqué*

Secretary Dulles asked for comments on the draft preamble to the communiqué and it was agreed that certain minor drafting changes could be left to the drafting committee for resolution.

Mr. Bidault questioned the order in which the sections of the communiqué would fall and it was agreed that the communiqué would be presented in the following manner: 1) Preamble, 2) European Unity, 3) Four-Power Conference, and 4) Far East.

The drafting committee retired to finalize the text.

*Preliminary Tripartite Meeting on Germany, Austria*

Secretary Dulles then suggested that German and Austrian experts of the US, UK and France meet in early August, perhaps in Paris, to concert the tripartite position in detail. He said he understood that there was substantial agreement on Austria with the possible difference that the UK and France were prepared to accept the long draft treaty with Article 35 in its present form whereas the US was disposed to show some resistance. He commented that this might be a matter of tactics rather than substance and asked if such a meeting would be useful.

Lord Salisbury expressed the view that it would be valuable to have a meeting to consider the questions to be discussed in the proposed four-power meeting but that it would depend somewhat on the Soviet reply to the tripartite invitation.

Mr. Bidault accepted the Secretary's suggestion for a meeting, saying he would prefer a meeting of experts rather than deputies to avoid giving any impression of a pre-conference prior to the four-power meeting.

Lord Salisbury agreed to a meeting on the expert level, saying we should not risk giving the impression that matters had been settled by the three powers and that the Soviet Union would be presented with a *fait accompli.*

Secretary Dulles expressed the view that such discussions would be useful even if the Soviets reject or evade the issue of a four-power meeting. He said the problem of Germany would still be acute and that our experts should be in close working accord since we will have to be making moves on the eve of the German elections. He suggested

that such a meeting should take place not later than August 10 or 15 because of the September 6 elections.

Lord Salisbury noted that even though these preliminary talks would have a minimum of publicity it might be better that they not take place during the period of the German elections since, in the event of a leak, the talks might give the impression in Germany of a change in three power policy toward that country. He wondered whether these talks could take place in the three week period after the German elections and before the proposed date for a four-power meeting.

Mr. Bidault commented that tripartite discussions on Germany might complicate the electoral situation with the result that Adenauer might try to intervene in the talks in a manner which would benefit him in electoral speeches. He suggested that these tripartite talks begin the day after the elections.

Secretary Dulles suggested that a fixed decision on the time, manner, and place of tripartite talks be postponed as long as it had been agreed that the experts should meet prior to a four-power meeting.

Lord Salisbury commented that if the Soviets should decline the invitation for a four-power meeting, such a tripartite meeting of experts might be reconsidered since it might give the impression of a change in policy toward Germany.

*Site of Four-Power Meeting*

Secretary Dulles stated that he was impressed by Mr. Bidault's views on the advantages of holding a four-power meeting in Switzerland rather than in Vienna. He agreed that negotiations on Austria in Austria would risk maneuvers by the Austrian Government as regards the Soviet Union and the three powers.

Lord Salisbury agreed that Switzerland seemed less provocative but said that he would have to consult his Government.

*Informing Benelux Representatives*

It was agreed that when the Benelux representatives arrived, Secretary Dulles, as chairman of the meeting and in the name of the three Foreign Ministers, would give to the representatives the gist of the communiqué and the note to the Soviet Government.

*Non-Military Aspects of NATO*

Secretary Dulles referred then to the future of NATO, commenting that it may become necessary to place more emphasis on certain of that organization's non-military aspects. He said he had been thinking tentatively of attempting to establish some sort of parliamentary structure built around the North Atlantic Council which would include Congressional representatives. He referred to the constructive influence on individual Congressmen who had attended sessions of the Inter-Parliamentary Union whose meetings, he said, have been both

useful and educational. In view of the necessity of putting the financial houses of the various member Governments in order and in the event of a decrease in the Soviet military threat, he foresaw a possible slowdown in the military aspects of NATO and a necessity for placing more emphasis on its non-military functions. He made clear that these comments constituted only tentative thinking and were not meant to be a definite proposal.

Mr. Bidault noted that the French have always desired that more emphasis be placed on NATO's non-military aspects, and particularly believe that Article 2 [6] should be given more importance. He said he had not thought of the possibility of a parliamentary structure, commenting that NATO military meetings seemed to have already too many parliamentary aspects. He noted the work of certain distinguished parliamentarians in the *Ad Hoc* Assembly working on the European Political Community but described the EPC document, which had resulted from their deliberations, as a maximum but not a optimum document and one that would be difficult for the participating Governments to adopt in full. He noted the discrepancy between the views of these parliamentarians and the views of their respective Governments who must bear the responsibility of implementation of their ideas. He thought some association of parliamentarians with the European Political Community might be more appropriate than with NATO, but if the latter were attempted, emphasized that a way must be found of so doing which would not result in interference of these parliamentarians in matters belonging in the Governmental sphere.

*Informing NATO of Ministers' Decisions*

Lord Salisbury then referred to the manner in which the NATO Council would be informed of the results of the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

After some discussion, it was agreed that instructions will be sent to Ambassador Hughes who will work out with his French and British colleagues a procedure for advising the Council.

*Joint NATO–CSC Meeting*

Lord Salisbury then referred to Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi's proposal for a joint meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the NATO and Coal–Steel Community countries in August which would include Germany and which he had put forward with the thought of helping Chancellor Adenauer in his electoral situation. He commented that no one apparently thinks De Gasperi's idea is a good one and suggested that no formal reply be made, noting that too obvious attempts to help Adenauer might do more harm than good.

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[6] For the text of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed Apr. 4, 1949 at Washington, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IV, p. 281.

Secretary Dulles suggested that the Italian Ambassador in Washington be informed on Wednesday of the decisions reached by the three Ministers with some additional background information. Lord Salisbury and Mr. Bidault agreed.

The Ministers then recessed to meet the Benelux representatives.[7]

Secretary Dulles, on reconvening the meeting, said that radio and television representatives were anxious that the three Ministers appear immediately following conclusion of the meeting to make brief statements which would be held until the communiqué had been released.[8] He recommended that this be done and Lord Salisbury and Mr. Bidault agreed.

*Indochina and the Saar*

Mr. Bidault then circulated the French text of a memorandum which he said contained some "reflections" on Indochina. He emphasized this was not a formal document and he was not asking for an immediate reply. (See Annex II for translation of French note.[9]) He also noted that while he was aware of the general desire not to complicate the German situation, in any further discussion on Germany it should be remembered that the Saar was still an outstanding question. Mr. Bidault said he merely wished to mention this.

*Communiqué*

The final draft of the general communiqué was then distributed and, following some discussion and minor corrections and a rearrangement of paragraphs, was approved by the three Ministers. (See Annex III for final communiqué.)

Secretary Dulles then called for any other business which either of the Ministers desired to discuss.

Mr. Bidault expressed deep appreciation on behalf of himself and Lord Salisbury for the courtesy, patience and will to reach agreement which had marked Secretary Dulles' chairmanship of the meetings and expressed the view that the success of these meetings was largely due to Mr. Dulles' personal action.

Lord Salisbury echoed Mr. Bidault's sentiments, saying the British and French representatives owed Mr. Dulles a debt of gratitude for his patience and wisdom.

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[7] No minutes for the Foreign Ministers meeting with the Benelux representatives have been found in the Department of State files; however, in telegram 57 to The Hague (repeated to Brussels and Luxembourg), July 14, the Department of State reported that Secretary Dulles had informed them of the major conference developments. (396.1 WA/7–1453)

[8] For the texts of the Foreign Ministers concluding statements, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 27, 1953, p. 106.

[9] Not printed; in it the French expressed their feeling that the hostilities in Indochina and Korea were connected and that Communist China might be prevailed upon in a political conference on Korea to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward events in Indochina as well as in Korea. The memorandum concluded by asking for the views of the United States and the United Kingdom on this subject.

Secretary Dulles expressed his thanks for Mr. Bidault and Lord Salisbury's words, saying he considered the meeting to have been very successful and that, although there had appeared to be passing differences of opinion, the atmosphere of friendliness in which problems of the moment had been dealt with had made it apparent that the positions of the three Governments were really close together. He said he considered the results of the meeting a definite contribution to peace, welfare and justice.

## 3. DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

**Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158**

*Egyptian Prime Minister Naguib to President Eisenhower* [1]

[Translation]

TOP SECRET [CAIRO, July 10, 1953?]

MY DEAR FRIEND: In view of the desire expressed on several occasions by yourself and by your Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, to be of assistance in bringing about an Anglo-Egyptian settlement, consultations have taken place between our diplomatic representatives. I trust that His Excellency Mr. Jefferson Caffery is keeping you informed as to the basis on which the Egyptian Government would be prepared to conclude an agreement with the British Government concerning the Suez Canal base.

I wish to point out that in making these suggestions Egypt is motivated by a sincere desire to reach a peaceful settlement on the issues now standing between her and Great Britain in order that new foundation may be laid for cooperation with the peace-loving powers in an effective defense Egypt and her Arab allies. I can assure you that if a satisfactory settlement can be reached, Egypt will cooperate loyally with her friends and allies to this end and, with their assistance, will be prepared to do her full part in building the military strength and economic and social stability which is indispensable to the achievement of security in the Middle East.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding in the future and so that you may not think me unreasonable, I must point out that the Egyptian Government's willingness to conclude an agreement concerning the Suez Canal base is conditional upon simultaneous agreement on the other questions as set out below.

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[1] The source text was attached to STB MIN 1 as Tab A. A note at the top of it states that Naguib's message was received on July 11, while STB MIN 1 indicates that it was accompanied by the Egyptian formula concerning the Suez Canal Base (*infra*). The message was discussed by the British and United States Foreign Ministers at their meetings on July 11 and 14; for the minutes of these meetings, see pp. 1631 and 1675.

First, there must be a satisfactory agreement with the British Government on the immediate evacuation of all British personnel in the Canal Zone, with the exception of the minimum required number of technicians whose presence during a limited period we accept.

Secondly, while we are prepared to agree to consultations for the building up of Egypt's economic and military strength, we cannot ask my people to accept the presence of British technicians and a commitment as regards the availability of the base with nothing to show for it in return except a vague assurance that the United States and Great Britain will confer on 'measures to strengthen Egypt militarily and economically'.

It is essential, therefore, that simultaneously with the signing of agreements on evacuation and the future of the base, there be firm undertakings and specific commitments to forthwith furnish Egypt with such military equipment and other assistance as may concomitantly be agreed. It should be understood that this will constitute a first step in the re-equipment of the Egyptian Army, and establishment of military industries which shall be carried out, in accordance with terms to be agreed upon.

In closing I must say that we are greatly relying upon your frequently-expressed sentiments of friendship and support for Egypt's right to be a fully free and independent state. You will recognize that the position I have outlined marks a great effort on Egypt's part to reach an agreement which would be satisfactory by all.

Such an agreement can be acceptable to the Egyptian people only if reciprocal good-will of equivalent magnitude is shown. These proposals do not represent a bargaining position and any attempt to treat them as such will only convince us that Egypt's earnest desire for a prompt, honorable and peaceful settlement is not reciprocated.

Please believe me to be ever, your friend,

MOHAMMED NAGUIB

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Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158

*Egyptian Formula Concerning the Suez Canal Base* [1]

SECRET [CAIRO, undated.]

Egypt and the United Kingdom hereby accept the following understandings with respect to certain of the points pertaining to their discussions:

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[1] The source text was attached to STB MIN 1 as Tab B, and was received together with Prime Minister Naguib's letter to President Eisenhower (*supra*) on July 11. The formula was discussed by the British and United States Foreign Ministers at their meetings on July 11 and 14; for the minutes of these meetings, see pp. 1631 and 1675.

I. *Technical management over the base*

A. An Egyptian officer shall assume command over the base.

B. A British officer shall be appointed to the staff of the Egyptian Base Commander as Technical Adviser. He shall be responsible to the Base Commander for the training of Egyptian personnel in the functions performed by the British technicians remaining in the Base. He shall also be in charge of British technicians.*

C. Messages from the British war office pertaining to technical matters shall be sent directly to the Base Communications Center.

D. The Communications Center shall route action copies of such messages to the Technical Adviser and information copies to the Base Commander.

E. Disagreements between the Base Commander and the Technical Adviser over action that is taken by the Technical Adviser on messages from the British War Office shall be referred for settlement to diplomatic channels or other established procedures.

II. *Movement of material to and from the base*

A. The United Kingdom shall be accorded full rights to move any British material in or out of the base to any point and at any time at its discretion. There shall be no major increase above the level of supplies existing at the time this Agreement is signed without Egypt's consent.

III. *Number of technicians*

A. The number of British technicians to remain after withdrawal of British troops shall be fixed at 4,000 which is the absolute minimum required for the efficient operation of the installations.

B. This number of technicians shall remain for the duration of the Agreement, that is for 3 years.

C. At the end of 3 years the parties shall review the desirability of retaining the same or other numbers of British technicians. Should they fail to reach agreement the technicians shall be withdrawn. In this case British inspectors attached to the staff of the United Kingdom Ambassador to Egypt shall be allowed to inspect Egyptian maintenance of British-owned supplies and installations remaining in the Base under the terms of this Agreement.

IV. *Duration of agreement*

A. This Agreement shall last for 3 years.

B. The need for the arrangements created under this Agreement from the point of view of both parties will depend upon fluctuating world conditions outside the control of either. Because of this factor the parties shall review the Agreement prior to its expiration to deter-

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*Technical adviser and technicians shall be in civilian clothes. [Footnote in the source text.]

mine whether they wish it to continue in its present or altered form. If the parties are unable to agree on this question the Agreement shall terminate with the following exceptions:

C. The British Government shall withdraw or otherwise dispose of remaining British-owned stores and installations within a period to be agreed upon.

D. The understanding with respect to the future availability of the Base mentioned below shall not be affected by the termination of this Agreement.

V. *Future availability of the base*

A. The Base shall be made available immediately to Egypt's allies and allies of Egypt's allies in case of attack upon any Arab Nation. In case of a threat of attack on any Arab Nation there shall be immediate consultation between Egypt and the parties mentioned above. The provision regarding availability of the Base shall apply provided Egypt agrees that a threat of attack in fact exists.

B. This provision shall be made public at the time the Agreement is signed.

VI. *Military and economic consultations*

A. Upon the conclusion of an agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom regarding the Suez Canal Base, Egypt shall invite military and economic experts from the United Kingdom, United States and from such other countries as she may wish, to confer regarding plans for defense of the area and regarding economic problems of mutual interest. The discussions shall include measures to strengthen Egypt militarily and economically.

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CFM files, lot M 88, box 165, "Washington Talks, July 1953"

*Draft Tripartite Declaration on European Unity Prepared in the Department of State* [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, July 9, 1953.]

1. The Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Georges Bidault, the Acting Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, the Marquess of Salisbury, and the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. John Foster Dulles, in the course of their present consultations at Washington,

[1] The source text was attached as Annex A to a paper in the records of the United States Delegation titled "Draft Communiqué VI". A cover sheet to the draft communiqué, dated July 9, stated that the source text had been prepared by Knight, and that its substance had been summarized in appropriate sections of the communiqué. The various declarations on European unity were discussed at the third, fourth, and fifth tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings, July 13–14; for the minutes of these meetings, see pp. 1654, 1669, and 1688, respectively.

have reviewed the progress made thus far in NATO and toward European integration.

2. The Three Ministers reaffirmed the determination of their governments to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They stressed their governments' resolve to strengthen and develop further the NATO, which among other things has provided an instrument of collective security which greatly contributed to the maintenance of international peace. Together with the other NATO member nations they will continue to explore and develop new non-military avenues of cooperation leading toward even closer association within the Atlantic Community. They noted with satisfaction the progress made by the North Atlantic Council in providing continuing leadership in furthering an environment of mutual trust and good will in the constant work carried on by the governments in NATO.

3. The Ministers firmly believe that no efforts must be spared in taking these steps which lead toward closer European unity within the framework of the Atlantic Community. The Coal and Steel Community, proposed by France as a first step, is actually operating and removing the many barriers between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, to establish a single market for these basic materials. The Treaty for the European Defense Community, an essential second step toward this goal, has already been approved by the Parliament of the German Federal Republic, and is now before the other five Parliaments. Now in the hands of governments is the Draft Treaty to establish a European Parliament, elected by the people, and an Executive responsible to it. This is designed to provide democratic political institutions to facilitate future extension of the European Community. The Ministers believe that the coming into being of this Community will constitute a great and historic step in history toward peace.

4. In the light of the progress thus far, the Three Ministers agreed on the following statement of policy on European integration:

*a.* These constructive efforts to build a stable, secure European Community are a major contribution toward world peace. Their success is essential for the security and prosperity of Europe and the world. The European Community will strengthen the Atlantic Community and will in turn draw strength from association with it.

*b.* The measures to create this European Community are not directed against the Soviet Union or any other power, and constitute no threat to any State. Indeed the vital interests and security of all, including the Soviet Union, will be most truly served by removing sources of discord and friction in Europe. The fullest guarantees that its military forces will never be used for aggression are contained in the democratic controls envisaged for the Community and other safeguards under the Treaty.

*c.* Since the Community is an answer to long-term needs and interests, a reduction in tensions between the Soviet Union and the West would in no way remove the necessity for carrying it forward expeditiously. The lessening of tensions would, of course, be welcome and would assist the Community in its economic and political development, but it would provide no basis for abandoning or modifying the plans and actions for its creation.

*d.* The European Community will improve the economic well-being of the peoples of the member states, preserve and strengthen their common culture and harmonize the interests of states whose conflicts, in the past, have brought so much bloodshed and misery. The Community of Six can also serve ultimately as a nucleus for a broader European community ending the existing unnatural division between Eastern and Western Europe. This division has arisen from the inability under present circumstances of the oppressed peoples in Eastern Europe to establish through free elections governments of their own choosing. The present member states have repeatedly stressed that other democratic nations dedicated to peace may become members of the Community or associated with it.

*e.* For these reasons, the three Ministers found themselves in full agreement that the European Defense Community should come into existence without delay, in the conviction that a strong, integrated Europe will be a source of stability and a major contribution toward peace.

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**Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158**

*The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the Government of the Soviet Union* [1]

[WASHINGTON, July 14, 1953.]

The development of the international situation and the recent events in Eastern Germany and in Berlin have intensified the universal desire to see peace more firmly established and to ease existing tensions in a way consistent with the fundamental right to freedom.

While recognizing the fact that enduring peace can only be ultimately assured when certain basic problems, such as controlled disarmament, can be dealt with, the United States Government desires to dispose now of those problems which are capable of early solution.

The conclusion of the German and Austrian Treaties which are long overdue clearly constitutes an essential element of the European settle-

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[1] The source text was attached to ST MIN 5 (Draft), p. 1689 as Annex 1. It was approved by the Foreign Ministers at their fifth tripartite meeting on July 14; for the minutes of this meeting, see ST MIN 5 (Draft). The source text states that the note was to be delivered to the Soviet Embassies in Washington, London, and Paris at noon E.D.T. on July 15. Another copy of this note in file 396.1/7–1553, which has an introductory greeting from the Secretary of State, bears a handwritten notation that the note was delivered by hand to the Soviet Embassy on July 15 by an official from the Office of Eastern European Affairs.

ment which the United States Government regards as a major contribution to peace.

A German peace treaty can only be negotiated with the participation of a free and representative all-German Government in a position freely to discuss such a treaty. Such a government can only result from free elections.

The conditions under which such a Government should be formed and enjoy full liberty of action, constitute a problem which is capable of early solution if there is good will on all sides. It is equally clear that no real progress can be made toward a general relaxation of tension in Europe so long as this problem remains unsolved.

In its notes to the Soviet Government, the last of which is that of September 23, 1952,[2] to which no answer has yet been received, the United States Government made constructive proposals, which were fully reflected in the resolution of the German Bundestag of June 10th of this year.[3] These proposals are designed to satisfy the unanimous desire of the German people for unity in freedom.

Mindful of the even greater urgency which the recent events have given to German unification, the United States Government is determined to make a new effort so as to bring to an end the abnormal situation to which the German people is [*are*] subjected. It has therefore decided, after consulting the German Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin, to propose to the Soviet Government a meeting of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, United States, and the Soviet Union. This meeting of limited duration might begin about the end of September at a place to be mutually agreed. The subjects for discussion should be the following:

(1) The organization of free elections in the Federal Republic, the Eastern Zone of Germany, and in Berlin. This would involve discussion *inter alia* of the necessary guarantees for freedom of movement, freedom of action for political parties, freedom of the press, and the enjoyment of the basic freedoms by all Germans before, during and after elections.

(2) Conditions for the establishment of a free all-German Government, with freedom of action in internal and external affairs.

These are essential steps which must precede the opening of discussions with the Soviet Government for a German peace treaty, itself a major element of a general settlement.

The United States Government also considers that at this first meeting agreement should finally be reached on the Austrian Treaty.

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[2] Documentation relating to the tripartite note of Sept. 23, 1952 is presented in volume VII.

[3] The five-point Bundestag resolution of June 10 is summarized in telegram 89, July 6, p. 1591.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 158

*Communiqué of the Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France* [1]

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1953.

The Foreign Minister of France, M. Georges Bidault, the Acting Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, the Marquess of Salisbury, and the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. John Foster Dulles, met and consulted together at Washington from July 10 to 14, 1953.

I

In the course of their consultations, they reviewed a wide range of common problems of concern to the three Governments. The topics considered have been diverse, but the entire conference has been inspired by one dominant purpose. That has been to seek solutions fulfilling the common hope of their governments and peoples for peace, freedom, and justice. They are certain that these same aspirations are shared by peoples everywhere.

The three Ministers are convinced that solid foundations for peace can be built only by constructive action to end oppression and remove causes of instability and sources of conflict. These who genuinely want peace must seek to restore liberty, hope, and human dignity. In their meetings, the Ministers have sought answers to existing problems consistent with these principles.

This has been the spirit leading to their conclusions on the future of Europe, the restoration of German unity and of Austrian independence, and the establishment of peace in Korea and Indochina. The same spirit inspires their desire to see true liberty restored in the countries of Eastern Europe. In each case, they have sought means offering the greatest hope of satisfying the general desire for freedom, security, and well-being. They believe that their proposed solutions will help to achieve that stability based on consent which alone can reduce tension and guarantee a durable peace.

It is the earnest hope of the three Ministers that the Soviet Union will approach outstanding problems in the same spirit. In so doing the Soviet Union would contribute to a lasting peace assuring the security of all.

II

The three Foreign Ministers have reaffirmed their resolve to pursue vigorously the policies upon which their Governments have agreed within the framework of the Atlantic Treaty. These policies include

[1] The source text was attached to ST MIN 5 (Draft), p. 1689, as Annex 3. It was approved by the Foreign Ministers at their fifth tripartite meeting on July 14; for the minutes of this meeting, see ST MIN 5 (Draft).

the work for European unity of the six European countries which have already set up the Coal and Steel Community and whose Governments have signed the treaty for the European Defense Community.

The three Governments are determined to safeguard, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, the freedom, the common heritage and the civilization of their peoples, based on the principles of democracy, freedom of the individual and the rule of law. They have emphasized their resolve to continue the common defense effort necessary to redress the present lack of balance of power and thus to contribute to collective security and to the maintenance of international peace. The Ministers reaffirmed that the North Atlantic Alliance is fundamental to the foreign and defense policies of the three Governments. They were agreed that the improved prospects of peace were largely due to the existence of the alliance and that its defensive strength must be maintained. They wish to pay tribute to the vital work of the North Atlantic Council.

The three Ministers are instructing their Governments' Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council concerning the discussions they have held in order that the other member nations of NATO may be informed in accordance with established practice.

## III

Convinced that no effort should be spared to strengthen European unity within the Atlantic Community, the three Ministers have noted that the Coal and Steel Community, the result of a French initiative, is now operating successfully. The establishment of the European Defense Community constitutes a necessary step to the same goal; meanwhile the work of creating a European Political Community is being pursued by the six Governments. They have noted the steps already taken or contemplated by the British Government to establish close links with these communities.

The three Ministers were therefore agreed that:

(*a*) the above institutions of a European Community will strengthen the Atlantic Community and will in turn be strengthened by association with it;

(*b*) those constructive efforts to build a stable, secure European Community are a major contribution toward world peace. Since the European Community corresponds to the lasting needs of its members and their people for peace, security and welfare, it is to be looked upon as necessary in itself and not linked up with existing international tensions.

(*c*) such a Community, peaceful by its very nature, is not directed against anyone. The interests and security of all countries cannot be better safeguarded than by the removal of causes of conflict in Europe. Indeed, the provisions laid down in the European Defense Community Treaty are a guarantee that its forces would never be used in the service of aggression.

(*d*) designed to put an end to the conflicts of the past, the European Community does not exclude any State; on the contrary, the six member-countries have repeatedly stressed that other free countries of Europe may become members of the Community or be associated with it.

IV

The three Ministers have also given further consideration to the problem of the reunification of Germany. The grave events which took place recently in Berlin and in the Soviet Zone once again gave proof of the will to independence and the indomitable determination for freedom of the inhabitants of these areas.

These developments have confirmed the view of the Ministers, that the early reunification of Germany, in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the German population, would be a great contribution to the easing of international tension.

The three powers have made sustained efforts to reach this goal. They have, in the course of recent years addressed several notes with constructive proposals to the USSR, the last dated September 23, 1952 to which no reply has yet been received. These notes responded to the overwhelming desire of the German people to see unity re-established in freedom, as reflected most recently by the Resolution of the German Bundestag of June 10 of this year.

An early and orderly progress in this direction requires the cooperation of the Soviet Government.

Mindful of the special urgency which recent events have given to the question of the unification of Germany, the three powers have resolved to make a new effort to bring to an end the division of Germany.

The three Governments have therefore decided, in consultation with the German Federal Government, to propose a meeting in the early autumn of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the USSR to discuss directly the first steps which should lead to a satisfactory solution of the German problem, namely, the organization of free elections and the establishment of a free all-German government.

This meeting should also consider the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty.

V [2]

The three Ministers reviewed the situation in the Far East.

In reviewing the Korean situation the three Ministers reaffirmed their admiration for the gallantry of the United Nations forces, including the indomitable forces of the Republic of Korea, defending

[2] A parenthetical note at this point in the source text states that this part of the communiqué was released at 4 p. m., July 14.

the free world's cause. They reaffirmed their strong support of the efforts of the United Nations Command to conclude an early armistice consistent with the United Nations' aims and the determination of their governments to continue to work toward that end. They agreed to pursue every effort to assist the stouthearted and sorely tried Koreans to reunite peacefully under institutions of their own choosing.

They considered that, in existing circumstances and pending further consultation, the common policies of the three Powers towards Communist China should be maintained. They resolved that, if the Communists should renew their aggression in Korea after an armistice and again threaten the principles defended by the United Nations, their governments would as members of the United Nations again support the restoration of peace and security.

The Foreign Ministers were of the opinion that an armistice in Korea must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia. They hope that any armistice accepted by the United Nations would be a step forward in the cause of peace everywhere, and in particular in the Far East.

The current situation in Indochina was examined. The three Foreign Ministers paid tribute once again to the heroic efforts and sacrifices of the soldiers of the French Union, be they from France, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos or other parts of the Union. They agreed that the struggle in defense of the independence of these three nations against aggressive Communism is essential to the Free World, and they exchanged views on various measures to hasten a satisfactory outcome and the restoration of peace in Indochina.

The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and the United States noted with great satisfaction the proposal of the French Government to open discussions with each of the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam with a view toward completing their sovereignty and independence. They agreed that this initiative was a most important and auspicious step toward perfecting a free association of these four nations, since the internal security and stability of the Associated States are best safeguarded by freely established constitutional regimes.

They noted that the French Union offers a harmonious and flexible framework within which the mutual interest of the participants may be guaranteed and their individual interests reconciled. They are convinced that the objective of the French Government is to perfect with the Associated States that mutually desirable cohesion which is indispensable to the success of the common struggle for the independence of the three states and which is therefore of fundamental importance to the security of the whole of Southeast Asia.

396.1 WA/7–1453 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France* [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 14, 1953—8 : 54 p. m.

Topol 51. As representative of host Government for tripartite talks you are authorized to make this report on behalf of three Governments, in concert with your French and UK colleagues:

The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France and the United States have completed a series of meetings in Washington with frank discussion various topics of special interest in atmosphere of sincere cordiality. Since a number of the subjects considered are of great interest to other partners in NATO, the Governments of the UK, France and the US desire to inform NAC regarding conclusions reached.

Considerable time during first tripartite session was devoted to discussion of significance of Soviet policy Beria purge. Recognizing it too early to determine exactly significance this act, sense of the discussion was as follows:

1. Beria purge may mean a tougher nationalistic Soviet line as similarity between recent *Pravda* editorial and the March 1939 report of the 18th Congress Russian CP are striking. Would be dangerous, however, to overemphasize historical analogy and firm up now an interpretation of the event, which may in fact result in continuation "peace offensive".
2. Recent softer internal Soviet line very possibly caused by pressure of public opinion within the Soviet Union as well as in the satellites, especially Eastern Germany and Hungary.
3. Peace offensive destined as offensive weapon against the West has boomeranged against Soviets at home.
4. While situation still unclear, major events are obviously taking place and at a rhythm unprecedentedly rapid in the Communist world.
5. Basic policies of West have been successful, particularly in preventing consolidation of Soviet world and should be pursued without faltering. At same time, tactical flexibility in application of our policies should be preserved to take advantage of developments in Soviet Union. It was also agreed that hopes of eventual freedom for satellite peoples should be supported and developed by the West while avoiding inciting open revolt.

In lengthy discussion of Germany, the three Ministers agreed that the West must recognize that German opinion attracted increasingly by hope of re-unification. They agreed upon the necessity for reaffirming publicly and vigorously the policies of their governments in support of European unification and of EDC in particular.

[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Adair and cleared by Merchant, was repeated priority to London and Rome.

They agreed that the three governments should take the initiative in inviting Soviet Union to a four-power meeting to be held about the end of September. This agreement accords with the views of Chancellor Adenauer. To prevent unsettling effects in Germany it was considered that invitation to USSR for four-power talks should be announced prior to German elections, but meeting to be held after those elections. It is felt that announcement might assist Government of GFR in coming elections and at the same time assist ratification of EDC in France.

It was agreed that any four-power meeting would be of fixed and limited duration with a limited agenda. Although Germany will be the major agenda item, it is agreed that scope of four-power discussion which would be at the Foreign Minister level should be restricted to topics which can be solved, e.g. free elections, provisional independent German Government free to choose its own courses of action, and method of control over elections. Austria would also be on agenda. Four-power Foreign Ministers meeting as proposed does not exclude the possibility of other meetings on other subjects at an appropriate time. Experts will meet in Paris to discuss details German and Austrian peace treaties at time to be settled later.

The Ministers considered the danger inherent in holding four-power talks with Soviet Union prior establishment EDC, but agreed desirable because of German elections and alternative of further delay in ratification EDC Treaty.

US and UK Foreign Ministers stressed that EDC would remain firm in the policy of their Governments and that four-power talks would not be permitted to re-open the question of EDC.

The French Foreign Minister presented the Indochina problem, stressing military difficulties and the French political declaration of July 3.[2] The British and Americans expressed great satisfaction over liberal French plans for completing sovereignty of Associated States.

The American Secretary of State presented a résumé of the Korean situation. See Wireless Bulletin for text communiqué issued July 14.[3]

Full text follows by separate telegram identic notes to be delivered by three powers at noon July 15 Washington time to Soviet Ambassadors at their respective capitals, to be released for morning papers July 16.[4]

This cable has been approved by UK and French Delegations here.

DULLES

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[2] See footnote 3, p. 1644.
[3] *Supra.*
[4] For text of the note, see p. 1701.

## E. Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meetings at London, October 1953

*Editorial Note*

On October 10, Foreign Secretary Eden, who had just returned to office after a seven-month illness, extended invitations to Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Bidault to meet in London for talks on European and Far Eastern topics. Following acceptances of the invitations, arrangements were made to hold tripartite and bipartite discussions on October 16–18 and to extend the range of topics to include the Middle East. A copy of Eden's invitation to Dulles is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 165, "Tri Mins Mtg London". For a statement by Secretary Dulles on the objectives of the conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 26, 1953, pages 546–547.

The first two tripartite sessions were held on October 16. At their morning meeting the Foreign Ministers discussed the reply of the three Western powers to the Soviet note of September 28 and Trieste. At their afternoon meeting they discussed security guarantees for Europe, the Israeli raid on the Jordanian village of Qibya on the night of October 14–15, and the date of the next North Atlantic Council meeting; and considered further the text of their reply to the Soviet note. For a report on their discussion of the security guarantees, see Secto 8 from London, October 16, page 825. For a record of the United States-French bilateral meeting on October 16, see telegram Secto 27, page 826. For documentation on the participation of the United States in NATO, see pages 1 ff.; documentation on the Soviet note and the Western reply of October 18 is presented in volume VII; documentation on the policy of the United States toward the Free Territory of Trieste is presented in volume VIII; documentation on the reaction of the United States to the Israeli raid on Qibya is presented in volume IX.

Following the afternoon session Foreign Secretary Eden gave a dinner for his two colleagues at which Bidault related the latest developments in Indochina. Documentation on Indochina is presented in volume XIII.

On October 17 the three Ministers again met twice. At the morning session they considered once more their reply to the Soviet note, Trieste, and the date of the next North Atlantic Council meeting; and discussed the situation in Korea and Indochina. At their afternoon meeting they discussed the possibility of a four-power conference with the Soviet Union. During the morning Secretary Dulles also met with Foreign Secretary Eden to discuss Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Kuwait, and during the afternoon he conferred with Bidault on Indo-

china and the European Defense Community. Documentation on Korea is presented in volume XV; documentation on Iran is in volume X; documentation on Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait is presented in volume IX; for documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a European Defense Community, see pages 571 ff.

On October 17 a final tripartite meeting was held at which the Foreign Ministers discussed Trieste, recognition of the People's Republic of China, and a communiqué on their meetings. Documentation on the policy of the United States with respect to recognition of the People's Republic of China is presented in volume XIV. For the text of the Foreign Ministers communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 26, 1953, page 546. Further documentation on the meetings, including sets of telegrams to and from Secretary Dulles, background papers prepared in the Department of State on the several topics discussed by the Foreign Ministers, and papers relating to the preparations for the meetings, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 165 and the CFM files, lot M 88, box 165, "Tri Mins Meeting London", and in volume VII.

## F. Bermuda Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, December 4–8, 1953

### 1. PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE

*Editorial Note*

On May 20, Prime Minister Mayer, who faced a vote of confidence in the French National Assembly on May 21, sent to President Eisenhower through the United States Embassy in Paris a request for approval of a statement to the Assembly which would include, *inter alia*, the proposal for a high level meeting of the three Western powers. Officers from the Department of State, which opposed the suggestion for such a meeting on the grounds that it was undesirable to commit the United States while the Korean situation hung in the balance and before the Austrian Treaty discussions began, discussed Mayer's request with President Eisenhower at 6 p. m. on May 20. The President, however, strongly favored the meeting and immediately telephoned Prime Minister Churchill. As a result of their telephone conversation, the President made the decision to hold the meeting. The next day the three governments announced that they had agreed to hold a high

level tripartite meeting at a time convenient to all of them. On the same day following this announcement, however, Mayer was defeated on the vote of confidence and France remained without a government for a month. The meeting was then scheduled for June 29, but on June 26, the British announced that Churchill's physician had advised him to lighten his duties, thus delaying indefinitely the meeting at Bermuda. On June 28, arrangements were made to have the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France instead of their chiefs meet at Washington starting July 10.

Copies of Mayer's request, transmitted in telegram 6019 from Paris, and telegram 2911, May 20 (10:43 p. m.), from the Department of State to Secretary Dulles, who was in New Delhi, relating the ensuing developments, are in file 396.1/5–2053. Additional documentation relating to the preparations for the abortive meeting at Bermuda is in file 396.1; the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166 and the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 187. For the text of the tripartite announcement on May 21, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1, 1953, page 778; for documentation on the Foreign Ministers meetings at Washington, see pages 1582 ff.; for President Eisenhower's account of these events, see Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, page 242.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 187**

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower*

TOP SECRET PERSONAL [LONDON,] November 5, 1953.

MY DEAR FRIEND: The Soviet answer [1] puts us back to where we were when Bermuda broke down through my misfortune.[2] We are confronted with a deadlock. So why not let us try Bermuda again? I suggest four or five days during the first fortnight in December. We could then take stock of the whole position and I think quite a lot of people will be pleased that we are doing so. If you want the French, I am quite agreeable and it would be a good opportunity of talking to them about E.D.C., which surely we ought to get settled now. I hope you would bring Foster. Anthony who would be all for it and would come with me. It would be worth trying to make Laniel come with Bidault.

All arrangements were very carefully worked out last time, and it only takes a word of command to put them all on again.

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[1] Documentation on the Soviet note, dated Nov. 3, concerning a four-power meeting on Germany is presented in volume VII.

[2] Regarding the postponement of the Bermuda meeting scheduled for June 1953, see the editorial note, *supra*.

Let me know how this strikes you. I really think there will be serious criticism if we are all left gaping at a void.

WINSTON

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396.1/11–653

*President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill* [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 6, 1953.

DEAR WINSTON: I am temporarily out of touch with Foster but I assume that within limits he could arrange his schedule to conform to whatever plans you and I might make.

Because of the negative character of the Soviet reply, there may be considerable value in a good talk between us and the French in order to survey the situation in which we now find ourselves. It would be necessary of course to avoid creating a false impression that our purpose in meeting is to issue another invitation to the Soviets. There is nothing to be gained by showing too much concern over their intransigence and bad deportment and I believe that instead of relating our meeting to any Soviet word or act, past or future, we should merely announce that we are meeting to discuss matters of common interest. I feel that the presence of the French is almost an essential because of EDC, Indochina, and NATO problems in general, in which both you and we have such a great stake. My only reservation about our meeting would be if it were some way seized upon as a pretext by opponents of EDC in France to delay ratification. This would be a tragedy for us all. Also, in view of the French presidential elections now scheduled for about mid-December, I do not know whether the French would find it possible to attend such a meeting in early December. Of course if Laniel could not come, Bidault might attend. I assume you, as head of the host government, would issue the invitation to the French and inquire whether they could attend such a meeting.

