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1943

Volume II
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PREFACE

This volume was prepared under the direct supervision of E. Ralph Perkins, who retired as Chief of the Foreign Relations Division on December 30, 1963. The compiler of the volume was N. O. Sappington, assisted by John P. Glennon and a former member of the Division, Warren H. Reynolds.

The Division of Publishing Services (Jerome H. Perlmutter, Chief) was responsible for the technical editing of this volume and the preparation of the index. These functions were performed in the Foreign Relations Section under the direct supervision of Elizabeth A. Vary, Chief, and Ouida J. Ward, Assistant Chief.

WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN
*Director, Historical Office,
Bureau of Public Affairs*

FEBRUARY 20, 1964.

PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the current regulation is printed below:

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, shall be edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, the Historical Office shall:

- a. Refer to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refer to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

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ALBANIA

QUESTION OF RECOGNITION OF AN ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE

[The United States did not recognize the annexation of Albania by Italy in 1939. For correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, volume II, pages 365 ff. In a statement to the press, December 10, 1942, on continued resistance of Albania to Italian occupation, the Secretary of State reaffirmed the policy of the United States of non-recognition of Italian annexation and called for the restoration of a free Albania. See Department of State *Bulletin*, December 12, 1942, page 998.

On January 20, 1943, Mr. Peter V. Kolonia, an Albanian citizen, called at the Department of State, stating that he had been appointed "Acting Representative" in Washington of King Zog. He requested the Department to extend recognition to King Zog as head of the Albanian Government in exile. Mr. Kolonia was informed that recognition of a particular group outside of Albania would raise the question of which group actually represented the Albanian people and that it was the Department's policy to postpone political questions of this nature until the people of the occupied country involved would have an opportunity to express themselves when liberated. (701.7511/56)

On March 30, 1943, President Roosevelt referred to the Department of State for preparation of a reply a letter of March 4 from Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., Ambassador and Minister at London to several governments in exile, enclosing a letter of February 19 from King Zog to Mr. Biddle expressing the King's readiness to send a representative to Washington to effect the re-establishment of normal relations between the United States and Albania. On May 1, the Department sent to President Roosevelt for his signature a reply instructing Mr. Biddle to thank King Zog for his friendly sentiments but to tell him that "the occupation of his country makes it impractical to define our policy with respect to the future government of Albania beyond the broad outlines of the Secretary's statement of December 10." This letter, as signed by the President and sent to Ambassador Biddle, was dated May 3, 1943 (711.75/20).]

BELGIUM

REPRESENTATION BY BELGIUM REGARDING BOMBING IN BELGIUM BY AMERICAN AIR FORCES WHICH RESULTED IN HEAVY CASUAL- TIES AMONG BELGIAN POPULATION

740.0011 European War 1939/29428

*The Belgian Ambassador (Van der Straten-Ponthoz) to the Secretary
of State*

No. 2289

The Belgian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to have recourse to his usual courtesy in the following matter.

On April 29th the Belgian Government handed to Ambassador Biddle in London a note regarding the bombardment of Antwerp by the American Air Force, the contents of which is summarized here below.

"The Belgian Government having been consulted by the British authorities regarding the bombardment of military objectives on Belgian territory, agreed in principle on such bombardments on condition that the military importance of the objective be in proportion to the hazards involved by the civilian population. The Belgian Government also emphasized the desirability of consulting with the Belgian information services before proceeding with such aerial operations.

The Belgian Government regrets that these principles which had been carefully adhered to up until now, were not applied at the time of the raid on The Erla Works and The Gevaert Photographic Supply Company near Antwerp on April 5th. On that day 300 tons of bombs were dropped from a very high altitude into a densely populated area, killing 1200 persons, many among whom were children. German propaganda was not slow to take full advantage of the profound emotion created among the people by these heavy casualties.

The Belgian people are prepared to accept the inevitable risks of Allied aerial operations, provided they are assured that every precaution has been taken to reduce their sacrifices to a minimum. In the case of the raid of April 5th these precautions were apparently not taken as evidenced by the results of the raid on the one hand, and the appalling loss of life on the other.

The Belgian Government cannot consider as acceptable the conditions under which that air raid was carried out and urgently requests that the American Air Force avoid objectives and methods of operation that involve excessive hazards for the civilian population. The Belgian Government is certain that the United States Government is fully aware of the importance of this matter. Disregard of the principles outlined above would result in destruction, loss

of life, and grief far in excess of the military need, and might further leave an undesirable impression on the minds of the Belgian people.

The United States Government no doubt knows that it is with the full support of the Belgians in the occupied country that the Belgian Government is giving all possible aid to the Allied war effort for the liberation of the enslaved people of the world. It is within the framework of this policy and without any contradiction to its principles, that the present request is being made."

The Belgian Ambassador has been instructed by his Government to call this matter to the special attention of the American authorities. He would be very grateful if the Department would be kind enough to interpose its good offices so that favorable consideration be given to this request.

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1943.

740.0011 European War 1939/29428

The Secretary of State to the Belgian Ambassador
(*Van der Straten-Ponthoz*)¹

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Belgian Ambassador and has the honor to refer to his note No. 2289 of May 5, 1943 quoting the text of a note of April 29 which the Belgian Government in London handed to the American Ambassador regarding the bombardment of Antwerp by the American Air Force. The note of the Ambassador's Government has received the earnest and careful consideration of the appropriate American military authorities.

In reply the Ambassador is assured that it has ever been and will continue to be the policy and practice of the United States Government to do everything within its power to crush utterly all enemy resistance in the shortest possible time without causing unnecessary suffering among the innocent peoples of Axis occupied countries. This Government is fully aware of the misery attendant upon enemy domination, and it has no desire to add to that misery by any thoughtlessness or by any military action which is not of real value in speeding the liberation of enslaved peoples.

The American theory and technique of bomber employment are so designed as to permit, with minimum waste of effort, the ultimate efficiency in the destruction of actual installations which are of real assistance to the enemy war-making ability. Applied to bombing in Axis occupied countries, this technique tends to cause less extraneous destruction outside the targets themselves, and the American Air Forces have demonstrated a generally increasing ability to restrict

¹ Handed to the Ambassador by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs on June 9.

civilian damage while accomplishing the desired purpose. Some civilian casualties cannot be avoided, but the attainment of even a part of the possibilities of this technique reduces materially the risk to nearby populations.

The United States Government deeply regrets any loss of Belgian life incurred on the occasion of the April 5 attack upon military targets in the Antwerp area. It hastens to assure the Belgian Government that there was no intention to disregard principles previously agreed upon and outlined in the Ambassador's note under reference. The targets in question were industrial establishments known to be of great importance to the Axis war effort, and it has been ascertained that normally adequate precautions were taken in this attack to avoid dropping bombs outside the target area.

The United States Government reaffirms its agreement to the effect that American Air Forces must not attack, in occupied countries, objectives which are not vitally important to the enemy effort, and it will do everything within its power to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. However, the Secretary feels sure of the Ambassador's agreement that vital units of Axis industry cannot be ignored in the total effort of the United Nations to achieve victory and liberate the enslaved peoples of Europe, including Belgium, from the Axis at the earliest possible moment. Therefore, in so far as it is humanly possible without danger to the Allied effort, American bombing will continue to be carried out against proper objectives everywhere, but in a manner designed to cause minimum injury to the civilian populations of occupied countries.

It is hoped that the Belgian Government will understand the necessity for this position. Prolongation of the war and the continued suffering of captive peoples would necessarily be the consequence of a policy whereby the enemy, in disposing either his industry or his defenses, would be permitted to take advantage of any regional immunities.

The Belgian Government may rest assured that every effort will be made to prevent unnecessary suffering on the part of innocent persons in any of the Axis-occupied countries.

WASHINGTON [undated].

**SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
BELGIUM REGARDING PRINCIPLES APPLYING TO THE PROVISION
OF AID TO THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES**

[For text of agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington January 30, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 313, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 920.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BELGIUM REGARDING JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE BELGIAN CONGO

[For text of agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington March 31, May 27, June 23, and August 4, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 395, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1215.]

DENMARK

CONTINUED RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE DANISH MINISTER AS REPRESENTATIVE OF DENMARK WHILE THAT COUNTRY WAS UNDER GERMAN OCCUPATION¹

859.00/988

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*²

[WASHINGTON, April 8, 1943.]

The only positive suggestion made by Mr. Kauffmann³ in his memorandum of December 7, 1942, is that if we and the Americans think it desirable that there should be a change in Denmark we should in good time get a message through to King Christian, informing him of our views. This is a suggestion which had occurred to us, and we will certainly bear it in mind. For your confidential information we have in the past conveyed messages to King Christian through secret channels, and we recently informed him of our opinion, in which the State Department concurs, that in the event of the Germans imposing unacceptable demands he should not abdicate but rather become a prisoner. This makes it clear that we are interested in his attitude and look to him to maintain Denmark's independence as far as possible, but at present we do not think that the time is ripe for any more positive message. King Christian has given us to understand that he proposes to act in accordance with our advice should the Germans bring about a constitutional crisis. Our present information is that the Germans are not pressing the Danes particularly hard and that they are content for the time being at any rate with the present compromise. The Danish Government for their part, in spite of the recent appointment of Scavenius as Prime Minister, maintain considerable will and ability to resist German demands, and we are not convinced that there would at this stage be any advantage in an attempt on our part to upset the Government and to work for a state of affairs approximating more to that of other occupied countries. The time may come, however, when owing either to the general war situation or a change in German policy towards Denmark we may wish to call upon the Danes to change to a more active resistance. But in the present circumstances we do

¹ For previous correspondence on the refusal of the United States to recognize actions of the Danish Government deemed to be under German duress, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 35 ff.

² Left with the Department on April 8 by Mr. Donald Hall and Mr. John Wheeler-Bennett of the British Embassy.

³ Henrik de Kauffmann, Danish Minister in the United States.

not think that a radical change would produce any noticeable advantage to the cause of the United Nations, and in any case we doubt if anything we could do would produce such a change.

859.01/89

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Cumming)

[WASHINGTON,] August 20, 1943.

Participants: Mr. Donald Hall, First Secretary, British Embassy;
Mr. David Bowes-Lyon, British PWE Mission;⁴
Mr. Turkelson;
Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Assistant Chief, Division of European Affairs;
Mr. R. Borden Reams, Division of European Affairs.

Mr. Donald Hall, accompanied by Mr. Bowes-Lyon, called on me today by appointment to present Mr. Turkelson. Mr. Turkelson is a Dane employed by the PWE who is in the United States for a visit of about one month. His trip was arranged by PWE with, I understand, the approval of the Danish Council in London and Mr. de Kauffmann, Danish Minister in Washington.

Mr. Hall referred to the previous conversation which I had had with him about a fortnight ago during which I had informed him, on instructions of Assistant Secretary Berle, of our concern lest a telegram sent by the Danish Council in London to Danes in the United States and presumably in other parts of the world might indicate a divergence between British and American views regarding the propaganda and political warfare line to be taken toward Denmark. (During this previous conversation Mr. Hall had told me he felt sure that the Danish Council's telegram did not represent British official views, which he was sure coincided, except possibly the minor points of detail, with the State Department's views. He promised to take the matter up with the Foreign Office.)

Mr. Hall said that he had now received a reply to the inquiry which he had sent the Foreign Office and handed me a copy of the Foreign Office telegram which is attached hereto marked A.⁵

Mr. Bowes-Lyon had a copy of another telegram which he had received from the Foreign Office, a copy of which is attached hereto and marked B.⁵

After reading these telegrams I remarked that the line set forth in these messages differed considerably from the line taken in the telegram sent out by the Danish Council in London and that the new British line, except in certain minor points of emphasis, seemed to

⁴ Political Warfare Executive Mission.

⁵ Not attached to file copy of this memorandum.

follow that previously agreed upon between the Department and the British Foreign Office in that it purposed to obtain cooperation on the part of Danes in Denmark by emphasizing the specific results obtained by underground activities in Denmark whereas the line taken by the Danish Council was critical of internal Danish effort.

Following the line previously indicated to me by Mr. Berle, I said that we were concerned over the attitude taken by the Danish Council as much because of its possible adverse effect on Danes living outside of Denmark as because of its effect on persons still within that country. I said that I assumed that the British Government had an interest in this equal to our own, since we both had military forces in temporary occupation of Danish territory—referring, of course, to the Faroes and to Greenland. Naturally we did not desire to see any split within the ranks of the Danes not under German domination and even little things might tend to create such a division.

Mr. Bowes-Lyon remarked that the Danish position was especially difficult because it had no government in exile to act as a focal point.

I said that precisely because of that fact I thought that it was in the interest of both the British Government and the American Government to attempt to supply some substitute for this missing focal point. I said that I thought that this might be brought about through (a) full coordination of views between Danes in Britain, (b) coordination between the Danes in Britain and the British Foreign Office; (c) full coordination between the Danes in the United States and those other Danes in the rest of the world who voluntarily look to Mr. de Kauffmann for guidance; (d) coordination between Mr. de Kauffmann and the State Department which we already had to the fullest extent; and (e) coordination between the British and American Governments with regard to their propaganda and political warfare objectives in Denmark. I said that if we had coordination in all of these fields, we would be doing a very friendly thing for the free Denmark which we all hoped would eventually be reestablished. My three visitors seemed to indicate their agreement.

The conversation then became general.

CONFIDENTIAL NOTE: Before leaving my office, Mr. Bowes-Lyon asked me if I saw the British PWE directive regarding Denmark. I told him that I only saw the summaries which we received from time to time through OWI.⁷ Mr. Bowes-Lyon said that he thought that I should see the full directives for Norway, Denmark, Holland and perhaps some other countries and said that he would arrange to have these sent to me commencing in a few days for my strictly confidential information. I thanked him and said that I would be very glad to have them.

⁷ Office of War Information.

859.00/1068

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1943.

The Danish Minister came in to see me, at his request.

He referred to the recent reports emanating from Denmark and tending to show that the King was now guarded in one of his country palaces and that the Government had resigned. He said that at the moment he had no information other than that which came through the press, and that he had already been told by Mr. Reams, of the European Division, that we had no reports, either. I said that this was true.

He said that as it seemed to him, before he could take account of stock, two situations had to be clarified:

(1) Was it true that the King was now captive and that the Danish Government had been dispersed; and

(2) Was it true, as stated, that a number of Danish political personages had escaped to Sweden, where they might undertake to carry on political activity?

Until these questions were answered, he said, he could not see that there was much to be done at this time. He had felt right along that the Danish people would make some move, partly because of their settled hostility to the Germans, but partly because most Danes felt that they could not save their souls unless in some outstanding fashion they aligned themselves definitely against the Nazis. He knew they had been increasingly restive under the rather passive regime.

Agreeing that it was premature, he then asked what our view as to his status was, in the light of developments, and in the light of the possibility that some of the Danes might have escaped to Sweden. I said that obviously we could not say anything without knowing the facts. We had long ago continued to recognize him as Minister of Denmark, though representing a government which was in effect captive. On the basis of the press reports, nothing had happened so far except that the captivity was now obvious, whereas heretofore there had been an attempt to deny the fact.

As to the possibility of escaped Danish personages in Sweden, of course I could say nothing. The Minister was well acquainted with our policy towards so-called free movements and with the fact that we were cautious about assuming the representative quality of such free movements in the absence of access to the peoples they claimed to represent. This did not, of course, prevent us from dealing with a situation in which such a group were representative, as in the case of President Beneš.⁸

⁸ Of Czechoslovakia.

I said that I had discussed the matter with Secretary Hull this morning and that I hoped the Minister would keep in close touch with us, since he might have information we did not have. He agreed to do this.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

859.00/1047b

The Secretary of State to the Danish Minister (Kauffmann)

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1943.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to reports concerning further German oppressive measures taken in Denmark. While detailed information is not yet available, the Germans clearly have decided to extinguish the last remnants of freedom left in your country in a final attempt to crush the spirit of resistance to a brutal conqueror so gallantly displayed by your King and countrymen.

You are, I am sure, proud of this reaffirmation of your country's devotion to the principles of freedom and democracy and of its determination to contribute toward the reestablishment of these principles. I offer to you on behalf of the Government and people of the United States of America profound sympathy for the sufferings already endured and still to come in Denmark.

I shall continue to look to you as the duly accredited representative in this country of the Kingdom of Denmark and hope that in the not too distant future your relations with this country may be conducted against the background of a freed and happy Danish people.

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

859.00/1068

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1943.

The Danish Minister came in to see me, at his request.

He had seen the President and expected to see Secretary Hull this morning; and his visit was merely to keep me up-to-date.

He said that in his conversation with the President he had indicated that he thought some gesture might be made which would encourage and hearten the Danish people in the hour of their trial. The President had been more than sympathetic to the idea—and inquired what he had in mind. The Minister thereupon had suggested a statement along the lines of the attached copy⁹—preferably to be made by the President and Mr. Churchill.¹⁰ The Minister hoped that before

⁹ Not attached to file copy of memorandum, but see draft statement, p. 12.

¹⁰ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

Churchill left town, the President and Churchill might arrange to receive him and perhaps thereafter put out some such statement. He wondered what I thought.

I said that since he was to see Secretary Hull in a few moments, it would be well for him to take this up with the Secretary. So far as I was concerned, it seemed to me like an idea well worth considering.

He said that the President had indicated a slight question in the next to the last paragraph. This paragraph speaks of the Danish official representatives in Washington and London as trustees for Danish interests outside Denmark, "working for the liberation of Denmark together with Free Danish organizations all over the world". The Minister said that he put this in partly to remind the existence of the Danish Council in London and partly to indicate that the Danish Council was not the only such Council in existence. There were vastly larger American societies far more entitled to recognition than the handful of Danish business and shipping men who lived in London. He did not mention, but I think had in mind, the possibility of a similar group which existed in Sweden.

He said with entire frankness that the effect of such a statement would be in part to build up his own position a little, but under the circumstances he thought this was allowable. Again, though he did not say so, I think he had in mind the fact that the juniors in the British Foreign Office have indicated a slight tendency to try to take over control of the whole Danish matter by emphasizing the position of Christmas Moeller ¹¹ in London and by drawing out of obscurity the rather meek Danish Minister Reventlow in London.

I indicated that general sympathy was with the Danish people and with the Minister's hope of being able to crystallize the situation.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

NOTE: In the balance, the Danish Minister's idea seems to be a good one. Our interests in the Danish situation are quite as large as the British—partly because of the great number of Danish ships, partly because of our vast interest in Greenland, partly because we presently have the responsibility of Iceland. There is, in my judgment, no possible doubt that the Danish Minister here is the strongest Danish figure outside of Denmark, as well as the one who took the most courageous stand and who also has the greatest political standing at home. Finally, he has a continuing mandate as plenipotentiary for the Danish Government when it was last free to act and has disposal of the Danish funds here under the Secretary's supervision. He would probably be accepted in Denmark as the Dane outside the country best qualified to handle the Danish interests.

A. A. B., JR.

¹¹ Head of the Free Danish Council in London.

740.0011 European War 1939/31526

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1943.

The Minister of Denmark called at his request. He said it meant a great deal to his people to receive encouragement just now and especially such encouragement as would be given by a brief statement that the President and Mr. Churchill might together or individually put out. He handed me a copy of a draft which he said he gave to the President yesterday (copy attached). I showed every interest in the situation and said that he had fully presented the idea to the President, that the matter is perfectly simple and calls for no conference between the President and myself, and that the President himself will decide whether or not to put it out and that if he does not do so, the matter will have to remain in abeyance until later when it could be revived on some suitable occasion.

The Minister was greatly appreciative of what I had said on this same subject during the past three days.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Annex]

Draft Statement

The Danish people, long subjected to the Nazi yoke, have revolted against their oppressors in a way that has stirred the admiration of the Free World. The sympathy of all free men go forward to the Danish Nation and their gallant King, who, though made virtually a prisoner in his own country, continue to fill the hearts of his people with his defiant spirit, which the tyrants have been unable to break.

Since the occupation of Denmark on April 9, 1940, the Danes in the Free World, through their contributions to the Allied war effort, have voiced the suppressed feelings of their countrymen at home. Greenland has taken her place as a bastion in the Atlantic battle.

In December 1941, Mr. Churchill and I invited the Danish Minister in Washington, Mr. Henrik Kauffmann, to join the United Nations declaration (of January 1, 1942).¹² In accepting, Mr. Kauffmann referred to the fact that the Danish Government in occupied Denmark were under German duress, and thus not free to sign the Declaration by the United Nations. Mr. Kauffmann proclaimed that the Danish Nation, "though subjugated, now more than ever, believes in the principles and purposes of the Atlantic Charter."¹³ Danes in the free world feel pledged to contribute the best of their efforts in the common struggle for victory over Hitlerism, adhering to the

¹² For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

¹³ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *ibid.*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

principles of the Declaration of January 1, 1942 as if the Declaration had been signed by a free Danish Government."

All remnants of a Danish Government in Copenhagen have now ceased to exist. As trustees for Danish interests outside Denmark, the Danish Ministers in Washington and London and Danish official representatives elsewhere, working for the liberation of Denmark together with Free Danish organizations all over the world, may count upon our fullest support.

Our thoughts and our good wishes go to the people of Denmark in their struggle; they have clearly demonstrated to the world that they fully endorse the declaration of the Danish Minister in Washington on January 2, 1942. Every Dane, whether in his home country or abroad, who contributes to our common cause is an ally in name as well as in fact. We welcome Denmark's time-honoured flag, "Dannebrog", by the side of the banners of the United Nations.

859.00/1068

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1943.

The Danish Minister came in to see me at his request. He referred to his recent conversation with the President, and with Mr. Hull, and the proposed statement he hoped the President would issue. According to him the President had agreed. He said Secretary Hull had suggested that he go and see Steve Early.¹⁴ He did not wish to do that since he had confined his relations exclusively to the State Department. He wondered how the matter stood.

I told him I could not say. The matter was, of course, receiving study. I would inquire of the Secretary whether he had any views on the subject.

The Minister said that he felt something ought to be done. The Danish people had revolted; two thousand of them had died, and thus far the only recognition of that fact had been advice from the British Broadcasting System for them to be "cautious". The Danes were telling the British that they were fools to risk their necks since nobody bothered about it. He was grateful for the note the Secretary had sent him; but rather hoped something could be done to release the Danish people further on the side against it. He was a bit emotional about it.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

¹⁴ Executive Secretary to President Roosevelt.

859.00/1053 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 10, 1943.

[Received September 10—4: 23 p. m.]

6008. Text of note sent to Danish Minister quoted in Department's 5355, September 2¹⁵ was promptly given Foreign Office. We received today from the Foreign Office the text of a communication which Mr. Eden¹⁶ sent to the President and Chairman of the Danish Council in reply to one which had been addressed to Mr. Churchill on September 1. Mr. Eden's communication reads as follows:

"In the absence of the Prime Minister and on his behalf I thank you for the telegram which you addressed to Mr. Churchill on September 1st assuring him of the keen desire of all Danes to further the cause of the United Nations. I take this opportunity to inform you that His Majesty's Government have watched with sympathetic attention the recent developments in your country. It seems clear that King Christian and the Danish people have taken a courageous stand against the barbarous invader and his attempts to harness their country to his war machine. Action such as this which levies a new toll on the German war potential is a valuable contribution to the general war effort and one of which you can be justifiably proud. On behalf of His Majesty's Government and the people of Great Britain, I express to you our deepest sympathy in the sufferings which your countrymen must now undergo and my hope that the day is not far distant when they can unite with your gallant seamen who sail with us and other free Danes here and elsewhere to hail a Denmark to whose liberation all Danes will have made an active and worthy contribution. I am sure that Mr. Churchill cordially endorses these views."

WINANT

859.00/1083

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I understand that on September 4, 1943 the Danish Minister presented to you a request for the issuance by you and Mr. Churchill of a statement regarding recent events in Denmark.¹⁷ Subsequently he

¹⁵ Telegram not printed, but see note of September 2 to the Danish Minister, p. 10.

¹⁶ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁷ After the resignation of the Danish Government on August 28, 1943, German troops entered Copenhagen and took over the most important administrative posts of the city. In a number of places there were incidents of conflict between Danes and Germans and a state of emergency was declared.

spoke to me about this matter and also gave me a copy of a draft statement¹⁸ which he had prepared.

I believe that on balance a statement of this sort should be issued. There is evidence to indicate that the Germans now realize that it was a mistake to force the resignation of the Government in Copenhagen. Recent press reports indicate that they have approached several political leaders in connection with the possible formation of a new government. A statement by you and, if possible, by you and Mr. Churchill would do much to deter the Danes from any form of future collaboration with Germany and would encourage the Danish people in their resistance to German rule.

A redraft¹⁹ of the Minister's statement is attached for your consideration.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

859.01/91

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. R. Borden Reams of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 16, 1943.

Participants: Mr. Donald Hall, First Secretary, British Embassy;
Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Assistant Chief, Division
of European Affairs;
Mr. R. Borden Reams, Division of European Affairs.

Mr. Donald Hall, First Secretary, British Embassy, telephoned to Mr. Cumming late on the afternoon of September 16, 1943 to state that he had received an urgent communication from the British Foreign Office in regard to the statement proposed by Mr. de Kauffmann for issuance by the President and Mr. Churchill. Mr. Hall arrived in Mr. Cumming's office at 5 p. m. and presented the attached *aide-mémoire*²⁰ with which is attached a redraft¹⁹ by the British Foreign Office of the Danish Minister's statement.

Mr. Hall was informed that our redraft is already before the President. A British redraft was then read and Mr. Cumming remarked that our redraft was actually more conservative than the British. He pointed out that we had entirely omitted paragraph 3 and we had rewritten the last sentence of the draft to remove any implication that Denmark had become one of the United Nations. Mr. Cumming then gave Mr. Hall a copy of our redraft. Mr. Hall was visibly surprised and stated that he could now say that the covering telegram from the British Foreign Office had indicated the belief that we would

¹⁸ See draft statement, p. 12.

¹⁹ Not printed.

²⁰ *Infra*.

wish to go much farther than the British. The draft prepared by the British was the utmost to which they could agree without further serious consideration of the matter. Mr. Hall felt that our draft is preferable to the British and stated that he would so report to his Government.

The British draft was then examined in detail. It was explained to Mr. Hall that we had originally thought of including the Faroe Islands in the last sentence of paragraph 2 but had decided that it would be better not to do so. The difference between the use of Greenland by agreement and the use of the Faroes by occupation was stressed. In addition, a passing reference was made to the fact that an Independence Party had come into being in the Faroe Islands and that since this fact was known to the Danish people, there might be some propaganda embarrassment in referring specifically to them.

Paragraph 3 had been deleted by us in its entirety. There is a certain confusion about the nature of the invitation extended to Mr. de Kauffmann to adhere to the United Nations declaration. Mention of his adherence might also create difficulties with other organizations.

In paragraph 4 of the British draft we had made no specific mention of the Danish Council in London and believed that no mention should be made of any specific Danish organization. We had confined ourselves to specific mention of persons enjoying an official representative status and had made a general reference to Danish organizations all over the world.

In the last paragraph we had entirely redrafted the last sentence. It was considered advisable to retain some mention of the Danish flag but we believed that it was preferable to associate the flag with the Danish people rather than with the United Nations. The sentence as redrafted in the Department also urged upon the Danes the necessity for continued resistance and by implication asked them to avoid future collaboration with the Germans.

The discussion then turned to the *aide-mémoire* presented by Mr. Hall and it was agreed that everything but the last paragraph had been taken care of by the revised drafts. Mr. Cumming stated that he felt it was inappropriate for the British Government to request that Mr. de Kauffmann should consult with the Danish Council in London. The surest way to avoid trouble would be to keep consultation between the Danes on a strictly official basis. Mr. Hall stressed the importance to the British of the Danish Council, stating that it was active in Danish shipping matters, was in close touch with Denmark and was much more effective than the Danish Minister in London. Mr. Cumming reiterated that we had no desire to interfere with any use that the British Government might wish to make of the Danish Council but that we did feel that it was inappropriate to endeavor to make an official body out of a purely private organization. It was pointed

out to Mr. Hall that under certain circumstances a similar body might with great propriety be created in the United States. After all, there were Danish shipping problems in this country, there were many more Danes here than there were in England and we had a special interest in Greenland. Mr. Cumming went on to point out that our situation vis-à-vis Denmark differed materially from the British. We maintain diplomatic ties with the country and in addition to having a Danish Minister in Washington we had an American accredited to the Danish King. Mr. Hall recognized the validity of these arguments and promised to present them to his Government. Mr. Cumming stressed that all his remarks on this subject were tentative, since it would obviously be necessary for him to discuss the matter with other persons in the Department.

859.01/90

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government have considered the draft statement prepared by the Danish Minister, M. Kauffmann, and which he proposed should be published over the signatures of the President and the Prime Minister. The attached new draft²² prepared by the Foreign Office is submitted for the consideration of the United States Government, together with the following observations.

The third paragraph of the Danish Minister's draft does not state the position accurately. There was, it will be remembered, some discussion, when the Danish Minister expressed his wish to sign the United Nations Declaration, as to his qualifications, the up-shot of which was that M. Kauffmann made a unilateral declaration and not a formal adherence.

With regard to the use of the word "trustees" in the second sentence of the penultimate paragraph of M. Kauffmann's draft, the Ministry of War Transport and Trading with the Enemy Department were consulted. They pointed out that Danish ships have all been taken in prize and the Ministry of War Transport could not meet the legal consequences of handing over ships out of prize to a Danish body not exercising sovereign powers. In the same connection they considered it dangerous to use the phrase in the penultimate sentence of the last paragraph in which the Danes are recognised as Allies.

His Majesty's Government would in particular wish to have the view of the United States Government on the implications of both the question of recognising the Danes as Allies and of their acceptance among the United Nations. It should also be considered whether the formula

²² Not printed.

used at the end of the draft would necessitate consultation with other adherents to the United Nations Declaration.

In any event, His Majesty's Government think that the Danish Minister in London and the Danish Council situated there, should be consulted and that such action should be taken by Mr. Kauffmann.

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1943.

859.01/91

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. R. Borden Reams of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 28, 1943.

Mr. Richard Law²³ called to see me on September 27, 1943 and during the course of our conversation the questions arising out of recent developments in Denmark came up for discussion. I took the occasion to make a detailed exposition of our views on this subject with particular reference to the discussion between the British and American Governments in connection with the proposed issuance of a joint declaration regarding Danish conditions. I pointed out that the British apparently felt that we wished to push de Kauffmann into a position of preeminence among the Danes outside of Denmark. This was definitely not true. We had no such desire and to the best of my knowledge de Kauffmann himself had made no active efforts to establish himself as the head of the free Danes. We were under obligation to him because of the Greenland agreement²⁴ which had been essential to the utilization of that colony by our armed forces. There were a large number of Danes in the United States and many of them were serving in our armed forces. Danish shipping was being utilized to a considerable extent by the United States. It was our feeling that relations with Danish representatives should so far as possible be internal matters and that such relations should be confined to people with a definite official representative status.

I went on to state that it was quite obvious that the British felt that we were afraid that they were endeavoring to make the Danish Council the focal point for all free Danes. It should be understood that we fully appreciated the value to the British of the Danish Council. They had done extremely good work and we had no desire to interfere in any way with that work. However, it was our contention that this was a purely private body and that it could not be held to be in any way representative of the Danish people. Mr. Law interposed at this

²³ Minister of State in the British Foreign Office.

²⁴ Agreement between the United States and Denmark regarding the defense of Greenland, signed April 9, 1941; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 204, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1245. For correspondence, see *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 35 ff.

point to state that it was their feeling that Christmas Moeller had some sort of a mandate from the Danish people but that he himself was not certain of this. I replied that Moeller's position within Denmark was subject to many misconceptions. He had originally been in control of the Conservative Party but had broken with his party in 1938 on a question of internal policy and actually at the time of the occupation of Denmark by the Germans led only a portion of this minority party. He had been brought into the first Coalition Cabinet as Minister of Commerce. This Government had been formed for the avowed purpose of giving to the Germans a minimum amount of collaboration but to maintain good relations with the German authorities as far as possible. Moeller had subscribed to these principles in theory. From time to time he made a number of public utterances which were highly indiscreet in that they were extremely critical of the Germans. These utterances finally led to extreme German pressure which resulted in his resignation from the Government and from public life. . . .

859.00/1075

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1943.

Mr. Law came down to see me at my request.

I brought up the matter of the Danish situation, and handed him the memorandum²⁵ of even date herewith prepared in answer to the British memorandum²⁶ making suggestions as to a joint statement by our two Governments regarding the recent Danish rising against the Germans. Our memorandum suggests in essence that we drop the matter in view of the fact that the British wish to push the Danish Council in London as part of the statement.

I added a few observations. It seems to me that there was the beginning of a possible rivalry between the Danish Council, Christmas Moeller and Reventlow in London on the one hand and de Kauffmann and the Danish groups here. The fact was that Christmas Moeller had broadcast to Denmark followed by an uncoordinated effort of the British political warfare people to stimulate a rising in Denmark; this had occurred; the Danish Council in London, apparently without guidance from the British Foreign Office had then telegraphed all Danish societies in America asking their support over de Kauffmann's head. This had not been understood here. The British suggestion that the Danish Council might be recognized as *primus inter pares*, of course, made no sense here.

²⁵ *Infra.*

²⁶ *Ante*, p. 17.

I thereupon suggested :

(1) That we continue to regard the King of Denmark as the symbol of Danish nationality—which seems to accord with the usual feeling in Denmark;

(2) That we continue to regard the Danish Ministers outside Denmark, who have declared independence since the King had become a prisoner, as the King's representatives—especially since they continued to be accorded recognition as such by the countries to which they were accredited;

(3) That the Danish Council in London be used by the British for British purposes just as we use the groups of Danish businessmen and the Danish-American societies here as bodies with which de Kauffmann might consult;

(4) That in the event that political differences should arise requiring bringing these various interests together, we might consult together.

Meanwhile, we might consider what kind of a step might be taken to encourage the Danes in Denmark. Decisions on that could await further reflection since the logical occasion for such a gesture had now passed.

I commented on the British suggestion that we consult the Russians in this regard and observed that the principal Danish interests were inside the Western Hemisphere. I did not think that our people were prepared to accept consultation with the Russians in matters affecting this Hemisphere; for example, we would not wish to consult them particularly regarding Martinique, and could not, I thought, be in the position of suggesting Greenland to tri-partite consultation.

Mr. Law seemed to accept this; and said that he thought the four-point disposition of affairs was acceptable. He said that the matter should not have been allowed to reach this point; and ought not to have got to this level.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

859.01/86

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*²⁷

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Early in September 1943 and immediately after the assumption by the German military of full powers in Denmark and the consequent disappearance of any semblance of Danish governmental authority other than the presence of the King, the Danish Minister in Washington presented to the President a proposal for a joint declaration by the President and the Prime Minister of Great Britain in regard to Denmark.

²⁷ Handed to the British Minister of State (Law) by the Acting Secretary of State (Berle) on October 1.

The United States Government and the British Government have given sympathetic consideration to the Danish Minister's proposal which was designed to serve the double purpose of showing appreciation for the notable resistance of the Danish people to German rule and of discouraging in advance any renewal of collaboration with the Germans through the formation of a new Danish Government.

The wording of the statement as originally proposed by the Danish Minister was not entirely satisfactory to the United States Government and the British Government and accordingly the Department of State and the British Foreign Office separately prepared redrafts which were identical in substance except for two points. The first of these differences—specific mention of the Faroes, in addition to Greenland—was easily resolved. The second point of difference arises out of the insistence of the British Government on specific mention of the Danish Council in London.

The United States Government is not unaware of the assistance which the Danish Council in London has given the British Government in connection with Danish shipping and other matters and understands therefore the desire of the British Government to give the Council some public mark of approbation. The United States Government does not believe, however, that a specific mention of any non-official Danish organization would be appropriate in a statement to be issued jointly by the American and British Governments. The American Government's views with regard to this matter are as follows:

Denmark's situation differs materially from that of any other occupied country. The King remains not only as a symbol of Danish resistance but as the actual head of his country and people. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom have broken relations with Denmark. Both governments accord recognition to the Danish Ministers in London and Washington who were accredited by the King of Denmark before the occupation of Denmark by German Forces. Moreover the United States Government continues to accredit a Minister to the King of Denmark. In the view of the United States Government, therefore, the recognition given by the American Government to the duly accredited Danish Minister in Washington precludes the extension by the United States Government of the degree of recognition to unofficial Danish bodies inherent in specific official mention thereof. Any other course of action might well cause undesirable reactions both within and without Denmark and would to an extent be in derogation of the recognition already given the Danish Ministers as the accredited representatives of their sovereign.

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1943.

FINLAND

(See Volume III, pages 213–313.)

FRANCE

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE DISUNITY BETWEEN GENERALS GIRAUD AND DE GAULLE IN FRENCH NORTH AND WEST AFRICA; RECOGNITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION¹

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*²

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1943.

Personal No. 250 from the President to the Former Naval Person.

In reply to your 249³ I feel very strongly that we have a military occupation in North Africa and as such our Commanding General has complete charge of all matters civil as well as military. We must not let any of our French friends forget this for a moment. By the same token I don't want any of them to think that we are going to recognize any one or any committee or group as representing the French Government or the French Empire. The people of France will settle their own affairs after we have won this war. Until then we can deal with local Frenchmen on a local basis wherever our armies occupy former French territory. And if these local officials won't play ball we will have to replace them.

I agree that Eisenhower has had to spend too much time on political affairs but Marshall⁴ has sent him very explicit instructions on this point. I don't know whether Eisenhower can hold Giraud⁵ in line

¹ For previous correspondence regarding the invasion and occupation of French North Africa and the relations of the United States with Free French Forces, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 429 ff. and 502 ff. For accounts of military cooperation between the United States and the French forces, see Marcel Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, and George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*, both in the series *United States Army in World War II* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957).

² Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Notation on telegram indicates it was sent also to Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, with second paragraph omitted except for second sentence. General Eisenhower was Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, and Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, North Africa.

³ Telegram No. 249, December 31, 1942, filed in Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. In addition to discussing military matters, Mr. Churchill stated that the Allied Commander in Chief should be supreme in Northwest Africa in all matters civil and military, but that a civil regime should be set up in whatever form was found locally convenient, subject to the guidance and veto of Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt, and Mr. Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters.

⁴ Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

⁵ Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud, High Commissioner of French North Africa.

with another Frenchman running the civil affairs but I shall find out. Why doesn't De Gaulle⁶ go to war? Why doesn't he start North by West half West from Brazenville? It would take him a long time to get to the Oasis of Somewhere.

A happy new year to you and yours.

ROOSEVELT

740.0011 European War 1939/26856½ : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 1, 1943—1 p. m.
[Received January 1—11 : 05 a. m.]

1. Press discussion following the arrests⁷ by General Giraud in North Africa has served to emphasize with greater clarity the basic British policy with regard to France namely that British prestige requires that General de Gaulle be given and maintained in a position of political primacy both during the war and in any early transitory period following the liberation of continental France. The British Government accepts the President's and the Department[s] often enunciated policy that the people of France alone must choose their form of government. But this is accepted with the reservations that some French authority, in effect if not in name a provisional government, must reign in France from the time the Allies first arrive until conditions permit the establishment of that permanent Government and during this period it must be de Gaulle who exercises authority. I have been told by several sources, including a high British secret intelligence official in direct contact with France itself and an escaped French Officer who left the country only a fortnight ago, that the name of Giraud and our operations in Africa are firing the imagination of the people of France. But we must realize that the British Foreign Office will persist in its buildup of General de Gaulle and in its full support of his demands that all who bear the stamp of Vichy must be eliminated from the "unified" France for which they so loudly call. If de Gaulle is a "symbol" to the people of France, he is also a "symbol" to the British Government, a symbol of justification for its whole French policy since June 1940. British prestige requires that "the one Frenchman who stuck by us in the dark days of 1940" must be installed in France when the day of liberation comes, however fleeting his tenure may be and whatever the consequences for the people of France.

⁶ Gen Charles de Gaulle, President of the French National Committee in London.

⁷ For an account of the assassination of Adm. Jean François Darlan on December 24, 1942, and the arrest of several Frenchmen a few days later, see Henri Giraud, *Un Seul But, La Victoire: Alger, 1942-1944* (Paris, 1949), pp. 69-81.

It was this policy which lay behind the Madagascar agreement.⁸ It was this policy which motivated the determination that Djibouti must join the Fighting French. It was this policy which caused the Foreign Office to oppose the combined effort of General Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham⁹ and Darlan to bring over Godefroy's¹⁰ Alexandria fleet to the North African authorities. It was this policy that made the Foreign Office so insistent that Macmillan or some other political officer of Cabinet rank be sent to Algiers without delay. And it is this policy which is behind the present campaign to emphasize Giraud as the military man and de Gaulle as the political leader. The diplomatic correspondent of the London *Times* MacDonald, who is closer to the Foreign Office than any other London journalist, has the following to say this morning:

"If anyone thought for a moment that Darlan's murder would simplify affairs in North Africa he must have been given a sharp jolt towards reality yesterday. General Giraud as briefly reported in the later editions of the *Times* yesterday announced on Wednesday¹¹ that, convinced that other would-be assassins were preparing their weapons, he had acted first. He had arrested 12 Frenchmen. Four of them were police officials, two or three others were men who had helped the Allies before the landing, and some of the others were considered to be pro-Vichy to the British and apparently to the American peoples. The whole affair appears on first hearing to be wildly confusing. How is it that pro-Allied Frenchmen can be arrested? An American broadcaster from Algiers attempted an answer in remarkably frank terms. According to Reuters, Charles Collingwood of the Columbia Broadcasting System declared yesterday: There is an impression here that the fault of the present government in North Africa is that it is made up of pro-Vichy and anti-de Gaulle men. General Giraud said yesterday that he did not see many pro-Vichy men in power. Be that as it may, the impression still remains here; and acts like the arrest of a number of pro-Allied persons do not help to remove that impression. I have talked to a great many people about these arrests but I have heard no one blame Giraud. He is still held by all parties here to be an incorruptible soldier, a man who has dedicated himself to the task of defeating Germany. What worries people here is not Giraud but the men who are General Giraud's government. That appears to be a fair summary of opinion in some sections in Algiers. Among other sections the habit of Vichy still persists and probably these sections are trying to increase their power now that the High Commissioner does not touch politics. The whole affair, still puzzling in some details increases the need for establishing agreement between all forces of France now ranged against the common enemy. Only after such agreement can a worthy and representative civilian authority be set up."

⁸ For correspondence relating to British occupation of Madagascar, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 687-708, *passim*.

⁹ Adm. Sir Andrew Cunningham, British Naval Commander of Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa.

¹⁰ Vice Adm. René-Emile Godefroy, Commander of French fleet at Alexandria.

¹¹ December 30, 1942.

The quotation from Collingwood's broadcast appears in every London paper this morning and was given prominence by the British Broadcasting Company. Vernon Bartlett in this morning's *News Chronicle* comments on Collingwood's broadcast and says:

"There is no doubt that Giraud and de Gaulle hold each other in high esteem. They would gladly cooperate but they have three obstacles to overcome: one is this bitter hostility in North Africa to the revival or development of democracy in France. The second is the question who should take military and political precedence. The third which depends less upon them than upon us and the Americans, is that in some quarters de Gaulle is looked upon as the British candidate for power and Giraud as the candidate of the United States."

I have given the Department this somewhat lengthy review of British policy not in any spirit of criticism but because I think it essential that it should have an accurate picture for its guidance. If we are prepared to go along with the British view that something resembling a de Gaulle government should be set up in Algiers, there will be no divergence between us and it probably can be brought about. If we are prepared to continue what seems to me to have been our past policy, of opposing the establishment of any French political authority which may even "temporarily" impose its political will upon the French people, there will be sharp differences which we must face. There will be efforts here to depict General Giraud as a high minded but politically innocent tool of "pro-Vichy and Fascist minded jobholders," de Gaulle (who not so long ago was himself in many circles charged with having "dictatorship" or extreme right tendencies) will be displayed as the upholder of democracy, the hope of the *front populaire* elements, and the legitimate continuation of the third republic. Parenthetically the picture is causing considerable anxiety to such objective and dispassionate Frenchmen as Roger Cambon:¹² They think the ground is being laid for civil war in France. Be that as it may one thing seems clear; if we do not intend to go along with the French policy of our British friends we must take prompt, firm and articulate steps so to indicate. Otherwise the dangers of a split between us, with all that it means for the future of the war and the peace, are obvious and serious.

I respectfully request that no summary of this telegram be inserted in the special telegram.

MATTHEWS

¹² Minister Plenipotentiary and Counsellor of the French Embassy in London, 1924-1940; in residence in London during World War II.

851.01/965

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*¹³

[WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1943.

The British Ambassador¹⁴ called at his request. He said that Foreign Minister Eden communicated to him a report to the effect that he tried to stop De Gaulle from making his radio broadcast and general public statement of January second¹⁵ but that he had failed.

The Ambassador then said that one of our radio commentators, Mr. Eric Sevareid, had recently stated that the De Gaulle and North African matters had now become a real difference between the British and the United States Governments. The Ambassador added that it would be most unfortunate for friction to arise between our governments on this account and that he hoped Mr. Sevareid could be induced to correct this impression. I thereupon took up and repeated the entire differences of attitudes on the part of the British Government toward De Gaulle and what he is standing for and doing, and the American Government in dealing with the North African situation and refusing to deal with De Gaulle politically on the other hand. I said the public in this country is rapidly reaching the conclusion that De Gaulle is primarily interested not in winning the extremely crucial battle in Africa but in dismissing the military side of the battle while negotiations are carried on to settle his demands for political supremacy in one form or another in the French Empire. It is reported here that the entire British press and radio and many British leaders of public thought devoted the better part of the two days following De Gaulle's broadcast, shouting their approval; that these acts and utterances relating to De Gaulle's political aspirations were being carried on during the past four days in Great Britain while the battle for most of Africa and the western Mediterranean area especially has become increasingly serious and while the American and French generals in command must give up their military emergency duties and go to the rear in an effort to calm a confused situation and discuss the political aspirations of De Gaulle, when approached by his representatives there. In conclusion I said that this impression about the British supporting De Gaulle in this movement for political preferment at the expense of the prosecution of the African battle will soon create enough differences between our two

¹³ The substance of this conversation was sent to London in telegram No. 146, January 7, 2 p.m. (not printed), with the instruction that the Ambassador read it to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and also telegram No. 104, January 5, 11 p.m., *infra*, and that he might at his discretion leave paraphrases of the telegrams. (851R.01/57)

¹⁴ Viscount Halifax.

¹⁵ For text of public statement, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. v (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1944), p. 570.

countries and that no one, I know, will regret such a development more than the British Ambassador and myself. The Ambassador seemed to be quite impressed with what I had said and assured me that he would take it up at once with his Government.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.00115 European War 1939/5545 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1943—11 p. m.

104. My 6563, December 24, 10 p. m.¹⁷ On December 31 in Lord Halifax' absence I called in Sir Ronald Campbell¹⁸ and told him that many of us in the Government were becoming seriously concerned about the development of what appeared to be British policy in relation to such matters as the Darlan case, particularly in the way it is exploited by the British press and radio and persons in the British Government associated with de Gaulle publicity. I said that this type of propaganda was aimed directly at stirring up bitterness against this Government, was distinctly harmful and was resented by many people in this country, who were much more interested in driving the Axis out of Africa than in hair pulling about French personal political rivalries. This Government had from the beginning devoted its whole mind, heart and effort to win the battle of Africa and it was disconcerting to hear nothing in this vast output of inspired British propaganda relating in any manner to the campaign being waged in Northwest Africa except this controversial and inflammable propaganda. I added that of course I spoke in a most friendly spirit but that I seriously feared that continuation of the policies or practices to which I had referred would inevitably create serious friction between our two countries. I referred to our efforts to protect the British Government from attacks in this country, particularly with respect to India although we were as much interested in freedom for India as for any other dependent people who are seeking it. While we are thus protecting the British Government here that Government has been creating a constantly stronger impression that it is closely associated with Fighting French propaganda which is continually attacking us. I concluded by expressing the hope that he would take up this matter very earnestly and promptly with his Government since further drifting along the recent line could not but have unfortunate results. He promised to take up the matter promptly.

That evening Mr. Berle¹⁹ also discussed this problem with Sir

¹⁷ Not printed.

¹⁸ British Minister.

¹⁹ Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

Ronald ²⁰ and expressed the view that the difference lay in a complete conflict in our interpretation of the basic facts as against that of the British. In that case it should be possible to get together and ascertain what the facts really were. If there were a conflict in policy that was another question. Sir Ronald agreed and said if there were a difference in policy the only possible safe course was to get at it, hammer out the question and reach an agreement.

HULL

851.01/983

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 7, 1943.

The British Minister, Sir Ronald I. Campbell, called at his request. He handed me an *aide-mémoire*, a copy of which is hereto attached,²¹ relative to a plan of settlement of the political differences among the different French factions. He also handed me a statement²² relative to the views of the Prime Minister²³ and Mr. Eden regarding British propaganda and agitation against this country, in close relation with the De Gaulle agitation, so close in fact that several days ago I informed the British Government that the opinion is steadily growing here to the effect that the British and De Gaulle agitations which are harmful to the United States and also to the military situation in Africa, are one and the same.

There followed some brief comment by me relative to our original position in regard to the political phases. I said that there would probably be new governments in each French territory freed from Axis occupation where there were Frenchmen with political ambitions who would proclaim a provisional government, and that there arose questions of authority on the part of this agency or provisional government over other remnants of the French Empire freed from occupation. The Minister agreed that these differences must be talked out and worked out in a proper spirit.

I again emphasized to him that opinion is forming in this country that the British are strictly behind De Gaulle in all of his political ambitions and undertakings, and the American people are feeling more and more that this is already constituting a serious impediment to the successful outcome of the battle for North Africa, for the reason that it is consuming quite a little of the time of General Eisenhower and his associates who are called back from the front to listen to French political controversies and to attempt to prevent riots and

²⁰ See memorandum of conversation, December 31, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 556.

²¹ *Infra*.

²² See note from the British Embassy, January 7, p. 32.

²³ Winston S. Churchill.

other kinds of civil commotion and that this belief will continue to become stronger very rapidly now. I said that if the British Government would make clear its disassociation from De Gaulle's political ambitions, this would go far to quiet the situation.

I then endeavored to correct the impression the British Government is making to the effect that we are urging rigid censorship of the British press and radio which is supporting in the loudest and most extravagant ways De Gaulle's desire for supreme political control of France. I added in this connection that when I was at the London Conference in 1933²⁴ the British Government only had to indicate to the press the line of attack it desired made on some of the issues raised and the press would promptly comply. I said that, of course, this would not be the case in all circumstances such as instances of serious controversy where there were deep-seated differences, but I insisted that where there is a plain and palpable interference with the prosecution of the North African campaign by pure brazen politics, it was high time, in my opinion, that this receives the serious attention of the British Government.

The Minister did not argue the matter but said there are cases where the press cannot be controlled but that his Government had done fairly well in their efforts along this line, such as the meeting of Parliament to hear an address by Churchill. I said that I fully appreciated the British difficulties but that in the opinion of this Government British statesmen and officials had gone entirely too far in tolerating the excesses committed by the politicians around De Gaulle, who were apparently dominating him, with the result that they have corresponding difficulty in checking the excessive criticism of this Government and others, which is being carried on primarily by the concurrent efforts of the De Gaullists and the British.

The Minister handed me a statement containing extracts from an exchange of telegrams between the British Foreign Office and the Minister Resident at Accra, a copy of which is hereto attached.²⁵

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851.01/983

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The proposals from both sides for a *rapprochement* between Generals Giraud and De Gaulle (though these as yet have not gone very far) make it desirable that His Majesty's Government and the

²⁴ For correspondence pertaining to the Monetary and Economic Conference, London, June 12-July 27, 1933, see *Foreign Relations*, 1933, vol. I, pp. 452 ff.

²⁵ Not printed.

United States Government should begin to consider together what should be their future relations with the French Empire.

His Majesty's Government assume that the United States Government, no less than they themselves, wish to see the French Empire united as soon as possible under a single authority making its maximum contribution to the war effort of the United Nations, and that while this result can only be achieved by agreement reached by Frenchmen with Frenchmen, the United States Government, like His Majesty's Government, will promote the desired agreement so far as they can.

The best solution would be the establishment in Algeria on the soil of a department of France of a single authority in the place of both the French National Committee in London and General Giraud's administration in Algiers. This authority would be recognised by the United States Government and His Majesty's Government and no doubt by other governments merely as a *de facto* administration provisionally exercising French sovereignty over certain parts of France and over the whole French Empire (except Indo China) pending the establishment of a government chosen by the French people themselves. It would not be recognised as the Government or even as the provisional Government of France. It would however maintain relations with foreign Governments by informal exchange of representatives. It would be treated as an Allied power and be formally admitted to the ranks of the United Nations. Agreements relating to various parts of the French Empire would normally be made with this central authority and not with the local colonial administrations. Economic agreements might be made on a tri-partite basis like the agreements in respect of French Equatorial Africa and the Cameroons at present under negotiation between the British and American Governments and the French National Committee.

So far as French North Africa is concerned, the special powers exercised by the Allied Commander in Chief in virtue of his command of military operations would be redefined in a formal agreement concluded between the United States Government and the central French authority. The agreement recently concluded by His Majesty's Government with the French National Committee about Madagascar might provide a possible precedent. In that agreement, French sovereignty, provisionally exercised by the National Committee, is expressly recognized and the special powers enjoyed by the Commander in Chief are conferred upon him by the National Committee. General Giraud has recently raised the question of respect for French sovereignty with the Commander in Chief (General Eisenhower's telegram No. 3351 of December 28th) and it may be taken as certain that the Fighting French element in any new administration would be no less sensitive on this point. French North Africa would there-

fore be regarded as Allied territory in which the Allied Commander in Chief is vested with extensive powers rather than as quasi-occupied territory where he possesses the administrative authority. It would be essential to require as a counterpart that the central authority should conduct itself in all respects both internally and externally as an Allied administration.

It would be desirable that all links with Vichy should be severed or at any rate that any claim to unbroken succession through Darlan ²⁶ from Pétain ²⁷ should not be revived and also that a return should be made to the laws of the French Republic. His Majesty's Government note from the Commander in Chief's telegram No. 3124 of December 26th that these ideas have been mooted in Algiers. The National Committee would almost certainly press for their adoption as part of any agreement for fusion.

A statement of policy issued to Reuters on December 31st by Fighting French headquarters in London is of interest in this connection. The main point made is that unification of the military effort of the French Empire must result from the creation of a central provisional and administrative organ and not vice versa. The statement points out that this new unit which will include a population of 50 million and possess huge natural resources, as well as many vital strategic positions, would quantitatively take fifth place in importance among the United Nations.

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1943.

851.01/983

The British Embassy to the Department of State

His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to convey the following to Mr. Hull as a message representing the views of the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden.

"Under our present constitution and war time procedure we have been ceaselessly exposed to 'emotional views of little men on political matters' and to check this entirely would involve His Majesty's Government in a direct attack on freedom of Parliament and Press. There is a deep loathing in this country, particularly strong among working classes, against anything which savours to them of intrigues with Darlan and Vichy which are held to be contrary to the broad simple loyalties which unite the masses throughout the world against the common foe. It took the Prime Minister all his time and all his influence to smooth things out with House of Commons in secret session. You should warn Mr. Hull that there is almost a passion

²⁶ Adm. Jean François Darlan, former Vice President of the French Council of Ministers and Commander in Chief of French Land, Sea, and Air Forces. After the landing of Allied Forces Admiral Darlan was recognized as French High Commissioner in North Africa. He was assassinated December 24, 1942.

²⁷ Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

on this subject and one which if it broke loose would certainly cause differences of opinion and controversy in United States.

"We have done our very best to help in Darlan business and continue to do so in regard to Vichy contacts still being preserved. But general feeling is that a brilliant military episode has been tarnished and tainted. The danger of the situation is fully realized. Prime Minister can no more embark on an effective muzzling of press and Parliament than State Department could gag Willkie,²⁸ Luce²⁹ and company when they say things which give profound offence here. The remedy is to agree to a policy and reach sound ground in this French quagmire."

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1942 [1943].

851R.20/49 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*³⁰

LONDON, January 8, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 10:05 p. m.]

192. As instructed in your telegram No. 146, January 7, 2 p. m.,³¹ I left with Mr. Eden this morning paraphrases of that telegram and of your telegram No. 104, January 5, 10 [11] p. m., and went over the North African situation with him. I gained the impression that he had not previously been fully impressed with the seriousness with which you view the situation or that he considered the attitude of the British press as particularly harmful. He took some exception to the statement that "British leaders" were approving de Gaulle's broadcast or the present Fighting French propaganda campaign. He referred to his attempt to dissuade General de Gaulle from issuing his January 2 statement and of de Gaulle's refusal to grant his request. He added "de Gaulle has caused me more trouble than all the other Allies put together". He said that he had been faced with the alternative of issuing a dead censorship stop which six hundred correspondents would have known about, or of letting him go ahead. I said that since the British had largely built up de Gaulle and he was obtaining all his financial support from the British Government, and since the British have turned over to him control over Madagascar and Djibouti³² that it seemed to us in the United States that there

²⁸ Wendell Willkie, Republican candidate for President of the United States in 1940.

²⁹ Henry Luce, American publisher.

³⁰ Copy of this telegram in Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park has the following marginal notation: "I showed this to the P.M., Casablanca, Jan. 15, 1943. F.D.R."

³¹ See footnote 13, p. 27.

³² For correspondence relating to efforts of the United States to bring about peaceful collaboration of French Somaliland with the United Nations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 596 ff.

must be means of bringing about a more reasonable attitude on de Gaulle's part. His reply was that due in large part, he thought, to the Darlan arrangements, de Gaulle had become a sort of public hero in Britain; that he, Eden, had had great difficulties with the House of Commons on the question, and that any attempt to exercise financial or other pressure would inevitably bring a serious backfire in the House of Commons. He added: "I can't censor him any more than you can censor the statements of the Willkies and Luces."

He asked me to tell you: First, that the British had a lot of troops fighting in Tunisia and they are just as anxious for a military success as we are. Secondly, that de Gaulle is not like "a quantity of gin that can be put in a bottle", but is very difficult to handle and that we must remember he has a large following in metropolitan France. Thirdly, he feels that it is important that all French be brought together and that they would work better under a single organization than under separate ones. I said that it did not seem to me that de Gaulle's present tactics were calculated to bring them together, and he agreed. He said specifically that he did not care whether Giraud or de Gaulle headed such unified group. I said that de Gaulle's allegations of "increasing confusion" in North Africa did not seem likely either to help our military operations or to bring about unity, and that I wondered whether the British had suggested to de Gaulle that he might simply offer his military support to General Giraud. Eden replied that he did not think that the Fighting French would agree to it. He added that he understood that de Gaulle was planning to send military emissaries as suggested by Giraud and that this seemed to be a step in the right direction. I said that my reading of de Gaulle's reply (my telegram 174, January 7, 8 p. m.)³³ did not seem to indicate any clear acceptance of the suggestion, and we found out later that he had based his statement on an earlier indication to Charles Peake³⁴ by de Gaulle that he would send military representatives to Algiers, a tentative decision apparently reversed by the General later. Your statement that de Gaulle's political aspirations were forcing General Eisenhower to take time out from essential military duties elicited Mr. Eden's comment that he understood that "Eisenhower had returned from the front because of Darlan's assassination and not because of General de Gaulle's activities".

Although our conversation was friendly throughout, I left with the impression that Mr. Eden had not fully realized the seriousness with which you view the situation, that he did not accept the view that the British are in any way responsible for the propaganda and intrigues of de Gaulle and his advisers, and that he does wish a single *de facto* political organization set up in Algiers which will provide for the

³³ Not printed.

³⁴ British Representative to the French National Committee.

elimination of what he considers unreliable elements. Incidentally he is inclined to feel that a visit by de Gaulle to Washington at this time would not be wise, a view with which I concur. (Most secret. I understand that the Prime Minister in private conversation with an American has expressed bluntly the view that the "Americans should not have one Frenchman, Giraud, while the British have another, de Gaulle". When it was suggested to him that one solution might be that de Gaulle assume a secondary role, he replied: "No, you can't do that. De Gaulle is more than a man. He is a movement and a symbol".)

To sum up, I feel that, quite aside from de Gaulle propaganda and the question of British responsibility for not restraining it, there are certain divergencies of viewpoint between us: (1) the British place more emphasis on setting up some political entity which will have most of the attributes of a transitional government though not calling itself so by name, whereas we consider the military aspect of French support be more important; (2) the British Government lays great store on the strength of de Gaulle's followers and his public support in France with a corollary emphasis on the need to get rid of all taint of Vichy and Pétain supporters in North Africa, while we, not having based our policy for the last 2 years on support of de Gaulle and vilification of Vichy, see the problem in truer perspective; (3) our policy is that of letting the French people freely choose their own government after the war, whereas the British would prefer, the transitional period which they envisage, to see a regime which owes its existence to them; (4) they are perhaps jealous of our leading role in North Africa.

I believe that a public statement of our policy is the best way to clarify the present confusion. Your telegrams Nos. 104 and 146 have been most helpful. If in addition you could give me (if a public statement seems inadvisable) a full statement of your policy—such as that mentioned in your telegram No. 6662, December 30, 9 p.m.³⁵—it would be, I think, useful.

MATTHEWS

³⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 501.

851R.00/335

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of European Affairs (Reber)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 9, 1943.

Participants: The Secretary of State
Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil ³⁶
Mr. Georges-Picot ³⁷
Mr. Atherton ³⁸
Mr. Reber.

The Secretary of State began the conversation by stating that since Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil's previous visit there had been several developments and proposals which had complicated the situation. For example, it was apparent that General de Gaulle was primarily concerned with a political arrangement before achieving military unity and had so stated both publicly in a broadcast and in his suggestions for a meeting with General Giraud. A British proposal had likewise been received which required further consideration.

It was however the view of the American Government that any political arrangements might give rise to discussions which could adversely affect the military situation and consequently they should not be dealt with at the present time. The Secretary added that he was glad to take note of the position of the Mission both in its conversations with the War Department and in Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil's letter to Admiral Leahy.³⁹

Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil replied that it was impossible to meet the situation and to answer propaganda criticism emanating from British, de Gaullist, Axis and German controlled French stations which claimed that Africa was "occupied" by the United States. Likewise it was impossible to concentrate on the military situation until certain conditions pertaining to matériel and morale had been fulfilled. The solution of these depended in a large measure upon the United States.

Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil felt it was necessary to recall in this instance that the intervention of American troops had been requested, prepared and facilitated by the French, to whom assurances had been given at that time in letters exchanged between Mr. Murphy⁴⁰ and General Giraud that the necessary matériel would be furnished and

³⁶ Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil, Chief of the Research Section of General Giraud's Headquarters, temporarily assigned to General Giraud's Military Mission to the United States.

³⁷ Liaison Officer with General Giraud's Military Mission to the United States.

³⁸ Ray Atherton, Acting Chief, Division of European Affairs.

³⁹ Not printed.

⁴⁰ Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser to General Eisenhower, and Personal Representative of the President in North Africa with rank of Minister. For texts of letters exchanged, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 412-422.

that they would be treated as an ally in full possession of their sovereignty. Although it was known that promise to supply arms and equipment to the French forces had been made two months ago the Mission had not yet been able to set a date for shipment of any of these or to determine any quantity of matériel to be furnished the French troops. It was essential that some concrete manifestation of the American willingness to send supplies both to the French forces and the civilian population be forthcoming, as otherwise both military and civilian morale would be seriously affected and real military risk incurred. France had once been defeated because of the lack of matériel and consequently Frenchmen were very sensitive to the danger presented if they could not obtain adequate arms.

The impression in North Africa was growing that it was being treated as an occupied rather than an allied territory. In order to meet this situation it would be necessary that certain changes be effected in the Darlan-Clark protocol,⁴¹ notably to include recognition of French North Africa as an ally. It would also be necessary to take into account and modify the rate of exchange which had been imposed and which was markedly increasing prices and the cost of living within the country. Furthermore, Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil pointed out, that whereas the United States was represented in North Africa in civil matters as well as in military affairs, there was no reciprocal treatment of the North African authorities in this country since there only existed in the United States at the present time a Military Mission.

Unless some such form of representation were granted General Giraud, General de Gaulle would be able to claim that he was in a superior position as regards civil and political matters since he could discuss them direct with the United States and British Governments and consequently should be regarded as the political leader of French resistance. General Giraud was primarily concerned with the military necessity and of bringing Frenchmen back into active participation in the war. If he could be given support in this position and receive supplies and recognition as an ally, he could then pursue the war with a maximum of efficiency, reassure French preoccupation and establish himself as the leader of French military resistance, thus relegating General de Gaulle's political aspirations to a secondary place and clearing the entire political situation. Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil added parenthetically that although his primary interest and that of General Giraud was the satisfactory conduct of the campaign he nevertheless had found political consideration had been introduced into all of his talks in the United States where the primary concern seemed to be related to General de Gaulle and British political intentions.

⁴¹ For text of the Clark-Darlan Agreement, signed at Algiers November 22, 1942, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 453.

In order that General Giraud's position should be made perfectly clear Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil suggested that the former might issue a declaration which would clarify his position and demonstrate its non-political character. The declaration would be of such a nature as clearly to indicate to General de Gaulle that the real problem and the only problem to be solved was of a military and not of a political character until such a time as France and the French people were free to determine their own destiny. Giraud would be regarded as a trustee for French interests until the end of the war and consequently would be free to conduct the military campaign without political complications. In this declaration he could reassure opinion in French Africa and answer contentious propaganda. To be able to make such a declaration he must have received assurances along the foregoing lines, the details of which could be elaborated in further discussions between Mr. Atherton and Mr. Georges-Picot.

If this procedure were to be accepted the terms of the declaration could be agreed with General Eisenhower who would be informed of the immediate return of Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil. The latter made it clear that he had been speaking personally but that at the same time what he had said was in conformity with his conversations with General Giraud just prior to his departure from North Africa.

The Secretary answered that he would be glad to give these considerations his prompt attention and to discuss them with the President. He said that it might be possible to obtain some specific information concerning proposed deliveries of matériel before Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil's departure. He expressed his sympathetic attitude in regard to General Giraud and said that latter's present trip of inspection in French West Africa was apparently producing most successful results. The Secretary added that the American Government wished to do everything in its power to make things easier for General Giraud in his conduct of the military campaign in North Africa which necessarily included some recognition of the fact that he would be in charge of the maintenance of civil order in these territories.

851R.01/252

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Reber)

[WASHINGTON,] January 11, 1943.

Participants: Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil,
Mr. Georges-Picot,
Mr. Atherton and
Mr. Reber.

Following his conversations with the Secretary and the Under Secretary on January 9 Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil called on Mr. Atherton

ton. It was agreed that the memorandum of the Secretary's conversation which was comprehensive could serve as the memorandum of his conversation with the Under Secretary as well and be submitted to General Eisenhower. Mr. Atherton stated that it had been agreed that civil representation in the United States should be accorded General Giraud. A civil representative would be attached to General Bethouart's⁴² mission whose position would be similar to that occupied by Murphy on General Eisenhower's staff.

Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil felt it was important to further elaborate the points he had made in his earlier conversations particularly with regard to the proposed declaration of General Giraud in order that it should be perfectly clear that General de Gaulle should not be in a position to claim that he is better able to represent French interests than General Giraud. General Giraud's declaration would say that since no government in France existed he was acting as a trustee for the defence of French interests until such a time as the French people would be free to choose a government. Since it is important that the attitude of the United States and the other Allied Governments be clearly understood the declaration of General Giraud should be followed by a declaration by the President who would confirm that in the opinion of the American Government no French Government existed and that he recognized General Giraud as an ally and entrusted with the military defence and responsibility for the protection of French interests which would constitute a trusteeship until such time as the French people could themselves take over in their own behalf. Either the President's declaration or the proposed modification of the Darlan-Clark protocol might likewise reaffirm the spirit of the exchange of letters which have taken place between General Giraud and Murphy with regard to the recognition of the former as an ally in full possession of sovereignty. It was agreed that Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil would discuss this declaration with General Eisenhower upon his return and that the Department would await General Eisenhower's report before undertaking further to comment upon the proposed declaration.

Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil added that a further point should be considered as regards greater freedom in the use of French African funds particularly as it was important to establish some organ which would represent the French African position in this country and counteract adverse propaganda from other established French newspapers or magazines.

⁴² Maj. Gen. M. E. Bethouart, Head of General Giraud's Military Mission to the United States.

851R.01/75: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 12, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received January 13—7: 56 p. m.]

46. From Murphy. On December 31 I sent through AGWAR⁴³ telegram 3575, December 30, 1911-2 [1942],⁴⁴ to you, recommending, with the concurrence of the C.-in-C.,⁴⁵ that West Africa be included under this civil affairs jurisdiction. Admiral Glassford,⁴⁶ who leaves today on his return to Dakar, confirms previous indications we had had that Boisson⁴⁷ is very anxious to link West Africa to Algiers in economic as well as political and military matters. Glassford also stated to us informally that on the basis of his discussions and observation in Dakar he felt strongly that this was desirable. Herbert⁴⁸ and other British on NAEB,⁴⁹ however, have taken a fixed position that French West Africa should be tied in under Lord Swinton⁵⁰ and the economy of the whole of West Africa⁵¹ with perhaps the establishment in Dakar of an independent counter part to NAEB. We have taken informally an equally fixed position that French West Africa must be tied in economically as well as politically with Algiers. I would therefore, appreciate instructions and guidance on this question as soon as possible.

At Glassford's request Rosenthal,⁵² Short,⁵³ and Lieutenant Colonel Spofford⁵⁴ will go this week to Dakar to assist Glassford and to study the situation on the ground. Rosenthal will return to Washington from Dakar, Short and Spofford to return here. Rosenthal's return at this time meets with my entire approval as I think it would be well for him to report on the entire economic situation in this whole area. [Murphy.]

WILEY

⁴³ Adjutant General, War Department.

⁴⁴ Not printed.

⁴⁵ Commander in Chief; reference is to General Eisenhower.

⁴⁶ Rear Adm. William A. Glassford, Head of the United States Military Mission to French West Africa. For information on this mission, see George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*, in the series *United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 271-272.

⁴⁷ Pierre Boisson, Governor General of French West Africa.

⁴⁸ Roscoe Herbert, Chief British Economic Adviser, North African Economic Board.

⁴⁹ North African Economic Board.

⁵⁰ British Minister Resident in West Africa.

⁵¹ See correspondence regarding proposal to appoint an American representative as counterpart of British Minister Resident in West Africa, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 37 ff.

⁵² Morris Rosenthal, Assistant Director, Board of Economic Warfare.

⁵³ Livingston Short, Head of the United States Lend Lease Mission to North Africa, and Chief of the Import Division, North African Economic Board.

⁵⁴ Lt. Col. Charles M. Spofford, Financial Adviser on special duty with General Eisenhower.

851R.20/49 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 15, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received January 15—7 p. m.]

401. Strang⁵⁵ showed me this afternoon a telegram sent this morning to Lord Halifax which set forth in some detail the views of the British Government with respect to de Gaulle and suggested that he lay them before the Department. It began by frankly stating that Mr. Eden had not realized the serious cleavage between the British and ourselves on the North African question (presumably until receiving the paraphrases I left with Eden on January 8—my telegram number 192, January 8, 6 p. m.). While this telegram to Lord Halifax set forth the British viewpoint with clarity and was entirely conciliatory in tone, it does not in my opinion serve to remove the important divergencies between us set forth in my telegram number 192 but rather to confirm them. While denying any desire to set up a "provisional government" with or without de Gaulle as its head, it did stress the importance of his following in France, of his service to England in her hour of need, and the improbability that he would be willing to accept a purely military position in North Africa. With respect to this last, the telegram indicated that the British had not advised him to accept a military command in view of the unlikelihood that such advice would be followed (compare paragraph 2 of my telegram 192). On the other hand the telegram to Halifax spoke with frankness of de Gaulle's difficult temperament, and of the British need for patience in dealing with him. It said that "however Anglophobe he might be" or whatever his political ambitions might be, there was no doubt of his firm conviction that Germany is the true enemy of France. For this reason, the telegram continued, he had acquired sympathy largely from Left elements in France "in spite of his own Rightist political views". (The telegram curiously takes no note of the fact that until some 6 months ago the principal criticism of de Gaulle in London lay in the fact that he was surrounded largely by Right-Wing and *Croix de Feu* sympathizers and it was only after this criticism had reached the danger point that he made his moves toward the left and played up the adherence of Philip⁵⁶ and his, de Gaulle's, supposed strong ties with the Left elements in France). It likewise said that British experience in Syria, Madagascar and Djibouti had shown that once the Vichy authorities had been removed the great majority of the population flocked willingly

⁵⁵ William Strang, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

⁵⁶ André Philip, member of French National Committee in London.

to de Gaulle, and cited the "popular ovation" just given Legentilhomme in Madagascar.

Strang in discussing this telegram said: "Frankly it is natural there should be a difference in viewpoint between us. De Gaulle stuck by us when we were in desperate need and the collaborationists of Vichy attacked us. We naturally have an emotional feeling about the whole question and about some of the people associated with Vichy that you don't have. We cannot look at the situation and personalities with the same objective detachment." He said however that Maillaud of the French Independent News Agency, who has just returned from Algiers, had spoken of the rather strong Royalist sentiment there and the weakness of de Gaulle's following. He, Strang, agreed with this estimate: saying that "de Gaulle's small following is largely among the Jews, which further complicates the situation".

On the other hand I think the British are doing what they can to encourage de Gaulle to meet with Giraud and not to impose impossible conditions to such a meeting. As set forth in this telegram to Halifax, the British have felt that the chances of agreement are better if the first contacts are made on a lower level. They are hopeful that possibly Catroux⁵⁷ will stop off on his way back to Syria next week, Strang said. Apparently Catroux does not agree with de Gaulle's rather intransigent attitude toward the North African situation.

Strang remarked that he thought Brendan Bracken's⁵⁸ statement should be quite helpful, and I agreed. He thought Macmillan's interview at Algiers was "in general good, but perhaps a little optimistic about early agreement between de Gaulle and Giraud".

MATTHEWS

851R.01/75 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1943—8 p. m.

92. For Murphy. Your 3575, December 30⁵⁹ and No. 46, January 12. In view of General Eisenhower's and your recommendations the Department agrees that French West Africa should be included under the civil affairs jurisdiction of General Eisenhower's Staff.

HULL

⁵⁷ Gen. Georges Catroux, Commanding General, French Forces in the Levant.

⁵⁸ British Minister of Information.

⁵⁹ Not printed.

851.01/955 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 20, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received January 20—7:30 p. m.]

533. Although Strang made no mention to me (my telegram No. 532, January 20⁶⁰) of de Gaulle's latest display of temperament, I learn that the General sent for Charles Peake last evening and launched into a bitter denunciation of "the Americans". He delivered an elaborate description of American plots to hold up all his various messages to Giraud until we had been able to arrange various matters to suit ourselves in North Africa, our duplicity being shown by the period of time which elapsed between the original delivery of his message to our military authorities in London and his replies from Giraud. For instance he said that we held up his first message to Giraud for several days until we had persuaded Bergeret⁶¹ to make a number of arrests "which included two of my people". Peake who has been kept informed by Commander Kittredge⁶² of all developments in that connection, replied that he didn't believe a word of it but that if de Gaulle felt that way he should discuss it with some higher authority, specifically Mr. Eden. This de Gaulle declined to do on the ground that he was "too busy". However following a report of this conversation to the Foreign Office the latter persuaded de Gaulle to talk to Mr. Eden which he is doing this afternoon.

Strang did reiterate this afternoon to me that de Gaulle feels very strongly that he cannot "compromise his moral position" by working with people who collaborated with Vichy and that such action would be a "betrayal of his followers" in France. I remarked that I thought the majority of de Gaulle's supporters in France were probably far more interested in some military cooperation which would hasten the liberation of their country than in quibbling over the relative degree of patriotism of personalities involved.

MATTHEWS

⁶⁰ Not printed.

⁶¹ Gen. Jean Marie Bergeret had been French Deputy High Commissioner in French North Africa under Darlan.

⁶² Comdr. Tracy B. Kittredge, aide to Admiral Stark, who was Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

740.0011 European War 1939/27641 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 1, 1943—noon.

[Received February 2—7:51 a. m.]

124. For Atherton from Murphy. A few minutes before his departure from Anfa⁶⁶ the President had a short conversation with General Giraud during the course of which Giraud presented two memoranda dated January 24, 1943. The first memorandum reads as follows:

"1. The intervention of the Anglo-American troops on the 8th of November on French territory in Africa,⁶⁷ brought about at the demand of the French who, since 1940 have wanted to take up the fight against Germany, was the first act of liberation of an oppressed nation accomplished by the United Nations.

"2. The form of the relations between France and the Foreign Powers temporarily occupying part of French territory, the post war consequences of the association of France and the United States in the fight against Germany, the military, economic and financial aid given to France, have all been defined in letters exchanged between the Consul [*adviser*], Mr. Murphy, in the name of President Roosevelt, and General Giraud, before the landing. They remain in force. However, the paragraph dealing with the military question and with the Inter Allied command is excepted.

"3. Because of the fact that the French nation and the French people are the only ones who may fix their representation and designate their government, and because it is impossible for the French in other lands [*motherland?*] to pronounce freely her will, France no longer possesses a government.

"In the interests of the French people, in order to safeguard France's past, her present, and her future, the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain recognize in the Commander-in-Chief, with his headquarters in Algiers, the right and duty of preserving all French interests under the military, economic, financial, and moral plan. They bind themselves to aid him by all the means in their power until the day when, in complete freedom, the French people and the French nation shall be able to designate their regular government.

"General Eisenhower and Minister Murphy will work out with the French Commander-in-Chief, with his headquarters as Algiers, the details of the present understanding. In so doing, they will be governed by the conversations exchanged in Washington between the 28th of December and the 2d [*11th*] of January,⁶⁸ by the representative of General Giraud and the State Department, and the decisions which

⁶⁶ Suburb of Casablanca where the Casablanca Conference was held January 14-24, 1943. Documentation on the Casablanca Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

⁶⁷ For correspondence concerning the invasion, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 429 ff.

⁶⁸ See the following memoranda by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs: December 28, 1942, *ibid.*, p. 493; January 9 and January 11, 1943, *ante*, pp. 36 and 38, respectively.

have been made by President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, and General Giraud in the interviews at Casablanca between the 17th and 24th of January 1943.”⁶⁹

The foregoing was endorsed “approved” by the President.

It is my understanding of the second paragraph of article III from the conversations between the President and General Giraud that this phraseology relates to French interests in French Africa together with such interests outside of that area as have rallied or may adhere in the future to General’s authority.

The second memorandum is entitled “Résumé of the Agreements in Principle Resulting From the Conversations at Anfa.[”]

First paragraph reads as follows :

“Under the military plan, it has been agreed between the President of the United States and General Giraud that the French forces will receive, by priority, the equipment which is indispensable to them and that this shall be made up of the most modern matériel.”

The President made a marginal notation okaying the foregoing paragraph. The second paragraph relates to conversations with General Marshall and General Somervell⁷⁰ regarding the delivery of military matériel. I shall not quote this paragraph for reasons of military security.

The third paragraph reads as follows :

“In regard to transport, it has been agreed with General Somervell that there [*the?*] supplying of French Africa would be assured by the monthly allocation of 65,000 tons (50,000 tons of wheat, 12,000 tons of sugar, and 3,000 tons of material) and that the shipment of this material would be made before next summer. France would furnish to the inter-Allied pool as share of 165,000 tons of shipping and the Allies would furnish the remainder necessary for the delivery to be completed within the agreed time. The aviation material would be sent, as far as possible, by air.”

The President made a marginal notation regarding paragraphs 2 and 3 as follows :

“Okay in principle. Work out with Eisenhower and Somervell.”

Paragraph 4 reads as follows :

“Under the political plan, it was agreed between the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and General Giraud that it was to their common interest for all the French fighting against Germany to be reunited under one authority, and that every facility would be given to General Giraud in order to bring about this union.”

⁶⁹ For text of communiqué regarding the Casablanca Conference cabled from Casablanca on January 26, 1943, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 30, 1943, p. 93.

⁷⁰ Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, U.S. Army, Commanding General of the Services of Supply.

The paragraph was okayed by the President.

Paragraph 5 reads as follows:

“In connection with this, it has been agreed by the President of the United States that the exchange would be brought to 50 francs to the dollar in order to ameliorate the existing differences with the exchange rate given to the territories placed under the control of General de Gaulle (it being the strong hope that, in the latter territories, the rate will be lowered from 43 to 50 francs to the dollar).”

The parenthetical reference is language inserted by the President. He made a marginal note to this paragraph “okay as amended”.

Paragraph 6 reads as follows:

“It has also been agreed that the necessary propaganda (for France in the French language) should be carried on from the African territory by the French authorities and that, for this reason, conferences should be held regarding the use of the short wave radio stations.”

The President made a marginal notation to this paragraph “amend”. In the conversation he agreed that in principle propaganda by radio from French North Africa in the French language for metropolitan France should be directed by the French authorities in consultation with Allied authorities. Allied authorities would conduct propaganda activity destined for other European countries. It was understood between the President and General Giraud that this entire subject is one for conversations between the French and Allied authorities looking to the most advantageous use of French North African radio facilities in the prosecution of the war.

These two memoranda were not discussed in advance with the British as there was no opportunity to do so, but I have provided copies of them to Macmillan.⁷² General Eisenhower of course is fully informed.

Giraud acted extremely well throughout the conference, making a favorable impression on both the President and the Prime Minister. I believe every one noted Giraud’s obvious simplicity and sincerity of purpose to prosecute the war against the Axis—a consideration with him which overrides everything.

This telegram is addressed to you as I believe that the Secretary would wish to limit distribution.

Repeated to Matthews for his information only. [Murphy.]

WILBY

⁷² Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North Africa.

851.01/981a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1943—10 p. m.

729. Personal for Matthews. Please personally deliver the following message to Mr. Eden from me :

"The President has shown some annoyance at the continued propaganda emanating from the de Gaulle Headquarters in London. The President labels their attitude as a continuing irritant. He knows that the Prime Minister would agree with him and hopes that you can take further steps to allay the irritation."

HULL

851.01/982 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, February 4, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received 11 : 16 p. m.]

927. Your No. 729, February 3, 10 p. m. I delivered your message to Mr. Eden this afternoon. He said that he did not know to what particular recent propaganda stories you had reference but that he quite agreed many of the stories put out from Carlton Gardens⁷³ are an irritant. He asked me to assure you that he would do what he can to stop them. He added that he did not know just what can be done to keep de Gaulle's Headquarters quiet but he will have a talk with Charles Peake and see what steps can be taken. He said : "I am just as anxious as the President and Secretary Hull to stop this irritant, for it creates difficulties for me in the House and with the public." I cited for him several instances of Carlton Gardens' stories, notably (1) the one that Murphy and Giraud were pushing the Comte de Paris⁷⁴ to head a unified set up, (2) the reports that Giraud never replied to any of de Gaulle's questions without first looking at Murphy for his reactions (which General de Gaulle himself told his large staff meeting yesterday), and (3) the unfriendly articles appearing in each issue of de Gaulle's *Marseillaise*.

He also said : "De Gaulle is making a speech tonight which my people have gone over and think is pretty good."

MATTHEWS

⁷³ Headquarters of the French National Committee.

⁷⁴ Orleanist pretender to the French throne.

740.0011 European War 1939/27782 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 6, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received February 7—11 : 45 p. m.]

153. For the Secretary and Under Secretary from Murphy. Upon his return from Turkey the British Prime Minister spent yesterday in Algiers. He asked that a message along the following lines be communicated to the President.

The Prime Minister understands how the two memoranda of points agreed at the Anfa Conference (see my 124, February 1, noon) were approved by the President immediately prior to his departure from Anfa which left no opportunity for coordination with the Prime Minister. The memoranda include specific mention of the agreement on the part of the British Government and he considers it important that a text be prepared which can be accepted by the three participants of the conference. The text in its present informal state only represents agreement between the President and General Giraud. Mr. Churchill said that the British Government had prior commitments, notably the recognition that it was [*had?*] accorded to de Gaulle as representing certain French interests. Having every regard for the President's direction of affairs in this area, he believed that the President would wish to modify the memoranda slightly to avoid conflict with the British Government's other commitments.

In consequence the draft which follows in sections 3, 4 and 5 of this telegram⁷⁵ was prepared jointly by the American and British representatives. It has been approved by the Prime Minister for submission to the President and it further meets with the approval of General Eisenhower. General Giraud is in accord. We feel that the new text provides an improvement over the hastily prepared minute which was discussed at the last moment between the President and General Giraud. The result should be that the British host is equally prepared to provide more complete cooperation than might have been the case if they were to look upon the agreement as primarily bilateral in character.

In his conversation with me the Prime Minister emphasized his intention to treat Giraud and de Gaulle upon an absolute plane of equality. Mr. Churchill did not want to be put in position of appearing to abandon de Gaulle. In giving his full support to Giraud in this area he said he was motivated by two factors of prime importance in the successful prosecution of the military campaign; namely, the necessity of preserving tranquility in local affairs and of maintaining uninterrupted communications. He felt, however, that in building

⁷⁵ The draft begins on p. 50.

up Giraud position and striving to bring about unity between the different French factions a process which was complicated at times by de Gaulle's temperament, it was nevertheless important that the latter's contribution should not be overlooked. In addition to his achievements during the past 2 years he had an army of 30,000 men in the field whereas, in fact it had now become necessary to withdraw French troops from the Tunisian front. It was true that this withdrawal had been necessitated by supply difficulties and lack of equipment and to avoid annihilation of French troops but the result was that Allied forces destined for attack purposes are now being required to hold some former French positions. Mr. Churchill agreed that the French forces at the Tunisian front could not be expected to withstand tank attacks equipped only with light arms, many of them of antiquated manufacture. His estimate of 50,000 men in the field under General de Gaulle is disputed. It is believed that the figure is closer to 30,000 and it is also true that the British have equipped de Gaulle's forces with modern armament. The Prime Minister acknowledged valuable services rendered to the Allies by Giraud's forces on the front and in the maintenance of the long line of communications to Tunisia.

Giraud told me this morning that after his long private conversation with the Prime Minister last evening he was disturbed by the thought that this might portend a weakening of American support. He was interested particularly in paragraph 4 of the following text relating to his right and duty to acting as trustee for French interests. In the original memorandum of January 24 ⁷⁶ the language is broader than in the present text. He understood from his conversation with the President that the latter favored Giraud's representation of French interests in the United States and he hopes that this may be true. I told him that in my opinion the present language "the right and duty of acting as trustee for French interests military, economic and financial which are associated or become associated with the movement of liberation now established in French North and West Africa" undoubtedly represented the President's understanding. This language would seem to me to care adequately for the question of representation in the United States.

The second point which troubled Giraud is the change in wording regarding military supply. The original text approved by the President in principle indicated that improved priority would be granted to the French forces in this area subject to the decisions of General Eisenhower and General Somervell. The present text refers to "priority which their military situation demands and as may be determined by the combined Chiefs of Staff". General Giraud wanted to know whether this altered the character of the President's approval.

⁷⁶ See telegram No. 124, February 1, from the Consul General at Algiers, p. 44.

I assured him that it did not but that the new text merely outlined more in detail than [*the?*] procedure which necessarily would be followed. He said that with these explanations he was prepared to accept the new text and that he was quite agreeable to the insertion in paragraph 4, section II of the reference to the French National Committee under General de Gaulle. He [apparent omission] was giving every day of good faith in a desire to arrive at a friendly and workable union with de Gaulle he hoped that the British would support him in prevailing upon the French National Committee to cease its vindictive and personal radio campaign against certain Frenchmen in North Africa who are wholeheartedly and sincerely engaged in prosecuting the war against the Axis.

I urgently recommend acceptance of the text as now submitted; it should provide a workable basis in the conduct of our affairs in that area.

The amended memoranda reads as follows:

“Memoranda of Points Agreed at the Conference at Anfa Camp Between the President of the United States of America and the British Prime Minister on the one Hand and General Giraud on the Other

I

1. The intervention of the Anglo-American troops on 8th November on French territory in Africa, brought about at the demand of Frenchmen who, since 1940 have wanted to take up the fight against Germany, was an act of liberation of an oppressed nation accomplished by the United Nations.

2. The form of the relations between France and the United States of America, the post war consequences of the association of France and the United States in the fight against Germany, the military, economic and financial aid given to France, have all been defined in letters exchanged between the Consul [*adviser*], R. Murphy, in the name of President Roosevelt, and General Giraud, before the landing.

3. The French nation and the French people are the only ones who may fix their representation and designate their government. Because it is impossible for the French Motherland to pronounce freely her will, France does not now possess a recognizable government and the question of the future government of France is not capable now of final solution.

4. In the interests of the French people, in order to safeguard France's past, her present and her future, the President of the United States of America and the British Prime Minister attribute to the French Commander-in-Chief, with his headquarters at Algiers the right and duty of acting as a trustee for French interests, military, economic and financial, in French territories which are associated or which hereafter become associated with the movement of liberation now established in French North and West Africa. They bind themselves to aid him in this task by all the means in their power.

II

1. On the military plane it has been agreed between the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister on the one hand and General Giraud on the other that the French people will receive the equipment which is indispensable to them with the priority which their military situation demands and as may be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and that this shall be made up of the most modern material.

2. In subsequent talks with General Marshall and General Somervell, it was agreed in principle that the delivery would amount to material for 3 armored divisions and 8 motorized divisions as well as for a first line air force consisting of 500 bombers, and 200 transport planes, and that of this equipment there would be delivered during the weeks to come 400 trucks, and the equipment for 2 armoured divisions, 3 reconnaissance battalions, 3 battalions of tank destroyers, and the 3 motorized divisions and such of the aviation equipment as can come by air. The details are to be worked out with the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces.

3. In regard to transport it has been agreed in principle with General Somervell that [apparent omission] supplying of French Africa would be assured by the monthly allocation of 65,000 tons (50,000 tons of wheat, 12,000 tons of sugar and 3,000 tons of material) and that the shipment of this material would be made before next summer. France would furnish to the inter-Allied pool a share of 165,000 tons of shipping and the Allies would furnish the remainder necessary for the delivery to be completed within the agreed time. The aviation material would be sent as far as possible by air. The details are to be worked out with the appropriate Allied authorities.

4. On the political plane it was agreed between the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, General Giraud that it was to their common interest for all French fighting against Germany to be reunited under one authority and that every facility would be given to General Giraud and to the French National Committee under General de Gaulle in order to bring about this union.

5. In this connection it has been agreed by the President whereas [*sic*] that the exchange would be brought to 50 francs to the dollar in order to ameliorate the existing differences with the exchange rate given to the territories placed under the control of General de Gaulle it being the strong hope that in the latter territories the rate will be lowered from 43 to 50 francs to the dollar.

6. It has also been agreed that the necessary propaganda from the North and the West African territory for France in the French language should be carried on by the French authorities in concert with the Allied authorities and that, for this reason, conferences should be held regarding the use of short wave radio stations."

[Murphy]

WILEY

740.0011 European War 1939/27838 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 9, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received February 10—10: 12 a. m.]

172. For the Secretary and Under Secretary from Murphy. My 153, February 6, 6 p. m. Giraud today handed me a note⁷⁷ relating to the reservation which he makes regarding paragraph 4 of the new joint American-British-French memoranda of the Anfa Conference.

The note states that this reservation relates specifically to paragraph 3 of the memorandum of July [*January*] 24 (my 124, February 1, noon) and asks whether the President would confirm that he recognizes the Commander in Chief residing in Algiers as the "trustee" of French interests in the United States as well as in other countries "of American influences".

Giraud asks that the foregoing be telegraphed in order that the President may promptly be informed of the reservations which accompany his acceptance of the protocol. He also considers it important that General Eisenhower and I be empowered urgently to put into operation the results of the conversations at Washington and the Anfa Conference. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851T.50/22 : Telegram

The Consul General at Dakar (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

DAKAR, February 15, 1943—1 p. m.
[Received February 16—4: 39 a. m.]

60. Lord Swinton visited Dakar yesterday. He seemed most pleased by the friendly informal nature of the welcome extended to him by the Governor General. He was also gratified to learn while here of the acceptance by Washington of the joint recommendations reported in Glassford's 252,000 January 25,⁷⁸ and of the decision which will permit American-British economic experts to carry on informally under the two Consulates within the framework of the principles and policies established by NAEB.

Lord Swinton expressed to me the opinion that it would be most helpful if an American opposite number to him in West Africa were appointed and said that he understood that some thought had already

⁷⁷ For text of note to which is ascribed the date of February 10, see "Crusoe" [Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil], *Vicissitudes d'une victoire* (Paris, 1946), p. 149.

⁷⁸ Reference is to a telegram sent via military channels by Admiral Glassford conveying the substance of a memorandum, also dated January 25, entitled "Joint Recommendations by the British and American Economic Missions at Dakar"; memorandum not printed. This was the basis for Allied economic cooperation in French West Africa (Dakar Consulate General Files: 850).

been given to this subject in Washington. He added that should such an appointment be made it would doubtless be desirable bearing French susceptibilities in mind that General Giraud be kept informed of the general West African situation through the establishment by the General of a liaison arrangement with himself (Swinton) and his American colleague.

Repeated to Murphy.

BARNES

740.0011 European War 1939/27838 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1943—11 p. m.

264. Your 153, February 6. For Murphy. A number of circumstances, including questions raised in your 172 of February 9, your 437, January 22 to War Department,⁷⁹ and the statement reported February 9 by Gentil⁸⁰ that he will make trip to obtain reaction of South American countries "to the possibility of recognizing the North African Government as legal for all France" make it desirable that there should be no doubt in the mind of General Giraud concerning our interpretation of the first memorandum as reported in your 153. Our position as determined by the President⁸¹ is as follows:

1. Article III of first memorandum disposes of question of recognition of a French Government until French people are free to express their will and therefore disposes of question of a French Diplomatic or Consular service.

2. We regard Giraud as the trustee in the United States of the interests mentioned in Article IV. We will welcome civilian representation on the French Military Mission. We do not recognize Giraud as trustee in this country of French interests not associated with his movement. He is aware of our relationship with the French National Committee.

3. The question of representation in other countries, including those of South and Central America by Missions similar to that noted in paragraph 2 above, is entirely between the countries concerned and Giraud. If they ask us for advice we will inform them of the position we have taken.

4. Within the limits set forth above Giraud can count on our wholehearted cooperation.

HULL

⁷⁹ Letter not found in Department files.

⁸⁰ François Gentil, assistant to General Giraud.

⁸¹ The amended memoranda on Anfa Plan were approved by President Roosevelt on April 22. For additional treatment of the Anfa Plan, see Marcel Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, pp. 33-44.

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/1: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 16, 1943—2 p. m.
[Received February 16—11:25 a. m.]

1184. I told Sir Alexander Cadogan⁸³ yesterday afternoon that I was delighted that Mr. Eden and he are going to Washington; a full exchange of views with all concerned there could not but be helpful. He said that the visit would at least afford an opportunity to find out a little of the lines on which American minds are running with regard to the various aspects of post war problems before British ideas have become too crystallized. "If American ideas and British ideas differ", he said, "we are quite prepared to reexamine the lines along which we have been thinking, but it is important for us to learn without delay what progress you have made and what sort of approach you are taking."

I said that in addition to the general usefulness of such a visit—and he emphasized that they are going over with no fixed agenda or program of discussion—I thought it would be helpful to have a frank and full discussion of our respective French policies. I said that as he was aware there was considerable feeling in American quarters that the British had not exercised all the control or influence over General de Gaulle and his advisers they could at a time when they were stirring up public clamor and creating difficulties for all concerned; if it is not British policy to support General de Gaulle in some of his pretensions this would give Mr. Eden a good opportunity to make it clear. He assured me that there is no desire on the British side to back General de Gaulle for any position of political primacy but that we must remember how strongly British public opinion feels on the subject. He said that during the period of difficulties with de Gaulle over the Syrian question last summer he and Strang thought that with the North African operation it might be possible to "drop de Gaulle entirely", but unfortunately the feeling stirred up over the Darlan question had so strengthened him here that this was not possible.

I asked if he was optimistic over the possibility of bringing about some unity between Giraud and de Gaulle. He seemed somewhat doubtful, though he thought Catroux's mission might help and certainly Massigli's⁸⁴ influence would be on the right side. He fears, however, given de Gaulle's temperament, that eventually the General and Massigli will clash.

⁸³ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁴ René Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs under General de Gaulle.

He said he too welcomed the opportunity which the Washington visit would give Mr. Eden and him to try to prevent any sort of split between us over French problems. He agreed with me that there has been considerable improvement in the last few days in the sense of a more understanding attitude in the press.

MATTHEWS

851R.01/210 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 18, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 7 : 20 p. m.]

228. For the President and Secretary of State from Murphy. We believe that the following résumé of the situation in North Africa should be brought to your attention. Macmillan is sending an identical telegram to the British Prime Minister as the basis of possible consultation with you.

1. The Tunisian campaign will take much longer to terminate than was anticipated when military operations began in North Africa and subsequently when the present political arrangements with the local authorities were concluded.

2. As a result of the Anfa Conference the immediate situation in North Africa improved owing (a) to the support which the Conference gave to General Giraud's position and (b) to the promise which it held out to a political settlement between Giraud and de Gaulle.

3. Since the Conference there has been some further improvement in the local political atmosphere which has, however, not yet been translated into many positive administrative achievements. The progress towards a Giraud-de Gaulle understanding has been marked by hesitation on both sides and has been too slow to overcome the tendency towards divergence which will continue so long as effective and permanent contact is not established between the two groups. On the Allied side, although nearly a month has passed, there has been no realization of the promises held forth at Anfa in particular as regards military supplies, and in consequence there is growing disillusionment here. (The purely military aspect is the subject of a separate telegram.⁸⁵)

4. This disillusionment is giving rise to a belief both in the Administration and the Army here that the United Nations have no intention of supporting a French Army except as a defensive force; that the military effort here is being held back, as a matter of policy; and that as a result French troops will have no share in the conquest of France and France will not be present at the victory. This belief is having

⁸⁵ Telegram No. 252, February 20, midnight, p. 61.

its effect on the morale of the French Army. The slow course of the Tunisian campaign contributes to this concern which in turn is holding up progress on the political side. The conclusion is that we are in a vicious circle. The failure to supply armaments is holding up political progress and the lack of progress may be having an adverse effect on the supply of armaments.

5. In the light of this situation we feel obliged to suggest that the policy of two Governments towards the French problem should be further defined. The prolongation of the Tunisian campaign and the potential deterioration of the general situation in North Africa in particular raise the question it is desirable to defer until a later stage of the war, a decision whether the various elements of the French Empire are to be regarded and treated as separate administrative units or whether it is not now indispensable to bring about their fusion in the interests both of the present campaign and of those in contemplation.

It is certain that if the position is not clarified the benefits of the Anfa Conference for the French situation will be dissipated.

6. The present moment is suitable for further definition of policy, since political changes can still be exacted in return for undertakings in regard to the supply and armaments and the future participation of the French Army in the war. It is clear that if we wish to improve the situation and indeed to prevent its further decline we must be prepared to give and execute definite commitments on these two points and also to contemplate the acceptance of a provisional French authority which will speak for all French territories and French men adhering to the movement of Giraud and de Gaulle.

7. If you agree to the foregoing we recommend that a new joint approach should be made to General Giraud and de Gaulle in the sense that the present French situation is unsatisfactory; that it is compromising the future role of the French Army, that it is having an adverse effect upon opinion in occupied Europe; and that the basis should be found without delay for an agreement between all Frenchmen and French territories outside France with such minimum changes of policy and personnel as may be necessary to bring this about.

8. Should you approve we should submit suggestions on procedure.

[Murphy]

WILEY

851.01/1025 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 18, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received 11:23 p. m.]

1268. There is evident optimism among those elements at Carlton Gardens who favor early agreement with General Giraud and this new optimism is shared by Admiral Stark. The reasons therefor seem to be threefold:

1. Thanks to the President's address⁸⁶ and the attitude and reports of Capitant in whom de Gaulle appears to have confidence the General seems to have come round for the time being at least to accept the view that "the Americans" have all along and still are trying to bring about an improvement in North Africa. Capitant has apparently given a full report of American policies and activities since the November landings and this report coming from one of his own trusted people has served to dissipate some, at least, of de Gaulle's suspicions. In contrast to his previous criticisms of Murphy, de Gaulle seems for the moment to be prepared to accept Capitant's assertions that Murphy's influence and efforts from the moment of Darlan's accession to power have been directed toward the changes and reforms that Carlton Gardens has so loudly demanded. Capitant has likewise successfully scotched the rumor propagated by Carlton Gardens that Murphy "was backing the Comte de Paris".

2. De Gaulle has likewise, say the optimists, been persuaded that General Giraud is in full agreement with him on the need for a thorough reorganization of the French Army, and its moral as well as material re-equipment through the elimination of senior officer deadwood, the promotion of able juniors, et cetera. Catroux's reports on this subject seem to have been constructive as have the assurances of Pannafieu.

3. The Prime Minister's suggestion that failure to reach agreement with Giraud or at least show substantial progress along the road to conciliation would make it difficult for His Majesty's Government to renew its credits to the National Committee for the coming fiscal year (my telegram No. 1127, February 12, midnight⁸⁷) has likewise unquestionably had a salutary effect. While they do not naturally refer to the subject in conversation, the possibility that they might lose the financial support so vital to the continuance of the Fighting French movement has at least aroused sufficient doubts and qualms at Carlton Gardens to reduce their propaganda against Giraud and their stories about "the Americans" to a minimum. Massigli himself has confirmed my impression that the prospect of penury has chilled the hearts (and tongues) of many of those at Fighting French Headquarters.

⁸⁶ President's address before the White House Correspondents Association, February 12, 1943; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 13, 1943, p. 145.

⁸⁷ Not printed.

Whatever the relative weight of these three factors (and I am not inclined to underestimate the third), the better elements among the Fighting French are for the moment hopeful that through a gradual step by step cooperation on military and economic practical problems eventual French unity may yet be achieved. These elements are in agreement that on the contrary to endeavor to force some sort of immediate merger of the National Committee and the North African War Committee would be poor tactics.

As the Department is presumably aware General Eisenhower has sent a cordial reply to General de Gaulle's message (my telegram No. 1191, February 16, 4 p. m.⁸⁸). De Gaulle has asked the Foreign Office to put a plane at his disposal between the 1st and 8th of March to enable him to proceed on a month's inspection trip to Cairo, Beirut, Tobruk (to see Larminat), Tripoli (to see Leclerc⁸⁹), Chad, Brazzaville, Madagascar and back to Cairo. It is either during his visit to Tripoli around the middle of March or following his return to Cairo that he would like to stop off in French North Africa to see General Eisenhower. De Gaulle will be accompanied by Colonel Billotte and has likewise asked if Colonel Archdale (British) may accompany him. The Foreign Office is awaiting General Eisenhower's reaction before giving General de Gaulle the plane. (Admiral Stark has cabled General Eisenhower.)

MATTHEWS

Algiers Consulate General Files : 710

The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa (Murphy) to the High Commissioner of French North Africa (Giraud)

[ALGIERS,] February 19, 1943.

MY DEAR GENERAL GIRAUD: I did not fail immediately to communicate the substance of your letter of February 9, 1943,⁹⁰ to the President of the United States who has authorized me to state in reply that the Government of the United States regards you as the trustee in the United States for French interests, military, economic and financial which are associated or become associated with the movement of liberation now established in French North and West Africa. In view, however, of the relationship which exists between the United States Government and the French National Committee, it is not possible to accord you recognition as trustee in the United States of French interests not associated with your movement.

⁸⁸ Not printed.

⁸⁹ Jean Leclerc, Commanding General of the Fighting French Forces in Africa.

⁹⁰ See telegram No. 172, February 9, 6 p.m., from the Consul General at Algiers, p. 52.

Inasmuch as it has been agreed in Article III of the joint memorandum that the French nation and the French people are the only ones who may fix their representation and designate their Government, and that the question of the future Government of France is not capable now of final solution, no question of the recognition of a French Government will arise until the French people are free to express their will. Consequently the question of a French diplomatic and consular service does not arise. My Government, however, welcomes civilian representation on the French military mission now in the United States.

The question of representation in other countries including those of South and Central America by missions similar to those envisaged above is a matter for discussion between the countries concerned and the French High Command. Should these countries ask my Government for advice they would be informed in the sense of the foregoing paragraphs.

I have been instructed, however, to inform you that with this understanding you may be assured of the wholehearted cooperation of the United States.

Please accept [etc.]

ROBERT D. MURPHY

851.01/1013 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1943—7 p. m.

1117. For the Chargé d'Affaires. I received two cables yesterday, your 1184, February 16, 2 p. m., and your 1191, February 16, 4 p. m.,⁹¹ that I wish you would discuss either with Eden or Cadogan, in your judgment. In the former telegram you refer to their forthcoming visit to this country with an idea of ascertaining whether American ideas and British ideas differ. You then went on to make specific reference to General de Gaulle (who is heading a French Movement and supported by British funds, as is understood here, because of the aid General de Gaulle may contribute to the cause of the United Nations in defeating the Axis powers).

In your second telegram under reference there is quoted a statement of General de Gaulle to a representative of the American Government that General de Gaulle (who, as stated above, is financially supported by the British Government as the leader of the Free French Movement in London) believes that the United States Government, through the Department of State, favors the establishment of fascist regimes in all European countries. You may point out to Mr. Eden I find

⁹¹ Latter not printed.

these two telegrams difficult to reconcile and that I entirely approve the statement made by you and reported in your telegram 1184, February 16, 2 p. m. that "there was considerable feeling in American quarters that the British had not exercised all the control or influence over General de Gaulle and his advisers they could at a time when they were stirring up public clamor and creating difficulties for all concerned." I should like a telegraphic report of your conversation based on these instructions.

HULL

851.24/3073 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, February 20, 1943—5 p. m.

305. Personal from the President for Murphy.

"I wish our good friends in North Africa would get their feet on the ground. You can tell them that at no time did I or General Marshall promise equipment for the French divisions on any given date. What was agreed on was the principle of rearming them—to be done as soon as we found it practicable from a shipping point of view.

You are at liberty to tell them from me also that I have the same kind of cries for help from Russia on the north route, Russia through the Persian Gulf, the British for supplies in England, the British for building up strength in Burma, the Chinese throughout China and several South American States who believe they will be bombed out of existence before the week is out. I had hoped that our French friends in Africa would not join the chorus, for the very simple reason that they can well realize that I am shipping everything that the available ships will carry.

Tell them that it is uncooperative to start stories that they are disillusioned, that they have been let down in equipping an Army to go into France, or that slowness in supplying armaments is holding up political progress. You can intimate that they ought not to be children but should act quickly in denying all these silly rumors. Tell them the whole outcry can be summed up in the French words 'une bêtise'.

I am going ahead with their rearmament as fast as I can get it over. But, of course, it is also true that the present situation in Tunisia is necessarily affecting dates of delivery.

Give General Giraud my very warm regards and to tell all his people that they must remain calm and sensible. Roosevelt."

HULL

851R.01/210 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, February 20, 1943—11 p. m.

312. For Murphy. Your 228, February 18, 4 p. m. has had careful attention. The separate telegram concerning the military aspects

which you refer to at the end of section I is being replied to by the War Department. We assume that military headquarters in North Africa and the War Department are keeping each other informed of any developments in the situation which have a bearing in those areas on the military campaign.

It has been the policy of this Government from the beginning to encourage all French elements to unite for the liberation of France. This remains in effect and any approach that you can suggest to this end would be welcomed by this Government but we do not wish to set off political inducements which might possibly compromise the future status of the French people against a problem which is primarily military although we recognize fully there are French civilian responsibilities involved. These new civilian responsibilities in North Africa have only recently begun to result in improved civilian political administration and we are still awaiting the results of the recent conversations between General Giraud and General Catroux. Here again if there are concrete suggestions you wish to offer we shall be very glad to consider them since we recognize fully the final adjudication of differences between the various French elements is an essential but has been from the beginning a problem to be worked out by the French themselves with such aid as we can offer within the limits of our war effort and war policy.

Repeated to London as No. 1141.

HULL

851.24/307½ : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, February 20, 1943—midnight.

[Received February 21—7:05 p. m.]

252. For President and Secretary from Murphy. Our recent telegrams have indicated that we are arriving at a rather critical point in our relations with the French over the question of our program for the rearmament of the French forces. They manifest a growing feeling that they are being hoodwinked. There is a consequent lowering of morale and confidence in us largely because of the uncertainty which prevails. This results from the lack of a definite program other than the allocation by the Commander in Chief prior to Anfa, i. e., 25,000 tons of military equipment monthly.

Giraud believes that in his conversations with Marshall and Somervell at Anfa a far more substantial program was indicated but a month later Giraud is still in the dark regarding our intentions. This situation is clearly set forth in telegrams despatched yesterday and today by Eisenhower to Marshall. At Allied forces headquarters the Rearmament Commission has informed Giraud that it has no author-

ity to make commitments in excess of 25,000 tons monthly. Giraud learns from Bethouart that the composition of these 25,000 tons includes items never requested such as ambulance equipment, projectors and items of a defensive character, but no tanks and little other equipment described as offensive type. This sense of uncertainty has been heightened by unfavorable military developments of the past few days.

The point of this letter is a desire to let you know that throughout the French Army in North Africa the conviction is developing that we are not sincere in the many references we have made through the months to the rearmament of the French forces and also that the military effort is being held back in this area. The French have listened with respectful credence to our various announcements of armament production and they also realize fully the gravity of the shipping problem but what primarily disturbs them is that after three months of our presence in Africa during which time we have of necessity depended on the French for many things no evidence of a substantial program of rearmament is in sight.

They know the de Gaulle forces have been equipped by the British with modern armament and that with British help de Gaulle agents are smuggling quantities of munitions into France (together with propaganda to the effect that the United States is backing a Fascist Pretorian guard in North Africa).

Under these circumstances the American objective is questioned and there is uncertainty whether United States has any real intention of permitting the French African Army to equip itself and whether French African forces will be excluded from the European operation.

We emphasize that whatever immediate increase of armaments shipments is made to this area within the framework of existing shipping possibilities it would in no wise affect your longer term policy regarding the equipment of the French Army in France, a matter of at least 100 divisions. What we are driving at is a few divisions and the necessity now to galvanize the French fighting spirit here for the African operation and the participation even if only a participation in the initial stages of the European invasion. We feel it of the utmost importance that the French African Army be given the opportunity to participate with Allied forces when the time comes to move into southern Europe. Deprived of such a prospect morale will deteriorate to a point where our European operation might be seriously embarrassed.

The Security of the North African base is of capital importance to the success of that operation. We should do everything we can to stimulate the fighting spirit here. Without the allocation of modern armament to the French we cannot expect that essential cooperation.

Some credence is being given by the French to a current report that the United States does not favor the creation of any French Army even after victory is achieved and proposes, with Great Britain and Soviet Russia, to exclude France from real participation in the peace settlement. They point out furthermore in support of their concern that most of the still insignificant quantities of material thus far given by us is obviously designed for defensive purposes and although they previously held a considerable sector of the Tunisian front without modern equipment their units have been withdrawn presumably to be equipped but so far the material is lacking.

Under such circumstances Giraud told General Eisenhower and me yesterday he had no interest in continuing the battle. His primary purpose is the participation in the fight for the liberation of France. If that were to be denied him he preferred to quit now. He has every confidence in your sincerity and that of Generals Marshall and Somervell and Eisenhower, but he feels that somewhere along the line there is opposition if not deception.

General Eisenhower is sending two telegrams outlining the position regarding armament of the French forces as it relates to the critical battle now in progress in Tunisia as well as to the European program. I urgently recommend that we lay at least some cards on the table and enter into franker discussion as to the future of the French participation if this is at all practicable. Our prestige and policy are being challenged.

French officers are beginning to look more and more to England for practical encouragement. There has been some discussion of sending two French African divisions to England for training and eventual equipment. Giraud states that many French aviation officers are applying for permission to go to England where they feel that the prospect of participating in the military action may be brighter than is the case here.

If possible General Eisenhower should have more support; and more tonnage with necessary escort vessels should be allocated to this area. The French have made an important contribution to shipping and considerable progress has been made in port facilities and speed of unloading. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/1023 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 22, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 9:55 p. m.]

1349. I called on Mr. Eden this afternoon and discussed with him the question of General de Gaulle's recent statements along the lines

of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 1117, February 19, 7 p. m. I read to him de Gaulle's remarks and said that you naturally found some inconsistency in the fact that the General expressing those views should be supported by British funds on the basis of his contribution to the United Nations cause in defeating the Axis.

Mr. Eden said he quite understood your feelings. De Gaulle had frequently said worse things to him and just a few days ago had spent an hour and a half telling him all the mistakes of his, Eden's, French policy over the past 2 years. . . . Eden went on to say that he is now faced with a practical problem of whether to let de Gaulle take his proposed trip (please see last paragraph my telegram No. 1268, February 18, 11 p. m.) and probably stir up further trouble in Syria as he did the last time and possibly in Madagascar and Djibouti, or whether to take the drastic step of refusing to let him go. (I learn from another source that the Prime Minister sent instructions several days ago to Cadogan to tell de Gaulle he could not leave. Cadogan has, however, been laid up with influenza and the message has not been delivered. Eden feels that such a veto might do more harm than good at this time. He learned today of General Eisenhower's and Giraud's willingness to meet de Gaulle in North Africa but the question is still undecided.)

Eden said that he thought that Capitant's visit (my telegram No. 1268, February 18, and 1292, February 19, 8 p. m.⁹²) and the influence of Massigli (my telegram No. 1021, February 8, 9 p. m.⁹³) have brought about an improvement in the atmosphere and I said that I agreed. I added that I thought an equally important factor responsible for the better behaviour of Carlton Gardens was the Prime Minister's indication that failure on de Gaulle's part to make progress toward agreement with Giraud might make it difficult for the British Government to renew its credits. He said, with a smile, that he had not been told of this move but agreed that the intimation would be effective at least with a number of the General's advisers.

I then reminded him that de Gaulle's attitude toward the American Government and its policy toward France over the past 2 years had been one of definite hostility, that he had lost no opportunity to incite our press, which was necessarily ignorant of the many factors involved, to attack our Government and our policy, and that many of the people with whom he had surrounded himself led us seriously to doubt whether he is in fact the Messiah that the French people will choose for the rebuilding of their country when its liberation comes. Mr. Eden said he quite understands your feeling and that he himself has serious doubts of de Gaulle's stability—though apparently not of his sincerity. (He said the President had struck it when he mentioned

⁹² Latter not printed.

⁹³ Not printed.

the strange light in de Gaulle's eye after their Casablanca meeting. Incidentally, he added, "I don't believe de Gaulle yet realizes the mistake he made in delaying his departure for Casablanca 2 days.") In conclusion he said he looked forward eagerly to the opportunity of talking over with you personally the whole question of our respective policies toward France.

MATTHEWS

851R.01/267a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1943—midnight.

322. For Murphy. The issues raised in your 252 of February 20, midnight, and related telegrams have been answered by a personal telegram from the President (305, February 20, 5 p. m.), the Department's 312, February 20, 11 p. m. and a long telegram direct from Marshall for Eisenhower. I am most appreciative of your keeping the Department so adequately informed of the situation as seen from your angle.

Upon General Giraud's request Jean Monnet⁹⁴ left this morning for Algiers but only after consultations with the White House and extended conversations with the War and State Departments. I think the information he is able to give not only as a Frenchman but in view of the work he has been doing in the munitions field here these last 2 years will be of great assistance in clarifying for General Giraud all those points which ill-intentioned people possibly from this side of the Atlantic have endeavored to put into his mind.

For the special purposes of his present trip Monnet has been authorized to represent the Munitions Assignments Board of which Harry Hopkins is Chairman.

Monnet has undertaken after his arrival in North Africa to keep the State Department generally informed of his impressions, but I should also value your opinion as to whether the issues involved have been satisfactorily straightened out with General Giraud and the French High Command after sufficient time has elapsed for study of the telegrams above referred to and an extended opportunity for Monnet to present specific information in his possession.

I feel that you should know that these matters have been under continuous consideration since the Casablanca conference and more than a month ago the issues involved in providing adequate shipping tonnage for material already manufactured and awaiting shipment were being worked out in relation to other requirements.

HULL

⁹⁴ A French businessman who came to Washington after the fall of France to serve on the British Purchasing Commission; he became Commissioner of Armaments, Supplies and Reconstruction in the French Committee of National Liberation created on June 3, 1943.

851R.01/251 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 2, 1943—11 p. m.
 [Received March 3—10:20 p. m.]

315. From Murphy. Department's 312, February 20, and London's 1350, February 22.⁹⁵ The Prime Minister has replied to Macmillan's telegram identic with my 228, February 18, 4 p. m., stating that the British Government would like to see as soon as possible a central provisional administrative authority of the French Empire as a whole to exercise the maximum war effort. Its experience with de Gaulle has led it to believe there should be a strong civilian element in the governing body which should be able to direct and control the head of the administration. The latter under existing conditions might have to be a soldier. The best solution would be a "government of officials" if the necessary staff can be secured or brought from France. Under this central authority all available French Forces should be equipped and trained as soon as possible so that they may participate in the liberation of France and that France may be present at the victory.

The Prime Minister added he was looking into the matter of the rearmament of French Forces in North Africa which was, however, a matter for the United States in the first instance but doubted whether in view of the political attitude of the United States the time was yet appropriate for a further joint formal approach to de Gaulle and Giraud. He stated, however, that all his influence was being brought to bear on the French National Committee to urge the necessity of early agreement between Algiers and the Fighting French.

Before Macmillan's departure for Cairo February 28 he agreed that in view of the arrival of Monnet who reached Algiers March 1 and the opening of discussions with the Gaullist representatives it would be preferable to await the outcome of these discussions among the French themselves before making specific recommendations for joint action on the part of our two Governments. I shall endeavor to keep you currently informed of these developments and am continuing to emphasize the importance of reaching an early agreement as between the two French factors. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851R.01/255 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 3, 1943—2 p. m.
 [Received March 4—1:39 a. m.]

318. From Murphy. It is understood that the representatives of the French National Committee who arrived last week in Algiers,

⁹⁵ Latter not printed.

Charbonniere and Colonel Pechkoff, have received a proposal from the French Nationalist Committee to serve as a basis for fusion between the High Command in Algiers and the Fighting French.⁹⁶ In substances these are:

1. Repudiation of the armistice.
2. Repudiation of the connection with Vichy and repeal in so far as the state of war permits of law instituted by Vichy.
3. No attempt to be made to establish a French Government at this time but a review of all acts now carried out by French authorities by the constituent assembly after the liberation of France.

If the foregoing were accepted, the French National Committee proposed:

- (a) Immediate coordination of military forces
- (b) Creation of a diplomatic union so that abroad there should only be one diplomatic voice for French opinion.
- (c) Cooperation in all economic matters

Pending the arrival of General Catroux now scheduled for March 12, these proposals are not to be formally presented but it will serve as the basis for preliminary discussions of the Fighting French Mission now here.

It is apparent that no real progress can be expected either along these lines or toward any definite fusion until Catroux's return. De Gaullist representatives are reluctant to engage in any discussions of substance until that time which in turn gives the local authorities the impression that they are manifesting no particular desire for agreement. Giraud has seen Charbonniere and Pechkoff on two occasions and tells me their attitude is not encouraging.

It is feared this difficulty will persist until Catroux arrives. In Macmillan's absence, Makins⁹⁷ is telegraphing his Government urging that its influence be brought to bear to induce Catroux to expedite his return. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851R.01/268 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 4, 1943—3 p. m.
[Received March 5—6: 18 p. m.]

331. Personal for the President and Secretary from Murphy. Your 322, February 23, midnight. Since my return from Morocco I have

⁹⁶ Information on these proposals received from British sources had been transmitted to the Department earlier by the Chargé in the United Kingdom in telegram No. 1449, February 26, 9 p.m. (851.01/1026½).

⁹⁷ Roger Makins, Assistant to the British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Command.

had conversations with General Giraud during the course of which I dwelt on our preoccupation regarding the possible effects of criticisms of slow political progress in his administration. After these conversations I am more convinced than ever of Giraud's utter sincerity of purpose to cooperate wholeheartedly and unreservedly in our war effort, his desire to make a clean break with undesirable Vichy ideas and policies and his sound judgment on certain phases of the North African situation, especially the Moslem question. I explained that I believed he may have lost ground in some sections of public opinion abroad as well as in France itself because of his failure to implement his purpose by prompt administrative reforms and for his failure to eliminate from public office in North Africa several high ranking officials who are regarded as undesirable either because of their former affiliation with the Vichy Government or simply due to the fact that they participated in resistance to the arrival of our forces in November as well as in resistance to Giraud himself. I suggested that if some of these changes were delayed until after the arrival of the Catroux mission later this month credit for the changes made later would undoubtedly be attributed to de Gaulle rather than Giraud. Giraud is thoroughly alive to this situation and I am left in no doubt that he has not forgotten incidents for which Noguès, Michelier and Mendigal were responsible at the time of the arrival of our Forces. Appropriate action in this regard he promised will be taken when in his discretion the time is ripe.

He said quite rightly that it is often overlooked in editorial comment on the local North African situation that the population here has been worked on unremittingly by Axis propaganda during a period of over 2 years. Many false ideas and a lack of true understanding of the principles involved in the war resulted. It is not unreasonable that at a few months elapse to permit an evolution of ideas on the part of many army and navy officers, civilian officials and the business and agricultural world. North Africa is a Moslem and a colonial structure radically different from metropolitan France. It is essentially Arab rather than European.

The French people, Giraud said, will never tolerate the imposition of a government on them by a North African group nor by a group of émigrés. The French people and they alone will decide their political destiny. They may wish he stated a return to the Third Republic form of government or they may wish a communistic or other form but that will be for them—each Frenchman in his village—to decide.

My objective, said Giraud, is a simple one, to get on with the war and liberate the French people at the earliest moment possible, enabling them to make their own decisions. He expressed the opinion that the local political situation had been exaggerated out of all

proportion to its true importance. The colonial structure which now exists was set up by laws of the Third Republic. Undesirable Vichy decrees are being and will continue to be eliminated in an orderly fashion. Anyone who knows me, said Giraud, realizes that I deplore and oppose racial discrimination. My program for the elimination discriminatory restrictions against the Jews is formed on a sound basis which will avoid disturbance in the Moslem world, especially in the French Armed Forces over 70 percent of whom are Arabs. In a speech yesterday he said I publicly announce the support of the Atlantic Charter ⁹⁸ and you know that I am working for a liberalized economy in this area.

Giraud said that the information he had received from the President (Department's 305, February 20, 5 p. m.) from the War Department and his conversations with McCloy ⁹⁹ and Monnet left no doubt in his mind regarding our intentions respecting the French Army and that he is extremely grateful for the President's support. He is proud of the showing of the French troops on the Tunisian front and said again that they had suffered over 5000 casualties.

Giraud said: You may assure the President that I will do my level best to justify his confidence in me. He knows that I have started from scratch in respect of political organization with an acute lack of civilian personnel. I am doing my best to find qualified people whose records will not embarrass the Allies. It is not an easy task. I know there has been criticism of the retention of so-called "Vichy-ites" even though such men may now be giving wholehearted support to the Allied cause. Thus General Bergeret who is Secretary General of the War Committee and an honest man who conscientiously devotes himself to the war effort will resign within a few days at my instance because I realize that the presence of a former member of the Vichy Government may be embarrassing to the Allies. I want to make it quite clear, that I stand for a clean break with undesirable Vichy ideas and policies. The world knows I never was associated with them. Bergeret's dismissal will be followed by others in accordance with my policy of gradual change which recognizes that the paramount consideration is the conduct of the war. Civilian commotion in the rear must be avoided.

We discussed at length the concentration camp problem. Giraud said that he detested concentration camps and everything related to them. He had nothing to do with their exception [*inception?*]. He wishes to release the persons in these camps in an orderly fashion. Means must and will be found he said to enable them to earn a living or depart from the area. He had a report from the Allied Commission

⁹⁸ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367.

⁹⁹ John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War.

now investigating the camps in the Colomb-Bechar area to the effect that a number of the refugees stated that they would not accept employment in the British labor battalions offered them. I made it quite clear to Giraud that there has been a heavy fire of newspaper criticism and much misunderstanding regarding both the importance of these camps and the prevailing conditions. He is, I am convinced, just as eager as the critics to find a happy solution to this vexing problem.

It is believed that the Allied Command will contribute much to that end. In that connection it would be of great assistance if a reply from the Mexican Government regarding its intention in principle to accept a number of Spanish refugees in this area (Department's 61, January 12, midnight and our February 4, 11 a. m.¹) could be hastened. Giraud declared as have other officials connected with this matter that they ask for nothing better than an opportunity to release the Spanish refugees and permit them to depart from this area avoiding embarrassing complications with the Spanish Government which regards many of these individuals as dangerous.

On the subject of the de Gaulle question Giraud stated that he stands for an agreement in principle with de Gaulle; that he hoped that the President and the Secretary realized that he constantly refrains from polemics on the radio and in the press notwithstanding that de Gaulle's organization continues to indulge in public criticism and depreciation of the North African effort. He feels that it is unfortunate that a few individuals in the de Gaulle group seem to place personal recrimination before the war effort and seem to insist that they and they alone stand for whatever is good in French political life.

Repeated to London personal for Matthews. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851T.01/13

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On his return from Dakar a short time ago, Admiral William A. Glassford, who headed the American Naval Mission to that city, expressed the strong opinion that it would be desirable to assign a high-ranking representative of the United States Government to French West Africa as soon as possible.²

Admiral Glassford stated that from both the political and economic point of view French West Africa was in urgent need of guidance in

¹ Neither printed.

² Under date of February 27, Admiral Glassford had sent a copy of his brief of the political and economic situation of French West Africa enclosed in a letter to the Adviser on Political Relations, Wallace Murray (851T.00/91).

order that the fullest use might be made of its war potentialities. The French, he said, were willing to cooperate in the war effort of the United Nations, but required direction and support from an outside source if the proper degree of productivity were to be obtained. Governor General Boisson had indicated that this outside support should, by preference, be American.

Admiral Glassford also stressed the great importance of Dakar from the strategic viewpoint. He recalled your recent remarks to the effect that never again should Dakar constitute a threat to the Western Hemisphere, that it must remain in the hands of people who are friendly to us.³ With the development of the airplane, the significance of Dakar to the United States and the other American Republics can scarcely be exaggerated.

Under the energetic direction of Lord Swinton, the British Resident Minister at Accra, the British are at present rapidly building up a corps of economic specialists and experts at Dakar; with the obvious design of drawing French West Africa into the British orbit. Admiral Glassford feels that unless we are able to meet the expanding influence of Lord Swinton promptly and adequately, we shall inevitably lose the position which should belong to us at Dakar.

I believe that no better person could be found to represent this Government in French West Africa than Admiral Glassford himself. He enjoyed excellent relations with Governor General Boisson, and it is my impression that he would be doubly welcome were he to return as a counterweight to Lord Swinton at Accra. The fact that Admiral Glassford is a naval officer would undoubtedly add to his prestige at such an important French naval base as Dakar.

If you concur, Admiral Glassford might be asked to serve in French West Africa in the capacity above indicated and given the title of Personal Representative of the President, with the rank of Minister. May I have an indication of your views in this matter?

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

851R.01/295 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 14, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 10:08 p. m.]

383. Personal for the President and the Secretary from Murphy. The speech which Giraud is broadcasting today⁴ and political action

³ For the texts of two recent statements by President Roosevelt on Dakar, see Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1943* volume, *The Tide Turns* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 51 and 87.

⁴ For text of General Giraud's speech, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1942-1943* (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1944), vol. v, p. 560.

which will follow it, mark a most important milestone. The full text of the speech has been telegraphed to the War Department. Its main points are as follows:

(1) A repudiation of the legality of any acts taken since the armistice on ground that the free expression of French sovereignty was interrupted by German occupation.

(2) The conclusion that France can have no other political authority except that which has been freely established by the people under the laws of the republic. A provisional government cannot therefore be constituted until France has been liberated and is free to choose its own government. General Giraud undertakes to create conditions in which a free popular choice can be made and that he and his army will be the servants of any provisional government chosen under these conditions and will surrender their powers to such a government if it is adopted.

[3?] All legislation subsequent to June 22, 1940, is in principle declared to have no legal validity. The necessary action to give effect to this declaration will be taken as soon as possible both as regards measures and men. Much that has been done in the meantime cannot immediately be undone, but steps will be taken at once to reestablish French traditions. The municipal assemblies and Conseils Généraux will be convoked.

(4) All laws of racial discrimination are being abrogated.

(5) Strong emphasis is laid on the vital importance of the union of all Frenchmen outside France, and General Giraud offers to cooperate with all those taking part in the struggle against the enemy who accept the fundamental and traditional principles which he has expressed of return to French democratic traditions, and join in the solemn pledges which he gives to the people of France.

Giraud's announcement sets forth with crystal clarity his purpose of identifying himself with those traditional principles which have governed France for over a century; which are at the core of American political philosophy today. These are set forth in the President Lincoln's Birthday Address.⁵ They are the basis of the North African development—the chart of the new France.

In consequence, based on those principles, the question of the constitution of the provisional government of France is settled. The laws of the Third Republic will govern without the imposition by any outside group of any preconceived formula.

The status of Giraud's organization now or later if union is achieved is settled. The organization is purely an administrative body concerned only with the prosecution of the war. It preserves the liberty of action of the French people.

The immediate consequences of Giraud's action are (a) the abolition of racial discrimination, (b) the reinstatement of deliberative assemblies.

⁵ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 13, 1943, p. 145.

It should be understood in Washington that liberal measures dealing with economic life will be taken but this is a complex task which requires time but which will be done.

Giraud's present action should change situation here completely as it should affect world opinion, dealing as it does with fundamental issues thus far obscure.

It seems to me that the present occasion should be seized by the President to publicly applaud and support this spontaneous French gesture which outlines a charter of French freedom.

Macmillan is urging his Government to take steps to set forth this situation in sharp and favorable relief (see my 384, March 14, 6 p. m.⁶).

It seems to us that Eden's presence in Washington might be exploited to that end.

Please note in above connection Monnet's telegram to Hopkins. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851R.01/297 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 14, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received March 14—8:54 p. m.]

387. For the President and Secretary of State from Murphy. I have just returned from the public meeting held under the auspices of the local Alsace and Lorraine Committee at which Giraud delivered his declaration mentioned in my 383, March 14, 5 p. m. He met with enthusiastic reception and it may be helpful to you to know that the patriotic audience representing a good cross-section of French public opinion particularly applauded those portions of the address relating to resistance to the Nazis and the sufferings of the French population; the idea that France has faith in herself; that the French Army of victory will join the people of France in the liberation of the homeland with the help the United States, Great Britain and Russia; that France will take her place among the victorious nations; that the people of France will become masters of their destinies and then constitute their provisional government according to the laws of the Republicans; that Giraud and those with him are the servants of the French people today and tomorrow will be the servants of the provisional government freely chosen by the French people; that post-armistice legislation has no legal validity; that measures are being taken to reinstate public assemblies and eliminate Nazi-imposed laws of racial discrimination; the wish for the union of all Frenchmen.

⁶ Not printed.

Your public approval of this excellent statement of fundamentals is essential. It should be linked if possible with the expressed hope that a victorious France will come to the peace table fortified by the knowledge that her position among the nations is intact.

One of the factors which preys on the confidence of many is the fear that the prostrate situation of their country provides too great a temptation to the Allies in respect of the future of French territories abroad.

I am told that Bergeret has resigned and other personnel changes will follow.

Jean Monnet has done a grand job. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851R.01/297 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1943—4 p. m.

460. For Murphy. Your 387, March 14, 10 p. m. Following is text of statement made by me today :

“General Giraud has now confirmed the hopes of this Government that his selection as the Commander in Chief of the French forces fighting in North Africa would make possible a greater unification of all groups behind his military leadership. This should insure the proper place for a victorious France in the restoration of liberty everywhere.

General Giraud, like a true soldier, has devoted all the time available to him from his military duties to the careful and patient study of the problems involved in the French territories. He has reached the point where, with no material disturbance to his military effort, he has been able to remove discrimination in the treatment of those living under his jurisdiction. He has now made it possible for all elements who desire the defeat of the Axis powers and the liberation of French territory to unite in their will to rid French soil of the weight of the Axis yoke. He has based his authority firmly upon the principle of the free expression of liberated Frenchmen and, foreseeing all France once more mistress of her destiny, has swept aside laws and decrees which were contrary to her traditional republican institutions.”

HULL

851.01/1069 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 18, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received March 19—1 : 17 a. m.]

422. From Murphy for the President [and] Secretary of State. The de Gaulle mission informed us last night that in response to

Giraud's message (see my 400, March 16⁷) de Gaulle now plans to come himself to Algiers as soon as possible for direct talks with Giraud and that Catroux will not arrive until de Gaulle has reached Algiers.

From our conversations with the members of his mission it is clear that the purpose of de Gaulle's visit is to endeavor to establish his leadership of any United French movement. The mission is further saying now that Giraud has set forth the principles on which unity can be based and has demonstrated he does not desire to retain political leadership there should be no reason why de Gaulle cannot assume control. He would leave Giraud in the position of military commander. The basis of de Gaulle's leadership would then be the establishment under his direction of a provisional government of France probably in Algiers. Regardless of the fact that Giraud has now made it clear that no such provisional government can be established except by the French people themselves when they are able freely to express their will, this important aspect of his speech is either being overlooked or deliberately discounted by the de Gaulle mission. In their talks here they are emphasizing that Giraud's break with Vichy and return to the democratic principles of France mean that he has formally accepted de Gaulle's principles and there are no longer any differences between them except those involving personalities.

The Gaullists are now considering the possibility of making use of the five or six former French Senators and Deputies who are outside of France as a form of provisional assembly to constitute the nucleus of the future government of France. Vallin of the de Gaulle mission has established contact with Flandin⁸ and both are apparently active in promoting the foregoing ideas.

It is clear that any such proposals will conflict with the basic principle, now recognized by Giraud, that no form of government of France, provisional or otherwise, can be set up until the French people are free to exercise their own choice; but it is easy to see that in the course of the conversations between Giraud and de Gaulle the latter will not spare any effort to bring about the creation of a provisional government. I assume you wish me to support Giraud in endeavoring to bring about fusion on the only possible basis which can insure lasting unity and preservation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter; namely that until France has been liberated French interests can only be grouped under temporary trusteeships which exercise jurisdiction over territories which they control in the name of the French people. Such trusteeships must be governed by the

⁷ Not printed; this telegram quoted General Giraud's message of March 15 to General Catroux in which he expressed his desire for unity of French Forces and an understanding with General de Gaulle (851R.01/306).

⁸ Pierre Etienne Flandin had served in several French Cabinet posts and was Premier 1934-35; he was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Vichy Government December 1940-February 1941.

traditional French principles of liberty and democracy and return to the laws of the Republic.

I should be grateful for your instructions in this respect.

Repeated to American Embassy London for Matthews. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/1075 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 22, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

2006. For the President and the Secretary of State. The impression gained by Murphy from de Gaulle's mission at Algiers reported in Murphy's 422, March 18, 5 p. m., finds considerable corroboration at this end. Carlton Gardens in private conversations state frankly that they think that all the past propaganda and attacks in the British and American press have served to "wear down" Giraud to the point where he will be glad to turn over the political side of his administration, if not directly to de Gaulle, to Catroux. They feel that thus they will accomplish their primary objective, namely, political supremacy for de Gaulle. They are quite willing to modify the composition of the national committee but they insist on two things, first that its name shall be retained and Giraud "adhere to it" (my telegrams Nos. 1557, March 3, 8 p. m. and 1587, March 4, 10 p. m.⁹) and consequently that de Gaulle be given the real power therein. They add, with what appears to them a generous concession, that any changes Giraud desires will be made except that Noguès,¹⁰ Peyrouton¹¹ or other "men of Vichy" cannot be included in the inner membership of such new national committee. Apparently they envisage also a larger council including colonial governors in which they would be prepared to accept the two above mentioned and even Boisson provided that they get the political control they are so ambitious to have.

Whatever the facts of feeling in France, de Gaulle and his entourage sitting in the relative isolation of London and listening only to their own representatives paid by their funds (advanced from the British Treasury!) and brought from France at their instigation, have at least partly convinced themselves that suffering France demands the leadership of de Gaulle the man, not merely de Gaulle the symbol. They insist (my telegram no. 1791, March 13, 6 p. m.¹²) that their "secret army" numbers 150,000 whereas certain Brit-

⁹ Neither printed.

¹⁰ Gen. Albert Noguès, Resident General in Morocco.

¹¹ Marcel Peyrouton, Governor General of Algeria.

¹² Not printed.

ish secret reports and our own Office of Strategic Services put the maximum at 25,000. Whether or not the Gaullists views of their own strength are exaggerated the fact remains that they look upon themselves as the real liberators and consequently by right the governors of the future France. To them Giraud and North Africa are but useful appendages or irritating competitors to the great magnetizing movement of Fighting France depending on whether or not agreement is reached. The warning note sounded by French socialist spokesmen against any "single party" trend is lost on those to whom personal allegiance to General de Gaulle is the acid test for Fighting France. . . .

That Carlton Gardens are aware that the chief obstacle to their recognition *de facto* as the government of France today and the liberated France of tomorrow is American policy is clear from their speech, both public and private. For example, in addition to his remarks reported in my telegram No. 1896, March 18, noon,¹³ André Philip on Saturday¹⁴ in addressing a public meeting celebrating the thousandth day of the Fighting French movement said, with an obvious reference to us, that because of their moral and material suffering there were two expressions which the people of France could no longer stomach: "realism" and "temporary expediency". He was wildly applauded. Both Philip and Massigli have, however, told de Gaulle that the people of France would never understand it if he broke with the American and British Governments. De Gaulle, I am told was impressed with this advice and it may be well to remember this should future occasion require.

Paraphrase to Murphy.

MATTHEWS

740.00119 European War 1939/1370

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1943.

Participants: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Mr. Anthony Eden,¹⁵
British Ambassador, Lord Halifax,
Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull.

The British Foreign Secretary came in this morning accompanied by the British Ambassador and Mr. William Strang, Assistant

¹³ Not printed.

¹⁴ March 20.

¹⁵ Mr. Eden was in Washington for several days during March for an exchange of views with the United States Government on the war situation. For correspondence regarding his visit, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office. I had asked Mr. Welles to be present but he had found it impossible to join us because of previous engagements. Mr. Winant, Mr. Atherton, and Mr. Dunn ¹⁷ were present, and Mr. Norman Davis ¹⁸ joined us later in the conversation.

I then thought it well to bring up the general subject of the question of North Africa and the position of the de Gaulle organization. I referred to the fact that de Gaulle had apparently entrenched himself with the support of large British newspapers which at times he turned loose on us with bitter criticism of certain attitudes and policies of this Government which did not please him. I said this had the effect of confusing public opinion and diverting it from the main purpose we were determined to accomplish in North Africa, which was the defeat of the enemy in that territory and the liberation of that area from Axis domination. We found ourselves in the position of meeting these attacks head on and found these attacks interfering with the actual prosecution of the war as far as American military action was concerned. I said that, of course, the people of this country are now able to see what we were driving at. They understand thoroughly that we consider the fighting of the enemy our first aim and that we had continually had in mind and never lost sight of the gradual liberalization of conditions in North Africa, promoting and encouraging such steps along these lines as far as might be possible without interfering with the military situation. I then referred to the fact that no statement had ever been made by Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, or officials of the Government generally in Great Britain, during the time these attacks were being directed toward American policies, and I felt that it would be extremely helpful in promoting and sustaining good relationship between the British and American peoples if more public concurrence with American policy could be expressed from time to time, and I asked whether the British Government officials could not from time to time drop some appropriate statement with respect to this as we go along. I referred again, as I had before, to the matter of relationship with Vichy which we had pursued for a common purpose but which had been assailed in Great Britain, and said that as these things developed they could drop a comment here and there to show that the two governments understand what they are each trying to work out for a common purpose, thus removing the possibility of misunderstandings, and thus helping immeasurably in keeping the relationship between the two countries on a firm and satisfactory basis. Mr. Eden said that in his first press conference

¹⁷ James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations, and member of the Committee on Political Planning.

¹⁸ Chairman of the American Red Cross.

he had spoken of the French situation, and while he readily agreed that something might be done along these lines, I did not gain the impression that either he or Lord Halifax was very much impressed with the advisability of the British Government taking action from time to time to indicate solidarity with the American viewpoint, particularly in this matter of the division among the French.

I then stated that we have information that de Gaulle is making another drive for political power and that in connection with the forthcoming conversations between his organization and the Giraud authorities in North Africa he fully expected to press for control as political head of whatever form of cooperation might result from these talks. I asked if there were anything we could do about that. I said that our own policy and attitude toward the French situation had always been that we did not feel that there should be any supreme political power set up now to exercise control over the French people. We felt that the primary purpose in any French organization should be the prosecution of the war for the liberation of France, and we felt that there should be no form of provisional government set up or recognized, and that any political activities should be kept to a minimum dictated by necessity. Mr. Eden said that it was his understanding that de Gaulle did not want either a government or a provisional government set up, that he does desire a union of all French forms of authority, and that the idea of de Gaulle, Massigli, and Catroux was the establishment of a unified French authority which could deal with situations with respect to French questions all over the world. He asked me whether there would be any objection on the part of this Government to the setting up and recognition of some central authority of this kind. I said that it was our earnest desire to have the French factions settle these questions among themselves; that up to the present time we had recognized the authority of each group with respect to the territory in which they were operating; and that we particularly desired to refrain from introducing political questions into our relations with different French factions. We had always stressed the desire for a military character of any of these French organizations. I said that this method of dealing with the French situation was entirely satisfactory to us and that our primary consideration was to avoid any step which would give rise to the placing of control of French political matters in the hands of any group which might attempt to carry over such authority into metropolitan France itself in a way which would prevent the free expression of the French people when they had obtained their liberation. Mr. Eden asked if the French get together and agree on a unified authority which might deal with questions affecting all territories now under French control if such an arrangement would be satisfactory to this Government. I said that it would seem to me perfectly possible for

them to agree on certain things and certain aspects of things, but that we must always consider the true relation of such a unified action; that it would not be possible for them to be considered as having political authority with respect to the disposition of the French people or French territories before it is possible for the French people to reestablish by their own will their own Government. Lord Halifax then put the following question which he divided into two parts:

(a) Was it desirable for Giraud and de Gaulle to get together?

(b) In getting together and making it clear that the formation of their organization was purely temporary and did not prejudice any future authority for France, was it possible for them to form some organism comparable to the French National Committee in London?

I said that if such a committee were formulated it was absolutely essential to avoid the picture that was presented by some of the refugee governments in London which will try to go back to their countries and attempt to go through the transition period in that country and to carry on their authority which they have continued to exercise while they were refugee governments. I said that particularly in the case of France which had no government it seemed to me that it would be inadvisable for any political power to be assumed by such an organization. Mr. Eden said that it was their view that the British Government would say "no" to any question of a Government of France, even provisional, but did not object to a rather larger French National Committee which would be composed of a joint group of people from both sides; that the British Government would consider that they were not officials nor clothed with any official authority but that they were merely place holders temporarily dealing with questions which might affect French interests everywhere, and that he sincerely hoped, although he doubted the real possibility of such an eventuation, that there would be some such meeting of minds between the two factions. I then referred to some of the experiences we had had with the French authorities, and told of the difficulties some of our military people had had in New Caledonia¹⁹ where the political authorities had objected to measures the American military Commander considered absolutely necessary for the defense of the island to such an extent that the military Commander had found it necessary to proceed regardless of the objection of the French political head. I pointed out that of course in measures relating to the war we could not be subject to French political authorities in places where we have American troops for the prosecution of the war. Mr. Eden said that they had had similar experiences and he fully recognized the necessity of separating the military considerations from the political.

¹⁹ For correspondence regarding the policy of the United States regarding the protection of French Island possessions in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 687 ff.

I then brought up the matter of the recent events in French Guiana²⁰ and explained how necessary it was for us to deal with French officials who were willing to cooperate with us, particularly in that area right in this hemisphere surrounded by nations, such as Brazil, with which we had inter-American arrangements and who were only too willing and ready to come into the situation with their armed forces if necessary, a picture which we desired by all means to avoid. I asked that inasmuch as the official in command of the military forces in Cayenne had pledged allegiance to General Giraud that the Giraud appointee as Governor be permitted to take control of the situation as we desired to avoid by all means clashes or public disturbances in that area. Neither Mr. Eden nor Lord Halifax was familiar with that particular region but indicated that they could quite understand how it was necessary for us to deal with cooperative officials in that area. There was some discussion at this point of the Martinique situation²¹ and the position of Admiral Robert as compared with a similar situation entailing the position of Admiral Godefroy and the French fleet at Alexandria. I explained very briefly some of the steps we had taken to endeavor to have Admiral Robert come over to the side of the United Nations, and Mr. Eden said that in view of their inability to accomplish very much with Admiral Godefroy he did not feel that they were in a position to lay any complaint at our door with regard to the Martinique situation, although he recalled that there were certain merchant ships and tonnage there which would be extremely useful at this particular time in the war situation.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851.01/1080 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 23, 1943—11 a. m.
[Received March 24—9: 27 a. m.]

464. From Murphy. Today's local newspapers carry an announcement under a Washington date line to the effect that it has been revealed that during the course of Eden's conversations in Washington complete agreement has been reached with respect to Anglo-American policy concerning France.

The publication of this announcement is giving rise to questions on the part of both French groups here, particularly in view of Catroux's

²⁰ For correspondence regarding interest of the United States in the adhesion of French Guiana to the United Nations cause, see pp. 249 ff.

²¹ For correspondence relating to aid given by the United States in securing the transfer of control of French West Indies to representative of the French Committee of National Liberation, see pp. 219 ff.

imminent arrival now scheduled for March 25. I should welcome information regarding the recent trend of Anglo-American discussions as well as any guidance regarding the attitude you may wish me to take in connection with the forthcoming conversations on the subject of French unity.

In the first instance we might wish to inform both Giraud and de Gaulle or his representative that whereas unity of French effort is one of the general objectives of the joint Anglo-American policy, the form and details of such unity are matters for the French themselves to work out with the general understanding that no provisional government of France will be established until France and the French people are liberated. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/1080: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1943—9 p. m.

576. For Murphy—personal from the Secretary. The Anglo-American policy concerning France has been discussed on various occasions during Mr. Eden's visit. I do not gain the impression that either Eden or Lord Halifax was very much impressed with the advisability of the British Government taking action from time to time to indicate solidarity with the American viewpoint, particularly in the matter of the division among the French. Our own viewpoint is well-known to you and conforms with last paragraph of your telegram 464 March 23, 11 a. m. (See also your 422 Mar 18, 5 p. m.)

Mr. Eden said that it was his understanding that de Gaulle did not want either a government or a provisional government set up, that he does desire a union of all French forms of authority and that the idea of de Gaulle, Massigli and Catroux was the establishment of a unified French authority which could deal with situations with respect to the French questions all over the world. He asked whether there would be any objection on our part to the setting up and recognition of some central authority of this kind. In an attempt to crystallize the issue, Lord Halifax then said the question could be divided into two parts: (1) Was it desirable for Giraud and de Gaulle to get together; and (2) In getting together and making it clear that the formation of their organization was purely temporary and did not prejudice any future authority for France, was it possible for them to form some organism comparable to the French National Committee?

I said that if such a committee were formulated it was absolutely essential to avoid the picture that was presented by some of the refugee governments in London which will try to go back to their

countries and attempt to go through the transition period in that country and to carry on their authority which they have continued to exercise while they were refugee governments. I said that particularly in the case of France which had no government it seemed to me that it would be inadvisable for any political power to be assumed by such an organization. Mr. Eden said that it was their view that the British Government would say "no" to any question of a Government of France, even provisional, but did not object to a rather larger French National Committee which would be composed of a joint group of people from both sides; that the British Government would consider that they were not officials nor clothed with any official authority but that they were merely place holders temporarily dealing with questions which might affect French interests everywhere, and that he sincerely hoped, although he doubted the real possibility of such an eventuation, that there would be some such meeting of minds between the two factions.

If the two factions are not able to arrive at some working arrangement satisfactory to both of them and which will fulfill our requirement that no provisional government may expect recognition by us, it will become absolutely essential that the British and American Governments decide between themselves as to the policies which will be pursued by our two Governments with respect to the different French factions. In view of our immediate interest in the North African situation by reason of the presence of American armed forces in that French territory, and in view of the spirit of cooperation already manifested by the French North African authorities toward this country's primary objective of defeating the Axis, we have every intention of continuing to render all the assistance and cooperation practicable to the French North African authorities with respect to the territories over which they exercise authority.

Repeated to London.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/28856

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Early in February, on his way home from Turkey by way of Algiers, the Prime Minister discussed and approved revised drafts of two memoranda²² covering certain phases of the Casablanca conversations, notably recognition of the extent of

²² See telegram No. 124, February 1, noon, from the Consul General at Algiers, p. 44.

General Giraud's trusteeship for certain French interests, together with other questions mostly of a military nature.

Instructions have been issued to Mr. Murphy in Algiers to the effect that the President has authorized the Department of State to approve the two revised memoranda subject to the following amendments.

Paragraph two of the first memorandum to read as follows, the words underlined²³ being in substitution for the word "France" in the earlier draft:

"Two. The form of the relations between France and the United States of America, the post war consequences of the association of France and the United States in the fight against Germany, the military, economic and financial aid given to *French North Africa*, have all been defined in letters exchanged between the Consul, R. Murphy, in the name of President Roosevelt, and General Giraud, before the landing."

Similarly, the following text of paragraph four of the first memorandum has been approved, the words underlined being added to the earlier draft:

"Four. In the interests of the French people, in order to safeguard France's past, her present and her future, the President of the United States of America and the British Prime Minister attribute to the French Commander in Chief; with his headquarters at Algiers, the right and duty of acting as a trustee for French interests, military, economic and financial, *in French territories* which are associated or *which hereafter* become associated with the movement of liberation now established in French North and West Africa. They bind themselves to aid him in this task by all the means in their power."

The second memorandum is approved provided the second paragraph thereof is omitted. It is felt that its accomplishment in detail is impossible at the present time and, furthermore, the essentials are fully covered in the paragraph which precedes it.

Very sincerely yours,

WELLES

851.01/2008 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 3, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received April 4—3: 55 a. m.]

549. From Murphy. My 542, April 2, 4 p. m.²⁴ Macmillan and I have received from General Giraud copies of a memorandum²⁵ dealing with the bases for French unity, which has been discussed with

²³ Printed in italics.

²⁴ Not printed.

²⁵ Dated April 1; for text in translation, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. v, p. 574.

Catroux and which the latter is prepared to take immediately to London as establishing the general lines of an agreement between the High Command and the French National Committee. Both Giraud and Catroux feel that the memorandum takes into account insofar as possible the views of both the High Command and the French National Committee and provides a real solution which they hope will be accepted. The question of personalities and individual leadership is left for further discussion.

Macmillan and I agree that its acceptance would mark real progress in the direction of unity and recommend that the British and American Governments give it their full support insofar as it is consistent with the policies agreed between Washington and London. Macmillan is sending a similar telegram to London.

(Section 2)

Memorandum is too long to be telegraphed in full but may be summarized as follows :

1. Union can only be achieved if unity is reached on well defined principles and a program of action putting these principles into execution. It is essential that unification of all the fighting and resisting forces inside as well as outside France should be achieved, and this implies unity on the basis of a single legislative structure, and direction by a single organization.

2. Principles of agreement. The basic principles of agreement have been defined by General Giraud in his speech of March 14²⁶ and in the French National Committee's memorandum of February 27,²⁷ namely, that the armistice is repudiated, and that the free expression of the sovereignty of French people has been suspended by German occupation and can only be resumed when France is freed. Consequently, legislation subsequent to June 22, 1940, has no legal force. In order to meet a situation of fact, rules derived from such legislation will, however, have to be adjusted in conformity with French tradition. All oaths of allegiance and engagements, either private or public, to individuals are barred and any previous undertakings of this nature are annulled. The restoration of traditional French law means a return to the respect for the law which is the true expression of the French people and will involve restoration of French liberties so that the French people can themselves determine their own destiny. The process by which the will of France shall be expressed is laid down by the legislation in force before the armistice.

A "French Council of Overseas Territories" will be set up and will be composed of the individuals responsible for the administration of the various territories as well as those responsible for the various Departments in the Central Administration. A limited Executive Committee will be responsible for the direction of affairs.

3. Program of action (1) all overseas territories and metropolitan territories, as and when they are liberated, will be placed under the

²⁶ For translation of speech, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. v, p. 560.

²⁷ Memorandum adopted by the French National Committee on February 23 and sent to General Giraud on February 27; for text, see *ibid.*, p. 571.

authority of the Council. This will include Martinique and involve the adherence of Indochina when liberated.

(Section 3)

2. The Council will exercise national sovereignty over these territories until such time as it can deliver its powers to a provisional government.

3. In North Africa this will in particular involve a revision of the position of the Allied authorities established by the Clark-Darlan agreement. The Council will grant the Allied authorities certain facilities and will delegate to them certain rights and powers necessary to the conduct of the war. The administrative autonomy of the different overseas territories will be maintained under the centralized control and coordination of the Council.

4. The Council will enter into any necessary agreements with the Allied Powers or other states as regards all French territories, and in particular negotiate a Lend-Lease agreement with the United States. The Council should be accorded recognition by the Allies as administrator and trustee of all French interests abroad, and should be treated as an Allied Power formally accepted as one of the United Nations. The Council will establish and maintain relations with foreign governments through the appointment of representatives. It will centralize financial questions and control.

5. The establishment and equipment of a single French Army shall be undertaken as quickly as possible. The necessary arrangements will be made for the French Command to participate in the Allied General Staff so that the French Command as well as the French Army will form an integral part of the Allied Armies. Furthermore, a French Army must effectively participate in Allied operations for the liberation of Europe.

6. It is then anticipated that France will take its place at the peace table alongside Great Britain, the United States, Russia and China with an equal status and become a member of the Supreme Council of the United Nations which will establish the peace and determine the postwar settlement. In re-entering the struggle France secures the right to participate in the victory and, in full possession of the overseas territories which it possessed at the time of the armistice, to take its place in the discussions looking toward a free peace.

(Section 4)

7. The Council, in collaboration with the Allies, will make preparations for aid and relief to the people of liberated France.

8. Through the maintenance of continuous contact with occupied France the Council will aid and coordinate resistance efforts in France and will not allow the organization of resistance to become involved in politics. It will inform the French people of the program of action for the purpose of reestablishing confidence in themselves, faith in victory, pride in the Army, and will make it clear to them that they alone will determine the construction of the constitution of their provisional government in accord with the laws of the Republic. The Council will also make it clear that the Council and the Army are the servants of the French people and eventually of the provisional government. The Council will unify and control French propaganda and French information services, coordinating them with the United Nations' services.

9. Provision is made for the establishment in France, when the Allied Armies shall enter French territory, of successive stages providing first that the French military Commander shall be responsible for preserving order; that as soon as possible the Executive Committee of the Overseas Council will move to France, will reestablish the legislation of the Republic and will revive the Conseils Généraux to assist it in administering French territory until such a time as the law of February 15, 1872 (Loi Tréveneuc)²⁸ permits the convocation of an Assembly of Delegates from the Conseils Généraux. This Assembly will, according to the law, then provide for a provisional government and arrange general elections for a date on which they can take place under conditions of peace. The National Assembly will then provide for a constitution. In the meanwhile, the provisional government thus created will act as the legitimate Government of France, to which the Council will then surrender its powers.

Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851R.01/388 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1943—9 p. m.

632. For Murphy. Your 481, March 26.²⁹ Since the presentation to the Treasury of the request for release of funds to the persons mentioned in your Section 3 the Department in conjunction with the interested agencies in Washington has been examining the problem with great care and has come to the following conclusions:

1. The Banque d'Algérie's telegram to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in regard to the funds for the individuals mentioned in your Section 3 spoke of funds "to be allocated among the following French diplomatic posts for their operation". Please inform the French authorities that this Government believes that the designation "French diplomatic posts" will under present conditions lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Compliance with future requests to this Government for the release or transfer of funds would be facilitated if such requests did not raise the basic policy question of whether or not the Giraud regime represents French interests as a whole. We have already made our attitude perfectly clear on this point.

2. We would of course be willing to facilitate the transmittal of funds to persons recognized by the governments of the countries in which they are stationed as the official representatives of the French North African regime. This is a question, however, which must be settled in each case by the North African regime with the government

²⁸ Duvergier, *Lois, Décrets, etc.*, vol. 72, p. 83.

²⁹ Not printed.

of the country in question. Please inform the French authorities that it will assist us in facilitating the transmittal of funds if we are informed in each case by the government of the country in which he is stationed that the person for whom the funds are intended has in fact been recognized by that government as the official representative of the North African regime. We would appreciate being informed of the basis of Tron's statement in Section 4 of your 481³⁰ as we have no confirmatory information from our representatives in the countries concerned.

3. The Department has as you know followed a policy of discouraging the inclusion in positions of responsibility in the representation of the North African regime in the US of persons who before November 8 were members of the staffs of the Vichy Embassy or Consulates in this country. While recognizing that the representation of the North African regime in other countries is a matter for determination between that regime and the governments of those countries, we should nevertheless like to have you point out to the French authorities that the principle which is being followed in their representation in the US is a sound one and is in the best interest of the French themselves. The choice by the North African regime as its representative in a foreign capital of an individual who only a few months ago was representing Vichy in that capital, who was frequently on terms of intimacy with the German and Italian missions there, who has often been outspokenly hostile or lukewarm to the US and Great Britain and who has alienated most of the French colony at his post, cannot fail to have an unfortunate effect both on the esteem in which the North African regime is held in those countries and on the unification of French opinion and effort there. This is particularly true in Central and South America where the former Vichy representatives are known by reputation in all countries and a mere shifting of personnel from one post to another would not avoid the difficulty. For these reasons we should like to urge that former Vichy diplomats be chosen to represent Giraud at the same posts which they formerly held for Vichy, or in other posts in this hemisphere, only in those cases where a careful investigation has first been made and it has been clearly determined that their previous sentiments and associations would not nullify their usefulness.

4. [Here follows a paragraph commenting on certain persons who had held posts in the French Foreign Service under the Vichy regime.]

Activities such as those enumerated above would qualify residents of the countries concerned for inclusion on the proclaimed list which

³⁰ Tron, Secretary of Finance of the French North African regime, stated in section 4 that agreements had been reached with a number of South American countries accepting the persons named as Giraud's representatives to those countries.

would automatically preclude all financial and economic relations between them and American citizens and corporations. For us therefore to facilitate the transfer of funds to these persons mentioned above would be directly contrary to and would undermine the policy which we have established. We trust that the French North African authorities will withdraw their request as to these persons when you make known to them the foregoing views.

5. This Government is authorizing the Federal Reserve Bank to open the desired credits in favor of Marquais for the use of Henriot, Franqueville, Brun, Obre, Rotton and Dumaine. Even in these cases, however, we should recommend that the French authorities give careful consideration to the undesirability of maintaining these individuals at the posts they formerly held for Vichy before requests are made to transfer additional funds.

6. You will of course understand that in taking these positions we are not attempting to exercise any control over the choice and activities of representatives of the North African authorities but we are applying our general rules as to transfer of funds to them in the same way as to all others.

HULL

851.01/2024 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 6, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received April 7—2:37 a. m.]

572. From Murphy for the President and the Secretary. In agreement with General Eisenhower, the British Minister telegraphed his Government on April 4th that while Eisenhower certainly does not wish to put any impediments in the way of General de Gaulle's proposed visit to Algiers—which he earnestly hopes would lead soon to French union—he would be grateful if de Gaulle would postpone his departure until he feels that the groundwork for an agreement has been formally established, ensuring its rapid consummation.

The reason for Eisenhower's request is that because of the rapidly approaching crisis of the battle in Tunisia, it would be undesirable to have concurrently a protracted political crisis.

Eisenhower added that he has confidence in de Gaulle's political judgment and good faith and said he does not wish to embarrass de Gaulle. On the other hand, he is confident that the latter would not wish to embarrass him.

Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2016 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 6, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received April 6—6:55 p. m.]

2425. Embassy's telegram No. 2364, April 3, 2 p. m., and No. 2402, April 5, 6 p. m.¹ After considering the matter yesterday afternoon General de Gaulle and the French National Committee issued last night the following statement:

"General Eisenhower has asked General de Gaulle to delay his journey to French North Africa.

General de Gaulle and the National Committee regret the delay, which cannot be prolonged without serious disadvantage. General de Gaulle and several members of the National Committee have been ready for some days to leave for Algiers, in order to reestablish the unity of the Empire, which is necessitated by the national interest and demanded by French opinion at home and overseas."

I learned of this statement at 10 last evening and immediately got in touch with Mr. Eden. I said that the statement was not a helpful one and that its publication both in Great Britain and in the United States cannot but lead to misinterpretation of the reasons for the delay in General de Gaulle's visit to Algiers.

He agreed but ascertained that since no security censorship question was involved the statement had already been cabled by our correspondents to the United States and would appear in the British papers. He suggested that the best that could be done under the circumstances would be for the Foreign Office to issue some statement expressing concurrence with the postponement of de Gaulle's visit.

The entire British press this morning carried de Gaulle's statement on the front page under such headlines as the following: "General Eisenhower and General de Gaulle—request to delay visit to Africa" (*Times*); "General de Gaulle defers visit to North Africa—Committees Regret" (*Telegraph*); "De Gaulle's visit again delayed—Eisenhower Request" (*News Chronicle*); "Eisenhower puts off de Gaulle" (*Daily Herald*); "De Gaulle visit surprise—Eisenhower asks 'put it off'" (*Daily Mail*); "De Gaulle visit stopped on departure eve" (*Daily Express*); "Last ditch fight to stop de Gaulle" (*Daily Worker*); "Eisenhower tells de Gaulle: delay trip to Africa" (*Daily Mirror*).

While a number of papers carry some comments sympathetic in varying degree to the attitude of the French National Committee, the *Times* alone seems to have followed Foreign Office guidance. That journal's diplomatic correspondent writes:

¹ Neither printed.

"Although Fighting French circles in London seem to have been surprised by General Eisenhower's request there is in fact nothing unexpected about it. At the moment all attention is concentrated on the military operations, and clearly General Eisenhower does not wish to turn aside to political considerations at a time when events in Tunisia are marching to a climax.

General de Gaulle's visit to North Africa is of such cardinal importance that the cause of French unity, which both he and General Giraud have so much at heart, would be hindered and not helped if the wrong moment for the visit were chosen. General Giraud is with his troops.

The delay, which need not be long, will give General Catroux fuller opportunity to continue and perhaps to complete his inquiries. Moreover, General de Gaulle will wish to call on Mr. Eden, and to hear at first-hand an account of the discussions in Washington on French unity and the future of France.

It may be taken for granted that the British Government fully understand and sympathize with the reasons for General Eisenhower's request, and share his hope that the meeting will take place when the military situation has been cleared up."

An example of the different points of view—the *News Chronicle* has the following to say:

"The least that can be said is that it (the delay) has caused considerable disappointment in French circles here.

Several factors have led, I learn, to the American Commander-in-Chief's appeal to de Gaulle.

One is that all energy for the time being is concentrated in North Africa in a final fight with Rommel² to clear Tunisia of Axis forces.

Another factor is that certain French military elements in North Africa—notably senior officers who are still Pétainist—are reported to have warned General Giraud that they objected to any kind of unity or collaboration with de Gaulle and the Fighting French whom they still regard as rebels.

A third factor is that in view of recent progress in activities of the de Gaullist elements in North Africa in Algiers might lead to demonstrations and counter-demonstrations not only in Algiers itself but in other important centers of North Africa where the leader of the Fighting French is becoming more and more popular."

Repeated to Algiers.

WINANT

851.01/2027 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 7, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received April 8—10 p. m.]

580. From Murphy. Reference AGWAR telegram number 2116, April 6, to Marshall from Eisenhower.³ Macmillan and I called

² Gen. Erwin Rommel, Commander of the German motorized Afrika Korps in North Africa.

³ Not found in Department files.

upon Catroux last night to inform him that de Gaulle's announcement concerning the postponement of his departure for North Africa had come to our attention and we wished to notify him that it did not accord with the facts as set forth in General Eisenhower's reply to the Prime Minister (see my 572, April 6, 6 p. m.). Macmillan explained in detail what had taken place.

Catroux agreed that the situation had been grossly misrepresented and assured us that he would send an immediate telegram to de Gaulle, insisting that the matter be rectified publicly without delay. He said he had himself previously urged that de Gaulle postpone his visit at least until the principles to govern the basis of French unity could be established and the negotiations further advanced (see my 542, April 2⁴). He said that a visit of de Gaulle would be premature at this time and could only be for the purpose of endeavoring to create a show of popular support. He continued that de Gaulle did not understand the situation in North Africa, that whereas he would receive popular acclaim, there would also be a show of public opposition and that unity could not be cemented if these differences became the subject of public demonstrations.

Catroux then said he would not be associated with such a policy and proposes to leave for London tomorrow and lay the entire matter before de Gaulle. Catroux further explained that the principal difficulty was that de Gaulle would not accept any position except that of the principal leader and had refused to consider a proposal that Catroux had made which would give Giraud position equivalent to that of Chief of State, whereas de Gaulle would be the Prime Minister.

Under the circumstances I consider it extremely important, if a satisfactory statement is not forthcoming in the immediate future from London, that a full explanation of this situation be made public in the United States, and that it should be made clear that de Gaulle has completely misrepresented the position of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2008 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1943—7 p. m.

701. For Murphy. Although we fully recognize that the points covered in your 549 of April 3 are only summarized and that the memorandum represents a proposed basis for agreement between

⁴ Not printed.

Frenchmen, it may be useful for you to have our preliminary comments particularly with respect to those proposals, involving future action or acquiescence on our part, which appear to go beyond the limits of the policy which we have pursued up to now. Moreover, it is probable that we will wish to discuss certain of these points with the British before making our views definitely known to the French. There are also a number of questions on which we would like to have further light.

Section 2, numbered paragraph 1: What is the nature of the proposed single legislative structure:

Numbered paragraph 3: Is there any special significance in the reference to Martinique at this time?

Section 3, numbered paragraph 2: The phrase "exercising national sovereignty" appears out of line with the proposition that no provisional government will be established until after the liberation of France. In our opinion the following wording would be more desirable "The Council will exercise its functions as trustee in those territories until such time as it can relinquish those functions to a provisional government."

Numbered paragraph 3: Proposed revision of Clark-Darlan agreement is a matter for the Allied High Command in North Africa.

Numbered paragraph 4: The following wording is more consistent with our views. "The work of the Council will envisage contacts with the Allied powers or other states as regards those French territories for which it is or may become trustee. In particular the desirability of entering into a general lend-lease agreement with the United States is recognized. The Council may establish and maintain relations with foreign governments through direct negotiations with those governments as to the form of representation and appointment of representatives. It will centralize financial questions and control."

Numbered paragraph 6: Questions of this kind would have to be decided in consultation with the United Nations.

Section 4, numbered paragraph 7: The Council will be accorded representation in a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation program.

Numbered paragraph 9: We would prefer that the first sentence begin as follows: "The French Army will be represented with forces of the other United Nations in the liberation of France and the restoration of order."

Of course, it is clear that after agreement may be reached between the two French groups, any matters in their basis of agreement which require other than unilateral action by the French would have to be discussed with the United States Government and with the British Government before becoming effective.

Consideration by the United States Government and the British Government of any new arrangement by the French with respect to the administration of French territories now or in the future free of Axis domination must remain subject to the exigencies of the prosecution of the war against the Axis.

CORDELL HULL

851.01/2054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 15, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received April 15—6:49 p. m.]

2664. After 3 days of wrangling during which practically all the civilian members of the French National Committee insisted upon General de Gaulle's preeminence in any unified setup in opposition to Massigli and Catroux who favored counterproposals of a more moderate nature more likely to be acceptable to General Giraud, agreement within the Committee has finally been reached. Catroux, we understand, is returning to Algiers tomorrow. He and Massigli called on Admiral Stark this afternoon and outlined these proposals. They are based on the following "principles": First, in any program for French unity there must be separation of civil and military powers. Hence, the Commander in Chief of French Forces cannot preside or form part of any provisional unified administrative authority. (This is, of course, to force Giraud to choose either to be commander in chief or to be nominal head of the council or committee.) Second, the council or committee now proposed should not in any way prejudice the later formation of a provisional government in France. Third, any provisional authority now established should be set up and should function as far as possible in accordance with the French constitution and Republican traditions. (The last two provisions seem to us as already, in effect, accepted by Giraud.)

According to Catroux, if Giraud accepts these "principles" he will be asked to meet as soon as possible with General de Gaulle and agree upon the composition and functions of the new council. The latter would control the Unified French Forces and administer French overseas territories and would furthermore assure French representation on the councils and staffs of the Allies. If General Giraud preferred to preside over this body rather than to continue as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces he would be made President. De Gaulle would be made "Second President". The council would be composed of administrators of territories, selected commanders of various services and would have an executive committee of 5 or 7 members probably including, in addition to de Gaulle and Giraud, Monnet and

Massigli. A new Commander in Chief of French Forces would be appointed nominally subordinate to the council but who would in effect direct the French General Staff. (Catroux mentioned General Juin⁵ in this connection should Giraud elect to serve as President of the council.) Catroux himself might serve as deputy to Giraud charged with supervision of the administration of French territories. It is the thought of the National Committee that de Gaulle in addition to his position as "Second President" of the council (or First President should Giraud choose the post of Commander in Chief) would be made "War Commissioner" and given control of the organization of resistance forces in metropolitan France and the training and equipment of new French armored units to serve with the Allies in any offensive on the continent.

Charles Peake has indicated to Admiral Stark that the British Government, while not "supporting" this or any other specific proposal, are taking the position that any reasonable agreement which would bring unity is to be encouraged.

The foregoing results from the National Committee's bitter opposition to any plan which would permit Giraud to be head of both civil and political administration and Commander in Chief of French military forces in any unified authority. They apparently feel that by making him nominal head of the council they can pretty well shelve him. The above plan likewise would seem to satisfy General de Gaulle's determination to have control of all "resistance groups" and "secret armies" in metropolitan France. It is in order to get this control and all that it implies for the future that he would apparently be willing to accept a position nominally inferior to that of General Giraud.

Repeated to Algiers.

WINANT

851.01/2058 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 19, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received April 20—4:30 a. m.]

645. From Murphy. Pending the return of Catroux and further indications of the present position of the French National Committee, it seems to us that the nature of the publicity which the National Committee is giving in London to Giraud's proposals for unity show that the main differences of principle relate primarily to the question of a provisional government. Even this could probably be regulated

⁵ Gen. Alphonse Juin, Commander of French ground forces in North Africa.

if any real effort to settle the question of leadership were apparent. The Gaullist mission here continues to insist upon the rising popularity of their chief in North Africa and is undoubtedly reporting this to London despite Catroux's warning regarding the attitude of the army.

As de Gaulle comes out more clearly in favor of a provisional government so his position appeals more strongly to those elements here who look toward the establishment of such a government, either because they hope to secure places in it or because in all sincerity they feel that without a government France will not be looked upon as one of the United Nations. They contrast this position with that of Giraud, alleging that he has the support of the United States in opposing the renaissance of a strong France capable of taking care of its own interests and not subordinate to the Allied Nations. There is no doubt that this trend, which has recently been further advanced by a series of articles in the local press advocating the provisional government, and by considerable confusion in the public mind to Giraud's views, has a considerable measure of support even in the local administration, largely from those who do not look beyond the immediate future. De Gaulle is profiting by this confusion to strengthen his claim that only under his leadership can real unity be achieved.

Giraud hopes by the publication in full of his proposal together with the explanatory note to dispel this confusion and to reassure public opinion both here and in France itself that the proposed Council will not only exercise control over the Empire but maintain close contact with resistance elements in France so that their representatives should have a voice in the trusteeship of French affairs.