In the event the French accept, my calendar does not leave me much leeway in choice of dates. I could reach Bermuda on the morning of December 4 and stay through the 7th, returning here on the morning of the 8th. It is also possible that I myself could arrive on the morning of the 11th returning on the 15th but in this case, Foster would be unable to come with me as the North Atlantic Council Ministers meet in Paris on December 14–16 and Foster must leave Washington not later than December 12. I give you these possibilities only tentatively because I have yet to discuss it with Foster.

Foster should be back here by Monday morning, by which time you may be able to inform me as to the suitability of the periods I suggest

[1] Transmitted to London in telegram 2481, eyes only for Ambassador Aldrich.

before making any approach to the French. I think then we would have to agree quickly as to timing of the announcement so that danger of leaks can be eliminated.[2]

With warm regards,

As ever, IKE

[2] Following further exchanges of communications between Washington and London and between London and Paris, James Hagerty, Presidential Press Secretary, announced on Nov. 10 that the meeting at Bermuda would be held Dec. 4–8, to discuss various matters of concern to the three powers. (Press release, Nov. 10, CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "Big Three Bermuda") Documentation on the exchanges between the three governments is in file 396.1/11–653 through 11–1053.

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*Editorial Note*

On November 12, the Department of State transmitted to 46 posts guidance for the upcoming Bermuda Conference. The posts were instructed to use the substance of circular telegram 1228, June 24, which had transmitted the guidance for the meeting of the Heads of Governments in July that had been postponed due to Churchill's illness. Circular telegram 1228 stated that the individual posts should inform the governments to which they were accredited:

"1) Bermuda Conference primarily intended permit exchange of views on broad trends and general topics of mutual interest without necessarily reaching conclusions.

"2) It will be essentially informal and without predetermined agenda.

"3) In any event US Government would not make new policy decision directly affecting the national interests of any friendly power at Bermuda or flowing therefrom without consulting with interested government." (396.1/6–2453)

In addition to this, the posts were instructed to discourage speculation that the December meeting stemmed from the Soviet note of November 3 or from special concern over Soviet policy or that the three powers were developing an alternative to the European Defense Community. (Circular telegram 192; 396.1/11–1253)

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**Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, 1953–61, Whitman file**

*Memorandum of Discussion at the 170th Meeting of the National Security Council, November 12, 1953*

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY WASHINGTON, November 13, 1953.

Present at the 170th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration;

and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President was out of the country and so did not attend this meeting. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Secretary of the Interior (for Item 1); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 2, 4 and 5); the Secretary of the Navy (for Item 1); Robert Murray and Louis Rothschild, of the Department of Commerce (for Item 1); Robert Finley, Office of Defense Mobilization (for Item 1); General Ridgway for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follows discussion of a national petroleum program, significant world developments affecting United States security, NSC 26, and the United States position with respect to the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments.]

5. *Forthcoming Bermuda Conference*

Mr. Cutler asked whether the Secretary of State would comment to the Council on the origin of the Bermuda Conference and the probable subjects for discussion at this meeting.

Secretary Dulles said that the idea had originated with Prime Minister Churchill, who was won over by Secretary Dulles' arguments against a high-level conference with the Russians, but had suggested that in its place an informal meeting with the President and the French Premier be scheduled. There was no indication at this point what the Prime Minister specifically wanted to talk about, except ways and means of pushing ahead to the ratification of EDC. The British Embassy, likewise, had had no guidance from London as to what other matters were likely to be on the agenda. Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles thought it quite possible that in addition to EDC the Prime Minister would wish to talk about Germany, the Suez base, Iran, and possibly atomic energy matters. Secretary Dulles reminded the Council that the Prime Minister was very fond of meetings without any agenda, since they permitted him to spring surprises. Secretary Dulles would not be astonished, therefore, if Sir Winston revived the idea of the meeting with the Russians.

In response to a question from Mr. Cutler, Secretary Dulles stated that the situation in Indochina might likewise get onto the agenda at Bermuda. If the subject were raised by the French, Secretary Dulles proposed to restrict himself to re-emphasizing the very great concern

of the United States Government that France go ahead vigorously in carrying out the Navarre plan.[1]

The President indicated his intention of having a very small group accompany him and the Secretary of State to Bermuda, but also indicated his desire that the Secretaries of the Treasury and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission be prepared to come to Bermuda on short notice if their presence were needed. The President also indicated his intention of keeping the discussion with the British and French on the most general terms.

The National Security Council:

Discussed the subject in the light of an oral report by the Secretary of State as to items which might possibly be discussed at the Conference.

S. EVERETT GLEASON

[1] Documentation on Indochina and the concern of the United States about the carrying out of the Navarre Plan is presented in volume XIII.

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396.1/11–1653

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor) to the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)*

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1953.

Subject: Bermuda Meeting; British Angles

*General Approach*

Churchill thinks traditionally in world-wide terms. It is perhaps stating the obvious to say that he will tour the world in the discussions. This he will probably do in a general way but, if he approaches past form, he will not fail to make the British position clear area by area, problem by problem.

*Global Planning*

I think, moreover, it is likely that at this meeting he will go beyond this and argue the case for global planning (politico-military). He is likely to cite this as the greatest void in our western security shield. He is apt to argue that we must "sort out" priorities on a world-wide basis; i.e., what relative weight should be given to areas such as Western Europe, the Middle East, the Far East, the North American Continent, etc. (See Field Marshal Montgomery's memo [1]).

This concept has long been present in the thinking of Churchill and the British military. They would favor such planning on an U.S.–U.K. basis but would grudgingly admit France in the arrangements.

[1] The memorandum under reference has not been identified further.

The ideal arrangement from the British point of view probably would be the re-creation of the war-time Combined Chiefs of Staff type of organization. Alternatively, their objective may be some form of combined political direction of worldwide strategy.

I do not anticipate that those or other specific proposals necessarily will be made (Churchill is aware of our opposition to the Combined Chiefs concept). I do think, however, we should expect the argument in general terms and be prepared to meet it.

*NATO*

I understand we intend to stress this subject. I would expect the British position to be that the members cannot stand the present high defense costs indefinitely and that our job is to formulate the type of program which countries can maintain for 20 to 25 years (again see Montgomery's memo which rather surprisingly seems to me to be close to what I believe U.K. thinking to be).

If our program is, as I believe it should be, along similar lines we should have no difficulty on this one with the British.

*EDC*

We should remember Churchill has never thought much of the EDC concept per se and goes along with it only on the theory that it has appeared to be the most feasible method of accomplishing western German rearmament. The British favor western German rearmament for both security and economic reasons.

It is my impression that the maintenance of U.S. troops in Europe is presently the point of cardinal importance to the British in this whole complex of western European defense. Whatever reassurances the President is in a position to give on this point should serve "to sweeten" the British re this general subject.

*Soviet Union*

We should bear in mind that short of appeasement, and there is no evidence whatsoever of appeasement in the attitude of the present British Government, the British are willing to go further than we are in seeking talks with the Russians. The reason for this is largely one of geography (vulnerability to atomic warfare).

Churchill is certain to want to explore thoroughly all aspects of possible talks with the Russians including his May idea of high-level exploratory conversations.[2] I doubt if he will press this against our opposition, however, as I think he realizes that the moment of best timing for such a meeting was when he made it and not now.

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[2] For the text of Prime Minister Churchill's speech to the House of Commons on May 11, see *H.C. Debs.*, 5th series, vol. 515, cols. 883–898.

I believe Churchill will go along with a reasoned and persuasive case put up by us provided we avoid giving an impression of rigidity.

*Far East*

The British feel it is of vital importance to get the Korean Political Conference going fearing that in the absence of a conference the general Far Eastern situation will deteriorate further.[3] It is quite possible, on the one hand therefore, that Churchill may advocate that we make further concessions in the interest of getting a conference going. Contrarywise and as he has done before he may indicate or more probably imply, a willingness to concede more to our own point of view in the Far East (reason of record the responsibilities we are carrying there) provided we take more fully into account U.K. views and interests in the Near East.

As I see it, the odds as to which tack he will take are about even with perhaps a little edge on the former because of public opinion in the U.K.

In any event we should keep in mind three fundamentals in the U.K. position (1) desire to accommodate Indian viewpoint to greatest extent possible in view of great importance attached by U.K. to India (rightly I think) and her hope that through the Commonwealth machinery India can be kept with the West, (2) antipathy in U.K. and Commonwealth to Rhee and feeling that U.S. should and could do more to control him, and (3) general feeling in the U.K. that Communist control of mainland China is a fact of life which must be faced which must entail membership in U.N. in relatively near future.

*Near East*

The Near East remains the most critical area in our relations with the British. The British, rightly or wrongly, appear to feel that we have not given them the public support in the area which they feel is required in order for them to carry out their agreed primary responsibility for the defense of the area and to protect their interest in the area. I am preparing for you a separate memorandum on this question.[4]

*Trade; Economic and Financial Questions*

As these questions rarely catch Churchill's imagination, they are unlikely to be stressed by him at Bermuda.

We would be doing ourselves a disservice, however, if we overlooked the fact that apprehension over the possible course of U.S. foreign economic policy is one of the major question marks about us today in England—in both the Government and the public. Our inability to pursue the proposals developed in the Commonwealth Economic

[3] Documentation on the Geneva Conference on Korea is presented in volume XVI.

[4] The memorandum under reference here has not been identified further.

Conference plus a number of Buy American and other actions have occasioned expressions of British concern over future U.S. policy in this field. At Bermuda, we are most likely to feel the impact of this in the discussion of the future of NATO, the well-known theme of "trade not aid", one or the other being a necessity.

We may possibly be confronted by an argument for relaxation on East-West trade controls on the ground that Western Europe, indeed the free world, requires more of that trade if their economies are to be self-supporting without the dollar dole. China trade might be raised in the Far Eastern discussions.

*Background*

The conference will be held against a background of repeated public expressions in the U.K. of concern over the present state of the Anglo-American relationship. Undoubtedly it will be a major objective of Churchill to strengthen and improve the relationship. The situation will therefore provide an opportunity to correct those misunderstandings which have contributed to British concern. A number of these have been referred to in the previous sections of this memorandum. It should be noted that the British, from the Government point of view, feel that as problems arise, area by area, which involve their interests, we are prone to give too great weight to the local area considerations and not enough weight to the British interests at stake.

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**396.1/11–1753 : Telegram**

*The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET PARIS, November 17, 1953—7 p. m.

1954. Laniel and Bidault will probably be accompanied at Bermuda by Bougenot (Secretary of State for Presidency), Vidal (Directeur de Cabinet), Fouchet (Foreign Office liaison with Laniel), and possibly Leca (financial adviser), all of Laniel's Cabinet; and Parodi, Margerie, Seydoux, Roux, Laloy and Boegner or Sauvagnargues, all of Foreign Office. Bougenot and Leca not yet definite.

French in general agreement with Secretary's ideas on subjects to be discussed (Deptel 1784, November 10 [2]) and have so advised British. They believe that evaluation of Soviet Policy, Trieste and Far East with particular reference to Indochina will undoubtedly loom large. They also believe that there should be a discussion of general NATO

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.

[2] Not printed; it reported *inter alia* that Secretary Dulles felt there were a number of questions which could be usefully discussed at Bermuda including evaluation of the Soviet position, implementation of the Bonn and Paris Treaties, the situation in the Far East, and how the three Western powers could move ahead with greater unity. (396.1/11–1053)

policy, the effect of new weapons on strategy and, since meeting will occur just before NAC, topics on NAC agenda. French feel strongly, and Margerie states British agree, that any discussion of EDC questions would be premature. Laniel and Bidault can report on developments since London meeting [3] and give estimate of current parliamentary situation and timetable contemplated by government, but believe that to go further would be improper since government position is already known and since Parliament is officially seized of Paris and Bonn treaties. Margerie reminded me of closeness with which schedule Bidault had outlined to Secretary and Eden at London was being followed. He said that as soon as present debate was concluded, Bonnet and Massigli would probably be instructed to advise Washington and London again of Bidault's ideas concerning balance of schedule, to ask that great care be taken at Bermuda to avoid anything which might savor of public pressure and to emphasize that "wheels are now turning but one pebble in them could do great damage."

On Bermuda in general, he remarked that West had apparently reached new "turning point" in its relations with USSR but questioned whether we should emphasize this publicly. There was no chance for peace in sense of negotiating diplomatic settlements with USSR. On other hand, there was great chance for peace in sense of remoteness of possibility of Soviet attack. He felt we should avoid giving any impression that we regarded present situation as dangerous, but should rather take approach that we were now settling down for the long term, during which Europe would be divided as at present for many years, and that we must find means of adapting ourselves to this long-range situation and of maintaining the necessary defense as economically as possible. Russian expansion had been stopped in Europe, including Greece, Yugoslavia and Berlin, by firmness and at the 38th Parallel by war. It had not yet been stopped in Southeast Asia. Any rolling back of the curtain must be a very long-term operation and basically a moral one. We were left with the *status quo* which the Russians had the power to break at any time but were deterred from doing so primarily by fact that armed adventures in Europe would bring their own destruction. The West should again make clear both the strictly defensive nature of its policy and its determination to do whatever was necessary to defend itself.[4]

Bohlen comments on foregoing that we are less at "turning point" than in early stage of new phase, that chances of war or negotiated

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[3] Regarding the three Western Foreign Ministers meeting at London, Oct. 16–18; see the editorial note, p. 1709.

[4] On Nov. 19, Ambassador Bonnet discussed the Bermuda meeting with Secretary Dulles, stating that the French attached the greatest importance to consideration of NATO problems. The Ambassador indicated also that the French would seek assurances that U.S. troops would not be withdrawn from Europe. (Memorandum of conversation, Nov. 19; 396.1/11–1953)

settlement are both remote and that West should accordingly undertake to develop its unity and viability on long-term basis.

ACHILLES

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396.1/11–2753 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Secretary of State*[1]

SECRET LONDON, November 27, 1953—1 p. m.

2296. Bermuda Meeting—Far East. Foreign Office hopes for general discussion at Bermuda of longer term policy for Far East which, it believes, will show a wider area of agreement among the three powers than would appear from public reiteration of areas of disagreement on tactics. Eden known to hold to view negotiations with Moscow on European problems have reached deadlock and only apparent flexibility anywhere around Iron Curtain is on Far Eastern periphery. He is therefore likely initiate discussion future of Korea and negotiations for political conference where he believes UN position should continue to be flexible in hope (*a*) avoid breakdown in negotiations and (*b*) obtain some relaxation in Far Eastern tensions. UK views on Korea remain about as outlined in UK position paper presented Department November 5.[2] Re Indochina, UK will be content have French present survey present political and military situation. Re Indonesia, UK, while ready participate in discussions, will probably not originate them. Its view is that while situation there far from satisfactory, and while it may be many years before it can make substantial contribution to stability in SEA, Indonesia is determined stand on own feet without meddling from abroad and probably best policy is respect Indonesian sensitiveness and allow country develop along lines its own choosing. For outsiders to attempt influence Indonesian policy might likely result in drawing Nationalists into Commie camp.

If time permits Eden would also wish have at least exchange of views on general problems on Far East, including (*a*) future role of Japan, (*b*) desirability continued reliance on ROK and Formosa, and means available keep them in line, and (*c*) role of India, Thailand, Burma and Indonesia in defense of SEA. In this last connection, Foreign Office has been working for some time on plan for broadening defense arrangements in SEA, but it unlikely UK will do more than broach subject at Bermuda.

ALDRICH

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] Not printed; it presented the preliminary British views on a Korean political conference. (795.00/11–553)

396.1/11–2753 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 27, 1953—6 p. m.

2311. Bermuda Meeting—USSR and high-level talks. We have been able obtain no clear picture of Churchill's probable line on USSR. Although officials have undoubtedly prepared position papers they have been unwilling discuss them as they are well aware that British position on question of where we go from here will depend almost entirely on Prime Minister.

Foreign Office official told Embassy officer in confidence that they had not been directed to prepare paper on subject of high-level talks. It is not known how strongly Churchill persists in idea of meeting Soviet head of state, either by himself or in company US and French heads. Wishful hope that this great British statesman can find bridge over horrifying chasm between East and West remains alive in this country, and Churchill might be impelled by this to seek meeting. On other hand, he apparently is not in same state of mind as in June when he definitely viewed Bermuda as opportunity to lay groundwork for four-power top-level meeting; his remarks in Commons November 3 [2] seemed to show tempering of his optimism expressed in May, although not abandonment of dream. (As for any special hint from Soviets to British, Foreign Office has told us categorically there has been none. Hayter has not yet seen Malenkov and his call on Molotov was formal). We consider chances better than even that Churchill will not press specific suggestion for any chiefs of state meeting. It must always be borne in mind, however, that he is imaginative, unpredictable, firm in belief in his own genius, and apparently determined to attempt one last crowning act on world stage.

Foreign Office officials and most of government, including Foreign Minister, do not favor meeting. They have never been convinced it could succeed and, in their view, Soviet intentions have been made clearer in past few months, i.e., meeting now less needed to consolidate opinion. As for official estimates of Soviet capabilities or ultimate objectives, they see no basic change. Soviet regime had been credited with tentatively attempting policies of greater flexibility and ostensible moderation for brief time following Stalin's death. This probably was to gain breathing spell in which to secure their position. This purpose has now been at least partially accomplished: Evidence seems to be that new regime, dominated by Malenkov, is now better established and has retained firm control over Soviet (and satellite) struc-

[1] Repeated to Moscow and Paris.

[2] For the text of the Queen's speech and subsequent remarks by Prime Minister Churchill on Nov. 3, see *H. C. Debs.*, 5th series, vol. 520, cols. 3 ff.

ture. In internal administration they seem to be tackling some of their economic and social problems in more realistic manner. In external policy, at least with respect to Europe, they have now returned to one of rigidly holding present gains, both because they feel sure of being able to do so and because they have not devised any better alternative. Although Soviet note of November 26,[3] of course, requires fresh appraisal, Eden had arrived at conclusion that for present Soviets were not prepared to make any change in policy or tactics, in particular with respect to Germany, and there was now no prospect of any negotiations on European problems.

ALDRICH

[3] Documentation on the Soviet note, Nov. 26, accepting participation in a four-power conference, is presented in volume VII.

396.1/11–2753 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET LONDON, November 27, 1953—5 p. m.

2303. Bermuda meeting—atomic energy. British plans for atomic energy talks at Bermuda are shrouded in same uncertainty that envelops other subjects (see Embtel 2294, November 27 [1]). We have been able to learn of only two specific subjects Cherwell is likely to bring up in conversations with Admiral Strauss:

1. Cherwell will probably refer to reports that administration is in favor of extending area of atomic cooperation involving amendment of McMahon Act and ask for detailed information on plans and prospects.

2. Fact that US and UK have both announced industrial atomic projects raises long term question of uranium supplies. Cherwell may wish to touch on this.

In general we suspect that British approach likely to be shifted from previous emphasis on mutual advantages of trading information. Believe Churchill and Cherwell likely to stress instead extent Soviet atomic development and danger this poses for West, urging that joint US–UK interests demand pooling of effort and arguing that in view extent Soviet knowledge security risk acceptable.

ALDRICH

[1] Not printed; in it Aldrich reported that Foreign Office officials were "somewhat vague and uncertain in their prognostications on both form and content of talks, most admitting quite frankly that much depends on the unpredictable Churchill" (396.1/11–2753).

396.1/11–2753 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Secretary of State* [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 27, 1953—7 p. m.

2321. Subject Bermuda meeting—Europe.

1. Following outline British position based entirely on conversations prior news new Soviet note.[2] Definite positions may of course also be influenced French foreign policy debate.

2. Taking essential task at Bermuda as making affirmative contribution to EDC ratification and getting on with German defense contribution, British point out that previous meetings have emerged with reiterated agreement by three powers (or by fourteen in NATO), including French, of urgency achieving EDC ratification. In view present position French Government, British believe mere reiteration this position at Bermuda useless. Only constructive approach is to ask what can be done to help French Government with its problem, and to direct communiqué this end.

3. Obvious French desire is to obtain British commitment for 50 years against reducing present level British forces on Continent without French consent. Any such undertaking clearly not acceptable. British presume any similar French desires concerning American forces equally unacceptable to United States. British therefore, casting about for possible additions to reiteration previous assurances contained May 1952 tripartite declaration and United Kingdom–EDC agreement.[3]

4. British approach is to tie this problem into NATO new look, which would set framework for Anglo-American assurances on Continental force maintenance for reasonable forward period. They hope outline new look can be agreed at Bermuda partly as basis Bermuda communiqué itself and partly as common approach for Paris NATO meeting. Framework involves following elements:

(*a*) Restatement long continuing Soviet threat in Europe, despite some alterations character Soviet problem;

(*b*) Emphasis on previous NATO build-up and plans for German participation as essential elements in stabilizing situation and providing thus for a deterrent to aggression;

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] Reference is to the Soviet note of Nov. 26.

[3] The text of the treaty between the United Kingdom and the members of the European Defense Community is printed in *AFP*, vol. I, pp. 1107–1198. The text of the declaration of the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France concerning their interest in the strength and integrity of the European Defense Community, signed at Paris, May 27, 1952, is printed on p. 686.

(*c*) Need for continuing deterrent through continued qualitative improvements, inclusion of Germany, and in due course incorporation new weapons, but within realistic politico-economic capabilities;

(*d*) Replacement concept military requirements for effective forward strategy defense, leading to unbridgeable gap, by more modest politico-military concept adequate deterrent which is achievable; and

(*e*) Formulation directive along these lines for 1954 NATO AR.

5. In this connection, British recognize flaw in Makin's presentation,[4] namely, absence satisfactory rationalization of present magnitude forces, qualitatively improved, plus German contingents in fact, constituting adequate future deterrent. They have tried unsuccessfully to obtain quantitative military definition of deterrent force, but find problem involves too many political elements to be susceptible purely military definition. They have open mind on how to approach problem of politico-military definition, recognizing weaknesses and dangers in mere argument that past performance has constituted deterrent.

6. Final element in NATO new look package would be conclusion by United Kingdom and United States that forces of present magnitudes must be maintained on Continent "at least for next few years". British recognize extreme delicacy problem formulation this conclusion so as avoid implication time period being merely that required for effective German build-up. Their reference to "next few years" is designed simply to cover period as far forward as anyone can reasonably plan. Essential concept is to encourage French through restatement basic Western Europe defense problem, concluding with assurances on United States–United Kingdom force maintenance, but with unacceptable commitment to French veto over changes in United States or United Kingdom Continental force levels.

7. British also preoccupied difficult problem drafting communiqué providing above results without apparently prejudicing outcome NATO meeting and reviving friction between "little two" and "big three". They rely heavily on Ismay's presence and his return to Paris to report to permanent representatives in advance NATO Ministerial meeting, as means soften any such friction.[5]

8. British have considered at length pros and cons doing something at Bermuda on subjects at pre-Lugano meeting,[6] such as security

[4] The presentation under reference here has not been identified further.

[5] On June 23, 1953, Hughes had transmitted to Secretary Dulles a request from Ismay that he be "summoned" to Bermuda as an observer on behalf of NATO. Ismay argued that this type of consultation would give NATO a "shot in the arm" and would be a great encouragement to the other 11 allies who were not represented at Bermuda. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman file) Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower endorsed the idea on that day (memorandum by Dulles, Eisenhower Library, Whitman file) and the idea was kept alive despite the cancellation of the conference in June.

[6] Documentation on the four-power conference, proposed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to open Oct. 15 at Lugano, but subsequently held in Berlin, Jan. 25–Feb. 18, 1954 is presented in volume VII.

guaranties, declaration of intent for Germany, free elections, status all-German Government, et cetera. Present conclusion is against such discussions, partly on ground impossibility effective consultation with Adenauer between Bermuda and NATO. They do not rule out, however, further discussion of these matters if closer meeting of minds can be achieved.

9. On Saar,[7] British also feel time is not ripe for pressure on French at Bermuda, partly on tactical grounds, partly because impossible know just where to press French until specific Franco-German differences clarified between Bidault and Adenauer. On other hand, Eden very concerned with Saar as obstacle to EDC and anxious use Anglo-American good offices whenever positive results seem possible.

ALDRICH

[7] Further documentation on the Saar is presented in volume VII.

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CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "Big Three Bermuda"

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)*

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 2, 1953.

Subject: Points which UK May Raise at Bermuda regarding Atomic Energy Questions.

Participants: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador.
Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor.

Sir Roger Makins called today at his request. He said he had just had a letter from Sir Pierson Dixon indicating that in view of the satisfactory nature of the recent US–UK talks on atomic energy matters in Washington,[1] it did not appear that Lord Cherwell would spring anything new on us at Bermuda. Dixon believed Cherwell would express satisfaction at the outcome of the recent Washington talks and that he would probably ask Admiral Strauss for more information relating to the scope of the amendments to the McMahon Act which the US Administration will put before the Congress. It is also possible that Lord Cherwell will discuss the possibility of some expansion of the existing US–UK *modus vivendi* based, I believe, on the 1948 agreement.[2] Sir Roger made clear, however, that it was not anticipated that Lord Cherwell would wish to do more than discuss these matters with Admiral Strauss.* There was no indication that he

[1] Documentation on the United States–United Kingdom talks on atomic energy matters is presented in volume II.

[2] For documentation on the United States–United Kingdom *modus vivendi* of 1948 on atomic energy matters, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, pp. 677 ff.

*He also mentioned Cherwell might wish to discuss the raw materials problem and US–UK cooperation in greater civilian use of fissionable material. [Footnote in the source text.]

would ask Admiral Strauss's agreement on anything at Bermuda.

Sir Roger then said he wished to speak on a personal and highly confidential basis about a related matter. He said there were clear indications that Churchill is still very much rankled by what he considers the US backing down on Chuchill's understanding of the wartime agreements with respect to US–UK atomic energy partnership. He said "the old man" seems to have convinced himself that Roosevelt at Quebec gave him assurances on which he later reneged. Sir Roger said Churchill also has the feeling that Truman made some verbal promise to him in 1945 (presumably at Potsdam) with respect to US and UK sharing atomic energy knowledge on which President Truman subsequently reneged. In fact, Churchill continues to brood about all this and is now in quite a bitter frame of mind. Sir Roger said Churchill would be strongly advised not to take this matter up with the President, and in particular not to make an harangue about the past promises broken by the US in this field. . . . Sir Roger indicated that in view of the satisfactory way in which matters were now progressing, it would be particularly unfortunate to get into a hassle.

He expressed the personal view that wartime agreements were wartime agreements and were obviously for the duration of hostilities. Generally speaking, the British felt that we had not been as forthcoming with them on atomic energy matters as we should have been, but this was all in the past, and should not be raked up again. The only thing that was really important was that in the future we work together in the closest feasible cooperation in the atomic energy field.

The discussion then turned to questions the French would put to us at Bermuda regarding the recent US–UK–Canadian agreement on exchanges of information relating to the effects of atomic explosions. Sir Roger said the British believed we should play this "straight" and make very clear that there was no new sensational agreement with the US, UK, and Canada; that since the last war there had been arrangements for the exchange of information of certain kinds in the atomic energy field; and that recently agreement had been reached among the three simply to extend in the technical field existing arrangements; this extension of the existing arangements would simply mean that better information on the effects of atomic explosions would be obtained which in turn would enable military and civil defense planners to plan with greater effectiveness. In other words, to stress that there had been no new agreement reached, but rather there had simply been an extension of technical information stemming from the existing arrangements.

396.1/12–453 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation at the Bermuda Conference to the Department of State*

SECRET BERMUDA, December 4, 1953—1 a. m.

Secto 1. Following summary conversation afternoon December 3 between Roberts, UK delegation, and Knight.[1]

1. *Order of Business.*

Roberts reported our tentative order tripartite business "virtually identical" with theirs.[2]

2. *Agenda for first Foreign Ministers meeting December 4, 4 p. m.*

Roberts expressed following ideas:

*a.* Preliminary discussion of reply to Soviet note November 26[3] prior giving instructions to drafting group. Roberts implied British expect reply to be completed and probably despatched from Bermuda.

*b.* Re organization of meetings, UK in agreement our preliminary thinking. Visualize one meeting each day between Foreign Ministers and another with heads of government.

*c.* Re adequate recognition, Ismay's presence suggested possibility Ismay participating in Sunday meeting, preferably with heads of government.

3. *Security Assurances to Soviets.*

Roberts expects Churchill to raise this question. Visualized principals and Foreign Ministers would discuss in broad terms formulating general instructions for working group which would study them together with "Paris texts" for referral back to three Foreign Ministers prior "Berlin conference".[4]

4. *"Berlin Conference."*

Roberts believes French will agree Berlin local after initial objections.

UK strong for making clear Four Power Headquarters in Berlin should be conference site.

UK leaning more and more to "early January" as mentioned by Secretary to Makins. Gathered British have broached this early date with French although Roberts evasive this point.

5. *Communiqué.*

British have no draft. Like US, their original plans altered by latest Soviet note. Their general theme:

*a.* Expression of calmness, strength and unity.

[1] A memorandum of Knight's conversation with Roberts and Caroline Petrie, Secretary of the British Delegation, is in file 396.1/12–353.

[2] The documents under reference here have not been identified further.

[3] Documentation on the Soviet note, Nov. 26, accepting participation in a four-power conference, is presented in volume VII.

[4] Documentation on the Berlin Conference, Jan. 25–Feb. 18, 1954, is *ibid.*

*b.* Appropriate reassurances to Soviets.
*c.* Willingness discuss and negotiate whenever opportunity arises.

6. *Adenauer's Position.*

British mystified by degree Adenauer desire to stall and postpone meeting Soviets. They feel we must reason with Chancellor strongly. UK convinced we should do nothing to create impression West stalling and fearful of meeting.

7. *Bilateral Meetings.*

Roberts thought would have to fit in bilaterals as needs and opportunities arise. UK and French holding bilateral today.

In separate conversation with French they expressed general agreement with our tentative order of business and our thinking on organization of meetings.[5] While French agree heads of government should limit themselves to broader policy considerations, they indicated desire to discuss at top level some aspect all items our tentative agenda.

Laniel wishes Bidault to accompany him to all meetings.

Purposefully did not raise any other topics discussed with Roberts.

[5] A memorandum of Knight's conversation with Jean-Marc Boegner, Jean Laloy, and Jean Sauvagnargues is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 185.

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation at the Bermuda Conference to the Department of State* [1]

SECRET

BERMUDA, December 4, 1953.

Secto 4. In talk with Tyler of US delegation Vidal, Laniel's Director of Cabinet, said Laniel will state flatly there is no chance EDC Treaty can be ratified for several months and then only if greatly increased assurances and commitments given by British and US.[2] Vidal said British guarantees proposed so far not sufficient to remove the present grave French doubts. He said Laniel aware American constitutional factors and limitations, but way must be found formulate assurances going beyond intentions and which will suffice, reassure French opinion re danger of eventual US withdrawal leaving France "alone" with Germany.

Vidal implied that Laniel will stress that above is reality of situation and discussion must be based on this reality.

Preliminary conversations indicate a sharp split between the views of Laniel and Bidault with latter less inclined to resign himself to degree of pessimism apparently felt by Laniel. Vidal obviously would tend to reflect views of his chief.

[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.
[2] A memorandum of Tyler's conversation with Germain Vidal on Dec. 3 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 185.

*Editorial Note*

The Department of State began planning for the Bermuda Conference on November 13 by circulating BM Memo 1 (CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "Bermuda Mtg") which contained instructions for the preparation of papers for the meeting. Three types of papers were prepared. The first were position papers giving the United States view on a particular problem; the second were talking papers, presenting a one-page summary of the position paper; and the third were background papers, giving extensive information on those subjects which would require further documentation than that presented in the position papers. The initial list of papers was drafted on November 13, revised on November 19 and 27, and given final approval on December 2. Ridgway Knight, the Acting Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, was selected as the chairman of the steering group which considered each paper, and any difficulties that could not be settled in his steering group were referred to an Assistant Secretary of State group, chaired by the Counselor of the Department of State, Douglas MacArthur, for resolution. All these papers, whether prepared for trilateral discussions or for bilateral talks with either the British or French were given the series indicator BM D. Those that were drafted for tripartite talks dealt with European and Far Eastern topics; those for bipartite talks with the British covered global strategy, Near Eastern questions, Germany, the Pacific area, and United States–United Kingdom relations; while those for bipartite talks with the French discussed Indochina, North Africa, Morocco, and the French Government's anti-Communist drive. Sets of these papers are in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166 and the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 181. Two of the papers are printed here, *infra* and page 1731.

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**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 186**

*Paper Prepared by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)*[1]

TOP SECRET
[BM Special 3c]

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1953.

## OUTLINE OF U.S. POLICIES

BERMUDA

### I. *General Direction of Policy*

In the face of the Soviet threat, the U.S. will seek to develop and

[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which indicated that this paper had been revised following its discussion with Secretary Dulles, that it was being distributed on a limited basis, and that it had been designated BM Special 3c in the records of the U.S. Delegation for the Bermuda Conference. No previous or subsequent drafts of this paper have been identified in the Department of State files.

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maintain economic and military strength for itself and its friends, and to strive for cohesion and unity of purpose and policy to counter Soviet divisive tactics.

II. *Military Strength*

A. U.S. will maintain a respectable military posture, including strategic retaliatory power as a basic deterrent to Soviet aggression. This involves continental defense and overseas bases.

B. The U.S. will help NATO to build and maintain respectable military strength in Europe. There should be periodic review of (*a*) force requirements in the light of new weapons and techniques; and (*b*) force goals, on the basis of changing estimates of the risks and of political and economic capabilities.

C. EDC is essential to assure adequate European continental defense; without EDC, radical changes of U.S. policy are inevitable.

D. With NATO, reinforced by EDC, U.S. expects to maintain substantial forces in Europe, recognizing their political as well as military significance.

E. Indochina must be held for sake of all Southeast Asia. U.S. will continue to furnish military and financial aid and believes that U.K., France and U.S. should agree on the military action to be taken in case of open Chinese Communist intervention.

III. *Maintaining Free World Unity*

A. In Korea, the U.S. will—

1. Seek to prevent the renewal of hostilities by the Communists or South Koreans;
2. Continue, so long as there is hope, to work for a Political Conference;
3. Seek a unified Korea, under a free representative government, withdrawal of all foreign forces; and, if necessary, a northern demilitarized zone.
4. Actively assist to rehabilitate Korea.

B. The U.S. will do its utmost to help to achieve stable solutions as quickly as possible in—(1) Trieste; (2) Egypt; (3) Iran; (4) Arab-Israel; (5) Kashmir.

C. The U.S. strongly supports EPC and other measures for European integration as essential for European stability and cohesion.

D. Trade and Aid Policies

1. The U.S. is dedicated to the expansion of mutually beneficial world trade and investment and recognizes the importance of its own economic policies in this regard.
2. The U.S. will tend to eliminate economic grant aid except as necessary to support military efforts (such as in Turkey, Greece, Formosa, and Indochina) and except for modest aid in special situations (Middle East, South Asia, and South America).
3. In the underdeveloped areas, the West must find ways to recon-

cile strong nationalism with necessary cooperation and to assist efforts to improve living standards, by extending technical knowledge and encouraging investment.

IV. *Attitude Toward Soviet Bloc*

A. Negotiation

U.S. will be prepared to settle any concrete issues by negotiation whenever the Soviets are willing to talk realistically and without unacceptable preconditions.

Top-level talks of a general character might well be damaging. The U.S. is prepared to engage in private talks with the Soviets on disarmament in conformity with the U.N. resolution.

B. Satellites

The U.S. will continue its policy of not accepting as permanent the rule of the Soviets over the Satellites, but will avoid actions likely to increase the risk of war.

C. Communist China

Until the regime stops promoting aggression in Korea and Indochina and shows its willingness to conform to principles of UN Charter, the U.S. will not consider recognizing the Communist regime in China, will oppose its admission to the U.N., and will maintain a trade embargo.

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Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 181

*Paper Prepared by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs* [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 2, 1953.

[BM D–4/1c]

U.S. ASSURANCES

Both the French and British have indicated a desire to discuss this subject.

U.S. POSITION

1. In any discussion of this subject, we should not commit ourselves to the issuance of a declaration or assurances at Bermuda.

2. We should discuss the possibility of a declaration to be issued at a later date when it will be of maximum assistance to the French Government in obtaining ratification.

[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which indicated that it had been prepared by Fessenden, revised to reflect the comments of the Department of Defense, and circulated as BM D–4/1c. Two earlier drafts of this paper, BM D–4/1, dated Nov. 24, and BM D–4/1b Approved, dated Dec. 1, are the same in substance as BM D–4/1c, but the former contains no draft declaration while the latter contains three draft declarations on EDC and NATO plus a paragraph on EDC and NATO for the Bermuda communiqué. Copies of BM D–4/1 and BM D–4/1b Approved are in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "Bermuda Meeting".

3. For illustrative purposes, there is attached a draft declaration of the sort which might be issued subsequent to Bermuda when it may be decided to do so.

FRENCH POSITION

To meet their need for assurances, the French have proposed a United States statement which would make the following main points:

(*a*) reiterate the Senate's interpretation that the NAT is of indefinite duration and that the NAT is in accordance with the basic interest of the United States;
(*b*) the NAT is a fundamental and permanent part of our foreign policy and it is our intention that the Treaty should remain in force indefinitely;
(*c*) press speculation implying that the United States intends to withdraw its forces under NATO command is erroneous;
(*d*) under NATO procedures it is the constant aim of the member states to consult together on the size and nature of the forces required for the common defense of their territories and on the level and composition of the forces that each nation is to place at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe to meet the requirements of European defense;
(*e*) the United States considers these consultations to be one of the fundamental elements of the North Atlantic Treaty;
(*f*) during such consultations, the United States will be guided by its determination to defend Europe against any aggression in application of the present concept of the "formed strategy";
(*g*) to this end, within the framework of the above, the United States, in cooperation with the members of NATO and the EDC, will continue to place the forces necessary at the disposal of SACEUR.