As long, however, as the continued spirit of loyalty to Pétain pervades some Army and Navy circles, it is clear that Giraud's position must be reinforced by progress in the direction of unity. Monnet and others are frankly concerned by the persistence of this spirit and are endeavoring to counteract it to the utmost of their abilities. Re-armament which is now underway and which will permit the more effective use of French units will greatly assist in this respect. It is clear, however, that another essential step in this direction would be the removal of senior officers responsible for the persistence of this spirit. Giraud has been hesitant to remove some top Army and Navy officers pending development of the Tunisian campaign.

Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

851.01/2062 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 20, 1943—noon.

[Received April 21—1:31 a. m.]

662. From Murphy. Department's 701, April 13, 7 p. m. It is clearly recognized here that after the bases of argument [*agreement*] have been accepted by both French factions, further discussions will be required with both the United States and British Governments before they can be accepted as the basis to govern relations with the newly constituted French organization. In fact Macmillan and I have already pointed this out in a purely informal fashion. We had however agreed that it would be undesirable to inject specific reservations at this stage of unilateral action on the part of the French.

As regards the "single legislative structure" referred to in paragraph 1, the full text of the memorandum makes it clear that unity must be founded on the basis of a common legislation and that the only legislation having legal force is legislation enacted prior to June 22, 1940. It is not implied that the organization to be established has legislative functions.

The particular significance attached to Martinique is that the Antilles are the only French territories not under Axis occupation which have not joined either Giraud or de Gaulle and an effort will be made to bring them into line. Special importance is attached to the statement on page 5 of the memorandum to the effect that France will participate in the peace discussion in full possession of the overseas territories held in June 1940.

Giraud's thought here is that it is essential to eliminate the suspicion in the minds of many Frenchmen that the United States and Britain plan to take its overseas possessions away from France—this idea was fostered by Pétain and Laval⁸ and even de Gaulle and, of course, by Axis propaganda. Giraud wishes to emphasize that no one is going to deprive France of her possessions during the war and that France will come to the peace table intact (there is an underlying idea that whatever internationalization might be made of Bizerte and Dakar, for example, would be coupled in discussions regarding the internationalization of other points such as Gibraltar and Suez).

In my opinion the other modifications will present little difficulty except possibly as regards the question of national sovereignty and the future role of the French Army in European operations. Although Giraud fully recognizes the importance of postponing the creation of the provisional government, nevertheless, importance is

⁸ Pierre Laval, Chief of Government in Vichy, France.

attached to the exercise of French sovereignty over the territories which are administered by French authorities. It would, however, have been more accurate to state in my 549 of April 3 that "the Council will exercise as trustee national sovereignty, et cetera". According to this conception if French sovereignty exercised through a trusteeship is not recognized in these areas the administration becomes purely dissident and would have no local authority either to speak for the areas under its control or to be regarded as the trustee for French interests.

It is also clear that Giraud contemplates that the French Army will play an important role in the liberation in France. There is a fundamental consideration involved here about which the French are highly sensitive. They point out that if and when Allied forces arrive in France, the responsibility for the maintenance of order should rest with the French command. If the Allied High Command insures order then the military action becomes occupation of the country. If the French Command insures order it is liberation in their opinion. They feel that psychologically this is most important to the French people. This, of course, is based on the assumption that the French Army is what it should be.

I feel that emphasis should be laid on the important distinction which exists between France and Axis countries. If sanctions are to be taken against individuals and punishment meted out, it would seem far better for the future that these penalties be exacted by the French authorities as part of an Allied organization than by British or American authorities. It is presumed that such a policy will be followed in the cases of other countries to be reoccupied such as Belgium, Holland and Norway.

I feel certain from the conversations I had with Giraud and Monnet when Giraud's declaration was being drafted that the interpretations given here are correct and could be confirmed informally if the Department desires. I suggest that the Department instruct me to discuss this with Giraud and Monnet so that we might have Giraud's interpretation on record before the arrival of Massigli and de Gaulle. We would thus avoid later risk of a confused interpretation. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851T.00/95a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1943—8 p. m.

775. For Murphy's background information. We have received disquieting indications that a move may be on foot to remove Governor General Boisson of French West Africa. In addition to the insistence

of the Fighting French on this point, a recent press despatch from London reported that General Giraud was planning to oust Boisson as soon as a replacement could be found. Moreover, we have learned that Boisson has incurred the disfavor of Lord Swinton at Accra, who while formerly well disposed is now said to be opposed to Boisson's continuing in office.

We have heard only the most favorable reports of Boisson. He is regarded by our officers who have served at Dakar as strongly anti-collaborationist and pro-American, a fact beginning to be recognized in the American press. Admiral Glassford, whose proposed appointment to represent this Government in French West Africa has been approved by the President, thinks highly of Boisson and describes him as prepared to cooperate fully with us in the prosecution of the war.

Our main concern in this matter is the obvious difficulty of finding a suitable successor to Boisson if he were to be removed. In view of Boisson's demonstrated willingness to facilitate our task in French West Africa and the friendly relations already established between him and Admiral Glassford, we should deem his continuation in office as in the furtherance of French and American interests.⁹

HULL

851R.01/537: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 24, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received April 25—7:30 a. m.]

697. From Murphy. The French National Committee's reply to Giraud's memo of April 1 (see my 549, April 3) has been published in the Algerian press April 23.¹⁰ The Catroux mission informs me the full text was made available to the Embassy in London before Catroux's departure. I assume it has been communicated to you.

The main differences of principles now seem to be the following, according to the National Committee's proposals:

1. The central authority must have the equivalent of ministerial functions and exercise control over administration. The governors, et cetera, of the various territories will carry out its instructions instead of sharing responsibility for the direction of general policy.

2. The military command must be subordinate to this central authority.

⁹ In his telegram No. 709, April 26, 1 p. m., the Consul General at Algiers gave the following reply from Murphy: "This information is most helpful. As the Department, of course, understands, Giraud has no intention of ousting Boisson." (851T.00/96)

¹⁰ For translation of reply, dated April 15, 1943, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. v, p. 579.

3. There must be a consultative body along the lines proposed in the National Committee's memorandum of February 23.¹¹

4. The Departmental administrations in liberated France must not be set up by the military but must be under central authority.

Catroux further explains that he has proposed a form of joint dual responsibility to be exercised by Giraud and de Gaulle, who would both preside over the deliberations of the central council and accept joint responsibility for its decisions. They would countersign decrees and make appointments jointly.

Precedence between the two at meetings of the general council would be determined by the subjects under discussion. Catroux feels that only through the exercise of this joint responsibility can the question of personalities be eliminated. He is hopeful that agreement in principle can be reached on these proposals in order that a meeting between de Gaulle and Giraud can be arranged without delay. He feels it should not take more than about 10 days for the discussion of the outstanding differences.

In a conversation with General Eisenhower 2 days ago, the latter informed Catroux that he would welcome the de Gaulle-Giraud meeting at the earliest possible opportunity to ascertain his views. I shall do so shortly after his return, which is now scheduled for tomorrow, and will telegraph you further.

Whereas the tone of the reply tends to place Giraud in a defensive position, and looks toward the creation of a strong central organization having a civil character and leaving less freedom of choice to the people of France (see my 645, April 19, 10 a. m. [*p. m.*]) it, nevertheless, seems to us that the importance of securing some form of unity must be the principal consideration at the present time, provided no government is set up outside of France to impose its will or system. Without this unity, and in some measure because Giraud is still hesitant to eliminate the remnants of Pétainism in the Army and Navy, his position is being weakened without an early agreement which would preserve the main lines of his proposal. It would be better in my opinion to leave settlement of some questions until after unity has been achieved rather than to delay the Giraud-de Gaulle meeting until all points are agreed.

Furthermore, in the absence of such unity, the extreme elements of both factions are taking advantage of the delay, which is not generally understood, to claim that the Allied Governments, and in particular the U. S., are opposing this unity in order that a strong France shall not be revived, and thus interfere with decisions on post-war policy. The persistence of any such contention will in the long

¹¹ This memorandum was adopted February 23 but was sent to General Giraud on February 27; for text, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. v, p. 571.

run have unfavorable if not dangerous results upon the future of Franco-American relations.

For these reasons I feel that at this time we should consider these discussions as essentially French in character, reserving the right, however, in agreement with the British Government, to insist that any conclusions which involve more than unilateral French action must be discussed with the Allied Governments before the eventual program which will require some degree of recognition by us becomes effective. There is no doubt in my mind that unity will be achieved in some form. When it is, it should not be made to appear that it was brought about at the expense of our position, and our approach to any eventual united French organization on questions of Allied interest should, if possible, be made jointly with the British Government.

These questions will be further discussed at the next meeting of the Political and Economic Council of April 26 and if necessary, further recommendations submitted.

To Department, repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2062 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1943—midnight.

800. For Murphy. As suggested in final paragraph your 662, April 20, you may endeavor informally to confirm your interpretation of certain points in the Giraud Memorandum. You should not, of course, express any views on the subject.

HULL

851.01/2078 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 28, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received April 29—4:38 a. m.]

728. From Murphy. My 697, April 24. Giraud told me Sunday night¹² that he wonders whether there is a real desire for unity as evidenced by the French National Committee's reply, except on the Committee's own terms. He said, however, that he was prepared to go as far as he could to make agreement possible, but that he could not agree that the French Commander-in-Chief should be excluded from the central authority or be completely subservient to it or that the central authority should immediately control the administration of

¹² April 25.

the departments of France as they are liberated. He must insist, he said, on the recognition by the French National Committee of the procedure established by the constitutional laws of the Third Republic (Tréveneuc Law of 1872). He is not unalterably opposed to Catroux's proposal that joint responsibility be exercised by him and by de Gaulle, but believes latter is passed [*possessed?*] by an unlimited ambition for personal political power.

He was to inform Catroux of the foregoing in a conversation and to suggest that an early meeting with de Gaulle be fixed. This would presumably take place on French territory, but not in the town of Algiers. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2080 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 29, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received April 30—5:30 p. m.]

742. From Murphy. General Giraud sent for Macmillan and me last night and gave us three documents:

1. A declaration addressed to the British and American Governments.
2. A copy of his letter to General de Gaulle proposing a meeting.
3. A lengthy memorandum in response to the National Committee's note of April 15.¹³

After explaining the contents of the documents addressed to General de Gaulle, Giraud told us we could see that a point had been reached where union should easily obtain but that a meeting was essential to settle the outstanding points. Giraud explained that in his proposals to de Gaulle he had distinguished between those relating to the period prior to the liberation of France and those concerning the constitution of a provisional government of France after liberation.

With regard to the first of these, Giraud said he had taken into account insofar as possible the views of the National Committee and was confident that any remaining differences could be settled at his meeting with de Gaulle.

As regards the period after the liberation, Giraud asked us to communicate the following declaration to our Governments:

"As regards this period I consider myself bound by the provisions of French law which are explained in my *aide-mémoire* of the 1st of April and my letter of the 27th April to General de Gaulle. These provisions give to Frenchmen guarantees for the preservation of their liberties and for the rapid constitution of a provisional government,

¹³ See footnote 10, p. 99.

which it is our strictest duty to maintain and respect. I consider that it is essential that the Council, as soon as it is established, should address a proclamation to the French people on this subject. I have no doubt that there is complete agreement between General de Gaulle and myself on this point. However, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, I was anxious to define to you, as I did to General Catroux yesterday, my position on this point."

The text in translation of his letter to de Gaulle¹⁴ and a summary of the memorandum¹⁵ follow in separate telegrams. The letter is phrased in such terms that Giraud hopes will permit the meeting to be held with a reasonable chance of success and still maintain his principles regarding the future government of France. He said he hoped that when publicity should be given to the proposed meeting the communiqués which he and de Gaulle would issue should be limited to an announcement of the meeting and not at this stage enter into the details of his latest memorandum.

Repeated to London, sent to the Department. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2081 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 29, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received April 30—8:25 p. m.]

741. From Murphy. Reference to my 742, April 29, 3 p. m. The text in translation of Giraud's letter to de Gaulle follows:

"General Catroux has handed me the text of the note setting forth the views of the National Committee with respect to my *aide-mémoire* of April 1.¹⁶ The object of the latter was to draw up the principles and the program of action for the establishment of the unity of our efforts which is so vital to France.

1. The National Committee's note makes interesting observations in regard to the *aide-mémoire*. The annex to this letter answers these observations and contains proposals to resolve the differences in regard to the settlement of the present situation of fact, division of labors, et cetera. I have no doubt that we can rapidly reach an understanding on all these questions. As regards the settlement of our personal positions, I accept the proposal which General Catroux made to me and include it in the annexed note.

2. There is one point on which our complete agreement is essential, namely, that the French people from the moment of their liberation should establish a provisional government by legislative means under the indispensable legitimate authority derived from the fact of its origin in law. In order to solve fundamental problem, the *aide-mémoire* of April 1st proposed to insure the return of legality at time

¹⁴ See *infra*.

¹⁵ See telegram No. 747, April 30, from the Consul General at Algiers, p. 104.

¹⁶ For summary of *aide-mémoire*, see telegram No. 549, April 3, 6 p. m., from the Consul General at Algiers, p. 84.

of reentry into France by leaving the appointment of the provisional government to an assembly of delegates from the Conseils Généraux in conformity with the Tréveneuc law of February 15, 1872. Frenchmen drew up this law to defend themselves against arbitrary action at a time when they were anxious to maintain their liberties. For my part, after studying the situation carefully, I see no other way for France, in accord with its laws, to return to a normal legitimate and free regime. We cannot leave this path, because others would lead us into unknown dangers.

"Since the National Committee in its note of April 15 offered no objection to this course, I have no doubt of obtaining its full agreement on this question which is at the same time a point of departure for our union and the goal of our common efforts.

Consequently, I consider that one of the first acts of the Council as soon as it is established must be to address a proclamation to the people of France which will give solemn undertaking to the nation that the law of February 15, 1872 will be put into operation when French territory is liberated under the conditions set forth in my memorandum of April 1. Our agreement on those principles conforms with the spirit of the undertakings of our Allies to restore to France its integrity, its liberties, and its territory. The French people will be informed in advance of the stages by which the country will recover its rights, will take comfort in these assurances for the future and have new reasons for confidence and hope. We shall thus give assurances of the disinterestedness of the Council and the proof of its will to reestablish republican laws and to be governed by them. Doubts and fears will disappear.

3. Since we have now exchanged views on essential points, I believe that we should now reach our agreement by means of direct conversations. This work can be done rapidly together. Therefore propose to you that we should meet as soon as it is possible for you after May 5th at Marrakech or Biskra. When it is known our agreement is reached we can return together to Algiers and begin to work without reticence or reserve.

"In order that our conversations may retain the character which they should have, I suggest that we should only each be accompanied by indispensable collaborators, two or three at the most."

A summary of the annex will follow in a separate telegram.¹⁷

Repeated to London. Sent to the Department. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2082 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 30, 1943—2 a. m.

[Received May 1—8:22 a. m.]

747. From Murphy. My 741, March [April] 29, 3 p. m. The annex of Giraud's letter to de Gaulle may be summarized as follows:

¹⁷ For summary, see *infra*; for text in translation, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. v, p. 583.

Its stated object is:

- I. Immediate settlement of the present situation; and
- II. The preparation of a program of action for the return of France.

I. *Settlement of the present situation of fact:*

A. The Council.

1. *Composition.* The Council will be formed of secretaries of Departments, governors, resident generals et cetera, and qualified individuals without special administrative functions. Within this Council, a small executive committee will be created, composed of de Gaulle and Giraud, the secretaries general of the Departments essential for the war effort, and a few individuals without administrative posts. The Executive Committee will meet several times a [apparent omission] and have the responsibility for the general direction of affairs. The Committee should have collective responsibility and discuss all essential decisions, the choice of original members would be decided between Giraud and de Gaulle, and afterwards, any new or additional appointment would be made by the full Council.

2. *Our respective positions.* The two Generals shall preside in turn over the meetings of the Committee and of the Council. There is no question of a duumvirate. On the contrary their responsibilities are merged in the collective responsibility of the Committee and of the Council. They shall sign decrees together and participate on the same level as the other members in the deliberations and decisions of the two bodies.

3. *The Council and the future provisional government.* The distinction must be maintained between a Council having its origin in necessity, and a provisional government resulting from the laws of France. The Council will represent a national effort and will continue to depend for the liberation of France on American and British assistance. Liberated France represented by persons accredited by a provisional government, will have its historic place equal to that of England, the United States and Russia.

4. *Relations between the Council and the Commander-in-Chief.* Giraud recognizes that it is in accordance with the tradition of France to subordinate the Commander-in-Chief to the central power. However, the present exceptional circumstances justify and make necessary the participation in the Council of the Commander-in-Chief.

B. Abolition of Vichy legislation.

They must be complete. Giraud proclaimed it on the 14th March. It is only in order to insure public order and the continued functioning of the administration and life of the community that the rules and regulations made since June 22, 1940 are to be reviewed.

C. Totalitarian associations.

These should be suppressed or prohibited. The Legion des Combattants will be dissolved at once.

D. People who have taken part in the capitulation or have collaborated with the enemy.

The question of individuals to be examined and decided by the Executive Committee. By "collaboration" should be understood the action of those who by their attitude or, actions, have helped the enemy. One should not include in this term Frenchmen who have resisted the enemy while remaining at their posts, and whose task has often been more difficult than those who have left France and served her abroad.

E. Consultative bodies.

Full account has been taken of the remarks of the French National Committee's memorandum on this point and it is proposed (a) to create a National Advisory Committee; (b) to change the functions of the Supreme Council of Legislation; (c) to create a committee for the coordination of resistance; (d) to establish an information committee.

(a) National Advisory Committee.

While it is important to keep in close touch with French public opinion and representative organizations in the empire, care should be taken not to give to any bodies which we set up the appearance of elected bodies. These can only be advisory. Giraud suggests the Advisory Committee be composed of 60 to 80 members, divided into sections, for example finance, agriculture, et cetera. The sections will meet periodically. They would also meet in plenary session.

(b) Supreme Council on Legislation.

One has already been set up in Algiers to ensure that legislation and executive action are in conformity with the laws of the 22d June 1940. It is composed of a permanent committee of 3 members and of persons appointed on account of their functions in North African territories. The permanent committee, whose president only has so far been chosen, could be transformed into a body having definite jurisdiction and decide appeals in cases of abuse of power in conformity with the procedure followed before the Consul [*Conseil?*] d'Etat.

(c) Committee for the coordination of resistance underlined.

Giraud agrees with the National Committee's proposal for the constitution of such a committee, composed of representatives of resistance groups and of persons qualified to deal with the military and other questions involved in the organization and maintenance of resistance in France.

(d) Information Committee.

This would include representatives of French resistance.

II. *Program of action against the return to [of?] France [to a?] state of siege.*

There is a misunderstanding in paragraph 2 of the National Committee's memorandum of April 15. The intention was that when the Allied Armies entered France, the French Commander in Chief should be responsible to the Allied High Command for the maintenance of order in the liberated territories, and that he should be empowered by the council to specify the military authority temporarily charged with the prefectural duties and police powers. It is understood that the departmental administration will not be nominated by the military authority. Giraud's original formula assumed the application of the legislation concerning the state of siege (law of the 9th August 1949 [1849] article 8).

It follows:

(a) That as the French military authority will take responsibility for the maintenance of order to the Allied High Command, the Allied Armies will, in the eyes of the French people, be unmistakably armies of liberation and not occupying troops.

(b) That the departmental administration is not nominated by the military authority. In every case, the central power will appoint the perfect [*prefects*]. The Consul [*Conseil?*] Général and the Commission Départementale, being elected bodies, will be composed of the members functioning on the 22 June 1940, subject to those who may be subsequently eliminated according to the normal procedure.

III. *Application of the Tréveneuc law.*

The procedure of this law to be followed as indicated in my memorandum of April 1.

Sent to Department, repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851R.01/570 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 30, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received April 30—5:08 p. m.]

2984. The following is our No. 208, April 30, 6 p. m., to Algiers.

"For Murphy from Matthews.

Your 734, April 28, 11 p. m.¹⁸ and 742, April 29, 3 p. m., to Department.

De Gaulle is much annoyed at suggestion that this meeting with Giraud be held elsewhere than at Algiers (presumably because the public demonstrations of support he has planned could not be staged). He had Massigli approach both Eden and Admiral Stark with the

¹⁸ Not printed.

thought that we should intervene to persuade General Giraud to receive General de Gaulle at Algiers where both would have the benefit of the presence of their advisers. Mr. Eden gave no encouragement and in fact urged him to proceed without further haggling. Admiral Stark, after consulting us, replied that in view of General de Gaulle's insistence that these matters should be settled as between Frenchmen it seemed inappropriate for us to take the action he was requesting. In reply to the Admiral's indication that General de Gaulle had publicly announced some time ago his desire to meet General Giraud anywhere on French territory, Massigli replied that this only referred to the first meeting which, of course, had already taken place at Casablanca.

Massigli likewise indicated that de Gaulle resented General Giraud's insistence that he stop recruiting sailors from French North African vessels.¹⁹ A third sticky point was the question of the separation of military and civil authority. Massigli indicated that General Giraud had pointed out that the constitutions of both the French and American Republics provided that the head of the civil authority, the President in each case, is the Commander in Chief of the military forces and that the head of the provisional civil authority to be established might therefore hold at least nominal provisional command of all French forces. This idea, Massigli said, de Gaulle did not welcome. On the other hand, de Gaulle was pleased with Giraud's acceptance of a small councilor committee over which the two Generals would jointly preside.

Repeated to Department[.]”]

WINANT

851.01/2105 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 6, 1943—5 p. m.
[Received May 7—12: 27 p. m.]

805. For the Secretary from Murphy. General Giraud invited me to call last evening. There were also present Catroux, Macmillan and Monnet. The reason for the meeting was General de Gaulle's dictatorial speech in London on May 4th.²⁰ General Catroux read the entire speech to us and also read his recent exchange of telegrams with de Gaulle, including one which he transmitted yesterday after reading the speech. Catroux makes it quite clear that he believes his role as negotiator has terminated in view of the fact that de Gaulle has chosen to conduct his own negotiations by public radio.

In his recent telegrams to Catroux, de Gaulle, in an almost childish manner, insisted that he would come to North Africa when he pleased and to whatever town he wished. He accuses Giraud of inviting him to the city of Algiers and then welching on that invita-

¹⁹ For correspondence concerning the recruiting of French sailors in American ports, see pp. 202 ff.

²⁰ For French text, see Charles de Gaulle, *Discours aux Français*, vol. II, p. 175.

tion. Giraud on the other hand, states he has never invited de Gaulle to the city of Algiers. Catroux admitted, and everyone agreed, including Macmillan, that de Gaulle's speech is an open confession of a drive for personal power. . . .

Macmillan, who is visibly disturbed over these developments, takes the position that the matter is a serious one for his Government and that, as would be done in the case of a domestic political manoeuvre, it would not be well to let the opponent take advantage of an insignificant issue such as whether the meeting would be held in one town or another. The issue, he suggested, must be joined on substantial questions of principle which would be understood by the public. He made the suggestion, which he said was only personal as he had no instructions from his Government, that Giraud inform de Gaulle that, as his speech dodges every question of principle involved, no meeting can occur between them at any place if de Gaulle does not agree in advance to: (1) recognition of the procedure, including the application of the Tréveneuc law of 1872 for the establishment of the future provisional government of France; (2) selection of the persons who will make up the executive committee of the French Central Council.

The suggestions appealed to Giraud and Catroux except that Giraud said he saw no reason for making any concession regarding meeting in the city of Algiers as this would only be construed as another concession and another sign of weakness.

This informal discussion was left on the basis that an urgent reply de Gaulle from Giraud is not necessary. He will make one after careful reflection.

It seems to me that the speech of de Gaulle clearly demonstrates once more that the National Committee will take advantage of every conciliatory gesture to endeavor to reduce Giraud's power in this area. Either de Gaulle wishes to come to Algiers, where he feels that his increased popularity brought about by effective propaganda and Giraud's delay in fortifying his administration will enable him to seize power, or he feels that the longer he delays giving any commitment regarding the future government of France thus putting off the meeting the greater will be the pressure of French opinion for fusion on any basis. Thus also will he be able to dominate the situation. In either event Giraud's prestige and consequently our own are seriously compromised.

Positive action, preferably in concert with the British Government, should be taken to prevent the situation from further deteriorating, since it is further clear that the National Committee, feeling that it may have the support of the British Government, is making definite efforts to weaken our own position here. For example, in de Gaulle's telegram to Catroux of May 3d, de Gaulle made derogatory references

to the United States in effect, as the power against which the French must join forces. He said that he could not consider meeting Giraud in Marrakech because it was nothing more than an annex of an American aviation base. It will furthermore be claimed that if Giraud refuses to meet de Gaulle on the issue of the places of meeting the Americans are responsible for this action and consequently we shall have to accept the responsibility for blocking French unity in the face of a popular demand therefor.

In my opinion the time has come when this matter must without delay be thrashed out with London and the necessity of establishing a common policy must be realized by the British Government. It may be difficult to induce the public, in the face of recent buildups, to believe that Giraud has suddenly become "democratic" and de Gaulle a Fascist, but on the other hand the British Government is in effect subsidizing and facilitating the operation of an organization which evinces hostility to the United States. In Tunisia, for example, the Eighth Army has permitted General Leclerc²¹ forces to recruit from neighboring forces of General Giraud because Leclerc was enabled to offer more pay, and better clothing and rations than the men received in Giraud's army.

The CinC²² has now ordered a cessation of this activity. The Eighth Army proposed to install representatives of the Fighting French in the civilian administration of the various towns occupied but this program was stopped by our civil affairs officers in the area. The de Gaulle mission in Algiers has been coordinating an active and effective propaganda effort throughout French North Africa. It is seemingly equipped with abundant funds.

To Department and to London repeated. [Murphy.]

WILEY

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*²³

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1943.

I enclose copy of memorandum I thought of taking up with the Prime Minister.²⁴

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

²¹ Jean Leclerc, Commanding General of the Fighting French Forces in Africa. ²² Commander in Chief.

²³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

²⁴ No record has been found in the Department as to whether President Roosevelt did take up the attached memorandum with Mr. Churchill. The latter has recorded, however, that during the time of the Third Washington Conference, May 12-25, 1943, "Not a day passed that the President did not mention the subject [of de Gaulle] to me." (Winston S. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 801.) Documentation on the Third Washington Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*. For an account by Secretary Hull of discussions at this time regarding relations with General de Gaulle, see *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. II, pp. 1216-1219.

[Annex]

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

[WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1943.

I am sorry, but it seems to me the conduct of the Bride²⁵ continues to be more and more aggravated. His course and attitude is well nigh intolerable.

The war in North Africa has terminated successfully without any material aid from De Gaulle and the civil situation with all its dangers seems to be working out well.

I think that Macmillan concurs in this.

However, De Gaulle is without question taking his vicious propaganda staff down to Algiers to stir up strife between the various elements, including the Arabs and Jews. He is expanding his present group of agitators who are working up counter demonstrations and even riots.

Unfortunately, too many people are catching on to the fact that these disturbances are being financed in whole or in part by British Government funds.

De Gaulle may be an honest fellow but he has the Messianic complex. Further he has the idea that the people of France itself are strongly behind him personally.

This I doubt. I think that the people of France are behind the Free French Movement; that they do not know De Gaulle and that their loyalty is to the fine objectives of the movement when it was started and to the larger phase of it which looks to the restoration of France. If they only knew what you and I know about De Gaulle himself, they would continue to be for the movement but not for its present leader in London.

That is why I become more and more disturbed by the continued machinations of De Gaulle.

In my judgment, there should be a reorganization of the French National Committee, removing some of the people we know to be impossible such as Philippe, and include in it some of the strong men like Monnet and others from Giraud's North African Administration, and possibly one or two others from Madagascar, etc.

Furthermore, I am inclined to think that when we get into France itself we will have to regard it as a military occupation run by British and American generals.

In such a case, they will be able to use 90% of the Mayors of Arrondissements, many of the subordinate officials of the cities and departments. But the top line, or national administration must be kept in the hands of the British or American Commander-in-Chief. I

²⁵ Reference is to General de Gaulle.

think that this may be necessary for six months or even a year after we get into France, thus giving time to build up for an election and a new form of government. The old form simply will not work.

I enclose extracts from some of the reports I recently have received from North Africa relating to De Gaulle.

[Here follow paraphrases of excerpts from telegram No. 805, May 6, 5 p. m., from Algiers, printed *supra*.]

All in all, I think you and I should thrash out this disagreeable problem and establish a common policy.

I think we might talk over the formation of an entirely new French Committee subject in its membership to the approval of you and me.

I do not think it should act in any way as a provisional government, but could be called advisory in its functions.

Giraud should be made the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army and Navy and would, of course, sit on the Advisory National Committee. I think he has shown fine qualities since we saw him in Casablanca.

I do not know what to do with De Gaulle. Possibly you would like to make him Governor of Madagascar!

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

P. S. I hear the rumor that Leclerc forces in Tunisia have been permitted to recruit from the neighboring forces of Giraud because Leclerc offered more pay and better rations and clothing than Giraud's men got. I do not know if this is true. The same source reports that the De Gaulle mission in Algiers seems to have abundant funds and has put together an active and effective propaganda. F. D. R.

851.01/2105 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1943—9 p. m.

884. For Murphy. Your no. 805, May 6, 5 p. m. In the military and other circumstances of the general situation the action of General Giraud seems to be free from any objection.

As he knows, our one primary consideration and concern in the African campaign is the waging of battle until the continent is conquered, and we see no reason, therefore, why political or other considerations should be allowed to interfere with the military effort now proceeding. We have so expressed ourselves to the War Department this morning.

HULL

851.01/2138

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1943.

Referring to your memorandum of May 8 for W. S. C.,²⁶ I am in complete agreement that the issue presented in the French situation has come to a head and we must take a definite position that will determine the future of this controversy which, although outwardly between two French factions, may, if permitted to continue, involve both the British and American Governments in difficulties. I say this because the issue at stake is not only the success of our future military operations, but the very future of France itself. I am in complete agreement that either Allied or United Nations military must at the conclusion of hostilities be on hand in France to prevent anarchy and remain just so long as the French people in Metropolitan France, unhampered and unthreatened, need to formulate machinery to carry on a French Government.

It is very evident that the French National Committee is basing its whole policy on the idea that when France is liberated from the Germans, organized elements under de Gaulle may be in control. At the moment, this policy is leading the de Gaullists to attack all French and other elements not with them. To obtain this control, de Gaulle has permitted to come under his umbrella all the most radical elements in France. Under their statement of April 1, the Communists in France, probably the most highly organized political group there today, have announced their insistence that de Gaulle be their leader. The British Government has given its full weight, both financial and official, to the de Gaulle movement so that the active propaganda which has been carried on in this country and in North Africa against any or all elements believed to be insistent upon the free and untrammelled will of the French people to determine their own future has had more weight than would have been otherwise possible. Today, however, we face a situation where de Gaulle's active political propaganda directed from London immediately threatens the military success against the Axis powers to which we have dedicated our every effort. It cannot but be realized from your message of congratulation for the Allied victory in North Africa²⁷ that the real French contribution was given by the French forces under General Giraud, while throughout the period of the battle de Gaulle, through his political agitation directed from London, caused nothing but disturbance and concern to our military commanders.

²⁶ Winston S. Churchill.

²⁷ For text of President Roosevelt's despatch to General Giraud on May 9, 1943, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 15, 1943, p. 427.

The remedy for this situation is in our hands today but, if not used, may not be tomorrow. We must reach agreement with the British on the fundamental question as to the future of France and the manner in which the free expression of the French will as to their Government may be obtained. Once this is determined neither de Gaulle nor Giraud personally is an issue. If we cannot reach agreement with the British on this fundamental point, then the one thing left is candidly to state in your forthcoming conversation that since General Giraud is fully cooperating and contributing to the military purposes we have in view and his military aid in North Africa is an essential in our war effort, we intend to support him in every way as military head of the French Allied forces whose collaboration is not [only] essential to the British and Americans, but to the cause of the United Nations as well.

851.01/2121 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 11, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

846. From Murphy. I am informed that the text of de Gaulle's reply to Giraud's memorandum of April 27 has been handed to Bouscat in London. In the meanwhile, however, Catroux has informal knowledge of its contents.

It is understood that the reply only touches vaguely upon the primary considerations of the collective responsibility of the Executive Committee including the dual presidency and upon the constitution of the future provisional government. It states, however, that the French National Committee cannot accept Giraud's proposal that the colonial governors and military commander should be members of the Central Council or that military commander should accept responsibility to the Allied Commander-in-Chief for the maintenance of order in liberated France, as in its opinion this pertains solely to the civil authority. The note further insists that de Gaulle shall come to Algiers and that a national consultative committee composed of ex-parliamentarians et cetera should be set up promptly in Algiers.

Pending official receipt of the note and further time for consideration it is understood no immediate action is contemplated, but I am assured that in the intervening period further progress will be made in the replacement of men.

To Department, repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

740.0011 European War 1939/29478

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1943.

I called on Prime Minister Churchill at the White House at his request.²⁸ He proceeded first to express his extreme gratification at the final and complete military victory in Africa. I interjected to say that "your" and our Vichy policy has been justified and vindicated 100 percent. He promptly replied with enthusiasm that it had been vindicated 140 percent, and then went on to say that it was one of the greatest classical operations, perfect in every essential respect in that the air, land and naval forces and the diplomatic activities of our Governments were all synchronized together with marvelous precision and thrown against the enemy with the most powerful effect. He said that the United States had not received credit for the two years' work of preparation and of paving the way for the African expedition under our Vichy policy. I said I must agree with him on that, but that one of these days the full facts would come out.

I brought up the need for a more full and complete understanding with Russia on the part of Great Britain and the United States and went on to repeat in substance what I had said to Foreign Minister Eden on his recent visit here in regard to the extreme importance of our two countries proceeding systematically through carefully selected persons to talk Mr. Stalin out of his shell, so to speak, away from his aloofness, secretiveness and suspiciousness until he broadened his views and visualized a more practical international cooperation in the future, at the same time indicating Russia's intentions both in the East and the West. Mr. Churchill thought that Russia would help fight Japan when the war in the West was over, to which I replied that so far as I knew, there was no evidence or intimation of any kind as to what Russia would do in this respect; that it was my opinion that if she eventually should come into the war in the Pacific, it would probably be two or three weeks before victory, during which time she could spread out over Manchuria and other large areas and then be assured of sitting in at the peace conference. I said she may come into the war in the East, but the point I was emphasizing was that I could not get any intimation as to her future plans except in regard to certain territorial matters on her borders in Europe.

I then referred to our commercial policy and trade agreements program and elaborated on that in ways that are familiar to all. I expressed the opinion that we would receive the support of the public in carrying forward this combined program of liberal commercial,

²⁸ Prime Minister Churchill was in Washington to confer with President Roosevelt on matters pertaining to the prosecution of the war.

monetary and other related policies. He said very little on this question but appeared definitely interested.

He then said that the President had suggested that he might talk to me about De Gaulle. He proceeded to say that he was not pushing forward De Gaulle, although he had heard it reported that we felt that De Gaulle was receiving British financial support with which to do the things that are most objectionable to us. The Prime Minister said that he and Eden found De Gaulle terrible to get on with and that he wanted it understood that they were not undertaking to build him up. He added that we on the other hand must not get behind Giraud and pit him against De Gaulle, one reason being that De Gaulle was considered a symbol of French resistance and the British just could not throw him overboard, notwithstanding his many very objectionable and difficult ways. I said that the one big point in the situation that should appeal to both Governments alike was that if this De Gaulle matter is allowed to go forward as it has been, it will undoubtedly bring about serious friction between our two Governments; that large cross sections of people in this country will finally become aroused through false propaganda and constant agitations and machinations on the part of the De Gaulle organization, and in turn the Governments will be subject to repercussions that will seriously affect the relations between the two. I said that there was nothing personal implied in my remarks but I wished to point out with emphasis the poisonous propaganda activities of the De Gaulle organization both in this country and in North Africa where the purpose seemed to be to undermine and break down support for Giraud and then for De Gaulle to take charge politically from the top to the bottom and transplant this organization to Metropolitan France. I repeated with emphasis that inevitably friction will arise between our two Governments if this sort of propaganda work, which is so false and misleading in so many ways, is kept up by the De Gaulle organization. I elaborated in other ways in regard to the offer of higher wages to take sailors off their ships and for similar purposes thereby keeping everything in an uproar wherever a De Gaulle representative goes. I also made it very emphatic more than once the universal belief that the British are definitely behind these operations with money, the aid of the radio and with other methods. The Prime Minister maintained, first, that he personally was utterly disgusted with De Gaulle and, second, that the British were not aiding him as much as I seemed to think. I then suggested that there were numerous ways for the British to get away from their build-up of De Gaulle both rapid and gradual, if the latter course should prove necessary. I do not think that I made any special impression on the Prime Minister in this regard as he continued to urge that this Government should not support Giraud to the point of engaging in

a quarrel with De Gaulle and the British. I, of course, maintained that this would be the inevitable outcome of the British policy in regard to De Gaulle.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/29487

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1943.

MY DEAR WELLES: I have now received the comments of my Government on the amendments which as you informed me in your letter of April 2nd, the President wished to make in the revised drafts of the Casablanca memoranda regarding relations with General Giraud.

His Majesty's Government accept these amendments but they would now like to suggest that the third as well as the second paragraph of the second memorandum should be deleted. They point out that this paragraph is misleading since there could now be no question of providing shipping and supplies on the scale indicated. In any case it seems inappropriate to give details of the economic programme seeing that details of the military equipment to be supplied are now left out. They would accordingly prefer to substitute for the existing paragraph 3 a general statement in the following terms:—

“On the economic plane it has been agreed that the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall do their best to furnish the supplies necessary for the re-establishment of the economic life of French North and West Africa, in so far as shipping can be made available for this purpose and having regard to the schemes of other territories at war with the Axis.”

I have been asked to suggest that if the President accepts this further amendment, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan should be instructed to address identic letters to General Giraud covering the amended versions of the memoranda and stating that they have the approval of their respective Governments.

Would you let me know whether this proposal is acceptable?

Yours very sincerely,

HALIFAX

*President Roosevelt to Rear Admiral Glassford*²⁹

[WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1943.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL GLASSFORD: Reposing special faith and confidence in you, I am asking that you proceed at your early convenience

²⁹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

to Dakar, French West Africa, there to serve as my Personal Representative with the rank of Minister. In military and naval matters you will be directly responsible to the Commanding General at Algiers; in civil matters you will act under the general direction of his Chief Civil Affairs Officer, who is likewise the ranking representative of the Department of State in French North and West Africa. Instructions concerning your activities other than those of a military or naval character will be provided by the Department of State either directly or through the Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

In your capacity as my Personal Representative in French West Africa, you will take all appropriate measures to supervise and coordinate American activities in that area, to foster friendly relations with the French authorities, and to promote mutual interests in economic and other matters.

You will, of course, report through appropriate channels any matters coming to your attention in the performance of your mission that may be of interest to this Government.

With all best wishes for the success of your mission, I am

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

851.01/2121 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1943—6 p. m.

946. For Murphy. Further to our 940, May 13,³¹ reports reaching us during the past week from London and elsewhere indicate that the delay in the meeting between Giraud and de Gaulle is working more and more to the latter's advantage, thanks in large part to the effectiveness of his propaganda organization. The announcements concerning the French Council of Resistance (London's 3369, May 15³¹) and the National Committee's stand against abrogation of Cremieux decree (London's 3377, May 15³¹) are cases in point. With regard to latter the importance is obvious of putting into immediate effect the procedure which has been under examination since mid-March whereby native Algerian Jews may again acquire French citizenship.

We are reliably informed that the British are now primarily interested in an early agreement between Giraud and de Gaulle in order that they may get rid of the entire Carlton Gardens organization and ship it to Algiers where the problem of dealing with them will be placed on our doorstep.

We learn confidentially from member of Giraud Military Mission that Giraud sympathizers in Algiers report strong swing to de Gaulle among younger men both in and out of the army based largely on

³¹ Not printed.

Giraud's failure to make adequate personnel changes particularly in the higher ranks of the armed forces and civil administration.

In the circumstances we believe that there is no time to be lost, now that the Tunisian battle has been brought to a successful conclusion, in pushing forward long awaited reforms of a political character.

HULL

851.01/2135 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 17, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received May 18—3:39 a. m.]

902. From Murphy for the President and Secretary of State. Giraud has handed Macmillan and me a copy of his reply to de Gaulle's last memorandum which reads in translation as follows:

"Thank you for your letter of the 10th of May which replies to my letter and my memorandum April 27.

This latest exchange of views convinces me that our preliminary discussions have come to an end; and that the hour of action and of our common responsibilities has come. Time presses, among other questions, the rapid fusion of all the French forces in a single army of victory is urgent.

I propose that we should pass to action and immediately bring about our union.

The method is simple and can be rapid.

It is sufficient for us to form immediately the Central Executive Committee and at the same time to record our agreement on its essential bases, namely that its responsibility should be collective and that its life should be limited. Thus we shall conform to the tradition and to the laws of the Republic.

Thus established the Executive Committee will meet immediately at Algiers.

The formation of the Executive Committee. The Committee is the central authority. It possesses the general direction of and the responsibility for all matters at present within the scope of the National Committee or of the High Command, civil and military, at Algiers. It will discuss all the other questions which have been the subject of our exchange of views based on the notes which we have exchanged. In particular it will organize the national consultative council and the committee on resistance, appoint the commissioners, fix their functions et cetera.

'The responsibility of the Executive Committee must be collective.' All the essential decisions will be discussed and taken by the Executive Committee acting as a whole. In accordance with the proposal made by General Catroux, you and I will preside in turn; our responsibilities will be merged in the collective responsibility of the Executive Committee. With the commissioner or commissioners who may be responsible, we shall together sign the decrees or ordinances which may be discussed and decided in the committee.

'The duration and the functions of the committee must be limited.' In the action which we are now taking we are convinced that we are

acting according to the wish of the French people. However, we must recognize that our authority derives from a situation of fact. We are not and cannot be the Government of France.

Immediately the Executive Committee begins its functions it should solemnly make known to the French people that it [will] hand over its powers to the provisional government which as soon as the country is liberated, will be constituted in France according to the law of February 15, 1872. The application of this law is contemplated when the legislative assemblies have ceased to function, which is the case today, and can be adapted by having recourse to other elected bodies on the advice of the National Consultative Council and of the Council of Legislation taking into account the changes brought about by the action of the enemy or by the development of the situation in France (*id est* since the law of 1872 was passed).

If I have correctly represented the essential points of the opinions expressed by the National Committee and by myself on this subject, I beg you to give me the agreement on these points, which is essential for the establishment of our union. At the same time we can rapidly agree upon the composition of the Committee. To begin with it will consist of 2 members proposed by you and 2 members proposed by me, making the first members of the Executive Committee 6 in all. I suggest that 3 places should be left vacant in order that the Executive Committee may fill them later."

We feel here that the two principles of collective responsibility and relinquishment of power preserve the essentials of French democratic tradition and return to the laws of the Republic and unless they are accepted no unity is possible. The proposals avoid the danger that any single individual can assume dictatorial powers since the Committee as a whole accepts responsibility for all actions. Care will, however, have to be exercised in the selection of the members of the Committee to preserve the balance and to prevent any individual from assuming complete control.

I hope that during the present visit of Mr. Churchill to Washington an opportunity will be found for both the British and American Governments to concert their policy as regards this proposal. If de Gaulle should refuse to accept this last offer he will have demonstrated unwillingness to achieve real unity and to preserve the fundamental rights of the French people. Whereas the previous discussions were primarily a matter of French concern, a refusal on de Gaulle's part to accept fundamental democratic principles becomes of concern to the United Nations as a whole and in particular to the American and British Governments as co-authors of the Atlantic Charter. In such an event it should be made clear that de Gaulle is only interested in a personal drive for power and consequently can no longer count upon the support and subsidies furnished him by the British Government. Macmillan is urging this course of action upon his Government.

It is anticipated that Catroux will leave immediately for London to endeavor to obtain de Gaulle's acceptance. If he fails he proposes to

resign. Macmillan may also decide to proceed to London for 2 or 3 days.

Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2134 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 17, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received May 17—7:24 p. m.]

3413. General Cochet, who recently came from France and who several times was detained at Vals-les-Bains for his anti-collaborationist attitude, has, we understand, accepted General de Gaulle's appointment to head up his "secret army" in Metropolitan France.

He saw Roger Cambon and Comert several days ago and told them that to his amazement General de Gaulle had said privately to him that he had no longer confidence in the Anglo-Saxons and that in the future he would base his policy solely on Russia "and perhaps on Germany".

WINANT

851.01/2139 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 18, 1943—10 a. m.
[Received 10:20 p. m.]

906. For the President and the Secretary from Murphy. General Catroux tells me today in strict confidence that he begins to despair that the tactics insisted upon by de Gaulle will lead to nothing but confusion and division among the French people. He said that he had just received a long communication from de Gaulle expressing the greatest distrust of American policy which he asserts is opposed to French union and a strong France. De Gaulle, he said, expressed fear that the United States is counting on an early Italian debacle and would be willing to make concessions to Italy at the expense of France in order to arrive at an early armistice with Italy. De Gaulle also asserted that Giraud is nothing but an American puppet who could not be trusted with political power which must be centered in the person of de Gaulle. The latter expressed also resentment over what he considers an American maneuver to prevent his arrival in the city of Algiers, insisting that the proposition of meeting in some place outside the city such as Bou-Saâda or Biskra is designed to prevent his easy communication with the French National Committee and consultation with representative elements here (this is of course absurd).

Catroux also informs me that about 15 days ago de Gaulle ordered Generals de Larminat and Leclerc to report to de Gaulle directly, thus relieving Catroux of his command of those troops which he had originally organized and which he commanded.

Catroux also stated that de Gaulle's pretention that de Gaulle only be considered as the chief of resistance in France due to the spontaneous support of elements there is simply a maneuver to strengthen his position. Information coming to Catroux from sources in France contradicts this pretention. One of the reasons which encouraged de Gaulle to take the stand is a message said to have been received by de Gaulle from Herriot to the effect that he would be willing to participate in a government formed by de Gaulle. Catroux said that with all due deference to Herriot the French people today demand new men in their political leadership and that he is convinced that practically none of the old guard will be acceptable. Catroux said that Frenchmen generally understood that Giraud has no long term political ambitions and have no fear that he will endeavor to set himself up as a military dictator, which would be obviously impossible.

Catroux also urged that we insist that the French forces commanded by General Leclerc in Tunisia be obliged to leave there with the Eighth Army as, notwithstanding the orders of General Eisenhower, they continue to carry on an active recruiting campaign, using every means to induce members of Giraud's forces to desert and join with them.

Catroux recommends that the British and American Governments, possibly through Admiral Stark, take a definite stand, making it clear that they support fully the idea of French unity but that they oppose de Gaulle's drive for personal power. Catroux pointed out that the British Government has ample means at its disposal to insist on the termination of de Gaulle's present tactics.

Giraud and Catroux are conferring this afternoon and it is expected that later in the day Giraud will approve his reply to de Gaulle's last communication the text of which follows in a separate telegram.³² [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2140 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 18, 1943—3 p. m.
[Received May 19—1 : 47 a. m.]

912. For the President and Secretary of State from Murphy. My 902, May 17. After our conversation with Giraud, Macmillan and I saw Catroux late last evening. He said he was not telegraphing

³² Telegram No. 978, May 27, 10 a. m., from the Consul General at Algiers, p. 124.

Giraud's proposal to London until he had a further opportunity to talk with Giraud today on a third point which is not mentioned in the reply. That point is the question of the High Command of French forces. Catroux maintained that de Gaulle will take advantage of every opportunity to place Giraud in an unfavorable light. He is convinced that by omitting reference to French tradition in respect of combining political office and military command Giraud's position is vulnerable. He will urge Giraud, and believes he can persuade him, to add that the question of High Command will be determined by the Central Executive Committee after its formation. In such a set up Giraud would then act as a joint President and Minister of War. However, this is a sensitive point with Giraud and it remains to be seen whether Catroux will be able to convince him.

Catroux insists also that he must be in Tunis on May 20th for the Allied review. He plans to proceed to London on May 21 to report in person to the French National Committee, stating that if de Gaulle refuses to accept Giraud's reply he will resign.

Macmillan also plans to proceed to London about the same time for the purpose of contacting various members in the Government, explaining to them the true state of affairs and urging a decision by the British Government to terminate a situation which could be characterized as ridiculous if it did not contain elements of danger for the future.

To the Department. Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 18, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received May 18—6:50 p. m.]

3436. De Jean, Massigli's *chef de cabinet*, called this afternoon very much discouraged. He confirmed that the message from the so-called Council of French Resistance and the organization of the Council were the work solely of André Philip. He said that frankly he sees little chance of de Gaulle's accepting any agreement with the North African administration which will not leave him in effective control and with every facility "to prepare for his dictatorship after the liberation of France". De Jean mentioned in this connection that de Gaulle had instructed Palevski³³ today to ascertain whether decisions of the French Council of Ministers were customarily taken by majority vote—an inquiry which De Jean said had obvious reference to any

³³ Gaston Palevski, of General de Gaulle's staff at London.

proposed overseas council or executive committee. A member of the Fighting French movement and close friend of De Jean returned recently from Mexico. He spoke of the importance of reaching agreement with Giraud not only for the future role of France in the war but because of the effect throughout the world. To this General de Gaulle replied that unity is really unimportant since he, de Gaulle, had already been chosen (plebiscite) by the people of France as their present and future leader.

De Jean further said that de Gaulle's game in insisting that the meeting be held at Algiers was with the intent of stirring up such acclamations by the crowd as would enable him to refuse any concessions to General Giraud that would not afford him, de Gaulle, full political control; he could always say that he personally was prepared to step aside but this would be a betrayal of the people's wishes.

This admission from within Carlton Gardens itself seems not without interest.

Repeated to Algiers.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/29654a

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.

MY DEAR LORD HALIFAX: With reference to your secret letter of May 16, 1943 I wish to inform you that the suggestions contained therein have been approved by the President and Mr. Murphy has been instructed to join with Mr. Macmillan in addressing identic letters to General Giraud covering the amended versions of the two Anfa memoranda.

Sincerely yours,

WELLES

851.01/2170 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 27, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 6:06 p. m.]

978. From Murphy. General de Gaulle's reply to Giraud in translation reads as follows:

"The National Committee is of the same opinion as you that the preliminary discussions should be brought to an end and that it is necessary immediately to establish in Algiers the body which will exercise the common central power. You and I will alternately assume the presidency.

We are in agreement with you the responsibility of this body is collective and that the length of its functions shall be limited at the latest to the date on which the law of February 25 [15,] 1872 will permit the nation to obtain a provisional representation and constitute the Government.

With regard to the composition of this body to be created which from now will exercise the central power and with regard to other questions which remain to be settled it is understood that we will discuss them in Algiers, you and I, as well as the two persons proposed by you and two by the National Committee. I expect to arrive in Algiers the end of this week and I am pleased that shortly I shall collaborate directly with you in the service of France."

It is understood that Catroux who is bringing the original of this communication to Algiers is due to arrive May 28 and de Gaulle is expected May 30. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.001/12a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1943—7 p. m.

1017. For Murphy's information only. Following telegram is being sent through War Department today:

"For General Eisenhower from the President. Please transmit immediately the following textual message from me to General Henri Honoré Giraud:

'I hope very much that as soon as the existing situation in North Africa permits and as soon as the burden of your heavy responsibilities makes it possible, you will come to Washington as the guest of this Government.^{33a} I feel there are many problems of common interest to our two countries which it would be most helpful to me to have the opportunity of discussing with you. Will you let me know how soon you think it would be possible for you to make the trip to this country. I remember with the greatest satisfaction my meetings with you at Casablanca and I send you my warm personal regards and the assurances of my highest consideration.'

Please transmit to me the reply which General Giraud may make. As soon as I receive an indication from General Giraud of the approximate date when he can make this visit, I shall make it public."

HULL

^{33a} On June 28, 1943, the White House announced that General Giraud would soon visit the United States, but would come in his military capacity rather than as joint leader of the Committee of National Liberation. He arrived in Washington July 7.

851.01/2175

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Arrangements have been made with the approval of General Eisenhower and General Giraud for General de Gaulle to travel by air to Algiers at the end of this week accompanied by Massigli, Philip, Billotte, Palewski and other subordinate staff.

The United States Government will be aware of the exchanges which have taken place between General Giraud and General de Gaulle, and of the acceptance by the French National Committee of the latest proposals received from Algiers. His Majesty's Government understand that a central Executive Committee will be formed immediately with Generals Giraud and de Gaulle acting as joint presidents, and that this Committee will operate on the principle of collective responsibility and will last until such time as, after the liberation of France, a provisional government can be established in accordance with the Constitution of the French Republic.

A statement will be issued at Algiers in due course announcing the formation of the new central authority and defining its status and functions. It is desirable that the United States Government and His Majesty's Government should be in a position to define their attitude to the new body as soon as possible thereafter, and that their attitude should so far as is practicable be concerted in advance. In any event, it is likely that Mr. Eden will be called upon in the House of Commons next week to make a statement about developments at Algiers and, if agreement has been reached in Algiers by then, he would like to be able to indicate the attitude of His Majesty's Government to the new Administration, at any rate in a preliminary way, in agreement with the United States Government.

The idea of His Majesty's Government would be that the two governments should say at the appropriate moment that they regard this central Executive Committee as representing all French Nationals and Territories which are associated, or hereafter become associated with the United Nations in the war against the Axis. It might be as well to add that the existing agreements between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the French authorities in French North and West Africa, and those between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French National Committee will remain in force until replaced by new arrangements with the Executive Committee, with whom all negotiations will in future be conducted.

His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive the observations of the United States Government on the above proposal.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1943.

851.01/2217 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 30, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

996. For the President and Secretary from Murphy. I spent last evening with the Prime Minister, Macmillan and Cunningham.³⁴ We discussed the various ramifications of the French problem. Eden will arrive tomorrow at noon.

The Prime Minister said he was here to visit the troops and the British Navy and to contribute what he could to a favorable adjustment of the French situation which will and must, he said, demonstrate Anglo-American solidarity.

In résumé from what he told me he plans that the British Government will cancel its present arrangements with the French National Committee which will be transferred to Algiers, lock, stock, and barrel.

British financial subsidy, which I am told approximates about 20 million pounds annually, will cease during the month of June with possibly a lump settlement to assist the Committee in meeting certain outstanding obligations. We would then deal jointly with the central organization established in North Africa, making whatever financial, Lend-Lease and political arrangements we may see fit. The Prime Minister says that the facilities of the BBC³⁵ in London will no longer be available to de Gaulle.

We discussed at great length the constitution of the new French Executive Council which, as the matter stands, will initially consist of six persons: Giraud, de Gaulle, and two members to be selected by each. De Gaulle has indicated his choice of Massigli and Philip; Giraud, up to last evening, had not decided definitely except to indicate that he will insist that Jean Monnet, General Catroux and General Georges, now in Algiers, must be in the Council. He is deciding this morning which two persons he will include originally. Yesterday he thought he would select Tron and Odic and that he could persuade de Gaulle to agree to the appointment of Monnet, Georges and Catroux to make up the total membership of nine. Both Monnet and I do not at all share this opinion and are insisting that Giraud appoint in the beginning two strong men. Monnet is urging that Odic would be a grave mistake.

The Prime Minister said that he had persuaded and aided General Georges to leave France and that he believed that Georges could make a real contribution. [Murphy.]

WILEY

³⁴ Sir Andrew Cunningham, British Naval Commander.

³⁵ British Broadcasting Company.

851.01/2175 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1943—midnight.

3432. An *aide-mémoire* in the sense of your 3678, May 29,³⁶ was left with Department that day by Sir Ronald Campbell³⁷ who was told that we had no objection in principle to making a joint statement with the British Government at the appropriate time. It was made clear to him, however, that we did not favor any hasty action since we still could not foretell what would emerge from the present conversations at Algiers and it was desirable that the French should be in full agreement before a public position should be taken by any foreign government. Campbell stated that he understood the force of these points and would raise the question again when the discussions at Algiers were a little more advanced.

Repeated to Algiers as No. 1041.

HULL

851.01/2188 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 1, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received June 2—4:07 a. m.]

1012. For the Secretary and Under Secretary [from Murphy]. Should the present discussions between de Gaulle and Giraud result in creation of a Central French Administration for all overseas territories I believe that careful consideration should be given to the question of the relationship of this Central Administration not only to the United States Government but to the United Nations as a whole. It is recognized that the United Nations Declaration³⁸ contemplates the adherence of "Governments" and that the new French administration will not be a government. The final clause, however, refers to the adherence of "other nations." In our opinion not only will the new French administration wish to be regarded as an ally and therefore as one of the United Nations but that its adherence to the Declaration would be of definite advantage in the prosecution of the war. We hope therefore that an appropriate formula could be found.

Whereas it is understood that the National Committee has declared

³⁶ Telegram No. 3678 not printed.

³⁷ British Minister.

³⁸ Signed at Washington, January 1, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

that a state of war exists between it and the Japanese Government this does not apply to the North African Administration but it is assumed would be required if the new Central Administration is to join the United Nations. Likewise the importance of the agreement not to enter a separate peace is self-apparent and should justify admission of this organization upon the basis of equality insofar as the territories and resources it controls are concerned.

Macmillan is raising these questions with the Foreign Office and we would welcome an early expression of your views as this will undoubtedly be one of the first questions which the new administration will wish to discuss with us. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851R.01/746 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 1, 1943—midnight.

[Received June 2—6 p. m.]

1015. For the President and Secretary from Murphy. Last evening I again saw the Prime Minister and Eden. The Prime Minister said that he was disappointed with the lack of results obtained by the first meeting of the French yesterday but still confident that with time they would work out their problems. He still feels that his insistence over the selection of General Georges as a member of the Committee was right and Georges would make a real contribution.

Eden told me that he had not expected to come here and his arrival was due to a sudden telegram from the Prime Minister received by Eden on Sunday.³⁹ He said that he wanted me to know that this had nothing to do with de Gaulle, explaining that he was "fed up with him" and had no desire to see him.

The Prime Minister again warned that de Gaulle was capable of a *coup d'etat* and asked whether Giraud was taking all necessary police measures. He expressed the belief that de Gaulle might skip off to Brazzaville if he could not have his way in all matters.

While the press yesterday carried the news of the appointments of Georges, Monnet, Massigli, Philip and Catroux to the Executive Committee the latter had not yet been constituted. Yesterday's meeting was devoted instead to a rambling and acrimonious discussion regarding the retention of civilian officials and officers in the Army, Navy and Air Force leading nowhere.

Macmillan and I saw de Gaulle this morning. His attitude towards us personally was conciliatory and friendly but he expressed great

³⁹ May 30.

doubt that the unity of organization [could] be established in the light of yesterday's discussion. He said that he would not tolerate the presence of officials not acceptable to him. The organization which is to be set up here even though it may not be recognized as a government must have the attributions of a government. He said that in the formation of a government, there must be a program.

He made it clear that he did not wish to be caught in the meshes of a mechanism without some understanding of the policy line which the organization would follow. I expressed surprise that there should be a debate of questions which the Committee presumably by a majority vote would decide in an orderly fashion in due course. He brushed this aside and talked at great length about the impossibility of working effectively with old men like General Georges bowed down under the weight of France's defeat. He demanded Giraud's promise to remove a number of civilian officials and high ranking Army, Navy and Air officers and according to de Gaulle, Giraud flatly refused to take such action.

At the conclusion of our interview he said to me that he hoped that the American Government would adopt a more understanding attitude toward the Fighting French and not "embarrass and obstruct them" at every turn. I replied that he must have understood at Anfa the sincerity of the President's effort and desire to facilitate French unity. I suggested that it might be well for him to consider an effort on the part of the Fighting French to better understand the friendly intentions of my Government but that this would not be arrived at if we at every turn were met by suspicion, distrust and even hostility. He said that he understood perfectly that France is dependent upon us for supplies and material but that this was not everything and that perhaps ideals were even more important. I expressed the opinion that if he had been willing to make some concessions at Anfa and entered into the spirit of the effort in this area that undoubtedly many of the things which he would like to see accomplished would long since have been achieved.

Macmillan and I both made it quite clear that in our opinion the French should get on with the constitution of their organization and then approach their problems in a sympathetic spirit of goodwill which alone could make a real contribution to the war effort.

The French will probably meet again today but de Gaulle would give no assurance that he intended to surrender his independence of action. At the same time I do not believe that de Gaulle has any intention of departing. He is convinced of his own ability eventually to prevail.

Sent to Department. Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

851R.01/741 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 2, 1943—4 p. m.
[Received June 2—1:54 p. m.]

1022. From Murphy. Late last night Peyrouton⁴⁰ addressed letters of resignation both to Giraud and de Gaulle as joint Presidents of the Committee, and requested to be reinstated as a reserve captain of infantry. Giraud replied accepting the resignation, but requesting Peyrouton to remain provisionally in office. I am further informed, however, that de Gaulle replied accepting the resignation and appointing Peyrouton as captain attached to the Army of the Levant, thus bringing him under orders of de Gaulle's forces. Giraud has retaliated by attaching Muselier to his staff and making the latter responsible for the maintenance of order in Algiers. In informing us of his appointment, Muselier said that he had received instructions to permit no manifestations of any sort.

G-2 of AFHQ⁴¹ has just informed me that they learned private[ly] but definitely that negotiations between the two Generals have broken down. In consequence, they have been requested to make necessary arrangements to prevent the entry into this country of all Frenchmen. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851R.01/748 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 2, 1943—10 p. m.
[Received June 3—12:45 a. m.]

1028. From Murphy. My 1022, June 2, 4 p. m. At Giraud's request, Macmillan and I called on him this morning. He was very disturbed at the trend of events and said that de Gaulle was being exceedingly difficult. He told us that he had been astounded by de Gaulle's action with regard to Peyrouton, which had been taken without consultation with him, in fact it had been taken even before Giraud received Peyrouton's letter. Under the circumstances, he had felt it necessary to write de Gaulle a letter protesting against the action. He also asked in this letter that de Gaulle make a public declaration denying that he was endeavoring to establish a totalitarian political system in France under his personal leadership.

Although Macmillan and I did not feel that the tone of the letter was helpful in the present situation, we urged Giraud immediately

⁴⁰ Marcel Peyrouton, Governor General of Algeria.

⁴¹ Intelligence Division, Allied Force Headquarters.

to summon the Committee and to insist that any action taken now can only be taken as a matter of collective responsibility.

It is apparent that Giraud fears that de Gaulle may be planning some form of *Putsch* but insists that he is prepared to make a last attempt to bring about an agreement provided the principles of collective responsibility are preserved.

It seems clear to us that Peyrouton's action which in the circumstances was not only ill-advised but taken for selfish reasons in an effort to make his peace with de Gaulle, gave de Gaulle a pretext for placing Peyrouton under his orders, although this represents a complete departure from his previous stand, and is being interpreted by Giraud's supporters as giving further evidence of de Gaulle's intention to assume control of all important officials and posts.

De Gaulle agreed to meet with Giraud late this afternoon and a meeting of the full Committee is scheduled to take place tomorrow at 10. He does not plan to answer Giraud's letter.

Massigli is in a very depressed state of mind and explained both he and Catroux had protested de Gaulle's instructions to Peyrouton. Neither of them were consulted by de Gaulle in advance of this step.

Catroux informs me that this morning at a meeting with de Gaulle and his staff, he accused de Gaulle of bad faith and irregular methods. De Gaulle replied that Catroux was disloyal to the National Committee, Catroux protested de Gaulle's assertion and in turn accused him of totalitarian methods, thereupon walking out of the meeting.

Massigli is urging that the Committee enter into being, as soon as possible, but explains that the appointment of General Georges has been one of the stumbling blocks as de Gaulle is suspicious of the appointment, feeling that Georges represents the defeated French Army, and does not have sufficient popular standing in France. Massigli, however, admits that he may prove a useful counselor. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2198 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 3, 1943—noon.

[Received June 4—12:56 a. m.]

1032. From Murphy. The Executive Committee met this morning. Formal notification of the constitution of the Committee has not yet been made but will be issued this afternoon. I am informed that certain decisions were taken regarding personnel among which are the appointment of Georges as Governor General of Algeria

(see my 1030, June 3, 3 p. m.⁴²), the replacement of General Mendigal by General Bouscat, recently head of the Giraud mission to London, and the appointment of Gabriel Puaux to replace General Noguès as Resident General of French Morocco.

The Committee is scheduled to convene tomorrow morning and on the agenda is the question of the Commander-in-Chief of French Forces. Giraud declared that if such a decision is taken he will retire which of course would please de Gaulle immensely. Bethouart⁴³ expressed the opinion that the French North African Army will not accept de Gaulle's leadership.

On the agenda also is the discussion of Boisson's possible replacement.

De Gaulle also made an oral declaration in the Committee denying that he was endeavoring to establish a totalitarian political system in France under his personal leadership (see my 1028, June 2, 10 p. m.). He made no written reply to Giraud's letter.

It is understood that de Gaulle also insisted that General Bergeret now commanding a small aviation unit at Dakar be eliminated.

To Department. To London repeated. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2188 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1943—7 p. m.

1065. For Murphy. Your 1012, June 1, 6 p. m. The decision of this Government on the position it will take toward any French administration to be created must await conclusion of present conversations in Algiers since the results of those conversations so far indicate uncertainty as to future course of the French.

With regard to possible adherence of the French to United Nations Declaration, the above considerations also apply and furthermore in order to avoid embarrassment there should be no French communication requesting adherence to United Nations Declaration unless a decision is reached in advance by this Government, in consultation with certain other United Nations, to accept French adherence. For your information such consultation is customary before acceptance of adherence.

The views contained in your 1012 are appreciated and you will of course report developments.

HULL

⁴² Not printed.

⁴³ Maj. Gen. M. E. Bethouart, Chief of the French Military Mission in the United States, temporarily in Algiers.

851.01/2197 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 3, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received June 4—1:06 a. m.]

1034. From Murphy. My 1032, June 3, noon. Massigli was delegated by the newly established French Committee of National Liberation to inform me officially of its constitution this afternoon. He handed me the text of the official communiqué, a copy in translation of which follows as section 2 of this telegram. Massigli explained that instructions were being sent to the two missions in Washington to inform the American Government officially that the Committee had been formed. In my opinion the framework of the new Committee as established contains valuable elements of French unity and agreement on it represents a real achievement in the reconstruction of France.

(Section 2)

1. Generals de Gaulle and Giraud as Presidents, General Catroux, General Georges, MM. René Massigli, Jean Monnet and André Philip as members, constitute the French Committee for National Liberation. This Committee will later be completed by the addition of other members.

2. The Committee thus constituted is the central French power.

3. The Committee directs the French war effort in all its forms and in all places. Consequently it exercises French sovereignty on all territories not subject to the power of the enemy; it undertakes the administration and the defense of all French interests in the world, it assumes authority over the territories and the land, sea and air forces which, up to the present, have been under the authority of the French National Committee and the Commander in Chief, civil and military.

4. All necessary steps to bring about the fusion of the administration dependent on these two bodies will be taken without delay by the Committee.

5. In accordance with the letters exchanged between Generals de Gaulle and Giraud, the Committee will relinquish its powers to the provisional government which will be constituted in conformity with the laws of the Republic as soon as the liberation of metropolitan territory permits, and at the latest upon the total liberation of France. The Committee, in close cooperation with all the Allies, will continue the common struggle, looking toward the complete liberation of French and allied territories, until victory is complete over all the enemy powers.

6. The Committee similarly undertakes to reestablish all French liberties, the laws of the Republic and the republican regime through the complete destruction of the regime of arbitrary authority and of personal power which is today imposed upon the country. The Committee is at the service of the French people, whose war effort, whose resistance and whose trials, as well as the necessary work of reconstruction, require the union of all the national forces.

7. The Committee calls upon all Frenchmen to follow it in order that, through struggle and victory, France may regain its liberty, its

greatness, and its traditional place among the great Allied Powers, and that in the peace negotiations France may be able to make its contribution to the Council of the United Nations which will settle the state of Europe and of the world after the war.

Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

*President Roosevelt to the Governor General of French West Africa
(Boisson)* ⁴⁴

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1943.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR GENERAL: I have made choice of Admiral William Glassford as my Personal Representative in French West Africa, to reside at Dakar with the rank of Minister.

Admiral Glassford, a distinguished Naval officer of long experience, has been selected for this important mission because of his outstanding ability and high character; and he is fully apprised of the mutual interests and problems of our two Governments. I commend him to Your Excellency.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

851.01/2204 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 4, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 11 : 59 p. m.]

1037. For the Under Secretary from Murphy. I have had several talks with Bethouart. He told me about your message to Giraud.⁴⁵ Giraud also has mentioned it to me and has told several people about the receipt of the message.

Monnet asked urgently to see me early this morning and said that he believes that you should know that your message is being interpreted by Giraud that the U.S. Government will support him come what may.

The principal item on the agenda of the Committee in its morning's meeting is the status of the CinC of the French Forces. Giraud's position is that he will insist on the retention of this command in addition to his status as co-President of the Committee. Monnet informs me that Giraud can command a majority of the Committee on this point if he agrees that a reorganization and modification [*modernization?*] of the French Army should be undertaken. Monnet deploras

⁴⁴ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Pencil notation on this copy indicated that it was sent to the Secretary of State for transmittal.

⁴⁵ See telegram No. 1017, May 27, 7 p. m., p. 125.

that Giraud has not already taken initiative in this direction and says that it will be fatal for Giraud if he refuses to do so.

I informed Giraud this morning that there is no change in our attitude and that we wanted to give him wholehearted support but that did not presume a purely negative attitude on his part. I referred to my many conversations with him over a period of months in which I urged him to make changes as he went along, not only in the military establishment but in the civil administration, thus obtaining full credit for the improvements and liberation which he accomplished. I again urged him this morning to take and keep this initiative in these matters rather than permit the de Gaulle faction to seize credit.

I should be grateful if you would inform me of the text of the message sent by you to Giraud via Bethouart in order that I may adhere to the line which you have apparently laid down.

I am continuing to press for action on the Jewish legislation which, of course, will now be considered by the Executive Committee. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851T.001/37

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON], June 5, 1943.

M. Baudet⁴⁶ came in to see me today at his request. He asked what our view was as to the retention of Governor Boisson in Dakar.

I said we did not presume to advise in that regard. But, I said, we did not have the same picture of Boisson as had been painted in the propaganda press here. Boisson had kept the Germans from infiltrating into Dakar. He had been of assistance in checking on and preventing the use of the port by German submarines. Without passing on the question which M. Baudet asked, we did not have the same impression of Boisson as that which apparently prevailed in some de Gaullist circles.

M. Baudet said that they did have against him the fact that he had stuck with the Pétain Government instead of striking out against the Germans immediately after the Armistice; and related a not unfamiliar line of complaint of that kind.

I said I could understand how they felt. On the other hand, the fact that some men had been slow to throw the French Government

⁴⁶ Philippe Baudet had been a member of the Free French Delegation in the United States. Following the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation on June 3, he became Delegate ad interim of the French Committee of National Liberation in the United States; see memorandum by the Secretary of State, June 8, p. 141.

overboard was not, to my mind, conclusive. . . . I said that many very honest men would cling to their government, however mistaken they thought it might be, for a long time: I could not easily imagine a situation in which Americans would desert their government and go into exile; for that reason I thought the mere fact that men not forced to do so by points of honor had remained with the only government in France they could see, was not ground for wholesale condemnation. Indeed, in the unification of France a great many such men would be encountered, and to proscribe them might make more enemies than friends.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

851.01/2215a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1943—5 p. m.

1077. For Murphy's consideration. There are convincing reasons to believe that engagements or promises may have been made by either of the French elements represented on the Committee of National Liberation in some cases of an international character which in the view of this Government should by clear definition not be carried over or held binding in any of the future commitments or even deliberations of this new Committee. The Department suggests therefore you should take this matter up most confidentially with General Giraud or such of his immediate associates as you may determine to the end that it shall be clearly understood if not indeed publicly set forth in the minutes of the Committee that any commitments of an international character made by any members of the Committee prior to the formation of that body shall by unanimous decision not be held binding or applicable upon that Committee; and furthermore the Department suggests that it should be well for the Committee also to have clearly set forth in its early minutes that any agreement of that body, more especially in the international field, does not constitute an engagement and is not binding unless it has the full assent of both Presidents, and the collective agreement of the Committee itself.

When the time comes for this Government to deal with the Committee of National Liberation it will expect to be fully informed regarding any and all commitments or obligations for which it has assumed responsibility in the international field.

A report from you on this matter will be awaited with interest.

HULL

851.01/2204 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1943—5 p. m.

1084. For Murphy. Your 1037, June 4, 4 p. m. In the conversation with General Bethouart the Under Secretary informed him of the President's invitation to General Giraud to visit this country and that the message was not only to express the President's warm desire to meet with General Giraud here but also to assure him that the bases laid down in Casablanca conversations were in no way changed.

Secondly, it was made clear to General Bethouart that there was no tradition in this country which would prevent the Commander in Chief of the Army from holding such a further position as, for instance, the President or alternating President of the proposed National Committee of Liberation.

Third, in the view of this Government the National Committee of Liberation would be responsible as trustees for all French interests and territories outside of metropolitan France but was not to be or become the provisional Government of France.

Four. The British were in general agreement with the last two points.

Five. The people of metropolitan France must be free to work out their own future free from outside coercion either foreign or French.

Six. The United States Government regarded the French armies as military allies and General Bethouart could be assured this Government would make every effort to fulfill our military commitments.

Seven. This country very much desired immediate union between all French authorities outside of metropolitan France and that this union might assist in every way possible in the war against the Axis but no union could be looked on with favor that in any way threatened either to become an organization intended to further personal ambitions or to impair the military effort of the allied nations.

HULL

851.01/2222 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 7, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 10:40 p. m.]

1057. From Murphy. According to reports received last night from members of the French Committee, the discussions are proceeding in an orderly fashion and center at the present around nominations for secretariat posts. I shall report as soon as final decisions are taken.

De Gaulle has agreed that Giraud may retain the post of Commander-in-Chief. He has informed various persons here to that effect, and the information is corroborated by Monnet. The political atmosphere in Algiers has improved during the past 48 hours, but there are still major decisions of policy to be taken by the Committee including de Gaulle's probable attempt to gain control of information services and resistance organizations. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2216 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 7, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received June 7—6 p. m.]

3855. Personal to the Secretary. Mr. Eden told me this afternoon that he had not gone to North Africa in connection with the French political negotiations, that he and the Prime Minister had been absent in the field during the first 2 days of the negotiations, and that they had not seen Generals Giraud and de Gaulle until Admiral Cunningham's lunch. Eden had limited his action to giving full support to Murphy and Macmillan.

He said that the Prime Minister and he hoped to transfer present British financial support from General de Gaulle to the newly constituted French Committee of National Liberation and they hoped to enter into agreements with that body similar to those now existing with the Fighting French. He said that he hoped our Government would support the British in this policy.

WINANT

851.01/2223 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 7, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received June 8—1:07 a. m.]

1059. For the President and Secretary from Murphy. This is the state of affairs on [apparent omission] no seven [*sic*] in a situation which seems to be progressing in an orderly fashion. Barring accidents, I believe the results will be satisfactory to you.

The French Committee meets daily and while there has been much discussion of a general nature, most of it has been concentrated on questions of organization. The following decisions have been taken in addition to the replacement of Peyrouton by Catroux as Governor General of Algeria, and of Noguès, Resident General of Morocco by

Gabriel Puaux: The assignment of Foreign Affairs to René Massigli; Interior to André Philip as regards metropolitan France; Interior Affairs of Overseas Territories to Perillier; Finance to Couve de Murville; Armaments, Supplies and Reconstruction to Jean Monnet; Communications and Merchant Marine to René Mayer; Justice, Health and Education to Jules Abadie; Colonies to René Pleven; Labor to Tixier; Production and Commerce to Diethelm; Moslem Affairs and Public Security to Georges Catroux, in addition to his duties as Governor General of Algeria; Information and Propaganda to Henri Bonnet. The additional appointees will have the rank of Commissioners and will be subordinate to the Committee.

General Georges will be for the moment without portfolio. Giraud and de Gaulle preside alternately.

Bethouart is to return to Washington promptly to continue as head of the mission with Hoppenot. It is planned that after some weeks he may be replaced, when the situation has developed completely. Bethouart would then receive an appropriate army command and [apparent omission].

The question of the CinC of the French Forces has not been formally decided and will come up for discussion again tomorrow, but there seems to be a spirit of confidence that a satisfactory solution will be found leaving Giraud in command with reorganization and modernization of the military establishment. This will probably be handled by the small War Cabinet which he formed, the discussion of which has not been completed.

De Gaulle is trying to split the command between troops in active operations under Giraud and the rest under another general approved by him.

There is no change in the status of Governor General Boisson and the de Gaulle element is not pushing this matter. They understand your feeling about Boisson and give indication that they intend to respect it.

Yesterday the de Gaulle organization "Combat" held a meeting presided over by General de Gaulle which went off quietly. The belief that de Gaulle planned to develop Combat into a political party to serve his own purposes is dwindling although in his speech to the Congress de Gaulle stated that "Fighting France" has decided to remain, in order and with enthusiasm, the guide of the rebirth of France! I discussed this with General Giraud this afternoon. He said there was an active debate in the Committee meeting this morning during the course of which he pointed out that de Gaulle's public statement smacked of the Hitlerian. He said de Gaulle had adopted position of the "Entschlossener Fuehrer". De Gaulle vigorously denied any such intention but sentiment of the Committee supported Giraud's view. It was of course necessary for de Gaulle to meet with

those who have supported him during the past but its leaders including André Philip have improved their education during recent days and begin to understand that such a party would not serve the democratic principles which they have so loudly proclaimed. There has been some criticism that the meeting was held without prior authorization from local authorities. Philip's conduct under Monnet's influence—and Monnet has worked hard on Philip since his arrival here—has been particularly satisfactory. He is reported to have said that democratic principles are more in evidence here than they have been in London.

For your secret information, de Gaulle said frankly yesterday that he perceives that he is being bound hand and foot by being submerged in the collective action of the Committee. He notices that on several questions which have been debated in the Committee he has been alone. As I see it, there is, however, the risk that he may, in a fit of ambition, resign prematurely, which would be most undesirable. If he can be held within the framework of the Committee for another 4 weeks, whether he then resigns or not would be comparatively unimportant, as the situation would have so crystallized and French unity become so developed that it could withstand the shock.

De Gaulle's present detachment from too lofty position he occupied on Mount Sinai, and caught as he is in the meshes of the collective mechanism, is a happy development because I believe we had progressed with the French structure here as far as was possible on the personal responsibility of Giraud. The latter found himself unable to take further decisions involving change of personalities and political construction for the future which properly should be the responsibility of a collective body.

In addition, the Executive Committee plans the organization of a consultative council, probably under the chairmanship of Queuille, former Minister of Agriculture, and composed of elected legislative officials such as councilors general, senators and deputies.

Once the complete organization is established and functioning, there should be an effective safeguard against the acquisition by any one man of personal power and all that implies for the future.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2403

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 8, 1943.

Mr. Henri Hoppenot, Chief ad interim of the French Military Purchasing Commission, and Mr. Philippe Baudet, Delegate ad interim of the French National Committee in the United States, called

at their request and handed me a notice of the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation and the text of the declaration establishing the Committee (copies attached ⁴⁷).

I stated that, as was well known, this Government had continuously hoped for the unification of all French resisters in a common effort against Axis aggression wherever it might be found throughout the world. I said I warmly welcomed, therefore, the spirit in which the French National Council of Liberation had been formed.⁴⁸

I concluded by expressing deep appreciation of the spirit of sacrifice which had made the union of true French interests possible and added the conviction that the same spirit would continue to animate all Frenchmen in meeting the problems still to be faced for the liberation of continental France.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851.01/2239 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 8, 1943—7 p. m.
[Received June 9—4:36 p. m.]

1063. From Murphy. I had talks today with General de Gaulle and Massigli separately. De Gaulle was in a most amiable and conciliatory mood, insisting throughout conversation of his great desire to cooperate with the United States and recognizing French dependence on our country to liberate France and rebuild the French nation. He said that definite progress is being made in the work of the Committee which devoted its [its?] session today to a discussion of the military establishment. He said that the French must have regard for realities and not imagine that they will be able to construct a large military establishment in the near future. In his opinion a force of not more than eight divisions is possible by 1944. There would, of course, be additional garrison troops for the policing and protection of the far flung territories but a striking force available for European operations in his opinion would not exceed the figure mentioned. He said also that it would be foolish to hope for an invasion force of more than about 15 groups which together with a small navy is the extent of the contribution that France could hope to make. He proposes the elimination of superannuated generals stating the present total of 185 French generals is absurd.

He said that he is in agreement that General Giraud whose qualifications he recognizes, continue as CinC of the combat troops but

⁴⁷ Notice of the formation of the Committee not printed. The text of the declaration establishing the Committee is quoted in telegram No. 1034, June 3, 8 p. m., from the Consul General at Algiers, p. 134.

⁴⁸ For text of statement on the acceptance of the Committee by the United States, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 12, 1943, p. 514.

that a member of the Committee should perform as [apparent omission] customary functions following to a Minister of War. This is the function he would like to perform which would also carry with it command of the garrison troops in the rear areas. No decision has been taken and the matter will continue under discussion.

De Gaulle talked at length regarding communism. He said the French Communist Party had by its resistance to Germany gained an important place in France and he feared that unless a capable French administration is built up in time to control the Communist element there would be grave danger of widespread violence in France after liberation. His references to communism as a danger led me to question him regarding whether he feared communism as such. He hesitated and said "no" but that there is bitter feeling between the French working classes and the *bourgeoisie*. He indicated that in his opinion he felt he is qualified to control the French Communist Party. Stalin's dissolution of the Comintern he termed as a gesture to lull the world into a sense of security and is designed to eliminate the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact.⁴⁹

He denied that the forces under General de Larminat are still engaged in recruiting among the forces under the command of General Giraud and said there would be no further question on this score because of the fusion that would occur. He also said that in his opinion that while there would be a French CinC the only possible way the French Army could function temporarily would be in the form of army corps under Allied High Command.

Massigli said that the Committee had taken a definite decision condemning competitive recruiting as between the Giraud and de Gaulle forces as part of the program of fusing these forces.

Massigli also emphasized his desire to cooperate with U. S. insisting that he and the other members of the former French National Committee intended to be frank and cooperative.

He will return to London shortly to liquidate his affairs there and asked that we expedite the travel of several of his associates necessary in the conduct of foreign affairs.

André Philip called and said that he proposed to devote himself exclusively to the direction of resistance groups in France. Due to geography and facilities he said that of necessity much of this work would be directed from London and that it would be necessary for him to maintain part of his organization there. I indicated that I felt that we would wish to have some influence in the resistance movements in France and must be kept informed of his activities. I pointed

⁴⁹ Pact between Germany and Japan, signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, p. 153. For additional secret agreement, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. I, p. 734, footnote 2a.

to the recent unfortunate incident at Corsica conducted by the de Gaullist organization without our knowledge which resulted in the capture of their organization on the island disrupting incidentally one of our secret radio transmitters.

I have no illusions regarding the ambitious activities of members of the de Gaulle group such as Gaston Palewski but I see no evidence that they intend to adopt anything but peaceful means to acquire more and more power and influence.

Sent to Department, repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2238 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 9, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received June 10—1:46 a. m.]

1069. From Murphy for Secretary and Under Secretary (repeated to London). Giraud tells me this afternoon that during this morning's session of French Committee, de Gaulle finally brought into the open his desire to act as Commissioner for National Defense having the attributes of a Minister of War in the ordinary Cabinet set up. He also demanded the commander [*command?*] of French Forces not actively engaged in operations which is contrary to what he has told Eisenhower, Macmillan and me in regard to his intentions.

Giraud flatly refused to relinquish command of French Forces and insisted General Georges be appointed Commissioner of National Defense. Catroux submitted a compromise proposal which very much favored de Gaulle's proposition.

Giraud expressed to me his determination that if Committee outvoted him on this question he would retire informing British and American Governments as well as French people of injustice caused by de Gaulle's ambition. I asked General Giraud to postpone any such action pending an opportunity for a discussion of this question with several members of Committee, including Catroux.

I also informed General Giraud that both Macmillan and I are perturbed regarding activities of Gaston Palewski who acts as personal counselor of de Gaulle. He is spreading stories detrimental to the Allies to effect, for example, that Giraud has not properly protected French interests allowing Allies to have their way in all things. We believe he is inspiration for Geoffrey Parsons'⁵⁰ story June 7 to effect that what is happening here is a victory for de Gaulle over Giraud and State Department.

Giraud also told me de Gaulle brought up subject of Boisson insisting on his removal on ground that some of his adherents such

⁵⁰ Geoffrey Parsons, chief editorial writer, *New York Herald Tribune*.

as De Bois Lambert has suffered at his hands as a result of Dakar incident September 1940.⁵¹ Giraud pointed out President Roosevelt had indicated we considered Boisson a most able administrator who had cooperated with USA wholeheartedly. This, he said, de Gaulle brushed aside as of no consequence. [Murphy.]

WILEY

*President Roosevelt to the Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, North Africa (Eisenhower)*⁵²

[WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1943.

I request that you deliver the following message from yourself orally to General Giraud and to General de Gaulle as nearly simultaneously as possible.

"You will recall that we have consulted together for the final destruction of Axis forces in North Africa and the liberation and restoration of France as a great nation. In the first phase of this we have been successful. The second phase is still before us. I feel because of our common cause, I should continue to convey my views from time to time both to General Giraud and General de Gaulle as frankly in the future as in the past, particularly upon the happy announcement of the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation.

It is in this spirit that I am expressing to you a concern over reports reaching me, but I may add, happily unconfirmed, that the Council may possibly be giving consideration to the removal of Governor General Boisson from his post in West Africa. In view of Governor General Boisson's ability as an able French administrator, such action would be contrary to the very aims we have in view, and I hope to receive reassurances from the French Committee of National Liberation that these reports as to General Boisson's future are indeed unfounded."

I trust you will agree with this. It is inconceivable to me that in view of the uncertainty of de Gaulle's future attitude French West

⁵¹Dakar, French West Africa, was unsuccessfully attacked by British and Free French Forces September 23-25, 1940; see memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, September 24, 1940, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. II, p. 590.

⁵²Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Notation indicated that it was released from the White House Map Room at 6:30 p.m. Eastern War Time, June 10, 1943. This message was sent to Algiers as War Department telegram Freedom 9985.

In a memorandum of the same date Under Secretary Welles with the concurrence of Secretary Hull had sent to President Roosevelt a suggested instruction for General Eisenhower (851T.001/13). No copy of this suggested instruction has been found in Department files. The Roosevelt Library, however, does contain a telegram, drafted in the State Department, with manuscript corrections by President Roosevelt which make it identical with the copy here printed.

Africa should come under his domination. Please read my message to Prime Minister ⁵³ with special regard to your sending troops there.

ROOSEVELT

851.01/2242 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 10, 1943—noon.

[Received June 10—10:56 a. m.]

1071. From Murphy. General de Gaulle has submitted his resignation to the French Committee on the grounds that he is unable to work with the body particularly with reference to the question of military command and responsibility.

This may be an endeavor on his part to put across his own wishes for further decisions will be reached during the day and I shall telegraph as soon as I have more information.

Sent to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2247 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 10, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received June 11—2:38 a. m.]

1079. For the President and Secretary from Murphy. According to Catroux after conversation with de Gaulle, latter's reasons for tendering resignation in writing to Committee are:

⁵³ President Roosevelt, simultaneously with this telegram, sent telegram No. 281 to Prime Minister Churchill in which he quoted both telegram No. 1069, June 9, from Algiers, and this telegram to General Eisenhower. Following the quotation of these messages, the President appended this comment to the Prime Minister:

"I think this whole matter of de Gaulle domination of Dakar is too serious for me to remain quiescent. Neither you nor I know just where de Gaulle will end up.

"Therefore I find it impossible to consider any de Gaulle domination of French West Africa.

"This is so serious that I should have to consider sending several regiments to Dakar and also naval vessels if there were any sign that de Gaulle proposes to take things over in French West Africa. Such things would be highly unfortunate.

"Finally, I cannot feel happy unless Giraud has complete control of the French Army in North Africa. Control by de Gaulle would create a definitely uneasy feeling about the safety of the rear of the British and American positions, the line of supply and the adequacy of British and American forces left for the protection of the rear."

On the following day, Prime Minister Churchill's telegram No. 306 to President Roosevelt gave the following reply:

"Your No. 281. His Majesty's Government are in full agreement with you on all points, and we are instructing Macmillan accordingly."

Copies of telegrams No. 281 and No. 306 obtained from Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

1. Difficulties he experiences in working out within the Committee a solution satisfactory to him of problems of reorganization especially the French military establishment.

2. Lack of confidence Allies show in him as evidenced, for example, by delay in departure from England of some of his associates, and

3. Violent dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister's declaration in the House of Commons which he asserts disregards French rights and interests.

Catroux told de Gaulle, he said, that it was impossible that he resign now because such action would be detrimental to French interests. It might lead, he said, to a situation where the Allies would be obliged to step in and take charge and would in any event excite world opinion.

There was an informal meeting this morning of several members of the Committee. Giraud proposed to accept the resignation at once but the decision was taken only to acknowledge the communication and call a meeting of the Committee at 10 o'clock Friday.⁵⁴ In the interval an effort will be made to draft a formula regarding the Commissioner for National Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces. Monnet and several others are working on that now.

Macmillan is seeing de Gaulle this afternoon and will inform him of the impending arrival of a high British personality in Algiers this week-end. He feels he should do this as he so informed Giraud this morning. Macmillan will point out that de Gaulle's action is hasty and ill-advised and that it might have serious consequences.

General Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham and I discussed this question early today deciding that no action on our part at the moment is indicated and that if approached by de Gaulle, Eisenhower's position will be that in view of the tacit approval of the British and American Governments of the formation of the French Committee that the Allied authorities must deal with that Committee as distinguished from any individual member thereof. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2258 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 11, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 11:45 p. m.]

1081. For the Secretary and Under Secretary from Murphy. Last evening I had separate conversations with Giraud and Monnet. Giraud was firm in his attitude that he would not be influenced by de Gaulle's tender of resignation as co-President and member of

⁵⁴ June 11.

the French Committee. He said the whole matter hinged on de Gaulle's determination to dominate the French military establishment. De Gaulle's motive according to Giraud, is apparent because during the course of the early meetings he scoffed at Giraud's title as Commander-in-Chief, stating that this was an empty title which really represented no substantial authority because the French Army in the last analysis was under Allied High Command and broken up in different units. He added that General Giraud was also not in the confidence of the Allied High Command, which did not communicate to him plans for future operations. In subsequent meetings, however, de Gaulle reversed his position, stating that he would be very glad to see General Giraud remain as Commander-in-Chief of French Forces, but demanding that he be named Commissioner for National Defense with full powers to reorganize and control the French military establishment.

Giraud said that de Gaulle's purpose thus became most obvious and that he could not submit to a situation in which he would retain the shadow and de Gaulle the substance of military power.

Later in the evening, I saw Monnet who denied that the Committee had any intention of permitting de Gaulle to dominate the French military situation, but he attacked Giraud's failure to eliminate superannuated generals and improve French military organization. He said that Giraud alone was not capable of undertaking the task of reorganizing French Forces in the light of all his other duties and that a formula must be found under which de Gaulle would share in this function. He also prophesied that if de Gaulle quits now, the situation will further deteriorate and that Giraud will not be able to hold power for more than 2 or 3 months, after which French public opinion will demand de Gaulle.

Monnet feels that if de Gaulle's abilities can be harnessed and used within the framework of the Committee during the coming weeks, if he then quits later his departure may cause little emotion. To permit him to quit now, in his opinion, would be premature and might risk unpleasant reactions on the part both of British and American public opinion.

Monnet admits at the same time that de Gaulle must not be permitted by force of threats and a system of blackmail to have his way with the Committee. [Murphy.]

851.01/2259 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 11, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received June 12—3:50 a. m.]

1082. From Murphy for the Secretary and Under Secretary. My June 11.⁵⁵ An informal meeting of the Committee was held this morning without de Gaulle who had been invited but did not attend. His letter of resignation was discussed but no action taken. Discussion then turned to question of the Commander-in-Chief. A formula has been prepared by Monnet and accepted by Catroux, Philip and Massigli. It is based on General Georges' original plan and provides Giraud will be Commander-in-Chief of all French Forces and the Commissioner or Commissioners of National Defense will be charged with reorganization and modernization of the army but that supreme command will be exercised by Commander-in-Chief for the Committee of National Liberation.

Although Giraud and Georges did not appear disposed at this morning's discussion to accept this formula, Monnet is hopeful that after reflection they may be induced to agree thereto. Meanwhile, it is planned that a delegation of the Committee will call on de Gaulle to urge his acceptance of formula and consequently reconsideration of his resignation. It may be that several days will pass before final decision is taken.

Meanwhile, General Eisenhower, Macmillan and I believe unless final formula is detrimental to Allied military effort at this critical stage or destructive of Giraud, we should continue to regard current negotiations as involving primarily French responsibility reserving any objections we may have until such time as it is clear either that our military position is not fully safeguarded or that de Gaulle is gaining control of entire situation. We suggest it might be desirable to insert our conditions, whatever they may be, into the formula of recognition. We propose to submit suggestions in this respect as soon as conditions permit.

If de Gaulle's resignation is now accepted on grounds which may be publicized that Giraud is opposed to reorganization of army, it would give rise to constant friction and would not be clear to public opinion both in France and abroad, thus in reality weakening Giraud's position. Although de Gaulle claims he has no intention of heading an opposition party from the outside, the Committee has not yet obtained sufficient authority to be recognized as the only duly constituted French authority with whom Allies can deal. Once it is, however, actually in operation and the cement has hardened in the new

⁵⁵ *Supra.*

structure, de Gaulle's resignation or resignation of any other member would not have same results and would appear in their true light as resignation of those who are not willing to submit to collective responsibility. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2198 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1943—10 p. m.

1118. For Murphy. We are in close consultation with the War Department on the North African situation and I want you to know, recalling particularly paragraph 2 of your 1032 of June 3, noon, that the very suggestion that General Giraud might under any circumstances contemplate resigning from the Committee would create not only a most unfortunate impression in playing into the hands of his opponents but for the future of France would jeopardize the very aims he as a good Frenchman has in view. As you know, this Government has consistently favored the unity of all French elements resisting Axis aggression, and it is within this unity that General Giraud can play his greatest role.

HULL

851.01/2266 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 12, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 8 : 33 p. m.]

1091. From Murphy for the Secretary and Under Secretary. We have had conversations today with Catroux, Georges, Monnet and Massigli. The situation as of this evening seems to be the following. Giraud states that he will maintain firmly his position in reference to the problem of command or control of the army under the over-all direction of the Committee and that he would not yield on any proposal of the dual command. With reference to the reorganization and modernization of the army, a proposal has been made to Giraud which he has accepted to the effect that this be accomplished through a permanent committee of the following members:

General Giraud as Chairman; General de Gaulle as co-President of the French Committee; General Juin as Commissioner for National Defense; General Bouscat (Air Force) and Admiral Collinet (Navy). Other additions may be made to the Committee.

This proposal was submitted to de Gaulle this morning. If he accepts and is willing to return to Committee on this basis, question will

be settled and de Gaulle will be given an appropriate part in reorganization. If he refuses, however, to return on that basis, Committee will then consider taking a decision on his resignation.

We understand de Gaulle is insisting on controlling reorganization and modernization of the army but Massigli states he feels de Gaulle will accept Giraud as Commander in Chief. Whether de Gaulle's attitude will be stiffened by arrival in North Africa today of Pleven, Diethelm and Tixier who are scheduled to arrive Algiers tonight will be determined in course of next 24 hours.

Members of Committee are resolved, however, if he persists in his resignation to continue as a Committee with thought Catroux may become co-President. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2269 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 13, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 8:32 p. m.]

1092. For the Secretary and Under Secretary from Murphy. The text in translation of the letter of June 9 addressed by General de Gaulle to the members of the French Committee of National Liberation on requesting that he be considered no longer a member or President thereof is as follows:

“A week ago today, with a view to directing the French war effort, we accomplished a so-called unity and set up the French Committee of National Liberation affirming that this Committee will take the place of a French Government.

Since that date everything shows that ‘unity’ does not exist and that there is in fact no government.

What is more, we see a state of anarchy in civil and military matters of which certain intriguing demoniacs, devotees of Vichy or even enemy agents, all in office or at least having freedom of action, take advantage to practice sabotage and constantly to create an atmosphere of ‘Putsch’.

The slightest questions which should be settled in a few minutes and immediately be put into effect involve us in discussions as interminable as they are unpleasant.

Thus we have not even been able to settle, in the military field, the problem involving the respective powers of the Government and of the High Command the logical and national solution of which is self-evident.

Furthermore the Allies are behaving in our regard in a manner which might cause us to doubt the extent of the ability which they attribute to our ‘committee’ to represent the interests of France and to exercise the necessary authority.

These conditions do not accord with the responsibilities which I feel I carry in this war with respect to my country by virtue of the confidence of a very great number of Frenchmen.

I would therefore be failing in my duty if I should any longer associate myself with the labors of the French Committee of National Liberation in the conditions under which it is functioning. I consequently request you to consider that I am no longer either a member or President thereof."

[Murphy]
WILEY

851.01/2283 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 16, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received June 17—1:23 a. m.]

1108. For the President and the Secretary from Murphy. A situation has developed in which General Eisenhower and I should have guidance. Yesterday morning we were informed for the first time of the issuance of a number of decrees dated June 7 which enlarged the membership of the French Committee of National Liberation from 7 to 14 persons. The membership in our opinion insures supremacy to de Gaulle.

Giraud informs me that he signed the decrees as co-President on the recommendation of Monnet and not understanding that the enlarged Committee became the repository of power over all affairs both civil and military. He believed up to this morning that the original Committee of 7 would automatically become the subcommittee of war which would determine all questions relating to the conduct of the war. However, there is nothing in any of the decrees signed thus far to support his opinion.

General Giraud informed me this morning that in his opinion Monnet has betrayed him. As you know I have worked closely with Monnet and he has communicated to me daily the progress he was making. During the past week he has made no mention to me or Macmillan of the fact that he had persuaded General Giraud to sign the decrees increasing the membership of the Committee to 14 regardless of the fact that this was contrary to his own commitment. I reproached him with this yesterday but the reproach left him indifferent. It is obvious to us that things have gone to Monnet's head and that he feels as strongly as possible like de Gaulle that French rights and sovereignty must be more aggressively asserted in respect of the Allies. He also seems to feel he can control the Committee whereas it is increasingly clear that he is being used by de Gaulle and will probably later be discarded.

De Gaulle having withdrawn his resignation now that the Committee is so constituted that he is assured of authority is insisting on a plenary meeting this afternoon at which might be discussed the

question of the military establishment. I have suggested to Giraud that he refuse to permit this question to be decided until Eisenhower's return here Friday. I am recommending that Eisenhower call in de Gaulle and Giraud and state to them clearly the American position as we understand it with particular reference to our military requirements and that it be made abundantly clear that in the light of recent developments it is necessary for the USA to review its present policy of rearmament of French Forces.

I have insisted with Giraud and he agrees that it would be disastrous for him to retire as he has been tempted to do and he has promised to make a determined stand insisting that the Committee agree that as CinC he remain as co-President until France is liberated. His present legal strength lies in the fact that no decree of the French Committee is valid without the signature of both President[s].

De Gaulle and Massigli came to Macmillan late last evening and asked him whether in his opinion our rearmament policy would be affected by de Gaulle's dominance of the situation and other questions indicating uneasiness on their part. Macmillan refused, he says, to give an opinion stating that those would be questions for the CinC to answer. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2284 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 16, 1943—7 p. m.
[Received June 17—1:22 a. m.]

1109. For the President and Secretary of State from Murphy. My 1108, June 16, 6 p. m. Giraud's proposal for the organization of the French High Command follows as section II of this telegram. I understand that de Gaulle on the other hand stands for the constitution of a Commissioner of National Defense which position he desires. He would exercise the prerogatives attributed to the military committee described in article 2 and also some of the powers attributed to the CinC. It should also be noted that the full committee has the power to control the general conduct of the war.

After consultation with the Chief of Staff and Mr. Macmillan it was agreed that a joint *démarche* would be made this afternoon to Massigli asking him to inform all members of the Committee of National Liberation that the CinC would be glad of an opportunity to discuss the question of the command organization of the French Armed Forces personally with General Giraud and General de Gaulle and to explain clearly to them the military requirements which he feels should be satisfied in view of the large commitments and future

obligations of the forces under his command. It is planned that this meeting should take place early next week as soon as General Eisenhower returns to Algiers, and should be limited to a discussion of the military position and the nature of the control of the French Armed Forces which is considered necessary.

Massigli has agreed to communicate this message to all members of the Committee prior to the meeting which is now scheduled to take place tomorrow morning.

(Section II)

Article 1. The French Committee of National Liberation is in charge of the general conduct of the war. It controls all of the land, naval and air forces. It is assisted in this by the War Committee constituted from within its midst and providing [*provided?*] for by article 2 of the decree of June 3, 1943.

Article 2. The Commander-in-Chief will exercise the command of all French land, sea and air [units?], stationed in France and outside of France. Consequently: he will direct and control the formation and instruction of the units with a view to their use as may be or has been provided for, either by the inter-Allied plans of operation, or by the plans for the defense or the security of the territories. He will allot armament.

He will participate with the inter-Allied Command in the establishment of the inter-Allied plans of operation.

He will fix the conditions for the distribution and the use of the French Forces in the various theaters of operation, taking into account the organization of the command in each of them.

Article 3. A general officer will be charged with coordinating the action of the chiefs of the general staffs of the land, sea and air forces, and they will be responsible for the organization, the administration and the maintenance of the armies in accordance with the decisions or directives of the permanent military committee which is the subject of article 4 below.

Article 4. The permanent military committee comprises: the co-Presidents of the French Committee of National Liberation; the Commissioner of Armament; the chiefs of the general staffs of the land, sea and air forces; eventually the general officer or officers designated to exercise an active command in a theater of operations.

The presidency of the committee is exercised by the Commander in Chief, and, in his absence, by the co-President of the National Committee of Liberation.

The permanent military committee has power of decision by virtue of the directives of the war committee on questions of organization and administration of the armies, in particular: budget of the armies; distribution of credits and resources among the three armies; arma-

ment plan; reforms in the structure of the armies (fusion, rejuvenation of the cadres, modernization of the armies, regulations regarding personnel, etc. etc.); promotions and assignments in general officers and corps commanders.

Article 5. Until the provisional government is constituted the Commander-in-Chief remains co-President of the French Committee of National Liberation.

Should he take an active command at the front, he will be replaced in the Committee by one of the commissioners remaining at the seat of the central power. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2283 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1943.

1147. For Murphy. Your telegram, June 16th.⁵⁶ Approve your suggestion contained in paragraph third before end. Will telegraph again.

HULL

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁵⁷

[WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1943—3:30 p. m.

288. I am fed up with De Gaulle and the secret personal and political machinations of that Committee in the last few days indicates that there is no possibility of our working with De Gaulle. If these were peace times it wouldn't make so much difference but I am absolutely convinced that he has been and is now injuring our war effort and that he is a very dangerous threat to us. I agree with you that he likes neither the British nor the Americans . . . I agree with you that the time has arrived when we must break with him. It is an intolerable situation. I think the important thing is that we act together and my thinking regarding the whole matter runs about as follows:

We must divorce ourselves from De Gaulle because . . . he has more recently been interested far more in political machinations than he has in the prosecution of the war and these machinations have been carried on without our knowledge and to the detriment of our military interests. One result of this scheming on the part of De Gaulle has been that Eisenhower has had to give half his time to a purely

⁵⁶ Telegram No. 1108, p. 152.

⁵⁷ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

local political situation which De Gaulle has accentuated. The war is so urgent and our military operations so serious and fraught with danger that we cannot have them menaced any longer by De Gaulle.

Our two countries have solemnly pledged that they will liberate the French Republic and when we drive the Germans out, return that country to the control of the sovereign French people. This pledge we renew.

All of the above can be put by us in language which will be mutually agreeable. Above all I am anxious that the break be made on a basis and for reasons which are identical with both our Governments. There are plenty of emotional and dissident people throughout the world who will try to separate England and the United States in this matter and we must stand shoulder to shoulder, identically and simultaneously through this miserable mess. My affirmative thought is that we should go ahead and encourage the creation of a committee of Frenchmen made up of people who really want to fight the war and are not thinking too much about politics. I am sure we can find such a group. During the formation period we can continue to deal with the military authorities as in the past.

The first step in any event should be the deferment of any meeting of the French Committee in North Africa until later. In the meantime you can well suggest your views as to how you will approach and deal with the De Gaulle situation most effectively from the standpoint of later public opinion, also anything this government might say concurrently with any public utterance you may make. Will you communicate with Macmillan to cooperate with Eisenhower in postponing any further meeting of the French Committee in North Africa.

I am anxious to have your thoughts on this as soon as possible.

The following is a paraphrase of a cable I have today sent to General Eisenhower:

"To General Eisenhower secret and personal from the President. To Mr. Murphy for information.

Murphy's telegram 1108⁵⁸ is very disturbing. I wish you would carefully read once more War Department Number Nine⁵⁹ relative to our W2382 of the 10th of June.⁶⁰

The position of this government is that, during our military occupation of North Africa, we will not tolerate the control of the French Army by any agency which is not subject to the Allied Supreme Commander's direction. We must have someone whom we completely and wholly trust. We would under no circumstances continue the arming of a force without being completely confident in their willingness to cooperate in our military operations; we are not interested, moreover, in the formation of any government or committee which presumes in any way to indicate that, until such time as the French

⁵⁸ Dated June 16, p. 152.

⁵⁹ Not printed.

⁶⁰ Not found in Department files.

people select a government for themselves, it will govern in France. When we get into France, the Allies will have a civil government plan that is completely in consonance with French sovereignty. Lastly, it must be absolutely clear that in North and West Africa we have a military occupation and, therefore, without your full approval no independent civil decision can be made.

Our policy, as you know, has been to encourage, as long as they cooperate with our military interests, local officials to manage their own affairs. It is our policy to encourage an extension of this; but civil or military direction which in any way might endanger the safety of our troops, our lines of communication, or otherwise interfere with our military operations must not be tolerated by us. This would include the necessity of keeping in North Africa more troops than we now plan.

I want to state for your exclusive information that at this time we will not permit De Gaulle to direct himself or to control through partisans on any committee, the African French army, either in the field of supplies, training, or operations.

This message has been seen by Hull and Marshall and has their approval.

Please acknowledge receipt.

Again I want to assure you that you are authorized to take such action as you think best in behalf of this government."

ROOSEVELT

851.01/2302 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 18, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received June 19—3:02 a. m.]

1119. For the Secretary and Under Secretary from Murphy. Your 1147, June 17 and my 1108, June 16, 6 p. m. Massigli informs me that he is in receipt of a message from Hoppenot regarding the latter's conversation with Dunn⁶¹ concerning the subject matter of my 1108, June 16, 6 p. m., relative to the composition of the enlarged French Committee. Massigli asserts that the information conveyed to the Department by me regarding the apparent domination of the Committee by de Gaulle is inaccurate. Like Monnet he says that he was unaware that we were ignorant of the changes in the formation of the Committee made on June 7 and about which we learned on June 15. He admits that he should have informed us.

According to Massigli we should consider that of the 14 members, he, Catroux, Monnet, Abadie, Couve de Murville, Mayer and Bonnet are independents and opposed to the domination of either de Gaulle or Giraud. He says that de Gaulle can count on the total support only of Pleven, Tixier, Diethelm and Philip, leaving Giraud with

⁶¹ James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.

Georges. He said that all of the independents will insist on the retention of Giraud as Commander-in-Chief, although they all stand for a reform and improvements in the military establishment.

Massigli also denies that the Committee intends to change the necessity of joint signatures to validate its acts, stating that if, of course, either one of the co-Presidents deliberately block the work of the Committee such action would result in a crisis looking to a change in the system.

Massigli said that he would make every effort to promote friendly understanding between the Committee and the Allied authorities and is particularly concerned that we have confidence in his determination to prevent domination of the Committee by de Gaulle.

I believe that the concern which our Government has brought home to the members of the Committee as a result of their unpublished action changing the constitution of the Committee, and the effect that it might have on the French military establishment, is salutary and will make for a better understanding on the part of the recent arrivals, of the American position in this area.

General Georges also indicated this afternoon that the discussions in the Committee yesterday demonstrated that de Gaulle could only count on the unqualified support of the 5 members listed by Massigli. He said that the other 8 were demonstrating an independence of judgment which led him and Giraud to feel that on the question at least of CinC, their support would be forthcoming. He stated, nevertheless, that the Committee as constituted did not correspond to the original agreement which had called for a small executive committee. He felt, however, that it might be possible to retrieve the error through the establishment of a small war committee, which would in fact direct the war effort, leaving other questions to the larger body. Even in the larger body Giraud, however, still maintained the veto power through the necessity of obtaining joint signatures upon all decrees.

Georges was confident that General Eisenhower's decision to discuss the question of military command with both Generals de Gaulle and Giraud would solve this problem. He said the decision had been welcomed by the reasonable elements on the Committee. Georges is also fully aware of necessity for the rejuvenation of the army and gave us his personal guarantee that he would see that this was accomplished in an orderly but prompt fashion.

He had just had a long talk with a newly arrived leader of one of the resistance organizations in France which had greatly impressed him as to the necessity of grouping the resistance organizations under a committee of resistance which would represent both de Gaulle and Giraud since his informant did not feel that Philip alone was competent to deal with this important matter. [Murphy.]

851.01/6-1943

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁶²

[LONDON,] June 18, 1943.

[316?] Your No. 288.⁶³ It is imperative that the French Army in Northwest Africa should be in loyal and trustworthy hands especially on the eve of great operations which impend. I agree with you that no confidence can be placed in de Gaulle's friendship for the Allies and I could not myself be responsible to the British nation whose armies have been placed under Eisenhower's command in North Africa if our base and lines of communication were disturbed or endangered through the existence of a French army under potentially hostile control and not properly subordinated to the Supreme Commander. I am glad therefore to learn of the clear instructions you have given General Eisenhower not to "permit de Gaulle to direct himself or to control through the partisans of any Committee the African French Army either in the field of supplies, training or operations".

2. I am not in favour at this moment of breaking up the Committee of 7 or forbidding it to meet. I should prefer that General Eisenhower should take your instructions as his directive and that Murphy and Macmillan should work towards its fulfillment by whatever means they find most appropriate. His Majesty's Government will associate themselves with this policy.

3. Committee will then be confronted with a choice of either accepting our decision by a majority or placing themselves in definite opposition to the two rescuing powers. If as I deem probable they accept the decision by a majority it will be for de Gaulle to decide whether he and other dissentients will submit or resign. If de Gaulle resigns he will put himself in the wrong with public opinion and necessary measures must be taken to prevent him from creating a disturbance. If he submits we shall probably have further trouble in the future but this will be better than our sweeping away a Committee on which many hopes are founded amongst the United Nations as well as in France. We should prescribe conditions essential for the safety of our forces and place the onus on de Gaulle. At any rate it would be wise to try this first.

4. I have already notified Massigli through Macmillan that no further payments will be made from British funds to the French National Committee in London and that any further payments will only be made to the new Committee of 7 acting by a majority. I have received from Macmillan the following paraphrased message.

⁶² Copy of this telegram transmitted to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on June 19.

⁶³ June 17, 3:30 p. m., p. 155.

"I take the right interpretation of your wishes to be full support of General Eisenhower in order to ensure that Giraud remains in effective command of French forces. This must include measures to ensure that reorganisation of personnel and appointments only take place with his concurrence. If this can be achieved while French unity is preserved, and de Gaulle remains on the Committee, well and good. Failing this, our first requirement must be military security."

5. In view of the situation that has now developed "the measures to secure that any reorganisation of personnel and appointments should have his (Giraud's) concurrence" would not be satisfied by any division of military control between Giraud as Commander-in-Chief and de Gaulle as Minister of Defence. This last office should be put in the hands of General Georges or some other officer equally acceptable to the rescuing powers.

851.01/6-1943

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁶⁴

[LONDON,] June 18, 1943.

318. Further to your 288. Some of my colleagues have questioned your sentence "I agree with you that the time has arrived when we break with him". As you will remember I sent a telegram from the White House when we were together but as I told you at the time, the Cabinet did not accept this view because *inter alia* de Gaulle was just starting for Algiers to meet Giraud. This was a new fact to me and we were all inclined to give the meeting a fair chance. Since then we have been watching their manoeuvres with growing dissatisfaction. It would not however be right to say that we have decided "that the time has arrived when we must break with him". This may come but it would come as the result of his refusing to accept the necessary military conditions to ensure that the French army remains in trustworthy hands on which full agreement exists between our two Governments.

2. Will you very kindly read this message in conjunction with my 316.⁶⁵

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁶⁶

[WASHINGTON,] June 21, 1943.

290. Replying to your messages numbered 316 and 318 of the 18th of June, I am glad to be reassured that you are in complete agreement

⁶⁴ Copy of this telegram transmitted by the British Ambassador to the Secretary of State on June 19.

⁶⁵ *Supra*.

⁶⁶ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

with me on the major question of the control in Africa of the Military forces which question includes the security of our lines of supply.

My telegram Number 288 was based on the fact that the Committee of seven had, by an unpublished decree of the 7th of June, been increased to fourteen, a fact which had not been made known to Macmillan or Murphy until the 16th of June. It would appear that the Committee now stands as overwhelmingly De Gaullist. Full authority over all the war effort of French territory and the French is claimed by this augmented Committee. I am sure you agree that the jeopardizing of our military position in North Africa by an antagonistic element in such control cannot be accepted by us.

ROOSEVELT

851.01/6-2443

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁶⁷

[LONDON,] June 23, 1943.

325. Your No. 290.⁶⁸ I told Parliament on June 8th that formation of new Algiers Committee of Seven (to wit: Giraud, de Gaulle, Georges, Catroux, Massigli, Monnet and Philippe) marked the end of my relations with de Gaulle as defined by letters exchanged in 1940 and that our dealings would henceforth be with Committee of Seven. Like you I was surprised when these seven suddenly sprouted out into fourteen. However I thought at first that it was a War Cabinet with other members attending its meetings. Presently it appeared that all members had equal status and therefore like you I feared that de Gaulle would have a clear working majority. This is not certain but if true would I am sure lead to nothing but trouble.

2. Accordingly I have now made it clear to Macmillan that His Majesty's Government can at present deal only with Committee of Seven in its collective capacity expressed by a majority of the seven; otherwise no payments will be made. I am not however sure how much money the large Committee as a whole can draw from revenues of French North West Africa which are of course much increased by heavy United States and British expenditure there or how much they can draw from other parts of the French Empire. The Committee of Seven are floating loan to which there may be considerable response. De Gaulle has also a development fund of perhaps 150,000 pounds drawn from his partisans and admirers. We should in any case have to pay French soldiers and sailors who are serving locally with us in different parts of the world through local payments as a *modus*

⁶⁷ Copy of this telegram transmitted by the British Ambassador to the Secretary of State on June 24.

⁶⁸ *Supra.*

vivendi. It is therefore likely that the Committee may be able to get on without payments hitherto made to de Gaulle from British Exchequer.

3. We have also made trade arrangements with various French colonies who joined de Gaulle which are serviceable to us and vital to them and in addition we have guaranteed pay and pensions of all French officials who renounced Vichy and gave us their allegiance in these places. Should de Gaulle break with the Committee of Seven and go off into the wilderness I should consider that discharge of these obligations would depend on our relations not with him any more but only with majority of Committee of Seven. This would be a very much more powerful lever of control.

4. You will no doubt regulate your issue of arms and ammunition to French North African Army in accordance with the confidence that you have in the Authorities controlling it and we should both supply goods and shipping to other French colonies only on same basis.

5. On quite a different plane is the question of recognition of this Committee of Seven which they will certainly demand as representative of France in some degree or other. Here I feel with you that it would be most unwise to commit ourselves until we know much more clearly than we do now how they are going to behave. In this connexion I send you a paraphrase of message which is being sent to Stalin.⁶⁹ The United Nations must certainly try to act together on this larger question also.

851T.001/16 : Telegram

The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in French West Africa (Glassford) to the Secretary of State

DAKAR, June 23, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received June 24—2: 56 a. m.]

381. Following telegram has been sent to Algiers.

182, June 23, 1 p. m. For Murphy. Can you give me any further information on the attitude of the Liberation Committee as it has developed toward Boisson.

The Gaullists and other critics of the Governor General ([Amis de Combat?], Action Républicaine, Union National [des Anciens?] Combattants) are disposed to say that Boisson has sold Dakar to the Americans who are therefore keeping him in office; that in fact the Governor General is now relying to a great extent on American support and is still in office because [of] us. For the time being at any rate this reaction appears to be prompted entirely by exasperation

⁶⁹ Not printed.

with Boisson's tenacity and not by any real mistrust of our intentions with respect to French West Africa.

GLASSFORD

851.01/2334 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 23, 1943—7 p. m.
[Received June 24—4:30 a. m.]

1145. For the Secretary and Under Secretary from Murphy. As reported by General Eisenhower to the War Department the deliberations of the French Committee of National Liberation terminated last evening in a decree approved by Generals Giraud and de Gaulle regarding the conduct of the war. The full text of this decree was telegraphed to the War Department last evening (see W-3293 to AGWAR, June 22, 1943).⁷⁰

The Committee retains the authority to direct French war effort and to dispose of all of land, naval and air forces.

The duty of effecting a unification of the French military forces, matters of organization and equipment, are confined to a Permanent Military Committee.

The Permanent Military Committee is composed Generals Giraud and de Gaulle and their Chiefs of Staff for land, air and naval forces with a Permanent Secretariat.

Article 5 of the decree defines the authority of the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of command. These duties include the direction and control of military units with a view to their employment either in inter-Allied operations or for the defense and security of the particular territories. The commanding generals control the division and employment of French forces in their zones of command and the distribution of armaments attributed to them by the Committee.

The Commanders-in-Chief participate, under article 7, with the Inter-Allied High Command in the planning of operations which concern operations under their command.

Separate decrees approved by the Committee appoint General Giraud [Commanding General] of all French land, air and naval forces in North and West Africa, and General de Gaulle as Commander-in-Chief of similar forces in all other overseas territories.

Massigli requested Macmillan and myself to call last evening at which time he handed us copies of the text of the decree. He said that it had been decided by the Committee that no formal reply would be made to the letters addressed by the CinC to Generals de Gaulle and Giraud confirming General Eisenhower's conversation with them

⁷⁰ Not found in Department files.

on June 19. Massigli said that several members of the Committee felt that a formal reply should be made but that the majority believed that it would be more tactful to communicate the Committee's action to Macmillan and myself in the regular channel.

Both Macmillan and I believe that the Committee's present action complies with the President's directive to General Eisenhower relating to the control of French forces in this vital theater, that the result provides as satisfactory a temporary solution as we could hope to obtain under existing circumstances and that it should be accepted as such. For the present it ends the current tension and if loyally put into effect will permit the maintenance of order and tranquility in this area at a time when these are primary considerations.

Monnet desired to communicate the text of the decree to the press immediately last evening. At my instance he deferred release until 7 o'clock this morning.

Before indicating approval General Eisenhower will await the President's reaction and will also require assurances from Generals Giraud and de Gaulle that the present decree represents compliance with the terms of his communication to them.

We feel that while this result may be satisfactory for the present the necessity of having a dual organization nevertheless demonstrates that real unity has not yet been created on a basis of collective and democratic action or mutual confidence. In fact it seems somewhat ridiculous that there should have to be two Commanders-in-Chief when the total of de Gaulle's army does not exceed a maximum of 15,000. We should have no illusions over the continuing determination of General de Gaulle to dominate the situation. A review of his actions during the past 2 weeks show[s] that his technique of reaching his objective through threats remains unchanged, that he has been able to frighten members of the Committee including Monnet to the point either of accepting his wishes or of producing compromise solutions which do not always give promise of lasting stability.

In other words the compromise postpones for a critical moment in military operations the real test of control, whether it is to be exercised by de Gaulle or by the Committee under its collective judgment. It is to be hoped that the latter tendency will be strengthened as this group settles down to work.

It should also be remembered that during these past weeks and months General Giraud has not been a tower of political strength in his honest and simple desire to prosecute the war. He discounts the value of the political side and is prone to make concessions in the hope of arriving at French unity. The de Gaulle group have repeatedly taken advantage of this susceptibility.

Giraud informed me this morning that the present temporary solution is far from ideal but that he consented to approve it for the

purpose of promoting French unity. He stated that he is prepared to inform General Eisenhower that the present formula meets the requirements of command for North and West Africa stated by Eisenhower to Giraud and de Gaulle on June 19.

The de Gaulle group continues to strike the note in their propaganda effort that Giraud in effect has been a "pushover" for the Allies and that the time has arrived for a greater assertion of the French position. Once the questions of French internal organization have been regulated by the Committee we may expect a drive for the revision of our present agreements with the French African authorities. We detect in our daily negotiations with the French in economic matters an increasing tendency to make the Allies pay.

Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851T.001/18: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 26, 1943—midnight.

[Received June 26—10: 15 p. m.]

1169. From Murphy. My 1151, June 24.⁷³ At its meeting yesterday the Committee of National Liberation accepted Governor General Boisson's resignation but asked that he remain in office until his successor could be named. I understand the Committee is endeavoring to find an acceptable replacement and plans to discuss the matter with us.

I shall telegraph further tomorrow after consultation with Giraud and Massigli. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851T.001/19: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, June 27, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 11: 28 p. m.]

1171. For the Secretary and the President from Murphy. I have discussed the situation at Dakar both with Giraud and Massigli. Macmillan and I saw Massigli about it this morning. Prior to our visit with him, Massigli and Monnet had visited the Chief of Staff⁷⁴

⁷³ Not printed; in this telegram Mr. Murphy reported that Giraud's headquarters had informed him that Boisson had tendered his resignation on the grounds that he could not work with the Committee of National Liberation as it was then constituted. No official action had yet been taken on the resignation. (851.01/2338)

⁷⁴ Maj. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.

in an effort to persuade him to approve immediately the appointment of Cournarie, at present Governor of the Cameroons, as Boisson's successor stating that Mr. Prevost now of Boisson's staff would act as his assistant.

Last evening Giraud told me that he had not been informed of this suggestion. He said that he would propose to the French Committee the appointment of General Boisboissel,⁷⁵ recently appointed as Commanding General for French West Africa, also as Governor General in the event Boisson's resignation is approved by the Committee.

The name of Cournarie was suggested by Pleven⁷⁶ who speaks of him in the highest terms as a colonial administrator with whom he has been in close association during the past years. Massigli insists that Cournarie is not involved in politics but the fact remains that he has been associated with the de Gaulle movement, and his appointment unquestionably will be regarded as a de Gaulle selection.

While Massigli was not frank with Macmillan and myself in describing the events leading to Boisson's resignation, it appears that as a result of the recent public manifestation in Dakar which apparently involved some disorder, several arrests were made by the local authorities. The French Committee through Pleven ordered that the persons arrested be released and thereafter Boisson tendered his resignation.

Massigli promised he would suggest to the Committee that in view of our interests the question of Boisson's resignation and eventual replacement would be postponed for several days but that it would not be stated to the Committee that this was for the purpose of consultation with the American authorities. He said that the French Committee felt strongly that this question just as that involving the Commander-in-Chief involved questions of French sovereignty about which it would be improper to consult a foreign power.

I should appreciate your comment on the foregoing.

Repeated to Dakar and London. Sent to Department. [Murphy.]
WILEY

851.01/2401c: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1943—noon.

504. For your information the Department has been informed by the British Embassy that on June 20 the British Ambassador at

⁷⁵ Gen. Yves de Boisboissel, Commander of French Ground and Air Forces, French West Africa.

⁷⁶ René Pleven, Commissioner for Colonies, French Committee of National Liberation.

Moscow⁷⁷ was informed by Molotov⁷⁸ in a private letter that the Fighting French Representative in Moscow had requested the Soviet Government to recognize the French Committee of National Liberation in North Africa. In his letter, Molotov further stated that after due consideration of the request made by the British Ambassador on June 15 stressing the importance of a common attitude on the part of the Soviet, British and American Governments on the question of recognition, the Soviet Government had come to the conclusion that it was not expedient to postpone recognition because of the effect that such postponement would have on the French forces opposed to Hitler. The Soviet Government, therefore, expressed the hope that the British Government would for its part favor recognition.

On June 22 the British Embassy at Moscow was instructed to inform Molotov that the British Government shared the desire of the Soviet Government to avoid unnecessary delay in recognizing the French Committee of National Liberation but found it necessary to postpone action on the question of recognition until the outcome of the latest crisis in Algiers was known and until it was possible to observe how the Committee functioned. The British Ambassador was also instructed to explain to the Soviet Government that General Eisenhower had been authorized by the British and American Governments to insist on effective control of French forces in North Africa remaining in the hands of General Giraud with whom the military arrangements were working smoothly; that in view of the pending military operations and the presence of millions of Allied soldiers in North Africa the command of the French forces was a military and not a political matter and that General Eisenhower had the full support of the British and American Governments in this matter. The Ambassador under instruction urged the Soviet Government to consult the British Government before committing itself to recognition.

You are requested to seek an early interview with Molotov and inform him that the Government of the United States is in complete agreement with the views expressed by the British Ambassador and requests the Soviet Government to refrain from any act of recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation without prior consultation with this Government.

You should add that in our opinion any emphasis in the North African situation at this time on other than strictly military questions would be most undesirable and even harmful from the point of view of our common military effort against the Axis powers.

HULL

⁷⁷ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

⁷⁸ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

851T.001/24: Telegram

The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in French West Africa (Glassford) to the Secretary of State

DAKAR, July 2, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 10:46 p. m.]

409. Reference Murphy's 1187, June 29, 8 p. m., section 4⁷⁹ and my 384, June 23, 8 p. m.⁸⁰ Boisson told me that the immediate reason for his decision to resign was a visit from an emissary sent by Pleven who insisted that he must leave office; also the contents of a telegram sent by de Gaulle to his adherents here which he, Boisson, had seen. He did not explain to me the nature of this telegram.

Boisson is now taking the situation philosophically and is much improved in spirit. He told me day before yesterday that he hopes to get away for the north sometime next week. The radio report of Cournarie's appointment has caused no noticeable reaction here.⁸¹

Repeated to Murphy.

GLASSFORD

*Memorandum by Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, Naval Aide to President Roosevelt*⁸²

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1943.

Admiral Leahy⁸³ requests that you submit at your earliest convenience, but not later than 11:00 a. m., Sunday, July 4, your comments with reference to the attached message from the President.

Admiral Leahy further requests that these comments be addressed to him at the Map Room, The White House.

⁷⁹ Not printed. The first paragraph of section 4 read as follows; "Giraud said that Boisson's resignation had been offered as far as he knew spontaneously to the French Committee of National Liberation and against Giraud's advice that he refuse to tender it. I am confidently [*confidentially?*] informed by a reliable source that de Gaulle's emissaries visited Boisson persuading that his remaining in office would be an obstacle to French unity. The resignation was considered by the Committee during this morning's session and accepted." (851.001/22)

⁸⁰ Not printed.

⁸¹ In telegram No. 1199, July 1, 6 p. m., from the Consul General at Algiers (repeated to Dakar), Murphy had reported unanimous approval given by the French Committee of National Liberation on that afternoon to the appointment of Pierre Cournarie as Governor General of French West Africa succeeding Boisson (851.01/2367).

⁸² Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A copy in the Department of State files is identical except for omission of the third paragraph (851T.001/38). This memorandum was addressed to the Secretary of State; Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

⁸³ Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

A copy of State Department message No. 1195 from Mr. Murphy in Algiers is attached.⁸⁴ Your attention is invited to the fact that this message No. 1195 is not a paraphrased copy, and so it is requested that you return this copy, without distribution, with your above mentioned comments.⁸⁵

WILSON BROWN

[Enclosure]

I suggest sending Eisenhower for himself and Murphy the following,⁸⁶ in view of the State Department dispatch from Murphy, Number 1195, from Algiers:⁸⁷

"By virtue of the general approval in North Africa for appointment of Pierre Cournarie as Governor of West Africa, I concur in this appointment. Due to the unusual military importance of Dakar to the defense of the American hemisphere and the control of the South Atlantic, however, the following point should be made absolutely clear to the French Committee: If at any time during the rest of the war the United States requests a change in Cournarie's command, such a change will be effected by putting in his place a man totally agreeable to the United States. The fact that this proposed measure is for military reasons in the conduct of the war should be emphasized."

ROOSEVELT

851.01/2568

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1943.

MR. SECRETARY: Etienne Boegner who, you will remember, was on the de Gaullist Delegation here and who resigned and went to join General Giraud, has just come in to see me. He is here with General Giraud.⁸⁸ He made a tangible suggestion which I think is thoroughly

⁸⁴ Dated June 30, 7 p. m.; not printed. In this telegram, Mr. Murphy gave the following summary of conversations with French officials regarding French West Africa: "I have made quite clear in all my conversations the President's concern regarding the security of this area and his determination that there should be no development here endangering Allies' security and military operations.

"Should the Committee approve Cournarie's appointment I believe we should not offer objection at this time. Should there be later any indication of difficulty we could then insist on his immediate removal." (851.01/2366)

⁸⁵ No reply from the Secretary of State has been found either in the Department files or in the Roosevelt Library. A handwritten note on this copy, from Admiral King to Admiral Leahy, indicated that the former had no objection to the attached draft message for General Eisenhower and Mr. Murphy.

⁸⁶ A handwritten note on this copy by Admiral Leahy stated that President Roosevelt's approval was received at 2:45 p. m. on July 4, 1943. The message was then sent to Algiers via military channels on the same date.

⁸⁷ See footnote 84, above.

⁸⁸ General Giraud was in the United States at this time for consultation with respect to affairs in French North Africa.

worth considering. He is convinced that General de Gaulle, despite his protestations, is now merely the promoter of the equivalent of a French Nazi movement with himself as Fuehrer, and that both the French and the Allied cause are in grave danger if it gets out of hand.

According to Boegner, Giraud, being no politician, has allowed himself to be jockeyed out of position after position, partly I regret to say, because Monnet and some of the people in Algiers convinced Giraud that he could not count on the firm support of the United States. By consequence, unless great care is taken, General de Gaulle may wind up in sole personal control of a French Army which he hopes to arm from the United States, and which he will then use to force a dictatorship on France.

Boegner suggests:

(1) that General Giraud's position as commander-in-chief of the French army be strengthened and reinforced;

(2) that an agreement be made between him as commander-in-chief of the French army and General Eisenhower (or other appropriate American officer) representing the Command of the American Expeditionary Force. This presumably would cover delivery of arms and supplies for which General Giraud is asking;

(3) this agreement should have a clause providing for a Committee of Liaison and Administration between the American Command and the French Command. This might consist of three Americans and three Frenchmen. The Liaison Committee should have general jurisdiction over the handling of the supplies, equipment and reorganization of the French army, and also over the exercise of whatever civil functions (police, keeping order, etc.) General Giraud may have to exercise as commander of the army. The three French officers should be appointed by General Giraud from his command. The whole transaction should be independent of the French Committee of Liberation. The prime function of this Liaison and Administration Committee should be the protection of the integrity of the French army; its maintenance as a strictly French command and not as the partisans of any party or personality. (This is in line, of course, with our own policy of not undertaking to prejudge ultimate political solutions in France.);

(4) a clause in the contract should provide for training centers in which the French troops are trained in the use of the new American weapons for which they are asking. This, Boegner believes, is essential, and General Giraud who has little knowledge of the new weapons wholly realizes that this is a procedure already found necessary in the American armies. These training centers could also be administered under general guidance of the Committee of Liaison and Administration;

(5) in general, the Committee of Liaison should be built up so that it could serve as the guardian of American and French interests and of Allied interests generally, as contrasted with any partisan interests which might intrude themselves.

Boegner says that the bitterness and betrayals and personal intrigues in North Africa are beyond description. He thinks it was a

great mistake for General Giraud not to have accepted General de Gaulle's resignation when it was offered, believing that in that case, unity might have been postponed, but "we did not get unity anyhow".

He adds that General Giraud ought to be disabused of the impression that he was compelled to yield because of American feeling in the matter. He says that Monnet convinced Giraud that he, Monnet, could interpret the real American attitude for him. He feels that our attitude should be one of surprise that he made as many concessions as he did, and of very firm insistence that the power and prerogatives of the military command at the moment must be maintained in any event.

I feel this important enough to pass on to you at once. You may even wish to send a copy of it or the substance of it to the White House.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

851.01/7-943

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁸⁹

[LONDON,] July 8, 1943.

348. I hear from Macmillan that Eisenhower and Murphy propose immediate recognition of French Committee. This is rather sudden. I should like to know your reactions.

Our Foreign Office would also like to go ahead and recognize. My chief desire in this business has been to keep in step with you.

It is however essential that we should act together and that we should agree to the extent and moment of our recognition.

My immediately following telegram⁹⁰ contains formula for recognition suggested by Foreign Office.

851.01/7-943

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁸⁹

[LONDON,] July 8, 1943.

349. My immediately preceding telegram.⁹¹ Following is formula for recognition of French Committee suggested by Foreign Office.

Begins:

His Majesty's Government are happy to recognize French Committee of National Liberation as administering those parts of French Overseas Empire which acknowledge their authority, and as having

⁸⁹ Copy of this telegram was transmitted by the British Ambassador to the Secretary of State on July 9.

⁹⁰ *Infra.*

⁹¹ *Supra.*

assumed functions of former French National Committee in respect of territories in the Levant. They also recognize it as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the framework of inter-allied cooperation as well as, in principle, the administration and defence of French interests. The practical application of this principle to the different categories of French interests must be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

His Majesty's Government have taken note of the Committee's determination to continue their struggle, in close cooperation with all the Allies, until French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all enemy powers. They count on the Committee to afford such facilities in military and economic spheres in territories under their administration as may be required by Governments of United Nations for prosecution of the war. In respect of certain of these territories, agreements already exist between French authorities and British or United States authorities. The creation of the French Committee of National Liberation may make it necessary to revise these agreements, and, pending their revision, all such agreements concluded since June 1940, except in so far as these have been automatically made inapplicable by the formation of French Committee of National Liberation, will remain in force.

851.01/2492 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, July 17, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received July 17—5:58 p. m.]

1273. For Secretary and Under Secretary from Murphy. In my recent telegrams I have endeavored to give the impression which is based on conversations not only with nearly all members of Committee of National Liberation, but other representative Frenchmen here, that Committee continues to consolidate its own position and to move forward as a collective body endeavoring to exercise authority over French interests under its jurisdiction. In absence of any information from Department, I have also assumed from these conversations and from press reports that question of Martinique has now been regulated in a manner which Department considers satisfactory.

Under these circumstances, may I again raise question of desirability of an early recognition on our part. The civilian members of Committee are concerned that our delay in recognition implies existency of an American policy of ignoring this body, and consequently that we are supporting an individual in contrast to support for the nearest approach to a representative group which can at present be constituted.

It is believed that Committee will continue to function with an increasing sense of civilian responsibility and that only alternative to such Committee could be assumption of control under de Gaulle in view of Giraud's disinterestedness in political matters. Therefore

if we are to avoid giving de Gaulle the means of increasing his personal leadership, it would seem that an early recognition of the collective nature of Committee is implied. De Gaulle himself has now publicly admitted in his speech of July 14 that Committee of National Liberation is responsible to French people for representation of their honor and interests, and is apparently reconciled to work within its frame.

The President's message of July 14,⁹³ which was widely publicized here, was interpreted as envisaging possibility of recognition along lines clearly consistent with our policy of allowing French people their own choice of government, but of establishing an interim trusteeship which would bring the maximum French contribution to the war effort.

I have not been informed of any recent developments in the United States or in England which might render further delay in recognition advisable, but from the situation as viewed here, there is a growing apprehension in regard to our policy which if it continues, can, as far as we can see, be disadvantageous to our own interests in the long run. I should appreciate the earliest possible indication of your views and those of the President in this respect. General Eisenhower concurs in the foregoing recommendation and urges prompt recognition.

Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/7-2243

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁹⁴

[LONDON,] July 21, 1943.

373. Please see my No. 348 of the 8th instant. It seems to me that something has got to be done about this. I am under considerable pressure from the Foreign Office, from my Cabinet colleagues and also from force of circumstances to "recognize" the National Committee of Liberation in Algiers. What does recognition mean? One can recognize a man as an Emperor or as a Grocer. Recognition is meaningless without a defining formula. We submitted to you our formula which would meet our daily practical needs. These cannot be overlooked. Until de Gaulle went to North West Africa and the new Committee was formed all our relations were with him and his Committee. I stated to Parliament on 8/6⁹⁵ that "the formation of this Committee with its collective responsibility supersedes the situa-

⁹³ For text of President Roosevelt's statement on Bastille Day, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 17, 1943, p. 28.

⁹⁴ Copy of this telegram transmitted by the British Minister (Campbell) to the Secretary of State on July 22.

⁹⁵ June 8.

tion created by the correspondence between General de Gaulle and myself in 1940. Our dealings financial and otherwise will henceforth be with the Committee as a whole". I was glad to do this because I would rather deal with the Committee collectively than with de Gaulle alone. I had in fact for many months been working to induce or compel de Gaulle to "put himself in commission". This seemed to be largely achieved by the new arrangement.

Since then we have been dealing with the new Committee on a *de facto* basis. We are now discussing the problems of Syria (where there is much friction) with Massigli and are getting a good deal of help from him. Minister of State (Casey) and General Spears are stopping off at Algiers on their way back to the Middle East in order to carry these discussions further. General Catroux has returned from Syria to Algiers and also shows a disposition to be helpful. He is a level-headed man and by no means in the pocket of de Gaulle. Neither I am sure is Massigli. I am certain that we shall have a smoother course in Syria which is full of dangerous possibilities by dealing with the Committee collectively than with de Gaulle personally. Yet that is the only alternative.

Very soon will come here Monsieur Couve de Murville to wind up our financial arrangements with de Gaulle and transfer them insofar as transference is required to the new Committee. What other choice have I but to do this?

A third instance is supplied by the fact that there are a number of Free French troops and establishments here and about 50 Free French vessels which are doing very useful work and all of which have to be kept under military discipline. For this purpose an Act of Parliament was passed in 1940 vesting powers of discipline for such forces in General de Gaulle. I wish to transfer this to the Committee and I shall have presently to submit an amending bill to Parliament.

Beside all this there are numerous Colonies of the French Empire which came over to us or were brought over forcibly including Madagascar, Jibuti and French West Africa and Central African Colonies. With all of these we have a varying flow of business and trade to do and at present all this is formally focused on the personality of de Gaulle. I would much prefer it to be transacted with the Committee and with the particular member of the Committee charged with administration of Colonial affairs. In fact from day to day we have been inevitably drawn to recognise the Committee in the sense of doing business with it.

Macmillan tells us repeatedly that the Committee is acquiring a collective authority and that de Gaulle is by no means its master. He tells us further that if the Committee breaks down as it may do if

left utterly without support, de Gaulle will become once again the sole personality in control of everything except the powers exercised by Giraud under armed force of the United States in North West Africa and Dakar. He strongly recommends a measure of recognition. He reports that Eisenhower and Murphy both agree with this.

I am therefore reaching the point where it may be necessary for me to take this step so far as Great Britain and Anglo-French interests set out above are concerned. If I do, Russia will certainly recognise, and I fear lest this might be embarrassing to you.

I do hope therefore that you will let me know (a) whether you could subscribe to our formula or something like it or (b) whether you would mind if His Majesty's Government took that step separately themselves. There is no doubt whatever in my mind that the former would be far the better. There are a lot of good men on the Committee, Catroux, Massigli, Monnet, Georges and of course Giraud who arrived here yesterday. He will certainly raise all this and bring it to a head.

As you know I have always taken the view that de Gaulle should be made to settle down to honest team-work. I am no more enamoured of him than you are but I would rather have him on the Committee than strutting about as combination Joan of Arc and Clemenceau. Pray therefore let me know your wishes for I try above all things to walk in step with you and the advantages of our joint action in this affair are especially obvious.

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁹⁶

[WASHINGTON,] July 22, 1943—12:25 p. m.

321. Various sources continue, though with less pressure, to ask recognition of the existing French Committee of National Liberation. Some people want to recognize it as the organization acting for French interests in all French territory, including France. Other people want to recognize it as acting for French interests only in former French Empire.

Most, not all, are willing to accept the Committee's authority subject to the military requirements of the British and American Forces.

We have been saying, first, that the military requirements are and will be paramount to all civil matters; second, that the French Committee of National Liberation has only begun to function and should give further and more satisfactory evidence of the complete and genuine unity of the Committee. This unity must eliminate hitherto

⁹⁶ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

French political or factional controversies designed to promote either group antagonisms or individual aspirations, and demonstrate a real purpose to unify itself and, behind it, all Frenchmen in support of the cooperative efforts of the United Nations in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers, having in mind its single cause of the liberation of France and the success of the United Nations.

The French Committee was supposedly conceived on the principle of collective responsibility of individual Frenchmen for the prosecution of the war and our relations with it should be kept on this basis, it being understood that as to matters of a military character the two Governments will deal directly with the French Commander-in-Chief of the French forces. French political questions must be left to solution by the people of France when they have been freed from the present domination of the enemy.

Visible signs of bitter propaganda against French elements by other French groups continue. This applies also to their attitude against Britain and the United States. Attempted claims of the exercise of French sovereignty by the Committee in the face of military exigencies are without basis and hence veiled references to invasion of French sovereignty by the United States and Great Britain have no justification whatever. Appearances of unity within the Committee seem to me to be still on the surface and at this time I must conclude that they are continuing or are ready at any time to continue bitter attacks on each other and on us jointly or severally.

This Government is most anxious to join with you and the other United Nations to move along the line of limited acceptance of the Committee, subject always to military requirements, but we should make it clear that the plain conditions of French unity must be properly met.

I do not think we should at any time use the word "recognition" because this would be distorted to imply that we recognize the Committee as the government of France as soon as we land on French soil. Perhaps the word "acceptance" of the Committee's local, civil authority in various colonies on a temporary basis comes nearer to expressing my thought. We must, however, retain the right and continue the present practice of dealing directly with local French officials in the colonies whenever military advantage to the Allied cause so dictates. Martinique is an illustrative example.

Giraud's visit here was very successful. We kept it on a purely military basis and we are starting immediately to send additional equipment for his Army with every North African convoy.

As far as concerns the situation of the French Committee, what would you think of the following proposed statement to be made simultaneously to the French Committee on the part of the two Governments by Macmillan and Murphy?

"The Governments of the United States and Great Britain desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and territory from the oppressions of the enemy.

"Arrangements have been made with the French Commander-in-Chief in North and West Africa for continuing the cooperation of the French armed forces under his control. The two Governments will cooperate with the French Committee of National Liberation on other matters of mutual interest on the understanding that the Committee was conceived and will function, on the principle of collective responsibility of all members of the Committee, for the prosecution of the war and not for the promotion of factional movements.

"They desire to make clear, however, the following two conditions:

"(1) That the constitution and government to be established for France must be determined by the French people after they shall have been afforded an opportunity freely to express themselves.

"(2) That the relationship with the Committee will be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders in the prosecution of the war."

ROOSEVELT

851T.51/28: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1943—6 p. m.

1367. For Murphy. Refer BOC airgram 67⁷⁷ and Dakar's 374, June 20.⁷⁸ The failure of our efforts so far to get the French to adopt and enforce adequate economic warfare controls obliges us to consider what further steps should be taken, and what the nature and character of those steps should be. We feel strongly that some further steps must be taken to get the French themselves to control this important phase of the conduct of our Allied effort against the Axis. If however they themselves are unprepared to cooperate in this matter we must give consideration to filling in the gap with appropriate measures of our own, such as the extension of our blacklists⁷⁹ to French North and West Africa. American and British blacklists, instituted prior to their entry into the war, are still maintained in Allied countries in South America.

⁷⁷ Not found in Department files.

⁷⁸ Not printed.

⁷⁹ Reference here is to the Proclaimed List. The original proclamation was made by President Roosevelt on July 17, 1941, and entitled *The Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals*; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 19, 1941, pp. 41-43. The Proclaimed List was designed to control rigidly the export of specified articles to those persons named on the List, in the interests of maintaining the security of the United States. The List was to be published in the *Federal Register* with additions and deletions, as circumstances required. For correspondence concerning the List, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. vi, pp. 268 ff.; *ibid.*, 1942, vol. v, pp. 280 ff.

Before we make further threats such as that contained in your note of April 20 to Couve de Murville¹ we must decide in advance that continued failure in this matter on the part of the French will be followed by the carrying out of this threat. We would like to have your estimate of whether a further threat will accomplish our purpose and also possible French reaction if we take steps of our own, and if adverse, the extent to which the resentment might be extended to other fields. The British view is that in the absence of a showing that French failure to carry out effective controls results in a real detriment to the war effort, we should not risk arousing French resentment with possible repercussions on issues of much greater importance.

Please telegraph your views and recommendations which we will wish to have even though Couve de Murville should come to Washington as suggested in your 1247, July 10.²

HULL

851.01/2600 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, July 31, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received August 1—10:20 p. m.]

1349. For the Under Secretary from Murphy. As you know we have had no indication over a period of days regarding whatever progress is being made toward recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. Today da Cunha, the Brazilian representative who has been most cooperative and has kept me closely advised regarding his Government's interest, tells me that the British Government recently proposed a formula of recognition to his Government

¹ Note not found in Department files. Maurice Couve de Murville, secretary to General Giraud, was appointed Commissioner of Finance, French Committee of National Liberation, in June 1943.

² Not printed. Telegram No. 1354, July 31, midnight, from the Consul General at Algiers, sent a lengthy reply to this telegram (No. 1367) for the Secretary of the Treasury from Murphy and Harold Glasser of the Treasury Department, detailed to the staff of Mr. Murphy, discussing the economic warfare program. The most pertinent section concerning application of the Proclaimed List to French North and West Africa reads as follows: "We feel that the establishment of a proclaimed statutory list for this area would not contribute materially at this time to the economic warfare program of the Allies regarded as a whole. The real force of such action would seem to be on the side of making known to the world that we are not satisfied with the controls in this area. In view of the degree of cooperation with French administration in more important fields of activity, such publicity could not accomplish its objective, and while it would antagonize the French it would not likely have any desirable effect on their actions in the field. Any added controls which such a step would give us over communications and transactions would be trivial compared to what the French could do if they were interested in an effective program. The Proclaimed List technique by itself would not be effective . . ." (740.00112A European War, 1939/34466)

at Rio. Da Cunha states that his Government is in accord with the formula and apparently is so advising the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington.

There may be good reasons for creating an impression that the matter of recognition is being left to British initiative but from here it would appear that the American position is being gradually weakened as a result. There seems to be no doubt in the minds of the members of the Committee that we are responsible for the delay and of course, those elements which are not particularly friendly are encouraging the impression, which has gained some ground locally, that basically our policy is noncooperative and even unfriendly.

Many rumors of course are current. For example it is frequently heard that the United States intends to remain in North Africa indefinitely; that we are acquiring a lease hold on North African railways, buying up the post, radio and telegraph systems; dominating the market for textiles and other products for the purpose of excluding French industry after the war; and of course interfering in French internal politics. The importance of these rumors naturally should not be overemphasized in this area where gossip is particularly prevalent but we are taking steps to refute such assertions. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/2592 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, July 31, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received August 1—2: 35 p. m.]

1352. From Murphy. My 1345, July 30, 7 p. m.³ Agreement was reached by the Committee of National Liberation on the subject of the High Command and two decrees have been approved and published. The first of these amends the first article of the decree of June 3, 1943 (see annex to my A-36, June 11³) by providing that General Giraud will direct the discussions and be responsible for the execution of the Committee's decisions on matters relating to national defense and that General de Gaulle will exercise these functions as regards other activities and the general policy of the Committee.

The second decree provides that the Committee of National Liberation is responsible for the prosecution of the war and controls the land, sea and air forces. General Giraud is given command of all French forces. For any period when he is in operational command he will not exercise his duties as President of the Committee.

As Commander-in-Chief and within the framework of directives from the Committee of National Liberation and the Committee of

³ Not printed.

National Defense (see below) Giraud is charged with the organization, administration and maintenance of the forces and of the allocation of the French forces to the various theaters of operation. He will participate with the Inter-Allied High Command in the establishment of plans of operation. He will direct and control the formation and instruction of units with a view to their utilization as provided either by Inter-Allied plans operation or by defense and security requirements. He will allocate armaments.

An Assistant Commissioner of National Defense is appointed to assist General Giraud on organizational and administrative matters but he will only have a consultative voice in the discussions of the Committee of National Liberation.

A Committee of National Defense is created to prepare general provisions relating to the allocation of French forces in the different theaters of operation and to plan measures necessary to insure fusion of the forces. It will discuss general plans of organization and armament. The committee will include [de Gaulle as President, Gir]aud, the Assistant Commissioner of National Defense, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Land, Sea, and Air Forces. General Le Gentilhomme, at present Governor of Madagascar, has been appointed Assistant Commissioner of National Defense; General Leyer as Chief of Staff of the Land Forces; with General Koenig as his Deputy Chief of Staff; Rear Admiral Lemmonier as Chief of Staff of the Navy; with Auboyneau as Deputy; and Bouscat as Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

Massigli in informing me of the Committee's decision adopting the foregoing text claims that this is a happy solution from every point of view. He states that Giraud is satisfied, that de Gaulle wanted more than he is getting and that the majority of the Committee believe that the formula adopted is a practical and satisfactory solution. Massigli declares that the immediate fusion of French forces under the unified command will follow and that the ensemble fortifies Giraud's military position.

The Committee's further action in adopting the plan under which Giraud will preside at meetings of the French Committee of National Liberation which are devoted to military subjects and de Gaulle at sessions relating to general subjects is a compromise which was adopted after a long argument by de Gaulle that he should become the sole President of the Committee because consistent work could not be done under a Siamese set up.

Massigli as his associate and Secretary of Foreign Affairs followed this exposé with a strong plea that we take prompt action to recognize the French Committee of National Liberation on the ground that we had now every guarantee of the integrity of Giraud's command, which is fortified by the appointment of his nominees as Chief of Staff, the

Committee's collective control of acts of individuals in the Committee as well as of cooperation of the Allies in the prosecution of the war.

Giraud who was visibly relieved to have finished with the past 5 days of wrangling discussed the foregoing decisions with me late this afternoon. He asks that the President be informed that he considers that his military position has been strengthened and that he is satisfied that his authority over all French forces—land, sea and air is definitely established. The fusion of these forces will be developed in a manner best adopted to the prosecution of the war even if some individual ambitious of certain officers may be disappointed. Giraud is content he says with the provision that during intervals when he may be absent in the field in command of troops that de Gaulle preside the meetings of the Committee regardless of the subject matter. He is also satisfied with the composition of the Committee of National Defense. I asked him particularly about General Le Gentilhomme who becomes Assistant Commissioner of National Defense. Giraud expressed his approval stating that in London recently he had a very satisfactory talk with Le Gentilhomme and finds himself in accord with the latter's views. Giraud is also very pleased with the selection of the three Chiefs of Staff for Land, Sea and Air. The selection of young Admiral Lemmonier who has cooperated with us so ably at Algiers since last November as Chief of Staff of the Navy is particularly satisfactory. Admiral Collinet who was contemplated originally for this place but who roused general opposition in the Committee by misplaced criticism of several of its members will resume his command at Dakar.

Giraud asked also that the President be informed that in his opinion our Government would be justified now in granting an appropriate form of recognition to the French Committee of National Liberation. Such timing of recognition would signalize our interest in the military factor and mark our approval of Giraud's confirmation as commander of all French forces. I recommend sympathetic and prompt consideration of Giraud's suggestion. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.01/8-343 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁵

399. I am sorry not to have answered your telegram No. 321⁶ in reply to my telegram No. 373.⁷ I thought first that your proposed

⁵ This copy of telegram was sent by the British Minister (Campbell) to the Secretary of State on August 3. Minor corrections were made from copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁶ July 22, p. 175.

⁷ July 21, p. 173.

formula was rather chilling and would not end the agitation there is for recognition in both our countries. Meanwhile events have moved in our favour. The Committee have felt acutely being ignored while the whole Italian problem is open. De Gaulle, I feel, has climbed down a good deal and is now more enclosed in the general body of the Committee. The arrangements for Command also seems more satisfactory to us than the previous deadlock.

2. I have therefore asked the Foreign Office to suggest a certain modification in your formula designed to bring our two views into harmony. Please note especially the sentence "The Committee will of course afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war." This gives us complete power to override or break with them in the event of bad faith or misconduct. Revised formula follows in my next.⁸ Please let me know what you think of it or how it could be improved. If we cannot agree we will talk it over at QUADRANT.⁹

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ¹⁰

[WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1943.

343. Referring to your numbers 399¹¹ and 400,¹² I earnestly hope that nothing will be done in the matter of recognition of the Committee of National Liberation until we have an opportunity to talk it over together.

ROOSEVELT

851.01/2600 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1943—4 p. m.

1430. For Murphy from the Under Secretary. The exchange of views between ourselves and the British on the matter referred to in your 1349 of July 31 continue. Our formula was transmitted by the President to the Prime Minister on July 22.¹³ An effort is now

⁸ Telegram No. 400, August 3, not printed.

⁹ Code name for the conference between the Combined Chiefs of Staff, President Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Churchill at Quebec, August 11-24, 1943. Documentation regarding this conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

¹⁰ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹¹ *Supra*.

¹² Not printed.

¹³ See telegram No. 321, July 22, 12:25 p. m., from President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister, p. 175.

being made to expedite agreement between the two Governments which we sincerely hope can be accomplished in the near future. [Welles.]

HULL

851.01/2252a

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1943.

The British Embassy has handed us a copy of Mr. Churchill's messages to you, nos. 399¹⁴ and 400¹⁵ of August 3, concerning a possible formula to govern our future relations with the French Committee of National Liberation.

We have endeavored to harmonize the formula which you sent to Mr. Churchill on July 22¹⁶ with the latest Foreign Office formula, preserving the essential parts of each. A copy of our suggested draft is attached.¹⁷

We have assumed that this Government has undertaken to equip a French army of approximately 300,000 men to serve, in the first instance, under the direct orders of General Giraud and, in the final analysis, under the orders of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. We likewise assume that this undertaking on our part was predicated on the understanding that General Giraud would have the final word with respect to the French forces which we are arming and that in military matters General Giraud would be the sole responsible French authority with whom the two Governments would deal with respect to the French armed forces.

You are of course aware that on July 31 the French Committee of National Liberation issued a new decree providing in part for the creation of a Committee of National Defense under the chairmanship of General de Gaulle and subject to the "directive" of the main Committee. The question of whether or not the present personnel of the Committee of National Defense is satisfactory appears to be irrelevant since its members are apparently subject to change at any time by the French Committee of National Liberation (which is of course dominated by de Gaulle). A copy of the communiqué from Algiers concerning the new set-up, as reported in the *New York Times* of August 1, is attached herewith.¹⁸

Although General Giraud has informed Mr. Murphy that he is fully satisfied with the new set-up we have no knowledge as yet of

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 181.

¹⁵ Not printed.

¹⁶ See telegram No. 321, July 22, 12:25 p. m., from President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister, p. 175.

¹⁷ Not attached to the file copy of memorandum.

¹⁸ Not reprinted.

General Eisenhower's opinion. It is our view that General Giraud has lost further ground and in view of the well-known attitude of General de Gaulle and his followers toward this country we feel it essential in our dealings with the Committee to make a clear-cut distinction between military and other questions. This distinction was not at all clear in the latest British formula which appears to us as being the same for all practical purposes as their formula of July 8.

You will also have noted that in spite of your telling the Prime Minister that you objected to the use of the word "recognition" in any form, the British have come right back with the same phrase.

In our draft we have omitted the British reference to the Committee's position in the Levant and they may wish to handle this separately with the French. We likewise consider it wise to omit reference to past agreements, since we do not know what agreements the British may have made with the Fighting French. This question can be taken up with the French under the general terms of our proposed declaration.

You may be interested in the attached note¹⁹ left with us jointly by General Bethouart of the French Military Mission and Mr. Baudet of the Fighting French Delegation concerning the Committee's interest in being consulted in connection with Italian developments.

I am furnishing a copy of our latest revision of the formula to the War Department for its comment with respect to the safeguarding of the position of our military command.

If the formula is approved by the British we would wish, if possible, to postpone publication for a few days in order to notify the Soviet, Canadian, and certain other interested Governments of our intentions.

851.01/2811b : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers
(Wiley)

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1943—4 p. m.

1552. Personal for Murphy from the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State in Quebec has instructed me to convey to you the following terms of the announcement to be made public in the morning press here of August 27 regarding relations with the French Committee of National Liberation.²⁰ Please transmit a communication con-

¹⁹ Not printed.

²⁰ President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were unable by means of correspondence and by their discussions at the First Quebec Conference to arrive at an agreement on the form of recognition to be given the Committee of National Liberation. Consequently, they agreed to issue separate statements, both of which were issued on August 26. For text of statement of the United Kingdom, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. vi, p. 669. Documentation on the First Quebec Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

taining the statement herein quoted to the appropriate authorities of the Committee on August 26. Please also arrange to concert your action with Macmillan, who will have the text of the statement to be made on the subject at the same time by the British Government:

"The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen, looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

"The Government of the United States, accordingly, welcomes the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is our expectation that the Committee will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the active prosecution of the war.

"In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders.

"The Government of the United States takes note, with sympathy, of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defense of French interests. The extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

"On these understandings the Government of the United States recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority.

"This statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States.

"It does constitute recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as functioning within specific limitations during the war. Later on the people of France, in a free and untrammelled manner, will proceed in due course to select their own government and their own officials to administer it.

"The Government of the United States welcomes the Committee's expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the Allies until French soil is freed from its invaders and until victory is complete over all enemy powers.

"May the restoration of France come with the utmost speed."

This is the result of agreement between some of the governments concerned to make announcement of relations with the Committee, each in its own terms. You are to regard this as most confidential until time of release.

BERLE

851.01/2832

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews)

[WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1943.

M. Baudet called this afternoon to renew an acquaintanceship from London and I handed him a copy of the President's announcement with regard to the French Committee of National Liberation. M. Baudet read it and seemed pleased. He said that he felt that the announcement provided a working basis for relations between the American Government and the Committee and he was glad the step had been taken. While his manner implied he would naturally have liked to see it go farther he offered no criticism either of its contents or wording. He remarked that of course the Committee had never asked to be recognized as a Government and did not expect such recognition.

In the course of the conversation he said that with regard to frozen French funds in this country the Algiers Committee felt that it had no right to touch them and hoped they would remain frozen pending establishment of a French Government after the liberation of his country.

M. Baudet also handed me a letter informing the Department of the change in his Delegation's status, namely that henceforth his office will be called the Delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation and that for the time being he will remain in charge. This action, the letter states, is based on instructions from the Committee.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

851.01/2758 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, August 26, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received August 27—12:44 a. m.]

1488. Personal for Secretary from Murphy. Your 1552, August 24, 4 p. m. In accordance with your instructions, terms of the announcement to be made in the morning press in USA of August 27 regarding relations with French Committee of National Liberation were delivered to Massigli at 3 p. m., August 26. I was accompanied by Macmillan who presented simultaneously terms of British announcement. Both were received by Massigli with satisfaction. We agreed to meet with representatives of the press at 6 p. m. this evening to answer such questions as may be practicable.

Massigli made no effort to conceal his pleasure over the result. He said of the American formula that he found it good, adequate and approved its leaving door open for future adjustments. It was apparent during a conversation with him and Bonnet which followed immediately that he intends to "sell" the formulas to his colleagues representing the result as a solid but flexible basis for cooperation. Massigli also said he is very happy to have received from Dunn through Bayens [*Barnes?*]²¹ a suggestion that his visit to Washington would be welcome. His visit came up in my subsequent conversation with de Gaulle, who after a moment's hesitation said, of course, he felt a trip by Massigli to Washington would be valuable and he fully approved. I interpret the hesitation as inspired by regret that he himself had not been invited. In my opinion, he yearns to see the USA.

Thereafter, Macmillan and I called on General Giraud and de Gaulle who had in interim been informed of text by Massigli. Both expressed satisfaction and pleasure over the manner in which this problem has been solved. Giraud does not take as tense a view of the present political phase as does de Gaulle and limited himself to an expression of contentment that this question has been regulated. The latter was obviously both pleased and relieved stating that present action would give added impulse to war effort, augment French confidence in future and insure happy relations between ourselves and the French.

De Gaulle also brought up subject of the eventual action of Soviet Union which both he and Massigli hope would be favorable. They said they had no intimation yet of character of recognition Soviets will accord or when Bogomolov²² will arrive in Algiers. De Gaulle took pains to intimate that while French Communists are cooperating fully in the effort to liberate France, he reserved opinion concerning their postwar aspirations and he indicated his purpose not to permit their domination of the country. He makes this point in almost every conversation I have with him.

Macmillan tells me Soviet text will closely follow the British.

Not a word of criticism or objection was spoken by anyone of the persons mentioned.

Sent to Department. Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

²¹ Presumably Maynard B. Barnes, Consul General at Dakar.

²² Alexander Efremovich Bogomolov, Russian Plenipotentiary Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation. On July 5 the Secretary of State advised the Soviet Chargé that Mr. Bogomolov's proposed visit to North Africa be postponed because of the delicate political situation and impending military operations. On August 14 the Secretary informed the Soviet Chargé that under existing circumstances the Allied Commander in Chief perceived no objections to the visit and that the United States Government would be glad to facilitate his visit.

851.01/2830

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1943.

Participants: Secretary of State Hull
 General M. E. Bethouart
 Mr. Philippe Baudet

General Bethouart and Mr. Baudet called at my request. I said to them that I had no business to take up at the moment but that I merely requested them to call in order that we might felicitate each other over the recent recognitions of the French Committee of National Liberation. I stated that I felt everything is propitious for greater teamwork and more effective cooperation than heretofore and that this gives me and my associates in this country special satisfaction. I said the one test will be the increasing unity of the French Committee behind the French people and the Allied cause and that with a steady increase of such unity there would be corresponding cooperation on the part of this and, I am sure, other governments. They expressed their pleasure in return and indicated their belief that relations would certainly improve.

One of them inquired about the money of the French Government that is now frozen. I replied that that would be kept in trust for the French Government when it is restored in proper form. I said that any question about small amounts for necessary expenses was a matter that could and would be taken up from time to time in the light of the particular facts in each instance.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

851.01/31743

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the American Representative to the Political-Military Commission at Algiers (Wilson)*²³

[ALGIERS,] November 10, 1943.

I had a long talk last night with General de Gaulle. I began it by saying that there seemed to be some misunderstandings between Algiers and Washington, which ought to be cleared up. General de Gaulle asked: "You think they are only misunderstandings?" I replied: "Yes, I think they are only misunderstandings; what do you think they are?" He said: "I have come to wonder whether it was not a matter of policy on the part of your Government." I asked him just what he meant concretely. He then said that it was hard for him to escape the conclusion that our Government and military

²³ Transmitted to the Department by Mr. Wilson in his letter of November 12 to the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews).

authorities have deliberately sought to keep him down, to put him in a subordinate place, and to support and build up other French leaders whom we preferred to deal with. He spoke of our continuing diplomatic relations with Pétain and Vichy, of our dealing with Darlan, and of the Peyrouton affair. I said that surely he must understand that our continuing relations with Pétain and Vichy had been a sound policy, as it had permitted us to prepare the landings in North Africa leading to the ultimate liberation of France. I said that I felt the misunderstandings were due in part to his failure to appreciate the fact that the United States Government and people are not thinking politically about France, but are thinking solely in terms of getting on with the war and defeating Hitler. I said that I felt there was a failure on the part of many people here in Algiers to understand our position, that the war against Hitler is only the first part of our war, and that after we have liquidated Hitler we must turn to the war against Japan. France has only one war—against Hitler. Our Government and people are thinking in terms of getting these two wars or two aspects of the one war over with as quickly as possible and getting our young men back to our country.

General de Gaulle said that he understood that it was reasons of military necessity which counseled our maintaining relations with Vichy, and our dealing with Darlan. He said, however, that he could never understand why we had not taken him into our confidence about the North African landings. He said that if we had told him of what we intended to do, that we were bringing Giraud to North Africa to help our war effort, then he, de Gaulle, would have understood and helped in every way possible. Instead of that, he said, he was kept in ignorance, and then after the military effort was over in North Africa, instead of limiting Giraud to his military role, we had tried to build Giraud up as a political leader and to relegate him, de Gaulle, to a secondary role. He insisted that this was what we had done, stating that at the meeting at Anfa, Giraud had become convinced that he would be supported by the United States as the leader of the French, and that when he, de Gaulle, had then proposed to Giraud an arrangement for the French Committee under which de Gaulle would be the political head and Giraud in control of the army, Giraud had refused. It was only now, today, General de Gaulle said, that Giraud had at last been brought to accept the fact that he could not continue as a political co-president of the Committee and at the same time be the head of the armed forces (the Committee was reorganized this afternoon).^{23a} General de Gaulle said that Giraud was a great

^{23a} During the French Committee of National Liberation session of November 6, 1943, a decision was reached that all commissioners would resign in order that a new list of members could be drawn up. By a decree of November 9 General de Gaulle became the sole President and the new membership of the Committee was designated.

military leader, but should remain exactly that. He said that he had been glad to turn over to Giraud's command all the troops who had once been his, de Gaulle's.

General de Gaulle said that at one of President Roosevelt's press conferences the President had stated that General Giraud commanded 300,000 troops and he, de Gaulle only 12,000. He said that this was not entirely exact, since he then had about 100,000, but that apart from this the evident intention and effect of the statement had been to play him down and to build up Giraud.

General de Gaulle said that when Archbishop Spellman visited him here, the Archbishop, who gave the impression that he was speaking for President Roosevelt, had proposed to de Gaulle that the latter accept a secondary role under Giraud. I expressed doubts of this, saying that I felt that General de Gaulle must have misunderstood what the Archbishop said. General de Gaulle replied that on the contrary the Archbishop had been very clear and had used the illustration that as Eisenhower was the Commanding General and Alexander²⁴ accepted an important but secondary role under him, so de Gaulle should accept a secondary role under Giraud.

I caught up an inference General de Gaulle had made that it was feared that when our troops landed in France we might deal with Vichy on some plea of military expediency. I said that I was astounded that he should make such an inference. I stated that I was convinced that the only dealings we would have with Vichy would be to liquidate it. I said that he might be interested to know what Secretary of State Hull had said to me a few days ago on returning from the Moscow Conference when I mentioned to him that this fear seemed to exist in some quarters. Mr. Hull had replied: "That is preposterous. The chance of that is zero, simply zero." General de Gaulle said that this fear did exist, there had been the Darlan and Peyrouton incidents, our support of Giraud which to many meant an ultimate deal with Vichy, etc., but he was greatly interested and relieved at what I had said.

I asked General de Gaulle how he saw the situation in France after liberation as regards the setting up of French governmental authority. He replied that it was of course difficult to prophesy, but since I had asked the question he would give me frankly his views. He said that upon liberation of sections of French territory, members of the resistance groups, who are numerous and well-organized, would appear and undoubtedly play an important role. He said that as French territory is cleared and the Allied Armies get to Paris or some other large city, he and the members of the French Committee would go to France "unless you (the United States) forbid it", that he was con-

²⁴ Gen. Sir Harold R. L. Alexander, British military leader in North Africa.

vinced that there would be wide-spread support for him, that steps would be taken to set up a provisional government representing all major French political groups, and that this provisional government would be in power until the war prisoners and enforced laborers could be brought back from Germany and elections held freely by the French people for a National Assembly to decide the future government of France. It would be for the people to decide, he said, who would be the head of this government, it might be him, de Gaulle, it might be anybody else the people wanted. He said that he hoped that at the time of setting up the provisional government, outstanding political leaders like President Lebrun, Herriot, and Jeanneney, would come forward and support the provisional government to give it as great an appearance of legality as possible.

General de Gaulle said that he hoped very much that the United States would not seek to restrain him from going to France at the time that French territory was liberated, since he felt that unless prompt action was taken to establish order, matters would drift into civil war. He said that prompt action would be necessary above all to prevent the Communists from seizing control. I remarked that this seemed to be another of the misunderstandings, as I could not see how he could believe that the United States would prevent him or any other French political leader from returning to France.

General de Gaulle said something of his movement, *Gaullisme*. He said that he himself was a symbol for resistance. That the French people have gone through a terrible period of defeat and suffering, that it has affected them all, and that resistance is the one thing that all loyal Frenchmen are interested in. He himself has stood for resistance from the beginning, it is this that gives him his strength. He said that it is his belief that France cannot return to the same system of weak, corrupt governments which it had before the war. This simply would not be good enough after all the suffering. France will have a republic and a democratic form of government, but the government will be stronger. These, he said, were his ideas, but the people of France will decide.

I said that, speaking of misunderstandings, there is one which existed in the minds of some people, and that was that he intended to make himself a dictator and to rule France by personal power. He smiled and asked whether anyone who knew the French people believed that they would accept a dictator. He said that when he came to Algiers he was accompanied by only three or four people. He has no military forces, he has no naval forces. The armed forces are under the control of General Giraud. He said that that did not look to him very much like a dictator.

General de Gaulle spoke briefly of the provisional Consultative Assembly. He said that many of its members had recently come from

France, belong to resistance groups, and are extreme in their views. He said he thought the Assembly would be a good opportunity to work off pent-up emotions. He felt that gradually the Assembly would become more moderate and prove a useful organization.

EDWIN C. WILSON

851T.01/70

*The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in French West Africa (Glassford) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)*²⁵

DAKAR, November 16, 1943.

[Received November 30.]

DEAR DUNN: Pursuant to our conversation when recently you passed through Dakar, in regard to clarification of my situation in French West Africa, I should like very much to record here as an *aide-mémoire* for you the substance of my views as then expressed and with which I felt you agreed in principle.

I should like to say to you first of all that it was my understanding when I left Washington in June that I was to regard the eventual building up of Dakar as one of the prime United Nations strategic strongholds as the objective of my mission. Further I understood that I should not discuss the matter or enter into negotiations with the French until further instructed. It was intimated to me in no uncertain terms that Dakar itself should be taken over eventually by the United Nations to be administered by the United States, as a delegate of the United Nations. The French were to move to St. Louis, about one hundred miles to the northward on the coast.

Lacking further instructions I must conclude of course that the desire that I take no action remains unaltered. At the same time it is quite possible, in my view, that progressive developments since last June, culminating in the recent crystalization of all authority in a civil Committee of Liberation have served to emphasize the fact in Washington that the French are determined to maintain their sovereignty throughout the Empire at all costs. At the present time the sovereignty of France can be exercised only in the Colonies, a fact which renders the French jealous and suspicious with respect to their overseas possessions and correspondingly complicates the position of a representative of the President in one of their colonies who, by force of circumstance must conceal the purpose of his mission.

In my judgment, based on experience gained in Africa, especially since the advent of the De Gaulle regime, the activities of which have confirmed in my view that the French will brook no outside inter-

²⁵ Telegram No. 50, February 12, 1944, 7 p. m., to the Consul General at Dakar conveyed the reply from Dunn to Glassford that the contents of this letter had been discussed with Barnes while the latter was in Washington; Barnes was to report to Glassford in detail on his return to Dakar (851T.01/70b).

ference in the administration of their colonies but will fight for their sovereignty over them if necessary, the time has come when full realization must be given to the desirability of inducing the French themselves to create out of Dakar the military stronghold envisaged by the United Nations, the latter assisting the French as our partner in this project, as may be convenient and necessary to the French.

If such could be our announced policy, then I could come out into the open with my French colleagues here in French West Africa in the well defined role of representing the President in implementing our share of the United Nations' joint effort to help the French make of Dakar the military strategic point desired. Surveys could be made at once by the French with such assistance as we could give them and which I feel they would welcome especially with respect to more modern methods, installations and equipment. The military, naval and air establishments and defenses could be determined in accordance with actual United Nations and French requirements. Plans could be submitted at once and their implementation started as soon as Allied more important commitments elsewhere permitted.

This is to my mind briefly the logical procedure for us to pursue in our relations here with the French. I trust that these views will meet with approval and that I may be instructed in response to them with as little delay as possible.

Already I have expressed to the President the gradual lessening of American prestige here due in most part to our unsatisfactory economic relations and dealings with the French in A.O.F. up to about a month ago. These however have much improved since then. I know that my own unclarified overall situation is being discussed by the French authorities whose logical thinking I feel inclines them to regard this Mission with obvious suspicion. They are very intelligent and most astute. I feel very strongly that we must act at once to remedy this situation. The means to do so I firmly believe are set forth above.

With every good wish,
Sincerely,

GLASSFORD

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*²⁶

LONDON, 21 December, 1943.

513. 1. I am shocked at the arrests reported this morning of Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin. There are even rumours here that the

²⁶ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. This telegram and Churchill's telegram No. 517, dated December 23, 1943 (*post*, p. 196), were based on press reports. It subsequently became clear that the French Committee was not taking the extreme steps that the Prime Minister feared.

first two at any rate will be shot. I consider I have a certain obligation as, in supporting your policy and that of General Eisenhower, I did undoubtedly in Algiers in February²⁷ encourage these men to hold firm in their posts and aid us in our struggle for Tunis, saying also in that case, "Count on me". It seems to me the American obligation is even stronger because we were admittedly following (query) your general lines.

2. I trust, therefore, you will take what steps you can to impress upon the French Committee the unwisdom of their present proceedings. You, no doubt, will also be considering the question of offering asylum. Pray let me know if there is any way in which we could help.

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Eisenhower), to President Roosevelt*²⁸

[TUNIS,] December 22, 1943.

News of the arrest of Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin has just reached me at Advanced Headquarters in Italy where I am visiting the front. I have also only this minute received copy of the Prime Minister's message to the Foreign Secretary and the Resident Minister at Algiers expressing his concern at this action of the French National Committee. I am profoundly disturbed, particularly in the case of Boisson who acted for a time as my loyal subordinate. I have radioed Murphy of my conviction that if the Committee presses this affair to its probable conclusion it can only result in the most serious consequences. Smith is flying to Algiers tomorrow morning and will confer with Murphy and Macmillan.

851.01/3299a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1943—9 p. m.

211. For Wilson.²⁹ The President directs that the following message which he has sent to General Eisenhower³⁰ should be repeated to you for your information:

²⁷ Regarding Prime Minister Churchill's arrival in Algiers, see telegram No. 153, February 6, 6 p. m., from the Consul General at Algiers, p. 48.

²⁸ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. This telegram was dispatched via War Department channels from an advanced Command Post near Tunis.

²⁹ Edwin C. Wilson, American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers.

³⁰ The message had been sent to Algiers for General Eisenhower as War Department telegram No. 5456, December 22.

“Please inform the French Committee as follows :

‘In view of the assistance given to the allied armies during the campaign in Africa by Boisson, Peyrouton, and Flandin, you are directed to take no action against these individuals at the present time.’

Keep the Prime Minister informed. Roosevelt”

This message which was sent following the receipt of a telegram from Prime Minister Churchill³¹ has also been repeated to Mr. Churchill.³²

HULL

851.01/12-2243

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs
(Matthews)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 22, 1943.

I telephoned Admiral Leahy with regard to the message which the President desires to have transmitted to “Mr. Murphy”. I explained that Murphy was now concerned only with Italian problems³³ and Admiral Leahy concurred that the message should go to Mr. Wilson instead.³⁴

I also referred to the reference to Flandin in the message to General Eisenhower and said that as I recalled it Flandin had not been of assistance to our people at the time of the landings or subsequently; that on the contrary his efforts to get into the picture had been somewhat embarrassing to Bob Murphy and me at the time. The Admiral said that he had a similar impression but that Flandin had been included because he had been mentioned specifically in the message received from Prime Minister Churchill. He then read me a paraphrase of the pertinent portion of Mr. Churchill’s telegram to the President. It ran about as follows :

“I am shocked about the arrest of Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin. There are rumors even that the first two may be shot. I feel that I have an obligation toward them for what they did for us. I did encourage these men to hold firm at the time of our struggle in Tunisia. It seems to me that the American obligation is even stronger since

³¹ No. 513, December 21, p. 193.

³² Telegram No. 423 from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, in addition to the message quoted above, expressed the hope that Mr. Churchill was in full agreement with the directive to General Eisenhower and would so inform Eisenhower and Macmillan. The final paragraph of this telegram read as follows: “It seems to me that this is the proper time effectively to eliminate the Jeanne D’Arc complex and to return to realism. I too am shocked by the high handed arrests at this time.”

³³ Robert D. Murphy had become United States Representative on the Advisory Council, Allied Control Commission for Italy, on November 22, 1943.

³⁴ See *supra*.

it was primarily an American operation under General Eisenhower. I hope that you will take what steps you can to protect them and even give them asylum if necessary."

Admiral Leahy said that it was in the light of the foregoing that the message was sent to General Eisenhower. The text was repeated to Prime Minister Churchill and the President added that he hoped the Prime Minister was in full agreement and would so inform General Eisenhower and Macmillan. The President added that he thought the time had come to eliminate de Gaulle and to give the Committee a sense of the realities of the situation. The Admiral said he hoped General Eisenhower would take strong action since he felt that the General as Allied Commander-in-Chief had both the power and the authority to act. I remarked as regards the latter that the French would presumably take the viewpoint that while the General's authority unquestionably extended to all matters connected with the prosecution of the war they would consider other questions internal ones to be handled by them. The Admiral remarked that he was not sure himself of just what the legal situation was but he felt the time for action was overdue.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*³⁵

LONDON, 23 December, 1943.

517. 1. I have signalled my colleagues that I am in entire agreement with your No. 423³⁶ about the arrests and have every expectation that instructions will be given to Macmillan to support your action. The actual form of the *démarche* might be discussed by Eisenhower with Macmillan and Wilson.

2. Our case is a very strong one. Boisson saved us the cost and diversion of a major expedition against Dakar. Peyrouton returned voluntarily at the invitation of Giraud and his journey was approved and facilitated by the State Department. Flandin was, it is true, a Minister at Vichy and was turned out for his opposition to the German demands. Notably he prevented an expedition from Dakar being sent to attack the Free French near Lake Chad.

3. But far above individuals, the whole question of our relations with France is raised. France can only be liberated by British and American force and bloodshed. To admit that a handful of émigrés are to have the power behind this all-powerful shield to carry civil

³⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

³⁶ See footnote 32, p. 195.

war into France is to lose the future of that unfortunate country and prevent the earliest expression of the will of the people as a whole, in fact, we should be lending ourselves to a process of adding to the burdens and sacrifices of our troops and of infringing our fundamental principle, "All governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."

*President Roosevelt to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Eisenhower)*³⁷

[WASHINGTON,] 26 December, 1943.

In view of developments in the situation since dispatch to you of the instructions included in AGWAR 5456,³⁸ it is desired that if not already delivered to the French Committee you withhold it and, subject to your discretion, deliver the following which expresses my views on the matter. If, in your judgement, the same ends can be obtained through informal discussions, formal presentation need not be made. In any event we must have formal assurance from the French Committee that no trials of these individuals will take place until the restoration of France is accomplished and then in accordance with the constitutional laws of the French Republic.

"In view of the assistance rendered the Allied Armies during the North African campaign by Peyrouton, Boisson and Flandin the United States Government views with alarm reports reaching it to the effect that these gentlemen have been charged with high treason. If, in view of the charges made, it is necessary that these individuals should stand trial, their trials should not be held until after the liberation of France and the establishment of constitutional government."

ROOSEVELT

851.01/3292 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 29, 1943—noon.

[Received 3 : 52 p. m.]

276. For President. My 245, December 23,³⁹ and your cable to General Eisenhower from AGWAR number 5752, December 26.⁴⁰

³⁷ This message was sent to Algiers as War Department telegram No. 5752; copy obtained from the Department of the Army files.

³⁸ See footnote 30, p. 194.

³⁹ Not printed.

⁴⁰ *Supra.*

I have told Massigli that as he had doubtless inferred the arrests of these three persons had in fact caused the strongest reaction in Washington and London and that instructions of a serious nature had been received. I said in view of information he had furnished in our informal discussions as to manner in which French Committee proposed to deal with these cases, it had been possible for the moment to delay action on these instructions. I said, however, action could not be delayed much longer and that in my judgment the only solution of this question would be for him to furnish without delay definite assurances from French Committee that (1) trials of these individuals will not be held until after liberation of France and establishment of constitutional government and, (2) meanwhile, these individuals will be held under conditions which are not of a prison regime and that they will live under such conditions as will afford proper food and care.

He said to me last night that he had reported our conversation (Macmillan had a similar one) to the Committee and that active consideration was now being given by their constitutional lawyers to the preparation of a decree which through granting the right of appeal in case a decision should be rendered by the examining magistrate that it was in order to proceed to trial, would enable the Committee in fact to defer the trial until after liberation of France and return to a constitutional government. He said that the difficulty they were encountering in this respect arose from the necessary separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. He said that while it was impossible in his judgment that the examining magistrate could in fact find it possible to proceed to trial, nevertheless in order to give the assurances requested, and since under existing practice the executive could not bind the judiciary, it would be necessary to enact some new provision under which the French Committee could intervene and prevent the trial.

As regards the second point he told me that the Commissioner for War ⁴¹ was now engaged in locating and furnishing a proper residence on the outskirts of Algiers where these three men would live under satisfactory conditions.

Massigli said that he hopes shortly to be in a position to furnish the assurance requested.

I might add, with reference to my 245, that the Committee has already issued decree which Massigli assured me they would do, in the sense of conferring authority upon the examining magistrate to rule that the trial may be postponed until after liberation of France.

WILSON

⁴¹ André le Troquer.

851.01/3299 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation. (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 31, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

291. For the President and the Secretary. I had a talk with General de Gaulle yesterday afternoon in which we discussed at length the case of Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin. He was familiar with the various conversations [apparent omission]. I impressed upon him that action on the very serious instructions which had been received could not be delayed much longer and urged him to give assurance in the sense desired. He said to me that he hoped we would not insist upon a written assurance since he believed we must realize that it would be impossible for the Committee to state in writing that it would bind judiciary not to take a certain course of action. He then said speaking deliberately and measuring each word the following which I give in translation: "I state to you that the examining magistrate will not be able to assemble the necessary elements on which he would be in position to decide whether or not a trial should take place until after the liberation of France. Furthermore I say to you that the Commissioner for War is at present searching for a residence on the outskirts of Algiers in which these three men while regarded as being in prison will in fact live under proper conditions with proper care, food and an opportunity for exercise."

He then repeated the foregoing to me in exactly the same words.

I said to him that he would expand the statement that he had just made that these trials would not take place until after the liberation of France so as to cover not only the period up to the liberation of France but until the establishment of a constitutional government in France. He replied, "It is the intention of the Committee as you know to place its resignation in the hand of the consultative assembly to be elected as soon as possible after the liberation of France; [apparent omission] bind the Committee beyond the date upon which it ceases to exist, but I say to you that my statement that the trials will not take place until after the liberation of France means that they will not take place before the French Committee resigns its powers."

I strongly urge that these statements of General de Gaulle be accepted as satisfactory assurances in the matter. It seems to me evident that we cannot expect the French Committee to go on record in writing that it will control the judiciary.

I have this morning informed General Eisenhower of the foregoing. He stated that in his opinion these statements of General de Gaulle should be accepted as satisfactory assurances and that he would cable you to this effect.

I have also informed Macmillan who likewise held the view that these assurances are satisfactory and he is recommending to the Prime Minister and to his Government that they be so regarded.

I should appreciate your instructions.⁴²

WILSON

851.01/3397 : Telegram

The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in French West Africa (Glassford) to the Secretary of State

DAKAR, January 27, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 9:05 p. m.]

52. For the President and the Secretary of State. Monsieur Pleven, Commissioner of Colonies on the French Committee of National Liberation, who arrived in Dakar last Tuesday with General de Gaulle, called on me yesterday and spoke frankly of the case of ex-Governor General Boisson, who is now under arrest at Algiers.

Pleven stated at the outset that the Comité fears and must guard against civil war in the Metropole; and that the arrest and prospective trial of Boisson and other individuals is purely a political move designed, together with other political measures, to check the current fully recognized trend toward violent civil disturbance in France. According to Pleven, the French of the Metropole hold that Boisson, as Governor General of AOF, a position of great responsibility and corresponding authority, deeply wronged his country by: (1) The example set by his early adherence to Vichy (2) his subsequent intransigence, especially in September, 1940, when (3) he was the first Frenchman to open fire on his countrymen, a fact which Pleven said his people will never forget or condone.⁴³

It will be necessary according to Pleven, for Boisson to give an accounting of these actions and added that he (Pleven) shared the opinion with many others that Boisson, after his removal, erred politically in not demanding at once that he be tried before a Court of Honor.

Pleven assured me that there is no personal feeling against Boisson either on his part or on the part of de Gaulle. He stated that he

⁴² In telegram No. 15 to Algiers, January 1, 1944, midnight, the Secretary of State expressed his appreciation to Mr. Wilson for his skillful handling of such a delicate subject, indicating also his belief that the question appeared "to have been settled in the most satisfactory manner possible under all the circumstances." (851.01/3313c)

⁴³ Reference here is to the role of Governor General Boisson in opposing the unsuccessful attack upon Dakar by British and Free French Forces, September 23-25, 1940; see footnote 51, p. 145.

could "guarantee" a fair trial. He did not know when Boisson would be tried, but stated emphatically that it is the present intention of the Committee to require the courts to proceed in due course with his trial. Further it was stated that in the opinion of certain members of the Committee including himself, Boisson could not possibly hope to survive a trial by jury on metropolitan French soil after the liberation of France. Accordingly it was stated that the Committee was inclined, in the absence of a senatorial body, to order Boisson tried by a special court composed of high civil, military and naval officials. He could not of course predict what verdict such a court would reach but stated that in his opinion and in the opinion of other members of the Committee, a political sentence depriving him of his official rank of Governor General and denying to him future civil or military employment by the Government should satisfy the demands of the Metropole for justice. Pleven stated that he would himself be a damaging but reluctant witness against Boisson because of Boisson's order to try him in 1939. He added that de Gaulle had never uttered a word in condemnation of Boisson in spite of the fact that de Gaulle was repulsed at Dakar in 1940.

No action would be taken against General Barrau he said, who was Commander-in-Chief under Boisson when de Gaulle attempted to take Dakar, because Barrau simply carried out Boisson's orders.

Pleven told me that these were the views of General de Gaulle on this subject.

GLASSFORD

[As events prior to the end of 1943 had indicated, the relative importance of French West Africa declined more and more with the passage of time. In connection with his expressed desire that his mission be terminated, Vice Admiral Glassford was directed on April 1, 1944, to proceed to Washington for consultation (851T.01/76a). No record of these discussions has been found in Department files. On June 16, 1944, Secretary of State Hull in a memorandum to President Roosevelt recommended the withdrawal of Glassford, due to the latter's own expressed views on the decreasing importance of his post following General Eisenhower's departure from North Africa and also due to the Navy Department's lack of interest in Glassford's continuing in French West Africa (851T.01/6-1644). Subsequent to the President's approval, the diplomatic mission under Admiral Glassford was closed effective June 30, 1944, and the post at Dakar reverted to a Consulate General as of July 1, 1944 (851T.01/6-2344, 851T.01/7-144).]

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER METHODS USED BY THE
FREE FRENCH IN RECRUITING FRENCH SAILORS IN AMERICAN
PORTS

851.86/61a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1943—10 p. m.

839. Please ask Admiral Stark⁴⁴ to take up at once the following matter with the French National Committee. There are now in New York two North African French vessels, one a naval tanker and the other the merchant ship *Wyoming*. About 30 seamen from these vessels, of which about 25 were French naval ratings, have been recruited by the local Fighting French Recruiting Office in New York into Fighting French service, thereby taking the services of these men away from the North African French units concerned. This severely cripples the operation of the ships.

Please request that General de Gaulle⁴⁵ take immediate steps to correct this case and insure that no further recruiting of personnel of other services in the United Nations effort takes place.

For your information, the maritime United Nations have agreed here that no one of them would recruit or accept sailors from ships of the other, except with the specific consent of the representatives of the other, and of course recruiting of navy ratings is impossible. We have tacitly allowed recruiting by the Fighting French but if this practice is insisted on, the privilege would necessarily have to be reviewed.

Parallel representations are being made to the Fighting French Delegation here.

HULL

851.86/62 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, February 15, 1943—midnight.
[Received February 16—12:25 a. m.]

1174. In reply to representations made on the basis of the Department's 839, February 6, 10 p. m., Admiral Stark has just received from General de Gaulle a memorandum on the following lines:

The request to join the Fighting French made by some of the petty officers and sailors from the tanker *Lot* and steamship *Wyoming*

⁴⁴ Adm. Harold R. Stark, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

⁴⁵ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French National Committee in London.

was welcomed, as are all requests of this nature. The action of these men was entirely spontaneous since Monsieur Tixier⁴⁶ forbade the recruiting service to carry on any propaganda among the crews of the *Lot* and *Wyoming* or to make contact with them outside of the quarters of the Free French Delegation. These men told Tixier that they could not remain under the command of officers who made them fight against their American allies and who, when the ships left Casablanca, had not told them the truth. Fighting France under these conditions was not in a position to refuse a welcome to Frenchmen who desired to assume their national obligations in its ranks. The Fighting French National Committee believes it is morally impossible to ask the American authorities to reinstate these sailors in their previous employment and thus expose them to serious punishment as a result of their decision to give expression, in the only manner left to them in the absence of legal French authority, to their fulfillment of duty as Frenchmen. It may be mentioned that they were not bound by any undertaking to the Free French to serve in a military capacity. The National Committee assumes entire responsibility for the material inconveniences resulting from the recruitment of these sailors. It is of the belief that a settlement must be arrived at by direct arrangement between Fighting France and the French North African authorities. Mission being sent to Algiers will be charged to give this matter its immediate attention.

In a further communication to General de Gaulle Admiral Stark has pointed out that the inability of the ships in question to sail, due to the recruitment of their crews by the Fighting French, might well cause serious embarrassment to the united war effort in North Africa. He took note of the fact that the French National Committee assumes full responsibility for the resulting material inconveniences and is making no effort to relieve the present situation or prevent a repetition of this incident. Admiral Stark stated he assumed the recruiting services granted at Admiral Auboyneau's request were accorded with the understanding that vital war needs would not be jeopardized by such recruiting. Admiral Stark declared he could not subscribe to the action taken by the Committee and urged reconsideration of the latter's attitude. He concluded he would be glad to inform the United States Government should the Committee be prepared, on further consideration, to subscribe to the American viewpoint and to send the necessary instructions to its recruiting officers.

MATTHEWS

⁴⁶ Adrien Tixier, Chief of the Free French Delegation at Washington.

851.86/63 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 16, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received February 16—2:25 p. m.]

1189. When Admiral Stark's representative delivered the further communication to General de Gaulle referred to in the Embassy's telegram No. 1174, February 15, 10 p. m. [*midnight*], to Palewski⁴⁷ yesterday morning, the latter reiterated the arguments contained in General de Gaulle's memorandum. He specifically stated that "General de Gaulle had not been consulted as to Allied arrangements with the French authorities in North Africa and refused to be bound by any agreement to which the French National Committee was not a party." He also reiterated that "it would be impossible to insist that the 30 seamen return to the *Lot* and *Wyoming* in New York in view of the punishment to which they would be unduly submitted for this display of their freedom as free Frenchmen to choose to serve with the forces really representative of France."

MATTHEWS

851.86/64 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 18, 1943—midnight.

[Received February 19—5:07 a. m.]

1278. In a second communication in reply to Admiral Stark's letter mentioned in my 1174, February 15, 10 p. m. [*midnight*], General de Gaulle states that "in contradiction with what you seem to suggest," the National Committee cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the personnel from the *Lot* and *Wyoming* joining Fighting France since this act was "entirely spontaneous" and "was inspired by profound reasons". De Gaulle says however he does not wish to see these ships immobilized which should be used in the service of France and makes the suggestion that as a first measure men and ratings to complete the crews of the *Lot* and *Wyoming* might be provided from units of the French Fleet recently arrived in New York which he points out will be necessarily out of service for a long period. De Gaulle further declares the National Committee would be prepared to place on board the *Lot* and *Wyoming* a detachment of petty officers and sailors, commanded by an officer and sufficient to complete the crews and allow the sailings. Such personnel would be drawn from naval effectives

⁴⁷ Gaston Palewski, member of General de Gaulle's staff at London.

now at St. Pierre. On arrival in North Africa they would be released and returned to England on the assumption that French personnel would be available in North Africa.

Admiral Stark would appreciate being informed as soon as possible if we are willing to accept de Gaulle's offer to provide a Fighting French naval detachment to complete the crews of the *Lot* and *Wyoming* under the conditions above indicated, a suggestion which, it seems to me, might lead to trouble among the crews.

Admiral Stark has been informed that in British ports similar incidents have occurred, resulting from desertions to join Fighting France from sailors of North African ships. A Fighting French recruiting officer was in fact arrested but subsequently released with the warning that he should refrain from recruiting such deserters. On February 13 British services concerned agreed on prompt action and, for the information of American authorities confronted with a similar problem, Admiral Stark was advised of the following steps being taken with respect to ships already in United Kingdom ports:

(1) Men on shore will be informed that they must remain with their ships, as British authorities will not permit them to join Fighting France and will deport deserters to North Africa.

(2) Any man refusing to return to their ships in spite of this warning would be forcibly returned if ships were still in port.

(3) British authorities would impress on masters of ships that there must be no victimization of men who intended to join de Gaulle but were persuaded to return voluntarily.

(4) Admiral Cunningham⁴⁸ would be asked to arrange to inform crews of all ships sailing for British ports that they would not be permitted to desert to Fighting France [on] arrival.

British security officers will in the future visit ships from French North African ports on arrival to explain the position above outlined. Ministry of War Transport hopes to announce shortly that crews of French ships from North Africa will henceforth receive British rates of pay as is now the case with the Free French merchant marine. This may remove one incentive for desertion as men at present think they will be better paid under the Fighting French.

British officials feel agreement between Free French and North African authorities would be the only long-term solution of this problem. They believe it may become serious when units of North African navy arrive for refueling. Each of the two French groups they say seeks to recruit, or is prepared to accept enlistments from vessels under control of the other group.

Admiral Stark has written General de Gaulle today again inviting attention to the responsibility of the National Committee regarding the enlistment of deserters of French ships from North Africa.

⁴⁸ Sir Andrew Cunningham, British Naval Commander.

Pointing out the danger of repetition of such incidents, he again asks de Gaulle to issue instructions to Fighting French representatives in the United States to refuse the enlistment in the United States of any such deserters. Should such instructions be issued, Admiral Stark suggests that steps similar to those adopted in British ports be taken to avoid punishment or victimization of men voluntarily returning to their ships after offering to join the Fighting French services.

MATTHEWS

851.86/66 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 20, 1943—midnight.

[Received February 21—4: 59 p. m.]

1328. Admiral Stark has been informed, with reference to the question dealt with in my 1278, February 18, midnight, that the French National Committee and British representatives have further discussed the problem arising from the recruiting of French personnel from North Africa for the Fighting French. The latter claim that the masters of certain French ships are anti-Allied and untrustworthy and hence that loyal French cannot serve under them. British security officials report that certain officers and ships from North Africa are in fact of doubtful loyalty. Foreign Office is reviewing the situation and will cable a report to the British Embassy in Washington. Palewski informed Stark's aide this morning that North African French Missions in Washington have opened recruiting stations and are actively soliciting from among the French in America volunteers to enroll in the land, air and sea forces under Giraud's⁴⁹ command. Palewski claims that a certain number of French in the United States who had contracted engagements with the Fighting French services have been solicited by Giraud's recruiting service and had been accepted. It is stated that for this reason the French National Committee hesitates, while Giraud's recruiting forces continue to solicit men of the Fighting French forces, to issue instructions to refuse recruits from the North and West African services.

MATTHEWS

⁴⁹ Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud, French High Commissioner of French North Africa.

851.86/64 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1943—8 p. m.

1161. Your 1278, February 18. Please inform Admiral Stark that Navy Department is not disposed to accept General de Gaulle's proposal of a Fighting French naval detachment.

The Navy Department proposes to adopt the same procedure in dealing with this problem as is now being followed by the British as outlined in your telegram under acknowledgment pending an agreement between Fighting French and North African authorities.

HULL

851.86/67 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, February 22, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received 10:36 p. m.]

1351. Fighting French officials have made further mention (my 1328, February 20, midnight) of the alleged recruiting by Giraud's military and naval representatives of French for service in North Africa and to the acceptance of persons already enrolled for service with Fighting French forces. Reference was made to a French news agency dispatch from Washington published in *Francegen* in London that Giraud's delegation is carrying out such recruiting with the agreement of the American authorities. Admiral Stark would like to know whether any such arrangements stipulate that Giraud's representatives should refuse to accept enlistments from persons who have previously signed enrollment in Fighting French forces.

MATTHEWS

851.86/66 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1943—midnight.

1209. Your 1328 February 20. We naturally are anxious to avoid any discrimination between the Fighting French and the representatives of the North African authorities in this matter and we would therefore be glad to receive information concerning any specific cases

which the French National Committee may wish to bring to our attention involving the recruiting of Fighting French personnel by General Giraud's representatives here.

HULL

851.86/69 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 25, 1943—midnight.

[Received February 25—11 : 59 p. m.]

1424. I communicated the Department's 1161, February 22, 8 p. m., to Admiral Stark who tells me that he has been informed by the authorities here that the procedure outlined in my 1278, February 18, midnight, has been modified after an exchange of telegrams with Lord Halifax⁵⁰ in accordance with the latter's suggestions. Seamen will not be forcibly returned to ships or deported to Africa, pending agreement between de Gaulle and Giraud. The new procedure authorizes enlistment of the Fighting French and transportation to England of seamen who refuse positively to serve under their present officers. It is claimed by British Security authorities that some of the officers in question "fired on Allied forces in November and are still rabidly pro-Axis and anti-British."

It is understood that Lord Halifax reported that this applies to the 40 seamen of the *Wyoming* and *Lotnowin*, Halifax, awaiting transport to England in accordance with General de Gaulle's request. The British are instructing Macmillan⁵¹ to urge on Giraud the importance of making an early recruiting agreement with de Gaulle and likewise of taking steps that no vessels sail for British or American ports with officers whose records might provoke the crews to desert.

Admiral Stark is of the opinion that it is advisable that both countries should follow the same procedure. He suggests that the Navy Department adopt the amended British procedure or propose changes to render this acceptable.

Repeated to Algiers.

MATTHEWS

⁵⁰ British Ambassador in the United States.

⁵¹ Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North Africa.

851.86/115

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*⁵²

[WASHINGTON,] March 2, 1943.

I refer to Algiers No. 3658, March 1st, 1943.⁵³ This is a request from Giraud that all possible action be taken to avoid repetition of the incidents occurring in connection with the steamers *Lot* and *Wyoming*. In these cases, sailors deserted the ships and endeavored to join the Free French forces. They were promptly accepted by the Free French recruiting station. The Free French insisted that they came of their own accord. The Giraud group insists they were recruited.

I should not be surprised to find that an exactly similar incident was in the making in connection with the crew of the battleship *Richelieu*. I am not convinced that the de Gaullists are altogether innocent in the matter. We already know that a de Gaullist agent has been in touch with certain members of the crew of the *Richelieu*, though it does not appear whether the crew members came to him or he went to them. Certainly the de Gaullists are not doing anything to discourage defection of the Giraud sailors.

Our chief interest in the matter ought to be the keeping of the ships in active operation; and cross recruiting, if continued, may immobilize the ships.

It is obvious that very little will be done by the de Gaullists to discourage desertion from the Giraud camp. It is equally obvious that, at least in the United States, the Giraud group cannot do very much to prevent desertion.

I think we should take two steps:

(1) Draft telegrams both to Algiers and to London, in the hope of securing agreement between General Giraud and General de Gaulle on a joint statement. This statement ought to be in the form of an order by each to his respective followers not to recruit from the other side or to accept recruits from the other side; and should stress the absolute necessity of keeping the fighting and transport units in strength and up-to-date. I think that the statement should also provide a method by which sailors can choose in which of the fleets they wish to serve, and provided they loyally continue to render service, transfers will be arranged by the two authorities.

(2) I think consideration should be given to a clear statement by this Government of its position in the matter. The statement presumably ought to be issued by the Navy. It ought to say, in substance, that we are fighting a common war against a common enemy; that the first interest of all of us is to see to it that the transport and fighting

⁵² Addressed to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Ather-ton) and to the Adviser on Political Relations (Duggan).

⁵³ Not found in Department files.

units are maintained in continuous operation; that, in consequence, it is considered of the highest importance that every sailor shall stick to his ship until further notice.

I am pretty clear that incidents of this kind will continue. The Breton sailors, as I am told, tend to support de Gaulle. Whether their complaints against the North African naval authorities are justified, I am not clear, and no doubt they have been exaggerated. Equally, it is quite probable that there is some basis for the idea that some of these officers are not too secure in their loyalty to the United Nations.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

851.86/118

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Know)

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received and considered your letter of March 3, 1943 (Serial No. 019913 (SC) P14-4/EF)⁵⁴ concerning recruiting in the United States by representatives of General de Gaulle and General Giraud.

I agree that this problem is a serious one for which a solution must be found. Obviously it serves the interests of the enemy for rival French factions to recruit members of the armed forces of other French factions. It is my earnest hope that an agreement may be reached between General de Gaulle and General Giraud under which all of the energies of the French will be directed toward the objective upon which all Frenchmen who love liberty can agree; that is the defeat of Germany. Pending such an agreement on a broad scale, it seems to me that the recruiting problem can, as suggested in your letter, best be met by an agreement between General de Gaulle and General Giraud to the effect that personnel having affiliations with other armed forces will not be accepted until the representative of the other Service concerned has been consulted and has given permission for such recruiting.

The Department of State will be glad to assist in every way at its disposal in urging the immediate conclusion of a recruiting agreement along the above-mentioned lines. I have been informally advised by the British Embassy that the British Government has made representations to General de Gaulle and General Giraud urging the conclusion of a recruiting agreement at once.

Your letter of March 3, 1943, proposes that pending the conclusion of a recruiting agreement between General de Gaulle and General Giraud, the American Government stop the recruiting of all French personnel in the United States. Title 18, Section 22, of the United

⁵⁴ Not printed.

States Code makes it unlawful for any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to hire or retain another person to enlist or enter himself in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district or people as "a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer". The penalty may be a fine of not more than \$1,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than three years. There is a proviso to the section stating that it shall not apply to citizens or subjects of any country engaged in war with a country with which the United States is at war, unless such citizen or subject of such foreign country shall hire or solicit a citizen of the United States to enlist or go beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to enlist or enter the service of a foreign country. Enlistments under the proviso "shall be under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War".

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES

851.86/71 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 5, 1943—midnight.

[Received March 6—8:30 a. m.]

1616. With further regard to the recruitment of French merchant seamen (my 1424, February 25, midnight) Admiral Stark wrote Massigli⁵⁵ on February 27 (*a*) he would appreciate knowing whether instructions had been sent to Fighting French representatives in the United States to discontinue recruiting men from French crews from North Africa pending negotiations with General Giraud; (*b*) that the United States Navy Department is taking steps similar to those adopted by British authorities in United Kingdom ports and hopes for cooperation from the Fighting French in making these measures effective and (*c*) the American Government authorities would appreciate receiving information concerning specific cases of Fighting French servicemen being recruited by French North African representatives (Department's 1209, February 24, midnight).

Under date of March 3, Massigli wrote Admiral Stark that the French National Committee maintains the principles guiding its action as defined in de Gaulle's letters communicated in my 1174, February 15, 10 p. m. [*midnight*] and 1278 February 18, midnight. The Committee expressed however recognition of the material inconveniences resulting from the recruiting of men from North African ships and states its resolve to assure full efficiency of French military

⁵⁵ René Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs under General de Gaulle.

services in their contribution to the common war effort. Pending complete agreement on organization of French forces in the discussions about to begin in Algiers between the de Gaulle Commission and Giraud's representatives the Committee therefore proposes a temporary solution of the immediate problem.

The Committee makes a distinction between cases first of recruits from war vessels now immobilized in American ports and secondly recruits from merchant ships coming to get cargoes. It says in the former cases immobilization in American ports will be relatively lengthy and hence enlistment and employment of personnel from such war vessels does not appear to have any immediate unfavorable results; in these circumstances this question can appropriately be reserved for the discussions in Algiers with Giraud. In the second case namely, that of merchant ships the Committee pending general agreement with Giraud is preparing to issue instructions to Fighting French representatives in the United States covering the following points:

1. Propaganda among crews and solicitation of recruits are prohibited.
2. Voluntary enlistment can still be accepted of officers ratings and men who present themselves independently.
3. As regards the enlistment of officers ratings and men from merchant ships loading for North Africa the Fighting French delegation will give them orders to return to temporary service on these ships.
4. These cases will be examined individually later on or be dealt with in the general agreement to be negotiated with Giraud.

Massigli's letter concluded with the surprising assertion that "the National Committee hopes that our Government will recognize the spirit inspiring these instructions and that pending a definite arrangement to be reached they will find in them a satisfactory solution of the difficulties which are causing concern to you".

Repeated to Algiers.

MATTHEWS

851.86/72: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 8, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 7:55 p. m.]

351. From Murphy.⁵⁶ London's 1424, February 25. The British have made representations to General Giraud urging the importance of reaching an early recruiting agreement with General de Gaulle,

⁵⁶ Robert D. Murphy, United States Political Adviser on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, and Personal Representative of the President in North Africa.

the necessity of which is admitted by Giraud, but no progress can be made until Catroux's⁵⁷ arrival here. The members of the de Gaulle mission now in Algiers have no authority even to discuss this matter.

The Bethouart mission has informed Giraud that measures have been taken in the United States to put an end to desertions from French ships arriving in American ports and to recruiting among French North African personnel on behalf of de Gaulle.

The Allied military and naval authorities here believe it is important to make a distinction between civilian, including merchant seamen, deserters and deserters from the French Armed Forces and that for reasons of military security and discipline the latter should be returned to their units if apprehended in American or British territory. The British Minister's office has been requested to make a similar recommendation to London since the military authorities feel that whatever action in this respect is taken outside the theater has definite repercussions here. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851.86/76 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 15, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 7:29 p. m.]

1828. Embassy's telegram no. 1616, March 5, midnight. Admiral Stark has requested that the following telegram be sent to the Department:

"1. Have discussed further with General de Gaulle problems involved in acceptance by Fighting France of enlistment in American ports of men from French ships from North Africa.

2. De Gaulle recognizes impossibility of permitting delays in sailings for North Africa, insists on the difficulties both of a moral and a material order for Fighting France of refusing to accept such enlistments, and refuses to consider as deserters men transferring from one French service to another French service.

3. Instructions being sent Catroux to discuss with Giraud terms of immediate agreement on organization of French forces in the war to permit initial transfer between various services of officers and men desiring to transfer either from North African forces to Fighting French units or vice versa.

4. Pending such agreement de Gaulle reaffirms proposals in Massigli letter of March 3 summarized in Embassy telegram no. 1616 March 5, 12 p. m., to State Department. First he insists that in case of naval vessels in American ports for refitting spontaneous offers of ratings and men from such vessels to join Fighting France be accepted and asks American authorities to avoid treating men as deserters by

⁵⁷ Gen. Georges Catroux, being sent to North Africa as representative of General de Gaulle.

arresting or returning them by force to ships. He recognizes need for agreement which will assure full complement upon completion of refit. General de Gaulle remarked that neither American procedures nor international law had ever foreseen the present exceptional situation of France and especially the naval position of those sailors who were recently ordered by their officers to fight the allies of France and who are not certain of the will of certain of these officers to lead them legally in battle against the enemy.

5. I explained to de Gaulle impossibility for American naval officers to connive at desertion of naval personnel from their vessels or recognize legitimacy of transfers of men not authorized by their own commanders and urged he come to an immediate understanding with Giraud with suspension of acceptance of such naval ratings as recruits during negotiations under way.

6. Second in case of war vessels engaged in active operations or of merchant or naval supply ships, required to return immediately with cargoes for North Africa de Gaulle proposed to order Fighting French recruits from such vessels to make return voyage, with understanding they be permitted on arrival in North African port to leave their ships to join Fighting French forces. De Gaulle's agreement is conditional on guarantees being given that these men may join Fighting French after arrival in North Africa. He would send representatives with such ships to North Africa to insure observance of guarantees. I urged that important object was to keep ships running subordinating other questions to this. General de Gaulle said he fully recognized the importance of the question of transport but could not overlook the grave moral and national problem raised by the position of these sailors.

Third, if large proportion or whole crew of ship wish to join Fighting France, de Gaulle proposes his representatives provide necessary officers and men for return journey to North Africa, again on condition that they be permitted to rejoin their own service on arrival."

Admiral Stark informs me that the foregoing text was submitted to and approved by General de Gaulle. Admiral Stark had suggested that acceptance of recruits from French ships from North Africa should be suspended pending conclusion of negotiations with Giraud for a general agreement covering transfers of personnel. In the case of men wishing to join Fighting France but prepared to remain on their ships for the return journey from United States ports to Africa the Admiral suggested arrangements might be made on their arrival in Africa to opt for transfer to Fighting France. He further suggested guarantees would be given that they might then be transported to a Fighting French base. In his conversation with Admiral Stark, General de Gaulle agreed to these suggestions but when the Admiral's proposed cable was submitted to him he "welshed" (the expression is Kittredge's⁵⁸) and insisted that men wishing to join Fighting France should be actually enrolled before returning to Africa.

⁵⁸ Comdr. Tracy B. Kittredge, aide to Admiral Stark.

I am told, incidentally, that during the past week some dozen members of Fighting French Air Force, Army and Navy have approached Admiral Stark to ascertain whether some arrangements can not be made to permit them to join Giraud's North African forces. There is no doubt in Kittredge's mind that large numbers of Fighting French officer and enlisted personnel are fed up with their organization and are eager to join the North African forces. While publicity has now been given here to the "wholesale desertions" from the *Richelieu* and other French ships in American ports, no whisper has appeared in the British press of growing dissatisfaction within the Fighting French forces.

MATTHEWS

851.86/82 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 26, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

2157. Admiral Stark has had further discussions and exchanges of correspondence with General de Gaulle regarding the question of the enlistment by Fighting France of French sailors from North African ships in American ports (my 1828, March 15, 4 p. m.). On March 16 Admiral Stark wrote the General that he would be glad to know whether the latter would consider the Admiral's previous suggestion that enrollments by the Fighting French of crews from French vessels from North and West Africa in American ports be suspended while negotiations are under way for an agreement governing transfers of French personnel between the different French forces. The Admiral said that should de Gaulle approve such suspension of formal enrollment of men voluntarily presenting themselves in American ports, he would recommend to the US Government that it give a guarantee that such personnel on arrival in African ports be permitted to leave their ships and to proceed to a Fighting French base for enrollment. Reference was made to another suggestion by the Admiral that representatives of Fighting France might give advice and use their influence to persuade such personnel to remain on ships required to return immediately to Africa with war material and supplies.

In a curt reply dated March 22, de Gaulle wrote the Admiral as follows:

"With reference to the crews of French merchant vessels and naval supply vessels now in the US, you have seen fit to ask, in your letter of March 16, that the Fighting French authorities should refuse the enrollment of sailors in asking them to remain on their vessels, subject

to certain possible guarantees on their return to the port of departure. I must confess that I can hardly see how the Fighting French authorities could give orders to sailors not under their orders."

Admiral Stark has now written de Gaulle referring to Massigli's letter of March 3 (my 1616, March 5, midnight) and to a further conversation which he had with de Gaulle in which it was made clear that the National Committee recognized the importance of avoiding delays in sailings of ships bound for North Africa. The Admiral's letter mentions that the Giraud mission in Washington has agreed that it will recruit no Frenchmen who have contracted engagements with the Fighting French. The Admiral continues that de Gaulle had offered to order personnel volunteering from North African ships in the US to return with these vessels to Africa after enrollment with Fighting France. The Admiral referred to de Gaulle's statement that he would issue such orders only if guarantees were given him that such personnel would in fact be permitted to leave their ships on arrival in Africa and be transported to a Fighting French base. Admiral Stark recalls that he then inquired whether the National Committee might not temporarily suspend enrollment of men in North African French service if the aforementioned guarantees were provided. In conclusion the Admiral said that his letter of March 16 repeated this suggestion only because of the fact that General de Gaulle had apparently not understood it or taken it into account.

According to reports which have been received from two independent sources and which supposedly emanate from Admiral Auboyneau's⁵⁹ office, the latter has very recently sent instructions to Gayral in the U. S. to take all feasible steps to recruit French sailors from North Africa for de Gaulle. Gayral has reportedly been authorized to offer these sailors increased pay and the opportunity of having payments made to their families in France. I have also been told that the Fighting French are very much interested in the recruitment, by promises of one kind or another, of some 200 men from the French naval air service who have been sent to England from North Africa for training. If such reports are true they would indicate that the Fighting French are trying to anticipate any possible subsequent agreement with Giraud on recruitment by securing the enlistment of as many men as they now can get to come over to their side. The engagement given by the Giraud mission in Washington mentioned in Admiral Stark's letter to de Gaulle would seem to be clearly unfair to Giraud in view of de Gaulle's continued refusal to make a similar commitment.

MATTHEWS

⁵⁹ Commander in Chief of the Fighting French Navy.

851.86/96 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 5, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received April 5—7: 19 p. m.]

2410. Admiral Stark has requested that the following telegram be sent to the Department with reference to his proposed solutions for the avoidance of difficulties in American and British ports through the enrollment of personnel of crews on North African French vessels in Fighting French forces:

“General de Gaulle had proposed to Admiral Stark that such personnel be ordered by de Gaulle, after enrollment, to return to their ships, at least temporarily. General de Gaulle indicated that before giving such orders he would require a guarantee that on the return of the vessel to North Africa, where replacement might be obtained, this personnel should be permitted to proceed to a Free French base for duty.

Admiral Stark had enquired whether de Gaulle would be prepared to order the suspension of recruiting of French personnel from North African services during the course of negotiations now under way in Algiers subject to a guarantee that they would on return to North Africa be permitted to proceed to a Fighting French base if they still wished to join Fighting France. This might be provided for in any general recruiting agreement which may be contemplated in Algiers.

In the telegram NAF-196 from Eisenhower⁶⁰ of March 30, General Catroux is reported as agreeing to the necessity of such an immediate recruiting agreement. He is discussing with Giraud the possibility of a joint de Gaulle-Giraud statement inviting all French abroad to remain in their present services pending the creation of a unified French military and naval organization.

In view of these circumstances Admiral Stark enquires whether the United States Government would be disposed to guarantee an option for personnel on North African ships to join de Gaulle forces at a later date, if de Gaulle were to agree immediately to order the suspension of enrollments by Fighting French of men from North African French vessels.”

WINANT

851.86/106 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 11, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received May 11—6: 16 p. m.]

3264. The Department will recall the difficulties preceding and attending the departure of the SS *Jamaïque*, a French ship under

⁶⁰ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa.

charter from Algiers and operated by our WSA.⁶¹ A new situation has now developed with regard to the SS *Fort de Douamont* similarly chartered and operated. On Friday April 30, a Fighting French naval officer from Liverpool met members of the crew at Middlesborough where the ship lay. On the following day 6 French Naval gunners and 6 merchant seamen deserted and some at least took tickets to London. A number of them have since been identified by British Security officials at the Fighting French naval reception center here. In order to move the vessel from Middlesborough to the convoy assembly point from which she is scheduled to sail next week the British Admiralty provided temporarily for that brief run only, 6 seamen from the British Shipping Pool and a military gun crew. Authorization has likewise been requested from North Africa to obtain 6 members of the gun crew of the *Mont Vigo* now in a British port to replace the deserters. The British through Charles Peake⁶² are endeavoring to persuade the Fighting French to send the deserters back to their vessel.

This brings again to the fore the whole question of British treatment of deserters from North African vessels who join the Fighting French. The whole previous file on this question was covered in Admiral Stark's report to OPNAV⁶³ of April 4, No. 00098 and of April 17, No. 00127. The Department will recall that earlier instructions of the British Admiralty to arrest seamen deserting North African ships to join de Gaulle were revoked following a telegram from Lord Halifax objecting to this drastic step. Admiral Stark now feels, however, that the question should be made a matter of formal protest to the British and is so telegraphing the Navy Department today. For the Department's convenience we quote below the pertinent paragraph of standing instructions of the British Admiralty:

"His Majesty's Government's policy is that although every effort is to be made to persuade crews of North African French ships to remain with their ships, they should not be stopped from joining the Free French if they persist in their wish to do. In the latter case, therefore, they will not be treated as deserters but will, after the usual security examination, be handed over to the Free French."

WINANT

⁶¹ War Shipping Administration.

⁶² British Representative to the French National Committee.

⁶³ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

851.86/107 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 15, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received May 15—5:24 p. m.]

3382. Embassy's telegram No. 3264, May 11, 7 p. m. The British Admiralty have just informed Admiral Stark that Admiral D'Argenlieu, Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Fighting French Navy in the absence of Auboyneau, states that the Fighting French formally refuse to order the deserters of the naval gun crew back to the *Fort de Douamont*. The British are taking no further action.

Kerr⁶⁴ of War Shipping Administration states that the ship may thus be compelled to sail without a gun crew endangering both the ship and loyal members of its crew.

WINANT

[No later correspondence on this question has been found in Department files. Presumably conflicting claims on the services of French seamen were ended by the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation in June 1943.]

AID OF THE UNITED STATES IN SECURING TRANSFER OF CONTROL OF THE FRENCH WEST INDIES TO REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION⁶⁵

851B.24/33 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1943—5 p. m.

3. The following is for your own strictly confidential information. You may wish to have a preliminary conversation with Lenoir⁶⁶ upon his return now scheduled for January 10, before discussing the substance of this telegram with the High Commissioner.⁶⁷

It must be obvious that Admiral Robert's counter proposal⁶⁸ is thoroughly unsatisfactory and we should not be prepared to accept it even as a basis of discussion.

⁶⁴ Alexander C. Kerr.

⁶⁵ For previous correspondence regarding United States relations with the French West Indies, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 611 ff.

⁶⁶ J. Lenoir, Comptroller for Admiral Robert.

⁶⁷ Adm. Georges Robert, French High Commissioner in the French West Indies.

⁶⁸ See Admiral Robert's letter of December 29, 1942, to the Consul General in Martinique, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 652.

During his visit to the United States Lenoir was fully and completely informed of the position of this Government of its proposal and of its relations with other parts of the French Empire. He has likewise had several conversations with General Giraud's⁶⁹ special mission now in Washington and was received by Admiral Horne.⁷⁰ At the latter meeting Admiral Horne began by stating he had great admiration for Marshal Pétain⁷¹ and sympathy for the Marshal's position but that it was clear no real government existed in Vichy any longer and that the Marshal being a virtual prisoner of the Germans was no longer able to help the French Empire. In the circumstances he said that communications between Martinique and Vichy would have to cease. He then said that we were willing to deal with Admiral Robert on either of two bases (1) as a person who collaborates with the French Army now fighting the Axis in North Africa or (2) as a "quasi independent" agent in the French possessions. He said that we do not believe in threats but that we have reached a point where something must be done and that the collaboration of Admiral Robert with us is essential. In reply to a question Admiral Horne outlined the situation of French warships at Dakar and Alexandria. Formal assurances were given to Lenoir that the United States had no designs with respect to French sovereignty in the Antilles and Guiana and that the French flag would continue to fly. It was also added that whereas no useful purpose could be served by discussing details regarding the protection to be afforded French ships at this time it was nevertheless our definite intention to do our utmost to see that French possessions received the supplies needed.

Whereas Admiral Robert's indication that convoying of his ships could now be envisaged as representing a step in the right direction we feel no useful purpose will be served by discussing any such details as contained in your no. 8 of January 5, 6 p. m.⁷²

Lenoir is likewise fully informed regarding the Board of Economic Warfare's proposal to reclassify the French possessions for the purposes of export control. Further details will be furnished you as soon as practicable.

HULL

⁶⁹ Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud, French High Commissioner of French North Africa.

⁷⁰ Adm. F. J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

⁷¹ Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

⁷² Not printed.

851B.24/38 : Telegram

The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State

FORT-DE-FRANCE, January 10, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received 2 : 40 p. m.]

16. Following is substance of Vichy message⁷³ mentioned in my 14, January 8,⁷⁴ and just received by me :

German Government consents to use of *St. Domingue, Angouleme, Guadeloupe, Duc d'Anmale*, and *Bourgogne* for supplying Antilles provided French Government guarantees, after receiving such a guarantee from you as the representative of France, that you will take all steps to prevent the immobilized warships and planes, the gold and the merchant ships including the tankers while in Antilles or on voyages or in a foreign port from falling into the hands of foreign powers; also that you will abstain from all relations with dissident authorities in North Africa.

The above not exceeding previous French Government instructions to you, the German requirement arises out of events in North Africa and the parts [*ports?*] of the immobilized ships.

Insofar as our ships do not enter the zone of operations, the German Government will take all steps towards non-molestation but without responsibility in case of error.

Telegraph dates of departures and detailed itineraries 6 days beforehand except 10 days for resumption of traffic.

Messages of reply from Admiral Robert contain the above guarantees and fix departures on January 18 of *Angouleme* for Mobile, *Guadeloupe* for New Orleans, *Bourgogne* for Aruba and *St. Domingue* for Para and on January 21, of *Duc d'Anmale* for Ciudad Trujillo via Curaçao.

MALIGE

851B.24/40 : Telegram

The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State

FORT-DE-FRANCE, January 13, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received January 14—3 : 52 a. m.]

23. My 20 today.⁷⁴ I spoke 2 hours this morning with Admiral Robert and aides and we agreed to an exchange of notes today defining the respective positions.

⁷³ Message from Vichy to Admiral Robert.

⁷⁴ Not printed.

My note, delivered at noon, was based on Department's 3, January 7 and requested reconsideration of the proposal in Department's 275, December 17.⁷⁶

In his reply, just received, Admiral Robert states that the only position he can envisage now is that of "quasi independence" of his possessions; that he agrees to reconsider our proposal as regards efforts to feed the population of North Africa; that he intends his aid shall not harm the interests of the people under his charge nor French interests in general; and that this involves both safeguarding his merchant ships and a collaboration not violating the neutrality of article LV of the Gentlemen's Agreement.⁷⁷

These considerations lead him to ask our agreement to the following:

(a) The *Sagittaire* and *Oregon* to be reserved for Antilles-Morocco service.

(b) These ships to navigate under French flags, crews and management.

(c) They and the ships supplying the Antilles from this hemisphere to be guaranteed against seizure by us.

(d) The sale of Antilles products to be conducted as a commercial operation between private parties, with sale in dollars to the credit of Antilles banks in New York.

(e) His ships returning from Morocco to bring back North African produce for the Antilles, bought and paid for as in point (d).

(f) We would insure his supply ships necessary protection in case the steps envisaged brought a risk of German reaction.

(g) Insufficiency of tonnage (for supplying his possessions) caused by lengthened journeys or loss of ships to be replaced by us.

(h) Additional tonnage for supplying the Antilles to be granted without delay, especially a collier.

(i) No publicity whatever as to these arrangements.

(j) He will retain with Vichy only official radio communications in clear or code deposited with us and limited to purely administrative matters.

My comments below may be useful:

(1) Admiral Robert must win over to what will be regarded as dissidence his three Governors, besides officers and crews of ships, none of whom has evolved as he has recently and painfully. This may take some time.

(2) His recent guarantees to Vichy (my 16, January 10) which he could with difficulty avoid, complicates his situation but he finds escape for sending sugar to Morocco in "abstain from all relations with dissident authorities". This explains point (d).

(3) He agrees not to consult Vichy on political matters, being willing to stretch previous Vichy instructions to exercise within limits his own discretion in relations with us. The Governors, however, need

⁷⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 650.

⁷⁷ For correspondence concerning the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of November 7, 1942, see *ibid.*, pp. 611 ff.

administrative guidance without which colonial administration would be severely disrupted. It appears probable that the Germans will stop all communications on learning of his collaboration; this would strengthen his position locally. The present system of control has worked well and I recommend we give point (j) a trial.

(4) He will hedge unless given satisfaction on the points in my 543, December 25.⁷⁸

MALIGE

851B.20/168a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1943—6 p. m.

23. Your 23, January 13, 8 p. m. Please communicate the following message to the High Commissioner:

"1. Although the proposals set forth in the High Commissioner's note of January 13 may be regarded as a step in the right direction, they represent merely a further elaboration of his previous counter-proposals and consequently are inadequate in the light of the present situation as respects France and French territories.

"2. Our position can be put very briefly:

As the Government of the United States has repeatedly stated, it has no territorial designs on the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere and is prepared to continue to recognize French authority over them. However, events in Metropolitan France, where German and Italian control now covers the entire country, have brought about a situation which the United States Government cannot ignore. The fact that the former Vichy regime is no more than a mouthpiece for the Axis Governments is too obvious to require elaboration and deprives that regime of any claim either to represent the French people or to issue orders or to require guarantees, such as those recently sought by the German Government, in the name of France.

"3. In view of the above circumstances the United States Government regards fulfillment of the following conditions essential to further discussion with the High Commissioner, acting in the name of the French people as the recognized trustee of French interests in the Antilles and Guiana.

(a) All communication of whatever nature and by whatever means between the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere and Axis-occupied France must cease, except that, if he so desires, the High Commissioner may make his new status known to Vichy, and may inform any belligerent Government through Vichy of future movements of the *Duc d'Aumale*, *Saint Domingue*, *Guadeloupe*, *Angouleme*, *St. Laurent*, *Trois Ilets* and of such other vessels as may be used for the purpose of supplying the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere. All such communications are to be subject to the approval of the United States Government before being sent.

⁷⁸ Not printed. The points referred to are, namely: (1) that Admiral Robert's ships be admitted unarmed to convoys, and (2) that several anti-submarine craft be loaned to Admiral Robert for patrol duty. (740.00112 European War 1939/7508)

(b) In connection with their joint economy, it has become necessary for all countries in the Western Hemisphere, whether at war, or in a non-belligerent or neutral status, to collaborate both as regards shipping and supplies, in order to minimize the shock of war to the Hemisphere as a whole. In view of this fact and in order that the French Antilles and Guiana may continue to share in the Hemisphere economy it is necessary that the High Commissioner collaborate with the United States by making available, although operating under the French flag and with French crews, the *Oregon*, *Sagittaire* and the tankers. The routing of these vessels would have to be under United States control but the rights of France would be appropriately safeguarded."

4. The Department desires to be consulted before any communication is sent to Vichy by the High Commissioner in accordance with sub-paragraph *a*.

5. In addition to handing the above message to Admiral Robert you should inform him orally as follows:

There apparently exists a difference of opinion between the High Commissioner and this Government with regard to the nature and scope of the "Gentleman's Agreement". Admiral Robert seems to regard this informal *modus vivendi* as a rigid undertaking having the authority and inflexibility of a written signed agreement. However, (as indicated in the Department's telegram no. 252 of November 12⁷⁹) this Government merely expressed its willingness at that time to regard the results of the negotiations prior to November 7 as a basis for its future relations with the High Commissioner, at the same time expressing its readiness to examine with him "whatever aspects of our relations may be necessitated by the new situation". Obviously the situation in Metropolitan France since November 7 has changed and is continuing to change in a number of important respects. The situation in the world at large has likewise changed and is continuing to change in important respects. Under these circumstances this Government feels fully justified in taking these changes into consideration in its future dealings with the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere. If the High Commissioner is unwilling to take this view of the basis for our future relations, this Government may be reluctantly compelled to consider it necessary to withdraw the gentlemen's agreement as any basis whatever for future relations.

HULL

⁷⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 647.

851B.20/171a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1943—11 p. m.

29. To be decoded by Malige. Admiral Battet⁸⁰ left Washington this afternoon for consultation with Admiral Hoover⁸¹ at San Juan. He will then proceed to Fort-de-France by Navy plane in an endeavor to persuade Admiral Robert to abandon his attitude of rigid neutrality. He has been fully informed of the present situation, including Robert's personal guarantees to Vichy. You should render him all appropriate assistance, if so requested, but you should make no mention of the impending visit or take any action until instructed by Admiral Hoover.

HULL

851B.20/172 : Telegram

The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State

FORT-DE-FRANCE, February 6, 1943—noon.

[Received 11:46 p. m.]

51. Department's 23, January 23, 6 p. m. and my 38, January 25.⁸² The following reply from Admiral Robert has been handed to me by Captain Benech:⁸³

"Your note of January 25⁸⁴ reveals such a conception of my position and my duties that it is worthwhile that, to avoid any confusion, my position be stated precisely:

"(1) It is because I was appointed High Commissioner by the French Government in 1939 and confirmed by the succeeding French Governments that I act here in the name of the French people and that I am, legally and in fact, the guardian of French interests in the French Antilles and Guiana.

"(2) The Gentlemen's Agreement represents for me a bilateral engagement the more affirmed because the result of concessions subscribed to by me beforehand at the request of the American Government. In particular the clause of reciprocal neutrality had as a costly counterpart the immobilization of the warships exacted as a pledge. I cannot neglect recalling the insistence used in obtaining this pledge nor the satisfaction that the representatives of the American Government experienced nor the correct nature of the French attitude in these possessions since the entry into war of the United States.

⁸⁰ Rear Adm. Robert Battet was loyal to the French North Africa group headed by General Giraud.

⁸¹ Adm. John H. Hoover, Commander in Chief of the United States Navy in the Western Atlantic.

⁸² Latter not printed.

⁸³ Capt. Pierre Benech, Chief of Staff to Admiral Robert.

⁸⁴ See telegram No. 23, January 23, 6 p. m., to the Consul General in Martinique, p. 223.

"(3) On November 13, the State Department informed me that your Government, with the approval of the President of the United States, was disposed to maintain relations with these territories on the basis of the Gentlemen's Agreement and to examine the problems that would arise in the same spirit as in the past. I recall that this decision was taken on November 13 subsequent to the action of American forces in North Africa,⁸⁵ to the rupture of diplomatic relations between France and the United States, to the invasion of unoccupied France and to the occupation of our frontiers by the German and Italian troops. I was then and am still justified in believing that the events of November 7 to 13 would not alter the principles that had resulted in our agreement and which only events to come could place them under discussion again. However, since November 13 there has not been to my knowledge any change in the situation of France that exceeds in importance the total sacrifice on November 27 of the French Fleet acting under orders received not to fall into the hands of the enemies of the United Nations.

"(4) The unilateral annulment of the Gentlemen's Agreement solely because one of the signatories intends to respect scrupulously all of its clauses or because one party is not in a position to adopt a derogation sought by the other appears to me to be difficult to justify legally.

"(5) It is impossible for me to consider that the defeat of France or the misfortunes it does not cease to experience, honorably, removes from its Government the right to represent the French people or its legitimacy. Besides this concerns a French question where an error of judgment is easy, for a foreigner. You know very well also that never has the French Government given me orders nor laid down directives that might have in any way harmed American rights and interests—finally that the Gentlemen's Agreement permits on my part of an engagement of strict neutrality and that my communications since December 3 have been limited to your convenience.

"The preceding considerations represent my reality. Also real is the constant loyalty of my attitude. I want to believe that, these realities considered, the examination of our problems may be pursued by means of friendly negotiations and that the difficulties of my position will not be systematically disregarded. My resources are of the lowest order compared with those that the American nation is employing and the effects of my neutrality are negligible compared with the forces engaged in the conflict. However, feeble those resources may be, it is nevertheless in the interest of no one that they be condemned to destruction between two opposing pressures and that they should no longer exist when their utilization would become possible.

"In sum, I refuse to lose the confidence placed by every Frenchman in the idea of liberty whose torch is upheld by the American nation."

Captain Benech confirmed that in the penultimate sentence above "destruction" means "scuttling", that the two pressures are American and German and that the last six words convey Admiral Robert's hope that he may allow us to have the ships eventually. He said the Admiral intended to consult Vichy in an effort to obtain a relaxation

⁸⁵ For correspondence on the Allied invasion of North Africa, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 429 ff.

in his guarantees as described in my 16, January 10. They interpret item 4 in Department's 23, January 23, as not yet applicable to any such message but I have reserved the doubt in our favor until I can receive clarification on the point from the Department.

MALIGE

851B.20/196

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*⁸⁶

[WASHINGTON,] February 10, 1943.

From a strictly confidential source, it is now certain that:

(1) Admiral Robert got notice on January 6 from Premier Laval that French merchant ships plying the Antilles will no longer have safe passage, unless certain new pledges are made by Robert and Laval.

(2) On January 8, Robert pledged that warships, planes, gold, merchant ships, tankers, and so forth, would not in any event fall into the hands of the United Nations, and that he would not have any relation with the North African Government. He notified Malige of this.

On January 28, Robert again told Laval that he was being pressed by the United States to the point of suggested cut-off of supplies to Martinique and it would help if he could use the ships there to send sugar to Morocco. On February 1, Laval refused to do this. Robert is under orders in case of greater pressure by the United States to comply with instructions already given. It is plain that the instructions referred to mean scuttling the ships, and so forth.

(3) Although we are supposed to be in control of communications, a station at Martinique is sending out coded messages, presumably to Vichy and the Germans. Copies of all messages are supposed to be filed with Malige. The copies filed with Malige are not forwarded to State.

This angle may be covered with the Navy, but I know of nothing indicating that all of the messages sent are filed, inspected and read.

(4) The danger to the French ships in Martinique is of course obvious, and that is apparently recognized in the negotiations. But the other danger, namely, that the Martinique station may be used as the method by which certain espionage reports are reaching Europe, seems not to be covered, so far as I can see.

(5) There is a possibility that this angle may be fully covered by Navy; but we are not informed on the point.

I believe that we may be open to criticism on two points:

First: Continued permission of communication between Robert and Laval seems to me unwarranted and dangerous. When the gentlemen's agreement was made, Laval, despite his many misdeeds, was still a French unit. Now he is, at best, a German prisoner, and probably a German agent. A gentlemen's agreement on the basis of Robert's

⁸⁶ Addressed to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Ather-ton) and to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn).

relations with France was understandable. But I cannot see that a gentlemen's agreement on the basis of Robert's agreement with the Germans could stand gunfire.

Second: Since Robert is in direct communication by code with Vichy, that is to say, the Germans, we are open to criticism unless the Navy is prepared to tell us that it was abreast of these communications and in adequate control of them. The second situation is intrinsically more dangerous than the first, since the first merely has to do with the safety of a limited amount of matériel—albeit of great potential value. But the latter may jeopardize the safety of a very great many ships and men.

I should be glad if you would let me know whether the Navy is prepared to say that they have the situation under control. If not, I believe we should promptly work up with the Navy and the Army appropriate methods of control of the station. If there is adequate reason for not closing it down, arrangement should be made for Malige to send the filed copies of the messages here, and the code messages as they are picked up should be adequately processed by the Intelligence people, so that measures can be taken thereon.

Mr. Dunn may wish to refer to Magic Summary No. 321, page 2 ff.
A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

851B.24/56: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1943—6 p. m.

33. Department is informed by Morin de Linclays, General Manager of French Line in New York, that Captain, officers and crew of *Guadeloupe*, now at New Orleans, have expressed their wish to abandon status of neutrality and to serve the Allied cause. They have declared that they will not return to the Antilles with their vessel and cargo pending definite clarification of the status of French possessions and until measures of security are taken for the vessel. They further decline to load cargo which is waiting on the docks.

De Linclays is telegraphing Admiral Robert in the above sense today. Inform Hickey.⁸⁷ Navy is informing Admiral Hoover.

You should take no action regarding this matter unless it is brought to your attention by French authorities in which case you may say that you have been informed of the report and that your Government has had nothing whatever to do with the position taken by these men.

HULL

⁸⁷ Capt. A. S. Hickey, Naval Observer at the American Consulate at Fort-de-France.

851B.24/57 : Telegram

The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State

FORT-DE-FRANCE, February 13, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 3:20 p. m.]

63. Department's 33, February 11. Captains Benech and Roques⁸⁸ have just handed me a note from Admiral Robert, still in hospital, requesting us to have the port authorities at New Orleans intervene with a view to the cargo being loaded and the vessel departing for Martinique, but with a new master.

The Admiral requests that officers and crew be informed that he has considered their wishes, that he continues as in the past 3½ years to watch over their safety and defense as over that of the Antilles, and that in compromising the feeding of these possessions they do not help the Allied cause.

In any case Admiral Robert points out that the *Guadeloupe* is French property and that he reserves the right to send a new crew to take possession should the present strike continue.

I informed the two officers as in the last sentence of Department's 33, but had difficulty reassuring them. They admitted that they had no illusions about the success of the above *démarche* with us. I said that a satisfactory solution of present negotiations would doubtless bring the ship back here.

MALIGE

851B.24/78 : Telegram

The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State

FORT-DE-FRANCE, February 25, 1943—noon.

[Received February 26—1:03 a. m.]

86. My 82, February 23.⁸⁹ Admiral Robert has telegraphed Vichy as follows:

"The United States Government recognizes no longer the Gentlemen's Agreement, regarding it unsuited to circumstances arising since its conclusion. That Government requests another agreement involving a closer economic cooperation similar to that being given by the other countries of this hemisphere. The adoption by the United States of a totalitarian economy spreading to the hemisphere is a fact that will weigh increasingly on the life of these colonies until traffic can be reestablished with Europe or North Africa. I regard as reasonable the grant of some economic satisfactions to the United States through helping the American Republics by means of a few

⁸⁸ Roger Roques, a member of Admiral Robert's staff.

⁸⁹ Not printed.

tankers. The most practicable solution is to affreight them on time charter to French Lines, incorporated, a French company being organized in New York, which would use them only in this hemisphere. They would remain entirely French. It would facilitate my task if you could reply before the end of this month."

MALIGE

:851B.20/193: Airgram

The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State

MARTINIQUE, February 25, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received March 8—noon.]

A-55. Admiral Robert has issued today a communiqué, of which the following is a close translation:

"Since December 19, these French possessions have been the subject of various *démarches* and requests on the part of the American Government and on the part of representatives of various dissident French authorities. The Admiral-High Commissioner believes it useful to bring to the knowledge of the people of the Antilles and Guiana his position in the matter.

"The relations between these colonies and the United States were defined in a document, the terms of which were fixed on November 7, which consolidated, as a counterpart of the immobilization of the war ships, the strict neutrality of the Antilles and Guiana. In addition, this agreement guaranteed, on the American side, the free navigation and the security in the ports of the Hemisphere of our supply ships, as well as the grant of the dollars necessary for our imports. On the other hand, the other belligerent conceded this definition of our status and of our existence, and accepted and agreed to respect our ships.

"A few days later, November 13, the American Government confirmed to me, with the approval of the President of the United States, this basis of our relations⁹⁰—on November 13, after the American action in North Africa, after the rupture of diplomatic relations between France and the United States, after the invasion of the free zone of Metropolitan France and the occupation of our frontiers by the German and Italian troops.

"Since then, on the basis of our agreement, the French promises—and mine—have been fulfilled. No consideration, to my knowledge, would authorize the American Government not to hold its own. It has only informed me of its desire to find here a formula better adapted to certain necessities of the war.

⁹⁰ See letter of November 14, 1942, from the French High Commissioner in the French West Indies to Mr. Samuel Reber, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 648. Mr. Reber, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, and Adm. John Hoover were sent to Martinique in May 1942 to negotiate with Admiral Robert regarding the relations of the United States with French possessions in the West Indies.

"I am negotiating regarding this matter in the spirit of reciprocal confidence that I have always maintained in our relations with the United States. I am doing everything possible to conserve the political status, permitting the French of the Antilles and Guiana, after almost four years of war, to live honestly, with freedom, without harming anyone, witnesses and examples of the era of peace that humanity aspires to find again; witnesses and examples for France also, since we remain, Antilles and Guiana, the only territories where our flag flies without proximity to another. I excuse the French of London and of Algiers for being a little jealous about it. I would like them to remain so.

"Our material and moral position merits that we hold fast to it at the price of momentary sacrifices should some difficulties of supply arise.

"I think of you, people of the Antilles and Guiana, and I think of our mother France—France, covetous of your blood, generous with her gifts, faithful to your present, anxious for your future. I have served her longer than any of you. I believe I have served her well and have no other end than to serve her well in watching over you. I know how she suffers. I know that she is not dying. I know what she hopes for. There remains for me one ambition at the bottom of my heart, and it is that which guides me: one day to return the Antilles and Guiana free to France liberated.

"If in the harshness of war which destroys the works of men, if in the necessities of war which sometimes scorn human morale, if in the passions of war we should one day be put to the proof, know that what I shall ask you to defend with me is your present and your future—it is today your life, your children, your honor, your property; it is tomorrow your right to liberty.

"Such is my thought, such is the road on which I am leading you, according to the directives that have not varied since the Marshal assumed the responsibility for the destinies of France."

It has always been Admiral Robert's practice to issue public statements of the above character, either in speeches on public or semi-public occasions or in communiqués, whenever word as to important matters regarding these possessions has developed into rumors of disturbing character. In addition, since the events of last November, he has given to local propaganda an emphasis on popular loyalty to Marshal Pétain through him (Admiral Robert) rather than direct to the Marshal.

The last general statements of his position were those of last November (my A-123, November 30; despatch No. 316, December 5⁹¹). The attempted visit of Rear-Admiral Battet, the *Guadeloupe* incident, recent army exercises and naval gun-practice, all of these and other considerations against the North African background have produced a state of nervousness. The "various *démarches* and requests

⁹¹ Neither printed.

of the American Government" were not actually known publicly, although rumors are constantly arising about this or that demand made by us, whether true or not.

MALIGE

851B.24/78 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1943—5 p. m.

47. Your 86, February 25. We assume that Admiral Robert has intentionally distorted the facts in order to obtain the ends he desires from Vichy. As you are aware, however, we have not yet gone beyond telling him that withdrawal of the gentlemen's agreement may be necessary. For your information, this may have to be done in the near future. As you are also aware, we have at no time expressed a desire to conclude "another agreement".

BERLE

851B.20/190b : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1943—10 p. m.

51. This is for your own information and background. There is a rising opinion here against a continuance of the present situation in Martinique and in favor of a satisfactory solution in the not too distant future. This Government questions whether the French Antilles should continue to share the security of this hemisphere without making any contribution to that security and aiding their compatriots who are fighting for the liberation of their homeland.

A series of daily radio broadcasts in French from this country directed towards Martinique will begin tomorrow afternoon at 6:45 with a view to explaining to the local authorities and population the changing situation. You will please listen and keep the Department currently informed of the reception of these broadcasts, the impression created in Fort-de-France and any comments and suggestions you may wish to offer. Meantime the Department is preparing an instruction which will serve as a basis of conversation for you with Admiral Robert.

Repeat to Cayenne as No. 9.

WELLES

851B.24/99 : Airgram

The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State

MARTINIQUE, March 16, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received March 19—4 p. m.]

A-72. Referring to my telegram No. 112 of today,⁹² the following is the translated text in full of the note dated March 15, mentioned therein, from Admiral Robert:

"After an abnormal delay in the transmission of certain telegrams that, on your advice, I entrusted to you, your Government does not issue the port-call licenses requested—one of them for over a month—for the supply ships: these ships are therefore practically immobilized.

"Payments and purchases themselves are also stopped since March 1st because the Treasury has not renewed the license for operating the bank accounts and has not issued the monthly license supplying these accounts.

"The postal correspondence that I exchanged with my agent, Mr. Marquais, is intercepted almost completely since the first of the month.

"Finally, I learned that the American Naval Attaché at Ciudad Trujillo⁹³ has declared having received the order no longer to authorize the departure of my ships.

"These administrative measures prevent these colonies from being supplied, even by neighboring countries that desire to continue to supply them. There results a veritable blockade, the tragic consequences of which weigh directly on the population which lacks products most indispensable to daily life: bread, meat, salt, milk, medicaments, in particular, especially in Guiana where torrential rains have just destroyed 70 percent of the food crops.

"Since, to my knowledge, we are still bound, the Government of the United States and myself, by a mutual agreement, I have the right to state my surprise over these measures.

"This agreement, in effect, assures me in precise fashion that the Government of the United States will not interfere with and, on the contrary, will aid the supply of these colonies. Having paid in advance for this assurance and kept my own engagements, I could expect being shown the same care for a correct attitude as I have constantly shown with respect to the United States.

"To this attitude, as well as to my recent offer of added economic collaboration, does the American Government intend to reply only by starving, by means that are indirect and round-about but effective, the populations under my care?

"I do not think so, but I have the right to protest—if they are deliberate—against these acts and these measures of coercion on the part of a powerful nation against tiny defenseless territories.

"Without insisting on the fact that the publicity that might be given to them would diminish the hopes of the French and the confidence in the promises made to them today, I want to hope that it will suffice for your Government that you transmit my protest to it

⁹² Not printed.

⁹³ Lt. Col. John A. Butler.

and inform it of the situation in order that it raise the obstacles placed at present against the supply of the populations of these territories.⁹⁷

MALIGE

851B.24/102 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at St. John's,
Newfoundland (Hopper)*

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1943—6 p. m.

13. Your telegram no. 23, March 20, 5 p. m.⁹⁴ The *Meigle* was reported to us in the first instance as a Canadian vessel with a cargo of codfish from St. Pierre-Miquelon. We therefore did not know of any Newfoundland interest in this vessel at the time we requested the Canadian Government to take steps to prevent the departure of this vessel for Martinique, Guadeloupe or St. Martin's with its cargo of codfish.

Please get in touch immediately with the appropriate Newfoundland authorities and inform them orally in the following sense.

On March 8, last, the Acting Secretary of State informed the press, as the Newfoundland authorities may have noted, that no shipments of food had been made to Martinique from the United States since November 8, 1942. No funds are being released in the United States to permit those Islands to purchase food or other products. The codfish on board the *Meigle* was doubtless purchased with funds released prior to March 1. The Newfoundland authorities will of course understand that the purpose of this economic pressure is directly connected with the conduct of the war and is considered of great importance to the interests of all the United Nations. We consider it essential to have a more cooperative attitude from Admiral Robert. As the Newfoundland authorities probably know there are important units of the French Navy and a number of merchant vessels and tankers which have for many months been idle in Martinique.

All of the foregoing may be communicated in strict confidence orally to the Newfoundland authorities.

Please say to the Newfoundland authorities that we look to Newfoundland to cooperate with the United States in this matter. We therefore hope that the Newfoundland authorities will take the necessary action to prevent the *Meigle* from proceeding to Martinique, Guadeloupe, or St. Martin's until shipments of foodstuffs from the United States to those Islands are resumed. There is a great need for food including codfish in French Guiana which as the Newfound-

⁹⁴ Not printed.

land authorities will be aware recently announced their allegiance to General Giraud. The American Government is doing everything it can to facilitate sending foodstuffs to French Guiana. We understand also that there is an urgent and pressing need for codfish in Puerto Rico. There should in these circumstances be no difficulty in diverting this vessel's cargo.

Please telegraph a report on the result of your representations as soon as possible.

HULL

S51B.24/110 : Telegram

The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State

FORT-DE-FRANCE, March 28, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 12:11 p.m.]

140. The High Commissioner protests in writing against first the requisitioning of the *Guadeloupe* and second the ship's despatch to French Guiana, of which he learns from Marquais and Gallantiere, respectively. He terms the actions most unfriendly because violating the Gentlemen's Agreement, vexatious because aiding dissidents and harming the faithful, and unworthy of "a great nation pretending to base its policy on the principles of the Atlantic Charter"⁹⁵ because tending to induce revolt by starvation. He makes all reservations as to political and litigious consequences and does not recognize that "your Government, as long as you represent it here, should inform me of its decisions through an ordinary propaganda service".

MALIGE

S51B.24/110 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1943—10 p. m.

76. Your 140, March 28. The High Commissioner is of course in error in stating that the *Guadeloupe* has been requisitioned. Part of the cargo itself was requisitioned in the normal manner in order that relief might be sent immediately to French Guiana. The status of the vessel remains unchanged under the control of the French Line. She sailed because the captain and crew were willing to make the trip to bring relief to their compatriots who had joined the United Nations cause.

HULL

⁹⁵ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill on August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. 1, p. 367.

851B.20/251 : Airgram

The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State

MARTINIQUE, April 11, 1943—12 noon.

[Received April 15—4 p. m.]

A-94. As a matter of record, I transmit below in translation the text of a memorandum handed to me by Admiral Robert during an interview in which I asked him to state frankly the nature of his grievances against us; in reply, the Admiral handed me the memorandum, which he had already prepared in view of our conference:

"The events of November left a stable basis for the continuance of relations between the United States and the French possessions in America, namely, the Gentlemen's Agreement of November 7, 1942, confirmed by a letter of November 13 from Mr. Reber.⁹⁶ As foreseen by this letter, the necessary measures were taken at Washington and at New York in December, as soon as I was able to send there on mission Comptroller Lenoir in order to adjust to the new state of things the mechanism of the economic life of these possessions. Our relations were therefore established in December on a basis that is still valid and were developing in a satisfactory manner.

"On December 18, you informed me in an official note⁹⁷ that in order to insure a proper service of supply to the populations of the Antilles a greater cooperation appeared necessary and your Government requests the placing at its disposition of the merchant ships immobilized in the Antilles.

"I reply on the 29th⁹⁸ by explaining the political and material disadvantages which would result therefrom for these possessions. I propose nevertheless a collaboration of shipping at least limited to the Caribbean, at the same time pointing out the consequences that I must fear and asking you for guarantee in this respect.

"Since that time, because of the American Government, our relations are abnormal. On my side, all my efforts tend to modify in conformity with your material demands our existing accords. They are the propositions in my letter of December 29, in my letter of January 13,⁹⁹ in my letter of February 24.¹ During all of this period I do not cease to make *démarches* to my Government in order to be in a position to give you satisfaction without compromising the interests of which I have charge.

"On the American side, none of my acts of goodwill is taken into consideration. In contrast, we are the object of official injunctions (your notes of January 13 and January 25²), of semi-official threats (conversation between Admiral Horne and Comptroller Lenoir, messages transmitted by Admiral Battet and by Mr. Morin de Linclays).

⁹⁶ Letter not printed.

⁹⁷ For substance of note, see telegram No. 275, December 17, 1942, to the Consul General in Martinique, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 650.

⁹⁸ For Admiral Robert's reply, see letter of December 29, 1942, to the Consul General in Martinique, *ibid.*, p. 652.

⁹⁹ Concerning the letter of January 13, see telegram No. 23, January 13, 8 p. m., from the Consul General in Martinique, p. 221.

¹ Not printed.

² For latter, see telegram No. 23, January 23, 6 p. m., to the Consul General in Martinique, p. 223.

Then the month of March brings an absolute blockade of our service of supply by means of the suspension of every administrative measure concerning us and the unloosening of a violent campaign of lies directed in the press and by the official services of the American radio.

"The avowed end of these inhuman and unjust measures is to bring about in these possessions a political change contrary to French interests of which I have charge by bringing about the annulment of the accords in vigor between your Government and myself. I review these interests, as they have been conserved up to the present:

"1). Maintenance of French sovereignty by (a) the spiritual bond with the mother-country, a bond that conserves for each inhabitant of these islands the full rights of citizenship; (b) the fact that I alone am charged with the defense and communications.

"2). The safeguard of the shipping immobilized in the ports of the Antilles.

"3). The security of navigation of the ships assigned to the service of supply.

"4). The integrity of the gold stock belonging to the Bank of France and stored in Fort Desaix, which must be maintained intact until the day when it will be returned to the disposal of the Bank free of foreign control.

"I am determined to defend these interests up to the point of sacrifice. I desire that your Government be good enough to understand that my attitude in fact has always been pro-American and that I cannot consider the measures taken by it since the first of March other than anti-French. I do not think that this situation is beneficial to the United States or to France. I therefore ask that your Government, which created it, be good enough to take into consideration again the basis of our relations, not to refuse the offers of economic cooperation that I have or will be able to make it and, by revoking the measures taken in March, return to these possessions their right to life.

"I point out that I am ready, since February 24, to assign the *Sagittaire* and the *Oregon* to maritime traffic in this Hemisphere. I am pursuing, with the firm hope of succeeding, my *démarches* with a view to assigning the tankers to that traffic. I am also ready to discuss any amendment to our accords that would take into consideration the French interests mentioned above."

MALIGE

NOTE—I should add that the occasion for the question and the reply referred to in the opening paragraph of this airgram was a complete review of relations between the United States and Admiral Robert, preparatory to my forthcoming period of consultation at the Department with respect to those relations.

851B.01/71a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1943—5 p. m.

821. For Murphy. On April 26 Admiral Robert was officially informed that this Government no longer considers effective or binding

any informal understanding with respect to the French Antilles based upon past discussions and conditions. Our note will be made public on April 30.³

Although there is no definite indication of a change of policy on the part of Admiral Robert, reports of internal disorders and growing tension in Guadeloupe make it desirable for us to be prepared at a moment's notice to deal with any situation which may develop there or in Martinique.

Should the situation in Guadeloupe reach a head within the next few days, we will be faced with the immediate problem of preserving order and there will immediately arise the problem of providing leadership for a new administration. The recent experience in French Guiana suggests the possibility that Admiral Robert could no longer be regarded as a suitable choice, even if he were to announce a sudden and complete change of policy by breaking with Vichy and adhering to the cause of the United Nations.

It is obvious from the present status of the negotiations between General Giraud and General de Gaulle⁴ and the progress which has been made toward French unity⁵ that the best interests of all concerned, including the interests of the population of the French Antilles and unity in the war effort, would be greatly furthered by agreement now between General Giraud and General de Gaulle on the choice of a Governor for Martinique and Guadeloupe. Moreover, it is possible that knowledge of agreement on this point might serve to hasten a decision which would range these French possessions on the side of those who seek the liberation of France and the defeat of the Axis powers.

In view of the necessity for working closely with the U. S. in the preservation of order and in the reestablishment of the economic life of the Colonies, it is essential that the Governor selected be one who can be counted upon to cooperate fully with us in every way.

Please discuss this matter with General Giraud and, if he approves, also with General Catroux⁶ and urge the necessity for immediate action.

HULL

³ For text of note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1, 1943, p. 359. The Consul General in Martinique was instructed to return to the United States, thus terminating the informal direct relations with the French West Indies.

⁴ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French National Committee in London.

⁵ For correspondence pertaining to efforts toward the establishment of unity in French North Africa, see pp. 23 ff.

⁶ Gen. Georges Catroux, representative of General de Gaulle.

851B.20/260 : Telegram

The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State

FORT-DE-FRANCE, May 1, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 5:12 p. m.]

177. The following is a close translation of Admiral Robert's reply to our note :

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of April 26.⁷ I take note of it.

Almost 6 months have passed since Mr. Reber's note of November 13, 1942,⁸ which established, in the present situation of Metropolitan France and North Africa, the basis of our relations. Since that date all my efforts have tended to amend that agreement, in the sense of your material requests, while conserving legitimate care for the interests of which I have charge. Since that date the acts of your Government have been combined in order to drive the people of these colonies into hunger. And now the American Government bases arguments on misfortunes, which France is in the physical impossibility of avoiding, to pronounce the rupture of all relations with the territories placed under my authority.

I protest in the name of the French Government against the unjust judgment that is formulated very lightly regarding it. It is not a question of general opinion. History will say some day what was spared the French people, [as] the Marshal⁹ has told us (message of April 4, 1943¹⁰).

I protest in the name of the Frenchmen of the Antilles whom you have subjected by blockade and by violating your engagements to the abusive action of force and power.

I protest in my name, for I am conscious—in charge of the foreign relations of these colonies—of always having been for the United States 'a good neighbor' and of having merited treatment as such.

I regret to see that the difficulties of war appear to conceal from the American Government and American public opinion what is for us a living reality. I regret it for the French people. I regret it also for the American people who perhaps some day will have to pay the price of this unawareness.

I accept provisionally the maintenance of the naval observers at Martinique and Guadeloupe."

MALIGE

⁷ See footnote 3, p. 238.

⁸ Not printed; but for Admiral Robert's reply, November 14, 1942, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 648.

⁹ Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain.

¹⁰ For text of Marshal Pétain's message, see the *New York Times*, April 5, 1943, p. 8.

851B.20/269

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On May 5th the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent an identical letter ¹¹ to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy regarding the present situation in Martinique in which they recommended:

(a) That no positive action be taken at the present time and that the present policy of the United States be continued for the time being.

(b) That United States forces not be employed for an intervention under existing conditions.

(c) That when conditions warrant, French forces be permitted to intervene in an effort to take over control of the Islands, Martinique and Guadeloupe.

In furtherance of the above recommendations, the United States Chiefs of Staff now propose the following plan:

(a) That a French force composed of one cruiser from West Africa and two destroyers now repairing in the United States and ready early in June, make the first landing in Guadeloupe. This landing would be the simpler of the two, and would probably have a good effect on the general population in Martinique. Admiral Robert might scuttle his ships as a result thereof, but he would probably not do so until direct threat was made against Martinique itself.

(b) That immediately following this landing, a merchant ship with food supplies be sent there in order to stabilize local conditions as soon as practicable.

(c) That upon completion of the Guadeloupe landing, the situation be publicized to Martinique.

(d) That after the landing at Guadeloupe and with the experience thus gained, appropriate plans be then made concerning Martinique. It will probably not be desirable to land at Martinique until the *Montcalm* and *Richelieu* are available.

The United States Chiefs of Staff submit the above plan for your approval. If you concur, it will then be referred to Admiral Fénard ¹² for his concurrence and implementation.

In connection with the foregoing plan, the Navy Department will arrange that a medium-sized merchant vessel be loaded with food supplies and made available to the Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier at San Juan, ready to go to either Martinique or Guadeloupe if conditions in the future render this advisable.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it would be desirable that the Navy Department arrange for some publicity to Martinique and Guadeloupe, using the following specific items, provided this meets with the concurrence of the State Department:

(a) In reply to Admiral Robert's statement that all possibility of a French proposition on his part has been shut out by the recalling of

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Chief of the French Naval Mission in Washington.

the Consul General, point out that a means of communication with Washington through the Vice Consul at Ft. De France does exist.

(b) Reasons why the allegiance of Martinique to Vichy should be disrupted.

(c) Every reason exists for merchant vessels and tankers under Martinique control to operate for the economic well-being of the Western Hemisphere and also thereby for the well-being of Martinique and Guadeloupe.

(d) Undoubtedly, with any reasonable attitude on the part of the Martinique authorities, United States would facilitate food supplies, which are available near by, being sent to those islands.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

851B.01/787

*The French High Commissioner in the French West Indies (Robert) to the Naval Observer at the American Consulate at Fort-de-France (Hickey)*¹³

[Translation]

FORT-DE-FRANCE, June 30, 1943.

I have the honor to request that you transmit to Admiral Hoover the following telegram:

"The economic blockade to which the American Government has subjected the French Antilles has borne fruit. Hunger and restrictions have gained the upper hand. Realizing that my Government is responsible, and in order to avoid bloodshed, I ask you under the guarantee of upholding French sovereignty in these possessions and the expressed condition of no American force intervening, to send me a plenipotentiary with whom I will be able to fix the method of changing authority on the issue of which, having fulfilled all my duties, I have decided to retire."

ROBERT

851B.01/787

*Memorandum by the French High Commissioner in the French West Indies (Robert) to the Commander in Chief of the United States Navy in the Western Atlantic (Hoover)*¹⁴

[Translation]

FORT-DE-FRANCE, July 3, 1943.

Diplomatic relations have been broken between the Government of the United States and Admiral Robert, High Commissioner of the

¹³ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Navy Department on July 26. After the return to the United States of Consul General Malige, American interests regarding Martinique were placed in the hands of the Navy.

¹⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Navy Department on July 26.

Antilles and of French Guiana, following the refusal of Admiral Robert to cut off relations with the French Government.

The blockade which followed the rupture of relations has brought to Martinique the great lack of indispensable food products.

Because the population can no longer endure this situation, Admiral Robert recognizes that he ought to stop the struggle, and in order to do this an American plenipotentiary should come.

Admiral Robert requests that the following stipulations be adhered to:

1. That the American Government guarantees French sovereignty in the Colonies, recognizing the fact that the French High Commissioner is alone charged with defense and communications.

2. That the new status include the non-intervention of foreign armed forces.

3. That the American Government guarantees the integrity of the gold belonging to the bank of France deposited at Fort Desaix, which should be maintained intact and be remitted to the bank when it is free of foreign control.

4. That food supplies be immediately commenced by the renewal of licenses at the expense of the Antilles by the immediate approval of a program of food supplies, of products of prime necessity, and the payment of export licenses according to the former method as soon as possible.

5. For merchant tonnage: a guarantee to maintain the merchant ships as French property and safeguard the owner's interests.

The population and part of the Army having made known their desire to see these colonies re-attached to the French Empire, Admiral Robert has decided not to oppose the entry of a High Commissioner designated by the actual heads of that Empire.

Admiral Robert asks that the American Government use its influence to obtain from the designated new authority a guarantee of protection of personal and private goods as follows:

- (a) No judicial proceedings, no administrative sanctions nor private reprisals will be exercised against the people, public employees, military or civil, for the functions which they have exercised or the opinions which they have expressed. This guarantee is to include families and personal property.

- (b) The right of an option will be open to everyone—public or civil employees. Those who wish to be repatriated to France via Portugal or Spain under the supervision of the U.S. Government with their baggage and their goods.

- (c) The people taking the options of remaining in the Antilles will be free to exercise their activities and they will not be mobilized against their wishes nor be obliged to fulfill such charges or duties.

Admiral Robert will withdraw after having obtained the agreement of the American plenipotentiary and before the arrival of a new High Commissioner.

Until his departure, he will remain in full charge of negotiations and of maintaining order to the exclusion of all the committees.

Between his departure and the arrival of his successor, he will place Admiral Le Loup in charge of maintaining order and in command of the armed forces.

ROBERT

851B.01/78th

Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1943.

Mr. Henri Hoppenot, Chief of the Civilian Services of the French Military Mission, called on Mr. Atherton¹⁵ this morning to inform him that he had received instructions from the French Committee of National Liberation in Algiers appointing him as a "délégué extraordinaire" to negotiate with the United States Government and with the authorities in Martinique concerning the future administration of the French Antilles.

Mr. Hoppenot hoped that an early decision could be reached in order that he might proceed by plane to Puerto Rico where he would board the French destroyer *Terrible* and continue on to Fort-de-France. The members of his mission were to include the following persons:

- Commandant Lambert (Appointed by Admiral Fénard)
- Commandant Sarrat (Since his escape from Martinique this spring he has been actively engaged in de Gaulle activities.)
- Colonel de Chevigne (At present ranking military representative of the Fighting French in this country and a rabid de Gaulle.)
- M. Ponton (A career colonial officer now in St. Lucia, British West Indies, where he has been engaged in recruiting for the de Gaulle.)
- Naval Captain Wietzel (Now in London and presumably an adherent of de Gaulle.)
- General Jacomy (Formerly a member of the French Purchasing Commission in the United States and now in Algiers. Thought to be an adherent of Giraud. He will eventually have command of the French troops in the Antilles.)
- M. Charvet (An employee of the French Military Mission who will act as Hoppenot's secretary or clerk.)

Mr. Hoppenot stated that he had informed the members of his mission that he and they would act as representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation; that he would make that position clear upon his arrival in Martinique and that no appeals to support de Gaulle or Giraud personally would be entertained. He added that it

¹⁵ Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

would be his policy to work in close cooperation with the United States.

Mr. Hoppenot said that he was prepared to negotiate directly with Admiral Robert if the latter were willing or with any successor, such as Admiral Le Loup, whom Robert might appoint to maintain authority until Hoppenot's arrival.

With regard to the disposition of Admiral Robert, Mr. Hoppenot stated that although the Algiers committee would not desire any publicity to be given to it, they would not object to the granting of a safe conduct to Admiral Robert to return to France. He added that, of course, this was a question in which we were also interested and that personally he would have been inclined to favor detaining Robert at Hershey, Pennsylvania where former Ambassador Henry-Haye is located.

It is apparently Hoppenot's thought that he would only remain in Martinique for a matter of a few weeks in order to straighten out the situation and pending the definitive appointment of a governor of Martinique and a governor of Guadeloupe. He said that it was not the intention of the committee to keep the office of High Commissioner, now held by Admiral Robert, with authority over all the French Antilles. It was his intention to have the local administration carried on temporarily by the present Secretaries General of Martinique and Guadeloupe until appointment of new governors.

851B.01/76a

*The Department of State to the French Delegate Extraordinary to the French West Indies (Hoppenot)*¹⁶

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. The Government of the United States is prepared to deal with M. Hoppenot as the ultimate authority for the French Antilles, until such time as the United States and British Governments formalize their relations with the French Committee of National Liberation in Algiers.

2. The voyage of M. Hoppenot to Martinique, and that of the officials whom he desires to have accompany him, will be facilitated. Efforts will be made to have two vessels loaded with lend-lease supplies arrive simultaneously. The Government of the United States will continue to cooperate with M. Hoppenot, particularly in the economic field, as long as he follows the policy which he has already enunciated of close collaboration with the United States.

3. The provisions of paragraph 2 will be fulfilled upon receipt of the following assurances:

¹⁶ Handed to Mr. Hoppenot by Mr. Atherton on July 7.

(a) The gold in Martinique will remain intact and subject to inspection by the American Consulate.

(b) No transfer of bank credits to places outside the French Antilles will be permitted without the prior approval of the United States Government.

(c) French commercial tonnage in the Antilles, although remaining under the French flag, will be made available to the Allied war effort in a manner similar to that adopted in the case of French merchant shipping in North Africa.

(d) The United States military interest in the Caribbean area is recognized, and full cooperation with the United States authorities for the defenses of that area is guaranteed.

851B.01/787₆

The Naval Observer at the American Consulate at Fort-de-France (Hickey) to the French High Commissioner in the French West Indies (Robert)

FORT-DE-FRANCE, July 8, 1943.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the following message has been forwarded to me from the President of the United States with instructions to deliver it to you:

Message From Washington:

"The President desires that Admiral Robert be informed of the following:

1. The United States is agreeable to his relinquishing his authority in the French Antilles to a Frenchman approved by the Government of the United States.

2. The United States will provide transportation for Admiral Robert and his entourage to a United States port after which they will be given asylum.

3. We are not prepared to make any commitments whatever to Admiral Robert prior to his departure.

4. The United States insists that the French gold now in Martinique shall be safeguarded.

5. The United States insists that there shall be no transfers of bank credits to places outside the islands.

6. Henri Hoppenot, now Chief of the Civilian Services of the French Military Mission here, has been suggested by Algiers as temporary successor to Admiral Robert and would be acceptable to us. He is prepared to take over directly from Admiral Robert or from whoever Admiral Robert desires to place in charge pending his arrival.

7. All questions concerning the future administration of the islands, including questions involving food supplies, merchant and Naval ships, will be discussed by the United States with the new French Authorities and not with Admiral Robert."

Admiral Hoover wishes me to inform you that he personally feels that persons and property will be kindly dealt with and safeguarded

though he cannot guarantee it. Admiral Hoover feels it would be advisable to leave while relations are fairly good and that no more provisions should be made.

Accept [etc.]

A. S. HICKEY
Captain, USN

851B.01/90

The French Military Mission to the Department of State

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1943.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The French Committee of National Liberation, which was created especially to ensure the administration, under a single provisional authority, of all French territory now under the control of the enemy, had had cognizance for several weeks past, through sources reporting identical information, of the will of the French population of Martinique and of Gaudeloupe to cast off the dictatorial regime of Admiral Robert and join other French territories united to resume the war in intimate and confident cooperation with all the Allies of France and, in particular, with the United States.

The Committee appointed Mr. Hoppenot, on July 3, 1943, Delegate Extraordinary to take over the powers of Admiral Robert, ensure the administration of the West Indies in the name of the French Committee of National Liberation, and centralize all negotiations with the American Government relative to economic, military and naval cooperation of the French Committee in all matters which pertain to the West Indies.

This decision of the National Committee was communicated to the American Government by Mr. Hoppenot himself.

The Committee was advised by Mr. Hoppenot of several questions mentioned by Mr. Atherton as being of particular interest to the American Government. Mr. Hoppenot is authorized by the Committee to state in writing, in the latter's name, to the American Government that:

(a) The gold of the Bank of France now deposited in Martinique will be inventoried at the time of the transfer of the powers of Admiral Robert to Mr. Hoppenot with a view to giving Admiral Robert a receipt for delivery. The French Committee could agree to an American technical expert assisting Mr. Hoppenot for the purposes of the inventory in question. The inventoried gold could be temporarily retained in Martinique.

(b) The French Committee is introducing into Martinique and Gaudeloupe rules regarding exchange prohibiting transfers of credits

to foreign countries and creating, in connection with these matters, a system which conforms to the regulations which may be established in agreement with the authorities who are charged with the direction of economic warfare waged in common.

(c) The commercial tonnage of the West Indies, while remaining under the French flag, may be placed at the disposal of the Allied effort under a form similar to that adopted for the French Merchant Marine in Africa, and the Commission for the Merchant Marine is ready to issue all necessary technical instructions to Mr. Hoppenot to that end or to negotiate the necessary arrangements with the Allied authorities in North Africa.

(d) The French Committee recognizes the military interests of the United States in the Caribbean zone and agrees that, as the result of such interests, the High Command of the entire area should be placed in the hands of the American military authorities. The French military authorities in the West Indies will therefore be ordered to collaborate with the competent American authorities in the closest and most trustful manner in the territories in question, which are subject to French sovereignty, for the defense of the Caribbean Sea.

Mr. Hoppenot likewise advised the Committee that, until the United States and Great Britain have made official their relationship with the French Committee, it would not be possible to deal with Mr. Hoppenot as Delegate Extraordinary of the French Committee.

Mr. Hoppenot ought, therefore, to be considered simply as the *de facto* French authority in the West Indies until the time arrives when the status of the relations of the French Committee and the United States and England has been determined. The Committee certainly realizes the juridical difficulties resulting from the fact that the French Committee is not officially recognized by the American Government. Although the American Government has established *de facto* relations as regards many subjects and agrees, consequently, to discuss matters of all kinds with the Committee, the latter can understand that the American Government wishes to avoid making, with respect to the West Indies, a decision which might, in its eyes, assume the aspect of official recognition. But, it is certain that this passing difficulty may, with mutual good will, be the object of a solution which, while accepting Mr. Hoppenot as Extraordinary Delegate of the French Committee, would not prejudice the settlement of the question of recognition, with respect to which the American Government wishes to continue to reserve its decision.

For many years, Martinique and the West Indies have had an essential status which is comparable, particularly as regards political rights, to the status of the French Departments. Moreover, one of the essential objects of the French Committee has been to place under a single central administration, in accordance with French tradition, all French overseas territories. The abandonment, even tem-

porary, of this prerogative, even if the Committee were so disposed, as regards the West Indies more especially, would create in the public opinion of all French territories, as well as in France itself, a feeling of reprobation which might well impair the moral authority which is indispensable to the Committee for directing into the war all the forces and resources available to France.

For all the foregoing reasons, the French Committee feels that it must appeal in the most pressing manner to the spirit of understanding of the American Government with a view to achieving a satisfactory settlement of these questions, both as regards the preoccupations of the American Government as well as regards the French point of view.

851B.01/80 : Telegram

*The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State*¹⁷

FORT-DE-FRANCE, July 17, 1943.
[Received July 18—3:37 a. m.]

197. Hoppenot posted proclamation acknowledging adhesion of Antilles to supreme authority of Empire united at side of United Nations already victorious stating that Antilles self-liberation from former tyrannical regime is to their imperishable honor and promising all Vichy acts bearing armistice imprint or contravening laws of the French Republic will be abrogated.

Hoppenot letter of July 15 to Robert which is circulating freely states no civil, military or naval personnel will be forced to serve the new authorities and any not desiring to do so have until July 31 to opt in favor of either residence here or of departure which the new authorities will facilitate as soon as possible including payment of travel or actual transportation to destination and obtainment of foreign funds. Letter promises no punishment of any kind for obedience or service to previous authorities or refusal to serve new ones. The letter states Algiers Committee agreeable to Robert and encourage proceeding to France and Hoppenot promises to aid any others desiring to proceed there, subject Allied war policy which he emphasizes would probably bar men of military age and merchant seamen.

MALIGE

¹⁷ Relations with the French Antilles were resumed through Consul General Malige after Mr. Hoppenot arrived in Martinique as Delegate Extraordinary to replace Admiral Robert.

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ADHESION OF FRENCH
GUIANA TO THE UNITED NATIONS CAUSE

851D.20/36 : Airgram

The Consul at Cayenne (LaMont) to the Secretary of State

CAYENNE, March 15, 1943—8 a. m.

[Received March 19—3 p. m.]

A-37. Reference my telegram No. 13, March 14, 6 p. m.¹⁸ Contrary to the opinion expressed in my A-34, March 9, 10 a.m.,¹⁸ I believe there is now definite prospect of a revolt against the existing regime, instigated in a large measure by the special broadcasts from the United States to the French Antilles and French Guiana.

One movement is led by Dr. Romaine Parfaite, a French army medical officer with the rank of a major. I believe that his plans are not as yet definitely fixed but that he has in mind using Captain François Frechet and the Senegalese troops if possible and if not he feels certain that they will take no hostile action. If Parfaite is not able to have the use of Senegalese he may have to rely on natives who would be considerably less useful. The latter talk loudly and at length against the existing regime but are anything but courageous when it comes to action. In a conversation yesterday Parfaite asked me to inquire of my Government if it would assist by sending planes or a vessel to prevent hostile action by the gunboat *Mouttet* which is now at St. Laurent but which might return to Cayenne at any time, and whether Martinique would be prevented from sending troops to retake the Colony once the present regime was overthrown. I told him I would bring his inquiry to the attention of my Government but added that I thought he would have nothing to worry about once he had control of Cayenne.

I believe that Dr. Parfaite is obtaining a certain amount of assistance and advice from Albert Darnal¹⁹ (my A-26 February 12, 10 a. m.¹⁸) but believe he is convinced that Darnal and other local leaders will take no risks themselves. If he has to make use of natives, however, he may use men obtained through Darnal.

In connection with a new government Parfaite says that nothing has been decided as yet. He speaks vaguely of a temporary committee composed of five Frenchmen and five natives to decide whether to

¹⁸ Not printed.

¹⁹ President of the "Conseil Général" under the former regime.

affiliate with de Gaulle²¹ or Giraud,²² or possibly a popular vote to decide. With reference to an election on such a matter I pointed out that its inadvisability seemed worthy of study as both factions were apparently fighting for the same end: to free France, and an election might divide the population on this extraneous issue. He said he thought most of the local anti-Vichy Frenchmen would be in favor of affiliation with Giraud but that most of the natives favored de Gaulle.

This conspiracy may depend to a considerable extent on the cooperation of Freuchet. In a private conversation with me, Freuchet said that in case of a revolt against the present regime the troops would take no action. He could easily carry through the revolt himself if he wished but while he is strongly anti-Vichy, he apparently hesitates to take any action.

Colonel Yvan Vanegue, the commander of local troops, is not being included in the conspiracy because his opinions are unknown.

There is an increasing shortage of food in Cayenne and this has caused discontent as well as the broadcasts from the United States. A group of women planned a demonstration Sunday morning March 14th based on the shortage of food but it was decided to postpone it for a week or two until reserve stocks were consumed and the Government would be able to do nothing to alleviate the situation. Flour stocks are reported to be nearly exhausted, practically no fresh meat has been obtainable for several months, and very frequently no fish is obtainable as well as fresh vegetables. For days at a time the public market is completely empty. Furthermore, one of the heaviest rainfalls on record during the past 2 weeks is believed to have done considerable agricultural damage. According to a rumor in Cayenne, the S.S. *Guadeloupe* while in New Orleans passed to the Free French movement and if this is true no relief is in sight from current food shortages as this vessel brought supplies from the United States.

There is a remote possibility that a revolt here might get out of hand and some of the present officials assassinated. This seems quite unlikely as long as the movement is controlled by responsible persons, but if the movement should get in the hands of the local population, especially the women, anything might happen. In this connection it should be noted that during election riots in 1928 several persons were killed by a mob of local women.

LAMONT

²¹ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French National Committee in London.

²² Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud, French High Commissioner of French North Africa.

851D.20/25 : Telegram

The Consul General in Martinique (Malige) to the Secretary of State

FORT-DE-FRANCE, March 17, 1943—11 a. m.
[Received March 18—1:57 p. m.]

116. In answer to questions Admiral Robert²³ tells me that he will not use force of any kind in French Guiana but accepts the action of Governor Veber as a *fait accompli*.²⁴

For the past 3 days the Governor's reports of the food situation and its possible repercussions had created concern in the Admiral, who was preparing to reply that a food relief ship would leave here March 30. The Admiral was bitter in his denunciation of Captain Hannicotte without whose defection he states the Governor would have received ample supplies in time.

The Admiral states his attitude to French Guiana will be that towards all dissident territories or complete severance of relations. He adds that the defection was not motivated by political considerations but by hunger. He was not aware of nor did he suspect any plot to overthrow the local government.

Repeated to LaMont. First paragraph repeated to Algiers and Rio de Janeiro.

MALIGE

851D.20/27 : Telegram

The Consul at Cayenne (LaMont) to the Secretary of State

CAYENNE, March 17, 1943—3 p. m.
[Received 11:35 p. m.]

16. My telegram No. 15, March 17, 11 [10] a. m.²⁵ Action of Governor followed demonstration by mob of about 500 which started 7 o'clock last night in front of Consulate and in my absence moved to Governor's residence where Governor was hissed and de Gaulle, Giraud and America acclaimed. This action forestalled demand this afternoon by most prominent natives that French Guiana join Fighting French.²⁶

Sent to Department, repeated to Rio de Janeiro and Algiers.

LAMONT

²³ Adm. Georges Robert, French High Commissioner in the French West Indies.

²⁴ Following demonstration of a mob Gov. René Veber stated he was placing Government at disposition of General Giraud.

²⁵ Not printed.

²⁶ For account of the deposition of Governor Veber, see despatch No. 93, March 23, from the Consul at Cayenne, p. 264.

851D.20/23 : Telegram

The Consul at Cayenne (LaMont) to the Secretary of State

CAYENNE, March 17, 1943.

[Received March 18—12:15 p. m.]

17. Direction government taken over committee natives and French officers. Important that Governor, collaborators and families, 10 persons in all, leave country at once as lives in danger. Please arrange earliest possible plane transport. Brazilian Consul telegraphing for permission for them to go to Belem.

Sent to Department, repeated to Rio de Janeiro, Paramaribo and Algiers.

LAMONT

851D.20/24 : Telegram

The Consul at Cayenne (LaMont) to the Secretary of State

CAYENNE, March 17, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received March 18—12:46 p. m.]

18. My telegram number 17.²⁷ Committee composed of Mayor²⁸ as chairman, five other natives with Parfaite and Freuchet representing French officials, believe urgent that Giraud send new Governor and staff at once by plane to insure stability.

The Governor, Marchesseau, Balland, Michel, and Claveri, their wives and Governor's daughter are going. The committee declined to be responsible for their safety unless they would leave and Governor agreed. However the Governor still fearful safety of his entourage and it is believed that they should be gotten out with utmost speed.

The Government so discredited especially by our radio broadcasts for Antilles and Governor's action came so late that it rapidly became apparent during the day that he and staff could no longer remain in office.

Mass meeting was held this evening after which crowd passed before Brazilian and this Consulate cheering and singing Marseillaise. They then disbanded and Cayenne now appears calm.

I asked Committee if they needed troops from outside [to] preserve order and they said no. However, as they are now our ally apparently no objection unlimited use of air field, our Air Force and possibly Army will wish to send someone to make arrangements.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro, Algiers, Paramaribo.

LAMONT

²⁷ *Supra.*²⁸ Ulrich Sophie.

851D.00/934

*Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of European Affairs*²⁹

[WASHINGTON,] March 18, 1943.

Although details are still lacking regarding local conditions in French Guiana since the decision of the Government yesterday to join the United Nations cause, there are certain indications that a serious situation may be developing in the Colony as between the adherents of General Giraud and General de Gaulle.

1. Although the Governor of French Guiana, M. René Veber, announced the government's adherence to Giraud the Mayor of Cayenne, Mr. Ulrich Sophie, endeavored to communicate with both General Giraud and General de Gaulle. As the Mayor must have known of the Governor's action it seems likely that his message to Giraud was in the nature of insurance and that his real appeal was to General de Gaulle.

2. Mr. Sophie has also endeavored to communicate with the Governor General of French Equatorial Africa, Mr. Eboué. This of course is Fighting French territory.

3. A close relative of Governor General Eboué lives in Cayenne. Her husband is interned on the Island of Guadeloupe.

4. Mr. Sophie is the only prominent official who is a native of French Guiana. This fact and his position as Mayor suggest that he is considerably closer to the populace than the Governor who is generally disliked.

On December 27, 1942 Consul LaMont listed Mr. Sophie as "pro-United Nations."

He listed Mr. Veber as "anti-United Nations." Last October the Consul expressed the opinion that Mr. Veber is anti-British and anti-American. The Consul thought, however, that Mr. Veber would follow any course laid down by Admiral Robert in Martinique.

5. It is significant that although the Governor has adhered to Giraud, he has not prevented the Mayor from telegraphing to different Fighting French officials. It seems probable that the Governor would not have allowed this if he had dared prevent it.

6. Up to now we have suppressed all messages from the Mayor which have come to our attention in the hope that the Governor could consolidate the position as adhering to General Giraud.

²⁹ Addressed to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton), the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn), the Under Secretary of State (Welles), and the Secretary of State.

851D.20/36b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1943—noon.

986. From the Under Secretary. Please express to Aranha³¹ my confident belief that he will share with me a feeling of approval and gratification at the action of the Governor of French Guiana in placing his Government at the side of the United Nations through his adherence to General Giraud, a step which clearly expresses the will of the people of this French colony. [Welles.]

HULL

851D.20/31 : Telegram

The Consul at Paramaribo (Scott) to the Secretary of State

PARAMARIBO, March 18, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received March 19—12:20 p. m.]

18. Referring to my telegram No. 17.³² Two United States Army officers returned to Paramaribo this evening following a conference with LaMont, Lieutenant Colonel Van Egue and others. Full responsibility for situation assumed by the Lieutenant Colonel who requested immediate removal of Governor and entourage aggregating 13 and prompt action concerning a successor by Giraud; urgent action on basic foodstuffs including supplies awaiting shipment on [*in*] New Orleans; conference with qualified United States Army representative and permanent appointment American Army officer; that no troops should be sent unless required to meet emergencies and that the French gunboat *Moulet* be placed under surveillance. Colonels Meijer³³ and Singer³⁴ leaving for Cayenne Friday morning with an officer for duty there; Governor and collaborators to be removed to Paramaribo but preferably to Belem; French gunboat reported at St. Laurent 4 p. m. now under observation and local government shipping rice, corned beef and beans shortly to be dispensed by LaMont. Reliably advised food supplies sufficient only to April 15, therefore suggest that Department authorize American Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro arrange shipment meat, flour, medicines and all necessary clothing supplies from Belem on the Netherlands steamer *Prince Bernhard* carrying foodstuffs Cayenne due to arrive Belem within 10 days.

Despatch follows.

SCOTT

³¹ Oswaldo Aranha, Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs.³² Dated March 18, not printed.³³ Col. J. K. Meijer, Territorial Commander of Surinam.³⁴ Col. John Singer, Chief of the American Forces in Surinam.

851D.00/100

The Consul at Cayenne (LaMont) to the Secretary of State

No. 91

CAYENNE, March 19, 1943.

[Received April 6.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 15 of March 17, 11 [10] A.M.³⁵ and subsequent ones regarding the adhesion of this government to General Giraud and the Fighting French movement, and to submit herewith a copy of a declaration of the Governor and a copy of the declaration of the local committee³⁶ temporarily directing the affairs of the Colony.

It should be noted that the Governor does not mention in his declaration, which was published in the *Journal Officiel* in a special issue March 17, 1943, whether he is adhering to the regime of General De Gaulle or General Giraud but he informed me that he was placing his government at the disposition of General Giraud and he showed me a telegram he sent to the latter so stating. It should be noted also that the Governor says he took this action in order to assure under the most favorable conditions the existence of the Colony and the life of the population. He says nothing about the justice of the allied cause nor of his own convictions. While he told me personally that this action came from his heart it is obvious that he did not take it until he was absolutely forced to do so by the local population including most of the French officials. Furthermore that his adhesion to the allied cause was lukewarm to say the least is shown by the fact that in the *Radio Presse* for March 17, 1943, after this declaration in bold type, official German communiqués are given as usual including German censored news from France.

The proclamation of the Committee was designed to indicate that the change in the local regime was brought about without outside intervention and without a drop of blood being shed. The committee desires that this proclamation be given as wide publicity as possible. The reference to the Brazilian Consul and myself in the final paragraph of the proclamation was without our knowledge or consent.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE D. LAMONT

851D.004: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 20, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received March 21—9:25 p. m.]

442. General Giraud has just appointed Mr. Rapenne as Governor of French Guiana, and has asked that facilities be afforded

³⁵ Not printed.³⁶ Neither printed.

Rapenne so that he can reach Cayenne as soon as possible. He expects to leave tomorrow by way of Natal.

The High Command has been informed that de Gaulle has likewise appointed a Governor of French Guiana, who is also said to be on his way. An effort will be made to straighten this matter out with the Gaullist Mission, but some doubt is expressed whether it will be possible.

If for any other reason the Department should deem it inadvisable for Rapenne to proceed to Cayenne, he may be stopped at Natal where he will get in touch with General Walsh³⁷ as soon as he arrives.

Repeated to Cayenne.

WILEY

851D.20/37a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba (Braden)

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1943—7 p. m.

342. We have reason to believe that local Fighting French Representative will receive instructions from London to proceed to Cayenne to make contact with French Guiana officials. For your own information a member of the Giraud Military Mission here has left for Cayenne and arrives there tomorrow (Sunday). This is in line with the declaration of the Governor in adhering to General Giraud and of the Senior Military Commander who is now in authority there. In order to avoid any clashes or disturbance to the public order it is highly advisable not to have any French officials other than Giraud representatives in Cayenne for the time being. We suggest, therefore, that you take the matter up discreetly with the local Pan American officials and take such measures as may be possible to delay the departure from Cuba of the Fighting French representative. Please keep Department informed of any developments in this regard.

HULL

851D.001/10a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1943—midnight.

511. For Murphy.³⁸ With respect to the situation in French Guiana the French Military Mission here has informed Giraud of the urgent necessity of sending a Governor to Cayenne. Colonel LeBel, from the Military Mission here, left last night and arrives Cayenne Sunday

³⁷ Apparently Gen. Robert Walsh, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Brazil.

³⁸ Robert D. Murphy, United States Political Adviser, Staff of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, and Personal Representative of the President in North Africa.

for the purpose of making contact with local officials pending arrival of properly designated representative from Giraud. Attempts are being made to have officials from other than North African authorities proceed to French Guiana and UP despatch from London states deGaulle has "appointed a Governor of the Colony". Hope you will appreciate the necessity of expediting the sending of Giraud's representative with authority to assume control in order that public order may be maintained and avoid any internal disturbance or disorder.

HULL

851D.001/5 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 21, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received March 21—10:30 a. m.]

1979. Department's 1709, March 20, 9 p. m.³⁹ The French National Committee announced last night the appointment of Maurice Bertaud as Governor of French Guiana. The press this morning briefly reports the appointment and states that the new Governor is now in the Cameroons. In response to inquiries by Commander Kittredge⁴⁰ to confirm the accuracy of this report, Carlton Gardens⁴¹ appears "singularly embarrassed". They now say that the name Bertaud was merely "informally suggested" to M. Sophie, Mayor of Cayenne, President of the local committee for Fighting French. They confirm that he is now in the Cameroons. (It may be that they now regret the premature announcement of Bertaud's appointment prior to his arrival in the Colony.)

Fighting France also says that Sophie's announcement of his adherence to General Giraud 2 days ago, when Veber was ousted from the Colony by a "popular uprising" against him, was an error based on their assumption that union between de Gaulle and Giraud was already an accomplished fact.

Mack⁴² telephoned me last night to say that without consulting the Foreign Office, Carlton Gardens had given out the news to the press and that in their "handout" General de Gaulle was reported to have sent his "warm congratulations on the patriotism of the Colony" to M. Sophie and to have expressed approval of his actions.

³⁹ Not printed; it requested information as to the name and whereabouts of the Governor of French Guiana appointed by General de Gaulle (851D.001/18a).

⁴⁰ Cmdr. Tracy B. Kittredge, Aide to Adm. Harold R. Stark, Commander of the United States Naval Forces in Europe.

⁴¹ Headquarters of the French National Committee in London.

⁴² William H. B. Mack, British Political Liaison Officer with the United States Forces in Great Britain, with rank of Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State.

The "handout" went on to speak of the "increasingly large number of young Frenchmen from Guadeloupe and Martinique who are escaping to join de Gaulle" and mentioned by name the Chef de Bataillon Sarrat. The escapes, according to Carlton Gardens, are continuing and new volunteers are awaiting transportation in neighboring colonies. Mack said that he believed this action of de Gaulle and the National Committee would not be approved by the Department, and the Foreign Office had, therefore, done what it could to keep the news off the air and to get the press to minimize it. In the latter it has been successful, for the Sunday papers give only a few lines to French Guiana developments.

Mack told me this morning that a telegram from the British Ambassador at Rio ⁴³ reports that Veber has arrived there and requested transportation to North Africa.

MATTHEWS

851D.001/6 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 22, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received March 22—11 : 22 a. m.]

1983. My telegram no. 1979, March 21, 2 p. m. Admiral Stark has received the following rather peremptory letter from General de Gaulle dated March 21 :

"I believe that I should send you for your information copies of three clear telegrams dated March 17 and 18 which reached me yesterday from M. Sophie, Mayor of Cayenne and President of the Comité de Ralliement of Fighting France.

It is clear from these telegrams that the *de facto* authorities and the population of French Guiana are urgently asking me for instructions and requesting me to appoint a Governor. Several of these communications have at the same time been sent to General Giraud. The delegation of the National Committee having been informed immediately got in contact with the Mission of General Bethouart.⁴⁴ That mission replied to the delegation that: al [*Colonel?*] LeBel of General Bethouart's staff had left for French Guiana where he should arrive March 22 at midday.

I had on my side instructed Colonel de Chevigné, Chief of the Military Mission of Fighting France in the United States to proceed to Cayenne to take on the spot in the name of the National Committee all necessary steps pending the arrival of the Governor. This Governor, M. Bertaud, Chief Administrator of Colonies and at pres-

⁴³ Sir N. H. H. Charles.

⁴⁴ Gen. M. E. Bethouart, Chief of the French Military Mission in the United States, sent by General Giraud.

ent in the Cameroons, was yesterday appointed by the National Committee which has informed General Giraud thereof.

However, Colonel de Chevigné informs me of the fact that the War Department at Washington has advised him that he cannot leave before the month of April.

The arrival at Cayenne of the representative of General Giraud going from Washington while the representative of the National Committee is delayed threatens to involve French Guiana in confusion and incidents of every kind with respect to which I must ask you urgently to draw the attention of the Government of the United States.

In order to prevent, while there is still time, such confusion and such incidents, I believe it necessary that the trip of Colonel LeBel be immediately halted en route, at least until Colonel de Chevigné has been able to join him. These two officers will thus be in a position to proceed together to Cayenne jointly to study the situation and ascertain the facts."

The three telegrams enclosed therewith are as follows

1. March 17:

"Adherence is demanded by the population, cable urgently your instructions to the Mayor of Cayenne, representative of the Local Committee. A similar communication has been sent to General Giraud."

2. March 18:

"In order to avoid any misunderstanding with respect to the despatch of Veber, the Comité de Ralliement states that adherence is due solely to the population, Governor Veber only yielding before it. Since the latter is leaving the Colony this evening, M. Collat, Chief of Administration, is assured by the delegation of the Committee that current business may be carried out. Please designate a new Governor. An identical message has been sent to General Giraud."

3. March 18:

"The Committee has charged M. Collat, Chief of Administration unclassified of the General Secretariat of the Colonies, to carry on current business of the Government of Guiana and Inini. I should appreciate your giving me your approval."

I have suggested to Admiral Stark that since General de Gaulle has requested that the foregoing be communicated to our Government I believe that he could appropriately request copies of de Gaulle's replies to the messages quoted above.

I can find no sense of gratification at Carlton Gardens that French Guiana is at last in the camp of the United Nations: On the contrary only irritation at the earlier indication that it had adhered to General Giraud. Commander Kittredge, who has been in close touch with Carlton Gardens, describes the present situation as "another effort of de Gaulle to get in on the ground floor".

MATTHEWS

851D.001/7 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 22, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

1991. My telegram no. 1983, March 22, 1 p. m. Under heavy headlines "Guiana rallies to Fighting France" the *Marseillaise* (de Gaulle's weekly paper) carries the French texts of General de Gaulle's replies to the three messages quoted in my 1983, March 22, 1 p. m. In order, however, to conceal the fact that similar messages were addressed by M. Sophie to General Giraud the texts of the incoming telegrams are not given and there is nothing in that journal to indicate that any approach whatsoever has been made from Cayenne to the North African administration. The same concealment was apparent in the statement given the British press Saturday⁴⁵ and reported in my telegram no. 1979, March 21, 2 p. m. De Gaulle's two replies to Sophie follow:

1. "I received today your messages of the 17th and 18th of March. The National Committee and I send French Guiana our warm congratulations. Thanks to the patriotism of its population French Guiana rejoins the Empire which is struggling for the liberation of France and the liberty of the world. I approve the steps taken by the Comité de Ralliement over which you preside and particularly the authorization given by the Comité to M. Collat, Chief of Administration for the carrying out of all the current business is approved by Fighting France. The appointment of the Governor will be made immediately."

2. "M. Bertaud (Maurice), Chief Administrator of Colonies, is charged by the National Committee with the functions of Governor of French Guiana. M. Bertaud at present in the Cameroons will proceed to his post as soon as possible. General de Gaulle."

The *Marseillaise* also carries Saturday's handout which was not published in the British press. It reads as follows:

"Press service of Fighting France communicates: The rallying to Fighting French of French Guiana draws attention once more to the French possessions in the western Atlantic. According to information which has recently reached the headquarters of Fighting France a growing number of young people from Guadeloupe and Martinique are escaping from these islands to join the armed forces of Fighting France. Several months ago the escape from Martinique was announced of the Commander of the troops Chef de Bataillon Farrac, who thus joined several hundreds of volunteers who are at

⁴⁵ March 20.

present training in the United States. Subsequently the escapes continued and among those escaping is the son of Governor Nicol and several hundred new volunteers who are at present waiting in neighboring territories for transfer to units of Fighting France. In the first 10 days of March the numbers of those escaping exceeded 50."

MATTHEWS

851D.001/11a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1943—10 p. m.

1740. On March 17 Governor Veber of French Guiana telegraphed General Giraud announcing the adherence of the Colony to the Allied cause under the direction of General Giraud. Shortly afterwards the Mayor of Cayenne, Mr. Sophie, telegraphed both General Giraud and General de Gaulle asking for instructions.

Subsequent to the expulsion of former Governor Veber as a result of popular pressure a local committee of which Mr. Sophie was chairman urged upon General Giraud the necessity of his sending a representative at the earliest possible date. This request was later confirmed by the local military authority, Colonel Vanegue, who stated that he assumed responsibility for the actions of the committee. Likewise at that time the American Consul reported that after a few street demonstrations there was complete order in Cayenne and this situation has remained unchanged according to our information.

Shortly after the middle of last week General Giraud's representative here made a request for a place on a plane about to proceed to Cayenne which it was found possible to grant and he arrived there March 21. On Saturday, March 20, the military representative of the Fighting French Delegation asked for a priority which the War Department was not able to grant immediately. Meanwhile the Dutch Government we understand have shipped food to Cayenne and supplies will shortly be going forward from Puerto Rico.

In so far as we know whatever confusion may have arisen in the Cayenne situation comes from the Mayor's messages seeking dual instructions as outlined above.

I have outlined the situation to Mr. Eden ⁴⁶ this morning and the American interest in keeping this situation stabilized.

HULL

⁴⁶ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at this time on a visit to Washington.

851D.001/14a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1943—11 p. m.

517. For Murphy. Please inform General Giraud that former Governor Veber of French Guiana having been compelled by popular pressure to leave the colony, was safely evacuated to Paramaribo together with his family and officials of his immediate entourage who were closely associated with the Governor's previous policy.

The Governor and his party numbering about 10 are being transferred immediately to Puerto Rico. Please endeavor to obtain an expression of General Giraud's wishes in connection with what should be done with former Governor Veber and his party and please note that because of possible implications this Government does not wish to assume the responsibility for their expenses.

HULL

851D.00/98

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] March 23, 1943.

Monsieur Tixier, representative of the Fighting French, called to see me today. Monsieur Tixier first of all said he desired to discuss questions affecting French Guiana with me. He said he wished to read to me a series of telegrams which had been sent to General de Gaulle in London by Monsieur Sophie, the mayor of Cayenne. I said that I had already seen these telegrams in view of the fact that General de Gaulle had sent the texts of them yesterday to Admiral Stark and I had been informed of their contents by telegram. Monsieur Tixier wished to know what my opinion was with regard to the last in the series. This telegram merely stated that Monsieur Sophie and his associates had selected Monsieur Collat "chief of bureau as in charge of the affairs of the colony" and requested General de Gaulle's approval. I remarked that I didn't understand what the significance of this message was and that I didn't see that there was any cause for me to comment upon it.

Monsieur Tixier then said that he would like to know what the intentions of this Government were with regard to the situation in French Guiana. I replied that my understanding was that the Government of French Guiana had notified General Giraud of the adherence of the colony to General Giraud and his authority; that thereafter rioting had broken out and a committee of notables had informed Governor Veber that he would no longer be tolerated as Governor; that thereafter Colonel Vanegue had notified General Giraud and our

own officials in French Guiana that they desired the appointment immediately by General Giraud of a new governor and that simultaneously Monsieur Sophie had sent identic messages of adherence to General Giraud and General de Gaulle; that thereafter General Giraud's delegation in Washington had sent by plane Colonel LeBel to Cayenne to act as the temporary representative of General Giraud and that General Giraud had responded to the request of the local authorities by appointing a new governor who was now actually on his way to Cayenne.

Monsieur Tixier interjected to say that he had demanded passage for Colonel Chevigné, his own military assistant, and that this Government had refused him passage. I answered that that was incorrect, that the question of priorities was a question for the War Department to determine, but that it was my clear understanding that the War Department in the latter case had stated that a priority could not immediately be arranged and that one would be available early next month.

I said that I really did not feel that there was anything to be gained by discussing details of this character with Monsieur Tixier, that the whole manner in which the Fighting French Committee had dealt with the question reminded me of nothing so much as an old fashioned farce which I used to see in my early days in the Palais Royale Theatre in Paris. I said it seemed to me appalling that at a moment like this, when the local population in French Guiana and the local authorities in that colony had declared their adherence to the cause of the United Nations for the purpose of cooperating in the defeat of Germany, the Fighting French authorities should be devoting themselves exclusively to trying to appoint their own individual authorities in the colony rather than devoting themselves to cooperating in the great cause in which we are all engaged. I said it seemed to me that this was more than ever an occasion for unity of French resistant effort and that it was pitiful to see distinguished and outstanding Frenchmen like General de Gaulle maneuvering for what they considered immediate personal political advantage rather than for effective and active cooperation in the war effort. I concluded by saying that I wondered if this would not be an admirable opportunity for all French resistant elements to get together and to agree to cooperate in French Guiana rather than to expend their energy in fighting each other.

Monsieur Tixier said that he was entirely in accord with my thesis but he wanted me to realize that Monsieur Sophie had been elected mayor of Cayenne in the year 1936 and consequently could speak for the will of the population in French Guiana far better than Colonel Vanegue, who was merely a military officer. I said that I could hardly take this remark seriously since I did not see that the fact that Monsieur Sophie had been elected mayor of Cayenne in 1936 had the slightest connection with his ability to speak today for the will of the

people in French Guiana with regard to this, that or the other individual that should be appointed governor of the colony now. I reiterated my urgent request that an effort be made to achieve a meeting of the minds between the Giraud authorities in Algiers and the de Gaulle mission there so as to avoid any continuation of the present bickering.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

851D.00/94 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, March 23, 1943—noon.

[Received March 24—10:15 a. m.]

467. From Murphy. My 442 March 20, 7 p. m. Before his departure from Algiers, Rapenne called on us to discuss the local situation at Cayenne. He was informed in general of the contents of Cayenne's telegrams received to date and advantage was taken of this conversation to discuss the question of making the airport at Cayenne available for use of American Air Forces. Rapenne assured he would be prepared to take immediate steps upon his arrival to see that this would be done and undertook to discuss the matter both with General Walsh at Natal and with LaMont.

Rapenne is a career colonial administrator. He was governor of the Nigek [*Niger*] in 1938-40 and of the Soudan from December 1940 until May 1942. From that date he has been on leave as he refused to return to France and placed himself at Boisson's⁴⁷ disposal in November. He gave the impression that he was anxious fully to cooperate with the United States in matters affecting French interests in the Western Hemisphere.

Repeated to Cayenne. [Murphy.]

WILEY

851D.00/102

The Consul at Cayenne (LaMont) to the Secretary of State

No. 93

CAYENNE, March 23, 1943.

[Received April 6.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my telegrams No. 15 March 17, 11 [10] A. M.⁴⁸ and those which followed regarding the change in the allegiance of the local Government from Admiral Robert and Vichy to General Giraud and the fighting French, and to give below a brief résumé of events during the past few days.

The movement which culminated in the events of the past few days appears to have started with the funeral for the victims of the air-

⁴⁷ Pierre Boisson, Governor General of French West Africa.

⁴⁸ Not printed.

plane crash of February 27, 1943 (my despatch No. 86 of March 4, 1943⁴⁹). That was the first opportunity the local population had had to show their sympathy towards the United States and the allies and they turned out en masse for the funeral. On March 11 I had a requiem mass for the deceased at the cathedral, a local custom, and again large numbers of the local population were present despite a torrential rain that morning. It was upon leaving the cathedral after this mass that I first heard discussions of local women for a demonstration. Later that day I was told by one of the participants, that it was planned to hold a demonstration in front of this Consulate Sunday morning, March 14 in connection with the local lack of food. I pointed out to her that I could see no reason for demonstrating in front of this office as insofar as I knew my government had never refused to sell food to this Colony, that she should appreciate that my country was at war, had a shortage of vessels and had a right to expect the regime in these French colonies to send vessels for whatever they obtained in the United States. I afterwards ascertained that a group of local women had a meeting that evening and decided in favor of a demonstration in front of the "Palais du Gouvernement" (residence of Governor and government offices) instead of this office and that it had been decided to postpone the demonstration for two weeks or until all reserve supplies of food had become completely exhausted and the government could do nothing to alleviate the situation.

I subsequently ascertained that on Saturday, March 13, Dr. Romaine Parfaite (my telegram No. 13 March 14, 6 P. M.⁴⁹) endeavored to organize a movement to seize the government in the early morning of March 14 but late that evening abandoned this plan because certain native leaders would not give him their support due to the hasty and incomplete preparations. This plan was what induced my Brazilian colleague to report to his government that there would be a revolution here the 14th (Rio de Janeiro telegram No. 1268 March 14, 4 P. M.⁴⁹).

It should be noted that during the entire week starting March 8 the local regime and that of Admiral Robert were under attack each evening in the special radio program from the United States directed toward these colonies. These broadcasts were widely listened to and discussed by the local population.

On Tuesday March 16th I was informed that a demonstration was planned in front of this Consulate that evening because of the shortage of food. I was informed of this by two young natives who called on me at noon that day accompanied by Mr. Albert Darnal (my A-26 February 12, 10 A. M.⁴⁹). They asked me if I would agree to the demonstration and I said I could neither agree nor disagree. I

⁴⁹ Not printed.

pointed out however that I could see no point in demonstrating before this office, giving the same reasons as I had previously given regarding the proposed demonstration of women. I further stated that if they held the demonstration I would report the facts to my government but that I would not be at home. When they left I was not sure whether the demonstration would be held or if it would be called off.

That evening (March 16th) a crowd gathered in front of my office at about 7 P. M. They were led by Mr. Vermont Polycarpe, a local lawyer. After waiting some time in front of this office and after pro-American cries there were cries of "Au Gouvernement" and the mob moved off to the "Governor's residence, where they shouted demands for food, "*Vive De Gaulle, Vive Giraud, Vive L'Amérique* and *à bas Pétain*". That morning the government had started the distribution of ration cards for the very small remaining quantities of rice, margarine, edible oil, and salted beef. The Governor flanked by Messrs. Gaston Marchesseau⁵¹ and Frederic Balland⁵² (my A-56 December 22 [27], 6 P. M.⁵³) asked if they would be satisfied if the food under these ration cards should be made available the 18th they shouted "no". He then suggested the 17th and they again shouted "no". Hence, it turned into a purely political demonstration against the regime.

The morning of the 17th I ascertained that a meeting of the most important native professional and businessmen was to be held that morning at 11 A. M. with the Mayor of Cayenne, Mr. Ulrich Sophie, to draft a demand to be made of the Governor that day to join the fighting French movements. At that time, early in the morning, I believe the majority would have been satisfied to permit the Governor to remain in power if he acceded to their demands but the temper of the population against the existing regime mounted rapidly during the morning.

I was in the process of coding a telegram to the Department regarding the events of the previous evening and the existing situation when I received, at about 11 A. M. a telephone call from Mr. Marchesseau saying that the Governor wished to see me urgently. Upon arrival the Governor announced to me that he was placing his government at the disposition of General Giraud and asking me for my assistance in preventing further disturbances. With regard to the latter I told him I would be glad to do anything possible and appropriate for a foreign representative.

At about noon I discussed the situation with several local businessmen and Dr. Parfaite who seemed to be the leader of the French

⁵¹ Chief of Governor Veber's cabinet.

⁵² Chief of the Judiciary of French Guiana.

⁵³ Not printed.

officials. The meeting with the Mayor previously mentioned had then been in session for about an hour and they informed me it was the consensus of opinion that the Governor and his entourage would have to go, not only because they were *persona non grata* but because their lives were actually in danger as long as they remained.

I had three other conferences with the Governor that day, one alone when I informed him of the conversations noted done [*sic*], one in the presence of my Brazilian colleague and one in the presence of the latter and the Mayor who was then acting as the chairman of the temporary committee which had been formed. The one in the presence of the Brazilian Consul, Mr. de Oliveira was in connection with plans for the safety of the Governor and his party. The question of moving them to the airport construction camp at Gallion for the night was discussed as well as our remaining with them at the Governor's residence that evening. Mr. de Oliveira and myself then went to the committee and asked them for their opinion regarding the Governor's safety and they assured us that he was in no danger whatever provided he agreed to leave. As the Governor by this time was thoroughly frightened and as he had assured my Brazilian colleague and myself that he would leave, we accompanied Mr. Sophie, the Mayor and Chairman of the Committee, on a call on the Governor to obtain his formal consent to departure, which he readily gave.

A mass meeting was held that evening in a dance hall at the opposite end of the city from the Governor's residence led by members of the committee. The crowd was informed that they could afterwards salute myself and the Brazilian Consul at our respective Consulates, which they did, and were then to disperse, which they also did. Later that evening I found the city quiet.

The committee chosen in the mass meeting at the Mayor's office that morning consisted of Ulrich Sophie, the Mayor as chairman; Major (medical corps) Romaine Parfaite; Captain François Freuchet; Albert Darnal, a lawyer; Philippe Saccharin, a lawyer; Vermont Polycarpe, a lawyer; and Ernest Prevot, a notary. The stability of this committee seems questionable as Messrs. Darnal and Saccharin are long standing political enemies, never speaking to each other if they can avoid it.

In some of our actions during the day the Brazilian Consul and myself may have exceeded our duties and rights as consuls but the question of the safety of the Governor seemed to be so urgent and we enjoyed so much prestige with the natives as the only local representatives of allied governments that we considered it advisable to assist in any way we could to bring about a swift and acceptable settlement. We were frequently asked for advice by the Governor and we avoided committing ourselves insofar as possible although we informed him of our observations and what we had heard, we being the

most "neutral" outside contacts he had. On one occasion Governor Veber asked me if I considered it advisable for him to turn over the administration to the committee and I told him that in my opinion the situation was such that the question of advisability was no longer important. I wish to also add that Mr. de Oliveira and myself were in almost constant conference throughout the afternoon and all of our actions were in concert.

The morning of March 18th I received a call from Lt. Colonel Vanegue, the chief of the local army, who said that he would like to receive immediately an American military mission. This occasioned my urgent telegram to Paramaribo that morning on this subject which was repeated to the Department.⁵⁴ However, this request was anticipated by the military establishment in Paramaribo and late that morning a group of officers arrived by plane, much to the pleasure of Colonel Vanegue.

Colonel John Singer, in charge of the American troops in Surinam, accompanied by Colonel Jon Meijer, head of the Dutch forces in Surinam came to Cayenne Friday, March 19, and conferred with Colonel Vanegue. Colonel Singer carefully explained that the United States had no intention of interfering in any way whatsoever with the local government. He quickly obtained temporary permission (subject to confirmation by and a formal arrangement with the new governor) for military use of the airfield especially for anti-submarine patrol, and for army radio communication facilities at the airfield and in Cayenne. He subsequently obtained permission for enlarging the airfield.

One of the first requests of Colonel Vanegue was for a military mission composed of at least one army and one navy officer, and when Colonel Singer returned from Paramaribo March 20 he had with him Commander J. Marvin Krause who with himself, he said, would constitute the military mission requested, that Commander Krause would remain in Cayenne and that he would visit Cayenne frequently.

When Colonel Singer returned to Cayenne March 22 bringing with him acting Governor Colonel Albert Le Bel, he also brought Captain Hubert Mouwen of the Netherlands army in Surinam who has since remained in Cayenne representing the Dutch authorities and acting as subordinate to and special aide to Colonel Singer. Governor Le Bel has stated that if further allied military representatives arrive (a Brazilian Mission is believed en route), he will consider them as subordinate to Colonel Singer who he would consider as chief of any allied mission or missions.

⁵⁴ Not printed.

In conclusion I wish to add for whatever my opinion may be worth that the charming personality of Colonel Singer, and his tactful and diplomatic handling of relations with the local authorities has greatly enhanced the prestige of the United States vis-à-vis the local French authorities.

Summary

During the week ending March 13, 1943 there was some talk of a demonstration because of lack of food and plans were made for seizing the government by force to have it join the fighting French movements. A demonstration of the local population took place the evening of March 16 and the local government was so frightened that Governor Veber put the colony at the disposition of General Giraud the morning of March 17. This action came so late and the temper of the local population had so risen against the Governor and his entourage during the morning and the previous evening that it was impossible for them to remain in Cayenne.

Colonel John Singer, chief of the American forces in Surinam, arrived in Cayenne the morning of March 19 and quickly obtained temporary permission for the military use of the airfield at Gallion and for the lengthening of the runway.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE D. LAMONT

851D.001/9 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General in Martinique (Malige)

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1943—2 p. m.

65. Your 129 and 130, March 23.⁵⁵ General Giraud has appointed Monsieur Rapenne as Governor of French Guiana. The latter is on his way from North Africa and should arrive in the immediate future.

In the meantime Colonel LeBel of the French North African Military Mission here arrived at Cayenne Sunday to establish contact with local authorities.

The situation in French Guiana remains quiet and there is every reason to hope that it will develop normally and satisfactorily.

Rice and other food supplies were immediately sent to Cayenne from Paramaribo. Cargo of the *Guadeloupe*, which included some 400 tons of supplies for French Guiana, was requisitioned by Lend Lease and is now en route to the colony. Details as to manner in which future supplies will be furnished have not yet been worked out but immediate needs are being amply cared for and necessary arrangements will be made in due course.

HULL

⁵⁵ Neither printed.

851D.001/15 : Telegram

Colonel John Singer of the United States Military Mission to the Secretary of State

PARAMARIBO, March 26, 1943.

[Received March 26—5 p. m.]

USAFS 287. The following radiogram for Mayor Sophie, Mayor of Cayenne, from General de Gaulle has been relayed through local military radio this morning. A translation:

"I thank you for your telegram of March 24th. As soon as I became aware of the conflict caused by the simultaneous sending of telegrams, I sent a telegram to General Giraud on March 21st announcing that Mr. Bertaud had been appointed and suggesting that our Military Attaché in Washington, Colonel de Chevigné, get in touch with the colonel, jointly with him make arrangements for avoiding all incidents. Also to study between them the situation and report to me. I have not yet received reply from General Giraud. Meanwhile, National Committee maintains the appointment of Mr. Maurice Bertaud who belongs to this magnificent corps of administration of Free French Africa who, following the example of this glorious son of French Guiana, Governor General Eboué, joined the cause of freedom as early as the month of August 1940. He was born October 10th, 1901. Former pupil of the Colonial School. Doctor of law, Mr. Maurice Bertaud is moreover one of those men who has revealed himself in French Cameroun as one of the most distinguished administrators of his generation. Signed de Gaulle."

SINGER

851D.001/22 : Airgram

The Consul at Cayenne (LaMont) to the Secretary of State

CAYENNE, March 29, 1943—8 a. m.

[Received April 3—2 p. m.]

A-41. Reference my telegram No. 25 March 23, 7 p. m.⁵⁶ and telegram No. 286 [287?] of March 26, 1943 from Singer of the Army, Paramaribo, to Singer, [*sic*] Cayenne for Colonel Le Bel and the American Consul, Cayenne, which was repeated to the Department and which quoted a message from General de Gaulle to Sophie, Mayor of Cayenne.

Yesterday Mr. Sophie showed me a copy of a telegram which he sent to General de Gaulle in the name of the temporary committee, requesting him to withdraw the nomination of Bertaud as Governor of French Guiana inasmuch as with the arrival of Rapenne the colony now has a Governor.

⁵⁶ Telegram No. 25 not in Department files. The Department transmitted it to the Office of Strategic Services.

The temporary committee disbanded upon the arrival of Colonel Le Bel and only met yesterday to agree upon the above mentioned telegram.

LAMONT

851D.20/38 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Cayenne (LaMont)

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1943—11 p. m.

19. Acting upon instructions from General de Gaulle, the Fighting French representative at Habana, Monsieur Philippe Grousset, has applied to our Embassy for air priority to Cayenne. Embassy states that unless otherwise instructed it will furnish priority for April 3, since if Grousset is not allowed to go soon he intends to cable his colleague in Bogotá to proceed in his place.

The Department has received a similar request from Fighting French Delegation here to permit Colonel Cheigné to proceed from Washington to Cayenne.

Now that Governor Rapenne has arrived and assumed control in the colony we would like to have the benefit of his views in considering future applications for persons desirous of proceeding to French Guiana. Please inform him in this sense and request his opinion on specific cases mentioned above.

HULL

851D.20/46 : Telegram

The Consul at Cayenne (LaMont) to the Secretary of State

CAYENNE, April 1, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received April 2—9:45 a. m.]

42. Department's 19, March 30. Rapenne strongly opposed presence French Guiana persons mentioned and arrival here any other de Gaulle agents whatever. He says if any should arrive will not permit them disembark as their presence might seriously jeopardize local stability. Entire country now solidly behind him, most natives see no difference de Gaulle and Giraud and he fears serious split loyalty population as well as disorders if de Gaulle agent here. Rapenne says cooperating fully United States military, United States helped him get here all possible speed, and he hopes United States will further assist him this matter so that Guiana may make maximum war effort.

Sent to the Department repeated to Habana.

LAMONT

851D.00/97a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Cayenne (LaMont)

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1943—5 p.m.

21. Department is without information of political situation in French Guiana since arrival Governor Rapenne. We desire particularly to know whether he has received support of population and local officials including those with Gaullist sympathies.

Please keep Department informed of situation.

HULL

851D.00/99 : Telegram

The Consul at Cayenne (LaMont) to the Secretary of State

CAYENNE, April 2, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received April 3—2:32 a. m.]

43. Department 21, April 1, and my 42, April 1. Rapenne received enthusiastic support both here and on visit St. Laurent local population and officials. A few officials former regime replaced and may leave colony. No special de Gaulle partisans here where both he and Giraud equally admired by local population. Practically all officials always favored Giraud. Rapenne seems very able official and has situation well in hand.

LAMONT

851D.001/27 : Telegram

The Consul at Cayenne (LaMont) to the Secretary of State

CAYENNE, April 3, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received April 6—10:25 p. m.]

46. Reference my A-41, March 29, 8 a. m. A reply from de Gaulle to Mayor Sophie's telegram received today stating that he understands the situation, that French Guiana must give the world an example of dignity and order but that it is not possible for the National Committee to ratify the nomination of Rapenne at present because of the circumstances which accompanied the nomination and above all to the obstacles put in the way of his appointee in connection with traveling to French Guiana.

LAMONT

851D.00/108 : Airgram

The Consul at Cayenne (LaMont) to the Secretary of State

CAYENNE, April 3, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received April 10—noon.]

A-48. Reference Department's telegram 21, April 1, 5 p. m. and my 43 April 2, 2 p. m. Rapenne appears to have received the whole-

hearted support of both the local population and government officials. He seems to be an energetic as well as a capable administrator.

There is no special de Gaulle faction in French Guiana. There are many who speak of themselves as de Gaullists but by that they mean that they have been opposed to the Vichy regime and in favor of continuing the struggle against the Axis. With the advent of Giraud in North Africa, he was subject to the same admiration as de Gaulle, as the local population could see no difference between the two. The main desire of the local population was to throw off the Vichy regime in the Colony and join the French fighting the Axis, without regard to factions. In general, the local population is also very pro-American and they are convinced that with the United States against them the Axis must lose.

The new regime now headed by Governor Rapenne has liberated all persons previously interned for being anti-Vichy, pro-de Gaulle or both (it should be remembered that prior to November 1942 de Gaulle was the only symbol of Frenchmen wanting to continue the struggle against the Axis). It has also carefully refrained from any action by word or deed against de Gaulle that might split the local population. I have talked with many natives since the arrival of Governor Rapenne and while they give him their enthusiastic support they may during the same conversation also speak in glowing terms of both de Gaulle and Giraud. When the Governor speaks, the local population is quite likely to shout "*Vive de Gaulle*" as well as "*Vive Giraud*" and "*Vive la France*".

Major Robert Parfaite, who was the moving spirit in the overthrow of the former regime, had at first no choice between de Gaulle and Giraud (my telegram No. 14 March 16, 3 p. m.⁵⁷). Now he is an ardent supporter of Giraud and especially of Governor Rapenne. He is acting as the "Chef du Cabinet" of Rapenne and while in his office this morning he showed me copies of telegrams and letters received from the mayors of the various communes pledging their support and many expressed extreme pleasure at again being in the conflict to free the mother country.

All persons who have mentioned the matter to me, and who know they are separate, have expressed the hope that the Giraud and de Gaulle movements will soon be united.

Governor Rapenne and Colonel Le Bel are the first French representatives to receive an enthusiastic reception on the part of the local population upon their arrival here, during the year in which I have been in French Guiana. In connection with Governor Rapenne I have recently observed people standing in front of the "Palais du Gouvernement" at noon to catch a glimpse of him on his balcony passing from his office to his residence quarters.

LAMONT

⁵⁷ Not printed.

851D.001/74a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1943—6 p. m.

2142. Will you please inform the British Foreign Office that Governor Rapenne of French Guiana has made known that he does not wish representatives of the Fighting French to arrive in his territory at this time. In this connection we understand that M. Bertaud, the Fighting French nominee, plans to arrive in Trinidad by British air service from Lagos, Nigeria, and states that his transportation has been arranged. The situation in French Guiana is quiet and it would appear that the stirring up of factional questions at this time could only lead to disunity and interference with the war effort. It is obviously better for Bertaud to remain where he is than for him to proceed to Trinidad and not be able to complete his journey from there. Please request the British to take the necessary steps to prevent Bertaud's departure from Africa. If he has already left Africa it is requested that the British send suitable instructions to Trinidad.

HULL

851D.20/46 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Cayenne (LaMont)

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1943—10 p. m.

23. Your 42, April 1. Please assure Governor Rapenne that we will be guided by his wishes in the matter.

HULL

851D.001/26 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, April 7, 1943—noon.

[Received April 7—7:06 a. m.]

2433. We took up immediately with the Foreign Office the Department's telegram 2142, April 6, 6 p. m., and were informed that a telegram had been received yesterday from the Governor of Trinidad stating that Monsieur Bertaud and his wife were expected there on either the 7th or 12th of this month. The Governor asked what he should do about them and whether he should facilitate their journey to Cayenne. The Foreign Office telegraphed back that no British facilities should be granted the Bertauds to proceed to Guiana unless

the local French and United States authorities at Cayenne agreed thereto. Foreign Office added that there was of course no objection to the Governor receiving the Bertauds.

In the light of the foregoing and the possibility that the Bertauds have not yet left Lagos, we have requested the Foreign Office urgently to telegraph British authorities there not to furnish transportation. The Foreign Office states that it will either do that or request the Fighting French authorities to send instructions to Bertaud not to proceed.

WINANT

851D.001/36a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1943—noon.

2264. Consul in Trinidad reports Bertaud arrived there April 9. As result Governor Rapenne at Cayenne has postponed his intended visit to Surinam.

Please inform British authorities that presence of Bertaud in Trinidad constitutes a disrupting influence and request that he be returned immediately to Africa.

HULL

851D.001/35 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, April 11, 1943—noon.

[Received April 11—8:05 a. m.]

2548. The Foreign Office tells us that in accordance with the request contained in the Department's telegram No. 2264, April 10, noon, instructions will immediately be sent to the Governor at Trinidad to return Bertaud to Africa by first available transportation. Foreign Office has asked us to say that it regrets it had no information from Lagos that Bertaud was being given transportation or it would have prevented his proceeding to Trinidad until we had been consulted. The Foreign Office also points out that there are only occasional British BOAC planes operating between Trinidad and Lagos and there may accordingly be a little delay before Bertaud can be sent back.

WINANT

851D.001/36 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, April 12, 1943—1 p. m.
[Received April 12—8:33 a. m.]

2565. Department's 2264, April 10, noon. The Foreign Office has telephoned this morning to say that Mr. Eden feels that a more appropriate procedure is to request the Fighting French to recall Monsieur Bertaud to Africa and it is taking action in this sense today. Pending reply from the Fighting French, instructions are not therefore being sent the Governor of Trinidad as indicated in our telegram No. 2548, April 11, noon.

WINANT

851D.001/37 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, April 15, 1943—1 p. m.
[Received April 15—8:25 a. m.]

2641. Embassy's telegram No. 2565, April 12, 1 p. m. Strang⁵⁸ says that while Massigli⁵⁹ is prepared to cooperate so far, Pleven⁶⁰ has not been willing to send any instructions recalling Bertaud to Africa (Department's 2264, April 10, noon). Strang says that the British are hopeful Bertaud will himself telegraph from Trinidad for instructions and he added that the British are in full agreement that Bertaud's presence in Trinidad is not helpful.

WINANT

851D.001/36 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1943—8 p. m.

2395. Your 2565, April 12. Presence of Bertaud in Trinidad continues to affect stability of situation in French Guiana. Please inform British authorities that unless Fighting French order Bertaud's return to Africa within the next few days, we expect the British themselves to take action on the matter. If you deem it necessary, you may remind the British that it was by means of their transportation facilities that Bertaud reached Trinidad.

HULL

⁵⁸ William Strang, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

⁵⁹ René Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs under General de Gaulle.

⁶⁰ René Pleven, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs until succeeded by Massigli.

851D.001/43 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 21, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 5:17 p. m.]

2767. Department's telegram No. 2395, April 15, 8 p. m. Strang states that he has failed in his efforts to get the Fighting French to send instructions recalling Bertaud to Africa. Massigli was anxious to cooperate, Strang says, but Pleven was adamant and Massigli failed just as he has equally failed in his endeavors to have de Gaulle's newspaper, the *Marseillaise*, cease its bitterly anti-American tone. (There was some improvement for one issue but the most recent contains at least five articles critical of the United States and its policy.)

Strang states that he has referred the question of Bertaud's return to Mr. Eden in view of the latter's personal interest in French problems. We have reiterated the importance we attach to Bertaud's early departure from Trinidad.

WINANT

851D.001/44 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 27, 1943—midnight.

[Received April 27—9:48 p. m.]

2909. I have continuously pressed the Foreign Secretary to have Bertaud recalled from Trinidad (Department's 2395, April 15, 8 p. m.). This afternoon Eden told me he had asked Massigli today for the last time to recall Bertaud and that if Massigli failed to issue the order by tonight Eden would instruct the Governor of Trinidad to have Bertaud leave the Island.

WINANT

851D.001/45 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 28, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received April 28—4:20 p. m.]

2925. Department's 2395, April 15, 8 p. m. and Embassy's 2909, April 27, midnight. Strang has just telephoned us to say that Massigli has assured the Foreign Office that instructions will be issued today recalling Bertaud to London. The Foreign Office is telegraph-

ing the Governor of Trinidad in this sense, instructing him to get in touch with Bertaud and arrange for his early departure.

WINANT

851D.001/46 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 30, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received April 30—12:30 p. m.]

2977. Embassy's telegram No. 2925, April 28, 7 p. m. Foreign Office states that the National Committee instructions to Bertaud and his wife to return to London by the first available means have been transmitted to Trinidad.

WINANT

851D.001/48 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Port-of-Spain (Hall)

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1943—5 p. m.

117. We understand that the French National Committee has issued instructions to Bertaud to return to London with his wife by first available means. Please take this matter up with General Patch⁶¹ and local British authorities with a view to facilitating departure as quickly as possible. It is desired that their return to London be accomplished by means of a route which does not involve transit through the United States.

HULL

851D.00/122 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Cayenne (O'Sullivan) to the Secretary of State

CAYENNE, May 13, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received May 14—3:16 a. m.]

88. Rapenne reported tonight he has been informed by General Giraud that it had been decided to hold popular elections French

⁶¹ Gen. Joseph D. Patch, Commanding Officer, Trinidad Sector and Base Commander, Headquarters of Caribbean Defense Command.

Guiana as in North Africa. Rapenne's position is that situation here differs radically from North Africa. He thinks election at present time would place in power professional politicians to detriment of many who helped precipitate change in government here. He added he felt reasons for elections North Africa were, 1, to draw Giraud and de Gaulle together and, 2, to create favorable reaction in United States. He states he is cabling decision to North Africa tonight where he thought matter would be taken up with American authorities.

United States Army officials here agree cooperation of local government is so complete nothing to be gained by risking change. Commander Krause of Military Mission concurs.

Competent observers believe election would place Darnal in office. While his election in no circumstances would jeopardize American position here, consensus of opinion is it would cause intramural quarrels in local government and probably result in delaying completion new air base here.

Please repeat to Algiers. Forwarded by courier to Rio de Janeiro.
O'SULLIVAN

851D.00/122 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Cayenne (O'Sullivan)

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1943—5 p. m.

38. Algiers has been informed of contents of your 88, May 13. You should exercise utmost discretion in discussing this matter with French authorities with whom ultimate decision regarding advisability of holding elections must rest. Under no circumstances should this Government be placed in the position of opposing the elections and you should make it clear to Governor Rapenne that the question is for him to decide in consultation with the French Civil and Military Commander in Chief in Algiers.

HULL

**NEGOTIATION BY THE UNITED STATES WITH FRENCH AUTHORITIES
TO RELIEVE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN TUNISIA OF NAZI FINES AND
LEVIES RESULTING IN FORCED PROPERTY TRANSFERS**

740.00113 European War 1939/938 : Airgram

*The North African Economic Board*⁶² to the Combined Committee for French North and West African Civil Affairs⁶³ and to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau)⁶⁴

[ALGIERS,] June 15, 1943.

[Received June 19.]

Subject: Property Changes under German Rule—Tunisia

BOC A-60. 1. Tunis, as the first sizeable city recaptured from Nazi occupation, offers a realistic indication of the problems which will arise in the return of property and the indemnification of discriminated groups who have suffered at Nazi hands. Our preliminary study of this matter, presented herewith, is based primarily on the treatment accorded to Jewish people in Tunis and was gleaned from conferences with the heads of Jewish groups and other persons in Tunis. Exact figures are not available at present.

2. There are about 90,000 Jews in Tunisia as a whole. About 80,000 are descendants of people who have been in the country 2,000 years. They are not subjects of the French, but of the Bey. There are about 5,000-6,000 Italian Jews, sent to Tunisia as colonists about 150-200 years ago, who have remained subjects of Italy. Lastly, there are about 5,000 Jews who are French subjects.

3. Shortly after the arrival of the Germans in Tunisia on about 8 November, 1942, the Nazis commenced to requisition buildings of the Jews for use as offices and dwelling houses. A typical case is the following: A middle class Jewish family in Tunis was notified one evening in early December that they would have to evacuate their apartment the next morning, since it was to be taken over by Italian officers as a residence. The family, more fortunate than many, packed up most of its belongings during the night and moved out the next morning. After 8 May with the departure of the Italians, the family returned. In many cases in which houses were requisitioned for use by the Germans or Italians, damage was done to fixtures and furniture.

⁶² The Department was charged by President Roosevelt with responsibility for development and execution of a plan for the economic support of North Africa, subject to military exigencies, and, accordingly, the North African Economic Board (NAEB) was set up in December 1942 to carry this plan into effect. Communications from the Board (identified as BOC) for the Department and other interested agencies in Washington were transmitted through the War Department.

⁶³ Representing the Combined Chiefs of Staff (United States-British) in Washington. Communications from the Committee (CCNA) to the Board were identified as COB.

⁶⁴ Copy transmitted by the Department of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in instruction No. 2913, July 13, 1943 (not printed).

Rugs, hangings, furniture, etc. were taken. The Nazis also requisitioned the vehicles owned by Jewish people and obliged them to turn in their radios, refrigerators, firearms, etc. Many of these requisitioned vehicles were damaged and some were sent to Europe. Most of the radios, refrigerators, etc. were sent to Europe. The total cost of this phase of Nazi oppression was estimated at about 30,000,000 francs. While some of the requisitioned vehicles have been found and returned, there is, as yet, no program developed for compensation for losses incurred as the result of this type of activity.

4. On 6 December, 1942, the Council of the Jewish community in Tunis received an order from the German authorities to produce 2,000 workers, under an arrangement whereby food, clothing, wages, etc. were to be paid for by the Jews. At the cost of an additional 1,000 laborers a 24-hour extension was obtained. On 9 December, 1942, the request not having been complied with, a reign of terror commenced, in which synagogues and schools were broken into, Jews beaten and threatened, and obliged to march long distances. At this point the Jewish Community organized itself and set up services for drafting laborers, feeding, clothing and paying them, as well as supplying them with transportation and medical aid. About 4,000 workers were obtained, and put at work at the airport and harbor in Tunis, at Bizerta, Mateur, Enfidaville, and Cheylus, all points of nearly constant Allied air attacks. The Jews also had to act as policemen, to insure that the workers remained at their jobs despite heavy bombings and maltreatment.

5. The Jewish Community was obliged also to shoulder the financial burden of caring for Jewish refugees who came to Tunis from Bizerta and similarly destroyed cities as well as those who lost their homes by other means.

6. The funds to meet the expenses referred to above including the costs of feeding and care for the labor gangs were obtained by the Jewish Community by imposing a capital levy of 10-15% upon the property of its members. Mortgages, sales, etc. were resorted to to raise these funds, which were estimated at 60,000,000 francs. At the present time, these mortgages are still outstanding, and in the hands of banks principally.

7. On 22 December 1942, the Germans imposed a levy of 20,000,000 francs on the Jewish Community to "pay" for the Anglo-American bombings of non-Jewish property, for which the Jews were said to be responsible because they were friends of the Allies. The head of the Jewish Community endeavored, without success, to raise these funds at the private banks in Tunis, and was obliged to appeal to the Government for aid. The latter authorized the Caisse Fonciere, a semi-public institution, to advance these funds in the form of a loan at 8% interest, with commissions and carrying charges running it up to about

12%. The loan was secured by mortgages on Jewish estates, those in the country being insisted upon because there was less danger from bombing. The Caisse Fonciere received the funds from the Bank of Algeria, Tunis Branch, and we have been advised that payment was made in Bank of France notes. It was said that these Bank of France notes were subsequently distributed among the Arab and Italian followers of the Nazis. The former head of the Jewish Community has recently approached the Government in Tunisia with a view toward adjusting or deferring the payment of this loan which the Jews are not in a position to meet at present. The Caisse Fonciere threatened foreclosure and a 6 months interest payment of 1,500,000 francs is due. At first the Government was said to have advised the head of the Jewish Community to repay the loan, with interest, and to place a claim against the Germans after the war. The latest indications were that the French authorities had not yet reached a definite decision of the question but were thinking in terms of a moratorium.

8. On 15 February, 1943, the Germans, because many of the forced Jewish laborers were leaving the work camps, imposed a fine of 3,000,000 francs on the Community. This fine was paid without resort to the banks, by the sale of jewels, etc. belonging to individual members of the Community.

9. On the basis of present estimates, the measures taken by the Germans and Italians against the Jews in the Tunis area, from 8 November, 1942 to 8 May, 1943 cost the latter about 100,000,000 francs. No indemnification or relief measures have yet been taken by the French, and, insofar as the bulk of the problem is concerned, none appears to be contemplated.

10. From the fact that this memorandum is confined largely to the Jews, it should not be inferred that this class stood alone in regard to discrimination. The case of the Jews is probably the most glaring, because the great majority of them could not be considered enemies of the Nazis or Italians in the technical sense. Furthermore, there appears to have been more physical hardships, and the imposition of fines seems to be an additional measure of oppression. However, vehicles, houses, factories, etc. were requisitioned from the French in Tunis. Machinery was taken away, and forced labor was at least threatened, if not in fact realized. We are canvassing this side of the picture more fully at the present.

11. Likewise, a counterpart of this story which we will canvass if [*is?*] the matter of increments to Italians and Arabs as the result of this discrimination. Rumors as to these matters have reached us, but it is, of course, more difficult to develop this side of the problem.

12. We are also studying the question of real property transfers made during the occupations and endeavoring to obtain as much information as possible on this score.

13. We should appreciate your views on the problems. In this connection, reference might be made to the United Nations Declaration on property transfers.⁶⁵

740.00113 European War 1939/938

President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There has just come to my attention a BOC Airgram No. 60 of June 15, 1943, from the Combined Committee for French North and West African Civil Affairs, relative to "Property Changes under German Rule—Tunisia".

The conditions described in this airgram are additional evidences of the extremes to which the Axis powers have gone to wreak their vengeance upon innocent inhabitants of occupied territories.

I should appreciate it if you would notify the representatives of the United States Government in North Africa that the conditions described in BOC Airgram 60 come within the accepted and announced policy stated by the United Nations last December *not* to recognize property transfers made by inhabitants of occupied territories under the duress of the Axis powers.⁶⁶

Our representatives should also be instructed to notify the French authorities in North Africa that this Government looks with disfavor upon any attempt at foreclosure or collection of interest on mortgages incurred as a result of levies made by the Axis powers.

I should appreciate your keeping me informed of such actions as are taken by our representatives and of any changes in the situation that may occur.

Sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.00113 European War 1939/938 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1943—4 p. m.

1275. For Murphy.⁶⁷ Reference BOC Airgram 60.⁶⁸ On January 5, 1943 the Department announced the following declaration by the United States and certain others of the United Nations:

[Here follows text of statement printed in volume I, page 444.]

⁶⁵ For text of declaration of January 5, 1943, see vol. I, p. 444; for further correspondence on this subject, see *ibid.*, pp. 439 ff.

⁶⁶ For correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. I, pp. 72 ff.

⁶⁷ Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; United States Political Adviser on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa.

⁶⁸ Dated June 15, p. 280.

The President has requested me to point out to you that the conditions described in BOC Airgram 60 come within the policy announced in the above declaration not to recognize property transfers made by inhabitants of occupied territories under duress of Axis powers.

Please take this matter up with the French authorities and endeavor to ascertain from them what action they propose to take to implement the United Nations declaration in respect to the situation reported in BOC Airgram 60. You should inform them that this Government looks with disfavor upon any attempt at foreclosure or collection of interest on mortgages executed as a result of levies by the Axis powers.

After you have discussed this matter with the French authorities, please report to me promptly their reaction and any changes that may occur in the situation.

Inasmuch as BOC Airgram 60 originated from the Finance and Control Division of the North African Economic Board, please bring this cable to its attention.

HULL

740.00113 European War 1939/943 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, July 10, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received July 11—12:47 a. m.]

1245. From Murphy. Referring to your telegram No. 1275, July 9. June 21, the following memorandum was presented to Couve de Murville⁶⁹ signed by Glasser:⁷⁰

“You will recall that on January 5, 1943, there was released the text of a declaration of the United Nations of their policy on transfers of property in enemy occupied territory. The French National Committee participated in this declaration a copy of which is attached.

The liberation of Tunisia brings us face to face with many of the problems to which this declaration was addressed. For example, it has come to my attention that during the Nazi occupation fines were levied against the Jewish people in the larger cities of Tunisia and that in order to meet these levies it was necessary for these people to pledge their property. I understand that the funds to pay many of these levies were advanced by the banks against mortgages on Jewish property at high interest rates. It seems to me that the redemption of these mortgages as well as the payment of interest thereon are definitely within the purview of the aforementioned declaration.

⁶⁹ Maurice Couve de Murville, Finance Commissioner, French Committee of National Liberation, Algiers.

⁷⁰ Harold Glasser, Assistant Director of Monetary Research, Treasury Department, detailed to North Africa.

I am sure that there are many other illustrations of similar matters arising from forced labor costs, requisitions, et cetera.

I should very much appreciate your views on these problems including an indication of the approach toward the specific matters referred to above and any general program which you may be considering."

The French are studying the matter and have promised us a reply with respect to their policy. We have on three occasions within the past [apparent omission] urged them to hasten their reply. [Murphy.]

WILEY

740.00113 European War 1939/938 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1943—4 p. m.

1289. For Murphy. Department's 1275 of July 9. The following suggestions may be helpful to you in carrying out the President's instructions contained in the telegram under reference:

1. The French should be requested, as an immediate step, to declare a moratorium on the collection of all principal and interest due on obligations incurred by persons under the condition described in BOC Airgram 60.

2. In discussing the problems with the French, it should be borne in mind that invalidation and moratorium provisions will probably be insufficient to meet the problem. The French are likely to be concerned about the loss that would have to be borne by the banks if obligations of the type described in section 7 of BOC Airgram 60 were invalidated. The following measures might be suggested to meet this type of objection: (a) that if the banks are innocent of collaboration, they be paid as indemnity to make up the loss resulting from the cancellation of obligations; (b) that in lieu of cancelling obligations and transfers, the administration make reparation payments to persons fined by the Germans or whose property was confiscated to permit such persons to discharge the obligations or to compensate them for loss of property. This approach is discussed further in a separate telegram being sent by CCNA to NAEB.

3. In connection with the foregoing suggestions, it might be well to emphasize to the French the desirability and fairness of having the losses in question borne by the French administration. As a practical matter, it should be pointed out that the administration would be in a position to recoup losses resulting from indemnity or reparation payments suggested in paragraph 2 in the following ways: (a) by vesting enemy properties; (b) by recapturing commissions and other profits paid to banks and other intermediaries of the Germans; (c) by recovering amounts traced to beneficiaries of the Axis exactions as suggested in section 11 of BOC Airgram 60; and (d) by imposing

taxes aimed at windfall profits as proposed in COB 428.⁷² Another possibility is to have the administration substitute sequestered enemy property as security for the bank loan in place of the property mortgaged by persons to secure funds necessary to satisfy enemy levies.

4. If necessary, the French might be reminded that there are specific provisions of French law which invalidate contracts and obligations entered into for unlawful purposes or under conditions of duress, violence, or fraud. See in particular Article 1131 and 1109 of the Civil Code. You may wish to suggest the applicability of these general contract principles to the transactions described in BOC Airgram 60.

Further study is being given by the Department to the problems raised and you will be advised of additional suggestions and recommendations. In the meanwhile, you are requested to proceed along whatever lines appear to promise relief from the unjust exactions imposed by the enemy in Tunisia.

HULL

740.00113 European War 1939/1050 : Telegram

*The Vice Consul at Algiers (McBride)*⁷³ to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, September 1, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received September 2—2:07 a. m.]

1513. For Secretary and Morgenthau from Murphy and Glasser. Department's 1276 [1275]⁷⁴ and 1289.⁷⁵ Commissariat of Finance proposal for settling problem of mortgages, fines, levies, et cetera, imposed on Jews in Tunisia by enemy is as follows: The banks to make loans to organized Jewish communities who will distribute funds and will give formal acknowledgment of debt but will not pledge any property. These loans are to be of indefinite maturity and guaranteed by Tunisian Treasury. It is proposed advance will last until such time as it is possible to settle whole question of fines and levies imposed by enemy in both France and Tunisia. Tunisian Treasury to pay all charges including interest. Advances will be sufficient in amount to repay previous bank loans and reimburse fully members of Jewish communities who advanced funds to meet enemy levies.

This proposal to be submitted to Comité.⁷⁶ We said conditions were great improvement over previous suggestions but we considered that [it] was important that French authorities assume obligation in first instance. French have two objections to this. First—do not want to

⁷² Dated May 15, not printed.

⁷³ Robert H. McBride, Secretary and Vice Consul, in charge of Consulate General during absence of the Consul General, September 1-25.

⁷⁴ Dated July 9, p. 283.

⁷⁵ *Supra.*

⁷⁶ Comité Français de la Libération Nationale (French Committee of National Liberation), which was constituted on June 3, 1943.

commit French Treasury at this time to an unknown and possibly huge financial burden once France is free. Second—in view of delicate Arab-Jewish political problem in Tunisia, fear direct payment of Jewish fines will lead to resentment and demands for financial aid by Arabs. We have requested matter not be referred to the Comité pending your reactions. We believe by continuing to point out advantages to Economic Warfare of our position we still have a good possibility of achieving unqualified indemnification by French authorities.

Please reply urgently. [Murphy and Glasser.]

MCBRIDE

740.00113 European War 1939/1070

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

No. 11,126

LONDON, September 10, 1943.

[Received September 15.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's instruction 2913 of July 13, 1943,⁷⁷ asking the Embassy to submit its views as to measures which might be taken to invalidate the forced transfers of property belonging to Jewish residents in Tunisia described in BOC airgram 60 of June 15, 1943, from Algiers. In accordance with the Department's instruction, the Embassy has consulted officials of the British Foreign Office and Trading with the Enemy Department.

Since the question of invalidating forced transfers of Jewish property in Tunisia is related to the broader problem of invalidating Axis acts of dispossession in all the occupied countries of Europe, the following discussion deals both with the general issues and with their application to Tunisia. This discussion, of course, presumes the liberation of the occupied countries because effective action to invalidate forced transfers will in most cases be possible only after liberation. The general policy to be followed has already been outlined in the Inter-Allied Declaration of January 5, 1943, but important policy decisions remain to be made in the application of the Declaration to concrete cases.

The Inter-Allied Declaration of January 5, 1943, refers to transfers of property, rights and interests located in occupied territory or belonging to persons resident in such territory. The terms of the Declaration are sufficiently broad to cover any transfer during the period of occupation but are obviously meant to apply more specifically to transfers made directly or indirectly at the behest and for the benefit of the enemy, that is, to transfers which can be described as forms of looting, spoliation or economic and financial

⁷⁷ See footnote 64, p. 280.

penetration. However, all forms of looting are covered, regardless of the type of property or any cloak of legality or any compensation, partial or complete.