We have already told the French that we will consider a statement along the general lines proposed, although we have difficulties with the specific French draft. We feel the statement should not be an attempt to refute erroneous press speculation, but should be a strong and positive affirmation of United States policy made upon a suitable important position. We have told the French that our present thinking is in terms of a declaration making the following general points: (*a*) The United States considers its own security integrally bound up with the security of NATO and for this reason NATO is a basic and enduring element in our foreign policy; (*b*) these facts are clearly reflected in the United States Foreign Relations Committee's interpretations at the time of ratification of the NAT that the Treaty is in accordance with the basic security interests of the United States and should be of indefinite duration; and (*c*) in carrying out policy of basic and enduring support for NATO, the United States attaches the greatest importance to mutual consultations through NATO on defense requirements and to agreed arrangement for placing forces at the disposal of NATO's European and Atlantic Commanders.

BRITISH POSITION

The British, as part of their package on British association, have been willing to move a step beyond the Tripartite Declaration in meeting the French. They have agreed in their proposals on institutional association to a special procedure for separate UK–EDC consultations on the level of troops to be maintained on the Continent. Furthermore, up until very recently at least, they have been willing to reinforce this with a UK–EDC declaration in which they would associate themselves with the EDC countries in taking the initiative in NATO to adopt the duration provision of the NAT to those of the EDC.

A new complication has arisen in that the British are apparently having serious second thoughts about joining the EDC countries in declaring for the 50-year extension of the NAT. In view of the fact that the United States is not willing to take similar action the British may decide to retreat this proposal (even though it was submitted six months ago to all EDC countries) and discuss at Bermuda the possibility of joining us in a joint statement of assurances. Although British withdrawal of their 50-year proposal might provoke strong adverse reactions by the other EDC countries, there would be advantages from our point of view to having the British drop the 50-year declaration and join us in a common policy statement. This would avoid attention being focused on our inability to go along with the 50-year declaration.

DISCUSSION

The French have publicly stated that they will discuss at Bermuda the question of American and British assurances regarding the EDC, including the maintenance of American and British forces on the Continent as long as necessary. Ideally, what the French would like is a US–UK guarantee of the integrity of the EDC involving a commitment to maintain American and British troops on the Continent throughout the fifty-year life of the EDC. This, of course, is impossible for both us and the British. In the first place, we have carefully avoided any binding commitments to maintain troops on the Continent in connection with NATO. In the second place, we have not bound ourselves legally to the fifty-year term of the EDC Treaty; we adhere to the doctrine of the indefinite duration of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Tripartite Declaration of May 27, 1952 [2] is as far as we have been willing to go in meeting the French request for a guarantee of the integrity of the EDC. The British have recently been willing to go somewhat further in their proposals on British

[2] *Ante*, p. 686.

association. The French can be expected to seek re-affirmation of the Tripartite Declaration and also to obtain further assurances.

There are set forth below the main elements needed for formulating a U.S. position on assurances at Bermuda. These are: (1) what commitments we have made and what we have told Congress; (2) what the British are proposing to do; (3) what the French currently would like to have us do.

STATUS OF U.S. COMMITMENTS

There are three inter-related questions which are relevant to the question: guarantees on the integrity of the EDC, commitments on the maintenance of troops, and the duration of the NAT.

*Guarantees of the integrity of the EDC.* The Tripartite Declaration was specifically designed to guarantee the integrity of the EDC. It contains a US–UK statement that any action from whatever quarter threatening the integrity or unity of the EDC will be regarded as a threat to their own security and will involve consultation under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Tripartite Declaration along with the EDC Treaty and other documents was submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a supporting document at the time of the ratification of the Contractuals and the EDC Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty. The Declaration was discussed by the Senate, but specific Senate action was not required. The precise legal effect is not clear, but is being given further study by the Legal Adviser's Office.

*Maintenance of Troops on the Continent.* On the one hand, the U.S. has no binding legal commitment to retain troops in Europe for any particular time period; on the other, the Executive Branch has made no statements or commitments to the Congress limiting in time the maintenance of the present level of troops on the Continent. Furthermore, the United States has made, in conjunction with the U.K. and France, certain public declarations regarding occupation forces in Germany which might be interpreted as commitments to retain United States forces in Europe for a particular period.

In a joint communiqué issued on 7 June 1948,[3] following a conference in London among representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries on the subject of Germany, the statement was made that "The United States, United Kingdom, and French delegates reiterated the firm views of their governments that there could not be any general withdrawal of their forces from Germany until the peace of Europe is secured and without prior consultation. During this period there should be no general with-

[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. II, p. 313.

drawal of the forces of occupation of the United States, France or the United Kingdom without prior consultation. . ."

Senate concurrent Resolution 8 of April 1951, which concluded the "troops for Europe" debate, contained no provisions on withdrawal. The Resolution recognized the U.S. interest in Europe's security and the desirability of contributing a "fair share" of the forces required for the common defense. No time limit on this contribution was indicated. The primary limitation implied by the Resolution was the expression of the sense of the Senate to the effect that the President should consult the Congress before increasing further the number of troops assigned to Europe. It should be noted that this Resolution set forth the sense of the Senate, but was not at the time recognized as legally binding by the Executive Branch.

During hearings on Senate Resolution 8, the question of the duration of the troop assignment arose on a few occasions. Spokesmen for the Executive Branch declined to indicate a probable time limit for the assignment of troops. Both General Eisenhower and General Bradley commented on this subject, and stated that a date for withdrawal could not be predicted. General Bradley expressed the view that U.S. troops should remain in Europe as long as needed.

The London Agreement of June 1948 [4] imposes on the three occupying powers not to undertake a general withdrawal of their occupation forces without prior consultation among them. Furthermore the U.S. is obligated to maintain its occupation forces until "the peace is secured".

The commitments we have under NATO are to consult through the Annual Review on the size and nature of the forces required under the common defense and to consult with the NATO Major Commanders on the level and composition of forces available to them. We have always preserved the legal right to withdraw forces from NATO. The relevant document on the powers of the NATO Commander (DC 24/3 [5]) is silent on a nation's right to withdraw forces assigned to NATO. It does provide that national authorities retain the right, subject to consultation with the Supreme Commander, to change over units and formations stationed in Europe, provided that the size, composition, and quality of the national contribution to the total force immediately available to the Supreme Commander remains basically unchanged.

In the Tripartite Declaration there is the assertion that the signatories "have expressed their resolve to station such forces on the Continent of Europe, including the Federal Republic of Germany, as they

[4] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. II, p. 309.
[5] Dated Dec. 12, 1950; for text, see *ibid.*, 1950, vol. III, p. 548.

deem necessary and appropriate to contribute to the joint defense of the NAT area, having regard to their NATO obligations, their interest in the integrity of the EDC, and their special responsibilities in Germany". The Tripartite Declaration also includes the statement that: "The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the three powers there are regarded by the three powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly, they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it . . ."

*Duration of the NAT.* The U.S. interpretation of the duration of the NAT is that given by the U.S. Senate at the time of the signing of the NAT:

"The committee gave serious thought to the problem involved in the duration of the treaty. In view of the difficulties of forecasting developments in the international situation in the distant future rigidity for too long a time clearly would be undesirable. On the one hand, the committee agrees that the stability and confidence which are so essential for the security of the North Atlantic area could not adequately be established if the treaty were of short duration. It accepts as a desirable solution, therefore, the indefinite duration of the treaty, with provision for review after 10 years, and for withdrawal after 20 years."

The committee further stated:

"The treaty is in accordance with the basic interest of the United States, which should be steadfastly served regardless of fluctuations in the international situation or our relations with any country."

We have always taken the position that these statements by the United States Senate actually make our NATO commitment a more enduring one than the finite commitment resulting from a treaty with a specific termination date.

[Attachment]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

## DRAFT DECLARATION ON EDC AND NATO

The United States, the United Kingdom and France, having reviewed in the light of the present international situation their participation in the several inter-related arrangements which have been created to further the security and well-being of Western Europe and the North Atlantic area, have concluded that the practical unification of the six-nation European community is of vital importance to the attainment of these objectives. It is recognized that the European community must be developed and maintained within the framework

of a continuing Atlantic community. The three Governments believe that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides a basis for lasting association among the member nations, and it is their policy to strengthen and preserve such an association. To this end the following principles have been agreed:

1. The Three Powers, considering that their own security is integrally bound up with the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and recalling that the treaty establishing that Organization is of indefinite duration, hereby reaffirm that their full support for the Organization is a fundamental and enduring element of their respective foreign policies.

2. Recalling the Declaration of May 27, 1952 regarding the abiding interest of the Three Powers in the effectiveness of the treaty creating the European Defense Community and in the strength and integrity of that Community, the U.S. and the U.K., reiterate that they will regard as a threat to their own security any action from whatever quarter which threatens the integrity or unity of the Community and that they will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

3. Furthermore, the U.S. and the U.K. each reiterate their resolve to station such forces on the Continent of Europe, including the Federal Republic of Germany, as they deem necessary and appropriate to contribute to the joint defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, having regard to their obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, their interest in the integrity of the European Defense Community, and their special responsibilities in Germany. In this connection, the Three Powers attach the greatest importance to the continuance of the arrangements for mutual consultation through the NAT Organization on defense requirements and on the size and composition of forces to be placed at the disposal of NATO Commanders.

## 2. MEETINGS OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN MINISTERS

### LIST OF PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE BERMUDA CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 4–8, 1953[1]

*United States:*

Dwight D. Eisenhower, President
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President
C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President
Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of the Department of State
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense

[1] Compiled from delegation lists in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 180. This list includes the names and positions only of those mentioned in the documentation which follows.

Ann Whitman, Secretary to the President
Lt. Col. Vernon Walters, Interpreter for the President
Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs
Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Ridgway B. Knight, Acting Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State
Brewster H. Morris, Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State
Ray L. Thurston, Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
William Tyler, First Secretary at the Embassy in France
Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs

*France:*

Joseph Laniel, Prime Minister
Georges Bidault, Foreign Minister
André Bougenot, Under Secretary of State
Germain Vidal, Director of the Cabinet
Paul Fouchet, Diplomatic Counselor to the Prime Minister
Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry
Roland Jacquin de Margerie, Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, Foreign Ministry
François Seydoux de Clausonne, Director of European Affairs, Foreign Ministry
Jacques Roux, Director of Asian Affairs, Foreign Ministry
André Baeyens, Press Officer, Foreign Ministry
Jacques Vimont, Director of the Foreign Minister's Cabinet
Jean-Marc Boegner, Counselor of the Embassy in the United States
Jean Laloy, Counselor of the Embassy in the United States
Jean Sauvagnargues, Counselor of the Embassy in the United States
Hervé Alphand, Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
Constantin Andronikov, Official Interpreter

*United Kingdom:*

Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister
Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
John R. Colville, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Charles A. E. Shuckburgh, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Lord Cherwell, Adviser to the Prime Minister on Atomic Energy
Sir Pierson Dixon, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
William D. Allen, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Sir Frank Roberts, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Sir Norman Brook, Secretary of the Cabinet
John V. Rob, News Department of the Foreign Office

D'Arcy Edmondson, Head of the British Information Services in the United States
Joan C. Petrie, Delegation Secretary

*North Atlantic Treaty Organization:*

Lord Ismay, Secretary General and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council

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## EISENHOWER-CHURCHILL MEETING, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 4, 1953

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM |
|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Prime Minister Churchill |

396.1/12–453

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State* [1]

TOP SECRET BERMUDA, December 4, 1953.

1. *Korea.* The President said that if there was a deliberate breach of the Armistice by the Communists we would expect to strike back with atomic weapons at military targets. We would not expect to bomb cities but would attack areas that were directly supporting the aggression.

The Prime Minister said that he quite accepted this and that the President's statement put him in a position to say to Parliament that he had been consulted in advance and had agreed.

2. *Dependent Areas.* They discussed dependent areas. The President stated he thought that each case should be considered on its merit as to who should take the lead and as to who might play the role of "moderator", and that it was not necessary always openly to appear to present a consolidated front. Sir Winston argued for the united front approach.

3. *Egypt.* Sir Winston said he felt that they had gone as far as they could go; that the uniforms were important because if there was an attack upon a soldier in uniform that would be more serious than if it were someone not in uniform, and would give a basis for counter action. Sir Winston referred to the group of 20 or more of their own Party who would oppose going any further.

4. *Meeting with the Soviet Union.* There seemed to be agreement that there should be a meeting as promptly as possible, preferably

[1] According to President Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, p. 249, this conversation took place in the President's sitting room at the Mid Ocean Club immediately after the presidential party arrived at Bermuda. This would place the time of the meeting at shortly after noon. The source text bears a typewritten notation that it was drafted by Dulles on Dec. 4, and that the last part was retyped on Dec. 5 to conform with President Eisenhower's comments.

early in January. The Prime Minister suggested that if the meeting was held in Berlin it might alternate between the two Sectors. He felt we should always keep the "door open" to the Russians. The President emphasized that he would not participate in the Heads of Government meeting until at a Foreign Ministers meeting the Soviets had shown evidence of good faith.

5. The Prime Minister spoke of the feeling that the UK could not differ with the US, without this creating a sense of animosity. He apparently had in mind the different attitudes toward China. The President said that there was no sense of animosity as far as our Government was concerned; that we feel strongly there could be differences which each side respected. However, the President urged a closer alignment of UK policy with the US.

The Prime Minister said that he had originally opposed recognition of Communist China but that this had now become an established fact which would be difficult to alter. However, he said that when it came to any vote about China in the UN, the UK would vote with the US.

6. *Trade with China.* They discussed this question and the Prime Minister said that he looked upon trade as a means of achieving the desired results; also, that in his case trade was necessary to keep their nose above water. They are gradually getting stronger but need trade.

7. *French Position.* The Prime Minister felt that the French were very weak but that we must not allow this to balk our moving ahead. He suggested a possible EDC without France, or the possibility of bringing Germany into NATO, or if the French vetoed this, establishing a new treaty arrangement with Germany. The President indicated skepticism concerning this.

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## MACARTHUR–LANIEL MEETING, LANIEL'S QUARTERS, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 4, 1953

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | FRANCE |
|---|---|
| Mr. MacArthur | Prime Minister Laniel |

**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 185**

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Douglas MacArthur II* [1]

SECRET BERMUDA, December 4, 1953.

M. Laniel said he would like to see me alone for a few minutes, and

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[1] In the records of the U.S. Delegation, the source text comprises two separate memoranda of conversation by MacArthur. The first consisted of the four paragraphs on Indochina; the second consisted of the paragraphs on EDC. Both memoranda were drafted on Dec. 5.

accordingly I met alone with him at three this afternoon in his room. He said he first wished to bring me up to date on his thinking regarding Indochina in light of the recent Ho Chi Minh overture through the Swedish press.[2]

He said the Ho overture was obviously a propaganda move and should be treated as such. On the other hand, it had created a serious problem not only with regard to the French Parliament but the French Government. In particular, President Auriol was soft and spongy and had wanted immediately to send a message to Ho that France was willing to negotiate. Certain members of the French Cabinet shared this view. Laniel reiterated his own conviction that there was no basis for negotiation with the Communist Vietminh until the French had established a position of military strength in Indochina. He had complete confidence in General Navarre and believed that by April Navarre would be able to be in a very substantially better military position than at present. Therefore, France should continue its military effort in Indochina with all the resources at its disposal and should not be diverted by Communist propaganda. Once France had established a strong military position, Laniel did not exclude the possibility of some form of negotiation to end the Indochina conflict. Laniel said the French Government would only give "consideration" to a peace feeler from Ho if it came through regular diplomatic channels—for example, through some neutral. He added that if such a "feeler" were received, France would only consider it in conjunction with the Governments of the Associated States.

I said to M. Laniel that I was glad to hear his determination to continue the war in Indochina to a successful conclusion. I said the recent news emanating from France had been disquieting in this respect. In particular, if the French gave the impression that they were ready to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh, which would in fact turn Indochina over to the Communists, the Associated States of Indochina would probably cease supporting the French effort there, which in turn would make General Navarre's task impossible since military success in Indochina must depend on the Associated States bearing an increasing part of the burden and effort in prosecuting the war there. Any indication that the French were going to make a deal with the Communists would be substantial encouragement to the fence-sitters in Indochina who then would begin to think in terms of making a deal with the Communists. This would be a disaster for France.

M. Laniel said he could assure me that he himself would never do

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[2] Regarding statements in the Swedish paper *Expressen* on Nov. 29 by the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, see footnote 1, vol. XIII, Part 1, p. 887.

anything which would result in turning Indochina over to the Communists, and he hoped I would make known his feelings in this respect to the President and the Secretary.

During the conversation which I had alone with M. Laniel today at his request, he discussed the European Defense Community. He said he had opposed the idea of having a debate on the European Defense Community (EDC) and European Political Community (EPC) before the Hague meeting of the Ministers of the six countries of the European community, because he felt that psychologically France was not yet prepared to enter a European community. Furthermore, it had been his judgment that at the present time there was not a majority for the EDC. He said to get EDC through the French Parliament, the British should be willing to associate themselves much more closely with the EDC, and implied that the United States also should go as far as it could toward reassuring France that it did not intend to pull out of Europe thus leaving France and Germany virtually alone together on the continent.

I said to M. Laniel that as an old friend I would speak with great frankness. The recent debates in the French Assembly on the EDC had created the most deplorable impression not only in the United States but in Britain, the Benelux countries, and Germany. The French parliamentary debate had been confused to say the least, with persons who favored the EDC voting against it and vice versa and with the French Government finally surviving thanks to the votes of the Gaullists, who were utterly opposed to the EDC, which we understand is the fundamental plank in the French foreign policy platform.

I then said to M. Laniel that there was a very strong feeling on the part of the American Government, Congress, and people that we have reached what might be described as the crossroads of our European policy. Our policy in essence has been based on the premise that if Europe is to be defended, the major part of such defense must be borne by the Europeans. This can only be achieved if there is a strong and united Europe. The heart of the problem of Europe's strength is the relationship between France and Germany. If France and Germany are woven together in a European fabric, Europe will be strong. If they cannot pull together in the same harness, Europe will remain weak and divided and hence indefensible. The additional and essential increment of strength which the United States has been willing to provide to European defense will be meaningless unless there is a strong and united Europe. In other words, if Europe remains weak and divided, the United States will be frittering away its resources, which are not unlimited, in a program which has no real meaning.

I then said that M. Laniel had seemed to imply that the United States might give additional assurances with respect to Europe. Speaking on a personal basis, I said I did not see how this was possible at

the present time. Any assurances which we might give would have to be based on a reasonably sound estimate of the future course of events in Europe. We are not able to make such an estimate and will remain unable to do so until France has decided whether it is to merge some sovereignty with Germany and the other EDC countries or whether to refuse to do so. If France intends to make the EDC come into existence, the United States, I felt certain, would wish to do everything it could to assist and ensure the success of this great project. On the other hand, if the EDC is to fail or be put off indefinitely, the United States would have to consider other programs and policies with respect to Europe, with particular respect to France and Germany. In other words, until a decision is made with respect to EDC, the point has been reached where the United States cannot engage in realistic planning for the future defense of Europe.

I said there was one other point I would like to mention. We believed that the next three or four months were a period of infinite possibility if the West had the courage to grasp the opportunities which were now open to us. On the other hand, the opportunities which were now open to us would not remain open very long. If the EDC were further postponed, I did not believe that the American Congress would be disposed to appropriate funds for the support of a program with respect to Europe which was largely a question-mark and would remain so until the French had acted. Furthermore, the present favorable situation in Germany would not remain favorable in the absence of French action on EDC. To me, it was a miracle and a great tribute to Adenauer that Germany was still willing to accept the agreements which she had signed eighteen months ago which imposed substantial controls on Germany's future course of action when Germany had now much greater strength than she did eighteen months ago. If the French rebuffed Germany's desire to associate herself with France and the other European countries, German opinion, supported by other opinion, would insist that alternative arrangements be made, and these could involve the evolution of Germany into a country on the continent which acted independently and without full cooperation with France. This would be a tragedy for Europe, but particularly for France.

I concluded by saying that the United States Government had done everything it could to encourage and support France in a role of leadership in world affairs and European affairs. We had supported France and made a great contribution to the Indochina war; we had tried to be helpful by supporting the French position in the United Nations whenever we could with respect to North Africa; and we had stressed French leadership on the continent as exemplified by French imagination and vision in the Schuman Plan and the EDC. If France, which had put forward the EDC, could not make up its mind or should

reject it, I did not believe there would be anything we could do to support French leadership, for in fact France would have demonstrated that it was incapable when faced with a difficult situation of exercising the type of leadership on which we had counted so firmly.

I added that I had spoken with great frankness and on a personal basis as an old friend since I felt that unless the leaders knew our views they might make miscalculations which would be costly not only for France, but for Europe and the free world. We had purposely avoided pushing the French publicly with respect to the EDC, but they must realize that if it were rejected or further put off, a most serious situation would arise.

M. Laniel said he was glad I had spoken frankly. He recognized that the recent debate in the French Parliament had not helped French prestige. He firmly supported the EDC and saw no other alternative. He agreed that France should move rapidly toward ratification, but he emphasized again the "great internal political difficulties with the French Parliament". In essence, he seemed to be trying to apologize for the fact that he had not taken a firmer position himself by repeatedly emphasizing his own personal support for the EDC, but adding that it would have been impossible for him to hold his government together if he had been any more forthright with respect to EDC in the recent debate.

I had the feeling that while Laniel accepted the point of view I set forth, he did not really understand the urgency of the situation nor did he indicate any real awareness that we have in fact arrived at a most critical moment in terms of Europe's future.

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## INFORMAL TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 4, 1953

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| | Sir Pierson Dixon | Jacquin de Margerie |

750G.00/12–453

*Telegraphic Summary, by the Secretary of State* [1]

TOP SECRET BERMUDA, December 4, 1953.

Today held two meetings with Eden, Pierson and Bidault, De

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State in Secto 3 from Bermuda, Dec. 4 at 7 p. m.; sent also to Belgrade and Rome and repeated to Paris and London. No other records of these two meetings have been found in Department of State files.

Margerie, during which with stout support from Eden I urged proceeding with approach to Tito and Pella as United Kingdom and United States had hitherto agreed.[2] Bidault finally capitulated, but only after I had suggested that it might be less awkward for French in their special and valuable relationship with Italians, if United Kingdom and United States took responsibility for next approach. Bidault suggested, and Eden and I accepted following language. Only substantive change, apart from acceptance of Bidault's original second point regarding AMG announcement, is that communiqué stating Five Power preconference had been agreed, would be issued on same day AMG statement issued in Trieste that AMG and Italian representatives would meet to discuss modalities transfer.

Following text should be substituted after third sentence of paragraph three of instruction previously agreed with United Kingdom (reference Foreign Office telegram 5026 Department,[3] reference being unavailable here):

"We believe that a compromise can be found on the following lines: It would be agreed that the public announcement of a preliminary meeting should be made as soon as possible, as soon as the approval of Belgrade and Rome has been received. We should inform the Italian Government that, simultaneously with the beginning of the preliminary meeting, conversations would begin between representatives of the Italian Government and AMG regarding changes in individual civilian posts, as set forth in paragraph two of the proposals of November 13.[4] In order that Mr. Pella may not have to answer embarrassing questions about the execution of the decision of October 8,[5] a communiqué will be issued in Trieste, if the Yugoslavs and Italians accept our proposals in principle, announcing the opening of the conversations between the AMG and the Italian representatives. The contemplated transfers are of a minor administrative character."

Three Ambassadors in Belgrade and Rome should concert for purpose approaching Tito and Pella respectively Saturday, December 5.[6]

Foregoing agreed with British and French who are sending similar instructions tonight.

DULLES

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[2] Documentation on Trieste is presented in volume VIII.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

[4] On Nov. 13, the three Western powers proposed a preliminary conference of five to examine the Trieste question; documentation on this proposal is presented in volume VIII.

[5] On Oct. 8, the United States and the United Kingdom had announced their decision to withdraw their troops from Zone A in the Free Territory of Trieste; documentation on this decision is presented *ibid.*

[6] On Dec. 5, Secretary Dulles reported that the U.K. and U.S. Delegations had made an error in proposing simultaneous approaches and stated that for the moment the approach would only be made in Belgrade. (Secto 6 from Bermuda, 750G.00/12–553)

578-017 O - 83 - 43 (Part 2)

## FIRST TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 4, 1953, 4 P. M.

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Mr. Merchant | Sir Pierson Dixon | M. Parodi |
| Mr. Nash | Sir Frank Roberts | M. de Margerie |
| Mr. Bowie | Mr. Allen | M. Laloy |
| Mr. Hagerty | Mr. Shuckburgh | M. Vimont |
| Mr. Jackson | Mr. Edmondson | M. Baeyens |
| Mr. Knight | Miss Petrie | M. Fouchet |
| Mr. Thurston | | M. Andronikov |
| Lt. Col. Walters | | |

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184

*Thurston Minutes* [1]

SECRET BERMUDA, December 4, 1953.

FM MIN 1

Mr. Dulles suggested that Mr. Eden chair the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. This was agreed to by the French and Mr. Eden.

*Agenda and Organization of Meetings*

Mr. Eden then had distributed a list of topics for discussion during the Tripartite meetings at Bermuda (a copy of the list is attached). Mr. Dulles, referring to the list, asked whether it was intended that the Foreign Ministers should discuss this list in the first instance and refer differences to the Chiefs of Government, or what procedure was intended? Mr. Eden replied that the procedure suggested by Mr. Dulles might be followed in the case of some topics but not necessarily for all of them.

Mr. Eden suggested that the reply to the Soviet note was a matter in which the Foreign Ministers had a responsibility and that they therefore might address themselves to this topic. He also thought that the subject of NATO was an appropriate one for the Foreign Ministers to discuss. Mr. Bidault indicated general concurrence with this idea but indicated that the Foreign Ministers ought to decide which topics they should discuss and which should be discussed by the Chiefs of Government. He suggested topics No. 1 and 2 for the Foreign Ministers and topic No. 3 by the Heads of Government. It would leave the disposition of topics 4 and 5 until later.

Mr. Dulles wondered whether topic No. 1 should not be discussed

[1] The text of the list of topics and a brief summary of this meeting were sent to the Department of State in Secto 2 from Bermuda, Dec. 4. (396.1/12–453) The telegram was repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

by the Heads of Government since it was a subject not requiring fine agreement or any specific course of action. Otherwise, Mr. Dulles indicated, he thought Mr. Bidault's suggestion was alright. Mr. Eden stated that the heavy work of the Foreign Ministers would obviously be on topic No. 2 and perhaps on NATO. He therefore suggested that the Heads of Government take up No. 1, all sub-headings under No. 3 except NATO, and No. 4. He went on to say that Prime Minister Churchill had particularly indicated a desire to discuss the Trade with Russia item under No. 3. He wondered if No. 5 should not be discussed by the Foreign Ministers first and then referred to the Heads of Government. He thought at any event the Foreign Ministers should start on No. 2. He then went through the advance headings of the list and the three Foreign Ministers agreed to the following subdivision of work:

1. Heads of Government
2. Foreign Ministers
3. Item 1—Foreign Ministers
   Item 2—Heads of Government
   Item 3—Heads of Government
   Item 4—Foreign Ministers
4. Heads of Government
5. Heads of Government

Mr. Eden then moved on to the question of the times of meetings. He wondered whether the Heads of Government might wish to meet in the morning.

Mr. Dulles remarked that President Eisenhower had authorized him to say that he was up at 6:00 a. m. every morning and at the disposal of others.

Mr. Eden remarked with a smile that he was not authorized by the Prime Minister on this point but that he was quite certain that 6:00 a. m. would not be suitable.

Mr. Bidault observed that M. Laniel sleeps well and would be available at any time.

Mr. Dulles said that he had understood that there had been an understanding by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill that they might do some painting in the morning because that is a time when the conditions were best in Bermuda.

Mr. Bidault said that he was not in a position to make any comment on the artistic propensity of M. Laniel.

Mr. Eden summarized this part of the discussion by saying that it would be necessary to see what the Heads of Government themselves thought on this question.

Mr. Eden said that he assumed that in accordance with past practice there might be Bilateral meetings between the Foreign Ministers' sessions.

Mr. Bidault then remarked that the Heads of Government would refer matters to the Foreign Ministers and they would then pass them on to experts.

Mr. Eden referred to the prospective arrival of Lord Ismay the NATO Secretary General and asked what the others would think of the attendance of Lord Ismay at the Foreign Ministers meeting on Sunday and the meeting of the Heads of Government on Monday.

Mr. Bidault said that that was alright but he would particularly suggest that Lord Ismay be present at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers to discuss the NATO sub-heading under topic 3.

Mr. Bidault asked whether an interpreter should be present and Mr. Dulles replied "by all means".

*Press Arrangements*

Mr. Dulles then raised the question of press arrangements.

Mr. Eden asked Sir Pierson Dixon to speak to this point. Sir Pierson said that there had been preliminary consultation on this point in Washington and that it was agreed that the press officer of each Delegation would participate in a joint briefing of the press after each principal meeting. The different press officers would alternate in presiding over the briefing with the other two being available to make what supplementary observations they desired.

Mr. Dulles suggested that the agenda which had been agreed upon be classified as secret, which was agreed to by the others.[2]

Mr. Eden observed that there probably would be some questions we had better not mention to the press and went on to say that on this matter the three governments should concert together.

A short draft communiqué (attached herewith [3]) was then circulated by Mr. Eden's delegation.

Mr. Dulles wondered whether to this communiqué could not be added a statement to the effect that the world situation would be taken up by the Heads of Governments and that the Foreign Ministers would get to work on a reply to the Soviet note for reference to the Heads of Government. Both Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault expressed some concern that by stating this much on the first day, the problem would come up every day as to what had been discussed. Also Mr. Bidault wondered if this would not give the impression that more had been discussed today than had been the case. He added that he thought we should increase gradually what we say each day.

Mr. Eden thought that in accepting Mr. Dulles' addition we would in fact be designating the agenda. Mr. Bidault thought it might be

[2] Presumably Dulles is referring to the list of topics which is printed as an attachment to the source text.

[3] No draft communiqué was found attached to the source text.

better to talk about these things after they had actually been discussed.

Mr. Dulles remarked that it was no secret that we were going to discuss the Soviet note so why should we try to conceal it. He added that there was a galaxy of newspaper people here, all having to write stories and that it was an alternative as to whether they make up their stories or get some guidance from us. He thought that the lesser evil was to get some guidance.

Mr. Eden observed that there was no real division on this so why not let each delegation say what it likes. Mr. Bidault nodded assent to this.

*Trieste*

Mr. Eden asked for permission to revert to the Trieste question which had been under informal discussion before the beginning of the meeting [4] and suggested that the three delegations coordinate the instructions to the three Ambassadors. Mr. Dulles designated Mr. Merchant to handle this.

Attachment

*List of Topics Prepared by the British Delegation*

SECRET [BERMUDA, December 4, 1953?]

1. General Discussion of World Situation
   The Communist Threat in West (Russia) and East (China)
2. Four Power Meeting on Germany and Austria
   Reply to Soviet Note
   Objectives and Tactics at Meeting
   Security Assurances
3. European Questions
   NATO. New Basis for Military Planning
   EDC
   Trade with Russia
   Any Other European Questions
4. Far East
   Korea
   Indo-China
   Long-term Policy in Far East
5. Middle East
   Egyptian negotiations and Middle East Defense Policy.
6. Any Other Business
7. Communiqué

[4] For a record of this discussion, see the telegraphic summary, p. 1744.

## FIRST RESTRICTED TRIPARTITE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 4, 1953, 5 P. M.

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Prime Minister Churchill | Prime Minister Laniel |
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Lt. Col. Walters | | M. Bougenot |

396.1/12–453

*Walters Minutes*

TOP SECRET BERMUDA, December 4, 1953.

STRICTLY LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Sir Winston Churchill opened the meeting by bidding the other participants a hearty welcome. He rejoiced to think that they had met together and expressed his pleasure at being present at this long-projected meeting. He had long hoped to be able to open the proceedings and as a first action he would like to ask the President of the United States, as the Chief of State, to take the chair to preside at the future meetings. He felt this would be agreeable to all, and he did not propose to add to the labors of the conferees by making a speech before so distinguished an audience. He felt he would have an opportunity to do this later on and was anxious to get down to business at once. There were still a few points as to procedures, times of meetings, etc., to be settled. The sooner this could be done, the better. He then asked President Eisenhower to take over the chair.

Prime Minister Laniel then said he wished to express his gratitude to Sir Winston in his own name and M. Bidault's name for the splendid hospitality that had been shown them since their arrival and to express his warm agreement with the Prime Minister's suggestion that President Eisenhower preside.

The President then expressed his gratitude to his conferees of both countries for their designation of him as chairman. As he understood it, these meetings would be most informal, and consequently his duties would not be onerous nor was he likely to have to make decisions that would arouse objections. He would like to have the privilege of joining the French in thanking Sir Winston for his hospitality. The President then suggested that the conferees should get down to business. He said one of the points taken up at the meeting of the Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers earlier was the question of the hours of the meetings.[1] The Foreign Ministers had suggested that they (the Foreign Ministers) meet in the morning at an hour of their own choosing, and the heads of government might meet in the later afternoon after the Foreign Ministers had had a chance to prepare some of the work.

[1] For a record of this meeting, see FM MIN 1, p. 1746.

As he understood it, the heads of government would meet at 5 p. m. and the Foreign Ministers would meet earlier at an hour of their own choosing. Mr. Eden said he thought there would be certain advantages if the work could be prepared. The President said that so far as he was concerned, he was available all day and he was rather inclined to agree with what Mr. Eden had said. He felt the Foreign Ministers had certain subjects they had allocated between themselves and the chiefs of delegation. They would handle the more detailed subjects and the chiefs of delegation would handle the more general subjects such as the Soviet position. The day should, therefore, be largely the Foreign Ministers'. Sir Winston nodded agreement.

Sir Winston said he would like to ask, not as a sign of personal indulgence but rather as an indication of the informal nature of the talks, if he might have permission to smoke. The President replied that in his first ruling as chairman he granted this permission.

The President then said there was a subject he would like to bring up. He had been invited to make a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations before it adjourned (approximately on December 8). When he had received this invitation he had been unwilling to make a firm decision in the matter until he had had the opportunity to see the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and France. Because there were certain pitfalls in tackling something like this, he felt he would rather confer with them with the honest purpose of obtaining their opinions and advice. When a Chief of State appears at a meeting such as that of the United Nations General Assembly, the presumption is that he has something serious to say. He would not be there just for the sound and fury but would have a serious proposal to make. The world was in a rather hysterical condition about the atomic bomb. He felt something might be said which, while admitting the terrible destructive quality of atomic energy, might express the point of view of the free world on the constructive capabilities of atomic energy. We might make an offer through some United Nations organization emphasizing constructive work rather than the destructive value of this force.

The talk he would make was still only a draft, but what he would like to do would be to say something that would not terrify further but rather bring forth a thread of hope that might be expanded and developed. Such an offer would presuppose a readiness on the part of the Russians to meet us half way. Such a presumption might be false—in fact, was probably false—but nevertheless, we would be making a concrete proposal rather than just expressing a pious hope.

We had announced that if we were again attacked in Korea we would not merely attempt to hold by using ground troops and shedding blood, but we would exert reprisals by attacking military objectives in the region. We stood on that kind of attitude on the one hand. On the

other, we wished to appear before the world as we really were—struggling for peace, not showing belligerence and truculence, but rather our will for peace.

We would give if others would likewise donate. This was not something that could be done unilaterally—certainly not for long. One of the purposes of it was to diminish the Soviet stockpile as well as our own. We would make an initial donation much greater than theirs. We might possibly ask Britain to make a contribution (this was something that had not been discussed with the British as yet). We would be giving to the United Nations through some UN authority. We might put in a thousand kilos, the USSR 200, the UK 40. Thereafter details could be worked out between the interested parties as to how much could be made available to the scientists of the world to use for practical purposes. We knew that atomic energy could be used to generate power, to run tractors—in fact, we had a ship ready to run—its engine was built. This was very expensive, but scientists might find a way to make it cheaper. It had great capabilities in the medical field, in the field of agriculture, and tremendous possibilities if used peacefully instead of for destruction. The general thought he was trying to convey was that all would contribute. One purpose was the diminishing of the USSR stockpile, and we would also pick up a recent UN Resolution urging private conversations on disarmament between the countries "principally concerned". The President was not sure who these were. His thought would be, if the speech were delivered, and Secretary Dulles agreed, to suggest that we were ready to start private conversations. He hoped that if this offer were made in the atomic energy field, it would bring disarmament a little closer.

The President said he would have to reply to the United Nations before Sunday night and he wanted to find out not merely if his fellow conferees had objections, but if on the general scene they saw any reasons for or against such an effort. As he had to make the reply by Sunday, he would be grateful if they would tell him their thoughts on the following day or perhaps right then if they had any immediate reaction.

Prime Minister Laniel said he approved entirely what the President had proposed. He felt that the effect of such action could only be excellent and it would show the good will of the United States, and the United Nations if the latter were to accept, and this, he felt, was highly probable.

Sir Winston Churchill said he would like to think this over before making an answer because he would like his answer to be as helpful and suggestive as possible. He felt there would be great difficulty in drawing a line between atomic energy commercial information and atomic energy military information. Such a line had been drawn in general terms.