The British officials consulted tended immediately to take the view that although the Declaration covers all forms of looting or forced transfers of property, it will not be practicable to do something about each and every case and that the various types of cases should be studied to determine what action is feasible and where the responsibility for action lies. Although the British officials consulted agree personally with many of the points of view expressed below, the following discussion does not represent the official British position which has not yet been formulated. Where British officials have expressed views similar to those outlined below, this is indicated at the appropriate points in the text. Further information respecting British views will be sent subsequently when available.

The following discussion analyses the types of cases likely to arise in accordance with (a) the kind of property involved, (b) its location. The location of the property will in large part determine where the responsibility for action to invalidate Axis property transfers lies.

I. IDENTIFIABLE AND TRACEABLE PROPERTY

The simplest cases and those to which the Declaration is most obviously applicable are those involving identifiable and traceable property. It will be convenient to divide transfers of such property into the following categories: (1) cases where the property subjected to seizure or transfer has remained inside the country (or possessions) in which it previously resided; (2) cases where the property has been taken outside the original country (or possessions).

(A) *Property Remaining in Same Country.*

Where the property involved is fixed, as in the case of real estate, or relatively immovable as in the case of buildings, it will, of course, have remained in the same location. Some movable property such as railway cars, automotive vehicles, refrigerators and the like may likewise have remained in the same location (even though seized and temporarily used by Axis occupying authorities as individuals) or, if moved, may not have been taken outside the country (or possessions, as in the case of French North and West Africa). In these cases the property involved will by virtue of its physical location be under the jurisdiction of the same Government, or at least country, as before. (This assumes that the Government supplanting the Axis occupation authorities is a Government of the same country as before, i.e., that the country continues to exist in more or less the same form as before. Boundary changes may, of course, occur and complicate the situation somewhat.)

In all cases of dispossession where the property remains under the jurisdiction of the same Government or country, the question of return of such property to the rightful owners is properly the concern of the Government in question. The Allied Governments in London and the French National Committee have all indicated adherence to the Inter-Allied Declaration and are, therefore, obligated to implement its terms as regards property under their jurisdiction. Once the occupied territories are liberated and national Governments are re-established in each of these countries, it is to be expected that they will adopt whatever measures are necessary and feasible to carry out the aims of the Declaration. This view appears to be in accord with views expressed by the British officials consulted.

French North Africa presents a special case. Property which has been removed from North Africa to Metropolitan France, is for the time being outside the control of the French authorities in North Africa. However, it may, after the liberation of France, come within the jurisdiction of the Government which is then established in France. This Government may or may not regard itself bound by the act of the French National Committee in adhering to the Declaration but will, it is hoped, adopt measures in accordance therewith.

The houses and other quarters mentioned in BOC airgram 60 as requisitioned or seized by the Axis occupation authorities in Tunisia presumably come within this general category of property. In many of these cases the question of actual transfer of title may not have arisen. The occupying authorities simply took possession temporarily. Following their departure possession was presumably restored to the original occupants or owners. Many of these cases may come under the Hague Convention.⁷⁸ Some of the movable property such as the railway cars, motor cars, other vehicles, refrigerators, radios, firearms and the like reported in BOC airgram 60 to have been requisitioned or seized in Tunisia may still be in North Africa and, therefore, also belong in this general category. The furniture, fixtures, rugs, hangings etc. likewise reported to have been seized are in most instances probably not traceable or not indentifiable with sufficient certainty to belong in this category.

(B) Property Taken Outside the Original Country.

Many identifiable movable articles seized by Axis individuals in Tunisia appear to have been shipped to Continental Europe. Except in those instances where the property is recovered in Metropolitan France, it will therefore be outside the jurisdiction of the French

⁷⁸ For text of convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land, signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907, see *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204, or Department of State Treaty Series No. 539, or 36 Stat. (pt. 2) 2277.

authorities even after all France is liberated. Restoration of the property and implementation of the Declaration will thus require action by more than one country.

Three cases may be distinguished: (1) those in which the property is located in enemy or enemy-allied territory; (2) those in which it is located in a neutral country; (3) those in which it is located in an Allied country now in enemy occupation.

In the first case, it seems that the return of the property will have to be made the subject of special arrangements with Allied occupation authorities or with whatever governments are later formed in those countries.

The second case appears to present the most difficult problems of all. In the absence of any special arrangements it seems that the individuals' suits would have to be brought in the law courts of the neutral countries. The outcome would be uncertain, particularly in cases where the property had changed hands several times. On the other hand, if the neutral countries were asked to undertake, by treaty or otherwise, to direct their courts in such cases the question would arise how far other countries, for example the United States and Great Britain, were ready to take similar steps. We think that, as a preliminary step, it is advisable to examine the legal systems of the neutral countries concerned from the point of view of cases involving the Declaration. These views respecting the problem of the neutrals are shared by some of the British officials concerned.

The neutrals will also constitute a problem as regards titles to property such as shares in industrial concerns. It is known that German interests have acquired share holdings in many business enterprises located in occupied countries. As (or just before) the German forces are driven out of these countries, the new German holders of such shares may attempt to disguise the German ownership by transferring title to neutral names or may attempt to sell such shares to neutral buyers (who have already been warned against such purchasers by the Declaration). One of the problems confronting the Governments of newly liberated territories will be that of deciding who has proper title in cases where title transfers occurred during the German occupation and of uncovering any hidden German interest where it exists.

The third case involves cooperation between the parties to the Declaration. Effective action to return property looted by the Axis may require more than an undertaking not to recognize the validity of transfers by the Axis. This is true quite apart from the question what executive or legislative action could be taken to assure that courts will refuse to regard Axis transfers as valid.

We think it will be advisable to set up some form of international commission to facilitate the adjustments required in the first and

third categories and avoid the confusion likely to arise if each piece of property involved is made the subject of separate negotiations.

It may also be advisable to turn over to some kind of international body the problem of untangling title to corporate industrial properties located in the occupied countries where the Germans have made efforts during the occupation to acquire title in whole or part and possibly also to hide such title before liberation of the country. While this untangling may be regarded by (some of) the Governments of liberated countries as a domestic prerogative, it seems to us advantageous to attempt to get some uniformity of practice in this way. The question of uncovering any German title to industrial and commercial property is involved, not only in the problem of restoring property to original owners under the Declaration but also in connection with the sequestration of enemy property to meet claims against the enemy for war damage. While certain British officials agree in general as to the desirability of an international commission for handling problems of this kind, no detailed opinions have yet been expressed as to the precise duties and functions of such a commission.

(C) Compensation for Damage to Property.

The houses and other quarters requisitioned or seized by the Axis in Tunisia were apparently in most instances taken over without compensation of any kind for tenancy or at least without adequate compensation. Moreover, in many cases considerable damage appears to have been done to the properties. These losses represent in a sense property transfers to the Axis but they probably cannot usefully be regarded as transfers of the type envisaged in the Declaration since the problem involved is not return of the properties but compensation for the losses suffered.

Conceivably compensation could be demanded in the first instance from the enemy after defeat. It seems more likely, however, that the Governments of liberated areas will establish means for granting compensation to their nationals or persons under their jurisdiction for war losses and seek recompense later from the enemy, if at all. This, however, involves the general question of reparations which is beyond the scope of this discussion. The kinds of losses for which Governments of liberated areas will provide compensation and the extent of the compensation are presumably matters for local determination.

In the case of movable articles seized by the Germans, the articles when located may likewise be found damaged or deteriorated. The question of whether compensation is to be paid for such damage and by whom will be a difficult one. The return of the articles is a matter clearly coming under the Declaration and one on which the signatory

Governments have committed themselves. The same is not necessarily true as regards the question of compensation for damage or deterioration. Where the articles have not been taken outside the jurisdiction of the original country of residence, the problem is again one for local determination. Where the articles have been taken away to another country, the country in which they come to rest, if a signatory to the Declaration, can probably be regarded as having partial responsibility for return of the articles; but whether the recipient country can be regarded as having any responsibility for damage is highly problematical. The person responsible for the damage may not, for example, be within the jurisdiction of the recipient country. Here again the question of reparations is involved.

II. NON-IDENTIFIABLE AND UNTRACEABLE PROPERTY

Articles seized by the Germans or Italians in Tunisia which cannot be traced or identified present a case of forced property transfer where the remedy of the Declaration, namely invalidation of the transfer, cannot be applied. Loss of such articles will presumably have to be treated like other cases of occupation or war damage where the recompense, if any, must come from the local Government or enemy. Representatives of the Allied Governments in London on the Sub-Committee on Axis Acts of Dispossession have several times mentioned informally and unofficially the possibility of obtaining recompense from Germany in the shape simply of some useful physical object, not necessarily of the same kind as the article originally looted by the Germans. This is evidently regarded by some of these people as far better than financial reparations or the promise thereof. It involves almost a form of inverse looting of Germany to recompense the individuals in occupied countries who suffered losses as a result of the original German looting. Any compensation for unfair losses imposed on individual Germans in this process would have to be taken care of, if at all, by the German Government. It should be emphasized that this viewpoint is strictly unofficial, and so far as can be determined here at present, simply the personal opinion of a number of individual officials. It is put forward by these individuals, not as a proposal, but simply as a tentative suggestion for discussion.

III. CAPITAL LEVIES, FINES, AND OTHER IMPOSITIONS

One of the difficult problems raised by BOC-60 is the treatment of the property transfers resulting from the fines and levies imposed on the Jewish community. BOC-60 points out that the Jewish community was compelled to supply and support laborers for the occupying authority and to care for Jewish refugees and that to meet these expenses the community imposed a 10% to 15% capital levy totalling 60,000,000 francs upon its members who mortgaged or sold property

to raise the necessary funds. To meet an additional 20,000,000 franc bomb damage levy the Jewish community was compelled to resort to an 8% loan from the Caisse Fonciere, a semi-official institution which took mortgages on Jewish property as security. In addition, a fine of 3,000,000 francs was imposed on the community for absenteeism on the part of forced Jewish labor and was met by the sale of jewels and other property belonging to individual members of the community. These are all property transfers resulting indirectly from Axis action, but they are not transfers made directly and in the first instance under Axis pressure. The British officials consulted appeared to be divided on the question of whether or not transfers of this type can properly be regarded as subject to the Declaration. The view was expressed that the Axis action consisted of imposition of a fine (which is itself a transfer of property, i.e., currency) but that the Jewish individuals who mortgaged or sold property did so merely as one means of raising the necessary funds and that these transfers, while the direct consequence of the fine, are not transfers of the type envisaged by the Declaration or at least are not transfers which can feasibly be declared invalid under the Declaration. The British officials pointed out that individual Jews may have sold property to other Jews or friends in order to obtain the necessary cash resources and that to declare such transfers invalid would simply create further difficulties and injustices. It was also suggested that this type of action by the enemy is related to occupation levies such as that imposed on the French and paid for through advances from the Bank of France. Occupation levies while also a property transfer of sorts do not, it was claimed, give rise to transfers of specific pieces of property which can be invalidated and do not, therefore, represent a problem properly coming under the Declaration. On the other hand, it was argued, that a fine of this type may simply be a thinly disguised form of looting and that under such circumstances the precise mechanism used should not be allowed to circumvent the aims of the Declaration.

It was agreed that in the case of the Tunisian fines under discussion the mortgages placed on Jewish properties were probably in most instances (and certainly in the case of the Caisse Fonciere) made out to persons or firms still under the jurisdiction of North African authorities. The problem was, therefore, regarded primarily as one for the local government. It was pointed out that the most obvious first step was to declare a moratorium on the mortgages involved—at least those made out to the Caisse Fonciere—as has apparently been done. (In cases where moratoria of this kind threaten the solvency of the banking institutions involved further steps would of course be necessary). This gives the local Government the time necessary to make final decisions respecting the action to be taken about these various forms of dispossession.

The foregoing discussion deals with two broad categories of cases coming within the scope of the Declaration: first, cases where the responsibility for action lies wholly or primarily with a single Government, that is, cases where the property has remained within territory under the jurisdiction of that Government; second, cases where international action is involved because the property has been moved into territory under the jurisdiction of another Government.

Measures for invalidating property transfers in the first category can only be devised after examination of the relevant laws in each Allied country concerned. (See Interim Report of Inter-Allied Subcommittee on Axis Acts of Dispossession ⁷⁹). Suggestions for concrete measures for invalidation in these cases can probably best be made by each of the Governments concerned, possibly after consultation with other interested Governments.

Measures for invalidating property transfers in the second category involve jurisdictional and legal problems. We feel therefore that the creation of an international commission would be helpful in such cases and could achieve a closer approximation to uniformity of treatment for essentially similar cases than would otherwise be attainable.

These questions will no doubt be considered by the Committee composed of Finance Ministers of Allied Governments, representatives of appropriate British authorities and of the Soviet Union, China and the Dominions when it takes up the final report of the Subcommittee on Axis Acts of Dispossession, which will probably be presented within the next three months. We shall appreciate a statement of the Department's views before the main committee meets.⁸⁰

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
W. J. GALLMAN
First Secretary of Embassy

740.00113 European War 1939/1076: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers
(Wiley)

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1943—midnight.

2048. For Murphy and Hoffman ⁸¹ from Stettinius ⁸² and Morgenthau. Your 1513, September 1; 1962, September 20; ⁸³ and BOC

⁷⁹ Copy of this Report was transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his despatch No. 9758, June 24, 1943, not printed.

⁸⁰ In a memorandum of March 13, 1944, to the Division of Communications and Records, Mr. Harold R. Spiegel of the Liberated Areas Division stated: "The inquiry in this despatch no longer needs an answer for the reason that the contemplated meeting of the Allied Finance Ministers in London has not been held and, as far as known, it will not be held." (740.00113 EW 1939/1070)

⁸¹ M. L. Hoffman, Assistant Director of Foreign Funds Control, Treasury Department, on detail in North Africa.

⁸² Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State.

⁸³ Not printed.

Airgram 129, October 11.⁸⁴ Issue raised in telegrams and airgram under reference have received detailed consideration and the following position has been decided upon:

1. The United Nations Declaration is not sufficiently relevant to warrant its use as the basis for this Government's position on the discrimination issue. The issue is faced on its merits and the conclusion is in no way dependent upon the Declaration.

2. As we understand it, the Commissariat of Finance is examining three possible courses of action for recommendation to the Comité with respect to fines and levies imposed on the Jewish Community in Tunis.

(a) Loans would be made to the Jewish Community which would distribute funds to individual members of the Community and the Community would formally acknowledge the debt to the banks but no security would be pledged. Loans would be of indefinite maturity and guaranteed by Tunisian Treasury which would pay all charges, including interest. Amount of loans would be sufficient to repay previous bank loans and to reimburse fully the members of the Community who advanced funds and mortgaged or sold property to meet fines and levies. Ultimate decision on question whether loans are to be considered as final obligation of the government or to be repaid by the Community, and if so under what terms and conditions, would be made only after the facts concerning fines and levies in other areas of colonial and metropolitan France have been ascertained.

(b) To have the French authorities assume responsibility in the first instance, i.e., to make funds available in the form of a gift by the authorities, rather than by a loan which would permit the authorities to leave the ultimate decision for later determination.

(c) To take action as provided in (a) or (b) above and also to make funds available up to fixed amount to all persons in Tunis for repair of property damaged or destroyed as result of war.

3. This Government favors the proposal as set forth in (b) and (c) with the French authorities assuming responsibility in first instance, subject to the following modification which is an additional point. Any other person or group of persons who were subjected to similar discriminatory treatment and injury should be entitled to relief also upon submitting proof of such discriminatory treatment and injury. For example, if Nazis seized or requisitioned property from a person or group of persons solely for the reason of such person or group of persons' race or political views, similar discrimination would seem to be proved.

4. The reasons for this Government's position are:

(a) Unless funds are now made available as gifts, total relief will be lacking as recipients will not have same freedom in respect to use of such funds in absence of knowledge that repayment will not be expected, nor payment of any carrying or interest charges, and

⁸⁴ Not printed.

(b) From the standpoint of psychological warfare, restitution for the Jews is essential to show to the world that the United Nations guarantees of the Atlantic Charter⁸⁴ against racial discrimination mean what they say, and that Allies are fighting Hitler's methods as well as Hitler.

The modification embodying an additional point is to provide a means for not disturbing the delicate Arab-Jewish relationship. We recognize the strength of the argument for the proposal contained in 2(a), as reported by you, but have concluded that this argument is over-weighed by the considerations set forth in 4 (a) and (b).

5. It is requested that the position of this Government be presented to the appropriate French authorities, unless you perceive some objection. At that time it should be made wholly clear to such authorities that we recognize clearly that the decisions are for the French to make and merely present our views to them for their consideration.⁸⁵

6. For your information we are repeating this to London⁸⁶ with the request that the British be strongly urged to take a similar position and because of the urgency of the matter do so without delay. We have asked the Embassy in London to keep you informed directly. [Stettinius and Morgenthau.]

STETTINIUS

740.00113 European War 1939/1076

The Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In your letter of July 30⁸⁷ you requested that you be kept informed of developments with respect to the fines and levies imposed by the German occupation authorities on the Jewish Community in Tunis. There are attached paraphrases of cables which have just been sent to Algiers and London⁸⁸ setting forth the position of this Government with respect to this matter.

The position taken by this Government is that funds should be given to the Jewish Community to cover the fines and levies and the obligation assumed by the French authorities in the first instance. The reasons for this position are (1) full relief can only be effected by having the French authorities assume responsibility at

⁸⁴ For text of United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, embodying the Atlantic Charter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, p. 25, or Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 236, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1603.

⁸⁵ In telegram No. 2035, November 20, 1 p. m., the Consul General at Algiers reported that local political considerations made it inadvisable to present program to the French immediately (740.00113 European War 1939/1147).

⁸⁶ Repeated as telegram No. 6889, November 2, midnight, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

⁸⁷ Not printed.

⁸⁸ See telegram No. 2048, November 2, *supra*.

this time, and (2) such action is desirable from the standpoint of psychological warfare. In the cables under reference, it is also suggested that the position of this Government be brought to the attention of the appropriate French authorities, but it should at that time be pointed out that we recognize that the ultimate decision is, naturally, a matter for the French to determine.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the cables under reference were discussed with representatives of the Treasury Department and had the full approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.

Faithfully yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

740.00113 European War 1939/1076 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1943—4 p. m.

93. Personal for Hoffman from Morgenthau. In a telegram from Stettinius and Morgenthau to Murphy and you of November 2, No. 2048, we presented the position of this Government with respect to the fines and levies imposed on the Jewish Community in Tunisia and war damage in general. We requested that this position be presented to the appropriate French authorities unless Murphy or you perceived some objection. We further stated that it should be made clear to the French authorities at this time that it is clearly recognized by us that the decisions are for the French to make and that our views should be merely presented to them for their consideration.

In a cable from Wiley of November 20, No. 2035,⁸⁹ it was indicated that the prompt presentation of this Government's position on this matter to the French authorities for their consideration and decision was deemed inadvisable in view of local political considerations.

Despite the strong interest which the Treasury has shown in this matter as evidenced in our cables, I have not received any information from you concerning developments since the dispatch of cable 2048. In your BOC 1718 of November 21⁸⁹ you refer to our 2048, but merely indicate that the French have been asked to set aside for the present final decision with respect to Jewish Community fines and levies, and request our views as to whether the French should be asked to alter their policy on the general question of war damages in view of our cable. Snider,⁹⁰ who left Algiers on November 26, had no information on this matter.

⁸⁹ Not printed.

⁹⁰ D. A. Snider, Representative of the Treasury Department.

You are hereby requested to furnish to me directly a full detailed report concerning all developments in this matter since the dispatch of our 2048. You should cover the following points:

(1) Did you discuss cable 2048 with Murphy or Wiley and make clear our concern regarding this matter.

(2) Explain fully if known to you the reasons that it was decided that local conditions would not even permit the presentation of this Government's view to the French authorities and whether you were in agreement with such decision and reasons. In this connection it was our understanding that the French authorities had requested and were awaiting our recommendation and advice on this question and we had stressed the urgency of the matter in our cable.

(3) Why no response to cable 2048 of November 2 was made before November 20.

A prompt reply is requested. [Morgenthau.]

HULL

740.00113 European War 1939/1205 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 14, 1943.

[Received December 15—7:10 a. m.]

8705. The Embassy wrote to the Foreign Office on November 3rd, following receipt of the Department's 6889 November 2.⁹² A letter has been received from the Foreign Office which, after making suitable apologies for delay in replying regarding this matter, continues as follows:

"His Majesty's Government recognize that it is desirable on grounds of general policy that speedy relief should be afforded to the victims of discriminatory measures imposed by the enemy. They doubt, however, whether the present case is an appropriate one in which to attempt to influence the decision of the French authorities as to the particular measures to be adopted since the compensation which the latter may decide to afford to the victims of such discrimination is a matter not of international obligation but of domestic law and policy. The *locus standi* of the British and United States Governments in this matter seems to be further weakened by the fact that it is agreed that the Inter-Allied Declaration of the 5th January 1943 concerning acts of dispossession committed by the enemy in occupied territory is not sufficiently relevant to the present question to be used as a basis of representation.

His Majesty's Government are the more reluctant to intervene in this question as it appears to them that the attitude adopted by the United States Government would logically involve pressing each United Nations Government, on its return from exile, to make good

⁹² See footnote 86, p. 296.

without prior assurance of reparation by the enemy all losses due to discriminatory measures imposed by the latter. His Majesty's Government would not wish to commit themselves to pressing this course upon Allied Governments and in the [apparent omission] they do not feel able to urge the French authorities to take any action at this stage which might tie their hands when the whole question of compensation is considered after the liberation of metropolitan France.

For the above reasons His Majesty's Government while feeling that the matter is one for the French authorities to decide alone are inclined on general grounds to support a proposal which they understand to be favoured by those authorities and which corresponds to that in sub-paragraph 2a of your letter of the 3rd November, namely that temporary relief should be granted by way of loans to the victims of both discriminatory fines and war damage, the whole matter being subject to final post-war settlement in accordance with such measures as are eventually adopted in metropolitan France. In view of the interest taken by the United States Government in this matter His Majesty's Embassy at Washington were instructed on the 3rd September last, to convey to them His Majesty's Government's approval of this proposal."

The Embassy has been pressing the Foreign Office for this answer and regrets the delay.

Repeated to Algiers.

WINANT

740.00113 European War/1206 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 15, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

157. For Morgenthau from Johnson⁹³ from Hoffman. The following message is for Secretary Morgenthau from Hoffman in reply to his personal message transmitted in Department's 93, of December 9.

Section I. Following is in response to your request for report on developments in connection with Tunisian Jewish mortgage problem since receipt of your 2048 of November 2, which was not received by me until November 5.

I fully appreciate importance attached to this matter by Treasury.

Section II. Your point 1. Cable 2048 was discussed immediately with Royce⁹⁴ and thereafter with Murphy and Wilson. After preliminary discussion position was embodied in letter which underwent several drafts as result of discussions which followed Treasury's in-

⁹³ Harold F. Johnson, temporary officer on special detail, North African Economic Board.

⁹⁴ Alexander Royce, Director of War Economic Operations for North and West Africa.

terest and statement of President's position contained in State Department cable 1276 [1275] of July 9 were described and discussed in all of these conferences.

Section IIIe [*sic*]. Your point 2. I was advised by Murphy that delicate relations with Comité arising from Lebanese crisis⁹⁵ made presentation of our views on a question of such political implications inadvisable at that time. Lack of British support was regarded as particularly unfortunate at that time and it was hoped that answer from London might be received in a few days. In view of these considerations I agreed with Murphy to defer action temporarily provided our views, even without British support, would be presented to French in a few days and before they took independent action. At this time our 2035⁹⁶ was dispatched. You are correct in your understanding that French were anxious to receive our views.

Section IV. Your point 3. Our 2035 was signed November 18. Delay in responding your 2048 due first to my expectation of prompt response from London in view paragraph 6 your 2048 and to necessity of completion of analysis and discussion with French of war damage legislation reported our BOC 1718⁹⁷ in order to determine relation between your proposals and action already taken by French. Delay these causes about one week. Subsequent delay due to discussions referred to in Sections II and III above. Cable 2035 dispatched immediately upon clarification of situation referred to in Section III above.

Section V. After a few days matter was raised again with Royce. Ambassador Wilson's⁹⁸ appointment was announced November 22 and it was felt desirable to discuss matter with him. After consultation with Wilson we advised Commissariat of Finance on November 26 that we were prepared to present our views. Views were presented to Mendes-France⁹⁹ on November 29 by Royce and Hoffman orally and in form of unsigned memorandum embodying complete position taken in 2048 copy of which has been forwarded Treasury. Mendes-France advised us that he would have an answer in a few days but desired consult with Cartry, Director Finance, Tunis, before giving his views. I was advised on December 13 by Mendes-France that Cartry has just arrived and that he hopes to give us French response later this week. [Johnson; Hoffman.]

WILSON

⁹⁵ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iv, pp. 996 ff.

⁹⁶ See footnote 85, p. 296.

⁹⁷ Dated November 21, not printed.

⁹⁸ Edwin C. Wilson, American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers.

⁹⁹ Pierre Mendes-France, Minister of Finance, French Committee of National Liberation.

851R.50 C.C.N.A./99: Telegram

The Officer in Charge of Mission in Algeria (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, January 21, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

212. This is 1987, Treasury A-151. Reference BOC 1969.¹

French have now made available to us details of program concerning Tunisian mortgage problem. As indicated in BOC 1969 outlines of this program are similar to those of French proposal described in our 1513 of 1 September 1943 with following changes:

(1) Instead of being of indefinite maturity loans will fall due in 3 years. This time limit is set so that these loans will conform with the terms of loans granted under general war damage legislation. Refer BOC 1718.¹ However, loans for relief of Tunisian mortgages may be extended by agreement between the Tunisian state and banks granting credits provided such agreement is reached 2 months before expiration date. This provision has practical effect of making loans of indefinite maturity and we believe this is French intention.

(2) Service charges on loans will be borne not by Tunisian state but by Comité. Program has been accepted by Comité and is being forwarded to Tunisian authorities for approval and enactment. Complete description of proposal follows by airgram.²

CHAPIN

**AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FRENCH
COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION REGARDING RECIPROCAL
AID IN FRENCH NORTH AND WEST AFRICA**

[For text of agreement signed at Algiers, September 25, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 483, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1666.]

¹ Not printed.

² Not found in Department files.

GREECE

(See Volume IV, pages 124-177.)

ICELAND

REDUCTION IN PRICES CHARGED BY THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN ICELAND FOR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN RESPONSE TO REPRESENTATIONS BY THE ICELANDIC GOVERNMENT

859A.6363/31

The Icelandic Minister (Thors) to the Secretary of State

The Minister of Iceland presents his compliments to the Honorable, the Secretary of State and has the honor to call the Secretary's attention to the following matter:

During the last twelve to fifteen years British companies have supplied Iceland with all its requirements of gasoline, oil, petrol and kerosene. This remained so until last September when the United States Navy began to supply Iceland with these commodities, according to an agreement between the Government of the United States and the United Kingdom and of which the Icelandic Government was unaware.

When the United States Navy had supplied Icelandic firms with these commodities for almost two months it became known that the United States Navy was charging considerably higher prices to the Icelandic companies than they had been paying to the British suppliers. As it is the firm policy of the present Icelandic Government to fight the inflation that has occurred in Iceland, and not to allow any raise in prices, the Icelandic oil companies have had to sell the supplies obtained from the United States Navy at a considerable loss. This situation evidently cannot continue to exist and the Icelandic Government is therefore faced with the alternative of giving way to raising the prices unless the United States Navy is willing to sell these commodities at the same prices as the Icelandic companies had been paying the British suppliers.

Gasoline, oil and petrol are very important factors in the cost of production for Icelandic fisheries. It would result in extremely serious consequences should the Icelandic Government be unable to halt the inflation by keeping the prices for these commodities at their former level. In addition the Icelandic fishermen are not able to pay higher prices for these necessities as the price of fish was fixed in a previous agreement with the United States and Great Britain.

The Minister of Iceland has been informed that the Department of State has received details in this matter from the American Legation

in Reykjavik and the Icelandic Government would be greatly appreciative if, through the good services of the Department of State, a satisfactory solution could be arrived at in this matter.

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1943.

859A.6363/30: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland (Morris)

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1943—10 p. m.

26. Your 19, January 12,¹ and other telegrams regarding supply of petroleum products for Iceland.

(1) An investigation of the price of petroleum products charged Iceland by the United States Navy reveals that this price is the actual cost of delivery as determined by the War Shipping Administration. This price is higher than the price charged by the British because the latter price is based on artificial calculation of cost based on a subsidy. We are exploring possibility of bringing about a reduction in delivery price in Iceland.

(2) For your strictly confidential information, the Navy Department informs us that responsibility for supplying Iceland with petroleum products was transferred from the United Kingdom to the United States in August 1942 at the request of the British Admiralty. Navy's agreement was based primarily on military considerations and necessities rather than on Icelandic civilian factors which were considered relatively of lesser importance. We are also exploring this phase further and will inform you of the results.

HULL

859A.6363/32: Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (Morris) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, January 29, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received January 30—9:15 p. m.]

52. I communicated to the Icelandic Foreign Office the contents of the first paragraph of your telegram no. 26 of January 22, 1943, after which the Foreign Minister² sent for me and expressed his appreciation of the understanding and aid which the Department is endeavoring to lend in the question of fuel oil deliveries. The Foreign Minister showed me telegrams recently received from the Ice-

¹ Not printed.

² Vilhjalmur Thor.

landic Minister in Washington which also reflect appreciation of the Department's efforts to help. Mr. Thor said that the petroleum agencies are threatening to stop deliveries of motorcycles fuels at present prices after February 1 unless the Government consents to a price advance. The Foreign Minister said that he appreciated the Department's suggestion made informally to the Icelandic Minister to increase prices temporarily against a possible future readjustment in view of the delay the Department is necessarily encountering in consulting interested American and British agencies. He said that he was reluctant to follow this suggestion as it would upset the keystone of his Government's whole policy which is based on a freezing of prices as reported in my telegram no. 674 of December 24, 1942.³ To ask the Parliament to absorb the present loss on fuel oil prices even temporarily from the general Treasury would be for him a highly undesirable course as it would open to debate the whole matter of economic relationship of Iceland with the United States and Great Britain. Strong opposition to the present Governmental policy would almost surely ensure [*ensue*] and the Government does not feel itself firmly enough seated to risk itself in the hands of Parliament at present in regard to its retrenchment policy. I told the Foreign Minister that there was obviously little more that the Department would do to expedite matters as was perfectly apparent from the telegrams he had received from the Icelandic Minister at Washington and I strongly recommended that he use his best efforts to induce the petroleum companies to continue delivery at present prices at least up to February 15, by which time I hoped the Department would have been able to conclude its investigations and consultations with other agencies, both British and American. Mr. Thor accepted my viewpoint and said that he would do his best in this sense. I will telegraph as soon as result is known.

As will be understood from the foregoing the acuteness of this question and its importance to the present Government have not abated. I feel confident that the Department will wish to use the most expeditious means of communication [in] order to pursue to a conclusion this question which is of such prime importance to the present government and its policy. Faulty and slipshod methods in the treatment of the provision of fuel oil and related economic questions are apparent in the past. The present Government, however, is not responsible for them and its declared policy is on the right track. I am hopeful that if it is able to solve this one problem without too much exposure to the Parliament and to the public of past errors—which could result in the unseating of this managerial gov-

³ Not printed.

ernment and a return to the unbusinesslike methods, bickerings, and quarrels of the political parties, none of which enjoys a majority—our own relationship in the economic field will profit thereby.

This whole matter is extremely complicated and I probably have not yet been able to gather in all the loose ends to make a clear picture of just what happened in respect of these liquid fuel deliveries which are tied in with the Lend-Lease fish contract ⁴ for [apparent omission].

MORRIS

859A.6363/32 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland (Morris)

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1943—10 p. m.

52. Legation's 52, January 29. Department is informed by Navy that Naval Commandant in Iceland has been instructed to reduce prices of petroleum deliveries to substantially equal those charged by British deliveries prior to September 1942.

The Minister of Iceland here, upon being informed of this concession, now asks that the Navy refund any monies paid between September and the present time, in excess of the former British rate. He was told that decision to do this would have to originate with the Naval Commandant in Iceland in as much as latter is most familiar with the facts and the accounting complications involved.

HULL

859A.6363/35

The Secretary of State to the Icelandic Minister (Thors)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Iceland and invites attention to his note of January 15, 1943 respecting the prices charged for the delivery of petroleum products to Iceland.

As the Minister requested in the note under reference, the United States Government has considered the practicability of delivering petroleum products to Iceland at a rate substantially equivalent to that charged for similar deliveries by British tankers prior to September 1942, and it has been found feasible to do so. The Commandant of United States naval forces in Iceland has accordingly been directed to make the necessary adjustments.

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1943.

⁴ For correspondence concerning this subject, see *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 755-775, *passim*.

859A.6363/42 : Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (Morris) to the Secretary of State

REYKJAVIK, March 10, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 12:07 p. m.]

141. Legation's 101, February 22, 3 p. m.⁵ and Department's 52, February 16, 10 p. m. In view of instructions received by the Naval Commandant here and communicated by him to me I formally advised the Foreign Minister on March 5 that the Navy would issue liquid fuels to Icelandic oil companies at charges based upon the cost at source plus freight charges equal to the British freight charges established as of September last plus handling charges and that the Commandant would credit the companies with the excess charge for prior purchases based upon the difference between the newly established and the past schedule of charges. The Foreign Minister expressed to me today by formal note "the Icelandic Government's appreciation of the sympathetic attitude taken in this matter" and orally stated that this action has been of inestimable assistance to the present Government.

MORRIS

REQUEST BY ICELAND FOR ASSURANCES REGARDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH TROOPS FROM THE ISLAND⁶

859A.20/337

The Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Legation in Iceland

AIDE-MÉMOIRE⁷

On the 24th of June, 1941, His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Reykjavik informed the Icelandic Government that the British Forces in Iceland were required elsewhere, but these forces had been in Iceland since May 10th, 1940, when they occupied many strategically vital points in this country. At the same time the British Minister informed the Government that the President of the United States of America was prepared to send immediately United States troops to supplement and eventually to replace the British Forces here provided an invitation came from the Icelandic Government.

On this basis an agreement was reached whereby the protection of Iceland was entrusted to the United States, ref. cablegrams ex-

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ For previous correspondence respecting the defense of Iceland, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

⁷ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Iceland in his despatch No. 178, August 11; received August 19.

changed between the Prime Minister of Iceland and the President of the United States in June–July 1941, this agreement being a little later sanctioned by the Althing and ratified by the Regent.⁸

Among other reasons governing the attitude of the Icelandic Government and the Althing in this matter was the one that it was considered of great advantage that instead of British occupation against the will of the nation there came a free agreement with the United States on the protection of the country.

Quite naturally as also intelligible to the Icelanders it was unavoidable that a transportation of forces from the United States to replace the British troops should take some time. On the other hand, His Britannic Majesty's Minister made a declaration to the effect that "Great Britain promises to withdraw from this country all her armed forces as soon as the transport of the United States forces is so far advanced that their military strength is sufficient for the defence of the country".

Now more than two years have elapsed since the first United States forces arrived in this country according to the above mentioned agreement, and in this country there are still stationed British forces, mainly in the air and navy services, and even forces from another country originally coming here in connection with the British occupation.

These conditions which are different from what the Icelanders had in mind when the agreement with the President of the United States was made more than two years ago, give the Government of Iceland occasion to request the United States Government kindly to give information and confirm as to the following points, without, of course, asking for information about any military secrets not concerning Iceland.

I. Could not some date be decided in the near future when "the transport of the United States forces is so far advanced that their military strength is sufficient for the defence of the country"?

II. Has anything happened after the 1st of July 1941, to change the circumstances that the United States alone can exercise the protection of the country according to the made agreement. No such changes have been notified to the Icelandic Government hitherto.

Provided however that such was the case, could the Icelandic Government be given as accurate information as possible about such changed circumstances.

III. In the protection agreement it is provided that the United States will "withdraw with all their military forces, land, air and sea, from Iceland immediately on the conclusion of the present war."

⁸ For correspondence concerning the agreement with the Icelandic Government for sending of American troops to assume protection of Iceland, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 776 ff.

If, by any chance, cessation of hostilities should come before other nations' military forces, land, air and sea, have withdrawn from here, the Icelandic Government expect that the Government of the United States see to it that such forces withdraw from this country all at the same time as the United States forces. The Government would appreciate to receive confirmation to this effect.

In order to prevent any misunderstanding the Icelandic Government wish to point out that relations between Icelanders and Icelandic authorities and forces from other nations stationed here have been such that dissatisfaction in that respect has not in any way been the cause of this communication.

The Government would appreciate to receive the above-mentioned information as soon as possible, and in any case not later than some time before the Althing will be summoned to a session latest on the 1st of September 1943.

At the same time, the Government will notify His Britannic Majesty's Minister of the above inquiry, which for the time being, the Government wish should be considered informal and confidential.

REYKJAVIK, August 7, 1943.

859A.20/335

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Cumming)

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

Mr. Barclay⁹ telephoned me this morning and said that the British Foreign Office had informed the Embassy by telegraph that the Icelandic Government had given the British Minister in Reykjavik an *aide-mémoire* similar to the *aide-mémoire* given the American Minister which was the subject of Minister Morris' telegram no. 420, August 9, 4 p. m.¹⁰ The two memoranda referred to the withdrawal from Iceland of British and Norwegian troops now there.

Mr. Barclay said that the British Foreign Office telegram informed the Embassy that the questions posed by the Icelandic Government had been referred to the British Joint Chiefs of Staff for an expression of opinion. The Foreign Office telegram also expressed the hope that the State Department would make no reply to the Icelandic inquiry until the British Government had had an opportunity to present its views.

I told Mr. Barclay that since the question had military aspects, we were also contemplating putting the question to the United States

⁹ R. E. Barclay, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

¹⁰ Telegram not printed.

Joint Chiefs of Staff and that accordingly I felt sure that no reply would be sent to Iceland until the British Government had had an opportunity to present its views.

859A.20/335 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland (Morris)

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1943—11 p. m.

310. You may inform the Icelandic Foreign Minister that the contents of his *aide-mémoire*¹¹ which was the subject of your 420, August 9, 4 p. m.,¹² will receive the immediate attention of the American Government. While we will do our best to expedite the formulation of our reply, we cannot undertake to have the reply ready before September 1, since the questions put to us by the Icelandic Government involve matters of high policy which will have to be laid before the military and naval authorities and the President.

WELLES

859A.20/339

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*¹³

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Icelandic Government are understood to have presented an *aide-mémoire* to the United States Minister at Reykjavik pointing out that in June 1941 in connexion with the taking over by United States forces of the protection of the Island, His Majesty's Government undertook to withdraw all forces as soon as the transport of United States forces was so far advanced that their military strength was sufficient for the defence of the country, and that in spite of this undertaking British naval and air forces are still stationed in Iceland. The Icelandic Government have accordingly asked :—

(1) Whether a date could be decided in the near future on which transport of United States forces is so far advanced that their military strength is sufficient for the defence of Iceland ;

(2) Whether anything has happened since 1941 to alter the agreement by which only the United States can exercise the protection of Iceland ; and

¹¹ Dated August 7, p. 307.

¹² Not printed.

¹³ Notation on original by Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Assistant Chief, Division of European Affairs: "15.IX.43 Mr. Hayter, Secretary of British Embassy informed orally that U. S. G. had no objection to H. M. G. making reply to Iceland Govt. in the sense of this *aide-mémoire*."

(3) Whether if the war ends before the other nations' forces have been withdrawn the United States will see to it that such forces withdraw at the same time as the United States forces, the United States having promised to withdraw all their forces at the end of the war. A reply is requested by September 1st when the Althing meets.

A copy of this *aide-mémoire* has been given to His Majesty's Minister in Reykjavik.

Although the original *aide-mémoire* was handed to the United States Minister, His Majesty's Government are directly concerned and would propose to reply direct, so far as British and Norwegian forces are concerned, through His Majesty's Minister.

If the United States Government agree, His Majesty's Government propose to inform the Icelandic Government that, as they are aware, the bulk of the British forces in Iceland have long ago been withdrawn, and command of forces there was taken over by the United States authorities on April 22, 1942. This date can therefore be regarded as the one referred to in point 1 of the Icelandic *aide-mémoire*. As regards point 2, the circumstances have been changed by the entry of the United States into the war. The Allied nations must be free to dispose their joint forces as they think best for the successful conduct of the war. Thus while the general responsibility for the protection of Iceland remains with the United States, it has been found necessary for operational reasons into which the Icelandic Government will not expect His Majesty's Government to enter, to maintain certain British personnel and Allied personnel under British operational control in the Island. These personnel should not be regarded as being left over from the original British force sent to defend the territory from invasion, but as performing special tasks of defending Iceland from attack by Germany's naval forces and keeping open the sea routes for the trade of Iceland and of the Allies. His Majesty's Government feel sure that the Icelandic Government will be prepared to regard the undertaking given in 1941 as sufficiently fulfilled by the withdrawal of the British force sent for the protection of the island against German attack and to release His Majesty's Government from literal fulfillment of that undertaking.

As regards point 3 of the Icelandic *aide-mémoire* it has, as the Icelandic Government is aware, never been the intention of His Majesty's Government to retain their forces in Iceland after the conclusion of the present war and the Icelandic Government may rest assured that the promise given by the President of the United States in respect of the withdrawal of American forces in Iceland applies no less to British forces and other forces under British operational control.

His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn whether the United States Government agree to their replying to the Icelandic Government in the above sense.

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1943.

859A.20/337 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland (Morris)

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1943—6 p. m.

336. Your 420, August 9 and despatch 178, August 11.¹⁴

1. You may deliver to the Foreign Minister the following *aide-mémoire* which has been approved by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff:

“The Government of the United States has considered the *aide-mémoire* dated August 7, 1943 regarding the protection of Iceland by United States forces.

The bulk of the British forces in Iceland having been withdrawn and the transport of United States forces having reached the point where their strength was considered sufficient for the defense of Iceland, the United States authorities on April 22, 1942 assumed command of the military forces in Iceland. This date can therefore be regarded as that referred to in point I of the Icelandic *aide-mémoire*.

As regards point II of the Icelandic *aide-mémoire*, the circumstances as they existed on July 1, 1941 have been changed by the entry of the United States into the war. The United Nations, including the United States, must be free to dispose their joint military forces as thought best for the successful conduct of the war. While the responsibility for the protection of Iceland rests with the United States, it has been found necessary for operational reasons to maintain certain British personnel, and Allied personnel under British operational control, in Iceland. These forces, including the Norwegian forces now under United States operational control, should not be regarded as being left over from the original British force sent to deny Iceland to the enemy, but are there to perform special tasks in connection with the defense of Iceland from attack by German air and naval forces and to keep open the sea routes for the commerce of Iceland and of the United Nations.

With respect to point III of the Icelandic *aide-mémoire*, the Government of the United States entertains no doubt as to the intention of other governments of the United Nations which now have military personnel stationed in Iceland to withdraw such personnel after the conclusion of the present war. The Government of the United States understands in this connection that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom considers that the promise made by the President of the United States in respect of the withdrawal of United States forces in Iceland applies no less to British forces, and other forces

¹⁴ Neither printed.

under British operational control, and intends to give the Government of Iceland assurances in this sense.”

2. For your confidential information the Department understands that the British Government will also inform the Icelandic Government along the foregoing lines but with specific reference to point III of the Icelandic *aide-mémoire* will say in substance that it has never been the intention of the British Government to retain forces in Iceland after the conclusion of the war and that accordingly the Icelandic Government may be assured that the President's promise in respect to the withdrawal of American forces in Iceland applies no less to British forces and other forces under British operational control.

HULL

**RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND ICELAND, SIGNED AT REYKJAVIK AUGUST 27, 1943**

[For previous correspondence respecting a trade agreement between the United States and Iceland, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, volume II, pages 755 ff. For text of Agreement, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 342, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1075.]

ITALY

OVERTHROW OF FASCIST REGIME IN ITALY; ITALIAN SURRENDER AND RECOGNITION AS CO-BELLIGERENT

740.0011 European War 1939/28231

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1942.

The British Ambassador¹ called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador handed me a telegram, attached herewith, giving the views of the British Government with regard to the type of propaganda which should be undertaken by the United States and Great Britain in Italy. I told the Ambassador that I would be very glad to consider these suggestions.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

[Annex]

TEXT OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM FOREIGN OFFICE ON NOVEMBER 30TH, 1942

I am strongly of opinion that best method of facilitating an internal collapse in Italy is by stressing hopelessness of Italy's position militarily and determination of United Nations to pursue the war with utmost vigour against Italy. In my view there is nothing to be gained at this stage by making any direct or indirect appeal to both sentiment or history or holding out any inducements to Italian people or armed forces to overthrow Fascist regime and abandon Germans. A policy of appeals and promises could only be really effective when there was a question of building up some dissident movement or leader which could challenge established government. At present there is no such leader or movement in Italy nor are there any potential leaders outside Italy of sufficient calibre. If and when there is any sign of a real anti-Fascist or anti-German movement developing in Italy, the question of making useful declarations as to our future Italian policy would of course have to be reconsidered.

¹ Lord Halifax.

The line we are adopting in our political warfare is accordingly as follows: the Italian people should be told constantly and with every weapon open to propaganda that Mussolini and Fascist party have chosen to link Italy's future with Nazism, that they have thus committed themselves to the same fate as Hitler, and that we are determined and assuredly shall defeat and punish Nazis and everyone associated with them. We appreciate that Italian people were forced into this struggle by Fascist régime. But if now Italian people decide to continue along Fascist road they will undoubtedly suffer all the woes and penalties which fall to the vanquished Fascist leaders. If they do not, they themselves will know what they have to do. It was Italian Government and not His Majesty's Government which took step breaking a friendship between two peoples which had never been broken before. This struggle was therefore none of our seeking. But once gauntlet has been thrown down it is our habit to continue until our opponent is beaten, and in this case our opponent is and always will be Fascist Government and régime.

I much hope United States Government will agree that policy indicated above is appropriate in present circumstances and will issue instructions to their propaganda organisations accordingly.

740.0011 European War 1939/28232 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 18, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 4:30 p. m.]

7188. For the President and the Secretary. I have just received the following letter from Eden:²

"I feel that the United States Government should know that we have received in recent weeks certain 'peace feelers' from Italians outside Italy. They are as follows:

1. The Italian Legation at Lisbon have used a Roumanian intermediary to show His Majesty's Embassy and the Polish Embassy at Lisbon their interest in a separate peace.

We have decided not to pursue this 'feeler' since the Italians in Lisbon are servants of the present régime and to maintain contact with them could only serve to throw suspicion on our declarations that we are out to destroy Fascism.

2. The Italian Consul General at Geneva³ is anxious to establish a channel of communication between His Majesty's Government and the Duke of Aosta (formerly Duke of Spoleto). The Duke is repre-

² Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

³ Luigi Cortese.

sented as being prepared, in return for certain guarantees from us, to lead an armed uprising against Mussolini and the Fascist regime. He is said to be confident that he can count on the support of the Italian Navy and certain elements in the Bersaglieri,⁴ although he could not depend on the Army, and the Italian Air Force is stated to be definitely Fascist.

The guarantees required would [be?]

- (a) RAF support to deal with the Germans and Italian Air Force,
- (b) an agreed landing by British and United States troops, on the understanding that they should land as Allies to assist in the overthrow of the regime and not as troops to conquer and occupy Italy;
- (c) no demands to be made to hand over the Italian Fleet;
- (d) preservation of the monarchy in Italy;
- (e) guarantees on these lines to be given in the name of all the Allied countries.

Our view is that this approach is probably genuine. But we are not greatly impressed by the possibilities of making anything of it. It is clear for instance that we would find a hostile air force, no support from the army with the exception of the Bersaglieri (i.e. at most about 27,000 men), and probably no active cooperation from the navy. Point (b) moreover stipulates an 'agreed landing' which at best presents complicated problems of coordination and timing and at worst may be nothing better than a trap.

Nevertheless the prize to be won if we can hasten an Italian collapse is so great that we have decided that it is worthwhile keeping this line of communication open. The Duke of Aosta has undertaken to discuss his plan with the Prince of Piedmont and to inform our intermediary of the result.

The Italian Consul General at Geneva told our intermediary that certain overtures had already been made to the United States Government via the Vatican by an Italian group in opposition to Mussolini. We should naturally be much interested to know whether this was in fact the case, and to learn of any similar approaches that the United States Government may have received or may in the future receive from Italian sources.

I am sending a similar letter to Monsieur Maisky,⁵ except for the above paragraph."

I shall appreciate your instructions as to the nature of the reply I should make to the above letter.

WINANT

⁴ Name of a rifle corps of the Italian Army originating in 1836.

⁵ I. M. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

740.0011 European War 1939/28232 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1942—7 p. m.

6536. YOUR 7188, December 18, 4 p. m. Please reply confidentially to Mr. Eden's letter in the following sense:

We appreciate Mr. Eden's thoughtfulness in informing us of the recent Italian "peace feelers". We on the other hand have not received through the Vatican or any other source overtures of a similar nature.

In commenting on the various points raised by Mr. Eden, we are in complete agreement with the British attitude that although lines of communication might well be kept open proposals of this nature should not be pursued with representatives of the Fascist regime such as the diplomatic mission at Lisbon.

Concerning the proposals of the Duke certain of the guarantees raise questions of a purely military character. We understand that Italy may be of doubtful interest strategically to our military leaders. Guarantees to "preserve the monarchy" would require further definition. Obviously we will not oppose the ultimate will of the Italian people in this regard.

The question also arises concerning our position with respect to those various Italian personalities of political and military life who may, now that the position of Italy is becoming more and more untenable, desire to cooperate with the United Nations. Our common policy concerning the extent of our acceptance of Italian officials now willing to come over to our side should be defined. In the case of Italy the question of military expedience may not arise to the same extent that it has in other theaters of war. Before any of the United Nations can pursue negotiations with opposition leaders inside Italy, we feel the determination of our future attitude toward and responsibility for such leaders to be essential.

We would appreciate views of the British Government on this point.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/28231

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] January 13, 1943.

Sir Ronald Campbell⁶ came in to see me, at his request.

In the course of conversation he said that some time ago the British Government had handed us a note⁷ giving their views as to the political warfare to be employed against Italy. He wondered whether I could expedite an answer to the note.

I said that we had taken cognizance of the note and I would endeavor to expedite the answer, in writing, rather than to give one orally. I said there had been a slight difference of opinion, not in fundamentals, but in emphasis. The British position had been simply to leave the matter with a threat. The American feeling, and the information we had, seemed to indicate that as a matter of strict strategy it might be better to hold out a slight degree of hope that the Italians would ameliorate their position if they joined the Allies or got out of the war. This was implicit in the British position, but not accented. This, at least, appeared to be the general view here.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

740.0011 European War 1939/28233 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 15, 1943—noon.

[Received 12:33 p. m.]

382. For the President and the Secretary. I have just received the following letter from Mr. Eden, dated January 14:

“Thank you for your letter of the 24th December last (Department’s 6536, December 23, 7 p. m.) in which you conveyed to me the views of the Department of State on the recent Italian ‘peace feelers’, about which I wrote to the Ambassador on the 17th December (Embassy’s 7188, December 18, 4 p. m.).

I am glad to notice that the State Department agree with the decision we have reached not to pursue negotiations with representatives of the Fascist regime such as the Italian diplomats at Lisbon. I fully concur in the view of the State Department that the guarantees required by the Duke of Aosta would need fuller investigation both from the military and the diplomatic point of view. In order to furnish the State Department with the views of His Majesty’s Gov-

⁶ British Minister.⁷ See annex to memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, dated December 4, 1942, p. 314.

ernment on the attitude which should be adopted towards any opposition leaders who may come forward, I think it will be necessary for me to summarize briefly the general policy which His Majesty's Government are in favor of pursuing towards Italy. Any conclusions should not, of course, be interpreted as hard and fast rules, and in fact it is our view that our policy towards Italy must to a large extent be opportunist and readily adaptable to take advantage of any change in the situation.

Our aim must be to knock Italy out of the war as quickly as possible and this could be achieved with almost equal effect whether Italy made a separate peace or whether dissatisfaction and disorder within the country attained such serious proportions that the Germans were forced to establish a full scale occupation. In the latter event it is to be expected that the Germans would not only have to provide troops for the occupation of Italy but would also be forced to replace the Italian troops on the Russian front, in France and in the Balkans. Our own military authorities share the doubts expressed in your letter as to the value of Italy even as an ally against Germany. In their view it may well be in our interest that Italy should, as a member of the Axis, develop into a German commitment and become as such an increasing drain on German strength.

We have considered the possibility of a party arising in Italy which would be willing and able to conclude a separate peace. Before this situation could occur, two prerequisites would in our view be essential. The Germans would have to be so weakened as no longer to be able to control events in Italy, and a national leader would have to emerge with sufficient strength to displace Mussolini. Such evidence as we have recently received does not suggest that either of these prerequisites are likely to be fulfilled in the immediate future. In particular, there is as yet no sign of an alternative leader to Mussolini appearing. Of the Italians outside Italy, Count Sforza⁸ has probably the most influence, but we feel that he has been out of the country for so long now that he could count on very little support in Italy. In Italy itself there seems little prospect that the Church will take a stand against the regime. The King is regarded as a willing tool of Fascism and the Italian people appear no longer to be looking to him as a leader. In spite of the recent approach by the Duke of Aosta, we remain extremely doubtful of the willingness or ability of any of the royal family to lead a revolt against Fascism. A general with sufficient following in the Army, such as General Badoglio, might at the right moment be able to overthrow the Government, but our reports do not indicate that dissatisfaction in the Army has yet reached the stage which would make this a practicable possibility. Finally, there is the possibility that the moderate members of the Fascist Party itself might take a stand against Mussolini. Such evidence as we have, however, tends to show that the leaders of the Fascist Party as a whole are still united and still convinced that co-operation with Germany and the prosecution of the war is essential if their own position is to be maintained.

The view of His Majesty's Government is, therefore, that we should

⁸ Count Carlo Sforza, Italian Foreign Minister before the advent of Mussolini; leader of Italian anti-Fascists in North and South America.

not count on the possibility of a separate peace but should aim at provoking such disorder in Italy as would necessitate a German occupation. We suggest that the best means of achieving this aim is to intensify all forms of military operations against Italy, particularly aerial bombardment, and to support the military operations by a firm line in our propaganda.

We have given careful consideration to the question of attempting to detach the Italian people from the regime by promising them lenient peace terms, but we have decided that the moment has not yet come to make any such assurances. The minimum which would be likely to appeal to the Italian people would be a guarantee of the pre-war frontiers of Metropolitan Italy, but since it may be desirable after the war to effect frontier rectifications in favor of Yugoslavia and possibly of Austria, it would in our view be most unwise to commit ourselves on this point. Any assurances which fall short of this would be likely to react against us by providing the Fascist Government with a powerful weapon of propaganda. We hold, therefore, that our own propaganda policy should be aimed at convincing the Italians that we shall win the war and that they will suffer most grievously so long as they remain our enemies. We may hope that once the Italian people have been convinced of this they will be ready to take a stand against the present Government either without prior assurances from us or on such terms as we shall be disposed to offer them when the time comes.

The view of His Majesty's Government is, therefore, that no reliance may be put in the possibility of a separate peace in the near future. Should offers be received they would be examined on their merits and military considerations would naturally weigh very heavily in the balance. Meanwhile, we should aim at provoking an internal collapse in Italy. In pursuance of this policy we should as far as possible intensify our military attack on Italy, stress in our political warfare the hopelessness of Italy's military position and the determination of the United Nations to pursue the war with the utmost vigour against Italy, and generally encourage and help the discontented elements in Italy itself whenever we are able to do so without unduly committing ourselves on political issues.

I shall be very glad to receive the views of the United States Government on the policy suggested in this letter."

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/28234 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 1, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 6:33 p. m.]

827. For the President and Secretary. Referring to my 382, January 15, I have just received the following letter from Eden:

"I wrote to you on the 17th December last to inform you of certain peace feelers which we had received from Italy. There has now been a

further approach of which I think the United States Government might wish to hear.

One of our representatives in Switzerland learned through an intermediary that Marshal Badoglio is willing at the right moment to take over and establish a military government in Italy. He is in touch with Marshal Caviglia who would assist him in this project. Marshal Badoglio suggested that he should send an emissary, General Pesenti, to Cyrenaica to discuss coordinated action from outside and inside Italy aimed at the overthrow of the Fascist regime. Marshal Badoglio did not ask for any assurances regarding the future but only that General Pesenti should hold these discussions with us and that he should be given facilities for recruiting a force from among the Italians resident abroad and prisoners of war.

This proposal has been carefully considered but it is felt that the advantages likely to be derived from it are not sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages and the risks involved. There is clearly a serious danger that General Pesenti's journey and the object of it might become known and the fact that we were treating with Italian Army leaders might be misunderstood. It was also considered that any force which General Pesenti might raise would be of little or no military value. The main disadvantage which we foresaw was that if General Pesenti came out of Italy, negotiations with him could not continue without some undertakings being entered into on our side—and we do not consider it advisable at this stage to commit ourselves to the support of any individual Italian without considerably more information regarding the degree of support which he could command inside Italy.

In these circumstances we have decided not make any response for the time being to Marshal Badoglio and Marshal Caviglia.

I am sending a similar letter to Monsieur Maisky."

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/28233 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1943—8 p. m.

889. Your 382, January 15, noon. I have read with great interest Mr. Eden's letter of January 14 setting forth the British position with respect to Italy and have noted with considerable satisfaction that we are in substantial accord with all the views expressed. We wish to make certain reservations, however, which are a matter of emphasis rather than fundamental differences of opinion.

To all intents and purposes we feel that Italy is effectively occupied by the Germans at the present time. We consider it debatable that a full scale occupation in the event of an internal collapse would require sending a considerable number of additional troops into Italy. It seems certain, however, that effective occupation would require addi-

tional manpower for administrative purposes at least. It would in any event be an additional heavy responsibility on the Germans which they could ill afford to undertake as the war closes in on them. Furthermore, the onus of the inevitable deterioration of the internal supply situation would fall squarely on the Germans.

We agree entirely that a condition for a separate peace is the weakening of Germany to the point where she can no longer control events in Italy. We believe, however, that the second condition, namely, the emergence of a national leader or leaders in opposition to Mussolini, cannot be fulfilled while the Germans through the Fascist Government continue in effective control of Italy. The opposition groups which are known to exist can, therefore, be expected to bring their plans into the open only when the weakening of the German-supported Fascist Government promises them some assurance of success.

Concerning the House of Savoy, as distinguished from Victor Emanuel III, our information leads us to believe that it may have sufficient support of conservative elements in Italy, including the aristocracy, the army and the peasantry, to retain the sovereign power at least during the interim period between the Fascist regime and its permanent successor.

Concerning the most effective means of eliminating Italy from the war, we feel that aerial bombardment of Italy should be confined to military objectives as much as is humanly possible. Indiscriminate bombing of Italian cities will only stiffen Italian morale. For the first two and one-half years of the war the British enjoyed an unparalleled reputation among Italians for discriminate bombing of legitimate targets despite the frantic efforts of the Fascist press and radio to the contrary. On the other hand they have no illusions about the brutality of German methods.

While we agree that a firm line of propaganda should be adopted to convince the Italians that we intend to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion we believe that threats of destruction as a people and a country, unless and until they request an armistice, should be avoided. We are both in agreement that a separate peace is remote for reasons beyond the control of the Italian people. Consequently, threats of physical violence, unless certain improbable conditions are fulfilled, would not in our opinion prove effective propaganda but rather would react to our detriment.

We believe that it is not too early to attempt to detach the Italians from the Fascist regime. Mental and spiritual disloyalty already exist to a great extent and if properly appealed to can, we believe, be effective in furthering the disruption of the Axis war effort in Italy. Our propaganda should—in addition to convincing the Italians that

we will win this war—also appeal to their overwhelming desire to end the conflict. In view of the German domination of their country the persuasion of our broadcasts should be directed towards a constant and ever-increasing campaign of passive resistance, civil disobedience and sabotage short of open revolt. When referring to our determination to prosecute the war with increasing vigor against Italy, we should explain to the Italian people that this is the regrettable but local result of the Fascist Government's unprovoked declarations of war against Great Britain and the United States.

While we agree that we do not wish to make any postwar commitments to the Italians, at least for the present, we would like reaction of the British authorities to certain general phrases which might be used with reassuring effect in our propaganda. Those which have occurred to us as proving useful in combatting Axis propaganda are "The United States and its Allies have no intention of destroying Italy as a nation"; "The United States and its Allies have no intention of depriving the Italian people of those territories which are and have always been essentially Italian" and other statements of a similar nature.

While we recognize that Italy may be of doubtful interest strategically to our military leaders, our whole approach to the Italian problem is based on the assumption that the Italian people and their fundamental good will toward both our nations can and should be used in the prosecution of our common war effort. Even if a landing operation is never attempted in Italy itself, it would seem unwise to alienate the affections of a people who could threaten the flank of an Allied landing operation in southern Europe.

In conclusion we would like to emphasize the following considerations:

1. Our propaganda should impress upon the Italians the hopelessness of their present position in the war.
2. We should prosecute the war with all possible force in Italy upon all occasions by attacking by land, sea and air military objectives only.
3. We should in our propaganda and by all other means encourage passive resistance and sabotage of the Italian war effort.
4. We should avoid ridiculing the Italian armed forces or the Italian people or inciting them to premature revolt.
5. Without making any specific political or territorial commitments we should hold out to the Italian people the hope that Italy as a nation will survive after the defeat of the Fascist Government and that neither we nor our Allies have territorial ambitions with respect to that territory which is and has always been essentially Italian.

Through military action already taken by American armed forces, it is evident that the United States in the prosecution of the war

against the Axis does not intend to spare Italy from the consequences and ravages of war because of American sympathy for the Italian people. In connection with this general subject of our attitude toward Italy, I understand that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are now giving consideration to the matter from the point of view of the military developments of the war.

In transmitting our observations to the Foreign Secretary please thank him for his letter of January 14 and inform him that we would welcome any further comments from him on our views.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/28660

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Reference is made to the Department's memorandum 740.0011 European War 1939/28556 of March 5th⁹ on the subject of propaganda to Italy.

The proposal in Mr. Hull's telegram has been considered by His Majesty's Government who find themselves in full agreement with the proposals contained therein. In their view it is important to distinguish between the policy to be pursued up to the moment of the invasion of Italy and the policy to be pursued after that period. In the first period a firm line should be followed, without any promises, and the following four points of Mr. Hull's formula should be the basis of our joint propaganda:—

1. We should lose no opportunity to point out the hopelessness of Italy's present position in the war to the Italian people.
2. The war against Italy should be pursued by attacking by land and sea and air upon all possible occasions and with all possible force.
3. By all possible means passive resistance and sabotage of the Italian war effort should be encouraged.
4. Appeals to premature revolt or ridicule of the Italian armed forces or the Italian people should be avoided.

Immediately before invasion takes place, and for the period succeeding the assault, this line should be modified to the extent of holding out some ray of hope to the Italians about their future, the Allies being presented in the guise not of conquerors but of liberators. Mr. Hull's fifth point should then be added, as follows:—

5. We should inform the people of Italy that neither we nor our Allies have territorial ambitions concerning territory which is essentially Italian, and we should hold out hope that Italy will survive as

⁹ Not printed, but see telegram No. 889, *supra*.

a nation after the defeat of the Fascist Government, without making any specific territorial commitments.

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1943.

740.0011 European War 1939/28584 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 19, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 4:48 p. m.]

1928. Department's telegram No. 889, February 9, 8 p. m. and my telegram No. 1861, March 17, noon.¹⁰ The Department will be gratified to learn that I just received the following letter from Sir Orme Sargent.¹¹

"In the Secretary of State's absence I write to thank you for your letter of the 11th February¹² on the subject of Italy and to explain the delay in answering it.

In the interval between the receipt of your letter and Mr. Eden's departure for Washington,¹³ the whole question of policy towards Italy was brought under review, with particular reference to a request for a directive received from General Eisenhower.¹⁴ We came to the conclusion that we could not do better than adopt, as the basis of propaganda policy, the five considerations mentioned at the end of your letter, on the understanding that the fifth could be held in reserve until operational reasons rendered it desirable to make an appeal to the Italian people.

Mr. Eden, who has taken with him a copy of the correspondence, proposes to discuss the question in Washington on the above lines."

The five considerations referred to are the paragraphs so designated by number in the Department's telegram under reference.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/28584 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1943—8 p. m.

2326. Your 1928, March 19, 4 p. m. Please inform Mr. Eden that the five considerations adopted by the British and ourselves as a basis

¹⁰ Latter not printed; it reported that a draft of "basic plan of political warfare against Italy" had been received (740.0011 European War 1939/28552).

¹¹ British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹² Presumably letter based on telegram No. 889, February 9, 8 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 321.

¹³ Mr. Eden arrived in Washington on March 12, 1943.

¹⁴ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, North Africa.

of propaganda policy with respect to Italy were submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration and acceptance. The proposals have been accepted with the exception of the fifth and last paragraph, which has been amended to read, at the suggestion of the President, as follows:

"We should hold out assurance that Italy will survive as a nation after the defeat of the Fascist Government without making any specific territorial commitments."

I will, of course, be guided by the President's wishes in the matter and have so informed the British Embassy.

HULL

740.0011 EW/4-1343

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt

TEXT OF MESSAGE DATED APRIL 13TH FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

[282.]¹⁵ As you know the Joint Anglo-American Planning is starting at Algiers in connection with military administration of Italian occupied territory (operation of HUSKY¹⁶). I feel it is important that both sides should at the outset be clear in their minds about the character of the administration to be set up.

2. I hope that you may feel in view of the fact that the Force Commander under the supreme direction of General Eisenhower will be British we should be senior partner in the military administration of enemy occupied territory in that area. Our proposal will be that under the supreme authority of General Eisenhower a British General Officer should be appointed as Military Governor of HUSKYLAND and that he should be assisted by a Joint Anglo-American staff. Thus there would be no dualism in actual executive decisions on the spot.

3. Such a local arrangement would of course in no way affect decisions on major policy being taken as usual by agreement between our two Governments if convenient by personal correspondence between you and me.

¹⁵ Number supplied from copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹⁶ Code word for invasion of Sicily. For additional information regarding HUSKY and Allied military administration in Italy, see C. R. S. Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945* in the *History of the Second World War* (United Kingdom Military Series) edited by J. R. M. Butler. See also Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, in the series *United States Army in World War II: Special Studies* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1964).

740.0011 EW/4-1343

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*TEXT OF MESSAGE DATED APRIL 14TH FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
PRIME MINISTER

[271.]¹⁷ Replying to your telegram of April 13th, I have given my approval to appointment of General Alexander¹⁸ as the Allied Military Governor of HUSKYLAND during occupation and under the Supreme Commander General Eisenhower. In view of friendly feeling toward America entertained by a great number of the citizens of Italy and in consideration of the large number of citizens of the United States who are of Italian descent it is my opinion that our military problem will be made less difficult by giving to the Allied Military Government as much of an American character as is practicable.

This can be accomplished at least to some extent by appointing to the offices of the Allied Military Government a large proportion of Americans.

I believe that this Military Government should be presented to the world as a definitely joint Allied control and that there should be no "senior partner".

740.0011 EW/4-1543

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*TEXT OF MESSAGE DATED APRIL 15TH FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

[283.]¹⁷ I hope paragraph 3 of my telegram of April 13th made it somehow clear that I contemplated HUSKY as our joint enterprise on terms of perfect equality, with our usual intimacy and confidence and with no question of a "senior partner".

2. This expression only applied to actual executive work to be done by Military Governor who would receive his directive from you and me in complete agreement. In executive and administrative sphere there ought not to be two voices but only one voice which will say what you and I have agreed. General Alexander would be directing military operations under Supreme Commander and he would delegate powers of Military Governor to a British officer mutually agreeable to us both.

¹⁷ Number supplied from copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹⁸ Gen. Sir Harold R. L. Alexander.

3. I entirely agree with you that utmost advantage should be taken of American ties with Italy and that at least half of the officers of Allied Military Government should be American and further if in any case or district it is found that American pre-eminence is more useful to the common cause this should at once be arranged. The two flags should always be displayed together and we should present a united and unbreakable front in all directions. All the above is of course without prejudice to United States being supreme throughout the whole of French North Africa and my continuing to be your lieutenant there. I hope I have given satisfaction.

4. I am ready to study with you outlines of a directive foreseeing and forecasting as far as possible our policy towards (a) conquered districts and (b) peace overtures. These latter may come upon us swiftly and suddenly and we must be ready for them. I have on this subject at present only two thoughts. Firstly we cannot treat with Mussolini and secondly we should be immense gainers by getting Italy out of the war as soon as possible.

5. Your No. 272²⁰ has just arrived. There must be a pause while the armies are regrouping in the North and while Montgomery²¹ is dragging up his customary battery but I hope for great events before April is out. I continue to have very agreeable correspondence with Joe²² who has taken convoy blow extremely well. He is very pleased that we should attempt to send British-American aircraft quotas to him through Africa or Mediterranean. I am trying to arrange this through Averell²³ and will communicate with Harry.²⁴ I trust your inspection tour will be as pleasant as it will be memorable.

6. Let me take this opportunity of thanking you for all your kindness and hospitality to Anthony.²⁵ He has greatly enjoyed his visit and everyone here has acclaimed it.

740.0011 EW/4-1743

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*²⁶

In the territory subject to the supreme command of General Eisenhower and covered by operation HUSKY, the Officer Commanding Force 141 (who is a British General) would become Military Govern-

²⁰ Not printed.

²¹ Gen. Sir Bernard Montgomery, Commander of British Eighth Army.

²² Marshal I. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

²³ W. Averell Harriman, United States Defense Expediter in England.

²⁴ Harry Hopkins, Chairman of British-American Munitions Assignments Board.

²⁵ For correspondence regarding visit of Anthony Eden to Washington, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

²⁶ Handed to the British Minister (Campbell) by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) on April 17, 1943.

nor of Occupied Territory and in that capacity exercise all functions attached to such position under the general direction of the Commander-in-Chief. In order to assist him he would have an organization comparable to Occupied Enemy Territory Administration but adapted to meet the special conditions of the metropolitan European country and the joint responsibility of the two Governments. This organization would be known as Allied Military Government, Occupied Territory (AMGOT) and would be Allied in character in the same sense as is Allied Force. The chief officer of AMGOT would be British; the deputy American; the staff Anglo-American. This would be predicated on the agreement that in matters of broad policy affecting political and fiscal affairs, etc., the two Governments would agree on the general lines to be followed and a directive would be prepared based on this agreement and transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Commander-in-Chief would be responsible to the two Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the military Government of the territory concerned. In order that these matters may be expeditiously handled by AFHQ²⁷ the Commander-in-Chief would appoint a deputy Chief-of-Staff who would be his executive in matters involved in the military government of HUSKY. This officer would be an American and if found desirable would have a British assistant.

In view of the friendly attitude of many of the inhabitants of Italy toward the United States, and in consideration of the great number of American citizens of Italian descent, the President is of the opinion that the allied military government should be given, particularly in the lower offices, as much of an American character and as large a proportion of American personnel as is practicable, with the purpose of facilitating our allied war effort in HUSKY and in other areas that may be occupied at a later date.

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*²⁸

LONDON, July 5, 1943.

344. Personal. Your No. 302.²⁹

Your War Cabinet had contemplated a joint declaration to the Italian people in the name of both our countries. Whereas TORCH³⁰ was by agreement planned as an American expedition with a British contingent and I have acted as your Lieutenant throughout, we con-

²⁷ Allied Force Headquarters.

²⁸ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

²⁹ Not printed.

³⁰ Code name for planned U.S. expedition to Northwest Africa.

sider HUSKY and post-HUSKY as joint undertakings in which we are equal partners. This would certainly seem justified by the proportion of troops, Naval forces, shipping and aircraft involved. I fully accepted your dictum that "There should be no senior partner".

However since we have been longer in quarrel or war with Italy than you, and also since a document of this character written by one man in its integrity is better than a joint production, we are ready that you should speak at this juncture to the Italian people on behalf of both our countries and in the interests of the common cause.

There are a few amendments which I venture to suggest to you in all the frankness of our friendship. They are of importance because without them untoward reactions might grow among the British people and their forces that their contribution had not received equal or sufficient recognition. In fact they are only mentioned once, and all else is either United States or United Nations.

The amendments are as follow :

(a). After the words "Against whom on December 11, 1941, your government declared war" insert "I speak also on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government and in their name".

(b). After the words "Under the command of General Eisenhower" insert "And his Deputy General Alexander".

(c). The end of the sentence "The skies over Italy are dominated by the vast air armadas of the United Nations" should read "Of the United States and Great Britain. Italy's sea coasts are threatened by the greatest accumulation of the British and Allied sea power ever concentrated in the Mediterranean." (I am sure you will see the justice of this, as after all it is the United States and Great Britain who are doing virtually the whole thing.)

Finally we think that the message to the Italian people would seem to come better after an initial success in HUSKY has been achieved, because a repulse would make it somewhat inappropriate. It would anyhow be lost to the world in the cannonade and will hardly get through to the Axis fighting troops in time to influence the crunch.

Your No. 303²¹ about bombing the Marshalling Yards in Rome. We concur.

*Message of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the People of Italy, July 16, 1943*²²

On July 16 the President and the Prime Minister of Great Britain sent the following joint message to the people of Italy :

"At this moment the combined armed forces of the United States and Great Britain under the command of General Eisenhower and

²¹ Not found in Department files.

²² Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, July 17, 1943, p. 27.

his Deputy General Alexander are carrying the war deep into the territory of your country. This is the direct consequence of the shameful leadership to which you have been subjected by Mussolini and his Fascist regime.

"Mussolini carried you into this war as the satellite of a brutal destroyer of peoples and liberties. Mussolini plunged you into a war which he thought Hitler had already won. In spite of Italy's great vulnerability to attack by air and sea, your Fascist leaders sent your sons, your ships, your air forces, to distant battlefields to aid Germany in her attempt to conquer England, Russia, and the world. This association with the designs of Nazi-controlled Germany was unworthy of Italy's ancient traditions of freedom and culture—traditions to which the peoples of America and Great Britain owe so much.

"Your soldiers have fought not in the interests of Italy but for Nazi Germany. They have fought courageously, but they have been betrayed and abandoned by the Germans on the Russian front and on every battlefield in Africa from El Alamein to Cape Bon. Today Germany's hopes for world conquest have been blasted on all fronts. The skies over Italy are dominated by the vast air armadas of the United States and Great Britain. Italy's seacoasts are threatened by the greatest accumulation of British and Allied sea power ever concentrated in the Mediterranean.

"The forces now opposed to you are pledged to destroy the power of Nazi Germany—power which has ruthlessly been used to inflict slavery, destruction, and death on all those who refuse to recognize the Germans as the master race. The sole hope for Italy's survival lies in honorable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations. If you continue to tolerate the Fascist regime which serves the evil power of the Nazis, you must suffer the consequences of your own choice. We take no satisfaction in invading Italian soil and bringing the tragic devastation of war home to the Italian people. But we are determined to destroy the false leaders and their doctrines which have brought Italy to her present position.

"Every moment that you resist the combined forces of the United Nations—every drop of blood that you sacrifice—can serve only one purpose: to give the Fascist and Nazi leaders a little more time to escape from the inevitable consequences of their own crimes. All your interests and all your traditions have been betrayed by Nazi Germany and your own false and corrupt leaders; it is only by disavowing both that a reconstituted Italy can hope to occupy a respected place in the family of European Nations.

"The time has now come for you, the Italian people, to consult your own self-respect and your own interests and your own desire for a restoration of national dignity, security, and peace. The time has come for you to decide whether Italians shall die for Mussolini and Hitler—or live for Italy, and for civilization."

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ³³

[WASHINGTON,] July 26, 1943.

324. By coincidence I was again at Shangri La ³⁴ this afternoon when the news from Rome came, ³⁵ but this time it seems to be true. If any overtures come we must be certain of the use of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the North and against the whole Balkan peninsula, as well as use of airfields of all kinds. It is my thought that we should come as close as possible to unconditional surrender followed by good treatment of the Italian populace. But I think also that the head devil should be surrendered together with his chief partners in crime. In no event should our officers in the field fix on any general terms without your approval and mine. Let me have your thoughts.

ROOSEVELT

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt ³³

LONDON, July 26, 1943.

383. Para 1. Your 324. I send you my thoughts in the form in which I submitted them to the war cabinet obtaining their full approval.

Para 2. I don't think myself that we should be too particular in dealing with any Non Fascist Government even if it is not all we should like. Now Mussolini is gone I would deal with any Non Fascist Italian Government which can deliver the goods. The goods are set out in my memo herewith. My colleagues also agreed with this.

THOUGHTS ON THE FALL OF MUSSOLINI
BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Para 1. It seems highly probable that the fall of Mussolini will involve the overthrow of the Fascist Regime and that the new government of the King and Badoglio will seek to negotiate a separate arrangement with the Allies for an armistice. Should this prove to

³³ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

³⁴ Camp used by President Roosevelt in the Catoctin Mountains, Maryland, about 65 miles from Washington.

³⁵ The resignation of Prime Minister Benito Mussolini and his Cabinet was announced by King Victor Emmanuel on July 25. Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio was appointed Prime Minister.

be the case it will be necessary for us to make up our minds first of all upon what we want and secondly upon the measures and conditions required to gain it for us.

Para 2. At this moment above all others our thoughts must be concentrated upon the supreme aim namely the destruction of Hitler, Hitlerism and next [*Nazi*] Germany. Every military advantage arising out of the surrender of Italy (should that occur) must be sought for this purpose.

Para. 3. The first of these is in the President's words "The control of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the north and against the whole Balkan peninsula as well as the use of airfields of all kinds." This must include the surrender to our Garrisons of Sardina, the Dodecanese and Corfu as well as of all the naval and air bases in the Italian mainland as soon as they can be taken over.

Para 4. Secondly and of equal importance the immediate surrender to the Allies of the Italian fleet or at least its effective demobilization and paralysis and the disarmament of the Italian air and ground forces to whatever extent we find needful and useful. The surrender of the fleet will liberate powerful British naval forces for service in the Indian Ocean against Japan and will be most agreeable to the United States.

Para 5. Also of equal consequence the immediate withdrawal from or surrender of all Italian forces in Corsica, the Riviera including Toulon and the Balkan Peninsula to wit, in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece.

Para 6. Another objective of the highest importance about which there will be passionate feeling in this country is the immediate liberation of all British prisoners of war in Italian hands and the prevention which can in the first instance only be by the Italians of their being transported northwards to Germany. I regard it as a matter of honour and humanity to get our own flesh and blood back as soon as possible and spare them the measureless horrors of incarceration in Germany during the final stages of the war.

Para 7. The fate of the German troops in Italy and particularly of those south of Rome will probably lead to fighting between the Germans and the Italian army and population. We should demand their surrender and that any Italian Government with whom we can reach a settlement shall do their utmost to procure this. It may be however that the German divisions will cut their way northward in spite of anything that the Italian armed forces are capable of doing. We should provoke this conflict as much as possible and should not hesitate to send troops and air support to assist the Italians in procuring the surrender of the Germans south of Rome.

Para 8. When we see how this process goes we can take a further view about the action to be taken north of Rome. We should however try to get possession of points on both the west coast and east coast railways of Italy as far north as we dare. And this is a time to dare.

Para 9. In our struggle with Hitler and the German army we cannot afford to deny ourselves any assistance that will kill Germans. The fury of the Italian population will now be turned against the German intruders who have as they will feel brought these miseries upon Italy and then come so scantily and grudgingly to her aid. We should stimulate this process in order that the new liberated Anti-Fascist Italy shall afford us at the earliest moment a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany.

Para 10. This air attack is a new advantage of the first order as it brings the whole of the Mediterranean Air Forces into action from a direction which turns the entire line of air defences in the west and which furthermore exposes all those centers of war production which have been increasingly developed to escape air attack from Great Britain. It will become urgent in the highest degree to get agents, commandos and supplies by sea across the Adriatic into Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. It must be remembered that there are 15 German divisions in the Balkan Peninsula of which 10 are mobile. Nevertheless once we have control of the Italian Peninsula and of the Adriatic and the Italian armies in the Balkans withdraw or lay down their arms it is by no means unlikely that the Hun will be forced to withdraw northwards to the line of the Save and Danube thus liberating Greece and other tortured countries.

Para 11. We cannot yet measure the effects of Mussolini's fall and of Italian capitulation upon Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary. They may be profound. In connection with this situation the collapse of Italy should fix the moment for putting the strongest pressure on Turkey to act in accordance with the spirit of the alliance and in this Britain and the United States acting jointly or severally should if possible be joined or at least supported by Russia.

Para 12. The surrender of, to quote the President, "the head devil together with his partners in crime" must be considered an eminent object and one for which we should strive by all means in our power short of wrecking the immense prospects which have been outlined in earlier paragraphs. It may be however that these criminals will flee into Germany or escape into Switzerland. On the other hand they may surrender themselves or be surrendered by the Italian Government. Should they fall into our hands we ought now to decide in consultation with the United States and after agreement with them

with the USSR what treatment should be meted out to them. One may prefer prompt execution without trial except for identification purposes. Others may prefer that they be kept in confinement until the end of the war in Europe and their fate decided together with that of other war criminals. Personally I am fairly indifferent on this matter provided always that no solid military advantages are sacrificed for the sake of immediate vengeance.

740.0011 European War 1939/30341 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 26, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received July 26—1:15 p. m.]

4862. Personal for the President and the Secretary. This afternoon in talking with Eden I found there were two opinions in the Foreign Office in relation to the Italian situation.

1. That the change-over³⁷ was due to a last desperate attempt to strengthen the war effort.

2. The dominant opinion and that held by Mr. Eden which he described as "A mixture of the policies adopted by Prince Max von Baden³⁸ and Pétain³⁹ on their way to quitting". He felt that neither Mussolini nor General Badoglio could make the Italians fight.

He said one thing which I believe is important. That Russia in some way should be brought into our councils in considering the Italian situation. He felt that the Russian manifesto to Germany might have been in part influenced by their not having been included as signatories to the Anglo-American proclamation to the Italian people.⁴⁰ He did not mean by this that he thought they should have been included as a practical matter but only that they were sensitive to exclusion.

When the tide turns and the Russian armies are able to advance we might well want to influence their terms of capitulation and occupancy in Allied and enemy territory.

WINANT

³⁷ Reference is to the fall of Mussolini on July 25 and transference of supreme authority in Italy to the King and Badoglio, with latter as Head of Government.

³⁸ German Imperial Chancellor who was active in peace negotiations in 1918; see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, pp. 337-459, *passim*.

³⁹ Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.

⁴⁰ Dated July 16, 1943, p. 330.

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁴¹

LONDON, 29 July, 1943.

387. I was so glad to hear your voice again and that you were in such good spirits, and also that you like our plans for "QUADRANT"⁴² to which we are all ardently looking forward.

I have told Eisenhower that we fully agree to his releasing the proclamation with our amendment inserted about British and Allied prisoners.⁴³

Discarding etiquette, I have sent a direct message to the King of Italy through Switzerland emphasizing our vehement and savage interest in this matter. I am most grateful for your promise to put the screw on through the Pope or any other convenient channel. If the King and Badoglio allow our prisoners and keymen to be carried off by the Huns without doing their utmost to stop it, by which I mean using physical force, the feeling here would be such that no negotiations with that Government would stand a chance in public opinion.

Armistice terms: The War Cabinet are quite clear that we ought not to broadcast armistice terms to the enemy. It is for their responsible government to ask formally for an armistice on the basis of our principle of unconditional surrender. Then I suppose envoys would be appointed and a rendezvous fixed. Our version is already in your hands. As you will see, it follows the main lines of Eisenhower's draft, but is more precise and is cast in a form suited to discussion between plenipotentiaries rather than a popular appeal. There are great dangers in trying to dish this sort of dose up with jam for the patient.

We also think that the terms should cover civil as well as military requirements, and that it would be much better for them to be settled by envoys appointed by our two governments than by the general commanding in the field. He can of course deal with any proposals coming from the troops on his immediate front for a local surrender.

Finally, all our thoughts are concentrated upon the great battle about to be fought by the British 8th and United States 7th Armies against the 65,000 Germans cornered in the eastern Sicilian tip. The destruction of these rascals could not come at a better time to influence events, not only in Italy but throughout the world. It is grand to

⁴¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁴² Code name for First Quebec Conference August 11-24, 1943. Documentation on this Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

⁴³ For text of General Eisenhower's radio broadcast to the Italian people on July 29, 1943, see *New York Times*, July 30, 1943, p. 3.

think of our soldiers advancing side by side like brothers and with good prospects of victory ahead.

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁴⁴

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1943.

331. My thoughts of today on prospects and methods of handling the Italian situation with which we are now confronted are expressed generally in your message No. 383 dated July 26, 1943.

I have suggested for consideration in the following draft certain minor changes. If the reasons for these changes are not obvious, we can discuss them at our next meeting.

Para 1. There seems to be a high probability that Mussolini's fall will involve the overthrow of the Fascist regime and that the new government of the King and Badoglio will attempt to negotiate with the Allies a separate arrangement for an armistice. If this should develop, it will become necessary for us to make up our minds first of all as to what we want and secondly as to the conditions and measures necessary to achieve it for us.

Para 2. Our thoughts at this moment above all others must be directed at the supreme goal namely the destruction of Hitlerism and Hitler. Should the surrender of Italy occur, every military advantage arising out of it must be sought for this objective.

Para 3. Of these, the first is the control of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the north and against the entire Balkan peninsula in addition to the use of air bases of all types. Included in this must be the surrender to our garrisons of the Dodecanese and Corfu and Sardinia as well as all the air and naval bases on the mainland of Italy as soon as they can be acquired.

Para 4. The second of these and of equal importance is the immediate capitulation of the Italian fleet to the Allies, or at least its effective demobilization and the disarmament, to whatever extent we find needful and useful, of Italian ground and air forces. The surrender of the fleet will be most agreeable to the United States and will liberate powerful British naval forces for service in the Indian Ocean against Japan.

Para 5. The immediate surrender or withdrawal to Italy of all Italian forces wherever they may be outside of Italy proper will also be of equal consequence.

⁴⁴ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

Para 6. Still another goal of the greatest importance regarding which there will be passionate feeling in Britain and in this country is the immediate release of all prisoners of war from the United Nations in the hands of the Italians, and the prevention of their being transported northwards towards Germany, which can in the first instance be made only by the Italians. I look upon it as a matter of humanity and honor to obtain the return of our own flesh and blood as soon as possible and to spare them the incalculable horrors of incarceration during the last stages of the war in Germany.

Para 7. Fighting between the Germans and the Italian Army and population will probably be a result of the fate of the German troops in Italy and particularly of those south of Rome.

Para 8. We can take a further view about action to be taken north of Rome when we see how this process goes. However, we should attempt at the earliest moment to get possession of points on both the west coast and east coast railways of Italy as far north as we dare and of a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany. And dare we must at this time.

Para 9. We cannot afford in our struggle with the German Army and with Hitler to deny ourselves any means that will kill Germans. The Italian population's fury may now be turned against the German intruders who, as the Italians will feel, have thrust these miseries upon Italy and then come to her aid so grudgingly and so scantily. In order that the new liberated Anti-Fascist Italy shall afford us at the earliest moment a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany, we should stimulate this process.

Para 10. A new advantage of the first order is obtained by this air attack as it brings the whole of the Mediterranean Air Forces into action from a direction which exposes all those centers of war production which have been increasingly developed to escape air blows from Great Britain and which furthermore turns the whole line of air defenses in the west. The highest degree of urgency will apply to getting supplies, agents and commandos across the Adriatic into Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia by sea. It must be borne in mind that there are 15 German divisions, of which 10 are mobile, in the Balkan Peninsula. However, it is by no means unlikely that the Hun will be forced to withdraw northwards to the line of the Save and Danube, thus liberating Greece and other oppressed countries, once we have control of the Italian Peninsula and of the Adriatic and the Italian armies in the Balkans withdraw or surrender.

Para 11. The effects of Italian capitulation and of Mussolini's fall upon Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary cannot yet be calculated. It may be that they will be profound. The collapse of Italy, in regard to this situation, should establish the time for applying to Turkey the strongest pressure to act according to the spirit of the alliance. Britain and the United States should, if possible, be joined or at least supported by Russia in this move. If practicable, I believe the agreement of Russia should be obtained in any important negotiations affecting the Balkans.

Para 12. Our primary goal of getting Italy out of the war would, I believe, be prejudiced by an effort to seize the "head devil" in the early future. In due time we can try to secure the person of the "head devil" and his assistants, and then their individual degrees of guilt for which "the punishment should fit the crime" may be determined.

ROOSEVELT

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁴⁵

LONDON, 31 July 1943.

394. Your 334.⁴⁶ My position is that once Mussolini and the Fascists are gone, I will deal with any Italian authority which can deliver the goods. I am not in the least afraid for this purpose of seeming to recognize the House of Savoy or Badoglio, provided they are the ones who can make the Italians do what we need for our war purposes. Those purposes would certainly be hindered by chaos, bolshevisation or civil war. We have no right to lay undue burdens on our troops. It may well be that after the armistice terms have been accepted, both the King and Badoglio will sink under the odium of surrender and that the Crown Prince and a new Prime Minister may be chosen.

I should deprecate any pronouncement about self determination at the present time, beyond what is implicit in the Atlantic Charter.⁴⁷ I agree with you that we must be very careful not to throw everything into the melting pot.

⁴⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁴⁶ Not found in Department files, but see message dated July 30, printed in Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Closing the Ring* (Boston, 1951), p. 64.

⁴⁷ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941. For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. 1, p. 367.

740.0011 European War 1939/30341 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1943—1 p. m.

4636. Your 4862, July 26, 6 p. m. Please arrange to see Eden at his earliest convenience and state to him that we agree that in the interest of the war effort the United States and British Governments should at once inform the Soviet Government regarding developments in Italy and give the Soviet Government to understand that we would welcome any suggestions with respect to the Italian situation that it may care to offer.

We propose that we address a communication to the Soviet Government of the character set forth below and that the British Government simultaneously hand to the Soviet Government a communication along similar lines.

[Here follows text the same, except for omission of last sentence of first paragraph, as that of *aide-mémoire* transmitted in telegram No. 637, August 3, 2 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, printed on page 344.]

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1556 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*⁴⁸

BERN, August 2, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 6 : 20 p. m.]

4659. 138, July 31, from Tittmann.⁴⁹ My 131, July 26.⁵⁰

1. For the moment it would appear Badoglio Government less preoccupied by prospect unconditional surrender to Allies than by possibility public disorder and uncertainty as to intentions of Germans. I am told of indications that predominant emotion Italian official circles today is fear and that this possibility should not be lost sight of when evaluating situation.

[2.] Vatican officials are following closely all Allied pronouncements with regard to surrender of Italy and are on lookout for anything that might imply "terms". Thus far however efforts to assess in this light various public statements made by Allies would seem to have resulted only in their confusion. In some quarters suggestion

⁴⁸ In telegram as received, paragraph 2 preceded paragraph 1; the editor has replaced paragraphs in numbered order.

⁴⁹ Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the President's Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII.

⁵⁰ Not printed.

has been reiterated that an early landing on peninsula by Allied forces would be desirable from point of view Italian security and that we would meet with little opposition if we attempted to do so. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/30493 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 2, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received 10:12 p. m.]

5032. Thank you for your good message 4636, August 1, 1 p. m., which came in late last night. I could not reach Eden until 3 o'clock this afternoon London time as he was out of town. I found that since I sent you my message 4862, July 26, 6 p. m., he had communicated with the Russians. He explained to me that he felt obligated to do this because of the British-Russian treaty.⁵¹ I know that he had the support of the War Cabinet in this although I was not informed.

I will let him state the action taken in the *aide-mémoire* which I asked him to prepare for me and which, together with copies of the documents given to the Russians, follow below:

Aide-mémoire. A day or two ago the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires was given a summary of the draft instrument of Surrender, which is still before the United States Government (annex 1). It was made clear that this instrument was purely provisional, pending agreement with the U.S. Government, and that its terms might have to be modified. A note has now been received from Monsieur Sobolev⁵² saying that the Soviet Government consider the provisions contained in this summary to correspond fully to the existing conditions, and have no objection to them.

Since communicating the above to the Soviet Government, the President has suggested a shorter formula for a purely military arrangement to be used by General Eisenhower in case of necessity. The Prime Minister has indicated to the President that in case of emergency General Eisenhower may be authorized to present this document. But he has asked the President to consider further the draft instrument already communicated to Washington, so that, if agreement can be reached on it before the emergency arises, General Eisen-

⁵¹ Treaty for an alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe and providing also for collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter concluded between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at London, May 26, 1942. For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxliv, p. 1038.

⁵² Arkady Alexandrovich Sobolev, Counselor of Soviet Embassy in the United Kingdom. His appointment as Soviet Ambassador to Canada was announced July 28, 1943.

hower may be authorized to present this fuller document in reply to any Italian request.

The Soviet Government are now being given a summary of the shorter document (annex 2) with an explanation of the circumstances in which it was drafted, and in which it may be used. End *aide-mémoire*.

Begin annex 1 to *aide-mémoire*. Summary of draft instrument of surrender for Italy.

The governing consideration is the prosecution of the war against Germany. Our aim is thus to secure the maximum strategic advantage and to avoid unnecessary commitments involving any dissipation of the war effort.

Provision is made for:

1. Acknowledgment of total defeat.
2. Italian participation in the war to cease in all theaters.
3. Withdrawal of the Italian armed forces from all areas outside Italian territory as and when directed.
4. Occupation of such parts of Italian territory as may be required.
5. Such measure of demobilization and disarmament as may be prescribed.
6. The Italian fleet to assemble and to be dealt with as prescribed.
7. Control of airfields, ports and transport systems.
8. All merchant shipping and inland transport equipment to be made available.
9. Rights of passage for United Nations personnel, material, aircraft, and ships.
10. Control of all inter-communications and imposition of censorship.
11. War material to be stored and dealt with as prescribed.
12. Industrial and financial controls.
13. Severance of relations with the other Axis powers and prohibition of all intercourse with them.
14. Internment of Axis forces in Italy.
15. Surrender of war criminals.
16. Dissolution of the Fascist organization and repeal of any objectionable legislation.
17. Immediate handing over of all Allied prisoners of war.

End annex 1 to *aide-mémoire*.

Begin annex 2 to *aide-mémoire*.

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces.

2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny to the Germans facilities that might be used against the United Nations.

3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, and none of these may from the beginning of these negotiations be evacuated to Germany.

4. Immediate transfer of the Italian fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.

5. Agreement that Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander-in-Chief to meet the needs of his military-naval program.

6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory both islands and mainland to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.

7. Immediate guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all air-fields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian armed forces until this function is taken over by the Allies.

8. Immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged.

9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.

10. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied forces or for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander-in-Chief may require and in particular the Commander-in-Chief will establish Allied military government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

11. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization. End annex 2 to *aide-memoire*.

In so far as the communications that have passed between the President and the Prime Minister in regard to terms with Italy are concerned, I have been fully informed, but there has been no discussion with me as regards the Russians except as I reported to you following my talk with Eden on July 26.⁵³ The first information given to the Russians was on July 30.

Eden thought that the statement you forwarded was excellent but of course recognized that it was too late to make it a joint statement. He suggested that we make it our own statement and add at the end of it that "we understand that the British Government has kept you informed of our joint ideas on the terms of surrender to be exacted from Italy", and perhaps add that "we were in accord with this procedure".

I helped draft the above statement, except the last sentence. It is my opinion that your statement with the added paragraph would be worth doing. You have asked the Russians in the last paragraph of the statement for suggestions and agreed to reply to specific in-

⁵³ See the Ambassador's telegram No. 4862, July 26, 6 p. m., p. 335.

quiries. The British have done neither; they have limited both their messages to simply informing them. Their method calls for no reciprocal action beyond giving them information in similar circumstances. Ours puts the Russians under an obligation to seek suggestions from us and to reply to specific inquiries by us if we choose to make them.

WINANT

740.00119 European War 1939/1560a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1943—2 p. m.

637. Your 977, July 30, 4 p. m.⁵⁴ Please call upon Molotov⁵⁵ as soon as you are able to obtain an appointment and hand him an *aide-mémoire* reading substantially as follows: Begin *aide-mémoire*.

The Government of the United States is of the opinion that following the disappearance of Mussolini Italian resistance is rapidly crumbling and that within a relatively short period full capitulation is to be expected. The Allied Commander-in-Chief of the area is being authorized to accept unconditional surrender from anyone who in his judgment is in a position to offer it. He is also being authorized to take such military measures as may seem to him to be appropriate in order to preserve order, guarantee the security of the Allied forces in Italy, and to prepare for his next immediate future military operations. We understand that the British Government has informed the Soviet Government of our joint ideas on the terms of surrender to be exacted from Italy.

The Government of the United States continues to share the view that it is essential that the United States, British, and Soviet Governments keep each other fully informed regarding military developments in the various areas in which their respective armed forces are operating and also that they maintain constant touch with each other regarding such developments of a political nature as may arise from the immediate military developments.

Any suggestions with regard to the situation in Italy which the Soviet Government may at this or at any future time care to offer would, therefore, be welcomed by the United States Government. Furthermore, the United States Government would be glad to reply to any specific inquiries which the Soviet Government might care to make with regard to the Italian situation. End *aide-mémoire*.

For your confidential information the British Government has been informed of and has agreed to the contents of this *aide-mémoire*.

⁵⁴ Not printed.

⁵⁵ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

The British Government's *aide-mémoire* in reply handed to Winant by Eden on August 2 with annexes reads as follows:

[Here follows text of British *aide-mémoire* quoted in telegram No. 5032, August 2, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, printed *supra*.]

We are advised that the first information given to the Russians by the British was given on July 30. You will note that the British have limited their messages simply to informing the Russians whereas our *aide-mémoire* specifically asks them for suggestions and agrees to reply to specific inquiries they may choose to make.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/30562 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*⁵⁶

BERN, August 5, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 6:46 p. m.]

4742. 140, August 3, from Tittmann. My 131, July 31 [26].⁵⁷

1. There is of course no truth in reports appearing Swiss press to effect that either my British colleague or myself have been "negotiating" with Badoglio Government through Vatican.

2. General feeling Vatican circles appears to be that German menace to assume political control of Italy has become very real and consequently position of Badoglio Government extremely difficult. Possibility that Germans may recall Fascists and even insist upon substitution of a Gauleiter of Farinacci⁵⁸ type for present government does not seem to be excluded. Completely lacking in aviation and modern armor, Italian armed forces are not considered to be in a position effectively to oppose military occupation of Rome. It is believed there is at present time German armored division within 50 miles of capital ready to move in at moment's notice. Under circumstances it is felt temporizing tactics on part of Badoglio Government are justifiable on grounds that if Germans could be held off long enough some military or other event might intervene to ease situation. Suggestion has again been heard that early Allied landing on peninsula would be desirable and that if this could be effected in north of Italy Germans would be obliged to retire immediately from south and center. It has been intimated that good will toward Allies of

⁵⁶ In telegram as received, paragraph 2 preceded paragraph 1; the editor has replaced paragraphs in numbered order.

⁵⁷ Not printed.

⁵⁸ R. Farinacci was a member of the Grand Fascist Council under Mussolini.

Italian people at present time is evident and Allies should not fail to take advantage this state of mind while it lasts.

3. I understand that Badoglio Government now has internal situation under control and that fear of social disorders is for moment in abeyance. Apparent apathy of people suggests popular uprising against Germans near future is unlikely. Also suggests that while desire for peace undoubtedly very strong people are counting on us rather than own efforts to get them out of war.

4. Great deal of foregoing is of course speculative and question also arises as to how Vatican may be playing game of Badoglio Government. In any event it seems to be fact that this government has had support of Vatican from beginning. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/30493 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1943—6 p. m.

4768. Your 5032, August 2, 9 p. m. Ambassador Standley has been instructed to hand Molotov the *Aide-Mémoire* given in our 4636, August 1, 1 p. m., with the following added at end of first paragraph "We understand that the British Government has informed the Soviet Government of our joint ideas on the terms of surrender to be exacted from Italy."

Please impress upon Mr. Eden and the Prime Minister the importance which we attach to reaching prior agreement concerning the communication to other governments of secret matters under discussion between us. As they know, we attach great importance to consultation with the Russians concerning matters of serious importance to all three governments. We fully realize the relationship of the British and Soviet Governments under the Anglo-Soviet Treaty. We feel, however, that for the British Government to approach the Soviet Government singly with regard to matters under discussion between the British and United States Governments may give the Russians the impression that the British Government is seeking the role of intermediary, an impression which in our opinion is not conducive to the close cooperation and confidence between the three Powers which the British and we equally desire.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1565 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 8, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received August 9—10: 45 a. m.]

1031 bis. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Your 637, August 3, 2 p. m. On August 3 and 4 the British Ambassador here⁵⁹ orally informed Ambassador Standley and me of the summary of the terms of surrender to be exacted from Italy, both the longer draft and the shorter formula for a purely military arrangement to be used in case of necessity. Clark Kerr, under instruction communicated the longer draft to Molotov and promptly received a reply along the lines of that communicated to Eden by the Soviet Chargé in London. Shortly thereafter Clark Kerr communicated the shorter draft to Molotov with the explanation stated in your telegram under reference. Clark Kerr told me yesterday in reply to my inquiry that the Soviet Government has as yet made no comment on the shorter draft.

I told Clark Kerr yesterday of the communication which our Government had made to the Soviet Government. Without my calling attention to it he expressed special gratification at the fact that our Government had asked the Soviet Government for suggestions and had stated that it would be glad to reply to any specific inquiries which the Soviet Government might care to make. He commented further that he doubted whether his Government or the American Government had yet been able to convince the Soviet Government that our two Governments really desired to collaborate with the Soviet Government. He said that the Soviet Government felt that the American and British Governments first consulted together and arrived at a decision and then simply communicated that decision to the Soviet Government for its information. The Soviet Government felt that it was not made a party during the consultative stage and therefore did not have a share in the formulating of decisions.

I commented that the communicating to the Soviet Government of information in regard to the plans and attitudes of the American and British Governments constituted an important step in the process of collaboration. He agreed and again expressed gratification at the fact that the American Government had expressly asked the Soviet Government for comment in regard to the terms of surrender to be exacted from Italy. I expressed the personal view that the next 3 to 6 months were likely to be a very important period, in that during that time the tendencies for or against collaboration among the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain would probably further

⁵⁹ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

crystallize and that I thought it important that the United States and Great Britain put forth special effort to strengthen and develop the trends in the direction of collaboration. Clark Kerr indicated that he heartily believes in trying to bring about greater collaboration with the Soviet Government.

HAMILTON

740.0011 European War 1939/30612 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 9, 1943—noon.

[Received August 10—10:59 a. m.]

4846. Tittmann's 144, August 6. My 140.⁶⁰

1. Although speculation as to developments is dilemma in which Badoglio Government finds itself, little concrete has emerged since my last telegram. General tone Vatican circles continues pessimistic.

2. There is still Italian people's overwhelming desire for peace that must be satisfied yet they seem incapable of taking initiative themselves either because they lack experience in democratic processes or because of presence of German military power—probably combination of both. It is difficult to escape conclusion that Italian people are relying on United States to large extent to get them out of war. To illustrate I have heard Italians frequently say that if as charged by Allies, Badoglio Government lost opportunity to get rid of Germans by not taking action against them immediately after fall of Fascist regime, Allies themselves are guilty same mistake because they failed to land military forces on Peninsula while Germans were still in confusion.

3. Meanwhile liquidation of Fascism by Badoglio Government seems to be making good progress. Recent provision for establishment of commission for investigation rapid accumulation fortunes by Fascists who held public office especially popular. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.00119 European War 1939/1596

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 10, 1943.

The Greek Ambassador ⁶¹ called to see me this afternoon at his request. By instruction of his Government the Ambassador handed

⁶⁰ No. 4742, August 5, 4 p.m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 345.

⁶¹ Cimon P. Diamantopoulos.

me the memorandum attached herewith and asked what the opinion of this Government might be with regard to the initiative undertaken by the Papal Nuncio in Bern. I said to the Ambassador that it seemed to me that the reply was a very simple one, namely, that in as much as the United Nations had announced that the only terms for peace with Italy were unconditional surrender, there was no possibility of the negotiations urged by the Papal Nuncio, and that if any neutral nations endeavored to intercede in the manner suggested a reply in that sense would necessarily be made to them. The Ambassador said he fully understood and was completely in accord.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

[Annex]

The Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos) to the Secretary of State

No. 1889

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

The Ambassador of Greece presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State and has the honor to transmit herewith, for the consideration of the State Department, a translation of a telegram addressed by the Greek Legation at Berne to the Prime Minister of Greece at Cairo:

"The Papal Nuncio returned from Rome a few days ago and told me that although the Holy See does not wish to involve the Swiss Government in Italian affairs and that he had no instructions on the matter, he believes, nevertheless, that the neutral nations should intercede and exert efforts to commence negotiations for Italy's exit from the war, and he expressed the hope that they would wish to secure for her an honorable peace.

"The Nuncio requested me to help him in this matter and to exchange views concerning it with my Government. He assured me that as he was in a position to know Italy has definitely abandoned her fantastic claims on Greek territories and that he perceived that the people of Italy desire not only reconciliation but also close cooperation with us. I replied that I do not know the views of my Government and had no instructions on the point, but that in my personal opinion not only was reconciliation and cooperation impossible, but even simple friendly relations, before there is a satisfactory solution for Greece of the questions of the Dodecanese Islands and Northern Epirus, which have for a long time divided the two countries. He assured me that he was absolutely in accord. Please let me have your advice on the matter."

740.0011 European War 1939/30608 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 10, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received August 10—11: 35 a. m.]

5236. Thank you for the information contained in the Department's 4768, August 7, 6 p. m. I conveyed to Mr. Eden the need for the closest cooperation and common action in dealing with problems affecting Russian interests and our own particularly in regard to secret matters under discussion between us. He repeated to me his previous statement that the British-Russian Treaty puts his Government under obligation to keep the Russians informed (Department's 5032, August 2, 9 p. m.). He also suggested the need for prompt exchanges in consultation and he said he would be very happy to work out a procedure which would keep us currently aware of each other's position on issues involving information and action concerning all three Governments.

WINANT

740.00119 European War 1939/1722

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1943.

Due to the illness of the Greek Ambassador, who had asked for an appointment, Mr. Philon⁶² called to present the Embassy's note No. 1962, dated August 13, 1943 (copy attached⁶³), containing the demands of the Greek Government that:

- 1) Greece be represented on the Armistice Delegation to be set up in connection with the anticipated surrender of Italy.
- 2) That every vestige of Italian domination be completely uprooted from the Eastern Mediterranean and from the West Coast of the Balkan peninsula and adjacent islands.
- 3) That the Armistice terms provide "for the immediate evacuation of Italian military and civil authorities of all the territories claimed by Greece (i.e. Northern Epirus and the Dodecanese) and for the delivery of these territories to Greek authorities", or, in the absence of Greek authorities, be "provisionally left in the care of Allied authorities."

I told Mr. Philon that the Embassy's note would receive the attention of the appropriate authorities of this Government, including the military. I said I should point out, however, that it was the policy

⁶² Philon Philon, Counselor of the Greek Embassy.

⁶³ Not printed.

of this Government that territorial questions be left for settlement after the war.

In reply to my inquiry, Mr. Philon said that similar representations had been made to the British Government.

Referring to the Greek request for representation on the Armistice Commission, I asked Mr. Philon if he knew whether the Yugoslav Government was making a similar demand. He had no information on this point.

740.00119 European War 1939/1579 : Telegram

The Chargé in Portugal (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, August 14, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

1799. This is Tittmann's 145, August 8. Following is from a sure source:

1. The Badoglio Government would like to make peace with the Allies immediately.

2. It is prevented from doing so by German threat to occupy Italy and to take over control of the Italian Government in Rome.

3. Italian armed forces now in Italy are not strong enough successfully oppose the Germans. Two German armored divisions are at present moment in proximity of Rome.

4. Badoglio must therefore play for time in hope that Allies will be in a position to come to help of the Italians in opposing the Germans with sufficient aviation or possibly by effecting a landing on the peninsula, preferably in the north.

5. The suggestion that Badoglio Government may be playing the Germans against the Allies in hope of obtaining better terms from latter is to be excluded. The Government is motivated solely by fear of the Germans.

6. Hitler is in a vengeful mood against Italy and the Germans are seeking a [pretext] to occupy the country. German occupation would mean bloodshed.

7. Tension Italian and German troops is growing and an incident arising therefrom may furnish the Germans with the desired pretext. Popular uprisings could also furnish a pretext and could conceivably end in revolution and anarchy. The present state of tension cannot last for more than a few weeks at the most.

8. It is therefore necessary for the Badoglio Government to maintain its authority. In order not to undermine this authority the Allies should (a) refrain from attacking the Badoglio Government and (b) refrain from bombing the civilian populations. It would also help

if the Allies could inform the Badoglio Government as to any plans they may have in mind for Italy.

9. Attempts have been made to make known the foregoing to the authorities in Washington and London through Lisbon and Tangier. Recent indiscriminate bombings of Naples and cities in northern Italy, however, suggest that the information may not have reached its destinations.

Please inform London. [Tittmann.]

KENNAN

740.0011 European War 1939/30711 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 17, 1943—noon.

[Received 12:38 p. m.]

5012. This is Tittmann's 153, August 12. My 145, August 8.⁶⁴

1. Chief pre-occupation Badoglio Government remains German menace to occupy country and to gain control of Government very probably by recalling Fascists to power. I have heard it stated authoritatively that Germans are in fact seeking pretext to carry out their threat and that should Italians for instance attempt surrender Allies, Germans would undoubtedly take over within 2 hours after learning of attempt.

2. Another excuse which Germans would in all probability seize upon is outbreak internal disorder and this Badoglio Government dreads and is endeavoring avoid at all costs. It is stated in general leaders moderate political parties aware situation and are cooperating with Government in effort to maintain order but attitude Communists uncertain. According to reliable source investigation made by Ministry of Interior after fall Fascist regime revealed Communists in Italy are well organized, not without financial resources, and even to some extent armed. The present situation would appear to be that popular feeling is under control but that any agitation would be dangerous.

3. Am reliably informed that Badoglio Government is of opinion indiscriminate bombings by Allies such as Naples August 4, Genoa, Turin and Milan August 7, will if continued have a disturbing effect upon masses with grave risk inciting them to public protests and demonstrations. If such disorders should take place Germans would be presented with pretext for which they are looking and result would be German occupation of country and return of Fascist regime or worse. Government circles are urging very strongly that Allied

⁶⁴ *Supra.*

bombings be confined to military objectives only with least possible derangement of civilian population especially poorer classes. I myself believe that Badoglio Government is sincere when it solemnly warns of this danger but I have too few elements available on which to base independent judgment.

4. I am told that Rome is at present surrounded by both German and Italian armed forces. German forces form outer ring and Italians inner, latter apparently drawn up to protect capital in case Germans should attempt move in.

Tension continues. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ⁶⁵

1. I have received Your message concerning the negotiations with the Italians and the new terms of armistice with Italy. Thank you for the information.

Mr. Eden told Mr. Sobolev that Moscow was fully informed about the negotiations with Italy. I have, however, to say, that Mr. Eden's statement does not correspond with reality, as I have received your message in which long passages are omitted and which has no concluding paragraphs. In view of this, it is necessary to state that the Soviet Government is not informed about the negotiations of the British and the Americans with the Italians. Mr. Kerr gives assurance that within a short time he will receive the complete text of your message; although the three days have passed, and Ambassador Kerr has not yet given me the complete text of the message. I cannot understand how such delay could have occurred during the transmission of the information on such important matter.

2. I believe that the time is ripe to organize the military-political Commission of the representatives of the three countries: The United States, Great Britain and the USSR with the purpose of considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different Governments dissociating themselves from Germany.^{65a} Until now the matter stood as follows: The United States and Great Britain made agreements but the Soviet Union received information about the results

⁶⁵ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt were in attendance at Quebec Conference August 17-24, 1943. Documentation on the Conference will be published in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

^{65a} For correspondence relating to the Political-Military Commission, see vol. 1, pp. 782 ff.

of the agreements between the two countries just as a passive third observer. I have to tell you that it is impossible to tolerate such situation any longer. I propose to establish this Commission and to assign Sicily at the beginning as the place of residence of the Commission.

3. I am waiting for the complete text of your message concerning the negotiations with Italy.

AUGUST 22, 1943.

740.00119 European War 1939/1610 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 25, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received August 26—11:05 a. m.]

1163. Personal for the Secretary. I have received a note from Molotov dated August 23 containing a personal and secret message from Stalin to the President and the Prime Minister dated August 22⁶⁶ in reply to a communication concerning negotiations with Italy over armistice terms. The reply in part affirms that the Soviet Government was not kept fully informed of the negotiations since the original communication transmitted to the Soviet Foreign Office by the British Ambassador contained many omissions. Inasmuch as Molotov's letter states that the reply was telegraphed to Gromyko⁶⁷ for transmission to the President, I am not summarizing the remainder of the reply.

Clark Kerr who has received an identical note from Molotov has advised me that the original communication in question was received by the British Embassy with one word garbled and with the final sentence of 12 words missing. However in view of its urgency he transmitted it in its incomplete form to Molotov on August 20 with the omissions noted and upon receipt of the corrections he furnished Molotov with the complete text of the message on August 22.

Clark Kerr is somewhat perturbed at the fact that although Molotov was aware that the full text of the note had been received on August 22 he had transmitted in his note of August 23 Stalin's charges that the full text of the message had not been received.

STANDLEY

⁶⁶ Message of August 22 printed *supra*.

⁶⁷ A. A. Gromyko, Soviet Chargé in the United States.

740.00119 European War 1939/1618

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁶⁸

The following instructions were sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow on August 25th.

My immediately succeeding telegram contains full text of instrument of surrender for Italy which has now been approved by the President and the Prime Minister. You should communicate this text to Marshal Stalin explaining that it has only now been got into final shape and say that we hope that Soviet Government will consider, as they did in the case of the summary previously communicated to them, that this document is suitable and adequately covers the interests of the U. S. S. R.

2. Marshal Stalin will observe that the preamble provides that surrender shall be concluded with Italy by the United States and United Kingdom Governments on behalf of the United Nations. It is proposed that General Eisenhower should sign the instrument. His Majesty's Government hope that these arrangements will be agreeable to the Soviet Government and that they will empower General Eisenhower to sign the instrument on their behalf as he will on behalf of all the other United Nations who are at war with Italy including the United Kingdom.

3. You should say that the instrument is being sent to Lisbon where it will be presented to the Italian emissaries should they return to that town with an explanation that it embodies points already handed to them and also contains the additional points which they were warned to expect. General Eisenhower is being sent the text with similar instructions in case the Italians get into direct touch with his headquarters. General Castellano⁶⁹ has stated that his Government would give their answer either 28/8 or 29/8 and if by midnight of 30/8 no message had been received we should assume that our terms had not been accepted.

4. You should say that whilst under the procedure we intend to follow in the event of acceptance there will be only one signatory on behalf of all the United Nations, if the Soviet Government desire that their representative should be present at the time of signature, we would welcome this. In that case arrangements should be put in hand at once.

5. If you are asked whether the Soviet Government are expected to offer comments on the instrument, you should reply that comments would no doubt be sympathetically examined but the Soviet Govern-

⁶⁸ Undated. Division of Communications and Records receipt date is August 30, 1943, but the document was very likely handed to a Department official at an earlier date.

⁶⁹ Brig. Gen. Giuseppe Castellano, attached to the Italian High Command.

ment will appreciate that in view of the time factor it may be physically impossible to give effect to them.

6. I am repeating this telegram to Washington to ask that the United States Ambassador in Moscow should be instructed to make similar communication to Marshal Stalin. Unfortunately there is no time to concert joint action.

740.00119 European War 1939/1618: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1943—7 p. m.

749. Department's 637, August 3, 2 p. m. The text of instrument for surrender of Italy has just been agreed upon by the President and Prime Minister Churchill. The full text has been telegraphed by the British Foreign Office to Clark Kerr together with instructions containing the observations he should make in transmitting this document to Marshal Stalin. In order to avoid delay connected with transmitting these documents to you by telegraph, you should obtain them from your British colleague and communicate on behalf of this Government the text of instrument of surrender to Marshal Stalin with the statement that this Government associates itself fully with the oral statements made by the British Ambassador to Stalin. In transmitting this document to Stalin, please inform him that the present instrument of surrender does not supersede but includes all the military clauses contained in annex 2 of the British *aide-mémoire* quoted in my reference telegram as well as political and economic conditions of surrender.

Please report action taken.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1615: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 27, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received August 28—2:30 a. m.]

1201. Personal for the Secretary. In our meeting with Molotov last night the British Ambassador handed to him the text of the terms of surrender to Italy with a covering note which he said was being communicated to the Soviet Government on behalf of the President and the Prime Minister. This note *inter alia* stated that the terms in their final form had only now been agreed upon by the British and American Governments and expressed the hope that the Soviet Gov-

ernment would regard the terms as it did in the case of the summary previously communicated as suitable and adequately covering the interests of the Soviet Union. Clark Kerr explained that the terms were already known to the Soviet Government and that they were merely presented in legal form in the present document.

Molotov stated that he would report the entire matter to his Government.

STANDLEY

740.00119 European War 1939/1620 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 28, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received August 29—12: 50 p.m.]

1216. Personal for the Secretary. Your 749, August 26, 7 p. m., my 1201, August 27, 5 p. m. The British Ambassador has received a note from Molotov dated August 27 which reads in paraphrased translation as follows:

[“]The Soviet Government has acquainted itself with the Italian surrender terms which have been approved by the American and British Governments as transmitted by Ambassador Kerr and Ambassador Standley on August 26.

The Soviet Government approves the terms in question. It empowers General Eisenhower to sign the terms in the negotiations with Castellano on behalf of the Soviet Government.⁷⁰

In the present instance it is the opinion of the Soviet Government that a special representative of the Soviet Union is not required when the Italian terms of surrender are signed by General Eisenhower.”

STANDLEY

740.00119 European War 1939/1650

*The American Embassy Near the Yugoslav Government in Exile to the Yugoslav Ministry for Foreign Affairs*⁷¹

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Recent developments in Italy render it highly desirable for the United Nations in a state of war with her to agree among themselves

⁷⁰ For text of Italian Armistice signed September 3, 1943, but not announced until September 8, see Department of State, *United States and Italy, 1936-1946*, Documentary Record (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 51, or *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604*, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2740.

⁷¹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile, at London, in his despatch No. 86, August 30; received September 8.

what common action they should take if she applies for a suspension of hostilities. In the view of the United States and United Kingdom Governments, who are together responsible for the conduct of the present military operations against Italy, it will best accord with the various obligations which the United Nations have undertaken towards one another, particularly under Article 2 of the United Nations Declaration,⁷² if, after receiving the formal unconditional surrender of Italy for which they have stipulated, a statement in the name of all the United Nations who are at war with her should be presented stating what they require her to do. Such a document would have to be signed by the representative of the Italian Government without discussion. It would suspend the state of hostilities simultaneously between her and all the United Nations at war with her. Only in this way would it be possible to guard against the dangerous confusion which would be likely to result from a multiplicity of instruments between the United Nations severally and the defeated Power.

2. The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States have agreed to recommend to other United Nations whose interests are most immediately concerned that the Allied Commander-in-Chief should be empowered as sole signatory to sign, with any Italian Government whom they consider to dispose of the necessary degree of authority to give it effect, an instrument covering the following ground:

1. Acknowledgment of total defeat.
2. Italian participation in the war to cease in all theatres.
3. Withdrawal of the Italian armed forces from all areas outside Italian territory as and when directed.
4. Occupation of such parts of Italian territory as may be required.
5. Such measure of demobilisation and disarmament as may be prescribed.
6. The Italian fleet to assemble and to be dealt with as prescribed.
7. Control of airfields, ports and transport systems.
8. All merchant shipping and inland transport equipment to be made available.
9. Rights of passage for United Nations Personnel, materials, aircraft and ships.
10. Control of all inter-communications and imposition of censorship.
11. War material to be stored and dealt with as prescribed.
12. Industrial and financial controls.

⁷² Signed at Washington, January 1, 1942; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

13. Severance of relations with the other Axis Powers and prohibition of all intercourse with them.
14. Internment of Axis forces in Italy.
15. Surrender of war criminals.
16. Dissolution of the Fascist organisation and repeal of objectionable legislation.
17. Immediate handing over of all Allied prisoners of war.

3. The Yugoslav Government will observe that such an Instrument amply covers its needs and takes into account all those general desiderata set out in the various informal communications made to the United States and United Kingdom Governments by the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in London.

4. The two Governments therefore express the hope that the Yugoslav Government will at once agree that the Allied Commander-in-Chief may be empowered to sign such an Instrument as sole signatory on their behalf as on that of all other United Nations who are at war with Italy.

5. The full text of the proposed Instrument will be communicated as soon as possible.

6. The Yugoslav Government will recognise that the two Governments actually conducting military operations on Italian territory feel compelled to sign an Instrument in these terms even if when the time for signature arrives some of the United Nations at war with Italy may not have conferred a mandate on the Commander-in-Chief to sign on their behalf. Therefore they sincerely hope that the Yugoslav Government will agree that its interests are fully protected by the draft Instrument, as they are most anxious that its signature should not be impeded by the proposal of amendments which it would be difficult to make at a moment when the Italians were ready to sign.

7. Although under this procedure there will be only one signatory on behalf of the United Nations, if for any reason the Yugoslav Government desire that their representative should be present at the time of signature, the United States and United Kingdom Governments will do what they can to arrange for this.

8. A similar communication has been or is being made to the Governments of H.B.M.⁷³ Dominions, U.S.S.R., China, Brazil, Ethiopia, Greece and to the French Committee of National Liberation.

LONDON, August 30, 1943.

⁷³ His Britannic Majesty.

740.00119 European War 1939/1946

*The Yugoslav Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy
Near the Yugoslav Government in Exile*⁷⁴

NOTE VERBALE

P. No. 4956

The Yugoslav Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America to Yugoslavia and has the honor to bring to notice that the Royal Yugoslav Government agree that the Allied Commander-in-Chief be empowered to sign on their behalf an Instrument containing the proposed conditions to be imposed on Italy.

At the same time, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to communicate the desire of the Royal Yugoslav Government that their representative be present at the time of signature of this Instrument, and the Ministry would be grateful for further information as to the necessary arrangements for this purpose.

LONDON, 30 August, 1943.

*President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister (Churchill) to
the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet
Union (Stalin)*⁷⁵

[WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1943.

1. We have received from General C.⁷⁶ a statement that the Italians accept and that he is coming to sign, but we do not know for certain whether this refers to the short military terms which you have already seen, or to the more comprehensive and complete terms in regard to which your readiness to sign was specifically indicated.

2. The military situation there is at once critical and hopeful. Our invasion of the mainland begins almost immediately, and the heavy blow called AVALANCHE will be struck in the next week or so. The difficulties of the Italian Government and people in extricating themselves from Hitler's clutches may make a still more daring enterprise necessary, for which General Eisenhower will need as much Italian help as he can get. The Italian acceptance of the terms is largely based on the fact that we shall send an airborne division to Rome to

⁷⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile, at London, in his despatch No. 87, September 1; received September 10. Similar replies agreeing that the Allied Commander in Chief be empowered to sign on their behalf were received from other of the governments to which the *aide-memoire* of August 30 was sent.

⁷⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁷⁶ General Castellano.

enable them to hold off the Germans, who have gathered Panzer strength in that vicinity and who may replace the Badoglio Government with a Quisling⁷⁷ administration probably under Farinacci. Matters are moving so fast there that we think General Eisenhower should have discretion not to delay settlement with the Italians for the sake of the differences between the short and long terms. It is clear that the short terms are included in the long terms, that they proceed on the basis of unconditional surrender and Clause Ten in the short terms places the interpretation in the hands of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

3. We are therefore assuming that you expect General Eisenhower to sign the short terms in your behalf if that be necessary to avoid the further journeying of General C to Rome and consequent delay and uncertainty affecting the military operations. We are of course anxious that the Italian unconditional surrender be to the Soviet Union as well as to Britain and the United States. The date of the surrender announcement must of course be fitted in with the military coup.

ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL

740.00119 European War 1939/1692: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Algiers (McBride) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, September 9, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received September 10—12: 14 p. m.]

1565. From Murphy.⁷⁸ Refer AGWAR telegrams J. 9411. Macmillan⁷⁹ and I called on Massigli⁸⁰ at 5:30 p. m., September 8, to inform him of impending announcement General Eisenhower of a military armistice with Italy. Communicated to him text of General Eisenhower's announcement.⁸¹ Massigli's satisfaction that Italy would cease hostilities against Allies was overshadowed by his indignation and regret that French Committee of National Liberation had not been consulted and kept informed of negotiations leading up to armistice.

⁷⁷ Vidkun Quisling, Minister-President of the puppet government set up by the Germans in Norway.

⁷⁸ Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; United States Political Adviser on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa.

⁷⁹ Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North Africa.

⁸⁰ René Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the French Committee of National Liberation.

⁸¹ For text of General Eisenhower's radio announcement on September 8, 1943, of Italian military armistice, see *United States and Italy, 1936-1946*, p. 50.

In that connection it should be said that in complying with Department's 1583, August 28, 6 p. m.,⁸² instructing me to inform French of outline of complete armistice terms I carefully refrained from any statement regarding active negotiations. Macmillan however in a probably overzealous desire to quiet French apprehensions in this respect had told French at the time that no negotiations were in progress. Massigli said he could not advise us strongly enough that French be consulted a priori before conclusion of complete armistice terms with Italy. He said that after all we must recognize that France has a greater interest in Italy than some other countries such as China and Brazil. In his opinion French people would never understand or forgive us if we disregard French interests in our longer term dealings with Italians.

As General Giraud⁸³ is absent on an inspection trip in Morocco, Macmillan and I in agreement with Chief of Staff also called on de Gaulle⁸⁴ a few minutes before broadcast of General Eisenhower's declaration and conveyed foregoing information to him. His reaction was milder than we had expected but tinged with bitterness. He congratulated Allies on having obliged Italy to take this decision but said that insofar as French were concerned their position vis-à-vis Italy was unchanged. He failed to understand why French had not been consulted because of obvious interests in it which they possess. We emphasized that present arrangement is of a military character but he was quick to point out that according to Eisenhower's declaration the Governments of USA, Great Britain and Soviet Union had approved [?] therefore political considerations were involved and it was obvious France had been ignored and slighted. (De Gaulle was visibly impressed by the news that approval of Soviet Union had been given). De Gaulle also asserted that decision to accept Italian military cooperation involved very definite political consideration on which French authorities were entitled to have been consulted. We informed de Gaulle that as our Governments regard armistice strictly as a military instrument signed by soldiers and as French Commander-in-Chief has been kept generally informed of steps leading to the armistice we considered that his objections are not well founded. He shrugged his shoulders saying he did not understand this reference to French Commander-in-Chief.

Department might also be interested to know that when we emphasized that de Gaulle as a soldier would be the first to understand military necessities involved and appreciate that present action so advan-

⁸² Not printed.

⁸³ Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud, Co-Chairman of the French Committee of National Liberation.

⁸⁴ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, Co-Chairman of the French Committee of National Liberation.

tageous to French people had many features of a *ruse de guerre* he promptly replied he was not a soldier but he represented France's political interests. At the time he spoke he was wearing gun uniform of a Brigadier General in French Army which is his regular costume.

Thus far general sentiment on part of North African population is mixed. On the one hand there is pleasure and satisfaction over Italian capitulation and on the other a feeling that French interests have not been sufficiently stressed.

After Committee meeting today Massigli called on me to state suspicion is rife among membership that notwithstanding our declarations a political deal possibly involving Tunisia is involved and that Allies intend to exclude French from consultation regarding complete armistice terms and development of post armistice stages, work of armistice commission, etc. I reassured Massigli referring to our yesterday's conversation when he was informed that present armistice text of which was communicated informally by AHQ⁸⁵ [to] Giraud is limited to military considerations. He also indicated that his personal situation by reason of his failure to keep Committee informed of this development is adversely affected.

Massigli urges that Washington and London issue promptly a declaration to effect that the French Committee of National Liberation will be associated in stages which follow present Italian armistice on ground that Committee has responsibility of defending very important French interests which armistice must safeguard. In making that request Massigli emphasized French interest in it by its close geographic and political relationship and fact that French have been actively participating in war against Italians (I had mentioned that Greece and Yugoslavia had not been consulted for some [*same?*] reasons though they also had special interests in Italy).

Macmillan is telegraphing this suggestion to London. We both feel if some comforting, if innocuous, communication could be made it would calm present tempest in a tea cup. [Murphy.]

McBRIDE

740.00111 European War 1939/31345

Press Release Issued by the White House, September 10, 1943

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill tonight dispatched the following message to Marshal Badoglio and to the people of Italy:

"It has fallen to you in the hour of your country's agony to take the first decisive steps to win peace and freedom for the Italian people

⁸⁵ Army Headquarters.

and to win back for Italy an honourable place in the civilization of Europe.

"You have already freed your country from Fascist servitude. There remains the even more important task of cleansing the Italian soil from the German invaders. Hitler, through his accomplice Mussolini, has brought Italy to the verge of ruin. He has driven the Italians into disastrous campaigns in the sands of Egypt and the snows of Russia. The Germans have always deserted the Italian troops on the battlefield, sacrificing them contemptuously in order to cover their own retreats. Now Hitler threatens to subject you all to the cruelties he is perpetrating in so many lands.

"Now is the time for every Italian to strike his blow. The liberating armies of the Western World are coming to your rescue. We have very strong forces and are entering at many points. The German terror in Italy will not last long. They will be extirpated from your land and you, by helping in this great surge of liberation, will place yourselves once more among the true and long-proved friends of your country from whom you have been so wrongfully estranged.

["]Take every chance you can. Strike hard and strike home. Have faith in your future. All will come well. March forward with your American and British friends in the great world movement towards Freedom, Justice and Peace."

740.00119 European War 1939/1742

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Unless General Eisenhower sees insuperable objection His Majesty's Government consider that it is desirable to proceed at once to obtain signature of Marshal Badoglio, as head of the Italian Government, to the comprehensive instrument of surrender, informing the Marshal that it contains the other conditions mentioned in Article 12 of the Military Armistice and that the full instrument when signed will take the place of the military armistice.

The absence of an instrument covering economic and other terms is already proving inconvenient, e.g. to the supply departments of His Majesty's Government who are being forced to suggest in the absence of such an instrument that the question of Italian merchant shipping should be dealt with by directive. A further reason is that requests are beginning to mount up from the Allied Governments on points which are covered by the comprehensive terms, but on which no satisfaction can be given until the comprehensive instrument is signed.

It is true that a number of provisions in the comprehensive instrument may read somewhat inappropriately in the present circumstances; but it was always the assumption that parts of Italian terri-

tory would not be under the control of the Badoglio Government, and the amount of territory which they do control is only a question of degree. It must be assumed that the Badoglio Government or its recognised successor will eventually be in control of a substantial portion of Italian territory and thus be able to comply with Allied requirements. However, it would probably also be desirable to intimate informally to Marshal Badoglio that it is realised that the terms cannot at present be carried out in respect of territory under actual German control. When the full terms are published it would be explained that they were drafted some time ago and that they represent requirements with which the Italian Government will be expected to comply when they are in a position to do so.

It is desirable that the comprehensive instrument should be signed at the earliest possible moment. Although the establishment of a fascist Government in Northern Italy, which would no doubt repudiate the armistice of September 3rd, would not in fact invalidate it, it is clearly desirable if possible that the definitive instrument should be signed before any rival government has been set up.

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1943.

740.00119 European War 1939/1747: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Algiers (McBride) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, September 17, 1943—midnight.

[Received September 19—1:30 a. m.]

1606. From Murphy. Massigli has today communicated to the British Representative and to me the text of a memorandum setting forth the French claims with regard to participation in any armistice settlement with Italy (reference AGWAR 8,988).

In the note which accompanied the memorandum, the Committee of National Liberation reemphasizes the importance that it attaches to French participation in any conversations or discussions to which the application and development of armistice clauses will give rise. The disappointment which the Committee felt over its absence from the discussions leading up to the preliminary military clauses is repeated.

In the Committee's opinion, one of the first consequences of the Italian capitulation should be a formal declaration on the part of

Italy that the Armistice of 1940⁸⁶ is considered null and void. The note goes on to say that the Committee requests not only that its delegates participate in any Allied control organization but also in the preparation of the political, economic and financial clauses to be imposed upon the Italian Government in accordance with Clause 12 of the armistice. In envisaging the participation of French officers or officials in the execution of such provisions the Committee anticipates not only that they will supervise the execution of the armistice and insure the defense of Allied interests but that the restoration of normal life in Italy must be undertaken in such a way as to insure that the last trace of the Fascist regime disappears and that there is no possibility of the restoration of that system of economic isolation which was so destructive to the normal European economic life before the war.

The memorandum claims that in view of the Italian occupation of national soil, France, like Greece and Yugoslavia, has acquired a right to receive priority in the restoration and replacement of property sequestered or removed under the terms of the armistice. It also argues that French forces should have a special claim on Italian material falling into the hands of the Allies to take place of French material either seized by the Italian Army or for which payment was required by the Italians if the material itself was not utilized. It looks to the elimination of all transactions which have taken place since the armistice and to the restitution of all property, compensation for any damages to French property or nationals. The liberation of all French nationals is demanded. The memorandum likewise insists that the French territories should benefit from exportable Italian surpluses and the constitution of any stocks for the relief of liberated territories.

Three annexes of claims against Italy are attached to this memorandum setting forth in detail lists of transport material taken by the Italians, ships in French ports which were taken by the Axis in 1942 totaling approximately 850,000 tons which, however, includes vessels formerly under Norwegian and Danish flags in French ports at that time and an extensive list of French claims in regard to war materials.

The British Minister is sending a similar telegram to London. My comments with those of AFHQ will be telegraphed shortly.

Full text by airmail.

Repeated to London. [Murphy.]

MCBRIDE

⁸⁶ Armistice between France and Italy, signed June 24, 1940. For text in English translation, see *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, July 1939-June 1940, vol. II (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1940), p. 436.

740.00119 European War 1939/1742

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire*, dated September 16, 1943, setting forth the views of the British Government to the effect that, unless General Eisenhower perceives insuperable objection, effort should be made to obtain the immediate signature of Marshal Badoglio, as head of the Italian Government, to the comprehensive instrument of surrender. The British Embassy is informed that the views of the British Government, as set forth in the aforesaid *aide-mémoire*, have been conveyed to the appropriate American military authorities.

The Department assumes that since the question is one falling primarily within the jurisdiction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British Government is laying its views before that Board through the medium of the British Joint Chiefs of Staff.

WASHINGTON, [September 17, 1943.]

740.00119 European War 1939/9-1943: Telegram

*The Commander in Chief of Allied Forces (Eisenhower) to the War Department*⁸⁷

ALGIERS, September 18, 1943.

NAF 409. The military mission which I dispatched to Brindisi September 13 has been in daily contact with the Badoglio Administration. The British and American Ministers who accompanied MacFarlane⁸⁸ to Brindisi have now returned and the following analysis of the situation made during the course of our preliminary investigation on the spot may be of assistance to both Governments in determining our future Italian policy. It seems to me that certain decisions are urgently necessary.

Marshal Badoglio asserts that Italy is now in a *de facto* state of war with Germany. The Brindisi Administration, however, is free to exercise its authority, with Allied consent, over only 5 provinces of Italy with a population of about 2,000,000 and including about 3 army divisions, an insignificant Air Force and a certain amount of naval personnel. The bulk of the country is now under German control. All of Badoglio's civilian Ministries remained in Rome. The Brindisi party consists of the King, Crown Prince Umberto,

⁸⁷ For the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Copy transmitted to the Department of State by Brig. Gen. John R. Deane, U.S. Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff.

⁸⁸ Gen. Mason MacFarlane, British head of liaison mission with Badoglio Government.

Badoglio, and a group of Generals and Admirals including Joint Chief of Staff Ambrosio, and the Army Chief of Staff Roatta. Marshal Badoglio and his associates claim that the civilian Ministers left in Rome are not disloyal but are merely separated from the Head of the Government by *force majeure*. It should be noted that the King and Badoglio left Rome by automobile in great haste at 5 a. m., September 9, proceeding to the port of Pescara on the Adriatic and thence by Italian cruiser to Brindisi. We believe, however, that there was dispute among the Italians regarding the wisdom of departure from Rome and the present position may be a straddle to protect better Italian interests.

The importance of the Badoglio Administration is its unchallenged claim to legality. Its only contestant is the newly established "Republican Fascist" Government said to be established in Northern Italy, maintaining certain "Commissioners" in Rome under German auspices. While Mussolini's name is associated with the latter by German radio, our Brindisi contacts doubt that he has authorized the use of his name in that connection, believing that the party is headed by gangsters of the type of Farinacci, Sforza and the like.

We have little doubt of the sincerity of the Badoglio Administration to cooperate with the Allies. From the military point of view it thus far offers only a few divisions in territory free from the Germans. With the armed forces Badoglio unquestionably enjoys a definite prestige. While there is a pronounced atmosphere of sympathy for the Allies, it is also coupled with a spirit of defeatism.

The chief question which faces us and has a most important bearing on our military operations in Italy is the status to be given the Badoglio Administration and Italy as a whole. This vital point of policy will govern all executive action whether in the military, political or propaganda sphere.

Badoglio has made repeated references to the spirit of the message from the President and the Prime Minister.⁸⁹ He points out to us that his administration is conscientiously and loyally carrying out the terms of the armistice and has surrendered the Italian fleet. The Italian people and the armed forces naturally regard an armistice as connoting a cessation of hostilities. His administration, however, stands for war against the Germans. How will the Italian people and the army, Badoglio asks, understand that this is their duty unless a status of at least co-belligerency can be given to Italy. Most of the problems which face us in Italy, directly affecting our military operations, depend upon the reply which our Governments will make. We have general instructions covering support to be given to Italian units or individuals who resist or oppose the Germans, and covering

⁸⁹ Joint message of July 16 to the Italian people, printed on p. 330.

the employment of Italian naval vessels. Acting under these, we are preparing to group the three Italian divisions in the Calabria-Taranto area into a corps which will be placed under command of the 8th Army and used for static defense of ports, L of C, etc. Two or three additional divisions, which will become available by reason of the German evacuation of Sardinia, will be similarly employed later. Italian divisions in Corsica are now collaborating with French forces and are engaged against the Germans. Two Italian cruisers are being used to transport troops and supplies from North Africa to Corsica at considerable risk. All this, however, necessary as it is to our success, is inconsistent with the terms of the armistice, and as it will shortly become necessary for me to confer directly with Marshal Badoglio, I should be able to reassure him on a number of matters which will have a profound effect on our military relations with Italy during the period of active hostilities. For example, are the Italians to be disarmed and disbanded in accordance with the armistice, or used to actively assist our forces? Will the Navy be seized or used with Italian sailors? Will Allied Para-Military organizations work with the equivalent Italian organizations to whom we would supply radio equipment, etc.? Our present plan of Allied Military Government depends upon the policy we select. Will we adopt a policy of indirect control of government to replace Allied Military Government, at least in certain areas? My instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on several of these matters are clear, and are in accordance with military necessity and my own ideas, but they are not at all consistent with provisions of the long term armistice conditions to which I am instructed to obtain signature.

This raises the critical question of what action should be taken at this point regarding the signature of the complete armistice terms. We found that Marshal Badoglio does not clearly understand the necessity of signing these terms. In his mind the imposition of such terms is undoubtedly inconsistent with active Italian cooperation in the war effort against Germany.

It is obviously impracticable to adopt an effective propaganda line to the people of Italy until the government structure and the Italian status are clarified.

We feel that our Governments might wish to consider some form of *de facto* recognition of the Badoglio Administration as a co-belligerent or military associate subject to certain conditions:

(a) Strengthening of the national character of the administration by infusion of representatives of political parties—a form of national coalition government.

(b) A decree restoring the former constitution and promising free elections after the war for a constitutional assembly.

(c) Possible eventual abdication of the King in favor of either his son or grandson. (This requires careful study as it might prove more popular abroad than with the Italian people).

(d) Whatever military requirements we might decide upon.

(e) Acceptance of an Allied organization in the nature of an armistice commission, but possibly with a different title from which the Italian administration would accept guidance and ultimate instructions. Allied Military Government would gradually disappear and its personnel be integrated where necessary in the new organization, while we might agree to suspend the application of certain rights under the armistice and regard the reformed and liberated Italy as a co-belligerent.

The benefits we have obtained already from the armistice are tremendous. We have BUTTRESS, GOBLET and MUSKET, almost without fighting, and will shortly have BRIMSTONE and FIREBRAND, not to mention the fleet. Nevertheless, we have a hard and risky campaign before us, in which our relationship with the Italians may mean the difference between complete and only partial success. A formal meeting with Badoglio can hardly be deferred for more than 10 days, and I would be most grateful if the question I have raised here can be answered, and the policy of our two Governments be defined before that time. I realize that the line of action which I have suggested here will provoke political repercussions and may arouse considerable opposition and criticism. Accordingly I recommend that the burden be placed upon us, on the ground of military necessity, which I am convinced should be the governing factor.

740.00119 European War 1939/9-1943 : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief of Allied Forces (Eisenhower) to the War Department*⁹⁰

AFHQ IN NORTH AFRICA, September 20, 1943.

NAF 410. This is in continuation of my NAF 409.⁹¹ My views are summarized as follows. In our future relations with Italy there are only two courses:

1. To accept and strengthen the legal Government of Italy under the King and Badoglio; to regard this Government and the Italian people as co-belligerents but with their military activity subject to my direction under terms of armistice, and I, of course, making such military, political and administrative conditions as I may find necessary from time to time. Included in these would be the imposition by directive of such clauses of the long terms as may be necessary from the supply, shipping, economic and other points of view under the authority of article 12 of the short terms.

⁹⁰ For the Combined Chiefs of Staff; a copy was also sent to the British Chiefs of Staff.

⁹¹ *Supra.*

2. To sweep this Government aside, set up an Allied military government of occupied Italy, and accept the very heavy commitments involved.

Of these two courses, on military grounds, I strongly recommend the first. Since as co-belligerent it would necessarily declare war on Germany and on the Fascist Republican Government of Italy, for all elements desiring to fight against Fascism in Italy it will be the natural rallying point.

740.0011 EW 1939/31399a: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1943—11 a. m.

881. At the direction of the President and in view of the military situation in Italy, you are instructed to inform the Soviet Government that it is proposed to send the following message to General Eisenhower, the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean theater. In conveying this message to the Soviet Government you should transmit a very close paraphrase:

[Here follows text of message printed on page 373.]

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/9-2143

The British Minister (Campbell) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I send you herewith copies of two messages which the Prime Minister sent to the President about the Badoglio Government.

Believe me [etc.]

R. I. CAMPBELL

[Enclosure 1]

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON ⁹² TO PRESIDENT DATED
SEPTEMBER 21st, 1943

No. 417 of September 20th.

I send you in my immediately following message our comments on Eisenhower's proposals for dealing with Badoglio Government (NAF 409 of September 18th).

⁹² Code name used by Winston Churchill.

If you agree I hope you will instruct Eisenhower accordingly.

I am informing the Soviet Government of the line I propose we should take. If you agree please back this up. We cannot delay action or hamper Eisenhower in these critical days.

[Enclosure 2]

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT DATED
SEPTEMBER 21st, 1943

No. 418. Following are our comments referred to in my telegram No. 417 as sent to Macmillan.

Begins.

Following from the Prime Minister to Resident Minister, Algiers.

After considering your telegram 1812 and NAF 409⁹³ I and my colleagues in the War Cabinet have come to the following conclusions.

2. It is vital to build up the authority of the King and bring about administration as a Government and have unity of command throughout Italy. The way to do this is indicated in Foreign Secretary's telegram No. 1928.⁹⁴ Despite Badoglio's broadcast we still feel that it is essential that the King should go to the microphone at Bari, tell the Italian people he is there and proclaim that Badoglio is carrying on the legitimate Government of Italy under his authority. This is needed not only for the Italian people but for Italian representatives and garrisons abroad.

3. The King and Badoglio should be told that they must build up the broadest basis of anti-fascist coalition Government organisation. Any healthy elements that can deliver some goods should be rallied in this crisis. These points should be made plain in the King's broadcast. It would be very useful if Count Sforza and Professors who claim to represent the Six Parties were willing to join the common effort.

4. It must however be clearly understood that none of these provisional arrangements dictated by war needs will stand in the way of full choice by the Italian people of form of democratic Government which they prefer.

5. Question of giving status does not come into our immediate programme. Co-belligerency is good enough. On this footing we should work for gradual conversion of Italy into an effective national force against Germany but as we have said she must work her passage. Useful service against the enemy will be recognised by us in adjustment and working armistice terms.

6. In return we expect Badoglio to continue to work for the Allies on basis of the Armistice. Our principle will be payment by results.

⁹³ Latter telegram dated September 18, p. 367.

⁹⁴ Dated March 19, p. 325.

7. Badoglio should be free to declare war on Germany and by so doing he would at once become though not an ally, a co-belligerent.

8. Badoglio can be told that it is not part of our plan to install Allied Military Government everywhere. If he will cooperate we are ready to hand over territory to his Government as quickly as it is freed from the enemy. This offer applies to historic mainland of Italy, Sicily and Sardinia. The dealings of the United Nations with Italian Government in territories which they are allowed to administer will be carried out through Control Commission.

9. It would make it much easier for us if full instrument of surrender even though somewhat superseded could now be signed. It is true that many clauses could not be operated by Brindisi administration in their present situation. But as we go up the peninsula and turn over territory to the Italian Government these questions will become real. We do not want to put ourselves in the position of having to haggle over every requirement with the Government. The longer we leave it the more difficult it becomes to get the instrument signed. I hope Eisenhower will get Badoglio's signature to it as soon as possible on basis suggested in Foreign Secretary's telegrams (Nos. 1905 to Algiers and 6275 to Washington).

10. Stipulation about Mussolini was of course governed by physical facts; but should certainly stand for the record.

11. This programme should be put to the King and Badoglio at once. The first essential is that the King should make the public announcement suggested. This should not surely await final refinements of policy.

12. I am asking the President if he agrees with this programme to instruct Eisenhower accordingly. I am also informing the Soviet Government. Meanwhile you should without waiting urge the King to broadcast at once as proposed in paragraphs 2 and 3.

740.00119 European War 1939/9-2343 : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces (Eisenhower)*⁹⁵

[WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1943.

In reply to your NAF 409 and NAF 410,⁹⁶ the following directive has been agreed upon by the Prime Minister and myself:

"1. You will withhold long term armistice provisions pending further instructions.

⁹⁵ This copy of directive was sent to the Secretary of State by Adm. William Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, September 23.

⁹⁶ Dated September 18 and 20, pp. 367 and 370, respectively.

"2. On the basis of military necessity, you are empowered to make recommendations from time to time to lighten the provisions of the military armistice in order to enable the Italians, within the limit of their capacities, to wage war against Germany.

"3. On condition that it declare war on Germany, the present government of Italy be permitted, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 hereunder, to carry on as the government of Italy and as such be treated as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. Such relationship to be based on the clear understanding that it is not in any way to prejudice the untrammelled right of the people of Italy to decide on the form of government they will eventually have; that no final form of the government of Italy will be decided upon until the Germans are evicted from Italian territory.

"4. The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio government on military, political and administrative matters.

"5. You will encourage, in all practical ways, the vigorous use, under your direction, of the Italian armed forces against Germany.

"6. You are authorized to inform the French military authorities of the above to the extent that you deem advisable."

Following is message number 418 from the Prime Minister to me on the same subject which I send to you as commentary.

[Here follows text of message printed *supra*.]

ROOSEVELT

740.00119 European War 1939/9-2443 : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief of Allied Forces (Eisenhower) to the War Department*⁹⁷

AFHQ IN NORTH AFRICA, 23 September, 1943.

NAF 379. Delivered to me today and transmitted by couriers are letters from the King of Italy addressed to the King of England and the President of the United States. As requested by the Italian Government the text of these letters is transmitted herewith. Letter to the King begins:

"Your Majesty. I think it advisable to lay before Your Majesty in a confidential and personal way some considerations inspired by the common interest of our countries.

In my opinion it is necessary and urgent that all, or the greatest possible part of Italian territory be freed from the Germans in order to avoid having the large industries of Northern Italy work fully for the enemy, furnishing it with tanks, airplanes and trucks; in a few months, with the forced labor of our ship yards in the north,

⁹⁷ For the Combined Chiefs of Staff; a copy was also sent to the British Chiefs of Staff.

several war ships, including two of our battleships, will again be able to sail in the Mediterranean under the German flag.

In the meanwhile, it is of essential political importance for you and for us to reach Rome as soon as possible.

The Italian people, on the 25th of July, decidedly broke away from the past regime, but I think that a new Fascist government, even though not legally set up, but in possession of the capital, could always, with the help of formations of the militia and the self-interested contribution of a lawless minority place serious obstacles in the way of our military operations and stir up civil war.

It is to our common interest that this should not happen, and the sooner my Government and I are able to return to Rome and the sooner our troops may be able to push towards Northern Italy, all the more quickly may this be avoided.

At present my Government exercises civil power over four provinces of the Puglie and over Sardinia; it would be very considerably strengthened, both morally and politically, with regards to the illegal government of the north, if it was allowed to extend its jurisdiction over the remainder of the occupied territory, Sicily included.

The exercise of civil power over an important part of the national territory would enable us, by being able to count on a greater choice of political leaders, to carry out the political reconstruction of the country, which would be completed with the return to the parliamentary regime which I have always wished for.

Finally, I submit to the personal attention of Your Majesty the very important question of the exchange; a more favorable treatment than that adopted in Sicily would have incalculable moral and political repercussions for the common cause.

With the expression of my best wishes for our two countries, I beg to sign myself the good brother of Your Majesty."

Letter to the President of the United States is identical except for substitution of Mr. President for Your Majesty and except for last paragraph. Last paragraph of letter to the President begins: "With the expression of my best wishes for our countries. I beg of you, Mr. President, to believe in my great esteem. ["]

740.00119 European War 1939/9-2543 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁹⁸

[LONDON, September 24, 1943.]

420. The following has just arrived from Uncle Joe.⁹⁹ Please let me know what he has said to you or you to him.

2. It seems to me that the question of longer terms might well be considered by the new Commission.

⁹⁸ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on September 25.

⁹⁹ Marshal Stalin.

3. Message from Stalin dated September 22nd. Begins.

(1) I agree with your proposal concerning appeal by radio of Italian King to Italian people. But I consider it entirely necessary that, in the appeal of the King it should be clearly stated that Italy, which capitulated to Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, will fight against Germany together with Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Union.

(2) I also agree with your proposal about the necessity of signing comprehensive armistice terms. In regard to your reservation that certain of these terms cannot be put into force at present moment I understand this reservation only in the sense that these terms cannot be realized now on territory which is so far held by Germans. In any case I should like to receive confirmation or necessary explanation from you on that point. Ends.

740.00119 European War 1939/9-2543 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*¹

[LONDON, September 24, 1943.]

421. My No. 420 of September 24th. Macmillan now tells me he is confident that Badoglio's signature can be obtained to whole set of terms within the next few days and that the longer we leave it the more haggling there will be. It may be some time before the new Commission can give their views and I should myself feel happier if we clinched the matter now. This might save us a great deal of trouble later on.

2. At Eisenhower's suggestion we have made the preamble less harsh. We have also provided that armistice of September 3rd will remain operative.

3. See also Uncle Joe *passim*.²

740.00119 European War 1939/9-2543 : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces (Eisenhower)*³

[WASHINGTON,] 25 September, 1943.

I have just sent the following message to the Prime Minister agreeing that the long terms should be signed:

"I go along with your thought about the long set of terms if signature can be obtained quickly."

ROOSEVELT

¹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on September 25.

² See *supra*.

³ Copy transmitted to the Department by the White House on September 25.

740.0011 EW 1939/31399½ : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 26, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received September 27—9:55 a. m.]

1470. Your 881, September 21, 11 a. m. There was delivered at the Embassy this morning a secret communication dated September 25, signed by Molotov, reading in translation made by an officer of the Embassy as follows:

The Soviet Government, having taken note of your letter of September 22, 1943 in which is set forth contents of the proposed message of the President to General Eisenhower concerning Italy, considers it necessary to inform the Government of the United States of America of the following:

1. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to expedite the signature with Italy of detailed armistice terms,⁴ which is particularly necessary in view of the situation existing in Italy at the present time.

2. The Allies obviously must be interested in the strict execution by Italy under the control of the Allies of the detailed terms of the armistice agreed upon and ratified by them. Therefore, the Soviet Government sees no reason for giving instructions regarding the lightening of the terms of the military armistice for Italy as is proposed in point 2 of the message, particularly since it is not clear from the contents of point 2 exactly what lightening of the terms is under consideration. It is also necessary to keep in mind that a change of the provisions ratified by the Allied Governments obviously can take place only with the agreement of these Governments.

3. The Soviet Government considers that the establishment of an Allied Commission with the functions and powers set forth in point 4 of the message is not necessary in view of the fact that, as is well known, after the ratification of the detailed armistice terms there was established by the decision of the three Governments the Military Political Commission, as a result of which the question of a Control Commission envisaged in article 37 of the detailed terms should be considered as falling away. Therefore, in opinion of Soviet Government there should be included in the work of the Military Political Commission the coordination and direction of the activities of all military organs organized won [*in?*] enemy territory and of any Allied civil authorities with regard to questions of the armistice and of control over the execution of the terms of the armistice and, consequently there should be included in the functions of the Military Political Commission the issuance from time to time of instructions and directives on military, political and administrative questions for the Badoglio Government while military operational questions remain entirely under the direction of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

The Soviet Government, therefore, sees no reason for establishment

⁴ For text of additional conditions of the armistice with Italy signed by Marshal Badoglio and General Eisenhower at Malta on September 29, 1943, see *United States and Italy, 1936-1946*, p. 55.

of an Allied Commission under the direction of General Eisenhower with above mentioned functions.

4. The Soviet Government is opposed to [*declares itself for*]⁵ Italy fighting together with the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union against Germany.

5. The Soviet Government agrees to the consideration expressed in point 3 of message concerning the inalienable right of the Italian people to make a decision concerning the form of government which they will eventually adopt and also agrees to points 5 and 6 of the message.

HAMILTON

740.00119 European War 1939/9-2843 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁶

[LONDON,] September 28, 1943.

We agree that long-term surrender documents should be kept secret for the present. I have no doubt Uncle Joe will concur but it would be well if you told him our views speaking for both of us.

2. We think it would be a mistake to talk about making Rome an open city,⁷ as it may hamper our forward movement and will anyway not bind the enemy. We should prefer therefore to omit the words beginning "as an open city" down to the words "proposed by your Government".

3. I am asking Treasury about exchange rate and will cable you tomorrow. I agree with Eisenhower that we should not treat the Italian population unfairly.

4. I am very glad about Sforza. Badoglio would be very foolish not to embrace him after his generous letter. A shotgun marriage will have to be arranged if necessary.

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁸

[WASHINGTON,] 29 September, 1943.

363. The following message is received from General Eisenhower:

"In order to insure maximum effect and clearly define Italian position consider it most desirable that joint announcement by Prime Minister and President be made explaining co-belligerent status. Announcement to follow immediately after release of Italian declaration war on Germany. Suggest simultaneous release London and Washington.

⁵ Corrected on basis of telegram No. 1487, September 28, 1943, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union (740.0011 European War 1939/31399¾).

⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on September 28.

⁷ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 910 ff.

⁸ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

"Please say if this recommendation is approved."

The following is submitted for your consideration as a suitable joint statement from both of us:

"The governments of Great Britain and the United States acknowledge the position of the Italian government as stated by Marshal Badoglio and accept with appreciation the active cooperation of the Italian government and armed forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since September 8 culminating in the Italian declaration of war against Germany have, in fact, made Italy a co-belligerent and the American and British governments will continue to treat with the Italian government on that basis (add the Soviet government if concurrence is received). The two governments acknowledge the Italian government's pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy and emphasize that the relationship which has developed between the government of Italy and the governments of the United Nations is based on the clear understanding that it will not in any way prejudice the military interests of the United Nations or the absolute and untrammelled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have."

I will await your reply.

ROOSEVELT

*President Roosevelt to the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces
(Eisenhower)*⁹

[WASHINGTON,] 30 September, 1943.

8980. In reply to your N.A.F. 379,¹⁰ please arrange for the delivery to the King of Italy the following reply by the President to the letter from the King transmitted in N.A.F. 379:

"Your Majesty,

"I am very pleased to receive your letter of September twenty-third transmitted to me by cable by General Eisenhower and to have your expression of opinion in that in the common interests of our two countries it is necessary and urgent that all or the greatest possible part of Italian territory be freed from the Germans with which opinion I am in complete agreement, and toward the accomplishment of which we should jointly direct our full effort using all available military resources of Italy and the Allied Governments.

"It is the intention of the Allied Governments to obtain control of Rome at the earliest practicable date.

"It is my desire that civil government in the recovered areas in Italy shall be administered by the Italian Government insofar as is per-

⁹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹⁰ Dated September 23, p. 374.

mitted by military considerations and under the supervision of the Allied Supreme Commander.

"Consideration is now being given, in consultation with our Allies, to the exchange rate for the lira.

"With an expression of best wishes for the early success of our common effort to dislodge and destroy the Nazi invaders of your country, I am

Most sincerely,

Franklin D. Roosevelt"

740.00119 European War 1939/10-143 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*¹¹

[LONDON, September 30, 1943.]

[427.]¹² Your No. 363.¹³ I agree that we should make a joint announcement but would it not be a good chance of getting Uncle Joe in too? It is clear now, from correction of Molotov's message,¹⁴ that he does accept the Italians as co-belligerents. It is true we may lose a few days in communicating with Moscow, but this delay seems relatively unimportant compared with value of Russian participation.

If you agree, would you put it to Stalin in the form that we wish an announcement of the kind made; will he join with us in making it, or would he prefer us to go ahead without him? Of course we should consider any drafting alterations he might wish to propose.

I myself would like to see several changes, and my immediately following telegram¹⁵ embodies these. If you see no objection to them would you, if you agree, approach Stalin and put text to him in this form.

740.00119 European War 1939/10-143 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*¹¹

[LONDON, September 30, 1943.]

[428.]¹² Following is amended text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.¹⁶

"The Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union acknowledge position of Royal Italian Government as stated by Marshal Badoglio and accept active cooperation of the

¹¹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on October 1, 1943.

¹² Number supplied from copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹³ Dated September 29, p. 378.

¹⁴ See footnote 5, p. 378.

¹⁵ *Infra.*

¹⁶ *Supra.*

Italian nation and armed forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since September 8th and brutal maltreatment by the Germans of the Italian population culminating in the Italian declaration of war against Germany have in fact made Italy a co-belligerent and American, British and Soviet Governments will continue to work with the Italian Government on that basis. The three Governments acknowledge the Italian Government's pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy, and it is understood that nothing can detract from the absolute and untrammelled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide democratic form of Government they will eventually have.

The relationship of co-belligerency between Government of Italy and United Nations Governments cannot of itself affect the importance of the recently signed [terms] which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by agreement between Allied Governments in the light of assistance which the Italian Government may be able to afford to United Nations' cause."

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*¹⁷

[WASHINGTON,] 1 October, 1943.

366. I have sent the following to U.J. regarding Eisenhower's NAF 426:¹⁸

"The Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean Area, Eisenhower, has recommended the following changes in the 'Instrument of Surrender of Italy':

"1. Change the title to 'Additional conditions of the armistice with Italy.'

"2. Change the last sentence of the preamble to read 'and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government'.

"3. Omit the statement of unconditional surrender in paragraph 1.

"General Eisenhower and all of his senior commanders concur in this recommendation as highly advantageous to our progress in defeating the German forces in Italy in that it will help to align the Italian Army, Navy, and civil population on our side.

"Eisenhower urgently requests that pending a decision on these recommendations secrecy in regard to the Terms of Surrender document is 'absolutely vital to our success in Italy'.

"I hope that these recommendations of General Eisenhower will be approved by the Allied Powers because they are highly advantageous to our war effort and can be of no disadvantage to us.

"Your concurrence is requested by telegraph at the earliest practicable date."

ROOSEVELT

¹⁷ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹⁸ Not printed.

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*²¹

[WASHINGTON,] 1 October, 1943.

367. Your 427 and 428.²² Italy has not yet made a declaration of war against Germany.

I suggest that you endeavor to obtain from Stalin approval of your text of proposed joint statement by all three of us to be made public immediately following a declaration of war against Germany by Italy.

Your text meets with my approval.

ROOSEVELT

740.00119 European War 1939/10-243 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*²³

[LONDON, October 2, 1943.]

432. Your telegrams Nos. 366²⁴ and 367.²⁵ We entirely agree. I have telegraphed Stalin as follows:

“His Majesty’s Government are in full agreement with proposals of General Eisenhower telegraphed to you by the President on this first day of October and hope you will concur.

2. We also hope you will join with the President and me in three-fold declaration to be made public immediately following a declaration of war against Germany by Italy.”

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*²¹

[WASHINGTON,] 4 October, 1943.

370. Reference Para 3 of my 362 to you, dated September 27 [28], 1943,²⁶ I suggest following message be sent to Molotov to clarify Russian position with respect to two commissions now being set up in the Mediterranean Area.

“Message begins. To M. Molotov from the Secretary of State.

Reference Para 3 of your message to me dated 26 September 1943.²⁷

There appears to be no conflict between the Military-Political Commission envisaged by the three governments of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and the Control Commission set

²¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

²² Dated September 30, p. 380.

²³ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on October 2.

²⁴ Dated October 1, p. 381.

²⁵ *Supra*.

²⁶ Not printed.

²⁷ See telegram No. 1470, September 26, 1 p.m., from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 377.

up by Para 37 of the long term Italian surrender document agreed to by the three governments.

The Control Commission acts directly under the Supreme Allied Commander to deal with specific problems arising in areas of Italy liberated by Anglo-American armies. These are problems arising in any active military area under direct supervision of the Supreme Commander and so the commission must act under his direct control.

On the contrary, the Military-Political Commission for the Mediterranean Basin will have the purpose, as Marshal Stalin says, of 'considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different governments disassociating themselves with Germany'. Thus it will deal with the broad overall picture in this area. It will not have plenary powers. Its members will study the problems and advise their governments. The governments will then consult each other and reach a decision. If such decision affects the Supreme Allied Commander, he will be informed of it through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Now that the members of this Military-Political Commission have been appointed and it will meet soon, I feel the policies of our three governments in the Mediterranean area will be harmonized more effectively and quickly than heretofore." End message.

I will await your reply before asking the Secretary of State to send above message. I feel it important to straighten out this matter now as it will set the precedent for all such future activities in the war.

ROOSEVELT

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*²⁸

[WASHINGTON,] 4 October, 1943.

372. The following message has been received from U.J. and is forwarded for your information. Eisenhower has been informed.

"To approval by the United States and Great Britain of General Eisenhower's proposal to keep secret for the present the provisions of the long term surrender document after it is signed by the Italian Government, I have no objection."

ROOSEVELT

740.00119 European War 1939/10-543 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*²⁹

[LONDON, October 4, 1943.]

435. 1. Now that Uncle Joe has come in with us about Italian Declaration (see my No. 428³⁰) it appears to be of the highest

²⁸ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

²⁹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on October 5.

³⁰ Dated September 30, p. 380.

importance to compel the King to declare war as soon as possible. This is, as I know, your view. I suggest that instructions are given Eisenhower to put fullest pressure upon him. There should be no nonsense about terms until Rome is taken. It seems to us high time that the Italians began to work their passage. If you are in agreement pray give the necessary orders without further reference to us.

President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) ³²

[WASHINGTON,] 7 October, 1943.

380. Reference your 440.³³ On October 5 I informed Eisenhower as follows:

"The President and Prime Minister are in agreement that the King of Italy declare war on Germany as soon as possible. There appears to be no necessity for waiting until Rome is occupied. You will therefore put pressure on the Italian government for an early declaration of war without waiting for further successes."

Eisenhower informs me that he is using the above to reinforce his own efforts along this line.

We can arrange to synchronize the three announcements immediately when war is declared.

ROOSEVELT

740.00119 European War 1939/10-843 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt ³⁴

[LONDON,] October 8, 1943.

442. Your 370 of October 5th [4th]. I agree with your proposed answer to Molotov.

2. Since we are in fact rejecting Soviet proposal it would be a good thing to tell Molotov that we understand the Soviet Government desire to play their part in control of Italy, and that we hope to propose a scheme to them in the near future which we trust will meet their requirements.

3. I suggest that Eisenhower should be asked to submit a scheme for consideration. I understand from Macmillan who is here that this could be done without undue difficulty.

³² Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

³³ Not printed.

³⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on October 8.

740.00119 European War 1939/1999

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow reports that Monsieur Molotov on October 1st sent him a memorandum summarizing the letter which the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow addressed to M. Molotov on September 22nd concerning policy towards Italy, and of M. Molotov's reply of September 25th.³⁵ The memorandum ended by asking for the views of His Majesty's Government.

His Majesty's Government do not propose to be drawn by this attempt on the part of the Soviet Government to elicit from them an independent view on the question of Italy, which is primarily a joint Anglo-American responsibility. They therefore suggest that it would be better that the reply to the Soviet Government's communication should emanate from the United States Government, since it was addressed to them, and that His Majesty's Government should inform the Soviet Government that they agree with that reply.

As regards point 1 of M. Molotov's communication of September 25th, His Majesty's Government suggest that the Soviet Government at once be informed that the full armistice was signed on September 29th.³⁶

As regards point 2, which questions the agreed policy of the United States Government and His Majesty's Government of regulating the application of the armistice terms according to services rendered, the Prime Minister has already made it clear to the President that in his view we cannot be put in a position of having to defer to the Soviet Government on this point. (Mr. Churchill said, "We cannot be put in a position where our two armies are doing all the fighting but Russians have a veto and must be consulted upon any minor variation of the armistice terms, which Eisenhower considers militarily essential. Unconditional surrender and terms expressing it are basic principle. The Commander-in-Chief must be free to apply it as, when and how he thinks most helpful.")

As regards point 3, the President and the Prime Minister are in concurrence regarding the reply to M. Molotov. (See the Prime Minister's telegram to the President No. 442 of October 8th.)

His Majesty's Government suggest that the State Department may wish to draft an answer to points 1 and 2, and would be glad to have an opportunity to comment upon it before the reply is sent. As

³⁵ See telegram No. 1470, September 26, 1 p. m., from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 377.

³⁶ For text of Instrument of Surrender, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2742.

soon as the reply has gone, His Majesty's Government will ask His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow to inform M. Molotov that they have nothing to add to the answer sent by the United States Government.

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1943.

740.0011 European War 1939/31512 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, October 12, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 4:58 p. m.]

1741. From Murphy. According to latest advices from Brindisi, Italy will declare war against Germany at 1600 a hours October 13.

It was originally understood that the declaration would be made by the King but at the last moment the latter expressed a strong preference to have Badoglio make the declaration for constitutional reasons. The proclamation will be supplemented by a press conference to be held by Badoglio at the above mentioned hour.

Badoglio's communication to General Eisenhower informing him of the declaration of war reads as follows:

"October 11, 1943.

General Eisenhower. I take great pleasure in informing you that His Majesty the King of Italy has declared war on Germany; the declaration will be handed by our Ambassador in Madrid to the German Ambassador on October 13 at 15 Greenwich time, by this act all ties with the dreadful past are broken and my Government will be proud to be able to march with you on to the inevitable victory.

Will you be good enough my dear General to communicate the foregoing to the Anglo-American, Russian and other United Nations Governments. I shall also be grateful if you will be kind enough to inform the Italian Embassies in Ankara and Buenos Aires and the Legations in Bern, Stockholm, Dublin and Lisbon."

Repeated to London, Madrid, Lisbon. [Murphy.]

WILEY

740.0011 European War 1939/31513 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, October 12, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received October 12—12:23 p. m.]

1744. From Murphy. Coincident with the Italian declaration of war October 13 at 15 hours Greenwich time Badoglio is issuing the following statement:

"Italians! With declaration made September 8, 1943 the Government of the King headed by me in announcing that the Commander

in Chief of the Anglo-American forces in the Mediterranean had accepted the armistice requested by us ordered the Italian troops to remain in readiness with their arms prepared to repel any act of violence directed at them from whatever other source it might come.

With a synchronized action which clearly revealed order previously given by some high authority German troops compelled some of our units to disarm while in most cases they proceeded to a decisive attack (against our troops).

But German arrogance and ferocity did not stop here.

We had already seen some examples of their behavior in the abuses of power, robbery and violence of all kinds perpetrated in Catania while they were still our Allies.

Even more savage incidents against our unarmed populations took place at Calabria in the Puglia and in region of Salerno.

But the ferocity of the enemy surpassed every limit of the human imagination at Naples.

The heroic population of that city which for weeks experienced every form of torment, strongly cooperated with the Anglo-American troops in putting the hated Germans to flight.

Italians! There will not be peace in Italy as long as a single German remains upon our soil.

Shoulder to shoulder we must march forward with our friends of the United States and Great Britain and Russia and of all the other United Nations.

Wherever Italian troops may be in the Balkans, Yugoslavia, Albania and in Greece they have witnessed similar acts of aggression and cruelty and they must fight against the Germans to the last man.

The Government headed by me will be completed shortly. In order that it may constitute a true expression of democratic government in Italy the representations of every political party will be asked to participate. Italians! I inform you that His Majesty the King has given me the task of announcing today, October 13, the declaration of war against Germany.

Signed Badoglio”.

He is also being required to insert a sentence to the effect that when peace is restored nothing will impair the completely free right of the Italian people to select their own form of democratic government. [Murphy.]

WILEY

740.0011 European War 1939/31635

Press Release Issued by the White House, October 13, 1943

The following is a joint statement by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Prime Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, re declaration of war by Italy against Germany:

The governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union acknowledge the position of the Royal Italian Government as

stated by Marshal Badoglio and accept the active cooperation of the Italian nation and armed forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since September eighth and the brutal maltreatment by the Germans of the Italian population, culminating in the Italian declaration of war against Germany have in fact made Italy a co-belligerent and the American, British and Soviet governments will continue to work with the Italian government on that basis. The three governments acknowledge the Italian government's pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy, and it is understood that nothing can detract from the absolute and untrammelled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have.

The relationship of co-belligerency between the governments of Italy and the United Nations governments cannot of itself affect the terms recently signed, which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by agreement between the Allied governments in the light of the assistance which the Italian government may be able to afford to the United Nations' cause.

740.00119 European War 1939/1906a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1943—8 p. m.

1002. With reference to paragraph 2 of your 1470, September 26, 1 p. m., please present a communication along the following lines to Molotov. (Prior thereto you should consult with your British colleague, who we hope will be instructed by his Government to present a similar reply to the Soviet Government.):

While the United States Government agrees with the Soviet Government that there should be no important changes in the armistice terms which might materially affect the question of the unconditional surrender of Italy to the United Nations, it is felt that the Soviet Government will agree that, with Italy now at war with Germany occasions might arise which would require the Allied Commander in Chief, in order to assure full coordination of the military operations under his control, to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the extent to which he considers it advisable to apply the terms of the military armistice and the additional terms imposed. The terms were drawn up and imposed on the Italians for the purpose of insuring the fullest use of Italian resources in the prosecution of the war against Germany. The United States Government feels assured that the Soviet Government will concur that if, in the opinion of the Chiefs of

Staff of the two Governments conducting active military operations in Italy, minor modifications in the application of the military terms were necessary in the best military interests of the joint military undertaking and ultimately therefore the best interests of all the United Nations, the Allied Commander in Chief with the concurrence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should have authority to make them.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1906: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 19, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received October 19—10:50 a. m.]

1637. Your 1002, October 16, 8 p. m. The British Ambassador has received similar instructions and each of us is addressing a communication to Molotov in accordance with instructions.

HAMILTON

740.00119 European War 1939/1985

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Several London newspapers published on October 29th a Reuters report from Washington stating that "it had been learned" that an agreement in forty articles covering the economic and financial terms foreshadowed in the Italian Armistice Agreement of September 3rd had been signed on October 1st, and that the terms were "severe". In reply to enquiries from journalists the Foreign Office had no alternative but to confirm that the full armistice terms were in fact signed on September 29th, and to say their details would no doubt be made known later.

2. The Counsellor of the Netherlands Embassy in London³⁷ enquired of the Foreign Office on October 30th whether the information was correct, and if so whether he could be supplied with the text of the full terms. He was given the text and was informed that a protocol was still to be signed amending it in certain particulars. It was explained that the only reason why the text had not been communicated to the Netherlands Government earlier was that there had hitherto been some doubt as to what its final form would be.

3. The Counsellor of the Netherlands Embassy was asked not to communicate the text to the other Allied representatives in London.

³⁷ Teixeira de Mattos.

But the Foreign Office expect to receive enquiries from the representatives of these Allies, and in that case propose to give them the text with a similar explanation.

4. In the light of these developments the Foreign Office propose, subject to the views of the State Department, immediately on the signature of the protocol to communicate the text of the long terms, of the amending protocol and of General Eisenhower's letter to Marshal Badoglio³⁸ to all the representatives in London of the European Allies who are at war with Italy, as well as to the Iraqi and Ethiopian representatives. This would be in accordance with the action taken in the case of the short terms. The Foreign Office presume that the United States authorities would wish to take similar action in respect of the Latin American Allies and China.

5. As soon as the Allies have been informed in this way the Foreign Office would like to proceed to immediate publication. Apart from the danger of leakage, His Majesty's Government expect to be under severe pressure in Parliament from now on to reveal the full text. They propose therefore, subject to the concurrence of the United States Government, to lay the texts of the long terms and of the amending protocol before Parliament prior to its recess on November 11th (it should be noted that the date of the recess must be regarded as confidential). General Eisenhower's letter might with advantage be withheld from publication, although it will have to be shown to the Allied Governments.

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1943.

740.00119 European War 1939/1953 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, November 10, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 8:07 p. m.]

Greek Series No. 101. Prime Minister³⁹ in communication dated November 7, 1943, states that Royal Hellenic Government was astonished when informed by a publication of the *Times* on October 31 that 1 month before, an agreement with Italy comprising 40 articles defining the political, economic and financial terms of the armistice with that country was signed by the Allies on September 29, 1943.

³⁸ For text of letter, dated September 29, 1943, and amending protocol, see *United States and Italy, 1936-1946*, p. 64, or Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604.

³⁹ Emmanuel J. Tsouderos.

The Prime Minister's communication continues as quoted in my immediately following telegram.⁴⁰

The Foreign Office advises informally that in reply to a protest in this regard by the Greek Ambassador in London,⁴¹ Sir Alexander Cadogan⁴² confirmed signature of new agreement but aside from promising to investigate matter offered no comment.

The failure to consult Greece in advance in this instance has created a most unfortunate impression in official circles here where it has been interpreted as a deference to Italian sensibilities at the expense of a small ally and has been coupled with the reception accorded Colonel Laios, Greece's representative in Algiers (see my telegram No. 95, November 3, 9 a. m.⁴³). Since we associated ourselves with the British in communicating the terms of the original agreement to the Greek Government (see Department's 23, August 28, 7 p. m., and my despatch No. 25 of August 31st⁴⁴) and consequently would seem to have been obligated at least jointly with the British to continue to keep the Greek Government informed of later developments, I should appreciate a clarification of this matter for communication to the Greek Prime Minister.

KIRK

740.00119 European War 1939/1985

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

A copy of the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of November 2, 1943 proposing the publication of the full terms of surrender for Italy was submitted to the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy for the consideration of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Leahy has now replied that after careful consideration the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the terms of surrender for Italy should be kept secret and that they should not be made public at this time.

As Mr. Hayter⁴⁵ has been informed orally, General Eisenhower, whose views in the matter were requested, has replied that he considers it undesirable to proceed to the publication of the full terms at this time particularly in view of the possible imminent changes in the Italian Government.

⁴⁰ No. 102, not printed.

⁴¹ Thanassis Aghnides.

⁴² British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁴³ Not printed.

⁴⁴ Neither printed.

⁴⁵ W. G. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

Consequently, it would be appreciated if the Embassy would inform the Foreign Office that in the opinion of the Government of the United States it would be contrary to the best interests of the United Nations to make public at this time the Italian terms of surrender.

The Department of State is agreeable to the proposal of the Foreign Office contained in paragraph 4 of the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* under reference concerning the communication of the text of the full terms of the Italian surrender to the representatives in London of the European members of the United Nations who are at war with Italy as well as to the representatives of Iraq and Ethiopia, provided the representatives are informed at the time that for vital military reasons the full terms of surrender must be kept secret for the time being. The Department of State will communicate in secret the full terms of surrender of Italy to the members of the United Nations among the other American Republics. China and Brazil have already received copies in strict confidence.

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1943.

740.00119 European War 1939/2095

The British Embassy to the Department of State

His Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State, and has the honour to refer to the Department's memorandum of November 16th on the subject of the full terms of surrender of Italy.

His Majesty's Government appreciate the agreement of the United States Government to the proposal to communicate the text of the full terms of the Italian surrender to the representatives in London of the European members of the United Nations who are at war with Italy and to those of Iraq and Ethiopia, and will take this action as soon as the protocol of amendment has been executed. On reconsideration His Majesty's Government have decided that there would be no advantage in handing to the representatives of the Allied Governments the text of General Eisenhower's letter to Marshal Badoglio.

In view of the objections advanced by the State Department, His Majesty's Government withdraw their proposal to publish the long terms of surrender at the present time.

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1943.

Rome Embassy Files, 711.9 Italy

The Head of the Italian Government (Badoglio) to President Roosevelt^{45a}

20 NOVEMBER, 1943.

MR. PRESIDENT: I should be very grateful to you, Mr. President, if you would find time and leisure to consider some brief considerations on the amendment regarding the armistice and the naval clauses which I, as head of the Italian government and Admiral DeCourten, as Minister of the Navy, have found ourselves in the harsh necessity of being obliged to sign today, after having in vain suggested a modification which, in our opinion, would have been without doubt more in keeping with the *de jure* and *de facto* situation now existing between our countries.

I shall sum up my thought briefly:

The armistice signed by General Castellano on the 3d of September by my order contained no clause which referred to the surrender of Italy. They were, as you know, principally military clauses. At that time I was told that later further clauses would be presented to me but only civil ones.

On the 29th of September when on our part we had already given loyal execution to all the terms of the armistice and when, with the full approval of the Anglo-American mission, the phase of real collaboration had begun, I was compelled, at Malta, to sign the additional clauses which altered and made more burdensome the conditions of the armistice signed the 3d of September, and which were entitled "Unconditional surrender of Italy."

On my remonstrance General Eisenhower pledged himself to present to the Allied governments the reason for my disagreement and to propose to them the cancellation of various sentences particularly and needlessly harmful to the good name of the new Italy and prejudicial, in my opinion to the common cause which it was and is my firm purpose to maintain with all means at my disposal.

General Eisenhower in fact wrote me—among other things—what follows:

"The supplementary terms of the Armistice are based upon the situation obtaining prior to the cessation of hostilities. Developments since that time have altered considerably the status of Italy, which has become in effect a co-operator with the United Nations.

"It is fully recognized by the Governments on whose behalf I am acting that these terms are in some respects superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent."

^{45a} Badoglio addressed an identical letter to Prime Minister Churchill on the same date.

And even more explicitly the Head of the Allied Mission assured me formally and in writing on October 17:

“In confirmation of the statement which I have already made to you orally, I have the honor to inform you that the American, British and Soviet Governments have approved the amendments to the document containing the Long Armistice terms which you desired.”

However and notwithstanding the further transition from cooperation to cobelligerency and the assurances I had been given, the document was returned to me corrected in part but still containing the word “surrender” which did not occur in the original clauses.

Similarly too for the naval conditions.

On the 23d of September this question was discussed exhaustively and at length by Admiral Cunningham and Admiral DeCourten and brought to a conclusion agreed upon by both parties.

Now, more than thirty days after, a new document is presented to me, a new amendment in which there is finally conceded the cancellation—previously promised and announced—of the words which had occasioned my remonstrances, but, at the same time, signature by the Allies is conditioned on our acceptance of another naval clause which turns again on a matter already agreed upon after discussion and weighs heavily on the position of Italy.

I have been compelled, I repeat, to sign this amendment which I nevertheless hope you will be able to have re-examined on the basis of the modification suggested by me.

May I be allowed to point out that at this time three quarters of the Italian naval forces are collaborating with the naval forces of the Allies; that Italian forces have fought in Sardinia and in Corsica; that Italian forces are fighting in the Aegean islands at the side of English forces; that Italian forces are fighting, under particularly hard and trying circumstances, in Croatia, Montenegro and Greece in unity with Greeks and Serbs; that our patriots are fighting in Northern Italy, in desperate conditions, against the Germans and are sabotaging lines of communication and supply.

May I be allowed also to recall that in the liberated zone we have not only complied with all the requests of the Allies but we have continued to insist that our troops take part in the liberation of the country—a plea that has been finally granted in part.

My Government which, in its present temporary formation, ensures, in my opinion under present circumstances those guarantees of order and stability which it is in your interest to maintain, and which as you know must be replaced as soon as Rome is reached, by another which may better and more completely represent the new Italy, my government, born as it was among the difficulties of war

and extremely difficult domestic conditions, watches with a certain bitterness this progressive and constant aggravation of conditions already discussed and agreed upon by the Allied governments. It finds some difficulty in understanding this, deprived as it is of communications, of any source of information in the outside world, without direct contact with the tens of millions of Italians who live abroad or with its representatives in other countries, without, in a word, those elementary attributes of liberty which on our part we yet intend to introduce into our country.

And it is for this reason that I permit myself to turn directly to you, Mr. President, in order that being aware above all of the numerous, grave and painful difficulties which beset the Italian nation, of the firm purpose of my government and myself to fight at your side against the common enemy, of my desire to give the country those free democratic institutions which form your strength, you may continue to find inspiration for your actions in our regard in those standards of human equity of which you undoubtedly are among the greatest and most respected champions in the world.

BADOGLIO

740.00119 European War 1939/2024

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In the British Embassy's memorandum of November 19th, reference was made to the proposal to publish the full terms of the Italian surrender together with the amending protocol.

2. His Majesty's Government feel that as the situation is now developing it will become increasingly difficult to justify the continued non-publication of these documents. Now that the public are aware of the existence of the long terms of surrender, pressure in the United Kingdom in favour of publication will increase, and it will be difficult for His Majesty's Government to find good reasons for resisting this.

3. Two arguments may be advanced against publication:

(a) that it would have a bad effect on the Italian people and lessen their desire to cooperate, and;

(b) that it would weaken the Badoglio Government and perhaps bring on a second Governmental crisis before the Allied forces reach Rome.

Neither of these arguments appear to His Majesty's Government to be particularly strong on close examination.

4. As regards (a) it is apparent that most Italians are so apathetic about the war and about politics in general that they would be quite

unmoved by the news that their Government had signed a second armistice on the lines foreshadowed in the first. But even if there were any force in this argument it would apply equally or more strongly at a later date when the armistice finally came to be published, as at some stage it inevitably must be, and when the disadvantages which are feared would be just as serious or still more so.

5. The essence of argument (*b*) is that to publish the armistice would weaken the position of the Badoglio Government by publicly saddling it with the responsibility for what might be regarded as a humiliating document. His Majesty's Government agree that within the limits permitted by the general apathy referred to in the preceding paragraph there is a possibility of this effect being produced, particularly if the publication took place before the Government had got into its stride. On the other hand the Badoglio Government will sooner or later be succeeded by a new Government. There is a risk that unless the new Government are informed about it and accept the armistice in advance they will later repudiate it, or alternatively if they accept the armistice, their followers, when the terms are eventually published, will oblige them to repudiate it or try to overthrow them. The best way to minimise a risk of this kind is to make the terms public well before the Badoglio Government is likely to be changed. The obligations and responsibilities of its successors will then be clear for all to see.

6. The amending protocol has now been signed. The Badoglio Government is now as firmly in the saddle as it can ever be expected to be. The long terms and the amending protocol have been communicated to the Allied Governments. His Majesty's Government therefore feel that this is the appropriate moment for publication of the terms, and that continued failure to publish will expose them to considerable criticism.

7. Although His Majesty's Government do not believe that the Soviet Government were a party to the original agreement to keep the long terms secret, as suggested in General Eisenhower's telegram to the combined Chiefs of Staff, NAF 508 of November 6th, they would in any case propose before proceeding to publication to ask His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow to confirm that the Soviet Government have no objection.

8. His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the United States Government will agree to early publication. They would be grateful for a reply as soon as may be convenient.⁴⁶

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1943.

⁴⁶ See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, December 1, 1943, p. 398.

740.00119 European War 1939/1953 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (Kirk), at Cairo

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1943—8 p. m.

Greek Series No. 54. The additional conditions of the Italian armistice which were signed in secret at Malta by General Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio were communicated in skeleton form by you and your British colleague to the Greek Prime Minister on August 29, 1943, and acknowledged by him in an *aide-mémoire* dated Cairo the same day. Your no. 101 and 102, November 10.⁴⁷ In the *aide-mémoire* the Prime Minister stated that his Government "agreed with the proposal that the Allied Commander-in-Chief should be empowered as sole signatory to sign with the representative of Italy such an instrument". In a radio broadcast made from Cairo on September 9 by the Prime Minister he said that the Greek Government was directly consulted and given an opportunity to express its views regarding the terms of capitulation of Italy and that General Eisenhower was specifically authorized by the Greek Government to sign in the name of Greece.

For reasons of military security it was not possible to have representatives of any of the United Nations other than the United States and United Kingdom present at the signing of the additional terms of capitulation.

For your confidential background information the military armistice consisting of 12 articles which representatives of General Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio signed in Sicily on September 3 were included in, but not in as comprehensive a manner as, the armistice terms described in the note which you presented on August 29. Those terms, which have been published in substance in the press, are repeated for your reference in my immediately following telegram.⁴⁸ Since these were not considered sufficiently comprehensive and since it was contemplated, as you will see in Article 12, that other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature would be imposed, the full armistice terms were subsequently signed and accepted by the Italian Government on September 29. These full terms were those described by you to the Greek Government in your communication of August 29. Their signature and contents were kept secret at General Eisenhower's request for vital military reasons. Reference to their existence and signature in the London press was an unfortunate leak. It has now been agreed that the text of the additional conditions of the Italian armistice may be furnished the other members of the

⁴⁷ Telegram No. 102 not printed.

⁴⁸ Greek Series No. 55, November 26, 1943, not printed.

United Nations and the Greek Government will undoubtedly receive a copy of this document from the British Government in the near future. For the time being the existence and signature of these terms must be kept secret.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/2029

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Stettinius)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1943.

Lord Halifax this afternoon brought up the question of the desirability of making the Italian surrender terms public. He stated that Mr. Jones of the State Department had discussed this with Mr. Hayter, but that he wished to press the matter, stating that the British Government would be asked about this by Parliament and it would be difficult for them to keep the terms private indefinitely.

I discussed this with Mr. Matthews on the telephone and he informed me that only two weeks ago we had referred this to General Eisenhower who took the position that this was a military matter and the terms could not be made public at this time.

The matter was left that Mr. Matthews will communicate with Sir Ronald Campbell on this matter in Lord Halifax's absence.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

740.00119 European War 1939/2017

The Belgian Embassy to the Department of State^{48a}

D. 8248

No. 5951

The Belgian Government have just learned of the instrument signed on September 29, 1943, which completes the terms of the Armistice with Italy of September 3, 1943, by terms of a political, economic, and financial nature. In the preamble it was stated that the Allied signatories or signatory duly authorized to that effect were acting "on behalf of the United Nations".

The Belgian Government consider it to be their duty to leave no doubt that they cannot agree to this procedure. They express their earnest hope that it may not serve as a precedent for similar action in future cases.

^{48a} A similar note from the Netherlands Embassy dated December 3, 1943, not printed.

The Belgian Government fully understand that when urgency and secrecy are paramount considerations in view of military action, measures may have to be concerted by the High Command of the principal belligerents or by their governments without the foreknowledge of the governments of the other United Nations concerned. Owing to their full understanding of this point they not only raised no objection to the original Armistice terms being determined without their participation but were even in favour of that procedure on that particular occasion. In so far, however, as previous consultation may be possible, the Belgian Government will always expect to be consulted in good time.

The Belgian Government are of the opinion that considerations of urgency and secrecy in view of military action did not exist when the further political, economic, and financial terms signed on September 29 were determined. They, therefore, consider that they should have at least been given a timely opportunity of expressing their views.

The Belgian Government wish to state that with one exception they agree with the said further terms which have been handed over. The exception concerns clause 28 paragraphs B and C in so far as these refer to Belgian nationals.⁴⁹ The number of Belgian nationals in Italy is small and comprises mainly persons known to the Belgian Government as good citizens opposed to totalitarian ways of thought and glad to see fascist rule come to an end. It is unacceptable to the Belgian Government that such persons should be considered to deserve internment and the impounding of their property pending further instructions.

The Belgian Government, moreover, have been painfully surprised by the discrimination made a priori as between civilian nationals of occupied countries and those of *non*-occupied countries as if there were a generally valid presumption of suspicion against the former, whereas the latter are presumed to be above suspicion. They can, for instance, see no valid reason why in Italy those Belgian subjects to whom reference was made at the end of the preceding paragraph should be treated more stringently than civilian nationals of an unoccupied country in the same circumstances.

⁴⁹ Paragraph "B" of clause 28 reads: "The Military, Naval and Air personnel and the civilian nationals of any such country or occupied country in Italian or Italian-occupied territory will be prevented from leaving and will be interned pending further instructions." Paragraph "C" reads: "All property in Italian territory belonging to any such country or occupied country or its nationals will be impounded and kept in custody pending further instructions."

The phrase "any such country or occupied country" refers to "any country against which any of the United Nations is carrying on hostilities or which is occupied by any such country."

It is therefore suggested that paragraphs B and C of clause 28 be so amended or applied that Belgian civilian nationals found in Italy should not be considered as suspect unless indications to that effect are forthcoming.

The Belgian Government intend to send Mr. G. Carlier, former Secretary of the Belgian Embassy at Rome, as acting Consul General, to the Allied authorities in Italy. The Belgian Government suggest that Mr. Carlier be consulted on all matters concerning civilians of Belgian nationality, in order that undeserved and unjustified trials should not be inflicted upon persons who are good citizens and who are no less devoted to the cause of the United Nations than are the nationals of the principal belligerent states among the United Nations.

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1943.

740.00119 European War 1939/2017

The Department of State to the Belgian Embassy^{49a}

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to note D. 8248.No. 5951 dated December 3, 1943 from the Belgian Embassy concerning the signature of the Additional Conditions of the Armistice with Italy on September 29 at Malta. The Embassy states that its Government cannot agree to the procedure which was followed by the Allied signatory in acting "on behalf of the United Nations" and expresses the hope that it will not serve as a precedent. The opinion is expressed that considerations of urgency and secrecy did not exist when the additional conditions were signed on September 29.

The Government of the United States cannot accept this view. The Embassy is assured that there did exist vital military considerations which required that the signing of the additional terms on September 29 be guarded with greatest secrecy. None of the United Nations except those conducting active military operations in Italy had knowledge of the signing of this document, nor was it possible, for reasons of security to arrange for the presence of representatives of those United Nations most directly interested in Italy at the signing. It is only recently that the Allied military authorities have approved the communication of the text of the additional terms, in secret, to the Governments of the United Nations. In view of the important military considerations which are still involved, the Secretary feels certain that the Embassy and the Belgian Government will continue to

^{49a} A practically identical note to the Netherlands Ambassador, dated December 21, not printed.

maintain the secret character of the Additional Conditions of the Armistice with Italy.

The reservations of the Belgian Government with respect to paragraphs B and C of Article 28 of the Additional Conditions of the Armistice with Italy have been noted and are receiving careful consideration. A further reply in this respect will be made at a later date.

The intention of the Belgian Government to send a consul general to Italy to interest himself in all matters pertaining to Belgian nationals has been referred to the Theater Commander of the Allied forces whose approval must first be obtained. A further communication to the Embassy will likewise be made in this regard when a reply has been received from General Eisenhower.

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1943.

740.00119 European War 1939/2017

The Department of State to the Belgian Embassy^{49b}

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the Department's memorandum of December 21, 1943 concerning the Additional Conditions of the Armistice with Italy signed at Malta on September 29, 1943 and to the exception noted in note D. 8248 No. 5951 dated December 3 from the Belgian Embassy with respect to Article 28, paragraphs B and C of the Additional Conditions of the Italian Armistice.

It is the view of this Government that the Belgian Government has misinterpreted the paragraphs of the Article referred to. The obligations arising from them rest on the Italian Government and not on the Commander-in-Chief or any Allied authority.

The purpose of paragraphs B and C of Article 28 of the Additional Conditions of the Armistice with Italy was to oblige the Italian Government to hold, preserve and protect certain United Nations property and nationals in Italy until the Allied authorities could arrive to deal with them. These particular clauses were intended to safeguard a situation in which the Germans might try to remove the nationals and property of certain United Nations and in which the Italian Government, with which the Armistice had been concluded, would be in a position to prevent the Germans from taking such action. The operative words in each paragraph are "pending further instructions". Whenever United Nations nationals or property were

^{49b} A similar note to the Netherlands Ambassador dated February 22, 1944, not printed.

discovered in the hands of the Italian authorities, the intention was that instructions would be given at once for their release unless special circumstances existed which would make this undesirable.

The State Department therefore concludes that the suggestion that the Allied Commander-in-Chief might feel under an obligation to impose hardships upon certain United Nations nationals in Italy is not borne out by the texts of the paragraphs under reference.

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1944.

**CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE MAINTENANCE
OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN ITALY FOLLOWING THE FALL
OF MUSSOLINI⁵⁰**

865.01/393

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1943.

Count Carlo Sforza⁵¹ came in to see me, at my request.

I said that I had understood that, following his conversation with Secretary Hull⁵² he had requested passage to London, and that the British Government had felt that it could not facilitate his passage. I asked if this were true.

Count Sforza said it was: he had applied to the British Embassy who had enthusiastically welcomed the idea; had cabled to London; had been turned down. Count Sforza said he could not understand this in view of the fact that Churchill⁵³ had written him the most effusive letters.

I then said that I had conferred further with Secretary Hull and wished to state that we would be glad to endeavor to arrange his passage to North Africa. I said that this was on the understanding that he would go, of course, as a private citizen and on his own responsibility. We considered that we were not endeavoring to mix in Italian politics, but merely to let a prominent Italian go to a point from which, perhaps at an appropriate time, he might return to Italy and submit his views to his own people.

I added that as Count Sforza knew, there was a fighting front in Italy; and that I thought it would be impossible to arrange passage

⁵⁰ For correspondence concerning the overthrow of Fascist regime in Italy, see pp. 314 ff.

⁵¹ Leader of Italian anti-Fascists in North and South America.

⁵² On August 16; memorandum of conversation not printed.

⁵³ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

at this time farther than North Africa. From there out, the military people would have to control passage of individuals, and he would simply have to do the best he could. Through our representatives there he could get in touch with the army officials and state his case.

Count Sforza nearly exploded with gratitude and literally with tears in his eyes made a long speech about the possible use which he might be in Italy, especially if the Badoglio⁵⁴ regime were to fall to pieces, and so forth. He said that he would treat this confidentially. I said he could do that of course but that this was not a secret arrangement but a quite open transaction.

Count Sforza then said that the Embassy had told him here that if the State Department wished to indicate to London that it was interested in his trip, then he conceivably might go to London. I said I would raise that question for consideration with our people but I did not express a view on the point. Count Carlo seemed to think in any event that he would rather go to North Africa direct.

I told him we would do what we could on transport service but as he well knew the military forces claimed priority.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

865.01/438

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1943.

Sir Ronald Campbell⁵⁵ came to see me, at his request.

He said that Mr. Cannon⁵⁶ had spoken to Mr. Donald Hall⁵⁷ about the possibility of Count Sforza to go to North Africa. He wished to ask about this. I said that this was true. I talked the matter over with Secretary Hull and we had determined that it was best to permit him to go to North Africa in a purely private capacity and on his own responsibility. This did not indicate that the Government was sponsoring his trip. I said that the British, of course, were entirely within their rights in refusing to let him go to London; but we should have very great difficulty in explaining to several million Italians here why we were preventing him from leaving the country and going to a point near Italy. I observed that Count Sforza had succeeded in attaining the respect of this very large group of Americans of Italian ancestry; that he had been consistently anti-Axis and

⁵⁴ Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government.

⁵⁵ British Minister.

⁵⁶ Cavendish W. Cannon of the Division of European Affairs.

⁵⁷ First Secretary of the British Embassy.

had been helpful; and that we should have great difficulty in explaining why he was not permitted to say what he had to say to the Italians, in his native country, as and when the opportunity arose.

I added that we could, of course, say that the British declined to permit Sforza to go but that I thought the British would not desire this. Sir Ronald agreed.

He then asked whether the directive to General Eisenhower⁵⁸ might not provide that Count Sforza should be permitted to enter into no political activity whatsoever.

I said that point was open to consideration but that my own idea would be that the directive should state that Count Sforza's activities should be subject at all times to such limitation as might seem necessary in the military interest.

Sir Ronald said that he was glad to have this explanation because he wanted to be able to state it to his Foreign Office.

I did not debate the question of sending Count Sforza along but to state it merely as a decision we had already taken based on reasons of our own. I added that in certain other matters we had had to bear criticism because we had acquiesced in some of the British ideas and I thought that in this case we could afford to take account of our own position. Sir Ronald took this with entire grace.

A. A. B[ERLE], JR.

865.01/457

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The question of providing money for Italian Diplomatic Missions is likely to arise in several countries. His Majesty's Government are trying to ascertain whether the Badoglio Government can still provide funds for their upkeep, but it must be recognised that in the present circumstances they will probably be unable to do so.

2. It could, of course, be maintained that this was a matter which does not concern His Majesty's Government or the United States Government, and that if the Italian Government cannot support their missions abroad these must be withdrawn to Italy. There would, however, be advantage in maintaining Italian missions in neutral countries provided that they support the King and the Badoglio Government, since their withdrawal might give an opportunity to the puppet Fascist Government to secure representation in neutral countries. His Majesty's Government therefore feel that arrangements must be made, if necessary, for their upkeep from Allied funds. No

⁵⁸ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces.

funds should be advanced to missions suspected of supporting Mussolini's regime.

3. His Majesty's Government feel that this responsibility should be shared between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government on a 50-50 basis. They would naturally wish expenditure to be kept to the minimum, and British and United States representatives in the countries concerned could advise whether the Italian diplomatic or consular staffs there could be reduced by the repatriation of unnecessary personnel to Italy. We should also secure the removal of any Italians suspected of Fascist sympathies.

[WASHINGTON,] 25 September, 1943.

865.01/457

The Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will note from the attached copy of an *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy⁵⁹ that consideration is being given to the question of providing money for Italian diplomatic missions in various neutral countries which might find themselves in financial straits. You will further note that the British Government is endeavoring to ascertain whether the Badoglio Government is still able to supply funds for the upkeep of loyal missions abroad, and that if the Italian Government is not in a position immediately to provide needed funds, it is proposed that we share the responsibility on a fifty-fifty basis to furnish funds for the upkeep of these missions at least until such time as other arrangements can be made.

According to a telegram received from our mission in Madrid, the Italian representative in that city has already brought up the question of receiving financial assistance.

Since in the neutral countries involved (Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Turkey, and Afghanistan), there are also German missions which undoubtedly will endeavor, by offering financial assistance, to win over to the side of the puppet Italian Government the Italian missions in these posts, it is felt that as an emergency matter we should be in a position to advance funds on short notice in the event the Badoglio Government, itself, is not able immediately to make provisions for its loyal representatives abroad.

Efforts are being made to ascertain the availability of official Italian funds in this country which might be used to repay any advances made to the Badoglio Government. If official Italian funds are not available in this country for this purpose, it is hoped that the

⁵⁹ *Supra.*

Badoglio Government eventually can complete arrangements to cover these expenses from official Italian funds on deposit in one or more of the neutral countries involved.

In order that we may be in a position to act expeditiously in this matter in the event that it proves necessary for us to assist Italian missions to meet legitimate expenses until other arrangements can be made, it is suggested, if you agree to the proposal in principle, that you authorize an allocation from your Emergency Fund of various sums as needed, not to exceed \$1,000,000, however, for this purpose, on the understanding reimbursement will eventually be sought through diplomatic channels.

If you concur with the British proposal, we feel that the Soviet Government should be informed of our contemplated action in order that they may be in a position to offer suggestions and give their approval to the plan.

Faithfully yours,

A. A. BERLE, JR.

865.01/479 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1943—9 p. m.

1820. For Murphy.⁶⁰ Your 1691, October 3, midnight.⁶¹ So far as the Department is aware Count Sforza has made no broadcast "approving the actions of the Badoglio administration". His remarks at an Italian rally on September 26 have been variously interpreted by the press concerning the degree of support he is willing to give the present Italian government. According to an Associated Press despatch from London on September 28 the Algiers radio reported that Count Sforza had communicated to Marshal Badoglio his full support of the present Italian government as long as it continued its efforts to defeat the Germans. Subsequently Countess Sforza denied in New York any report that the Count had communicated with Badoglio, but this was probably because she had no reason to know of his message to Eisenhower's headquarters. In order to clarify what he termed "misinterpretation" of his viewpoint, Count Sforza gave the press on October 1 the statement communicated to you in the Department's recent press telegram.⁶² That represents the most recent public expression of his political views.

⁶⁰ Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa.

⁶¹ Not printed.

⁶² Telegram No. 1799, October 5; it quoted Sforza as stating to the press that "any ultimate political views of mine and of my friends are subordinate to one

With respect to the monarchy, Sforza during his period of exile has consistently denounced the King and the House of Savoy for its part in Italy's present plight. He has maintained this view in addresses and interviews since the armistice, and has expressed the opinion that Churchill is mistaken in trying to rally anti-Fascist forces around the King; but he has likewise taken the position that the question of constitutional reform should not be forced at this time and that all political bickering should be subordinated to the task of clearing the German invaders out of Italy. In general, while he has talked perhaps too freely, his expressed views tally with the statement he sent to Eisenhower's headquarters. He is not however committed to joining a Badoglio government nor does he apparently desire to do so.

HULL

865.01/527 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, October 12, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 9:50 p. m.]

1743. From Murphy. Your 1831, October 8, 5 p. m.⁶³ The military mission with the Italian Government was established by a directive of September 12 from the Allied Commander-in-Chief. Lieutenant General Mason MacFarlane was appointed head of that mission under this directive. The task [of] the mission is to transmit the military instructions of the Commander-in-Chief to the Italian Government, collect and transmit intelligence, and arrange for such coordinated action as the Italian armed forces and people can be induced to take against the Germans.

The military mission consists of naval ground forces and air sections. The headquarters of these sections report to General MacFarlane on all matters of policy. All technical matters they may report direct to the appropriate service.

According to the directive "on political questions the British Resident Minister in North Africa and the United States Minister or their representatives are associated with the mission in order to make the necessary diplomatic contacts with the Italian Government. They report to the head of the mission and all instructions from General Eisenhower on political as well as military questions are transmitted to them through MacFarlane".

supreme duty—union of all the Italians in the war against Germany. Therefore, I would consider it almost an act of treason against Italy to oppose the Badoglio government as long as it organizes and leads war against Germany in full accord with the Allied armies." (851.01/3002)

⁶³ Not printed.

The head of the mission reports to the Allied Commander-in-Chief and is not permitted to communicate direct with any agencies in Washington or London.

I forwarded a complete report on this matter together with an account of my first visit to Brindisi in a letter to the President dated September 20 of which a copy was sent to the Secretary.⁶⁴ Has this letter been received? This was followed by a further report in the same form dated October 6.⁶⁵

Telegraphic reports were made in my 1618, September 19, 3 p. m.; 1665, September 30, 6 p. m.⁶⁶ Have you received these telegrams?

It is also noted that you referred to the representation in Brindisi in your 1772, September 30, 9 p. m., in which connection see my 1668, September 30, 9 p. m.⁶⁶

A considerable number of telegraphic reports on this subject have been sent to the War Department by this headquarters.

I understand from Dunn's letter of July 21⁶⁷ that a civil affairs committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff included a representative of the Department to whom would be referred telegrams received from Allied Force Headquarters regarding the Italian operation. Have [you?] had access to the AGWAR⁶⁸ telegrams above mentioned?

Major General Kenyon Joyce has been detailed to the mission and is said to be en route from Washington to proceed to Brindisi. "See telegram 7902, from AGWAR dated September 12". He will replace Brigadier General Maxwell Taylor who is temporarily assigned as assistant to MacFarlane. The staff in addition to the Army, Naval and Air sections includes representative of AMG⁶⁹ and PWB.⁷⁰ [Murphy.]

WILEY

740.00119 Control (Italy)/10-1643

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On October 2nd Mr. Wright⁷¹ left with Mr. Dunn a copy of a telegram from the Foreign Office in which it was suggested that it would be desirable to offer the Soviet Government a satisfactory

⁶⁴ Copy not found in Department files. An account of the visit to Brindisi was contained in telegram No. 1618, September 19, 1943, 3 p. m., not printed (865.01/401½).

⁶⁵ Not printed.

⁶⁶ Neither printed.

⁶⁷ James C. Dunn, Adviser, Office of Foreign Economic Coordination. Letter of July 21 not found in Department files.

⁶⁸ Adjutant General, War Department.

⁶⁹ Allied Military Government.

⁷⁰ Psychological Warfare Branch of Allied Force Headquarters.

⁷¹ Michael Wright, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

position on the Control Commission for Italy⁷² or whatever authority was set up to ensure the carrying out of the surrender terms (a copy of this telegram is attached for convenience of reference⁷³).

In a message to President Roosevelt of October 8th (No. 442⁷⁴), Mr. Churchill suggested that it would be a good thing to tell Monsieur Molotov⁷⁵ that the Soviet Government's desire to play their part in the control of Italy was understood, and that it was hoped to propose a scheme to them in the near future which should meet their requirements. Mr. Churchill suggested that General Eisenhower should be asked to submit a scheme for consideration. He understood from Mr. Macmillan, who was in London, that this could be done without undue difficulty.

Sir Ronald Campbell has now been instructed to repeat the suggestion that General Eisenhower should be asked if he can devise a method of associating the U. S. S. R., the French and the other interested Allies with the Italian Control Commission.

WASHINGTON, 16 October, 1943.

865.01/564 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, October 18, 1943—5 a. m.

[Received 6:45 p. m.]

1781. From Murphy. Reports from Brindisi mission indicate a difference of views has arisen between Badoglio and Acquarone⁷⁶ in respect to broadening of base of Italian Government.

Acquarone recently went to Naples to get in touch with some old liberals (see my telegram 1736, October 11, 8 p. m.⁷³). Badoglio says this mission was a failure and describes liberals as "ghosts of a former era." His view is that it is not possible to form a satisfactory Cabinet until after arrival in Rome since it would lack machinery of government and could not be effective or wholly national in character. He is now preparing a list of Cabinet possibilities who he hopes will be available on arrival in Rome but is in agreement with Acquarone that in any event no ex-Fascist will be included.

On the other hand Acquarone thinks that Monarchy would be endangered if matters are not rapidly adjusted with anti-Fascist groups and therefore he is anxious immediately to broaden base of

⁷² Regarding the establishment of the Control Commission, see vol. I, pp. 793-794.

⁷³ Not printed.

⁷⁴ *Ante*, p. 384.

⁷⁵ V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁷⁶ Gen. Tietro Acquarone, Minister to the Royal Household of Italy.

the government. He was in touch with anti-Fascists in Naples in particular De Nicola former Parliamentarian and his group. They were invited to join the government but replied they did not wish to take part in a government headed by Badoglio. They perceive no personal objection to [the] Marshal but insist that head of government should be a civilian. They would be very glad to have Badoglio in the government as Minister of National Defense. Acquarone thinks this group is in a position to speak for Italian liberal elements in Rome and in general attaches more importance to Naples group than Badoglio.

We are not yet in a position to estimate either the strength and representative character of Acquarone's liberal elements in Naples or possibility that Badoglio as head of government will be able to command sufficient support now or in future from liberal groups.

Macmillan and I propose to confer here with General MacFarlane and others during course of this week and then proceed to Brindisi to review situation on spot.

Our first thoughts meanwhile are we think we should continue to work for earliest possible broadening of government through introduction of representatives of liberal and labor groups. Should we work for a civilian premiership which has many advantages it would at same time be essential Badoglio remain in government in a position compatible with service he has rendered in bringing about the armistice. This we feel could be accomplished by giving him Ministry of National Defense and command of Army. If we should appear to discard individual who had been responsible for Italian declaration of war and co-belligerency it would give rise to serious doubt and confusion of mind both in Italy and abroad.

Furthermore we are not in favor of pressing for any change until we have secured from Badoglio important modifications in form of proposed amendments to long term armistice provisions and to naval agreement.⁷⁸ We hope to achieve his signature to these modifications through our trip to Brindisi. Macmillan is sending a similar telegram to London.

Repeated to London and Moscow. [Murphy.]

WILEY

⁷⁸ For text of Armistice terms of September 3, of Naval Agreement of September 23, and the Additional Conditions of the Armistice, September 29, 1943, see Department of State, *United States and Italy, 1936-1946*, Documentary Record (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 51, or *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604*, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2740.

865.01/720

President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1943.

DEAR CORDELL: I refer to a letter from the Acting Secretary of State dated September 29, 1943 in regard to a proposal from the British Government that the United States and the British Governments share the financial responsibility, on a fifty-fifty basis, of making certain emergency advances to Italian diplomatic representatives abroad who are cooperating with our two Governments.

I approve our Government's joining with the British Government in this undertaking as set forth in Mr. Berle's letter and the British *aide-mémoire* which is enclosed.⁷⁹ I also approve the allocation of funds from the President's Emergency Fund, not to exceed one million dollars, to cover the United States' share of the financing of such advances. I have noted your statement that the repayment of these advances will be sought through diplomatic channels as soon as conditions permit.

I look to you to see to it that arrangements are made which will insure that no part of these funds is used to benefit any Italian officials about whose loyalty and devotion to the principles for which we are fighting there is any question. I suggest that no advance be made to Italian diplomatic representatives in any country unless the American and the British Chiefs of Mission in the country concerned both approve such advances and that they both certify that the official in question is wholeheartedly cooperating with the American and the British Governments in the conduct of the war.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Director of the Budget for his guidance in working out the necessary financial arrangements with officials of the Department of State.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

865.01/581 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, October 21, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received October 22—2: 17 a. m.]

1809. From Murphy. Our military mission in Brindisi reports that Sforza saw Badoglio on October 20th. Badoglio termed the meeting satisfactory and stated that Sforza had promised him full support.

Sforza called on our mission soon afterwards and began conversation by volunteering confirmation of Badoglio's report. He went

⁷⁹ Dated September 25, p. 404.

on to explain that by full support he meant that he would not at present at any rate join the government. He would use his influence to get the Italian people to follow the government if it was composed of "decent" people. If anyone were to ask him whether or not to join the government he would advise them to follow their conscience.

He thought that there could be no question of any change of regime at present. That question could only be put when Italy was freed and he would ask this openly at all times. But his frank opinion was that Badoglio would not be able to form a wide based government of outstanding political leaders so long as the King remained. The Crown Prince did not count and the proper solution in his view was a regency in favor of King's grandson with Badoglio as one of the regents and possibly the Princess of Piedmont as another.

According to our military mission, Sforza was, or, at least, appeared, deeply affected by his meeting with Badoglio, who he said was a friend of long standing. The mission reports that it should be wary of Sforza giving Badoglio steady support as it should be at this stage of accepting as final the views he expressed on the question of the regime. He impressed our mission as not wholly disinterested and to have been in Italy too short a time to have decided where his best interest lies.

Sforza has so far refused to give any statement to the press and intends to stay at Bari for at least a few days to be at hand if needed before going on to Naples.

Repeated to Moscow for Dunn⁸⁰ and to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

740.0011 Moscow/75 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

Moscow, October 26, 1943—noon.

[Received October 27—3 : 39 p. m.]

1739. Delam 28. For the Acting Secretary and Atherton⁸¹ from the Secretary.⁸² Reference Amdel no. 40.⁸³ Hope Grady⁸⁴ will accept appointment.

⁸⁰ Mr. Dunn was attending the Tripartite Conference in Moscow, held October 18–November 1, 1943; for correspondence concerning the Conference, see vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

⁸¹ Ray Atherton, Minister in Canada, temporarily in Washington for consultation.

⁸² Secretary of State Hull was attending the Tripartite Conference in Moscow.

⁸³ Telegram No. 1066, October 23, noon, not printed.

⁸⁴ Henry F. Grady, former Assistant Secretary of State, was proposed for appointment as Deputy Vice President of the Economic and Administrative Section of the Italian Control Commission.

I agree with suggestion that Murphy be named Political Adviser attached to AFHQ⁸⁵ in similar status as Macmillan and also that Murphy be appointed as United States member of Advisory Council to the Allied Control Commission for Italy. We are now discussing details with regard to Advisory Council and I hope to be able to let you know what the exact titles of the members of the Council will be as agreed upon. I would like very much to have following suggestions given consideration by the President and you: That Murphy, in view of fact that Macmillan is a member of the British Cabinet, be given the rank of Ambassador in his new letter of appointment, that his wishes as to this new assignment be ascertained by the Department direct and that in any event he be granted 2 months leave in the immediate future.

I also concur with the proposal that Reber⁸⁶ be provisionally appointed Deputy Vice President of the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission for Italy.

I assume that all of these appointments will be cleared through and approved by the War Department and General Eisenhower. The complicated question of jurisdiction and functions of the Political Military Commission which will concern itself with discussions, advice and recommendations to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union with respect to major questions of policy relating to occupied and liberated territories in Europe and which will probably sit in London is now under immediate discussion here. The jurisdiction and function of the Advisory Council for Italy is also being discussed. As soon as any decisions are arrived at here with respect to these matters you will be informed.

All these matters are of course for the approval or disapproval of the President. [Hull.]

HARRIMAN

000.01/564 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers
(Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1943—11 p. m.

1988. For Murphy. We agree in general with the observations contained in section 2 of your 1781, October 18, 5 a. m. It is our understanding however that the personnel available for the formation of a liberal government is limited in Southern Italy. We would like your comments on the possibility of forming satisfactory government prior to its return to Rome.

⁸⁵ Allied Force Headquarters.

⁸⁶ Samuel Reber, Counselor of Embassy attached to the office of President Roosevelt's special representative in North Africa.

Recent press reports from Algiers indicate that "Committees of National Liberation" are being formed in Southern Italy for the purpose "of solving the political problem of setting up a government in the void left by failing Fascism." A press report from Naples states that the *Partito d'Azione* has published an eight point program demanding the *immediate* establishment of a republican form of government in Italy. This does not seem to be in line with Sforza's comment that a change of government at the present time is out of the question.

We are also curious about the report that Leopoldo Piccardi, Badoglio's Minister of Industry, Commerce and Labor, is in Naples as the "key figure in the movement of the Committees of National Liberation". Has Piccardi ever rejoined the Badoglio Government and is he functioning as one of its Ministers?

STETTINIUS

865.01/647 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, November 1, 1943—5 p. m.
[Received November 2—2:39 a. m.]

1881. From Murphy. In view of the Allied agreement that the transfer of sovereignty need not wait arrival in Rome but will be effected as soon as circumstances permit, the King and Badoglio resolved to proceed at once to form a broader base for the government. The Brindisi administration has become increasingly cautious of the activities of the political groups in Naples and Rome. They have also established secret radio communication with the six parties in Rome. A recent message from the latter signed Bonomi (Democrazia del Lavoro) indicated that the Rome representatives of the parties have not been prepared to serve in a government under a military leader such as Badoglio but would be prepared to assist in the formation of a government under the Crown. It is noteworthy that in reference to the Crown no specific reference is made to the present King. Badoglio fears that the Bonomi group is organizing a shadow government in Rome which might be set up before the arrival of the Allies.

The Naples group under the leadership of Benedetto Croce and Carlo Sforza all refuse to participate in the Badoglio government as long as the King remains. They propose the abdication of the King in favor of the Prince of Naples, who is now in Switzerland, and the appointment of Badoglio as Regent. It is obvious from our recent conversations in Naples that Sforza is being pushed forward as Prime Minister.

Sforza and the Naples group agree that there can be no question of establishing a republic in Italy before the entire country is free

to participate in general elections even if it should be possible at that time. Your 1988, October 27, 11 p. m.

Leopoldo Piccardi joined the Badoglio Government in Brindisi about 10 days ago after a sojourn in Naples where he was in contact with the Committee of National Liberation. Badoglio leans on him heavily in matters concerning economics and industry. Piccardi is a favorable and useful element.

Badoglio, about October 22 wrote a letter to the King inviting the latter's attention to the position taken by Sforza and Naples group. Acquarone is [*in?*] discussing this matter with our Brindisi mission as well as with Sforza interpreted this letter as an effort on the part of Badoglio to induce the King to abdicate. Acquarone later proceeded to Naples for the purpose of canvassing the political personalities there in the King's behalf. The Naples group includes individuals only of regional importance some of whom might serve as useful technicians in the government. At present they are taking their directives from Sforza and Croce.

In our recent conversations with Badoglio, he was categoric in his statements that he could not be a party to any movement to force out the King even if a Regency is established. He asked MacFarlane if in a communication he proposed to send to Bonomi in Rome he could include a statement that the Allies do not favor any changes in the form of government at this particular junction. He was referred to the public pronouncements made by the American and British Governments and the importance which they attach to the efforts of driving out the Germans. He will show the text of his eventual reply to the mission before its despatch. Badoglio said that he was loyal to the King and would refuse to cooperate with the Naples and Rome groups if they forced the King's abdication. He said that he would urge the formation of an administration for national unity for the avowed single purpose of expelling the Germans. Failing this, he would resign and leave some politician to assume his duties.

Notwithstanding Badoglio's avowals, I believe that an understanding exists between Badoglio and Sforza looking to the abdication of the King and the establishment of Badoglio as Regent for the Prince of Naples.

Badoglio visited Sforza and Croce at Naples on October 31. He immediately thereafter advised MacFarlane that Sforza refused to take part in the government if the King remained. Sforza urged that the King abdicate in favor of the Prince of Naples and also urged the appointment of Badoglio as Regent. Croce was in entire accord. Badoglio also interviewed Rodino of the Christian Democratic Party. The latter maintained that he would not participate in the government unless Croce, Sforza, Orlando or Renaudi were

included. As Orlando is in Rome and Renauldi in Switzerland, this means Sforza and/or Croce.

Badoglio's conclusion now is that no political government can now be formed without Sforza stating that the latter had become clearly a symbol around which the six parties could rally. According to Badoglio he would be unable to fulfill without them the promise he made to the Allies to form a broad base government. Therefore, Badoglio proposes to inform the King of this situation and tender his resignation, recommending that the King ask Sforza to form government. Badoglio takes the position that Sforza and the Liberals must persuade the King to abdicate. He as a soldier would not take this step. If this action is taken appropriately, Badoglio now states that he would accept the Regency.

Before returning to Brindisi November 1, Badoglio planned to see De Nicola on the evening of October 31, but he did not anticipate this interview would change anything.

It appears therefore that our mission is faced with a fairly important constitutional crisis. In dealing with it our first consideration will be maintenance of order and the armistice. We consider it important for purpose of armistice that Badoglio remain at least as Regent. Both Sforza and Croce admit Badoglio's prestige in the country and with the army and assert that his retention as Regent will be approved by anti-Fascist elements in northern Italy.

Planning for transfer of AMGOT⁸⁷ territory to Italian administration continues. Allied Control Commission for Italy will be established about November 10 under a directive which will be issued shortly.

Sent to Department, repeated to London, Madrid, Lisbon and Moscow. [Murphy.]

WILEY

865.01/657: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, November 2, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 7:24 p. m.]

1891. (From Murphy.) Our Military Mission in Brindisi telegraphs as follows November 1.

Badoglio intends to see the King today and inform him that he finds it impossible under present circumstances to form a representative anti-Fascist government representing existing political parties. He therefore tenders his resignation. Badoglio will recommend that

⁸⁷ Allied Military Government, Occupied Territory.

the King summon Sforza who, in Badoglio's opinion, is the only person presently available to whom all the parties will rally.

Our Mission has asked Badoglio orally to explain to the King that the Allies don't wish to interfere with constitutional practice provided: (1) that Badoglio remain in office as effective head of the government until the new government is ready to take over and (2) that there be close accord with the Allies in all steps taken to insure the maintenance of order and that the provisions of armistice are respected.

In a subsequent telegram dated November 2 early our Mission reported that late November 1 the King received Reber and MacFarlane and Caccia⁸⁸ and informed them that Badoglio had reported his inability to form a broad based government because the Naples group would not collaborate "with the Marshal". The King said therefore that he wishes to go to Naples on November 3 for the purpose of discussing the situation with Sforza, Croce, Rodino and others. The King apparently is convinced that the Naples group would not obey a summons to come to Brindisi but hopes that they will not refuse to see him in Naples.

This is further evidence that the King does not understand his situation or refuses to admit that he himself is the obstacle to the formation of a broad based government. We have informed our Mission that there is no objection to the King's proceeding to Naples, but that it would be better if MacFarlane or other members of the Mission did not accompany him as proposed by MacFarlane. General Alexander has no objection from his point of view to proposed visit to Naples.

Sent Department, repeated Madrid, London, Moscow. [Murphy.]

WILEY

865.01/664: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, November 3, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received November 4—4:30 a. m.]

1907. From Murphy. According to our Military Mission in Brindisi, Badoglio is most depressed by the present situation.

He advised the King strongly against going to Naples. The first intimation that Badoglio had that the King was leaving for Naples today was advice received from MacFarlane. Badoglio categorically stated to MacFarlane that there is no solution to the present situation without the abdication of the King. He believed that the King will probably have unpleasant surprises after arrival in Naples and is

⁸⁸ Harold Caccia, serving with the British Resident Minister, North Africa. On November 10, 1943, he was announced as British Vice President of the Allied Control Commission for Italy.

certain that neither Croce nor Sforza nor probably Rodino will have anything to do with the King. Badoglio believes it unlikely that either De Nicola or Porzio would accept office under the King. If they did, Sforza and his friends would probably make serious trouble.

Badoglio showed MacFarlane a copy of a letter sent by him to King on October 24 in which he informed the King that it would be impossible to establish a representative government without the King's abdication. Badoglio agreed that the King would probably return from Naples having accomplished nothing. We would then be confronted by a situation which could only be regulated by the earliest possible abdication of the King. Badoglio hopes that by then the King would have realized the hopelessness of his position. In the interval Badoglio promises to carry on loyally in accordance with the terms of the armistice.

With reference to my no. 1888, November 1, 11 p. m.,⁸⁹ MacFarlane telegraphed on November 2 that he had informed Badoglio that evening that Roatta⁹⁰ must be replaced. Badoglio stated that he fully understood the situation but that it would be necessary to obtain the King's approval before taking action. He also said that he would have difficulty replacing Roatta and hoped that the Allies might be able to let him have one of the captured Italian generals, probably Messe. This is now under consideration by the CINC.⁹¹

Sent to Department, repeated to London, Madrid and Lisbon. [Murphy.]

WILEY

740.0011 Moscow/123a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers
(Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1943—3 p. m.

2065. Amdel 72. Personal for Secretary Hull⁹² from the President. I am in full accord with your suggestion that Bob Murphy be appointed United States member of the Advisory Council to the Allied Control Commission for Italy and further that he be given the rank of Ambassador. I am telegraphing General Eisenhower to that effect. The State Department I understand has telegraphed Murphy directly. I also agree that he be granted leave before taking up his new job. Roosevelt.

STETTINIUS

⁸⁹ Not printed.

⁹⁰ Gen. Mario Roatta, Chief of Staff under Badoglio.

⁹¹ Commander in Chief.

⁹² Secretary Hull returned from the Moscow Conference by way of North Africa.

865.01/875 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, November 4, 1943—midnight.

[Received November 5—6: 15 a. m.]

1918. For the President and the Acting Secretary from Murphy. AGWAR telegram MAT 77 of November 3 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in substance stated that King is in Naples today attempting to persuade the Naples group to join his government. Either he will succeed or he will be met by their refusal to participate in any government unless he abdicates and the Crown Prince renounces his right in favor of the Prince of Naples.

Should he succeed in forming a government no immediate problem for the Allies arises. On the other hand should he fail and accept the proposal for abdication there will also be no occasion for Allied intervention.

However if the King refuses to abdicate and appeals to Badoglio to continue notwithstanding the refusal of the Naples group to participate Badoglio undoubtedly will seek Allied advice. This for the reason that he will have failed to obtain the participation of liberal elements in line with stated Allied policy. Therefore unless instructions to the contrary are received it is proposed in the latter event to continue the present arrangements until we reach Rome. The alternative would be to stimulate the King's abdication resulting in a coalition government and the establishment of Badoglio as regent for the Prince of Naples.

Incident to the foregoing Macmillan is telegraphing to the Prime Minister in amplification of the foregoing requesting the Prime Minister's views.

The formula proposed by Sforza with which I believe Badoglio is in full accord seems to me a desirable solution which the U.S.A. if necessary might well support. The departure of the King should not adversely affect the military effort and the liberalization of the Italian Government should if anything aid it.

There are of course a number of practical considerations. Principal among these are the command of the Italian Armed Forces, the operation of the ports and communications, the eventual transfer of Italian territory now under AMG to the Italian administration, the conduct of the civilian Italian administration and the attitude of the personnel of the Italian diplomatic and consular personnel abroad.

Information regarding the signing of the long term armistice document has been closely held in Italy. If Sforza does form the new government it will be necessary to inform him of the details of the terms and to insist on his acceptance of the obligations of the armistice terms. [Murphy.]

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁹³

LONDON, 6 November, 1943.

495. Para 1. All my information goes to show that we should lose a lot in breaking up the present King Badoglio show. Victor Emmanuel is nothing to us but his coordination with Badoglio did in fact deliver the Italian Fleet which is rendering very useful service now and this same combination is at this moment holding the loyalties of a very large part of the unhappy Italian Army and people and of course of Italian Diplomatic Representatives everywhere. Why should we add to the burden of our British and United States soldiers on the march to Rome by weakening any of these aids? We ought not in my personal opinion to countenance a change in the Badoglio King Regime till we are seated in Rome and a really broad based Italian government can be formed.

Para 2. I understand Eisenhower in the main inclines to this view. Surely we should stick to what we have got till we are sure we can get something better and this can only be ascertained when we have Rome in our possession.

Para 3. I do not believe that Sforza counts for anything that will make men kill or die.

865.01/703 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, November 8, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received (November 9) 8:25 a. m.]

1944. (From Murphy.) MacFarlane telegraphs on November 6 the text of identic personal letters addressed to Berle and Eden⁹⁴ with the request that the text should be forwarded by telegram to Washington and London. The following text, as telegraphed, is slightly garbled in minor respects:

“King sent me today offer become Prime Minister adding that personal independence towards him would be guaranteed by a solemn declaration that at the end of war he would bow to any decision of nation. I answered:

1. That if all public men consulted by him agreed on my name it was because my past gave them the belief that WMAL [*sic*] gave force to unite and govern nation;

2. That since I had always believed in advantage of representative monarchy I had already succeeded in persuading even extremist to accept formula [of] grandson as King with Badoglio as Regent since all

⁹³ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁹⁴ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

princes are corrupt or dishonored; but that I have fully realized that this is maximum can be imposed on nation;

3. Therefore if I accepted present government my name would lose any force and prestige;

4. I added that I would not accept become Regent, my support being for Badoglio who is unwisely opposed by court circles;

5. That apart from any political considerations, I considered morally unacceptable King's offer become Prime Minister with mental reservation about his person and his future. Since I am in Italy I have done my best to fortify Badoglio in his effort to help Allies but neither I nor Badoglio can do anything without a complete moral purification of a situation where rightly nor wrongly it appears all forces of reaction and responsible of disaster hail King as their symbol.

Possible nobody told King yet that Monarchy can be saved only through formula of grandson without princes as regents. By now he knows my answer and I am ready to tell him personally. May I add Badoglio shares my views even if silent up to now.

It would help if Allies who have supreme responsibility recognized that there is a minimum that is indispensable to avoid too radical changes and to assure Italian efficiency and collaboration. Signed Sforza".

[MURPHY]
WILEY

740.00119 ACI/3: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, November 8, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received November 9—8:17 a. m.]

1946. For [From] Murphy. Dunn informed us that incident to establishment at the Moscow Conference of the Advisory Council to the Allied Control Commission for Italy which will include a representative of French Committee National Liberation latter has not been advised formally of this decision. Massigli⁹⁵ referred to this omission in his conversation with Dunn at Algiers.

Dunn suggested that the Department be informed and that the Department might wish, in concert with the British and Soviet Governments, to formally advise Massigli of the decision and to extend to the French an appropriate invitation to appoint the French representative. It is recommended that, if approved, Macmillan, Bogomolov⁹⁶ and myself be authorized to call together on Massigli and extend the invitation. Please telegraph.

Sent to Department, repeated to London and Moscow. [Murphy.]

WILEY

⁹⁵ René Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in the French Committee of National Liberation.

⁹⁶ Alexander Efremovich Bogomolov, Plenipotentiary Representative of the Soviet Union to the French Committee of National Liberation, and Soviet representative on the Allied Advisory Council for Italy.

740.00119 ACI/3 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers
(Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1943—8 p. m.

2097. For Murphy. Your recommendations concerning invitation to French Committee (your 1946, November 8, 6 p. m.) are approved and the Embassies at London and Moscow have been so informed. The Embassies have been asked to arrange if possible to have appropriate instructions sent to Macmillan and Bogomolov by their Governments. You should not, of course, extend the invitation to the Committee until after General Eisenhower has announced the establishment of the Allied Control Commission for Italy which, it is understood, will occur at 10 p. m. Algiers time, November 10.

When you see Massigli you should inform him of the decision to establish an Advisory Council representative of certain of the United Nations in conjunction with the establishment of the Allied Control Commission for Italy. If it is necessary to describe the functions of the Council, you should not go beyond the language used in the Joint Communiqué of the Tripartite Conference at Moscow or that used by General Eisenhower in announcing the Allied Control Commission.⁹⁷

STETTINIUS

865.01/662 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers
(Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1943—10 p. m.

2101. For Murphy. We have followed with interest events reported in your 1881, November 1, and 1891 and 1898, November 2,⁹⁸ concerning the Italian constitutional crisis. Several questions have occurred to us which you have no doubt already seriously considered.

1. The physical problem of the Prince of Naples in Switzerland. Is there a likelihood that his absence from Italian territory will cast serious doubt on the legitimacy of his secession [*succession?*] and his acceptability as a sovereign?

2. Constitutional objection to Marshal Badoglio as a regent. To overcome the constitutional difficulties, a regency council, including some member of the royal family in free Italy such as the present Duke of Aosta or Queen Elena, might be formed. Or, since the "Statuto"

⁹⁷ For text of Joint Communiqué of November 1, 1943, see vol. I, p. 741; for substance of General Eisenhower's announcement of November 10, 1943, see *United States and Italy, 1936-1946*, p. 76.

⁹⁸ Telegram No. 1898 not printed.

was given by a Savoy King to the Italian people, could not the present King amend it in the necessary manner and appoint Badoglio as regent?

3. With a rival government in the north of Italy, is it not to our best interest that the Italian Government, cooperating with us, preserve intact for the present its constitutional and legitimate character? If so, it would seem desirable to deviate as little as possible from constitutional procedure to the possible propaganda advantage of the so-called Republican-Fascist Government.

Your 1918, November 4, midnight. Your plan in event of King failing to form government and refusing to abdicate is approved. The above suggestions or questions are not put with any idea of limiting your freedom of action or changing your present course of action.

STETTINIUS

865.01/821

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*⁹⁹

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM: ITALIAN POLICY

The primary objective in Italy at present is necessarily military: the expulsion of Germans from Italy, and the maximum use of Italian territory and resources for further operations against the enemy.

A second objective, to be developed consistently with the foregoing, is the development of political conditions in Italy under which Italian public opinion can choose the form of government under which it wishes to live, subject to the unstated but implicit reservation that this government shall not be fascist, and that its prevailing methods and philosophy shall not be dangerous to Italian neighbors and to the peace of the world.

Since the military objective and political objective must be pursued simultaneously and must be harmonious, it follows that the process of rebuilding Italian institutions must at the same time contribute to our military effort, and assist in bringing about conditions, groupings and political personalities looking towards the evolution of an Italian Government drawing its mandate from Italian public opinion.

It would seem that having pledged to Italy the right to create a government of its own choosing, the United States is under an obligation, (military considerations permitting) to assist the return to Italy of the men able to offer themselves to Italian public opinion, state the constitutional and economic issues, and secure (if they can)

⁹⁹ Addressed to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), to Ray Atherton, and to H. Freeman Matthews of the Division of European Affairs.

a mandate from Italian public opinion. Probably, any group appearing now will have a relatively short political life. Their principal function may well be to develop the Italian non-fascists who are relatively unknown in governmental and political life, so that these can in turn present political and social programs to the Italian public, and thus provide steady evolution towards a wider political base.

A beginning in this direction seems to have been made by Count Sforza whose negotiations with Benedetto Croce and with Marshal Badoglio state, in more or less manageable form, the issue presented by the continuous reign of King Victor Emmanuel. The immediate result has been the discharge of General Roatta and possibly General Ambrosio. A further possible result may be the establishment of a regency.

Throughout this evolution, it is essential to maintain the structural integrity of Italian political and military institutions so that while they change, the liberated Italian state nevertheless presents a steady and contributing front against the German invaders.

In view of this necessity the men who are inserted into Italian public life, by return from exile or liberation from prison, must be prepared as a condition precedent to their taking part in the Italian scene, to accept the overall obligation not to weaken the Italian military effort such as it is.

Many Italian opposition figures became either outright anti-Royalists seeking the fall of the House of Savoy or in any event favored the elimination of King Victor Emmanuel and of the Crown Prince. Some of these men state that they could not conscientiously take any oath which bound them to support the Italian monarchy. Some, however, are prepared to accept an obligation of honor not to raise constitutional questions until Italy is liberated, without abandoning the positions they have taken as to the ultimate organization of Italy.

With these considerations in mind, it would seem that the Department can consistently follow a policy (which is almost exactly that followed by Mazzini¹ in the days of the unification of Italy) namely:

(1) Liberation of Italy is the first consideration; the form of government at the moment is secondary to this.

(2) The men who recognize this obligation and are prepared to subordinate immediate political considerations to it, are men who can be inserted into Italian political life.

(3) For those who decline to accept allegiance to the monarchy, a formula should be worked out permitting them to accept allegiance and pledge obedience to the Italian military command while it operates in conjunction with the Allied military headquarters, accom-

¹ Giuseppe Mazzini, 1805-1872, President of the Society of "Young Italy" organized in 1832.

panied by an agreement not to press political conventions which might weaken Italian military resistance.

(4) The position of the Department and of the American military and diplomatic representatives should be sympathetic to steady evolution of the Italian state towards government representative of the ascertainable public opinion. Changes making any Italian Government more nearly compatible with this opinion ought to be accepted and supported.

(5) To the extent possible in conditions of active warfare, free discussion of Italian political problems should be permitted.

(6) The idea should be sedulously propagated that the men will deserve most at the hands of Italy who do most to organize and maintain resistance against the invaders.

The operating elements by which we shall be exercising influence on the situation will be:

- (1) The American high command; the principal officers in AMG;
- (2) Our diplomatic representatives on the Italian Advisory Committee;
- (3) The principal representatives in OWI² in the area.

The OWI has selected an excellent man, Mr. Albert Spalding, best known as an American violinist, but also a distinguished scholar of Italian affairs and (unlike many musicians) a man with a level head, cool judgment, military experience and very considerable business and executive ability. Another man available for this purpose is an Italian-American, Romualdi, who has done an excellent job in handling problems of Italian public opinion in South America for the CIAA,³ and who is widely respected in labor circles in Italy and the United States. Both Romualdi and Spalding would be disposed to work very closely with the Department representatives.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

740.00119 ACI/5: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 13, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 11:58 p. m.]

1937. Reference Department's 1182, November 9, 8 p. m., and Embassy's 1914, November 11, 3 p. m.⁴ I have received today a reply from Molotov dated November 12 expressing the agreement of the Soviet Government to the suggestion that the representatives of the U. S., Great Britain and the Soviet Union in Algiers jointly extend

² Office of War Information.

³ Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

⁴ Neither printed, but see telegram No. 2097, November 9, 8 p. m., to the Consul General at Algiers, p. 422.

an invitation to Massigli for the French National Committee to participate in the Advisory Council for Italy and stating that instructions to that effect were sent on November 12 to Bogomolov in Algiers.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/31889 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1943—11 p. m.

7188. Reference is made to Item B of Thursday's agenda of the Political Warfare Coordinating Committee reported in your 7847, November 11, 8 p. m.⁵ The position described by Sir Orme Sargent⁶ is in general correct and the Department approves the propaganda line adopted. In reporting on the political crisis in Italy, General Eisenhower suggested the following formula which was approved by the War and State Departments. If the King were successful in forming a liberal government or if the King were unsuccessful and agreed to abdicate in favor of his grandson, the Prince of Naples (which Sforza, Croce, et cetera, stated would be acceptable), no problem would arise. If, however, the King were unsuccessful in forming a broad-based government and refused to abdicate, the Allied Military Mission at Brindisi would be faced with a first-class constitutional crisis. General Eisenhower proposed that in the latter event the present arrangement with the King and Badoglio would be permitted to continue until Allied forces had occupied Rome.

According to information received in the Department on November 11 the King rejected Italian suggestions of abdication as well as Badoglio's resignation and asked the latter to carry on until Rome is reached. Badoglio has agreed and is assembling an administration of technicians to operate in close cooperation with the Allied Control Commission. General Mason MacFarlane, prior to his departure from Brindisi, was instructed by AFHQ, in view of the approval of the Eisenhower formula by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, (1) that the temporary solution of the political crisis was acceptable and did not conflict with the Moscow decisions; (2) that decision on the publicity line must await development of the situation between Badoglio and Sforza; (3) that Badoglio should ask Sforza to refrain from sabotaging this temporary adjustment; and (4) that the Italian Government's move to Naples was favored.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

General Joyce, the new Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission, reported on November 12 that he had a conversation with Badoglio who confirmed his intention to carry on until Rome was reached, when he would resign to permit the formation of a broad-based cabinet of political leaders. The Marshal was of the opinion that he could have a "cabinet of experts" functioning within a week. General Joyce reported that Badoglio mentioned several times his anticipation of serious difficulties within the armed forces if an abdication were forced upon the King now.

While the British are reluctant to interfere in the Italian crisis, it is obvious that they are inclined to be more disturbed at the prospect of the King's abdication and its constitutional implications than we are. While many of the British arguments against a fundamental change at this time in the Italian political structure are valid, their attitude is probably dictated by their desire to protect, particularly in Europe, the dignity and prerogatives of monarchical institutions. Our policy is fundamentally to support that regime and authority which at the present time is in a position to furnish greatest aid and cooperation to the Allied war effort. If for any reason General Eisenhower should in the future decide that to force the abdication of the King would benefit the Allied war effort in Italy, the Department would approve the adoption of such a policy.

HULL

865.01/726 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, November 15, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received November 16—11:43 a. m.]

2003. From Murphy. Marshal Badoglio informed General Joyce November 11 he wished to confirm his intention to carry on until Rome. After arrival in Rome he would resign and facilitate organization of a broad based ministry of political leaders. In interval, as it is patent that it is impossible to form such a government immediately due to lack in southern area of the necessary politicians, he was organizing, he said, a temporary government of technicians with ministries in charge of qualified under-secretaries who would be authorized by special decree to sign with full powers of minister. He hopes to have such an organization functioning within several days.

In support of this proposition he said that it was necessary to have continuity without a radical change which might be likely to cause disorder in Allied zone of communications. Effective collaboration with the Allied Control Commission also calls for such an organization. He pointed out also that the establishment of such an admin-

istration would permit functioning regardless of whatever damage may be done by Germans to the governmental machinery in Rome.

The Marshal also suggested that, in his opinion, a reaction in favor of the King was growing throughout country. Should King be forced at this time to abdicate Badoglio would anticipate serious difficulty within Italian Armed Forces.

In discussion his conference with Count Sforza, Benedetto Croce and others in Naples and referring to Sforza's refusal to take any part in Badoglio's government unless King abdicated and Crown Prince renounced, Badoglio declared he had pointed out to Naples group that, in his opinion, the most important problem was that of freeing Italy of Germans. He advocated avoiding any radical action at this time which might cause confusion in liberated zone. He stated opinion that complete liberation of Italy should be awaited so that Italian people as a whole could openly decide what form of government they desired. As a result of his failure to induce any of Naples group to participate, he had decided on the organization of an administration of technicians which was approved by the King. [Murphy.]

WILEY

865.01/733 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, November 16, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received November 17—6:37 a. m.]

2010. [From Murphy.] Joyce telegraphs from Brindisi that according to information obtained indirectly it is clear that the Naples politicians do not accept Badoglio's provisional government of technicians until Rome. They unanimously insist "on the immediate formation of a political government and the elimination of all hindrances now obstructing this". By hindrances they say that they mean the presence of the King whose immediate abdication they demand. According to Croce "the thesis that the Allies should uphold Victor Emmanuel because they found him reigning when the armistice was signed is untenable".

Joyce adds that he has not been able to check whether this is Sforza's determined attitude, but suggests that if it is there would be a question whether the Allied Governments would not wish to take advantage of the opportunity presented by Sforza's letters to Eden and Berle⁷ in order to influence him in any replies that may be made. It is Joyce's

⁷ Identical letter of November 6 quoted in telegram No. 1944, November 8, 5 p. m., from the Consul General at Algiers, p. 420.

opinion that Sforza derives most of his strength in Italy by furthering the impression that he is in the confidence of the American and British Governments.

Your comment would be appreciated.

Sent Department, repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILEY

865.01/756a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1943—7 p. m.

2201. For Murphy from Berle. Please acknowledge Count Sforza's letter of November 6 and convey to him my interest in and appreciation of his report. The following is my answer :

"Through the courtesy of our mission at Algiers, I have the text of a letter which you were kind enough to address both to Mr. Anthony Eden and myself on or about the 6th of November. The press here had likewise reported your attitude as in much the same sense as that conveyed in your letter.

Clearly, the positions you take must be guided, as they undoubtedly are, by your own devotion to the best interests of Italy and the Italian people. The highest interest at the moment must be the expulsion of the German invader from the soil of Italy and his complete defeat; and the mobilization, to this end, of the maximum resources which the liberated part of Italy can devote to that cause. I am very sure that this is the ruling consideration in the minds of the statesmen of the United Nations.

It would seem, here, that Italian affairs were in process of rapid political evolution and that, while assisting in securing expression of Italian public opinion which will make it possible for the political developments in Italy to be responsive to the popular will, you should support fully the Italian military effort and Marshal Badoglio as its responsible head. For the time being the temporary sub-cabinet seems to be the only solution presently available, in view of the deadlock, and I am sure you will create no difficulties for Badoglio during the interim period for which that sub-cabinet was set up."

There is quoted in my immediately following telegram⁸ the text of Sforza's message to Badoglio which he asked me to deliver through AFHQ on September 23 and which was sent through War Department facilities at that time. This should be given to General Joyce for such use as he may wish to make of it, if he is not already in possession of the text. [Berle.]

HULL.

⁸ *Infra*.

865.01/733 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1943—10 p. m.

2204. For Murphy from Berle. With reference to my immediately preceding telegram,⁹ there is quoted below the text of the message referred to:

"I have read with extreme interest the statement of Marshal Badoglio issued on September 16, 1943 unequivocally stating that he considers the defeat of the Germans and their expulsion from Italy to be his primary duty, and urging all Italians to join in this struggle.

In my view, it now becomes the paramount duty of all Italians irrespective of party or political differences to support and assist in the struggle to crush the German arms and to drive every German soldier from Italian soil.

So long as Marshal Badoglio is engaged in that task and is acceptable to the Allies in devoting the Italian military and material resources to that struggle, I consider it criminal to do anything to weaken his position or hamper his work in fighting for the liberation of Italy and the Italian people. I am prepared to offer my full support so long as he is thus engaged all the more because this is the only way to destroy the last criminal remnants of Fascism.

Matters of internal Italian politics can and should be adjourned for the period of the struggle, and the activities military and political of all Italians who seek the freedom and future of their Fatherland should be devoted to supporting the organized forces which are endeavoring to overthrow the common enemy. I pledge my honor to do this myself, and urge this course on my many friends and associates."

[Berle]

HULL

740.00119 ACI/10 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, November 23, 1943—noon.

[Received November 24—7:13 a. m.]

8. From Murphy. Department's 2097, November 9, 8 p. m. Masigli has now handed me a communication acknowledging tripartite invitation to French Committee of National Liberation to designate a French representative to Advisory Council for Italy. Communication adds that this acceptance must not be considered as committing the French Committee on the Italian question in its ensemble and more particularly with respect to Government of Marshal Badoglio.

The communication states that French representative to the Coun-

⁹ *Supra.*

cil will be designated shortly. If the Council meets before such designation Massigli has been authorized to represent the Committee.

Sent to Department, repeated to London. [Murphy.]

WILSON

740.00119 ACI/11 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, November 23, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received November 24—8:08 p. m.]

17. From Murphy. Following telegram from Foreign Office making suggestions regarding organization of Advisory Council for Italy has been received by Macmillan.

“It has always been intention that Advisory Council for Italy should be established early as possible and I have no doubt you are as anxious as we are that it should start to function without further delay. I understand President is likely to appoint Mr. Murphy as United States of America representative and I assume that either Bogomolov or Vyshinski¹⁰ will be Soviet representative. If French committee delays answering their invitation it seems to us it would be perfectly in order for representatives of the three Governments to start work without a French colleague. I have no doubt he would follow very quickly.

2nd. Terms of reference provide that Council will be established at same place as headquarters of the CINC. In point of fact it will of course have to be located at headquarters of the Control Commission which will be wherever Italian Government is and which can in fact be regarded as headquarters of the CINC in his capacity as President of Control Commission. You will have therefore first to establish yourselves at Brindisi.

3d. There are three questions to do with the Council which were left undecided at Moscow, viz., relationship between it and Italian Government, chairmanship and the secretariat. None of these questions is covered in the terms of reference but they will have to be decided sooner or later and I should hope you might be able to reach agreement about them with your colleagues without reference to your respective Governments. Our own thoughts on each point are as follows:

4. It will in practice be impossible to prevent each member of the Council from having direct access to the Italian Government, nor should we wish to prevent it. You yourself, for example, will naturally become the channel through which His Majesty's Government will communicate with the Italian Government, on such matters as do not concern the other Governments. But in matters of common interest to all you should try to insure, via the Council, always act

¹⁰ A. Y. Vyshinski, Vice President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs; Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission for Italy.

as a body and that individual members do not approach the Italian Government independently. This principle should if possible be established and agreed upon at the outset.

5. The most workable solution of chairmanship question is that you arrange to rotate among British, American, Soviet, and French representative, but Yugoslav and Greek representatives may object. They are already showing signs of touchiness about only being brought into the Council at a later stage.

6. Secretariat. The Council could probably get along to a start without a secretariat but a small secretariat of some kind will inevitably be required at some stage for practical purposes. You will have to reach agreement as to its composition with your colleagues on the Council. A secretariat including representatives of all six countries would be unmanageable. Greek and Yugoslav susceptibilities may, however, prove an obstacle to a four power secretariat, and we doubt whether the ideal of an Anglo-American secretariat would be acceptable to Russian and French. If the others agree to an Anglo-American secretariat there is much to be said for suggestion that political section of Control Commission should provide the secretariat."

The foregoing suggestions seem to be practical and satisfactory. I should appreciate the Department's comment.

Sent Department, repeated London. [Murphy.]

WILSON

865.01/733 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1943—9 p. m.

22. For Murphy. Berle's reply to Sforza's letter has already been telegraphed to you for delivery to the Count.¹¹ Your 2010, November 16, 2 p. m. As you know, this Government has not followed the principle of having "protégés" or favorite candidates. It is the present plan of this Government to permit individuals of standing to proceed to Italy and there take part as citizens in the political life of the country. This was clearly understood with Count Sforza prior to his leaving. You may use your discretion in making this clear in Italian political and press circles. Though it should be stated as a matter of general principle, Department does not desire to give the impression that it disapproves of Count Sforza's position, but rather that it is not sponsoring either his or anyone else's political moves.

HULL

¹¹ See telegram No. 2201, November 19, 7 p. m., to the Consul General at Algiers, p. 429.

740.00119 ACI/14: Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, November 30, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received December 1—4: 30 a. m.]

72. From Murphy. Andrei Vyshinsky with a party of some 31 persons arrived in Algiers from Moscow on November 24 during the absence of Macmillan and myself in Cairo. On our return to Algiers an informal preliminary meeting of the Advisory Council for Italy was held at my home on November 29 and the first formal meeting occurred today at AFHQ. As the first meeting was held on French territory it was agreed that Mr. Massigli would preside and that thereafter the chairmanship would rotate. It was also agreed that each member would name a substitute, and I proposed that after Reinhardt¹² arrives he would act in this capacity. The Secretariat would consist of one person of each nationality to be selected by the respective members. It was also agreed that the business of the meetings would be conducted in the English language. Military representatives of AFHQ attended and gave the members an exposé of the current situation in Italy with particular reference to the activities of the Allied Military Government and current civilian problems.

Vyshinsky has expressed eagerness to visit Italy immediately and a party has been organized to proceed to Brindisi December 2. Mr. Vyshinsky and his colleagues will be given an opportunity to examine on the spot the different aspects of the Italian situation with possible visits to the Fifteenth Army group, the Fifth Army, the Eighth Army as well as to the Allied Control Commission in order to give the Soviet delegates an air picture of actual conditions of military operations as well as civilian conditions. Macmillan, Massigli and I will accompany them but Macmillan and I propose to proceed to Cairo on December 4 spending 2 or 3 days there, later rejoining Vyshinsky after the latter's visit to Italy has been completed. A further meeting of the Advisory Council will be held in Algiers to afford the Soviet representative an opportunity to discuss whatever Italian problems he may desire.

When the Soviet representatives arrived in Algiers they believed that article 37 of the Long Term Armistice Convention with Italy¹³ authorized the automatic appointment of Soviet representatives to the Allied Control Commission. They have been informed by the Chief of Staff that appointments must be approved by the Combined

¹² G. Frederick Reinhardt, appointed U.S. member of Advisory Council, Allied Control Commission for Italy, during the absence of Mr. Murphy.

¹³ For text of Additional Conditions of the Armistice with Italy, see *United States and Italy, 1936-1946*, p. 55.

Chiefs of Staff and that the provision of article 37 is of a general nature to the effect that the United Nations shall be represented on the Allied Control Commission. An appropriate message is being sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was obvious also from our preliminary discussions with Vyshinsky that he understood that the Advisory Council had the task of deciding the functions of the Allied Control Commission. This has also been clarified in accordance with the terms of reference for the Council as specified by the Tripartite Conference at Moscow.

Vyshinsky has repeatedly emphasized that the Soviet interest in the Italian situation relates primarily to the military phase and that the Soviet Union desires to develop in concert with USA every possibility to shorten the war.

(?) Molotov will act as Vyshinsky's principal assistant on the Advisory Council and his substitute during Vyshinsky absence.

A press communiqué is being issued limited to a statement of the organization of the Committee.

Sent to Department. Repeated Cairo, Moscow and London.
[Murphy.]

[WILSON]

740.00119 ACI/11

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*¹⁴

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Mr. Macmillan has informed Mr. Murphy of the substance of a recent Foreign Office communication regarding the organization of the Advisory Council for Italy.¹⁵

The Department agrees with the British view that the Advisory Council must be located near the headquarters of the Allied Control Commission and that it will therefore first have to establish itself at Brindisi.

Concerning the relationship between the Advisory Council and the Italian Government, the terms of reference¹⁶ (paragraph 5) provide, "The Council will advise the Allied Commander-in-Chief *in his capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission* on general policy connected with the work of the control". Paragraph 4 says, "The Council will have the duty in particular of watching the operation of the machinery of control in Italy which will be enforcing the terms of surrender". The directive for the Allied Control Commission for Italy from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower defines one of the functions of the Commission as follows: "To

¹⁴ Handed to the British Embassy on December 4, 1943.

¹⁵ See telegram No. 17, November 23, 11 p. m., from the American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation, p. 431.

¹⁶ See vol. I, p. 758.

be the organ through which the policy of the United Nations towards the Italian Government is conducted and the relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government are handled". It is the Department's view that the Advisory Council as such has no direct relationship with the Italian Government but must use the machinery of the Control Commission for any questions which it wishes to take up with the Italian Government.

While the Department agrees that it will be impossible and undesirable to prevent individual members of the Advisory Council from having personal relations with members of the Italian Government, it interprets the terms of reference and the Combined Chiefs of Staff directives to provide that, acting in their official capacities, individual members of the Advisory Council may address the Italian Government only through the machinery of the Allied Control Commission, that is, the Political Section. The Department does not agree with the British view that its member of the Advisory Council should be the channel through which the British Government will communicate with the Italian Government on matters which do not concern the other Governments represented on the Council. The Political Section of the Allied Control Commission is composed exclusively of British and American nationals and the ranking member of that Section is a British subject. While it is recognized that Messrs. Macmillan and Murphy are the principal British and American representatives in Italy, it would appear appropriate for them and the other members of the Advisory Council to make any individual official communications they may have to the Italian Government through the Political Section of the Control Commission. The advantages, during active military operations in Italy, of permitting the Italian Government to establish and maintain communication with only one United Nations body are obvious.

The Department shares the British hope that the members of the Advisory Council will be able to work out in consultation with each other the question of the chairmanship of the Council and its secretariat.

WASHINGTON, [undated.]

740.00119 ACI/17: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, December 8, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 7:38 p. m.]

2263. From MacVeagh.¹⁷ Prime Minister Tsouderos in communication dated today asked me to convey to Department Greek Govern-

¹⁷ Lincoln MacVeagh, Ambassador near the Governments in Exile of Yugoslavia and Greece, established in Egypt.

ment's "disappointment" at absence so far of invitation for participation of Greek representative in work of Advisory Council for Italy which he says, according to press, already held several meetings. Stating after the Moscow Conference official assurances were received from both British and American sources that "Greece should participate in the Council on the same footing as the other member powers" and that Mr. Eden declared to him yesterday "that no difference as to the degree or time of Greece's participation in this Council with regard to that of other powers was ever intended or meant by those who decided the setting up of the Council" the Prime Minister says that he is informed that unofficial invitation to Greece to send its representative to the Council which has held up so far by "only administrative delay" will be forthcoming soon and he will appreciate my urging the Department to expedite the matter. He concluded that he has made a similar request to my British colleague.

A member of the Greek Foreign Office mentioned today that the delay is causing comment embarrassing to the Government in Greek press here and informally advised the Embassy that the Greek Government understands that the mechanics connected with the issuance of the invitation for Greek participation in the Council have after reference been approved Moscow but that action by the State Department is still awaited. [MacVeagh.]

KIRK

740.00119 ACI/19 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1943—9 a. m.

98. For Murphy. We believe that there need be no further delay in inviting the Greeks and Yugoslavs to participate in the Advisory Council for Italy. Consequently, we hope that the Council will take favorable action on such a proposal at its next meeting. The decision of the Council should be communicated to the appropriate representatives in Cairo of the respective Governments and the French Committee. An invitation based on the Council's action should be issued jointly by the four representatives to the Greek and Yugoslav Governments in Cairo respectively.

HULL

740.00119 Control (Italy)/11 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 14, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received December 15—2: 26 a. m.]

154. [From Murphy.] Eisenhower has requested Advisory Council for Italy for an opinion regarding representation on Allied Control Commission of representatives of Soviet Union. As you know Vyshinsky was accompanied on arrival by Major General Solodovnic and Lt. Colonel Ubev who, according to Vyshinsky, have been appointed by his Government to Allied Control Commission under provisions of article 37 of Italian Armistice Convention. Vyshinsky asserts it was understanding of his Government, when latter gave its approval to armistice terms, that Allied Control Commission would include Soviet representatives and also that this was understood by Moscow Conference.

There will be a meeting of Advisory Council on December 15 and this question is on agenda. I shall ask for postponement until I receive your advice. Macmillan has also requested Foreign Office instructions.

Both Macmillan and I feel Soviet and possibly French representation (Massigli has also stated opinion French Comité wish representation) will be inevitable and agree that with the case of Russian Major General Solodovnic might well be appointed Deputy to Deputy President without having Soviet representatives enter into mechanism of the several sections. This we believe will be satisfactory to them. They indicate it is matter of prestige.

Please telegraph.

Sent Department repeated Moscow. [Murphy.]

WILSON

740.00119 ACI/22 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 14, 1943—midnight.

[Received December 15—10: 27 a. m.]

156. From Murphy. Prior to Brindisi meeting of Advisory Council for Italy Marshal Badoglio addressed a written communication to General Joyce asking him to obtain authorization for an Italian member to sit in at meetings of the Council as an observer. He stated such a person would be completely at disposition of the Council and it would be a strong disappointment if Council should start its work with the absolute exclusion of any Italian participation.

General Eisenhower has now instructed General Joyce as follows: to grant Italian Government either representation or right to send observer to Advisory Council would not be in accord with nature and purpose of this body. The representative of United Nations and the organ for conducting relations with Italian Government is the Control Commission which is charged with executing armistice and insuring that conduct of Italian Government conforms to Allied requirements. Present representation Advisory Council which is charged to watch machinery of control and advise President of Commission on general policy connected therewith is confined to American, British, French and Soviet representatives.

Sent Department, repeated London, Moscow. [Murphy.]

WILSON

865.01/1005a

*Count Carlo Sforza to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*¹⁸

NAPLES, December 17, 1943.

DEAR MR. BERLE: You may be sure that—as you cabled me on or about November 23¹⁹—I did my best “to be responsive to the popular will, while supporting fully the Italian military effort and Marshal Badoglio as its responsible head.” I knew the heavy mistakes of Badoglio in the fateful months of August and September, after Mussolini’s fall, but I knew also (a) that the responsibility of these tragic errors rested with the King, whom I had, with the whole Italian nation, openly rejected, as I told Mr. Hull and you and—even more forcefully—to Mr. Churchill since he had the most wrong information about the King’s position; (b) that just because we had to eliminate a traitor king it was advisable not to increase the list of eliminations and ostracisms. Badoglio had been a gallant leader in the past and I hoped that I might help him, since he was “in power”, to become the creator of an immediate Italian military effort.

You know that trying to keep alive the principle of a liberal monarchy I suggested the abdication of the King and proclamation of his innocent grandson as King with Badoglio as Regent or—if the King liked it better—with a decent non-Fascist prince. Badoglio entered enthusiastically into my views. He told me that the King hated him just as he despised the republicans, accepted my scheme as a compromise in order to go on, now, only with the war. But suddenly—I do not know why—Badoglio changed and began saying the contrary of what he had confided to me and my friends. I’ll tell

¹⁸ Copy of letter transmitted to President Roosevelt by Mr. Berle.

¹⁹ See telegram No. 2201, November 19, 7 p. m., to the Consul General at Algiers, p. 429.

you later the psychological explanation his Under-Secretaries (he has been unable to find Ministers) give of Badoglio's transformation. Now about the "military effort".

This is our supreme duty as Italians. But the main fault of Badoglio is that he failed: after four months he has put in line 4000 men; while in Southern Italy there are very many thousands of men, disbanded in September, who might become again an army—but they want colonels and generals who are not pro-German as these proved to be when they betrayed our soldiers and Italy last September. But these generals are the King's men; therefore they are tabu. There is more: a most conservative Italian, Senator Croce (the philosopher and historian) had promoted a body of volunteers; I had supported him on my arrival; we might have now a splendid little army of "partisans" like Tito's²⁰ in Croatia; these men might still be created; they might be precious to the Allies, on our mountains, to harass the Germans on their flanks. But the traitor king imposed Badoglio to have our volunteers suppressed.

I must tell you the bitter truth: Badoglio, whom I liked in the past, is unable to create an army. Here is the explanation his Under-Secretaries murmur; that he has become at once a tired discouraged man without any moral force left in him.

Who supports him? An old old old tale: that his adversaries are *red*. This is at the basis of the many tragicomic mistakes, I am afraid, of the Brindisi diplomats. Do you imagine Croce or me *reds* while we are the only ones who try to keep alive the principle of the representative monarchy.

As for Marshal Messe, he does not command general confidence; many are afraid that he might evolve into a South American "hero".

As for the King, he is preparing a dreadful neo-fascism; Badoglio deploras it but does nothing; he allows all the Fascists to become a body of new official recruits of a new fascist regular army (to kill Italians, not Germans); just the contrary of what Croce and I wanted. May I speak with a sincerity which has its roots in my deep and grateful respect for America? If things go on that way, it will be said some day that the Allies made it impossible for Italy to come again into life, to take her share in the struggle, to spare American lives—and to spare time.

As you saw so well when you cabled me, Italian affairs are "in rapid political evolution". Badoglio—I am sorry to say—is no more Badoglio; (any objective inquest will prove it to you); I cannot in conscience assume the power with the King or his son, because they are the symbol and the alibi of all the Fascists and because I want present and future true order in Italy, not a Franco²¹ order and

²⁰ Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, President of the National Committee of Yugoslav Liberation and Commissar of National Defense.

²¹ Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

future disorders. If Badoglio falls I'll be glad to help anybody who may create a real military effort; but, be sure, this effort may only be the result of a destruction of Fascism—which the presence of the King makes impossible.

I'll be glad to discuss any point with your representatives; I might even come to the United States for a short visit, if assured to come back at once to do here my duty; my most ardent wish is the closest cooperation with Washington.

Believe me

Most sincerely yours,

SFORZA

740.00119 ACI/24 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 17, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 11 : 50 p. m.]

170. From Murphy.

1. At the meeting of the Advisory Council December 15, it was decided formally to recommend to the Commander in Chief that all Italian territory south of the line Salerno-Bari and including Sicily and Sardinia (areas 1, 2 and 6) be transferred to Italian administration subject, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, to the guidance and instructions of the Allied Control Commission. The transfer it is understood is subject to the two conditions: (a) That the administration local and central will be carried on by officials of Allied sympathies and proven good faith; and (b) that this involves no commitment to the Government of Marshal Badoglio after capture of Rome.

2. A second recommendation to the Commander in Chief decided upon by the Council suggests he issue to the Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission a specific directive to the effect that in so far as military necessity permits he should be guided in exercising the functions of control by the terms of the Moscow Declaration regarding Italy²² and in particular by the terms of the paragraph of the Declaration numbered 2.

The two foregoing recommendations of the Council have been communicated to the Commander in Chief and with his approval are being released to the press for publication in the morning papers of Saturday, December 18.

3. The question of Soviet and French representation on the Control Commission which had been referred by the Commander in Chief to the Council for an opinion brought forth discussion similar to that

²² Vol. I, p. 759.

already heard at the first two meetings of the Council. Mr. Makins,²³ acting in Macmillan's absence, proposed that such representation be agreed to and that the representatives should hold as Deputy Chiefs of Staff to the Deputy President of the Commission or be described as Soviet and French Vice Presidents of the Commission. Discussion of this proposal revealed that the Soviet conception of the Control Commission, their interpretation of article 37 of the Long Term Armistice was of a deliberative body meeting under the chairmanship of the Commander in Chief and empowered to make decisions of policy. This was in contrast to the Anglo-American concept of any executive instrument operating directly under the authority and instructions of the Commander in Chief. Mr. Vyshinsky stated that it was on the basis of the former interpretation that the Soviet Government had appointed General Solodovnic and his assistant to the Commission and their appointments notified to the American and British Governments which had in fact voiced no objections thereto. He considered that in order to obtain clarification of the matter which was now somewhat confused, it should be handled in writing. Mr. Makins accordingly undertook to prepare a written proposal for consideration at the next meeting of the Council.

I am inclined to believe that when the Soviet Government fully appreciates the administrative and technical nature of the work of the Commission it may even be satisfied with the present Soviet representation on the Advisory Council which corresponds in fact to the type of political participation Mr. Vyshinsky appears to be seeking on the Control Commission. Such a solution of this question, however, might well produce an expansion of the activities of the Council beyond that originally contemplated. In this connection I would be grateful for an early reply to my 152 [154] December 14, and an indication of the Department's views on this matter.

4. With reference to Marshal Badoglio's recent request to establish contact with the Council (see my 156, December 14) it was felt that it might be very useful to hear the Marshal or a member of his Government at the next meeting of the Council held in Italy. I pointed out, however, that for general purposes it was understood that the Control Commission and not the Advisory Council will be the agency of contact with the Italian Government and will maintain the relations between that Government and the Allies.

5. Following an informal discussion of the current political and economic situation in Italy it was agreed that the Council should next meet when the members were prepared to consider further the question of Soviet and French representation on the Control Commission.

(Sent to Department and repeated to London and Moscow.)
[Murphy.]

WILSON

²³ Roger Makins.

740.00119 Control (Italy)/11 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1943—10 p. m.

212. For Murphy for your information. The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires²⁴ called on me on December 21 concerning the appointment of a Soviet member on the Allied Control Commission in Italy.²⁵ (Your 154, December 14, 10 p. m., and Section 2 of your 170, December 17, 11 p. m. [*a. m.*]) I told him that I favored placing a Soviet representative on this Commission and that I would give the matter immediate attention. Later the same day I had an opportunity to discuss the matter with the President who also expressed himself in favor of Soviet representation on the Commission. With reference to the request of the French Committee for similar representation, the President said that there was to be no representative of the French Committee on the Allied Control Commission. The War Department has been informed of the foregoing.

HULL

740.00119 ACI/32 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 25, 1943—4 p. m.
[Received December 26—10:35 a. m.]

252. From Reinhardt.

(1)—The Advisory Council for Italy held its fourth meeting yesterday December 24.

(2)—The question of Yugoslav and Greek participation in the Council was raised by Macmillan who stated he believed the moment opportune to invite the two Governments to send representatives. Massigli and Vyshinsky concurred. In the absence of a reply to telegram 168, December 17, 10 a. m., from Murphy,²⁶ I stated I had no authority to do so. Macmillan expressed the view that the Council was empowered to extend the invitation without the members having specific authorizations from their Governments. I was supported by Vyshinsky who explained that such had not been the intention of the Moscow Conference. It was accordingly agreed that as soon as I had the necessary authorization the chairman would proceed to for-

²⁴ V. I. Bazykin.

²⁵ Memorandum of conversation not printed.

²⁶ Not printed; it inquired if the Department did not prefer, in view of the divisions among the Greeks and Yugoslavs, to postpone temporarily invitation to their Governments to send representatives to the Council (740.00119 ACI/27).

ward the invitation to the Governments in Cairo without calling a special meeting of the Council.

(3)—With respect to the Commander in Chief's request for a recommendation regarding Soviet and French representation on the Control Commission, both Vyshinsky and Massigli stated that they were authorized to agree to the British plan reported in telegrams 152 [154?] of December 14 and 170 of December 17, both from Murphy. I informed the Council that I was expecting instructions on the subject in the very near future and it was agreed to submit the Council's recommendation to the Commander in Chief when they had been received.

(4)—Following a discussion of the current situation in Italy, it was decided to arrange a tour of Sicily and Sardinia beginning December 27 and ending up with a meeting of the Council in Brindisi or Salerno depending upon the location of the Allied Control Commission at that time.

(5)—Please bring the foregoing to the attention of Murphy.

Repeated to Moscow and London. Sent to Department. [Reinhardt.]

WILSON

740.00119 Control (Italy)/17: Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 26, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received December 27—1:55 a. m.]

259. For Dunn and Murphy from Reinhardt. With reference to paragraph 3 of my 252, December 25, 3 [4] p. m. and Department's 212, December 22, 10 p. m., which reached here after the Council's meeting on December 24, may I bring to your attention following considerations:

1. The present plan to have Soviet and French "members" on the Control Commission would appear to be a most acceptable compromise between our original intention of limiting participation in the Commission to American and British officials only and the Soviet and French desire actively to participate in the organization's operations, which would presumably have involved the presence of numerous Soviet and French officials within the organization.

2. It is Macmillan's and my understanding that the question is one of a token representation tantamount to accepting a kind of superior "liaison officer". Like the Soviets the French are not only full members of the Advisory Council but they have as well people on such a technical body of the Control Commission as the Sub-Commission for Displaced Persons. To deny them the opportunity of

attaching what amounts to an observer to the Control Commission at a time when French troops are in action in Italy would not only appear difficult to explain but would almost certainly jeopardize the future harmonious work of the Advisory Council.

3. This is particularly true since as reported in reference telegram both British and Soviet members of the Council under instructions from their Governments have gone on record in the presence of Masigli in support of this French representation.

4. Wilson concurs with the foregoing. [Reinhardt.]

WILSON

740.00119 ACI/32 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1943—8 p. m.

238. For Reinhardt, your telegram no. 252, December 25, 4 p. m. You are authorized to associate yourself with the extension of the invitation to the Yugoslav and Greek Governments to be represented on the Advisory Council for Italy.

HULL

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*²⁷

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1943.

The United States member of the Advisory Council for Italy has strongly recommended that a French as well as a Soviet representative be attached to the Allied Control Commission for Italy. The "British formula" which is acceptable to the Soviets and French provides only for token representation by accepting a representative of the U.S.S.R. and France on the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Commission and avoids placing Soviet and French representatives throughout the entire structure of the Control Commission; in other words it provides for a kind of superior "liaison officer".

Our representative further reports that the British and the Soviet members of the Advisory Council have already committed themselves to recommending the acceptance of a French representative on the Control Commission.

Consequently if, after consideration, you perceive no objection, I shall instruct our representative on the Advisory Council to concur in the British formula recommending the acceptance of Soviet and French representatives on the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Commission.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

²⁷ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

740.00119 ACI/36 : Telegram

The American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, December 30, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received December 31—9 : 44 a. m.]

25. MacVeagh from Reinhardt, acting U.S. Member of Advisory Council for Italy. The Advisory Council for Italy has now decided to invite Yugoslav and Greek Governments to send representatives to the Council.

The Department requested that you be informed of this action when taken so that you would be prepared to associate yourself with your British, French and Soviet colleagues in the issuance of the invitations to the two Governments in Cairo. Macmillan, as acting chairman, has been instructed by the Council to transmit the formal notification thru British channels.

Sent to Cairo, repeated Department, London and Moscow. [Reinhardt.]

WILSON

NETHERLANDS

DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS REGARDING THE FINANCIAL NEEDS OF THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT

856.51/480

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1943.

Participants: Dr. A. Loudon, Netherlands Ambassador;
Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands Finance Minister;
Mr. Welles, Under Secretary.

The Ambassador of the Netherlands called this morning at his request in order to present to me the Netherlands Minister of Finance whom I had known before when he was Purchasing Agent for the Netherlands Government.

The Minister of Finance made a brief statement to me which is accurately set forth in the memorandum attached herewith which he gave me. The Minister said that he was not questioning the wisdom or unwisdom of the policy which his Government had previously followed, namely, of paying cash for all of their requirements, but the moment had now come when they could not continue the policy in question. He said that in all probability the small amount of revenue which they had been able to derive from the sale of bauxite from Dutch Guiana to the United States would soon be cut off in view of the decision of this Government to utilize the Arkansas sources in order to save tonnage. From now on, consequently, Dutch Guiana would be a drain on their resources rather than an asset. He added that of course individual Netherlands subjects had resources in this country which had been frozen which might be taken over by the Netherlands Government, but in any event compensation would have to be made by the Netherlands Government should such step be taken and the burden upon the Government would be the same.

I told the Minister that the question involved of course was one of major policy which the President himself had to pass upon. I told him consequently that as soon as I could have some indication of the President's desires in the matter or of the desires of the Secre-

tary of the Treasury¹ acting for the President, I would inform the Ambassador and suggest to him the authorities of this Government with whom the Minister of Finance should speak.

The Minister of Finance said that both his own Government and the Belgian Government favored the so-called White currency stabilization plan² although they had a few suggestions to make which he himself would offer to Secretary Morgenthau next week when the latter returned to Washington. He emphasized however his conviction that such a plan, however technically perfect it might be, could not be of any real service unless a practical working international organization were created after the war in which all powers would take part.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

[Annex]

*Memorandum by the Netherlands Finance Minister (Van den Broek)
to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

Financially the Kingdom of the Netherlands is in a difficult position. Whereas we still have our fighting forces, may they be small, in the field, we have no resources to meet their expenses.

Unfortunately, since our country is occupied, we are no more in a position to collect by taxation the necessary funds to meet the expenditure. Even if only our currency were accepted, then our position would be more similar to some other of the United Nations, like the United States of America, or Great Britain, where public debts are increasing.

However, this is not the case, which means that since the fall of Java we have had to finance our forces exclusively out of the foreign exchange and gold still in our possession. To make our position quite clear, I am giving the following general figures: The total yearly expenditure of our Government at the moment amounts to approximately \$100,000,000, of which over 85 percent is used up by our navy, army and air forces.

We are very near to the exhaustion of our foreign exchange reserves, and it will be necessary for us, if we want to keep our forces in the field, to come to some arrangement regarding further financing. So far, with the exception of very few goods acquired under lend-lease, we have paid cash for all our outlays, with the result that our free reserves at the moment amount to only about \$50,000,000 in gold and a small amount of sterling. We still collect from time to time sterling

¹ Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

² For correspondence on this subject, see vol. I, pp. 1054 ff., *passim*.

from insurance on ships sunk by the enemy and we are using even those funds, although the Government has to pay back in due time those funds to the original owners.

We therefore want to discuss possible means by which we can acquire the necessary funds to keep our fighting forces active, before we have completely exhausted our available cash.

856.51/480

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Netherlands
Ambassador (Loudon)*

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have given further thought to the question we talked about the other morning with the Minister of Finance. I am confident that a mutually satisfactory way can be found to deal with the prospective financial difficulties which concern your Government.

In order to decide along what course our mutual efforts can most satisfactorily be adjusted, there appears to be a need for a rather thorough-going review of the character of these different needs and of the various liquid assets your Government might be in a position to use to satisfy them. Also, it appears to be necessary to enter in a rather thorough-going way into the advantages and difficulties attendant upon several alternatives that seem worth examination. I have asked the Adviser on International Economic Affairs, Mr. Feis, to hold himself at your disposition to undertake in conjunction with representatives of your Government the necessary discussions and studies on the basis of which I think we could then best resume our discussion. I believe this is the most promising way to proceed, and hope you are agreeable to it.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES

856.51/486

*The Netherlands Ambassador (Loudon) to the Under Secretary of
State (Welles)*

GA-2220

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES: With reference to your note of June 17th I beg to inform you that I learned with a great deal of pleasure that you have assigned to Dr. Feis the task of holding discussions regarding the financial needs of the Netherlands Government with the representatives thereof.

Baron W. van Boetelaer of this Embassy and Mr. Crena de Iongh, representative of the Netherlands Minister of Finance will attend

these discussions on behalf of the Netherlands Government, whilst Mr. Ch. J. H. Daubanton, Commercial Counselor of this Mission, and Mr. August Philips, advisor to the Netherlands Department of Finance, will be adjoined to them in an advisory capacity.

Yours sincerely,

A. LOUDON

856.51/489

Mr. D. Crena de Iongh, Representative of the Netherlands Minister of Finance, and Mr. Ch. J. H. Daubanton, Commercial Counselor of the Netherlands Embassy, to the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis)

GA-2255

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1943.

DEAR DR. FEIS: Supplementing the discussions the Finance Minister of The Netherlands has had with the Under Secretary of State we beg to bring the following to your notice.

The Kingdom of The Netherlands has to deal with two distinctly different problems in connection with its finances. The first is: In what way can we carry on financing our fighting forces in different parts of the world? The second is: How can we acquire the necessary credits now, in order to be in a position to rebuild our industries after the liberation of Holland and in general to restore normal conditions and employment?

These two problems must be kept separate to a large extent, and in order to explain this we have to analyze the financial and political position of The Netherlands.

After the invasion of Holland, our Government decided, without hesitation, to carry on the war against Germany together with our Allies. Actually we decided to do so whatever might happen. Although our fighting forces were not large, especially in the beginning when there was a shortage of everything, our navy and our large merchant marine gave a real and important support to the war effort. We remind you of the important task of our merchant marine in bringing over from the Netherlands East Indies considerable amounts of strategic materials, such as tin and rubber, with the result that certain stockpiles, now badly needed, could be timely built up in the United States of America.

We could finance our war effort only with the balances of foreign exchange our Government was holding outside the country; in other words, by such means as were freely at the disposal of the Government and without the financial assistance of other governments.

It has been the policy of the Government of The Netherlands to pay for the war effort in cash as long as it could afford to do so. Before Japan entered the war, we could get some support in acquiring foreign

currency from the Netherlands East Indies, but since that part of the Kingdom has also been occupied, that source was dried up. The means at the disposal of The Netherlands were, firstly, gold belonging to the Government and to the Netherlands Central Bank and shipped out of the country before the invasion; and, secondly, free bank balances in foreign countries at the disposal of the Government.

These available means were increased to a small extent by certain amounts of money raised through taxation imposed on Netherland subjects living outside our country, but mainly by the sale of cargoes destined for the Netherlands but unloaded in the United Kingdom after the invasion and sold on instruction and for account of the Netherlands Government. We also received rather important amounts of money from the proceeds of insurances on ships sunk by enemy action. The result is that we are now financing our direct war effort with money belonging to third parties, although the third parties are Netherlands subjects. The ships, or the insurance money, belong to the ships' owners, the cargoes of merchandise to different merchants and import firms.

The Government of the Netherlands now has to consider how to finance in future the direct war effort. Our available means, i.e. our assets which we can use for that purpose, are at the moment as follows:

We still have approximately forty million dollars in free gold belonging to the Netherlands Bank. This gold, although originally frozen by the British Government, was put at our disposal in Canada. Moreover, we still have an amount of approximately twenty-five million pounds sterling against a liability as trustees for about the same amount. We also have, however, other liabilities for material and services acquired in England and elsewhere, and for which we have not yet received the bills.

What is the significance of cash for the Government of The Netherlands?

The Lend Lease Administration^a so far has taken the standpoint that war material and other goods could be supplied to allied nations but no cash for the payment of wages and salaries. As a general principle, this is completely understandable if applied to countries which can provide the necessary cash for the out-of-pocket expenses themselves—occupied countries cannot do this—by taxation of their subjects, and if the money raised by taxation is insufficient to pay for the war effort, they can issue additional currency and float internal loans.

However, because our country is occupied by the enemy, we are in a completely different situation—we cannot tax its population and

^a Functioning under the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

we cannot float internal loans to finance our armed forces. This does not mean, however, that whereas the public debts of our allies are steadily increasing, we should be financially in a better position. Just the reverse is true. Not only have the enemies destroyed part of our country—and I remind you of Rotterdam—but they also stripped our country of all the material wealth it possessed. Although we cannot even make a rough estimate of the value of the stolen and to Germany transported goods and of the loss caused by the destruction of houses, factories, industries, livestock, etc., we know from available data—for instance, the latest Annual Report of the Netherlands Bank—that our public debt, which before the war amounted to approximately three billion guilders, equivalent to about one and one-half billion dollars, has risen to no less than twelve billion guilders, or about six million [*billion*] dollars.

What now is the value of cash money for us, as compared to its significance for other countries? For us, cash money carries exactly the same character as commodities do for other countries. We must buy foreign currency exactly as, for instance, England has to buy foods and commodities, and we buy what actually for us is tantamount to a commodity, foreign currency, against our gold holdings or, as explained above, against the proceeds of cargoes and ships.

If our allies could accept our currency, or if we could pay our salaries and wages in our currency, we would be in a like position as that of other countries; but unfortunately, this is not the case.

Are there other possibilities to acquire the necessary funds than out of the assets at our disposal?

We have already explained that we have practically no free assets left. Very shortly after the invasion of Holland, namely on May 24th, 1940, the Government of The Netherlands issued a Royal Decree in which it took title to all property and assets in foreign countries belonging to Netherlands subjects, resident in occupied Netherlands, but with the provision to return those properties, or their equivalent, to the original owners not later than three months after the cessation of hostilities.

The free means at the disposal of the Government do not include the assets to which the Government took title under that Royal Decree. Those assets are also blocked by the so-called freezing measures taken by the American and British Governments. The British Government is negotiating an agreement with the Government of the Netherlands by virtue of which those assets can be freely used by our Government. This agreement although not yet signed, is completed in substance.

Regarding our expenditure for the direct war effort, our Government is of the opinion that since we have almost completely exhausted our available means and have no sources of income whatsoever left,

our allies should assist us in acquiring the commodity—in our case, cash—necessary to carry on the fight. The conditions on which such cash can be provided, whether under lend-lease or in another way, are, in our opinion, a matter for further discussion and negotiation.

But we want to stress especially the fact that cash supplied to us will be the complete equivalent of goods supplied under lend-lease to others.

We may also point out that The Netherlands, having a comparatively large navy, now spends no less than 85% of its total expenditure on the direct war effort. Very likely this situation will strongly differ from that of other countries, such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and others. We have asked ourselves the question: Will it be possible for us, presuming the American and British Governments will give us a free hand to use the above-mentioned frozen assets, to assign these assets for the financing of the war? We believe, however, that these assets should not be used for that purpose. As already explained, Holland has greatly suffered from enemy occupation and it would, in our opinion, be an ill advised Government policy to exhaust, unless forced to do so, the only means at our disposal for post-war purposes.

In our opinion, it is in the interest of the allied cause not only that our armed forces carry on, but also that a country supporting the war effort to the best of its ability shall not be forced into a position resulting, at the end of the war, in its being dependent on, and to a certain extent subjected to, financial conditions completely beyond its control.

The second problem, which was mentioned in the beginning of this letter, is of a completely different character. It is the intention of our Government to use the assets of Netherlands subjects in foreign countries for the purpose of reconstruction of our country.

We are of the opinion that these assets, now frozen through the Royal Decree and the measures taken by allied countries, after the war should remain under the control of the Government by exchange control measures. As a consequence thereof the Netherlands Government would be in a position to use these assets as a guarantee for the liquidation of loans which might be acquired from sources outside our country. The Netherlands Government actually desires to use all or part of these assets as guarantee for credits to be arranged for now.

Even if it were made possible to sell gold belonging to our Central Bank, we would not deem it wise to do so. In the first place, we feel sure that the population of The Netherlands will attach great importance to the conservation of our gold as cover for the bank's liabilities, and that it therefore would be a mistake to part with our

gold. Secondly, we must reserve a part of our gold for a possible participation in an international stabilization fund.

As to the use of the assets belonging to the Netherlands East Indies, we point out that these assets should be reserved for the Netherlands East Indies in the same manner as the assets of the Netherlands should be reserved for the European part of the Kingdom.

The finances of the Netherlands East Indies have always been administered as a separate entity. It is not to be expected that this situation will change after the war. This would be repugnant to the principles recently laid down by our Queen.

Therefore, although in consequence of measures taken by the Netherlands East Indies Government in concert with the United States Government before the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies, the assets of the Netherlands East Indies in this country are not frozen, yet, these assets, which are held by the Netherlands Government as trustee for the Netherlands East Indies, must not be used for reconstruction of, or otherwise for, the European part of the Kingdom. These assets should be reserved for the reconstruction of the Netherlands East Indies.

We attach hereto (Exhibit No. 1)⁴ a "balance sheet" of the assets of the Kingdom in the United States of America, Great Britain and Canada. The data of the "balance sheet" must be considered as approximations. In the first place, general world conditions make it very difficult to get all the data required; secondly the data available do not always synchronize; thirdly, different important data are not known to us in detail. We present in the attached "balance sheet" assets as estimated by us, so as to give a picture of the situation, be it not altogether accurate.

It must be remembered that immediately after the occupation of Holland there had been instituted by the Netherlands Indies Government an Exchange Control with requisition of the use of the greater part of privately owned assets, and for that reason we have more accurate information on these assets. No such control, however, had been established in Holland before the occupation, in consequence of which the Netherlands Government does not have precise information on the private assets which were taken under control by the United States of America and the United Kingdom after the fall of the country. The British gave us this information from their records, but the American Treasury has not yet communicated to us any particulars in respect to private assets of Netherlands subjects frozen in the United States of America.

⁴ Not printed.

We have split up the balance sheet as follows:

according to assets belonging to the European part of The Netherlands and to the Netherlands East Indies;

according to assets in dollars and pounds;

according to assets belonging to:

the Government

the Central Bank

private individuals and corporations.

We further present the following résumé of the Budget of the Kingdom for the calendar year 1943:

(In guilders*)

	<i>Salaries, wages, pensions, etc.</i>	<i>Goods, services, debt services, etc.</i>
Department of War.....	5,884,000	9,531,000
Department of the Navy.....	22,390,000	70,414,000
Department of Foreign Affairs.....	2,853,000	4,382,000
Department of Colonies.....	2,968,000	5,210,000
Other Departments.....	4,056,000	6,828,000
Debt Service.....	-----	2,074,000
	38,151,000	98,439,000
Total budget.....	136,590,000	

*The guilder was quoted before the invasion of The Netherlands (May 10, 1940) at about \$0.53. Consequently, the above figures divided by two would show the approximate equivalent in dollars.

It is pointed out that a number of items cannot be appraised with any degree of exactness, such as the sums that may have to be expended on new ships, planes, etc. (The possibility of acquiring ships and planes in the United States is at present being discussed with the Department of State by the Netherlands Embassy and with the War Shipping Administration by the Netherlands Economic, Financial and Shipping Mission.) Moreover, the budget figures given above do not include appropriations for unforeseen expenses. Therefore, the estimates may be somewhat lower than the actual figures will prove to be.

We consider it desirable to enter into an agreement for acquiring credits which will enable us to start making plans for reconstruction. We prefer to do this now because we hope to provide for employment and the re-establishment of industries, in Holland as soon as possible, and therefore it is necessary now to reserve available material for our own use. Also, we will open negotiations with different producers for the buying of material or for the contracting for deliveries which can be made immediately after cessation of hostilities when industry will be reconverted to normal production. We therefore

quired as to the requested amount of the loan, the collateral offered, the statutory provisions under which the loans might be made, and the types of securities that RFC might consider sufficient.

RFC representatives stated: (1) that the Netherlands Government had requested a loan in the amount of \$300,000,000; (2) that it had offered as security gold of the Central Bank of the Netherlands on deposit in this country, together with securities in the United States belonging to persons in the enemy occupied territory of the Netherlands; (3) that the loan would be made, if at all, under sec. 606 (b) (4) of Title 15, USCA,⁷ which authorizes loans to foreign governments for the purpose of achieving the maximum dollar exchange value for the securities and property of the foreign government, upon the security of bonds, debentures, stocks, or other obligations of the United States Government, or any state or political subdivision thereof or of any private corporation organized under the laws of the United States or any state, and (4) that RFC contemplated requiring in the first instance the hypothecation of the Netherlands gold accompanied by a general assignment of all right title and interest of the Netherlands Government in and to assets of persons in the occupied territory falling within the statutory requirements, the gold to be released as the securities were reduced to readily marketable form (street form) and physically pledged with RFC. It was stated that while the information of the Netherlands Government as to the value of such securities was incomplete, it appeared that the value would be sufficient to provide adequate security for a \$300,000,000 loan. Mr. Stoner expressed doubt as to the sufficiency of the gold alone as security, both by reason of the possibility that its value might fall and also by reason of the statutory requirement which seemed to contemplate that securities rather than commodities be pledged. He suggested, however, that if the gold could be obtained by the Netherlands Government and deposited to its account against certificates of deposit, the certificates would probably (as obligations of the depository) come within the statutory requirements. He stated too that the Netherlands Decree of May 24, 1940, would evidently be the basis for recognition of the Netherlands Government's interest in the private assets, and that he thought RFC would be reluctant to accept them as security unless the Decree was recognized by the Department and the American courts.

Mr. Hull inquired as to whether the securities could be reduced to street form when the certificates were probably situated in the Netherlands. Mr. Mulligan replied that their information was that the practice of Dutch investors prior to invasion had been to appoint Dutch banks and Trust companies as trustees or administrators of

⁷ United States Code Annotated.

their American holdings which were retained in American depositories while receipts and certificates of participation were issued to the equitable owners in the Netherlands and traded in on the Amsterdam Bourse. The securities, he said, were registered on the books of the American issuing corporations in the name of the administrators or trustees.

Mr. Hull stated that presumably the Netherlands Government could obtain the gold without explicit reference to the Decrees in view of Section 25 (b) of the Federal Reserve Act,⁸ but that, specific hypothecation of securities might unless carefully qualified, involve possible recognition of the Decrees and in any event would raise problems of conflicting jurisdiction in view of the property interest of nationals of countries other than the Netherlands. He inquired whether, in view of these and other difficulties, involved in recognition of the Netherlands Decrees, and in the segregation and pledge at this time of particular assets, the RFC might not consider accepting as securities the Netherlands gold or gold certificates, accompanied by a floating lien or an agreement to give a lien on such of the assets as were in fact owned by subjects of the Netherlands. It was pointed out that under Section 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act,⁹ as amended, a limited power could probably be created by executive action in the Netherlands Government to enter into such an arrangement without recognition of the Decrees. The RFC representatives stated that they would consider this possibility. Mr. Hull inquired as to the amount of and the collateral for loans made by the RFC to other foreign governments. It was stated that the loan to the British Government was the only one previously made under the applicable provision of the RFC Act¹⁰ and that loan had been in the amount of \$425,000,000, only \$395,000,000 of which had been actually disbursed, secured by assets of the type described in the statute in street form physically delivered to RFC, and that the British Government had obtained the assets used by requiring their conversion by the private owners into sterling or by borrowing them from the private owners for the purposes of the pledge.

Mr. Hull then inquired as to the purpose for which the Netherlands Government intended to use the proceeds of the loan. He stated that Act 606 (b) (4) of Title 15, USCA, seemed to contemplate that the proceeds of such a loan must be used for the maximization of the exchange value of the foreign government's assets. Mr. Stoner said that since the loan would evidently avoid forced and hasty liquidation

⁸ Approved December 23, 1913; 38 Stat. 251.

⁹ Approved October 6, 1917, amended 1918, 1920, 1933, 1940, and 1941; 40 Stat. 411, 966; 41 Stat. 977; 48 Stat. 1; 54 Stat. 179; and 55 Stat. 839.

¹⁰ Approved January 22, 1932; 47 Stat. 5.

at unfavorable prices, it could, in his opinion, be deemed to be made for the purpose mentioned in the Statute. He added that RFC had no information as to the actual use which the Netherlands Government intended to make of the money.

RFC's representatives agreed to keep the Department informed as to developments in regard to the loan, and requested that they be advised from time to time as to action taken or proposed by the Department in connection with the Netherlands Decrees. They stated also, that of course, Mr. Jones¹¹ would discuss the matter with appropriate officials of the Department at the proper time.

856.51/485

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Foreign Funds Control Division (Reinstein)

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1943.

Participants: Mr. D. Crena de Iongh, Representative of the Netherlands Ministry of Finance
 Dr. Feis, EA
 Mr. Roosevelt,¹² A-A
 Mr. Reinstein, FF

Mr. de Iongh called by appointment to discuss the Netherlands Ambassador's letter of July 2 transmitting a statement of Dutch resources and Dutch needs, and suggestions as to methods by which this Government might provide financial assistance to the Netherlands Government.¹³ Dr. Feis explained to Mr. de Iongh that he had been asked to make a report to Mr. Welles concerning the nature of the Dutch needs and the methods which they proposed to be adopted to meet them, and that he was not empowered to negotiate the extension of financial assistance but merely wished to get a clear picture of the problem. After this picture had been developed, a decision would be reached as to the manner in which further discussions would be carried on. Dr. Feis said that he did not know whether such discussions would be with the State Department or with financial agencies of the Government.

The discussion was devoted principally to questions designed to clarify the statements contained in the letter transmitted by the Am-

¹¹ Jesse H. Jones, Secretary of Commerce and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Export-Import Bank of Washington. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was under the jurisdiction and supervision of the Secretary of Commerce.

¹² Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Acheson.

¹³ Covering letter of July 2, 1943, not printed; for the document transmitted, see p. 449.

bassador on July 2. The following specific points were raised with Mr. de Iongh:

1. What part of the Dutch budget set forth in the letter will be expended in sterling?

Mr. de Iongh said that the expenditures are for the most part in sterling. He did not have exact figures. Almost all of the Navy expenditures and all of the expenditures of the Department of Colonies are in the sterling area. The larger part of the Department of War expenditures are also in the sterling area. The Debt Service expenditures are almost entirely in the sterling area. Mr. de Iongh said that the British Government does not furnish any assistance to the Netherlands Government for the maintenance and operation of the Dutch Navy, a large part of which is operating in the European area. The Debt Service item of the budget was explained by Mr. de Iongh as constituting the payment of interest on behalf of private Dutch individuals or corporations. He did not explain why such an obligation was undertaken by the Government.

2. Is the budget statement of expenditures of the Netherlands Government alone or does it include the expenditures of the Indies Government? What contribution does the Indies Government make in the defraying of these expenditures?

Mr. de Iongh said that the budget is a combined budget for the Empire. He said that the Indies Government bears only a small part of the total expenditures, specifically the cost of the maintenance of Naval forces in Australia, the Dutch Flying Camp in Mississippi and those expenditures which are directly attributable to the interests of the Indies, such as salaries of the Indies Government personnel.

3. Is the request of the Dutch Government that the United States Government assist it in the meeting of sterling expenditures?

Mr. de Iongh said that this was the purpose of the proposal.

4. Has the Netherlands Government requested the British Government to furnish it with the supplies it is now purchasing for the Navy in the sterling area or has it asked for a loan on the basis of Netherlands private assets in the United Kingdom?

Mr. de Iongh said that no request for such assistance had been made to the British Government.

5. Does the Netherlands Government have any sort of current income whatever?

Mr. de Iongh said that income from the operation of the Dutch merchant fleet is only adequate to cover costs and that, in fact, the fleet has recently been incurring a deficit. In response to a question, he indicated that no request for an adjustment of charter rates had been made to the British Government. He said that the taxation of Dutch individuals and corporations resident outside of occupied territory had been abandoned as impractical. In response to a question, he said that Dutch corporations which have transferred their seats to Curaçao are being taxed only by the local Government for local needs.

6. Have some of the expenditures contemplated in the Netherlands budget been met by Lend-Lease? Mention was made specifically of the expense of building and maintaining the Flying School in Jackson, Mississippi, and the supplying of Netherlands forces in Australia?

Mr. de Iongh thought that there had probably been some change since the budget was prepared, as a result of Lend-Lease assistance, but it was agreed that the amounts involved would not affect the total picture substantially. Further information on this point will be developed by Lend-Lease.

7. Under the agreements which the Dutch are negotiating with the British, will the liquid assets held by the British Custodians of Enemy Property "on behalf of the Royal Netherlands Government" be made available to the Netherlands Government?

Mr. de Iongh said that the sums would be made available. He explained that the agreement would be a model agreement as far as the British are concerned. Similar agreements will be included with governments of other occupied countries. The vagueness of the language of the agreement in this respect was insisted on by the British to enable them to deal differently with the different exile governments, if it seems desirable.

8. Does the loan proposal envisage recognition of the Netherlands Royal Decree of May 24, 1940 vesting in the Netherlands Government title to Dutch private property held abroad?

Mr. de Iongh said that some steps would be necessary to transfer securities to the name of the Government, so they could be put up as collateral for the loan. He pointed out that this could be done under the Decree. He said that since it would take some time to transfer the securities to the Government's name, it is contemplated that the loan would originally be secured by the gold of the Netherlands Central Bank and that the gold would be released as the securities became available for collateral.

At the conclusion of the discussion Mr. de Iongh offered to provide any other information which might be desired. It was arranged that the draft statement to be submitted to Mr. Welles on the Netherlands needs and resources would be shown to Mr. de Iongh for his comment prior to its submission.

856.51/484

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1943.

The Ambassador of the Netherlands, accompanied by the Finance Minister of that country, called at his request. The Ambassador said he had no business but merely called to say goodbye before leaving for a ten or twelve-day visit to London.

The Finance Minister proceeded to refer to the pending application of his Government for a loan of \$300,000,000 from our Government chiefly for post-war expenditures. I inquired if any purchases during the period of the war would or might interfere with the war needs of this country or the United Nations. He said that it would not since the purpose was to use the funds to place orders with many war plants in this country for products to be manufactured just as

soon as the war ends and that, therefore, it was important for his Government to have credits in this country ready for use without a day's delay. He stated that this would strengthen the general financial standing of the Netherlands. I expressed my appreciation of the desire of his country to begin rehabilitation and reconstruction just as promptly and effectively as possible. I added that I would be glad to talk with Mr. Jones and any other interested officials.

I inquired of the Finance Minister as to how the formal conversations on monetary subjects are progressing. He replied that a new draft of the stabilization plan had been prepared. He then proceeded to emphasize the view that it would be wiser to move gradually and develop on an ever-broadening scale the whole monetary and economic structure rather than to begin on too broad a scale, which might prove too cumbersome and too unwieldy for governments to sustain without serious risk of collapse and which would possibly delay everything in this line for twenty-five or thirty years.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

856.51/488

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State.

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1943.

Mr. van den Broek, Minister of Finance of the Netherlands, and Baron W. van Boetzelaer, the Chargé d'Affaires, called at their request.

Minister Broek took up the question of a proposed loan in the amount of \$300,000,000 by this Government to the Netherlands Government primarily for post-war purposes. I interrupted him to say that, while this Department was preparing a complete statement with respect to the assets, et cetera, of the Netherlands Government in this country, it was my opinion that the State Department has no real function in determining the new policy involved in the proposal of making post-war loans by this Government to other governments, adding that this is a matter for the Treasury Department, the President and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation officials to decide. I said that the State Department might probably be invited to attend the conferences held for such purpose in the event that, if any phase of foreign policy should be involved, even to a minor and limited extent, it could be presented by the State Department. I also said that the President was leaving today for a week of rest. Minister Broek said that he would remain instead of returning to London.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

856.51/488

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*¹⁴

[WASHINGTON,] July 31, 1943.

I reply to Dr. Feis' memorandum¹⁵ relating to a request for a loan by the Netherlands Government, which reached me July 28.

The problem as to the Department's handling the request will be academic if the conclusions of this memorandum are accepted.

The Netherlands authorities first made this proposal to the Export-Import Bank and the RFC. Mr. Pierson¹⁶ called me up as the Department representative on the Ex-Im Bank Board. I stated that this raised questions as much political as financial and suggested that they might tell the Netherlands Government representatives to present this matter first to the Secretary of State. This the Netherlands Ambassador did in conversation with the Secretary.¹⁷ I note that none of the regular financial divisions has had a look at it as yet.

In my judgment the proposal is one we need not consider at this time.

The Netherlands Government is not presently in need of any such sum as \$300,000,000. They have available to them approximately \$685,000,000 held either by the Government or by banks, exclusive of the assets of private individuals, held here. They have, one way or another, roughly \$290,000,000 more in England and Canada. Under these circumstances I doubt if the Congress would take kindly to their getting a loan of \$300,000,000 for post-war purposes.

Further, the desire of the Netherlands Government is to post as security for this loan property of Netherlands citizens held in the United States. The Netherlands Government claims title to this property under a decree of 1940 which requisitions such property. The Department has been cautious about giving extraterritorial effect to that decree. After thoroughly canvassing the situation some time ago, Mr. Hackworth¹⁸ and I came to the conclusion that it was dangerous to give unlimited recognition to such a decree since this might easily create an embarrassing precedent. At that time the Secretary agreed with this. The Treasury and the Alien Property Custodian¹⁹ did not agree.

¹⁴ Addressed to the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary (Acheson), and the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis).

¹⁵ Missing from Department files.

¹⁶ Warren Pierson, President of the Export-Import Bank.

¹⁷ Apparently reference is to conversation between the Netherlands Chargé and the Secretary of State, as the Ambassador was absent from Washington from July 15 to August 4, 1943; for memorandum of conversation with the Chargé, see *supra*.

¹⁸ Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser.

¹⁹ Leo T. Crowley.

I fear that if we now lend money against such property we shall be forced to recognize a decree which we in general are worried about, and second, when, after liberation, Netherlands citizens seek their property, we shall be the demon who has acquired their property and declines to give it up. We might face this with reasonable equanimity if we were sure the present Netherlands Government would survive and that its people would accept all its acts during its period of exile. But we are not clear on this point. A post-war Netherlands Government might very easily take the position that a Netherlands Government in exile had no right to try to bind Netherlands citizens after the war; that it had assets with which it could have carried on and therefore there was no justification for mortgaging the overseas savings of Netherlands citizens; and that we were on notice of that fact because the Netherlands Government had indicated that its first act, on being restored to Dutch territory, would be to submit forthwith to a general election in the nature of a plebiscite.

Being under no great compulsion, I feel we can let the matter quietly ride, and suggest to the Netherlands Government that this is not a particularly appropriate time for post-war loans to be considered. Since apparently Mr. de Jongh has been discussing this with Mr. Acheson, it would seem appropriate that Mr. Acheson be authorized to state this to Mr. de Jongh. It might be intimated that if they wished to draw on their current assets or gold, this of course could be done.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

856.51/488

*Memorandum by the Adviser on International Economic Affairs
(Feis)*²⁰

[WASHINGTON,] July 31, 1943.

It is now possible to present a fairly complete and reliable account of the Dutch financial situation and the requests they have put before the various branches of the Government. A report setting these matters forth is attached.²¹

It is recommended that the reply to the Dutch Government take the following lines:

1. That the Lend-Lease Administration be requested to extend such additional aid as can be arranged by technical adjustments within the limits of present Lend-Lease policy. (This may amount to as much as five or six million dollars out of an estimated dollar-area expendi-

²⁰ Addressed to the Secretary of State and to Assistant Secretaries of State Acheson and Berle.

²¹ Not printed.

ture of approximately thirteen million dollars for the current fiscal year.)

2. That the Netherlands Government be advised to find in discussion with Great Britain, a solution for its budget expenses in the sterling area.

3. That the Netherlands Government be informed that if its official dollar balances (approximately fifteen million dollars) are inadequate for budget expenditures in the dollar area, gold of the Netherlands Bank may be made available to the extent necessary through the certification procedure provided by the Federal Reserve Act.

4. That no objection be made to the granting by RFC of a loan in the requested amount of 300 million dollars to the Netherlands Government for purposes of post-war rehabilitation and relief of the Netherlands in Europe provided the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) No funds be spent for supplies without the agreement of this Government.

(b) Safeguards satisfactory to this Government would be provided for the protection of residents of this country having interests in or claims against the assets required as security for the loan; no assets owned by persons other than Netherlands subjects would be pledged as security and the Netherlands Government would hold harmless the United States and its nationals for liabilities arising out of employment of assets for this purpose.

(c) Any assets other than gold of the Netherlands Bank used as security would remain subject to the financial and property controls of this Government, except as to the RFC's security interest therein.

5. That negotiations be undertaken by the Lend-Lease Administration with representatives of the Netherlands Government looking toward the development of a more precise understanding with regard to reciprocal Lend-Lease arrangements in connection with military operations in the Pacific as and when the Netherlands Indies are reoccupied.

The following agencies of the Government in addition to the State Department would be involved or directly interested in the execution of the program recommended above:

1. The Treasury Department.
2. The Lend-Lease Administration.
3. OFRRO.²²
4. RFC.

If these recommendations are approved by the Department it will be necessary for the Department to call together representatives of Treasury, Lend-Lease, OFRRO and the Secretary of Commerce to see whether there is general agreement on this line of action. I believe this cannot be done satisfactorily through subordinates but that either the Secretary or one of the Assistant Secretaries should meet

²² Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

with the heads of the Government departments named. At the same time it should be determined which of the Government Departments will resume discussions with the Dutch authorities for the purpose of conveying the decisions made and carrying forward any resultant negotiations.

H. FEIS

856.51/487

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] August 5, 1943.

A meeting was held in my office yesterday, consisting of Dr. Feis, Mr. Livesey,²³ Mr. Collado,²⁴ Mr. Cumming²⁵ (Eu), and Mr. Roosevelt (A-A). This was called in response to a suggestion from Dr. Feis, to discuss the Netherlands loan.

After a short discussion, it developed :

(1) All parties were agreed that there was no particular reason for making a loan or commitment to a loan of three hundred million dollars to the Netherlands Government. The Netherlands Government stated that it had a budget deficit; but so do all other governments. The Netherlands Government is not in need of funds, having more than a billion dollars of available assets now. The probable motivation was to induce us to recognize the decree of 1940, which gives to the Netherlands Government the power of disposal of private assets in the United States of persons presently resident in the Netherlands. We are not clear that this is a desirable thing to do. Dr. Feis, modifying an earlier expressed view, stated that in his view also it was undesirable to make such a loan.

(2) It was agreed that if the Netherlands Government really felt that it needed money we would endeavor to take steps tending to facilitate the transfer of gold here by their Central Bank to the Netherlands Government, so that it could be sold to the United States Treasury for dollars. Note was taken of the fact that the Netherlands Government probably does not wish to do this.

(3) It is understood that the Secretary feels that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation should take the primary position in this matter.

There was agreement that it would be well if the Secretary could telephone Mr. Jesse Jones, saying, in substance, that the matter was being left with him for decision but that the Department had difficulty in seeing any pressing need for the loan. It was suggested also that the Secretary call to the attention of Mr. Jones the fact that, should this loan go through, we should at once be besieged with applications for other loans from all of the governments-in-exile.

²³ Frederick Livesey, Chief of the Financial Division.

²⁴ Emilio G. Collado, Associate Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

²⁵ Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

Certainly a condition of any loan if granted would have to be heavy restriction on its use for purchasing, else we should have competitive buying in our markets for all sorts of postwar stock piles.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

856.51/487

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 13, 1943.

The Ambassador of the Netherlands called at his request. He brought up the question of the pending application of the Netherlands Government for a loan of \$300,000,000 from this Government mainly for post-war purposes. He presented the usual arguments at some length in support of the application. I interrupted him from time to time to say that this Department really did not have any, or at the most five or ten percent, of the function to which the application related; that the main jurisdiction was with the Treasury Department, R.F.C., and the President. I elaborated a little to show that this was purely a matter of loan policy by this Government to another Government primarily for post-war purposes. The Ambassador said that this request was different from what might be made by other countries for the reason that this would be a gilt-edged transaction backed by full collateral, as I knew, and that, therefore, it would not involve a precedent which other nations might cite in pressing their claims for similar loans. I expressed some doubt on that point.

The Ambassador made some references to certain phases of the European situation, which he considered secret and not for the record. They were not of unusual interest however.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

856.51/493

*Memorandum by the Secretary of Commerce (Jones) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau)*²⁶

[WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1943.

When Mr. Van den Broek, Minister of Finance of the Netherlands, first spoke to me about a loan for post-war reconstruction, he stated that his Government wanted to be in a position to place orders for some raw materials and equipment so that when the war is over, and materials can be made available, they would be in a position to proceed with their reconstruction problems without delay.

²⁶ Copy attached to Secretary Morgenthau's letter to Secretary Hull dated August 31, 1943, *infra*.

He stated that they wanted a loan of \$300,000,000, payable in installments over a period of 15 years, and at a satisfactory rate of interest—say 3%; that investments in our own country, acceptable to us, would be pledged as collateral; that it was to be a strictly business transaction; and that, pending such time as title to the securities is determined to our entire satisfaction, their gold in this country could be pledged. He stated that they would need particularly railroad materials and equipment, motive power, etc.

I gave Mr. Van den Broek a copy of our loan agreement with the British under which we loaned them \$425,000,000. He would like a loan for the Netherlands on approximately the same basis and terms.

I appreciate that our own resources will be heavily drawn upon in the further prosecution of the war, and that means and methods of financing post-war reconstruction in the war-torn countries cannot now be definitely determined. However, the more of us that are ready immediately to get at the job when the war is over, the better.

The Dutch will have not only their homeland to rebuild, but their territorial possessions that are also occupied by the Axis.

I think we can admit that the best way to help people and governments, is to help them to help themselves. If we can help the Netherlands to do their job, they can—and I am sure will—help others that might properly or customarily look to them.

My thought as to what we might say to Mr. Van den Broek at this time is that, assuming we will be in a position to make his country a loan, and that no general plan by all governments to finance reconstruction is adopted from which the Netherlands would get the credit needed, we would make them a loan on acceptable U. S. investments. A condition of the loan would be that we have the right to require that all or any part of the proceeds of our loan shall be expended in our own country, and generally in cooperation with us in post-war reconstruction.

While such a commitment would be clearly a conditional one, it would say to them that we will make them a loan if we are in a position to do so, other demands upon our Treasury considered, provided other sources of credit are not available to them.

I would expect the loan to be set up on a basis which, at our option, could be passed along to private investors—generally along the lines that the RFC has made and sold loans throughout our own depression-recovery period, when credit was not otherwise available on fair terms.

I have discussed the matter at length with Finance Minister Van den Broek, and he recognizes the necessity for our making the commitment conditioned upon future circumstances that may be beyond our control.

He also feels very strongly that because of the cordial relationships long existing between our two peoples and the fact that the Dutch

have long been substantial investors in our country, we would want to be of every possible assistance to them in their reconstruction work. There is, of course, no question about that.

Incidentally, our steel mills and other manufacturers will need all of the orders they can get if we are to provide employment for our returning soldiers and others now engaged in war work. To the extent that this can be done through sound loans such as this, the easier it will be on our own Treasury.

A condition of the commitment should be that orders placed by the Dutch would not conflict with our war production or with our post-war plans, and that before placing any orders the appropriate authority of our Government would be consulted by them.

JESSE H. JONES

856.51/493

The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1943.

DEAR CORDELL: I am sending you herewith a photostat of a memorandum from the President.²⁷

We have drafted a memorandum for the President,²⁸ and before forwarding it to him, I would like to have your approval so that I can inform the President that this is the combined opinion of State and Treasury.²⁹

Sincerely yours,

HENRY

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) for President Roosevelt

The Netherlands Government has made a request that this Government commit itself to a loan of \$300 million to be obtained from the R.F.C. and to be secured by the pledge of privately owned securities in this country belonging to nationals in the Netherlands. It is our understanding that this loan has been requested by the Netherlands Government for the purpose of financing postwar purchases and not for meeting its war expenditures which are amply provided for under Lend-Lease arrangements.

²⁷ Not printed.

²⁸ See enclosure.

²⁹ Marginal note in long hand on original by Cecil W. Gray, the Assistant to the Secretary of State, reads: "Sept. 1, 1943. Answered orally for Sec. Hull on telephone to effect that State Dept. did not have jurisdiction, but that personally he was opposed to loan. C. W. Gray"

Since making the request for the loan the Dutch Finance Minister has, I understand, informed Secretary Jones that they would be satisfied with our commitment to make the loan after the war subject to whatever conditions we would wish to impose with respect to its availability and its use. Mr. Jones feels that there would be no harm in such a qualified commitment and it would be of some assistance to the Dutch Government and is inclined to favor making such a commitment. I am appending his memorandum on the subject.

It seems to me, however, that it would be unwise to make even a limited commitment at this time for the following reasons:

1. The financial resources of the Netherlands Government are substantial and entirely adequate to meet the contemplated payments on postwar orders they may wish to place. According to its own memorandum, the Netherlands already holds in the names of the Government and the Central Banks large resources in the form of gold, dollar balances and foreign exchange, amounting in all to more than \$1,050 million of which more than \$900 million is in the form of gold and dollars. This is in addition to the privately owned Netherlands assets held in this country. In view of the fact that the total budgeted expenditure of the Netherlands Government for 1943—including military and naval expenditures—is only \$65 million, it is obvious that the resources available to the Netherlands Government are very large without additional borrowing and without touching privately held funds in this country of Netherlands nationals.

The Netherlands Government can acquire any needed part of the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Central Banks of the Netherlands and the Netherlands Empire in return for national currency. We are cognizant of the reluctance of the Netherlands Government to use the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Central Banks of the Netherlands and the Netherlands Empire. However, we call attention to the fact that other United Nations have acquired and used the gold and foreign exchange reserves of their central banks.

2. Even if it were apparent that the Netherlands Government will need financial aid in the immediate postwar period it seems to us undesirable to make a commitment with respect to such loans at this time. The loan made to the British Government by the R.F.C. was for the purpose of meeting war expenditures.

The commitment requested by the Netherlands is for postwar purchases. Such a commitment would establish an undesirable precedent and would be likely to call forth similar requests for large sums on the part of other United Nations. It would be extremely difficult to deny such governments, lacking the resources of the Netherlands Government, loans to enable them to make postwar purchases. For

the United States to begin now a large scale program of loans or commitments for loans for the postwar period would represent a departure from our present policy which is likely to meet with serious public criticism. You would probably want to present the question to Congress before making any commitments on postwar loans.

This Government will be in a much better position to make a satisfactory decision as to the volume and distribution of foreign loans when we have a clearer idea as to the world's needs for American products and of our ability to produce for export in the immediate postwar period. Pending the development of an over-all program on postwar credits for reconstruction and development, it would seem inappropriate for this Government to embark upon a policy of making loans to foreign governments for postwar purposes.

3. If the need for dollar credits by the Netherlands Government should become manifest in the postwar period, such a loan should be secured directly from American investors rather than from this Government. The credit position of the Netherlands Government is so strong that there can be little doubt of its ability to secure a loan from private investors on reasonable terms after the war. The investing community in this country would be likely to resent a policy under which this Government would compete with private investors in making loans to countries whose high credit standing assures them access to our capital markets on favorable terms.

HENRY MORGENTHAU, JR.

**REPRESENTATIONS BY THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT WITH
RESPECT TO THE REQUISITION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE
S.S. "WILHELMINA"**

311.5654 Wilhelmina/16

The Netherlands Ambassador (London) to the Secretary of State

HAS-2439

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1943.

SIR: With reference to Your Excellency's note of July 30, 1942, No. 311.5654 Wilhelmina,³¹ which constituted a reply to my letter of May 4, 1942, No. 2844,³² I have the honor to advise that, in my desire to place my representations before the appropriate United States authorities at the earliest possible moment, I broached the subject-matter without antecedent communication thereanent with the Royal Netherlands Government. Since that time, however, such exchange

³⁰ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 40-49.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

of thoughts was effected, and as a result thereof the following points of discussion were developed.

According to the above mentioned missive of the Department of State, at the time the SS *Wilhelmina* arrived in American waters the status and nationality of the ship could not clearly be discerned and, although it was flying the Netherlands flag, sufficient proof of a valid transfer from the flag of a foreign nation to that of the Netherlands was lacking. Further, it was asserted, there was a possibility that no Netherlands Indies registration of the ship had been consummated.

I am now in a position positively to state that the status and nationality of the ship, as also its right to fly the Netherlands emblem at the time of its arrival in American waters, by virtue of being registered in the Netherlands Indies, are completely ascertained, as may appear from the following facts.

On March 30, 1938 the N.V. Java-China Handelsmaatschappij, then a Netherlands corporation with domicile at Amsterdam and branch offices in China, purchased of Mr. Stefan Salas, a Hungarian citizen, two small steamers, lying in the Yangtze river near Hankow, with the intention to add these ships to the Netherlands mercantile marine. Thus being acquired, the two ships, which were named respectively *Wilhelmina* and *Beatrice*, were recorded in the appropriate public register at Amsterdam on June 10, 1938. Pursuant to this registration as Netherlands vessels the Consul General of the Netherlands at Shanghai was instructed to provide them with provisional Certificates of Nationality and to have the Netherlands registration numbers chiseled into the hulls of the ships.

Under Netherlands law, after the purchase of a ship in foreign parts a provisional Certificate of Nationality may be issued, provided that all conditions to precede the registration of a ship as a Netherlands vessel have been satisfied. These conditions are most stringent with regard to the evidence showing that the ship is actually Netherlands owned. Seeing that the competent Netherlands authorities proceeded to the registration of the ships and then instructed the Consul General to furnish them with provisional Certificates of Nationality, it is beyond all reasonable doubt that they had become Netherlands property and acquired Netherlands nationality. In line with these established facts is a statement of the Consul General to the effect that, during the time the vessels were anchored in Chinese waters under the flag of the Netherlands, no effort to assert Chinese rights therein had come to his knowledge. Nor had the Japanese Navy, which repeatedly—i.e. in the case of a ship sailing under the German flag—has questioned the nationality of vessels in Chinese waters, ever expressed any doubt as to the nationality of the *Wil-*

helmina and *Beatrice*. To conclude, the entries in the registry at Amsterdam, together with the ensuing instructions given to said Consul General should be considered conclusive evidence of a valid transfer of these merchantmen to the Netherlands flag, wherefore the Royal Netherlands Government is unable to comprehend why no certainty should exist with respect thereto.

In accordance with the instructions referred to above the registration numbers were cut into the ships' hulls, so that in the *Wilhelmina* the designation "AMST", with reference number, could be easily located.

At the time when the N.V. Java-China Handelmaatschappij acquired the *Wilhelmina* and the *Beatrice*, under Japanese regulations navigation on the Yangtze river was impossible for non-Japanese ships, so that the bottoms in question could not depart from Hankow. As, under the circumstances, it would have served no purpose to provide them with provisional Certificates of Nationality, the Consul General deemed it sufficient to furnish them with temporary permits to fly the Netherlands flag.

At the end of 1940 an agreement was entered into with the Japanese authorities, under which the two ships were let in time charter to a Japanese company. These cargo carriers sailed then to Shanghai in order to receive the Netherlands ship's papers required for ocean voyages.

Meanwhile, following the occupation of the Kingdom in Europe by German forces, the N.V. Java-China Handelmaatschappij had transferred its domicile from Amsterdam to Batavia. The Consul General, therefore, got in touch with the proper authorities in the Netherlands Indies, to whom on April 18, 1941 he forwarded documentary evidence respecting the title to the ships and their former registration at Amsterdam. In pursuance thereof the Netherlands Indies authorities whom this matter concerned instructed the Consul General to issue provisional Certificates of Nationality showing their status as Netherlands Indies ships, with which instructions he duly complied. According to the pertinent laws of that Netherlands dominion no provisional Certificate of Nationality may issue except after the production of sufficient proof of the fact that the ship concerned is actually Netherlands Indies owned. The conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that at the time the two ships put to sea they were Netherlands Indies ships and as such entitled to fly the Netherlands flag and that upon the basis of that national status the Consul General provided them with provisional Certificates of Nationality valid for six months.

When the *Wilhelmina* was steering its course for American waters in order to elude seizure by the enemy the period of validity of its

provisional Certificate of Nationality had perhaps elapsed, but, according to Netherlands Indies law, even if such period should expire while a ship is in the process of a sea voyage, the Certificate of Nationality continues in full force and effect until its return from the ocean.

The attempt of the ship's owner to have the time of validity of the provisional Certificate of Nationality extended was but made for the purpose of putting its papers in good order, for, as explained above, despite the expiration of that term, the vessel would have retained the status of a Netherlands Indies ship, so that reference to that attempt in my letter of May 4th might just as well have been omitted.

In the meantime the Netherlands Indies authorities concerned had requisitioned the use of all vessels registered in the dominion. As stated in my above mentioned note this general demand included the *Wilhelmina* and was to take effect with regard to this freighter as soon as contact with the Master could be effected. On January 30, 1942 this contact was accomplished and, accordingly, the captain recorded the requisition in the ship's journal on that date.

In the Department of State's note of July 30th doubt is expressed as to whether the status of the *Wilhelmina* was such that it permitted my Government to requisition the use of the ship whilst being subject to American jurisdiction. Further, the question is posed whether the Commander of the East Indies Naval Forces could by means of a telegram effectually requisition the use of a ship lying in an American port.

So as to remove such doubts it may be adduced that, as appears from the foregoing, the *Wilhelmina* was a Netherlands Indies ship, the status of which was identical with that of a great many others regularly calling at American ports. It surprises the Netherlands Government that the United States Government could entertain any doubt as to the right of the government of the country to which a ship belongs to demand, regardless of where it is located, the use of a vessel which is part of the mercantile marine of that country. For such requisition affects the relations between the government and a citizen of the country concerned, the ship's owner, resulting in a limitation of the latter's control over the ship thus pressed into government service. Ships are subject to the laws of the country whose flag they fly and by virtue of existing legal provisions the Commander of the Netherlands Indies Naval Forces had the right to requisition the use of the *Wilhelmina*, irrespective of the fact that, when such demand was communicated to the Master, the ship was lying in a foreign port. Accordingly, the ship's owner has interposed no objection to this fully justified action. In the eyes of my Government it is of no consequence

whatever that the order to give effect to the requisition was given telegraphically instead of in writing.

As concerns the Department of State's contention that "assuming that the use of the vessel had been requisitioned by the Netherlands Government, this fact would not preclude the United States from requisitioning title to and possession of the vessel, in the exercise of a well-established right of a sovereign to take, in the case of necessity, property of any kind situated within its jurisdiction", this assertion is emphatically rejected. In support of this repudiation reference is made to a decision of the House of Lords of March 3, 1938 in the case of the SS *Christina* (*All England Law Reports* 1938 I, p. 719 *et seq.*), which ship, when moored in the harbor of Cardiff, pursuant to a requisition decree of the Spanish Government was seized by the Spanish Consul and brought under the authority of his government.

From this decision, as also from other American and English judicial determinations which by the various law-lords were cited in their considerations of the *Christina* case, it follows that a ship, by virtue of the requisitioning of its use by the government of the country whose flag it flies, secures immunity from seizure by another government and is withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the state within which it is physically located. Immunity under international law is not restricted to men of war or similar public vessels, nor to ships owned by a state, but applies likewise to merchantmen, in case they be employed or destined for public purposes, among which is to be counted the transportation of goods necessary for the waging of war, even if they are actually in the power of a foreign state.

Thus Lord Wright states (*ibid.*, p. 732) :

"The rule is not limited to ownership. It applies to cases where what the government has is a lesser interest, which may be not merely not proprietary, but also not even possessory. Thus, it has been applied to vessels requisitioned by a government, where, in consequence of the requisition, the vessel, whether or not it is in the possession of a foreign state, is subject to its direction and employed under its orders."

From Lord Maugham's views may be cited the following (*ibid.*, p. 741) :

"The government of Spain is engaged in civil war, and is entitled to take exceptional and drastic measures to defend itself. The ships mentioned in the requisitioning decree are Spanish ships. There may be public uses for any of such ships, e.g. in carrying stores, munitions, men, orders, and the like, for the purposes of defence or attack. On the whole, I think that the circumstances of the case justify the inference that the *Christina* is intended to be used for some of such purposes, and is therefore within the description *publicis usibus destinata*. She is in the possession of the Spanish government. On these grounds, I think she is entitled to the immunity claimed."

Finally, I may refer to the following terse statement of Lord Atkin (*ibid.*, p. 723 [722]) :

“It is well-established that the Court will not arrest a ship which is under the control of a sovereign by reason of requisition.”

The requisitioning of the use of the *Wilhelmina* by the Government of the Netherlands Indies had for its object the advancement of the war effort, and, when the ship in the aforementioned manner had come into its possession, it diligently looked after its interests; i. a. by advancing to the owner an amount of \$45,000 for certain expense incurred by the vessel. In consequence, the conditions precedent on which, according to the opinions in the above cited case, the immunity of a ship is dependent, have been completely satisfied. The Department of State's averment that [“] the *Wilhelmina* was not in the possession of the Netherlands Government, but had been libelled and was in the possession of the District Court of the United States, for the Western District of Washington”, does not seem to carry any weight, inasmuch as the ship was not subject to being libelled and the American court was therefore incompetent to arrest it. This Embassy has at the earliest possible moment protested against the attachment and in order to have it discharged, was willing to give security for the claims brought against it, with a view of having it released and having the question of the legality of the arrest threshed out thereafter. This Embassy never intended to relinquish its standpoint as to the immunity of the ship, as may appear from the following quotation from its note of May 4th :

“The Netherlands Government was and still is considering the question whether in the case of a Government requisitioned ship a libel can attach.”

Apart from the legal grounds expounded hereinbefore, my Government, considering that the two governments are engaged in a war against common enemies, cannot perceive any practical reason for the seizure of the *Wilhelmina* by the United States Government.

The laudable conduct of the Master of the *Wilhelmina*, who, after hearing of Japan's attack on the United States and the subsequent declaration of war by the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the assaulting country, braved the perils of navigating a ship under charter to Japanese interests to a port of a nation allied with the Kingdom, was but motivated by the fixed resolve to evade the grasp of the enemy in order to put his ship into the service of the United Nations. The Netherlands Government, in the same manner as previously done with other vessels of Netherlands nationality, would gladly have let it to the American Government. Thus the result, apparently sought

by the United States Government, would have been achieved without any controversial issue being raised.

My Government is, therefore, of the opinion that it must insist that the requisitioning by the American Government shall be nullified as soon as possible, and the *Wilhelmina* restored to the State of the Netherlands. On its part my government is prepared to charter it to the United States War Shipping Administration on a bareboat basis, and, if required by that Administration in connection with previous arrangements with regard to the operation of the ship, to make the charter party retroactive to April 18, 1942.

The Netherlands Government is convinced that, if the United States Government had been aware of all facts and circumstances surrounding this case, it would have refrained from requisitioning the Netherlands vessel concerned and that, now that the matter has been presented in all its material features, it will no longer hesitate to redress the injury which it unwittingly caused the State of the Netherlands to sustain.

In closing, it may not be amiss to observe that, in view of the agreement of the United Nations to pool their shipping resources so as to insure sufficiency of tonnage for the carriage of most essential goods, it would create an unhappy precedent if one of the parties thereto would take title to a vessel which is an asset of another party and destined to be part of the common reservoir of available shipping space.

Please accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador:
B. KLEIJN MOLEKAMP
Minister Plenipotentiary

311.5654 *Wilhelmina*/18

The Secretary of State to the Netherlands Ambassador (London)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Netherlands and has the honor to refer to the Ambassador's note of March 15, 1943 which was acknowledged by the Department on April 13, 1943,³³ concerning the desire of the Netherlands Government to obtain the return of the S.S. *Wilhelmina*, title to and possession of which were taken by the United States on April 18, 1942, with the understanding that the vessel would be chartered to the United States War Shipping Administration on a bare-boat basis, and that if required by the Administration the charter party would be made retroactive to April 18, 1942.

³³ Latter not printed.

The Ambassador's note recites at some length details bearing on the nationality and registration of the vessel. It states that requisition of the *Wilhelmina* by the Netherlands East Indies was to take effect as soon as contact with the master could be effected, and that, "on January 30, 1942 this contact was accomplished and, accordingly, the captain recorded the requisition in the ship's journal on that date." At that time the vessel was at Dutch Harbor, Alaska, and within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States.

The note quotes the Department's statement in its note of July 30, 1942,³⁴ that "assuming that the use of the vessel had been requisitioned by the Netherlands Government, this fact would not preclude the United States from requisitioning title to and possession of the vessel, in the exercise of a well established right of a sovereign to take, in the case of necessity, property of any kind situated within its jurisdiction," and states that this assertion is emphatically rejected. The Department cannot concur in this position but must maintain the position set forth in the above quoted excerpt from its note of July 30, 1942.

In support of the repudiation of this Government's position, the Ambassador cites a decision of the House of Lords on March 3, 1938 in the case of the S.S. *Christina*. (*All England Law Reports* 1938 I, p. 719 *et seq.*) An examination of this case, which is also reported in *Law Reports, Appeal Cases*, 1938, p. 485 *et seq.*, discloses that it does not support the position taken in the Ambassador's note. The case relates to a writ *in rem* issued by a private company claiming, as sole owner of a Spanish steamship requisitioned by the Spanish Government, to have the possession of the vessel adjudged to it. While this case may be regarded as supporting the view that the courts of Great Britain will not at the instigation of a private litigant allow the arrest of a ship, including a trading ship, which is in the possession of and which has been requisitioned for public purposes by a foreign sovereign state, it has no bearing on the question of the rights which the local sovereign may, in the case of necessity, exercise with respect to such vessel. This question was not before the House of Lords and was not passed upon in this case. The Department again affirms the right of the Government of the United States, under both its domestic law and international law, to take title to and possession of the *Wilhelmina* for use in connection with the prosecution of the war.

The *Wilhelmina* entered the jurisdiction of the United States at Dutch Harbor, Alaska, on December 25, 1941. Subsequently it proceeded to Seattle, Washington, where it arrived on February 20, 1942.

³⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 48.

Notwithstanding the great need for shipping in connection with the prosecution of the war, the *Wilhelmina* remained idle in the latter port for nearly four months until title to and possession of the vessel were taken by the United States on April 18, 1942. During this time it was libeled by various claimants. The Department on several occasions took up with the Embassy the question of whether some action could not be taken by it with a view to this vessel being put into service. Its efforts in this connection met with no success. The action taken by this Government in requisitioning the vessel had the effect of promptly putting it into service to the benefit of the United Nations.

With a view to effecting a settlement of the matter and meeting as far as may be possible the wishes of the Netherlands Government, the Department took up the matter with the War Shipping Administrator and is in receipt of a communication from him stating that by an Act approved June 16, 1942,³⁵ the Act of June 6, 1941,³⁶ under which the *Wilhelmina* was requisitioned by this Government, was amended to read in part as follows:

"The Administrator, War Shipping Administration, may determine at any time prior to the payment in full or deposit in full with the Treasurer of the United States, or the payment or deposit of 75 per centum, of just compensation therefor that the ownership of any vessel (the title to which has been requisitioned pursuant to . . .³⁷ the Act of June 6, 1941 . . .³⁷) is not required by the United States, and after such determination has been made and notice thereof has been published in the *Federal Register*, the use rather than the title to such vessel shall be deemed to have been requisitioned for all purposes as of the date of original taking: *Provided, however,* That no such determination shall be made with respect to any vessel after the expiration of a period of two months after the date of delivery of such vessel pursuant to title requisition except with the consent of the owner."

The War Shipping Administrator adds that should the Netherlands Government indicate that it desires him to make a determination such as that contemplated by the foregoing provision of law, converting the requisition of title to the *Wilhelmina* to requisition of use, he is prepared to give consideration to such proposal, provided that he is furnished with satisfactory evidence of the "consent of the owner" thereto, as required by the statute, and provided further that satisfactory arrangements can be made both with respect to the expenditures for the repair of the vessel and also for the disposition of the pending liens and libels.

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1943.

³⁵ 56 Stat. 370.

³⁶ 55 Stat. 242.

³⁷ Omission indicated in the original note.

311.5654 *Wilhelmina*/20

The Secretary of State to the Netherlands Ambassador (London)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Netherlands and has the honor to refer to previous correspondence with respect to the S.S. *Wilhelmina* and particularly to the Department's note of June 9, 1943 in which the following provision of the Act of June 16, 1942 amending the Act of June 6, 1941 was quoted:

[Here follows text of the provision.]

The Ambassador was advised of the statement of the War Shipping Administrator that should the Netherlands Government indicate that it desires him to make a determination such as that contemplated by the foregoing provision of law, converting the requisition of title to the *Wilhelmina* to requisition of use, he is prepared to give consideration to such proposal provided that he is furnished with satisfactory evidence of the "consent of the owner" thereto as required by the statute and provided further that satisfactory arrangements can be made both with respect to the expenditures for the repair of the vessel and also for the disposition of the pending liens and libels.

A further communication has been received from the War Shipping Administrator in which he states that libels filed on behalf of the seamen and officers who were on board the *Wilhelmina* at the time of requisition are in a state of suspense because no deposit has been made with the Treasurer of the United States on account of just compensation for the requisitioned title; that it is impracticable to make such a deposit pending a consideration of the views of the Netherlands Government regarding the suggestion of the War Shipping Administrator mentioned above; that in view of the present unsatisfactory status of the matter it is desirable that the Netherlands Government furnish as soon as possible a definite expression of its views and that unless such an expression of views is received within the near future it will be necessary for the War Shipping Administrator to proceed on the assumption that a conversion from requisition of title to requisition of use is not desired and to make a deposit on account of just compensation for the requisition of title.

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1943.

[No further correspondence on this case has been found in Department files.]

**SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE NETHERLANDS REGARDING PRINCIPLES APPLYING TO THE
PROVISION OF AID TO THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES**

[The agreement was effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington June 14, 1943. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 326, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 991.]

NORWAY

DISCUSSIONS REGARDING REPLACEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF SHIPS LOST BY NORWAY IN THE UNITED NATIONS WAR EFFORTS¹

857.85/1-843

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 8, 1943.

Participants: Norwegian Ambassador²
Mr. Sunde, Minister of Shipping
Mr. Long

The Norwegian Ambassador came in this afternoon at his own request and handed me the attached note of this date³ which concerns the status of the negotiations between the agents of the Norwegian Embassy and the War Shipping Administration. The negotiators have arrived at a preliminary agreement and the Norwegian Ambassador and the Minister of Shipping, Mr. Sunde, seemed satisfied with the progress made. The Ambassador stated that in view of the fact that he had kept in contact with the Department on matters of shipping and also as far as concerns the negotiations with the War Shipping Administration, he felt it proper to advise the Department in the sense of the attached memorandum.

I told the Ambassador that we would be glad if they would come to an understanding on the points already covered and that we hoped that they would be able to come to a complete and final agreement before long.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

857.85/1-843

*The Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary
of State*

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to my note of November 24, 1942,⁴ to Your Excellency's note of December 3, 1942, to my note of

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 78-99.

² Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne.

³ *Infra.*

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 91.

December 7, 1942,⁵ and to the resulting meeting of December 10, 1942, in the office of Admiral Land.⁶ Following that meeting and in accordance with the suggestion of the War Shipping Administration, discussions were carried on between representatives of the War Shipping Administration, the British Ministry of War Transport and the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission on the proposed matters for discussion listed as items (1), (2) and (3) in my note of November 24th.

The results of these discussions are embodied in a Memorandum of a Tripartite Agreement between the United States, Great Britain and Norway which has been initialled by the representatives of the War Shipping Administration, the British Ministry of War Transport and the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission and of which I herewith enclose a copy.⁷

As you will know from my previous notes, it has been my Government's considered view that the subjects comprised in my note of November 24th should, as far as possible, be dealt with in a Bilateral Agreement between your Government and mine. This view was based upon an appreciation of the strong ties which existed both before and during the war between commercial interests in the United States and Norwegian shipping and a desire for these relations to continue to receive the fullest possible expression. The safeguarding of these ties during the war period and their further extension after the war are regarded as matters of great importance by my Government. A bilateral agreement seemed to me to fit in the most harmoniously with these aims. In view, however, of the strong conviction held by the appropriate shipping authority of your Government that most of the matters under discussion should more appropriately be covered by a Tripartite Agreement, the scope of the enclosed Memorandum has been extended to conform with your Government's desires, in the expectation that in thus meeting your wishes the opportunity for effective cooperation in our common war effort would be increased.

It is still my view, however, that the Tripartite Agreement can nevertheless appropriately be embodied in a Bilateral Agreement between your Government and mine. If this meets with your approval, my Government suggests that you might be agreeable to nominate representatives of your Government to meet with the representatives of my Government named in my note of December 7th, to discuss the

⁵ Neither printed.

⁶ Adm. Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator.

⁷ Not found in Department files.

Bilateral Agreement and also the subject matter of Item 4 in my note of November 24th, namely :

“Some clarification in the light of experience since the conclusion of the Lend-Lease Agreement of July 11, 1942,⁸ of the practical interpretation to be put upon the language of Clause 2 of my note of that date, when applied to the varying facts of actual cases as they arise.”

In the meantime separate discussions have for some time past been going on between the Norwegian Ambassador and the Department of State as well as between the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission and the War Shipping Administration regarding a possible basis for placing American vessels (without any transfer of title) under the Norwegian flag, to be manned by Norwegian officers and crews and operated by the Mission. It is hoped that this may prove a valuable temporary expedient, employing Norwegian manpower made idle by war sinkings, as well as utilizing more fully the energy and experience of the executive personnel of the Mission, pending such time when (as contemplated in Clause 3 of my note of July 11, 1942, accompanying the Lend-Lease Agreement), it may prove possible to make newbuildings available, title to which can be transferred to my Government in actual replacement of lost tonnage.

Accept [etc.]

W. MORGENSTIERNE

857.85/1-2543

The Norwegian Ambassador (Morgenstierne) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: In my note to Your Excellency of February 28, 1942,⁹ I pointed out that the devastating losses suffered by the Norwegian merchant fleet in the common cause of the United Nations had led my Government to request the Government of the United States to assist Norway to make good these losses, in some measure, by making available new vessels to be placed under the Norwegian flag.

Subsequently, preliminary discussions took place between representatives of the State Department and of my Government, but it was not found feasible to carry these discussions to a conclusion pending the signing of the Lend-Lease Agreement between Norway and the United States on July 11, 1942, and of the accompanying notes of the same date. In the notes exchanged on July 11, 1942, it was stated i.a.:

“3. The Government of the United States of America recognizes that the Norwegian merchant fleet not only constitutes an important

⁸ For text of agreement and exchange of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 262, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1565.

⁹ Not printed.

contribution to the war effort of the United Nations but is likewise one of the principal national assets of the Royal Norwegian Government and, accordingly that the latter Government, which is operating its Fleet for the benefit of the United Nations in the common war effort, should be assisted in replacing ships lost in the service of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Government of the United States of America will continue to review the situation with the Royal Norwegian Government with a view to assisting that Government in a program of replacement as soon as conditions permit. The two Governments agree that negotiations to this end should be commenced without delay and should be pressed to a conclusion as promptly as possible."

Since February 1942 the position of the Norwegian merchant fleet has still further deteriorated. Since that time up to January 12, 1943, as so far reported, 1,067,980 tons dwt. have been lost (very many in service specified by your Government, all of them in the promotion of the common war effort), so that Norway has now suffered a total loss of about 2,500,000 tons or over 40% of that part of its fleet which was outside of Norway when the enemy invaded that country in April, 1940.

The losses since December 7, 1941, up to January 12, 1943, amount to 174 vessels, aggregating 1,218,178 tons. A large proportion of these vessels was lost off the Eastern seaboard of the United States, as can be seen from the attached map.¹⁰ I also enclose a statement¹¹ showing the composition of the fleet in the possession of my Government after the invasion, including a specified statement of the lost tonnage. It will appear therefrom that our losses chiefly consist of Diesel motor ships, an important part thereof being Diesel tankers.

Immediately upon the conclusion of our Lend-Lease Agreement of July 11, 1942, I ventured to urge that the negotiations about replacement of our devastating losses be carried on without delay, and, in accordance with our exchange of notes, be pressed to a conclusion as promptly as possible. I also had the great privilege, on several occasions, to discuss this matter with the President of the United States.

Shortly before I left for a visit with my Government, temporarily residing in London, I presented to the Department of State a Memorandum, dated September 22, 1942,¹² in which I set forth our position and strongly appealed for Your Excellency's kind assistance in order that some positive action might be taken in this long pending matter.

The importance to my country of actual replacements has already been stressed on previous occasions, but you will perhaps allow me

¹⁰ Not found in Department files.

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 80.

to remind you that no country in the world is more dependent upon shipping than Norway, whose soil is suitable for cultivation to the extent of about only 3 per cent of her area. The nation's livelihood can be maintained only by relying heavily upon the earnings from the merchant fleet.

Our country is being exploited to the utmost by the German invaders, and with a vast amount of reconstruction work waiting to be effected, Norway will, after the war, more than ever, be dependent upon shipping. The permanent replacement of her fleet to some modest extent in advance of the peace, is, therefore, of vital importance to my country and my Government is extremely anxious that our negotiations, as contemplated in the Notes of July 11, 1942, should be pressed to a conclusion with all possible dispatch.

While these negotiations are pending, it has been suggested that, in order to utilize for the war effort the experienced Norwegian sailors, unemployed for the time being, especially the engineers practised in the handling of Diesel motors, some American newbuildings should be transferred to the Norwegian flag during the hostilities without transfer of title.

By the end of 1942, no American ship had yet been transferred to the Norwegian flag, but in a letter dated December 30, 1942, Admiral Land has been good enough to inform me that two Liberty ships scheduled for delivery at Wilmington, N. C., on January 28th and 31st next, will be made available for operation under Norwegian flag and with Norwegian crews. It is stated that the "transfer of these vessels for Norwegian operation, for employment in the war effort under the direction of the War Shipping Administration, does not contemplate a transfer of title to the Norwegian Government, but it will provide vessels for Norwegian crews who would otherwise be idle due to the loss of Norwegian shipping in war service."

I beg to enclose for Your Excellency's information copy of my letter in reply, dated January 5, 1943.¹³

While my Government appreciates this first step, it is evident that this transfer of two ships would be only an extremely modest beginning, and it is the confident hope of my Government, therefore, that they may count on Your Excellency's continued cooperation, in order to make such transfer on a substantial scale a reality in the nearest possible future, and in order that the ships thus transferred may include not only Liberty ships, but also tankers and Diesel C boats, as mentioned in my Memorandum of November 20, 1942.¹³

I need hardly point out, however, that a transfer for temporary use of even a considerable number of ships would not in any way consti-

¹³ Not printed.

tute a solution of the problem referred to in the exchange of notes between Your Excellency and myself, in connection with the Lend-Lease Agreement, viz. some definite and real replacement of Norway's shipping losses.

My urgent request to Your Excellency, therefore, is for your continued good offices, in order that positive steps may now be taken towards filling the gaps in Norway's sadly dwindling fleet. I may add that the Norwegian Minister of Shipping, who has arrived in this country for the purpose of furthering these questions, as well as I personally, are ready at any time to continue the discussions about this matter in order that they may be brought to the earliest possible conclusion as stated in our above mentioned exchange of notes.

Please accept [etc.]

W. MORGENSTIERNE

857.85/411

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 16, 1943.

Participants: The Norwegian Ambassador
Mr. Sunde, the Norwegian Minister of Shipping
Mr. Acheson

The Norwegian Ambassador and Mr. Sunde called at their request. They told me that they had just had an interview with the President and handed me the attached copy of a memorandum¹⁵ which they had left with the President. They said that the President had requested them to repeat the substance of his interview with them to the Department and also to the War Shipping Administration. Their call upon me was for that purpose.

They informed me that, after glancing through the memorandum, the President had stated that he believed that it would not be feasible to transfer title to ships to Norway at the present time. He thought that there were legal complications in regard to this and that to do so might cause complications with the British and other countries. The Ambassador added that it was his impression that the President was not communicating a final decision but giving his impression of what the decision was likely to be. He stated, however, that the President had said that he would instruct the War Shipping Administration to carry through the transfer of the ten ships already under discussion to the Norwegians for operation. He added that these ships upon transfer should be "ear-marked" for the Norwegians and that there should be an agreement that the Norwegians should have the

¹⁵ Not printed.

option to acquire them after the war upon as favorable terms as might be given to any other nation. The Ambassador stated that the President authorized him to say to the Norwegian Government and the Norwegian seamen that he "hoped and expected to be able to acquire these ships for the Norwegian merchant marine."

Mr. Sunde stated further that the President had stated that, upon present forecasts, it appeared that the United States might, at the end of the war, own 50 per cent of the world's tonnage—a situation which might produce serious national dislocations. He said that the President had said that in this situation it might be desirable to "pool" all the tonnage of the world and reallocate it on the basis of the losses of the several nations, so that each might have the percentage of the world's tonnage with which it began the war. The President is reported further to have said that he was not prepared to adopt or announce such a proposal at the present time, but that he was considering it. Mr. Sunde suggested that such a proposal would have a great many practical difficulties since the tonnage in existence at the end of the war would consist of a great variety of ships, including a great number of victory ships, and that it would not be practicable to allocate shipping merely on the basis of tonnage regardless of the type of ship involved.