President Eisenhower interrupted to say he felt Sir Winston was right on this score and then said he would like to digress for a moment and speak to his French friends. Turning to M. Laniel, he said that because two of the Delegations spoke English, they were apt sometimes to react immediately without allowing time for translation. He hoped that if he did this without giving the French the courtesy of a translation, they would interrupt him and insist that the translation be made. M. Laniel and M. Bidault smiled agreement.

The President then went on to say that it was a fact that while this material could be stored in the hands of a common body, there were technical means of rendering it safe. A little bit could be diluted so that there would be no point in carrying it away. Insofar as methods had been developed where this substance could be used commercially for peacetime purposes, a certain amount could be taken back and used militarily. To our minds, this would not be too important an objection. If the plant were in the Andes or in Saudi Arabia or in some other area where other fuels would be expensive, the amounts involved would not be significant as compared with what we know to be in the hands of the USSR.

The President said there was one other point he wished to make regarding this talk. If it were made, it would be on the night of the 8th upon returning from Bermuda. While he would make it clear that he was not authorized to speak on behalf of Prime Minister Churchill and Prime Minister Laniel, he felt that this was an additional reason for his desire for their approval, as he would not want to involve them even by implication.

Prime Minister Churchill then said it would be very nice if mankind could share the blessings from this subject without suffering from the disadvantages of its curses. That was as he understood the general line or tendency by which the President would be governed in making his statement. Thus, he would view it with favor.

The President then said that one point in this great world struggle had been broadly described as a conflict between the USSR and China on one hand the United Kingdom, France, and United States on the other. Certain things might make other nations feel they had a stake if tension lessened, if we could give power where it had not been previously available. Men needed power everywhere. If we could give hope, it would give these nations a stronger feeling of participation in the struggle of East and West, and such a feeling of participation would be on our side, and hope might be engendered from a fairly insignificant start.

In 1946 we had made a proposal known as the Baruch Plan.[2] Today it might not be wholly acceptable to us, but this was something that

[2] Regarding the Baruch Plan, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 856.

could be done without inspections, control commissions, or endless red tape. We could bring in this material and use it with, of course, the necessary technical supervision. We would have to word this carefully so as not to raise hopes that if you gave a man a ball of plutonium he might be able to plow his field for the next hundred years, but we had here an area where we could do something that would bring a large number of people to our side.

The President concluded by saying he would like to ask those present to consider this as very secret. He had not yet even made a definite decision as to whether the talk would be given.

He then suggested that they take up the question of the Soviet position and that for this purpose the remaining members of the Delegations might be invited to join them. There was agreement on this and the remaining members of the various Delegations then joined the Chiefs of Delegation.[3]

[3] For the record of the remaining part of the first tripartite meeting, see Plenary Minutes 1, below on this page.

## FIRST PLENARY TRIPARTITE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 4, 1953, 6 P. M.

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Prime Minister Churchill | Prime Minister Laniel |
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Mr. MacArthur | Sir Norman Brook | M. Bougenot |
| Mr. Merchant | Sir Pierson Dixon | M. Parodi |
| Mr. Nash | Sir Frank Roberts | M. de Margerie |
| Mr. C. D. Jackson | Mr. J. Colville | M. Laloy |
| Mr. Hagerty | Mr. C. Shuckburgh | M. Baeyens |
| Mr. Bowie | | M. Andronikov |
| Mr. Knight | | |
| Lt. Col. Walters | | |

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 185

*United States Delegation Minutes*[1]

SECRET BERMUDA, December 4, 1953.

Plenary Minutes 1

After the other members of delegations had joined the Chiefs of Governments, the President then proposed that the subject of the

[1] The U.S. Delegation transmitted to Washington a summary of the plenary part of the first meeting in Secto 5, from Bermuda, Dec. 5. (396.1/12–553) This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow and states that President Eisenhower assumed the chair for the meeting at the request of Prime Minister Churchill. A photograph of the three Heads of Government before this meeting is printed on p. 567.

Soviet position be discussed. He suggested that the French Delegation be invited first to contribute to the discussion.

M. Bidault then thanked the President for asking the French delegate to speak. It was an honor which he assumed with the authorization of the Prime Minister to discuss this most fundamental question. Ever since Stalin had disappeared, they had discussed in conversations between the Foreign Ministers the mysteries, changes and continuities of Soviet policy throughout the world. Up to now they had been in agreement that the changes were more in manner, atmosphere and attitude towards foreigners rather than fundamental policy changes. Two events had occurred which had ended the new policy of relaxation. These were the events of the 17th of June in Berlin [2] and the somewhat inexplicable disappearance of Beria. He used the word inexplicable because this man who had been one of the most redoubtable of the Soviet leaders had been for many years a symbol of inflexibility. This had an influence which was by no means negligible on the peoples of the world and public opinion. If we were to take an overall view of the real international situation and the foreign policy of the Soviets, we would find that there were certain facts which would not be contested.

M. Bidault went on to say that for the first time since the death of Stalin certain clear figures had been given us that were not proportional figures given in percentages. He had painful memories of the use of such proportional figures in France before the last war when it was said that production of aircraft had gone up 100 percent. This might have meant that in one year one aircraft was built and in the second year two. Figures concerning the Soviet Union had been largely unknown up to now. Economists and politicians had been reduced to a state bordering on ignorance. Khruschev and Mikoyan had spoken out relatively clearly and despite what was being repeated everywhere in the Soviet Union, it was clear that a basic improvement in the material situation of the Soviet people was not something foreseeable in the near future. This is confirmed by the figures we find in the five-year plan. We learned that there are less cattle in the Soviet Union now than under the Czar, while there are 50 million more people to feed, and we are told that in 1955 in this largely land locked country where the sea is not everywhere at hand, that twice as much fish as meat will be made available for the population and twice as much sugar as meat. It is not tomorrow that the internal situation of the Soviet masses will permit the iron curtain to rise and free travel across the iron curtain will not yet be at hand. This compels the Soviets to press their foreign policy in order to maintain their power and present goals. Therefore, it is evident that the men in the Kremlin are facing great internal difficulties and we should not lose sight of this. M. Bidault

[2] Documentation on the uprising in the eastern sector of Berlin on June 17, 1953 is presented in volume VII.

went on that he could talk at great length on this subject. From announced figures it appeared that 1.1 meters of textiles would be produced per year per person. At this rate a Soviet woman would be able to get a dress every 13 years. There had been other signs such as the diminishing of the compulsory loan, the recognition of the failure of the agricultural program, the attempt to transform industry to serve both city and country consumers. The situation was of such dimensions that it could not be changed rapidly. An additional indication was the fact that 70 percent of the manpower working in industry was devoted to heavy industry. Foreign policy and its appearances, as well as our answer thereto, constituted the principal force of maneuver available to the Soviets.

There were certain obscure points in foreign policy and M. Bidault wanted to refer to the major questions regarding the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communist Government, the degree of satisfaction of the satellites and the meaning of the sudden and inexplicable changes in diplomatic personnel, of which the most recent example was the removal of the U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the Chinese Communist Government.[3] But if the overall situation were stated in simplified terms the French would see it somewhat as follows—one of the principal points of concern to the Soviets would be their relations with the Chinese Peoples Republic. Without having any certainty in this field, it may be that these relations are not as smooth as generally believed. The prestige of a dictator who would maintain himself in power for thirty-five years could not immediately be replaced by one or more men who did not have the same qualification and prestige and did not inspire the same degree of fear. In the economic field, the U.S.S.R. was simply not in a position to supply these hundreds of millions of people with the goods which even a government devoted to austerity must demand. This seemed to the French to be a first element to understanding the problem. If others had additional information it would be helpful. An additional factor which was not purely mysterious or fundamental was a tendency towards an improvement of previously bad relations between the U.S.S.R. and some of its neighbors. Turkey, for example, had been the object of a friendly gesture which was unexpected even by the Turks.[4] A similar situation had developed with regard to Greece but here through a third party, i.e., Bulgaria.[5] The Bulgarians had evidenced dispositions which were certainly not Bulgarian in inspiration. In Finland, we had seen a peculiar climate where the Finnish Communists had voted in Parliament for

[3] On Dec. 2, it was announced that Soviet Ambassador Kuznetsov would be replaced by P. A. Yudin.

[4] On May 30, the Soviet Union informed Turkey that the Armenian and Georgian Republics renounced their territorial claims against Turkey and stated that its security could be assured on conditions acceptable to the Turks.

[5] Presumably Bidault is referring to the Bulgarian offer on Sept. 9 to settle all disputes with Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

the Social Democrats and Conservatives. This peculiarity was not without precedent but nevertheless did arouse our interest. These moves, however, had not had any consequences of an essential nature and that was perhaps why the Soviet Union had gone on to another maneuver.

M. Bidault said that this maneuver was aimed at the Western European powers. He would not discuss a purely British problem, namely, the attitude of the U.S.S.R. to the U.K. but as for the French, they had been approached both openly and in a veiled manner and France's allies had been informed thereof. In July for the first time the French had been able to make a commercial agreement with the Soviets which was incidentally compatible with French commitments. The Soviets had even agreed to deliver certain materials of a strategic nature such as chromium, whereas the French did not furnish them with any strategic materials. Molotov had made an unexpected gesture of calling on the French the 14th of July. Malenkov, in his speech of August 8, had referred to the Franco-Soviet Pact and Soviet notes regularly mentioned Southeast Asian problems as being suitable for peaceful negotiations. Likewise, as the French had informed their allies, the Soviet leaders had often attempted to exchange views on the German problems and other subjects of common interest, both in Paris and in Moscow. The purpose of this was very clear. They were attempting to use the resentment against Hitler's Germany which still lingered in France and above all use all possible circumstances to create division and opposition in the great alliance for freedom. This was one of the Soviet's principal objectives and a trump they would not throw away. On the other hand, they maintained a violent campaign against the U.S. and even in their last answer, it was clear that the Soviets were not addressing the Western nations as a whole but rather separately, attempting to place one against the other. Such bilateral moves were an element of all dictatorial policy. They were used by Mussolini and Hitler and the changes in events have been less than they appear. Their purpose is simple to forecast in the present circumstances and atmosphere to work continuously to demolish the Western defensive organization. M. Bidault called attention to Malenkov's speech of 8 August, in which after blasting imperialists who do not want peace because of the gun merchants, he added the following phrase: "Aggressive circles realize that if under the present conditions of international tension, the North Atlantic Pact was torn by internal struggles and contradictions it might collapse entirely in case of a *détente*". M. Bidault concluded that it was extremely clear that in the face of such an equally clear policy the West must take a definite stand and it was the French delegate's view that the West should reassume the initiative so as to overcome those illusions which

had been created in the body of Western public opinion by the tactics of our adversaries.

President Eisenhower then expressed his thanks in the name of his associates to M. Bidault and said that he would always agree with the positive policy. He felt that Prime Minister Churchill might then either present a paper, make a presentation or supplement the discussion by any method which he desired.

Sir Winston Churchill said that he would like to read over again the very interesting and broad minded statement which M. Bidault had made. He would like to think it over without attempting to deal with its detailed aspects. All he would venture was to state that in his view the great question, the supreme question, which must underlie our judgment in a dozen spheres was "is there a new look, is there a new Soviet look?" Had there been a deep change in the mighty entity we call the Soviet Union? Had there been such a change since the death of Stalin? Several things M. Bidault had said gave reason for belief that this was so. Other considerations set forth by M. Bidault indicated that there had been no change of heart but an ingenious variation of tactics. It must of course have come as a great shock to the Kremlin when at the end of the war they thought they had the future at their feet but then found that, owing to the initiative and gigantic strength of the United States, the thing for which they had been hoping and even have been planning was no longer possible, confronted as they were by the immense process in which the conferees were taking part today. The free world rearming and facing their extensive movements and ambitions. This must have come as a great shock to them. It was easy to see that at the end of 1945 or at the beginning of 1946 they might have thought that they had only to press forward to carry Communism and behind it Soviet imperialism to the shores of the Atlantic and far and wide across the Pacific world. Then they had found that this was not so. It was profoundly difficult to judge what they had felt but at any rate, when the Stalin regime passed away, they must have thought that an opportunity had come for reconsidering the situation. It was quite clear that they would face a struggle if they continued on a course of aggression, infiltration and undermining.

Sir Winston Churchill did not think it extraordinary that, if in reviewing new circumstances, the Kremlin had come to the conclusion that the thoughts they might have had after Potsdam might require profound reconsideration. This was a first reason why he might be inclined to answer the question as to whether there was a new look in the affirmative. A second reason lay in the economic conditions of the Russian people with their vast increase in population. The hopes of a Communist utopia which had been dangled before the eyes of millions

had not been borne out. At the disposal of the Soviet leaders at any moment were enormous opportunities for improving the material situation of their population. He found it reasonable to believe that these two facts (1) opposition from the United States and (2) the need for economic hope may well have brought about a definite change in Russian policy and outlook which may govern their actions for many years to come. Therefore, on the question of a new look he would answer "let us make sure that we do not too lightly dismiss this possibility." Confrontation by the Western world abroad and economic and other internal troubles at home might well have led to a definite change. We should, however, be very careful of two dangers, first to be thrown off our guard, and second, to exclude altogether the possibility that there may have been a real change. If there had been a change it was due, if not entirely at least mainly, to the strength and unity of the Western allies. If they had gathered to consider whether they should weaken that or to allow themselves to be divided, they would have indeed come to a dangerous pass. The only hope for a better state of affairs lay in the maintenance of Western strength and unity and a clear resolute determination to defend the cause of freedom by all means at hand. If this gathering were being held to find ways to reduce our defenses, that would be an extreme of criminal folly but if we were resolved to continue our preparation with the utmost vigor and perseverance—if we are, then this second question whether there was any reality in a Russian change was one that could be examined within limits and it should find its part in a general survey of the scene, once we had convinced them that there was no hope of dividing the allies. We should not repulse every move for the better. There should not be a question of finding a reason full of suspicion for giving evil meaning to every move of the Soviets. That might be so if we were considering lessening our perseverance but we might afford to look shrewdly and delicately at the new scene which the Russians presented.

Sir Winston then went on that it was not merely those around the table who must be convinced but also our peoples that no bona fide movement towards a "*détente*" or effort for improvement had been rebuffed and cast aside without consideration. The fact that we should consider was that we should be on the lookout for any sign of improvement coupled with a firm resolution not to slacken our efforts. Thus could we guard our people and hope for a real improvement in the situation. The note we should be right to strike was that we should have a two-fold policy of strength and readiness to look for any hope of an improved state of mind, even if it were necessary to run a slight mental risk. This would give us great strength. Sir Winston felt sure that the British Parliament and people were willing to make every

exertion to maintain the unity and strength of the North Atlantic Treaty alliance. Nothing could make it easier to rally and sustain our peoples than the fact that we have not brushed aside anything which would give us assurance or hope of a better state of affairs. Therefore, he was anxious that contacts be considered. The Soviets were more afraid of infiltration now than we were—infiltration behind the iron curtain if he might use the word. This was feared by what was bad in the Kremlin. If infiltration takes place, it could do us no harm. Trade was a vehicle of infiltration and the best way in which ordinary people and countries could earn their livelihood. We had nothing to fear from that and he would like to see such contacts improved and trade increased and the process of infiltration developed. He would not be in too much of a hurry to believe that nothing but evil emanates from this mighty branch of the human family or that nothing but danger and peril could come out of this vast ocean of land in a single circle so little known and understood.

Sir Winston said that he had but one more thing to say. Contacts, infiltration, trade leading to greater prosperity, reassurance that they would not have another dose of Hitler—and they had a right to this—and at the same time make it clear that we do not regard the position of the satellites nor admit that such a position could be permanent or tolerable but saying that we do not intend to use world war efforts to alter this. Time and patience must play their part. Such are the ideas I would venture. While hope springs eternal in the human heart, there is never an occasion where hope should be so modest and restrained. We are not attempting to heal the world or banish danger for that would be far beyond our powers.

"Encourage, encourage", Sir Winston repeated, "the world by stimulating prosperity and getting people in a more agreeable state of mind. This might well carry us through a period of years to a time when a much better scene will come. I would finish where I had begun." This would only be possible if combined as he had depicted, we continued in a strong and resolute manner to perfect our defenses and organization so that we would not risk throwing away all that had been gained so far and did not undo the great work already achieved. If mitigation of our work were contemplated, he would not ask for consideration of the other thought.

Standing together indivisible and growing stronger, we might be entitled to cherish the hope that we could come to the end of our difficulties having preserved the peace of the world.

President Eisenhower then said that this subject was of such a nature that it was certain to recur again and again not only implicitly but explicitly. He doubted that at the risk of embarrassing their host

they should prolong the meeting but he would like it understood that at a later meeting anyone sitting at the table might volunteer his thoughts. He asked particularly for indulgence of our Secretary of State in this respect. The President said he would like to make one or two short observations. Personally, he had been enlightened by both of the presentations. He had particularly liked the note of confidence in the French statement. He had been intrigued by the approach of "new look". If he understood clearly what Sir Winston had said, he had no quarrel with it. He believed that Sir Winston meant that we should examine to see if the dress were a new one or merely an old patched one. If we understood that under this dress was the same old girl, if we understood that despite bath, perfume or lace, it was still the same old girl, on that basis then we might explore all that Sir Winston had said if we might apply the positive methods of which M. Bidault had spoken. Perhaps we could pull the old girl off the main street and put her on a back alley. He did not want to approach this problem on the basis that there had been any change in the Soviet policy of destroying the Capitalist free world by all means, by force, by deceit or by lies. This was their long-term purpose. From their writings it was clear there had been no change since Lenin. If he had misinterpreted the Prime Minister, he would be happy if Sir Winston would correct him.

President Eisenhower then adjourned the conference.

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## MEETING OF THE TRIPARTITE WORKING GROUP, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 5, 1953

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| Mr. Merchant | Sir Frank Roberts | M. Seydoux |

396.1/12–553

*Telegraphic Summary, by the United States Delegation*[1]

SECRET BERMUDA, December 5, 1953.

Today's Bermuda session began with working group on Soviet note. In preliminary exchange Merchant (US) commented we all presumably should regard Soviet note as acceptance of our efforts. US believed allied response should be brief and non-contentious in order to avoid further note exchange. He hoped note would be finished quickly and

[1] The source text was transmitted priority to Washington in Secto 7 from Bermuda, Dec. 5. This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna. No other record of this meeting has been found in the Department of State files.

578-017 O - 83 - 44 (Part 2)

dispatched before Bermuda ends. US favored meeting in first week January in Berlin in old ACC building.

Seydoux (French) agreed note should be short but added that French position regarding time and place of proposed conference more uncertain and Bidault would presumably wish discuss these details with other Foreign Ministers. Seydoux indicated that Bidault was not too keen about Berlin that French understood Adenauer was also evidentally not too keen about this location and that French presidential elections introduced certain element of delay regarding date of conference.

Roberts (UK) expressed preference for short prompt note tenor of which would assume Soviet acceptance of a meeting (even though not our idea of meeting). Regarding place he suggested that even though British might not have proposed Berlin it appeared inadvisable from public opinion viewpoint to argue this point. Under circumstances it therefore better accept Berlin though we should avoid meeting in Soviet sector and therefore press for ACC building. In fact conference in Berlin might be good idea to help try and force Soviets to concentrate on German discussions. British favored earliest possible conference if possible first week January though French admittedly have problem here. Roberts added that discussion already indicated general agreement except re date of conference.

Merchant added that while Foreign Ministers should clearly discuss and decide questions of time and place, US felt early date most important. If conference not held until February or March we feared real difficulties with Congress in connection US aid program. It therefore important US felt to have meeting if possible and have it over with early in 1954.

British and French then circulated draft replies they had prepared [2] (which generally in line with each other and with our tentative thinking). Merchant explained that while US not presenting its own draft our main concern was that note should be very brief construing Soviet note as acceptance containing short reservations re Soviet attack on EDC and Soviet five-power conference position and then proposing conference at specific time and place.

Following some exchange of views re respective drafts it was agreed that US would attempt to combine best points British and French drafts and at same time shorten same while Foreign Ministers meeting subsequently should discuss time and place of proposed conference.[3]

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[2] Neither of the drafts under reference here has been identified in the Department of State files.

[3] For a record of the Foreign Ministers discussion of the place and date of the four-power conference, see FM MIN 2, p. 1763.

## SECOND TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 5, 1953, 11 A. M.

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Mr. MacArthur | Sir Pierson Dixon | M. Parodi |
| Mr. Merchant | Sir Frank Roberts | M. de Margerie |
| Mr. Bowie | Sir Norman Brook | M. F. Seydoux |
| Mr. Nash | Mr. Shuckburgh | M. Vimont |
| Mr. C. D. Jackson | Mr. J. V. Rob | M. Laloy |
| Mr. Knight | Mr. Edmondson | M. Baeyens |
| | Mr. Allen | M. Sauvagnargues |
| | Miss Petrie | |

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184

*Knight Minutes* [1]

SECRET BERMUDA, December 6, 1953.

FM MIN 2

Subject: Place and Date of Meeting with Soviets.

Cable references: Secto 7
Secto 8 [2]

Mr. Eden reported on the meeting of experts (Secto 7). General agreement was achieved, except for two points requiring guidance by the Foreign Ministers: date and place of the meeting. While Berlin had certain disadvantages, it was difficult to make a real issue out of the place of meeting.

Mr. Bidault agreed that the place of the meeting should not become a "first-class topic of controversy". However, Berlin was definitely undesirable, and he suggested that the Western Ambassadors in Moscow make a verbal approach. If the Soviets remain firm then the West would accept Berlin. The same arguments against Vienna, which were accepted by the Foreign Ministers at their July meeting, were even more valid in the case of Berlin.[3] When asked by the Secretary for precise suggestions, Mr. Bidault mentioned tentatively Geneva, Lucerne, "or even Sweden". Obviously Geneva was his first choice in view of facilities of all kinds available there.

A brief discussion ensued concerning the locale in Berlin and it was

[1] The U.S. Delegation transmitted to Washington a summary of this meeting in Secto 8 from Bermuda, Dec. 5. (396.1/12–553) This telegram was repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Moscow.

[2] Secto 7 transmitted the telegraphic summary, p. 1761; regarding Secto 8, see footnote 1 above.

[3] For documentation on the Washington Foreign Ministers meetings, July 10–14, see pp. 1582 ff.

generally agreed that the Allied Control Headquarters was the obvious choice.

Initiating discussion of the "time" question, the Secretary spoke at length regarding the essential and vital importance of this matter, and that other considerations "will have to fall into place with it". The US was ready to accept a four-power meeting on the assumption that it will be over quickly and not converted into a Soviet propaganda weapon to upset Western European progress. The US was under no illusion about the Soviet concept of the meeting. True, they have dropped their absurd preconditions, but it was clear that they had the intention to make the same absurd demands at the conference. While it was impossible to be certain of the position of the "other side", we could be 90% sure in this case that the only purpose was to delay beyond a time when it would no longer be possible to put into execution our plans to strengthen the West through the EDC and NATO. Sabotage was the obvious intent of the Soviets.

The Secretary emphasized that time is now a very important factor and not a matter of convenience. Time was running out. While we all have parliamentary difficulties, the US Congress was now in such a mood that unless positive action toward continental European unity within NATO occurs within the next two or three months, any appropriations voted would be so rigid as to have very adverse repercussions on NATO programs now contemplated. The Secretary illustrated this with a description of the Richards Amendment [4] passed by Congress when the urgency was not as great as now. If there is no likelihood of early action—and particularly the creation of a strong Franco-German kernel of strength for NATO*—it will be very difficult to obtain further appropriations. Congressional committees will reach rather definite conclusions in early March. For all of these reasons time is to be considered as of the essence and the matter of the place is secondary. Our object is to have completed our explorations of Soviet attitudes in good time to permit the various needed parliamentary actions during February.

The Secretary did not disagree with Mr. Bidault concerning the place and only wanted to stress the importance of time, as he could not take the responsibility of saying that strong Congressional support for NATO would continue in the absence of concrete development of economic-military strength in Europe. Therefore we hope the meeting can be held in early January, and if possible, conclude it by the end of the month so that by early February we can see if we can proceed or not. Otherwise the Soviet maneuver will have achieved its purpose of sowing disunity, as revealed so obviously in Malenkov's speech of

[4] For the text of the Richards amendment, see Edcol 10, July 13, p. 796.
*On the Continent. [Footnote in the source text.]

August 8, which we would have quoted had not Mr. Bidault done so yesterday.[5]

Mr. Eden saw the force of the arguments relative to the importance of "time" but added as a consideration the time needed for the necessary preparations by the West. Concerning the place, he had originally disliked Berlin, was still not entirely happy about it, but thought it might have definite advantages. In particular, Berlin would have a direct relationship to the topic which we wanted to discuss, i.e., Germany and not China. Mr. Eden had no objection to Mr. Bidault's suggestion of a verbal approach by the three Ambassadors to Molotov. The Secretary interjected his approval. Mr. Eden went on to suggest a date around mid-January, expressing the thought that two weeks should be enough to probe Soviet intentions and that thus Mr. Dulles' timetable could be met.

The Secretary expressed preference for the first week in January.

Mr. Bidault expressed full agreement with the Secretary's position concerning the "dramatic importance" of the time element at this particular moment. However certain facts and embarrassing circumstances for the French Government existed. The new French President will be elected on December 17 and will take office on January 17 or 18. Then the new President must name a new Prime Minister. The problems resulting from these constitutional questions were such that he must consult Mr. Laniel. Of course there was a possibility that the present government could be retained in office by the new President but Mr. Bidault termed this possibility a "miracle".

Mr. Bidault then pointed out that while the discussion had centered on a date for the start of the conference, its duration and the date of its conclusion were of at least equal importance. Personally he would not be shocked by an agreed termination date, as the West could not afford to be dragged into another Palais Rose.[6] Because of the exigencies of the French situation, we should concentrate on a closing rather than an opening date of the conference. Mr. Bidault then threw out a very tentative thought that the West might afford to gamble by disregarding French constitutional problems and suggesting an early date on the assumption that the Soviets would not come. This, however, was very risky and he would have to mention it to Laniel. (In making this proposition Mr. Bidault gave the definite impression that he was thinking out loud and not making considered French suggestion.)

The Secretary, while not wishing to embarrass the French Government, nevertheless felt compelled to stress the importance of holding the four-power meeting before the inauguration of the new French

[5] For a record of the session under reference here, see Plenary Minutes 1, p. 1754.

[6] Documentation on the quadripartite Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting (Conference de Palais Rose). March–June 1951, is presented in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.

President. Parliament would remain the same and therefore there was no reason why the present government could not speak for the French people after the recent vote, just as representatively as the following government. Furthermore, recent history has shown that often "much time" is needed to form a new French Government. Could Mr. Bidault hazard a firm guess as to the time which might be required to form the new government on this occasion? The Secretary was afraid that if several new Ministers were brought into the government considerable further time might be needed to formulate policies. Thus time would slip by. Finally if the meeting were held before January 17, the French would have the advantage of being represented "by the Foreign Minister here most experienced in the conduct of these affairs." This could be a great advantage to all of us.

Mr. Bidault appreciated the compliment and said that it would be easier for him to foresee developments on the French political scene after the election of the new President on December 17. However he did not see how politically the Laniel Government with its life as limited as it is could undertake such an important task as negotiations with the Soviets. If Mr. Laniel agreed he would be very audacious. Mr. Bidault concluded that he was especially regretful to take such a position since he completely agreed with the views expressed by the Secretary.

Mr. Eden summed the matter up as follows:

*a.* The time problem must be discussed with Mr. Laniel. Meanwhile it was agreed that;

*b.* the West would accept Berlin, but;

*c.* prior attempt would be made verbally by the three Ambassadors in Moscow to obtain Soviet agreement on another place. This *démarche* was only agreed, however, on the understanding that it would not cause delay.

The Secretary added the further assumption that the meeting would be in the Allied Control Headquarters in Berlin, which according to advice received by the US was agreeable to Chancellor Adenauer. The Secretary then asked Mr. Bidault if the latter part of December might be a less difficult date for the French than early January.

Mr. Eden thought that this still earlier date would be unacceptable to Chancellor Adenauer. In view of all the difficulties and problems set forth during the meeting, we must be patient and cautious. All agreed this morning that the earliest possible date was the best, but unfortunately it is difficult to reconcile our constitutional difficulties with what we would prefer to do.

The Secretary then raised the question of duration of the four-power conference mentioned earlier by Mr. Bidault, and expressed doubt that the Soviets would agree on a termination date, in view of their obvious intent to drag the proceedings out. Would it be worthwhile to con-

sider whether the Ambassadors should also explore this question with Molotov? Mr. Bidault said he had not intended to suggest that this question be broached with the Soviets. He had merely intended that agreement be reached between the three Western powers as to a date by which either Deputies would be appointed to wind up the meeting or else a public statement would be made to the effect that continuation of the meeting would be a mere loss of time. Any mention of a termination date to the Soviets would give them a valuable weapon as it would facilitate the development of their tactics.

Mr. Eden fully agreed with Mr. Bidault that there should be no mention of a termination date to the Soviets. The Secretary also agreed. All three Ministers thought in terms of three weeks for the four-power meeting.

In discussing what should be said to the press, one point of substance occurred. Mr. Eden suggested that the press be informed that general agreement had been reached and that a drafting group had been appointed. The Secretary opposed that the press be told anything to the effect that the West had decided to attend a conference with the Soviets until the question of date had been settled satisfactorily, as otherwise the US may have to reconsider.

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**EISENHOWER–CHURCHILL MEETING, EISENHOWER'S QUARTERS, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 5, 1953, 11:30 A. M.**

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM |
|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Prime Minister Churchill |
| Admiral Strauss | Lord Cherwell |

**Eisenhower Library, Whitman file, "Bermuda State Dept Rpt"**

*Notes Prepared by Admiral Strauss* [1]

TOP SECRET [BERMUDA, December 5, 1953.]

The session had been arranged to discuss atomic energy matters of mutual interest.

Sir Winston referred to his concern at the cessation of full scale cooperation between the US and UK which had prevailed during the war. He made a case for its resumption.

The President explained the situation with respect to existing law, stated his personal sympathy, in principle, with the views of the Prime Minister and mentioned that steps were being taken to ameliorate the

[1] An introductory note at the beginning of the source text gives the time, place of and the participants in this meeting. It also states that the notes had been written in longhand by Admiral Strauss and were "returned to him for destroying".

condition so far as possible by seeking amendment to the McMahon Act at the next session of the Congress. He pointed out that he understood from Mr. Strauss that certain exchanges had recently been arranged for, within the present statute, but that more would probably have to await legislative action.

Sir Winston then referred to fact that UK planes were being designed and built with no proper knowledge of characteristics of our atomic weapons if they might ever be called upon to deliver them, and, as a minimum, he hoped that weight, dimensions and ballistics of our weapons could be supplied to them. . . .

Sir Winston stated that the UK having concluded successfully weapons tests were now embarked upon weapon production, that their first weapon had recently been delivered to the RAF, and that they expected to have ———[2] by 1957 and ———[2] by 1960. He volunteered their estimate of our present production as ———[2] per annum and our current stockpile as ———.[2]

Lord Cherwell here stated that they were not intending to do any work on hydrogen bombs—that they felt able to get one megaton or possibly two from boosted fission weapons and that in their view few targets needed a larger yield.

At this point the President touched upon his belief that atomic weapons were now coming to be regarded as a proper part of conventional armament and that he thought this a sound concept. Sir Winston concurred.

There followed a lengthy discussion of the effect of a resumption of hostilities in Korea. Sir Winston referred to his public utterances in this respect but twice during the ensuing discussion mentioned that Mr. Eden was more fully informed and that he did not wish anything he said in this area to be considered as a commitment until Mr. Eden was brought into the talks. . . .

Sir Winston next referred to the specific exchange of information under the *modus vivendi* mentioning first the agreement between the two countries arranged by Cherwell and Strauss in November (exchange of data on weapons effects).[3] He expressed his gratification at this. He said, however, that he also felt that there should be more freedom of information between the two countries on discussion of intelligence concerning enemy weapons and capabilities. The President expressed himself as sympathetic to this idea. He asked Mr. Strauss what the situation was and was told that while intelligence findings were exchanged the *evaluation* of such data was not exchanged—on the theory that evaluation being in terms of our existing weapons, it was considered a violation of the specific prohibition in the statute to

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[2] Omissions in the source text.

[3] Documentation on the exchange of information between the United States and the United Kingdom on the effects of atomic weapons is presented in volume II.

do so: The President directed Mr. Strauss to review the validity of this assumption.

Sir Winston then produced a photostat of the original signed copy of the Quebec Agreement of 1943 between himself and F. D. Roosevelt and read from it to the President[4] (It was the first time Mr. Strauss had ever seen a photostat. No signed counterpart is in the files of the State Department.) Sir Winston stated that in his opinion the time had now come to publish it and related documents. Mr. Strauss informed the President at this point that the Quebec Agreement had been formally superseded by the Blair House Agreement of January 8, 1948.[5] It was agreed, after some discussion, that the climate for closer working relations might be facilitated by publication of these and related documents and the President requested Mr. Strauss to prepare a White Paper on the subject. Lord Cherwell will collaborate on this.

Sir Winston briefly mentioned the President's proposed speech.[6] He said that he had some reservations as to the wisdom of delivering it. It was understood that his points would be discussed between Lord Cherwell and Mr. Strauss. He proposed a meeting on tomorrow (Sunday) morning. The President explained that he had filled his morning calendar and a meeting on Monday morning was tentatively set.[7]

The meeting ended at 12:59 p. m.

[4] *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, p. 1117.
[5] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, p. 683.
[6] Documentation on President Eisenhower's speech, given at the United Nations General Assembly on Dec. 8, is presented in volume II.
[7] No record of a Churchill–Eisenhower meeting on Monday, Dec. 7, to discuss the President's proposed speech has been found in Department of State files.

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## EISENHOWER–LANIEL MEETING, EISENHOWER'S QUARTERS, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 5, 1953, 2:30 P. M.

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | FRANCE |
|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Prime Minister Laniel |
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Mr. Merchant | M. Bougenot |
| Mr. MacArthur | M. Alphand |
| Mr. C. D. Jackson | M. Parodi |
| Lt. Col. Walters | M. de Margerie |

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Vernon Walters*

TOP SECRET BERMUDA, December 5, 1953.

The President opened the conversation after lunch by saying that

there was one subject he felt impelled to take up with Mr. Laniel and Mr. Bidault, and that was to explain to them the urgency of the situation, as he saw it, in view of the frame of mind of the United States Congress. Last year the Congress, over the opposition of the President and the Secretary, had passed an amendment withholding 50% of the appropriations voted for foreign, economic and military aid to countries which would participate in the European Defense Community until such time as EDC was set up to receive such end items as might be allocated to it. This meant we would soon find ourselves in a very embarrassing position.

The President said that he felt that, in the light of the Soviet menace weighing upon the free world, the only practical way to insure the defense of that free world lay in the development of a greater unity on continental Europe by the association of France and Germany. He felt that the EDC was the only way a German contribution could be made available and France be given the guarantees to which she was entitled against a resurrection of Pan-Germanism. The feeling of urgency, of which he spoke, not merely his own personal feeling and that of Secretary Dulles, but it was widespread in the United States. Although the Richards amendment had been voted against the opposition of the President and the Secretary of State because they themselves believed in EDC, their opposition could be only one of method rather than substance as they were necessarily in agreement with the intention which had inspired the amendment.

The President said that he felt that a basic factor militating in favor of EDC was the fact that no nation or region could properly defend itself unless it were able to earn its living and he did not believe, quite apart from any Russian menace, that Europe could properly earn its living unless it achieved a much greater degree of unity. He was convinced that EDC was not only practical and feasible, but absolutely essential to any permanent solution of the long-term problems of the countries involved.

He was fully conscious of the difficulties which confronted the French, but nevertheless he could see no acceptable alternative to the EDC, and he reiterated that time was of the essence as the United States Congress met on January 5.

The President then asked Secretary Dulles if he had anything he wished to say.

The Secretary said that he entirely shared the opinions that the President had expressed and emphasized again that this feeling was shared by the American people. If concrete steps were not taken in the near future to heal the breach that had torn the heart of Western civilization for so many years, it would be quite impossible to sustain the interest and support of the American people. They felt that the heart and head of European civilization had been torn by internecine

strife, and that there must be some guarantee for the future that we could go forward, knowing that this breach had been healed once and for all. The President had spoken of the Russian menace, which was a powerful and compelling reason for pushing forward in order to heal this age-old quarrel, but there were other powerful reasons that impelled us in the same direction.

The Secretary said that a number of years ago, even before United States had joined the alliance of free nations against Hitlerism, he had written a paper for a church group, with whom he had then been associated, setting forth peacetime objectives. The two principal ones he had mentioned had been the setting up of a world organization along the lines of the United Nations, and secondly, the development of an organization which would heal the age-old breach between the French and Germans. This paper had been written at a time in 1940 when the Soviet menace had not been as apparent as it now is, but nevertheless these two objectives had seemed to him essential even then. The American people were not avid for power or leadership. They wanted to see the age-old leadership of the Western World flower again under the aegis of France which had contributed so much in the fields of the spirit and the intellect. If this matter were allowed to drag on indefinitely or were finally rejected by the French, it would have tragic consequences on public opinion in the United States, and there would be a feeling that Western Europe was through and that we could no longer hope for leadership from that quarter, and this would require a complete reevaluation of our whole foreign policy. If, on the other hand, this dream could be brought into being as a reality, it would arouse the enthusiasm of our people and sustain their support for the policy we had been pursuing. EDC had become a symbol in the eyes of the American people of the will to heal the quarrel between France and Germany and the determination to resist the Soviet threat. Without it, there could be no adequate defense of Western Europe. Such a defense must be with France and with Germany, not with one and without the other.