The Ambassador reported further that the President had mentioned that among the subjects discussed at Casablanca²⁶ was the matter of what should be done in respect to ownership by the Axis powers of airplanes and ships; that it had been decided that the Axis countries should not be permitted to own planes for a period of twenty-five years after the war; and that some arrangement might be necessary to limit their ownership of ocean tonnage.

Mr. Sunde then asked whether the Department and the War Shipping Administration had made progress in preparing a memorandum for the Secretary and the President regarding a policy of replacement during and after the war. I stated that we had been continuously at work upon this matter and that obviously the views which the President had expressed to him would have a profound effect upon the study or work of the officials engaged upon it. Mr. Sunde thought that, in addition to the suggestion made by the President, it could be provided that ships turned over to the Norwegians might be chartered for some period after the war, certainly pending the negotiations regarding their acquisition, until a more suitable solution might be found to the replacement problem. He mentioned the matter of the price at which ships might be acquired, including the possibility that the insurance now being placed in the United States might provide a

²⁶ The records of the Casablanca Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

fund for the acquisition of such ships. He appeared to be in favor of postponing the matter of price and leaving that to negotiations to be undertaken within the terms of the President's proposal.

Mr. Sunde then asked that the Department again take up with the War Shipping Administration the question of lend-lease aid in the repair of ships. He thought that Mr. Scoll¹⁷ was opposed to doing anything upon this matter and believed that some broad over-all plan, such as he had proposed before, should be put into effect—i.e., that the United States undertake to perform under lend-lease all repairs made in this country upon Norwegian ships and have turned over to it all insurance and that the Norwegians pay a certain per cent of the cost. I said to Mr. Sunde that I had discussed this matter with Mr. Scoll, who had pointed out certain difficulties in the way of accepting the Norwegian proposal as made. However, I would again raise the matter with the War Shipping Administration, and would hope to get within a very short time a definitive answer upon the basis of which we could fairly dispose of the question.

DEAN ACHESON

857.85/5-2043

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 20, 1943.

The Norwegian Ambassador came in at his request. He stated that Norway had received six ships from the War Shipping Administration and that they would receive two more in the near future, which would make a total of eight. Norway was very appreciative of this favorable action on the part of the United States and would like to record its appreciation. In addition, however, the Ambassador desired to call attention to the desire of Norway to have additional vessels and he expressed the hope that the Department of State could support the thought that Norway should receive additional vessels. He stated that his original conversation had contemplated ten vessels at the time and additional vessels later on. So far they had received eight vessels and he trusted that intentions of the American Government would permit the allocation to them from time to time in the future and during the rest of this year of additional tonnage.

I asked the Ambassador whether the pool of Norwegian seamen had been exhausted by placing them upon the vessels which they had so far received. I recalled that he had had a number of seamen "on the beach" and that that was one of the reasons why vessels should

¹⁷ David Scoll of the War Shipping Administration.

be assigned to Norway so that those men could be utilized in the line of their profession and as sailors on the high seas presently serving in the Allied cause.

The Ambassador replied that many of the Norwegian sailors now in this country had taken jobs in other activities but he was sure they would always be able to man vessels. They had a great many captains and mates but did not have so many common sailors. In response to my inquiry as to whether or not they card-indexed the men when they came ashore so that they could be located at their places of occupation and summoned to resume their place aboard ship, he stated that he was not certain but that he thought that some such arrangement was carried on so that they could be reached.

I told the Ambassador that we were of course sympathetic to Norway's desire to have ships but I let it be plainly inferred that if Norway was to have ships to fly the Norwegian flag and be manned by Norwegian crews to help in the Allied cause, it would be expected that they would be in a position to put crews on those vessels. I stated in principle the interest of the Department in furthering the plan to furnish Norway tonnage for the duration.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

[No further diplomatic correspondence on this subject found in Department files. Presumably the transfer of ships was handled directly by the War Shipping Administration.]

REPRESENTATIONS BY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT FOR OBTAINING MATERIALS TO RESTORE NORSK HYDRO CHEMICAL PLANT IN NORWAY BOMBED BY UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

740.00112 European War 1939/9453

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

No. 11,467

LONDON, October 2, 1943.

[Received October 13.]

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that the Norwegian Embassy approached the Ministry of Economic Warfare on September 24, 1943 and submitted the following information and proposal:

It appears that on the recent raid against the aluminum plant on an island near Oslo the principal nitrate factory was extensively dam-

aged. The Norwegian government is seriously concerned over this destruction and points out that it will have a most deleterious effect upon the agricultural production of Norway and consequently upon the Norwegian food supply. While some of the nitrate products might be exported to Denmark against Danish products, a higher percentage of the nitrate production is destined for Norwegian agriculture.

The Norwegian Embassy indicated that if orders could be placed in Sweden it would be possible to obtain sufficient motors and cement partially to resume nitrate production by the end of December and probably to revert to full production by March 1944. In view of the importance of this plant to the Norwegian food production, the Norwegian Embassy would like Anglo-American consent to placing the necessary orders and further to permitting Swedish banks to advance the credit required for the transaction. The matter was extremely urgent for the reason that the Norwegian national handling the matter in Stockholm had only a permit for a very short stay in Sweden and requested our response before his departure.

After consultation between Mr. Foot¹⁸ and Mr. Riefler,¹⁹ it was decided that the Ministry and the Embassy would give their assent to the placing of the orders and also to the granting of Swedish bank credits. However, this consent was given on the understanding that both the British and American Governments must refer this proposal to a high level and that the Norwegian authorities would guarantee that no deliveries or shipments to Norway would be made pending our final joint decision. Under this arrangement, there would be no delay in placing the orders but delivery could not be effected until the British and American Governments had definitely concurred in the proposal.

A copy of the Ministry of Economic Warfare's letter of September 29, 1943 to the British Minister in Stockholm explaining this case in more detail is enclosed.²⁰ The Embassy would appreciate instructions after this matter has been considered by the competent authorities in Washington.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
JAMES W. RIDDLEBERGER
First Secretary of Embassy

¹⁸ Dingle Mackintosh Foot, Parliamentary Secretary to the British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

¹⁹ Winfield W. Riefler, special assistant to the American Ambassador in the United Kingdom with rank of Minister.

²⁰ Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/9453 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1943.

6862. For EWD.²¹ Reference Embassy's despatch 11,467 of October 2. Without knowing what special justifications may exist, Department and FEA²² are at a loss to understand why you and Foot gave your assent to the order on credit of motors and cement from Sweden to rebuild the Norsk Hydro nitrogen plant damaged by our recent bombing raid. Our reasons for strongly disapproving this action are as follows:

1. Norsk Hydro is completely under the control of the German Government. Its activities are directed by I. G. Farben,²³ which owns 80 percent of the stock.

2. Contrary to the statement in your despatch, only a relatively small portion of the total fertilizer production of Norsk Hydro remains in Norway. During 1942-43, of a total production of 64,700 tons of fertilizer, only 18,000 tons were for Norway, while Denmark was to receive 27,000 tons, Sweden 15,500 tons and Finland 4,200 tons. Even if all the nitrates were used in Norway, blockade principles would require refusal of the proposed export.

3. One of our primary objectives in the Swedish negotiations was to diminish Swedish imports from enemy territory so as to reduce Sweden's exports. Therefore, it is to our interest to eliminate so far as possible the nitrates exports from Norway to Sweden which in 1942 were valued at over 90 million kronor.

4. In addition to fertilizer the Norsk Hydro plant manufactures nitric acid, sulphuric acid, soda ash, heavy water, and other strategic industrial chemicals. The heavy water is entirely exported to Germany for highly secret military uses.

5. Since the power installations of Norsk Hydro supply electricity to aluminum and other plants in the same region, there is the danger that these Swedish supplies will be used to restore production at other bombed factories. This danger is increased because we have not obtained an exact description of the goods to be exported or the damage done.

6. Credits granted by Swedish banks for exports to Norway are contrary to the new War Trade Agreement²⁴ and we feel it is highly undesirable to weaken this provision of the agreement by exceptions of this kind. This is particularly important in our view because the Swedes did not approach us on this matter, thereby presumably indicating that they felt there was no ground for making an exception in this case.

²¹ Economic Warfare Division in the Embassy at London.

²² Foreign Economic Administration.

²³ A German Chemical Combine.

²⁴ For text of the War Trade Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, see *note verbale* of September 23, 1943, p. 806.

7. In any case, the partial destruction of the nitrogen plant according to MEW's²⁵ statement should not affect the Norwegian food supply for the coming year. In 12 months time the military situation will more likely have so changed that it may well be possible to relieve the Norwegians.

8. Aside from the foregoing reasons which clearly indicate the Norsk Hydro plant is a legitimate target for our air force, it seems to us that as a matter of general principle and in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, civilian agencies of the Government should not undertake any measures designed to repair damages inflicted by our forces on industrial plants in enemy territory.

Under these circumstances please inform MEW at the earliest opportunity that we strongly disapprove the proposed exports and the proposed credit whether guaranteed or not. It is apparent that under the new War Trade Agreement we have the clear right to disapprove the credit. Furthermore, in the letter of September 29 from the MEW to the British Mission in Stockholm it was stated that acquiescence to the credit was given without prejudice to our decision on the export license. Accordingly, the provisional agreement to the credit can now be withdrawn in view of this Government's opposition. Our position should be made clear as soon as possible to the Swedish Government and to the Swedish banks which otherwise might grant the credit on the basis of your conditional approval. In this connection, moreover, the banks should be reminded that under the terms of the new Agreement such credits are prohibited unless the full consent of the British and American Governments is obtained by the Swedish Government in advance.

It is also suggested that the Norwegian Government in Exile be informed regarding our attitude, and advised that we could not concur in the use of their funds held in Stockholm in any manner to effect a direct or indirect purchase. For your information, if Norsk Hydro attempts to purchase the goods without a credit, we might at the appropriate time point out to the Swedes that we consider the proposed export of cement and motors, even if within the ceilings, highly deleterious to our interests because repair of damages done by our air forces would be facilitated.

We would appreciate your informing us why we were not advised by cable of a matter of this importance rather than by a despatch which arrived nearly one month after assent to the Norwegian proposal had been given in London.

For information about Norsk Hydro, we suggest that you consult a report prepared in the London office of OSS²⁶ dated January 29, 1943, entitled "Norwegian Nitrogen Industry".

²⁵ Ministry of Economic Warfare.

²⁶ Office of Strategic Services.

Please inform Department and FEA of the remedial action MEW and the Embassy intend to take.

STETTINIUS

740.00112 E. W. 1939/9744 : Telegram

The Chargé to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 4, 1943—5 p. m.
[Received December 4—4:20 p. m.]

18. Norwegian Series. In note of November 29, Norwegian Foreign Minister Lie requests this Mission to transmit the considerations recorded below relating to the granting of export licenses for goods ordered in Sweden totaling 920,000 Swedish crowns for rebuilding the Heroya nitrate plant. I have discussed the matter with Riefler who states that a previous request for the desired licenses has been refused by British Ministry of Economic Warfare and our OEW.²⁷ Present note is in consequence in the nature of an appeal for reconsideration.

Tenor of note is as follows:

On July 24 last formations of United States Air Force bombed German Aluminum Works under construction on the Island of Heroya near Porsgrunn on south coast of Norway. On the same island, the Norwegian company, Norsk Hydro-Electrisk Kvaestofaktieselskab, has a plant for the production of nitrate fertilizers. This plant is situated very close to the said aluminum works so that, although the raid was directed against the latter, extensive damage was also done to the fertilizer plant.

In view of great importance of Norwegian fertilizer production to Norwegian agriculture, Norsk Hydro shortly after the raid took up question of having its plant at Heroya repaired. For this purpose, the company would have to obtain deliveries of certain machinery and other equipment from Sweden. It succeeded in arranging necessary credits and placed a number of orders with Swedish firms. Swedish authorities have declared themselves prepared to grant export licenses but before doing so must obtain consent of American and British authorities in accordance with provisions of Anglo-American-Swedish War Trade Agreement.

On receipt of above information, Norwegian authorities took up question with MEW. Norwegian Government's opinion is that support as far as possible should be given the Norwegian company in its endeavour to repair the fertilizer plant. In taking this view Norwegian Government has been prompted by consideration that in present circumstances, everything possible should be done to relieve the very alarming food situation in Norway.

Even before the war the greater part of Norwegian fertilizer production was sold in the Scandinavian countries and since the war started the whole production has been distributed between those

²⁷ Office of Economic Warfare.

countries. No part has been sent to Germany. Norway depended in normal times to a very large extent on imported foodstuffs and with the war preventing any food from reaching the country from outside the blockade, it is of vital importance to the loyal Norwegian population in Occupied Norway to increase home production as much as possible. For this purpose fertilizers are an absolute necessity. The part of the fertilizer production sent to Sweden and Denmark constitutes the most important means of exchange for obtaining imports of foodstuffs from those countries. Further, the extent to which the occupied countries, when liberated, are in a position to feed themselves will directly influence the burden which will be placed on the other Allied countries of procuring supplies for them after the war.

In view of the foregoing, the Norwegian Government hopes the American authorities will see their way to agree to the granting of the export licenses for deliveries from Sweden for rebuilding the Heroya factory.

Exact text of note and itemized list of orders placed with Swedish firms are being sent by special pouch.²⁸

Copy of this message and despatch sent to Embassy London.

[SCHOENFELD]

740.0011 European War 1939/32692

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 15, 1943.

The Norwegian Ambassador ²⁹ called at his request and handed me a copy of an *aide-mémoire* ³⁰ that his Government had delivered to the British relating to bombing in Norway by the Allied forces. He said that his Government and people complained grievously about two instances of bombing which did great damage to certain non-military establishments, and that this indiscriminate bombing was due more or less to the lack of cooperation between the Norwegians and our military forces, although the failure to cooperate was not the fault of the Norwegians. The plea of his Government, he said, was to improve these methods of cooperation between the military forces so as to avoid serious damage to non-military interests in Norway. I thanked him and said that of course these bombings could be minimized by developing closer cooperation and thereby avoiding much useless destruction. I said that I would see that this matter was brought to the attention of the appropriate officials in the War Department.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

²⁸ Despatch No. 71, December 4, 1943, not printed.

²⁹ Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstjerne.

³⁰ Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/9744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1943—7 p. m.

8055. From FEA for Schoenfeld reference Norwegian Series 18 December 4. After receipt of your despatch³¹ FEA and Department will consider Norwegian request that we approve export of materials from Sweden for rebuilding Norsk Hydro plant at Heroya. We have suggested to EWD since it appeared from some statements made by the Norwegians to you that our specific reasons for objecting to their original proposal have not been communicated to them, that as soon as possible this information be given to you to be transmitted at your discretion to the Norwegians. [FEA.]

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/9877 : Telegram

*The Chargé to the Norwegian Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to
the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 30, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received December 30—7: 15 p. m.]

20. [Norwegian Series.] For Department and FEA. I have consulted EWD and carefully considered your 8055, December 21, 7 p. m., suggesting that in my discretion I inform Norwegian Government in detail of reasons for originally withholding approval for shipments of machinery from Sweden for repair of Norsk Hydro plant at Heroya.

Since your telegram indicates that Norwegian request is being reconsidered I feel it would be preferable to await outcome of that reconsideration before advising Norwegians of reasons for original refusal. If because of special factors the reconsideration should result in a favorable decision, the suggested action would become unnecessary. If the original position is maintained, we may then still advise Norwegians of reasons determining our decision.

[SCHOENFELD]

³¹ Despatch No. 71, December 4, 1943, not printed.

POLAND

(See Volume III, pages 100-220.)

PORTUGAL

DIFFICULTIES WITH PORTUGAL OVER PRICE RAISING ON MATERIALS BOUGHT FROM AND SOLD TO PORTUGAL; RENEWAL OF WOLFRAM AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 24, 1942¹

740.00112 European War 1939/7664 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, January 19, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 11:15 p. m.]

96. I have just received from Salazar² a note dated January 16 of which I am submitting below the complete text in translation. I understand that an identic communication was received by the British Ambassador here.³

The text was as follows.

[“] Mr. Minister:

In the various Anglo-American memoranda presented during the negotiation the Supply-Purchase Agreement,⁴ reference was repeatedly made to the prices on the one hand of Portuguese merchandise and on the other of the British and American merchandise, it being said, regarding the latter, that the increases they had undergone since the beginning of the war were small and that ‘the British and American Governments would not be able to maintain for some few products to be furnished to Portugal the controlled prices which had been imposed for purely internal purposes.’ Such a phrase could not be left unexplained, owing to the implicit threat contained and the possible scope of its application, and therefore the Portuguese delegation was entrusted with obtaining from the British and American delegates an explanation as to its real sense and the intentions of the Governments of the ‘bloc’ in this respect.

[2.] Therefore the Portuguese delegate at the meeting of October 14, 1942, asked what was to be understood by the statement that the controlled prices for internal purposes could not be maintained. The reply was: (1) that the case was not one of a general export tax but rather of increasing the price of some few products as it would not be natural that in exporting those products the prices be maintained which had been fixed for internal consumption and which implied sacrifices for the producer or manufacturer; (2) that there was all

¹ For correspondence on Wolfram Agreement of 1942, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 221 ff.

² Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

³ Sir Ronald H. Campbell.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 231, footnote 18.

the more reason for such an increase because the controlled price of certain products in Britain and in the United States was below the current price of identical products in other countries and the example was cited of ammonium sulphate the price of which in Switzerland and Germany was higher than that in the United States; (3) the question of the increase had not yet been studied in detail by the British and American Governments but it seemed convenient to inform the Portuguese in advance of the intentions of the governments of the 'bloc'.

3. The Portuguese delegate suggested the advantage for both parties of stabilizing the prices at the level where they stood on the date of conclusion of the negotiations stating at the same time that on our side we were determined not to permit any increases of prices. This suggestion did not meet with the approval of the British-American delegates who persisted in their stand endeavoring to strengthen their arguments with the example of how absurd it would be for a government to maintain for exports, prices which could remain invariable only with the assistance of state subsidies.

4. Although the attempt had thus failed to fix or stabilize on either side the prices of the products to be imported and exported, which would have obviated speculation and provided a sound basis for adjusted exchanges, the negotiations were proceeded with for two reasons: Firstly, because it was the general policy of the interested countries to maintain stable prices so far as possible within pre-war limits; and secondly, because the particular phrase in question incorporated in the memoranda referred to 'few products' and was moreover restricted in fact in its practical application for the reason presented by the delegates of the 'bloc' that possible increases in prices were derived from the wish not to maintain domestic prices for exports at a sacrifice for the exporting country and to the benefit of the importing country. The explanation given thus provided an objective working basis which would avoid the possibility of misunderstandings or abuses and although not stated in the text of the agreement the Portuguese Government considered the said phrase constituted a reservation on the part of the governments of the 'bloc' and in view of the explanation thereof given a guarantee for itself.

5. It happens that the first product affected by the threat referred to is copper sulphate which under the agreement is to be supplied to Portugal by the United Kingdom. After having received tenders from British firms which offered to sell it at pounds 30 and pounds 38 per ton c.i.f.⁵ the British Embassy came forward with a statement that this product could only be supplied us at pounds 80 per ton i.e. more than twice the quoted prices. A meeting of the representatives of the 'bloc' prices convoked by Lieutenant Colonel Fernandes, the negotiator of the agreement, to discuss the matter, the former defined the situation as follows:

- (1) The phrase in the memorandum would apply to three, four or at the most five products,
- (2) Their Governments had not yet determined which products other than copper sulphate would be subject to price increases,

⁵ Cost, insurance, and freight.

(3) As there existed between the total purchases and sales of the 'bloc' to Portugal a balance which they estimated at 10 million pounds in our favor it was the intention of the Governments of the 'bloc' to decrease that margin somewhat by increasing prices of the products to be exported to Portugal, the view being taken, however, that it was preferable to apply such increases only to four or five products rather than to increase the prices of all or of a large number of the products. Owing to the insistence of and the arguments presented by the Portuguese representative who recalled the spirit of the agreement and the statements to which I have referred above made during the negotiations and stressed the enormous and unjustified burden which would fall on the national economy if we were to concur in the conditions advanced by the 'bloc' in this case, the delegates agreed to submit the question to their Governments.

6. Leaving aside the item of copper sulphate for the present in order to examine the question of principle raised by the policy which according to the statements of their delegates the Governments of the 'bloc' propose to follow, i.e., to endeavor to reduce their unfavorable trade balance with Portugal by increasing the prices of certain products which they undertook to supply to us I must state to Your Excellency that I consider such a policy contrary to the spirit of the supply purchase agreement and in absolute disaccord with the statements made during the negotiations. Those statements accepted in good faith sufficed to convince the Portuguese Government that abuses in the application of the principle regarding prices were not to be feared. We see, however, with amazement and disappointment that on the contrary the intent is to double or triple the cost of certain products by applying actual export taxes thus establishing regardless of commercial prices or costs of production 'controlled prices' to employ the expression used by the official of the Ministry of Economic Warfare to the Portuguese delegate charged with negotiating supplies of copper sulphate in London. Those prices are to be imposed not for the purpose of compensating any loss which might possibly ensue from the exportation of products at prices below costs of production but as a penalty for the reason that owing to the war the countries of the 'bloc' have to purchase from us goods to a greater value than they are able to supply to us.

7. It has been the policy of the Portuguese Government not to allow prices to rise to speculative levels, eloquent proof of which is provided by the much debated case of the price of sisal and the fixing of the price of canned sardines at the level proposed by the British Government, but rather to seek to keep them at pre-war levels so far as possible or at most to increase them only to the extent necessary to obtain that larger production required by foreign markets. Such was the spirit in which upon the conclusion of the negotiations we proposed to work since we considered it to be the most consistent with the general interests of both parties. In the face of the contrasting attitude taken by the Governments of the 'bloc' the Portuguese Government is of the opinion that the situation must be completely clarified with the greatest urgency, if necessary by means of new nego-

tiations to define precisely those products the prices of which come within the scope of the reservation referred to and the extent of the contemplated increases compatible with the statements referred to above. Otherwise the Governments of the 'bloc' will understand that it would be impossible for the Portuguese Government to carry out the agreement on its side within the spirit of the negotiations.

I avail myself of the opportunity of renewing to Your Excellency the assurances of my high consideration. (signed) Salazar."

FISH

740.00112 European War 1939/7685 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, January 20, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 1:30 p. m.]

99. My 96, January 19. In the course of a conversation which I had yesterday with the Secretary General of the Foreign Office⁶ the latter took occasion to bring up the subject of this note. It was evident that he had been instructed by Salazar to do this. He said that he wished to stress the seriousness of the views of the Portuguese Government on this subject. He added that unless the matter could be satisfactorily settled the entire commercial relations between the two countries might suffer serious damage and the conclusion of new agreements might be seriously complicated.

Since Butterworth⁷ is presumably now in Washington and can give information as to what took place in the discussions referred to by Salazar I shall not go into this matter here. There appears to be no written minutes of the discussions in question.

The present wolfram agreement will soon terminate. If the negotiations for a new agreement are to be conducted in a favorable atmosphere and to a satisfactory conclusion the sharp displeasure evidenced by this note of Salazar should be promptly removed.

Otherwise, the serious consequences to which the Secretary General yesterday called my attention may readily follow. We have already begun to feel in practical ways the results of Dr. Salazar's displeasure and it is evident that until a solution of this question is reached we shall get little satisfaction from the Portuguese authorities even in the current detailed problems of our trade relations.

FISH

⁶Teixeira de Sampaio.

⁷W. Walton Butterworth, First Secretary of Legation in Portugal, and Director General in charge of operations of the United States Commercial Company in Portugal and Spain.

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/619 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 2, 1943.

[Received February 2—7:43 a. m.]

840. For Department and Board of Economic Warfare from Riefler.⁸ In view of expiration of current wolfram agreement with Portugal on February 28, I have been discussing with Ministry of Economic Warfare tactics we should follow in negotiations for new agreement. Ministry of Economic Warfare has drafted a telegram to British Embassy Washington embodying the conclusions reached in the discussions. This telegram is being despatched with request that it be immediately discussed with you. I feel that, considering the history of past negotiations with the Portuguese, the proposals which will be put to you give us the best chance of securing favorable wolfram settlement and strengthening our general position in Portugal. [Riefler.]

MATTHEWS

740.00112 European War 1939/7664 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1943—midnight.

224. Your 96 of January 19.

1. The Department has discussed with British Embassy here proposed reply to Dr. Salazar's note. We expect to telegraph full instructions tomorrow.

2. Pending a reply to Dr. Salazar, we have attempted to withhold advising the Portuguese of the proposed increases in the prices of ammonium sulphate and petroleum products. However, in view of the fact that it was necessary to arrange for the immediate departure of the *Campechano* in order for it to arrive at Aruba on the dates specified by the Navy and in view of the fact that d'Andrade⁹ is anxious to arrange for a very early shipment of ammonium sulphate, it proved impracticable to withhold showing our hand.

3. Accordingly, d'Andrade has been advised that the price of ammonium sulphate will be \$90 per ton f.a.s.¹⁰ port of shipment and, as stated in Department's 214 of February 10,¹¹ the prices of petro-

⁸ Winfield W. Riefler, Head of the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy at London.

⁹ Presumably Freire d'Andrade, President of the Portuguese Purchasing and Trade Commission.

¹⁰ Free alongside ship.

¹¹ Not printed.

leum products to be carried in the *Campechano* (except bunkers, if any, taken to the Azores) will be doubled.

4. As news of these increases may come to Dr. Salazar's attention before the formal reply is made to his note, you may consider it desirable to get word to him in an informal manner that you and your British colleague expect to reply to the note in the very near future and that the quotation of prices was made prior to the reply solely because of our desire to expedite the movement of the materials to Portugal.

5. For your information, it is our present intention to confine price increases to those above set forth. In addition, however, the price of tinsplate to be supplied in connection with the sardine contracts will be above prices prevailing here and in the UK, but this price is definitely related to the price of the sardines. We understand that the British intend to raise the price of seed potatoes by approximately 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent, and they have of course already quoted over-prices on copper sulphate.

HULL

853.24/127 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1943—6 p. m.

227. Your 96, January 19; 99, January 20; 177, January 29; and 193, February 2.¹²

Part I.

1. As stated in Department's no. 1199 of September 5, 1942,¹³ the primary reason which motivated our decision to impose price increases on exports to Portugal was to assure our securing sufficient escudos to execute in full our projected supply and preemptive purchases in face of the tremendously high price of certain Portuguese goods and the heavy taxation. The reason and the objective remain unchanged.

2. It is realized that the Portuguese have given no indication that they will refuse us the necessary exchange facilities to carry on our program. Consequently, it might be urged that we should not seek to impose price increases at this time. However, there are five arguments which prompt us to persist in the course undertaken. First, the larger the dollar and sterling balances which the Portuguese accumulate, the less willing they may become to continue giving us the necessary exchange. The fact, therefore, that we have experienced no difficulty to date is no guarantee that we will not in the future. Second, we have sought to maintain substantially equal treatment for

¹² Telegrams Nos. 177 and 193 not printed.

¹³ Not printed.

the Spaniards and the Portuguese. It is considered necessary to apply price increases in Spain because of financial problems confronting us there, and unless some special concession can be obtained from Portugal to induce us not to apply price increases there, it will be extremely difficult to meet objections which may well be raised by the Spaniards. Third, since we have advised the Portuguese that we intend to increase certain prices, it would appear to be a sign of weakness if we retreated from that position simply because of Dr. Salazar's displeasure. Fourth. The ordinary prices prevailing for certain products we are scheduled to provide Portugal are comparatively low because of price control exercised by the United States Government, and in some cases below cost of production, being aided by US subsidy. The same is doubtless true of certain of the products to be supplied by the UK. Fifth. There is no reason why the Portuguese should benefit from the controlled prices existing in the US and UK while we have to pay exorbitant prices and high export taxes on the Portuguese materials we purchase. Our action is economically just and reasonable.

3. Our primary objective would be attained and the first three of the above five arguments substantially met if the Portuguese should formally agree to grant us all the financial facilities we need to carry on our present and projected purchase programs, regardless of their increasing dollar and sterling balances. Although such a formal agreement would not meet the fourth and fifth arguments and although we should like to recoup some of the high prices we are paying, we might be satisfied to accept such a formal agreement and to forego price increases (a) if Portugal will reduce the heavy export taxes imposed on United Nations purchases and (b) if insistence upon price increases would otherwise imperil our primary objective. However, the British are fearful of the results such formal agreement might have on their position. The British Embassy here indicates that if it is suggested to the Portuguese that all we require are facilities for making our purchases, the British may be placed in a position which would jeopardize their obtaining necessary funds for certain of their extraordinary expenses.

4. In the light of the existing circumstances, the Department and the Board of Economic Warfare believe that the approach which we and the British make to the matter can and must be the same. The tactics which we suggest be employed are set forth in the following Part II.

Part II.

5. The Department has seen a copy of MEW's¹⁴ telegram no. 246 of February 6 to Lisbon which sets forth suggested lines of reply to

¹⁴ Ministry of Economic Warfare.

Dr. Salazar's notes of January 16 to you¹⁵ and the British Ambassador. The Department agrees generally with these suggestions, but in view of the tenor of Salazar's note, we consider it important that the substance of our reply be in writing and not passed off simply by an oral statement of our position. The charges of bad faith must be definitely refuted in writing. Accordingly, you are requested to prepare an *aide-mémoire* in collaboration with your British colleague, such document to be based in general upon the various points set forth in MEW's telegram no. 246 of February 6. However, it is considered desirable that the following additions to or changes in the reply suggested by the MEW telegram be incorporated in the *aide-mémoire*:

(a) It should be stated that it is the present intention (repeat present intention) of the British and ourselves to apply price increases only to four or five materials, namely copper sulphate, ammonium sulphate, petroleum products and seed potatoes and, depending on the sardine contracts, possibly tinsplate. We do not consider it advisable to specify in the *aide-mémoire* the prices which it is proposed will be charged. It should be pointed out, however, that the prices charged or to be charged for copper sulphate and ammonium sulphate are not considered unreasonable for these materials in the European market at the present time. (In this connection, we understand that prices for ammonium sulphate and cyanamide of Swiss origin are approximately the same as the 90 dollar a ton figure at which the USCC¹⁶ proposes to sell ammonium sulphate. Either you or Madrid may have definite information on this point.) With respect to petroleum products, it should be stated that rather than attempting to increase the prices of all of the many other products to be supplied Portugal under the Supply-Purchase Agreement to the level which would doubtless prevail were it not for measures of internal control existing in the US and the UK, we have sought to simplify matters and have selected a material whose price increase will have a comparatively slight effect upon the ultimate consumer. (In this connection, we understand that the f.o.b.¹⁷ prices in this hemisphere for petroleum products constitute only a small fraction of the eventual retail prices in Portugal.) It should be emphasized that the administrative simplicity from our point of view in selecting a very few products for purposes of price raising also provided what we had assumed would be attractions in the eyes of the Portuguese. As to tinsplate, it should be stated that the price will be determined in the sardine contracts, those being definitely related matters. As to seed potatoes, your British colleague will supply the appropriate comment for these will be provided by the United Kingdom.

(b) The *aide-mémoire* should also refer to the fact that the Portuguese authorities have apparently been unable to enforce the price for sisal in the manner provided for in the Supply-Purchase Agreement. (You will, of course, be familiar with the details of this situation.)

¹⁵ See telegram No. 96, January 19, 6 p. m., from the Minister in Portugal, p. 497.

¹⁶ United States Commercial Company.

¹⁷ Free on board.

(c) We do not consider it advisable to make any suggestions in the *aide-mémoire* as to a possible solution of the problem. We consider it preferable for the *aide-mémoire* to end on the note that we should welcome any proposal which Dr. Salazar might put forward looking to a possible adjustment of the matter.

6. In your conversation with Dr. Salazar, however, you may wish to touch upon the possibility of reducing the export prices to the United Nations of such items as wolfram and tin, and also upon the matter of effectively insuring the continued production of sisal at reasonable prices. Dr. Salazar will doubtless inquire as to the extent of our price increases. If so, you may state that it is proposed to charge approximately \$90 a metric ton f.a.s. port of shipment for ammonium sulphate and to double the Western Hemisphere f.a.s. price for petroleum products. We understand that the copper sulphate figure which has already been quoted is slightly more than double the prevailing price in the UK. The seed potato prices will be supplied by your British colleague.

7. Depending upon Dr. Salazar's reaction to the foregoing, you may or may not wish to raise the subject of wolfram along the lines of the Department's immediately following telegram no. 228.¹⁸ If the wolfram question is not raised at the time of your interview with Salazar, please endeavor to discuss it with him at an early date.

8. Please telegraph when you expect to see Dr. Salazar. Also please telegraph text of the proposed *aide-mémoire* after it has been presented, together with your comments as to the course which the interview takes.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/663a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1943—7 p. m.

228. 1. The Department and BEW¹⁹ have discussed with British Embassy here contents of telegram no. 425 of February 2 from MEW to British Embassy Washington concerning new wolfram negotiations. We agree in general with four of the five basic assumptions set forth in the MEW telegram, namely (a), (b), (c) and (e). With respect to assumption (d), it is our opinion that it makes no real difference whether the expiration dates of the wolfram agreement and the supply purchase agreement are the same or different for the reason that, as wolfram is the strongest Portuguese card, they will

¹⁸ *Infra.*

¹⁹ Board of Economic Warfare.

presumably not sign it away at any time unless they have related it to the supplies they wish to receive from the US and the UK.

2. We agree that we might stand to gain by not attempting at this time to conclude a new agreement of long duration and we should be prepared to continue the present agreement until June 30 provided we can obtain satisfactory assurances that the Portuguese will not in the meantime give any long term commitment to the Germans which would prevent our bettering our position after June 30.

3. We therefore agree that a joint approach be made to Dr. Salazar by you and your British colleague along the following lines:

(a) Dr. Salazar should be advised that schedules for Portugal for the 6 months beginning July 1, 1943 are now being prepared in Washington for consideration by the appropriate supply authorities and that, upon the basis of present forecasts, it appears that there is no chance of allocating to Portugal supplies at the same rate as provided for in the present program unless we can be assured of securing not only the production from the presently recognized British and American mines and concessions but also the entire amount of the free wolfram. In this connection, the MEW telegram no. 425 indicated that the stipulations would depend upon our acquiring the whole amount of Portuguese production of wolfram. This seems unrealistic for it is difficult to believe that the Portuguese would be willing to take from the Germans their own concessions.

(b) Dr. Salazar should be requested to consider the wolfram position in the above light and to advise you and your British colleague in due course of the best terms that Portugal can offer so that the matter can be presented to the supply authorities here.

(c) If Salazar will not commit himself to a definite figure, or if he asks for time to consider the matter, or if he asks what will happen upon the expiration of the current agreement in the event no decision is reached, you and your British colleague should emphasize that we will not be content with anything less than the presently recognized British-American mines and concessions and the whole or nearly the whole of the free wolfram. But, you should then offer to recommend the continuation of the existing agreement on its present terms for a month or two in order to give Salazar opportunity for further consideration. In such event it should be made very clear that neither Washington nor London will agree to a continuation on the present terms unless Salazar assures us that no commitments will be made to the Germans pending the making of an agreement with us. In this connection it should be pointed out that the German Ambassador stated to the Portuguese authorities last year that the Germans would not be interested in wolfram this year. Furthermore, it should be stated to Salazar that we would expect that the current agreement will be strictly enforced and that measures will be taken to see to it that the Metals Commission does not discriminate against us as was recently the case.

(d) In the event Dr. Salazar offers to give us less than 60 percent of the free wolfram in addition to the presently recognized British-American mines and concessions, you should state that you are sure

that this will not be acceptable but you should offer to transmit the offer simply for our information.

(e) If Dr. Salazar offers 60 percent or more of the free wolfram plus the presently recognized British-American mines and concessions, it is quite probable that the offer will be accepted. However, please do not indicate this to Salazar. It is our hope that we may be able to get as much as 75 percent of the free wolfram.

4. The British Embassy here is advising London of the substance of this telegram and it is hoped that your British colleague will receive similar instructions. If he does not or if you have any suggestions as to different tactics or procedure, please telegraph urgently.

HULL

853.24/137 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, February 20, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 8:43 p. m.]

304. *Aide-mémoire.*

1. The Minister referred to Dr. Salazar's note of January 16, 1943²⁰ on the subject of the proposed price increases on certain products to be supplied to Portugal under the Anglo-American-Portuguese Supply-Purchase Agreement concluded November 24, 1942, and expressed regret that Dr. Salazar should have chosen to send a communication of this tenor, amounting in effect to a reproach of bad faith, for the purpose of giving expression to the view that the increase in the price of copper sulphate did not accord with his understanding of what had been agreed upon in the negotiations. It would have been appreciated if the Foreign Minister had first made inquiry informally, either directly or through the negotiations, as to whether there had not been some misunderstanding.

2. The Minister could not find in the records of the negotiations anything, either written or implied, which would indicate that there had been any breach of good faith on the Anglo-American side. Dr. Salazar would recall that the memorandum presented to the Portuguese Government on September 2, 1942, by the Anglo-American negotiations [*negotiators*] contained (page 4 clause 3) the following passage:

“The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom believe that the proposed program represents a fair exchange in terms of goods, and that this, rather than the prevailing prices of the goods to be exchanged, is the true criterion for assessing the balance. Indeed, the disparity between Portuguese prices and world prices is now so

²⁰ See telegram No. 96, January 19, 6 p. m., from the Minister in Portugal, p. 497.

great, and the increase since the outbreak of war in the prices charged for United States and United Kingdom goods so small, that the United States Government and His Majesty's Government will not be able to maintain for all the goods in list A the controlled prices they have imposed for purely internal purposes."

At no time during the conversations which followed had the Anglo-American negotiators made any suggestion that price adjustments would be limited to the amounts necessary to avoid sales of goods to Portugal at prices inferior to controlled domestic production costs, or at prices which would involve a sacrifice to the producer. If any such impression was gained, this must have been the result of a misunderstanding.

3. In accordance with the passage cited above, it was the present intention of the members of the "bloc" the Minister stated, to make price adjustments only with respect to five materials: namely copper, sulphate, ammonium sulphate, petroleum products, pitch and seed potatoes.

4. Discussing the items individually, the Minister remarked that he had received the impression that the new prices charged or to be charged for ammonium sulphate would not be out of proportion to those prevailing on the European market.

In connection with the increase in the price of petroleum products the Minister pointed out that rather than increase prices on all the 30-odd products to be supplied under the Supply-Purchase Agreement to the level which would have doubtless prevailed in the absence of the measures internal control now operating in the United States and the United Kingdom we had sought to simplify matters and had selected material with respect to which the price increase would have a comparatively slight effect upon the ultimate consumer. In this respect the Minister observed that the price increase on gasoline from what he had been able to learn would amount to only about 6 percent of the retail price in Portugal. Obviously had there been in the place of these few adjustments a general increase on all the prices as mentioned above the total cost to Portugal would have been certainly no less while a great deal more inconvenience would have been caused. It had been assumed that the administrative simplicity which has been achieved from the United States standpoint by the restriction of price increases to a very few products would also be welcomed to the Portuguese Government.

The Minister added that according to calculations the total price increases on supplies from the United States and the United Kingdom amounted to under 100,000,000 escudos and actually represents the bargaining 15 percent of the total value of all goods to be supplied from these sources under the Government.

5. The Minister pointing out that prices for Portuguese products being acquired by the members of the bloc under the terms of that Supply Purchase Agreement were in some cases fixed by the Portuguese authorities at levels considerably in excess of prevailing world prices and many times the pre-war levels. For wolfram for example the price was now fixed at a level some 782 percent higher than before the war. In the case of tin the figure was 775 percent. Other similar percentage figures were 318 percent for resin, 257 percent for turpentine and 219 percent for sardines.

In this connection the Minister also mentioned the price of sisal and pointed out that although the Portuguese Government had not found it possible to maintain for that commodity the price stipulated in the Supply Purchase Agreement our negotiators had tried to show due understanding of the Portuguese position and had certainly not been inclined to attribute this divergence to any lack of good faith on the part of those who had conducted the negotiations on the Portuguese side.

6. In addition to fixing high prices for certain commodities the Portuguese Government had imposed export taxes and price differentials in the case of wolfram on a scale which had been producing revenues from the sale of this single commodity greater than the entire additional amount to be yielded by the price increases now proposed by the "bloc". Since July 1 alone the Portuguese Government had received revenues from these sources totaling in the Legation's estimate some 111,000,000 escudos.

By way of contrast it has been calculated that aggregate price increases of the "bloc" corresponding to an identical period of the agreement would have been approximately 57,000,000 escudos or roughly half of the amount derived by the Portuguese Government from wolfram alone.

Altogether therefore the price increases now envisaged by the members of the "bloc" would, in the light of the charges of the Portuguese Government against its various exports, have been fully justified even if other considerations had not prevailed.

7. The Minister in conclusion expressed the hope that the above explanations, which had been intended to summarize the views of his Government with respect to contemplated price increases, would serve to dispel the doubts entertained by the Portuguese Government in this regard. If this should not be the case he would welcome any comment and any proposal for adjustment of the question which Dr. Salazar might care to make.

End of *aide-mémoire*.

853.24/138 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, February 21, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received February 22—12:30 p. m.]

308. My 303, February 20, 3 p. m.²¹ At our meeting with Salazar yesterday the British Ambassador began the interview by making an oral statement along the lines laid down in Ministry of Economic Warfare's 246 of February 6, referred to in Department's 227, February 12, 6 p. m., to me and he handed to Salazar copy of the notes which he had taken along for his own guidance together with certain statistical data designed to support the points he made. I then explained that since the views of my Government were substantially the same as those outlined by the Ambassador I did not wish to weary him with a repetition of these statements and that I had embodied my Government's views in an *aide-mémoire*²² which I would leave with him.

Salazar replied that the documents would be duly studied and considered but that if they contained no more than the statements the Ambassador had made he did not think that they would be satisfactory to the Portuguese Government. He then proceeded to expound with some feeling his views on the question of price raising the substance of which may be résuméed as follows:

When his negotiators had brought to him the news that we proposed to raise prices on certain commodities he had asked them to clarify the question and to ascertain just what was meant by this statement. He had then after renewed conversations been given to understand that prices were to be raised according to the principle of price equalizations mentioned in his note. In agreeing to this and to the proposition that the method of price increase should not be fixed in writing the agreement he had relied on his experience of previous dealings with us and his belief that we would not take advantage of such a loophole in the written accord. He had now found himself faced with arbitrary and unilateral price increases which had not been discussed individually with the Portuguese and which bore no ascertainable relation to what had taken place in the negotiations. If our position were to be accepted it would mean that no objective criterion had been established during the negotiations by which such increases might be governed. This in turn would mean that we were theoretically free to continue to raise prices arbitrarily as we liked. We could set up prices for example another 100 per cent next week and 200 per cent the week after at our pleasure. Meanwhile Portuguese prices were at least partially fixed in the agreement. How could we ever have supposed that he would assent to an agreement on this basis? No one but a fool, he said, would have allowed such an under-

²¹ Not printed.

²² See *supra*.

standing to rest. If it had been made clear to him last fall that that was what we had in mind he would have broken off the negotiations at once.

He understood what the British Ambassador had to say about the sacrifice involved for warring nations in making these supplies available. He found this a reasonable basis for discussion. If we had come to him and demonstrated to him that these considerations demanded even say a 300% increase in the price of copper sulphate he would have been glad to examine and discuss the question on this basis. But if our attitude were to prevail there was no objective measuring stick by which such increases could be governed and thus no limit to what we could do, a situation to which he would never knowingly have assented. He closed the discussion by saying that after the documents had been examined he would submit the matter to the Mixed Commission where it could be further discussed.

Since the British Ambassador had further matters not involving us which he also wished to discuss with the Prime Minister I withdrew as soon as the Prime Minister had concluded his remarks on price raising.

In comment on the above I may say that I did not gain the impression of any political resentment or personal unfriendliness in Salazar's remarks or bearing. His tone was rather that of a man whose feelings had been hurt by the assumption on the part of his friends that he could knowingly have assented to something which was legally and formally unsound. His objections were not to price raising per se but to the implication that the conversations failed to provide any definite criterion by which price increases should be governed and that he had acquiesced in this state of affairs. It was his pride as a jurist not his political sentiments which had been offended.

I did not think it wise to invite discussion at that time of our future plans with respect to price increases by drawing his attention orally to the statement made in my *aide-mémoire* that it was our present intention to confine these increases to five commodities. Nevertheless I believe that when he has digested this written statement it will go far to answering his objections and to easing the task of the negotiators who will have to pursue these discussions further.

Meanwhile I can see no real grounds for pessimism with respect to the future of our supply purchase program. I am reasonably sure that if we can go a certain way toward meeting his wish for some standard by which price increases can be limited the question can eventually be satisfactorily solved.

At the close of his remarks the British Ambassador referred to wolfram and made it clear that we could not refuse to consider an interim agreement designed to bring the termination dates of the two agreements into line but that we would wish to have at least 50% of the free wolfram assured to us for that period. The Prime Minister

made no comments on this suggestion in my presence and his reaction will presumably be forthcoming through his negotiators.

I was accompanied on this visit by Kennan²³ who concurs in the views expressed above.

FISH

740.00112 European War 1939/7897 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, February 27, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 1:35 p. m.]

381. My 308, February 21.

1. On February 24 there took place a meeting of the Mixed Commission set up primarily to deal with problems arising out of the Anglo-Portuguese War Trade Agreement. This meeting was attended by Ives²⁴ and Kennan on invitation and it was decided that the Mixed Commission supplemented by American representatives would henceforth treat current questions arising out of the Supply-Purchase Agreement as well.

2. The first question considered at this meeting was price raising. Colonel Fernandes, Salazar's spokesman for economic matters, opened the discussion by denying that the Portuguese Government had ever held suspicions that we had been guilty of bad faith in connection with price raising. This was followed by a reiteration in substance of Salazar's statements to the British Ambassador and myself of February 20. The session then developed into a long and repetitious debate between the British and Portuguese delegates over the question of what was agreed between the delegations last fall and convergent upon this justification for the Portuguese and United Nations controlled prices. The most that can be said by way of summary is that the question of arbitrary price raising remains for the Portuguese one of principal phases of material value that they insist that we should "discuss" i.e. modify in agreement with them, the price raises we have established and that if we are unwilling to do this they are determined to retaliate by the various means at their disposal which will possibly include the raising of export taxes and of freight rates. While they could not be explicit on this point at that stage of the conversations, I believe that they mean that their pride would be satisfied if we were to revise our price increases downwards to between 40 and 50% without any compensatory decreases on their side. If we refuse to

²³ George F. Kennan, Counselor of Legation in Portugal.

²⁴ J. Windsor Ives, Commercial Attaché in Portugal.

make such concessions and insist that our price increases should stand the result will probably be not only retaliation but a general poisoning of the atmosphere in all our economic relations with Portugal, an event which cannot help but be reflected on our general [apparent omission] here.

3. I fail to see on what objective basis we could "discuss" with the Portuguese the price increase on petroleum product. This increase is in reality an arbitrary one; we would be at a loss to explain to the Portuguese why on the basis of any understandings reached in last fall's negotiations we chose the particular figure of 100% and not any other figure; similarly we would not know how to explain price except as a flat concession to Portuguese wishes.

4. As for ammonium sulphate we could perhaps argue that the commodity could not be obtained anywhere in Europe much cheaper than \$90 per ton f.a.s. Our position has not been eased however by the fact that according to the Portuguese delegates one of the Assistant Secretaries of Agriculture expressed amazement to Bianchi²⁵ that the Portuguese should have been asked to pay as much as \$36 per ton which he considered very stiff.

5. In appraising this situation it should be taken into account that our reduced purchases of cork (Department's 290, February 23²⁶) will tend to reduce the financial gap under the agreement and if dilatory purchases are suspended altogether after existing commitments are fulfilled an approximate balance will be struck in the value of exchanges between the United States and Portugal.

6. Looked at solely from the standpoint of American interests in Portugal, I now see no reason why we should not reduce our prices in deference to Portuguese feelings. I believe that taking a long range view we would stand to gain much more than we would lose by such a course.

If, however, the principle of price raising really must be clung to in Portugal in order that the British and ourselves may ease our peseta position in Spain as indicated in the Department's 227, February 12, part I, paragraph 3, then I think that the best thing we can now do is to tell the Portuguese flatly that we are not inclined to discuss these prices and thus invite any consequences that may ensue.

7. The Portuguese are [not?] willing to discuss wolfram until the price question is settled. I doubt that they will discontinue the issuance of export licenses on a 25-75 basis after February 28.

Repeated to Madrid.

FISH

²⁵ Antonio de Bianchi, Portuguese Minister in the United States.

²⁶ Not printed.

853.24/140 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, February 27, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 6:20 p. m.]

383. In connection with my telegram No. 381, February 27, regarding the question of price raising, I should like to invite the attention of those authorities in the Department who are concerned with questions of general policy to some of the connotations of the commercial differences which have recently arisen between ourselves and the Portuguese Government.

The actual interests to our country in dollars and cents of this present controversy over price raising is hardly greater than \$1,000,000. The principle involved is one which the Portuguese consider to be of importance. The dispute has already affected our relations with Salazar and his Government and if we show no greater understanding of their sensibilities the resultant bad impression will not be easily or quickly overcome.

The reason that we are clinging to our present position now seems to be one that has little to do directly with our interests in Portugal. I am convinced that we do not need these price increases in order to assure our escudo position. Accordingly in the light of part I paragraph 3 of the Department's 227, February 12, our main reason for insisting on raising prices to the Portuguese can now only be to make it easier for ourselves and particularly the British to carry out parallel action in Spain.

I have no doubt that the reasons why we are asked to do this are sound ones from the standpoint of economic warfare and preemptive buying. I should like to be formerly [*to be formally assured?*] however, that they have been carefully weighed in relation to our other interests in Portugal.

In this connection I should like to refer to my despatch No. 833, February 19,²⁷ which should now have reached the Department. One question of considerable importance from the standpoint of our air transport between the United States, England and Africa is now pending before the Portuguese Government²⁸ and its decision will depend largely on Salazar's attitude toward us. Other questions of even greater moment may have to be raised with the Portuguese Government before the war is over. The Legation understands [that how?] these questions are being and will be considered is evidently being subjected to a certain amount of strain in deference to the preemptive programs of ourselves and the British in another country.

²⁷ Not printed.²⁸ See pp. 527 ff.

The Department alone can judge the extent to which this is desirable and I can only express the hope that the merits of the case both political and economic will be carefully weighed in their entirety before further decisions are adopted in either field.

FISH

853.24/143 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1943—7 p. m.

361. Department's 227, February 12; Legation's 304, February 20; Legation's 308, February 21; Legation's 381, February 27; Legation's 383, February 27.

1. The Department and Board of Economic Warfare have carefully reviewed the matter of price raising in the light of the information contained in your telegrams under reference, with particular regard to the considerations you emphasize in your 383.

2. As stated in the Department's 227, the primary reason for the imposition of price increases on exports to Portugal is to assure our ability to execute our purchase program under the conditions in which we must operate in Portugal. In the absence of the imposition of such price increases, our program is chronically curbed for the simple reason that the extremely high prices we are forced to pay in Portugal have distorted the terms of trade and thereby thrown the commodity interchange out of balance. There can be no question as to the validity of our position that in Portugal the prices of goods purchased by the U.S. and British Governments particularly have either been uncontrolled to our detriment or controlled in the sense that export taxes have been arbitrarily imposed likewise to our detriment, or that Government monopoly technique has been employed. Contrariwise the U.K. and the U.S. have taken effective action to stabilize their own internal price structures, and Portugal is benefiting therefrom.

3. The Department and Board of Economic Warfare, after due consideration, have decided that this Government should not recede from the position it has taken in the matter. We are prepared, however, to reduce or conceivably even eliminate the surcharges already imposed or intended in the event that the Portuguese reduce in proportionate amount the prices and/or the export taxes on Portuguese products we are purchasing. This would be an unattractive solution on economic warfare grounds, since it would equally benefit the Germans by permitting their escudo resources to buy more.

4. In support of the above reason, there is the further factor of according approximately equal treatment to Portugal and Spain. In the latter country our financial position more clearly and immediately

requires the imposition of price increases. This is not, however, our prime motive.

5. With specific reference to the price increase imposed on petroleum, the Department and the Board of Economic Warfare do not believe that it can be successfully argued that the selection of this commodity fails to meet the tests that Salazar, in numbered paragraph 2 of his note of January 16,²⁹ states were established by our negotiators with the Portuguese on October 14. While the oil is not of domestic origin, the price ceilings on petroleum and petroleum products in this country effectively regulate prices quoted in the Caribbean. The administrative advantages to us of selecting petroleum for price raising are of course great. The alternative would be to raise prices on a variety of miscellaneous products which would introduce not merely administrative complexities both here and in Portugal, but in addition presumably would result in a more direct and serious impact on the Portuguese consumer.

6. The Department has noted in your 308 that Salazar reverted to the point touched on in his letter of January 16; i.e., that Portuguese prices were at least partially fixed in the supply purchase agreement. It would appear well to reiterate that under the agreement, the single commodity on which the price was specifically fixed was sisal, and that in this case the control has proved ineffectual if not non-existent to our obvious detriment. There was in the agreement no other stipulation with respect to price maintenance.

7. The Portuguese authorities presumably must be aware of the fact that the export taxes we pay on purchases made by agencies of this Government in Portugal constitute an expenditure of this Government's funds for which this Government is accountable. To submit to the payment not only of inflated prices but high export levies as well without an effective move on the part of this Government to redress the terms of trade would be a difficult position to defend.

8. All the foregoing make it unreasonable to ask us to forego the moderate price increases in question unless the Portuguese on their part indicate a willingness to undertake to bring about reductions of export prices to us on such commodities as wolfram and tin. You may, however, transmit assurances that for the balance of the period of the current supply purchase agreement, no further price increases are contemplated other than those of which the Portuguese are aware or which are discussed in paragraph 6 of the Department's 227. This decision has been carefully weighed in its political as well as its economic aspects.

²⁹ See telegram No. 96, January 19, 6 p. m., from the Minister in Portugal, p. 497.

9. The British Embassy here has been informed of the contents of this telegram but has as yet received no word from London as to the British Government's present attitude in this matter. You are requested to consult with your British colleague. If your British colleague fails to receive parallel instructions enabling you to act in concert with him, or if there are other aspects of this problem which you wish to bring to the attention of the Department, please telegraph urgently.

WELLES

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/854 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1943—11 p. m.

618. Your 744, April 3, 11 a. m.³⁰ Immediately upon conclusion of surcharge controversy, it is requested that you open negotiations on wolfram agreement along lines detailed in the Department's 228 of February 12, 7 p. m. If your British colleague lacks parallel instructions, or if in your judgment intervening events require an altered approach, please telegraph urgently.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/982 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, May 8, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received May 8—2:45 p. m.]

1008. My 955, April 30, 7 p. m.³¹ The Mixed Commission convened again yesterday May 7, Ives and Kennan attending for this Legation.

Fernandes opened the discussion by informing us in response to our inquiry of last week that the Portuguese Government had concluded a new wolfram agreement with the Germans. His explanation was simply that the Germans had made proposals to the Portuguese subsequent to the expiration of the old German agreement, that they had found these proposals acceptable and had therefore concluded a new agreement and that this was within their sovereign rights. He was unwilling to offer any information as to the nature or duration of the new German accord and it is evident that the Portuguese are not prepared to divulge such information to us. Both Kennan and

³⁰ Not printed.

³¹ Not printed; this telegram contained information concerning agreement reached between the Portuguese and British on question of prices for rubber and tires (811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/949).

the head of the British delegation expressed in vigorous terms the conviction that the impression caused in Washington and London by this action of the Portuguese Government would be most unfortunate and cited the obvious reasons therefor.

Fernandes then states that the Portuguese Government was prepared in principle to agree to a prolongation of our former agreement, until June 30, it being understood that there would be some sort of an adjustment in the allocations of neutral wolfram. He was not prepared to make a detailed proposal as to the nature of the adjustments pending our acceptance in principle of the proposal to prolong the agreement.

Kennan then pointed out that the assumption by the Portuguese of new obligations to the Germans, of the nature and duration of which we were unaware, left us without instructions as to our position and that we would have to consult our Government. The British delegate expressed a similar view.

Annoying as the development may be particularly in view of the fact that the delay by which the Portuguese profited was caused by your endeavoring to meet their wishes on the question of price raising, it is only another demonstration of Salazar's determination to use Portugal's strategic raw materials as a bargaining counter for wartime supplies. Viewed from this standpoint our position is still not a strong one. The fact is that while German deliveries of a wide range of commodities seem to be maintained with reasonable punctuality and involve no strain on Portuguese shipping transportation, difficulties have nullified to a considerable degree the effect of the supply concessions which we made to the Portuguese in the present agreement. This is bad enough in the British case where the British supply the shipping and certain losses have been caused by sinking of seed potatoes and ammonium sulphate; but our case is even less favorable for we do not supply the shipping and the Portuguese—except in the case of petroleum—do not have enough of their own to lift the commodities we promised to make available to them. In this regard Castro Caldas³² mentioned in a conversation with Ives recently that as a result of a shortage in shipping tonnage Portugal would only be able to lift 7500 tons of the 20,000 tons of ammonium sulphate allocated during the period of the present Supply Purchase Agreement.

In these circumstances, I am afraid that the Portuguese are inclined to discount even the potential benefits to themselves from a new supply purchase agreement with us and will not be inclined to go

³² Francisco Teixeira Castro Caldas, Vice President of the Portuguese Technical Cooperative Council.

out of their way in the wolfram question even to assure the granting of supply allotments equivalent to those specified in the last agreement.

FISH

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/997 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, May 14, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 9:58 p. m.]

1063. Referring Legation's 1008, May 8, 3 p. m. During the course of a 4-hour conversation with Salazar last evening, the British Ambassador expressed his displeasure at the manner in which the Portuguese Government had recently concluded a new wolfram agreement with the Germans. Salazar appeared neither contrite nor even apologetic. He simply defended his action by stating that the Germans had approached him as far back as last November for a new wolfram agreement on more favorable terms than the one then in effect. Salazar said that he informed the Germans at that time that it was too early to discuss the terms of a new agreement. He said that he had then warned the Germans that a new agreement with them would have to be by virtue of other commitments on less favorable terms. Salazar appears to have mentioned a figure as representative of the maximum tonnage of wolfram which the Germans could be given export licenses for under a new agreement. The Prime Minister then stated that the Germans renewed attempts to obtain an agreement on the terms of the then effective agreement in mid-February when they were again confronted with Salazar's ceiling figure. When the Germans appeared again towards the end of April and accepted the figure of 2100 tons, Salazar stated that he had been obliged to conclude an agreement.

When the Ambassador inquired as to what we might expect in the way of an allocation of neutral wolfram under an interim agreement Salazar replied "I will see".

In concluding his remarks on the German agreement Salazar intimated indirectly that our position with respect to mineral from the pool might be improved by commenting that he anticipated that the Germans through more intensive exploitation on their own properties and concessions would be able to increase production from these sources over the period of the new agreement. This tends to bear out the informal statement made recently by Castro Caldas that it is the plan of the Portuguese to divide neutral mineral equally between the bel-

ligérents. Whether this will be done without the Portuguese asking for suitable *quid pro quo* from our side remains to be seen but it seems doubtful.

Repeated to London.

FISH

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/997: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1943—2 p. m.

879. Your 1008, May 8, 3 p. m. and your 1063, May 14, 8 p. m.

1. The conclusion by the Portuguese of a new wolfram agreement with the Germans came as a shock. In the light of this development, the prolongation of the surcharge controversy might easily be interpreted as deliberate and designed to permit the undisturbed conclusion of the new wolfram agreement with the Germans. Certainly it has been made abundantly clear to the Portuguese in the past year that we regard wolfram as of preeminent importance. Whether the delay was deliberate or not, the closing of a wolfram agreement with the Germans without prior consultation with us constitutes an action which it is difficult to construe as anything but a clear disregard of our interests. Following on the heels of the Portuguese signing a contract with the Germans for 45% of the 1943 summer pack of sardines in the midst of our own sardine negotiations, the impression is gained here that the Portuguese feel obliged to satisfy the demands of the enemy before giving fair consideration to the needs of the United Nations.

2. In the light of the information contained in your telegrams under reference, an intensive study is being made by the Department and Board of Economic Warfare as to the character and extent of any successor supply-purchase program, including the justification, if any, for maintaining oil supplies to Portugal at the rate provided for by the current supply-purchase agreement. Oil is our key card. Neither shipping nor supply limitations obscure our ability to control its flow.

3. It is our intention that, provided the British receive parallel instructions, you should jointly with your British colleague inform Salazar (*a*) that we are amazed at the conclusion by the Portuguese of a new wolfram agreement with the Germans without prior consultation with us; (*b*) that prior to June 30, it is our intention to discuss with him the matter of our willingness to make available after that date supplies, including oil, in terms of the Portuguese willingness and ability to make available to us certain commodities we desire, including wolfram; and (*c*) that we wish a prompt statement from him as to the disposition he intends to make of the free wolfram for the period March 1, 1943 to June 30, 1943. In this connection you should point

out that the U.S. supply authorities have been extremely disappointed over the amounts of wolfram secured by the U.S. and the U.K. in Portugal during the past year. Unless our treatment with respect to wolfram is substantially improved, it will be difficult to secure their consent to the release in the future of past quantities of material in tight supply as well as oil.

Your views on the approach outlined above are urgently requested.

4. British Embassy here has been informed and is telegraphing London.

5. Repeated to London.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1031 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, May 22, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received May 24—1:22 p. m.]

1132. With reference to the Department's telegram 879, May 19, 2 p. m., I have the following comments:

1. Our utter purpose which was to achieve by formal means a material decrease in the amount of wolfram which Germany could get from Portugal during the coming year has already been made impossible of complete attainment. The Portuguese are presumably not going to tear up on our behalf an agreement they have already concluded with the Germans unless they are prepared to abandon their neutrality.

2. Our immediate purposes in further negotiations with the Portuguese can therefore be only the following:

(a) to assure the continued use of our presently recognized concessions for our own supply and for special traffic purposes;

(b) to make sure that we at least get the remainder of neutral wolfram and that further quotas thereof are not used for bartering with the Axis states and

(c) to prevent the Germans as far as possible, from acquiring the United States Government amounts of wolfram by illegal means.

3. The Portuguese will expect a *quid pro quo* even for the leavings. We should decide in advance what these are worth to us in terms of supply and simply make this known to the Portuguese. I am not in favor of any lengthy bargaining efforts with the Portuguese on this subject particularly since they have already definitely restricted their own bargaining limits.

4. Since the Portuguese are not in a position to retract the undertakings they have made vis-à-vis the Germans we would have nothing tangible to gain for ourselves at this stage by withholding oil from

them by way of retaliation. At best such action could only have the effect of punishing the Portuguese people for something which their Government has done and cannot now undo. It would have the drawbacks that (a) oil is the one commodity on which we cannot plead supply to reserve of our own and (b) it would draw the odium of the action almost exclusively to ourselves rather than to the British.

5. We must bear in mind that we were clearly warned in January of this year that if we persisted in our price-raising plans, the repercussions on our entire commercial relations with the Portuguese would be serious. Please see particularly my 96, January 19, in this connection.

While it is true that we eventually reached a compromise agreement on price-raising,³³ we did not do so until after the Germans had already made acceptable proposals and reached an agreement with the Portuguese. I think therefore, that it will be difficult to cause Salazar to feel any particular remorse over this action and any retaliatory measures we now take with respect to oil will only be regarded by him as gratuitous. It must also be recognized that heretofore we have received a share of Portugal's wolfram production substantially greater than one-half and there is no reason to suppose despite the new agreement with Germany that the Portuguese intend that we should get a smaller proportion in the future. This may be unsatisfactory to us from the preemptive standpoint but from the standpoint of equal treatment of both belligerents as a part of Salazar's general policy of neutrality, it is difficult to find fault with.

British Ambassador has not yet received instructions parallel to mine. On the contrary numerous messages which he has had on this subject have all indicated that major strategic considerations do not make the moment propitious for an attempt to force Salazar to deviate from what he considers a policy of neutrality in the economic field.

7. In order to get the remainder of neutral wolfram as above mentioned we must indeed know what the remainder consists of. I therefore see no objection to asking for a prompt statement as to the disposition he intends to make of the wolfram for the period [March 1?] to June 30. I feel, however, that only after we have gotten such a statement and made up our own minds on what we now wish to get from Portugal in a new agreement should we begin to talk about the supplies which we can make available to them. Then if reductions in our supplies to Portugal are indicated I should suggest that they be so allotted that the burden be borne at least equally by the British.

FISH

³³ At a meeting of the Mixed Commission on April 29, 1943, a settlement was reached on the price-raising issue with slight mutual adjustment to avoid prolonging discussions.

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1031 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1943—5 p. m.

963. Your 1132, May 22, 5 p. m. and the Department's 879, May 19, 2 p. m.

1. The Department and Board of Economic Warfare agree with the recommendation that we should avoid at this time prolonged negotiations with Dr. Salazar. We also agree that the specific supplies which can be provided from the U.S. and the U.K. should be decided and thereafter a new supply-purchase program should be presented to the Portuguese on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Prior to these negotiations, however, it is necessary first to ascertain the precise nature of the wolfram commitment he has entered into with the Germans in order to establish what are the "leavings" available for us.

2. British Embassy here has informed the Department that Dr. Salazar is prepared to grant the British and ourselves 50 percent of the free wolfram for the interim period March 1, 1943 to June 30, 1943 with the reservation that the division after the latter date is subject to our general trade interchange arrangements. The Department and Board of Economic Warfare have reluctantly decided to accept this proposal.

3. Assuming your British colleague receives parallel instructions, you are therefore requested to call on Dr. Salazar with your British colleague and notify him of this Government's acceptance of the foregoing offer for the interim period. At the same time you should take the occasion to record with Dr. Salazar this Government's disappointment over his conclusion of a new wolfram agreement with the Germans without prior consultation with us. You should also seek precise information as to the terms of the Portuguese-German wolfram agreement, pointing out that in the framing of any supply-purchase agreement to succeed the current program, it is obviously necessary to know to what extent he has already tied his hands on the commodity to which we attach preeminent importance.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1091 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, June 12, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received June 12—4: 25 p. m.]

1303. Department's 963, June 1. In company with the British Ambassador I visited Salazar this afternoon, informed him that our Government was prepared to accept the prolongation until June 30

of the old agreement on condition that we get 50% of the pool instead of 25, and expressed disappointment of my Government that he should have seen fit to conclude with Germany a favorable wolfram agreement without first informing our Government the interests of which were so vitally involved.

The British Ambassador speaking on behalf of both of us then told him that we would [seek?] from him certain details regarding the German agreement in order that we might make our own plans and we left with Salazar a joint statement of the information we would require, with the understanding that he would examine it and give us a reply. A copy of this statement³⁴ is being forwarded to the Department by the next pouch which should go forward in a day or two.

FISH

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1128 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, June 22, 1943—11 a. m.
[Received June 22—10:04 a. m.]

1372. Legation's 1303, June 12, 6 p. m. Notes have been exchanged extending the wolfram agreement from March 1 to June 30, 1943, with clause (G) modified by the raising of the Anglo-American off-take from the pool to 50 percent. Copies by pouch.

Repeated to London and Madrid.

FISH

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1150 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, June 30, 1943—2 p. m.
[Received 3:30 p. m.]

1435. The Portuguese reply³⁵ to the *aide-mémoire* presented to Salazar on June 12 (Legation's 1303) has now been received and its main points are as follows:

1. The Portuguese-German Agreement was entered into at the end of April for 1 year beginning February 1. It accords the Germans half of the pool. It contains no obligation to supply definite quantities but only a guarantee of export licenses up to 2100 tons covering the wolfram from the German mines and the pool. "The Portuguese Government is not so optimistic" as to believe that the Germans will get even 1800 tons as it calculates production from the German mines at 900 tons and half the pool at 600. (I might add that we estimate

³⁴ Not printed.

³⁵ Portuguese memorandum dated June 29, 1943.

German mine production at about 600 tons and Castro Caldas also volunteered this figure. The difference, of course, is made up by smuggling neutral wolfram into German mines.[]

2. "It is confirmed in a categorical manner that from the date of the first German agreement no mines of wolfram were or will be recognized as of German capital ownership beyond those which were thus recognized on that date". The Portuguese Government asks that we supply the details regarding the 6 million escudo German mining concession which we will do forthwith.

3. With regard to the erroneous figures of wolfram exports for the first quarter of the year contained in the Portuguese bulletin of statistics, whereas the Portuguese figures for exports to Britain are still according to our calculations in error, those of Germany are given as January 0, February 217, March 370 tons. It is confirmed that the CRCM³⁶ only issued export permits to Germany during that period for 587 tons.

Repeated to London.

FISH

POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE ADVISABLE TO ENCOURAGE THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT TO ENTER THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

740.0011 Pacific War/3123

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In reply to a recent enquiry from His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon³⁷ about Timor, the Secretary General of the Portuguese Ministry for Foreign Affairs³⁸ said that, as Sir R. Campbell was aware, the Japanese occupation of Portuguese Timor had been followed by interminable discussions with the Japanese Government which had led nowhere. When the new Japanese Minister had been appointed, he had been told that the usual reference to "the friendly relations uniting the two countries", or words to that effect, would not be admitted in the customary address to the Head of the State on the presentation of his credentials. The most that would be allowed would be an expression of hope for "the improvement of relations". Discussions relating to Japanese behaviour in the Colonies had subsequently been reopened with the new Minister but these had also led nowhere.

Dr. Sampayo said that a number of Portuguese officials had escaped from Timor to Australia but, this abandonment of their posts being quite contrary to Portuguese traditions, they had been instructed

³⁶ Comissão Reguladora do Comércio de Metais.

³⁷ Sir Ronald H. Campbell.

³⁸ Teixeira de Sampayo.

to return to them. The Portuguese Government had demanded that the Japanese occupation forces should put no obstacle in the way of this and in general should abstain from making it impossible, as they had been doing, for the Portuguese administration to function. In reply the Japanese Minister had demanded an undertaking that the Governor and his staff would adopt a proper neutral attitude. This naturally infuriated Dr. Salazar,³⁹ who brought the discussions to an end.

His Majesty's Ambassador understands that he has since been considering in consultation with his principal Ministers what action is open to him.

Sir R. Campbell reports that according to one informant Dr. Salazar was contemplating an early declaration of war but he thinks it most improbable that Dr. Salazar would proceed to that extreme. He might possibly break off relations but even that would presumably expose him to the seizure of Macao, not to mention retaliatory action of some kind by other members of the Axis. Sir R. Campbell would not be surprised therefore if Dr. Salazar contrived to keep his anger in check for the time being.

Although His Majesty's Government agree with Sir R. Campbell's conclusions, they think it would be desirable to encourage Dr. Salazar if he shows any further signs of taking a stronger line vis-à-vis the Japanese. They therefore propose to telegraph to Sir R. Campbell as follows:

"If Dr. Salazar should decide to break off relations with or even to declare war on Japan we should welcome such a development and you should give all possible encouragement to such a step. An anticipated seizure of Macao would not affect us but we should be unable to afford the Portuguese any assistance if they were to attempt to hold that island.

"The above is sent for your information only and guidance."

As, however, Macao is in a United States strategic sphere, they would be glad to know whether the United States Government concur.

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1943.

740.0011 Pacific War/3144

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Departments of State, War and Navy have carefully considered the British Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of February 16, 1943 requesting the views of this Government concerning instructions which the

³⁹ Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

British Government proposes to send to the British Ambassador at Lisbon that he should give all possible encouragement to any decision by Dr. Salazar to break off relations with or to declare war on Japan.

The Government of the United States considers that a Portuguese declaration of war upon Japan would have no appreciable effect upon the war against that country. It is unable to accept the premise that the repercussions of such a development would be confined to the Pacific area and believes that it might lead to an extension of the war in Europe. It is accordingly unable to concur in the position indicated by the proposed instructions to Sir Ronald Campbell.

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1943.

**INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN OBTAINING WATER-PORT
AND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES**

853.79681/88 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 28, 1943—midnight.

[Received April 29—2:16 p. m.]

735. From Murphy.⁴⁰ My telegrams 630, April 16, 501, March 28, Algiers 554, April 15, and Lisbon's 850, April 16.⁴¹ The Mediterranean Air Command has agreed to give consideration to the proposal of Aero-Portuguesa to operate a direct service between Lisbon and French Morocco, but with Rabat-Salé as the North African terminus instead of Casablanca.

The Air Command requests in return, however, that an appropriate approach can be made to the Portuguese Government with a view to obtaining permission for Transatlantic land transport planes operated by a civilian air line, carrying mail, freight, or passengers with civilian passports, to stop at the Azores for refueling. Recent reports of a flight from Gander to Marrakech, which passed close to the Azores, indicate that multi-motored aircraft could be flown from Washington or New York to Northwest Africa in less than 24 hours. Pilots agree that if the three fields in the Azores could be utilized the time required would be materially shortened.

The route would be feasible from May to October. During the winter months the route New York-Bermuda-Azores-Africa is more practicable. On both routes considerable saving in time will result and greater pay loads will be possible due to the reduction of fuel

⁴⁰ Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser, staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa with the rank of Minister.

⁴¹ None printed.

loads. In short, the use of the Azores will have great potential benefits for Air Transport.

The Air Command recommends that negotiations be undertaken with the Portuguese Government for the use of the Azores by the United States Air Transport on terms which might be similar to those which now exist as regards Lisbon. If improvement to airports in the Azores is necessary, it is felt that the United States Government might be willing to assist.

I concur in the recommendations of the Air Command.

To Department, repeated to Lisbon and Tangier. [Murphy.]

WILEY

853.79681/89 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, May 3, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 4:30 p. m.]

975. Since Algiers 735, April 28, noon [*midnight*], from Murphy was addressed to Department I shall leave it to Department to enlighten him as to steps already taken toward utilization of land air base in Azores. A permit for Aero-Portuguesa to operate to Casablanca would scarcely be a *quid pro quo* for use of the Azores airports even if the Portuguese Government were keenly interested in the Aero-Portuguesa entering North Africa. Actually the Portuguese Government has no particular interest in this. It is this Legation which has fostered the project in the hope that we could thereby obtain at least one regular channel of access from Portugal to North Africa not subject to Spanish control.

The best thing the air command could do to expedite action concerning the Azores facilities would be to stir up interest in this matter in London and thus to stimulate British support for the steps already taken.

Repeated to Algiers.

FISH

853.79681/89 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1943—10 p. m.

924. For Murphy. Your 735, April 28, midnight and Lisbon's 975 of May 3, 4 p. m. to the Department, repeated to you. The whole question of utilizing the Azores as you suggest has been under consideration by the Department and by our Mission in Portugal for some time past. No definite solution has been reached although the matter is being pressed. You will be advised as soon as the Depart-

ment has a reply to an urgent telegram which is being sent to Portugal.

HULL

853.79681/89 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1943—8 p. m.

901. Your 975, May 3, 4 p. m. The following is for your strictly confidential information and you should not initiate any action with the Portuguese Government until you have made known your views to the Department and until a reply can be made thereto:

Informal discussions have been held between the Department and officers from the War and Navy Departments, who are vitally interested in trans-Atlantic air transportation and it is believed that a review of the situation is in order. Obviously, Murphy and the Mediterranean Air Command were not fully cognizant of the steps which have been and are being taken to inaugurate land transport services to Europe via the Azores.

The possibility of operating a landplane service from this country via the Azores to North Africa, without calling at Lisbon, would obviously offer the ideal solution, as it would materially shorten our communications to the Mediterranean and the Middle and Far East. Before this ideal condition can be attained, however, certain problems must be solved. The most immediate problem is the completion of landing facilities on one of the islands of the Azores group. In this connection the War Department through Pan American Airways is attempting to secure improvement of facilities on Terceira Island and explore possibilities of construction of new facilities on Santa Maria Island. The Department assumes that the Portuguese authorities would prefer that the military airport on Terceira Island be used since it would give them better control of operations. With this in mind Pan American is compiling, for the Portuguese Government, a list of requirements for operation of heavy land aircraft into Lisbon and Terceira. This list of equipment and facilities approved by Portuguese will be submitted here for handling as to priorities.

In the meantime Pan American will attempt to secure permission to undertake a test landing as early as possible on Terceira Island with a DC-4 so as to check physically the present possibilities of this field for large-type landplanes.

Reference is made to Department's telegram 1803 of December 30, 1942, 1 p. m. and to your reply no. 6, January 2, 1943, 6 p. m.⁴² The

⁴² Neither printed.

Department has the impression that recent events in North Africa⁴³ perhaps may have changed your views on this matter. In any event it would be appreciated if you would give an appraisal of the situation as it exists today. This Government is very much interested in operating a commercial air service directly to North Africa via the Azores, as noted above. The present commercial operator could no doubt operate this service. Such a service would be in addition to the service presently operated to Lisbon. Two immediate considerations now arise:

1. Do you believe that the Portuguese Government will permit the operation of a "Y" service of this nature by Pan American Airways and using landplanes? Of course, the Department would prefer to secure this permission without having to grant any return concessions.

2. If this is not possible, then for what concessions, in your opinion, would the Portuguese be willing to allow such an operation?

You should, of course, in reaching your conclusions, bear in mind the following factors:

1. The interested agencies of this Government do not want any steps to be taken which might prejudice the present discussions between Pan American and the Portuguese Government regarding Terceira Island.

2. A direct landplane route from this country to North Africa via the Azores has postwar connotations. However, the Department would be willing, if necessary, to confine the operations of this route for the duration only.

3. It might be preferable, in view of Pan American's long-term arrangement with the Portuguese, and in order to preserve the commercial character of the operation, to withhold any mention of a temporary service.

A second problem relates to item no. 2 referred to in your telegram 789 of April 8, 1943, 5 p. m.⁴⁴ to which the Department replied in telegram no. 760 of April 30, 1943, 9 p. m.⁴⁵ Further consideration of this matter leads the Department to believe that it would be preferable if the British were advised of the developments in the Azores at this time rather than to have them find out indirectly what is going on, or when the first landplane arrives. Your views on this subject are invited. The Department believes that it should advise British here so that our military may make a corresponding statement to the British military authorities at same time.

HULL

⁴³ For correspondence on the invasion and occupation of North Africa, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 429 ff.

⁴⁴ Not printed; item no. 2 was in reference to the concern of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs, over whether the British knew of or approved of Pan American's application for use of land airport in the Azores (853B.7962/20).

⁴⁵ Not printed.

853.79681/94 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, May 25, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received May 26—9:35 a. m.]

1149. Reference to Department's 901, May 21, concerning use of Azores airports. I doubt very much that the Portuguese Government would permit operation of a "Y" service via the Azores to Europe on a commercial basis at present time. This runs counter both to its established civil aviation policy which is to exploit the favorable position of the Azores in order to force the use of Lisbon as a terminus on the Continent and to its policy of neutrality which inhibits any innovation in practice in favor of one of the belligerents which could give rise to criticism or counterdemands on the part of the other. It is barely possible that after the war the Portuguese might within the framework of present commercial policy permit such a service on condition that a minimum frequency of flights to Lisbon be maintained but at present political considerations would almost surely rule this out.

As the Department is aware, a number of things are now being done in the Azores which could have significance only in connection with an anticipated entry of Portugal into the war. The mere fact that over 2,000 tons of 100-octane gasoline, much of it in drums marked "property Air Force U. S. Army", have already been transported to those islands where there is no single plane capable of burning such fuel makes it evident that certain agreements must exist which envisage the extensive use of the Azores as a military air base before the war is over. Should the Portuguese Government be requested to permit flights from our country to North Africa via the Azores in the line of military cooperation if and when associated with our country in the prosecution of the war its answer might well be different. But it will scarcely look with favor upon this idea as a commercial proposition until Salazar has been made to see the desirability of a basic change in Portugal's civil air policy. In any case I do not feel that operation to North Africa should be suggested to the Portuguese until permission to use Lagens for the Lisbon service has been secured.

It is difficult to conceive of concessions we could make at this time which would be apt to sway Salazar and which would at the same time be reconcilable with his neutrality. An offer to let him have fuel and spare parts for his air force equipment together with some trainer planes would certainly pull some weight but hardly enough. Economic concessions would be more impressive but would presumably run afoul of our pre-emptive program.

With respect to Pan American's application to use a land airport in the Azores, I believe that this matter is proceeding as favorably as could be hoped. At the moment, however, the Portuguese Government is waiting for Pan American to submit the technical data with respect to the ground equipment desired and the flying equipment to be used as agreed upon by Symington ⁴⁶ here. I understand that Leslie ⁴⁷ who is ill at Bermuda has this material and I have just telegraphed the Consul there asking whether it cannot be forwarded by courier on the next plane. It is important that this material should be filed at once with the Portuguese Government since with due regard for Portuguese susceptibilities a decent time should elapse between the presentation of this material and the submission of the request for test flights.

I understand that work is proceeding on the airports on Terceira and São Miguel Islands. The runways at Terceira which have heretofore been grass covered and almost too slippery for the work and the planes which operate there are apparently in the process of being surfaced. I understand that at Ponta Delgada two runways have now been substantially completed, one of 1500 meters and one of 1600 meters; but their angle with relation to prevailing winds is described as unsatisfactory. I am told that the sites on Santa Maria Island would not come into question for our purpose.

The Counselor of the Legation ⁴⁸ recently gained the impression from the British Ambassador ⁴⁹ in an informal conversation that the British were assisting the Portuguese in the construction of one of these airports. It may be that this is a part of the general secret agreement under which aviation fuel, submarine nets, ammunition, et cetera, are being delivered to the Islands.

All this appears to me to indicate the urgency of a clarification of this matter with London. I must reemphasize in this connection that since Imperial and Pan American contracts are identical any facilities acquired by Panair would presumably be automatically available to the British after the war.

Although I do not consider that the moment has yet arrived I think it inevitable that this Legation will eventually have to express to the Portuguese Government the official interest of our Government in this matter. When that time comes it is important that the British should be prepared to support us in this move.

FISH

⁴⁶ Representative of Pan American Airways in Portugal.

⁴⁷ John Leslie of Pan American Airways.

⁴⁸ George F. Kennan.

⁴⁹ Sir Ronald H. Campbell.

741.53/117 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 26, 1943—midnight.

[Received June 26—8:30 p. m.]

4228. To the President and the Secretary. This evening Eden⁵⁰ told me that they had had a reply from Salazar and that he had asked that the negotiations be in Lisbon. They are accepting this request and are sending Tuesday⁵¹ an Army and a Navy officer of medium rank, a Foreign Office official and one from the Ministry of Economic Warfare, the last because the British feel that Salazar will probably ask for some extension of trade facilities. Eden said they might need our help in this latter field. He will keep us informed of the negotiations. Both the Prime Minister and Eden felt that the suggestion with regard to Brazilian help should be postponed until the main issue has been established.

WINANT

741.53/119 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 29, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received June 29—4:42 p. m.]

4284. For the President and the Secretary. The following memorandum elaborating the references to economic concessions in my telegram No. 4228, June 26, midnight, was given me by Eden today.

In return for the facilities which the Portuguese Government have agreed to grant us in principle they will expect us to adopt a more forthcoming attitude than in the past in regard to their economic requirements. In particular they will want:

- (a) More generous treatment in regard to quotas and navicerts;⁵²
- (b) Permission to increase stocks, more particularly of cereals, to provide against any German interference with their imports;
- (c) Help in procuring supplies, more particularly of steel and oil.

Owing to the secrecy of our negotiations these questions cannot for the present be dealt with through the usual machinery of com-

⁵⁰ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁵¹ June 29.

⁵² Certificates issued by resident British authorities covering exports from one neutral nation to another.

mittees and combined boards. They will, however, eventually have to pass through that machinery and it will be helpful if the President could at the appropriate moment direct the competent American departments to cooperate with His Majesty's Government in the new and more forthcoming line now proposed in our economic relations with Portugal.⁵³ The timing of this directive could be discussed later in the light of the progress of the negotiations.

As it is agreed that the Portuguese Government should if possible remain outside the war they must be permitted to trade with Germany. The most important item is wolfram and in the view of His Majesty's Government we should acquiesce in a continuance of the present arrangements under which we receive the output of our own mines and 50 percent of the "free" wolfram. We shall also want to take certain measures to stop German smuggling of wolfram through Spain, or alternatively to compensate ourselves for this smuggling. This can, however, be dealt with separately.

WINANT

741.53/118 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 29, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received June 29—6:27 p. m.]

4285. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. My telegram No. 4228, June 26, midnight. The Prime Minister desires that the following message be transmitted to the President:

"1. We have now received the Portuguese reply about LIFE BELT.⁵⁴ This stated that the Portuguese are ready in principle to accord us the facilities we require. The consequences of this acceptance may, however, be so serious for Portugal and the life of her people that the actual use of the facilities accorded in principle must be preceded by the previous examination by the two Governments of the political, military and economic considerations involved.

2. The reply also takes note of our undertaking that at the close of hostilities British troops would be withdrawn from Bracken, and of the assurances concerning the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies. In this connection the Portuguese Government state that they will be glad to receive a similar

⁵³ For documentation on economic relations between the United States and Portugal and on the renewal of the Wolfram Agreement of August 24, 1942, see pp. 497 ff.

⁵⁴ Code name for operations against Portuguese Atlantic islands. For indications of the attitudes of Prime Minister Churchill, Mr. Eden, the British War Cabinet, the British Chiefs of Staff, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the necessity of the Allies obtaining use of the Azores, see Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, p. 378; Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*, in the series *United States Army in World War II: The War Department* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 134; and Admiral William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, pp. 140 and 191.

guarantee from the Government of the United States which we had indicated would be forthcoming. I hope you will be able to authorize me to inform the Portuguese Government that in the event of a satisfactory agreement being reached the United States Government are willing to associate themselves with the assurances already given by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

3. In the course of discussion with His Majesty's Ambassador, Dr. Salazar stated that having responded to our appeal he was willing to face the consequences whatever they might be, but that, in view of the present state of Portuguese defences, he would prefer that Portugal should not be drawn in as an active belligerent if that could be avoided. He hoped that any staff talks would be conducted with that consideration in mind. He also stated that Portuguese susceptibilities would not admit of the cession of bases under any form of lease, and that he would probably desire Portuguese forces to remain in a defensive capacity. These views are in accordance with our own.

4. Arising out of this, Dr. Salazar said that under no circumstances could he agree to admit forces other than British, except perhaps in the event of Portugal becoming fully involved in the war. He would, however, not object to fuelling facilities being given to warships and merchant vessels of the U.S.A. and of other United Nations, as convoy arrangements would obviously make it inconvenient to restrict such facilities only to the British. In view of the fact that the approach to the Portuguese was made on the basis of the treaties of alliance, I hope you will agree that we should conclude an agreement with the Portuguese on the lines desired by Dr. Salazar. I think that at a later stage, if it became necessary, it should be possible to secure Portuguese assent to the use of the facilities by the forces of other of the United Nations. In this connection, Harriman gave me a message on June 24 that you thought it would be useful if Brazil could be associated with LIFE BELT and perhaps station troops in Bracken. I am sure that in view of the statements made to our Ambassador at Lisbon by Dr. Salazar, it would be very difficult to secure Portuguese consent to such a proposal, and that it would jeopardize the success of the negotiations if we were to try to persuade them to accept other than British forces. I should not, therefore, like to have to raise this matter with the Portuguese at this time.

We have now proposed to Dr. Salazar that immediate discussions should be opened between experts on both sides, and our delegation will leave for Lisbon very soon."

WINANT

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁵⁵

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1943.

299. For the Former Naval Person. The circumstances of our peaceful occupation of the Azores and the attitude of cooperation

⁵⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

and common endeavor of the Government of Portugal in my opinion, place an obligation upon us to furnish military assistance to Portugal. Under these circumstances, I believe that Salazar should be assured that military forces will be sent to Portugal.

The Axis thus far has avoided commitment in the Iberian Peninsula under very favorable circumstances, and even though the movement of United Nations' forces into Portugal might precipitate an Axis invasion of Spain, that action appears unlikely. However, we must expect Germany to launch concentrated air and submarine attacks upon Portugal as retaliation and in order to impress neutral nations. It is inevitable that grave consequences would result if adequate provision were not made by the United Nations to meet this contingency.

A defensive force capable of providing the necessary initial assistance might include one infantry division, plus strong air defense elements consisting of 26 anti-aircraft battalions, ten day and two night fighter squadrons, two anti-submarine squadrons, together with supporting and service troops. Combat elements (less anti-aircraft troops) and possibly, though not probably, a part of the service units for this force could be obtained from the Mediterranean area with, however, a limiting effect on the scope of PRICELESS.⁵⁶ The anti-aircraft and the remainder of the service troops must be secured elsewhere, with a resulting effect on OVERLORD.⁵⁷

A preliminary examination indicates that the provision of shipping for this force would limit the scope of PRICELESS and would cost OVERLORD from two to four divisions.

My suggested action in these circumstances will cause certain delays in operations agreed to in TRIDENT.⁵⁸ However, I believe that we must accept this interference.

I should appreciate having your views on the foregoing. I think there is something to be said for the thought that a peninsular campaign would be very difficult for the Axis and that secure landing places for us are not to be laughed off.

ROOSEVELT

⁵⁶ Code name for the post-HUSKY operations in the Mediterranean; HUSKY is code name used for the Allied invasion of Sicily, July 1943.

⁵⁷ Code name used for Allied cross-Channel invasion of northwest Europe, June 1944.

⁵⁸ Code name for the conference at Washington between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and their advisers, May 12-May 24, 1943. Documentation regarding this conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁵⁹

LONDON, July 3, 1943.

341. Former Naval Person⁶⁰ to President Roosevelt. Thank you very much for your No. 299, which we have deeply considered.

Our discussions with Salazar about "LIFE BELT" are proceeding on the basis that Portugal maintains non-belligerency. We know this is what Salazar wants. If successful, which is far from certain, we shall secure "LIFE BELT" islands without deranging our present agreed strategy in the European and Mediterranean theatres. We do not believe that the Portuguese desire Allied Ground Forces on their mainland, and sending them might increase the risk of a German invasion. We share your view that our occupation of "LIFE BELT" will not, by itself, be likely to bring on a German ground invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. Anyhow the Spaniards are more likely to resist such invasion if we have not provoked it by landing troops.

Apart from a serious ground invasion, it would hardly pay the Germans to bomb Lisbon and Oporto. By so doing, they would only blot out a valuable listening post and enable us to base air squadrons in Portugal which would, *inter alia*, protect our convoys from German air attack and also strengthen the bay patrol. They would also lose their vital wolfram. If, therefore, we are right in thinking the Germans will not attack by ground forces, they are also unlikely to attack by air merely out of spite.

We have got ready to send simultaneously with the dispatch of the "LIFE BELT" Brigade about a hundred Ack Ack guns as part of the local defences of Lisbon and Oporto, as well as two day and one night fighter squadrons which Portal considers sufficient to deal with any bomber attack the Germans could make at this present time. We do not yet know what the Portuguese will ask for. They may be shy even of taking the forces aforesaid, lest it prejudice their non-belligerency.

Should, per contra, the Portuguese make our sending of ground forces a condition of granting "LIFE BELT", we must discuss with you what this would mean to our whole strategy.

We can, in any case, afford to await the outcome of "HUSKY", by which time we shall have learnt the extent and character of the Portuguese demands.

⁵⁹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁶⁰ Code name for Winston Churchill.

853.79681/103

Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 7 July, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In January 1943 the Air Transport Command of the Army Air Forces requested Pan American Airways, Inc., to explore the possibility of securing land airport facilities in the Azores. Pan American was to seek these facilities supposedly for commercial purposes but the real reason of the Army Air Forces' interest was to have these facilities available as a ferrying point for the transfer of heavy military aircraft from the United States to European and African theaters of operation when authority to do so was granted by the Portuguese Government.

On April 20, 1943, Pan American representatives submitted to the Portuguese National Air Council a proposal for service with large land aircraft through the Azores and Lisbon to the United Kingdom. No mention of service through the Azores to North Africa was made because it was felt that initially a proposed service to the United Kingdom would receive more favorable consideration.

The members of the Portuguese National Air Council raised no definitive objection to the proposed land plane service by Pan American but requested that a detailed statement of ground facilities and technical requirements be submitted. It is understood that Pan American will promptly submit such a statement and at the same time will suggest that a test flight with a C-54 Transport be made from Lisbon to the Azores, with Portuguese officials to ascertain more accurately the requirements involved.

These negotiations were begun before the TRIDENT Conference and such negotiations have been continuing their normal course since that time.

The British Government has not been notified of this project and the Portuguese Government has not been notified of the United States Government's interest in the project.

The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that you inform the British Foreign Office of the status of these negotiations and enlist its support when our legation has the occasion to advise the Portuguese Government of the United States Government's official interest in the matter.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
WILLIAM D. LEAHY

853.79681/94 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1943—8 p. m.

4484. In April 1943 Pan American Airways submitted to Portuguese authorities a proposal for land plane service to United Kingdom through the Azores and Lisbon. A prerequisite for this service is the securing of land airport facilities in the Azores, a matter in which our Air Transport Command is greatly interested.

On the assumption that it will be necessary for our Legation at Lisbon to assist officially in obtaining use of these land facilities in the Azores, and because of the desirability of having British support at such time, the British Ambassador here⁶¹ was recently informed of the status of these unofficial negotiations. A short time later he requested that the matter be held in abeyance since our proposed action might interfere with certain current negotiations between the British and Portuguese Governments.

Since Pan American's request presumably involves little more than a change in type of flight equipment, and incidentally has definite possibilities of aiding the prosecution of the war, it is not clear to the Department that the action contemplated by us would interfere with current British negotiations in Lisbon to which Lord Halifax referred. Unless the British Government has serious grounds for feeling that the impression given us by Halifax is correct and strongly desires us to hold in abeyance our own matter, we should prefer to proceed as planned.

Kindly take this up with the British authorities and report their reaction.

This message has been repeated to Lisbon as Depts no. 1275.

HULL

741.53/121 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, August 4, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received August 4—12:20 p. m.]

5051. For the President and the Secretary. In talking with Eden today he brought up a matter which has previously been brought to the Department's attention (my 4285 June 29, 10 p. m. and other

⁶¹ Viscount Halifax.

message). I asked him to put this request in writing. He has just sent me the following letter:

"You will remember that on the 29th June I handed you a message for communication to President Roosevelt on the subject of LIFE BELT.

In that message the hope was expressed that the President would authorize us to inform the Portuguese Government that in the event of a satisfactory agreement being reached the United States Government would be willing to associate themselves with the assurances already given by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. The Portuguese Government had asked specifically that we should approach the United States Government on this point.

The negotiations are now reaching a decisive stage and it is becoming urgently necessary for us to be able to inform the Portuguese Government that we are authorized by the United States Government to state that the latter associate themselves with the assurances already given by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom concerning the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies. I should be glad if you would let me know as soon as possible whether the United States Government are willing to authorize His Majesty's Government to do this."

WINANT

853.79681/101 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 5, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 3:20 p. m.]

5100. Matter dealt with in Department's 4484, July 26, 8 p. m., was taken up with Foreign Office as instructed. Foreign Office feels, as explained by Lord Halifax, that this matter should be held in abeyance so as not to interfere with certain current negotiations. At a later stage, Foreign Office adds, British Government will be prepared to give us any support it can.

WINANT

741.53/157

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*⁶²

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1943.

There is submitted herewith a draft of a telegram which it is proposed to send to London in connection with the secret negotiations now in progress between the British Government and the Prime Min-

⁶² This memorandum was returned to the Secretary's office on August 11, bearing the President's handwritten endorsement "OK FDR".

ister of Portugal. The conditions set forth in London's telegram no. 4285 of June 29, 1943 are as follows:

- (1) That at the close of hostilities British troops would be withdrawn from Bracken, and
- (2) That Portuguese sovereignty will be maintained over all Portuguese colonies.

In lieu of the assurances concerning "the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies", it will be observed that in the attached draft telegram⁶³ a phraseology has been submitted to indicate the undertaking of this Government to respect Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies.

There is attached a copy of a communication⁶⁴ addressed to the Department by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 9, 1943, upon which the second paragraph of the draft telegram is based.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

741.53/121: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*⁶⁵

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1943—1 a. m.

4856. Your 5051, August 4, 4 p. m. and 4285, June 29, 10 p. m. With regard to the British assurances, this Government is ready to communicate to the Portuguese Government (1) its concurrence in the undertaking to withdraw troops upon the termination of hostilities and (2) its agreement to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies.

With regard to the other conditions laid down by Dr. Salazar, our Chiefs of Staff, with the President's approval, have indicated to the British Chiefs of Staff that while appreciative of the delicacy of conversations now in progress between the British and the Portuguese, nevertheless any agreement restricting facilities in Bracken to British aircraft is unacceptable to this country and would not be in harmony with the TRIDENT Agreement. They have further indicated the vital importance that Bracken facilities be accorded air ferry, transport and military operations for this country. Obviously

⁶³ The "draft telegram" was subsequently sent as telegram No. 4856, August 12, to London, *infra*.

⁶⁴ Not attached to file copy.

⁶⁵ Department's file copy of this telegram is endorsed "FDR" in the President's hand. Telegram No. 5313, August 13, from London, reported that the message in this telegram had been transmitted to Foreign Secretary Eden and that the Foreign Office had informed Ambassador Winant on August 13 that the British reply would be made through the British Embassy in Washington and the Chiefs of Staff (741.53/122).

this would necessitate adequate protective and ground maintenance personnel.

HULL

841.34553B/12

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On June 29th Mr. Eden handed to Mr. Winant a message from the Prime Minister for the President informing him of the progress then made in connection with the British request to the Portuguese for facilities, and in particular of Dr. Salazar's stipulation that in no circumstances could he agree to admit forces other than British, except perhaps in the event of Portugal becoming fully involved in the war. In this message the hope was expressed that since the approach to the Portuguese Government was being made on the basis of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the President would agree that His Majesty's Government should conclude an agreement with Portugal on the lines desired by Dr. Salazar. It was added that at a later stage it ought to be possible to secure Portuguese assent to the use of the facilities by other United Nations forces.

Copies of a message from the British Chiefs of Staff to the United States Chiefs of Staff of the 31st July, and of a reply from the latter of the 4th August are enclosed.⁶⁶

His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon has now reported that to raise the request of the American Chiefs of Staff with Dr. Salazar at the present crucial stage in the negotiations would risk undoing all the progress made, and the complete failure of the negotiations, at a moment when it is hoped that the agreement is on the point of signature. His Majesty's Government do not therefore feel able to press the matter at present but assure the United States Government that immediately they begin to enjoy the facilities granted by the Portuguese Government they will make every endeavour to extend the benefit of them to the United States, as the American Chiefs of Staff have already been informed by the British Chiefs of Staff.

At the same time His Majesty's Government have instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon to confine any written references to assurances concerning the Portuguese Colonies to those given by His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa and the Commonwealth of Australia, omitting references to the United States, in case the United States Government wishes to link any assurance from it about the future of the Portuguese

⁶⁶ Neither printed.

Colonies with the grant of the facilities desired for the United States forces. If Dr. Salazar reverts to the question of the United States, His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon has been instructed to say that His Majesty's Government understand that the United States Government is in fact willing to communicate to the Portuguese Government its agreement to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese Colonies but that this matter is still under discussion between United States Government and His Majesty's Government. None the less, His Majesty's Government believe that an early communication from the United States Government to the Portuguese Government in respect of Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese Colonies might make it easier to obtain the Portuguese agreement now, and also in the future the facilities which the United States Government requires.

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1943.

741.53/138 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 31, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received August 31—5 : 32 p. m.]

5741. Eden today handed me the text of agreement and annexes reached with the Portuguese authorities for the use of Portuguese facilities in the Azores by United Kingdom aircraft and military and naval forces. Agreement is dated August 17 and use of facilities specified will begin as from 8th October, 1943.⁶⁷

For reasons of security am arranging to despatch this text by special courier on Army bomber expected to leave September 1st.

WINANT

841.34553B/15

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Certain arrangements of detail arising out of the agreement signed at Lisbon on August 17th require early coordination between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government. These arrangements concern in particular security questions and the positions of Consuls and other foreign nationals in the territory concerned.

2. As regards Consuls, His Majesty's Government understand that

⁶⁷ For text of the agreement, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLVI, p. 447.

United States Government do not wish any special arrangements to be made on behalf of their Consular Officers in the area in question.

3. In addition to closing of foreign Consulates, it has been decided to remove all foreigners living in Terceira and Fayal, and to subject all foreigners living in other islands of the group to strict measure of control. It has, however, been agreed that all British and United States nationals belonging to an essential public service such as that operated by Pan American Airways at Horta, and any other British or United States nationals on a list to be supplied by His Majesty's Consuls to the Portuguese military authorities, shall be exempted from these measures. It is understood that the only United States nationals involved, other than Consular officials or employees of Pan American Airways, are Portuguese-Americans of dual nationality, who would in any case be allowed to remain. No United States citizens will therefore in practice be adversely affected by these arrangements.

4. In connection with security, the following points arise:

(a) For reasons of operational security His Majesty's Government hope that the Portuguese Government will agree to postpone any public statement concerning this agreement until 10 to 14 days after the arrival of British forces in the Islands. If the Portuguese Government agree it will be necessary to ensure that no travellers, either by ship or air, should reach any point outside the Islands if they have been in the area at any time during this period of 10 to 14 days. If necessary shipping and air service time tables will have to be adjusted accordingly. The Embassy would be glad to discuss with the State Department what action will be necessary to secure this, on the assumption that the Portuguese Government agree to postpone a public announcement.

(b) It will be necessary during the period referred to in (a) above that the Pan American Airways radio transmitter in the area should cease to operate. The Portuguese authorities will themselves issue the necessary instructions locally, but as Pan American Airways operate under the United States Navy Department it seems desirable that the Pan American Airways representatives at Horta should be advised, by message sent by *cable* immediately before the arrival of the convoys conveying the British forces, to acquiesce in the instructions issued by the Portuguese authorities. It is hoped that the United States authorities will authorise the despatch of this message.

(c) In order that there may be no leakage of information it would be desirable that United States authorities should impose, as from the end of September, a censorship ban on all reference to operations in the neighbourhood of the Portuguese Atlantic Islands, until such time as the public announcement is made.

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1943.

841.34553B/15

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department has examined with care the *aide-mémoire* of the British Embassy dated September 21, 1943, deposited with the Department by Mr. Hayter⁶⁸ on September 22, 1943. In delivering this *aide-mémoire* Mr. Hayter inquired whether the United States Government would be prepared to say when the public announcement of this matter is made that the United States Government had been fully informed concerning this matter and that it had approved the move. Mr. Hayter explained that the purpose of such an announcement on the part of the American Government would be to forestall a criticism that the United Kingdom was seeking postwar civil aviation advantages.

It is the intention of this Government to maintain complete secrecy with regard to the agreement signed at Lisbon on August 17, 1943, and ensuing action, as long as possible, and upon release from strict secrecy to adopt the following line in its broadcasts:

(a) This is in no sense an occupation of the Azores.

(b) The administration of the Azores, civil and military, and the military defense of the Azores remain in the hands of the Portuguese authorities.

(c) This is merely a limited extension of commercial facilities heretofore enjoyed in the Azores.

In addition, it is now proposed that upon the issuance of a statement by the British Government, but not before, this Government will issue a statement to the effect that it has been fully informed concerning this matter and has approved the action.

In order to be in a position to make the statement requested by the Embassy it is deemed important that the Embassy should acquaint the Department in full with the details of the separate agreements negotiated since the signing of the agreement of August 17, 1943, including a statement of the prices at which military equipment and supplies to the Portuguese Government, covered in the agreement, will be furnished.

As regards consuls no special arrangements are asked in behalf of the consular officers of this country in the area in question, beyond the arrangement already agreed upon that these officers will be permitted to rejoin their posts immediately following the operation, in the capacity of shipping commissioners.

It is noted that it has been decided to remove all foreigners living in Terceira and Fayal and to subject all foreigners residing in other

⁶⁸ W. G. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

islands of the group to a strict measure of control. It is noted that it has been agreed that all United States nationals belonging to an essential public service such as that operated by Pan American Airways, and any other United States nationals on a list to be supplied by His Majesty's Consuls to the Portuguese military authorities, shall be exempted from these measures. It is assumed that His Majesty's Consuls will take the necessary steps to receive such lists from the American consular officers concerned. It is further noted that American citizens of dual (Portuguese American) nationality will in any case be permitted to remain.

The Department is at the disposal of the Embassy to discuss necessary action in the interest of operational security to ensure that no travelers, either by ship or by air should reach any point outside the Islands if they have been in the area at any time during a period of from ten to fourteen days after the arrival of British forces in the Islands.

Arrangements will be made to secure the compliance by Pan American Airways representatives in Horta with necessary instructions to be given them by the Portuguese authorities to secure a cessation of operations of the Pan American Airways radio transmitter. It is proposed to accomplish the despatch of appropriate instructions by cable immediately before the arrival of the convoys.

Steps will be taken, as from the end of September, to establish a censorship ban on all references to operations in the neighborhood of the affected area until such time as the proposed public announcement is made.

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1943.

841.34553B/15

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

With further reference to the *aide-mémoire* of the British Embassy dated September 21, 1943 deposited with the Department by Mr. Hayter on September 22, 1943, the Department is informed that the War and Navy Departments will arrange to meet the British desire to insure that no travelers shall reach any point outside the islands if they have been in the area at any time during the period of from ten to fourteen days after the arrival of the British forces, in so far as this concerns the movements of Pan American employees. The Department is further informed that the movements of any other civilians are not believed to be within the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The War and Navy Departments will arrange to issue the necessary instructions in connection with the Pan American Airways radio transmitters.

WASHINGTON, [September 30, 1943?]

741.53/124a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1943—2 p. m.

6116. Your 5051, August 4, 4 p. m. You may inform the Prime Minister that with respect to the British assurances this Government has authorized its Chargé d'Affaires in Lisbon to communicate to Dr. Salazar its agreement to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies if (but only if) Dr. Salazar should approach the Chargé d'Affaires with a request for such an undertaking.⁶⁹

HULL

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁷⁰

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1943.

376. To Former Naval Person. I have just received the following recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:⁷¹

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to convey to you their serious concern regarding the situation which has developed with respect to the use of the Azores.

The importance of the central Atlantic air transport and ferry route to the United Nations war effort cannot be over-emphasized. Briefly summarized, it represents:

a. Potential saving over the 6 months period (November 1943—April 1944) of approximately 51½ million gallons of high octane aviation fuel; sufficient to support 5,400 heavy bomber sorties per month for the same period or the rough equivalent of one month's consumption by the combined operations of the RAF and USAAF in and from the United Kingdom.

b. Potential saving in engine hours of each bomber ferried to the United Kingdom, sufficient to permit six or more additional combat missions before engine over-haul.

⁶⁹ Instructions to this effect to the Chargé in Portugal were contained in telegram No. 1700, October 4, 1 p. m., to Lisbon (741.53/124b).

⁷⁰ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁷¹ The Department of Defense has supplied information that the Joint Chiefs of Staff letter quoted by the President was apparently a draft, since on October 6, 1943, the Joint Staff Planners had not yet completed their work of preparing the letter for submission to the JCS. The version offered for JCS consideration differed only in a few phrases from the text already used by the President. Since Admiral Leahy advised the JCS that the President had already dispatched a message in this sense to the Prime Minister, the JCS never formally completed the action of approving the letter and sending it to the President.

c. The release of approximately 150 transport aircraft, which could thus become available for service in the India-Burma-China area where they are so urgently needed.

d. Some 15,000 trained ground personnel released for duty elsewhere.

This gasoline consumption required by the longer southern route is at the direct expense of the U.S. Army Air Forces Training Program which has just been temporarily curtailed due to fuel shortage. Unless immediate action is taken to effect a saving, the flow of replacement combat crews to theaters of operation will soon be reduced. Alternatively, the reserve levels of gasoline now maintained in theaters of operations will have to be lowered.

The present British-Portuguese agreement covering facilities in the islands does not provide facilities for air transport and air ferrying operations. We have advised the British Chiefs of Staff of our requirements and of additional steps which we feel should be taken, but we have little confidence that the British will provide facilities for a central Atlantic air route in time to be of value to the OVERLORD build-up during the coming winter months.

We consider this matter to be so serious that we are suggesting that you bring it to the attention of the Prime Minister, emphasizing the grave implications of delay in securing facilities for air ferrying and air transport operations. Our suggestion is that a specific request be made to the Prime Minister to make Lagens Field, Terceira, available for air transport and air ferrying purposes immediately following our initial entry and that further negotiations with the Portuguese be instituted in which the United States will participate with Great Britain to secure the additional facilities so urgently required."

I agree that this is a very important matter.

ROOSEVELT

741.53/152a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1943—10 p. m.

3771. Personal for the Ambassador. Please seek an immediate opportunity of calling on President Vargas⁷² and of giving him orally the following personal and highly confidential message from the President:

"I believe that I need not emphasize to you the strategic importance of the Azores in relation to the anti-submarine campaign. You and I discussed this situation last January.⁷³ An arrangement has now

⁷² Getulio Vargas, President of Brazil.

⁷³ President Roosevelt and President Vargas conferred at Natal, Brazil, on January 29, 1943. In the course of the meeting, President Roosevelt proposed to President Vargas that Brazil suggest to the Portuguese Government that Brazilian troops be sent to the Azores and Madeira to relieve Portuguese troops there, and President Vargas expressed a willingness to take up the matter with Salazar, subject to certain conditions. (See vol. v, section under Brazil entitled "Conference between President Roosevelt and President Vargas . . .")

been concluded between the British and Portuguese Governments which will enable the British to conduct air and sea activities against German submarines from the Azores. This arrangement will become effective in the very near future, probably on Friday, October 8. The agreement is based upon the six-century-old Treaty of Alliance between Portugal and Great Britain, in accordance with which these two countries pledged themselves to come to the aid of each other on request. Naturally you and I would have preferred an arrangement under which Portugal came to the assistance of the United Nations as a whole in their struggle against the Axis. However the bi-lateral agreement with Great Britain was apparently the only formula acceptable to Dr. Salazar. I am confident that the measures which the British will now be able to take will be of the very greatest assistance in driving submarines from the middle and south Atlantic."

Please inform the Department urgently of Vargas' reaction to the above.

Please also take every means of stressing the necessity for secrecy in connection with this operation until we hear from the British that the [matter?] may be made public without jeopardizing the safety of those involved.

HULL

741.53/153 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

RIO DE JANEIRO, October 7, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 4: 51 p. m.]

4739. Your 3771, October 6, 10 p. m. President Vargas is travelling on the southern frontier and will not return to Rio until the latter part of next week (my 4721, October 6, 10 a. m.⁷⁴). Today he is to lunch at his father's fazenda.

Under these circumstances I showed the telegram to Aranha⁷⁵ and we both are in complete agreement that President Vargas, while deprecating the fact that Salazar preferred to do this business with the British rather than with Brazil, will warmly approve the arrangement made as it is in the good cause.

I will of course convey the message to President Vargas when I have the opportunity of doing so. I duly impressed upon Aranha the necessity for secrecy.

CAFFERY

⁷⁴ Not printed.

⁷⁵ Oswaldo Aranha, Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

741.53/130a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1943—2 p. m.

6235. Department's 6116, October 4, 2 p. m. Please inform the Prime Minister that the Department is now instructing its Chargé d'Affaires in Lisbon to make this communication to Dr. Salazar without awaiting his request.⁷⁶

HULL

741.53/10-2143 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁷⁷

[LONDON,] October 8, 1943.

444. Your 376.⁷⁸ I fully recognize all the advantages set forth. Our forces were admitted to these islands on October 8th and publicity will be given on the 12th. It will be necessary to see what the German reaction is. If as I expect it is merely abusive, Salazar will be reassured and I will then immediately ask Salazar either by a direct message or through our Ambassador that you should have the necessary facilities for the ferry service which is of vital consequence and I will explain or have explained the full force of the argument to him.

2. I shall of course agree that Salazar has taken the plunge and to a large extent joined the Allies and that he runs no greater risk by your being in the islands too. On the contrary, by so doing he gets added support and the friendship of the United States and American guarantee about respecting Portuguese colonies similar to that which we have given. I assume that I may make full play with this argument since we already informed the Portuguese last June, on your authority, that we understood that the United States Government would associate itself with our Colonial guarantees. I have also received Mr. Winant's message that your Chargé d'Affaires at Lisbon has been instructed to communicate such guarantees only if requested to do so by Dr. Salazar. It should therefore be possible to keep this card in our hand for the present and it should assist us materially in playing our game.

⁷⁶ The instruction to this effect was contained in telegram No. 1725, October 8, 2 p. m., to Lisbon (741.53/126a), but in a later message, telegram No. 745, October 9, the Chargé was directed to disregard telegram No. 1725 and to await further action pending instructions from the Department (741.53/130b).

⁷⁷ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on October 21, 1943.

⁷⁸ Dated October 6, p. 547.

3. I am communicating through the State Department a Portuguese communication showing that they contemplate eventually taking an active part in the war at least in the Far East.⁷⁹ Our task will be much easier if and when Portugal joins us as a belligerent, and it is very much better in these matters to work things up gradually.

4. Supposing that Salazar refuses, being afraid you will stay there after the war and of the ambitions of Pan American Airways, I will immediately report to you. Then is the moment for your Ambassador to come forward or for you to address Salazar personally, it being of course understood that we shall give you fullest help and support by every means. We have in any case already provided under our own agreement with Portugal for the arrival of the first mixed convoy early November to which you refer in your 375.⁸⁰ I agree with detailed arrangements proposed in that telegram which should not give rise to any difficulties. I hope the Portuguese may be brought along in a friendly way and that they will listen to the many good reasons we can both advance for their doing so.

5. Pray let me know how you view this programme.

741.53/135: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 13, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received October 13—5:21 p. m.]

6993. On receiving your 6116 on October 4 I communicated its contents both to the Prime Minister and to Mr. Eden. On October 8 I received your 6235 and replied immediately on its decoding in my 6856, October 8, 12 midnight.⁸¹ You in turn replied in your 6268, October 9⁸² but followed it up with your 6308, October 9.⁸³

Since then I have talked several times with the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Sir Alexander Cadogan⁸⁴ and Mr. Roberts⁸⁵ of the Foreign

⁷⁹ British *aide-mémoire* dated October 13, 1943, relating to Portuguese willingness to enter the war against Japan is missing from Department files (740.0011 Pacific War/3492).

⁸⁰ Not printed.

⁸¹ Latter not printed; Ambassador Winant stated he believed it was in the interest of the United States to postpone assuring Salazar of American respect for sovereignty of Portuguese colonies (741.53/126).

⁸² Not printed (741.53/126); it reported that instructions had been sent to the Chargé in Portugal simultaneously with the dispatch of Department's telegram No. 6235, October 8, to London, p. 550.

⁸³ Not printed; it reported that the Chargé in Portugal had been instructed to take no further action pending new instructions from the Department (741.53/130c).

⁸⁴ Permanent Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

⁸⁵ Frank K. Roberts, Acting Head of the Central Department of the British Foreign Office.

Office who sat in with Ambassador Campbell during the negotiations with Salazar. The outcome of these conversations which contains our combined judgment is embodied in the directive given below forwarded by the Foreign Office today to Ambassador Campbell and repeated to Washington. I hope you will approve of my action and the approach therein suggested. The text below is a direct quotation of the message referred to. It reestablishes the position taken by the Department in its 6116 October 4, 2 p. m. You might want to send a further explanatory to our Chargé d'Affaires in Lisbon.

Begin directive:

"In view of original American decision reported in Washington telegram No. 4449⁸⁶ to communicate United States assurances if and only if requested to do so by Dr. Salazar, it was felt, after discussion with United States Ambassador here, that we should acquiesce in this decision and that we should ourselves make such use as we could of the United States assurances when the time comes to approach Dr. Salazar with a view to extending our facilities. (Further instructions on this will follow in due course.)

2. Later United States decision to communicate assurances without further delay, although unexpected, was not unwelcome to us, and we were then prepared to let matters take their course. United States Ambassador, however, in view of earlier conversations referred to above himself advised delay. Hence the countermanding instructions to United States Chargé d'Affaires reported in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 2062.

3. We have now advised United States Ambassador that in view (a) of our communication about United States assurances made to Dr. Salazar last June, and (b) of action already taken by United States Chargé d'Affaires with both Dr. Salazar and Dr. Leitao, it might only arouse suspicion and prejudice the atmosphere for our further conversations if United States assurances are delayed any longer.

4. I understand that United States Ambassador agrees, but he has suggested that in order to explain the circumstances of United States Chargé d'Affaires' approach, the line should be taken with Dr. Salazar that, having regard to the Portuguese desire to maintain neutrality and to avoid unnecessary provocation to Germany, the United States Government on reflection thought that it might only embarrass him to receive the United States assurances just before public announcement of the Azores Agreement. United States Government were however ready to communicate these assurances now or at such time as Dr. Salazar considered most appropriate.

5. Although actual communication on above lines must of course be left to United States Chargé d'Affaires, you might, after explaining the situation to him, also explain it to the Portuguese Government.

6. You should inform your United States colleague of above, but no action should be taken by you or by him pending receipt of further instructions from Washington."

End directive.

WINANT

⁸⁶ See telegram No. 6116, October 4, to London, p. 547.

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁸⁷

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1943.

387. To the Former Naval Person. You will recall agreement, made during your recent Portuguese negotiations, that any direct approach by U. S. Government to Portuguese Government would be suspended until those negotiations were concluded. Those negotiations were, as you know, concluded on 17 August with signing of INGOT agreement.

It was not practicable, however, to have included in that agreement adequate provision for U. S. Navy facilities in Azores, or any provision whatever for facilities for U. S. air transport and air ferrying operations.

We both fully realize the tremendous importance to combined war effort of establishing Central Atlantic air transport and ferry route via Azores, with resultant saving of millions of gallons of high octane gasoline and many thousands of pilot and engine hours per month.

We have received information from Lisbon that the Portuguese Government would not object to direct negotiations with the United States looking toward the use by U. S. airplanes of the islands, and I should like to suggest for your consideration that the U. S. State Department be directed by me to make a direct approach to the Government of Portugal with the purpose of obtaining agreement to permit us to provide aviation facilities in the Azores and to use such facilities for our combatant and transport airplanes in the furtherance of the Allied war effort.

I hope you will agree to this line of approach to our common problem and that if practicable your Representatives in Portugal may assist and join with ours in the discussions.

ROOSEVELT

741.53/135: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1943—10 p. m.

6402. Your 6993, October 13, 8 p. m. Department instructed Lisbon to deliver the assurances if approached by Salazar, and subsequently, at the request of the British Embassy, upon instructions from the Foreign Office, the Department instructed Lisbon to go ahead without awaiting an approach. Before Lisbon could execute this instruction the British Embassy intimated that the British Prime Minister in his message to the President had requested us to hold off for the

⁸⁷ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

reason that it was considered desirable to hold these assurances for possible future use in the acquisition of facilities in the Azores for us. The previous instruction was therefore canceled.

As this reasoning still appears valid, and as no approach has been made to us by the Portuguese to indicate any anxiety or suspicion, the Department is temporarily withholding further instructions to Lisbon.

You will observe that the first sentence of paragraph (2) of the British directive is not accurate.

HULL

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁸⁸

LONDON, [October 15, 1943.]

458. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Your number 387. By all means make your own request to the Portuguese Government. We will back you to the full, quoting particularly the "Friends to Friends" phrase in the Treaty of 1373.⁸⁹ Our two ambassadors should play the hand together, your man now taking the lead.

The only question open is whether you should give them a few more days to watch the German reaction. We leave this to you.⁹⁰

811.34553B/4a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Portugal (Kennan)

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1943—10 p. m.

1798. The following instructions are given you by direction of the President, to be executed on October 18 or as soon thereafter as possible, if at such time no military action has been taken by Germany against Portugal.

You are aware that we have held in suspense certain negotiations in order to avoid interference with the negotiations leading up to the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of August 17. Our negotiations were

⁸⁸ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁸⁹ Treaty of peace, friendship, and alliance between England and Portugal, signed at London, June 16, 1373; for text see *British and Foreign State Papers* vol. I, p. 462. Article I of the treaty reads: "In the first place, we settle and covenant that there shall be from this day forward . . . true, faithful, constant, mutual and perpetual Friendships, Unions, Alliances, and Leagues of sincere affection and that as true and faithful Friends they shall henceforth reciprocally be Friends to Friends, and Enemies to Enemies, and shall assist, maintain, and uphold each other mutually by sea and by land against all Men that may live or die . . ."

⁹⁰ A marginal note in longhand states: "A paraphrase to Secy. Stettinius with instructions to carry out with our Chargé d'Affaires on Monday 18 Oct. if at that time Germany has not taken action against Portugal."

designed to make available for us certain facilities in the Azores for our Army and Navy. You are now directed to seek an interview with Dr. Salazar and to request the following facilities:

a. For U.S. Naval surface craft: São Miguel Island. One operating and supply base at Ponta Delgada.

b. For U.S. Naval aircraft:

- (1) Fayal Island. One seaplane base at Horta.
- (2) São Miguel Island. One landplane base.

c. For U.S. Army Air Force aircraft.

(1) Terceira Island. One landplane base at Lagens Field for air transport and ferry operations, and accommodations for personnel.

(2) Flores Island. One landplane base for air transport and ferry operations. If the terrain of Flores Island does not permit adequate air base construction, the base may be placed on Santa Maria Island. Housing facilities to be provided to accommodate personnel.

d. Existing cable systems and communications facilities essential to the operations of U. S. forces based on and operating through the Azores and to the operations of U. S. forces in the North African and European theaters of operations.

e. Observation posts, Radar, etc., as required.

Where aircraft facilities are mentioned, we understand unrestricted use, as for example of Lagens Airfield and Rabo de Peixe Airfield.

In connection with these facilities we shall require:

(1) Unrestricted port facilities and shore accommodations for necessary personnel in Azores ports and the privilege of placing in each port affected a station ship of the United States Navy and necessary tankers, tenders, tugs, etc.;

(2) Prompt admission of necessary American personnel for the improvement, construction, and operation of these facilities;

(3) Prompt customs clearance for necessary material and supplies for the improvement, construction and operation of these facilities and for the maintenance of personnel.

We propose to restrict the use of facilities to an indispensable minimum but confidently expect Portugal will give friendly consideration to eventual further requests.

The request for these facilities should be based upon the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1373 and particularly upon the "Friends to Friends" phrase therein. This is in article I of that treaty. We may require British support in gaining these objectives, and if so we have the assurance of the British Prime Minister that this support will be forthcoming to the fullest extent. It is intended however that you shall take the lead in these negotiations.

The marine facilities should contemplate all the usual port facilities including refueling, water, food and other stores, repairs, etc., according to local resources.

We realize that some of the landing fields are non-existent today and consequently the facilities should embrace authorization to construct or improve fields as may be necessary in order to make fully available the facilities we have in mind.

Some of these facilities have already been extended to our British allies and in granting the same to us it is understood of course that the extent of our participation in their operation will be a matter for discussion between the appropriate British and American services.

For your confidential information the War and Navy Departments expect to send to Lisbon as soon as possible technical advisers to cooperate with you in your negotiations, but in view of the directive of the President you should not await their arrival but proceed to open negotiations as indicated in the first paragraph of this cable.

To insure priority treatment and secrecy at this end you should mark all cables on this subject U. S. Urgent, Secret for the Under Secretary⁹¹ and Matthews.⁹²

HULL

811.34553B/5 : Telegram

The Chargé in Portugal (Kenman) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, October 18, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 11:46 p. m.]

2449. For the Under Secretary and Matthews. Department's 1798, October 16. There are in my opinion compelling reasons why we should not advance these requests in the prescribed scope and at this particular moment. I believe that to do so would prejudice rather than benefit the chances—which are otherwise not unfavorable—of our ultimately coming to share the use of the facilities already granted to the British, and that it might cause complications in British-Portuguese relations not to mention our own.

I am reluctant to enter into a discussion with the Department or to ask the Department to do so with the President, over an instruction given me by the President. For this reason, I shall not cite here the various reasons for these opinions. But I should like to make it plain that I am willing to take full personal responsibility for this position;

⁹¹ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., appointed to succeed Sumner Welles, September 25, 1943.

⁹² H. Freeman Matthews, Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

and I should welcome it if the Department instead of requiring me to proceed at once with the execution of the instruction would permit me to return immediately to Washington and to explain, if necessary, personally to the President, the reasons for my views.

If the Department should approve this plan, I could proceed to North Africa Wednesday⁹³ morning by plane on the pretext—as far as Lisbon is concerned—of paying a visit to Algiers. I could presumably proceed at once from North Africa to Washington returning to Lisbon as soon as my mission is accomplished. It is not probable that much comment would be caused in Lisbon by a short absence. I would, of course, require specific authorization by return cable; and the Air Transport authorities at Algiers would have to be asked to cooperate.

As regards the delay in this case to the execution of the instruction, I may say that the Portuguese are not yet by any means sufficiently reassured about German intentions to provide the atmosphere envisaged in the instructions. It was only 3 days ago that they received the German note of protest worded in somewhat ominous terms and they are all gloomily awaiting some form of retribution. For this reason, I think that any delay is to the good.

The British Ambassador has been informed by his Government that I was receiving instructions of this general nature although his Government did not seem to have been aware of the full extent of our program. I have asked him to request his Government to make no comment to Washington this respect before I could have an opportunity to make my own because I have no desire to evade the direct responsibility which I bear for the execution of these orders.

KENNAN

811.34553B/5a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Portugal (Kennan)

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1943—1 p. m.

1816. Your 2449, October 18, 8 p. m., has been shown to the President who has directed me to state that a brief delay in opening negotiations will have no damaging effect from our point of view. He sees no reason however for your return here but wishes you to submit your views in full by cable.

STETTINIUS

⁹³ October 20.

741.53/10-2143 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*¹

[LONDON,] October 19, 1943.

466. I fear there may be some misunderstanding about your proposed direct approach to Portuguese concerning use of Azores. When you told me you had received information from Lisbon that Portuguese Government would not object to direct negotiations with your Government on this subject, I encouraged you to go ahead, thinking that all you had in mind were facilities for the ferry service referred to in my No. 444,² because in reply you said you were delighted with these arrangements.

Now I learn from Lisbon that you are instructing your Chargé d'Affaires to put the demands formulated by United States Chiefs of Staff on September 8th. The difficulties inherent in these were telegraphed from here to the Joint Staff Mission on September 18th.

I cannot help feeling that we could not obtain these for you immediately, and I wonder whether you have any definite information from Lisbon that you would be able to obtain them by direct approach.

811.34553B/6 : Telegram

The Chargé in Portugal (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, October 20, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 11:03 p. m.]

2469. For the Under Secretary and Matthews. Department's 1816, October 19, 1 p. m. My telegram was based on the belief that if we approach Salazar with this entire program, at this time, he will not only refuse us outright but will henceforth view with great suspicion even any minor desiderata we may later advance with respect to the Azores. In other words, he will slam the door entirely and it will not be easy to get him to open it again. The reasons for this belief are as follows:

1. Salazar is not prepared for anything of this sort.

No mention of it was made to him during British negotiations. He assented to British requests reluctantly and only in part. Even this assent was given solely on basis of alliance and he thought that when he had given it he had satisfied all demands.

2. He feels that he has strained his relations with the Germans to utmost already and that he will be lucky if he gets off with sinking of a ship or two and possibly some reprisals in Azores area. The idea of giving the Germans further cause for offense at this moment would appall him.

¹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on October 21, 1943.

² Dated October 8, p. 550.

I cannot disagree with this analysis. German-Portuguese relations seem indeed perilously close to the breaking point. Any further strain may well cause complications which would run counter to our desire to keep the Peninsula quiet at this juncture.

3. Salazar who fears association with us only slightly less than with the Russians has made a great point of the argument that in dickering with the British, he was only honoring an agreement which existed long before this war began and that his concessions were not to the United Nations as such, a temporary anti-Axis constellation, but only to Portugal's historic relationship to England. This was one of the arguments on which he relied to keep the Germans quiet.

4. German propaganda directed to Portugal has recently plugged the line "Now you'll see what you've gotten yourselves in for; the British agreement was only the beginning, other demands will follow from other members of the United Nations, the Americans are in the background and will soon want facilities of their own et cetera."

5. What we are asking is not only much more than what the British got: It considerably surpasses what they originally requested.

Our existing program advanced at this time would confirm Salazar's fears that we want nothing less than the whole archipelago, lock, stock and barrel, and it might very well make him adamant against even the mildest of further requests. It is true that when the Portuguese are willing to dicker, it is well to start by asking for plenty. When they are afraid to dicker and fear that their hand is going to be forced, the opposite is more apt to apply.

6. I have no *quid pro quo* to offer to Salazar.

While the British did not definitely undertake to defend the Portuguese mainland, they went so far as they could in this direction and Salazar probably feels that by honoring the alliance, he has in effect engaged them to do the same. He knows that they have guaranteed to respect the integrity of his empire. He also has their assurance that they will get out of the islands when the war is over. He doubtless hopes that he has committed them by implication to the support of his regime. He has also obtained advantages in the line of supplies from overseas and merchant shipping facilities for which he is inclined to thank the British.

7. The British Ambassador here has no instructions which would enable him to support us in these requests.

He has in fact the impression that our program is the same one which was at one time submitted to London by the American Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was rejected by London as excessive, and he is at a loss to explain its reappearance here. He has instructions to support us only in certain specific requests for the use by us in individual instances of facilities already granted to the British and in our general desire to operate ferry service via the Azores. He fears that if I go to Salazar with the existing program Salazar will only call him at once to account and reproach him for not giving warning in the preceding negotiations that any concessions made to England would be followed by even greater demands from us.

8. A number of the facilities we are asking for are ones which were flatly refused to the British.

Salazar in his talks with the British would not hear of facilities on São Miguel Island for the reason that it is the center of Portuguese

administration in the islands. The permission to use an airfield there occasionally for emergency landings was granted only with much reluctance. Santa Maria and Flores Islands never came into question. At no place did the British request a full-fledged naval base of their own. Our desire to station naval vessels in any Azores ports we like goes much beyond the British desire to have a mercantile marine tanker and tug at Horta. Finally what we are asking in the line of communications not only exceeds British requests but would turn both British and American cable facilities in the islands into relay stations for our conduct of the war in Europe.

So much for the negative side. The question now arises what can we then do to gain our objective.

My answer to this is as follows:

Unless we are willing to connive at the overthrow of Dr. Salazar, which would involve a responsibility I shudder to contemplate, we must gain his confidence. Our assurances of last fall³ and our forbearance during the British talks have already made a beginning in this direction. I have reason to believe that my recent talk with him was likewise helpful.

My suggestion would be that instead of calling upon him to make another anti-German demonstration on the heels of the first one—which was quite enough for his nerves—we now endeavor first to slip quietly and gradually through the gap which the British have succeeded in opening for us. . . .

I think that for the moment we should proceed in the most disarming and inconspicuous manner possible to work in an occasional American ship and plane to the use of the facilities, gradually increasing this practice, according to the degree of resilience we encounter.

Once the Portuguese have been conditioned to the presence of American planes and ships around the islands and we have thus gotten our foot in the door, I think we could well approach Salazar with the proposition that the intertwining of our war effort with that of England makes it impossible for our Armed Forces to be excluded from bases used by England but that administrative considerations require in some cases that the physical facilities used by our forces at those bases be kept separate from those of the British; that for this reason we must ask Portugal to permit us to set up certain separate establishments of our own in the islands similar—and wherever possible adjacent—to those of the British. The British Ambassador would presumably be able to support us in such a proposal and he could then make good use of the “friends of friends” argument which is a brilliant and constructive thought. Whoever negotiates the

³ Reference is to President Roosevelt's letter of November 8, 1942, to President Carmona of Portugal, assuring him that the presence of American Forces in French North Africa presaged no threat to Portugal or her island possessions; for text of letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1942, p. 905.

agreement on our behalf should be authorized to make judicial use at the proper time of assurances to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese possessions and also not to retain the facilities after the war without the agreement of the Portuguese Government. He should know just how far he can go in promising military support in the event of repercussions from Germany. He should be allowed also to play with our economic warfare pressure which might well be built up in advance as a bargaining factor. Finally, he should know whether it is the intention of our Government to make an open agreement which would be published to the world like the recent British arrangement; or whether we would be prepared to make an informal arrangement and to play down publicity to the maximum degree with a view to easing the shock to German-Portuguese relations. The latter should not be technically impossible in view of the rigid censorship in the islands; and it would undoubtedly sweeten the pill for Salazar. The above procedure may not give us all that we want. But it would reduce the risk of our getting nothing at all.

I appreciate deeply the President's generosity in allowing me to state these views. They reflect of course only a local outlook and are not intended to constitute a general picture of all the broader factors involved which I realize only the President is in a position to survey.

KENNAN

811.34553B/6 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Portugal (Kennan)

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1943—8 p. m.

1836. The President and the Department have given careful consideration to the clear and full exposition of your views contained in your 2469, October 20, 2 p. m. In the light of the considerations you advance, the President desires to leave to your judgment and discretion the manner of approach to these negotiations and the extent to which our desiderata should be presented to Dr. Salazar. You should bear in mind, however, that our need for certain air and port facilities in the Azores is imperative and urgent. With your knowledge and understanding of the local situation, the possibilities of German reactions and Portuguese psychology, the Department has confidence that you will know the practical limits to which you should go in requesting the aforesaid facilities. (The Department's telegram no. 1798, October 16, represented the maximum desired by our Air Corps and Navy authorities.)

You said in your telegram no. 2469 that you have no *quid pro quo* to offer Salazar. It is the Department's feeling that there are several

important considerations to which you may in your discretion wish to draw Dr. Salazar's attention. First among these in importance is the assurances to respect the sovereignty of Portugal and its entire colonial empire, assurances that have thus far been withheld. Secondly, the material support in the economic field which we have given and are continuing to give is far from unimportant in the maintenance of Portugal's internal stability and war-time economic life. In addition, as you may be aware, the Portuguese Government has asked us for a number of PT boats and arrangements for the granting of this request are now approaching completion. As your talks progress, it is not unlikely that Dr. Salazar will ask for further assistance in the economic field which this Government might be in a position to consider.

The Department knows that you will keep it fully and currently informed both as to the nature of your approach and the progress of the negotiations.

STETTINIUS

811.34553B/22

The Portuguese Minister (Bianchi) to the Secretary of State

No. 142

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1943.

SIR:—I am instructed by my Government to acknowledge the receipt of the note delivered in Lisbon on October the 25th, by the American Chargé d'Affaires,⁴ stating that with reference to the agreement recently concluded between Portugal and Great Britain, the United States Government has undertaken to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese Colonies.

My Government wishes me further to convey to the United States Government their appreciation and thanks for the guaranty thus given.

I avail myself [etc.]

J. BIANCHI

811.34553B/16 : Telegram

The Chargé in Portugal (Crocker) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, October 31, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

2599. For the Under Secretary and Matthews. For Kennan.⁵ As a result of a previous conversation of which you have knowledge

⁴The text of the note as reported by the Minister in Portugal in airgram No. A-695, December 21, 1943, 10:30 a. m., reads as follows:

"In pursuance to instructions from my Government, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that in connection with the agreement recently concluded between Portugal and Great Britain the United States of America undertakes to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies." (853.014/79)

⁵Mr. Kennan was temporarily in Washington for consultation.

between Solborg⁶ and Carvalhaes, the Under Secretary for War⁷ yesterday invited Solborg to call upon him for the first time. The following is a brief résumé of the conversation: Carvalhaes stated that the substance of Solborg's earlier conversation with him had been conveyed to Salazar who reacted favorably and consequently requested the Under Secretary to have this talk with Solborg. The conversation began with a somewhat extended outline of Portugal's early history and the background of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance which was based primarily upon geographical considerations (here the Under Secretary pointed out in support of this thesis that relations with Britain had not always been of the best especially during the last war when Portuguese troops were not particularly well treated in the field, et cetera). It was, of course, impossible to refuse Britain's request for facilities in the Azores under the terms of this Alliance. He then stated that the geographical situation in the modern world had been modified owing to astonishing advances in transportation, communications, modern thought and other factors in such a way as to make it comprehensible and logical that the United States should be brought closer to Portugal. "We are not unmindful of this fact" he said.

He emphasized, however, that Portugal's primary doctrine was that of strict neutrality which it was determined to preserve under all conditions.

Solborg then pointed out that the United States and Britain were fighting this war as allies and he wished to ask the Under Secretary whether he did not feel that as an ally of Portugal's ally—"Friends of Friends" so to speak—the United States might not expect to enjoy a more favored position vis-à-vis Portugal than say enemies of Portugal's ally. The Under Secretary admitted that within certain limitations such was undoubtedly the case. For instance, he continued, recognizing the ever growing needs of the United States in connection with the prosecution of the war, Portugal would favorably envisage, provided it remained both a pattern of the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement, to accord to the United States similar facilities, as for example, in connection with convoys.

Solborg signified his assent to the foregoing and the subject was pursued no further, the conversation turning on other matters chiefly in connection with the desirability of an improvement in commercial relations in the postwar world.

These then are the highlights of the conversations and the points I have touched upon have been carefully checked with Solborg as to their accuracy.

⁶ Col. Robert A. Solborg, American Military Attaché in Portugal.

⁷ Fernando dos Santos Costa.

In conveying the foregoing to you I am not unmindful of the difficulty of evaluating properly at such a distance the true import of this conversation. I am, however, persuaded that we would be on safe ground in concluding that the Under Secretary, probably reflecting Salazar's thoughts, wished to create the impression that he has at least an open mind in respect to an approach on the question of granting certain facilities to us. Neither Solborg nor myself have the impression that there was anything in the Under Secretary's statements which would justify the conclusion that we would necessarily be held within the precise limits of the British agreement.

CROCKER

*President Roosevelt to the President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers (Salazar)*⁸

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1943.

MY DEAR DR. SALAZAR: Mr. George F. Kennan has been here for a few days and I have seen him just prior to his departure. He will tell you what I have emphasized to him in regard to shortening the war and saving lives by American, as well as British, use of Terceira and Horta facilities.

But may I take this opportunity to remind you of a story with which you are familiar. In 1918, when I was the Under Secretary of the Navy, I went to Horta and to Ponta Delgada, in both of which ports the Allies were using repair, fueling and anti-submarine facilities. In fact, in Ponta Delgada the American Navy had a full-fledged base of operations—and very many of our ships used the harbor at Ponta Delgada for our fueling and repairs.

In those days there was never any question about the good faith of the United States in carrying out their pledge that as soon as possible after the war the bases would be dismantled and the shore batteries abandoned. I personally inspected everything and the relationship at that time between Portugal and the United States was on a basis of mutual confidence and great friendship. In 1919 all of our forces were withdrawn, and I am inclined to think that the use of these two places by us did much for the economic good of the people of the Azores.

I do wish that I could have a chance to see you one of these days because I want to talk to you about another matter—the furtherance of cultural relations between the United States and Portugal and Brazil. In other words, a closer association between the three na-

⁸ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

tions in regard to an improved status after the war is over. I do not need to tell you that the United States has no designs on the territory of Portugal and its possessions. I am thinking in long range terms because I do not think that our peoples have been in close enough touch in the past.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

811.34553B/16a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1943—midnight.

7024. Please have the following message from the President to Prime Minister Churchill delivered as soon as possible.

“George Kennan, our Chargé d’Affaires at Lisbon is returning to his post after brief consultation with us here. He expects to take up with Salazar immediately upon his return the urgent question of obtaining what we consider minimum necessary facilities in the Azores for the operation of the air transport, ferrying, anti-submarine and convoy operations by United States forces in that area.

I hope that he can depend on the full support of the British Ambassador to Lisbon in impressing upon the Portuguese the compelling importance to our common war effort of the early use of these facilities by United States forces and would appreciate your sending him instructions in that sense. Roosevelt.”

STETTINIUS

811.34553B/23a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Portugal (Kennan)

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1943—7 p. m.

2108. The British Embassy has asked the Department, in view of the fact that British support is to be furnished in your forthcoming negotiations, that it be furnished the nature of facilities you will request. The Embassy has been told that the Department is not fully informed on the subject and that considerable latitude has been given you. The Embassy replied that perhaps you could communicate to Sir Ronald Campbell the requests you propose to make at this time.

You are requested nevertheless to furnish the Department by cable an outline of the requests you will make at this time.

HULL

811.34553B/23 : Telegram

The Chargé in Portugal (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, November 22, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 3 p. m.]

2819. For Under Secretary and Matthews. In answer to the points raised in Department's 2108, November 20, it is my plan first to ask Salazar to confirm that Portuguese Government has no objection to use by our forces of Horta and Terceira facilities or to the participation of our engineering units in the improvement of these facilities.

Having once obtained these assurances which should make it possible for us to proceed forthwith to the improvement and use of Terceira field and to the temporary use of Horta for repairs and refueling I intend at the same interview to sound Salazar out informally on the desires of our Army and Navy for further facilities. In this I shall be guided by my original instruction, Department's 1798, October 16; and in view of failure of our military and naval authorities to agree on priorities among their respective desires I expect to place them all before Salazar in an informal and exploratory manner.

As far as the British are concerned I was given clearly to understand in Washington that it was the wish of our military and naval authorities that we should proceed with our program independently regardless of extent to which British might be prepared to support us. For this reason I am somewhat at a loss to understand instruction under reference.

In deference to the wish so strongly expressed by the Secretary of War⁹ and General Arnold¹⁰ that I should not consult with my British colleague before seeing Salazar I avoided seeing him as long as was decently possible after my return. In view of the delay in arranging the appointment with Salazar, however, a time was bound to come when I could no longer refuse without distinct discourtesy to see the British Ambassador. Accordingly I met him on Friday afternoon¹¹ at his request and outlined to him the plan which I have described above.

I must reiterate that I enter into these conversations with misgivings in view of our failure to reach complete agreement with the British in advance as to our joint military and strategic requirements. I am in a particularly poor position to demonstrate that our Navy needs a separate air field to participate in submarine patrolling when I have no clear evidence that the British, who I understand bear the

⁹ Henry L. Stimson.

¹⁰ Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

¹¹ November 19.

strategic responsibility for these operations in that particular sector, have ever recognized the need for our participation in this work in the Azores area much less our need for a separate field for this purpose.

Altogether, before entering on these discussions, I should like to record once more the view which I expressed repeatedly to our military and naval authorities at home that nothing could better facilitate the pending conversations with the Portuguese than complete agreement in the Combined Chiefs over those objectives which military necessity obliges us to seek.

I hope that the interview with Salazar will take place this evening.

KENNAN

811.34553B/24 : Telegram

The Chargé in Portugal (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, November 22, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

2825. For Under Secretary and Matthews. Interview with Salazar has been fixed for tomorrow Tuesday at 5 p. m.

British Ambassador has received instructions to support me and is being extremely cooperative and helpful.

Ambassador Norweb¹² is expected to arrive here at a late hour tonight.

KENNAN

811.34553B/26 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, November 23, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received November 24—2:12 a. m.]

2839. For the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary, and Matthews. Kennan saw Salazar this evening and had a 2-hour conversation with him. He had endeavored to arrange for my presence at the interview but protocol section of Foreign Office intervened and vetoed suggestion.

The conversation, conducted throughout in a distinctly cordial and friendly tone, was of an exploratory nature. Dr. Salazar said at outset that it was quite impossible for him to give authoritative answer offhand to questions and requests of great importance coming to his attention for the first time.

¹² R. Henry Norweb, recently appointed Minister to Portugal with the personal rank of Ambassador.

After Kennan had transmitted President's letter,¹³ which obviously made a deep impression on the Prime Minister, and had explained nature of our desire, a general conversation ensued, in course of which the following became clear :

1. Salazar had envisaged that we would use naval facilities granted in the British agreement whenever we had occasion to, and does not expect us to request permission—either generally or in specific instances—to do so.

2. About Terceira, he had not made up his mind; but he was not unsympathetic and was obviously prepared to seek a formula which would reconcile our use of the airport with terms of existing British. He raised question, not as any formal proposal but simply in thinking out loud, whether we could not regard aircraft being delivered to England by Ferry Commands having status of British craft from time they left our country until they had passed through Portuguese territory, and said in reply to Kennan's queries, that in this case he would not care about nationality of crews or of ground forces which might serve them. Kennan asked specifically whether this would apply to engineering and construction personnel, and he replied in the affirmative. I think incidentally that this statement should satisfy the desire of British Government that we obtain Portuguese [permission?] for participation of American technicians in improvement of Azores facilities.

3. About granting of further facilities to our forces over and above those granted the British, Salazar's first reaction as expected was that this was equivalent to asking Portugal to come into the war. He traced the background of Portugal's position of neutrality and dwelt at length on the case of Timor. He said that he could at any time have induced the Japanese to withdraw their occupation of the remainder of Timor and to restore the Portuguese civilian administration if he had been willing to acquiesce in the name of the Portuguese Government to their use of the airfield there but that he had not done this because he could not see Portugal as a neutral starting out to bargain with the belligerents over the facilities of the Portuguese Empire. In the case of the British Agreement, the Alliance had given Portugal the excuse for doing this and yet claiming to remain neutral. While he recognized necessity of a closer collaboration within the whole community of Atlantic Nations including our country and his in the future, there was no formal alliance in our case which could provide such an excuse. If he were to come into the war, he would as a matter of course extend to us every facility we might need in his colonies. But as to whether Portugal's entry into the war would be in Portugal's interests or even in those of the Allies was another question. His impression from his recent negotiations with the British was that the latter and ourselves did not wish to risk the Peninsula becoming a scene of hostilities.

Kennan described to him importance to U. S. of obtaining these facilities at a very early date and asked him to bear in mind in ponder-

¹³ Letter of November 4, p. 564.

ing these questions urgent necessity of finding some solution which would meet our needs. Kennan concluded by saying that he would have to ask for another appointment at an early date probably this same week.

In general Kennan considers this reaction relatively encouraging, and hopes that indications of British support, which will be given tomorrow by British Minister¹⁴ to Secretary General of Foreign Office¹⁵ if present plans mature, will further improve situation. He is convinced that Salazar, following receipt of President's letter and events of past weeks, is not now unreceptive to use of islands by pure [*our?*] forces but would like to find a formula reconcilable with basic policy of neutrality which he is still trying to pursue.

NORWEB

811.34553B/29 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, November 24, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 11:38 p. m.]

2854. For the Secretary, the Under Secretary and Matthews. I should like to add following comments on Kennan's interview with Salazar, as reported in my 2839, November 23, 10 p. m., and the resulting situation:

1. The British Minister is endeavoring to see the Portuguese this evening in order to support our requests. He expects to use the "Friends of Friends" thought and to express the earnest hope of his Government that the Portuguese should go along with us. He will invite their attention to a document of last June in which British informed them that the facilities they were then seeking would be needed for ferrying of aircraft to the various theaters of war. He will also say that prompt and favorable action on our request would make it much easier for British to induce us to provide supplies for Portugal envisaged in the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement.

2. In addition to support of the British here, I think it would be helpful if Ambassador Winant were to talk with Portuguese Ambassador in London and to tell him quite frankly of the great urgency and importance of this problem to us, and of advisability of prompt action, in Portuguese interests. If Winant could do this informally it would come with better grace than if it is said direct to Salazar here, where in the circumstances, it might sound like a threat.

¹⁴ Henry L. Hopkinson.

¹⁵ Teixeira de Sampaio.

3. I must invite attention particularly to Salazar's remark about Timor. In the end the Timor situation may have a decisive bearing on Portuguese attitude. One way out of Salazar's dilemma might be for us to ask him to enter war against Japan, though not against Germany, and to give us the facilities and consequences of this move. When the Azores agreement was made known to Germans they showed themselves more concerned about Portuguese relations with Japan than about facilities in the islands, and British have impression that Germans have promised Japanese to take same action if Japanese-Portuguese relations were disrupted. For this reason Salazar would probably hesitate to break with the Japanese just now.

4. We must remember that even if we can once overcome the qualms of principle in Dr. Salazar's mind we will still have to face the usual Portuguese proclivity for horse trading over details.

5. Salazar showed himself sceptical as to whether our military potential in the European theater was yet adequate to the winning of the war. He said that at present in his opinion the only real military force on our side in Europe was that of the Russians. This is important because it influences his estimate of our ability to defend the peninsula in case of German military action against Portugal.

6. The military and naval representatives here including the experts who have arrived for this purpose have been fully informed as to the conference with Salazar and are wiring their conclusions. Colonel Solborg the Military Attaché is leaving for Washington tonight. I would appreciate it if the Department would ask the War Department to see that he is kept informed of all developments here during his period of consultation in Washington and is given opportunity to state his views on these questions, as he has been constantly in contact with Portuguese military authorities in recent weeks.

7. I hope that instructions will be given to the survey group now in the Azores to keep this Legation posted currently as to results of their investigations. This can probably be done thru the services which they represent.

8. Kennan has offered to transmit Salazar's reply¹⁶ to the President's communication¹⁷ but we do not yet know whether Salazar intends to take advantage of this offer.

NORWEB

¹⁶ Letter of November 30, p. 571.

¹⁷ Letter of November 4, p. 564.

811.34553B/31 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, November 25, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 9:08 p. m.]

2858. For the Secretary, the Under Secretary and Matthews. The British Minister saw the Secretary General of the Foreign Office yesterday as anticipated in my 2854 of November 24 and supported our requests as planned.

From the ensuing conversation he gathered that Salazar was much preoccupied with the possible effects on Spain of any concessions to United States in the Azores. The question was raised as to whether in case Portugal granted to us as a power not allied with Portugal bases in the Azores the Germans might not cite this as a precedent for obtaining similar concessions from Spain in the Balearics.

Hopkinson remarked that he could hardly imagine the Spaniards could be so foolish as to do this at the present stage of the war to which Sampayo replied that one could never tell about Spaniards who were capable of doing the most surprising things at the most unexpected moments.

Further conversation purely informal in character turned along line of regarding additional facilities for us as merely constituting an extension of the existing agreement with the British in other ways of masking our activities under the British agreement. With respect to aircraft Sampayo said definitely that no questions would be asked about planes with British markings regardless of the nationality of the crews or ground forces. For planes with American markings he suggested that possibly some member of the British forces might be included in the crew of each plane. While we consider even this suggestion as excessive it is revealing of the way Portuguese and possibly British minds are working.

NORWEB

811.34553B/12-343

*The President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers (Salazar) to President Roosevelt*¹⁸

[Translation]

LISBON, November 30, 1943.

MR. PRESIDENT: I was highly gratified to receive the letter which Your Excellency was kind enough to address to me and which Mr. Kennan handed to me upon his return from Washington. It would not be excessive for me to tell Your Excellency of the great pleasure

¹⁸ Original and translation transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Portugal in his despatch No. 20, December 3; received December 14.

with which, through your own memories, we recall the personal contact of Your Excellency with the Portuguese lands, the good comradeship of the American forces with our people in the Azores during the last war, the loyal compliance with the obligations undertaken, and the good friendship which was reinforced and has happily been maintained.

Although the position of Portugal in the present conflict, by virtue of well-known circumstances, has been different than what it was at that time, we have been happy to be able to satisfy the desires of England with relation to facilities in the Azores and, through those concessions which we can base on the age-old existing alliance, to go some distance towards meeting the requirements which we know exist on the part of the United States.

I have explained at length to Mr. Kennan the reasons for which I find myself in entire agreement with Your Excellency over what I understand to be your thought—that in the world which will emerge from this war there must be established a closer collaboration between the nations of the Iberian Peninsula on the one hand and the United States and the nations of Central and South America on the other, and particularly Brazil, in special relation to Portugal.

In this realization, we shall not fail to take advantage of all the possibilities of deepening and fortifying our economic and cultural ties with a view to contributing with everything at our disposal to the work of harmonious, peaceful and progressive collaboration which is so much in Your Excellency's thoughts and which forms part of our major desires and aspirations.

I should consider myself very happy if some day I could discuss personally with Your Excellency these subjects, to which I attribute the highest importance.

I should not like to end this letter without thanking Your Excellency, Mr. President, for so spontaneous and clear a renewal of the amicable intentions you have always entertained for my country. Even though these intentions were always to be expected on the part of Your Excellency, I should like to assure you, Mr. President, that your words were received with the highest appreciation.

With the assurance of my best wishes for the prosperity of your great nation, believe me, Mr. President,

Very sincerely,

SALAZAR

811.34553B/31 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1943—5 p. m.

2170. Your 2858, November 25, 4 p. m. In view of Dr. Salazar's professed preoccupation with possible effects on Spain of concessions

to us in the Azores, you are authorized to say to the Prime Minister, should a suitable occasion present itself, that this Government considers it inconceivable that Spain should entertain any thought of imperiling the whole Spanish position by granting bases to Germany at this stage of the war.

HULL

811.34553B/35 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, December 2, 1943—noon.

[Received 2:31 p. m.]

2906. For the Secretary, the Under Secretary and Matthews. Kennan saw Salazar again yesterday morning. Salazar's general position on the Azores bases as it developed from this conference can be summarized as follows:

(a) He is not prepared to grant facilities outright to United States as long as he is trying to remain neutral.

(b) He is not willing at this time to grant further facilities to the British for use either by them or ourselves under article VIII of the British Agreement but will be so willing whenever it can show to his satisfaction that the general war situation has undergone a marked change and that danger to Portugal from Germany has decreased as compared with the past August.

(c) He is willing to go the limit in making possible our immediate use of existing British facilities provided external appearance of adherence to existing British agreement is maintained.

(d) He showed a willingness to consider arrangements which would permit us to undertake at once construction of a new airport on Santa Maria Island for the account of the Portuguese Government, leaving open for the moment the question of its use but with a view to its eventual assignment for Anglo-American use as mentioned in (b).

Details concerning the above points will go forward in another message together with certain specific recommendations for further action.

To us this means that we have gotten not only the camel's head but a large portion of his remaining anatomy into the tent and I think we should exploit this opening to the utmost.

NORWEB

811.34553B/36 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, December 2, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 8:12 p. m.]

2911. For the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and Matthews. The following detailed comments are added with respect to Kennan's last interview with Salazar, as reported in my 2906, December 2, noon:

1. Salazar is definitely agreed to our using Terceira to the full under any formula which will reconcile such use with the existing Anglo-Portuguese Agreement, but he wants us to tell him frankly what that formula will be. A nominal marking of the planes as British would be quite sufficient, in Salazar's view. We would, of course, have to abide by restrictions now applicable to British with respect to flights over Portuguese territorial waters, approaches, et cetera. Salazar expressed particular concern that we should consider this as a facility extended to us by Portugal and not by the British.

Kennan informed him of the plans for participation of our forces in antisubmarine patrol work at Terceira. He showed no surprise at this and expressed no objection but pointed out that it must be subject to the general rule that a formula be found to reconcile the practice with the British agreement.

2. He agreed to examine carefully the question of the construction and use by American forces of a new airport on Santa Maria Island. While he did not specifically say so, it was clear that this examination would be undertaken in a benevolent spirit. He could not see his way clear to conceding these facilities to us outright at this time. He says that the German Minister has been after him repeatedly with all sorts of questions about the possibility of the facilities in the Azores being used by the Americans; and German curiosity in this respect has been so keen that he suspects the question may represent a keystone of German policy with regard to Portugal.

For this reason Salazar's mind is working more along lines of our constructing an airfield at this time for the Portuguese account on understanding that if, at time the construction is finished, we could show that we and British have need for facilities greater than those accorded in the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement and that risk to Portugal in granting further facilities has declined, he would then make field available to the British under article VIII of existing Anglo-Portuguese Agreement and permit our use of it just as in the case of Lagens and Horta. If it then happened that the field was used 95 per cent by our forces he would presumably not object as long as some formula were observed which would permit him as in case of Terceira to deny officially to the Germans that he had granted any special facilities to the United States in the islands.

The above was not yet a specific proposal but merely a suggestion on which he did not repudiate and which he is revolving in his mind.

The interpretation of article VIII of the British Agreement is Salazar's own, and not, according to the British Ambassador, the result of an understanding with the British. Salazar said that he had himself ascertained since last interviewed that Flores was utterly

unsuitable for aviation. He did not deny advantages of Santa Maria. He said if our views about Santa Maria were to change in the next few days or if there were anything additional that we specifically wanted along these lines, we should let him know at once; which leads us to believe that he expects to give very serious consideration to this suggestion.

3. Salazar is not in a position to grant any facilities at this time on Island of São Miguel. Ponta Delgada, he points out, is not only the center of Portuguese administration but it is the only port left to Portuguese in islands. It has become matter of pride with Portuguese Navy to retain at least one base of operations which they can call their own in that area. Kennan pointed out our need for a port with an airfield nearby which could be used for grounding carrier based planes and suggested perhaps some informal arrangements might be made for use of Ribode Peixe field for this purpose. Salazar was doubtful about this and pointed out that it had been agreed with the British that fighter forces stationed in the islands would be Portuguese and that Ribode Peixe field had been reserved for those forces. He stated that the British naval authorities and presumably ours as well were under a misapprehension with respect to the capacity and potentialities of Horta. He believed that we could have everything there which we might require in the way of facilities for such aircraft. If we wished to station American tile [*mercantile?*] tanker and repair ship there for example that could be arranged. We propose to endeavor to arrange for conferences between our naval experts and Portuguese officials for further clarification of these questions.

4. Salazar was unwilling to contemplate any action with respect to bases in the Azores on hypothesis of future co-belligerency with us against Japan. He felt instinctively that some agreement existed between Germans and Japanese about Timor and was obviously worried lest his relations with Germany be complicated by the Timor situation. He is most anxious to have a reply to his inquiries concerning participation of Portuguese forces in the liberation of Timor (see my 2883, November 29¹⁹) and I think that it would pay us to be helpful here.

5. In view of the above I think that we should now take the following action:

(a) Our military authorities should agree with the British on the exact formula to be adopted to cover the use of Lagens field by our aircraft. This formula should then be communicated to me for further communication to Portuguese Government.

(b) A preliminary proposal should at once be drawn up for the construction of an airport on Santa Maria and this proposal should be communicated to me for use in further conversations. It should

¹⁹ Not printed.

be expressed in broad but succinct terms, leaving details for a later agreement. It should contain provision for immediate surveying of the island by our technicians. It should assure us most-favored-nation treatment with respect to later use for commercial aviation et cetera. It is my thought that this preliminary proposal could perhaps be embodied in a preliminary exchange of notes with Portuguese Government which would permit us to proceed at once to the surveying of the field and to technical planning. The actual construction contract could be left for a later date.

By way of comment on the general situation, I may say the following:

We may disagree with Salazar on the extent of the danger from Germany, which he probably thinks of in terms of security of Portuguese shipping rather than of invasion or of aerial bombardment; but we must recognize that if it is our desire that Portugal remain neutral—and the British specifically signified this in their agreement—then we must respect Salazar's desire to avoid complications with Germany. This being so, I think the length to which Salazar has gone constitutes considerable progress and that we should make the most of it. I should particularly appreciate being informed as to exact extent to which our Military and Naval authorities expect to do this.

NORWEB

811.34553B/36: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1943—4 p. m.

2195. Your 2906 and 2911, December 2. I heartily congratulate you and Kennan on the rapid and substantial progress made. Your encouraging telegrams have been brought to the attention of the President and War and Navy, and guidance will be furnished on the points you raise as promptly as possible.

Please clarify Salazar's expression of concern "that we should consider this as a facility extended to us by Portugal and not by the British". How do you reconcile this with his anxiety to place our facilities under Anglo-Portuguese agreement?

Restrictions concerning which we have complained in the past as affecting movements of Consuls in the Azores²⁰ apparently still apply and it is obvious these will interfere seriously with our activities if allowed to continue. Could you not discuss this informally with Salazar, pointing out the practical inconvenience and requesting him to issue appropriate instructions to the insular authorities to permit some freedom of movement for Maritime Delegates and also for our

²⁰ See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 232 ff.

survey parties, etc.? Or do you feel this might jeopardize your negotiations?

HULL

811.34553B/42b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1943—midnight.

2343. Your 2911, December 2, 5 p. m. The following preliminary formula for utilizing Lagens has been agreed upon with the British and you are requested to communicate it orally to Dr. Salazar:

(1) For the assistance of the British in the expansion of their facilities at Lagens personnel and equipment of the United States Army will be transported to Terceira. This assistance will consist mainly in improvement and enlargement of housing facilities and improvement of such operational facilities as taxi tracks, hard standings, runways, communications and lighting. If necessary further assistance will be extended in augmenting the British supply of aviation fuel. Such United States Navy equipment and personnel as may prove desirable in assisting in developing Lagens will likewise be provided.

(2) For assisting the British in caring for United States and British transport and ferried aircraft through Lagens operating personnel, mainly of U. S. Army, will be transported to Terceira.

(3) United States and United States personnel activities at Lagens will be directed toward the assistance of the British, under whose control those operations will be.

(4) Thorough instructions will be given all United States personnel respecting the nature of Lagens operations as described above.

(5) All restrictions set forth in the existing Anglo-Portuguese agreements, whether applicable to Lagens, to territorial waters of Portugal, or to other Azores land areas, will be adhered to fully by United States personnel.

HULL

841.34553B/36 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, December 24, 1943—midnight.

[Received 10:45 p. m.]

3067. For the Secretary, Under Secretary and Matthews. It might be helpful to set forth briefly my understanding of the situation regarding the Azores bases as a result of further conversations with the British Embassy.

1. The American position vis-à-vis the British Government may be summarized as follows:

(a) That an agreement has been reached as between the competent British and American authorities regarding American participation and use of all existing British facilities in the Azores with operations actually or nominally under British command.

(b) That the airfield at Lagens will have to be decidedly enlarged.

(c) That a suitable second base is desirable on Santa Maria or some other acceptable island.

2. The American position vis-à-vis the Portuguese Government may be summarized as follows:

(a) That we will be permitted full use of Lagens when we evolve a satisfactory formula covering such use under British aegis.

(b) The same formula should be applicable to effect such use of the emergency landing facilities at Santa Ana as the British have been able to obtain.

(c) That upon receipt of further instructions the granting of permission to construct and operate the Santa Maria airfield is to be sought.

3. (a) As regards 1 (b), the position is that the local Portuguese commander has gone as far as he feels able to go in requisitioning farm lands for extending the Lagens field. The requisite additions will require authorization from Salazar and the British Ambassador has asked London for instructions as to how Salazar should be approached and whether or not article VIII is if necessary to be invoked.

[b] As regards 2 (6) [(b)] Salazar has adhered to his position that Santa Ana field is a Portuguese Government airport and therefore direction and control must be in hands of Portuguese officials. However, he has been persuaded to interpret word "emergency" to admit of practice landings and installation of some additional equipment and British personnel to operate it. At same time Portuguese personnel is supposed to be learning how to operate equipment in expectation of relieving British personnel at some indeterminate date.

(c) As regards 1 (c) position is not at all clear. In a telegram dated December 10 received by British Embassy, it is stated in paragraph 3 thereof that the Combined Chiefs of Staff expect an attempt to be made by me to obtain from Dr. Salazar permission for United States to construct Santa Ana airfield for Portuguese Government but presumably for direct use by American forces on completion. If Salazar refuses this proposal, then article VIII of the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement is to be invoked and British Government will ask for authority to construct and operate such an airfield, using American material and assistance under ostensible if not actual British control.

However, paragraph 1 of same telegram states that Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that American facilities shall be within

framework of British agreement and paragraph 4 contains sentence that the second airfield when constructed would be under British command and aircraft using it would be subject to same conditions as those using Lagens. In this connection, Colonel Mason informs me that copies of Joint and Combined [apparent omission] discussed at SEXTANT²¹ and subsequent messages should arrive here in a few days from London and should give us background on this subject and help clarify any further instructions.

NORWEB

811.34553B/46a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1943—10 p. m.

2372. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated to the Department that they wish to obtain permission as soon as possible for the construction by United States engineers of a major airfield on Santa Maria or other suitable island. The Chiefs of Staff contemplate our use of such airfield, though it will be understood that the construction is for the Portuguese Government. The Chiefs of Staff consider in this connection that the desirability should be borne in mind of acquiring most-favored-nation commercial rights and continuing postwar rights for United States military supply to outlying military posts by air.

You are requested to seek an early interview with the Prime Minister and to submit to him a request for permission to undertake for his Government the proposed construction. Should the Prime Minister prove unwilling to commit himself to this now, the Chiefs of Staff desire you to press nevertheless for permission to go ahead without delay with reconnaissance and surveys on Santa Maria or other suitable island with the view to eventually coming back to the principal question.

Please furnish your comment and the Prime Minister's reaction as soon as possible.

HULL

841.34553B/38 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, December 30, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 10:17 p. m.]

3118. For the Secretary, the Under Secretary and Matthews. Salazar is now in Lisbon and I may be able to see him on New Year's

²¹ Code name for Cairo Conferences held November 22-26 and December 2-7, 1943. For documentation relating to these Conferences, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.*

Eve, if not, at the beginning of the week. At that, my first interview with him, I propose to confine the discussion to the matter of generalizing under the formula set forth in your 2343 of December 23, midnight, the use of existing British facilities and to the obtaining of permission for a survey by American engineers of the Santa Maria site and other possible island sites. I will indicate that, no doubt, a couple of British engineers likewise participate and that we will welcome the guidance and participation of any Portuguese officers he may assign to accompany the group. It seems to me the course of wisdom to finalize these two immediate and practical desiderata before embarking on the more involved and tortuous problem of an alternate airfield. Furthermore, after this interview, the British Ambassador will have an opportunity to see Salazar and make known his Government's concurrence with the proposed arrangements.

At termination of that interview I propose to ask him to receive me again in a few days when I will then be in a position to discuss with him question of the U. S. building airfield, probably at Santa Maria. I hope by that time I shall have received from you information re Salazar's inquiry as to Portugal's participation in liberation of Timor. I understand from my British colleague that he has received a repeat of an instruction from London to British Embassy in Washington suggesting that balance of advantage lies in our calling upon Portuguese to go to war against Japan forthwith and that preliminary reaction of State Department was favorable. Since main purpose of another large air base in Azores is to facilitate prosecution of war in Far East, it would obviously be helpful to connect these two matters.

Incidentally I take it that the last sentence of the first paragraph of your 2372, December 29, 10 p. m., is for my information and use at the appropriate moment and was not inserted with the intention that I deal with this longer range aspect of the problem at this initial stage.

NORWEB

811.34553B/44 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, December 31, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received January 1, 1944—4:15 a. m.]

3131. For the Secretary, the Under Secretary and Matthews. I saw Salazar this evening and followed the plan of negotiations set forth in my 3118 of December 30, 6 p. m. He accepted the formula for Lagens as set out in your telegram No. 2343 of December 23, midnight, and is quite agreeable to American personnel proceeding to the island forthwith on this basis.

In the matter of the survey party our discussion was protracted. He had received reports from the Portuguese Army and air officials of the probable suitability of Santa Maria but at the same time he, obviously for special reasons, had hopes that Horta might prove equally acceptable. In any case, it was apparent he did not view with pleasure the idea of a group of avowedly American Army, or, for that matter, British Army and naval officers surveying the islands of the Azores. Therefore, having in mind his "allergy to theory and imperviousness to practice", I suggested a compromise which he agreed to, namely, that the United States Government would recommend to him an American company capable of conducting such a survey and that he, on behalf of the Portuguese Government, would invite them to conduct the survey. At the same time, I made it clear that such a survey would include sites for aids to navigation, et cetera. The spirit in which he accepted this compromise may be judged by his remark that he supposed that now all American companies capable of conducting a survey of this kind were more or less under American Army or Navy control. Accordingly I have no doubt that you may induct into the personnel of the company making the surveys capable members from the armed services, provided they will be at pains to preserve their civilian guise and that there are bona fide company personnel present. On this matter the Army and Navy advisers here are telegraphing their comments and recommendations to their respective Departments.

NORWEB

PORTUGUESE POLICY REGARDING AMERICAN PLANES INTERNED IN PORTUGAL

811.2353/4a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1943—6 p. m.

81. With reference to 11 planes grounded Lisbon, press and radio here state as result of German pressure on Portuguese Government early in war when Nazi flyers came down in Portugal these were released on condition that the precedent should apply equally to airmen of all belligerent nations landed in Portugal. If this information is correct, and if the treatment applied to the planes as well, you should insist on like treatment for our planes. If not the Department suggests that you endeavor to obtain the same treatment for these planes as is customarily accorded to belligerent war vessels and obtain permission for them to depart within 48 hours.

War Department is cabling Military Attaché.²²

HULL

²² Col. William D. Hohenthal.

811.2353/4 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, January 18, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

94. Department's No. 81, January 16, 6 p. m. The problem of forced landings of military planes in Portugal is not a new one for ourselves or the British as the Department will observe from such communications as my 1583 November 14 [15]; 1596, November 16; 1896, December 27; and 77, January 15.²³

The general policy of the Portuguese Government has always been to intern initially both crews and planes.

I know of no instance in which military planes were released. Prior to our occupation of North Africa there were few if any cases where such planes were left sufficiently intact to be worth bothering about.

As for crews it has always proved possible for both sides to get them out of the country quietly after sufficient time had elapsed to permit public interest to die down and to enable Portuguese authorities to convince themselves that due respect had been shown to the principle of Portuguese sovereignty. Of the seven American airmen who had landed and been interned here since November 6 but prior to the arrival of these last 11 planes we have already succeeded in getting five out of the hands of the authorities and we hope that they will depart tomorrow for Allied-controlled territory. This is not easy to accomplish and requires considerable delicacy of handling. Nevertheless if the American press and radio will leave this subject alone I have no doubt that we shall in due time get the remaining pilots including the 11 new arrivals out as well.

As for the planes I doubt that representations for their release would be effective and I am not sure that they would be wise. Such a request would be at variance with the established British practice. These machines arrived armed and with guns loaded in the performance of a military mission. The Portuguese would doubtless reason that if they were to depart again with impunity all belligerents would soon take much greater liberty with operations in the neighborhood of Portugal confident that if they had fueling difficulties they could always fall back on Portuguese airports to save themselves. It would not appear to me to be to our advantage to have the German long-range bombers which occasionally operate off the Portuguese coast placed in a position where they could regularly risk running short of fuel and count on the Portuguese to help them get home.

²³ None printed.

The Military Attaché expects to discuss this matter with Portuguese military authorities this afternoon and the Department will be duly informed of the results. Meanwhile the pilots have proceeded to the usual place of internment.

FISH

811.2353/5 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, January 21, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 6:45 p. m.]

116. My 94, January 18. Military Attaché has discussed this matter with higher military authorities. They have agreed to submit to Salazar²⁴ question of juridical status of planes grounded in these circumstances. They have also undertaken to consider a business offer for the purchase of the planes.

War Department has been informed.

FISH

811.2353/9a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1943—4 p. m.

669. The Department has received a communication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending the adoption of a policy providing for the sale to the Portuguese Government of aircraft of non-confidential character forced-landed in Portugal. Pilots of such aircraft will be instructed that they need not be destroyed unless they contain secret instruments which cannot otherwise be destroyed.

These recommendations were conveyed to the British Embassy in Washington with a view to obtaining an identical policy for both governments. The British Embassy has replied that an arrangement is already in force providing for the sale to the Portuguese Government of British forced-landed aircraft non-confidential in character. British pilots have received instructions similar to those which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are proposing to issue.

Please convey to the Portuguese authorities the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and inform Department whether they are willing to enter into such an agreement.

HULL

²⁴ Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

811.2353/10 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, April 19, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 2:28 p. m.]

861. Department's 669 April 17. I should appreciate further clarification with respect to this instruction. As the Department is aware from my 116 January 21 the Portuguese are quite prepared to purchase aircraft of these categories and have actually made us an offer on those which we have here. Since the despatch of that telegram these conversations have been pursued through various phases details of which can be obtained through the War Department. I had assumed from the fact that my 116 January 20 [21], was never answered that the Department was not interested in learning further details of these negotiations from this mission.

I have no knowledge, of course, of the details of the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and if I were to approach the Portuguese authorities at this time I could only inform them that a general policy of this nature had been adopted and ask their views.

The reply would doubtless be that their readiness in principle to purchase such aircraft had been demonstrated by their recent offer to us but that their action in individual instances would naturally have to be governed by the sheer business terms they could obtain.

FISH

811.2353/11 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1943—7 p. m.

734. Your 861, April 19, 2 p. m. Further conversations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff reveal that they are in accord with the interpretation given to your telegram no. 116 of January 21 in regard to the sale to the Portuguese Government of forced landed aircraft of a non-confidential character.

It is also clear that the American and British Governments are pursuing an identical policy in this regard.

However, in order further to coordinate the policy of the two Governments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire that a proposal be made to the Portuguese Government, similar to one already made by the British which was that British forced landed aircraft of miscellaneous types, unlikely to be of much use to the Portuguese but valuable to

the British Government, should be exchanged for other aircraft of a type more useful to the Portuguese such as, for example, Spitfires.

Please convey a similar proposal to the Portuguese authorities.

HULL

811.2353/14: Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, April 28, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 6:26 p. m.]

935. Both American and British Military Attachés have approached the Ministry of War with proposals similar given in Department's 734, April 26. Portuguese have refused to consider such proposals stating that any release of interned planes whether by exchange or sale would involve a violation of neutrality. American Military Attaché was subsequently authorized by War Department to offer the 16 P-39's and the P-38 at \$20,000 each but with understanding that the U.S. could not supply spare parts equipment or munitions. He was authorized to offer gratis the four damaged planes as a reservoir of spare parts. Military Attaché conveyed this offer to Ministry of War April 26 and a favorable reply is expected shortly.

The British Military Attaché has cabled London requesting that he be authorized to make a similar offer re British interned planes.

This appears to be most satisfactory solution practicable inasmuch as Portuguese obviously will not consider any action *in re* these planes which might be possibly interpreted as a violation of neutrality. Moreover it is anticipated that sale of these planes will greatly facilitate early release of the 18 American pilots now interned in Portugal.

FISH

EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENFORCE RESTRICTIONS ON SALE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO GERMANS AND ITALIANS IN ANGOLA

853M.6363/27: Airgram

The Consul General at Loanda, Angola (Linnell) to the Secretary of State

LOANDA, December 27, 1942—noon.

[Received January 11, 1943—5 p. m.]

A-13. The [restriction on?] sale of gasoline and other petroleum products to Germans and Italians in Angola and to those who are found to be reselling to Germans and Italians, is being enforced by the oil companies quite strictly. Many protests are being made to the local

government and the Governor General⁸² has now asked my British colleague⁸³ and me to say to our Government that he hopes some way will be found to permit the sale of gasoline in limited quantities to Germans and Italians in this colony.

He said that his Government strictly limits the sale of gasoline to all persons in the colony in accordance with their necessities and he emphasized that any orders by any foreign governments or agents as to who may receive gasoline is an infringement of Portugal's sovereignty.

He said that it is contrary to humanitarian principles to forbid Germans and Italians to receive any gasoline since those living a long way from medical aid may urgently need to send for a doctor or take a sick person to a hospital or make an absolutely necessary trip to a town.

He said that Portugal is neutral and must treat Germans and Italians living in the colony like other residents while they behave properly and he reiterated again and again that any dictation from outside the country not only infringed its sovereignty but made his position and that of the government most difficult.

In reply I assured the Governor General that we appreciated the difficulties of his position and said that I would communicate his views to my Government.

I added that there was naturally a strong feeling in the United States that enemies should not receive gasoline, etc., from our country especially when their countries and fellow citizens were doing everything they could to sink the ships carrying these supplies and such supplies were therefore received in this colony only at the risk of the lives of our sailors.

Moreover, the Germans and Italians in this colony are undoubtedly doing everything in their power to defeat us and furnishing gasoline to these persons might well help them in their efforts against us.

LINNELL

853M.6363/27: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Loanda, Angola
(Linnell)*

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1943—midnight.

28. Your A-13 and 8, December 27, 1942 and January 9, 1943.⁸⁴

1. Department is prepared to make one of the contingencies to the supply of oil to Angola the enforcement by the Angola Government

⁸² Alvaro de Freitas Morna.

⁸³ Victor Vincent Cusden.

⁸⁴ Telegram No. 8 not printed.

and oil distributors there of an absolute ban on deliveries to "enemy nationals" as defined by General Ruling No. 11.⁸⁵ The latter ruling, a copy of which will be sent you from Lisbon, includes in the definition of "enemy national" 1) persons representing enemy or enemy-controlled governments and 2) Proclaimed List nationals. After consultation with your British colleague, please indicate whether the Proclaimed List in Angola now includes the names of all persons and firms with Axis connections or sympathies from which American oil should be withheld in the interests of our economic warfare program.

2. For your confidential information, we plan to control oil supplies to Angola from Belgian Congo. Therefore, if Angola's Governor refuses compliance with these conditions and since there is no way for him to obtain oil from the Germans or elsewhere, he can justify his acceptance of our conditions, which require unequal treatment for "enemy nationals", as a necessity to enable him to secure any oil at all for the balance of the population.

3. Department and BEW⁸⁶ are considering sending an oil specialist as an attaché of your Consulate to handle all oil matters and guard against diversion. Please comment.

Repeated to London Embassy.⁸⁷

HULL

858M.6363/28 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Loanda, Angola (Linnell) to the
Secretary of State*

LOANDA, February 8, 1943—10 p. m.
[Received February 10—11:05 a. m.]

37. Department's 28, February 2, midnight. My British colleague and I called on the Governor General and told him the United States could not give oil to Angola for "enemy nationals" as defined in General Ruling number 11. The Governor was much chagrined and reiterated that this was an unfriendly attitude for the United States to take and an infringement of Portugal's sovereignty. He thought the small amount of oil products saved could not affect the war and could not justify their [un]friendly attitude toward a neutral nation.

⁸⁵ 7 *Federal Register* 2168.

⁸⁶ Board of Economic Warfare.

⁸⁷ Repeated on the same date to London (No. 710) with the following introduction: "For Blacklist Section. The following is Department's of to Loanda." and the following conclusion: "Please request Lisbon to send Loanda the text of General Ruling No. 11 by mail, together with copies of such instructions on licensing thereunder as you deem desirable. Also please indicate to the Department your views on the adequacy of present listing in Angola for the purpose of controlling oil distribution."

Enforcement of distribution restrictions will have to be accomplished through oil companies' agents and my British colleague and I believe this can be done.

An oil specialist could doubtless decide here whether further supplies should be given various oil companies, but unless he knew Portuguese and a knowledge of the country and its industries and their special needs and covered entire colony by car (which is very difficult) he would only form his judgments upon data given him by oil companies' agents.

Please note in this connection that stocks of oil petroleum products now in Angola except lubricating oils are equivalent to nearly one year's ordinary consumption. Lubricating oils are stated to be sufficient only to mid-March for railroads and utility companies. Can shipments of lubricating oil be expedited?

LINNELL

853M.6363/27 Suppl : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1943—7 p. m.

Belgian Series No. 7. Department's 710, February 2.⁸⁸ There is reason to believe that petroleum products delivered in Angola are used for benefit of enemy nationals. Since distribution there is not properly regulated, Department and Board of Economic Warfare feel that shipments to Angola should be restricted. This cannot be done effectively without controlling exports of petroleum products to Angola from the Belgian Congo. According to the American Consul at Loanda, these exports included 1,375 metric tons of diesel oil during 1942. We should like to obtain the cooperation of the Congo authorities to prohibit the shipment of petroleum products to Angola, except with the approval of the American Consul at Leopoldville, who would be guided by the recommendations of the Department and the Consul General at Loanda.

You are requested to ascertain whether the Belgian Minister for Colonies⁸⁹ would agree to an export control of this sort. In order to be effective, the control should be extended to all types of petroleum products obtained from all sources, including the United States. We hope the Minister will appreciate the need of such regulations, particularly since they are in line with the article in the proposed tripartite agreement⁹⁰ which provides for the establishment in the

⁸⁸ See footnote 87, p. 587.

⁸⁹ Albert de Vleeschauer.

⁹⁰ For correspondence in regard to negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium for a tripartite agreement relating to imports from and exports to the Belgian Congo, see *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. II, p. 1 ff.

Congo of an export control for economic warfare purposes. We feel some further justification for our request in the efforts we are making with the British to provide supplies, including petroleum, for the consumption and industrial requirements of the Congo. As you know, there will be a commitment to this effect in the tripartite agreement. These supplies are intended for use in the Congo and should not be reexported, since the scope of the agreement does not include the requirements of other territories, such as Angola.

Please report by telegram the results of your conversations with the Minister. This message is being repeated to Leopoldville for the Consul's confidential information.

WELLES

740.00112A European War 1939/26264 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1943—midnight.

394. Department is informed by Loanda that Socony and Carbonang have received from their principals in Lisbon orders sent through Minister of Colonies and Government of Angola to sell gasoline and alcohol from their pumps to anyone holding a ration ticket regardless of presence of holder's name on Statutory or Proclaimed lists. Texas and Shell Companies operating in same market have received no such instructions. We are endeavoring to put a stop to the sale of our petroleum to listed nationals in Angola. Please ascertain from the oil companies what orders they have received from the Portuguese Government on this matter and an explanation as to why Texas and Shell were not included in those orders.

Repeated to London.

WELLES

853M.6363/32 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 13, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received March 13—1:50 p. m.]

Belgian Series 8. Your Belgian Series No. 7 of March 9, 7 p. m. Minister for Colonies De Vleeschauer is agreeable to the establishment of an export control to cover shipments of petroleum products to Angola. He suggests that this control take the form either (a) of the issuance of export licenses subject to consular visa or (b) of a fixed limit on quantity to be exported. While either scheme would be agreeable to him he is inclined to feel that due to the great distance

between some shipping points and our Consulate the latter scheme would prove the more practical of the two.

Moreover, he feels that in applying the control, it is advisable to take into consideration 1) the importance to the Congo of imports of salt, dried fish and dried meat from Angola, 2) the current and potential usefulness to the Allied war effort of the railway from Lobito.

[BIDDLE]

740.00112A European War 1939/27671 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, March 26, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

667. Referring Department's 394, March 11, and London's 72, March 22, to Lisbon regarding orders of Minister of Colonies to Socony and Carbonang representatives, Lisbon, respecting pump sales to blocked nationals in Angola. Since Socony office here has jurisdiction over sales in Angola and Carbonang's head office is also located at Lisbon the Minister of Colonies first requested the local managers of these companies to instruct their branches in Angola to respect any official ration tickets presented at the companies' pumps irrespective of the nationality of the holders.

The fact that the Texas Company has no representative here and operates in Angola under instructions from New York and that Shell's agent there receives his instructions from Leopoldville prevented the issuance of verbal instructions to these companies at Lisbon. However, the order of the Minister was intended for all petroleum companies operating in Angola and instructions were telegraphed to the Governor General there on March 15 to inform the Texas and Shell representatives.

In view of Portugal's position as a neutral I do not see that justification exists for attempting to impose a restriction on pump sales in Angola when no such control has been attempted in either Spain or Portugal.

Repeated to London.

FISH

853M.6363/32 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1943—11 p. m.

2475. From BEW. Your 8, Belgian Series, March 13. Each individual shipment should be covered by an export license, subject

to a consular visa, for the time being. It may be satisfactory at a later date to revise these licenses to cover, for certain definite periods, maximum quantities. Kindly note that this control system should apply also to Angola, to all shipments of petroleum products to Portuguese Guinea and São Thome, and to all deliveries to Spanish and Portuguese vessels from Belgian Congo territory regardless of whether they are held in bond or duty has been paid on such products.

Assurance can be had by the Minister that we have no intention of interfering with industries beneficial to the allied war effort and expect on the contrary to have a petroleum specialist resident in Angola who will also cover Belgian Congo to see that petroleum supplies are distributed equitably to all essential users and to regulate the control system mentioned above.

The following message has been sent to Leopoldville which information you may need:

“Except by our prior approval shipments of petroleum products from Belgian Congo to Angola, São Thome, and Portuguese Guinea has been suspended by all oil companies at our request. Mr. De Vleeschauer, Belgian Minister of Colonies, has subsequently agreed to the forming of an export control system in the form of an export license for each individual shipment subject to American Consular visa. The Minister has been requested to apply this control system on shipments of petroleum products from stocks in bond as well as from stocks on which duty has been paid and also apply it to deliveries to vessels belonging to Spain and Portugal.

It is understood that sufficient stocks are on hand in Portuguese territories for several months' requirements and therefore ask that suspension of shipments as effected by the oil companies continue until either we, as advised by the Consul General at Loanda, advise you differently or the operation of this official control system can be effected, at which time unless our petroleum observer has arrived, you will consult us further for instructions. Our proposal is that the observer live in Loanda but handle all petroleum matters in both Belgian Congo and Angola in cooperation with the Consul General in Loanda and you.

Suggest that you consult the oil companies regarding above and inform us of any ideas you or they have on same.

Kindly inform Brazzaville for the information of the Consul.

This message has been repeated to Loanda and London for guidance and information.” [BEW.]

HULL

740.00112A European War 1939/27671 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Fish)

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1943—noon.

787. Your 667, March 26.

1. We do not understand why you base your objection to controlling pump sales to enemy nationals in Angola upon the grounds of

Portugal's position as a neutral. The principal reason for the existence of the war trade lists is to trammel so far as possible the adverse business elements in neutral countries, though, of course, practical enforcement difficulties or other special limitations upon the full implementation of our war trade list policy may be present in any given neutral area due to local conditions. Whatever may be the situation in Portugal proper regarding pump sales to listed nationals (and in the absence of an adequate reply to its A-52, October 15,⁹¹ the Department is unaware of what the precise situation in Portugal may be) it would not seem to have a necessary bearing upon the extent of the control to be exercised in Angola.

In Angola the war trade lists contain comparatively few names, though in relation to motor vehicle statistics the list appears to be adequate to control the distribution of oil products. It is the view of the London Embassy that the Angola list is largely restricted to enemy-controlled sisal, coffee and other plantations and enemy affiliated commercial firms. The Loanda Consulate believes that the distribution of petroleum products can be controlled through agents of the oil companies. The Department, under these circumstances, intends to make allocations of petroleum products to Angola dependent upon assurances that enemy nationals will not have access to such products either in the form of pump sales or sales in larger volume except in so far as is necessary (1) to permit the production and development and transportation to shipping points of strategic raw materials, such as sisal, rubber and vegetable oils required by the United Nations in the war effort, or (2) to maintain facilities for the transshipment through Angola from the Congo of strategic raw materials needed by the United Nations in the war effort, or (3) to maintain in operation those enterprises which are essential to local economy.

2. As part of this plan BEW desires Department to attach vice consuls to Consulates at Loanda and Lourenço Marques as petroleum observers for Angola and Mozambique. They would be empowered to clear all oil importations from sources controlled by United Nations as well as watch stocks and possible diversions to enemy. Please obtain agreement Portuguese Government to authorize them carry out their duties.

3. The Legation's despatch 749, December 23, (as referred to in the Legation's telegram 15, January 5)⁹² is not regarded as responsive

⁹¹ Not printed; it called for a report on extent to which American oil companies in Portugal were making sales of petroleum products to Proclaimed List nationals (740.00112a E.W. 1939/16655).

⁹² Neither printed.

to Department's A-52, October 15. You are requested to submit promptly the report called for in Department's A-52.

Repeated to London.

HULL

853M.6363/32 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1943—7 p. m.

Belgian Series 17. From Stone,⁹³ BEW. Our 2475, April 17. Consul in Leopoldville advises that Belgian Congo Governor General has not as yet been advised by the Belgian Government of this export control system although such export control system was used by the Governor General for the release of the only shipment of petroleum products from the Belgian Congo to Portuguese territory since the local oil companies were asked by us to suspend such shipments. We are anxious to have this export control system put into force officially at once so that the local oil companies can be officially notified and relieved of the burden of this control to which they agreed only in the spirit of cooperation but which rightfully should be enforced by official government action. Please discuss with the Belgian Minister of Colonies with the object of having satisfactory instructions issued to the Belgian Congo Governor General and cable us and the American Consul, Leopoldville, what these instructions are.

This cable has been repeated to Consul, Leopoldville. [Stone.]

HULL

853M.6363/48 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Belgian Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 14, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received July 14—8:36 p. m.]

Belgian Series 21. For Stone, BEW. Your 17, July 9, 7 p. m. Belgian Minister of Colonies assures me orally that he is requesting Governor General at Leopoldville to put desired export control system for petroleum for Portuguese territory into force officially. It is understood that the system will involve the issuing of export licenses subject to visa by the American Consul covering each ship-

⁹³ William T. Stone, Assistant Director in charge of Economic Warfare Analysis, Board of Economic Warfare.

ment that it shall apply to shipments of petroleum products to Angola, Portuguese Guinea and São Thome as well as to deliveries from Belgian Congo territory to Portuguese and Spanish vessels regardless of whether duty has been paid on such products or whether they are held in bond.

Repeated to Leopoldville.

[BIDDLE]

853M.6363/53a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Loanda, Angola (Linnell)

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1943—10 p. m.

178. For your confidential information, a petroleum supply program has been set up for Portugal and its possessions for the second half of 1943 by the Department, OEW⁹⁴ and the British. In a separate telegram top limits for imports and stock limits are designated for Angola.⁹⁵ The program has not yet been submitted to Portuguese authorities so figures not final but recommend you use our data as operating basis for second half 1943. Stock limits are calculated on basis of one-third of 6 months imports for all products except lubricating oils which are permitted one-half of semester imports.

Products for Angola originate almost entirely in Caribbean area except lubricating oil and packaged goods which come from United States. Supply conditions respect petroleum products consumed in Angola are tight and will probably become more serious. Imperative you bring consumption in Angola down to top limits outlined. However, we will seriously consider any suggestions for higher import and stock limits if necessary to maintain operations of industries and railroads essential to Allied war effort.

When entire petroleum program for Portugal and its possessions is accepted by Portuguese, will inform you of final figures and conditions pertaining thereto. One of conditions to oil program requests permission to name Attachés, one of which to be allocated to Angola.

BERLE

⁹⁴ Office of Economic Warfare, successor agency of the Board of Economic Warfare.

⁹⁵ Telegram No. 206, September 23, 1943, 10 p. m., not printed.

SPAIN

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE MAINTENANCE OF NEUTRALITY BY SPAIN¹

740.0011 European War 1939/27231

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 14, 1943.

The Spanish Ambassador² called at his request for the purpose, as he said, of paying his respects and expressing the good will of his people and his Government at the beginning of the New Year. I expressed due appreciation and said that I, my Government and the American people, I knew, reciprocated fully what he said. I added that, in accordance with our good neighbor policy involving all practical cooperation with other countries such as has been carried forward in South America, we are pleased at all times to cooperate to the fullest practical extent with his Government and his people.

The Ambassador said that his Government desired that he should advise me of the emphasis which his Government and the Government of Portugal have placed upon the recent Iberian pact³ and the fixed purpose of each Government to exert themselves to the fullest extent to preserve their neutrality and keep out of war. I said that, while we were duly appreciative of this decision, I could with equal truth say that it is in my judgment a wise decision from every standpoint pertaining to the welfare and safety of the peoples of these countries. Spain and Portugal are therefore wise in assuming and giving the strongest emphasis to their position.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 European War 1939/27175 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, January 15, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 8:31 p. m.]

102. In my 1705, November 6, 10 p. m.,⁴ I reported that on that day I had transmitted to Jordana⁵ an offer of American assistance in event

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 248-319.

² Juan Francisco de Cárdenas.

³ Spain and Portugal announced the creation of a neutral Iberian bloc on December 22, 1942.

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 303.

⁵ Gen. Francisco Gómez Jordana, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

of German aggression against Spain in accordance with the President's authorization contained in Department's 1161, November 4, 6 p. m.⁶

No specific reply was ever made by Jordana nor was any reply expected particularly since the offer was made prior to our landing in North Africa.⁷

Since the date of our landing relations between the United States and Spain have steadily improved, our guarantees have been accepted, and Spain has made clear in various ways its determination to remain out of the war. I believe that the improvement in Spain's relations with the United Nations has been to the detriment of its relations with the Axis.

I consider that the next logical step for us to take is to renew in more specific terms our offer of military assistance to Spain in the event of German aggression. There is some reason to believe that if Germany should be impelled by overwhelming military reasons to enter Spain the entry may take place between the latter part of February and May. If we are to extend a specific military offer of military assistance in the event of German entry it would be desirable, therefore, to be prepared to offer it in the near future.

Before approaching the Foreign Minister on this subject I believe it desirable for Colonel Hohenthal,⁸ who is now in Madrid, to proceed to North Africa to discuss with General Eisenhower⁹ the specific assistance we would be prepared to render in the event of German entry in order that I may have that information when I approach the Foreign Minister.

I have in mind that even though our offer of assistance is not accepted in advance we shall have gained by (1) impressing on the Spaniards our ability as well as our willingness to assist, (2) exploring the Spanish attitude at a time when information concerning that attitude will be very valuable.

If we should be successful in obtaining Spain's acceptance in advance of American military assistance in the event of German entry, a possible next development might be the initiation of staff conversations or at least some direct conversations between American and Spanish military officers.

⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 303.

⁷ The landing took place on November 8, 1942; see telegram No. 559, November 8, 1942, 6 a. m., from the Chargé at Tangier, *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 430.

⁸ Col. William D. Hohenthal, Military Attaché at Lisbon, on special mission to Madrid.

⁹ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in North Africa.

Under present conditions I doubt that the Spaniards would dare to accept an offer of assistance or to engage in staff conversations with us out of fear of possible German reaction. However, we cannot accurately predict what the situation will be a month hence and I believe it important to be prepared for any contingency. The background which Colonel Hohenthal can give General Eisenhower and can bring back will be very helpful in that connection.

If Department and War Department agree, will the War Department please instruct Colonel Hohenthal to visit North Africa for the purpose indicated. Colonel Hohenthal agrees.

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/27175 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1943—2 p. m.

129. Your 102 of January 15, 2 p. m. has been discussed with the War Department which has instructed Colonel Hohenthal to report to you the substance of the instructions which have been sent him by the War Department. This Department is in complete agreement with the limitations that have been set forth in that message.

We shall await a report of Colonel Hohenthal's return to Madrid and a report of his discussions with General Eisenhower before authorizing you to proceed with the suggested conversation with Jordana as outlined in your telegram first above referred to.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/28440 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 11, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 5 : 22 p. m.]

585. Foreign Office assures me Franco¹⁰ has told Germans not only that he will resist aggression from any side but that Spain will not even discuss possible military concessions to the Axis.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy¹¹ and Lisbon.

BEAULAC

¹⁰ Gen. Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

¹¹ Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; U.S. Political Adviser, staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa, with the rank of Minister.

711.52/271

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

No. 746

MADRID, March 29, 1943.

[Received April 16.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a Note No. 767, dated March 19, 1943, which I left with the Foreign Minister on March 22, protesting against the pro-Axis attitude of Spanish publicity agencies, particularly the press and radio, and against the efforts of the Spanish police to interfere with our informational activities.

The Minister received my protest sympathetically, but without much comment, although I know from other sources in the Government that he is engaged in a continuous struggle with Falange to overcome the conditions concerning which I protested.

The British Ambassador,¹² in agreement with me, has made similar representations to the Foreign Minister.

The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs,¹³ in conversation recently, stated confidentially that Spain's position vis-à-vis the Axis would be much more "comfortable" once we had expelled the Axis from Tunisia.

I, of course, intend to press this matter with the Foreign Minister and am hopeful of obtaining an improvement in the situation.

Respectfully yours,

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

[Enclosure]

The American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana)

No. 767

MADRID, March 19, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to various communications from my Government to Your Excellency's Government guaranteeing that no aggression will be committed by the United States against Spanish territory or Spanish sovereignty; to the Spanish Government's acceptance of these guarantees; to General Franco's expression of hope to President Roosevelt¹⁴ that nothing might happen which would disturb Spain's relations with the United States in any of their aspects; and to numerous statements by Your Excellency that Spain intends to follow a policy of impartiality toward both sides in the present war.

My Government, of course, viewed Spain's prompt acceptance of our guarantees with satisfaction, and has confidence in General

¹² Sir Samuel Hoare.

¹³ José Pan de Soraluce.

¹⁴ For text of General Franco's message to President Roosevelt, November 10, 1942, see telegram No. 1766, November 12, 1942, from the Ambassador in Spain, *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. III, p. 308.

Franco's expressed desire that relations between Spain and the United States shall not be disturbed in any of their aspects. Needless to say, I likewise have full confidence that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Your Excellency's wise direction is endeavoring to ensure that General Franco's wishes in this regard, which correspond to the wishes of my Government, are carried out.

Nevertheless, I am constrained to point out to Your Excellency that certain agencies of the Spanish Government, particularly those agencies having to do with press and propaganda activities, are following a policy of marked partiality toward the Axis which is tending to defeat the Caudillo's announced policy, and which, in fact, is prejudicing good relations between our two Governments.

The Spanish press continues to give excessive and systematic prominence to news and tendentious articles from Axis countries, and to feature alleged Axis victories while systematically minimizing Allied victories. There is evident in this practice a concerted and determined effort to impress the Spanish people with the superiority of the Axis over the United Nations and to create among them a strong preference for the former. Many Spanish newspapers still do not publish war communiqués from the United Nations despite the various promises made to the Embassy by the Foreign Office that such communiqués would be published, and doubtless, too, despite the efforts of the Foreign Office to obtain the publication of such communiqués.

Many Spanish newspapers are prevented by the Government's censorship authorities from publishing American news photographs, and even those newspapers which occasionally publish them are obliged to publish a very much larger number of Axis news photographs.

American magazines are systematically prevented from being imported and sold in Spain, whereas Axis magazines, most of which are of a frankly propaganda nature, are permitted to be sold freely and constitute a large portion of the current reading matter available to the Spanish public.

The efforts of the Embassy and of the various American Consulates in Spain to distribute informative material are systematically interfered with by the Spanish authorities. Employees of the Consulates have been arbitrarily arrested and detained by Falange authorities; individuals who have called at the various American offices for such material have been assaulted or intimidated by Falange agents; persons have been fined for reading it; the list of persons to whom it can be sent has been arbitrarily reduced by the postal authorities, et cetera. In contrast, the Embassy has evidence that the Germans are afforded facilities to distribute their propaganda material

of all kinds freely both to Spanish authorities and to private individuals.

This Embassy, consonant with the wishes of the Foreign Office, has refrained from distributing propaganda material which the Foreign Office considers objectionable. The Germans, on the other hand, distribute freely through the Spanish post office material of an offensive and scurrilous nature, including vulgar caricatures of President Roosevelt and Mrs. Roosevelt. Recently, also, a large number of pro-Axis caricatures have begun to appear in the Spanish press.

The Spanish Government-controlled radio is notoriously partisan in its presentation of foreign news. For months past, it has confined itself almost exclusively to broadcasting news and propaganda from Axis sources.

Likewise, the Spanish Government-controlled news-reels convey to Spanish cinema attendants pictures largely Axis in origin and overwhelmingly Axis in intent.

Since it must be evident that in the present total war psychological warfare has a very important place, and that the Germans have attached a great deal of importance to such warfare, it should be evident also that in giving special facilities to the Axis to carry on psychological warfare in Spain, while depriving the United Nations of the opportunity adequately to combat it, Spain is in effect giving aid to the Axis which is clearly not consonant with Your Excellency's expressed attitude of impartiality toward both sides in the war, or with General Franco's expressed desire that nothing should occur which would disturb the relations between Spain and the United States in any of their aspects.

The relations between Spain and the United States are, indeed, being prejudiced by the present marked pro-Axis partisanship of all the instruments of publicity within Spain—press, radio, cinema news-reels. Few Americans understand how a Government which directs and controls all such instruments can permit them to be so seemingly desirous of Axis victory, and at the same time can profess a desire to stay out of the war and be impartial. Unfortunate as it is, popular suspicion of Spain's real intentions is thereby engendered in the United States, with embarrassing consequences to my Government in its dealings with Spain.

Despite my Government's preoccupation with possible effects of the pro-Axis publicity campaign conducted by agents of the Spanish Government, I have refrained from protesting formally against this evidence of partiality toward our enemies in the belief that Spain's foreign policy of impartiality would, through Your Excellency's efforts, become manifest not only in the attitude of the Foreign Office, but in the attitude of other agencies of the Spanish Government.

This has unfortunately not yet been the case, and I am now obliged to protest on behalf of my Government, and to express the earnest hope that the Spanish Government as a whole, and not merely the Foreign Office, will promptly adopt an attitude fully consistent with the treatment which is being accorded Spain by the United States, which is the treatment accorded to a neutral country.

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

852.48/1511

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*¹⁵

During the Ambassador's conversation with the Foreign Minister, this morning, General Jordana expressed the hope that we would soon have news about the planes and gasoline which Spain hopes to acquire from the United States. The Ambassador said that he hoped also that we would have news soon, but pointed out that our Government has to take into account public opinion in such matters. Meanwhile, he had noted no improvement in press, censorship or radio since he had left a Note on the subject a week ago. Now the matter of the treatment of refugees was up, and if the Spanish Government decided to send refugees back into France, as the Minister had implied might be done, to slavery or death, public opinion in the United States would probably make it impossible for our Government to make any concessions to Spain.

The Minister said he had hoped we would not tie the two things together. The Ambassador said he was not tying anything together; he was merely explaining a fact. We had not asked that the Spanish press be impartial if the Spanish Government did not wish to be impartial. The Spanish Government, on the other hand, had said that Spain had adopted a policy of impartiality and was determined to be neutral. We were, therefore, not asking any favor if we suggested that all agencies of the Spanish Government, and not merely the Foreign Office, follow that policy of impartiality which the Foreign Office itself had announced.

The Minister said he was sure there had been some improvement in the press recently. He was not aware of any attacks on the United States. The Ambassador said there would have to be more improvement than he had been able to notice before public opinion in the United States could be reassured.

MADRID, March 29, 1943.

¹⁵ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 763, April 2; received April 22.

711.52/269

*The Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy in Spain*¹⁶

[Translation]

No. 208

NOTE VERBALE

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States and with reference to its *Note Verbale* No. 767, dated March 19, is pleased to state that it will do everything it can with reference to the matters referred to therein, although it must make clear that the difficulties referred to are due largely to the fact that the propaganda of the Embassy is being distributed without being submitted to censorship as is required, for which reason this Ministry must recall to the Embassy the necessity of taking opportune measures to the end that all publications which are to be distributed are submitted to it previously, as a result of which not only will the incidents referred to in the Note mentioned be avoided, but also internal disturbance resulting from propaganda which, without any practical result, helps to create an atmosphere which gives to such propaganda an extension and a scope which, if it were true, would make necessary the adoption of measures which are usual in all countries in circumstances as delicate as the present.

A good example of that clandestine and prejudicial propaganda is the article in *Selecciones* of November 1942 in which instructions of a revolutionary type were given, and disseminated among elements inclined to rebellion, which might, at a given moment, cause great harm.

If those instructions are against Germany, and are intended for German-occupied countries, it should be of no interest to the United States that they be disseminated in Spain, which should be left tranquil and free from influences which only tend to disturb it.

MADRID, March 29, 1943.

852.00/10664

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

No. 761

MADRID, April 2, 1943.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a strictly confidential memorandum outlining a plan aimed at securing a modification of Spain's present relationship with the Axis which somewhat limits the field for some of our activities, such as publicity, et cetera, in Spain, and which gives

¹⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Spain in his despatch No. 809, April 15; received May 5.

the impression among certain groups in Spain and especially abroad that Spain is actually pro-Axis.

While the relative freedom with which German agencies and pro-German elements in the Falange have been allowed to operate in Spain has not, I think, had the effect of fostering pro-Axis sentiments in Spain at large, but, on the other hand, has synchronized with a growing friendship and dependence on the democracies, I believe nevertheless that the impression created abroad that Spain is a partisan of the Axis has had considerable propaganda value to the Axis, and that our general position would be greatly improved if the Spanish Government should take steps to counteract this impression. It has been this Embassy's belief, and likewise the belief of the British Embassy and of many sincere friends whom we have in the Spanish Government, that it would have been a mistake to make an issue of the matter up to now, particularly since, as pointed out in the memorandum, the Germans have tended to overplay their hand and to produce a reaction within Spain fundamentally favorable to us.

As events progress, and as and when our military position further improves, it may be in our interest, however, to make an issue with the Spanish Government. In the enclosed memorandum the Embassy has endeavored to outline some results which might possibly follow.

I do not recommend that this plan be put into effect today, and it may be that changing circumstances will make it unnecessary or undesirable ever to carry it into effect. However, I have begun to lay the basis for it if and when it should appear desirable (see my despatch No. 746 of March 29, 1943). I would assume, of course, that no such plan would be undertaken without the Embassy's prior consent and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Like everything else with which the Embassy occupies itself now, the plan envisages the possibility of obtaining additional military advantages to us in Spain, and, of course, it should be studied with that objective in mind.

I have shown the plan to Colonel Hohenthal, who approves it as a basis for study and for possible action if events should appear to make action of the kind suggested desirable.

Respectfully yours,

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 30, 1943.

It is rumored in Madrid that Count von der Schulenburg, thoroughgoing German Nazi, who came to Madrid as representative of Hitler

to Ambassador von Moltke's funeral, will be named Ambassador to Spain to succeed von Moltke. If this is true, we may anticipate strengthened Nazi pressure on Spain in the future, if not to bring Spain into the war or to obtain military facilities from Spain, then at least to secure minor favors from Spain and to limit Spain's concessions to the democracies.

Whether or not von der Schulenburg is named Ambassador it is still likely that the above will be Germany's attitude toward Spain during ensuing months.

We have already reported to the Department that Franco is giving indications that he is trying to establish a basis for maintaining himself in power indefinitely. The press has given prominence to a long lecture by a Madrid University professor endeavoring to demonstrate that "Caudillaje", the present "system of government" in Spain, is itself a legitimate system, having roots in Spanish "reason" and tradition, and that it differs no less from Naziism and Fascism than from democracy (Embassy's despatch No. 762, April 2, 1943¹⁷). Franco himself told the Cortes that the legitimacy of his power was that which pertained to one who had rescued a society (Embassy's despatch No. 694, March 20, 1943¹⁷).

There is little doubt that when Franco was named by a group of generals Chief of Government of the Spanish State while the civil war was still going on, it was in no one's mind that he would convert himself into Chief of State for life or that a new form of government was in the making in Spain, or that its chief bulwark would be a pro-German "Falange". It was generally accepted that the civil war would end in restoration of the Monarchy, and "Viva el Rey" was a battle cry of the Nationalist armies.

General Franco, however, with what he probably considered rare political sense, and undoubtedly encouraged by the then German Ambassador, made a national hero out of José Antonio Primo de Rivera and fostered the latter's relatively small "Falange" and built it up as the sole political party in Spain. Falange is probably now the only organization in Spain which would whole-heartedly support Franco in any effort to perpetuate himself in power or to perpetuate the present political system.

Falange has never been really popular in Spain, either with the Army, which saw in it a possible rival with its semi-military organization, or with the Spanish people, little addicted to totalitarianism and regimentation.

The outbreak of the present world war gave Franco a perhaps unexpected opportunity to consolidate himself in power. Spain was broken economically and divided politically as a result of three years

¹⁷ Not printed.

of bitter civil war, and the possibility that Spain might become involved in the world war induced nearly all sectors of the Spanish population to support Franco in the hope that some order might be brought out of the existing chaos and that Spain might be spared entry into the international conflict.

From the beginning, Franco identified himself closely with the Axis powers, both as a means of strengthening his own position in Spain and as insurance against Spain's being invaded. The Spanish people soon sensed that with all his apparent friendliness to the Axis General Franco was actually endeavoring to keep out of the war. This policy was heartily supported by the Spanish people.

Yet Spain, under Franco and the Falange, became a fertile field for Axis agents and Axis propaganda. The Germans, with practically complete freedom in the propaganda field, overplayed their hand, and as the Nazi menace revealed itself to the world there was a revulsion of public opinion in Catholic Spain which was directed not only against the Nazis, but against their artificial counterpart in Spain, Falange. This revulsion erased to a large extent the gratitude of Nationalists for the military help received during the civil war from Germany and Italy, which, of course, had been in large part responsible for the success of the Nationalist Movement.

As time has gone on, therefore, Franco, who has continued to be pro-Axis in his public statements, and Falange, which has continued to identify itself ideologically and sentimentally with the Axis, have steadily lost popular favor. This has been a progressive phenomenon although it has never been translated into effective action against the régime because (1) Franco's policy of staying out of the war has continued to receive general support; (2) economic conditions within the country have slowly but steadily improved; (3) close police supervision and the feeling that any disturbance in the domestic political situation might still result in German intervention and possible Spanish involvement in the war have continued to discourage opposition elements from getting together.

Now, as Allied military prospects improve, and particularly when the Axis is thrown out of Africa, it is logical that Spanish determination to resist Axis aggression will be reinforced. The Government itself has officially expressed such determination, the Spanish public is aware of our own guarantees, and it would be dangerous under the best circumstances for the Government to recede from its pledge to us. Furthermore, as our military plans develop and prosper, the danger of German aggression will decrease, or at least will appear to the Spaniards to decrease. In fact, the possibility of German invasion is already discounted by a majority of Spaniards.

As German ability to supply Spain with products Spain must import from abroad decreases—and it is steadily decreasing—our own ability to trade with Spain, and particularly our ability to provide Spain with petroleum products¹⁸ vitally needed in Spanish industry, agriculture and transportation, constitutes an increasingly powerful weapon in our hands. It is probably a more powerful weapon than any Germany can use against Spain, especially since German invasion in the face of probable Spanish resistance will involve grave military risks for the Germans, and German submarine warfare against Spanish shipping, which Germany has used as an active weapon in the past, can be limited in its effectiveness by convoying once the Spaniards feel safe to engage in such practice.

Because of our superior ability to trade with Spain, and our effective economic program, we have built up in Spain an economic dependence on us which constitutes a weapon in our hands waiting only to be used at the proper time. Meanwhile, as a result of past pro-Axis utterances of General Franco and of his continuing tolerance of the pro-Axis Falange, we have a number of legitimate complaints against Spain which we can press at the proper moment. These include the pro-Axis partisanship of the government-controlled Spanish press, radio and newsreels, other facilities given to the Axis in the Spanish propaganda field, Falange interference with our own informational activities in Spain, and, if we care to use it, the presence on the Eastern front of a Spanish volunteer division actively fighting the Russians.

It is recommended that we bear in mind the desirability *at the proper time* of exerting pressure on the Spanish Government to remove all such obvious discriminations against us. Such pressure may succeed, in which case we shall have made a net gain and shall have a fuller field for activities of all kinds in Spain.

On the other hand, it is possible that the Spanish Government, in the face of Falange and German pressure which it is anticipated will be exerted on Spain, may persist in its discriminations against us. In that event, we may decide to slow up, or even to interrupt, deliveries of American products, including petroleum, to Spain. We might simultaneously intensify our propaganda in Spain and complain publicly against the pro-Axis policies of the Spanish Government so that it would become apparent that there was a relationship between those policies and the reduction in Spanish-American trade.

Franco would in that event be in an extremely weak position. It would probably be too late for him to appeal for help from the Axis. The popular will to resist Axis interference, which has been culti-

¹⁸ See pp. 668 ff.

vated by the Government, itself, would be too strong, and he could not expect support from the Army.

The Spanish people, already anti-Axis in their feeling, would be aware, as in fact they are aware already, that we had real grievances against Spain, and there is a good chance that the odium for the economic crisis which would ensue in Spain would fall on General Franco, who is held to be personally responsible for the pro-Axis attitude of the Spanish Government.

The desire to overcome the economic crisis, which would in itself threaten to bring about popular revolt in Spain, might be the factor needed to bring the diverse anti-Franco and anti-Falange groups in Spain together. The Army, with monarchist support, might carry out a coup which would restore the Monarchy. If this opportunity were missed, the possibility of mass rebellion would become imminent.

A revolt against the present régime would be a revolt against the Axis because of the régime's close identification with it. As between the Axis and ourselves we would be in a favored position if we were able to take military advantage of our opportunity. If the Axis entered Spain we might enter also, without being guilty of committing an aggression. We would, in that event, have a ready-made second front without in any way repudiating our pledges to Spain.

Portugal would most probably be in a mood to accept our military aid, and both the Portuguese and Spanish islands in the Atlantic would become available for use by us as bases.

In creating the conditions for these developments we could not be accused of having committed an aggression against Spain because we have no obligation to continue our economic relations with Spain in the face of the pro-Axis attitude of many agencies of the Spanish Government. In fact, this attitude deprives Spain of any just claim to continued treatment as a neutral and we have a perfect right to reduce or suspend our trade with Spain so long as these Spanish agencies are allowed to persist in their pro-Axis partisanship.

740.0011 European War 1939/298194

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1943.

The Spanish Ambassador called upon me this afternoon at his request upon his return from Spain. The Ambassador told me in some detail of his conversations with General Franco and with General Jordana, the Foreign Minister. I asked the Ambassador to let me have a memorandum covering all of the points which he had brought up in his conversation with me so that I might be quite sure that all

of the information he had communicated to me would be made a matter of record in the precise and exact form in which he desired. The Ambassador told me he would send me this memorandum immediately.

The Ambassador said that he would like to repeat personally to the President the statements made to him by General Franco and his Foreign Minister. I said I would be very glad to communicate the Ambassador's request to the President and that I would let him know what the President's convenience might be.

In general terms the Ambassador emphasized the fact that relations between our two countries had improved materially. He stressed the fact that no one in Spain today, from General Franco on down, believed that Germany would win the war and that Spanish official opinion as well as public opinion in general believed that Germany would inevitably be defeated. General Franco apparently and a few persons closely identified with him are under the illusion that the war will be long drawn out and that some compromise peace may be arrived at as a result of the weariness of both sides. The Ambassador took occasion to say that he reminded General Franco when he was talking with him that he, the Ambassador, two years ago had given him in writing as his considered opinion that Germany could never win the war and that the United States would inevitably enter the war and decide it to the favor of the United Nations cause.

The Ambassador emphasized the fact that a bitter dispute was still going on within the Spanish Government between the Spanish Foreign Office which represented, under the direction of General Jordana, the desire for complete neutrality turning in the direction of the United Nations, and the Falange which still desired to pursue a policy friendly to the Axis powers. He made to me the categorical statement, by instruction of his Foreign Minister, in this connection that the external Falangist organization of the Spanish Government had been abolished, that all Falangist propaganda abroad had been prohibited by order of General Franco himself and that if this Government at any time had any evidence which showed that Falangist propaganda in Spanish America was being conducted and would bring this evidence to the attention of the Spanish Government, remedial action would be immediately instituted.

The Ambassador handed me the memorandum attached herewith¹⁹ referring to the policy of the Spanish Government with regard to its maintenance of neutrality.

The confidential and personal memorandum promised me by the Ambassador, as referred to in the first part of this memorandum, is also attached herewith.¹⁹

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

¹⁹ Not found in Department files.

811.911/402

*The American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana)*²⁰

No. 1059

MADRID, June 22, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to recent personal communications exchanged between us and to a conversation which we had on June 7 during which you informed me that steps had been taken to ensure that the government-controlled Spanish press would adopt an attitude of impartiality as between belligerents in the present war. Subsequent to our conversation, Señor Arias Salgado, Vice Secretary of Popular Education, informed the Press Attaché of this Embassy in a similar sense.

I noted with considerable gratification that just prior to our conversation and for several days subsequent to it there was, in fact, a noticeable improvement in the attitude of the Spanish press, that headlines were more fair and that a larger percentage of news from United Nations sources was published in the principal newspapers. I was particularly glad to be able to inform my Government accordingly.

I have noted with regret, however, that this tendency has since been reversed and that the Spanish press has now reverted to its older tendency to give preference to news from Axis sources and to present news from United Nations sources in the least favorable manner possible. Reports of this retrogression in the attitude of the Spanish press have reached me from all parts of Spain. I am informed that in the Barcelona area, for example, the attitude of the press is now worse than at any time subsequent to the landing of United Nations forces in North Africa. The latest retrogression in the attitude of the local press coincides, I am informed, with a visit to Barcelona of Señor Aparicio, National Delegate of Press and Propaganda.

During our conversation referred to, Your Excellency invited me to supply you with examples of unfair presentation of United Nations news. I am refraining from submitting examples at this time because they are contained in great numbers in any recent issue of the Spanish press which Your Excellency may care to examine. Merely by way of illustration, I refer you to the strongly pro-Axis slant of headlines and news on the first page of the Madrid *Ya* for Sunday, June 20, in such marked contrast to the impartiality which the same newspaper was obviously attempting to exhibit two weeks previously.

²⁰ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 1030, June 24; received July 5.

It would be too great a burden on the Embassy to collect and deliver to you the many and still more glaring examples of the current pro-Axis attitude of the Spanish press as a whole.

I am constrained to inform Your Excellency with the greatest seriousness that this widespread and obviously inspired retrogression in the attitude of the Spanish press gravely menaces the good relations between the United States and Spain which Your Excellency and I are endeavoring to foster. Unfortunately I am now obliged to report to my Government not only the newly intensified pro-Axis attitude of the press, deriving from the pro-Axis attitude of the Spanish censorship, but also its coinciding with greatly increased activity of the Press Attaché and other officials of the German Embassy.

The failure of the Spanish Government to carry out its commitment to ensure that the government-controlled Spanish press will indeed adopt an impartial attitude must necessarily raise doubt in America as to (1) the Spanish Government's sincerity in making the commitment, or (2) the Spanish Government's ability to control pro-Axis elements within the Spanish Government itself, which to date have been able to maintain or reassert the unneutral attitude of the Spanish press against which I have protested over a period of many months. If the Spanish Government, in effect, is unable to control the activities of these pro-Axis elements, my Government will of necessity be compelled to re-examine its attitude towards Spain, which is based on the Spanish Government's commitment to follow a policy of neutrality consistent with the treatment being given to Spain by my Government.

I should like to take this opportunity, too, to refer to my Note No. 1006 of June 1, 1943, protesting against the impediments placed in the way of the distribution of informational material by American agencies in Spain by Spanish Government agents. Reports from different areas in Spain, particularly from Seville, reveal that persons found with American informational material in their possession are being arrested and fined. These persons include employees of American Consulates. I request that the Spanish Government bear in mind that these Consulates are performing services which are valuable and indeed necessary to the conduct of economic and other relations between Spain and the United States, and that if the Spanish Government desires that these services be continued it should arrange for the police and its other officials to show to these Consuls and their staffs the consideration and the cooperation they are entitled to receive from officials of a friendly government.

I avail myself [etc.]

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

852.00/10761½

Memorandum by the Spanish Ambassador (Cárdenas) ²¹

NOTES

Germany knows Spain, the idiosyncrasies of the Spaniards, the ruggedness of the Spanish terrain and therefore she realizes that an invasion of the country is not an easy task.

Germany maintains good relations with Spain, but Spain has spoken firmly to her whenever Germany has seemed to seek anything departing from the usual course of the relations between independent nations.

Spain will resist a German invasion with all the means in her power.

Spain has no imperialistic aspirations towards the Iberic-American countries, aiming only at a continuance of the Spanish traditions and culture there.

Spain's regime is neither fascist, nor nazist; it is Spanish. It is based on the Spanish tradition and is essentially Christian-catholic. A great part of its present organization could find its origin in the purely-Spanish guilds of the past. The Government is authoritarian by reason of both the Civil and the global war.

After asserting that there not exists at present any cause for alarm, the Generalissimo would like to ascertain whether, should there ever become necessary, the American Government would be willing to provide Spain with arms for her defense.

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1943.

852.01/841 : Airgram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, July 29, 1943—noon.
[Received August 4—3 p. m.]

A-368. Supplementing my telegram No. 1969, July 29, 11 a. m.,²² I talked to General Franco an hour and forty minutes yesterday. Jordana was present.

I extended greetings on behalf of the President. I reiterated pledges we had made in connection with Spain and Spanish territory, and referred to rumors which our enemies were propagating

²¹ In a covering memorandum the Secretary of State stated: "The Spanish Ambassador called at his request. He proceeded to give me his reactions to conditions in Spain and to Spanish policy, as per copy of notes attached." (852.00/10761½)

²² Not printed; it gave an abridged account of the conversation reported in this airgram (852.01/837).

to the effect that we were intriguing to restore the Monarchy or restore the Republic or to return exiled Spaniards to Spain and place them in power. I said of course such rumors were unfounded and that we were not concerned with internal affairs in Spain. We were concerned, however, with Spain's foreign policy.

I said I felt that during my fifteen months in Spain there had been notable improvement in Spanish-American relations, especially in the economic and commercial field. This improvement had been slow, however, and had not reached the point it should. I was handicapped and Spain was handicapped by a widespread impression that the Spanish Government is sympathetic with the Axis and is not in fact neutral.

This circumstance is increasingly important now since it is very clear to us, and doubtless to Franco, that the United Nations are winning the war. Recent developments in Italy foreshadowed speedy capitulation. It was increasingly urgent that Spain clarify its international position and place it on the best possible basis.

Franco said he was not greatly surprised by the situation in Italy. He said that after we had occupied North Africa with very large forces, and knowing what he did about the low state of Italian morale, he was not surprised that Italy was in trouble. This did not mean that the war would end in the near future, however. Germany was still tough and morale there was excellent.

I said I was not prophesying when the war would end, but the offensive had now passed to the United Nations. He nodded agreement.

Returning to the main theme, I said there were three respects in which Spanish policy should be altered in order to give reassurance to the United Nations, and particularly to the United States and in Spain's own interest:

(1) There was misunderstanding outside Spain concerning the meaning and possible effect of Spain's non-belligerency. I said the Spanish Government should declare its neutrality in unequivocal terms.

Franco said that Spain's policy was in fact neutral. He was determined Spain would not be involved in the war. Spain intended to be neutral. However, the word neutral had a disagreeable connotation. It implied indifference. Spain could not be indifferent to the struggle against Communism.

I observed that whatever meaning his Government might give to non-belligerence, it was not understood outside Spain. The foreign policy of any country had to take into account the effect of that policy outside its borders. Unfortunately Mussolini had used the same word in describing Italy's policy just before it entered the war. Mussolini was now thoroughly discredited and German strength was

diminishing. Spain's continued non-belligerence was unfortunate from Spain's point of view. Franco made no further reply to this.

(2) I believed the Foreign Office, under Jordana, was honestly endeavoring to carry out a policy of impartiality. However, that policy was continually being interfered with by other agencies, especially those directed and controlled by Falange. He asked which agencies. I said the Ministry of the Party, the Vicesecretariat of Popular Education, and the agencies having to do with the postal service and the local police.

Franco said Jordana had brought this to his attention several times. He asked whether the press had not improved. I said it had, but improvement was sporadic and there were many setbacks. It had not improved enough. I then gave him a résumé concerning our difficulties in distributing informational material, and pointed out that while the German propaganda magazine, *Signal*, was freely sold in Spain, *Selecciones* could not be sold even though it had passed the Spanish censor.

Franco said this was important and he would look into the matter. He was anxious there should be no discrimination. He said of course one had to distinguish at times. Democratic propaganda was sometimes objectionable because it criticized the internal system in Spain. I pointed out that if it was interpreted in this manner it was because the internal system, that is Falange, was so pro-Axis.

He said he was glad I had called this matter to his attention.

(3) I then referred to the Blue Division. I quite understood Spain's repugnance to Russian Communism and to any possible forceful intervention by Russia in Spanish affairs. Conversely, I could see no reason why Spain should attempt to intervene forcefully in Russian affairs. The Blue Division was doing exactly that. I pointed out there was no Blue Division when Germany and Russia were in practical alliance.

In 1941, however, after Germany had attacked Russia, the Spanish Government suddenly discovered that Russian Communism was a great menace. It looked to outsiders as though Spain were more interested in giving military support, even of a token nature, to Germany than in fighting Russian Communism.

Franco said Spain was not fighting Russia. The Blue Division was maintained only to show Spain's horror of Communism and to resist Communism. The civil war in Spain developed into a war against Communism and Communist influence. While the civil war was still on, he was invited to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact.²³ Com-

²³ For text of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, see *Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, p. 153. For additional secret agreement, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. I (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 734, footnote 2a.

munism was so obviously a danger in Spain that he signed the Pact. He said I could not imagine his surprise when he learned Germany and Russia were drawing together. He protested to Hitler and also to Italy. He told Hitler he felt Germany was violating the Anti-Comintern Pact. He also made overtures to England, France, and to the Vatican, to bring pressure to break up this association.

When the war broke out, Franco and all Spaniards were sympathetic with Poland. He foresaw Germany was allowing half of Poland to be appropriated by Russia. He made representations to the Vatican on behalf of Poland. Poland was overwhelmingly Catholic, and he felt he should do what he could to save it. He said that after the invasion of Poland he couldn't think of joining Germany under any circumstances.

When Finland was attacked by Russia, Spain explored the possibility of sending a volunteer division to help the Finns. It was so soon after the civil war that Spain did not have the means, and the question of transport was difficult. Consequently, nothing was done.

He said there was a precedent for the Blue Division. A volunteer Spanish division fought on the French side during the first World War. Finally, when Germany and Russia fell out, it became practicable to send Spanish troops to the eastern front. He deemed it necessary to show Spain's unchanging hostility to Communism, which it considered the greatest menace in the world.

He then asked me whether I thought Germany and Russia would get together. I said no, but added that if that should occur it would be an additional reason for Spain's lining itself up with Britain and the United States.

I said I was very glad to have his explanation of the Blue Division. It was interesting and I knew my Government would be interested. I understood the motives prompting him historically. I felt, however, they did not square with the actual situation now. It is impossible to distinguish between the war against Communism and the war against Russia. Russia did not attack Germany. Germany attacked Russia. Germany obviously has imperialistic designs and hopes to annex large parts of Russia. Russia is fighting defensively. If Spain claimed Russia should not intervene in Spanish affairs, it could not justify Spain's intervening in Russian affairs. The matter was pressing. German power was declining. If Spain was not careful it would be left in an embarrassing position. What would happen if Russia declared war on Spain? We all had to live with Russia now and in the future, and Spain should bear this in mind.

Franco admitted that the situation probably had changed somewhat. He said that, after all, however, there was a certain utility

in having some Spanish officers on the eastern front. They furnish invaluable information about Germany and the eastern front.

I said I should think he could get this information through his Military Attaché in Berlin and not have to maintain a division on the eastern front for that purpose.

He said I had mentioned Spain's delicate position now and when the peace should come. He would like to express his views.

There are three wars going on :

(1) That of England and the United States against Germany and Italy. In this war Spain is neutral. It is really benevolent toward us.

(2) The war in the Pacific. This, in many ways, is the most important of all, and from the long range viewpoint the most menacing. Japan is the great enemy. . . . He would like to cooperate with us against the Japanese, although the relative weakness of Spain would prevent any effective aid.

(3) The war against Communism. Unfortunately Europe is honeycombed with Communist impulses and there has been a great breakdown of civilization in Europe. A kind of decadence has come over the Continent. In Germany and Italy and all the occupied countries there are sizeable Communist groups, well-organized and ready to act and to strike. As the war goes on, and Russia gets the better of the Germans, the Russians will have all these groups ready at hand. It will then be easy for Russia to take over the Continent of Europe.

I asked if the United States and Britain would not be winning the war also. He said yes, but that while we put great enthusiasm into winning the war, we would both withdraw from the Continent when the war was won. We would not be in a position to turn about and attack Russia.

I said that while he could arbitrarily break down the war into three wars, this was not practical because the whole thing could not be disentangled. I said I had greater faith than he in Europe. There were no doubt groups of Communists in the countries he mentioned, but there were also large numbers of people in Germany as well as in the other countries who did not want any kind of totalitarianism. People were not obliged to choose between Naziism and Communism. The large moderate group composed of middle- and upper-class persons, peasantry, army and navy officers, and many workers could be counted on to exert a modifying influence.

He said he hoped I was right. He still had his doubts.

I asked him how far he expected to get by saying: "Communism will triumph everywhere in Europe"? What could one Spanish division

do to stop it? Wasn't it better not to give Russia justification for attacking Spain? And shouldn't Spain cooperate with the moderate powers in its own interest? He did not reply to this. I then said that it seemed to me Spain did not have to choose between Russia and Germany. Spain, after all, was an American country even more than a European country. He expressed emphatic agreement. I then spoke of Spain's cultural and sentimental attachment to the Spanish American countries. He agreed. He said he recognized that the United States had certain economic, geographical and political ties with Spanish America. He feared my Government considered that Hispanidad was directed against the United States and had political ends.

I said my Government did not feel this, but that the popular press felt it and that there was justification for this feeling historically. I said that before Jordana became Foreign Minister an effort was being made to use Hispanidad in this manner. He said if it ever had been used that way, it had been stopped long since. He referred again to our important relations with Spanish America and said that he hoped we would have increasingly close relations also with Spain. Spanish ties with Latin America are purely cultural and sentimental. There was no reason why we all couldn't work together. He said he pictured it as a triangle in which we all would have mutually helpful relations. He knew the United States had no idea of extending political control over Spanish America and neither did Spain. He regarded Spain and the Spanish American countries as constituting a sentimental federation.

I said that reinforced what I had been telling him. Throughout Spanish America there was great repugnance for the German imperialism of Hitler. It seemed to me that Spain, in its desire for solidarity with Spanish America, could find an added important reason for ceasing in any way to favor the Axis or to appear to favor it. Public opinion in Spanish America was a very important consideration to Spain. I said that, in addition, the overwhelming majority of persons in Spain itself were not pro-German. He thought this was correct. He said, of course, there are sentimental ties with Germany for assistance given during the civil war. This debt, of course, had long since been paid.

I said I hoped that as we approached the end of the war Spain would find itself in full cooperation with the United Nations.

I thanked him for receiving me and expressed appreciation of his explanation of Spanish policy, and said it would be of interest to my Government. He thanked me and said he had profited by my exposition. He said he would give all the matters I had mentioned his most

earnest attention. He asked me to convey to President Roosevelt his highest regards. He has the greatest esteem for him and considers him a great leader. The interview was pleasant and unusually friendly.

HAYES

852.01/855 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 28, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 7:07 p. m.]

2329. During my conversation with Jordana Thursday²⁴ I showed him a letter I had just received from the President, dated August 14,²⁵ saying that it was impossible to avoid the assumption that the Spanish Government sanctions and directs the unneutral behavior of the Falange Party and the Spanish press.

Jordana expressed understanding of the President's attitude. He hoped he himself would not be held responsible for grievous mistakes of his predecessors in office. He regretted them and had made up his mind to rectify them. It was not merely because we were now winning victories. He had adopted and pursued this policy prior to our North African landing (this is true). It had been uphill work. However, Franco had been convinced that other agencies of the Spanish Government should be brought in line with Foreign Office and had recently given orders accordingly, at the same time charging Jordana with watching situation and reporting any infractions of his orders. It would still take time to bring all the press into line. Meanwhile Axis was protesting vigorously against attitude of press. He hoped I would assure the President Spain moving quickly and that he expects shortly that all grounds for complaint will be removed.

I said I was glad to have this from him. I recognized there had been improvement but press had not achieved perfect neutrality. I said I would not be content until Axis had protested as long and with as little success as I had and reminded him that all I insisted upon was neutrality while Axis protesting lack of partiality. If Spanish Government could resist my protests for a year it could easily resist Axis protests.

HAYES

²⁴ August 26.

²⁵ Not printed.

852.01/856 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 28, 1943—12 noon.

[Received August 29—9:24 p. m.]

2330. I told Jordana Thursday about reports reaching me of efforts of Falange to conscript new members for Blue Division. I said I considered this very serious and foresaw it would make bad situation worse.

He said he would like to talk frankly about Blue Division. He had long believed that sending of division was a mistake and that it should be withdrawn. Franco had been very favorably impressed by what I said to him on July 28 about the Blue Division²⁶ and he now shared Jordana's belief it should be withdrawn.

However, while I had spoken to Franco quietly and without fanfare Hoare²⁷ had since gone to him with trumpets and the BBC²⁸ had broadcast to effect that Hoare had made representations about Blue Division and British Embassy had clearly said same thing. As a result both German and Italian Ambassadors²⁹ had protested vigorously to Spanish Government, which did not lessen the practical difficulty of withdrawing the division. The gesture of withdrawing it had no value to Spain unless it appeared to be voluntary and British Ambassador probably unwittingly had now made it appear he was exerting pressure on Spain and hence he had made it difficult and perhaps postponed date of action. However, Jordana believed division would eventually be withdrawn and he hoped I would have patience in understanding.

He said he would take up matter of recruiting with Franco and he thought it would be stopped.

While foregoing may possibly appear [to] be an effort on Jordana's part to drive wedge between British and US I have no reason to believe it is. Publicity locally and by BBC given to Hoare's call on Franco much commented on locally, especially by those familiar with earlier conversation to which we were careful to give no publicity. Counselor British Embassy³⁰ said publicity was London's idea. Hoare told me on the other hand it was due to overenthusiasm of boys in press section. More probable Hoare endeavoring to repair political

²⁶ See airgram No. A-368, p. 611.

²⁷ Sir Samuel Hoare, British Ambassador in Spain.

²⁸ British Broadcasting Company.

²⁹ Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff and Giacomo Paolucci di Calboli, respectively.

³⁰ Arthur F. Yencken, who was Chargé at this time.

fences in England. I have not told British Chargé of my conversation with Jordana.

See my 2314, August 27.³¹

Repeated to London.

HAYES

862.20252/216

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

No. 1401

MADRID, October 2, 1943.

[Received October 16.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that I told the Minister of Foreign Affairs on September 28th that I was much concerned about information that had come to me from thoroughly reliable sources, during the past week, about what Axis agents had been allowed to do on Spanish soil against Allied military operations outside. I especially called his attention to the Italian assault force which had been engaged in sabotage activities around Gibraltar and espionage work in Spanish Morocco. I said the picture was not a pretty one and that my Government, when it knew the whole truth, would be bound to take a very serious view of it. However, there were many more German agents than Italian throughout Spain. I had been informed of a considerable recent increase of the Gestapo here and of their supplying arms to the Falange. It was obvious to me, and I imagined it must be to him, that these German agents had been very active, during the last two weeks, trying to foment trouble between Spain and the United Nations. It was apparent in a certain lapse that had occurred during the second half of September in the Spanish press, attributable, I did not doubt, to renewed pressure of the Germans upon Spanish newspapers and the Falange censorship. I felt these German agents were stirring up pro-German elements of the Falange as a prelude to possible German intervention and occupation. The Germans were obviously desperate, and so, too, was the pro-German element in the Falange. I felt that the Spanish Government should put curbs on both.

The Foreign Minister said that if we had any specific information other than what the British had already communicated to him about sabotage and espionage activity of Axis agents around Gibraltar or in Spanish Morocco, he wished to have it. The Caudillo,³² as much as himself, was determined to stop such activity. He believed there

³¹ Not printed.

³² Gen. Francisco Franco.

were too many German agents in Spain and he intended gradually to see that their number was reduced. However, I must distinguish between the Falange as an organization under chiefs responsible to the Caudillo and certain undisciplined individuals in the Falange. Amongst the latter there was doubtless a good deal of pro-German sentiment and activity, but the organization as such had been most rigorously instructed by the Caudillo to observe real neutrality as between the Axis and the United Nations, and the Minister believed the responsible heads of the Falange were seriously and honestly trying to carry the Caudillo's instructions into effect.

Respectfully yours,

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/31744

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to President Roosevelt

MADRID, October 4, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This exposed flank of ours becomes, I am glad to report, progressively less critical and dangerous. General Franco is giving evidence of having taken seriously what I told him in our lengthy conversation on July 28th³³—that in her own interest Spain could no longer afford (1) to adhere to dubious “non-belligerency”, (2) to tolerate a markedly pro-Axis press and radio, (3) to leave the pro-German Falange uncurbed, or (4) to maintain the Blue Division on the Russian front.

Ten days after that conversation, the Caudillo issued orders to the press to change its tune and to observe strict impartiality between the belligerents—orders which are not yet universally obeyed but which have led to a very obvious improvement in the principal newspapers. He must also have given special curbing instructions to those Falangist leaders most inclined to combat us in deed or in word. There has been a notable lessening of Falangist oratory, and even the big chief, Arrese,³⁴ . . . now subordinates his customary denunciation of communism to an elaborate exposition of the thesis that Falange is not a platform, that it is *sui generis* and should not be confused with any foreign product like Fascism or Naziism, and that, above all, it is “adaptable”.

Last Friday, the Caudillo gave his annual gala reception in the Oriente Palace to the diplomatic corps and the staffs of the various Spanish ministries, and afterwards made a speech. This year, unlike previous years, he did not receive the “Party” and did not wear the Falangist uniform. He wore instead a naval uniform—perhaps in

³³ See airgram No. A-368, July 29, noon, from the Ambassador in Spain, p. 611.

³⁴ José Luis Arrese, Secretary General of the Falange Party in Spain.

confirmation of what he said at La Coruña, last month, to the effect that Spain's future, like her past, was on the sea and toward the Americas. And in the speech he made, last Friday,³⁵ he uttered publicly and solemnly, *for the first time*, the hitherto tabooed word of "neutrality" to define Spain's "non-belligerency". I am sure we shall never again hear of Spain's "non-belligerency". It is as politically dead as its author, Serrano Suñer.³⁶ Jordana has triumphed . . .

By now, too, the Spanish Blue Division should have been on its way out of Russia. I have it from excellent, but of course confidential, sources that shortly after I talked with Franco on July 28th he consulted the Supreme War Council—the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Army, Navy and Air, and the Chiefs of Staff—and obtained their unanimous approval for the gradual withdrawal of the Legion. But then, on August 20th, Sir Samuel Hoare went to Franco at La Coruña with what Jordana has since described to me and also to the British Chargé as a "blare of trumpets", apparently encouraging the British press and the BBC to proclaim that he went with "demands" for the Legion's withdrawal. The publicity from Britain about it has continued to date with the unhappy results that the Spanish Government, if it should now withdraw the Legion, would seem to do so through compulsion and not on its own initiative, which hurts Spanish pride, and that, with the Germans alarmed and exerting heavy counter-pressure, the Legion still remains in Russia.

Nevertheless, the Legion has shrunk during the last two months to about 11,000 men, and, with a cessation of the unfortunate publicity from Britain and with the rapidly lessening fear of Germany on the part of the Spanish Government, I expect that further shrinkage of the Legion will soon ensue and that all the Spanish boys will be out of the trenches in Russia well before Christmas. Meanwhile, I am utilizing every opportunity quietly to press Jordana on the matter.

I don't mean to imply, from all the foregoing, that we are entirely out of the woods in Spain. The Germans here as elsewhere are now desperate and, failing to arrest the drift of the Spanish Government toward us, they are redoubling their efforts through propaganda and intrigue to halt the drift of popular opinion towards us. Of late they have been especially active in attempting to increase the number of "diehards" among the Falange—who also are desperate—and to incite them against Jordana and other "compromisers" within the Government. Rumors even emanate from them of a pro-Axis *coup d'état* against Franco.

From reports reaching me from Lisbon, I gather that Portugal will shortly join us in the war. Such a development will be a crucial

³⁵ October 1.

³⁶ Ramón Serrano Suñer preceded Jordana as Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

test of Spain's position between Germany, on the one hand, and the United States and Great Britain on the other. I believe that Germany will utilize it in a supreme (and last) endeavor to embroil Spain in war against us. I also believe that, thanks to our now obvious military superiority and to the policy which, during the past eighteen months, we have pursued towards Spain, this country—its Government as well as its people—will resist all German blandishments and threats.

The Italian Ambassador here, with the Military, Naval, Commercial and Press Attachés, is cooperating with us loyally and helpfully. Furthermore, he is managing to line up almost all the staff of his Embassy and Consulates and the majority of the large Italian colony with the King³⁷ and Badoglio.³⁸ We have assurances from Jordana that Spain will continue to recognize the Royal Italian Government and will withhold recognition from the puppet government of Mussolini.

May I call your attention to a brilliant and, in my opinion, most important article on "Roman Night" by Gouverneur Paulding in *The Commonwealth* for August 13, 1943. It deals with a fundamental problem which will confront us not only in Italy but all over central and western Europe—the problem of how to obviate or mitigate the internal hatreds and strife within countries externally freed by our arms.

When the time seems propitious, I should like to report in person to you and to Mr. Secretary Hull. I have been here steadily now for seventeen months.

With hearty congratulations to you on the progress of the war, I am,

Faithfully yours,

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

752.61/46

*The American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana)*³⁹

[Translation]

MADRID, October 21, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER AND FRIEND: In my conversation with the Caudillo on July 28,⁴⁰ I said that my Government was not interested in internal Spanish politics but that it was very much interested in Spain's foreign policy, and especially in its attitude toward the coun-

³⁷ King Victor Emmanuel III.

³⁸ Marshal Pietro Badoglio became Prime Minister of Italy following the resignation and arrest of Mussolini on July 25, 1943.

³⁹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 1511, October 22; received November 16.

⁴⁰ See airgram No. A-368, July 29, noon, from the Ambassador in Spain, p. 611.

tries at war. I recommended that Spain, in its own interest and in the interest of improved relations between our two countries, should openly declare its neutrality. I am very pleased that General Franco has done this and I am convinced that in doing it he has acted very intelligently in Spain's interest.

At the same time, I am seriously troubled by the continuing attacks on Russia by Spanish leaders and by the Spanish press. I do not refer to Spain's general opposition to communism, but rather to specific statements and actions which confuse communism with Russia, one of the principal allies of the United States in the war.

I fear lest the Spanish Government may have the impression that the Government of the United States is quite complacent over this anti-Russian attitude of the Spanish Government and its officially-controlled press. This is not the case, and I should like to set forth my Government's viewpoint in the matter a little more explicitly than I have had the opportunity of setting it forth in the past.

Russia is an important member of the United Nations. Any attack on Russia, therefore, is an attack on an important ally of the United States. Complacency toward Nazi Germany, on the other hand, is complacency toward an enemy of the United States. By systematically attacking Russia, while showing excessive complacency toward Nazi Germany, Spain is evidencing partiality toward Germany, and unfriendliness toward one of the United Nations.

There is no country in the world, with the exception of Russia, which welcomes *communism* within its borders. Spain's attitude in this respect does not differ from the attitude of most other countries. However, all free countries in the world are also opposed to *Naziism*, and I believe it is fair to estimate that a majority of Germans now are opposed to it. In failing to take an official stand against *Naziism*, Spain is practically alone among the free countries of the world. Even the Vatican, to whose attitude the Spanish Government appears in general to attach due importance, has denounced *Naziism* in stronger terms than it has denounced *Communism*. Some of the strongest denunciations of *Naziism* have come from the Catholic bishops of Germany.

Communism is, in the last analysis, an essentially internal problem. If conditions for the development of communism do not exist within a country, that country need not become communist. It is thoroughly unrealistic to believe that any country can help to overcome a possible communist menace within its borders by publicly attacking Russia. Such a menace can be overcome, in the long run, only by creating living standards which make the growth of communism impossible.

The United States and Great Britain, by maintaining trade with Spain, are cooperating effectively in helping to overcome conditions

in Spain which might encourage the growth of communism, and my Government is not content that Spain, on its part, should reciprocate by systematically attacking Russia, an important ally of the United States and Great Britain, while making it appear that it is attacking communism.

From the point of view of Spanish security, present and future, Spain is subjecting itself needlessly to possible future retaliation by Russia. The Spanish Government should bear in mind that Russia entered the war because it was attacked by Germany, and that Russia is engaged in a war in defense of its own soil.

When final victory for the United Nations comes, Russia will have earned the right to participate in the peace arrangements. It will have an important voice at the peace table and in the many readjustments that will inevitably have to be made in international matters after the war. This is a right which cannot and should not be denied to Russia, because it has been fairly earned. By systematically attacking Russia, Spain is making it more difficult for the democracies to continue to follow that helpful attitude toward Spain which they would like to follow.

My Government does not subscribe to the theory, frequently expressed by Spanish officials, that the present war must end in a war against communism. My Government looks forward to continued cooperation by the other United Nations with Russia during and after the war, and it is doing everything possible to help lay the basis for such cooperation. It considers that Spain, in its own interest, and in the interest of its relations with the rest of the world, should also be helping to lay the basis for peaceful cooperation with the United Nations, including Russia, in the future.

The Spanish Government, while it was officially "non-belligerent", declined to permit the publication of Russian war communiqués. All the news carried in the Spanish press concerning the war on the eastern front came from German sources. The Spanish Government must be quite aware by this time that such reports are undependable and have given such a distorted version of the war that the Spanish public no longer takes them seriously. Furthermore, news of Russian military victories reaches the Spanish public from many sources and the Spanish people are too intelligent to be fooled by German communiqués.

The Spanish Government's refusal to permit the publication of Russian communiqués has not, therefore, prevented the truth of Russian military successes from becoming known in Spain. It has, however, given the public the impression that those military successes of Russia, one of the United Nations, are displeasing to the Spanish Government. Consequently, every Russian victory is regarded as a defeat for the Spanish Government.

Now that General Franco has made it clear that Spain is neutral, there would appear to be every reason why the Spanish Government should presently take steps to ensure that Russian communiqués are published in the same manner that communiqués of the other belligerents are published. Russian communiqués are published in Germany, and I can conceive of no reason why they should not be published in Spain as they are in all other neutral countries.

In summary, my Government is not in any sense complacent about Spain's attitude toward Russia. This attitude is a strong deterrent to the improvement of relations between Spain and the United States. It is doing great harm to Spain's international position, and detracting gravely from the benefits which Spain could otherwise expect to receive as a result of other aspects of its foreign policy.

It is my Government's view that, in its own interest, Spain should take the following steps without delay :

1. Announce the withdrawal of the Blue Division.
2. Publish Russian communiqués in the same manner as it publishes the communiqués of other belligerent countries.
3. Cease attacking Russia, through public addresses of Spanish officials, and in the Spanish press, over the Spanish radio, et cetera.
4. Stop pretending that Germany's aggression against Russia is a "crusade", when the German Government, itself, has admitted on numerous occasions that it is a war of conquest.

I believe Spain should bear in mind that it is the only free country in the world whose government systematically attacks Russia while refraining from attacking Germany. This is a dubious and a dangerous distinction, and one that Spain might well abandon in its own interest.

I write Your Excellency in this frank and personal manner, not only as a representative of the United States but also as a sincere admirer and friend of Spain.

I avail myself [etc.]

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

852.20/203 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 22, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received October 23—11 : 14 a. m.]

3080. I told the Foreign Minister today that I had received many reports of impending withdrawal of the Blue Division. As I had already pointed out, it seemed to me important not only that it should be withdrawn but that Spain should get credit in the press of Allied and neutral countries for withdrawing it on its own initiative. I asked if he contemplated making public announcement which could be communicated abroad. He said arrangements for withdrawal

were not completed. Withdrawal will take place on October 25 and thereafter no Spanish soldiers will be left on eastern front. Division will be repatriated to Spain in groups during ensuing month. Meanwhile it would be brought to Koenigsburg, and of course no further reinforcements would be sent. He doubted it was prudent now to give official publicity to withdrawal since Spain had had great trouble with the Germans in arranging for withdrawal. However, it was finally arranged, and he could communicate this to me officially in confidence. Everybody in Spain knew of the withdrawal and he suspected it was known outside, but if publicity were given to it now it would be said that withdrawal was due to representations made by British Ambassador when, as a matter [matter] of fact, his representations had had nothing to do with withdrawal. He again referred to the unfortunate publicity already given to the matter, especially in the British press. My 2895 October 7, midnight.⁴¹

I reminded him that stories now circulating in Spain will doubtless creep into the press abroad and that it might be better to issue an official statement which was clear and to the point than to allow the withdrawal to be tied up with stories now circulating in United States and Britain. He said he would like to think it over, and would let me know later.

I then referred to the larger subject of Spanish-Russian relations. I said my Government understood Spanish Government's natural repugnance for communism but could not understand why Spanish Government associated communism exclusively with Russia, and I hoped neither he nor Franco gathered from anything that I had said that we felt complacent about Spain's general attitude toward Russia. Russia was our Ally and helping greatly. We and our Allies and also neutral nations had to live with Russia after the war as we had to live with each other. I had been giving serious thought to the subject and had written down my thoughts. I then handed him a personal letter in Spanish which I am transmitting by despatch.⁴² I said I considered it very important and hoped he would consider it important enough to show to Franco.

He read a large portion of the letter with evident interest. He said it was an important matter and he would like to study it and discuss it with Franco. He would speak to me about it in a week or 10 days.

He then asked me if I had shown the letter to any of my colleagues and if any publicity would be given to it. I replied no.

HAYES

⁴¹ Not printed.

⁴² English text printed *supra*.

*President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*⁴³

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1943.

MY DEAR HAYES: I have just received your letter of October 4, 1943, giving an account of recent developments in Spain. These are in general gratifying, and we have just learned that in all probability the Blue Division will have been retired from the front in a week.

It has been suggested that the Germans may form a sort of foreign legion, in which they will incorporate any members of the Blue Division who may decide, of their own free will, to continue fighting. It seems a little far-fetched to me, to suppose that any considerable number of these Spaniards would wish to remain on, especially as the voluntary character of their enlistment in the first place was subject to very considerable doubt. I wonder if this may not be a maneuver to maintain the Blue Division on the eastern front under another name.

Spain stands to lose in such a game, as you have been careful to point out to Count Jordana. I think it would be well for you to keep this reality before the Foreign Minister, in the hope that the Spanish Government will yet cleanly remove this awkward and ill-advised feature of Spanish foreign policy, albeit tardily, in the interest of the future of Spain's foreign relations. If this situation could be completely corrected, and a statement issued by the Spanish Government, the effect would be more beneficial than any we may expect from half measures carried out secretly.

I well realize that you have been on the job steadily now for seventeen months, under most trying and difficult circumstances. You have, I feel, done a magnificent job and I want you to know that the very tangible successes you have achieved are fully appreciated here. I should have liked to call you home for consultation before this, but have felt it the part of prudence to postpone that satisfaction in view of the very rapidly evolving situation in the Peninsula.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.0011 European War 1939/32055

*The American Embassy in Spain to the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs*⁴⁴

No. 1570

NOTE VERBALE

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to inform

⁴³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁴⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Spain in his despatch No. 1580, November 9; received November 26.

the latter that, according to information received from the competent American authorities, on October 27, 1943 an aircraft resembling a Fiat attacked United States patrol planes approximately six miles east of Las Palmas, in the Canary Islands, as a result of which damage was suffered by one of the planes and injuries sustained by a member of its crew.

It is further reported that on the following day, October 28, a bi-plane believed to be a Fiat made repeated but unsuccessful attempts to attack two American patrol planes operating four miles off the coast of the island of Gran Canaria at a point ten miles south of Las Palmas, and that on October 30 a similar aircraft pursued an American patrol plane for fifteen minutes off Las Palmas, during which period the American plane was at no time closer to the shore than a distance of six miles.

On November 1 it is reported that a United States aircraft on patrol duty was attacked three times at a point seven miles east of Melenara, Gran Canaria, by a plane resembling a Fiat, during the course of which attacks the American aircraft received approximately forty 50-caliber hits resulting in considerable damage to the plane itself and injuries to three of the members of its crew.

The Embassy has been instructed by its Government to protest strongly to the Spanish Government against the unneutral conduct of these Spanish aircraft in the Canary Islands in making repeated attacks against United States aircraft outside of the limits of Spanish territorial waters, and to request from the Spanish Government appropriate assurances that such unneutral acts will not occur in the future.

MADRID, November 9, 1943.

740.0011 European War 1939/32128

*The Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy in Spain*⁴⁵

[Translation]

No. 694

NOTE VERBALE

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States and, in acknowledgment of the latter's *Note Verbale* No. 1570 of November 9, has the honor to advise that the version officially received by this Department concerning the aviation incident which took place on October 28 in the Canary Islands Zone does not coincide with the information arriving at that Mission.

⁴⁵ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Spain in his despatch No. 1624, November 18; received December 2.

That which occurred on the above-mentioned date was exactly the following: at 11:55 a pursuit plane was obliged to take off at Puerto Luz in view of the presence of two bimotor planes, of unknown nationality, which were already flying from south to north at an altitude of 400 meters and a distance of 5 kilometers from the coast. When they saw the Spanish pursuit plane, the two referred-to machines went away in the northwest direction to some 8 or 10 kilometers in front of Puerto Luz, but they returned immediately, arriving to the vertical of the cited port. Warned by some bursts of machine-gun fire from the pursuit plane, they answered with violent firing, also from machine-guns of what appeared to be 12 mm. caliber, in spite of the fact that at that moment they were, as has been said, in a clearly prohibited location. The Spanish pursuit plane retired and the two planes, American according to that Mission, continued flying for some 20 minutes over Las Palmas and its port, thus persisting in their flagrant and illicit violation of Spanish air space in spite of the fact that the ground battery again fired a warning volley.

In this concrete case, therefore, the protest formulated by that Mission is groundless, and, on the other hand, there is basis for the protest which this Department begs the Embassy of the United States to transmit to its Government for the violation committed and especially for the refusal of the aviators to pay attention to the signals given them, with the aggravating factor of having answered them with violent firing, hoping that the pertinent Authorities will give suitable instructions in order that American planes not fly over prohibited zones and succeed in maintaining in the proximity of territorial waters sufficient distance to avoid any possible incident which, like those which have occurred, would be most regrettable and which the Spanish Government desires to avoid.

As to the incidents which occurred on the other dates mentioned in the *Note Verbale*, this Ministry has applied to the competent authorities and is awaiting their report in order to adopt suitable measures, of which it will be pleased to inform that Mission.

MADRID, November 15, 1943.

862.20252/218 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 18, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received November 19—3:36 a. m.]

3401. My 3323, November 12.⁴⁶ I told Jordana this morning that my Government was greatly troubled over the inordinate number of German agents throughout Spain including active Nazi party mem-

⁴⁶ Not printed.

bers, members of the Gestapo, and sabotage and espionage agents. Moreover, we are aware that the number of these agents had increased recently. We are aware also of increasing German pressure on unneutral elements in Falange. I said I would reserve for the future further discussion of this matter in its larger aspects but at this time specifically I wished to state that the United States Government joined the British Government in requesting prompt suppression of the German Consulate General at Tangier and expulsion of German agents from there. I said we had abundant evidence that Tangier is an important base of operations of the German agents I had referred to. I then handed him a note on the subject.

Jordana limited his reply to saying he would study the note.

Repeated to Tangier.

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/32599 : Telegram

*The Military Attaché in Spain (Hohenthal) to the War Department*⁴⁷

[Paraphrase]

MADRID, November 20, 1943.

421. Spanish Air Ministry advises Military Attaché Madrid that two bi-motored Allied planes flew over city and port of Las Palmas for 20 minutes at noon on the 28 October exchanging shots with Spanish pursuit planes at altitude of 400 meters. It is hoped by Ministry that American pilots are instructed to observe Spanish neutrality.

Colonel Hohenthal states that several incidents of this nature have been reported. The American Consul reports that American and British planes frequently fly over that city. Reports by the way of Gibraltar quotes that the crew of the plane mentioned in the first paragraph threatening to return and bomb airport at Las Palmas.

Colonel Hohenthal reports most cordial relations with Spanish Air Ministry and says he is allowed immediate possession from interned planes of secret papers and equipment which has greatly eased repatriation through Spain of many American aviators. It is desired that the smooth workings of the evacuation machinery be maintained and therefore Air command should be requested to brief air crews concerning the rights of neutrals. Hohenthal asked to be advised of any Spanish Air Force hostile action.

HOENTHAL

⁴⁷ This telegram was paraphrased by the War Department and copy sent to the Department of State.

711.52/303

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1943.

The Spanish Ambassador called at his request. He had no particular business except to urge continued close relations between our two Governments that would stand up and not break down in any way, and to assure me that his Government was doing everything it could along these lines, including favorable action on several requests of the United States Government. I said that while I appreciated this, I must very earnestly emphasize the fact that the whole favorable atmosphere existing in our two countries' relations was most seriously undermined and injured by the Laurel incident,⁴⁸ which no one here can understand. I said that it makes it extremely important for the Spanish Government to proceed at once with favorable action on such requests for an embargo on wolfram exports, landing rights for American planes in Spain, expulsion of German agents from Tangier, release of Italian warships in the Balearics, and release of Italian merchant vessels now in Spanish ports.⁴⁹ The Ambassador agreed to this but stated that his Government could only move so fast.

I said that since the Laurel incident, many people in this country were wondering whether the Spanish Government was making mistakes in its internal affairs, thereby impeding its own ability to go forward and deal promptly with such requests as those pending on the part of the United States. I added that the people of this country have such an implacable hatred for the barbarous conduct of the Japanese in murdering American prisoners and otherwise treating helpless Americans with every method of barbarism that they cannot understand why a country like Spain would engage in such action as the one in question. I said that this makes it all the more important that there should be expeditious action on the four or five requests of this Government. The Ambassador said that he would advise his Government very earnestly and emphatically in the matter.

The Ambassador inquired if anything was said at Moscow ^{49a} concerning the Spanish situation, to which I replied that, not for quotation in any sense, I was not aware of anything on that subject having been discussed. He also wanted to know whether the coming conference of the heads of government would discuss this question. I replied that he knew as much about that as I did.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁴⁸ For correspondence regarding the Laurel incident, see pp. 722 ff.

⁴⁹ With respect to these subjects, see index listings.

^{49a} For documentation regarding the Tripartite Conference in Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943, see vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

711.52/303 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1943—8 p. m.

2533. The Spanish Ambassador called on me at his request November 22⁵⁰ and urged the continuance of close relations between our two governments, assuring me that his Government was doing its utmost, including taking favorable action on a number of our requests. I said I understood this but must stress very earnestly that the whole favorable atmosphere in our relations had been most seriously damaged by the Laurel message which was incomprehensible here. I said this made it extremely important that his Government proceed forthwith to act favorably on such requests as wolfram embargo, expulsion of Germans from Tangier, and release of Italian war and merchant vessels. The Ambassador agreed.

I remarked that many people over here had been wondering, since the Laurel message, whether mistakes were being committed by the Spanish Government in its internal matters, thus interfering with his Government's ability to proceed promptly with requests such as those pending from us. I spoke of the intense feeling in this country with regard to Japan resulting from that country's barbarous methods, and said our people could not understand why Spain should take an action such as that referred to. This made expeditious action upon our requests the more important. The Ambassador said he would very earnestly and emphatically advise his Government.

HULL

**EFFORTS MADE TOWARD GETTING SPAIN TO IMPOSE AN EMBARGO
ON EXPORT OF WOLFRAM TO GERMANY⁵¹**

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/650 : Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Fish) to the Secretary of State

LISBON, June 22, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 5:01 p. m.]

1377. I venture to suggest that Department obtain from British Embassy Washington copies of telegram 77 which British Embassy in Madrid addressed to Lisbon under date of June 10, together with Lisbon's reply 90 of June 22 which was drafted by both British and American Missions here. As Department is no doubt aware rate of acquisitions of wolfram in Spain thus far this month will undoubt-

⁵⁰ See memorandum *supra*.

⁵¹ For previous correspondence respecting trade relations of the United States with Spain, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 248 ff., *passim*.

edly result in a record purchase, financial implications of which are so serious as to require immediate action, particularly Treasury's authorization to the Embassy at Madrid to offer gold to the Spaniards without attached conditions.

I need not point out that established trend has been for gold to flow into the peninsula, primarily from the Axis, and that even in the hypothetical event the gold in the peninsula should fall into hands of Axis it would then have no neutral place to go. Furthermore, it is quite likely that if no limitations of action are placed upon the Spaniards they may well lose inhibitions which our past policy has done so much to induce and in due course begin again to request earmarking facilities.

Informal advices via Embassy in London indicate that British Treasury not only will refrain from advancing any objections but positively favors in present circumstances the use of this and other resources to better our financial position in Spain.

Repeated to London and Madrid.

FISH

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/853 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 24, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received June 24—10:54 p. m.]

1666. COUSC⁵² 1641. German wolfram activities have recently taken the form of purchasing mines mainly in strategic areas near the Portuguese border. This manoeuvre indicates a major shift in policy. It either is designed to facilitate even larger scale smuggling from Portugal or it could be in anticipation of some regulatory action by the council on minerals of military interest such as now exists in Portugal. The British and ourselves will ask the Foreign Office for advance notification of and [*any*] change in regulation which might adversely affect our present position in the wolfram field. In either event, however, we feel that we may be obliged to take similar action and acquire mines through Safi: In view of this situation and of the contents of your 375, May 25, 10 p. m., last year,⁵³ can you now authorize us to buy properties upon approval in each instance by the Anglo-American Committee. Please reply promptly.

Repeated to Lisbon and to London.

HAYES

⁵² Designation used in telegrams sent through the Embassy by the representative of the U.S. Commercial Company; the Company was an emergency war agency, control of which was transferred to the Office of Economic Warfare, July 15, 1943.

⁵³ Not printed.

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1943—8 p. m.

1451. Embassy's 1261 of May 13, 1355 of May 24, 1370 of May 25, and 1637 of June 23; Department's 1037 of May 7 and 1156 of May 21; ⁵⁴ Lisbon's 1377 of June 22.

1. Department and BEW ⁵⁵ still feel that all other means for relieving peseta shortages and meeting our financial problem in Spain should be exhausted before Treasury is requested to make free exportable gold available to Spain. In order to judge whether the policy now needs to be altered, please telegraph urgently the following information:

(a) Referring to (b) and (c) of paragraph 3 of Department's 1011, ⁵⁶ have Spaniards expedited granting of export licenses and pesetas as we were assured in your paragraph 2 of 1355 of May 24 and 1370 of May 25? If not, please explain failure to do so.

(b) Have you fully explored possibilities as to whether Spaniards may now be willing to accumulate larger dollar balances or accept earmarked gold so that we may acquire additional pesetas in sufficient volume for our purchasing program?

(c) What has been drain on revolving fund for wolfram since June 15 and what are your anticipated future monthly requirements for wolfram? Please telegraph as quickly as possible position of fund as of June 30. Have the British paid in an additional 17,000,000 pesetas so that, together with our withdrawal of 17,000,000 pesetas from the reserve fund, a total of 34,000,000 pesetas are now available for addition to the fund? Furthermore, do you plan to use the 16,000,000 remaining pesetas in the reserve account for current wolfram purchases?

(d) If it should prove necessary to permit the Spaniards to acquire free exportable gold, what, in your opinion, should be the volume of the initial transaction and the probable volume and rate of future transactions?

(e) It seems to us that it might be of considerable assistance in achieving the objectives of our preclusive purchase in Spain without as large a financial outlay as we are now making if we could reduce or cut off granting of Spanish credits to the Axis. This might be done either by asking the Spanish not to grant further credits, or by a formal notification from the British and ourselves that we reserve the right to refuse to treat any credits granted by the Spaniards to the Axis during the war as in any way a legitimate charge against Axis assets and that in any event, such credits would be regarded as ranking below all Allied claims against Axis countries.

2. The shipment of gold to Spain cannot be considered as an isolated instance to be determined solely on local grounds. This Government

⁵⁴ None printed.

⁵⁵ Board of Economic Warfare.

⁵⁶ Not printed.

has since 1941 consistently adhered to a policy prohibiting the export of gold to European neutrals (*a*) because it would fall into Axis hands in case of invasion and (*b*) because it would result in the widening of the credit base on which the neutrals could extend additional credits to the Axis powers. To date the British policy on gold exports has been identical. On these grounds this Government has consistently refused requests for shipments of gold to Switzerland and Portugal. If an exception to this policy is now made for Spain, difficulties would be encountered in refusing to permit transfers to other neutrals. Therefore, unless the benefits to be derived from gold shipments to Spain are such as to outweigh the advantages of this Government's present policy of prohibiting any shipments of gold to Europe, the Department and BEW would be reluctant to recommend an exception in the case of Spain.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/819 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1943—midnight.

1600. USCCO ⁵⁷ 1490. Under our May 26 directive,⁵⁸ you are authorized to make purchases of up to 1,500 tons of tungsten ores in Spain, provided your expenditures do not exceed \$60,000,000. This amount is in addition to authorizations outstanding on May 1, last amounting to \$22,000,000, totaling \$82,000,000 in all. This refers to COUSC 1666, July 6 (Embassy's 1751).⁵⁹

Under May 24 directive ⁵⁸ issued here, further authorization is given you to expend up to \$2,000,000 in order to purchase tungsten-producing properties and facilities, together with facilities for refining. This latter authorization also covers purchase of leases or options on such properties or facilities, as well as for concluding any other arrangement whereby the enemy is prevented or hindered from acquiring tungsten or tungsten-producing properties or facilities, subject in each instance to prior approval by Washington.

In the agreed opinion of the Department and OEW,⁶⁰ first preemptive importance continues to be attached to wolfram which accordingly takes precedence over all other purchases. There is substantial agreement between OEW and MEW⁶¹ that the minimum

⁵⁷ Designation used by the U.S. Commercial Company in telegrams sent through the Department to the Company's representative in Spain.

⁵⁸ Not found in Department files.

⁵⁹ Not printed.

⁶⁰ Office of Economic Warfare, successor agency to the Board of Economic Warfare.

⁶¹ British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

amount of wolfram required by the enemy's iron and steel industry is between 4,000 and 4,300 tons of 65% concentrates. If the present rate of acquisition is continued, by the end of 1943 some 2000 tons will have been obtained by Germany from Spain and from Portugal an equal amount.

Acquisitions of the enemy in Spain from January to May inclusive, 1943, on a graph show that during January, February and March, purchases by the enemy were substantially consistent, that there were reduced purchases in April but that volume of purchases recovered in May. If Germany, therefore, continues present rate of acquisition, minimum enemy requirements will be satisfied, and although stockpiling by enemy has been prevented by our preclusive program, as well as acquisition of tungsten by enemy for secondary uses, it is imperative that we do something more than merely acquire all further production increases in Spain, since by obtaining such increases we do not reduce purchases by the enemy. We must wean away the enemy's principal suppliers, as well as purchase all further increases in production.

Referring to COUSC 1641, June 24, Embassy's 1666, it is recognized by Department and OEW that successful operations often require immediate decisions by the field. The Anglo-American Committee is therefore authorized to make final decisions involving purchase or lease of additional mines or claims and also to enter into total output contracts of such mines whenever situation is so urgent in Committee's judgment that the particular transaction could not be cleared in time with Washington and London. The foregoing delegation of authority to the Anglo-American Committee, however, is subject to parallel action by the British.

In the meantime, specific authority is hereby given to the Committee to make its own decision regarding purchase or lease of Sanfinx mine or in entering into a contract with Sanfinx management for total output of the mine. This refers to your COUSC 1609, May 29, Embassy's 1437.⁶²

The Department and OEW agree that the following points be considered in deciding what type of arrangement is most desirable in connection with any particular mine; that is, whether it should be in the form of a contract for the total production, purchase, or lease:

- (a) Will wolfram production be limited by the proposed arrangement?
- (b) Is a base for smuggling operations afforded by the property?
- (c) In case the Iberian Peninsula is shut off from communication with the enemy, can our obligation to pay out money be terminated under the proposed arrangement?

⁶² Not printed.

(d) From a long-term point of view (for example, 6 months) would the proposed arrangement involve the least expenditure?

(e) Would it be possible for us to make payment under the proposed arrangement in sterling or dollars rather than in pesetas?

Due consideration should be given to the abovementioned points by the Anglo-American Committee in deciding the Sanfinx proposition or any other wolfram mine proposition, even though the Committee may decide in such cases that such points are not the only controlling factors. When a final decision is made in Madrid, please report in each case by airgram to Washington showing how application has been made of each of the above-mentioned five points. In case these five points have not been the basis of the decision, please give detailed explanation of determining factors.

Repeated to London.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/968c: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1943—10 p. m.

1653. USCCO 1499. 1. We are informed by British Embassy here that 95,000,000 pesetas in export licenses have been issued to UKCC⁶³ by Spanish Government for British share of the wolfram. Of foregoing amount, reimbursement to the joint revolving fund has been made in the amount of only 10,000,000 pesetas. We understand that unwillingness of Spaniards to accumulate sterling beyond a certain level is responsible for this situation, and that until the present level of balances has been reduced by further exports from the UK to Spain, there will be no remedy for such situation.

2. Assuming the above to be correct, the revolving fund will be frozen indefinitely to the amount of 85,000,000 pesetas.

3. If your British colleagues agree, we therefore suggest that the transfer to dollars of the unused balance of the licenses already issued in sterling be requested of the Spaniards. It will be recalled that previously more licenses in sterling than in dollars were issued by the Spaniards for their own reasons, and that subsequent adjustment of this situation was made. The opposite is now the case, and it occurs to us that you might request the Spaniards to issue dollar licenses in a larger proportion at this time, the situation to be equalized and adjusted when more sterling may be available at a later date.

⁶³ United Kingdom Commercial Company.

4. We feel that no action should be overlooked which will permit us in any way to obtain or keep funds in greater amount.
5. British Embassy here telegraphing as per above.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/941 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 5, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 10:08 p. m.]

2037. In view of continued German absence from the wolfram market and their existing financial difficulties the Anglo-American Committee has authorized a sharp reduction in wolfram prices from the present market price of 243 pesetas for 65% ore. I [apparent omission] prices to about 130 pesetas, but with a premium of an additional 30 pesetas per kilo for persons with whom we have total output contracts. Both the base price and the premium will be reduced according to the extent to which the ore delivered is below 65%. The price for ore below 55% is fixed at what we hope will be shutout levels thus discouraging fossicking. The reduced price is also expected to discourage smuggling from Portugal. This action does not violate our total output contracts and will enable us to conserve our resources for a time when the Germans may reenter the market. By withholding the premium until the termination of each output contract we will develop a hold over producers against German reentry in the market. Persons not now holding total output contracts will be given an opportunity to sign them and thereby receive an additional 30 pesetas per kilo.

Although the foregoing decision is based on the absence of enemy activity and their present financial difficulties the necessity for it is clearly evidenced by our rapidly mounting purchases. Provisional figures for July show 510 tons of ore bought as against 348 in June and 270 in May. Reduced to 65% concentrates these purchases amount to 416, 283 and 227 tons respectively. At the prevailing market price of 243 pesetas our July purchases amounted to more than 100,000,000 pesetas without taking into account [apparent omission].

This move admittedly is experimental and the situation will be watched with extreme care for signs of renewed German activity. However, the Germans are still unable to raise the 8,000,000 pesetas needed to pay the tax on accumulated stocks for which they hold export licenses and with insignificant purchases in July coupled with our own purchases reaching astronomical levels the time to take some action is opportune to say the least.

Repeated to London and Lisbon.

HAYES

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/958 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 14, 1943.

[Received August 14—4: 45 p. m.]

5347. For Department and OEW. Embassy recommends pursuit of wolfram preemption in Spain with full vigor. Recommendation is based on considerations brought out in memorandum just completed by EWD.⁶⁴ Estimates used in memorandum, which apparently differ in some respects from current OEW figures (Embassy would appreciate full statement thereof as soon as possible) are based on new and very exhaustive review of Axis tungsten position just completed by MEW in cooperation with Treasury. MEW concurs in EWD memorandum, text which follows:

“The battle for tungsten (based on MEW estimates).

1. Wolfram is the source of tungsten, a metal vital to Germany for the production of (1) high speed machine tools and (2) armor-piercing shells. The American and British Governments have for a long time been engaged in a bitter preemption struggle with the Germans for wolfram in the Iberian Peninsula, the sole source of supply (except for possible blockade-running from the Far East) now open to Germany. During the month of July we have scored a signal success in this campaign.

2. It is estimated that Germany's minimum requirement for wolfram in industrial uses is 4,300 tons per year [apparent omission]. This quantity goes primarily into making ferro-tungsten for high speed steels, and tungsten carbide for edging tools. In addition to this basic industrial requirement, tungsten has a strategic military use in the form of tungsten carbide as a core material in anti-tank armor-piercing shells. There is no absolute minimum quantity of tungsten for carbide cores for projectiles, but it is believed that 1,500 tons of wolfram were used for this purpose in 1942, and the demand is undoubtedly increasing. There is recent evidence that the enemy is now using such cores in shells as large as 88 mm. ammunition. Analysis of captured enemy material and intelligence reports on the enemy's supply position indicate that there is no adequate alternative core material now available to Germany.

3. There is virtually no production of wolfram in German Europe (less than 250 tons per annum). The only sources of supply now open to Germany are (a) blockade running from Japanese-controlled areas (b) Spain and (c) Portugal.

4. (a) We are satisfied that Germany has obtained no wolfram from the Far East this year. Attempts to use this alternative source have been frustrated by the services during recent months. In view of the present supply position, however, Germany will probably again try to make use of this avenue to acquire wolfram.

(b) Spain is now producing wolfram at the rate of 430 tons per month. Germany acquired from Spain 680 tons of wolfram from

⁶⁴ Economic Warfare Division of the Embassy in London.

January 1 to June 30, of which about 525 tons were shipped to Germany. However, in June Germany acquired less than 50 tons. During July, strenuous efforts made by the American and British Governments to preempt wolfram in Spain have achieved a total victory. Germany bought no free wolfram during that month. Germany had exhausted her buying power, at least temporarily, and the total Spanish production (other than a negligible amount, 28 tons, mined in German-owned properties) was acquired by our agents. If this position could be held, German use of wolfram would be reduced to the amounts made available to Germany by Portugal, plus what she would draw from German mines and stocks held in Spain. These stocks may amount to as much as 800 tons.

(c) Portugal, where there is no free market and allocations to the belligerent powers are made by the Portuguese Government, is now producing wolfram at the rate of 520 tons per month. From January 1 to June 30 of this year Germany imported from Portugal 1,040 tons of wolfram.

5. To summarize:

During the first half of 1943 MEW estimates the position was as follows: Rate of enemy demand: (All figures in metric tons) basic industrial 2,150, cores for shells 750 (this figure could be expanded greatly) total 2,900 or a demand rate of 484 tons per month. Enemy supplies and acquisitions from January 1 to June 30, 1943: Spanish stocks on January 1, 1943, 600, purchases in Spain to June 30, 680, Portuguese stocks 200, purchases in Portugal 850, domestic production 125, total 2,455 or a monthly rate of 409 tons.

6. At the beginning of the second half of 1943, it is estimated by MEW that stocks of wolfram within Axis Europe were probably near exhaustion. Until Germany reestablishes her buying power in Spain, provided of course that we can maintain our preemption program (which means finding the necessary local currency), Germany will be limited to approximately 170 tons of new wolfram per month, consisting predominantly of the supplies made available to Germany by the Portuguese Government, as compared with an essential industrial demand of 358 tons a month. In yearly figures this would mean that as against Germany's essential industrial requirements of approximately 4,300 tons, she would be able to count on about 2,000 tons. Clearly a critical situation for Germany would result, which would not be materially relieved by the importation of stocks held in Spain which now may amount to as much as 800 tons. The enemy could not even meet his industrial requirements and would have no margin for the use of tungsten carbide in armor-piercing ammunition. The success of our preemption campaign in wolfram would be felt eventually on every European battle front where tanks are used.

7. We may look forward, consequently, to major efforts on the part of Germany to reopen her access to Spanish supplies. This access could be gained in three ways: (1) by a letdown in our preclusive buying campaign in Spain; (2) by greatly augmenting her shipments of goods to Spain, Germany could get export licenses to ship her wolfram stocks already purchased and held there, estimated to amount to as much as 800 tons; and (3) by acquiring pesetas, either through

making further supplies available or by forcing credits out of the Spanish Government, she could reestablish her purchasing program in Spain (this will be difficult, however, because Germany is already 800 million pesetas in arrears in the clearing and we have driven the price of wolfram to very high levels).["]

[Apparent omission] All figures in this paper are on the basis of wolfram having 65% $W\text{O}_3$ contents.

WINANT

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/962 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 14, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received August 15—11 : 35 a. m.]

2156. COUSC 1738. Supplementing my 2089, August 10, 8 p. m.; COUSC 1729.⁶⁵ The Spaniards, as anticipated, will accept gold in payment of the proposed sale of 50,000,000 pesetas. The basis of such a transaction will be 0.29032 grams fine gold to one peseta.

The Spanish dollar balance is now approximately 11,000,000 and wolfram licenses for another 5,000,000 are now pending. We cannot any longer beat around the bush on the use of gold to meet our financial problem if we are to hope for the prompt issuance of export licenses. Although we are continuing to press the Instituto to carry dollar balances in New York to the full extent of our requirements, they still resist. It is our thought that you complete arrangements for supplying free gold so that this may be used as a last resort to avoid interruption of our preemptive activities. Please reply as promptly as possible.

HAYES

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/962 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1943—5 p. m.

1788. USCCO 1525. Your 2156, August 14, COUSC 1738. Embassy's 2156 crossed London's Camer 280 which was repeated as London's no. 60 to Madrid.

1. The Department, Treasury and OEW have agreed to proceed along the lines set out in London's cable. Please take up with Embassy and request that negotiations along those lines be instituted with the Spaniards.

⁶⁵ Not printed.

Rather than attempting to convert a given sum or to establish a continuing sale of gold to the Spaniards, the proposal is, in essence, to convert currently pending export licenses (USCC and UKCC) into exportable gold as a one-shot transaction. It is believed that if such a deal can be arranged, you will be in possession of sufficient funds to continue your preclusive operations for another 6 weeks to 2 months.

2. The following comments relate to the British suggestion:

(a) If we are correctly informed, the British have a clearing arrangement with the Spaniards which limits Spanish sterling balances to 1,000,000 pounds. We understand a proposal has been made to increase this amount to 1,500,000 pounds. They are willing to convert any balance in excess of that amount—up to the total of this transaction—into gold, either earmarked for delivery to the Spaniards after the war, or, alternatively, to be shipped immediately, if that is necessary.

(b) The position of the United States differs in that all dollar balances may at any time be converted into earmarked gold at the request of the Instituto. If necessary, we would be prepared for the purpose of this transaction immediately to make available to the Spaniards at the Federal Reserve in New York freely exportable gold in the amount of the total peseta equivalent of export licenses pending for USCC, plus the export taxes, converted into dollars at the rate of \$35.00 per ounce of fine gold plus customary handling charges, which is $\frac{3}{4}$ of 1%. This means that transportation costs are to be to the account of the Spaniards.

(c) The rate specified in your reference telegram no. 2156 is the old gold peseta rate which equals 32.67 cents a peseta. Such a rate is of course totally unacceptable. All dealings must be handled on the basis of the present official dollar peseta rate of exchange which is 10.95.

(d) The British estimate that the amount involved in this operation is approximately 20,000,000 dollars gold, or roughly, an amount equivalent to the joint fund. Should pending licenses (USCC and UKCC) exceed this amount you are authorized to reasonably increase the amount to cover our share of these needs.

3. Camer 280, paragraph 5, points out that although it is desirable for both Governments to proceed along similar lines, nevertheless, it may be necessary for each side to make different arrangements. Reference to paragraph 2 (a) and (b) above will make this clear to you. You are herewith authorized to proceed immediately to make the best arrangements possible so that there shall be no break in our operations.

This cable has been cleared with Bernstein of Treasury,⁶⁶ Wyndham White of British Embassy,⁶⁷ OEW and USCC.

WELLES

⁶⁶ Bernard Bernstein, financial adviser to the North African Economic Board

⁶⁷ British representative to the North African Economic Board.

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/970 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 23, 1943—midnight.

[Received August 24—2: 25 p. m.]

2267. COUSC 1748. 1. Licenses for our share of June wolfram purchases amounting to roughly 53 million pesetas referred to in our 2256 August 22, midnight, COUSC 1747,⁶⁸ have been definitely promised and we can expect reimbursement within the next day or two.

2. Applications have now been submitted for our share of July purchases amounting to 79,724,934 pesetas. Huete has informed us however that he will be unable to grant these licenses against dollars until his present swollen dollar balance is reduced substantially but he has agreed to accept free gold.

3. There has been no change with respect to the British share of wolfram licenses and the liquidity of the joint fund, aside from one small British contribution, is being maintained solely by the turnover we have succeeded in obtaining for our share.

4. The Germans are still out of the wolfram market. Assuming there will be no immediate change we will probably acquire about 250 tons of ore this month costing roughly 40 million pesetas not including tax. Moreover, stocks which are undoubtedly accumulating as a result of our price reduction may have to be bought at a moment's notice if the Germans resume serious purchases.

5. Our financial position will permit us to carry through September at the present price and rate of acquisition but it will not enable us to employ the all-out methods necessary to combat active German competition, particularly with respect to the stocks now accumulating.

6. We again urge prompt and favorable consideration of Huete's offer to accept free gold which we have consistently recommended as the only answer to an all-out wolfram campaign. Even now we could not operate effectively if the Germans should resume purchases tomorrow and there should be no delay in your decision.

Repeated to London.

HAYES

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1128 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1943—9 p. m.

2194. In amplification of our 2148 of October 9,⁶⁸ in which we inquired whether the Spanish were interested in U.S. wheat since it

⁶⁸ Not printed.

probably would be available to them (although it is moving into a restricted supply position more rapidly than we anticipated), the Department wishes to present the following comments for your most serious consideration.

We have been informed by the Spanish here that 100,000 tons is the amount they would like to lift; and to this the Department has no objection. However, in the light of prevailing circumstances and the necessity of presenting the strongest possible case to the allocating authorities, the Department very strongly desires in exchange for this gesture a Spanish undertaking to stop all exports of wolfram to Germany.

If you are successful in securing a prohibition of wolfram exports to the Axis, the Department is confident that it can obtain the prompt concurrence of the other interested agencies in Washington. On the other hand, if you are unable to secure this concession in its entirety, it will be necessary for the Department to consult the other agencies concerned before any commitment can be made to the Spanish with respect to making American wheat available.

In this general connection we are extremely anxious to produce greater results in the field of economic warfare in Spain, and therefore for the continuing implementation of general policy toward Spain it will be necessary for you to extract from the Spaniards every possible concession in this field. The Department understands that your British colleague ⁷⁰ has recently talked with Jordana ⁷¹ along this general line. Accordingly you may wish to discuss the matter with the British Ambassador. If you see no objections, the Department considers that it would be most desirable if you could also bring this point of view home to Jordana.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1165 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 21, 1943—5 p. m.
[Received October 22—11 : 25 a. m.]

3066. Department's 2194, October 15, 9 p. m. In view of the importance of wolfram in creating Spanish purchasing power and revenue and as a weapon by which Spain has exercised pressure on the Germans to obtain armament, I believe it would be a technical error to propose prohibition of wolfram exports in return for making American wheat available. The British Embassy agrees.

⁷⁰ Sir Samuel Hoare.

⁷¹ Gen. Francisco Gómez Jordana, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The supply of wheat to Spain by the U.S. at market prices is a convenience to Spain because of shipping considerations which the Spaniards consider to justify American prices. It is not a necessity as Spain can obtain this commodity in Argentina and, with the dollars we agreed to make available for pesos, can pay immediately.

If you concur, I will discuss the question with Jordana along the following lines: Spain to prohibit exports of wolfram; to either prohibit export of fluorspar, strontium and zinc or to agree to transport to the United States in Spanish bottoms such tonnage as have accumulated from previous purchases and as may be purchased in the future. As a counterpart the United States and Great Britain would (a) suppress price averages imposed by purchasing agencies on petroleum products and commodities originating in the United States and British Isles; (b) increase purchase of commodities which enter into traditional commerce between Spain and the United States and Spain and Great Britain and/or commodities which may be consumed in liberated areas at least to an extent which would represent the cost at present prices less taxes of the volume of wolfram purchased during the present year; (c) in the event that purchase of the United States and Great Britain produce a volume of exchange in excess of the cost of materials obtained by Spain from dollar and sterling areas, the difference would be made available to Spain in free gold.

Traditional commerce would be understood to include citrus fruits among other commodities. Disposition of the forthcoming orange crop presents a serious problem for the Government and since normal markets not now available, pressure from producing areas may force it to grant Germany certain compensating advantages in return for substantial orange purchases.

In the event the Spaniards are unwilling to agree to the above proposals, I would indicate that this may make it necessary for us to reconsider supplies under future programs. It is possible that the Spaniards would make certain counterproposals which we should be prepared to consider if they involve prohibition of wolfram exports.

When I informed the British Embassy that I was considering these proposals along the above lines, they expressed the hope that I would not discuss the matter with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in detail until after they [garbled group] next Monday who is probably bringing certain definite British proposals.

British Ambassador informs me he has not discussed this specific subject with Jordana although he implied he might make some brief reference to it today.

852.50/111: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 26, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received October 27—4:21 p. m.]

3112. Since the existing economic program was conceived, several of its primary objectives have been accomplished and it would appear that the time has come to review the fundamentals to determine whether the program as now in effect is giving satisfactory results under the changed military and political conditions or whether we should seek new objectives. The two primary aims of the program when adopted were, first, to assure against Spain's collaboration with the enemy, either political, military or economic, and the second was to assure to ourselves certain additional economic advantages.

Military developments, plus the influence we have on Spanish economy through control of the seas and of principal sources of supply of materials essential to the functioning of that economy, and the economic cooperation we have given to Spain, have effectively checked and reversed any tendency to close political, military or economic collaboration with Germany.

We are ourselves receiving an increasing amount of both political and economic collaboration from Spain and this economic and political collaboration has been of important military assistance to the United Nations. Spain stood as a firm barrier between German forces in France and the vulnerable Straits of Gibraltar during and after our North African landings.⁷² It is a barrier today between these same German forces and Portugal, which counted very heavily on Spain when it decided to grant air and naval facilities to the British in the Azores.

Nevertheless, the time has come to examine once more whether these important advantages represent the maximum we can hope to obtain under present conditions, or whether we should press for greater advantages, and just what we should seek.

There are three possible objectives we might endeavor to obtain:

1. A military, political and economic alliance.
2. Full economic collaboration.
3. Limited economic cooperation.

(1) As military consideration and possible political repercussions in the United States, Great Britain and possibly Russia would have a bearing on determining the advisability of entering into a full alliance with the present Spanish Government, the Embassy is not in a position to make definite recommendations. There are no present indi-

⁷² For correspondence regarding the invasion and occupation of French North Africa, see *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. II, pp. 429 ff.

cations that the Spanish Government would agree to an arrangement of this sort although the long-term benefits to be derived might induce them to view such a proposal favorably; particularly when the Germans become so engaged on the Continent that the possibility of a successful invasion of the Spanish Peninsula may be discounted.

(2) A proposal looking towards complete economic collaboration would have to be very attractive to the Spaniards who could not discount the possibility of German attacks against Spanish shipping or some other form of German aggression against Spain. In addition to the economic considerations, we would doubtless be requested to supply arms and munitions and give assurances that in the event Spain is attacked it would receive our fullest support. Importantly we would have to be in a position to give prompt and full support. Spain would probably insist on consideration at the peace conference at least equal to that of nations which had broken relations with Germany, but were not geographically exposed to German retaliation as Spain has been.

Under an arrangement of this sort some of the principal advantages that we should seek would be:

(a) The prohibition of the export by Spain to Germany of strategic materials including wolfram, mercury, zinc, fluorspar, strontium arms, woolen textiles, foodstuffs of high vitamin value, and any other commodities which might benefit the war effort of the enemy, in addition to the prohibitions now in effect as a consequence of existing understandings and Spanish domestic shortages;

(b) The use of Spanish shipping to transport to the United States and the British Isles goods acquired in Spain by the United Nations, and the charter to the United Nations of an agreed upon quantity of Spanish shipping;

(c) The supply of such exportable surpluses as may be requested by the United Nations and the supply of agreed upon quantities of certain materials produced in quantities less than normal domestic requirements. In the latter instance consideration would be given to the means by which present Spanish domestic production may be increased in order that the quantities exported would not create undue hardship in Spain. There would be included products to meet military needs and the needs of liberated areas such as textiles, coal, steel and its manufactures, cement, telephonic equipment, cables, etc., certain foodstuffs such as fish, vitamin oils, fresh and canned fruit and vegetables and possibly rice. The Spanish Government would give assurances that these goods would be made available at reasonable prices and that it would not impose new export taxes or other taxes designed to increase the revenue of the state or to subsidize industries.

In return the United Nations would offer the following:

a. To suppress overpricing on petroleum products and on products originating in the United States or British Isles purchased through the Agency of the United States or British Governments;

b. To increase supplies to Spain of goods now being supplied under the existing economic program especially petroleum products, fertilizers, agricultural equipment, et cetera;

c. To make available materials needed to stimulate Spanish economy so as to enable it to supply additional commodities for the United Nations such materials to include equipment for hydro-electric power development, machine tools, textile machinery, mining equipment, transportation equipment, both rail and highway, scrap iron, possibly copper, nickel and other metals;

d. To increase purchases of exportable surpluses of commodities in order to maintain regional or industrial economy;

e. To the extent that the value of United Nations purchases in Spain or services rendered by Spain may exceed the value of goods and services supplied by [to] Spain to [by] the United Nations, settlement would be made in free gold.

3. The limited economic cooperation arrangement mentioned would be a modification of the existing arrangement to the extent set forth in my telegram No. 3066, October 21, 5 p. m.

As my views above set forth are at exploratory stage, I have considered it preferable to await your reaction before consulting with my British colleague except to plan number 3 as mentioned in my telegram referred to immediately preceding.

HAYES

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1165 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1943—midnight.

2297. Department and other interested agencies are giving careful consideration to proposal you suggest in your 3066, October 21, 5 p. m. We hope to place our considered comments and possibly some suggestions for modification in your hands in near future. In general, approach has appeal but pending further word from here should not be made to Jordana.

For your information, wheat is moving into increasingly tight position. Department will advise if and when firm offer can be made to Spaniards.

STETTINIUS

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1180a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1943—6 p. m.

2384. The Department wishes you to seek following concessions from the Spanish Government:

(1) A complete and immediate embargo on exports of wolfram to all destinations. The request for this concession may be made upon

any grounds you may wish to put forward, without furnishing any indication that this Government contemplates any material *quid pro quo*. If Count Jordana should suggest, in response to your approach, any *quid pro quo* which he considers Spain may seek in return, you should inform him that your instructions do not cover discussion of the matter but that you will be glad to communicate to your Government any suggestions he may care to make. For your own confidential information, and with specific reference to your 3153 of October 28,⁷⁴ the wheat position in this country has become very tight. The situation has changed radically from that reported in the Department's 2148 of October 9.⁷⁴ Without some sensational action on the part of Spain, such as a complete embargo on wolfram exports, it is highly unlikely that our supply authorities could be persuaded to make available an allocation to Spain, and lacking such a development the Department questions whether it would be justified in seriously supporting a request for such an allocation. In any event, it is not desired that in your discussions with the Spanish Government wolfram should be linked in any way with wheat supplies from this country. Pending report of your talk with Jordana the Department is unable to give a final answer to your 3153.

(2) The removal of German agents from Tangier.

Before making your approach on these two matters to the Spanish Government it will be necessary for you to confer with your British colleague, but the Department is anxious to avoid any unnecessary delay on this account. As regards the removal of German agents from Tangier, you will recall from the Department's telegram 2309 of October 29, 8 p. m.⁷⁴ that the British contemplate similar action. While the British position in this regard is on a different basis from our own, you will be able to find suitable grounds for supporting the British action or for making your representations separately if that seems the most desirable course.

STETTINIUS

711.52/297: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 10, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received November 11—10:20 a. m.]

3294. My 3268, November 8, 8 p. m.⁷⁵ I saw the Foreign Minister today and requested that an embargo be placed on wolfram export to all countries. I also asked for prompt action on following pending matters: (1) Release of Italian warships in Balearics, (2) release of Italian merchant ships in Spain⁷⁶ whenever they are free to depart,

⁷⁴ Not printed.

⁷⁵ *Post*, p. 732.

⁷⁶ For correspondence regarding representations against Spanish internment of Italian warships and merchant vessels, see pp. 711 ff.

(3) landing rights for American commercial airlines,⁷⁷ (4) recognition of right of American citizens to travel on Spanish ships, (5) direct radio telegraphic communication with United States.

With reference to wolfram the Minister said this was obviously a highly technical economic problem for Spain. It also involved Spain's whole international position. He would receive our request sympathetically and would study it. He asked me for a memorandum embodying the request in general terms and also whatever justification for the request we might wish to present. I said I would supply him with such a memorandum.

He reminded me that all the matters he had mentioned required the consent of other government departments. Meanwhile his own position vis-à-vis his colleagues was greatly weakened by our reaction to the Laurel telegram⁷⁸ which although doubtless a mistake was not ill-intentioned. He would be in an infinitely better position to arrange everything favorable to us if he could assure the Spanish Government that the Laurel incident was closed. He hoped therefore that the statement he had authorized Cárdenas⁷⁹ to make [would?] be satisfactory to us and that we would consider the incident closed.

He felt that the matters involving Italian merchant ships, direct radio communication, travel of Americans on Spanish ships, landing rights for American commercial airlines were so far advanced that favorable decisions could be confidentially [*confidently?*] expected.

With reference to Italian merchant ships he had proposed to the British Ambassador that Spain be allowed to hold two of these ships in warranty for two Spanish ships sunk by Italian submarines. In return he would authorize the release of all the other Italian merchant ships. He said the British Ambassador had received this proposal favorably. (The British Ambassador informs me he has recommended it to his Government. I should like to recommend it also, particularly since, according to our Naval Attaché,⁸⁰ both ships selected by the Spanish Government necessitates extensive repairs. The Italian Embassy is informing its Government that it considers proposal worthy of consideration.)

I pressed the Minister again for release of Italian warships in the Balearics. He replied that the British Ambassador had given the impression that it was much more important to devote attention to the merchant ships now than to the warships. I said I could not believe the British Ambassador deemed it less important than I that Spain release these warships and demonstrate that it adheres to principles of international law and is not giving aid to Germany. (My Naval

⁷⁷ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 668 ff.

⁷⁸ For correspondence regarding the Laurel incident, see pp. 722 ff.

⁷⁹ Juan Francisco de Cárdenas, Spanish Ambassador in the United States.

⁸⁰ Comdr. John C. Lusk.

Attaché informs me that the British do in fact consider it better strategy to concentrate on the release of the merchant ships at the present time. I personally consider we should press for release of both warships and merchant ships.) The Minister said he would go into this matter once more.

The Minister repeatedly expressed the hope that his explanation of the Laurel incident would be acceptable to our Government and said that if so the United States would find nobody in Spain more anxious to cooperate with it than he.

If the Department considers the Ministry's statement satisfactory, I recommend that it so inform me promptly.

HAYES

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1179 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 11, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received November 12—1:30 p. m.]

3302. I believe Spanish Government will place an embargo on exports of wolfram if we demonstrate to it that such an embargo will be in Spanish interest.

There are certain immediate and serious disadvantages which would accrue to Spain if it placed an embargo on wolfram exports:

(1) There would be an immediate loss of Spain's principal source of dollar and pound exchange.

(2) There would be an immediate loss of government revenue now derived from the export tax on wolfram.

(3) There would be opposition from wolfram producers, some of whom have been operating many years and have depended largely on their export trade.

(4) There would of course be opposition from the Germans who would be quite aware that such a step by Spain signified a reorientation of foreign policy in its economic, political, and even military aspects.

(5) There would be opposition from the Spanish armed forces who are obtaining arms from Germany which they badly require and which they cannot obtain from other sources. These arms are being obtained by holding out to the Germans the hope that Spain will make wolfram available to them.

In light of above we should be prepared to demonstrate that by placing an embargo on the export of wolfram Spain would obtain certain advantages which would outweigh the obvious disadvantages some of which are set forth above.

There are three possible ways in which we may demonstrate this: I, By offering Spain certain new advantages to compensate for the

disadvantages resulting from wolfram embargo, or II, by demonstrating that Spain must accept the disadvantages involved in order to retain more important advantages Spain now derives from its economic relations with the United States or III, a combination of I and II.

I. The Embassy in its telegram No. 3066, October 21, 5 p. m., presented a reasoned plan inducing the Spanish Government to place an embargo on wolfram exports. This plan embodies certain advantages to Spain. It likewise embodies certain advantages to us additional to the advantages to be obtained from an embargo on wolfram exports. What we offer in this plan is little in comparison with the cost to us of continued wolfram purchases. The plan has a sound economic basis. It forms a reasonable basis of discussion with the Spanish authorities. It is recommended that I be authorized to present this plan to the Spanish authorities in the memorandum on wolfram which the Foreign Minister has asked me for (my 3294, November 10, 9 p. m.).

II. The principal advantage obtained by Spain from its economic relations with the United States derives from the petroleum supplies made available to Spain.⁸¹ Spain can be expected to make great sacrifices, if necessary, to continue to receive these petroleum supplies. They are vital to Spain's national economy and hence are probably vital to the political life of the present regime in Spain, which does not enjoy popular support. They cannot be obtained from other sources.

If Spain were faced with the alternative of placing an embargo on wolfram exports or losing access to petroleum supplies it would probably decide to protect the latter.

We should, of course, not threaten Spain with cutting off or even reducing petroleum supplies. The whole basis of our economic relations with Spain to date have been successful. It should not be abandoned without a further trial in this case.

The Germans have made liberal use of threats toward Spain in the past. Spain has instinctively resisted such threats and has tended to come closer to us even while German military prospects seemed exceedingly bright to the Spaniards. It can be accepted that this aspect of German policy in Spain has not been successful.

The present German Ambassador to Spain ⁸² is intelligent and able. He is using persuasive methods. We must be careful not to exchange roles with the Germans.

The alternative to threatening the Spaniards is to face them with a *fait accompli* which can be explained on reasonable grounds and

⁸¹ For correspondence concerning this subject, see pp. 668 ff.

⁸² Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff.

can later be associated with the wolfram situation. Such a *fait accompli* would be the reduction or interruption without prior warning of petroleum shipments to Spain.

The Embassy has already prepared the ground for such a step. It has made clear that petroleum products are no longer a surplus commodity. It has made clear that the war effort of the United Nations is expanding on such an unprecedented and gigantic scale that from now on we can consume all petroleum products we are capable of producing. We have made clear also that the terrific consumption of petroleum products is rapidly depleting valuable reserves and that making available such products is a definite sacrifice from that point of view.

III. The tactics I would recommend to the Department are the following:

(a) Present to the Spaniards a reasoned plan such as is contemplated in I above.

(b) If that does not succeed within a reasonable time, interrupt petroleum shipments explaining the interruption courteously and in a reasonable manner as described in II above.

(c) Gradually make clear to the Spaniards that petroleum products can be made available to them only if some advantage such as an embargo on wolfram exports can be obtained commensurate with the sacrifice involved in making petroleum available.

It is the Embassy's judgment that the proposed tactics have an excellent chance of succeeding.

Because of the obviously secret nature of foregoing I have not discussed the plan with anyone outside this Embassy. However, if the Department approves I suggest it discuss the matter with the British Government and authorize me to discuss it in the strictest confidence with British Ambassador here.

The British Embassy is now proceeding independently of this Embassy and apparently under instructions from London to discuss traditional trade of the character referred to in my 3066, October 21, 5 p. m., without relating it to a possible embargo on wolfram exports. See my 3177, October 30, 11 a. m.⁸³

HAYES

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1179 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1943—7 p. m.

2439. Your 3302, November 11, 7 p. m. The Department approves in principle the proposals you have submitted. No difficulty is an-

⁸³ Not printed.

ticipated in connection with the proposal to suppress surcharging or the proposal to increase purchases of commodities in traditional trade. The Department cannot definitely say now that there will be no difficulty in making available free gold to compensate differences produced by a volume of exchange exceeding the cost of materials obtained by Spain from dollar and sterling areas, but this probably could be arranged (your 3066, October 21, 5 p. m.).

Of the three possible ways of demonstrating that the wolfram embargo will produce advantages for Spain outweighing the disadvantages, the Department naturally prefers the second, namely to demonstrate the importance to Spain of retaining the great advantages now derived from trade relations with this country. It is of course realized that the wolfram embargo, by effecting a decrease in German supplies to Spain, would increase the Spanish demand for supplies from this country. In view of the urgency of the matter the Department is unable to detail the increases that would be possible from our sources of supply. A study is under way and program will be submitted to you shortly but the Department does not wish you to await receipt of this. The Department anticipates little difficulty, inasmuch as the wolfram embargo would constitute an outstanding advantage for us, and would, in the opinion of the Department and FEA,⁸⁴ help to shorten the war in Europe. If we can get the wolfram embargo and the other concessions mentioned by Mr. Atherton⁸⁵ to Ambassador Cárdenas (Department's 2411, November 10, 9 p. m.⁸⁶) the Department will be in a very strong position vis-à-vis the supply and licensing authorities.

The Department is convinced that we must proceed rapidly on all these matters in order to achieve maximum results.

The British Embassy here has been advised of the contents of this telegram and will cable London urgently. As certain of your proposals, such as suppression of surcharges, are of immediate concern to the British as well as ourselves, please do not make such proposals to the Spanish authorities without first clearing with your British colleague. In the event your British colleague does not receive prompt instructions authorizing him to concur in the course of action suggested, the Department nevertheless wishes you to press the Spanish Government for an embargo on wolfram, leaving the *quid pro quo* (should such prove indispensable) for subsequent consideration between the British and ourselves.

HULL

⁸⁴ Foreign Economic Administration, into which the Office of Economic Warfare was consolidated, September 25, 1943.

⁸⁵ Ray Atherton, Ambassador to Canada, temporarily in the Department.

⁸⁶ *Post*, p. 735.

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1182 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 15, 1943—midnight.

[Received November 16—4:05 a. m.]

3342. The purpose of prohibiting wolfram exports from Spain would be to deny this important strategic material to the Germans. As the Department is aware that Germany obtains considerably larger quantities of wolfram from Portugal⁸⁷ than from Spain, I assume it understands that action by the Spanish Government alone will not accomplish this end. So long as wolfram continues to be purchased at attractive prices producers or intermediaries will use every device to dispose of the excess over domestic requirements and will not hesitate to smuggle into Portugal, bribing border officials or others where necessary. Likewise the strategic location of German mines on both sides of the border will make it difficult if not impossible for the Spanish authorities to prevent wolfram from being moved to the Portuguese side where the bulk of it would reappear as mineral from German mines and not in the neutral pool. The extent of such smuggling would be affected by prices offered but our experts estimate that with Portuguese prices at present levels the minimum flow into Portugal per month would be 100 tons. Our estimate of present German acquisitions in Spain is 60 tons monthly.

Spanish officials have already inquired whether we intend to request Portugal to prohibit wolfram exports to Germany. It appears to them to be a peninsular problem as Portuguese wolfram continues to be transported over Spanish railways in blacked [-out?] trains even when the Spanish Government has been refusing export permits to the Germans for Spanish wolfram.

I understand that in recent conversations with the Portuguese Government concerning readjustment of wolfram prices the Portuguese definitely stated that they would not make any change in their wolfram policy as between the belligerents.

As soon as I receive instructions from the Department in respect to my No. 3302, November 11, 7 p. m., it is my intention to press for this prohibition but I believe that a prohibition in Spain without parallel action in Portugal would be a boomerang which would give Germany a larger amount of wolfram from the peninsula than she is now getting.

Repeated to Lisbon.

HAYES

⁸⁷ See pp. 497 ff. *passim*.

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1182 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1943—6 p. m.

2454. Your 3342, November 15, midnight. The Department has considered the Portuguese angle and contemplates appropriate representations in Lisbon at the proper time. This should not be communicated to the Spanish Government and you may answer any inquiries from that source by simply stating that you have no instructions with regard to any proposals respecting the Portuguese wolfram trade.

The Department takes this opportunity to urge again that you proceed rapidly for obtaining the wolfram embargo as well as the other concessions we seek. The Department is under the impression that these concessions can be obtained at this time but that every delay will render the achievement of satisfactory results more difficult. The Department is encouraged by certain expressions in your despatch 1480 of October 19⁸⁸ and trusts that the Embassy will approach this task urgently.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1186 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 18, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received November 19—4:50 a. m.]

3398. Following is text of memorandum presented to Minister of Foreign Affairs today, mentioned in my 3399, November 18, 8 p. m.⁸⁹

"In the course of a conversation between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ambassador of the United States concerning the desire of the United States Government that the Spanish Government prohibit the export of wolfram to any destination, the Minister requested the Ambassador to submit a memorandum on the subject. The Ambassador now submits the following observations:

(1) Under the economic program which governs current trade between Spain and the United States the Spanish Government agreed to sell to the United States exportable surpluses of Spanish commodities, and to transport certain of these commodities to the United States. The United States in turn agreed to make available quantities of certain specified American goods and other commodities controlled by the United States, notwithstanding the fact that many such commodities are urgently needed for domestic economy or for the direct war effort.

(2) The total resources of the United States are directed to the primary objective of winning the war within the shortest time possi-

⁸⁸ Not printed.

⁸⁹ *Infra.*

ble. Economic programs with neutral nations must contribute to that objective and the United States Government must examine such programs periodically to determine what modifications may be necessary in order to accomplish this end.

(3) One of the principal commodities which the United States has purchased from Spain has been wolfram. The sums of dollars expended in the purchase of this commodity have attained such figures that the United States finds it necessary carefully to weigh whether it can also permit the entry into the United States of those other Spanish commodities which enter into traditional commerce, none of which are essential to the present wartime economy of the United States. So long as the volume of this traditional commerce was small, it did not seriously interfere with the program of wolfram purchasing especially as a part of the cost of such purchases was recovered from overprices charged on some of the commodities supplied by the United States.

Within recent months there has occurred a substantial increase in the volume of Spain's shipments to the United States on non-essential commodities. The United States has hesitated to make effective wartime controls against the importation of these non-essential commodities. Imposition of such controls would adversely affect several branches of Spanish economy.

(4) Were the United States to limit imports of traditional commodities from Spain so as to direct its primary attention to the purchase of wolfram, a sudden cessation of these wolfram purchases at a latter date would have a serious effect on Spanish economy. It should be borne in mind that Spanish wolfram is not required by the United States for its domestic economy or for the production of war materials. Therefore purchases of wolfram may be terminated at any time.

(5) Foregoing considerations have prompted my Government to request that the Spanish Government prohibit exports of wolfram to all countries.

(6) An immediate prohibition of exports of wolfram would make it unnecessary to restrict imports into the United States from Spain of non-essential products.

(7) As such prohibition might otherwise diminish Spain's purchasing power, the United States would be disposed (a) to study with the appropriate authorities of the Spanish Government the possibility of augmenting purchases of Spanish commodities which enter into traditional commerce between the two countries or of commodities which may be made available by Spain for the relief of [or] reconstruction of liberated areas and (b) to consider the removal of overpricing on petroleum products and other commodities of United States origin which are now being supplied through the U.S. Commercial Company.

(8) The United States would be disposed also (a) to maintain present supplies to Spain and (b) to reexamine the possibility of increasing the quantities and types of materials which may be made available to Spain."

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1187 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 18, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received November 19—3:30 a. m.]

3399. Your 2454, November 17, 6 p. m. I today reminded Jordana that in a conversation with him last week I had referred in general terms to my Govt's desire that Spain place an embargo on the export of wolfram and that he had requested a memorandum on the subject. I told him that the memorandum had been prepared and I handed it to him.⁹⁰ I requested that especially prompt attention be given to it since it was a matter to which my Government attached great importance.

Jordana said that the matter was very complicated. I said the more I thought it over the less complicated it seemed to me. I said I thought he would find the memorandum very clear. Jordana said he would study it and would expect to say something about it the next time I saw him. See my 3398, November 18, 7 p. m.

Repeated to Lisbon.

HAYES

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1191 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 22, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received November 23—1:05 p. m.]

3449. Before presenting the memo contained in my 3398, November 18, 7 p. m., I ascertained that British Embassy had not received instructions to support my request. However, it agreed to do so in general terms although it has made no representations in the matter since I submitted my memo. Furthermore in absence of instructions in the matter the British Embassy is unwilling to specify a *quid pro quo*. It perceives no serious objection to suppression of overcharges on goods originating in British Isles (we understand only product in this category is copper sulphate) but is reluctant to recommend suppression of overcharges on goods originating in Empire or Colonial areas.

British Embassy furthermore does not favor interrupting proposed large purchases of seasonal goods such as oranges. These, of course, must be purchased promptly if they are to be purchased at all. Ellis-Rees⁹¹ was informed by Ministry of Food that goods are needed for supply reasons and British have already contracted for onions, bitter

⁹⁰ See *supra*.

⁹¹ Hugh Ellis-Rees, Financial Adviser of the British Embassy in Spain.

oranges and lemons, leaving some 110,000 tons of sweet oranges yet to be negotiated for.

Aside from purely seasonal aspect, which is of immediate importance, Spain is normally important source of British food supplies and British Embassy is reluctant to take action which might threaten that trade and they hesitate to risk it by endeavoring to use it as a weapon in seeking wolfram embargo.

In other words, we understand British here consider there are two obvious difficulties: (1) Timing of effort to obtain wolfram embargo is bad since seasonal purchases of foodstuffs from this year's crop, which are being made at insistence of Ministry of Food, must be made now or not at all, (2) retention of Spain as a source of food and other supplies entering into British traditional trade is an objective comparable in importance in eyes of British Embassy to proposed wolfram embargo. British hesitate to risk first objective in seeking second.

My own view is that British attach insufficient weight to: (1) Spain's urgent need to sell surplus orange crop; (2) value to Spain of selling crop to British and thus increasing its ability to purchase wide range of products available in sterling area.

In contrast to the British position we do not require any products which Spain traditionally supplies to us and therefore the maintenance of our traditional purchases in Spain is not an objective in itself. Furthermore since our normal purchases average less than 10% of Spain's exports while British purchases average nearly 25%, our traditional trade is not as important as a source of Spanish purchasing power and therefore is not as substantial a weapon as is British traditional trade in our effort to obtain a wolfram embargo.

On the other hand our ability to supply, and Spain's dependence upon us for many of its most essential requirements give to us a more potent withholding weapon than the British possess. Of Spanish total imports we normally supplied 16-plus percent whereas the United Kingdom supplies only 10%. In addition we now control petroleum supplies.

It is obvious that by forging together into a single weapon British traditional purchases and American supplies our chances for obtaining the desired wolfram embargo would be much better than if we rely solely upon the American supply and purchase capacity.

In order to overcome any possibility of objections of the British on the ground of immediate needs, it might be helpful if we could assure them of supplies of oranges in the event the wolfram negotiations are so long delayed that the British may miss the opportunity of acquiring the incoming crop.

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1197 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 1, 1943—7 p. m.
[Received December 2—3: 55 a. m.]

3532. My 3399, November 18, 8 p. m. I asked the Foreign Minister today if he had given attention to my memorandum requesting a wolfram embargo. He said he had studied it. It was a very important matter which affected seriously present Spanish economy. He therefore felt it should be studied by experts before he could discuss it intelligently. He had therefore asked his economic advisers and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to study it and report to him.

It was agreed that Ackerman⁹² should continue discussions of details of the proposal with officials of the two Ministries.

The Minister assured me he was not seeking to delay a reply but that he was anxious to reach a decision which would not (1) impair Spanish economy or (2) impair relations between our two countries.

HAYES

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1165 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1943—11 p. m.

2571. Following comments are to correlate and give our interpretation of a number of recent telegrams between Department and Embassy:

1. In its 2194 of October 15, Department suggested seeking wolfram embargo in exchange for making wheat available to Spain.

2. In your 3066 of October 21 you questioned this approach and proposed instead a Spanish embargo on wolfram, plus either an agreement by Spain to prohibit export of zinc, strontium and fluor-spar or, alternatively, an agreement to transport to the U.S. in Spanish ships such tonnages of these materials as we might acquire, in exchange for following concessions:

(a) Suppression of surcharges on petroleum and other products;
(b) Increased purchases by U.S. and U.K. of commodities entering into traditional trade as well as commodities for liberated areas sufficient to "represent the cost at present prices less taxes of the volume of wolfram purchased during the present year";

(c) Use of gold to compensate Spanish for deficiency, if any, in trade balances.

3. Your 3112 of October 26 suggested an alternative of far-reaching effect. Its consideration must be temporarily postponed.

⁹² Ralph H. Ackerman, Commercial Attaché in Spain.

4. COUSC cable no. 1874 of October 28 (Embassy's 3149)⁹³ named a large number of items that it would be possible to obtain from Spain under program suggested in your 3066.

5. Your 3153 of October 28 and 3243 of November 4⁹⁴ stressed importance you attached to offering wheat.

6. About this time Department determined to take advantage of political developments by demanding, among other things, an embargo on wolfram exports irrespective of a *quid pro quo*, wheat or otherwise. This was the occasion of Department's 2384 of November 6.

7. We understand from your 3294 of November 10 that such a demand was made. However, your 3302 of November 11 questioned the advisability of continuing such a line and, in effect, repeated the suggestion that we try the plan outlined in your 3066. It also suggested a possible second approach which, in effect, we understood to involve the studied interruption of usual petroleum and other supplies in an effort to demonstrate to Spain her dependence upon us and the necessity of her meeting us in certain of economic warfare demands.

8. The Department's 2439 of November 15 approved in principle the proposals submitted in your 3302 (including the plan outlined in your 3066). It was intended in our 2439 to indicate a preference to follow the second course outlined in your 3302 (namely, emphasizing benefits Spain is presently receiving), rather than the first course (namely, the plan outlined in your 3066). It had been our hope that it would be unnecessary to offer any *quid pro quo* to the Spaniards in exchange for a wolfram embargo at least until matter had been carefully considered and cleared with British.

9. We judge from the terms of the memorandum which you left with the Foreign Minister (your 3398 of November 18), that it was necessary to relate the wolfram embargo to certain proposed concessions to be granted by us. Your 3532 of December 1 indicates that Ackerman is to discuss details with Spaniards. It is therefore necessary to give you our views concerning course such discussions should take. These will be sent in following telegram.

Repeated to London.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1172 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1943—midnight.

2572. We refer to proposed discussions with Spaniards concerning wolfram embargo (see Department's no. 2571 of December 4).

⁹³ Not printed.

⁹⁴ Neither printed.

1. Any discussions on this subject must be coordinated closely with the British. It is apparent from your 3177 of October 30⁹⁵ and 3449 of November 22, as well as from past experience, that unless there is a frank and full exchange of information and views between the British and ourselves, the chance of attaining our joint objectives will be seriously impaired. We have advised the British Embassy here of this view and it is in agreement. We have requested it to so advise London and to obtain for us a detailed statement as to their proposed program of purchases in and supplies to Spain. We assume that such a statement will be forthcoming promptly. When it is, the United States and British programs can be properly correlated to ensure maximum effectiveness and to minimize crossing of wires.

2. The British requirements of citrus fruits is the most immediate problem of concern to them which protracted negotiations might affect. If we could assure the British of their supplies from United States sources, as suggested by you, it would obviate the difficulty. However, we believe such a guarantee impracticable and therefore we should not ask the British to assume the substantial risk of losing their supplies.

3. Purchases of a nonessential nature, however, and discussions with the Spaniards concerning traditional trade, should, it appears to us, not be pressed until an overall plan is agreed upon between the United States and British representatives both in Washington and in Madrid.

4. The FEA is preparing urgently its suggestions for a possible enlarged trade program, including purchases for liberated areas. As soon as completed, you will be advised. In meantime, you should be guided by following general observations in any discussions with the Spaniards:

(a) In view of fact that a large part of our wolfram expenditures in Spain have been due to grossly inflated prices, we do not consider it desirable to undertake to increase traditional or other purchases to the extent of wolfram expenditures during present year, less taxes (your 3066 of October 21). FEA estimates that the total cost of wolfram in 1943, excluding production tax, will approximate 50 to 55 million dollars, of which the United States share is half. It would seem particularly undesirable to couple such an undertaking with an agreement to suppress surcharges and to make payments to Spain in gold. It is, of course, quite possible that we may be prepared to make such large expenditures in the future for purchases of textiles, etc., but we should not undertake to do so at this juncture.

(b) It should be borne in mind that, with a few possible exceptions, the Spaniards have the benefit of purchasing in a price-controlled market in this country.

(c) We consider it wise to retain the principle of surcharges, for the present at least, as it is an excellent bargaining weapon. Moreover, you will appreciate that the suppression of surcharges in Spain has a

⁹⁵ Not printed.

direct bearing upon such surcharges in Portugal. In addition, it has been agreed between the United States and British authorities that preemptive losses shall be shared jointly and consequently that each shall receive an equal share in profits, including surcharges. We therefore cannot stop surcharges on United States products without agreement with the British.

If it is finally determined to eliminate overpricing, this should be balanced by an agreement on the part of the Spaniards not to impose new taxes or to increase prices on commodities which we may wish to purchase. We would presumably have to agree in advance upon the list of commodities. In addition, FEA has suggested that it would be desirable to obtain a reduction in Spanish prices and taxes at least to the levels prevailing during the latter part of 1942. It is recalled that the Spaniards increased taxes on several commodities when we imposed overprices.

(d) We consider it desirable that no real hope be held out to the Spaniards at this time for increasing the quantities and types of materials to be made available to Spain. Rather, we believe you should stress the importance to Spain of retaining the advantages already being derived from trade relations with this country, and on this basis to secure the wolfram embargo. In other words, the Department prefers to secure the embargo without any other *quid pro quo*.

(e) As to wheat, the situation is becoming increasingly serious. The principal difficulty lies in moving wheat from the producing areas to ocean ports. The Combined Food Board's views on wheat have been sent by separate airgram. (A-525, November 26).⁹⁶

(f) FEA would prefer not to have an export prohibition on strontium. It states that production is tied up for some months and that the United States needs not less than 500 tons monthly for supply reasons.

(g) FEA states that we can use 3,000 tons of fluorspar per month. However, it considers preemption more important than supply and if our continuing to obtain Spanish fluorspar will result in Germans getting substantial quantities, the total export prohibition would be desirable.

(h) FEA considers it desirable to have Spaniards carry strontium and fluorspar, but does not believe this as important as in the past. It feels that United Nations vessels could be used.

(i) FEA states that Germans have licenses for 20,000 tons of zinc, and states that unless total export prohibition will nullify these licenses, such a prohibition would not be of much benefit. If licenses could be nullified, FEA considers it desirable. The United States could use Spanish zinc if carried in Spanish bottoms.

5. As any substantial change in the nature and quantity of supplies to be made available to the Spaniards will take considerable time to develop, we are planning to request the interested Combined Boards and supply authorities to allocate for Spain for the first 6 months of 1944 a schedule of materials based upon the schedule approved for the last half of 1943. This should, of course, not be di-

⁹⁶ Not printed.

vulged to the Spaniards at this time. In the event you consider it necessary to have the supply authorities prepared to make available additional materials or larger quantities of materials presently being made available, please advise in detail by telegram.

6. Butterworth⁹⁷ is generally familiar with the Washington views on this matter and he will comment in more detail upon his arrival. He expects to depart over the weekend.

Repeated to London.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1203 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 10, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received December 12—1 : 38 p. m.]

3637. My 3532, December 1, 7 p. m. Carceller⁹⁸ informed Ackerman December 8 that our request for a wolfram embargo is being given consideration and that the probable political and economic consequences are being carefully weighed. Carceller believes such a prohibition would be the first step toward breaking off relations with Germany as the latter would undoubtedly consider it to be an unjustified unneutral act in view of the fact that Spain has a large exportable surplus which Germany is disposed to buy in terms of goods needed by Spain. Although fully aware of the economic advantages being obtained from the Allies, Carceller stated Spain is contributing goods to the Allies which are useful to them and Spain is also receiving benefits from its trade with the Axis which will continue so long as a neutral position is maintained. Spain cannot discount the possibility that if wolfram exports are prohibited Germany may retaliate either by sinking Spanish ships or discontinuing to supply Spain with goods or both.

The loss of a single ship would be serious in view of Spain's dependence upon its overtaxed mercantile marine especially for such vital commodities such as wheat. Should the Allies make ships available to Spain sufficient to compensate for any possible losses by German action and apart from political and military considerations Spain would still have to weigh whether other compensatory advantages offered by the Allies would be sufficient to offset present German-Spanish trade.

⁹⁷ W. Walton Butterworth, Jr., First Secretary of Embassy in Madrid and of Legation in Portugal; also Director General for Operations in the Iberian Peninsula of the U.S. Commercial Company.

⁹⁸ Demetrio Carceller Segura, Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce.

During the last few months Germany has shipped to Spain over 500,000,000 pesetas of military equipment in addition to substantial quantities of machinery, seed potatoes and other products and an arrangement is being concluded whereby Spain will obtain 20,000 tons Rumanian wheat. The recent volume of German trade has been such that the German debt to the clearing has been reduced by more than 100,000,000 pesetas [since?] the beginning of the year. Germany has been acquiring only such Spanish goods as represent exportable surpluses and these at very high prices sometimes well above the prices which the Allies are willing to pay. Before Spain can decide whether to prohibit wolfram exports it would wish to know the extent to which the Allies are willing to compensate Spain for the possible political and economic consequences of German reaction and also for the pecuniary losses incident to cessation of wolfram purchases. He expressed doubts that we would be prepared to make a proposal which would offset the disadvantages Spain perceives. He has an open mind however and would consider objectively any proposal we wish to make. As a gesture of his sentiment to us and to overcome any possible difficulty in the conduct of our economic warfare program as relates to wolfram purchases in Spain he would be willing to advocate to his Government that it agree to make available the sums of pesetas we require to continue our wolfram purchases and to hold the corresponding dollar values in the United States until after the war when they would be expended for American goods. He believes this has the attraction of ensuring a considerable trade with Spain in immediate postwar years.

Ackerman pointed out that the Minister was obviously overlooking the fact that the goods we are now and have been making available to Spain represent a sacrifice to our war effort and that in our future programs we must consider whether the benefits we are obtaining from Spain compensate for what we are giving.

Furthermore there is no assurance that we shall continue to purchase wolfram for an extended length of time and should we cease voluntarily we might then find it inconvenient to continue making accessible to Spain the goods it needs. This alone merited most careful consideration of the Spanish Government, but if the Minister felt Spain must have additional compensation, we too had an open mind and would examine any proposals Spain wished to make. We of course do not know Spanish needs as intimately as Spaniards themselves. Although the proposal concerning credits for postwar needs is interesting it cannot be considered in any sense as an answer to our request that wolfram exports be prohibited. In conclusion the Minister stated he would continue to give thought to our request but hoped his proposal would be transmitted to Washington.

It would appear that decision on our request rests largely with Carceller and from above conversation it is equally apparent that he will temporize as long as possible. After discussing this matter with British Embassy we shall submit our further comments.

HAYES

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1203 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1943—11 p. m.

2662. The Department awaits with interest your comments on outcome of your discussions with the British, as indicated in your 3637 of December 10. In the meantime we regret to note that the Spanish apparently still remain unimpressed with the advantages they now derive from the present flow of supplies from U.S. and U.K. sources.

The suggestion put forward by them that as a gesture they make pesetas available against dollars in the U.S. should be accepted as a matter of course and should not be treated as a concession. The Spaniards will not only be acquiring dollars to be used for their own benefit for postwar purchases, but they will be building up this beneficial purchasing power at a rate far in excess of value given by them, due to the grossly inflated wolfram prices. Furthermore, as you will recall, this very same facility was made one of the primary conditions of the July–December 1943 Spanish program. It was stipulated in paragraph numbered 1 of the proposed statement to be made to the Spanish authorities that our supplies would be made available to Spain in the expectation that the Spanish authorities would take all necessary action to facilitate the purchases desired by us, including the granting of peseta exchange against dollars in New York if necessary. Please see Department's instruction no. 497 of July 19, including the note to subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of the proposed statement enclosed.⁹⁹

We shall withhold further comment pending advice as to the outcome of your discussions with the British.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1214 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 22, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received December 24—3 p. m.]

3768. Department's 2572, December 4, my 3637, December 10. It is quite clear from conversations with the British Embassy that British

⁹⁹ Instruction No. 497 not printed ; enclosure not attached to file copy.

Ambassador and the key members of his staff do not favor embarking on any drastic course of action to obtain a wolfram embargo or for that matter any of the other desiderata under current discussion with the Spanish Government, and in this they state they have the backing of London. The British seem now to be looking to Spain as a source of supply as well as an area of economic warfare.

It is equally clear here that the Spaniards have every intention of employing delaying tactics in the matter of a wolfram embargo and eventually these may include asking for far more than we could or would give. Whereas I believe our request for consideration of a wolfram embargo had to contain such alternate advantages to [apparent omission] with your authorization, embodied in my memorandum of November 18¹ since a prohibition of wolfram exports would create important political, revenue and economic repercussions, I do not believe that even a well balanced proposition will be voluntarily accepted by the Spaniards on its own merits as a far-sighted measure.

Germans have greatly improved their financial position in past few months and have decidedly increased their supplies to Spain of machinery, chemicals, coal, military equipment and miscellaneous products (Embassy's 3637, December 10, 11 p. m.). In these circumstances it will be the policy of the Spanish Government to reap the benefit of wolfram boom so long as communications between Spain and German-controlled France are not effectively severed.

The value of a wolfram embargo depends upon its immediate and effective application. If we hope to force an early issue we must be prepared to offer definite and substantial compensatory advantages to the Spaniards and should these be rejected or a decision unduly delayed, to immediately employ economic pressure. In all probability Spaniards would accede to our demand under duress but benefits would be lessened by increased smuggling both over French border and, unless Portugal also embargoes wolfram exports, over Portuguese border.

I believe possible political and economic repercussions should be weighed against possible benefits we would derive from wolfram embargo.

In any case I consider that London and Washington must reach agreement on policy and procedure in this matter of joint concern and determine how far both Governments are prepared to go, (a) as regards offering compensating advantages to the Spaniards in return for wolfram embargo, and (b) as regards application of sanctions in event first offer fails. I shall continue to press Spanish Government for reply to request which I have already submitted and in this I feel sure I will be seconded by my British colleague. Meantime,

¹ See telegram No. 3398, November 18, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in Spain, p. 656.

I hope Washington and London will give consideration to whether we should be prepared at some point to apply economic sanctions² with approval of Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Repeated to London.

HAYES

CONTROL OF IMPORTS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO SPAIN;³ OBTAINMENT OF LANDING RIGHTS FOR AMERICAN COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES IN SPAIN

852.6363/697 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 4, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received March 5—5:36 p. m.]

501. Department's 368, February 19.⁴ The purpose of Embassy's despatch 578⁴ was to obtain a policy ruling regarding aviation supplies to Spain.

During the past 6 months consumption has averaged 700 tons monthly of which 420 tons was 87 octane. The proposal is to supply 420 tons 87 octane monthly or preferably 74 octane convertible to 87 octane by CAMPSA⁵ of which the Air Ministry expects to set aside 100 tons for military use, leaving 320 tons for Iberia⁶ whose current consumption is 320 tons monthly as shown in attachment to despatch 578. It is proposed to furnish an additional 30 tons monthly of 100 octane if Spanish Government decides to acquire three United States Army transport planes which our Government has expressed willingness to sell. This quantity should be increased proportionately if other American and British non-confidential military planes forced-landed in Spain are sold to the Spanish Government as both British and American Governments have agreed.

Following is aviation stock position in tons: 87 octane, January 1 CAMPSA stocks 1960 deduct Axis stocks 150 add stocks at airports 150, balance Spanish stocks 1960, consumption January, February 840, balance March first 1120 immobilized in tank bottoms minimum 600, free stocks 520 equivalent to 6 weeks' supplies—until April 1.

² In telegram No. 3822, December 29, 1943, the Ambassador in Spain reported that the British Ambassador told him that he would go along with the United States in pressing for a wolfram embargo, but that he was opposed to sanctions (852.79681/30).

³ For previous correspondence respecting concern of the United States over petroleum situation in Spain, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 248 ff. *passim*.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Compañía Arrendataria del Monopolio de Petróleos, Sociedad Anónima.

⁶ Reference is to Iberia Airlines.

80 and 70 octane: March 1 CAMPSA stocks 1400 add stocks at airports 500, total 1900 immobilized in tank bottoms minimum 600 monthly consumption 280. Stock will last until July 21.

83 octane: 263 tons shown in despatch are estimated to last until July 31.

Above stock figures include all military and naval stocks and all other stocks.

Suitability of above octanes is explained in despatch 578.

No threat of any kind was implied by the unofficial and confidential comments made by a friend in the Air Ministry who believes that the Germans true to form would insist on controlling Iberia policy if they supplied aviation products. Comments in our despatch referred to possible control of Iberia services and not of capital stock. We repeat the Air Ministry has made no threats nor suggested concessions to anybody.

Ministry of Economic Warfare's attitude as stated in Department's cablegram under reference, last paragraph,⁷ is not shared by the British Embassy which strongly concurs in our views that aviation gasoline supplies constitute an essential part of the general petroleum program which has been such an important factor in developing and maintaining satisfactory relations with Spain.

Reference Department's 324, February 13,⁸ we are reliably informed Iberia capital stock is held as follows: Spanish Government 51%, Spanish private interest 24.5%, Lufthansa 24.5%. Lufthansa obtained this interest in 1940 in exchange for airplanes and aviation equipment.

Board of Directors consists of eight Spaniards and one German but policies and operation of services are under close control of the Air Ministry. Political character of management considered satisfactory. Reported predominantly monarchistic.

I favor a reasonable aviation supply program in line with the basic policies governing the general petroleum program and therefore recommend Department's approval of the proposal submitted in Embassy's despatch under reference. Since proposed quantities are small and commitments are limited to 1 month's supplies effective control can be exercised.

In view of the critical stock situation as shown above an early reply is urgently requested.

HAYES

⁷Last paragraph of telegram No. 368 stated that the British Embassy had informed the Department that the Ministry of Economic Warfare was opposed to supplying any available gasoline to Spain (852.6363/632).

⁸Not printed.

852.6363/698 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 4, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received March 4—3 p. m.]

510. Since Spain has assured us it will resist aggression from any side and since we, of course, have no aggressive designs on Spain, I believe it is in the interest of our military security to demonstrate our confidence in Spain's determination to resist aggression by agreeing to make available the limited stocks of aviation gasoline proposed in my 501, March 4, 2 p. m.

The next few weeks will probably be decisive in determining whether Spain will be forced into the war. There is no military risk involved in our agreeing in near future to furnish limited quantities of aviation gasoline and the military risk from actually furnishing them at a later date will be negligible in relation to the possible military advantage from furnishing them.

Our Military Attaché⁹ and Colonel Hohenthal¹⁰ regard Spain more as a potential ally than a potential enemy and strongly concur in the desirability from the military point of view of furnishing Spain the amounts of aviation gasoline in the amounts of aviation gasoline proposed.

I therefore repeat recommendation made in my 501, March 4, 2 p. m. that limited stocks proposed be furnished to Spain.

HAYES

852.6363/724 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 15, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received March 16—10:47 a. m.]

621. The British Embassy has been informed by the Ministry of Economic Warfare that decision has been reached not to furnish aviation gasoline to Spain. British Embassy has reopened this matter and has requested that the amounts of aviation gasoline recommended by the American Embassy be furnished for reasons of high policy. These reasons were fully set forth in my 501, and 510 of March 4.

Iberia service to Lisbon is being suspended on March 18 and Iberia service will be suspended shortly thereafter in view of the Air Ministry insistence on conserving its small remaining stocks and its unwillingness to release any more of them to Iberia. Suspension of Iberia

⁹ Col. Ralph W. Dusenbury.¹⁰ Col. William D. Hohenthal, Military Attaché in Portugal, on special mission to Spain.

service in addition to having a bad propaganda effect from our point of view will cause considerable inconvenience to the Embassy in carrying out its manifold activities in Spain including movement of couriers, petroleum observers, United States Commercial Corporation officers, et cetera. It should be recalled in this connection that rail service is badly congested and delays of many days are entailed in obtaining reservations. On the other hand Iberia makes available to us in emergencies seats reserved for Spanish officials.

For these reasons and other reasons already presented to Department I request prompt and favorable action on our request for aviation gasoline.

HAYES

852.6363/730 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 18, 1943—4 p. m.
[Received March 19—5:41 p. m.]

651. The Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs,¹¹ who is the person responsible for the important military cooperation reported separately to you, called on me personally, this morning, at the request of the Minister,¹² to urge that aviation gasoline for the civil airlines in Spain be made available promptly.

All civil aviation services will be suspended as of March 22. Two lines have already been suspended.

Meanwhile, General Vigón, Minister of Air, has called on General Jordana and asked his personal assistance in obtaining aviation gasoline for the airlines. General Vigón is one of Franco's¹³ closest advisors. He was formerly pro-German, but I have excellent evidence that he now fully supports Franco's policy of keeping Spain out of the war and of resisting aggression from any side. Furthermore, he has been outstanding in giving excellent treatment to American aviators forced down in Spanish territory and escaping from France and he has arranged for their prompt release. He, of course, also issued the orders which made possible the important military cooperation referred to above.

The Under Secretary of State, who has proved himself to be a staunch and capable friend of ours, and is in no small measure responsible for the favorable trend of Spanish foreign policy, urged most seriously that we make available the modest quantities of aviation gasoline needed for the operation of the civil airlines.

¹¹ José Pan de Soraluce.

¹² Gen. Francisco Gómez Jordana, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

¹³ Gen. Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

He recalled that Franco's efforts to achieve real neutrality, which have the support of the vast majority of Spaniards, but which are displeasing to the Germans and to a minority in Spain still committed to a pro-Axis policy, will be greatly [apparent omission] is able to demonstrate that we have so little confidence in Spain's international attitude that we are unwilling to make available even modest sums of aviation fuel for the maintenance of minimum service on Spanish airlines.

He pointed out that the suspension of air service had, for this reason, an importance immensely greater than its own intrinsic importance.

I told the Under Secretary that the Embassy had urged that supplies of aviation gasoline be furnished to Spain, and that I would renew my effort. I suggested to him that they also make representation to the British Embassy since the decision would have to be a joint one between the British and American Governments.

I pointed out that, whereas I had complete confidence in General Franco's desire to achieve real neutrality and in the Foreign Office's interpretation of that desire, the State Department and other agencies of our Government were hampered in their desire to extend cooperation between our two Governments by the effect on public opinion and on the American Congress of the continued pro-Axis attitude of the Spanish press and radio.

He assured me that the Foreign Office continued to exert every effort to improve this situation and pointed out that while much remained to be done, much also had been achieved. This is very true. This morning's press, for example, gave prominence to pro-Allied statements of the President of Turkey.¹⁴ This is bound to have a further beneficial effect on Spanish public opinion. I told him I intended shortly to make very serious representations on the matter, and he said the Minister would welcome them.

I wish again to urge the Department and our other agencies concerned to give immediate consideration to this matter. I believe that a promise to furnish aviation gasoline for civilian air use would have the immediate effect of releasing the small remaining military stocks for use by civil airlines. This will still further reduce the small stocks now existing and any risk which might derive from the presence of those small stocks in Spain.

While actually reducing our military risks, therefore, it would deprive our enemies in Spain of the opportunity to undermine the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its undoubted and, so far, very successful efforts to draw away from the close political ties which Spain has had with the Axis since the Spanish Civil War.

¹⁴ Ismet İnönü.

I am confident also that if our Government can make this small concession, which is directly in its own interest, I can take advantage of the situation to obtain concessions from the Spanish Government which will still further improve our situation here and accelerate the trend toward real neutrality which the Foreign Office has brought about with the support of Franco and his Cabinet.

Our Military and Naval Attachés¹⁵ strongly support my request in this sense, and Colonel Hohenthal, in whose judgment I continue to have great confidence, considers Spain to be a potential ally rather than a potential enemy.

I hope the Department and the other agencies of our Government will not let themselves be influenced by popular conceptions of Spain's attitude which while undoubtedly sincere, do not reflect the many favorable circumstances which I have reported to the Department and which, for obvious reasons, cannot be made public.

I can only reiterate in all sincerity that the present trend in Spain, from both the military and political point of view, is definitely in our favor, and that if we can accelerate that trend, while further reducing any possible military risks involved in the present situation, it would be less than realistic if we failed to do so.

As reported in my 621, March 15, 9 p. m., the British Embassy concurs fully and has asked that the Ministry of Economic Warfare reverse its reported decision not to permit exports of aviation gasoline to Spain.

See also my 501, and 510 of March 4. I again urge prompt and favorable action.

HAYES

852.6363/746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, March 22, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received March 23—11:50 a. m.]

680. Your 648, March 20, 1 p. m.¹⁶ Foreign Minister made a strong personal plea to me this morning that we furnish the modest amounts of aviation gasoline requested. He reminded me that Spain was showing more and more understanding of the international situation, that he was anxious to hasten this tendency, which was favorable to us, and that he hoped we would not do anything to embarrass his efforts. He said that Spain of course would consent to any kind of supervision of use of this gasoline we might choose to undertake. I said I would renew my efforts.

¹⁵ Col. Ralph W. Dusenbury and Capt. Richard D. White, respectively.

¹⁶ Not printed; it informed the Embassy that urgent consideration was being given to the proposal that aviation gasoline be sent to Spain (852.6363/724).

Iberia has suspended all services because of lack of gasoline. It has informed public, suspension temporary and due to lag in tanker arrivals and one tanker laid up for repairs. Public knows it was torpedoed by Germans. Only airlines now operating in Spain are German and Italian lines operating from Berlin and Rome to Barcelona, Madrid and Lisbon. Consequently the Axis is left with a monopoly in this important service.

Joint Chiefs of Staff will doubtless wish to bear in mind that Foreign Office has repeatedly assured us Spain will resist aggression from either side and that Franco himself has told the Germans this several times. If we are to give Spain assistance in event of attack by Germany we shall want to have available in Spain at least minimum quantities of aviation gasoline.

I repeat that Military and Naval Attachés and Colonel Hohenthal agree with me that while no military risk is involved in agreeing promptly to make aviation gasoline available to Spain the possible military advantages are considerable.

British Ambassador¹⁷ concurs fully in my recommendations and is telegraphing London urgently today.

I hope a favorable decision can be reached promptly.

HAYES

852.6363/766 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 6, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 9 : 27 p. m.]

822. British Embassy informed by London sympathetic consideration being given to supplying aviation gasoline. Ambassador suggested to me consent for British civil aircraft to land in Spain might be requested as compensation. While I am not prepared to say that we should decline to furnish aviation gasoline until concession for British airline to operate in Spain is obtained it would obviously be desirable from our general point of view if a British or other Allied airline were permitted to operate in Spain.

HAYES

852.6363/775 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 13, 1943—midnight.

[Received April 14—8 : 23 a. m.]

897. My 872 [822], April 6, 4 p. m. War Department has informed Military Attaché Joint General Staffs have recommended aviation

¹⁷ Sir Samuel Hoare.

gasoline be supplied to Spain in amount of 420 tons per month. British Ambassador has received similar telegram from London and has requested details as well as authorization to communicate decision to Spaniards when he and I agree conditions are propitious. I concur and request similar authorization as well as details.

HAYES

852.6363/775 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1943—11 a. m.

882. Your 897, April 13, midnight. As this matter is still being discussed here the Department feels it would be premature to make any communication to the Spanish Government at present.

HULL

852.6363/766 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, April 23 [22?], 1943—10 a. m.

924. Your 822, April 6, 4 p. m. It is assumed that permission to operate in Spain would be equally available to us as to the British. For your information only, the possibility of our making application for such permission is under consideration.

Please comment.

HULL

852.6363/799 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 22, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received April 23—4 a. m.]

1042. Your 924, April 23 [22?], 10 a. m. While I do not feel now that we should delay furnishing aviation gasoline until concession for airline granted, we might say at same time we agree to furnish it that we expect facilities to be given for American airline to operate in Spain in international service upon request. Are we interested in local passenger service between Spain and Portugal or merely in trans-Atlantic passengers?

I should like authority to sound out Foreign Office informally on general subject.

HAYES

852.6363/793 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1943—3 p. m.

958. Your 992, April 20, midnight; your 961, April 19, midnight; your 938, April 17; the Department's 872, April 16, 3 p. m.; the Department's 889, April 18, 10 a. m.; the Department's 903, April 20, 1 p. m.¹⁸

1. With respect to the first paragraph of your 961, estimates prepared in the Department indicate estimated stocks of kerosene on May 1 at 3180 tons against 60 day inventory limit of 2200 tons and estimated stocks of lub oil on May 1 at 9621 tons against 90 day inventory limit of 9250 tons. Similar estimate of automotive gasoline stocks on May 1 is 25,628 tons. The Department has been using 25,000 tons as a stable inventory limit for this product, but is unable to find that employment of this figure instead of 35,000, which it is presumed the Embassy is using, has ever been communicated to the Embassy. On the assumption that it has not been so communicated, you are of course entirely correct in stating that the Department's calculations were incorrect in so far as automotive gasoline is concerned.

2. The Department's 889 of April 18 was dispatched in the midst of careful consideration by the Department and the Board of Economic Warfare of the wisdom of permitting at this particular time a substantial increase in the rate of receipt of petroleum importations into metropolitan Spain as compared to the rate of such receipts during the preceding 6 months. But the Department's 889 was dispatched without reference to these general discussions going on here and on the basis that the estimates and inventory control figures used here required in any event a modification of the Spanish proposed nominations for the late April loading period.

3. The Department and Board of Economic Warfare have now decided that total importations of petroleum products into metropolitan Spain for the second quarter of 1943 should continue on the basis of approximately 100,000 tons per quarter, which has been the rate of importation in each of the past two quarters. Inherent in this decision is recognition that the importation of almost exactly 100,000 tons quarterly has enabled the Spanish Government during the past 6 months to maintain its domestic economy at a reasonable wartime level. As you have already pointed out in several despatches, including the Embassy's despatch 655 of February 17,¹⁹ the operation of rail, truck and bus service has improved, motor car gasoline rations have been moderately increased and the internal food situation has been

¹⁸ None printed.

¹⁹ Not printed.

ameliorated. The proposal referred to above is being referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and the Department expects to be able within a few days to telegraph you the results of such consultations.

4. In as much as the loading schedule prepared by the Spaniards for the balance of the current quarter would result, if approved *in toto*, in receipts by metropolitan Spain of approximately 151,000 tons of petroleum products, it will be necessary to suggest to the Spaniards a revision in their proposed schedule of tanker sailings in the event that the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the Department's and the Board of Economic Warfare's decision referred to in the previous paragraph. By arrangement the Navy might limit the number of tankers loading in any loading period, thereby providing you with an explanation for the future rejection of specific nominations.

5. In view of the fact that a 541,000 ton annual figure or any other specific figure has never been revealed to the Spaniards, it is assumed here that there is no reason to believe that the Spanish authorities would interpret the contemplated restraint on their loadings as effecting any commitment on our part under the supply-purchase arrangements.

6. No change whatsoever in basic policy is involved or in contemplation. The rate of importation for the third quarter and subsequent periods will be considered in the light of the then existing situation. Review of and control over the supply of oil to Spain on virtually a day to day basis is the policy which the Department has been pursuing from the beginning of the program.

7. In view of the fact that the *Remedios* apparently sailed prior to your receipt of the Department's 889, and in view of the further fact that you decided not to recall either the *Campuzano* or alternatively the *Campana* as requested in the Department's 889, loading authorization for these tankers will be granted, in as much as their recall at this late date might, in the opinion of the Department, take on a mistaken significance in the Spaniards' eyes. The Department wishes to point out, however, that in the event the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the proposed limitation of second quarter imports to 100,000 tons, a very extensive postponement of nominations for the late May and early June loading dates will be necessary as a consequence of the approval of the full schedule proposed by the Spanish for the early May period.

8. The British Embassy here, which has been kept informed of our discussions and decision, has not yet received final instructions in the matter from London. To date, however, they have expressed disagreement with any action which would reduce oil imports into

metropolitan Spain during the second quarter to a figure lower than the 541,000 ton annual rate.

9. Your comments on this telegram together with any views which you may care to submit from Smith²⁰ will be welcomed by the Department.

HULL

852.6363/793

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1943—11 a. m.

970. The Department and BEW request that the following information with respect to tankers nominated to load at Aruba on May 19 and 20 for mainland Spain be furnished urgently: (1) Names of tankers. (2) Cargoes nominated. (3) Sailing dates from Spanish ports proposed.

It is suggested that no sailings of tankers for loading on these dates be approved pending arrival of further instructions, in as much as the probable reduction in program limit to 100,000 tons for the second quarter described in Department's 958 of April 27 would necessitate limiting liftings on the late May and early June loading dates.