Prime Minister Laniel said he would like to reaffirm his own position and that of his Government in full support of EDC. The presence of Mr. Bidault at his side was the surest guarantee therefor. They believed in EDC and felt that it was the only practical solution under the circumstances. They felt that it was far better than a German national army. The hour of opportunity was at hand such as had not occurred in the past and might not again occur in the future because of the political situation in Germany and the personality of the Chancellor who governed that country. This opportunity should not be passed by but grasped. Mr. Laniel said he understood full well the problem facing the President and the Secretary in the temper of Congress. Alas, he, too, had a public opinion in France and a Parliament

with which it was not always easy to deal. He had not without difficulty passed through a difficult debate and obtained a vote of confidence from the French Parliament. This was the same French Parliament which some twenty months earlier had expressed general approval of the idea of a European army and the general principles of the EDC. His Government was determined to go forward with this program, but there were two problems, the solution of which would greatly facilitate his task, and these were a solution for the Saar question and the form of the British relationship to EDC. If he could obtain only one British division assigned to the EDC, this would have been of immeasurable help. The position was one where it was not London waiting for us but rather we (the French) waiting for London. The inclusion of the Saar's economy in that of France was what had made possible the equilibrium of the French economic situation, and were this to be removed, it would jeopardize not only the entire economic balance of France, but also the first step which had been taken in the direction of a greater measure of European unity, namely, the coal-steel pool. He recognized the problem which the Saar presented for the Germans, but felt that some formula must be found that would permit the present economic situation to persist.

The President said that in this matter of Paris waiting on London and London waiting on Paris, it was as though Mr. Laniel were walking along with a young lady and came to a door. The proper thing to do would be to step aside and let the lady pass through the door first, but if one knew that there was a malefactor of some sort on the other side of the door, the gallant thing then would be to go through first oneself. He felt that in this case, we should go right up to the job to be done and, seeing that we had to do it, go forward and do it.

President Eisenhower then said that Secretary Dulles had cited a number of other reasons which emphasized the necessity of going forward with EDC. As far as he was concerned personally, the Russian menace alone would provide sufficient justification for this course. It reminded him of the story of the man who was asked why he did not go to church any more. He replied that there were seven reasons, the first of which was that he had been thrown out and the six others did not really matter.

The President then asked Mr. Laniel if he had anything further to say on this subject.

Mr. Laniel said he would like to ask Mr. Bidault, who had worked so tirelessly in support of EDC, to say a few words.

Mr. Bidault said that what he would say was in full agreement with Mr. Laniel. He felt he would add little to what had already been said on this subject, but there was one thing he wished to do, and that was to pay tribute to the calm courage and tenacity that the Premier had shown in carrying alone the burden of winning the heavy

battle that recently had been fought in the French Chamber. They were fully aware of the urgency involved, but they likewise realized that there were grave difficulties in the path of success. These resided in great part in the fact that General De Gaulle with his great record of service, after first trying to play himself the card of Franco-German *rapprochement*, had finally decided upon a position of unshakeable opposition to this idea. On the other hand, there were the Socialists, who were determined to do everything that they could to make the life of a moderate government like the Laniel government miserable. They had assumed an official position of approving EDC, and this they confirmed on every possible occasion by hostile votes. Mr. Laniel's recent difficulties had arisen in large part from the difficulty of attempting to harness the votes of those on the right and left who favored EDC. This had finally been done at the end of the debate, but without the full measure that would have been desirable. While it was quite true that this National Assembly was the same one which twenty months previously had approved the principles of a European Army and EDC, this had been done before the treaties had been signed and before the wave of attacks had been launched.

Mr. Bidault said that he mentioned these difficulties not to cloud the issue or allow matters to drag. He was opposed in principle to allowing matters to drag and EDC was a matter which should certainly not be allowed to do so. He referred to these difficulties only to make clear the awkwardness of his position. The determination of the Government, of which he had the honor to be a member, was in no way shaken and their resolution was high. A first phase had been won in the parliamentary debate, but this was only the first phase, and in order to win the second phase, he would have to have in his hand cards that he could play to insure success. If he asked his colleagues from the United States and Great Britain for help, it was because he needed to have these cards in his hand. He hoped that we would understand this and do what we could to help him.

Mr. Bidault concluded by reaffirming his determination to success.

Secretary Dulles then said that if EDC were rebuffed, it would compel the United States to reevaluate their whole position as to the historic direction of the policy to be followed. Whatever assurances might be given officially meant little if they were not sustained by the will and enthusiasm of those who undertook the obligations. In a free country like ours, there were elections for Congress every two years, but if EDC were ratified, it would so stimulate the imagination and enthusiasm of the American people that he would not venture to set a limit on the period during which they might be expected steadfastly to support our plans for reenforcing the Atlantic Organization and making the west secure. The Secretary felt it was vital that this be clearly understood.

The President then said that he asked the Premier and Mr. Bidault to understand that he had not asked them there to deliver a lecture on the importance of EDC. He knew that both of them understood the tremendous importance of this, but he merely wished to inform them of the position in which we found ourselves on this most vital subject. Of course, we understood the difficulties they had to face and would do everything in our power to help them surmount the obstacles which confronted them.

After a cordial exchange of greetings, the French participants took their leave of the President of the United States and the Secretary of State.

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**SECOND PLENARY TRIPARTITE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 5, 1953, 5 P. M.**

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Prime Minister Churchill | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | M. Bougenot |
| Mr. MacArthur | Sir Norman Brook | M. Parodi |
| Mr. Merchant | Sir Pierson Dixon | M. de Margerie |
| Mr. Nash | Sir Frank Roberts | M. Baeyens |
| Mr. C. D. Jackson | Mr. Allen | M. Vimont |
| Mr. Hagerty | Mr. Shuckburgh | M. Seydoux |
| Mr. Bowie | Mr. Edmondson | M. Laloy |
| Mr. Knight | | M. Andronikov |
| Lt. Col. Walters | | |

**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184**

*United States Delegation Minutes* [1]

SECRET BERMUDA, December 5, 1953.

Plenary Minutes 2

President Eisenhower opened the proceedings by saying that he regretted to have to tell the others that M. Laniel was suffering from a slight fever and had been ordered by the doctor to remain quiet temporarily. He expressed his hope for a speedy return of the French Premier to health and voiced his request that no mention be made of his illness outside of the room where the conference was being held. Prime Minister Churchill associated himself in the name of the British delegation with the regrets the President expressed at M. Laniel's absence. M. Bidault then thanked the President and Sir Winston for the kind wishes they had expressed for M. Laniel's speedy recovery. He said

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[1] The U.S. Delegation transmitted to Washington a summary of this meeting in Secto 11 from Bermuda, Dec. 6 (396.1/12–653). This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

that the French delegate was very grateful and agreed that there should be no mention of this temporary indisposition of the Premier. He hoped that he would soon be able to join the Conference again.

Sir Winston Churchill then said that he had been rather disconcerted to hear that the press had had a full account of what had happened the previous day. They had been able to reprint whole passages that had been spoken around the table. A local paper had given a fair and tactful account of what had transpired, but nevertheless it was evident that they had received improper knowledge. For his part Sir Winston was quite willing to debate in public but he felt that it should be definitely decided whether these discussions were to be held in public or in private. He felt it was a very serious matter if people were talking of confidential matters to the press. While there was an American newspaper strike, the United Kingdom was not similarly favored. One way or the other, it was evident that secret information had leaked out and he felt that there should be nothing other than those matters contained in the communiqué, or if it was felt desirable to hold a press conference, that would be something else. He had felt bound to bring to the Chairman's notice the fact that people on his staff had talked to reporters who had an extraordinary amount of accurate information.

The President said that this was serious but that the best thing that could be done would be for the Heads of Delegations to instruct each individual on the delegation concerning the seriousness of any violation of security. The President then proposed that action be taken immediately to set up a communiqué drafting group. The Foreign Ministers could designate members of their delegation and they could begin drafting the communiqué as soon as the plenary session was concluded. This would lessen the pressure on any individual to give out information. He would propose that this be adopted immediately. M. Bidault said he had never seen a conference where this sort of thing had not happened but this in no way lessens his agreement with the President and Prime Minister. He fully approved the President's proposal and designated Mr. Seydoux as the French member. Secretary Dulles then designated Mr. Bowie if the President agreed, which he did. Mr. Eden then designated Sir David Allen as the British member.

President Eisenhower then asked Mr. Eden, as the Foreign Secretary of the host nation, to bring him up-to-date on what had happened in the earlier meeting of the Foreign Ministers.[2] Mr. Eden said they had considered the Soviet note and a draft of a reply thereto. Since the morning meeting the experts had been at work on the text and considerable progress had been made. The text was available but he had not personally read it. If agreeable the draft might be read in draft form. He felt it was desirable to get to general conclusions as

[2] For a report on the Foreign Ministers meeting at 11 a. m., see FM MIN 2, p. 1763.

soon as possible. The Foreign Secretary said that there were two points that were outstanding upon which the Foreign Ministers desired to draw the attention of the Chiefs of Delegation. These were firstly the question of place. All had agreed there were certain disadvantages inherent in Berlin. It was a place of great touchiness in the international situation and they would prefer a neutral location such as Switzerland. It had been felt that they might authorize the Ambassadors to raise this question with Molotov and indicate they felt a neutral location would be more desirable. They did not consider, however, that this point should be allowed to delay matters if the Russians insisted on Berlin. The Ambassadors should be authorized to agree to a Berlin meeting but if meetings were held there, they must be held in the Allied Control Commission building. Wandering around Berlin would be highly undesirable. It was a point on which Chancellor Adenauer felt very strongly. The second point was the question of timing. All were agreed that the sooner the conference were held the better, so that if it appeared that no progress was being made this would not delay other steps such as EDC and other plans for Europe. Secretary Dulles had reminded the Foreign Ministers that the aid program would go before Congress in the early spring. All had agreed that a date as early as possible in January would be desirable. Our French friends had a new President who would assume office about the 17th or 18th of January and the question of the authority of a new government from the new President had not made it possible to reach a conclusion on this point. M. Bidault was to see Premier Laniel on this subject and discuss it with him. There was one additional point and that was the question of declaration. We should not allow things to drag on interminably thereby delaying our plans for Europe. The question of saying anything concerning an end date for the Conference to the Russians had been considered and on balance, it was found desirable not to take it up with them. The Foreign Ministers had felt they might agree on a figure of approximately three weeks among themselves. If no progress was being made, they could consult among themselves as to what action they felt should be taken. If, on the other hand, progress were being made, then the situation would be quite different.

President Eisenhower said that in view of this he wondered if M. Bidault could give them any indication as to a possible date. M. Bidault said that he did not wish to hide his great embarrassment as this was a matter of assuming a very great responsibility but having said that he had talked to M. Laniel after dinner and had also discussed this matter with other members of the French Delegation and it had been finally agreed that, as there were difficulties everywhere, the earliest possible date would be preferred. He had had no success earlier in the morning when he had suggested the end of December and, there-

fore, he felt that the first days of January would be most desirable. If the conference were to start before the date of the French Presidential election, it would be well to have it started well in advance. President Eisenhower then said that he felt bound to approve every decision that had been reached, including the conclusion just set forth by M. Bidault. He realized the difficulties which the leaders had to face and was most appreciative of the consideration which M. Bidault had shown for Prime Minister Churchill and himself. The President felt that any attempt to face an earlier date would run into the problem of holidays and much ground might be lost there. The President then asked the British delegation how they felt on this matter. Mr. Eden said he felt that it would not be possible to hold the meeting on January 4. His feeling was that this date was too early as a great deal of preparatory work had to be done and it was most important that we know our own minds when going to a conference of this nature. Furthermore the NATO conference closely followed the Bermuda Conference and very little time was left before Christmas. Likewise, there had been a strong German appeal that this be held the end of January or beginning of February as they were anxious to be consulted and to know what was going on.

President Eisenhower at this point said that he would like to state that we had had definite word from the German Chancellor that, after hearing arguments for and against, Dr. Adenauer had sent word on the previous day that he had completely changed his mind and felt that the earlier the conference were held the better. The President said he would like to observe that there were a number of conflicting considerations, some of them urgent and some requiring more perfection and preparation. In the case of the French Assembly, more political preparation would be required in view of the forthcoming Presidential election. He felt that on the question of timing there was a certain urgency that made him willing to take a chance to go to such a conference not as completely prepared as might be desired. It was probable that once the meeting started, there would be a certain amount of foot-dragging on the other side and some work could be done even after the meeting had started. He would like to see the January 4 date fixed for this meeting. To go beyond that would be to confront M. Bidault with an entirely new problem. The President went on to say that every time there was any kind of a change, this really represented a new problem. It had been once believed that the conference could be held November 7 and he did not feel that the problem had changed so greatly that what would be needed on January 4 would not be vastly different from that which had been prepared for November 7. Mr. Eden said that he did not wish to dally on this subject and felt that it was best to get on with it. On balance he was worried about being unprepared and not having an agreed plan. One new issue had

been introduced and that was the question of security. The Russians had mentioned that in their reply. No joint plan had been prepared as to what to say on this subject and it was quite an important one. President Eisenhower said that he wondered if it would not be possible to adjourn decision on the question of date and the Foreign Ministers who were meeting on the note could present such specific considerations for or against this date. If this were accepted, the meeting could be referred to the Foreign Ministers and Secretary of State.

The President felt that the first item on the agenda [3] had been pretty well covered, namely, the world situation. The second item on the agenda was being discussed by the Foreign Ministers. The third item, EDC, had been earmarked for discussion by the Chiefs of Delegation. Personally, he had had the honor of having part of the French delegation to lunch and they had talked exhaustively on the subject of EDC and both the French and Americans were quite familiar with one another's views.[4] One or two points, however, had been raised and M. Bidault might like to make some mention of them, such as the British connection with EDC, and he might wish to indicate in what way he felt the others might help. M. Bidault then said that he was not attempting to evade this question but naturally he found himself in a difficult position where he had to undertake M. Laniel's tasks as well as his own and he was merely a shadow. He was a little confused as to the changing of the sequence of the matters on the agenda and he did not think that the first subject had been exhausted but if it was the desire of his colleagues to go ahead, he was prepared to enter upon this grave discussion of this immense and most complex subject and to talk on it today and tomorrow, both morning and night. President Eisenhower said he regretted that he did not realize that M. Bidault might have something further to say on the first question on the agenda. He had asked Mr. Dulles whether he had anything to say and as the Secretary did not wish to speak, he felt this subject had been fully discussed. Secretary Dulles then said that in all fairness, he had indicated at the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers that he might be prepared to speak further on Item 1, with particular reference to the Far East. Having reflected upon the matter, he felt it was difficult to discuss Far Eastern aspects without getting into the 4th point on the agenda, namely, Korea, Indochina and Far Eastern questions. Unless it was desired to telescope the 4th item into the first item, he would prefer to wait until the 4th item came up. M. Bidault then said that if there were no more general discussion, he was prepared to discuss in particular this main fundamental and almost overriding point. President Eisenhower then asked if M. Bidault pre-

[3] For the list of topics for the Bermuda Conference, see the attachment to FM MIN 1, p. 1749.

[4] For a record of the conversation under reference here, see the memorandum of conversation, p. 1769.

ferred to discuss NATO or EDC. M. Bidault said he had been confused by the mixing of the date with the substance of the question. The matter of the date having been moved back the basis of the question came forward. He did not know whether it was right or not not to make a decision on the date. It was an attempt to reconcile Latin logic with Anglo-Saxon logic. President Eisenhower said that if he understood M. Bidault correctly, the latter felt the date of the meeting should be fixed. M. Bidault replied in the affirmative. President Eisenhowever said that the British delegation had wished to have private discussions on this, particularly the Foreign Secretary with his associates and it had been felt that this part of the decision might be left in suspense and that one might proceed from there. M. Bidault agreed that this matter of date might be discussed later. He would like to add that his main difficulty, which he must admit quite frankly, was the non-diplomatic indisposition of Prime Minister Laniel. After all he had to bear the supreme parliamentary responsibility. Mr. Bidault hoped that he would be up the following day but was willing to proceed at that time.

President Eisenhower then inquired whether Mr. Bidault would not prefer to discuss the next item on the agenda, namely, trade with U.S.S.R. He recognized that the discussion of EDC would be a great deal more difficult for M. Bidault as the head of his government was not there. He again inquired if M. Bidault would prefer to discuss trade. M. Bidault expressed his gratitude to the President for his charitable effort to help him and his delegation in their difficulties. He could only accept this generous offer if it were acceptable to the other delegations. President Eisenhower said that he was quite agreeable and it presented no specific difficulty for him. Sir Winston Churchill said that he felt EDC would be a good subject. President Eisenhower then said he understood M. Bidault's difficulties and would not press for discussion of this subject. He did not see any direct connection between trade and EDC and if it were easier for M. Bidault, he would be quite prepared to discuss the trade question first. M. Bidault then smiled and said if all agreed, we could start on the discussion of EDC. The President and Sir Winston signified their agreement.

Sir Winston Churchill said that he felt that the discussion should be simplified by looking at what was wanted, what was the hope of EDC.[5] It was to form a fighting front with an Army. There was nothing to prevent such a front from being formed under a unified command with whatever resources could be gathered at present. Such a front did actually exist at present. When he had been active in starting this idea

[5] For President Eisenhower's account of this part of the meeting, see Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 245–246.

in Europe of an EDC or European army, he had thought of it in terms of a grand alliance with all nations standing in line together under a unified command. All sorts of questions arose in connection with an army of a federation of Europe. Three years had been lost on complicated details and the only thing that had come out of it was the EDC Treaty. He felt that this Treaty was a great improvement of earlier editions. It included the division idea. He had felt that the previous idea of making an army in a few years of people talking different languages, armed with different weapons, was indeed forlorn. Even companies and battalions would have been of different nationalities. There could be no doubt that the division is the minimum that is workable. He would, therefore, refrain from making the criticisms he used to make when he had been independent. Personally, he preferred a national presentation of armies bound by a grand alliance. The present army would be the best that could be obtained with a unified command. We would be prepared to take our part with our troops on line in sections chosen for occupation. Immense sections would be undefended except by flank attacks. We would be prepared to take our part and submit to the Supreme Commander.

Sir Winston Churchill could not see why anything further than that was required nor could he see any reason for further proposals. He would do all he could for the defense of the West. British troops could be ordered to any part of the front. If a war were to break out and one who did not know were looking at the forces of the West in action, he could not tell whether they were operating as EDC or as a grand alliance. The troops could be moved about at will. He felt that an immense amount of mutual energy had been expended in raising new and complicated problems. Three years had been completely wasted in getting what was absolutely necessary, a good strong German army. We ought to have had it three years ago. Under EDC, this could be done with the consent of the German Government with safeguards against nationalistic excesses. It contained great advantages. It should not be let slip away but we might have to return to the plan of a grand alliance under NATO. We must have a German army. There was no use of talking of the defense of Europe against Russia without Germany. It was not possible to allow this immense no man's land of Germany to remain utterly undefended. The Germans wanted to defend it and they ought to have effective means of defense. If this contribution were made within the framework of EDC, it would be the most satisfactory solution in the view of our French friends. We could not go on for three more years without a German army. We must have this German army; even with it the front would still be thinly held. But it would be a deterrent to the Soviets and he would beg his French

friends to do their utmost. He well appreciated the efforts M. Bidault had made to make this possible. But if it were impossible to put EDC into operation in the next few weeks, eight or ten; if not, then he would be bound to say that he would propose to make a new version of NATO achieving the same hope as EDC, with controls over the German army by the NATO organization so as to make it quite clear that this army could not be used against France or to precipitate war to regain the Eastern lost territories, which are far more prominent in the German mind than the old stories of the Alsace-Lorraine which are now in the German mind "vieux jeu" compared to the Eastern and Western Neisse. Therefore, Sir Winston earnestly hoped that his French friends would realize that unless the EDC, that they had shaped so carefully, could come in at once, we ought to establish an arrangement under NATO that would give us at once 12 German divisions, all battle-worthy. Otherwise, we could not undertake this burden as it would present us with an insoluble problem. And we must do this or admit complete failure.

He felt it was very necessary that the Germans should know whether the agreements made with them will be kept. These agreements had been satisfactory to all. He also felt that it was necessary for the Russians to know that these agreements were going to be kept. He had spoken of a "*détente*" on the previous day but not at the expense of jeopardizing our situation. The United Kingdom would stand in line and obey the Supreme Commander. It would contribute to the utmost and do everything it could to make its contribution strong and effective. If there is anyone who cannot now come in to join the line of battle in preparation for these dangers, let him then stay out. Nothing could affect the dominating fact that British and U.S. troops would stand in line with their French comrades and their comrades of the Benelux and that they could be moved as required. To go on waiting would only weaken us from every point of view. It was wrong to think that we could effectively direct the future of Germany with this question unsettled and the Russians closely interested though without wickedness, in preventing the creation of any German military force. Sir Winston hoped it would be clearly understood that if France could not come to a decision, it would not prevent the formation of a German army as soon as possible incorporated into NATO with all the safeguards that could be arranged. He felt that army would fight loyally and effectively in defense of the West. If there were traitors then those who remained would close lines and stand together. Germany would then become a no man's line subject to bombing, atomic and otherwise. It should make no difference of strength to EDC if the British were called partners—with EDC but not in it. The greater part

of British armed forces were there. Some countries had comfortable armed forces at home. The British had not a single brigade in the United Kingdom. They were doing their utmost. He would not be prepared to advise his fellow countrymen to undertake more. He could not go forward with this if it should cause any delay in the formation of a German army. He was sorry to have to speak in this way and he would not do it if he did not feel that it were in the interest of France, as well as the United Kingdom. For 40 years, he had been intimately associated with the valiant efforts of his French comrades to face these perils. He knew well the fearful losses they had sustained in the first World War and their great efforts in the second World War. He understood the brilliant and valiant efforts of the resistance. Here the Prime Minister's voice choked and tears came to his eyes. He well knew the gallant part that M. Bidault and Mr. Laniel had played in this resistance and this had won for them the gratitude of the free world. He must beg his French friends to understand that we must go on with EDC, or in NATO, a German army with a minimum of delay. Much preliminary work had been done and in a few years a substantial German contribution could be available. This would tend to check the Russians as it was the thing they feared most.

President Eisenhower said that in the normal course of events M. Bidault would then have the floor but he would like with their permission to say a few words. He was bold enough to feel that he could approach this matter in some sense as an expert. He had given a particularly intensive period of his life to the study of these problems. There were no easy generalized solutions. There was one important item which he felt had not been mentioned and that was the fact that the Germans, under their present leaders, do not want a German national army. He was certain that Chancellor Adenauer had no intention of setting up a mechanism which might be seized by the Hitler youth or some other similar organization and the German people once again be made the instrument of evil forces as in 1939. He could not agree that all this time had been lost. Much had been done. It is true that we should have started three years ago to set up German forces but there were then more difficulties. Not only was there the logical French fear of a resurgence of German militarism but when two nations had been enemies for centuries, to try and make a central core of a great defense force of them was indeed a difficult problem. There were differences of heart and mind as well as those of a technical nature. Much progress had been made. There was no question that M. Bidault completely understood this matter fully. He agreed with the Prime Minister that it was vital to bring in the Germans but this con-

tribution should not be merely as an army but with heart, will and economic ties as well. To integrate them in a federation from which they could not break loose. They must never be in a position where they could blackmail the other powers and say "meet my terms or else." While the President disagreed with no word that had been said, he felt that to resort to a national army was a second choice so far behind EDC that there could be no comparison. He did not even know if the Germans would agree. The last time he had talked to Chancellor Adenauer, the latter had been unalterably opposed to the idea. EDC must succeed. There could be no second alternative unless one was thinking of a future he could not now foresee. He had not reached these conclusions by standing off and studying the matter in an abstract fashion but rather he had arrived at these conclusions by visiting every capital, talking to statesmen and soldiers, and he found they shared his belief that it could work. If he had not believed this, he would never have assumed the responsibility to command these troops. This we must do. The President then said to M. Bidault that all knew where his heart lay. As he addressed himself to this subject which from the point of view of the United States was always cataclysmic in nature if it were to fail, he asked M. Bidault to tell us what we could do to help, for if it fails the President could not see what direction the U.S. might take. He again asked M. Bidault to see where he felt France's friends could help her.

M. Bidault then said that he would like to start by saying to the great war leader with whom he might not always agree, that no mention of difference could ever alter his conviction that no Frenchman could ever forget the part he had played in restoring freedom, liberating territory, returning France to independence and the world to dignity. He would like to recall to Sir Winston that in an earlier ministry along side General de Gaulle, who was not a man given to fullsome praise, that he had said in the recently liberated capital of France that a thousand years would pass before Frenchmen even began to forget what Sir Winston Churchill had done for them. He would like to pay the same tribute to the Commander in Chief of the armies who had allowed the French to put not only his flag but their flag again at their windows.

M. Bidault felt that frankness could only serve their common purpose. He must confess that he and M. Laniel, after the heavy parliamentary battle they had watched, felt themselves somewhat in the position of the parishioner who was reproached for not going to church. They had done what they could and their efforts were not yet over. He had never hidden at meetings during the previous year the

will of the government on this matter and the need for discernment on the question of time and means. There had been spread in the press an impression that the government's determination had weakened in the face of difficulties. He had been blamed for this and quite unjustly. The battle being waged was a perilous one. When the President of the United States had expressed his opinion and understanding of the difficulties as well as his understanding of the resolution and suffering of the French Government under this grievous burden, this had brought M. Bidault to certain conclusions. He well recalled having been an honorable accomplice at Strasbourg of Sir Winston Churchill when the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe had voted for a European army under an appropriate commissioner. A fellow member of the present French Government, Mr. Reynaud, had even suggested that Sir Winston be that High Commissioner. The latter had told M. Bidault at that time he envisaged this as a federation of armies under a single command. On this, there might be different points of view. The EDC was truly a complex matter but he felt impelled to repeat after the President that both France and the German Democrats, and those who govern them with such admirable continuity and predominence of the civil power, would fear a German general staff with the consequent autonomous wehrmacht which could dictate the law as it had on three previous occasions. M. Bidault said he was not speaking with a gay heart. He had been Minister of Defense. To federate an army, like that of his country almost a thousand years old, was not an easy thing. There had been encounters which were marked on the flags of the two countries for centuries. There was no pleasure in integration. The sacrifice was enormous to prevent a German national army. He asked, therefore, that there be no talk of waste before such a deep and grievous enterprise. He did not plead infallibility nor advance the theory of perfection of French policy but his colleagues must understand the moral psychological and national drama of this problem for the countries situated on the western edge of the Continent. A German national army might or might not remember Alsace-Lorraine but it could not fail to remember that the first King of Prussia had been crowned in Koenigsberg, now known as Kaliningrad. This memory could not be rooted out of the proud past of a people. This was the first difficulty. The other was to explain to patriots, among whom he had heard during the war the voice of Mr. Churchill referring to the "hereditary enemy." Three times in living memory France had been invaded. Three years was perhaps a long time to meditate. It was not long to take such a decision, if in the French Government M. Laniel and M. Bidault himself, who

was perhaps of a more adventurous nature and had taught history, understood the dramatic difficulty of such a decision. They belonged to an honest French national government facing criticism from both flanks. If they set forth these difficulties, it was not as a sign of weakened resolution or to cloud the issues but rather to ask those who did not have to make such a decision to realize the width of the abyss France must leap and leap alone. A German contribution is controlled and limited by the Bonn agreements and supplemented by the Paris agreements.[6] Its one goal is the accepted reconciliation by both countries working together with wisdom and strength to build up a unified European edifice. These were the goals and boldness of enterprise must bear in mind both the element of urgency and the extraordinary novelty of this idea. M. Bidault said he felt impelled to draw the attention of his colleagues to the fact that there was no guarantee against German rearmament in NATO which was on the basis of the general consent of those taking part. Any alternative solution would be extremely difficult to apply if indeed desirable. The very basis of NATO was non-discrimination. There were no limitations on strength, on the financial or economic strength of any country, regardless of the imbalance which might result therefrom.

Thus the French Government and M. Bidault agreed with what the President had said. The solution was not easy nor was it intellectually simple nor politically easy but there was no other solution. The loss of this difficult battle would be a cataclysm in both hemispheres. To win they would need good cards. The President and Prime Minister have told us to do all we could and to do it quickly. This we will do. There is a saying that "impossible" is not a French word. The first phase of the battle has been hard and help is needed for the second phase. The calm courage of M. Laniel helped win the first phase. The second phase could likewise be won. M. Bidault would like on the following day after talking again to M. Laniel and the other members of the delegation to tell his friends that which was needed to win. It was a matter which should be studied with understanding and friendship.

President Eisenhower then said that, if he might have the privilege of the last word, he would like to ask all those present to speak to no one concerning what had happened at the meeting. It was understood that this did not limit the action of the representatives appointed by the Foreign Ministers to prepare a statement to the press.

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[6] For documentation on the signing of the European Defense Community Treaty at Paris, May 27, 1952, see pp. 571 ff.; documentation on the conventions signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952 between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, United Kingdom, and France is presented in volume VII.

It was then agreed that the Foreign Ministers would meet on Sunday at 11 o'clock and the plenary meeting with the Chiefs of Delegation would take place at 5 p. m.

President Eisenhower then adjourned the meeting.

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## EISENHOWER–CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 5, 1953

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM |
|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Prime Minister Churchill |
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden |

**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184**

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET BERMUDA, December 6, 1953.

The primary subject of discussion was the topic raised in the proposed candor speech,[1] the use of the atomic bomb and missiles.

In the main, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden expressed the view that our thinking on the subject was several years ahead of theirs, and that they were ahead of the rest of the world. They felt there was danger of our taking action which would be morally repellant to most of the world. It would be much better if there were an attack in any area which permitted of delay and possible localization if we did not instantly react with atomic weapons but waited for public opinion to develop, which it probably would do very quickly.[2]

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[1] Presumably President Eisenhower is referring to a speech he was scheduled to make before the United Nations General Assembly on Dec. 8; for the text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 813–822 or Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 21, 1953, pp. 847–851.

[2] In a brief note to President Eisenhower, dated Dec. 6, Churchill commented as follows on the speech:

"I think it is a very fine speech and tackles the terrible problems which confront us with your usual courage and candor. I think it will help toward the 'easement' of which I have sometimes spoken and it may well be that the contacts which may develop will be useful. It is a great pronouncement and will resound through the anxious and bewildered world.

"Naturally I do not like what appears on page 11. History will, I am sure, make a different appraisement.

"About page 7. I hope we may have some further talk, for I know you understand the reservations I have to make in the light of our exposed position. Circumstances, proportion and the fate of friends and allies would never, I am sure, be absent from your mind." (Eisenhower Library, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 24) See also John Colville, *Footprints in Time*, London, 1976, pp. 240–241 and *The Churchillians*, London, 1981, pp. 106–107.

## THIRD TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 6, 1953, 11 A. M.

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Mr. Merchant | Sir Frank Roberts | M. de Margerie |
| Mr. MacArthur | Mr. Allen | M. Seydoux |
| Mr. Nash | Mr. Edmondson | M. Laloy |
| Mr. Bowie | | M. Baeyens |
| Mr. Hagerty | | |
| Mr. Jackson | | |
| Mr. Morris | | |
| Mr. Thurston | | |
| Lt. Col. Walters | | |

NATO

Lord Ismay (During part of meeting)

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184

*Morris Minutes* [1]

SECRET BERMUDA, December 6, 1953.

FM MIN 3

*Agenda*

A brief discussion led to agreement, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Eden, that this session's agenda would cover: the reply to the Soviet note; NATO, including participation by Lord Ismay, NATO Secretary General; and the question of "security assurances". The British and French indicated once more they attached considerable importance to the latter.

*Reply to Soviet Note*

The Ministers discussed the draft tripartite reply which had been prepared the afternoon before by a Working Party.[2] A number of changes were suggested and adopted, following some discussion. The most significant, in terms of the positions adopted during the tripartite sessions of the day before (both by the Working Party, Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government [3]), related to the date and place of the proposed conference.

[1] The record for the third Foreign Ministers meeting is divided into two parts in the files of the U.S. Delegation. The source text comprises the first part and covers the agenda and the Soviet note; the telegraphic summary (*infra*) comprises the second part and covers NATO. The U.S. Delegation transmitted to Washington a summary of the first part of this meeting in Secto 15 from Bermuda, Dec. 6. (396.1/12–653)

[2] For a report on this meeting, see p. 1761.

[3] For a record of the Foreign Ministers discussion of the tripartite reply, see FM MIN 2, p. 1763; for a record of the Heads of Government discussion, see Plenary Minutes 2, p. 1774.

With regard to the date, Mr. Eden proposed January 7, in order to "give a few more days for preparation" than the date January 4 would afford. Mr. Dulles commented that he would accept any of the "first days of January", and was only opposed either to leaving the date unspecified or suggesting a date after January 17th. M. Bidault then pointed out that, as he and Mr. Laniel were already "hanging on the razor's edge" for agreeing to a meeting prior to January 17th, from their point of view it would be better the earlier the date chosen. Mr. Eden then agreed to accept January 4th.

In connection with the place of the proposed meeting, the Secretary urged that we settle on Berlin and on the former Allied Control Authority building, and specify these in our note, for such treatment would make it harder for the Soviets to argue about unsettled points and to propose meeting in their sector of Berlin, a possibility which both the Germans and the Allies did not like to envisage. He felt this treatment in our note would also make it more acceptable to Dr. Adenauer. Following some discussion, this was agreed upon.

Mr. Eden then suggested that the text be cabled immediately to Germany, to obtain the concurrence of Dr. Adenauer and Lord Mayor Schreiber of Berlin, so that, if their agreement could be received by tomorrow, we could plan to deliver the note in Moscow on Tuesday, December 8, release it to the press at 1600 GMT with "the usual embargo" until 1:30 a. m. GMT the following morning (thus making the Wednesday morning press). This tentative plan was agreed to, with the idea that the Communiqué of the Bermuda Conference might be issued in time to reach the Tuesday morning press, and the Allied note the press the following morning.

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396.1/12–653

*Telegraphic Summary, by the United States Delegation*[1]

TOP SECRET BERMUDA, December 6, 1953.

Second part Foreign Ministers first meeting[2] December 6 a. m. follows.

Subject: NATO: (first portion this meeting reported in Secto 13 [*15*] dealt with reply to Soviets[3])

[1] The telegraphic summary printed here was transmitted in Secto 16 from Bermuda, Dec. 6 (11 p. m.). It was sent in two sections and repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn. No minutes have been found for this part of the third Foreign Ministers meeting in the Department of State files.

[2] For a record of the second Foreign Ministers meeting on Dec. 6, see the telegraphic summary of the Fourth Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting, p. 1791.

[3] Secto 15 is not printed, but see FM MIN 3, *supra*. For the text of the tripartite reply, see p. 1837; further documentation on the reply to the Soviet note is presented in volume VII.

After Eden welcomed Ismay, latter made clear only here as observer and any opinions he might express completely personal. Ismay said obviously he could not commit any of NATO countries but pointed out these would be very grateful for whatever he could tell them.

Secretary suggested understanding be reached among Foreign Ministers which phases Bermuda deliberations important to other NATO countries which Ismay should report on. Secretary stressed intimate character conference and desire avoid undue publicity and press leaks.

Initiating discussion of NATO topic, Eden stated organization at stage when tactics and objectives had to be viewed on "long haul" basis. First priority is maintenance strength and unity NATO so as to deter Russians over long period tension. Now seems attainment original force targets of less immediate urgency even though these remain optimum military objectives. UK suggests four basic plans:

1. Maintain present forces in being which together with West atomic power should provide effective deterrent against Soviet attack. These forces must be within our economic and financial means.
2. Quality these forces must be improved as rapidly as financially possible.
3. These forces must be supplemented soonest with German contribution.
4. We must maintain our lead in new weapons and research. Above plans should be basis of 1954 Annual Review, purposes of which should be:

*a.* Indicate how we can maintain present forces without economic damage;

*b.* How we can improve quality and balance of these forces so as to increase their deterrent value.

UK seeking reach broad general agreement with US and France at Bermuda to assist in reaching common agreement next NAC.

Bidault first made procedural suggestion that during Council meetings Foreign and Defense Ministers should meet separately in small committees better adapted for frank, confidential and effective preparatory work. Decisions of course would continue to be taken in plenary sessions. Bidault stressed that plenaries now attended by such vast numbers that debates were academic in view reluctance delegates to exchange clear and forthright views before such throng. Not wedded to his suggestion and would welcome any formula which would succeed in removing academic character of plenaries.

Turning to substance, French Foreign Minister said NATO faced with situation in which it cannot develop its strength quantitatively soon even though SG and all military authorities find present levels inadequate. We must, therefore, find ways and means improve our forward strategy as otherwise dangerous morale and political situation

could develop if military posture remains unsatisfactory indefinitely. Bidault recommended following measures:

1. Coordination of NATO and other plans and forces since relationship and solidarity between all theaters obvious. This amply demonstrated by Indochina.
2. Coordination and standardization equipment should be developed as constantly urged by French delegation. Must eliminate costly overlapping and duplication.
3. France has certain suggestions for increasing efficacy of military forces and, perhaps, for modifying their structure. Not appropriate, however, for discussion Bermuda. However, while quantitative improvement forces as defined by NATO not now possible, greater attention should be given to reserve formations which could eventually supplement first line units. NATO should think more of possible eventual period after D plus 30.
4. NATO strategy must take into account use new weapons. Plenary decisions now made in total ignorance character, availability and quantities of new weapons. This constitutes great strategic disadvantage and unnecessary handicap for West planning.

Bidault concluded NATO must maintain forward impulse in development its strength even though effort in terms dollars or manpower cannot be increased now.

Secretary accepted long haul concept for US which agreed with analysis heads of Government at Bermuda.

While all long for basic change in Soviet intentions this is only a hope, not an expectation. It would be fatal to let our guard down, as Churchill said. NATO got under way in emergency crisis atmosphere. Now we must determine a pace which can be sustained over considerable period of time.

Secretary warned, however, long haul must not mean static or "plateau" concept; instead we should constantly review and allow for variations of potentialities member countries.

Re mention by Eden and Bidault concerning development NATO strategy on basis of deterrent power atomic weapons in background, Secretary recognized strategic air and air base complex constituted essential element of global strategy of which NATO is part. However, we must recognize day when strategic air and atom bomb were virtually sufficient deterrents in themselves is perhaps disappearing. Indeed, our intelligence concerning Soviets indicates that while US has considerable advance, Soviets also progressing. US Government now thinks new concept may have to be considered according to which atomic and new weapons would be "meshed in" with conventional armaments. US anxious NATO forces not be obliged fight with obsolete equipment. President now hopes Congress will liberalize very stringent laws now in effect concerning atomic energy information and he expects ask Congress modify this legislation so as to permit fuller exchanges intelligence re new weapons with our allies.

Secretary concurred with Eden's mention essential need for German contribution for implementing NATO forward strategy. Likewise, he fully agreed with Eden's view concerning importance maintaining scientific lead over Soviets; also agreed importance avoiding duplication efforts.

Re Bidault's procedural suggestion, US sympathizes with his view. Secretary intends suggest next NAC that twice a year Foreign Ministers meet among themselves immediately prior to plenary sessions. In addition to valuable exchange views concerning degree Soviet threat and other factors, Foreign Ministers could develop guidance on a six-to-six-months basis. This guidance would deal with political prospects, increase or decrease tension, etc. Secretary thought this would also be useful in order increase nonmilitary character NATO. While he did not suggest any further complication in already complicated international organizations, he thought we should try to put more political flesh on NATO bones, and he pointed to fact world history complete with collapse of military organizations.

In concluding, Secretary stressed whatever he had said in course NATO discussion was predicated on assumption EDC comes into being and warned that effect Richards amendment would be felt beginning January 1954.

Foreign Ministers will meet again at 4 this afternoon.

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## FOURTH TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 6, 1953

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Bidault |

NATO
Lord Ismay

396.1/12–753

*Telegraphic Summary, by the United States Delegation*[1]

TOP SECRET BERMUDA, December 7, 1953.

Foreign Ministers second meeting December 6 p. m. follows.[2]

Subject: NATO

Ismay stated report to Ministers re NATO progress just completed

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[1] The telegraphic summary printed here was transmitted in Secto 17 from Bermuda, Dec. 7 (1 a. m.). It was sent in two sections and repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn. No other record of the fourth Foreign Ministers meeting has been found in the Department of State files.

[2] For a report on the first Foreign Ministers meeting on Dec. 6, see FM MIN 3, p. 1787 and the telegraphic summary, p. 1788.

before his departure.[3] This report does not touch upon "new look" or "long haul" concept re defense build-up. He believes time ripe for such work in NATO as we should know "what we want and how to obtain it." His mention this subject not caused by pessimism over defense build-up. On contrary, this not unsatisfactory. Annual Review will show 39 M Day divisions and 35 brigade groups and 83 M plus 30 divisions and 42 brigade groups. Of course, all these units not up to SACEUR standards; however, even though they may not constitute deterrent to Soviets they certainly are "discouragement." Re air strength, annual review will show 5,112 planes on M Day of which 4,090 under SACEUR. Furthermore, recent NATO international maneuvers revealed great progress in standardization in training and procedures. Equipment and armament has [*have*] been improved and there is well integrated command structure. As result, NATO forces now have real cohesion. Finally, infrastructure at last going well: 120 airfields this year compared to 60 last year.

Nevertheless, we must face certain facts:

1. Military budgets are leveling off after three years steady increase and could conceivably show slight reduction at later stage.
2. Forces in being are definitely less than military requirements. Ismay "absolutely certain," however, that these military requirements levels cannot be attained on basis present peace-time economies.

While essential take new look at NATO defense build-up, selection individuals to perform this exacting task also important. Existing NATO bodies cannot do it. Present NATO personnel cannot do it alone unless divorced from all other duties for at least three months. While Ismay has no definite plan, he suggested following general ideas: work should be under authority Secretary General. Most important very good man be chosen head up group which should be small as possible. Group should include representatives from non-Standing Group countries. Finally, Ismay said important Ministers also decide terms reference and suggested following general points for inclusion:

*a.* NATO build-up should be placed on "long pull" basis which apparently agreed by three Foreign Ministers.
*b.* There should be no change in present strategic concept of forward strategy (i.e., defense as far east as possible). Any change therein would have extremely grave political effects in Europe.
*c.* Terms reference should provide definite assumptions re new weapons.
*d.* Terms reference should include agreed orders of magnitude of future military expenditures.

Ismay expressed hope that if above agreed Bermuda one of Ministers

[3] Presumably Ismay is referring to C–M(53)162, "Report by the Secretary General of Progress during the Period 17th April 1953 to 3rd December 1953", dated Dec. 7, which was prepared for the North Atlantic Council meeting scheduled for mid-December in Paris. Documentation on the meeting is presented on pp. 454 ff. A copy of C–M (53) 162 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 170.

present there would raise it at forthcoming NAC and suggested appropriate opportunity would be in connection Annual Review.[4]

Bidault, in name French Government, agreed Ismay statement. He had several refinements to suggest which he trusted would be acceptable:

*a.* Heartily endorsed suggestion work should proceed under supervision Secretary General as "Wise Men of TCC had left not always best of memories behind them".[5] In particular, Bidault criticized their lack of drive and initiative. (Bidault carefully stated his remark only against collective work of Wise Men and against no individual.)

*b.* Existing organizations such as Standing Group on military side, and permanent representatives on civilian side, should be called upon to participate in new look, however and whenever they can assist.

*c.* Selection of members of group should be agreed by the US, UK and French Governments.

Eden expressed UK's entire agreement with Ismay proposals and expressed hope for real progress at next NAC. Eden then asked Ismay about status Bidault suggestion divert part of NAC work from plenaries to separate groups Defense and Foreign Ministers. Ismay answered question put to permanent representatives and, that while no decision reached, he believed most agree.

Secretary then raised question guidance Ismay re latter's report permanent council. After some discussion, following was agreed: Ismay would discreetly expand on communiqué exercising particular discretion concerning topics which would be more profitably developed by three Ministers themselves at NAC. In addition thereto, Ismay should report fully his presentation to three Foreign Ministers. Secretary cautioned Ismay particularly against repeating anything he had said re US NATO plans and atomic matters which he wishes present himself to NAC. Finally, at Bidault's suggestion, it was agreed that care would be exercised in communiqué to avoid giving impression Big Three had sought prepare forthcoming Council meeting in advance. Ismay thereupon left room.

Balance meeting devoted discussion organization and agenda subsequent meetings Foreign Ministers and heads delegations. Only two noteworthy aspects:

*a.* Bidault's dissatisfaction with manner in which separation items between Foreign Ministers and heads governments for primary consideration appeared to have resulted in "two simultaneous conferences"; and

*b.* Bidault expressed concern that matter of security assurances be treated "with seriousness which subject deserves".

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[4] In Secto 19, Dec. 7, not printed, Merchant urged that the Department of State should immediately give thought to this proposal by Ismay. (396.1/12–753)

[5] Documentation on the origin of the Temporary Council Committee (TCC) is presented in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.; for documentation on the report of the TCC Wisemen to NATO, see pp. 203 ff.

## THIRD PLENARY TRIPARTITE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 6, 1953, 5 P. M.

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Prime Minister Churchill | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | M. Bougenot |
| Mr. MacArthur | Sir Norman Brook | M. Parodi |
| Mr. Merchant | Sir Pierson Dixon | M. de Margerie |
| Mr. Nash | Sir Frank Roberts | M. Baeyens |
| Mr. C. D. Jackson | Mr. Allen | M. Vimont |
| Mr. Hagerty | Mr. Shuckburgh | M. Seydoux |
| Mr. Bowie | Mr. Edmondson | M. Laloy |
| Mr. Thurston | | M. Andronikov |
| Lt. Col. Walters | | |

**Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184**

*United States Delegation Minutes* [1]

SECRET BERMUDA, December 6, 1953.

Plenary Minutes 3

President Eisenhower opened the meeting by expressing his gratification at the good news concerning the improvement in M. Laniel's condition. Prime Minister Churchill associated himself with this expression of the President. M. Bidault expressed his thanks in the name of the French Delegation.

The President then said that the meeting on the previous day had concluded after M. Bidault had made a presentation on the EDC. He had indicated at that time that he wished to talk further with Prime Minister Laniel and that today he would have additional comments on this subject. The President said that before asking M. Bidault to make this additional statement, there were a few small items of business that might be disposed of quickly prior to hearing M. Bidault. As he understood it, the first item, the note to the Soviets, had been prepared and as far as he knew, no particular action was required by the plenary but he just wanted to make sure of this. The note had been forwarded to Bonn and if the German Chancellor had any comments, they could be taken up by the three Foreign Ministers. The President then said he understood the Foreign Ministers had met and he would ask Mr. Eden if he felt there was anything that should be brought to the attention of the Chiefs of Delegation.

Mr. Eden indicated that the action on the note had been completed.

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[1] The U.S. Delegation transmitted to Washington a summary of this meeting in Secto 18 from Bermuda, Dec. 7. This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn. For President Eisenhower's account of the meeting, see Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 244–245.

It had been forwarded to the Chancellor and they should receive his comments that night or the following day. At a second meeting, the question of future NATO planning had been discussed and there had been general approval for the "long haul concept" whereby all that could be expected in the next few years was the present level of forces plus the German contribution. There had been general agreement on the necessity for maintaining the forward strategy principle. Lord Ismay had made a report on the work of NATO. He had suggested that a review of the position be made and there had been agreement to undertake this. Lord Ismay considered that this was a work which would require three months to perform. Plans could be laid at Paris.[2]

The President then said that unless there were other items for discussion, he would suggest that M. Bidault might proceed.*

M. Bidault then said that the President had been kind enough the previous day to ask the French Government what its friends and allies could do to help it to succeed in this common objective of setting up EDC. He would like to talk on the subject with the conviction that it would be understood that there was no degree of lessening effort on the part of the French. The needs of which he would speak were neither original or new. Recent experience in the bitter parliamentary struggle which had just taken place indicated that it was indispensible that these needs be met. The request he was about to make to the U.K. and U.S. were, as he had said, by no means new. He had said that they were indispensable and he would like to explain why. Some progress in this field might put the French in a position where they could satisfy all impatience on this subject, including that of the U.S. and U.K. It seemed to M. Bidault that all should be able to understand the apprehension of a people who were called upon to integrate militarily, committing themselves for generations in the future unless they had the reassurance and confidence of having on the Continent U.S. and British troops standing with them and other Western Europeans and sharing in the defense of the Continent. This was not a case of a nervous public opinion though there might well be nervousness for a matter less important than this. This was a fundamental factor in the view of the fact that they were committing themselves for 50 years and felt they had the right to be encouraged to undertake this great commitment by positive assurances which they needed. Whether authorized or not, some indications which they had had proved deceptive. At the Strasbourg Consultative Assembly, some conclusions had been

[2] For records of the Foreign Ministers discussions with Lord Ismay, see FM MIN 3, p. 1787, and the telegraphic summary by the U.S. Delegation, p. 1788.

*An informal translation of the brief from which M. Bidault spoke is attached as Tab A. [Footnote in the source text. The five-page translation of Bidault's speech, attached to the source text as Tab A, is not printed.]

adopted which had not been confirmed by subsequent realities. These had been seized upon by some sectors of French opinion to prove how real was the lack of security. Here and there, without mentioning any names, some prominent people had suggested that the implementation of the EDC might permit the withdrawal by non-participating countries of some of the troops which they had stationed abroad. Even though there had been no confirmation for this, it had created some discouragement in French opinion and might prejudice the feeling of security. In order to quash rumors so that none could question this must be viewed with the utmost seriousness and balance.

M. Bidault then said he would undertake an exposé that would not be new for any of those who had heard him. He indicated that the French had recognized the principle of a forward strategy that is defending Western Europe as far to the East as possible. This was a requirement for the common security of all of the Atlantic nations. In this frame had been set the whole problem of a German contribution and the EDC. This brought the French Foreign Minister to two sets of considerations. The first of these was the question of the Saar.[3] A German contribution should favor and not hinder a French reconciliation. It was desired by all sincere forward-looking people despite the difficult circumstances of the past. A reasonable progressive and resolute effort toward the unification of Europe could not be carried through to a conclusion if the Saar question were not settled. Answering his own question, M. Bidault said that integration was not the same as an alliance. Intermingling troops who had fought one another for 150 years was a difficult task even though they might perhaps be facing an imminent common danger. M. Bidault said that he would talk later on the subject of the German Treaty and expressed the opinion that it was indeed difficult to integrate with a country whose Eastern frontiers were not fixed. He himself had not been present when certain Soviet measures were taken which some regarded as final and others as temporary. Integration with a country whose Eastern frontiers were unknown required courage but they were resolutely prepared to face this. If, however, the Western borders were unknown and between the two countries involved there lay a little territory which had nevertheless four times the population of Trieste, he could not foresee which way the balance would go. If this were allowed to become a sort of no man's land, it could again become the scene of the age old clash between Teuton and Gaul and the enterprise would then indeed be too great for the means at hand. Only at the 14th conference had the problem of the Saar been finally settled in favor of France. M. Bidault paid tribute to the support he had received first from

[3] Documentation on the status of the Saar is included in volume VII.

Mr. Byrnes and then from General Marshall. Mr. Bevin had been second to none in his generosity in this matter. Time had passed and the territorial break with the Reich had been made and real local autonomy had been granted. The Saar was in economic union with France and there was no ambiguity on this score. The French Government agreed, however, that the Saar should be a link and not an apple of discord. If free elections had been held and the press of the world had been able to judge how free these were, the Saar Government had received a majority which M. Bidault felt compelled to envy. Following this Chancellor Adenauer had written a letter of sharp criticism. This had been done during a period before the German elections and though the letter had been received two months before the German elections, M. Bidault had waited until after these elections had assured Chancellor Adenauer of a substantial majority, before replying. This was a clear indication that the French had never sought to use the Saar problem to drag their feet or hinder progress but rather saw it as an obstacle which must be overcome. Some reproaches had been directed at agreements concluded between the French and the Saar,[4] these agreements being in full accord with the powers which the allies had conferred upon France.

These Franco-Saar conventions should encourage hope rather than criticism. They had involved abandonment of powers of a political nature and the return to the Saar of a political autonomy as complete as possible. The Saar later regained control of their mines which had first been managed by the French as reparations—incidentally the only one the French had received worth mentioning. Thus the Saar had been given as much liberty as possible under the precarious statute of the territory and had been treated generously by the French. M. Bidault said that he regretted to say that he understood the very great difficulties of the German Chancellor and did not want to press this matter unduly. He did not feel that his colleagues would expect him to go into the full details of the recent confidential talks he had had with the Germans. But the general impression which he had derived unless it were changed for the better by subsequent events was as follows: They felt there was no urgence to conclude this matter. If in the economic field some progress was possible and considered by the Chancellor, this was so general in nature as to allow him great latitude of interpretation and was so vague as to make it dubious that there was any really new step forward taken.

There had recently cropped up in talks with M. Francois Poncet and in the last one that he himself had had a new idea which had never

[4] For documentation on the Franco-Saar Agreements, concluded at Paris, Mar. 3, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 927 ff.

been mentioned before, namely, that there be a modification in the territory of the Saar and its economy. France was being asked to provide a dowry for unified Europe. That dowry was the Saar. M. Bidault indicated clearly that the French were being asked to contribute French territory to this dowry. How could it be explained to French public opinion that this question of the Saar had been transformed into an even vaster problem. The solution of the Saar problem was its Europeanization. The economy of the Saar was incorporated in that of France. As the unification of Europe proceeded, the bonds with France would slacken.

From the first day the French had put their cards on the table. Throughout this interminable negotiation his predecessor, Mr. Schuman, and he himself had indicated clearly all that they were able to give. He knew that Chancellor Adenauer likewise had difficulties but he wished to draw attention to the very important symbolic value of a fundamentally satisfactory solution of the Saar problem.

He would like to repeat in finishing that the question of integration with a neighboring country may be bold when you do not know where it finishes but requires extraordinary courage when you do not even know where it begins.

M. Bidault then said he would go on to the question of the overall substance for which the French Government was asking. When the plan of a German contribution to the Defense of Europe had been accepted, it was with the understanding that this contribution would be a first step towards a forward strategy which would make possible a defense as far to the East as possible. The rearmament of Germany would in no sense have been accepted unless it assured the defense of Europe, including Germany. It implied support of the Atlantic alliance in all ways. M. Bidault said that he would like to refer to a conference of Foreign Ministers in Washington in 1951 and quoted briefly from decisions reached there. "A governing principle of policy was the inclusion of France in an Atlantic Community in constant development." [5] To our eyes and to those of any careful reader, it was clear that a parallelism was maintained between EDC and the Atlantic Community. This was the reason why the French Delegation today felt compelled to make certain remarks on the need to continue progress in the Atlantic alliance in quality and depth even if it was not possible to do so in quantity at the present time. There was need for better coordination and closer unity. All three countries represented there had responsibilities and roles that were not limited to a single conti-

[5] Documentation on the tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting at Washington, Sept. 10–14, 1951 is presented in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1163 ff.

nent. Alone of these three, France was asked in the interest of a common strategy to make sacrifice of sovereignty. Alone among the three, she was also invested with direct responsibility in the noble edifice of a European Community. M. Bidault said that he had never felt that Europe should be limited to six powers even though these might be the boldest. He had often said that it should be 14 instead of 6. The Europe that was being made was based on the will of the participants for lack of being able to be based on the limits of freedom, much less the limits of geography. We should take special care not to create a vacuum of difficulties because of insufficient coordination between the Atlantic organization and the European organization. The European organization is within the Atlantic organization and has the purpose of serving it. There were grave perils in poor coordination which might lead to serious difficulties. His country would not wish to run this risk.

He would like to express the idea that while France wishes to build Europe, it does not wish to be engulfed by it and thereby lose its individual personality so that the Continental character of France would no longer be considered except through the European Community, of which France would be a part but not necessarily a spokesman. The position of France on the Standing Group could not be questioned. The creation of the European Defense Community could not separate France and the other territories and countries who were marching with her along the road to progress from the association of the Big Three. This was a first point. M. Bidault said that he could not imagine for a second that because France had entered a European Community it would be a European who would sit in the place he had the honor to occupy. This possibility must be definitely excluded. This was a first danger but there was yet another. If the European Community were set up, the unintegrated powers (U.S.–U.K.) might consider that the problem had been satisfactorily solved and seek to pass to the new community certain political and military responsibilities. However bold one may be one must realize that the consolidation of something like the EDC would require time. Rome had not been built in a day nor had any of our countries. It would take time before integration had captured the heart and soul of its participants.

M. Bidault said that to sum up a real harmonization was necessary between the two organizations, Atlantic and European, that would reinforce the discipline of NATO. France, in this connection, would make certain proposals at the next NATO meeting and would hope that that would not be ill received. It was also necessary to establish on the European continent a certain balance between EDC with German contingents (about which there was still some uneasiness) and the unintegrated Atlantic forces which would guarantee the security of the Continent and the security of the world. M. Bidault said that he had been compelled for serious, even dramatic, reasons to make these

comments. There was an overriding problem which contained the key of all solutions and that was the problem of the U.S. and U.K. forces stationed on the European continent. The idea of German rearmament had been acceptable to his people and to others only as a military complement which was indispensable and controlled for the defense of the Continent. It should not have a replacement value. Nothing could be worse than the idea held in some ill-intentioned quarters that the counterweight of the U.S. and U.K. could be lacking and that the rearmament of Germany, instead of adding new divisions, would merely replace the troops of old allies by those of an old enemy, with whom the French wish to be friends but realize this could not be done in a day. Thus, it appeared indispensible that the strength of U.S. and U.K. forces stationed in Europe should represent a definite proportion of total forces and have a definite proportion relationship to the German forces of the couverture.

M. Bidault said that "with you, yes, without you, no" (he later corrected this to read without you it would be difficult). As things stood, the U.S. and U.K. Governments were free at every annual review to bring up the question of the strength that they maintained on the European continent. That is in fact one of the difficulties. The French Government well understands the reluctance of the other governments here represented to take final commitments to maintain certain precise forces on the Continent. He felt there was some misunderstanding. He was not asking for an indefinite or indeterminate commitment for an intangible period. The strength of these U.S. and U.K. forces might be varied in the light of a number of factors. He could see three cases. One a grave emergency occurring outside the European Continent and affecting one of the countries represented at the table at which he was sitting. He emphasized a grave emergency outside Europe. This would not only allow for withdrawal but also would make it possible to seek compensation from other forces which could only be U.S. or U.K. and would later lead to a restoration of those forces. The second case would be if new weapons made possible changes in the overall problem and the third case, if God were willing, a clear definite improvement in the international situation. EDC represented to the French Government an immense change in the course of history which affected France alone of the three nations and should give her the right to be consulted prior to any substantial change in the forces of her great allies stationed on the European continent. Such change might well be the subject of an agreement between the three powers there represented. M. Bidault said that at the risk of being repetitious, he would like to reiterate that this step was a revolution in the history of his nation which he had taught for 15 years. He was entirely ready to accept this extension of history but he felt that the immense resolution required to take this step gave them the right to

ask for that which they had required and which would be particularly necessary for Europe during the first period of the new community. Only thus would it be possible to assure confidence for the present and the future. He would further ask and he did not believe that this would be too difficult that the three main Atlantic powers declare that they had no intention of withdrawing from NATO after 20 years as is now possible, for the French would be tied for 50 years. There were still men who were not thinking of tomorrow alone but of the next half century to come. He felt that this was a reasonable request because the French, if not caught, would at least be frozen in Europe which might not take the shape which had been hoped for, and while this was taking place the two great powers, with whom France had been historically associated, might have grown distant. M. Bidault said that in so far as the precise points of assistance in this field would be required, this matter could be taken up by the experts who would apply to it their well-nigh inexhaustible patience.

As far as the U.K. was concerned, M. Bidault expressed his satisfaction with the Convention of association [6] as prepared up to now but he felt that it was a framework which would have to be completed by commitments on the equilibrium of forces and the permanence of the forward strategy. He likewise felt that the military protocol [7] now before the Interim Committee could stand improvement but he would not go into such details at this point. He said that if the others would put themselves in the place of France, they would realize that this was [illegible] the result of an analysis of the situation. He apologized for taking so much of his colleagues time but said that the gravity and urgency of the problem made it necessary. M. Bidault said that there were two perfect answers to this question. One would be a total Atlantic community but he realized this was not feasible for a long time. Another would be full participation by the U.K. but he understood that this could not be hoped for. Therefore, he was obliged to seek some replacement for which he needed their help. France was being asked to furnish the keystone of a vast structure of military defense that required overriding an historic national tradition. The inclusion in this of German divisions was in itself an explosive factor because of the partition of that country. He believed it would only be possible to enter EDC with the knowledge that the British and Americans would stand as comrades along side of them. If this were not possible, the French people might draw back from the abyss, which was wide indeed, rather than listen to the voice which M. Bidault and his colleagues had been sounding to the French people in the past and

[6] Presumably Bidault is referring to the treaty between the United Kingdom and the European Defense Community, signed at Paris, May 27, 1952. For documentation relating to the treaty, see pp. 571 ff.

[7] For documentation on the proposed French protocols to the EDC Treaty, see pp. 688 ff.

would continue to do so, the voice of courage and solidarity. He feared that if this were not heard, his fellow-countrymen would harken to the memory of past sufferings and the bitterness of abandonment rather than heed this voice of courage and solidarity.

The President said he would like to make a brief statement and then he would ask the Secretary of State to explain our reactions. Secretary Dulles said that he felt that a presentation as full and careful as that which M. Bidault had made deserved a great deal more consideration than it could possibly receive around that table. He knew he was speaking for the President in saying that M. Bidault's exposé would receive this consideration. He felt sure that all those present were agreed on two things. First, that the U.S. would be the last to want to see a federation of Continental Europe if it meant the disappearance of France as a great power, not only in the material sense but because of the contributions of the spirit, intellect and vigor which had enriched the whole world and his own country ever since that nation's birth. None in France need fear that France would disappear, for she was far too precious. Secondly, the remarks of M. Bidault emphasized the grave decision which confronts the continental nations. Their gravity was fully appreciated by our own opinion. They were not steps which would lead to a disassociation of the U.S. from Europe but rather insure the continuity of this association. It would be regrettable indeed if he had to feel that the future of Europe would only be a more violent repetition of the past. A prudent man would wish to disassociate himself from such an unhappy future. Because we believed that those steps being envisaged by France and the establishment of the EDC would end this past history and permit a continuing association of the U.S. with France and other countries of Western Europe from which our own people had drawn their origin, because of this we want to see the kind of Europe with which we can associate ourselves without mortal danger to ourselves. This is the reason for our eagerness to see this step taken. The Secretary said he had no doubt that it would be made apparent to the French Government and people that their hopes and ours lay in the same direction.

Sir Winston Churchill then said that he had thought they were really going to talk about the EDC with the thought of the salvation of the French. He did not feel we should be mixed up with a few fields in the Saar valley. We should maintain a sense of proportion. Yesterday the President in the course of the discussion on this subject had used most serious language which we should bear in mind. EDC had been a French proposal and her allies and friends had been doing all they could to help her out. This project had delayed for more than three years the formation of a German army, without which there could be no safety for anyone in Europe. A critical point had been

reached where EDC would either be ratified by France or not. He hoped that the French would consider what the consequences might be before they made a final decision. He had hoped that if the French were unwilling or unable because of parliamentary difficulties to ratify EDC, Germany would be brought in by a rearrangement or broadening of the NATO organization. He was not at all sure from what he had heard the President say that this might appear to be a good plan to the United States. It might be that EDC would be cast aside improvidently at this vital and perilous moment and that the NATO organization might not be reorganized in order to achieve the purpose of EDC. He hoped that before the French Parliament would take a final decision they would see the dark possibilities ahead if the U.S. would withdraw from its policy of direct aid and giving to Europe. It was certain that British troops could not stay any longer than the Americans (as long, no longer). If U.S. troops were withdrawn from France, it would expose Britain to mortal danger. No other country was doing in peace time what they were. They had two year military service and not a single brigade in the U.K. With the development of aircraft in a few months, they might be faced with a heavy paratroop attack in the U.K. If the U.S. were unable to continue their effort, if the EDC were rejected, the British would then have to do their utmost to fight to the death in their own island and this they would not hesitate to do to the best of their ability.

He begged and implored his French friends not to let a few fields in the Saar valley come between the life and death of the flaming spirit of France and the break up of the great structure on which so many hopes had been founded.

For his own part he was unable to propose any additional assistance which Britain might render. If necessary, Mr. Eden could explain how great were the measures that they had taken and how close would be our association with EDC if it went through. If EDC were rejected and NATO put aside as not being feasible, something in the nature of peripheral defense might replace what had been worked out. This would indeed be a frightful disaster for Europe could be quickly undermined and suborned by the Russian Communist advance and then, if a general war followed, it was very likely that they would never succeed in reviving the civilization and culture of Western Europe and of France. Sir Winston could not understand how anything could arise when this matter had been brought so far and had indeed been invented by the French themselves. He hoped and trusted that the French nation in Parliament would face facts before making their decision. For his part, he would feel compelled to put these facts before the world before catastrophe occurred. This would indeed be a

most terrible situation, worse than any he had seen ten years before if EDC were indeed to be cast aside and if it could not be replaced by some modified form of NATO, that would solve the problem. He felt it necessary that these terrible facts be faced rather than linger upon the Saar valley. He stressed the importance of preventing another World War, the preliminary of which would probably extinguish the culture, civilization and freedom of Western Europe. He could not understand how the seriousness of this was not realized. Sir Winston said he knew that M. Bidault had done everything that he could and it was not to convince him that he spoke. He knew that M. Bidault was prepared to risk not only his career but his life in order that this might turn out in the right way. He urged that the awful peril be not underrated. He pointed out that Germany would be totally disarmed at the mercy of Russia at any moment and that the British themselves might expect to be shattered but thank God they still had the channel which had stood them in such good stead. M. Bidault interrupted to say that France did not. All the more reason, said the Prime Minister, why France should support EDC which might well become for France what the channel was for the U.K. He knew that there was no fault on M. Bidault's part but if the French Parliament rejected EDC, he would view the future more somberly than at any time in World War II. He earnestly hoped this would not happen. EDC should be first and last but if that failed, he would beg the President and his associates to consider some way of achieving the same result through changes in NATO. If this fails the British would stay only so long as the United States.

President Eisenhower then said he had a few remarks to make and then would propose a schedule for the following day. In the first place, this was not intended to be a debate about EDC. It was assumed that all those present believed implicitly in it and supported it with their full heart and soul. M. Bidault had made his presentation in reply to an invitation from the President to speak on French problems directly relating to EDC and such other ones as were related to it. What he had said would help us to consider the problem from the U.S. point of view. He felt bound to say that he agreed with the Prime Minister on the seriousness of the consequences of rejection in the United States. He would like to recall at this table that he had been sent to Europe in December, 1950, when work on the EDC had begun. The concept had been given to him by the Standing Group of the NATO organization and on his own responsibility he had asked for U.S. troops to be sent over to instill confidence and help get the matter under way. He trusted that no one believed that the U.S. was a fair

weather friend that would run out when difficulties began. He knew that a thing like this took time but he could not but agree with Sir Winston as to the consequences of failure. The President did not see that we would refuse to consider any other solution but as he had said the previous day, he felt that an alternative based on a German national army came so far behind the EDC conception that it was not worthy of serious consideration. During his own recent experience in Europe, he had found both French and Germans opposed to the solution. They were the heart and core of European defense and if they were opposed, he did not see how it could be brought about.

The President said that he himself harbored no pessimism. A man who had been a soldier for a long time must necessarily be an optimist. He felt that this must be done and that the whole atmosphere must clear up. Strength would flow with no danger to France or Western Europe and guarantees would be given by honest governments and by allies on the ground. He would not talk of pessimism. He was certain France could do this. All other questions would be studied and he would like to renew the assurances that the Secretary of State had given that they would be commented upon. He emphasized that none must think that there could be a failure of EDC.

The President then said that there were quite a number of subjects to be taken up the following day. Trade with Russia was quite a technical problem and he would suggest that it be handled by the Foreign Ministers and Secretary of State. In as much as the Far East and Middle East remained to be discussed, he felt the Big Three might meet from 11 to 12:30, the Foreign Ministers at 3 and then another plenary meeting at 5 for the Communiqué, and thus the final part of the Conference could be ended unless someone had anything else he wished to bring up at 5 o'clock. It was probable that this time table would not permit as exhaustive a study of all subjects as might be desirable. Mr. Churchill then said he entirely accepted the President's wishes about the meeting and that on the following morning they could discuss Korea, China, Indochina and the problems of the other side of the world. Then the Communiqué could be taken up in the afternoon. The President then mentioned that for the evening communiqué of the day, it might be announced that he had accepted the invitation to address the U.N. on the 8th. M. Bidault then said that he had one or two difficulties. He thanked the other members for the attention they had given his long EDC exposé. He was not sure that this subject had been exhausted and might not be taken up again. The second difficulty was purely procedural. He and his colleagues constantly referred to European security assurances in their notes to the

Soviets but never talked about them themselves. President Eisenhower then said that these subjects could easily be continued at the NATO meetings and M. Bidault replied that if it was difficult to discuss them among three partners, it was infinitely more so to discuss them among 14. But he did not wish to discuss this matter further. He only trusted that, even if his arguments were dismissed, his conclusions be studied. Mr. Churchill then said that the Locarno security idea might be discussed if our friends would agree and he would also ask the President and Mr. Dulles if the Egyptian matter might be discussed separately. Herein the interests of the U.K. were entirely in accord with those of France. In comparison with the terrible matters they had been discussing, this might seem like a small matter but they had 80 thousand men in this area who might come into action next week or soon thereafter if attacked. He was not asking for physical help in favoring a solution but he felt it would be helpful if the Middle East thought that the U.S. and U.K. were thinking in the same way, seeking no advantage of imperial power but finding a way to discharge their duty to NATO and to the civilization of the world. Mr. Churchill then mentioned the question of trade with Russia. Mr. Eden then said that the only reason why the Prime Minister raised this topic was that it concerned the Minister of Trade almost more than the Foreign Minister and that it might be discussed at the NATO Conference in as much as their own agenda was so crowded at both meetings. M. Bidault said he had no objection to what the Foreign Secretary had proposed. He was not clear about Egypt but felt that the Prime Minister was asking for conversations with the President and these would be so interesting that even a Frenchman might like to listen in silence. M. Bidault said that one thing that bothered him was that there were so many things on the agenda for the following day that he feared many things would be passed over quickly. Only one subject, EDC, had been discussed fully. He would hope they would be able to fill out the communiqué on subjects of the long agenda, of which he had not been the author.

The President then said that he had not brought up the subject of Egypt but had acquiesced in its conclusion. He felt the Prime Minister was trying to save time. He himself would be willing to have a night meeting on the following day but he was bound by his commitment to the United Nations on the 8th. The President then concluded by suggesting that in as much as there were many subjects to be discussed, that a plenary meeting be held the following day at 10:30 instead of 11 and that they then discuss the Far East, Middle East and the security assurances. The Foreign Ministers could meet at 3 and another plenary could take place at 5.

The President then adjourned the meeting.

## DULLES-EDEN MEETINGS, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 6 AND 7, 1953

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM |
|---|---|
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden |

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184

*Memorandum of Conversations, by Henry A. Byroade*

SECRET [BERMUDA, undated.]

The Secretary informed me that he had discussed certain matters in connection with Middle East with Eden informally on the mornings of December 6 and 7. These were as follows:

*Egypt* [1]

Eden apparently informed the Secretary that they could not, politically, make any further concessions with the Egyptians. He stated that they had assumed which ever side won out on the Sudanese elections would be the side that should make future concessions. As the elections had gone against the British, Parliamentary opposition in London had increased. The Zionists had largely captured the Labor Party, and there was a revolt in the Conservative Party. He felt that there might be some compromise on the wording of availability formula so long as it kept the UN principle; but did not think they could give way at all on the subject of uniforms.[2]

The Secretary informed Eden that we could not wait much longer in extending economic aid to Egypt. He used the date of January 1 to be the deadline upon which we would have to act. Eden seemed to accept this as inevitable, but hoped some concessions might be made by the Egyptians which would allow agreement to come by the time they knew we would extend assistance. The Secretary agreed we would make a "push" for this.

In a subsequent conversation Eden asked the Secretary why we could not extend more aid to Iran instead of to Egypt.[3] The Secretary replied that this would not help us in trying to balance our position between the Arab States and Israel, and would not meet the requirements of Egypt which was a completely different subject.

*Military Assistance to Pakistan* [4]

The Secretary reported that Eden had queried him on our intentions of providing military assistance to Pakistan. The Secretary told him

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[1] Documentation on the Anglo-Egyptian dispute is presented in volume IX.

[2] Under reference here is the availability of the base at Suez to British forces in the event of war in the Middle East and whether British technicians in the Canal Zone should wear British uniforms. Documentation regarding these questions is *ibid.*

[3] Documentation on U.S. aid to Iran is presented in volume X.

[4] Documentation on U.S. military assistance to Pakistan is presented in volume XI.

of the status of the problem, and that a decision had not yet been reached by the President.

Eden apparently urged caution on this problem but seemed more concerned with the reaction in Afghanistan than in India. This was presumably because of the border problem between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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**SECOND RESTRICTED TRIPARTITE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 7, 1953, 11 A. M.**

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Prime Minister Churchill | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | M. Bougenot |
| Assistant Secretary Robertson | Sir Norman Brook | M. Roux |
| Lt. Col. Walters | | M. Andronikov |

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 185

*United States Delegation Minutes*

TOP SECRET [BERMUDA, undated.]

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The President opened the meeting by saying that he understood that it was desired to have additional members of delegations present when the questions of security guarantees and Indo-China were discussed, but that the meeting should be restricted for the discussion of Far Eastern and Middle Eastern problems. Sir Winston Churchill then said he would like to discuss what was to be done if the truce were to break down.

The President then said that he would ask Secretary Dulles to express our position on this. He understood that the French would want additional members of the delegation in for the discussion on Indo-China. They could discuss the Far East in the first place, then the Middle East and finally follow with a discussion on Indo-China. Sir Winston then stated that he hoped the meeting would be held particularly secret. He said he wished to bring up the question of the Suez Canal in which the French also had a historic interest as well as a financial interest. The President then said that they might begin discussion by having Secretary Dulles make a statement on the Far East.

Secretary Dulles said that the Far Eastern situation was a very confusing one for our policies were at variance with each other. This was not surprising. The Soviets were also somewhat confused and, as

M. Bidault had mentioned, they had had three ambassadors to China in eighteen months.[1] The Secretary felt the Chinese Communist rule was pretty solidly established, though less so in the South and North. There did not appear to exist in an open form resistance forces seriously threatening the Communist rule over the mainland. In the question of relations between Communist China and the USSR, it was difficult to come to a clear conclusion but he thought we were justified in believing that there was strain. This would seem logical. Mao Tse-tung was himself an outstanding Communist leader in his own right. His prestige, while less than that of Stalin was greater than Malenkov's. It was natural, therefore, that there should be a certain unwillingness on the part of Mao to be dictated to by Moscow as had been possible with Stalin because of the latter's enormous prestige resulting from his internal and external victories. Stalin's prestige had been such that Mao could be second to him. This was not the case with Malenkov. The very fact that the Soviet Communist leaders went to such extremes to eulogize Mao and push him forward as a major figure in the international scene was partly because of self-interest and partly because of the necessity of treating Mao as an equal partner on the world scene. The fact that this relationship exists is important and may eventually give us an opportunity for promoting division between the Soviet Union and Communist China in our own common interest.

There were major differences between the three powers in their approach to this problem, especially as between the United Kingdom and the United States. It was the view of the United States that the best hope for intensifying the strain and difficulties between Communist China and Russia would be to keep the Chinese under maximum pressure rather than by relieving such pressure. There were two theories for dealing with this problem. One was that by being nice to the Communist Chinese we could wean them away from the Soviets, and the other was that pressure and strain would compel them to make more demands on the USSR which the latter would be unable to meet and the strain would consequently increase.

The United States adhered to the latter view that pressure should be maintained on Communist China both politically and economically and, to the extent possible without war, military pressure should likewise be maintained. In the view of the United States this was the course to be followed rather than to seek to divide the Chinese and the Soviets by a sort of competition with Russia as to who would treat China best. This would put China in the best of worlds. The Secretary felt that if contradictory policies were applied to China, none of

[1] Documentation on U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China is presented in volume XIV.

them could make progress toward success and each would cancel out the other's efforts. He felt a very serious effort should be made to try to bring policies on China into closer harmony than was the case at present. We recognize the fact that the United Kingdom had given political recognition to the Communist regime in China. The Secretary had understood from what the Prime Minister had said the other day that this did not carry moral approbation. The British had said that one must recognize even one's enemies. This was true, but the fact that they were recognized did not mean that you had to give them aid of a political, moral or economic nature. The conduct of Communist China as a proclaimed aggressor in Korea, promoting aggression in Indo-China and generally attempting to arouse all Asia against the Western Powers created a situation which brought up the question as to whether they should be given *de facto* recognition. The Secretary did not feel that we should give them aid and comfort as was the case when some seemed to promote the admission of Communist China to the United Nations despite the standard of conduct required of members of the United Nations, i.e., to be peace-loving countries willing to undertake the obligations of the Charter. That seemed to be carrying recognition far beyond the conditions of the recognition of a *de facto* government. The Secretary felt that if we could align policies in the United Nations, taking the position that Communist China was an aggressor in Korea, as well as a promoter of aggression in Indo-China, and she had not proved her willingness to be peace loving and faithful to the obligations of the United Nations Charter, this would be helpful in establishing a common policy with some chance of success. As things stood now, some opposed the admission of Communist China to the United Nations while others were supporting it, despite its derelictions. This cleavage could be exploited by our enemies so that the policies of neither of us would be effective.

The Secretary said that he was mentioning the point at this time because the moratorium agreement at present in effect on preventing this issue from coming up in prolonged debate would expire at the end of December, and the whole question of future policy on this subject would force itself on our attention. The first thing we could expect after this recess would be the resumption of the move by Vishinsky for acceptance of the credentials of the Communist regime in China and we must have agreement on that point.

The Secretary said that he had spoken of political relations with Communist China, but it was important also to consider the question of commercial relations. All of us were at present carrying out a trade program involving an embargo on the shipments to China of strategic materials. The United States for its part embargoed all trade with

Communist China. This was a difficult and complicated subject. As the President had often said in talking over similar problems with the Secretary, there seems to be a generally accepted belief that trade benefits the other fellow and not you. This is not correct. Trade needs to be appraised on its merits as to whether it will benefit you or the other more. We recognize that there were some special situations such as Indonesia and Malaya where there were, so to speak, single crops which we were not anxious to buy ourselves but did not wish them to sell to Communist China. The rigor of our policy might defeat their purpose by creating economic conditions in these countries that would drive them into the arms of the Communists. It should be within our ability to find a rational answer to this problem. If we could do away with the impression in the United States that the United Kingdom was doing what it did because it loved Communist China, and if a common political approach could be achieved, it would be a great deal easier to obtain acceptance for what we do in the economic field in our own interest and it would not be believed that we were helping the Communists.

In Korea, said the Secretary, we had an armistice.[2] When he said we, he meant the United Nations whose mandatories we were. There were many people in the United States who believed this armistice had been a mistake because it took the strain off Communist China. In connection with the United Nations in Korea, the United States had not declared war. Constitutionally, the President could not continue the war without action by Congress except within the limits that the United Nations thought correct. The United Nations had decided by resolution, before President Eisenhower had been elected, that if we could get an armistice along the terms of the Indian resolution, this would be desirable if the terms reflected defeat of an aggressor who had been driven back beyond his starting point and the Communist surrendered on the issue of the non-forcible repatriation of prisoners. Under these conditions the United Nations felt the armistice should be accepted. We were able to obtain it under these conditions. The principal reason we were able to obtain the armistice was because we were prepared for a much more intensive scale of warfare. It should not be improper to say at such a restricted gathering that we had already sent the means to the theater for delivering atomic weapons. This became known to the Chinese Communists through their good intelligence sources and in fact we were not unwilling that they should find out. The Secretary said that he wished to emphasize that the armistice

[2] Further documentation on U.S. policy with respect to Korea is presented in volume xv. A British minute of the discussion on Korea is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 186.

had been obtained from a position of strength and not of weakness. The armistice was in effect and we would do all we could to honorably preserve it and prevent a renewal of the fighting.

He said there was, however, a danger of a breach. Such a danger arose from two quarters, from the Communists and from the ROK, meaning Syngman Rhee. Rhee was a problem of considerable difficulty. This, added the Secretary, was probably the understatement of the year. He did not think that any nation had ever exerted itself as fully with such a great combination of generosity on the one hand and threats on the other, as we had done to keep Rhee in line. Mr. Robertson had negotiated with him at great length, as had the Secretary himself.

Mr. Dulles felt that there was at least a high degree of probability that Rhee would not unilaterally resume hostilities even if no political conference were held or if it were to fail. He made this prediction with some hesitation as President Rhee was rather unpredictable. We had acted effectively in many ways to create a situation where it was highly unlikely that he would implement the threats he so often made of resuming war. The Secretary said that he felt he should add that no statement of this kind dealing with the problems of handling Rhee should be allowed to obscure the fact that he was a great patriot and leader of anti-Communist forces, that he had sustained the spirit and morale of his people under most difficult conditions and for this the whole free world owes him a debt of gratitude.

The Secretary then said he would like to tell M. Bidault an amusing story in this connection concerning Indo-China. He (the Secretary) had asked a Frenchman from Indo-China what was needed to win the war there, and the answer had been "Syngman Rhee". M. Bidault broke in to say, "It's a deal."

There was likewise the danger that the war might be resumed by the Chinese Communists. Over this we had no direct control. The Secretary said if this should happen, he felt the others ought to know that it would not be our intention to allow the war to persist as it had prior to the armistice with troop movements on the ground and fighting from entrenched positions with little chance of effective results for either side other than attrition of men and money. If there had not been an armistice, we intended to make a stronger and more vigorous effort and if hostilities were resumed we should do this. It was not our intention to do anything that would probably lead to a general war or which would bring the Soviet Union overtly into the conflict.

We would expect to attack with the most effective means the air bases the enemy was using for his effort in Korea. We would implement the doctrine of hot pursuit without being limited by the boundary

between North Korea and Manchuria. We would expect to take such action as seemed best to us to achieve a decisive result in Korea. There was some question as to whether it would ever be possible to hold indefinitely the line of the boundary of North Korea which was over 600 miles long running from a point close to Port Arthur to one near Vladivostok. This might not be readily defensible, but there were positions north of the present line which in case of military success could be held more advantageously. The knowledge that we intended to do this could be the greatest preventive to a resumption of hostilities. It was the knowledge of our willingness to use force that had brought about an end to the hostilities. A knowledge by the other side of our willingness and ability to wage a more intensive and vigorous war than had been the case up to the armistice. We were convinced that their knowledge of that intention on our part was a primary reason for the end of hostilities. The fact that we had such resolution was most likely to prevent a recurrence.

We knew that the Communists were taking steps to strengthen their position in North Korea by building air fields and taking other measures and they could readily create a situation where they might feel that it might be advantageous for them to resume the kind of war that had been going on up to the armistice. We doubt, said the Secretary, that they would like the kind of a war we would fight if the armistice were broken, and we would hope that if that should develop we would have both the moral and military support of the British Commonwealth. We knew that France was engaged in a major struggle in Indo-China and needed her forces there. Mr. Dulles understood that the French had withdrawn their battalion from the United Nations Command in Korea and this had been done with their full approval. We consider this an appropriate redeployment. We would hope that the British Commonwealth would share in the renewal of hostilities if the armistice were broken. That knowledge would be an added deterrent. We shared strongly the philosophy Sir Winston had so often expressed that much could be avoided if we were strong, vigorous and united and let this be known in advance so that there would be no miscalculation of weakness and division on our part. Secretary Dulles felt that the First and Second World Wars might well have been avoided if the enemy had known in advance of our unity and determination. He would hope for a similar show of unity by all three powers, and that if this should occur that the Commonwealth forces in Korea would operate in that theater while the French in association with the associated states were waging a hard battle in Indo-China.

The Secretary then said that he would like to add two more thoughts. First that we anticipate, in view of the present quiet in Korea, that it

might be desirable for us to withdraw from Korea part of the ground forces there as they are replaced by newly organized ROK units. Our program for the ROKs had been for twenty divisions—there were now seventeen. Three of them were awaiting training and equipment. Under the armistice we had undertaken not to increase our net strength. As more ROK divisions are created we would have to subtract from our overall forces. From every standpoint one or two United States divisions might be better located elsewhere. If this were done as envisaged, it would serve as a warning to Rhee that he could not commit us on land and it would be notice to everyone that if the war were resumed, we would probably resume it with more sea and air power and less land forces in Korea.

The second thought the Secretary would like to express was that everything he had said about deterring Rhee from any action to reopen hostilities applied equally strongly to Chiang Kai-Shek on Formosa. Our ability to influence the latter situation is greater than is the case in Korea because Formosa is an island. Chiang needs help and we have given him additional air, on condition that it not be used for more land adventures without our prior agreement. One might ask what was our purpose in aiding Chiang. There were two purposes, one was that this aid helped to hold the island which would probably fall without it to the Communists, and this would be a serious breach in the off-shore island chain anchored on the Korean and Indo-Chinese peninsulas and running through Japan, Formosa and the Philippines.

If contrary to all our hopes, expectations, and plans, general war were to break out the threat from Formosa would tend to concentrate a large measure of Communist strength opposite Formosa. There were at present some 400,000 Communist Chinese troops stationed opposite Formosa guarding against invasion. The Communists were unwilling to expose their seacoast. This was another of the measures we liked to pursue on the theory of exerting maximum strain causing the Chinese Communists to demand more from Russia and thereby placing additional stress on Russian-Chinese relations.

Mr. Eden then said that they had listened with the greatest interest to every word in the masterly survey of Far Eastern problems by the Secretary of State. Mr. Eden said that it was a puzzling question to know how far we can by our actions help to foster a division of opinion between the Chinese Communists and the Russians. It probably to some extent exists and will grow. History was on our side, for these two had never worked harmoniously together for long, but it might be long for in China things take centuries which require but years elsewhere. They were trying to divide the three of us, just as we were trying to divide them, and that in itself was in a measure an excuse for

argument for not thinking it wise to break off all contacts, however unsatisfactory our relationship with the Chinese Communists might be at present. The Foreign Secretary said that he would not go into the question of recognition at that time, all were familiar with the reasons for which it had been done and how it had been done. We should freely admit that we had a problem to face at the United Nations in February and we should immediately start talks. He would, of course, like to consult the Commonwealth Governments so that we might work out a common line to be used in February. It would be very bad if we found ourselves in disarray.

Another problem which worried Mr. Eden was the question of trade. He was certain that the Prime Minister agreed with him that recognition never meant that we should give comfort and aid to China, but in the question of trade we should give comfort and aid to ourselves and our friends and try to prevent the worst from happening. He was worried about some aspects of this situation. In the matter of rubber, Malaya was selling none, while Ceylon and Indonesia were. Malaya was aware of this and was restive. The only other product they had to sell was tin and the United States well knew the difficulties inherent in marketing this. It was quite true that if some trade could not be carried on this might well create conditions in these countries which would help the Communists. This was the dilemma before which we found ourselves. While trying not to aid China we might create difficult conditions for these countries. This was a matter about which Mr. Eden felt the three powers should talk further. He understood that this situation was charged with dynamite in the United States, but on the political side they also had difficulties at home.

Concerning the Korean problem, Mr. Eden recognized how hard the United States had worked in trying to deal with Syngman Rhee since the armistice. He felt it fair to say that the United States which had borne the chief burden of the fighting had also borne the chief burden in the diplomatic field in trying to restrain Rhee to a reasonable line of conduct.

It had been with a view to meeting the dangers of a rupture of the armistice from the other side that the British had joined the United States and the other sixteen countries which had forces fighting in Korea in issuing a warning which had been put out some time ago.[3] The Secretary of State had given some indication of United States action if there were a breach of the armistice by the Communists. He had made it clear that the United States Government did not wish to return to the type of war that had been fought before the armistice,

[3] Documentation relating to the 16-nation declaration, July 27, 1953, concerning the armistice in Korea is presented in volume xv.

nor would they wish to provoke a general war. Mr. Eden felt it might be extremely difficult to draw the line on this point. He would suggest that the United Nations whose mandatories we were be brought in at the earliest possible moment and their consent or approval obtained for the steps which the United States thought necessary. On some things there would be no difficulty, such as hot pursuit which had always been contemplated if there were fresh hostilities. Some of the other matters were new. The British regarded the question of the use of other weapons as new. The United States on the other hand was more and more inclined to regard these as conventional. However, neither the British nor the United Nations had had a chance to consider these aspects of the problem, nor how to assess military targets other than those immediately across the Yalu. Would not something of this nature bring the Soviet-Chinese Treaty into effect? This was something that would have to be carefully considered. There was also the matter of a blockade. The present British Government opposed this as much as its predecessor, because it did not believe it could be effective unless Soviet ports were included, and he said this would do more harm than good, particularly so in view of the fact that the main means of supply in this area was by railway. Mr. Eden went on to say that this subject should be probed much further between the three powers so that they could be ready whatever happened. They had not, of course, consulted the Commonwealth on this and could speak only for themselves. They did not believe, however, that the others would disagree. They would only want to plan what their part would be in a renewal of hostilities if they were satisfied that there was agreement on the manner in which it were to be done. Until this were done, they must reserve their position on some of the new items that had been brought up in the discussion previously. They had not had a chance to examine these either with their colleagues or with the dominions and could not, therefore, commit themselves on that question this morning.

M. Bidault then said that France could only view the problem of China across a battlefield. For them, China was the country giving sympathy and material aid as well as training facilities to the enemy that France had been fighting for seven years—Communism in Indo-China. Insofar as trade was concerned, the Secretary of State would recall that at Washington certain decisions were taken which brought an embargo on certain products to which French business people attach some importance.[4] On one or two points there had been misunderstandings. M. Bidault had been advised of the shipment of some metals to China and he had had the cargoes unloaded at Saigon. It was the

[4] For documentation on the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings held at Washington, July 10–14, 1953, see pp. 1582 ff.

ardent wish of the French that they could make progress toward holding and obtaining effective results from a political conference on Korea, and that they might then hope for a conference of a similar nature that would give them an honorable way out of Indo-China.

The perspective of a renewal of hostilities from the other side, which the Government of the United States had shown them, had contained some factors that were also new for them. M. Bidault said that he had no doubt that the persevering efforts of the Secretary of State to restrain the more warlike elements of the ROK were a proof of the desire of the American people to end the hostilities there and in Indo-China in a peaceful way.

M. Bidault said that his colleagues would recall that the French Government believes that there can be no normalization of relations between the United Nations and Communist China without a settlement of the Indo-China war and that until this occurred they could not undertake any normalization of these relations so long as the Chinese continued to support the war in Indo-China. The French Government felt that the admission of China to the United Nations should not be something to be accomplished before peace had been restored, but that it should only be considered after this had happened.

President Eisenhower then said that before leaving this subject he had one or two observations to make himself. He could certainly understand the views that had been expressed by his colleagues. There was no disposition on the part of the United States to do anything recklessly and without prior consultation. He was not sure of the language of the mandate of the United Nations under which we were fighting in Korea and was not sure exactly what authority the United States had. However, the question of atomic energy should be viewed in a larger field. Some interest had been expressed in the course of the meeting in connection with the deployment of United States troops around the world. Like other countries, we had to face the problem of the clash between budgetary possibilities and the amounts to be spent for defense. This year every man, woman, and child in the United States was spending $300 for security alone—more than fifty billion dollars. When we allowed troops to remain in Korea after the armistice, and we have there eight divisions and some 275,000 men who are maintained at tremendous expense, this inevitably increased the pressure on other deployment. How could we be responsible for the safety for all allied forces in Korea if we have to face this almost insoluble problem of how to reduce forces and yet keep troops in the areas where their presence is most significant and at the same time lift a little of this burden from the shoulders of our people. The President said that he did not know how many billions we had spent to develop

the atomic bomb. Our people would say why were we not ready to use it if attacked. We had never indicated that we would use it other than against aggression. We would not react hysterically but only against a clear-cut breach of the armistice and were attacked on a basis that made it clear that the Communists were flouting the armistice and moving in. Any prior decision that did not recognize the need for using what we had in a limited military situation would work for our discomfiture. It was not possible to go into all the details of this problem at that time, and the experts should consult further together, but the President felt that we should not allow ourselves to be cramped by trying to guess exactly what Russia would do. We must see this problem within a broad frame of reference.

Sir Winston then asked what were the prospects that the armistice would be broken. The President replied that he did not know but did not think that they were very high. Sir Winston then said that this was not being discussed because the United States had any information that led them to apprehend a breach of the armistice by the Communists and asked whether the United States foresaw any special direct emergency. The President replied not outside of a continued build up in North Korea. The President then said he should add for M. Bidault that we had never proposed attacking cities such as Chungking, Peking, or Shanghai, but merely military installations such as air fields being used to support directly the conflict in Korea, if the armistice were broken by the Communists.

. . . . . .

The experts then joined the National Delegations and the meeting continued as a plenary session.[5]

[5] For a report on the plenary session, see *infra*.

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**FOURTH PLENARY TRIPARTITE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 7, 1953, NOON**

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Prime Minister Churchill | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | M. Bougenot |
| Mr. MacArthur | Sir Norman Brook | M. Parodi |
| Mr. Merchant | Sir Pierson Dixon | M. de Margerie |
| Mr. Robertson | Sir Frank Roberts | M. Baeyens |
| Mr. Nash | Mr. Allen | M. Vimont |
| Mr. Bowie | Mr. Shuckburgh | M. Seydoux |
| Mr. Thurston | Mr. Edmondson | M. Laloy |
| Lt. Col. Walters | | M. Andronikov |

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 185

*United States Delegation Minutes*

SECRET BERMUDA, December 7, 1953.

Plenary Minutes 4

Subject: The Middle East

After previous discussion on the Far East had been concluded in restricted meeting, additional members of delegations joined the meeting.[1]

President Eisenhower then said that they might get along to the discussion of Indo-China and the Middle East.

M. Bidault then said that he would like to do so but he was a little worried about the question of time. Probably what he had to say about Indo-China would take a little longer than they could reasonably wait for lunch, so perhaps the question of the Middle East might be taken up at that time.

Sir Winston Churchill felt that they would require some time after dinner and suggested a meeting at 10 p. m.

The President said he would prefer to have dinner later and finish before dinner as he felt that was somewhat late, but he might ask Secretary Dulles to represent him.

Sir Winston then said that they could meet at 5 and go on as late as was necessary. This was agreed and Sir Winston said that the only point he wished to raise in connection with the Middle East was the international consequences of the Suez Canal and its moral association with the United Nations and with all of the powers on our side.[2] He had no wish to raise any question connected with the British holding their position against any Egyptian attack. They were quite ready to do this.

President Eisenhower said the item of Egypt had been placed on the agenda at the request of the British.

Sir Winston said that he did not wish to raise the question of the dangerous situation between the 80,000 troops and air force units which they had in Egypt and the Egyptian troops or government. He could bring this subject up if they had days to spare, but they did not. The great waterway of the Suez Canal was a question of world interest. He felt that there was a need to take every precaution to preserve it against neglect or obstruction. He was not considering the closing of the Canal by bombing by hostile nations. That would be

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[1] For a report on the restricted meeting, see the U.S. Delegation minutes, p. 1808.

[2] For President Eisenhower's report on the discussion of Egypt, see Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, p. 247.

difficult with the improved facilities. He did feel that an attempt should be made to consider the Suez Canal on an international basis. It was as worthy of dignity and respect as the Panama Canal. If anything could be done along these lines, it would steady the whole Middle East and that was all that he was asking. If they could obtain assurances from the President or the Secretary of State with the authority that they carry that they could have moral support in the negotiations now going on, that might lead to a reasonable conclusion and avoid what was not impossible, namely a lot of fighting.

Mr. Eden then said he would like to add that in the negotiations with Egypt, there were only two major points outstanding and the British were unable to give way further on either. One was the question of the reactivation of the bases. The United Nations could pronounce on the conditions requiring reactivation. This would be a most reasonable assurance. The Egyptians had not accepted this heretofore and it was the principal objection to the successful conclusion of the negotiations. The second question was a matter of uniforms. The British did not attach so much importance to this for prestige reasons, but their troops must have some protection, just as the NATO troops do in other countries. They did not want their troops dragged before Egyptian courts. Mr. Eden said he would appreciate help if this could be given when the Ambassador got back in about twelve days. There were some signs that the Egyptians would be willing to face realities if the United States gave them support on these matters.

Sir Winston said that he did not want the troops arrested by the local police or something else done which would constitute a military action and might lead to actual war.

Mr. Eden said that the only other thing he wanted to do was to thank the Secretary of State. There had been some discussion concerning aid which the United States was thinking of giving Egypt and the Secretary had indicated that the United States would be willing to hold this up until the new year in order to give a little more time during which negotiations might possibly be concluded.[3] For this he was grateful.

Secretary Dulles said that what he had indicated was that we could hold up until the first of the year to give a chance to put this through, but he did not think it would be possible to delay after that.

Mr. Eden said that he might remark that any question of aid in the Middle East can be very difficult. Mr. Bidault agreed. Mr. Eden added jocularly that the Persians might now be good candidates.

M. Bidault then said that France had a historic, financial, moral and strategic interest in Suez. All three powers used the Canal and the

[3] Regarding Eden's discussion of Egypt with Secretary Dulles, Dec. 6 and 7, see the memorandum of conversations by Byroade, p. 1807.

French supplied their forces in Indo-China through it. He wished to thank the British Government for keeping the French fully advised of developments. The French Government was fully satisfied with the formula regarding the Convention of 1888 on Free Navigation. He had nothing additional to add except that this was a major point for France and all countries as it was a jugular vein for strategy and trade and, though he preferred trade to strategy, sometimes both were useful.

President Eisenhower said that if there were no objections they might adjourn until 5 p. m. with the Foreign Ministers' meeting at 3.

Mr. Dulles said that would give them opportunity to discuss one slight change in the reply to the Soviet note suggested by Chancellor Adenauer.

M. Bidault asked if this change was of any consequence and the Secretary replied that it was not.

President Eisenhower then adjourned the meeting, stating that the Foreign Ministers would meet at 3 and the Chiefs of Government at 5.

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**EISENHOWER–BIDAULT MEETING, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 7, 1953**

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | FRANCE |
|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Mr. C. D. Jackson | M. Bougenot |
| Mr. Merchant | M. Parodi |
| Mr. MacArthur | M. Alphand |
| Lt. Col. Walters | M. de Margerie |
| | M. Seydoux |

396.1/12–753

*Memorandum of Conversation, by MacArthur*

SECRET BERMUDA, December 7, 1953.

Subject: Possible Periodic Meetings of the Three Heads of Government

Following the luncheon which M. Bidault gave for the President today (M. Laniel being ill) the President remarked that even though there were no earth shaking decisions to be taken at Bermuda, he thought and had always thought that it was most desirable for the three countries to get together from time to time and have good talks. The President said that no matter how good an Ambassador might be, he felt that exchanges between the leading personalities of different countries by cable were not entirely satisfactory and that periodic meetings every three or four months were useful, since it enabled each country to have a greater understanding of the problems of the other country or countries which in turn was most important in preserving

unity. The President concluded by saying that if leaders met every three or four months, the press would not expect earth shaking developments but would understand these meetings for what they were, namely, to talk over common problems with a view to developing better understanding. This in turn would enable the three countries to move forward together in the solution of longer term problems with which we were faced.

M. Bidault and the French representatives picked this idea most enthusiastically. They indicated that a meeting at top level by the three countries every three or four months would seem highly desirable (this of course is in line with France's great desire to continue its position as an equal member of the Big Three regardless of their entry into FDC, etc., and thereby be considered as an equal with the United States and the United Kingdom in matters of global import). Several members of the French Delegation suggested that this would be useful for the Communiqué.

The President indicated general approval of the idea but said that when such meetings could occur would, of course, depend on whether or not the people involved were able to absent themselves from their countries. The President said that simply as an idea, it might be useful if a meeting occurred on the territory of a country which was not a member of the Big Three, for example, the three might get together for a one day meeting at a place like Newfoundland. They could fly there, spend the day having a general talk and have lunch or dinner together and then return to their respective countries. In Newfoundland there were U.S. military air bases where they could be adequately taken care of and where they could meet without having the press descend on them.

M. Bidault smilingly said that if the President were talking about Newfoundland why not the Islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon which were just off the coast of Newfoundland. The President laughed and said that at any rate that was an idea. There was further brief conversation of a social nature and the President then said that since the Foreign Ministers had a meeting scheduled in about 15 minutes, he would withdraw so that M. Bidault could get his papers together and go on to the meeting with Secretary Dulles and Mr. Eden.

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**FIFTH TRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 7, 1953, 3 P. M.**

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Bidault |

*Editorial Note*

According to the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184, the three Foreign Ministers met at 3 p. m. to consider a communiqué for the Bermuda Conference. No record of their meeting has been found in the Department of State files, but see Charles M. Moran, *Churchill*, Cambridge, 1966, page 541.

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**FIFTH PLENARY TRIPARTITE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 7, 1953, 5:30 P. M.**

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Prime Minister Churchill | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | M. Bougenot |
| Mr. MacArthur | Sir Norman Brook | M. Parodi |
| Mr. Merchant | Sir Pierson Dixon | M. de Margerie |
| Mr. Robertson | Sir Frank Roberts | M. Roux |
| Mr. Nash | Mr. Allen | M. Baeyens |
| Mr. Bowie | Mr. Shuckburgh | M. Vimont |
| Mr. Morris | Mr. Edmondson | M. Seydoux |
| Lt. Col. Walters | | M. Laloy |
| | | M. Andronikov |

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 185

*United States Delegation Minutes* [1]

SECRET BERMUDA, December 7, 1953.

Plenary Minutes 5

Subjects: Indochina
Security Assurances

President Eisenhower opened the session by saying that he understood the first item to be discussed would be handled by the French and would deal with Indo-China.[2]

Mr. Bidault began by saying that he would first say a few words on the military situation. The Viet Minh forces were facing a stagnation in strength. This was happily indicated by the institution of special courts to try deserters who, by flight or other means, refused to serve in the Communist army. At the same time, however, as they had reached the ceiling of strength, there was increasing Chinese support

[1] The U.S. Delegation transmitted to Washington a summary of this meeting in Secto 24 from Bermuda, Dec. 7. This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

[2] Further documentation on Indochina is presented in volume XIII.

in transportation, signal communications, as well as in anti-aircraft equipment. This was known to France's allies. Reenforcements had been sent from France and had placed upon the government he represented a considerable onus of unpopularity. Furthermore, this last measure did not reenforce their defense in Europe.

The national forces of the Associated States, especially Vietnam which contained nine-tenths of the population of the peninsula, continued to improve. As his colleagues knew, in Washington he had committed the French Government to create, with equipment to be furnished by the United States, 54 additional battalions.[3] These were naturally a little improvised in nature. They needed cadres and there was a limit to the transfer of cadres from old units to the new ones. At the present time 30 of the 54 battalions had been activated and the remainder would be activated before the end of February 1954. At the same time the Vietnam regular army which up to now had not given any serious trouble had been increased by one division of nine battalions and fourteen artillery battalions. Overall, this represented a considerable effort, financed in common by the United States and France in proportions known to his colleagues.

By means of certain territorial sacrifices, by not trying to defend everything everywhere and by choosing what to defend and what to attack, it had been possible to create a force of maneuver of considerable size in relation to the forces committed by both sides in this conflict. This was a great novelty in this struggle and the credit belonged to General Navarre who avoided dispersing his forces in an attempt to counterattack everywhere. From the military point of view, this represents a considerable improvement over the situation prevailing a year ago. Mr. Bidault wished to say that none of this would have been possible if they had not received from the United States assistance of a financial nature and equipment of all sorts, including some air assistance to be forthcoming shortly. This had made it possible to face the constantly increasing pressure from the Communist adversaries. The French had sent out more men than have ever been contemplated even by Marshal De Lattre. He wished to mention the aircraft carrier, "Arromanches" loaned by the United States who had furnished the financial and material means to make possible this enormous military effort. On the 12th of December they would receive an additional group of U. S. aircraft. Mr. Bidault said that France was great lady enough to know how to say thank you with the hope that it would reach the man who had made this effort possible.

Mr. Bidault then said he would discuss the current situation. A first

[3] For documentation on the Washington Foreign Ministers meetings, July 10–14, see pp. 1582 ff.

effort was being made in the delta of the Red River. In this part of Tonkin there are more than 2000 natives per square mile and in some areas it is most difficult to distinguish between the peasant in his rice paddy and the enemy who has just laid his submachine gun in a ditch. The French have been trying to end the "dry rot" which was night infiltration on a broad scale in this area without hills or commanding heights where there had been one master by day and another by night. The French have worked progressively to install one master by day and by night, namely the forces of the French and the Associated States. A certain number of offensive actions had been successfully undertaken, offensive actions which had borne code names like those of World War II that General Eisenhower and Sir Winston had directed. These operations had mysterious names like "Brochet" (pike). He did not feel that these names should be bandied about too much as they might give some humorous papers a chance to make jokes about something which involved the lives of men. These operations had resulted in stopping the dry season offensive which the Indo-Chinese Communists had favorably prepared on the plateaux of Laos and in the two branches of the delta of the Red River for the purpose of a final accounting with the French. This the Communist radio had announced. Large sectors of public opinion believed that since the Viet Minh did not attack they were seeking some political maneuver. There was, however, another reason. They had been drawn off balance by the offensives which had been directed against them by General Navarre.

Mr. Bidault then said that the following was the situation held at arm's length by his government with United States help despite an indifferent or weary public opinion in France. The Vietnamese troops which could not be supported by their own country who have French-trained cadres usually behave well in combat. The supplementary battalions, of which he had promised 54, had less cadres and there had been some surprises, but he did not doubt, and past experience had led the French to believe that, without too much delay, these units might undertake the mopping-up task that was forseen for them. As for the French, it was sometimes alleged that they were absent from this war, having sent only cadres, but there were 100,000 of them and without counting French citizens of other territories of the French Union. Every year the equivalent of one graduating class of St. Cyr (Sandhurst or West Point) was cut down. This war would be lost without the 100,000 French troops and white men and the support that they had received. It was the intention of the command to first clean out the delta, then Cochin China, then Cambodia and then South Annam. The force of maneuver which had been concentrated enabled them to face any attack and punish the enemy severely but at any instant the

worst kind of politics could intervene to diminish the value of the Vietnamese units. Furthermore, the Chinese frontier lay close at hand and the roads leading to it had been re-built and the French might find themselves at any moment facing aggression in the air or an avalanche of land forces. This would, of course, completely change the character of the war. The French were losing men and experienced cadres. Also they were under the obligation of constantly rotating their troops fighting in this harsh tropical climate who had to face not only the enemy, but mosquitos, fever, amoebic dysentary and the weakening effect of a hot climate. They could not keep these men there indefinitely. This then was the military situation. It was better than Mr. Bidault had ever seen it before, but his colleagues must know that this front was supported by a zone of the interior which lay 8000 kilometres away across the world.

Mr. Bidault then said that he wished to discuss the political situation. On the 3rd of July 1953 Mr. Laniel's government had announced a declaration for the purpose of removing any ambiguity concerning the independence of the Associated States of Indo-China, an independence which had been proclaimed before that but was considered by some as being of form only.[4] The declaration of 3 July indicated that, with total independence, all powers in the hands of the French would be transferred to the Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians during negotiations which would take place subsequently. This was real independence and this declaration carried with it great risks. It might, in the eyes of ill-intentioned men, indicate that this was a great novelty and that true independence had not been granted before. This would be a false interpretation of the course the French had followed since the end of World War II. There were other risks inherent in this declaration of an independence which was not necessarily desired by all parties. Bao Dai had convened at Saigon a congress. Some of those who attended this congress would rather demand independence than fight for it, would talk for it rather than die for it. An attempt had been made to break with the French Union at a time when the soldiers of the French Union were shedding their blood to give those men the right to debate as they were. This had serious consequences in France and in Indo-China. Mr. Bidault said that the qualities and defects of Syngman Rhee had been mentioned. He would speak only of the virtues of Bao Dai and this would make his speech a good deal shorter. He had done his best. The question which the French Government had asked him, namely, whether the transfer of all authority with real independence was enough or not, had brought him to the Riviera like

[4] See footnote 3, p. 1644.

Galatea to the willows. His place was in Indo-China. Mr. Bidault went on that it was important, as agreed in Washington, that the idea that the French Union had a prison-like character be exorcised. This was a lie repeated by our Communist adversaries and nationalists who everywhere were helping Communists, especially in that part of the world and who say that independence means isolation. If that were the truth, if membership in the French Union were considered something pestiferous, how could one imagine that the French would be willing to fight Communism 8000 miles from home on behalf of people who felt they could fight alone or else make a deal.

The permanence of the broad, flexible formula of the French Union was a condition *sine qua non* for the maintenance of the French effort.

"Now suddenly," said Mr. Bidault, "Ho Chi Minh makes proposals. I know this bird well." In 1946 he had attended far behind Mr. Bidault a parade of the 14th of July. The French had tried to get along with him even though he was a Communist without success. After a long period of silence and hostility he suddenly put forth proposals that do not look as if they were drafted in Asia. He first of all told us that he was against EDC which, as is well known, is directly related to the every-day life of the Indo-Chinese peasants of the Red River delta.

Mr. Bidault said that seven years of war across the world were hard to bear in a country where public opinion like Marshal Foch believed in something higher than war, namely peace. The French reply was made with a historic prudence which was not fully understood by the world press. The reply to Ho's question as to why they should not discuss an armistice, had been made on such terms as to exclude in fact any possibility of negotiation. What the French had answered was that they were willing to discuss conditions under which the individual liberty of citizens could be respected. This appeared to exclude any sincere acceptance on his part. Had the French done otherwise, they would have left the field open for the Communists, and for seven years that is what they have tried to prevent. They had clearly indicated that if there were negotiations, they could only be held in agreement with the Associated States. This was a point of honor. The French would never abandon their comrades in battle. They would never abandon them under any conditions and nothing would be done without their agreement. Any negotiation for peace in Indo-China could only take place in an international frame and the French would hope that there would really be such a framework and not merely a hope for it. He repeated that seven years was a long struggle in what had been called the slandered war, the dirty war, the colonialist war, and all the other names his colleagues knew. There were many places where those who had fought

so long could not even show the decorations that their heroism had won. What other prospects were there? A bilateral negotiation with the Viet Minh had no dearth of French support. Some gallant Frenchmen believed that this was a solution because they wanted to get out of Indo-China. Mr. Bidault said that he did not believe in the sincerity of Ho and felt that, of all those seated around the table, he knew him best. Mediation was expensive and he was not sure that it would be possible to find a mediator who would be acceptable to both sides. Negotiations with China would be refused out of hand. Though they sent their supplies and equipment across the mountain passes, they would never admit this openly. Mr. Bidault had opposed a Five-Power conference as being scarcely adequate to handle the problem. If peace could be negotiated with the adversary, it would be necessary for the Associated States physically or morally represented through France to be present. They had been accompanied by her along the path of progress. This might be difficult but it should not prove insurmountable.

Mr. Bidault recalled that he had mentioned six months before that it was absolutely necessary that the French people should not be faced with an unending, dreary plain of continued war and that, while there was an armistice elsewhere, they must go on indefinitely with their bloody task in the service of the nation. Mr. Bidault recalled that earlier that morning he had said in the discussion on China that no normalization in relations of a political or commercial nature with Communist China could be undertaken until this open wound in the flank of Asia and of France had been closed, and that this seven-year old war should not go on any longer than necessary for the defense of the free world and the honor of the nation.[5]

Sir Winston then said he would like to pay his heartfelt compliments to France for her valiant effort to preserve her empire and the cause of freedom in Indo-China. He greatly admired her exertions and was sorry insofar as his own country was concerned that they had not been able to match these efforts on the vast sub-continent of India. This was a colossal disaster which he had lived to see and would leave its imprint on the future. He might not live to see it, but many of those around the table would realize what a great misfortune it was when Great Britain cast away her duties in India. He admired France and envied the record she has established under such difficult conditions.

He also felt impelled to say how much he admired the splendid work of France in North Africa and in Tunisia. He had often been there and had been struck by the wonderful manner in which the French

[5] For a record of the discussion of China under reference here, see the U.S. Delegation minutes, p. 1808.

cherished and nourished the civilization they had implanted. He earnestly hoped that all the powers allied with France would endeavor to lend their moral support and aid in the difficult task which she had undertaken with so much skill and resolution. The British had a small but costly preoccupation in Malaya. There the situation was improving and they had not the slightest intention of wavering in their effort. He only wished to pay this tribute to France. He felt it was a great mistake to suppose that the ancient powers of Europe had not made a contribution to the progress of these races in Asia and that all they had done was obsolete and that it was good that it had passed away. He said he hoped that France would courageously persevere in her efforts.

He would, however, suggest to Mr. Bidault the great advantages to be derived from a prolongation of military service even if there is a lessening of the number of men taken. The need was for well-trained troops who would breed their own cadres and not unduly strain the main organization and do not have to be moved too frequently. The British had derived great advantage from this in Malaya, Egypt and Hong Kong in not having to move these units to and fro so often while they bred their own cadres. He felt that the loss of a graduating class of St. Cyr, of which Mr. Bidault had spoken, was a terrible thing. He felt that a longer service term would save lives and would give the nation a higher return. He asked Mr. Bidault not to let this matter drop but he wished to pay his compliments to the French and only wished he could be able to pay a similar compliment to his own country on the great question of India. Dark days lie ahead in Asia as a result of those who thought that they could do without the guidance and aid of the European nations to whom they owed so much. He would say no more on this subject. He knew it was not a popular thing at present but he had done his utmost for it all the days of his life. He wished only the best of good fortune to France and to express his gratitude to the United States for giving aid to Indo-China and this aid will be found to have been foreseeing.

President Eisenhower said he would like to associate himself with the Prime Minister in the tribute he paid to France for the magnificent campaign they had waged so long and at such cost. He would like to pay personal tribute to General Navarre of whom he had heard the finest reports. He was happy to be able to say that another aircraft carrier was to be turned over to the French together with 25 aircraft in a few days. There were also some helicopters. He hoped these would soon be on the scene doing their job. He said that Mr. Bidault had made a cryptic allusion to a Five-Power meeting. He did not want to

go into the details, but a Five-Power meeting had very unpleasant connotations and we were likely to study this with a jaundiced eye.

Mr. Bidault said that he hoped to put aside any worry the President may have had on this question of a Five-Power conference. He had always felt that you could not have a conference at present as proposed on all subjects of the universe, but that if it were called in a specific framework to discuss Southeast Asia problems the French might be willing to agree, provided that the Associated States were there at their side. It was at present impossible to hold a Five-Power conference as he had always said it would end as a Four-Power conference without the United States. This statement of his had been published in the French papers and he only partially regretted that the President could not read them every day. The only way he felt it would be possible to hold a Five-Power conference would be if it were on one particular subject with the understanding that the Associated States would be there. He hoped that this would exorcise in the eyes of the President the evil influence of the figure five.

The President thanked Mr. Bidault for what he had said and went on that the one question they had not yet discussed was the problem of European security assurances. He asked who would begin discussion on this subject and Sir Winston indicated that he would.

The Prime Minister said that there was great difficulty in finding something which would please the Russians—which he was anxious to do—because they have already taken everything they could lay their hands on and now we were looking around to find something they had not taken and could not. This was a great pity. When the second World War was in its late phases he had been profoundly impressed with the deep grievance and passionate desire of the Soviets for effective protection against another Hitler or something like it, and he had felt deepest sympathy with that anxiety. If they had not been carried away by victory, something much better for all would have been feasible. Looking around after they have treated us so badly in the last few years, he still thought one ought not to fail to do for them what was just or express willingness to do it. He would hope that full assurances could be given them not only to the effect that our organization was an absolutely defensive one in nature, but that if they were wrongfully attacked, we should aid and support them. He felt this note should be struck. He had tried to strike it some months ago and it was still audible.[6] We should do something to reassure them. This, of course, was a minor thing compared to the need of maintaining our unity and self-defense. We should give them the feeling that what was right and

[6] For the text of Prime Minister Churchill's speech to the House of Commons on May 11, see *H. C. Debs.*, 5th series, vol. 515, cols. 883–898.

just when they were behaving well has not ceased to be right and just at a time when we might believe that they were inclined to behave badly. He felt this note should be struck and played upon. It would be very difficult to make any arrangement if we could not do anything of interest to them. They ought to have freedom of access to the broad waters. Sir Winston said he had never contemplated that we should commit ourselves to recognizing the present state of affairs in the satellites. We should try to make clear that we would not try to end this by violence but by allowing time, patience and perhaps good fortune to work. That was the note he would like to see. In the draft communiqué there were nine notes of strength and unity for a strong front.[7] He felt we could afford to strike one note which, at any rate, would give the sense that we wished them no harm and would feel it our duty to help them if they were maltreated or assaulted, that we would instantly play our part on their side as intended if they were right. He felt it would be well to use such language now. He was sure it would not be welcomed on the other side by the governments at least. It might help to alleviate the suffering and tyranny which prevails. He had read many phrases in the communiqué on one side, and few on what he called Locarnoism or reassurances. The other way would make the balance better and provide steady and continuous improvement. He recognized all the way through that this was only a very small counterpoise to the main effort which must absorb all our energies and brains.

Mr. Bidault then spoke and said that the experts who would like to feel that everything they prepared was read, had prepared for him a document for the next Four-Power conference, which did not solve all problems, but represented something of inestimable value, and in weight about one half pound. At this point he held up a briefing book.[8] The Prime Minister had raised problems that would have lots to do with the text. Mr. Eden had emphasized the need for new conversations to avoid finding ourselves in disarray for the Big Four conference. We would be facing a tough party there who would play a shrewd game. Perhaps, therefore, we have been too bold in speaking of security guarantees if at this time we would be incapable of giving a common reply as to what that meant. The experts should talk these matters over as they could always appeal for guidance to higher and the highest levels in resolving essential differences on this problem. Mr. Bidault recalled that at the preceding meeting of the Foreign Ministers over

[7] The draft communiqué under reference here has not been identified further; for the text of the final communiqué, see p. 1838.

[8] No copy of the briefing book under reference here has been found in the Department of State files.

which he presided,[9] they had felt that the Russians liked to receive territory and supply treaties. Therefore, he believed there were very few chances of getting them to accept as sufficient guarantees anything that might be said for they would believe that such guarantees would be as worthless coming from others as they would be coming from themselves. He felt it was reasonable that a unilateral declaration along these lines was not something to be made in advance, or while the conference had barely started, but rather something to be given at the end or close to the end of the conference if, in our judgment, they were then indicated. He had a different feeling about our making a unilateral declaration in advance which would have a bad effect on public opinion and would indicate that the war-like governments around this table do not intend to march on Vladivostok. A declaration could be made privately by Germany, which was the power the Russians really feared, and this could be endorsed by the other countries, in which Germany would say that she renounced force as a means of settling the problems of her frontiers. Within EDC he would consider the guarantee by Luxembourg that it would not invade Russia as being of the same value as that of Federal Germany, that there remained one urgent problem which was the question of Germany's uncertain borders. Mr. Bidault felt that the guarantees and assurances that the Russians wanted should come from Germany rather than from France or the United Kingdom, as no one would believe that they were prepared to cross Europe and march on Vladivostok. France or Spain might ask one another for guarantees (to put a hypothetical case) even though there were the Pyrenees which had been crossed many times and that would be reasonable. But for Germany, for instance, to demand assurances from Spain would be illogical. Because EDC and the political community do not signify the suppression of the sovereignty of states, and in recent talks it has been said that EDC and the political community would be an amalgamation of sovereign states, the existence of military integration does not suppress the liberties and duties of each state to undertake commitments countersigned by the others. The Russians feel that even democratic Germans will start again what they once so nearly succeeded in doing. The draft of the French Delegation on this subject seemed best to Mr. Bidault.

Secretary Dulles said that the policy of the United States was in accord with a view expressed by Sir Winston both on the question of satellites and recognizing that the Soviet Union, if it behaves, is entitled to the same security for which we hope ourselves. He had ex-

[9] Presumably Bidault is referring to his chairmanship of the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at Paris, Apr. 25–July 12, 1946.

pressed himself in his opening address at the United Nations General Assembly to this effect using language very close to that of the Prime Minister today. Translating that into a concrete plan, he concluded that work might be done on this by the Foreign Ministers when they met in Paris. The Locarno idea, as he understood it, was an undertaking by a group of nations that, if one were attacked, the others would consider the attacking nation as an outlaw and no finger of guilt was pointed at anyone. He believed that it would not be wise to single out the Germans by name as possible future aggressors. This matter should be dealt with in general terms. The Prime Minister had spoken of the importance of not having another Hitler in Germany. The Secretary said he had been in close touch with German problems at the time when Hitler came to power. He felt that if there was any one thing that could be singled out as having helped Hitler to power, it was the feeling on the part of the Germans that they had been singled out as a second class power and the offer of Hitler to redress that situation obtained wide appeal. If our purpose is to avoid the appearance of another Hitler, he would strongly suggest that the way to do this would not be to single out Germany as some sort of moral and political inferior. This would obtain the opposite result. He felt that some general formula which could accomplish what the Prime Minister sought might be proper. This could be discussed by the experts in Paris. He hoped further study would lead to an outcome which would result in the benefits indicated by the Prime Minister.

Mr. Eden said that he wondered about the timetable. There are two methods of proceeding. All seemed to be agreed this should be a declaration and not a negotiation, either a declaration or a re-statement of things said before at NATO and elsewhere, or try to see whether Germany, which was the key to the situation, could not volunteer a statement that we would endorse. This would avoid the dangers that Mr. Dulles had foreseen. Adenauer had said similar things before and we might ask him to say them again and build around that undertaking anything we could usefully add. If the Germans agreed, the experts could work on this so that it could be ready if asked for at Berlin. Mr. Dulles inquired whether Eden meant through normal diplomatic channels, and the British Foreign Secretary replied that was indeed the case. Mr. Eden then said that this seemed to dispose of that part of the business.

Mr. Dulles agreed and said that a bulletin he had just received on the communiqué indicated that the drafting committee might have it ready for submission in about ten minutes. He suggested a recess for this period and Mr. Eden agreed. The meeting then recessed.

## SIXTH PLENARY TRIPARTITE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, MID OCEAN CLUB, BERMUDA, DECEMBER 7, 1953, 10 P. M.

PRESENT

| UNITED STATES | UNITED KINGDOM | FRANCE |
|---|---|---|
| President Eisenhower | Prime Minister Churchill | Foreign Minister Bidault |
| Secretary of State Dulles | Foreign Secretary Eden | M. Bougenot |
| Mr. MacArthur | Sir Norman Brook | M. Parodi |
| Mr. Merchant | Sir Pierson Dixon | M. Alphand |
| Mr. Nash | Sir Frank Roberts | M. de Margerie |
| Mr. Jackson | Mr. Allen | M. Vimont |
| Mr. Hagerty | Mr. Shuckburgh | M. Baeyens |
| Mr. Bowie | Mr. Colville | M. Seydoux |
| Mr. Knight | | M. Laloy |
| Mr. Morris | | M. Andronikov |
| Lt. Col. Walters | | |

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*United States Delegation Minutes*

SECRET BERMUDA, December 7, 1953.

Plenary Minutes 6

During the discussions on the communiqué a number of statements were made by different delegates outside of the strict discussion of the wording of the communiqué.[1] Sir Winston Churchill pointed out that EDC was a French invention. Mr. Bidault said that the Chief of the French Government, whose absence was extremely painful to him and represented an immense sacrifice, had indicated his overall acceptance. Mr. Bidault felt it wise if they could go forward with this matter and put an end to quarrelling over commas. Mr. Eden said that it might perhaps be better to honestly admit that there are differences. If the phrase under discussion referred to what had been asked of the United Kingdom or the United States, he did not think it could be accepted in that form. He did not feel that this matter of the EDC could be conditioned on what the United Kingdom did or did not do in the light of what had already been done. He asked why any blame should be attached to them and if the real cause of difficulty was the Saar, it might be much better to say so plainly. Mr. Bidault replied that the Saar was not purely a French invention. The solution up to now had had but one adversary, who was Molotov, who fortunately survived. He apologized for seeming repetitious, but said that when his country was integrating with another it was important to know where this country began and where it ended. In consequence, if it was impossible for the Allies to give any answer while the French were undertaking formal and repeated commitments which were clearly

[1] For the text of the final communiqué, as agreed during the course of this meeting, see p. 1838.

set forth, he did not know to which God or Prince to turn. His colleagues knew perfectly well that the French had not invented this problem. As the Prime Minister well knew it was when the Saar had returned to Germany for the last time that the great ordeal of the peoples of the world had begun. This must not happen again. How could the freely expressed vote of the Saar people be set aside because other nations who are not themselves free [the Soviets] [2] refuse to recognize the validity of universal suffrage. The question of the Saar was fundamental and symbolic and must not become a barrier to the unification of Europe, but rather make it more possible. He would ask that France not be abandoned by the Allies, along side of whom she had fought. He was perhaps asking too much, but he felt that France had the right to be heard on fundamental matters. He asked that consideration be given to the consequences of the return of the Saar to the Reich and the consequences of the freely expressed vote. He spoke of the many sacrifices that France had made to demonstrate her will to succeed and meet Federal Germany. If all this did not count, this meant that previous sacrifices had been made in vain. He was sure that the opposite was the case. Mr. Bidault said that the French were anxious for a concrete reasonable solution, allowing the western frontier of Germany to be fixed by common agreement by the two peoples who were ruled by free men. France today faced Germany neither knowing where it began nor where it ended. He had one more word to add—the problem raised did not relate only to some villages in the Saar Valley. This area contained population four times as great as that of Zone A and Zone B of the Trieste Territory, ten times as great as Iceland, and four or five times as great as some areas that had been discussed. Having said that, he would conclude. At such a late hour it scarcely seemed appropriate to be carried away by our feelings.

Sir Winston Churchill then said he did not see why the Saar problem had been brought into the discussion of the communiqué. He realized that it was important to France that this problem be settled and was deeply sympathetic with this, but he did not understand why it had been brought into this discussion. Surely the French did not expect us to intervene. There could be, therefore, no profit in discussing it further at this point. We should admit that it was important and should be settled, but not at this meeting.

What, asked Sir Winston, would people think of the communiqué. He had no hesitation in replying that it would be interpreted as meaning that there was no agreement on EDC. This would be believed throughout the world and the consequences would be very grave. Mr. Bidault again called the attention of his colleagues to the fact that the text indicated that EDC was reaffirmed. He said that after so many discussions among the experts to reach a result, and after so much time

[2] Brackets appear in the source text.

had been spent by the French Delegation—apparently uselessly—in trying to explain its problem, he personally felt that there was nothing in the text of the proposed communiqué that was contrary to the truth or could be considered as commiting any of his colleagues.

There followed considerable discussion on the actual wording of the communiqué following which President Eisenhower made a statement. The President said he wanted to make a statement which did not involve anything personal but, nevertheless, he had to go back to the United States to start work on renewing the annual assistance program. Every word or implication that weakened unquestioned adherence of the French Government to EDC made his position more difficult and, in fact, defeated him before he started. This could reach a point where it might be useless to attempt to try and secure approval for this program. He was not saying that he would not try. He would. But the American people had been investing for many years in this program and were hoping for some return from it. They believed in European unity and EDC. The President said that he had derived a good understanding of the problems the French faced from what Mr. Bidault had said but, nevertheless, he was in a tough spot as he had to face up to this problem next month. He could not wait as the matter was almost upon him. He felt that it would be best not to parade in the communiqué all our difficulties if at all avoidable.

Sir Winston Churchill said that the *Washington Post* contained an article which indicated that he was always opposed to press conferences because he believed in a stirring communiqué, and had drafted seventy-five per cent of the communiqué for the Bermuda Conference before he came. He added with a smile that this was surely a distortion of the truth. Mr. Bidault replied that he was upset to see in the *Baltimore Sun* a Reuter dispatch indicating that the French Delegation had broken the secret of their deliberations and then published a full account of what Mr. Bidault had said during the secret deliberations.

Secretary Dulles then asked what were the questions which Mr. Bidault wanted to see solved. A whole series of suggestions had been made in the French Parliament, some new and some unrealistic. Did this mean that it was necessary to accept any condition proposed by any member of the French Chamber of Deputies? If so, we might as well throw the whole thing out of the window. During the debate in the French Parliament almost every Deputy had advanced a solution. Some wanted guarantees on the stationing of troops, others new treaties, others a prolongation of the North Atlantic Treaty—the air was full of various conditions. It would be tragic if EDC was thrown into the arena two years after it had been signed, three years after it had been negotiated, after the protocols had been agreed upon, after the Germans had ratified it in both Houses of Parliament, after one of the Dutch and one of the Belgian Chambers had ratified it. If now

new questions involving England and the United States were brought up, then it might be best to say nothing about it in the communiqué.

There was further discussion on the communiqué and finally Mr. Bidault said that he would agree on the contents of the disputed paragraph if he could obtain the consent that was indispensable of the French Premier who must bear the supreme parliamentary responsibility on this question.

The meeting was adjourned briefly and, upon reconvening, a mutually agreeable wording was proposed for the disputed paragraph and the communiqué was then approved.

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## 3. DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

396.1/12–653

*The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the Government of the Soviet Union* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERMUDA, December 6, 1953.

The US Government is glad to learn from the Soviet Government's Note of November 26 that it is now prepared to take part in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the UK, US, France and the Soviet Union. It is its hope that this meeting will lead towards the reunification of Germany in freedom and to the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty.

The US Government is confident that real progress towards the settlement of the German and Austrian questions, which are especially urgent, will contribute to the solution of other major international problems, including that of European security. In this connection, the US Government reaffrms that the voluntary association of the free countries of the Atlantic Alliance and the actions of certain European states for developing their prosperity and ensuring their joint security are exclusively defensive and a collective contribution to peace.

The Soviet Government has stated its desire to discuss the possibility of a Five-Power conference. The forthcoming meeting of the four Foreign Ministers will enable any participating Government to state its views on this question.

The US Government, having consulted with the German Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin, proposes that the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers should begin on January 4, 1954, in the building of the former Allied Control Council in Berlin.

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[1] The source text was approved by the Foreign Ministers at their third meeting on Dec. 6 (for a record of this meeting, see FM MIN 3, p. 1787) and was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 10 (telegram 2 to Berlin) from Bermuda, Dec. 6. This telegram was repeated to Washington, Paris, London, Moscow, and Vienna. The text was shown to Chancellor Adenauer and to Mayor Schreiber, who approved it, and delivered in Moscow to the Soviet Government on Dec. 8. For further documentation on this note and the Soviet note of Nov. 26, see volume VII.

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## *Communiqué of the Bermuda Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, and France* [1]

BERMUDA, December 7, 1953.

The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the Council of Ministers of the French Republic, accompanied by the Foreign Ministers of the three countries, met in Bermuda from the 4th to 7th of December, 1953. At their meeting they discussed their policies regarding many parts of the world where their countries have obligations. On the conclusion of the Conference they issued the following statement:

I.

Our meetings symbolized and confirmed the unity of purpose of our three countries. We found ourselves in accord on our analysis of the problems confronting us and have agreed on various measures essential for their solution.

Confident that our united strength is the best guarantee of peace and security we are resolved to maintain our joint efforts to perfect it. If the danger of aggression now appears less imminent, we attribute this to the mounting strength of the free world and the firmness of its policies.

We shall remain resolute in maintaining our solidarity and vigilant against efforts to divide us.

With their material and moral resources we are confident that the free peoples can provide both for their security and for their well being. We dedicate ourselves to work together towards these ends.

II.

The North Atlantic Treaty is and will remain the foundation of our common policy. We discussed means of developing the defensive capacity of our Alliance. Lord Ismay, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, was present at the conversations on this subject.

In the continuing development of a united Europe, including Germany, we see the best means of achieving greater prosperity, security and stability for its free peoples. We reaffirmed that the European Defence Community is needed to assure the defensive capacity of the Atlantic Community of which it will be an integral part. Within this framework it will ensure intimate and durable cooperation between the United Kingdom and United States forces and the forces of the European Defence Community on the Continent of Europe. The

[1] Released to the press on Dec. 7.

French Minister of Foreign Affairs explained the problems facing his Government in regard to the European Defence Community.

We cannot accept as justified or permanent the present division of Europe. Our hope is that in due course peaceful means will be found to enable the countries of Eastern Europe again to play their part as free nations in a free Europe.

III.

Our three Governments will lose no opportunity for easing the tensions that beset the world and for reassuring all nations that they have no cause to fear that the strength of the West will be invoked in any cause of wrongful violence. On the contrary it is the fundamental principle of the United Nations Organisation, which we serve, that the guarantees against aggression shall be universal in their application.

We are confident that if we remain strong, united and steadfast it will become possible gradually to solve the stubborn problems which have too long been unsettled.

In this spirit we have examined the latest note from the Soviet Government. We approved the text of our replies, which should lead to an early meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. Our hope is that this meeting will make progress towards the reunification of Germany in freedom and the conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty and thus towards the solution of other major international problems.

IV.

We reviewed the situation in the Far East. The immediate object of our policy continues to be the convening of the political conference provided for in the Korean Armistice agreement. This would provide the means for reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and for making progress in restoring more normal conditions in the Far East and South East Asia.

In Indo-China we salute the valiant forces of France and of the three Associated States of Indo-China fighting within the French Union to protect the independence of Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam. We recognise the vital importance of their contribution to the defence of the free world. We will continue to work together to restore peace and stability in this area.

V.

Our meetings have reinforced our solidarity, strengthened our resolve, and fortified our hopes. Confident in our common purposes and united in our views we shall persevere in our policies, whose sole aim is to foster and assure peace.

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*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)*[1]

TOP SECRET [BERMUDA,] December 8, 1953.

Participants: The President
Lord Ismay
Mr. MacArthur

In response to the President's request, Mr. MacArthur joined the President and Lord Ismay about 9 o'clock this morning. The President indicated that he and Lord Ismay had been discussing the French situation. The President said that he was concerned by the apparent French tendency, as demonstrated at the Bermuda meeting, to request additional commitments from the United States and United Kingdom as a sort of a condition for French ratification of EDC. The President said the United States had been extending all kinds of assistance to France and supporting France on the basis that the French Government would move ahead on EDC. He mentioned the $385,000,000 which had been granted to France for Indochina and stated his recollection that this had been granted on the condition that France ratify EDC.

Mr. MacArthur commented that the U.S. had not linked the $385,000,000 for Indochina and the EDC in the formal documents which had been exchanged when the recent Indochina agreement was completed. It had been deemed undesirable to link these two questions publicly or in the documents which had been exchanged, since it had been feared that opponents of EDC and opponents of France's continuing effort in Indochina might join together in the Assembly and block the French Government in its plans to send further reinforcements to Indochina, which were essential if success were to be achieved there. On the other hand, Ambassador Dillon in his conversations with M. Laniel and M. Bidault had made clear that we were extending this aid on the basis that the French Government's determination to put EDC through the French Parliament at the earliest possible moment had not in any way changed.

Mr. MacArthur recalled that the President had sent a letter to M. Laniel about September 20 [2] which after expressing regret that Laniel could not visit the U.S. had stated the President's understanding that both M. Laniel and M. Bidault believed the situation in France was propitious for the French Government to move quickly toward ratification and that both the French leaders were trying to bring it about by the end of the year. Mr. MacArthur also mentioned Laniel's reply to the above letter, which was received early in October, in which Laniel had confirmed that his Government's commitment in connec-

[1] The meeting took place from 9 to 9:40 a. m. on Dec. 8.

[2] For President Eisenhower's letter to Laniel, Sept. 20, see p. 812; for Laniel's reply, Oct. 8, see p. 820.

tion with EDC was binding and that his major concern was to get early French ratification of the EDC. Mr. MacArthur added that Laniel had not, however, indicated that it would be possible to get final French action before the end of the year. The President said that he recalled the exchange of letters and that probably was what he had in mind in connection with the linking of the additional aid to Indochina to the EDC.

In connection with the French problem, Mr. MacArthur expressed the opinion that the problem in France was not of French public opinion but one of parliamentary opinion and that until the French elections for the Presidency on December 17 were out of the way, we could not expect any constructive action of any kind from the French with respect to this problem. After the presidential elections considerable would depend on who was elected President and who the next Prime Minister would be. In this latter connection, there might be a real political crisis in France on the election of the new government, since the EDC question might be the major problem on which the formation of a new government would hinge. The President indicated that we should not let the French forget that EDC is a French proposal; that the U.S. has given all sorts of support to France—both in furnishing arms equipment and in increasing the numbers of U.S. divisions—and Europe on the basis that EDC would go through. We have reached a point where if EDC does not go through, our whole programs and policies aimed at building real defensive strength in Western Europe will be in very great jeopardy. Furthermore, we cannot go ahead developing plans for Europe when we don't know what kind of a Europe we will have to deal with.

The President said that he felt that Lord Ismay could be very helpful in driving home to the members of the North Atlantic Council the importance of bringing EDC into effect in the next couple of months if our whole collective effort aimed at European defense was not to bog down and come apart at the seams.

Mr. MacArthur threw out the suggestion that in particular Lord Ismay might bring the gravity of the present situation to the attention of the Dutch and Belgian members of the North Atlantic Council and their respective governments so that the latter could put pressure on the French. The advantage of this was that, whereas France always took the position that the U.S. and U.K. were not involved in the EDC and, therefore, were not making the kind of sacrifice that France was making, the Dutch and Belgians were prospective members and were making sacrifices of an equivalent nature to those of the French. For example, if the Dutch and Belgians indicated to the French that if EDC failed through French opposition, they would have to consider making arrangements with Germany and including the U.S. and U.K. so that the German situation would not drift indefinitely and

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perhaps take a turn which would jeopardize both the Netherlands and Belgium. Mr. MacArthur said that this was just a personal idea of his own but if the Dutch and Belgians knew the gravity of the situation as the United States sees it and if they heard it from an international figure like Lord Ismay, they might be able to do some helpful work of some kind on the French. The President said that if we could get the Dutch, the Belgians and the other members of EDC to work on France, it might be very helpful and also he hoped Lord Ismay would do his utmost with all members of NATO in his role as the senior civilian official of the entire organization. Lord Ismay said that he fully agreed and would do his best with NATO and would also see what he could do with the Dutch and Belgians.

Lord Ismay then in a very general way gave some of his views on NATO mentioning in particular that we had now reached a point where defense expenditures had to level off and the great problem was to get the most effective defense with the resources which would be available. Lord Ismay paid a high tribute to General Gruenther who, he said, was doing a superb job not only in the headquarters at SHAPE but in his talks and meetings with members of the NATO Governments and their parliamentarians and high officials. The President said that he had made the decision to leave General Gruenther in Europe because he believed that General Gruenther, more than any other figure, could hold the NAT organization together and keep it moving ahead. In connection with General Gruenther, the President said he had been disturbed by the tendency of Field Marshal Montgomery to sometimes take quite an independent line in some of his statements, particularly when he was visiting other NATO countries. The President mentioned the Field Marshal's trip to Greece as a case in point. He said he thought that if Monty were off the reservation, Ismay as the senior civilian official of the NAT Organization should speak to him in no uncertain terms. In a military command unswerving loyalty was expected of subordinates. The President understood that Monty was happy to serve under General Gruenther but if Monty could not follow out the directives and policy of General Gruenther then he should go and be replaced by someone who would. In particular, the President said that if the question ever came up about a choice between Field Marshal Montgomery and General Gruenther, there was absolutely no question where the President stood and it might be useful if Lord Ismay would let Monty know how we felt about this. The meeting then broke up with the arrival of Miss Whitman with some papers for the President's signature. On taking leave Lord Ismay said that his discussion with the President had been tremendously helpful and that he was deeply grateful to the President for giving so generously of his time. He would go back to Europe and do his utmost to be helpful with respect to the matters which he had discussed with the President.

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*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)*[1]

SECRET [BERMUDA,] December 8, 1953.

Participants: Secretary of State Dulles
Prime Minister Laniel
Mr. MacArthur

Secretary Dulles, accompanied by Mr. MacArthur, called on Prime Minister Laniel to say goodbye to him. The Prime Minister was still confined to his bed by doctor's orders and received the Secretary and Mr. MacArthur in his bedroom. The Secretary said that he had come to say goodbye to M. Laniel and to tell him how sorry he was that his illness had prevented him from attending the meetings. At the same time the Secretary expressed relief that according to all reports, M. Laniel was well on the way to recovery. M. Laniel thanked the Secretary and said that, never having been ill in his life, he was extremely chagrined to be laid up during the important meetings at Bermuda.

The conversation then turned to the meetings and the Secretary commented that there had been a long discussion with respect to the EDC and he hoped that there was no change in the French Government's determination to push EDC to a successful conclusion. M. Laniel said that he supported EDC but that he had great political difficulties in France with the Parliament. In particular, he felt it might have been a mistake to have precipitated the recent debate in the Assembly on the EDC since while the objective had been to get a vote in favor of the EDC, the final result had been confused and it was clear that at that time an EDC majority in the French Assembly did not exist. M. Laniel said he hoped that in due course a majority of the French Assembly would support the EDC.

Secretary Dulles said that he would like to speak very frankly to M. Laniel. He had always been a friend of France, having visited there as a boy with his father when he had bicycled throughout the country and later having studied at the Sorbonne. Since that time he had made numerous trips to France where he had many friends. Secretary Dulles then said that it was the strongest desire of the United States to see France's role of leadership on the European continent and in world affairs maintained and increased. Leadership, however, required the facing up to responsibilities and realities. In connection with the EDC if France because of internal political difficulties could not face up to the situation and take positive action on it, it was doubtful that she could maintain a position of leadership. The Secretary emphasized that any country which wishes to play a great role must act when

[1] The meeting took place from 9 : 55 to 10 : 10 a. m., Dec. 8.

necessity requires it so to do. The world would not stand still while France continued to postpone facing up to the decision on the EDC which involved the basic question of European unity. The Secretary said he felt he could speak this way because he felt he was a real friend of France. However, if France could not act when the situation required it, all the friendship in the world would not be able to support or sustain a position of leadership for France.

M. Laniel reiterated that the political situation in France was very, very difficult but that he would continue to do his best. He hoped that after the Presidential elections were over and a new French Government was formed that a pro-EDC majority in the French Assembly would be possible. The Secretary concluded by saying he did not wish to tire M. Laniel so that he would bid him goodbye. He wished him a very speedy recovery and expressed the hope that he might catch a glimpse of him while in Paris for the North Atlantic Council meeting.

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*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)*

SECRET BERMUDA, December 8, 1953.

Participants: Ambassador Herve Alphand
Livingston T. Merchant

Just before I left the club Alphand telephoned to ask if he could see me privately and informally. When he arrived he said that he was coming with Bidault's knowledge but he wanted to talk to me personally as an old friend about the question of assurances from the U.S. regarding maintenance of troops in Europe as a means to facilitate EDC ratification by France. He asked at the outset if we would be willing to sit down quietly with the French and the British in Paris at the time of the Council meeting to attempt to draw up a statement of U.S. intent or commitment which could then be held secretly in reserve for release at the critical moment in the debate.

I told Alphand that of course we would be willing to sit down privately in Paris and discuss sympathetically this whole question but that I thought he should be under no illusions regarding the following points. First, whereas our obvious purpose was to be as helpful as possible in securing passage of the EDC there were very definite limits, constitutional and other, beyond which we could not go. Secondly, that on a number of occasions the President and the Secretary of State had made public statements designed to clarify U.S. policy and reassure public opinion. There were also outstanding such state-

ments as the tripartite Declaration of May 27, 1952.[1] I said I doubted personally that we could go much beyond what we have already said or committed ourselves to but that obviously it might be possible to find some form of re-presentation which would be effective. Third, that I had always personally felt that in the effort to render precise, in written language, the policy which our adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty fundamentally constituted, we ran the grave risk of provoking a debate which regardless of its outcome might do great damage to our common endeavors while it was going on. I said that I wondered under whose domination Latin America might be today if, starting in 1820, the new countries of South America had attempted to nail the Monroe Doctrine down into precise, detailed treaties of alliance with the United States. Finally, I said that I thought it improbable we could agree on or put in final form any statement until the test of the crucial debate in the French Assembly were already upon us. I said it had been an educational experience to us to watch the mounting demands made on the British in this same general connection with the result that when they went down the road one-half a mile in answer to an appeal they were immediately requested to travel another mile.

Alphand did not seem surprised or upset by what I said but expressed appreciation for my reiterated assurance that we would talk to the French on this subject in Paris next week.

[1] *Ante*, p. 686.

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CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "Big Three Bermuda"

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)*

TOP SECRET BERMUDA, December 8, 1953.

Participants: M. Boegner, French Delegation
Mr. MacArthur, U.S.

M. Boegner called on me in my room at noon today. He said he had a matter which he wished to take up with me at M. Bidault's request. It concerned exchanges of information on atomic energy matters. M. Boegner then handed me a flimsy copy of a memo (translation of which is attached hereto),[1] and said he hoped I would accept it and pass it on to Secretary Dulles. He also said a copy of this memo was being handed to the UK Delegation.

[1] Not printed; it asked that the British and United States Governments study the question of sharing atomic energy information, and that they be prepared to discuss it with the French at Paris in a few days. The French asked further that they be allowed to participate in studies concerning the effects of atomic weapons and the means of protection against them.

I said I would be glad to see that the French memorandum reached Secretary Dulles. After glancing at it, I said to M. Boegner that I was not an expert on atomic energy questions, but from perusing his memo rapidly I should warn him that the requests made might well be impossible to grant. With respect to the US–UK–Canada exchanges of information, these arrangements were of very long standing and had their origin during the war. The recent announcement about them was in no sense a new arrangement or new agreement but simply an extension of existing arrangements which were sanctioned by the US Congress. Although I knew very little about the technical and legal aspects of these questions, I did not believe these arrangements could be extended to the French without specific Congressional action.

With respect to the other points raised in the French memo, I told M. Boegner that I could not comment on them other than to say that in this whole atomic field, the US Government's liberty of action was strictly limited by Congressional legislation.

I concluded by inquiring when M. Bidault expected a reply on these matters, and M. Boegner said Bidault would unquestionably hope to have Secretary Dulles' reaction next week during the course of the NATO Meeting. He added that M. Bidault had in mind having the three Foreign Ministers get together quietly some time during the NATO Meeting.

(*Comment* by Mr. MacArthur: This memo should be sent to Mr. Arneson and Mr. Merchant at once. It is hoped Mr. Arneson can prepare a position paper by tomorrow evening. Also, before Paris we should coordinate our position with the British so that we both tell the same story. Mr. Arneson might be able to do this through Sir Roger Makins prior to the Secretary's departure on Friday.)

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Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, 1953–61, Whitman file

*Memorandum of Discussion at the 174th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 10, 1953*

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY WASHINGTON, December 11, 1953.

Present at the 174th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend because of his absence from the country. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense; Gen. Porter, Foreign Operations Administration; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President (for Items 1, 2 and 3); Maurice Arth, Foreign Operations Administration (for Item 5); the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of significant world developments affecting United States security.]

2. *The Bermuda Conference*

Secretary Dulles stated that since he had already spoken to the Cabinet generally about the Bermuda Conference, he would confine his remarks this morning to matters of special concern to the National Security Council. The first of these matters was the attitude of the British and French to our suggestions with regard to normalizing the use of atomic weapons. Secretary Dulles said that both the British and the French exhibited very stubborn resistance to any idea of the automatic use of atomic weapons, even in the case of a Communist renewal of hostilities in Korea.

. . . . . .

Secretary Dulles then said that there was one other issue discussed at Bermuda which would be of special interest to the National Security Council. This was trade between the free world on the one hand and the Soviet bloc and China on the other. The British were sticking strongly to their familiar view that now that actual hostilities were over, this trade must be considerably increased. While, said Secretary Dulles, Sir Winston had emphasized the importance of trade as a weapon for penetrating the Iron Curtain, he could also clearly detect an even greater concern for the advantages which such increased trade could confer on the British economy.

The President said that he hoped that the Council would pardon him if he once again reminded them of his own position and hope that the United States would be selective and not take arbitrary action to cut off all trade with the Soviet bloc and Communist China.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State on the subject.

[Here follows discussion of the NATO Ministerial meeting (this part of the memorandum is printed on page 450), United States policy and courses of action to counter Soviet or satellite action against Berlin (printed in volume VII), United States policy with respect to

Germany (printed in volume VII), United States objectives and courses of action with respect to Latin America, United States assistance to NATO allies, and the status of NSC projects.]

## G. Four-Power Conference at Berlin, January 23–February 18, 1954

*Editorial Note*

Following five exchanges of notes from July 15 to December 26, 1953, a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union was held at Berlin, January 25 to February 18, 1954. At the second session of the conference the three Western powers accepted an agenda, proposed by the Soviet Union, consisting of the following three points:

"1. Measures for reducing tension in international relations and the convening of a meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Chinese People's Republic.

"2. The German question and the problem of ensuring European security.

"3. The Austrian State Treaty." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 196)

Discussion of the first item resulted in agreement to hold a conference at Geneva in April to consider Korea and Indochina. Discussion on items two and three proved fruitless, showing that major differences still existed between the three Western powers and the Soviet Union over the peace settlements with Germany and Austria.

Documentation on the Berlin Conference and on the exchanges of notes between the Soviet Union and the United States, the United Kingdom, and France is presented in volume VII; documentation on the Geneva Conference, April 26 to July 21, 1954, is presented in volume XVI.

## H. Nine-Power Conference at London, September 28–October 3, 1954

*Editorial Note*

From September 28 to October 3, 1954, a Nine-Power Conference was held in London to deal with the question of the association of the Federal Republic of Germany with the West and a German contribution to the Western European defense system. The Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,

Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States held 14 plenary meetings during the 6 days of the conference in an attempt to reach agreement on these issues. The Foreign Ministers of France, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, and United States also held five meetings concerning matters relating to their occupation status in Germany. In addition to the Nine-Power Conference and the Four-Power Conference, numerous bilateral and multilateral meetings occurred which dealt with conference matters as well as other subjects of common interest. By Sunday, October 3, agreement had been reached on the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference which incorporated many decisions affecting the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, NATO, and the Brussels Treaty Organization. It was decided to end the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, revoke the Occupation Statute, abolish the Allied High Commission, strengthen the Brussels Treaty Organization by inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to join, and recommend that NATO invite the Federal Republic of Germany to become a member.

Between October 3 and October 20, when the Foreign Ministers met again in Paris, the formulation of the necessary instruments to implement these decisions took place. Final agreement was reached on the texts of these documents during meetings of the Nine-Power Conference, Four-Power Conference, and NATO Ministerial Council from October 20 to October 23, with the formal signing ceremonies of the "Paris Agreements" on Saturday, October 23.

For comprehensive documentation on the London and Paris phases of the Nine-Power and Four-Power Conferences, including the texts of conference documents, see pages 1294 ff.

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