HULL

852.6363/805: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, April 30, 1943—noon.

[Received 2: 43 p. m.]

1098. In exercise of the discretion given to me in your 970, April 29, 11 p. m. [*a. m.*] I have authorized sailings proposed in my 1086, April 29, 2 p. m.²¹ I am prepared to justify to the President my decision in this regard which has been made in the light of the President's approval of our petroleum program and the relation of that program to our entire policy toward Spain which is bringing results of incalculable benefit to our war effort.

In a subsequent telegram I shall outline my views in response to Department's 958, April 27, 3 p. m. I request no categorical instructions limiting sailings or loadings of Spanish tankers be issued prior to receipt and consideration of that telegram.

HAYES

²⁰ Walter F. Smith, Petroleum Attaché in Spain.

²¹ Not printed.

852.6363/805 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1943—4 p. m.

984. Your 1098, April 30, noon; your 1086, April 29, 2 p. m.; my 982, April 30 [*May 1*];²² my 970, April 29, 11 a. m.; and my 958, April 27, 3 p. m. I am awaiting with interest your comments on my 958.

Let me emphasize that I contemplate no basic alteration in the policy of supporting a reasonable wartime economy in Spain nor in the provision of reasonable quantities of petroleum and petroleum products to implement that policy. However, with military operations continuing in North Africa, I am of the opinion, concurred in by the Board of Economic Warfare, that importations of petroleum and petroleum products into metropolitan Spain during the second quarter should not exceed the rate of importation of the past 6 months. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed me 2 days ago, in response to a letter I addressed to them, that there was no military reason why my proposal to not exceed this past rate of flow should not be put into effect. I am informed that if loading authorization at Aruba is granted for the five tankers, the sailing of which you report you authorized in your 1098, the total receipts of oil by metropolitan Spain during the second quarter will approximate 135,000 tons, and there will still remain the early June loading date.

Your interpretation of my 970 and your consequent authorization of the sailing of the five tankers proposed in your 1086 may have the result of necessitating refusal of authorization to load at Aruba for a part at least of this fleet on the May 19 loading date. Such action of course is less desirable than postponing their departure from Spain. Please therefore find a way of delaying the departure of two or three of these tankers.

I will keep you informed of further word received here from the British and of any action taken with respect to loading at Aruba for the late May and early June loading periods. In the meantime, I am looking forward to your comments on my 958.

HULL

852.6363/806 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 1, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received May 2—11:46 p. m.]

1117. Your 958, April 27, 3 p. m.

1. Fundamental question involved in a consideration of petroleum program is whether we can obtain greater advantages from a liberal than from a niggardly policy.

²² Telegrams numbered 1086 and 982 not printed.

2. When 1943 program was under study primary consideration was given to reaching a figure which would permit Spanish economy to function at a level sufficient but only sufficient to ensure production and distribution of most essential commodities. Secondary consideration was given to means by which this petroleum could be made available. Quantities required for each component of Spanish economy were carefully reviewed. Sum of these was then compared with means of transportation, i.e., tankers, and net result was program submitted by Smith in despatch No. 452 [450], November 20 last²³ and approved by all American and British agencies concerned. There have been no subsequent developments showing these calculations to be in error.

3. Since petroleum program got under way there has been improvement of transportation services in Spain and internal food situation has been ameliorated. However, petroleum supplies furnished have not permitted adequate transportation of foodstuffs and other commodities. While starvation rationing of petroleum products necessitated during large part of 1942 [apparent omission] your withholding of petroleum supplies for 4 months no longer exists. Our studies convince us that supplies at rate of 541,000 tons per year as agreed in program will be barely sufficient to meet minimum needs.

4. The fact that there has been no recent serious interruption to flow of petroleum products to Spain has permitted some liberalization of extremely severe rationing restrictions necessitated during 1942 and has given results more favorable to us than we had anticipated even late last year. In political field it has helped to strengthen elements in the Government favorable to us and converted many others to our side. As a result we have been able to achieve many objectives which otherwise would have been extremely difficult, such as acceptance of our guarantees at time of North African landing²⁴ (if they had not been accepted the soft under belly of the Axis would not have been exposed for a long time); Spanish determination to resist any Axis aggression; release of all our military internees, and of French refugees, mostly military; return to us uncompromised of important secret military equipment; consent to establishment of French North African representation; and, on the economic side, smooth functioning of our broad program which has been damaging to Axis. It has created public good will which extends from lowest class to highest, excepting only minority in Falange which still clings to hatred of democracies and which would like to see our program fail. Our military personnel have informed War Department that

²³ Not printed.

²⁴ For correspondence regarding the invasion and occupation of French North Africa, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 429 ff. Concerning guarantees to Spain, see President Roosevelt's letter of November 8, 1942, to General Franco, *ibid.*, vol. III, p. 306.

they now consider Spain a potential ally rather than a potential enemy.

5. We must now determine whether we wish to interfere with a program which has brought us such benefits merely because fulfillment of the program (which I repeat has already been agreed to by all agencies concerned) would involve importation of greater quantities of petroleum products during present quarter than during two preceding quarters when delays due to necessary repairs to tankers reduced carrying capacity of fleet. We should bear in mind, in this connection, that increased imports during present quarter will go to meet increased agricultural demand. Although Spanish Government has not been promised any specific quantity of petroleum products, it has experienced no interruption of movement of its tankers since present program agreed to excepting that necessary for Naval control; therefore there is widespread belief United States is not attempting forcibly to limit movement of petroleum products to Spain to levels below its most essential requirements. In searching for a possible explanation of the plan to reduce petroleum supplies to Spain the following questions occur to me: Are we to create dissatisfaction solely to diminish supplies by 64,000 tons a semester? What can be accomplished by this? What advantages would it bring to us? How will it help our war effort?

6. Program approved during Smith's visit in Washington in December equivalent to 541,000 tons per year. This figure represents not more than 60% of Spain's normal requirements and is in every respect within the interpretation of the policy laid down by the Department by which petroleum supply program is governed. These products are consumed in Spain and are not benefiting our enemies directly or indirectly. Month-end stocks have been and will be kept within agreed limit. Product being carried in Spanish tankers and authorities are sufficiently informed on world petroleum position to know that ample supplies are available in Caribbean.

7. Furthermore, in agreement with Department and Bureau of Economic Warfare we are exploring possibility of exploiting Spanish economy further to advantage of our war effort. Any arbitrary reduction of petroleum supplies to Spain below approved program, in face of developments in Spanish situation which all Spaniards as well as we and the Axis know are favorable to us, might seriously prejudice the carrying out of those plans.

In view of all the above, I see no logical reason for cutting this program down to 400,000 tons or for modifying any of the program figures which, after careful review last December, were approved by State, Bureau of Economic Warfare, and London, and I request this program be maintained.

HAYES

852.6363/810 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 2, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received May 3—12:47 a. m.]

1128. You ask me in your 984, May 1, 4 p. m., to delay sailing of two or three tankers. I shall do my best to comply with your request though I deem it most unfair, unfortunate, and inopportune. Just when Spanish Government has conceded to U. S. release and exodus of over a thousand military refugees to North Africa to fight against the Axis I have to express our thanks by alleging some fanciful reasons which can hardly deceive the Spaniards why their tankers, whose departure I have authorized in strict accordance with a program agreed to by the American and British Governments last December, may not sail, or if they have already sailed why they will be refused loadings in the Caribbean.

HAYES

852.6363/807 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 2, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received May 3—1 a. m.]

1125. Your 984, May 1, 4 p. m. I do not agree that proposal to limit petroleum supplies to 100,000 tons this quarter adequately implements our policy toward Spain. The Department has not yet given me any reason for so limiting supplies and I can think of no reason myself. On the other hand there is every reason to continue to adhere to the program agreed to last December, after North African military operations had been initiated, and when Spain's relation to those operations was much less clear than it is now. In my opinion and in the opinion of my military staff such reduction does in effect constitute a change in our Spanish policy precisely at a time when it is producing increasingly favorable results.

I recommend very strongly that the five tankers whose sailings I have authorized within the discretion granted to me in your 970²⁵ be permitted to load these tankers at this time when Jordana has been able to arrange after bitter opposition by the Germans and Falange for the evacuation to North Africa of French refugees,²⁶ nearly all of military age (in my 1123, May 1, 10 p. m.,²⁷ I informed you that 850 had crossed Portuguese border en route to North Africa and that 200 Poles

²⁵ Dated April 29, 11 a. m., p. 678.

²⁶ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. I, index entries under Refugees from Europe and the Middle East: Spain.

²⁷ Not printed.

had already been evacuated to Gibraltar, thus the timing of the proposed reduction of petroleum program could not conceivably be worse) and after we have been able with Jordana's help and against similar opposition to arrange for informal French representation here more successfully than any other neutral country, would constitute a major defeat for Jordana and might prejudice his usefulness to us if not his entire position within the Government.

I am surprised and disappointed that the Department went so far as to submit proposed reduction in supply program to Joint Chiefs of Staff before obtaining Embassy's opinion which you and the Joint Chiefs have a right to hear before making such an important decision.

Our Military Attaché has strongly recommended to War Department and to Joint Chiefs that no reduction in program agreed to last December be made. It is clear, however, that Joint Chiefs gave their negative consent to proposal before they had an opportunity to hear Military Attaché's recommendations.

I have always had very much in mind that it might be desirable to reduce petroleum supplies to Spain under given circumstances and when we are in a position to take military advantage of the situation which might arise as a result, and I should appreciate it if you would read my despatch 761, April 2,²⁸ and show it to the President. But such reduction should fit into a political, economic, military plan, carefully studied and agreed to by Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Embassy in advance and it should not derive from a mere impression that a reduction in the program is in some unexplained way necessary in view of our military operations in North Africa, particularly when our military men on the spot who are in the best possible position to determine the relationship between the two things strongly oppose on military grounds any reduction in the program at this time.

I cannot believe that the Department would revise its Spanish policy on basis of popular impressions of Spain (which derive partly from a failure in the United States to make clear the military advantages of our policy) instead of on the basis of the careful evaluations of the Spanish situation submitted by the Embassy (to which I hope the Iberian Committee and BEW²⁹ as well as Joint Chiefs have access) which demonstrate that Spanish neutrality has already been of great military assistance to us in conducting our North African operations and promises to be of greater assistance to us in the future. Otherwise the Embassy's continual patient efforts to bring not only the Spanish people but the Spanish Government over to our side would be frustrated.

²⁸ *Ante*, p. 602.

²⁹ Board of Economic Warfare.

If you will review Embassy's basic reports on Spain and its relation to our war effort since Pearl Harbor you will find that Embassy's evaluations of existing situations and of future probabilities have been in every case correct and I strongly recommend that policy successfully followed so far be not altered until Department in agreement with Embassy and in light of changed circumstances decides to alter if after reviewing all factors involved and after carefully evaluating probable effect on our military position.

HAYES

852.6363/822 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 5, 1943—10 p. m.
[Received May 6—10: 56 a. m.]

1174. 1. After lengthy discussion with the British Embassy, we are in agreement that it is of the utmost importance that decisions affecting the petroleum program should be based on the broadest considerations. I recommend that the British Ambassador's telegram number 835³⁰ should be carefully considered together with my various telegrams, particularly 1117, May 1.

2. In the economic field all of our forces are now being mustered to frustrate the attempts of the Axis to make up wolfram deficiencies by more extensive operations.³¹ During recent weeks we have been remarkably successful in our preemption and in obtaining export permits but to maintain this position we must utilize to the fullest all of our bargaining power and also our financial resources.

3. On the petroleum side measures of control which are in operation in Spain have effectively prevented leakage to the Axis. The only possible advantage from a reduction in supplies is the very indirect limitation which might be imposed on the contribution which Spanish economy could make to Germany by curtailing to the lowest levels economic life in Spain. This argument we consider to be unsound but in any event the damage which our position would suffer resulting from arbitrary limitations to a reasonable flow of supplies would be greater than any possible advantage which might be obtained.

4. As the program agreed to last December had the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff it is suggested that no modification of the program be made at least until the matter has been referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with a complete statement of the views submitted by the British Ambassador and myself.

³⁰ Not found in Department files.

³¹ For correspondence regarding the efforts made toward getting Spain to impose an embargo on export of wolfram to Germany, see pp. 632 ff.

The British Embassy is sending a parallel telegram to London which is being repeated to Washington as 118.³²

HAYES

852.6363/799 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1943—10 a. m.

1017. Your 1042, April 22, 6 p. m. The Department still has no assurance that aviation gas for Iberia will be forthcoming, although the whole problem is still under consideration. It may be that your British colleague will not request Spain to grant landing rights to British airlines. Regardless of whether he does or does not make such a request, and within your own discretion, you may approach the Spanish Foreign Office informally on the subject of securing rights for American commercial airlines to land in Spain for the purpose of discharging and loading passengers, mail and express, as well as rights for such lines to transit Spain en route to other foreign points. In other words the Department is not interested in securing cabotage rights within Spain for American airlines but merely the right to engage in international traffic. If you decide to speak to the foreign office on this subject it would be better to approach the matter without tying it into the question of aviation gasoline.

Leaving aside any question of postwar rights, the rapidly changing situation in the Mediterranean might make it desirable for us to have landing rights in Spain. In any event the reactions of the Spanish Government will be of interest to the Department and particularly any counterproposals it may have to make.

HULL

852.6363/809 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1943—1 p. m.

1034. Your 1128, your 1127, your 1126, and your 1125 all of May 2, your 1117 May 1; my 984 May 1, and my 982 May 1.³³

1. I believe that a recapitulation of the immediate position with respect to the supply of oil to Spain will define more closely the question under discussion.

2. In the first place, I assume that you are only urging that the Spaniards should not be restrained from importing into metropolitan Spain during the second quarter up to the full amount of 135,250 tons

³² Not found in Department files.

³³ Telegrams numbered 1127, 1126, and 982 not printed.

of oil, which is one quarter of 541,000. The first figure represents the maximum which has ever been discussed or agreed with the British, the BEW or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The British Embassy here has stated to the Department that there is no question of London suggesting at this time an increase in that quarterly amount, and on the basis of its present information neither the Department nor the Board of Economic Warfare would approve an increase.

3. In the absence of the figures urgently requested in my 984, the possibility of a discrepancy between your computations and ours exists. On the basis of our figures the amounts *a*) landed since April 1 in Spain, *b*) now afloat, *c*) loading this week, and *d*) clearances which you authorized according to your 1098, if loaded, would bring total importations of mainland Spain for the second quarter to approximately 134,000 tons. I therefore assume that it has been your intention from the outset to reject any and all nominations put forward by the Spaniards for loading in the June 3-4 loading period.

4. I appreciate the position to which you refer in your 1128, but it has its origin in the sailing authorizations reported as given in your 1098 of April 30, which followed less than 24 hours after your 1086 of April 29³⁴ informing us of the nominations, and was made in the face of the suggestion contained in my 970 of April 29 and against the background of my 958 of April 27, which clearly warned of the possible necessity of "a very extensive postponement of nominations for the late May and early June loading dates".

5. You refer in several of your telegrams under reference, notably your 1127, to a reduction in petroleum supplies. 100,000 tons of oil per quarter is of course no reduction in terms of what the Spaniards have been receiving. It would constitute the maintenance of the rate which has existed in the past 6 months.

6. Please expedite urgently the statistics requested in my 982. Your despatch 761 of April 2,³⁵ to which you refer in your 1127 and your 1125, has not yet been received. You may therefore wish to telegraph a brief summary.

HULL

852.6363/880 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 11, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 12—9:25 a. m.]

1236. Your 1017, May 6, 10 a. m. Without relating matter to question of aviation gasoline I sounded Minister of Foreign Affairs today

³⁴ Not printed.

³⁵ *Ante*, p. 602.

on Spanish rights for American airline operating international service. He said he was much interested and would urge Cabinet and Franco to agree to granting such rights.

He reiterated hope aviation gas would soon be made available because of importance to Spain and principally because he feared our continued withholding might be interpreted as change in our policy toward Spain which would be difficult for public to understand since it is well known that Spain orienting its policy more and more toward United Nations. I said I was hopeful it would be made available and would keep him informed. See my 1210, May 10, 7 p. m.³⁶

HAYES

852.6363/830 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1943—10 a. m.

1082. Your 1214 of May 11, 9 a. m.³⁶

1. Loading authorization is being granted by the Department and Board of Economic Warfare on May 19-20 for the five tankers named in your 1086, April 29, 2 p. m.,³⁶ in view of possible misunderstanding by the Spanish Government.

2. I remain of the opinion expressed in paragraph 3 of the Department's 1033, May 6, noon.³⁷ Loading authorization for the *Zorroza* for the early June loading date will therefore not be granted by the Department and Board of Economic Warfare. Accordingly, please arrange for the postponement of its departure from Spain.

3. It occurs to me from my reading of your recent telegrams that you may not be giving full weight to the importance of public opinion and judgement here which I believe would view most unfavorably any increase in the actual shipment of oil to Spain over that of the highest quarter of 1942. Indeed, despite the care with which we are following the matter, there is more criticism of this oil program to Spain than of any other matter of foreign policy under my direction. I have agreed to the loading of the five tankers (which will bring the second quarter shipments well above the first quarter rate) because the sailing authorizations leave me no alternative, but I do not wish any further authorization for second quarter sailings to be given, and I regard it of utmost importance that the prescriptions from the Department respecting all tanker movements be scrupulously adhered to.

HULL

³⁶ Not printed.

³⁷ Not printed; in paragraph 3, Secretary Hull expressed the opinion that it would be necessary to refuse loading authorization requested for the early June loading period (852.6363/811).

852.6363/846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 18, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received May 19—11 : 19 a. m.]

1299. (1) As instructed in Department's 1082, May 14, 10 a. m., I have informed the Spaniards the *Zorroza* may not sail. Am I to understand from the penultimate sentence that no tankers will be authorized to load on June 9-20 despite the fact that the products will not arrive until the third quarter?

(2) I am quite alive to the importance and weight of public opinion in a democratic country like ours, but when much of that opinion is so badly misinformed as it is about contemporary Spain I doubt whether in critical war times it should be the main determinant of our Government's foreign policy. To reduce the petroleum program by over a fourth below what was agreed to, last December, in order to cater to misinformed public opinion is actually an admission that our policy towards Spain has been wrong. Moreover I cannot believe that such reduction will satisfy that section of public opinion which would deprive Spain of any and all petroleum. Nor can I believe that the more enlightened American public opinion regardless of its attitude towards the present Spanish Government, desires to deny to the people of Spain ready access to foodstuffs and other necessities, which must be produced and transported by the aid of petroleum products. The program agreed to, last December for 541,000 tons, representing 60% of requirements, was the result of a careful study of most essential needs, and was not designed to permit, nor has there occurred, a free circulation of motor vehicles. Measuring the results of our policy by economic warfare benefits and progressive improvements in the political and military fields, I cannot conclude that it has been wrong.

3. The supply of sufficient petroleum for vital economic needs has been the keystone of the entire economic warfare program in this strategic peninsula, not alone for ourselves but also for the British. To weaken that keystone weakens the whole structure which is giving us blockade controls and economic and political benefits.

4. The success of our general economic program has been rendered possible only because the position of friendly elements in the Spanish Government has been strengthened by our ability and willingness of [to] carry out our supply program, permitting such elements to justify favoring us over the opposition of energetic pro-Axis elements. Conversely the latter have lost ground by reason of failures and reductions in German supply. Our accomplishments have been noteworthy. There are fewer limitations affecting the purchase and export of strategic materials by the Allies than by the Germans.

It should be remembered, moreover, that in this totalitarian country where the policy of fixed prices and quotas is widely employed, we have been permitted to utilize the value of our resources against the Axis in open competition, in marked contrast to the situation in Portugal, where preclusive operations have been gravely handicapped by the allocations of strategic materials between the opposing belligerents.⁴⁰ We have acquired 100 percent of the Spanish strontium output, 90 percent of the fluorspar output and we are now obtaining 75 percent of the wolfram produced.⁴¹ Last winter we upset German purchases of greatly needed woolen goods and made skins so costly as to reduce German acquisitions. Our oil program is basic to our success.

5. The above benefits are here viewed primarily from the American standpoint and do not give consideration to the importance of the supplies and other advantages obtained by Great Britain.

6. I am not unmindful that we may desire to use the petroleum weapon in order to gain additional benefits from the Spanish Government, or to precipitate a crisis with it, and I do not counsel a rigid adherence to pre-determined figures in such circumstances. But I earnestly urge that we do not injudiciously weaken our petroleum weapon unless thereby we can benefit.

HAYES

852.6363/879 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1943—3 p. m.

W-21. Your 1300 May 18 and 1307 May 19.⁴²

1. In view of your emphasis upon fact that you have made some sort of commitment to the Spaniards that the *Campilo* could lift 4,000 tons of lubes on the present voyage, we are reluctantly authorizing it to load. This action is being taken much against our wishes and only because we consider we are forced to do so as a matter of good faith. Please see that every precaution is taken to insure that none of these lubes reach enemy hands. Clearance of this cargo of lubricating oils will bring imports of lubes for first half year in excess of program limits and will also create a July 1 inventory in excess of agreed limits, even making full allowance for abnormally large consumption in May.

⁴⁰ For correspondence regarding U.S. trade in strategic materials with Portugal, see pp. 497 ff.

⁴¹ For correspondence regarding the purchase of wolfram from Spain, see pp. 632 ff.

⁴² Neither printed.

2. Under no circumstances should any further tankers be authorized to sail from Spanish ports without your first obtaining express approval from the Department. This approval should be requested for each tanker by telegram at least 10 days before the proposed sailing date from Spain. No commitment, direct or indirect, should be given prior to receipt of such authorization.

3. Information telegraphed by Careaga⁴³ concerning *Zorrosa* and *Campanario* is incorrect. We did not approve and do not intend to approve the sailing or loading of either of these vessels.

4. There has been and is no intention that we will permit any carryover either from the last half of 1942 or from the first half of 1943. In making any recommendations for future loadings this should be borne in mind; the current permissible total rate of flow for each period will be determined in the light of all immediately pertinent circumstances.

5. No statement should be made to the Spaniards in any form concerning the granting of any future petroleum supplies until you have received express authority from the Department.

6. There are two basic limitations governing our supplies of petroleum to the Spaniards. First, we are not undertaking to supply petroleum beyond essential minimum needs, and have no interest in facilitating various branches of Spanish production at the present time since it is certain that supplies available to Axis would thereby increase. Hence it is not a desirable objective to seek to increase consumption beyond minimum levels as a means of justifying additional imports. The "absorptive" capacity of the Spanish market, apparently deemed by Smith (see his 1300, May 18, 11 p. m. to Thornburg⁴⁴), is not to be taken as guide to amounts of imports; neither is the carrying capacity of the Spanish tanker fleet. Second, we do not wish to permit the building up of excessive stocks in Spain, whether these stocks are in the hands of CAMPSA or in the hands of other distributors or retailers. Hence the sudden switch of stocks from CAMPSA to other distributors or to retailers does not alter the facts that the stocks are in Spain.

7. It must be borne in mind that by "inventories" we understand "maximum inventories".

8. As soon as your recommended program for the second half of 1943 is received, it will be studied and you will be advised of this Government's decision. In this connection, we should emphasize that there is no present intention of altering our basic policy toward Spain.

⁴³ Presumably José M. Careaga, Technical Adviser on Petroleum Matters at Spanish Embassy in Washington.

⁴⁴ Max W. Thornburg, Consultant on Petroleum Matters, Office of the Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

We merely consider it of extreme importance, pending further developments, that every precaution be taken to assure the achievement of the two objectives stated in foregoing paragraph 6, and that full and careful consideration be given to the shipment to and use in the Peninsula of such an important material as petroleum.

9. Joint Chiefs of Staff have just communicated these recommendations:

(a) Clearance should be given Spanish tankers to depart for the Dutch West Indies for cargoes only when it is clear that total inventories in Spain of a given product are such that upon tankers return there will be no material excess beyond agreed limits. This should be clearly understood by our Embassy in Madrid and the Spanish Government.

(b) There is no foreseeable military reason why the proposal to restrict to 100,000 tons Spanish imports of petroleum products during the second quarter of 1943 should not be followed. As clearance has been given the six tankers, however, five of these should be permitted to take cargo and return even if this will allow imports of this quarter to reach about 135,000 tons.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the diversion of the sixth tanker to take fuel oil to Philadelphia after which it might return to Dutch Indies for next scheduled loading.

This will serve to clarify the Department's position and to illustrate that in releasing the *Campero* a concession is being made beyond the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

HULL

852.6363/869: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 24, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 25—1:20 p. m.]

1362. My 1236 May 11, midnight. Foreign Minister told me on own initiative today that he could not give me final answer on American airline matter but he had discussed it in "high circles" and obtained very favorable response. He hoped to transmit formal approval shortly.

Similarly I hope Department will inform me presently that aviation gasoline will be made available. British Embassy has received and commented on suggested conditions submitted by British Government in connection with furnishing this gasoline but I have had nothing from the Department.

HAYES

852.6363/869 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1943—5 p. m.

1281. Your 1362, May 24.

1. Department approves in principle the importation into Spain of limited quantities of 87 octane aviation gasoline. However, before authority can be given you to discuss matter with Spanish authorities, it is necessary for us to reach an agreement with the military and other authorities here as to the terms and various conditions to which the Spaniards must agree. The matter is under active consideration here, and we hope to telegraph you our final views in the immediate future.

2. The question has been raised here as to what lines it is proposed the Spaniards will operate as result of the importation of this aviation gasoline. Please telegraph urgently what routes are traversed by the Iberia lines, giving your comments as to desirability to the United States of maintaining traffic over the respective lines.

HULL

852.6363/848 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1943—8 p. m.

1331. Your 1342, May 22, 5 p. m.; your 1307, May 19, 1 p. m.; and Smith's 1300, May 18, 11 p. m.⁴⁵

1. The exchange of telegrams with respect to the Spanish oil program in the current quarter has revealed certain misunderstandings. The Department is anxious to put an end to the correspondence and, with the benefit of your advice and in collaboration with the British, proceed with (a) the construction of a program for the third and fourth quarters of 1943, and (b) a review, in collaboration with the Embassy, of the existing control measures under which the program operates with a view to strengthening and modifying them as study indicates.

2. The Department in this telegram will briefly recapitulate the essential points underlying the program as follows:

A. Our basic policy is to allow Spain to import as small a quantity of petroleum and petroleum products as will permit us to attain our objectives with respect to that country. In pursuit of high political and strategic objectives, such supplies will be made available by us as may be necessary to sustain in Spain a reasonable wartime economy, the support of which has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Agreement on the definition of a reasonable wartime economy of

⁴⁵ None printed.

course presents certain difficulties. In so far as imports of petroleum products are concerned the Department and the Board of Economic Warfare consider that importations of petroleum products for metropolitan Spain at the rate of between 50 and 65 percent of normal (normal being defined as the average consumption of the years 1933, 1934 and 1935 calculated to be 833,000 tons) are sufficient to support a reasonable wartime economy. There is no intention on our part to build up the economy of Spain through imports of oil beyond the minimum essential to satisfy the foregoing requirement. To do so obviously increases the risk of overflow to the Axis, or the stimulation of economic activities beneficial indirectly to the Axis.

B. In December 1942 the Department and the Board of Economic Warfare, with the British Government concurring, reached internal agreement that importations for metropolitan Spain including lub oils at the annual rate of 541,000 tons would suffice to accomplish our purpose. This was a program or control figure arrived at exclusively for our own use and guidance for two purposes; (a) to set an absolute upper limit on imports, and (b) to provide a framework within which the mechanics of operation could function. It was explicitly stated that the figure was not to be revealed to the Spaniards, and it was equally clearly understood that this constituted the maximum under any circumstances then visible. The program was to be operated on the basis of tanker by tanker approval, and it was implicit that the test of experience would be applied to establish the quantity of oil Spain would require to maintain in fact a reasonable wartime economy. This program rate for the first quarter of 1943 only was approved last winter by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

C. It has been understood from the beginning that adequate and effective controls would be instituted and maintained in order to satisfy ourselves that the Axis was benefitting neither directly nor indirectly from the oil supply program. One of these controls has been the use of limits to the quantities of the several products which could be held at any time in inventory.

D. The total Spanish trade program will be largely measured by the extent to which it lessens the supply of goods useful in wartime to the Axis. If the work of production, transport and distribution of various branches of Spanish activity which result in goods procured by the Axis is facilitated through our oil supply operations the whole program is exposed to criticism that would obstruct it.

3. With respect to 2 B above, the Department now understands from information acquired here that the Spanish officials have learned of the program referred to [and] would appreciate a statement whether you or to your knowledge any member of your staff has at any time communicated to any Spanish official the 541,000 ton figure or subsidiary figures which would enable the Spaniards to arrive at the former figure. Our assumption throughout has been that this has not occurred, and hence that any modification in the petroleum program which we felt advisable to make could be freely made without violation of any commitment or implied commitment made to the Spaniards. In this connection we would also appreciate a state-

ment from you as to whether to your knowledge or in your opinion the 541,000 ton figure or any relevant subsidiary figure has been communicated to any Spanish official by the British Embassy.

4. As repeatedly stated in several of the Department's telegrams, no change in basic policy was contemplated in our efforts to hold second quarter imports to 100,000 tons. The Department's 958 of April 27 specifically stated that the rate of imports for the third quarter and subsequent periods would be considered in the light of the then existing situation.

5. The decision to hold second quarter imports to the figure of 100,000 tons was based on the three following factors: (a) An understandable caution at a time when military operations were continuing in North Africa in wishing to maintain stocks in adjacent territories at levels no larger than they had been in preceding months. It seemed inescapable to the Department and the Board of Economic Warfare that a 35 to 50 percent increase in imports in a period of less than 3 months would result in stocks increasing in secondary if not in primary hands. (b) The belief that on an aggregate of 200,000 tons in the preceding 6 months Spain had been able materially to improve her internal transportation system with resultant benefits to her economy as a whole. To this fact the Embassy had testified on several then recent occasions. Pragmatically this appeared to offer evidence that the 541,000 ton program figure might be excessive for the accomplishment of our purpose. (c) Public opinion was and has been a factor. In order to retain the measure of support necessary to continue a policy toward Spain which, to say the least, is unpopular in many quarters, it is clearly necessary that that policy be operated so that it could be defended against informed as well as ill informed public opinion. There is a large body of informed public opinion which in the Department's judgment will support the program for Spain if it is patent we have given the very least necessary to attain our ends. By the same token that support would be lost if it could be demonstrated that we were being generous merely for the sake of generosity.

6. There is one aspect of the future oil program to Spain which troubles the Department and on which your comments would be appreciated. It seems to us that until recently a large part of Spain's satisfaction with the oil program has been due to the fact that we have permitted her to lift all the oil her tanker fleet could carry. Today the situation is that the increase in the fleet and its improved operating efficiency gives it a carrying capacity well in excess of 541,000 tons a year, or any figure which may be set as a reasonable maximum, and that Spanish authorities may try to increase the fleet still further by attempted purchases from the Axis. We therefore face the necessity of restraining the Spaniards from importing as much oil as it is within

their physical capacity to lift. Presumably this will detract from the satisfaction that the Spanish authorities may feel with the oil supply program.

7. With respect to an oil supply program from July 1 forward, your views would be appreciated on the question of whether or not the Spaniards should be informed of our willingness to supply a stated quantity, and, if so, for how long a future period should we commit ourselves. One tentative view here is that the preponderance of advantage would lie in informing the Spaniards but (a) limit the period to one quarter in advance, (b) stipulate no carry-overs into the succeeding quarter, (c) set out specific quantitative inventory limits by products, which figures would include all stocks including those in hands of secondary distributors and retailers, such figures to be conservatively estimated if exact statistics are unavailable, and (d) at the time of presentation of the program to the Spaniards seek certain specific concessions such as the promise of adequate peseta exchange to render our purchase program secure.

HULL

852.6363/918 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, June 22, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received June 24—3:50 p. m.]

1631. Your 1331, June 12, 8 p. m. Welcome the Department's reasoned statement of policy and find myself in complete accord with it. The Embassy of course considers the economic program of which the petroleum program forms a principal part as a device for advancing our own interests in Spain and not as a device for improving the lot of the Spanish people except of course to the extent that we can advance our own interests and prejudice the enemy by so doing.

A year and a half has passed since we adopted the formula of supplying Spain with enough and only enough petroleum to maintain Spanish economy on a low level. In the interim enormous changes in the military and political situations in this area have taken place and I believe the time has come for us to reconsider our policy.

In carrying on mutually beneficial trade with Spain we have already gained important strategic and political objectives. Our policy in that respect was thoroughly tested at the time of our North African landing when contrary to the predictions of many critics Spain did not lift a finger to interfere with our military operations, but promptly informed the Germans that it would resist any aggression from the Axis. It is obvious that if Spain's attitude had been different our North African operation might have failed and that in

any case it would have been much more difficult than it was. More recently as I have reported the Foreign Minister has given me explicit assurances that Spain will not hamper in any manner our future military operations in or across the Mediterranean.

I believe that these political and strategic objectives which have proved to be of great positive help to our war effort have now largely been consolidated and that from now on we should continue to work principally along two lines.

(1) Continue progressively to divorce the Spanish economic system from the German system and thus advance our own interests by further restricting the flow of Spanish products to Germany. In connection with this I am now giving thought to urging that in return for the voluntary cooperation we are giving to Spaniards which experience has shown to be so helpful to Spanish economy the Spaniards cease granting credits of any kind to Germany and decline to accept from Germany in payment for Spanish products gold which may have been looted from our Allies.

(2) Continue to explore and develop the possibility of exploiting Spain's economy in our own immediate interest, as for example, by placing orders for textiles for our armed forces and for civilian needs in Europe and Africa. As the war develops in our favor and as Spain is increasingly freed from German pressure and influence the possibilities of developing and utilizing Spain as an economic ally will be increasingly important.

If we could achieve these objectives best, or if we could achieve objective (1) without at the same time incurring military or political risks more than commensurate with the possible economic gain, by drastically curtailing the supply of petroleum products to Spain (after having given Spain the opportunity to obtain such products by mutually advantageous cooperation with us) I should be prepared to recommend that supplies be so curtailed. If on the other hand we can gain those objectives and possibly other objectives such as bringing Spain into the war on our side (which possibility is by no means remote) by making available to Spain petroleum supplies in excess of the 400,000 tons per annum the Department has had in mind or even of the 541,000 tons which is the program agreed to last year for the first 6 months of this year I believe we should be remiss in our obligation to our Government and people if we did not make available such additional supplies. This principle equally applies to other products subject to blockade control.

My present thought is that we should give our approval to the petroleum program already submitted by the Embassy which Smith is now discussing in Washington and that we should notify the Spaniards of the amount they may expect to obtain in a given quarter while making it clear that as in the past each tanker sailing and loading must be specifically approved and that the quantity may be

reduced by us for military or other reasons. It is also my thought that in the absence of developments I cannot now foresee the Department should leave with the Embassy the responsibility of deciding in the light of its intimate current knowledge of the changing situation in this area including the internal situation in Spain when and what tankers may sail within that total program.

If within the 6 months' period the Embassy should decide that our interest could be advanced by increasing the amount of petroleum to be made available I should not hesitate to recommend that this be done having in mind always that our primary objective is not to improve conditions in Spain but to advance our own military interests. If the Embassy should decide that it would be in our interest to retard the flow of petroleum into Spain I should of course delay authorization for tanker sailings.

In this connection I request you bear in mind that internal political changes may occur in Spain, possibly within the next 6 months' period. In my 1621, June 21, 6 p. m.,⁴⁶ I reported that 25 outstanding members of the Cortes have petitioned Franco to restore the monarchy promptly. The handling of our economic program may have an important influence on developments. For that reason decisions as to the carrying out of the program must be made from day to day in the light of the local situation, and I particularly request that the Department, on the basis of its own impressions, not suddenly hold up tankers or otherwise interrupt the orderly carrying of the program without prior consultation with the Embassy which for very natural reasons is in the best possible position to determine the probable effect of such action on the domestic situation and on our own position in Spain.

With further reference to particular points raised in your telegram, I submit the following comment and recommendations:

Our economic program with Spain, far from hampering our military operations in North Africa, aided those operations by enabling Spain progressively to overcome German military, political, and economic influence in Spain and by placing it in a position in which it could afford to warn Germany that it would grant it no military facilities and would resist any aggression from the Axis. There is no longer room for reasonable doubt on that score. My Military Attaché⁴⁷ and I regard Spain as potential military ally.

So far as concerns the effect your petroleum program on American public opinion, I can predict with reasonable assurance that the present marked tendency for Spain to draw away from the Axis and closer to the democracies, which our economic program has made possible, will be continued and accelerated. If we continue to win victories in

⁴⁶ Not printed.

⁴⁷ Col. William D. Hohenthal, who succeeded Col. Dusenbury, May 1, 1943.

Europe, it would indeed be remarkable if this were not the case. If we should suffer setbacks in Europe, the will of the Spanish nation to resist Axis aggression which has been strengthened and supported by our economic program will be an element of safety to us.

Our enemies, the Germans, are openly complaining not only privately but in the German press that we have already won great diplomatic victories in Spain, and the German press has long been consoling the German people by predicting that our efforts to bring Spain into the war on our side will not succeed. In my 1623, June 21, 9 p. m.,⁴⁸ I reported that the German Ambassador⁴⁹ himself has stated that the desire to please the United States is today the basis of Spanish diplomacy.

I do not believe that the Spaniards knew that the last approved program was for 541,000 tons per year but simple arithmetic permitted them to make fairly accurate deductions. It must be remembered that when this program was under study last year, it was necessary to have frequent conversations with CAMPSA,⁵⁰ CEPESA⁵¹ and the Petroleum Commissariat to determine Spain's requirements, and that an approximation of stock limits has had to be disclosed in order to make adjustments in tanker cargoes.

I do not consider that inability to use tanker fleet to capacity will cause serious dissatisfaction provided Spaniards are informed of the extent of the program. The Embassy has informed the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce and Industry, and Smith has informed the Petroleum Commissar, CAMPSA and CEPESA, that Spain cannot expect to have released of [*a*] quantity of products equivalent to the increasing tanker capacity, and, at my suggestion, Smith discussed tentatively with officials of CAMPSA the eventual employment of some of the tanker fleet for services beneficial to us.

The petroleum program is a part of the economic program and assurances regarding facilitating pesetas have been obtained in connection with the broad program. I do not believe it advisable to connect the petroleum program specifically to the peseta situation as this would encourage the Spaniards to point out that their difficulty in getting rid of dollars is partly due to our own unwillingness to make larger quantities of petroleum available to them. I prefer to accept the assurances already given as having constituted an undertaking of the Spanish Government.

Our petroleum control has been deficient in detail principally because many observers sent from the United States were unqualified and because they have devoted undue attention to other duties. I

⁴⁸ Not printed.

⁴⁹ Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff.

⁵⁰ Compañía Arrendataria del Monopolio de Petr6leos, Sociedad An6nima.

⁵¹ Compañía Espa1ola de Petr6leos, Sociedad An6nima.

have discussed this situation in a separate despatch. However, a very important guarantee that petroleum made available by United States will not benefit the Axis derives from (1) Spain's great need for petroleum and desire to utilize it in its own interest and (2) recognition by Spain that leakage of petroleum products to the Axis will mean the end of the program. Spain knows it is in its own interest to cooperate with us in petroleum control and is guided by that knowledge and interest.

HAYES

852.6363/889 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1943—3 p. m.

1411. 1. The interested agencies of this Government approve the importation into Spain of limited quantities of aviation gasoline for civilian airline use, subject however to the following conditions:

A. The octane rating is to be no higher than 87.

B. This gasoline is to be used only by the Iberia Airline for civilian purposes, unless other uses are specifically approved by us.

C. Imports are not to exceed the rate of 320 metric tons per month, and stocks of aviation gasoline in Spain shall not exceed 640 metric tons at any one time.

D. Specific allocations are to be made monthly by the Aviation Petroleum Products Allocation Committee in Washington.

E. Supplies are to originate in the Netherlands West Indies, are to be shipped in Spanish vessels and, if moved in containers, the latter are to be supplied by the Spaniards.

F. The Petroleum Attaché must be furnished with detailed monthly reports on all arrivals from any source consumption and stocks. In addition, he must be given full facilities to check by personal inspection and otherwise:

- (1) distribution of the aviation gasoline admitted into Spain;
- (2) subsequent allocation of supplies;
- (3) stocks of aviation gasoline wherever situated in Spain, whether in the hands of CAMPSA, of the Iberia Airline, the armed forces or elsewhere.

G. Foreign operations of the Iberia Airline shall not be extended to the Canary Islands, Rio de Oro or elsewhere without first obtaining the express approval of the United States and British authorities.

H. The Iberia Airline will not go into or pass over enemy occupied or controlled territory without our consent.

I. The supply of aviation gasoline will be reconsidered if the Germans or Italians are permitted to influence the operation of the line or in the event the German share holdings in the line are increased.

2. In giving their approval to the supply of aviation gasoline to Spain, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have emphasized that before agreeing

to the supply of the gasoline, the foregoing nine conditions must be accepted by the Spaniards.

3. In addition, the Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that it would be highly desirable to impose a tenth condition; namely, that no enemy nationals will be carried by the Iberia Airline from metropolitan Spain to Tangier or Spanish Morocco without the express approval of the United States and British authorities. It is agreed, however, that, since the Spaniards may have serious objection to the last stated condition, we might be prepared not to make it an absolute condition to supplying aviation gasoline. You are nevertheless requested to seek to obtain agreement to this condition.

4. In addition to the conditions set forth above, the Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is highly desirable that we seek to obtain from the Spaniards the following two concessions:

A. Assurances from the Spanish Government that it will make every effort to arrange for the establishment of a direct airline between Spain and Switzerland, to be controlled by Spanish or Swiss interests and to be free to carry passengers and freight of interest to Spain and Switzerland;

B. Landing rights in Spain for American commercial airlines as outlined in Departments telegram 1017, May 6, 1943, 10 a. m.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that the establishment of the line between Spain and Switzerland, although desirable, is not of sufficient importance to warrant making it a condition to the supply of aviation gasoline. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated, however, that every effort should be made to obtain the second stated concession; namely, the landing rights in Spain, etc. Your 1505, June 7, 1943, 5 p. m.,⁵² indicates Spanish are prepared to give favorable consideration to our request without linking it to the supply of aviation gasoline. Nevertheless, the rights are considered of sufficient importance to utilize the aviation gasoline as a bargaining weapon if necessary. Department is currently preparing a detailed reply to your 1505 which should go out within the next day or two.

6. From your 1539 of June 9,⁵³ the Department understands that the only lines which Iberia will operate as a result of the supply of aviation gasoline will be (1) the line from Madrid to Lisbon; (2) the line from Madrid to Seville to Tangier; and (3) the line from Madrid to Barcelona. In the event the Spaniards wish to operate additional lines, please telegraph the Department as, in such event, we should wish to reconsider its position.

⁵² Not printed; in it the Ambassador reported that the Spanish Foreign Minister had informed him that the Spanish Government agreed in principle to the operation of an American airline in Spain and invited the United States to apply for authorization to establish such an air service (852.6363/889).

⁵³ Not printed.

7. As you doubtless know, the British have been most active in pressing for the approval of an aviation gasoline program, and the above conditions and terms of the program have been worked out with the British Embassy here. We therefore feel that the matter should be presented to the Spaniards jointly by you and your British colleague. We assume that he will receive identical instructions to these. As soon as he does, you are authorized to join with him in discussing the matter with the Spaniards along the lines set forth above.

HULL

852.6363/957 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, July 19, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received July 20—6:53 p. m.]

1877. Your 1411, June 26. Inquired of the Foreign Minister this morning concerning progress in the plan to eliminate German participation in ownership of Iberia Airline. He said the agreement had been concluded but that there remained certain details to be settled. The Government planned to convert Iberian to a state-owned airline with some Spanish private capital participating, and it planned to float a loan for the purpose.

After receiving this information I told him that in agreement with the British Ambassador I was prepared to outline to him orally the principal conditions under which the British and American Governments were prepared to make available aviation gasoline to Spain. I explained that our countries were at war, that aviation gasoline was a scarce commodity and was the most precious of all war materials. We were reluctant to supply it to any country outside the United Nations and we were obliged if we supplied it to Spain to insist on certain conditions.

I said these came under four general headings:

(1) Imports should not exceed rate of 320 metric tons per month and stocks should not exceed 640 metric tons at any one time; octane rating would not exceed 87.

(2) Effective, complete control of distribution and use should be had by our Petroleum Attaché, who would be given all necessary facilities by Spanish Government.

(3) Gasoline to be used only by Iberia for civilian purposes unless other uses specifically approved by American and British Governments. Iberia could not fly over enemy territory without our consent. I said we were proceeding on basis that Iberia would want to resume its service between Madrid and Lisbon, Madrid and Barcelona, and Madrid and Seville. He said it possibly would want also to resume the line from Madrid to Valencia. I said I did not believe there would be any objection to that. I said I assumed the line would want to

continue also to fly from Seville to Tangier and Spanish Morocco, but that we had been examining the traffic on that line and found it consisted to an excessive degree of Germans and Italians. I said we did not intend to supply aviation gasoline in order to facilitate espionage and sabotage work by our enemies in Tangier and Spanish Morocco and submitted the matter to him to suggest what step should be taken to overcome this difficulty. He said our interests and Spain's in this regard were identical. He wanted to put a stop to or avoid the carrying on of any activities in Spanish Morocco which might be regarded as unfriendly to our operations in North Africa. He said one thing troubled him and that was that a number of Axis prisoners had escaped into Spanish Morocco. The British had recently protested against their being repatriated and had suggested instead that they be exchanged for an equal number of Allied prisoners in Germany. He said this was very embarrassing to him because as I knew Spain had been releasing all Allied escaped prisoners. I said I would discuss this with the British Ambassador. He said he would like to permit the repatriation of these escaped prisoners since their continued presence in North Africa was dangerous both from the Spanish and from the Allied point of view.

There were, of course, a number of Axis Consuls regularly accredited in North Africa. He thought it would be unfriendly if Spain denied them passage on Spanish airlines. He suggested, however, that the Spanish Government adopt a rule that no alien could travel on this line without express permission of Spanish Government, that is, Spanish Foreign Office. The Foreign Office in turn would give such permission to regularly accredited Axis representatives but would deny it to all other Axis citizens.

(4) The supply of aviation gasoline will be reconsidered if enemy nationals participate in ownership or direction of Iberia. He said he quite understood and it was Spain's intention to retain ownership.

I then pointed out there were two other points which were not antecedent to supplying aviation gasoline but for which my Government requested sympathetic consideration :

(1) Spain would try to arrange for establishment of direct air service between Spain and Switzerland. He said Spain had already tried and failed but that it would try again. He hoped Iberia might be able to establish a service.

(2) We wished landing rights for American commercial airlines in Spain. He said he had discussed this matter informally with the Air Minister who had received the suggestion sympathetically and had requested definite proposals. I said my Government had not made up its own mind as yet as to exactly what it wanted but that it would take up the matter later on. He said that whatever proposals we made would be sympathetically considered.

I shall later communicate the various conditions set forth by the Department to the Foreign Minister in writing. I believe his suggestion concerning control of passenger traffic to Spanish Morocco is very satisfactory from our point of view and has the merit of having been suggested by the Foreign Minister himself. I believe we can

count on the Spaniards to do everything they can to arrange for direct air service to Switzerland and that we can also depend on their sympathetically receiving any reasonable concrete proposals we may make for facilities for American airlines in Spain.

After I have presented the complete list of conditions in writing and obtained the Foreign Office's consent to these conditions I assume the Department will proceed to make aviation gasoline available.

HAYES

852.6363/984 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 5, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 2:31 p. m.]

2035. Your 1411, June 26, 3 p. m., paragraph 5. I am including landing rights for American airlines in Spain as one of conditions for furnishing aviation gas. British Ambassador requests permission for British airlines be included. I assume there is no objection. Please advise.

HAYES

852.6363/994 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 10, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 8:32 p. m.]

2082. My despatch 1144, July 29,⁵⁴ and my 2035, August 5, 1 p. m. Foreign Office has informed me in writing: (1) Iberia now entirely Spanish-owned and, (2) it will not transport Axis nationals to Morocco. Under circumstances I am omitting these two points from the further conditions I am presenting to Spanish Government for supply of aviation gasoline. I am also omitting for purpose of simplification and in order to lessen delay any reference to landing rights for American and British airlines in Spain although I am submitting note requesting such rights for American airlines at same time I present remaining conditions for furnishing aviation gasoline.

HAYES

852.6363/984 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1943—11 p. m.

1721. Your 2035, August 5, 1 p. m. Department, in its 1017, May 6, 10 a. m. stated that it would be better not to tie in question of aviation

⁵⁴ Not printed.

gas with that of landing rights. In paragraph 5 of Department's 1411, June 26, 3 p. m., it is stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the landing rights of sufficient importance to utilize, if necessary, the supply of aviation gas as a bargaining weapon. However, the Department continues to feel that every effort should be made to keep the issues separate. The Department has observed no Spanish inclination to associate the two matters and has confidence in your ability to secure landing rights separately. Before conveying the substance of the above to the British Ambassador, however, please advise the Department of the circumstances leading to your proposal.

For your strictly confidential information, the Department would prefer to see the British apply for their own commercial landing rights in Spain on a basis separate and apart from the action we take in this matter.

HULL

852.6363/999 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 14, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 1:40 p. m.]

2148. My 2082, August 10, 1 p. m. The written guarantee that Iberia would not carry Axis nationals to Spanish Morocco was given by an official of the Foreign Ministry who is interpreted [*interpreting?*] instruction received from the Minister. The latter requests that we accept his oral guarantee in the same sense pointing out that such an assurance in writing would become known to the Axis and would be unnecessarily embarrassing to the Government. I of course attach equal value to his oral as to his written assurance and I have accepted his oral assurance.

The Minister is submitting the other conditions to the appropriate Spanish authorities and hopes to give me a final reply Monday.⁵⁵ Meanwhile he is very anxious that some aviation gasoline be loaded on September 6th and I suggest I be instructed to inform him that such loading is authorized as soon as he agrees to remaining conditions.

HAYES

852.6363/1026 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 27, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received August 28—2:50 p. m.]

2324. My 2148, August 14, 1 p. m. In note dated August 25, Foreign Minister accepts various conditions proposed by United States

⁵⁵ August 16.

for furnishing aviation gasoline with following suggested modification;

1. He would like us to agree to furnish a quantity of 100-octane gasoline as soon as agreement reached for purchase by Spain of three Douglas transport planes forcelanded in Spain. Since planes of no value to Spain unless gasoline available and since furnishing gasoline contingent on our selling planes, I recommend agreement.

2. He accepts figure of 320 tons gasoline monthly as provisional but expresses hope figure can be raised to 420 and later to 600. He proposes following addition to pertinent article: "These figures (of 320 tons monthly and imports 640 tons stocks) are considered to be initial and may be increased according to need by agreement of both parties." The figures 420 and 600 coincide with Air Ministry's request a year ago to permit operation of military planes and training of pilots. As the Minister's proposal does not commit us beyond our offer, I recommend approval.

3. With reference to inspection of stocks, he proposes that such inspection be limited to CAMPSA receipts, stocks and deliveries, but states General Staff will furnish data on stocks at aerodromes whenever requested. This is in line with Smith's views set forth in Washington and noted in memorandum dated July 16, 1943,⁵⁶ entitled "Aviation Gasoline Inventory, Peninsular Spain". I consider an official statement preferable to actual checking of aviation stocks since as pointed out in the memorandum under reference, we would have no assurance that all stocks had been disclosed to the checker. I recommend approval.

4. He says Canaries are provinces of Spain and air service to Canaries appears indispensable. He proposes therefore that Spain obligate itself not to extend itself beyond the Spanish provinces or beyond Tangier and Tetuán except by previous agreement with American and British authorities. I suggest this be approved subject to Spain's reaching a special agreement with us covering Canaries route such as that proposed by our military authorities in North Africa and communicated to the Spanish Government (my despatch 621 February 6⁵⁷).

5. He suggests provision with reference to flying over enemy territory read that Iberia will not enter or fly over enemy dominated territory except by prior agreement between Spanish and American and British Governments. This is a mere matter of wording and I recommend agreement.

6. Re line to Switzerland, he suggests additional statement that American Government will furnish gasoline required for this line and other lines which may be established after mutual agreement,

⁵⁶ Not found in Department files.

⁵⁷ Not printed.

especially the commercial line to Buenos Aires, once peace has been established in addition to the 320 tons per month fixed provisionally. Since establishment all such proposed lines contingent on our agreement, I recommend we approve this provision.

7. He wishes to add to the list of lines to be operated by Iberia the line from Madrid to the Canaries. I recommend approval subject to special agreement mentioned under 4 above.

The note ends with the comment that our views have been substantially accepted and expresses confidence that aviation gasoline will be furnished immediately.

As noted above it seems to me all suggestions are accepted since they relate to the future and are contingent on future agreement by us except with reference to line to the Canaries concerning which I have commented above. I request urgent reply.

HAYES

852.6363/1026 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1943—5 p. m.

1883. Reference your 2324, August 27, 9 p. m., Department's point by point comment follows:

1. Aviation gasoline of 100 octane rating is one of the most precious of all war materials and its use is rigidly controlled. Consequently, we will not approve the supply of this product for the use of the Douglas transports. The Department is reliably informed that Douglas DC-3 transports, which are the planes under reference, can be operated with 87 octane gasoline, which is the type of gasoline we contemplate making available to Spain. It is understood that the allotment of 320 tons monthly also covers the use of these transports in the regular Iberian service and that if Spain does buy the transports Iberia will not necessarily increase its present schedules or inaugurate new services.

2. The Department concurs in your recommendation since it does not commit us to any specific amount and any increase must receive our approval. In the event that service is inaugurated in Switzerland a review of the current aviation gasoline program would appear to be in order to take care of the additional operations.

3. The Department agrees that an official statement would be preferable to the actual checking of aerodrome stocks.

4. The Department understands and appreciates the desire of the Spanish Government to resume air service to the Canaries. However, this is a matter that must be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Department will inform you of their views as soon as possible.

5. The Department concurs in your recommendation.

6. The Department is unwilling to include an additional statement that "the American Government will furnish gasoline required for this line and other lines which may be established after mutual agreement . . .⁵⁸ once peace has been established." It is to be hoped that with the return of peacetime conditions the normal commercial processes will be resumed, and hence this Government is now unable to make a post-war commitment to furnish gasoline to a foreign airline or airlines. Hence the Department disapproves of the inclusion of this provision.

7. This point is covered under paragraph 4 above.

Immediate reply is requested since present schedule calls for loading gasoline at Aruba on September 6-7.

Your 2376, September 1, noon,⁵⁹ has just been received and in no way affects the Department's views as expressed above.

HULL

852.6363/1107

The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana) to the American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) ⁶⁰

[Translation]

No. 562

MADRID, September 20, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to Your Excellency's courteous letter of September 6th in which you were kind enough to inform me that the Government of the United States agrees to furnish Spain the aviation gasoline required for the operation of the transport lines of the "Iberia" Company under the following conditions:

First.—The octane rating is to be no higher than 87.

Second.—The gasoline is to be used only by the Iberia airline for civilian purposes, unless other uses are specifically agreed to by the American and British Governments.

Third.—Imports are not to exceed the rate of 320 metric tons per month, and stocks of aviation gasoline held by Iberia shall not exceed 640 metric tons at any one time. These are considered to be initial figures and they may be increased according to need, after agreement by both parties.

Fourth.—Specific allocations are to be made monthly by the "Aviation Petroleum Products Allocation Committee" in Washington.

Fifth.—Supplies are to originate in the Netherlands West Indies, are to be shipped in Spanish vessels, and, if moved in containers, the latter are to be supplied by Spain.

⁵⁸ Omission indicated in the original.

⁵⁹ Not printed; in it the Ambassador expressed the opinion that the proposal to resume airline service to the Canaries should not be related to the proposed agreement concerning aviation gasoline (852.79652A/25).

⁶⁰ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 1373, September 25; received October 7.

Sixth.—The Petroleum Attaché will be furnished with detailed monthly reports on all arrivals from any source, consumption and stocks. In addition he will be given full facilities to check by personal inspection and otherwise:

- 1) The distribution of the aviation gasoline admitted into Spain;
- 2) subsequent allocation of supplies; and
- 3) stocks of aviation gasoline in the hands of CAMPSA.

It is understood that the Second Section of the General Staff for Air will inform the Military or Naval Attaché for Air of the American Embassy concerning stocks of gasoline at aerodromes whenever requested by the latter.

Seventh.—Operations of the Iberia airline shall not be extended to the Canary Islands or Rio de Oro, or to any foreign territory, without first obtaining the express agreement of the United States and British authorities.

Eighth.—The Iberia line will not, except by previous agreement between the British and American Governments and the Spanish Government, fly over enemy-dominated territories.

Ninth.—The Spanish Government will make every effort to arrange for the establishment of a direct airline between Spain and Switzerland to be controlled by Spanish or Swiss interests, and to be free to carry passengers and freight of interest to Spain and Switzerland. The Government of the United States will furnish the gasoline required by this line.

Tenth.—The foregoing is based on the understanding that Iberia wishes to operate the following lines:

- a) Madrid-Lisbon
- b) Madrid-Barcelona
- c) Madrid-Seville-Tangier-Tetuán

Having pointed out in my exchanges of views with the Ambassador Spain's need to establish a line of the Iberia Company to communicate between the Peninsula and the two Spanish provinces of the Canary Islands, the latter being an integral part of Spanish territory, I note that the Ambassador has expressed to me his hope that there will not be great difficulties in the way of a favorable decision in this matter, which is being considered by the Government at Washington. I also note that the Embassy of the United States has expressed its Government's desire that the lines which unite Spain and Morocco should not be utilized by enemies of the United States and England, with reference to which point the necessary instructions have been given in accordance with the precepts of neutrality, except in the special cases in which agreement is reached between the Spanish Government and the interested parties.

I take the opportunity to reiterate to you, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my high consideration.

F. G. JORDANA

852.6363/1080 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1943—9 p. m.

2310. Department has received your despatch no. 1373 of September 25⁶¹ and your telegram no. 2732 of September 24,⁶² and notes the addition at the end of Article Nine of the memorandum⁶³ setting forth the conditions to the aviation gasoline program of the sentence "The Government of the United States will furnish the gasoline required by this line."

If a sentence along this line is included it must be clearly of record that we shall in fact be willing to make available for the proposed Swiss-Spanish line only such quantities of aviation gasoline as we shall from time to time consider necessary for operations which are of benefit to the United States or the United Kingdom. Before any commitments as to quantities or grades are made, we shall, of course, want to know full particulars as to the proposed operation and control of such a line.

It should, of course, be understood that the United States Government will not actually furnish any gasoline. The most that the Government can undertake to do is to make available for purchase such quantities as shall be approved in the light of the foregoing paragraph.

We leave it to you whether it would be better to amend the sentence in the light of the foregoing, or to set forth an interpretation of the sentence and specify the conditions in an attachment.

STETTINIUS

852.6363/1149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1943—11 p. m.

2449. The Department leaves it to your discretion as to the propitious time to inform the Spaniards of the restrictions regarding supplies of aviation gasoline for the Spain-Switzerland line as outlined in Department's 2310 of October 29. Your 3218 of November 2.⁶² As stated previously, we will arrange for the supply of sufficient aviation gasoline for operations which are specifically for the benefit of the United States or the United Kingdom, and which meet with our approval. You can understand that any open-end commitment for

⁶¹ See footnote 60, p. 707.

⁶² Not printed.

⁶³ *Supra*.

supplies of such a strategic material would be inadvisable and subject to criticism. In other words we must keep a strong measure of control on an operation which necessitates our shipping a vital and critical war material.

In the event the proposed future line to Buenos Aires is again mentioned, you are particularly requested to give no encouragement whatever.

HULL

811.79652/27 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 18, 1943—midnight.

[Received November 19—5:45 p. m.]

3405. Jordana told me this morning that the Council of Ministers has approved our request for landing rights for American commercial airlines. Spanish Government proposes to create a special commission with full powers to agree to details, such as particular airports to be used, number and types of planes, et cetera. He would be glad if I named a representative or representatives of the Embassy to meet with this commission, and he was anxious that details be arranged as quickly as possible. I said I would do so.

I suggest Department inform me as promptly as possible details requested in my 3094, October 23, 6 p. m.,⁶⁵ as well as any other details it can. I also suggest that Colonel Cousland, recently appointed Assistant Military Air Attaché familiarize himself with American end of this subject before he leaves United States.

HAYES

811.79652/30 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1943—10 p. m.

2583. The Department believes, in answer to 3498, November 29, 4 p. m.⁶⁵ that it might be advisable for you to inform your British colleague that Spain has granted us temporary landing rights for American commercial airlines. You might add that this was on a basis entirely separate and apart from the question of aviation gasoline; that we hope to begin a token service in the near future on a limited basis; and that we are beginning to work out plans looking to a service which possibly may transit Spain. It might also be

⁶⁵ Not printed.

advisable to point out to him that because of Spain's neutrality we were naturally required to stress the commercial aspect of the service.

The Department will give corresponding advice to the British Embassy here.

HULL

REPRESENTATIONS AGAINST SPANISH INTERNMENT OF ITALIAN
WARSHIPS AND MERCHANT VESSELS

865.30/33 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, September 10, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 6:50 p. m.]

2525. Navy Ministry has informed Navy Attaché⁶⁶ that an Italian light cruiser, *Regolo* class, and three destroyers entered Port Mahon, Balearic Islands this morning. Three destroyers entered Pollensa Bay, Balearics at the same time. These will be transferred to Port Mahon to facilitate guarding and provisioning.

Spaniards have sent mine layer *Jupiter* and destroyer *Miranda* to act as guard ships.

Ministry says it does not know intentions of vessels but they will not be permitted to leave pending some decision concerning them.

HAYES

865.30/34 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Algiers (McBride) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, September 11, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received September 11—1:10 p. m.]

109. From Murphy.⁶⁷ Commander in Chief⁶⁸ has been informed one Italian cruiser and two destroyers may be en route to Spanish ports in Balearic Islands. It is understood London has instructed British Ambassador⁶⁹ to make representations to Spanish Government looking toward release of these ships as well as any Italian merchant ships now in Spanish ports since by terms of armistice with Italy⁷⁰ all Italian vessels were to be delivered to Allied authorities.

⁶⁶ Comdr. John C. Lusk.

⁶⁷ Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; U.S. Political Adviser, staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa, with the rank of Minister.

⁶⁸ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

⁶⁹ Sir Samuel Hoare.

⁷⁰ For text of the Armistice with Italy signed September 3, 1943, but not announced until September 8, see Department of State, *United States and Italy, 1936-1946*, Documentary Record (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 51; *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604*; or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2740. For correspondence concerning this subject, see pp. 314 ff.

Commander in Chief requests you concert with British Ambassador and support any representations which he may have made on subject. Sent to Madrid, repeated to Department. [Murphy.]

MCBRIDE

865.30/37 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, September 12, 1943—2 p. m.
[Received September 13—9:23 a. m.]

2555. My 2525, September 10, 3 p. m., Murphy's September 11, 2 p. m. According to the Ministry Marine two of the three Italian destroyers at Pollensa Bay scuttled themselves outside bay yesterday morning. Third unable to leave due engine trouble and interned.

Cruiser and three destroyers at Port Mahon claimed belligerent status and asked for fuel. None available and vessels interned.

British Naval Attaché⁷¹ requested vessels be considered non-belligerent and allowed to leave. Minister declined to agree. We are making informal representations.

Request instructions as to technical arguments we can advance.

Repeated to Murphy.

HAYES

865.30/35 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, September 13, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received September 14—5:03 a. m.]

2567. My 2555, September 12, 2 p. m. Inasmuch as the record so far indicates that Italian warships in Port Mahon requested fuel within the terms of article XIX of the Thirteenth Hague Convention⁷² and failed to obtain fuel and depart only because fuel was not available, may we not take position that the 24 or 48 hours within which the vessels must depart should be counted from the time fuel is made available to them, in which case I assume we can take steps to see that supplies of fuel are made available at Port Mahon. Foregoing based on assumption vessels to be considered belligerent.

I am addressing note to Foreign Office⁷³ requesting that these vessels be allowed to continue their journey and offering cooperation to ensure that fuel is made available if not available at present.

⁷¹ Cmdr. G. M. Bradley.

⁷² Signed October 18, 1907, *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1239.

⁷³ *Infra*.

British Naval Attaché has been informed that Italian Naval Attaché is being instructed to cooperate with his American and British colleagues in this matter but we have not yet contacted him.

Repeated to Algiers.

HAYES

865.30/44

*The American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana)*⁷⁴

No. 1337

MADRID, September 13, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to information received by this Embassy from the Spanish Ministry of the Marine to the effect that a number of Italian warships have entered Spanish ports in the Balearic Islands en route to Allied ports, in compliance with Article 4 of the Armistice signed on September 3rd. This Article reads as follows: "Immediate transfer of the Italian Fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander-in-Chief with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him".

My Government assumes that these Italian war vessels will be permitted to continue their journey. If the Spanish Government is not in a position, because of a scarcity of supplies, to furnish these vessels with the fuel which may be required by them to continue their journey, I shall be glad to be informed of this circumstance and to cooperate with Your Excellency in making certain that fuel supplies are made available for that purpose.

I avail myself [etc.]

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

865.30/35 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1943—5 p. m.

1957. Your 2567, September 13, 6 p. m. Article XIX of the Hague Convention of 1907 in providing that belligerent war vessels may revictual and take on fuel within limits as to quantity includes the following provision "If, in accordance with the law of the neutral Power, the ships are not supplied with coal within twenty-four hours of their arrival, the permissible duration of their stay is extended by twenty-four hours."

The rule of 24 hours' stay or of some other term set by the local authorities is designed to prevent a belligerent warship from taking refuge in a neutral port beyond a reasonable time. In other words

⁷⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 1363, September 23; received October 7.

it is for the purpose of making the ship move on. The rule concerning fuel presupposes the existence of a supply of fuel which may be taken on within the limits of quantity permitted. In making provision in Article XIX of the Hague Convention of 1907 for taking on sufficient fuel to enable the vessels to reach the nearest port in their own country, or to fill up their bunkers, the framers of the Convention did not have in mind the case of inability of the neutral port to supply fuel. It would be inequitable to invoke a 24 hour provision against a ship which is unable to obtain fuel through no fault of its own. Inasmuch as the neutral power is entitled to regulate the time for departure of the vessel it is our opinion that it should adopt an equitable attitude. Therefore it is believed that your position as expressed in the first paragraph of your telegram under reference is sound from a legal viewpoint.

You should continue to press for fuel for the vessels and permission for their departure.

Please report what types and quantities of fuel would be required to permit these ships to proceed to the nearest Allied port and availability.

HULL

865.30/40 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, September 21, 1943—midnight.

[Received September 22—4 : 32 p. m.]

2695. Your 1957, September 16, 5 p. m. I reminded Jordana yesterday that Italian warships in Balearics had put in there to tend wounded and had requested fuel to enable them to proceed to an Allied port in fulfillment of one of the provisions of the armistice agreed to with our military authorities. I understood that no fuel was available.

I said that if ships were non-belligerent they clearly should not be interned but should be allowed to proceed whenever they can. If they are belligerent they are entitled to receive fuel under article 19 of the 13 Hague Convention. This clearly presupposes existence of a fuel supply and the framers of the article did not have in mind a case of inability at a neutral port to supply fuel. It was therefore inequitable to invoke the 24- or 48-hour provision in cases of vessels which could not obtain fuel through no fault of their own.

I said our Petroleum Attaché⁷⁵ would cooperate with Spanish authorities if desired in seeing that fuel is provided so that within the

⁷⁵ Walter F. Smith.

24 to 48 hours thereafter ships might depart. In the meantime I hoped no decision to intern the ships would be made.

Jordana said the situation was complicated and delicate and he was not sure he had the full story yet. According to his information the ships were under a commander who is stridently Fascist. The fact that two had scuttled themselves suggested to him they were not trying to get to Allied territory but to get somewhere else. He suggested merely as a possibility that it might be to our advantage to have the vessels interned. He was not sure of course and was investigating further. The first problem was to determine whether they were belligerent or nonbelligerent. If the latter, he would then have to determine the full meaning of the fuel clause in article 19 of the 13 Hague Convention. Meanwhile he will hold the matter open.

Naval Attaché informs me that Spanish naval authorities allege they would be glad to get rid of the ships as their presence in Balearics where only small Spanish forces are maintained is an embarrassment.

I shall pursue the subject and am hopeful that the Italian Ambassador,⁷⁶ once he has received written instructions from his Government, will cooperate with me in the matter.

Repeated to Algiers.

HAYES

865.30/49

*The Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy in Spain*⁷⁷

[Translation]

No. 586

NOTE VERBALE

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States and with reference to the latter's *Note Verbale* No. 1337 of September 13, concerning necessary facilities in order that the Italian warships anchored in the ports of Mahon and Pollensa, as reported in the cited Note, may abandon said ports, in which they had sought and found refuge, has the honor to advise that it cannot grant the request therein contained due to the internment of the vessels upon not having put to sea within 24 hours of their arrival.

The arguments set forth in the referred-to Note having been examined attentively, this Department must likewise contradict them by pointing out that such an Armistice constitutes a case of *res inter*

⁷⁶ Giacomo Paolucci di Calboli.

⁷⁷ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Spain in his despatch No. 1441, October 12; received October 21.

alios for neutrals, the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of which does not affect them juridically, and that since an armistice is a simple cessation of hostilities and is not peace, the principles, rights and duties of neutrality continue to be binding for neutrals.

With respect to the provision of petroleum, an argument on which the Note under reference also dwells, this Ministry considers that the providing of petroleum, according to the terms of the XIII Hague Convention, is optional and in any case subject to the standard of strict equality for all belligerents, in accordance with a strict and just interpretation of the duties of neutrality. Furthermore, there is no grounds for extending indefinitely the period for supplying fuel when there is an initial lack thereof, as has occurred in this case, since this would lead to prolonging said period of twenty-four hours by such time as to vitiate completely the purpose which inspired the fixing thereof.

Because of the reasons set forth and duly informed by the competent technical organisms, this Ministry finds itself obliged not to grant the request of that Embassy.

MADRID, October 6, 1943.

865.30/45 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 10, 1943—5 p. m.
[Received October 11—4: 18 a. m.]

2933. In a note dated October 6, Foreign Ministry declines to accede to Embassy's request contained in its note of September 13 (despatch 1363 September 23) that Italian war vessels in Balearics be allowed to proceed on their journey, "as a result of their internment after they failed to depart within 24 hours of their arrival".

I am addressing a further note to the Foreign Ministry along lines of Department's 1958 [1957], September 16, 5 p. m., and my 2695, September 21, midnight, and shall take up matter personally with Foreign Minister at first opportunity.

HAYES

865.30/49

*The American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana)*⁷⁸

No. 1444

MADRID, October 12, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's *Note Verbale* No. 586 of October 6, 1943, in which it is

⁷⁸ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 1441, October 12; received October 21.

stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot accede to the Embassy's request, contained in its Note No. 1337 of September 13, 1943, that the Italian warships now in the ports of Mahon and Pollensa, in the Balearic Islands, be permitted to continue their journey.

The Ministry states that these Italian vessels entered the Spanish ports referred to in search of refuge, which they obtained. I am confident, however, that the opinion of the Ministry in this respect is based on a misunderstanding of the reasons for which these ships entered the ports of Mahon and Pollensa. The Italian war vessels, it should be pointed out, entered these ports (1) in order to land Italian naval personnel who had been killed or wounded as a result of an attack by German military forces, and (2) in order to obtain fuel under the provisions of Article 19 of the 13th Hague Convention.

With reference to the latter consideration, the Ministry recognizes in its Note that the cause of the delay in the departure of the Italian vessels has been their inability to obtain fuel, as requested, sufficient to enable them to continue their journey, but it also states that it cannot admit that the period for supplying fuel, when such fuel is not initially available, is indefinite, since that would have the result of extending such period for so long a time as to vitiate totally the purpose for which the period was fixed.

In this connection, I should like to point out to Your Excellency that this Embassy has never contended that the period within which fuel can be made available to the warships in question should be considered to be of indefinite duration. It has, on the contrary, taken the view that fuel should be made available at the earliest possible moment and that the vessels should thereafter be allowed only the usual period of twenty-four or forty-eight hours within which to depart, and, in order that their departure may be expedited, has, in its Note No. 1337, offered to cooperate with Your Excellency in making certain that fuel would be made available for this purpose, in the same manner in which it is presently cooperating in making petroleum supplies available for Spanish domestic needs, including the needs of the Spanish armed forces.

It is apparent, moreover, that the purpose underlying the fixing of a limited period within which fuel shall be made available, to which the Ministry refers, is, in fact, to make it possible for belligerent warships in need of fuel to enter neutral ports and take on sufficient fuel to permit them to continue their journeys, without compromising the neutrality of the port Power by remaining in its waters for a longer time than is necessary for them to complete their refueling and to depart. This rule presupposes the existence of a supply of fuel which may be taken on within the limits of the quantity permitted, however, and, in cases in which such fuel is not initially available, it

is apparent that, far from being vitiated by an extension of the time limit, this purpose would be completely defeated by the denial of such an extension and the internment of vessels which enter such ports well within their rights under international law, but which, through no fault of their own, are unable to obtain the fuel without which they are rendered incapable of continuing their journeys.

In such cases it would clearly be inequitable to invoke a twenty-four or forty-eight hour limit against such vessels until there has been made available to them sufficient fuel to enable them to depart, and it is therefore my Government's view that any time limit which may be set for the departure of these Italian warships from Spanish ports should be counted only from the time such fuel is made available to them.

I am confident that Your Excellency will wish to reconsider this matter in the light of the circumstances set forth above, and that the Ministry will agree with the views of my Government that fuel supplies should be made available to these vessels and that they should be permitted thereafter to continue their journeys, in accordance with orders already given to them by the Royal Italian Government.

I avail myself [etc.]

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

865.30/59

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of Embassy in Spain (Beaulac)*⁷⁹

[MADRID, October 16, 1943.]

I reminded Sr. Pan⁸⁰ that we had sent another note on the Italian warships in the Balearics (see enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 1441 of October 12, 1943)⁸¹ and that we presumed that the matter was still open in as much as the Foreign Minister had told the Ambassador it would be kept open until he advised him otherwise. I said we confidently expected a favorable decision in the matter.

Sr. Pan said it was the Minister's wish and intention to find a solution satisfactory to us. He had had to deliver so many blows recently to the Germans that he wanted to spring this one easily. He had turned down every important German request for a long time. He had notified the Germans of the withdrawal of the Blue Division. Spain had declined to have dealings with the Mussolini régime. Spain had made clear that its relations with Portugal were in no way preju-

⁷⁹ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Spain in his despatch No. 1479, October 18; received October 30.

⁸⁰ José Pan de Soraluce, Spanish Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

⁸¹ Note No. 1444, *supra*.

diced by the Azores agreement,⁸² et cetera, et cetera. He did not want the Germans to think Spain was turning completely against them. Nevertheless he wanted to release the warships, and it was his idea that the ships should leave the Balearics gradually, one by one.

I reminded him that fuel must be made available to them and suggested a small Spanish tanker proceed to the Balearics and deposit enough fuel to supply the ships. He said he thought the idea a good one.

I expressed gratitude at the Minister's plans to release the warships, as well as our hope that there would be little further delay in carrying them out.

W[ILLARD] L. B[EAULAC]

865.30/51 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 22, 1943—11 p. m.
[Received October 22—12 : 32 p. m.]

3083. My 293 [2933], October 10. I discussed Italian warships in Balearics again with Jordana today. I said legal status clear and Spain should release ships promptly. There were more than 2,000 seamen involved and I was sure the Spanish authorities would not want any trouble at Port Mahon. He said both he and Minister of Marine greatly impressed by arguments set forth in my note 1444 of October 12 (see my despatch 1441, October 12) and he hoped to reply very speedily. I said I trusted the decision would be favorable and he replied that our arguments were very strong.

HAYES

865.30/71

*Memorandum by the American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) of a Conversation With the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana)*⁸³

MADRID, December 9, 1943.

I said there was just one matter I wished to take up today but that it was very important. It was the matter of Italian warships and merchant ships in Spanish ports. They had been held by Spain for a long time and, in my Government's view, unjustifiably.

⁸² Presumably reference is to the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of August 17, 1943; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxlvi, p. 447.

⁸³ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 1722, December 11; received December 30.

With reference to the warships, I had submitted a Note on the subject on September 13, nearly three months ago. The Foreign Office had replied on October 6. I had sent a further Note, elaborating my arguments and asking for reconsideration, on October 12, nearly two months ago. More than sufficient time had elapsed for consideration of the matter, and I urgently requested a favorable response.

I said I would like briefly to review our basic argument.

The problem was not complex, but very simple. The Italian ships had put into Spanish ports for two reasons: (1) to land dead and wounded, and (2) to obtain fuel to enable them to continue their voyage.

Fuel was not made available for their departure within 24-48 hours. The question from the outset, therefore, has been one of making fuel available. I wished to make clear to the Minister that there was certain to be a most unfavorable reaction in the United States if Spain, to which the United States makes fuel available, does not, in turn, make fuel available to allow these Italian warships to depart within 24-48 hours thereafter, in accordance with international law.

I said there was also a political consideration which I wanted to present to him.

General Franco,⁸⁴ and more recently the Minister, himself, had assured me that the Spanish Government sympathized with the United States in its war against Japan. They had said that Spain was benevolently neutral and wished, so far as it was able, to cooperate with us.

If the Italian warships were released, they would replace certain American ships in the Mediterranean, and the latter could be used in the Pacific against Japan. This could be done through Spanish cooperation and without violation of Spanish neutrality. Spain's action would be in strict accordance with international law.

I said there was a third consideration. There were more than a thousand crew members on these Italian war vessels. They had been idle and cooped up on the ships for more than three months. As a result, there had been a great lowering in morale which, if continued, would become a very troublesome matter for the Spanish Government.

The Minister said he could not agree that the matter was quite as simple as I had alleged. He said there was a big question involved in interpreting the 24- or 48-hour rule. It was whether a neutral country not having fuel available could indefinitely prolong the period in which the ships could remain without internment in order to obtain fuel.

In addition, it had not been clear to him at the outset why the Italian ships had put in to the Balearics. The Ministry of Marine had sup-

⁸⁴ Gen. Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

plied him with the alleged reasons originally, and these were at variance with the reasons later assigned by us.

In view of the technicalities involved, he had submitted the matter to a group of technical experts and to the Ministry of Marine. On the basis of their findings he had sent me his Note of October 6. Back of this Note was his decision that the ships should be interned.

However, following the receipt of my Note of October 12, he had resubmitted the matter to the technical experts and to the Ministry of Marine. Both had carried on an elaborate investigation and study with special reference to precedents in international law pertinent to the case and to the statements of Italian and Spanish officers in the ports where the ships arrived concerning the reasons for putting in at those ports.

He had already received the report of the technical experts, but he had not yet received the report of the Ministry of Marine. He had requested the report just before I called on him on December 1, and since my call he had made a second and very peremptory request that the report and recommendations be hurried.

He said he was greatly interested in the political considerations I had presented. He wanted to repeat that I had a correct impression of the assurances given by General Franco and him concerning Spain's attitude toward Japan in the war between Japan and the United States.

At the same time, he felt that the case of the Italian warships must rest on a solid legal basis, and that he thought it might be extremely serious for Spain if any publicity should be given to Spain's being moved by any such political consideration.

I said that I was in perfect agreement that the release of the Italian warships should be made on a solid basis of international law, and that I had no thought, and my Government had no thought, of giving any publicity to the political consideration advanced. I had advanced it for his own personal use and in order to show him how Spain would be cooperating with the United States, just as General Franco and he had said Spain wished to cooperate, and still do it in strict conformity with Spain's position as a neutral.

The Minister said he would take this into consideration and that he was grateful for the assurance that we had no purpose of making public use of it. He sympathized personally with the object in view and hoped very much that the report which he expected to receive very soon from the Ministry of Marine would establish a legal basis which would justify Spain in meeting the wishes of the United States Government. He would notify me as quickly as he had the report and could reach a decision.

865.85/869 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, December 10, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 11 : 42 p. m.]

3633. Your 2542, November 30, 10 p. m.⁸⁵ I pressed Jordana again yesterday for prompt release of Italian merchant ships in Spanish harbors. I said that while we did not admit Spanish right to hold any of these ships on account of alleged sinking of two Spanish ships by Italian submarines, I was sure my Government, as a concession to Spain, would agree with the British Ambassador's suggestion that two of the ships might be held pending negotiations for their use by Spain, but that the others should be promptly released. Jordana said that six had already been released and he would submit the question of the other five promptly.

HAYES

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER CONGRATULATORY TELEGRAM SENT BY THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT TO JOSÉ P. LAUREL, HEAD OF THE JAPANESE-CONTROLLED PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

103.9166/6644e : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1943—midnight.

2274. OWI⁸⁶ reports a Tokyo broadcast in English, October 22, stating that Laurel⁸⁷ has received congratulations from Jordana⁸⁸ on proclamation of Philippine independence. The message attributed to Jordana expresses sentiments not only of General Franco⁸⁹ and Foreign Office but of Spanish people. The broadcast stated Laurel had also received congratulations from local Italian and German communities and from Bulgaria. Please comment by cable.

STETTINIUS

811B.01/489 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, October 26, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received October 27—11 : 30 a. m.]

3116. Your 2274, October 23, midnight. Foreign Office admits such a telegram was sent and says it was in reply to a very friendly tele-

⁸⁵ Not printed.⁸⁶ Office of War Information.⁸⁷ José P. Laurel, a former judge in the Philippines, who was placed at the head of the puppet government established there by the Japanese after their invasion of the Islands.⁸⁸ Gen. Francisco Gómez Jordana, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.⁸⁹ Gen. Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

gram from Laurel. Foreign Office says telegram does not signify recognition by Spain of the so-called Philippine Republic and that on the contrary Spain has no intention of recognizing it. The Foreign Office considers the telegram a courteous and natural reply which reflects Spain[']s long and intimate ties with the Philippine people. Beaulac,⁹⁰ in discussing this matter with the Under Secretary⁹¹ said our Government could not accept the Foreign Office's explanation of the telegram as valid. He said that in his experience he knew no precedent for a Government's sending such a telegram to a government which it did not recognize or plan to recognize. Spain's long and intimate relations with the Philippine people and Spain's determination not to recognize the so-called Philippine Republic were overwhelming reasons for not replying to Laurel's telegram. Spain had given to Japan very valuable propaganda material and had given support whether consciously or not to Japanese political and military plans in the Far East. Furthermore, the telegram did not reflect General Franco's attitude toward Japan as expressed to the Ambassador on July 28 (Embassy's airgram A-368, July 29⁹²). Beaulac said that our Government would take a very serious attitude in this matter.

I suspect, although I cannot prove it, that the telegram was drafted by the Political Director of the Foreign Office,⁹³ who was recently removed and later reinstated under circumstances we have been unable to determine. This official has given indications of being pro-Axis.

My own opinion is that I should present personally to Jordana a very strong note along the lines of Beaulac's conversation. If the Department itself wishes to supply me with the text of the note I shall be glad to receive it. If it wishes me to prepare it, please so advise at the earliest possible moment.

My idea is the note should inquire whether Spain has any intention of recognizing the so-called Philippine Republic. I should insist upon a reply, with the thought that our Government should publish both my note and the reply thereto.

Please instruct promptly.

HAYES

811B.01/489 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1943—3 p. m.

2298. Your 3116, October 26, 4 p. m. The Department takes a very serious view of this but before issuing any instructions is naturally

⁹⁰ Willard L. Beaulac, Counselor of Embassy in Spain.

⁹¹ José Pan de Soraluce.

⁹² *Ante*, p. 611.

⁹³ José María Doussinague.

desirous of consulting with the appropriate departments of the Government. Department will communicate with you as soon as possible. In the meantime you will please take no further action on this matter nor have any further conversations with the Foreign Minister on your initiative on any subject until you receive instructions.

STETTINIUS

811B.01/496 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 2, 1943—2 p. m.
[Received November 2—12: 50 p. m.]

3207. Your 2298, October 28, 3 p. m. I am concerned over continued delay in receiving instructions concerning Jordana's message to Laurel. It is my hope and I am sure it is the Department's hope to utilize this incident to improve further our position in Spain and to bring a further deterioration in the Axis position here and elsewhere. We have a number of very important matters pending with the Spanish Government concerning which I am anxious to talk to Jordana at the earliest possible moment, and I suggest that my relations with Jordana be not interrupted any longer. On the contrary when the Spanish Government has been made aware of the seriousness with which we regard the Philippine incident I am hopeful that I can obtain valuable concessions from the Spanish Government along unrelated but very important lines.

Our objective in this whole matter should not be to punish Jordana but to utilize the incident in order to further the interests of the United States.

I believe the note transmitted in my 3151, October 28,⁹⁴ adequately meets the situation and I request prompt instructions concerning its delivery.

HAYES

811B.01/502 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1943—7 p. m.

2344. Your 3207, November 2, 2 p. m. As indicated in the Department's 2298 October 28, 3 p. m., it has been necessary to consult other agencies of the Government, in particular the Chiefs of Staff, in connection with this incident. While the Department regrets the delay, the consultations have been carried on as speedily as possible.

This most ill-advised and unexpected action of the Spanish Government has been viewed seriously here, as constituting a direct affront

⁹⁴ Not printed.

to the United States and questioning the sovereignty of this country. We have reason to believe that the Spanish Government has been occasioned considerable anxiety by our refraining from any discussion leading to a liquidation of the incident and it would appear to be useful to maintain for the present some doubt in the Spanish mind as to just what our intentions may be. Ambassador Cárdenas,⁹⁵ acting under instructions from his Government, sought to discuss the matter with Mr. Atherton⁹⁶ on October 29 and 30, but was told that Mr. Atherton was not authorized to discuss the subject. On the afternoon of October 30 Ambassador Cárdenas was received by Assistant Secretary Long. The Ambassador said he wished to discuss the message sent by Jordana to Laurel. He said his Government had received a telegram devoted to two subjects: first, the so-called "independence" claimed in the Philippines, and second, the warmth and cordiality of sentiment between the Philippines and Spain. Jordana had answered the telegram, omitting any reference to the "independence" but responding to the sentiment expressed concerning cordiality of relations between Spain and the Philippine people over a long period of time and manifesting the wish of Jordana and the Spanish Government to continue these cordial relations. The Ambassador said there was no mention of "recognition," and no reference to "independence" or "liberty," and that no phraseology was employed that might be so construed. He read from what seemed to be a copy of a cable in Spanish received from his Government which required him to bring the facts concerning the message to Laurel to the attention of the Department, and to request the Department to note that there was no desire or intention on the part of Jordana or the Spanish Government to recognize the "independence" of the Philippines under existing circumstances.

Cárdenas then read from another document, apparently a copy of another cable from his Government, which was in answer to a cable sent on October 29 by Ambassador Cárdenas referring to a story which appeared in the *New York Times* on the subject.⁹⁷ With regard to this second cable, the Ambassador said his Foreign Office hoped the American Government would understand that the message of Jordana was intended merely to express a friendly emotion for the Philippine people and that the essential fact be not lost sight of that Jordana had not mentioned and had no intention of mentioning recognition of the puppet government established by Japan. The second cable reiterated the wish that this fact be noted by the American Government, and instructed Ambassador Cárdenas to make for himself and for the Spanish Government a firm denial of any intention

⁹⁵ Juan Francisco de Cárdenas, Spanish Ambassador in the United States.

⁹⁶ Ray Atherton, Minister to Canada, temporarily in Washington for consultation.

⁹⁷ *New York Times*, October 27, 1943, p. 9, col. 6.

to act in a manner contrary to the good relations between Spain and the United States.

The Ambassador inquired whether Mr. Long would wish to have from him a memorandum to the above effect. Mr. Long replied that he would prepare a memorandum of the conversation⁹⁸ for the appropriate officials of this Government. The Ambassador rose to depart and said he very much hoped this occurrence would not interfere with the progress of relations between Spain and the United States which had been progressing toward a better understanding. Mr. Long made no reply.

The Department now proposes to ask Ambassador Cárdenas to submit a statement in draft form for discussion. The Department intends to go over such a statement with the Ambassador with a view to releasing some final document for publicity. The Department intends further to remark that the Spanish Government will no doubt wish to take measures to correct any misapprehension on the part of the Japanese Government and of the German Government, whose broadcasts have been exploiting Jordana's message as a recognition of the Laurel regime.

The Department feels that the interruption in your relations with Jordana may now be brought to an end. It feels, however, that you should not take any initiative in connection with the Laurel telegram and that if Jordana broaches the subject to you you should reply that you are not in a position to discuss this matter other than to say that your government is seriously disturbed at this unexpected and, in our opinion, most ill-advised action on the part of the Spanish Government; you may add that you are being kept informed of the conversations on the subject between the Spanish Ambassador and officials of the Department of State in Washington.

The Department will keep you fully and currently informed.

STETTINIUS

811B.01/496 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1943—6 p. m.

2358. Department's 2344, November 3, 7 p. m. The Spanish Ambassador called at the Department this afternoon in response to a request from Mr. Atherton, and in a discussion of the message of the Spanish Government to Laurel repeated substantially what he had said to Mr. Long on October 30. Mr. Atherton said he was convinced that, with a view to the interest of Spain, the Spanish Government

⁹⁸ Memorandum dated October 30, 1943, not printed.

would wish to furnish us a statement with the understanding that we would release it to the press. As regards the terms of such a statement, Mr. Atherton said he felt that no message to Laurel should ever have been sent, and that the only really effective means of correcting the mistake committed would be a complete disavowal of the message. This the Ambassador said he was sure the Spanish Government could not do. The Spanish Government had to think of its dignity and also of its interests and of the colony of Spanish citizens in the Philippines. He thought that a disavowal would jeopardize those interests and those Spanish citizens. Mr. Atherton said that the incident was shaping up very badly here and that however he, the Ambassador, might regard it, the message to Laurel had been a direct affront to the American nation and certainly had implied recognition of the puppet government in the Philippines. This evidently was the understanding of Japan and Germany, inasmuch as their propaganda made use of the message in this way. He pointed out that Laurel had received similar messages from Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and that the association of Spain with this group plus the Japanese Government sponsoring Laurel, could not fail to strike the American public with force. The Ambassador was then asked what sort of statement he thought might be used as a corrective. He said he was unable to suggest anything offhand but that he would like to give the matter some thought. It was concluded that he would prepare a draft for discussion with Mr. George.⁹⁹ The Ambassador made the point that he of course would have to submit any statement to his Government prior to release.

STETTINIUS

811B.01/499 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 5, 1943—7 p. m.
[Received November 6—11:53 a. m.]

3249. Your November 3, 10 [7] p. m. I called on the Foreign Minister today at his request. He said he wanted it distinctly understood that in sending his telegram to Laurel he had no intention of recognizing Laurel as head of a Philippine government or of recognizing any Philippine government except that existing before our entry into the war. He had been pressed by Japan to recognize both the Burmese and the Philippine governments. The Japanese Minister¹ had called on him and had sent him formal notes. He had presented objections in conversation with the Japanese Minister and the notes remained unanswered.

⁹⁹ William P. George, of the Division of European Affairs.

¹ Yakichiro Suma.

He reminded me that when he was previously Minister for Foreign Affairs the Japanese had requested that their Legation in Madrid be raised to an Embassy. This request had lately been renewed. He had likewise objected to this and the note on the subject also remained unanswered. Spain did not intend to recognize the new governments in Burma or the Philippines and its attitude derived principally from its great desire to promote better relations with the U.S.

He said he considered his telegram to Laurel a purely personal telegram. He had received a very cordial and supposedly personal telegram from Laurel. On his own initiative and with himself solely responsible he had prepared a reply which he regarded as personal wishing well to the Philippine people but not mentioning the Philippine government or nation. If he had not sent it he felt that Spanish interests in the Philippines which are very numerous and important would seriously suffer.

He said it was his view that the U.S. Government should not misunderstand his telegram and not use it as a pretext for action against Spain. He was greatly troubled in this regard because he had received a telegram from Washington quoting an editorial in the *New York Times*² which tied this telegram up with decisions reportedly made in Moscow and recommended a basic change in policy towards Spain.

Cárdenas had given him no assurance that the U.S. Government had not more or less inspired the editorial or that at any rate it would not follow the policy suggested in *New York Times*. He asked me if I could throw any light on the situation.

I then told him I was not in a position to discuss the Laurel telegram except to say that my Government was very seriously disturbed at this unexpected action of the Spanish Government, an action not only unexpected by us but in our opinion most ill advised. I said I was being kept informed of conversations in Washington between the Spanish Ambassador and officials of the Department.

The Minister then talked excitedly for 10 minutes in Spanish. In summary he said he could not find out from Cárdenas what we wanted and now I had told him I could not give him any information on the subject. He asked me please find out from my Government whether it really supported the *New York Times* policy or whether it was willing to advance any concrete suggestion as to how the present difficulty might be overcome. What he really wants to know is the attitude of the American Government. He is willing to admit that the press attitude may not be approved by our Government but he would like to know. He fears that following so closely on the Moscow Confer-

² Editorial entitled "Franco Salutes a Puppet," *New York Times*, November 4, 1943, p. 22, col. 2.

ence³ this incident may be used as a pretext for our adopting a hostile attitude toward Spain.

I said he would have to expect a big access of critical editorials in the entire American press. He should recall that the information about his telegram had been transmitted in English over the Japanese and German radios. If there was one matter on which American public opinion was perfectly unanimous and very properly irritable, it was about Japan and Japanese relations with the Philippines. To have Tokyo radio and Berlin advertising in English that the Spanish Foreign Minister had sent a sympathetic telegram to the head of the pro-Japanese puppet government of the Philippines was bound to touch off the American press. He must not blame the American press for this but rather blame the justification which had been given by Spain to Japanese and German propaganda.

At that point a messenger brought a telegram from Cárdenas saying that the *New York Times* had reported that Paris and Budapest radios on October 24 and Berlin radio on October 25 had announced a commercial agreement with the Mussolini government. The *New York Times* considered that their report was true and that it reinforced its view that the United Nations must break with Spain.

The Minister became very excited and said there had been no such commercial agreement or any discussions concerning a commercial agreement or any other subject. Spain did not recognize nor intend to recognize the Mussolini regime. He had told me that and could not understand why the American press carried stories to the contrary. I said the explanation was simple. The American press could not know the stories were lies. They had been broadcast by Axis radio in English. It was very difficult to get Spain's story. He must not blame the American press but blame the source of the information and the lack of contradictory information from Spain.

He asked me if I were sure stories regarding his telegram to Laurel and the alleged commercial agreement with the Mussolini government, [were?] from Berlin. I said I had definite confirmation of this. He said it was outrageous.

He then said he thought the real situation was that the Germans, aided by exiled left-wing Spaniards, were doing their utmost to provoke a crisis between Spain and United States. He said he wanted to make a personal appearance [*observation?*].

Ever since he had become Foreign Minister, in September 1942, he had believed that the best interests in Spain required that Spain associate itself increasingly and as rapidly as possible with the United

³ For correspondence concerning the Tripartite Conference held in Moscow October 18–November 1, 1943, see vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

States and Britain and draw away from Germany. He came into office with that firm conviction. He had labored sincerely and honestly to realize this purpose for a whole year. He had encountered enormous difficulties, at first within the Government itself. He had had to endure constant protests and even threats from the Axis. He felt, however, that he had made progress in important respects. The Blue Division was being withdrawn. The last Spanish soldier will have returned to Spain before the end of the month. There has been a big transformation in the Spanish press, radio and newsreels. I was surely familiar with the great evolution in Spanish opinion, including opinion within the Government itself. I must know that Franco had definitely committed Spain to neutrality and had favored close collaboration with the United States. He would like to remind me that he had arranged for the direct evacuation to North Africa of thousands of French refugees.⁴

He asked if my Government was going to let a single incident which, while perhaps a mistake, was not ill intentioned and for which he must assume personal responsibility stand in the way of further approximation [*sic*] between Spain and the United States. If this was our plan, then he would have to consider that his entire conduct of Spanish foreign policy had been a mistake. He would resign and retire, knowing that he was a beaten and defeated man.

If our Government would view this difficulty in its proper proportion, on the other hand, there were a number of important pending questions which already were far advanced toward solutions eminently satisfactory to the United States. He believed they could be settled promptly. He did not want to discuss them now but as soon as he was sure that the United States was not going to change its fundamental policy towards Spain, he would take up these various pending matters and press for early and satisfactory solutions.

He asked me particularly to convey his thought that we must not allow Japanese and German propaganda to stand in the way of closer approachment [*rapprochement?*] between Spain and the United States. If we did, we would be serving German interests. I said I would convey this to my Government.

At my request he reiterated his categorical denial that any commercial agreement had been entered into between Spain and the Mussolini government. His pledge that Spain had no intention of entering into any relations with the Mussolini government still stood.

HAYES

⁴ For correspondence concerning this subject, see vol. I, index entries under Refugees from Europe and the Middle East: Spain.

811B.01/500 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 5, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received November 6—9:23 a. m.]

3250. My 3249, November 5, 7 p. m. I am satisfied that the Spanish Government is thoroughly frightened at our reaction to the Laurel telegram, and that it is within our ability not only to turn this incident against the Axis but to obtain new and important concessions from Spain while it is in its present chastened mood. I believe also, however, that if we should carry the matter too far and use it in a way that will further embarrass Jordana personally, he will resign as he threatens.

Meanwhile, I know of no one else in Spain who would be as constructively friendly as Jordana. The Laurel incident is the only act of his to which we might take strong exception. On the other hand, the positive gains he has brought about in Spain's relations with us, some of which he listed in our conversation today, are authentic and have been achieved in the face of great difficulties. I am convinced of his sincere desire to continue to bring Spain closer to United States.

By assuming personal responsibility for the incident, Jordana may be shielding subordinate. I have, to my own satisfaction, reduced authorship of the telegram to either Jordana himself or to the Political Director referred to in my 3116, October 26, 4 p. m. I have learned that other departments of the Foreign Ministers [*Ministry?*], which ordinarily would have been consulted in such a matter, were not consulted.

In preparing any statement for publication, I should be careful not to embarrass Jordana personally. I believe it is in our interest that he remain in office, and I am confident that if he survives this crisis, we can move rapidly toward obtaining additional valuable concessions from Spain along both economic and political lines.

If the Department has any request to make of Jordana in connection with the incident, please let me know promptly.

HAYES

511B.01/496 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1943—5 p. m.

2383. Your 3207, November 2, 2 p. m. The Department wishes you without delay to approach the Spanish Government for certain concessions, either in a personal conversation with Count Jordana or,

if you deem it preferable, in a conversation your Counselor may have with an appropriate high official of the Spanish Government. Among the particular concessions desired at this time are those set forth in the immediately following telegram no. 2384.⁵

STETTINIUS

811B.01/501 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, November 8, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received November 9—3: 33 a. m.]

3268. My 3250, November 5, 8 p. m. Department's 2383, November 6, 5 p. m.; and 2384 November 6, 5 [6] p. m., were obviously prepared and sent before receipt of my 3249, November 5, 7 p. m., in which I pointed out that Jordana made clear that, while he wishes to meet our interests to the greatest possible extent, he wants to have the Philippine incident cleared up first.

It is of course necessary that Jordana have this incident cleared up before he can successfully press for decisions on the various things we want.

Foreign Office advises me informally that on November 6 it telegraphed to the Spanish Embassy in Washington for transmission to the Department a statement explaining the telegram to Laurel. Foreign Office states it assumes American Government will make such use of the statement as it considers desirable.

I hope this statement will turn out to be satisfactory. When I discuss with Jordana the things we want I intend to tell him in turn that our policy towards Spain has not changed. Jordana himself has expressed his desire to clear up a number of the important matters pending with us, and I shall promptly request that he arrange for (1) release of Italian warships in the Balearics; (2) release of Italian merchant ships,⁶ and (3) landing rights for American airlines.⁷

I shall request also that Spain prohibit export of wolfram to all countries.⁸ The Department should bear in mind in this connection that Jordana himself has no authority to grant such a request. The decision would have to rest with Franco and Council of Ministers inasmuch as it obviously involves a complete reorientation of Spanish economic policy. In illustration of this point wolfram is one of the principal sources of dollar and sterling exchange and an important

⁵ November 6, 6 p. m., p. 648.

⁶ For correspondence on these two subjects, see pp. 711 ff.

⁷ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 668 ff. *passim*.

⁸ For correspondence regarding efforts made toward getting Spain to impose an embargo on export of wolfram to Germany, see pp. 632 ff.

source of revenue to the Spanish Government. It is the lever which Spain is using in order to obtain arms from Germany which the Spanish Army badly requires and cannot obtain elsewhere. It is a form of insurance against German attacks on Spanish ships. Consequently a decision to embargo all wolfram exports involves not only several government departments but also political and military considerations of the greatest importance to Spain and an immediate decision on this matter cannot be expected.

I discussed the Tangier matter with the British Ambassador⁹ today. His last instruction was to refrain from acting for the time being. However, in view of your instruction to me he is requesting new instructions from London. Pending receipt of these he has asked me to delay my representations. He considers as I do that the British have a better case than we and that it would be preferable that my presentations [*representations*] follow his. I agreed.¹⁰

HAYES

811B.01/499 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1943—9 p. m.

2397. Your 3249, November 5, 7 p. m. The Department does not understand how the telegram to Laurel can be considered a personal telegram inasmuch as it was apparently clearly stated that the message expressed the sentiments not only of the Chief of the Spanish State, the Government and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but also of the Spanish people. This, at any rate, is how the message was used by the enemy broadcasts. Incidentally, it is not yet clear to the Department how the message was addressed, that is whether to the "President of the Philippine Republic".

It is understood that Cárdenas has communicated with his Government with regard to a statement to be made public. The closing sentence of your third paragraph seems to suggest that Jordana may have been coerced by a Japanese threat against Spanish interests and nationals in the Philippines.

You may assure Jordana that this Government has inspired no editorials, but that the Department has examined the editorial referred to and believes that the *New York Times* has very accurately represented the reaction to be expected, and which should be regarded as entirely normal in the circumstances. As a matter of fact, for

⁹ Sir Samuel Hoare.

¹⁰ The U.S. and British Governments requested suppression of the German Consulate at Tangier and expulsion of German agents from there; concerning Ambassador Hayes' representations to the Spanish Foreign Minister, see his telegram No. 3401, November 18, 10 p. m., p. 629.

your own information, the Department has attempted to play this story down as much as possible pending clarification.

The attitude of this Government, concerning which Jordana has inquired, has constantly been translated in our desire to improve mutual relations. This attitude is fundamentally unchanged. We have worked very hard and very patiently, against many obstacles and much opposition. This Government fully realizes the extent to which Count Jordana has been cooperative and is appreciative. On the other hand, there is no gainsaying that many disturbing factors in our relations still persist. These you are thoroughly familiar with. It is unlikely that our relations can be placed on a completely satisfactory basis until the Falange Party, which has consistently opposed our aims and policies, will have gone out of existence or will have ceased to wield any power likely to disturb relations, or until we can feel quite sure of Spain's international position. The latter will continue to be at least equivocal as long as there are any doubts respecting Spanish cooperation with the enemies of this country. The Laurel incident unquestionably has produced a serious setback from which recovery will be difficult and perhaps slow unless the Spanish Government will avail itself promptly of such means as are at its disposal for restoring confidence. Jordana will understand that in the democratic processes of this nation public opinion is the fundamental factor upon which the policies of this Government are based. He should understand that in this particular incident, the considerable concern which our Government feels, is, we are confident, fully shared by public opinion in this country.

STETTINIUS

*The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State*¹¹

[Translation]

In view of the erroneous interpretation ascribed to the cablegram of courtesy which the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent on October 18th in reply to one addressed to him by Mr. J. P. Laurel from Manila, on the 13th of the same month, the Spanish Government is interested in letting the United States Government know what follows:

1. The cable in question is an act of courtesy towards the Philippine people, taking advantage of the opportunity offered by this same people in addressing our own. It was dictated exclusively by the sentiments which every phase of the Philippine life inspires to Spain,

¹¹ Reprinted from press release of November 9, 1943, Department of State *Bulletin*, November 13, 1943, p. 325.

because of the affinity of blood, religion and language which link the Spanish people to the Philippines, with which they shared life until fifty years ago, creating between both countries a confraternity which embraces all moral and material phases, and which makes of the Philippines, independently from whatever its political situation and its international position may be, a country spiritually bound to Spanish tradition. It is precisely because of that, that Spain, appreciating as it does appreciate the Philippine people without distinctions of any kind, refrains from any act of a political character which might be interpreted as partiality towards a country for which it only wishes all kinds of prosperity and well-being.

2. In thus establishing the true significance of the cable, completely devoid of all political aspects, and, consequently, of all act implying, even indirectly, recognition, the Minister of Foreign Affairs wishes to emphasize the point, so as to avoid at any time a disfigured interpretation which might serve as a foundation for a campaign tending to disturb the good relations existing between the Governments of Spain and the United States, and which, for our own part, have been proved time and again by evident and ostensible acts of a manifest good will.

811B.01/500 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1943—9 p. m.

2411. Your 3250, November 5, 8 p. m., and 3268, November 8, 8 p. m. It is desirable to obtain as expeditiously as possible any concessions the present atmosphere may facilitate that will aid us in the prosecution of the war.

Acting under instructions from his Government Ambassador Cárdenas last night submitted a statement for possible publication. An English translation thereof prepared by Ambassador Cárdenas was released to the press last night.¹² Ambassador Cárdenas called on Mr. Atherton today and was told that the statement had been released without any accompanying comment and made it clear that he did not expect that the American public would recover from the reaction produced by the message to Laurel without some concrete evidence tending to clarify Spain's attitude toward this country. Ambassador Cárdenas inquired what concessions Mr. Atherton had in mind, and Mr. Atherton answered "an embargo on wolfram exports, release of Italian war ships in the Balearics, release of Italian merchant ships, landing rights for American airplanes, and the ex-

¹² See *supra*.

pulsion of German agents from Tangier". Ambassador Cárdenas said that he would communicate this to his Government.

The Department is aware of the difficulties you stress in connection with the proposed wolfram embargo but considers that it is precisely these difficulties which, added to the critical enemy need for wolfram, make it urgently desirable for us to obtain from Spain at this time the complete embargo.

Please inform the Department who the political director is, referred to in paragraph 3 of your 3250, and furnish a revised complete air mail report on principal officials of the Spanish Government, including all ministries, captains general, civil and military governors.

STETTINIUS

811B.01/519

*Memorandum by the Chargé in Spain (Beaulac)*¹³

MADRID, November 12, 1943.

When I discussed Jordana's telegram to Laurel with the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs¹⁴ on October 26, 1943, he endeavored to minimize the importance of the telegram. He spoke with little conviction, however, and finally said that what he had been saying did not mean that he would have sent the telegram himself if he had been Minister for Foreign Affairs. From this statement, from his general attitude during the conversation, and from past experience with him over a period of more than two years, I am entirely confident that the telegram does not meet with his approval.

When I discussed this subject, last night, for the second time, with Señor Suñer, Chief of the Overseas Division of the Foreign Office, he told me that immediately after my conversation with the Undersecretary on October 26th the latter called him in and asked him who had drafted the telegram. The Undersecretary told Señor Suñer that he had not seen the telegram before it went out and expressed strong disapproval of it. Señor Suñer told the Undersecretary that he knew nothing about the telegram, that Señor Doussinague had not consulted him about it. The Undersecretary expressed great surprise to Señor Suñer, first, that the telegram had ever been sent, and second, that Señor Suñer had not been consulted.

On November 3rd I discussed the telegram privately and confidentially with the Foreign Office's principal legal adviser, Señor José María Trias de Bes, who is the Foreign Office's legal authority on questions of recognition. He told me he had had nothing to do with the telegram and that the implication conveyed by the telegram did

¹³ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Spain in his despatch No. 1600, November 13; received November 26.

¹⁴ José Pan de Soraluce.

not represent the Foreign Office's attitude toward the puppet Philippine Republic. He had not been aware at the time that the telegram had been sent. He said he would go into the matter and speak to me confidentially later on.

On November 4th I spoke to Felipe Campuzano, a member of the Foreign Minister's diplomatic cabinet. I asked him why he had ever let the telegram go out. He said he had not seen the telegram until after it had gone out, and that when he did see it he predicted the results which have followed. He said the diplomatic cabinet had had nothing to do with sending the telegram and was not aware of it until it had gone out.

On November 5th I talked to Tomás Suñer, Chief of the Overseas Section of the Foreign Office, in whose field Philippine matters lie. I told him that I was speaking to him entirely personally and confidentially. I said that I was aware of the extent to which he had influenced Spanish policy with reference to matters involving recognition or non-recognition of certain régimes, and that I could not understand, therefore, why he had allowed the telegram to Laurel to go out.

He said that although Philippine matters were within his jurisdiction he had not been consulted concerning the telegram and had not yet seen the text of it. He said that in as much as I had revealed that I was familiar with his connection with the Foreign Office's decision not to recognize the Mussolini régime he would tell me frankly and personally that he never would have approved of the Laurel telegram and that it was contrary not only to his own attitude toward the Philippines and toward the Japanese, but also contrary to the Foreign Office's attitude.

He said that he personally was very put out about the matter because Doussinague, the Political Director, had not consulted him with reference to the telegram. In as much as he had not been consulted, he had kept out of the matter, but it troubled him greatly. Using my personal visit as a pretext, he would discuss the matter with the Undersecretary. It was clear to him that Spain had to do something to overcome the impression which the telegram had given throughout the world.

I saw Señor Trias de Bes on November 6th. He was quite excited and asked that I not reveal that I had discussed this subject with him. He said the whole thing had been a "ligereza" (a thoughtless act) and that I should see the Undersecretary about it.

I did, in fact, see the Undersecretary. I asked him whether there was anything he wished to tell me in the matter. He said that the Minister wanted to resign. He, the Undersecretary, urged that he be permitted to resign instead, or at least that the blame be put on him and he be given some other post.

I said that if anybody had to be sacrificed it should not be the Minister or the Undersecretary. That would be making a bad matter worse, from the Spanish point of view.

He said the Minister had felt obliged to assume responsibility for the telegram, *as though he had written it himself*.

All the foregoing points to José María Doussinague, Political Director of the Foreign Office, reference to whom was made in the Embassy's telegram No. 3116, October 26, 4 p. m., as the person responsible for Jordana's telegram to Laurel. It would appear that in obtaining Jordana's approval of the telegram, or possibly in sending it without Jordana's approval, he failed to consult, as he normally should have consulted, the official next below him in charge of Philippine matters.

Doussinague, an old career Spanish diplomat, who was Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs during the Spanish Republic, and has been Chief of Mission in various posts, must have been fully cognizant, probably more so than the Minister, himself, of the interpretation which would be given to the telegram throughout the world.

W[ILLARD] L. B[EAULAC]

711.52/297 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1943—10 p. m.

2425. Your 3294, November 10, 9 p. m.¹⁵ The Department considers that no satisfactory explanation can be advanced for this uncalled for and ill-advised action of the Spanish Government. It is very unfortunate that the action was taken and only a complete disavowal could have undone it. This is for your own information and need not be communicated to the Spanish Government as the Department trusts its position has already been made amply clear on this point. You may tell Foreign Minister Jordana that the Department is convinced that the explanations given have been advanced in good faith and wishes to believe that the Spanish Government had no intention of implying a recognition of the Laurel regime or of disturbing relations with this country, and that the Department for its part is willing to let the matter rest. You should add however that a very unfavorable impression has been created in the public mind which can only be corrected by deeds of a nature to restore confidence. The Department further believes that any unnecessary delay in furnishing substantial demonstrations of good will can only tend to further deteriorate the present embarrassing position.

HULL

¹⁵ *Ante*, p. 649.

SWEDEN

WAR TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND SWEDEN¹

740.00112 European War 1939/7599a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Greene)

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1942 [1943]—9 p. m.

26. Your recent telegrams regarding the Swedish position with respect to the release of the unarmed Norwegian merchant vessels at Göteborg and other related matters indicate that Swedish officials may not have grasped the full implications of our conversations with Boheman² and our developing attitude toward Sweden's continued acquiescence in German demands. Subservience to Germany in the case of certain of these demands is not only in derogation of strict Swedish neutrality but also is of benefit to an enemy in whose defeat all freedom-loving peoples, including the Swedish, should have a vital interest.

We believe that a candid exposition of our views may assist responsible Swedish officials to get a proper perspective of this problem as we see it. Accordingly, you should arrange to call on the appropriate Foreign Office official and acquaint him with the substance of this telegram. You may leave a paraphrase in the form of an "oral statement".

In the final analysis the determining factor in our relations with Sweden during the war must be the degree to and manner in which Sweden is prepared to and does resist Axis demands which are contrary to Sweden's rights as a neutral and independent democratic nation.

We fully recognize that past events, military and otherwise, made it seem expedient for Sweden to acquiesce temporarily in the imposition by Germany of certain servitudes, such as, for example, transit of German troops, movement of German artillery through Swedish territory, et cetera. We cannot be expected, however, indefinitely to continue to accept the pleas of expediency and *force majeure* as excuses for giving in to Germany in such matters. We now regard

¹ For previous correspondence relating to the trade problems of Sweden arising out of the war, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 326 ff.

² Erik C. Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Swedish position as strong enough to enable her to assert her rights vis-à-vis Germany and to assume her full obligations to us as a neutral and sovereign nation. Our confidence in Sweden's present strength is based not only on the sturdy independence of the Swedish people and their demonstrated willingness to assume the heavy burden of maintaining strong defensive armed forces but also on such factors as the potent weapons at Sweden's disposal to enforce German respect of Swedish rights—such weapons, for example, as Sweden's ability to withhold important iron ore supplies from Germany.

If Sweden should give concrete evidence of her determination to stand up for her rights against Germany and to use the weapons at her disposal to that end, then it is our intention to recognize that Sweden has established a moral claim to participate in the distribution of the available pool of supplies and to include an allocation for Sweden in the distribution programs which are increasingly being put into force. (Details, of course, must be worked out in the negotiations which we hope will shortly take place in London pursuant to our conversations with Boheman.) While the amounts which could be so allocated admittedly may in many instances appear small, this is due to the fact that the total supply is much below total demands and all participants in the supply pool are being forced to accept heavy sacrifices. However, the necessity for such sacrifices by the United Nations may in itself be taken as a measure of the value to be attached to the allocation of a share to Sweden.

At the present time Sweden's action with respect to the two unarmed Norwegian merchant vessels constitutes something of a criterion by which we may judge the extent to which Sweden is prepared to enforce her rights vis-à-vis Germany. In our view, it is Sweden's clear right, if not an obligation as a neutral, to permit the departure of the two Norwegian ships and we are fully justified in expecting Sweden to exercise that right. As we understand it, the Swedish Government hesitates to permit the departure of the vessels from fear of German retaliation in the form of cutting off the Göteborg traffic. We feel it only fair to say that we would find difficulty in avoiding the conclusion that Swedish refusal to permit the ships to depart must be regarded as acquiescence in Nazi demands and therefore indicative of a defeatist attitude at a time when, as set forth above, we consider Sweden has never been in a stronger position to resist Germany.

If, however, Sweden should by its action in the matter of the Norwegian ships show a courageous determination to stand up under German pressure, such action would be a gauge by which we might estimate the real intention of Sweden to resist German aggression in all fields and the resulting atmosphere of basic understanding and

sympathy between Sweden and the United States would be such as to make us entirely confident of reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement on the details of the trade and other problems to be discussed in London.

Foregoing has been discussed with British Embassy here.

Repeat to London as No. 159 for information of Minister Johnson³ and Canfield.⁴

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/7600 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 8, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

79. Mallet⁵ having seen Boheman this morning, I talked with Söderblom⁶ this afternoon at length and left "oral statement" covering points mentioned in Department's 26, January 7, 9 p. m. Söderblom considered that statement would be useful in effort to obtain complete Government approval for release of ships. He was considerably more optimistic than during interview reported in my 43, January 5, 4 p. m.,⁷ and Mallet reports Boheman hopeful this morning. Söderblom talked with Prime Minister⁸ yesterday and both latter and Foreign Minister⁹ are very anxious that if ships are allowed to leave, which they seem to be working toward with other members of Government, there will be no new demand made shortly with threat of closing Göteborg traffic. Mallet has left impression that British Government would make no such demand and he considers that it would be helpful if American Government could do same immediately.

Söderblom also indicated nervousness that no action would be taken by either Government to seize ships which normally ply in Göteborg traffic and which are now outside Swedish waters. They wish these to be free to resume traffic after Germans have closed it if at a later date Germans permit traffic to be reopened. This of course assumes that traffic is to be closed by Germans. Should Department consider it desirable to reassure Swedes concerning ships mentioned above and future demands, please instruct earliest possible as I believe it would expedite decision. I feel no further pressure would be of any value

³ Herschel V. Johnson, American Minister to Sweden, temporarily in London.

⁴ Cass Canfield, member of the Board of Economic Warfare Overseas Mission on Trade Relations with Sweden.

⁵ V. A. L. Mallet, British Minister in Sweden.

⁶ Staffan J. Söderblom, Chief of the Political Affairs Division, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Per Albin Hansson.

⁹ Christian E. Günther.

as it seems evident that Prime Minister and Foreign Minister are practically ready to release ships. Mallet even hopes for an answer by Monday 11th but from my talk with Söderblom, I should consider this a little too early to expect it.

Repeated to London.

GREENE

740.00112 European War 1939/7599a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Greene)

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1943—midnight.

34. British Embassy informs us that unless within the next few days a favorable Swedish reply with respect to the Norwegian ships is received or Swedish reaction to the representations you were instructed in our 26, January 7, to make, is such as to forecast such an answer, the British Minister in Stockholm will be instructed to request the Swedish Foreign Office to reply within 24 hours to the outstanding British inquiry regarding the Swedish attitude toward the departure of these ships. He will at the same time warn the Swedish Foreign Office that should no reply be made within the stated time limit or should the reply be negative, the British Government would consider itself justified in implementing its previous warning and all new licenses for export from overseas of goods destined to Sweden would be withheld.

We have suggested to the British Embassy that Mallet's *démarche* be made not earlier than January 11 in order to give the two tankers now en route time to arrive in a Swedish port. We understand that the British Embassy is repeating this suggestion to the Foreign Office in London, but for overriding reasons it may be necessary for British *démarche* to be made earlier.

You should keep in close touch with the British Minister and if he should make representations, arrange to call upon the appropriate Swedish Foreign Office official as promptly as possible after Mallet's call, to say that your Government is acquainted with the nature of the British representations and you may add that your Government earnestly hopes that the Swedish Government will make a favorable reply. You may recall to the Foreign Office official that all obligations on our part are expressly conditioned upon the release of the two vessels (reference paragraph 1(b) of London's 184, December 9, to you¹⁰).

HULL

¹⁰ Telegram No. 184 repeated to Sweden Department's telegram No. 6112, December 3, 1942, midnight, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 366.

740.00112 European War 1939/7600 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Greene)

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1943—5 p. m.

35. Your 79, January 8. You may inform Swedish Government:

1. Our plans for forthcoming negotiations in London over details of trade with Sweden do not involve any matters which might occasion threat to close Göteborg traffic.

2. The Swedish Government may rest assured that we do not contemplate seizure of the "Göteborg ships" in the event Germans close the traffic, provided the ships do not attempt to return to Swedish waters without our approval.

Repeat to London your 79, this telegram and our 26 January 7 and 34 January 8.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/7603 : Telegram

The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 11, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

109. I saw Söderblom yesterday morning at his house and gave him verbally substance of your 35, January 9, 5 p. m. He seemed much relieved, said he would see Foreign Minister immediately and felt quite confident it would have a very beneficial effect on decision.

Boheman called British Minister and me to his office at half past 12 today. Villiers¹¹ and Söderblom were present. Boheman said that Government had informally decided to let *Lionel* and *Dicto* leave Göteborg any time from January 15 on subject to four conditions to be mentioned later in this telegram. He said that a formal decision would be given on January 13 following a meeting of Foreign Affairs Committee of Riksdag which must be consulted by Government on all matters of grave policy. He had no doubt, however, that Foreign Affairs Committee would give its approval to decision of Government. Conditions are:

(1) If German action should discontinue Göteborg traffic in consequence of departure of these two vessels Swedish ships employed in this traffic at time of cessation outside Kaggerak [*Skagerrak?*] blockade must be at disposal of Swedish Government to be used if and when traffic is resumed. (This was answered informally by my assurance to Söderblom based on Department's telegram 35.)

(2) Oil quantity allotted Sweden to be 120,000 tons per year instead of 30,000 tons per quarter. Oil cargoes of *Saturnus* and *Sveadrott* not to be considered part of 1943 allotment. (Boheman stated that

¹¹ Gerald Hyde Villiers, of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

when granted this quota he had not understood that when first quarter was mentioned by Mr. Acheson¹² that it meant first quarter of 1943 but first 3 months following his conversation.) This was only clarified when he read memorandum I left with Söderblom following receipt of Department's 1132, December 19, 4 p. m.¹³ They now feel that cargoes of two ships should not be considered part of 1943 quota but suggest informally that they be granted 120,000 tons exclusive of *Saturnus* and *Sveadrott* beginning January 15, 1943, for a period of 12 months. An annual instead of a quarterly allotment is desired because when ships are lost it is impossible to fill quarterly quota. Even if there were no losses it would take 8 months with available ships to fill annual allotment of 120,000 tons.

(3) Boheman's declaration in a memorandum submitted in October¹⁴ in London to be agreed to as satisfactory basis for further discussions between British and United States and Swedish Governments looking toward a reestablishment of basic rations for Swedish imports. Swedish desiderata to be given favorable and liberal consideration. (This they consider informally agreed to so far as United States is concerned by my talk with Söderblom yesterday and my oral statement based on Department's 26, January 7, 9 p. m.)

(4) That there will be no objection to replacement of ships lost in Göteborg traffic from ships outside Skagerrak blockade when Swedish Government deems such replacement necessary. (It was pointed out that in past when Göteborg traffic ships have been sunk replacements have been taken alternately from Swedish waters and from free ships outside blockade. They wish to have assurances that they can continue this same proportion.)

Boheman pointed out that this decision taken as a result of demand of British and American Governments placed Sweden in a situation of grave danger. He mentioned especially to me that candor required him to express his resentment that despite his extensive explanations concerning iron ore shipments while in United States it should still be suggested as in my oral statement based on Department's 26, January 7, 9 p. m., that withholding of important iron ore supplies from Germany could be used as a weapon by Sweden to enforce German respect for Swedish rights.

He said there will be only very small shipments of iron ore during winter months in any case due to ice in Baltic but even if transportation conditions were normal if iron ore were to be withheld by Sweden it would result in immediate cessation of German coal shipments and as a consequence almost immediate slowing down of Swedish production for her own defense and war economy. Government was nevertheless pleased at attitude shown by Department in anticipating mutually satisfactory agreement on details of trade and other problems to be discussed in London.

Boheman stated that Foreign Minister although he made no promise to do so will very soon tell German Legation of decision of Swedish

¹² Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

¹³ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 369.

¹⁴ Not found in Department files.

Government to release ships and he expects worst as a result. Mallet remained with Boheman after conference to discuss certain technical matters concerning preparation of ships for sailing and is telegraphing immediately to his Government four conditions included in this telegram. Both he and Villiers seemed elated and are urging immediate acceptance of conditions by British Government.

Please reply as soon as possible.

Repeated to London.

GREENE

740.00112 European War 1939/7621 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 13, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received January 13—1:28 p. m.]

132. Boheman has just called to say that Government has taken the formal decision with approval of Foreign Affairs Committee of Riksdag which was communicated informally to Mallet and Greene on January 11 (see Legation's 109, January 11, 6 p. m.). Everything is accordingly all clear as soon as British and American Governments have accepted four conditions mentioned in that telegram (see also Legation's 129, January 13, noon ¹⁵).

Repeated to London.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/7603 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1943—7 p. m.

51. Your 109, January 11.

1. We consider it incompatible with our stated position regarding the obligation of the Swedish Government to permit the two Norwegian ships to depart to accept from the Swedish Government any "conditions" for its permission for the free departure of these ships. However, treating the points 1 to 4 in your reference telegram solely as "requests" of the Swedish Government, our position thereto is as follows, seriatim :

(a) We assume that the assurances in paragraph 1 of our 35, January 9, satisfactorily dispel Swedish apprehensions on this point.

(b) We consider that method and time of shipment of the oil quota are matters which should be taken up for friendly discussion concurrently with the forthcoming London negotiations. We will in such

¹⁵ Not printed.

discussion take into full account Swedish military needs, and shipping problems. (For your information: Thorough consideration has been given to the recommendation in your 129, January 13,¹⁶ that full consent be given immediately to both sections of Swedish request (2). However, the terms of the President's directives of November 20¹⁷ with which you are familiar would make it impossible for us to agree to the Swedish request without going back to the President for further instructions. You will appreciate that such a step might instigate prolonged discussions with other agencies of the Government having a vital interest in oil matters. This would be inadvisable even though there were no factor of delay involved.)

(c) This point is not entirely clear to us. We have already assured the Swedes that if the Norwegian ship matter is satisfactorily concluded, we have every hope that the negotiations in London can proceed to a satisfactory agreement. We have also assured the Swedes that our plans for the forthcoming London negotiations do not involve any matters which might occasion a threat to close the Göteborg traffic; nor do we plan the introduction of further demands on Sweden which have not already been discussed with Boheman either in London or in Washington. Boheman is already familiar with our views and we have from the beginning assumed that the London negotiations would take place within the framework of those views and of Boheman's memorandum. We feel sure that the Swedish Government will appreciate that we cannot commit ourselves further on this point and tie our hands in advance of negotiations which we confidently expect will be conducted in a liberal and friendly spirit on both sides. We assume from the parenthetic sentence in paragraph numbered 3 of your 109 that the Swedes are not expecting any such definite commitments on our part but are satisfied with the general assurances given.

(d) In our discussions with Boheman on the question of charter to us of "free" Swedish ships in the Western Hemisphere, we have already made clear that such ships would be returned to the Swedes for use in the Göteborg traffic should they become necessary for the maintenance of the traffic. This assurance should take care of the question of the replacement of ships sunk in the Göteborg traffic.

2. The Swedish Government should be informed that, in view of the assurances set out above, we anticipate that it will agree without delay to all proper facilities for departure of the Norwegian ships at any time after the arrival of the *Sveadrott*. We should not consider that our requirements have been met should the discussion be further protracted over details.

3. The foregoing has been discussed with representatives of the British Embassy and the Board of Economic Warfare. The Embassy is telegraphing its substance to London. If substantially concurred in by London, we anticipate that Mallet will be instructed to make

¹⁶ Not printed.

¹⁷ See paragraph numbered 3 of telegram No. 5869, November 21, 1942, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 359.

a reply along these lines. You should keep in close touch with him and arrange to call at the Foreign Office immediately after his call in order to acquaint the Swedish Government with our views with respect to their requests.

4. Repeat to London for information of Canfield.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/7629 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 14, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 5:07 p. m.]

148. Because of very limited time at hand Mallet and I had an informal and preliminary conversation with Boheman this afternoon in which substance of Department's 51, January 13, 7 p. m., was discussed. All considered that points 1, 3 and 4 of Swedish requests were satisfactorily met. Boheman was immediately to speak with Foreign Minister reporting our attitude toward point 2 but was non-committal as to whether this would be satisfactory or not. I shall await time when Mallet receives definite instructions before taking more formal action instructed in final sentence of numbered paragraph 3 of Department's 51.

Boheman told Mallet last night that German Legation when informed that ships were to be released said that this is most serious situation which has yet arisen between Germany and Sweden and that matter is being referred to Hitler at his headquarters. Swedes feel most pessimistic as to outcome.

This morning Boheman told Mallet that yesterday German Foreign Office called in Swedish Minister to Berlin and in most violent terms referred to release of these ships as a breach of neutrality and that as a result basis for Göteborg traffic had been destroyed.

Repeated to London.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/7632 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 15, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 8:33 p. m.]

159. Secretary General Foreign Office asked British Minister and me to see him this morning (see my 148, January 14, 4 p. m.). He

informed us that Swedish Government agrees to grant immediate clearance for *Lionel* and *Dicto* whenever requested, understanding, however, that clearance will not be availed of until *Sveadrott* has reached Swedish territorial waters. *Sveadrott* is now at Kristiansand and will probably arrive tomorrow.

Swedish Government agrees to our reply to Swedish request No. 2.

Boheman said, however, that if for any reason proposed negotiations in London do not begin within next few weeks, Swedish Government will if it thinks it necessary take up with British and American Governments question involved regarding division of Swedish oil quota into quarterly installments.

Boheman also expressed his Government's acquiescence in Department's reply to Swedish requests 1, 3 and 4. Mallet yesterday left an *aide-mémoire* with Foreign Office stating substantially same views expressed by Department in its telegram 51¹⁸ as to points 1, 3 and 4. Point 2, he said, had been left to decision of American Government. Today I left an *aide-mémoire* confirming conversation of yesterday as reported my 148, substance of all four points as authorized in telegram 51.

Mr. Boheman told me that he had greatest difficulty in persuading his Government to release these ships and British Minister subsequently confirmed to me his conviction that their release had in fact been due to efforts of Mr. Boheman. British Minister also expressed his deep appreciation for very able help and support in this difficult negotiation which was given him by Mr. Greene when Chargé d'Affaires.

Repeated to London.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/7667: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, January 19, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

209. *Sveadrott* arrived in Göteborg January 17. Two Norwegian ships have not yet left. Foreign Office states there has been no definite abrogation of agreement for Göteborg traffic with Germany. Nevertheless in addition to steps mentioned second and third paragraphs my 148, January 14, 4 p. m., German Admiralty has informed.

¹⁸ January 13, 7 p. m., p. 745.

appropriate Swedish shipping officials that no ships will be granted passage from Göteborg through blockade. As ships never are given free passage by Great Britain to come in through blockade unless same number come out it is obvious that Göteborg traffic is suspended *de facto*.

Boheman yesterday afternoon said he felt very bitter because of position forced on Sweden by Great Britain and United States in connection with Göteborg traffic and release of these ships and also because now that they are released they do not leave Swedish territorial waters thus making possible over a continued period some serious incident. He foresees no way in which Göteborg traffic can be reopened now that it has been closed by Germans as was anticipated and he does not see that cargoes of two ships whose arrival in England is very questionable could balance rapidly deteriorating power of Sweden to resist German pressure in future. He also feels some resentment at crude method of approach to problem by British Foreign Office. Although latter is of secondary importance it indicates existence of a lack of concept of rights of small nations for which Great Britain and United States are constantly criticising Germany.

It was also mentioned that someone in State Department had spoken to Ribbing¹⁹ within a day or two apparently questioning that ships had been released, implication being that this would make it easier for Germans to sink ships while at sea. Fact that Germans were informed was considered a point of honor by Foreign Minister as he had at an earlier date said that ships would not leave. This has no bearing on action of German naval command as anyone in Göteborg can see movements of ships and any notification to German Government by Sweden would have no practical significance.

Now that Göteborg traffic has been stopped by Germans, Swedes are at a loss as to what to do. Threat of restrictions in shipments of iron ore (see paragraph 3 Legation's 109, January 11, 6 p. m.) too dangerous and it is learned that closing of transit traffic might result in German agreement to reopen Göteborg traffic only on condition that Swedes would assure continuation of transit traffic indefinitely thus making effect of that weapon very dubious. German claim that release of ships was an unneutral act (see final paragraph Legation's 148, January 1 [14], 4 p. m.) has been answered very strongly by Sweden as release of ships is in opinion of Swedish Government in no sense an unneutral act.

JOHNSON

¹⁹ Herbert de Ribbing, Counselor of the Swedish Legation.

857.85/407

*The Swedish Legation to the Department of State*²⁰

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

During negotiations between the British and United States Governments on one hand and the Swedish Government on the other about clearance of the two Norwegian ships *Dicto* and *Lionel*, it was most strongly emphasized from the British side that these ships for imperative operative and other reasons must leave Gothenburg at the very latest by the middle of January. As was pointed out by the Swedish authorities, preparations for the departure of these ships would most certainly have as their consequence interruption of the Gothenburg traffic from the German side, at least temporarily.

Had the Swedish Government been informed that the departure of the ships would be delayed for such a considerable period, and had final preparations for their departure been postponed until they really had intention of leaving, at least six more ships carrying about 37,000 tons of cargo to an approximate value of 32 million crowns could in the meantime have reached Sweden. Without any visible advantage to anybody Sweden has now, at least for the time being, been deprived of these cargoes which would have been of the utmost value for the defense and economical life of the country.

The Norwegian ships are still remaining in Swedish port. This fact can hardly be due to either weather conditions, which on several occasions have been favourable for departure, or to German naval measures, which must have been taken into account from the very outset. Consequently, as far as the Swedish Government can judge, there can hardly have been any necessity for fixing the departure of the ships to the middle of January at the very latest.

The Swedish Government wishes further to point out, that as long as the present situation continues there are hardly any possibilities for the Swedish Government to take action in order to try bringing about a resumption of the Gothenburg traffic. In accordance with what has been repeatedly stated from the British side the favourable season for breaking of the German blockade by the two ships seems to be approaching its end. Should the ships not depart before the end of this month, it would seem most likely that they will have to await a new darker season if the blockade situation remains unaltered.

The Swedish Government is asking the British Government to be good enough to inform them of their intentions, as an indefinite pro-

²⁰ The substance of this *aide-mémoire* was brought to the attention of the British Embassy and the Navy Department, and was sent to the Minister in Sweden as telegram No. 190, February 13, 9 p. m. (not printed).

longation of the present situation is seriously jeopardizing, if not rendering impossible, Swedish efforts to safeguard most vital Swedish interests.

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1943.

740.00112 European War 1939/7882 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, February 24, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received February 24—2:10 p. m.]

617. With respect to reopening of Göteborg traffic Boheman tells me that Swedish Foreign Office is taking position with Germans that traffic will be resumed as soon as two Norwegian ships have left. He indicated this position is based upon an explanation made by Germans when they closed traffic to effect that they were unwilling to accept any responsibility for safety of ships in Göteborg traffic when there existed possibility of confusing them with Norwegian vessels. Boheman says that his Government is greatly embarrassed by continued delay in departure of ships and cannot understand in view of British pleas of urgency on basis supply needs why their departure is being delayed as weather conditions become continuously worse for such a venture rather than better.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/7931 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, March 2, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received March 3—12:55 p. m.]

688. I went with Canfield this afternoon when he called on Boheman immediately before his departure for London to say goodbye and to thank him for hospitality and courtesies extended to him and his mission while in Sweden. Boheman asked Canfield if he was satisfied with what Swedish statisticians had been able to give him. Canfield replied that he felt they had been given very full information and were grateful for Swedish help and for what must have been very considerable labor.

Boheman then made a brief statement regarding Swedish position with respect to forthcoming London negotiations. Line he took was similar to that which Canfield reported from his talk with Häggglöf²¹ (see my 687 of March 2, 7 p. m.²²) but was stated with greater preci-

²¹ Gunnar R. Häggglöf, Chief of the Commercial Division. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

²² Not printed.

sion. Boheman said that whole basis of Swedish Government's policy was to survive present world conflict; that mainspring of their dealings with Germany had been entirely on a basis of hard bargaining; that if United States and Great Britain should present demands, in connection with London negotiations for basic rations for Sweden, which it would be impossible for Swedes to perform, there was no need their sending a delegation to London. He said that Sweden was compelled to keep her industries going in order to provide employment for her people; that certain commodities especially coal were an absolute necessity for this program and could only be received from Germany as Great Britain and United States were in no position to take Germany's place. From Swedish point of view he does not think we have any adequate reply for this.

If Swedish exports to Germany were made without necessary *quid pro quo* of imports from Germany then Great Britain and United States might have a basis on which to talk. But such is not the case. If Sweden should accede to an American-British demand for drastic curtailment of, for example, iron ore shipments, Germany would immediately stop shipments of coal which are now being given as a *quid pro quo* for iron ore, as well as close permanently Göteborg traffic, and any offsetting advantage which might be conceded by United States and Great Britain would thus be completely nullified. He emphasized that all imports into Sweden must go through double blockade. He said he fully realized that Swedish exports to Germany could not be pleasing to United States and Great Britain but that if Sweden was to survive as a going concern she could not upset her hard-won trade agreement with Germany, which has already been fixed for 1943, without completely disrupting her economy and producing a situation which no decision, however generous, taken by United States and Great Britain at London negotiations, could offset. He reiterated Hägglöf's request that before Swedish delegation leaves for London some statement of basic American requirements as a starting point for negotiations be telegraphed me for communication to the Foreign Office. He expressed hope that both United States and Great Britain would realize realities of Swedish position and not force an issue at London which would compel Sweden to get on by herself as well as she can. Sweden he said would have no other alternative.

While both Canfield and I feel that Boheman was sincere in his remarks, even if he overstated difficulty of Sweden's position, there is no doubt in my mind that he was accurately stating view of Swedish Government. They genuinely feel here that whatever concessions on basic rations we may be willing to make to them in London will be useless if in return their bargaining position is so upset that Germany will enforce the sea blockade against this country and cut off coal.

Swedes no longer seriously fear a German armed attack. Boheman admitted this but said that if Sweden is forced back on her own resources her position will steadily deteriorate and she might become so weak that it would take not a major but a very minor military attack on Germany's part to subjugate country. With Sweden in such a reduced state it might be sufficiently tempting for even a greatly weakened Germany. He reiterated that the Government did not seriously apprehend this but that it could not be dismissed as a possibility; that Sweden's only insurance was to keep herself as strong as possible, that this could be done only by obtaining certain necessary imports from overseas which in turn Sweden could not receive unless she is in some degree able to maintain her bargaining position with Germany.

Repeated to London for Riefler²³ and Canfield.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/7931 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1943—8 p. m.

293. Your 688, March 2.

1. The Swedish Minister furnished to Mr. Acheson on March 8 an oral statement²⁴ regarding the impressions gained by the Swedish Government as to the visit of Canfield and Fagen²⁵ to Stockholm and as to the stand which the latter intend to adopt in connection with the forthcoming London negotiations.

The statement set forth *inter alia* the Swedish impression that Canfield holds the view that the negotiations should cover all subjects mentioned in the resolution of the Board of Economic Warfare on November 12, 1942²⁶ and that unless satisfaction is obtained on these points basic rations would not be established and resumption of the Göteborg traffic would not be permitted by the United States Government. Before sending representatives to London to discuss the questions at issue with representatives of the United States and British Governments, "the Swedish Government wishes to obtain a clarification of the view of the United States Government and some information regarding the proposed agenda of the London discussions."

It was also stated that the Swedish Government understood that when it gave its decision to permit the departure of the Norwegian

²³ Winfield W. Riefler, Special Assistant to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

²⁴ Not printed.

²⁵ Melvin Fagen, member of the Board of Economic Warfare Overseas Mission in Sweden.

²⁶ See telegram No. 5369, November 21, 1942, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 359.

ships *Lionel* and *Dicto* and provided it agreed to the chartering to us of the so-called free Swedish ships in the Western Hemisphere, we would agree to set up basic rations for Sweden; and that it was only to negotiate these questions that the conferences in London were to be held.

It is the view of the Department and the Board of Economic Warfare that the negotiations in London will deal with the points raised with Mr. Boheman during his discussions in Washington and with which the Swedish Government is familiar as "Objectives A-L" of the BEW resolutions of November 12,²⁷ as well as with the proposed basic rations for Sweden. As the result of our discussions here with Boheman and Canfield's work in Stockholm, we feel that substantial progress has been made and we see no reason to believe that satisfactory understandings cannot be reached on these points. As to the two points which seem particularly to disturb the Minister, the iron ore shipments and the transit traffic, our discussions with Boheman pointed the way to a practical and realistic *modus vivendi* which should reach the objectives we are both seeking without raising questions of form which would create political or military problems for the Swedes.

There is no intention on the part of this Government to insert new demands into the negotiations. As stated in a memorandum by the United States Legation in Stockholm on January 15 to the Swedish Government it is not believed that "the forthcoming negotiations . . .²⁸ involve any matters which might occasion a threat to close the Göteborg traffic".

2. A paraphrase of this telegram is being given to the Swedish Minister in Washington as a reply to his oral statement referred to. Meanwhile, you may acquaint the Swedish Government orally with the contents of this telegram.

Repeat to London for Canfield and Riefler as our No. 1551.

WELLES

740.00112 European War 1939/8033 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, March 18, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 10:48 p. m.]

864. Boheman told me today in strict confidence that British have notified Swedish Government their intention to lay up two Norwegian ships *Lionel* and *Dicto* now at Göteborg and to make no attempt to

²⁷ See airgram No. A-242, November 27, 1942, 7:40 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 362.

²⁸ Omission indicated in the original telegram.

run them out at present. Boheman says he has no doubt that strength of German counter-measures (five destroyers lying in wait) are real reason. He asked me in reporting this to request that it not be passed on as information to any quarter. He does not know whether British have informed United States Government. British Legation here has not informed us.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/8189 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 10, 1943—3 p. m.
[Received April 10—11:55 a. m.]

2531. For Department and Board of Economic Warfare. Recently Prytz²⁹ approached Embassy with request that Gothenburg ships at present outside Baltic should be allowed to return to Sweden with German permission. Embassy and British took stand that this request was acceptable provided that an appropriate number of ships left Baltic and Germans were granted no concessions by Swedes for allowing this movement.

Department and Board of Economic Warfare have just signified agreement to this plan on these general conditions. They have also assumed that this will not constitute reopening of traffic nor will change take place at more than five ships per month. We understand that 11 ships of the 16 at present outside Baltic are covered by this plan. Embassy will inform you in more detail of plan, if subsequent discussions indicate that it will be adopted. This however would appear rather doubtful.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8090 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*³⁰

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1943—midnight.

2287. For Riefler and Canfield. Reference your 2224, March 27.³¹

1. Department and BEW approve generally your objectives and plans for forthcoming negotiations.

2. We are studying the transit question in the light of Stockholm's 1083 of April 6 (repeated to London) and your 2463, April 8³² (which

²⁹ Björn Gustaf Prytz, Swedish Minister in the United Kingdom.

³⁰ Repeated on the same date to the Minister in Sweden as telegram No. 435.

³¹ Not printed.

³² Neither printed.

has just come in) and hope shortly to telegraph you our views and a suggested treatment of this question.

3. In the meantime it is apparent that specific mention of the transit question in your proposed message to the Swedish Foreign Office would create embarrassment for the Swedes, and on the other hand, omission of the subject might lead the Swedes to take the position later that you are foreclosed from discussing the question during the negotiations. Accordingly, we suggest that your message to the Swedish Foreign Office be limited to a general invitation to start the negotiations immediately on the basis of our 293, of March 10, to Stockholm (sent to London as our 1551) which was concurred in by BEW and which the Swedish Legation here apparently considers to be the agenda for the negotiations. In your message you might refer to the contents of telegram 293 (a paraphrase of which was given the Swedish Minister here³³) as the agenda and specifically refer to the passage reading:

“As to the two points which seem particularly to disturb the Minister, the iron ore shipment and the transit traffic, our discussions with Boheman pointed the way to a practical and realistic *modus vivendi* which should reach the objective we are both seeking without raising questions of form which would create political or military problems for the Swedes.”

4. Swedish Minister is concerned about delay in starting negotiations. He has received a telegram from his Government informing him that a report or despatch from Canfield had been sent to Washington and that it did not seem appropriate for the Swedish negotiators to go to London until the Department and the BEW had given their detailed comments. We have told the Minister that unless telegram under reference is the report to which he refers, we have no report requiring our comment as a condition precedent to starting the negotiations, and we hope that the negotiations will be started as soon as possible and speedily concluded. We have, however, pointed out to the Minister that the necessary authorizations from the combined boards as well as the appropriate requirements committees for basic rations have not yet been obtained. It is hoped, however, that the negotiations can be started without waiting for final approval of supply authorities. For your information it is expected that CRMB³⁴ will make a decision this week and that decision will in general approve the suggested basic rations for raw materials with the exception of tung oil, bristles, copper, molybdenum, and tire fabric. There may be reductions or special comments relating to oleic acid, carbon

³³ Wollmar Boström.

³⁴ Combined Raw Materials Board.

black, cotton yarns and thread, paraffin wax, and asbestos. Detailed comments on status of basic rations in Combined Food Board have been sent you by pouch. In general approval by Combined Food Board is predicted with exceptions relating to fats and oils, rice, pepper and dried fruits.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8218: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*³⁵

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1943—11 p. m.

2514. For Canfield. Reference your 2645 and 2669, April 15,³⁶ and Department's 2287, April 10.

1. Quoted passage in Department's 2287, April 10, need not be incorporated in invitation to be extended to Swedish delegation.

2. Department and Board of Economic Warfare suggest that the invitation to be extended to the Swedish Government be made jointly by us and the British Government and you should arrange for our Minister in Stockholm to act in concert with his British colleague in presenting the invitation to the Swedish Foreign Office.

3. We agree that in addition to other matters the invitation should include a general statement to the effect that the discussions will cover all considerations arising out of Swedish exports and imports and any problems which have arisen in the past few months and to which no complete or satisfactory solution has yet been found. In case the Swedes become alarmed at the broad language suggested, we are requesting our Minister to reassure them that no new conditions or demands are intended.

4. We believe that you are in a better position to work out the exact phraseology of the invitation in collaboration with the British than we are in Washington. Our general views are expressed in Department's 293 of March 10 to Stockholm repeated to London, and Department's 2287 of April 10 to London. Your understanding expressed in your 2669 of April 15 is in general correct but a separate telegram relating to the transit traffic is being sent.³⁷

HULL

³⁵ Repeated on the same date to the Minister in Sweden as telegram No. 489, with the following opening sentences: "Following message has been sent to London. Your attention is directed to that part of paragraph 3 relating to reassuring the Swedes that no new conditions or demands are involved in the suggested sweeping language of the invitation."

³⁶ Neither printed.

³⁷ Telegram No. 2587, *infra*.

740.00112 European War 1939/8176 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*³⁸

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1943—2 p. m.

2587. From Stone,³⁹ B.E.W., and State Department for Canfield. Your 2463, April 8, and Stockholm's 1083, April 6, and 1275, April 20.⁴⁰ Regarding Swedish transit traffic Department and B.E.W. anxious to take immediate advantage of Boheman's more amenable position and in so far as possible meet necessities of Swedish position in this matter. Suggest the following plan for immediate consideration by you and the British:

1. Our Minister in Stockholm in collaboration with his British colleague should attempt at once to obtain an agreement (secret if necessary) from the Swedish Government that all leave traffic and transshipment of munitions of war through Sweden for the enemy will be discontinued, and that there will be no increase in the traffic of goods which are not munitions. Presumably this would result in a ceiling of about 133,000 tons yearly. The agreement would provide that the Swedish Government would be free to choose an appropriate time for taking such action but we would expect that it would be understood that the step will be made in any case within a reasonable period after the happening of either of these events:

- a. failure of Germany to permit the resumption of the Gothenburg traffic by June 1, or
- b. authorization by Germany for the resumption of the Gothenburg traffic.

The period of time which may elapse after the happening of either of the above events need not now be fixed, but it would be understood that if unreasonable delay occurs any Anglo-American commitments regarding basic rations or other trade facilities accorded Sweden may be withdrawn.

If the Swedes make such an agreement now we would inform the Swedes that it would seem unnecessary to include the traffic question in the London negotiations.

2. If you and the British concur in this plan please inform Stockholm, to whom the above suggestion is being repeated, with instructions to act if and when your concurrence is given. If you concur the American Minister in Stockholm will determine in cooperation with his British colleague whether an agreement or declaration of intention, secret if necessary, on the above lines is possible without delay.

If the Swedish answer is in the negative or if the Swedish Government hesitates to make any commitments at this time we would then

³⁸ Repeated on the same date to the Minister in Sweden as telegram No. 506.

³⁹ William T. Stone, Assistant Director in charge of Economic Warfare Analysis, Board of Economic Warfare.

⁴⁰ None printed.

have to consider another treatment including, possibly, the inclusion of traffic question in the London negotiations.

We consider it important that you and the British give this matter most immediate attention.

Repeated to Stockholm.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8280: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 24, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 6:09 p. m.]

2865. Reference 2587, April 23, from the Department and BEW, repeated to Stockholm. Matthews⁴¹ and Canfield discussed reference telegram with Foreign Office who gave following information:

1. That Mallet, who is expected here momentarily, lately held long conversation with Boheman regarding transits.

2. That while Boheman made it clear that the Swedish Government could not take any drastic action at the present time for reasons with which you are familiar, the Germans would be informed within a reasonable period (4 or 5 months were mentioned) that troop traffic must cease.

3. That Boheman indicated that if the transit of troops had not ceased within a reasonable period, he would feel the U.S. and British Governments would be justified in closing all "quotas" to Sweden. He further stated that he was prepared to agree in negotiations to make basic rations contingent upon stoppage of troop transits within such period.

Foreign Office is taking position and is so cabling Embassy, Washington, that further discussions on transit in Stockholm are inadvisable in view of the above and that the matter should be further dealt with in the negotiations. They understand from Mallet that the Swedes will not oppose including subject in London talks.

It is disturbing that Boheman made no mention of war materials transits, especially in view of your belief (expressed in Legation's 1083 to Washington, April 6⁴²) that the Swedish Government would at some stage aim to eliminate not only troop but also war materials traffic. However, this point could be taken up in negotiations as Foreign Office understands that Mallet gave no undertaking to the contrary.

⁴¹ H. Freeman Matthews, Minister Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

⁴² Not printed.

Embassy is of opinion that the conversation between Mallet and Boheman has changed situation so that it appears to us inadvisable to press the Swedes further on transit prior to negotiations. Accordingly, we believe that the course of action proposed by the Foreign Office should be followed.

This telegram is being repeated to Washington and we assume that you will hear shortly from Department and BEW.

For Acheson, Stone and Riefler, BEW, from Canfield.

The foregoing was sent to Stockholm.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8282 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, April 24, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 7:58 p. m.]

1336. Procedure for separate agreement in Stockholm regarding leave traffic and transshipment munitions of war through Sweden suggested in Department's 506, April 23, 2 p. m. (Department's 2587 to London) in my opinion if attempted will still further delay beginning of London negotiations. Prime Minister is absent from Stockholm until Tuesday, Mr. Gunther and Boheman until May 3 and Parliament does not reconvene until May 4. Boheman would probably return if I asked him but he could not take final action. If Foreign Office should consent to reach such an agreement, it could only be done after careful consideration by Cabinet and would probably be submitted to Foreign Relations Committee of Parliament. I personally do not believe Swedes will react favorably to a procedure which will commit them even conditionally on transit question before they get to London and know what our demands are. I still think Boheman's suggestion reported in my 1275, April 20⁴³ is preferable one to follow and fact this having gone so far appears to me to make unnecessary attempt to get separate agreement prior to London meeting. I do not think our mention of transit matter in invitation would cause Foreign Office as much embarrassment as is apparently thought in Washington. If Department desired, formal invitation could exclude mention of question which might be covered in a personal letter to accompany formal note.

I have been in touch with British Chargé today (Mallet went to London yesterday) and he has also received instructions regarding

⁴³ Not printed; Mr. Boheman suggested that the Americans and British negotiate basic rations for Sweden and other issues independently of transit traffic but to inform Sweden that if the transit traffic question was not settled in a specified length of time the Anglo-American commitment regarding basic rations might be considered cancelled (740.00112 European War 1939/8253).

invitation. I have informed Foreign Office that we have these instructions and that formal invitation would be delivered as soon as possible. Before delivering it, however, I would greatly appreciate by Monday⁴⁴ if possible expression of Department's wishes. If attempt is to be made to get prior agreement here on transit question, does Department desire issuance of formal invitation held up in meantime? In light Department's latest telegram under reference, I hesitate to go ahead with preparation of draft invitation without further instructions.

Repeated to London as our 214, April 24, 7 p. m.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/8282 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1943—8 p. m.

519. Your 1336, April 24, and London's 2865, April 24, 4 p. m. (repeated to you).

1. In light of views expressed in reference telegrams, Department and BEW agree that you should not seek agreement with Swedes on transit question at this time.

2. We understand that form of invitation referred to in Department's 489 of April 20 (Department's 2514 of April 20 to London) will permit discussion of this question in London. We consider it important that way be left open to raise this matter in London negotiations if we so desire.

3. If assumption in paragraph 2 correct, please extend invitation as soon as your British colleague is prepared to do so.

4. A later telegram will be sent to London and repeated to you containing suggestions as to type of understanding on transit traffic which Department and BEW believe should be sought from Swedes during course of London negotiations.

Repeated to London as Department's no. 2646.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8294 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, April 27, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 8:55 p. m.]

1369. Together with British Chargé d'Affaires I have just delivered invitation to Acting Secretary General of Foreign Office (my number

⁴⁴ April 26.

1368, April 27, 6 p. m.⁴⁵). Mr. Söderblom expressed thanks and appreciation of Swedish Government for invitation. He said that it would be submitted immediately to Prime Minister and Cabinet and that he did not anticipate any questions would arise which would delay formal acceptance. He stated informally that he thought Swedish delegation would be able to leave for London in about a week. Both his reaction to wording of note and that of Hägglöf who was present was not critical and Hägglöf remarked that he realized how difficult it would be to give a detailed agenda. He mentioned that terms of our invitation were broad but that they were obviously a basic agenda.

Repeated to London as my 222.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/8312 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, April 29, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 9 : 36 p. m.]

1394. British Chargé d'Affaires and I saw Acting Secretary General Foreign Office today at his request. He said that he was glad to communicate to us Swedish Government's formal acceptance of invitation to send representatives to London for trade negotiations and that for purposes of record a written reply to our notes would be delivered tomorrow. Mr. Söderblom stated informally that Swedish delegation would be composed of Mr. Gunnar Hägglöf, chairman, Mr. Marcus Wallenberg, Jr.,⁴⁶ and Mr. Nils Ståhle. Messrs. Hägglöf and Ståhle are Foreign Office officials. Secretary will be Mr. de Besche likewise Foreign Office official. Mr. Gunnar Carlsson⁴⁷ of Göteborg will be attached to delegation as technical assistant and adviser on all shipping matters. Swedish delegation is planning to leave Stockholm on May 6. Mr. Söderblom requests for security reasons that no publicity be given to forthcoming conference or to delegates having been named, either at Washington or London until after arrival of Swedish delegation in London.

Mr. Söderblom concluded by expressing his hope and belief that negotiations should have a successful conclusion and that he had never shared apprehensions which had existed among some of his colleagues that insuperable difficulties would arise for Sweden during these negotiations. He was undoubtedly referring to somewhat exaggerated apprehensions which Hägglöf voices from time to time that Sweden will be presented with impossible conditions.

⁴⁵ Not printed.

⁴⁶ Swedish banker and financier.

⁴⁷ Swedish shipowner.

Klath⁴⁸ and Mitcheson,⁴⁹ Commercial Counselor, British Legation, are making every endeavor to leave Stockholm by May 2 or 3.

Repeated to London as my 225.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/8343 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, May 4, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received May 4—5 : 41 p. m.]

1451. Söderblom of F.O. called Senior Counselor of German Legation to Foreign Office early last [apparent omission] and said that some definite action must be taken on Sweden's request for Germans to permit Göteborg traffic to be reopened, that if this were not done in immediate future it must be considered that Germany is abrogating original agreement and that appropriate steps must then be taken by Swedish Government. On Saturday May 1 German Legation stated that it had received instructions to say that Göteborg traffic would be permitted to be reopened but only so long as *Lionel* and *Dicto* two Norwegian ships lying in Göteborg harbor did not sail. F.O. immediately instructed Swedish Minister in London to approach F.O. and state that it would like assurance ships would not sail before October 15 to permit Swedish Government to say that these ships would not sail at least until that date. Yesterday Orme Sargent⁵⁰ told Swedish Minister that he would give a definite reply on this point before May 6, date when Swedish delegates to trade negotiations are expected to leave for London as Swedish Government is extremely anxious that this matter be settled with German Government before knowledge of delegates presence in London becomes public. There matter rests.

Repeated to London as my 242.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/8282 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*⁵¹

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1943—9 p. m.

2823. Reference Department's 519, April 26. Our suggestions concerning type of understanding on traffic transit are :

⁴⁸ Thormod O. Klath, Commercial Attaché in Sweden.

⁴⁹ John M. L. Mitcheson.

⁵⁰ British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁵¹ Repeated on the same date to the Minister in Sweden as telegram No. 552.

1. The commitment may take the form of a promise, assurance, or declaration of expectation, (secret if desired), coupled with the understanding that if the promise is not fulfilled or the expectation not realized within a reasonable time, we will be free to reconsider any commitments we may undertake to the Swedes.

2. The "reasonable time" referred to in above paragraph must be determined with reference to current developments. We would be guided by advice of our negotiators. Four months mentioned by Boheman does not seem unreasonable. A shorter time would, of course, be preferable.

3. The commitment should provide for the elimination of all leave traffic and transshipment of munitions of war through Sweden for the enemy and also provide that the transportation of goods other than munitions on enemy account shall not be increased over 1942 levels which we understand was about 133,000 tons a year.

4. The time and manner of bringing up the transit traffic question in London must be largely left to our negotiators who should bear in mind that we do not wish unnecessarily to embarrass the Swedes or interfere with the possible political exploitation of the action in connection with Swedish public opinion.

5. A solution of the transit traffic problem along the above suggested lines would be entirely satisfactory but if our negotiators should find that a better commitment is possible, they should seek it and keep us informed.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8426 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 12, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received May 12—4 p. m.]

3281. For Department and Stone, BEW. Opening meeting with Swedes held at noon, May 11, in Foreign Office with Ambassador, Lord Selborne,⁵² Prytz, representatives of EWD⁵³ and MEW,⁵⁴ and Swedish delegation including Häggglöf, Wallenberg, and Ståhle present.

Introductory remarks were made by Ambassador and Selborne, text of which will be sent by despatch. Prytz replied extemporaneously stating that in his view Swedish military situation had not fundamentally changed in past 2 years and that she was still surrounded.

⁵² British Minister of Economic Warfare.

⁵³ Economic Warfare Division of the Embassy in London.

⁵⁴ British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

He further said that Sweden in order to keep Gothenburg traffic open even for 3 to 4 months must abstain from further pressure on Germany.

In afternoon Swedish delegates met with representatives of EWD and MEW in latter's building with Foot⁵⁵ presiding. Foot having accepted Embassy's draft of initial demands based upon memorandum entitled "Forthcoming Negotiations with Sweden" brought back by Fagen in draft form, explained the document. (Initial demands thus presented to Swedes did not contain statistical data or tables of figures.)

Foot also gave to Hägglöf list of basic rations, additions to list A⁵⁶ and list of commodities for which special licensing and navicerting procedure is required (previously called "inverted list"). Although Foot emphasized final nature of quantities named for basic rations, list presented to Swedes can be revised upwards in case of several important commodities without exceeding limits imposed by Combined Boards.

American delegates made some remarks amplifying Foot's talk which however was precisely along line previously agreed upon between Embassy and MEW. We will continue to take position that no opinions affecting policy shall be expressed by MEW without our previous agreement to them.

Hägglöf made substantially these comments extemporaneously after hearing summary of initial demands:

(1) That while Swedish exports might be more valuable to Axis at this stage of war than previously, likewise Swedish imports from Axis were greater than before.

(2) That Swedish iron ore was of less importance to Germany than at the beginning of war when she had fewer sources of supply.

(3) That Sweden could not have maintained and cannot maintain her industry and rearmament program without important coal, chemicals, machinery, et cetera, from Axis and that therefore limits exist to extent to which our desiderata can be met.

(4) That Gothenburg traffic must be kept open as otherwise basic rations become meaningless. He said that he noted with satisfaction our assurance made in connection with *Lionel* and *Dicto* that we did not intend to take any steps which would bring about closing of traffic.

(5) That recent events have proved Swedish prognostications regarding Gothenburg traffic correct and that continuance of traffic hangs on slender thread. Accordingly Swedish problem is extent to which our desiderata can be met without destroying traffic.

⁵⁵ Dingle Foot, Parliamentary Secretary, British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

⁵⁶ List A was a list of basic rations attached to the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of 1939; text of the agreement not printed, but for substance, see W. N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade*, vol. 1, in the British civil series *History of the Second World War* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), pp. 141-152.

(6) In connection with our proposed ceilings that Swedish interpretation of term "Germany" in war trade agreement is that it applies to Germany and occupied countries. He added that British themselves had put forward this interpretation.

(7) That he was surprised at our dissatisfaction over Rumanian agreement which was very favorable only because of Swedish contracts with individuals and private interests in Rumania. He said he would give us all details later.

(8) That Argentine demand was not too difficult from Swedish angle provided Sweden could be assured of adequate imports from that country.

(9) That he expected we would agree at once to furnishing forthwith certain quantities of basic rations so that they could be shipped while Gothenburg traffic remains open.

Foot replied in general terms leaving answers to specific points to next meeting Wednesday.⁵⁷ Before then we will consult with British.

Two most troublesome points appear to be Hägglöf's comments numbered 8 and 9.

As to 8, after comparison of value and quantity of 1942 Swedish exports to Argentine of newsprint, wood pulp for paper making and rayon pulp, with Swedish imports from that country, we plan to telegraph you for advice.

As to 9, we feel that concession now on our part might deprive us of valuable card which could be used to obtain quick and acceptable agreement on principal desiderata.

In connection with 4, we will point out to Hägglöf that assurance regarding Gothenburg traffic was merely to effect that negotiations would not involve any matters which might occasion a threat to close traffic. It is obviously important that he should appreciate difference between our agreeing that no threat should be made on our part to close traffic and our making demands which in his opinion might result in Germans closing traffic.

It is our intention and wish to consult you on questions of policy in accordance with Department's 2567 of April 22 to Embassy.⁵⁸ However we would point out that in telegrams like above, summarizing meetings, we will report many Swedish arguments slated for subsequent rebuttal. Rebuttals in many cases will not involve a solution or compromise on any particular question; when they do solution or compromise can be postponed when necessary.

WINANT

⁵⁷ May 12.

⁵⁸ Not printed; it stated: "While London negotiators will be given wide discretion, it is expected that agreement on important issues will necessarily be referred to Washington for confirmation." (740.00112 European War 1939/8206)

740.00112 European War 1939/8438 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 13, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 14—3:27 a. m.]

3338. For Department and Stone, BEW. At second meeting with Swedes, held May 12, Hägglöf commented further on our initial demands and amplified certain of his points numbered 1 to 9 in Embassy's 3281 of May 12, 5 p. m.

Regarding ceilings he objected to use of 1938 as a base, stating that no logical reason existed for regarding this as normal year. He objected also to applying ceilings to individual rubrics, observing that such a procedure would make Swedish negotiations with Germans impossible and that under these circumstances Sweden would not be able to obtain commodities from enemy Europe. He added that imports from enemy Europe were to our interests. Sweden, he said, was willing to diminish her exports to the Continent but not in relation to 1938 and only through the use of an elastic system (in contrast to the "statistical" formula proposed by us).

In connection with point 8 he observed that as a matter of principle this was a strange request as Sweden's trade with Argentine was one between two neutrals on opposite sides of the blockade. However, main question from Swedish point of view was how Sweden would obtain her imports from the Argentine. He felt this matter would have to be discussed with the Argentine Government and indicated that the U.S. Government might undertake this. (A separate telegram will be sent to you on the Argentine question.)

Referring to proposed ban on exports of arms and ammunition, Hägglöf stated that exports of arms had been permitted only to Finland, that these exports were small and exceeded arms imports from Finland by about 1,000,000 kronor. He said that in some Swedish circles surprise was felt that Sweden should be treated more severely than Switzerland by our Governments.⁵⁹

He pointed out that many of the proposed additions to List A were not imported through the blockade, and that, therefore, we had introduced a new principle in this regard. The same observation applied to prohibition of exports of ferro tungsten and ferro vanadium permitted by war trade agreement.

Foot and others made these observations:

(1) If trade with neutrals were not advantageous to Germany, she would not permit it. Accordingly our interest was to restrict such trade.

⁵⁹ For correspondence concerning the War Trade Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, see pp. 824 ff.

(2) There was no basis for assumption that Switzerland received better treatment from us in blockade matters than Sweden. While comparisons were difficult, it was pointed out that Switzerland allowed no transits of troops or munitions.

(3) The Rumanian agreement violated ceilings under any interpretation of war trade agreement. Moreover, we were not consulted.

A subcommittee to consist of about nine, under chairmanship of Collins was appointed to discuss certain questions in detail, referring policy questions to a policy committee. Latter committee to consist at present of Foot, Villiers, Canfield, Cumming,⁶⁰ Hägglöf, Wallenberg. Subjects for subcommittee mainly those relating to basic rations, additions to List A and certain of the other restrictions on exports.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 15, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 4:05 p. m.]

3372. For Department and Stone, BEW. At meeting held yesterday of Policy Committee, Hägglöf made following statement regarding Swedish exports to enemy Europe.

Sweden is to large extent committed on her exports to enemy Europe for the rest of 1943. For example, she must deliver certain quantities of wood pulp and paper to Germany in second 6 months, provided Germany delivers 2 million tons of coal and coke in first half year, a condition latter is expected to fulfill. As to iron ore, he stated, contrary to our previous impression that some non-contractual relation existed between this export and deliveries of coal and coke, that no limit to deliveries is provided for, so long as they are paid for in cash through the clearing. With regard to most other commodities, agreements exist with Germany that export licenses up to certain quantities will be issued on condition payments through clearing are received from Germany and goods are available for export by private firms.

Agreements of generally similar nature exist with other countries in enemy Europe. They usually cover the current year, although in certain cases, such as exports of wood pulp and paper to Italy, said agreements are renewable for second half year upon fulfillment of specified conditions.

⁶⁰ Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, on special mission to London.

Effect of above agreements is that Sweden is bound to export to enemy Europe for last 6 months substantially what she exported in same period 1942, provided imports specified in 1943 agreements are forthcoming. Therefore, according to Hägglöf, no appreciable reduction in exports for last 6 months can be expected.

Foot and others took position we were primarily interested in immediate reduction Swedish exports and therefore particularly concerned with second half 1943. Further that Hägglöf's statements did not appear to provide even a basis for discussion.

Under pressure Hägglöf admitted that:

1. Perhaps 10 percent of Sweden's proposed 1943 exports to enemy Europe were not covered by agreements.

2. If no credits were given in accordance with our demand, Swedish exports to Germany would decrease by about 35 million kronor in second half year, this sum representing repayment of credits in that period by Germany. (Our own estimate of the decrease to be effected in Swedish exports to Finland during last half of 1943 through elimination of new credits, but not of extensions of credit to that country, is roughly 14 million kronor, not counting reduction which would result from stoppage of credit facilitating Finnish purchases of food-stuffs in Denmark. Latter credit amounted to 5.2 million kronor for first half year.)

3. German exports to Sweden would tend to decrease somewhat in second half year as compared to corresponding period 1942, with resulting effect on Swedish exports to Germany.

When asked whether Swedish exports could be cut by refusal on part of Sweden to provide shipping, Hägglöf pointed out that his Government was bound to arrange that adequate transportation facilities be made available with regard to certain Swedish exports to the Continent.

We then took position that inasmuch as Germany had found excuses in past years not to live up to her agreements, there appeared no compelling reason why Sweden should not take same attitude now vis-à-vis Germany. On this point Hägglöf gave no ground.

We countered by stating that although Swedish approach to exports was unacceptable, we believed it might be of some use to examine at subsequent meeting exact extent by which Swedish exports to enemy Europe might be reduced in second half year without violation of existing agreements.

When pressed as to other demands, Hägglöf expressed following personal opinions, subject to confirmation by his Government and to our granting basic rations in quantities to be agreed upon but substantially based on amounts offered which are still, in the case of a few key commodities, below figures of combined boards:

A. He would accept prohibition of credits, certain of our additions to list A and substantial reduction of Swedish exports to enemy Europe in 1944.

B. He would discuss our demand on exports of arms, ammunition, ships and other means of transport (though the ban on export of arms to Finland presented difficulties). Would also discuss demands on inverted procedure to be applied to certain commodities, abolition list B, processing and barter.

Although meeting far from satisfactory from point of view attainment our demands, British and American delegates agree that Hägglöf is probably prepared to give some ground if pressed hard as we intend to do. In our judgment, at this stage, on the basis of Hägglöf's statements being proved correct by submission of detailed statistics, about best attainable bargain on principal points (alternative being possible breakdown of negotiations) is following in broad terms:

1. Diminution of Swedish exports to enemy Europe for second half of this year by at most 20 to 25 percent as compared to corresponding period 1942.

2. Drastic but as yet undeterminable cut in Swedish exports to enemy Europe in 1944 using our proposed ceilings as basis of negotiations.

3. Abolition of credits, direct and indirect, to all countries and of extensions of credits to all countries except Finland.

4. Agreement satisfactory to us on most points involved in demands referred to in A and B above.

5. Limitations on Swedish exports and other Swedish concessions to apply, irrespective of continued operation Gothenburg traffic. (This in exchange for our substantial compromises on demands and for our providing basic rations, subject to supply considerations, whenever traffic is open.)

Regarding Argentine demand we are doubtful of Swedish acceptance, although still pressing the point. Separate telegram being sent to you on this matter.

It will be noted that possible bargain broadly outlined above does not provide specifically for any reduction in iron ore exports in last 6 months. This is a very serious omission. On the other hand, Hägglöf held out no prospect of our applying 1.75 to one ratio to second half this year.

We intend to keep pressing very hard on iron ore and obviously before even a tentative agreement on our part can be given to any compromise on our initial demands, a settlement must be reached on transits which will be discussed next week and on charter of free ships. However, it would be most helpful to us if you could telegraph your initial reaction to possible bargain we have outlined on assumption that transits and ship question can be satisfactorily settled. We make this request as Hägglöf now consulting his Government and as it is of importance that negotiations should not drag out.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8486 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 18, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received May 18—3:15 p. m.]

3430. For Department and BEW. Separate telegram is being sent outlining Swedish transit traffic discussions which took place this morning.

Unless otherwise instructed we propose at meeting to take place at Foreign Office 11:30 Thursday morning⁶¹ to put forth as basis of discussion following formula in the form of a declaration or statement by the Swedes:

“The ability of the Swedish Government to terminate the traffic across Swedish territory of German military personnel, personnel of organizations auxiliary to the German Armed Forces (such as the Todt organization⁶²) and of military supplies depends at any given moment on the extent of the danger of a German attack on Sweden and of the possibilities of Swedish resistance to such an attack.

The Swedish Government is of the opinion that at the present moment the general military situation and the state of readiness of the Swedish Armed Forces are such that Sweden could terminate the transit traffic immediately provided there were on hand in Sweden sufficient supplies of oil (to insure the combat effectiveness of the Swedish Armed Forces).

The Swedish Government proposes to terminate the German transit traffic when Swedish supplies of oil reach a level of (figure to be agreed upon) tons, provided that when this level is reached, the military position of Sweden vis-à-vis Germany has not deteriorated in the opinion of the Swedish Government.

The Swedish Government understands that, if the German transit traffic has not been terminated by (date will be discussed but we will press for one not later than October 1, 1943) the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will be free to suspend the operation of the agreement regarding basic rations for Sweden and will desire to discuss with the Swedish Government the situation then existing.

The Swedish Government will consider the possibility of informing the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States as far in advance as may be practicable of its decision, when made, to terminate the German transit traffic.”

Above formula will be discussed further in detail with Foreign Office tomorrow.

Urgent reply requested.

WINANT

⁶¹ May 20.

⁶² Engineering organization established by Fritz Todt, responsible for the building of many of the superhighways in Germany for Hitler.

740.00112 European War 1939/8491 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 19, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received May 19—7:40 a. m.]

3445. Swedish transit traffic meeting held at Foreign Office yesterday presided over by Sir Orme Sargent and attended by Hägglöf and Prytz for Sweden; Sargent, Warner⁶³ and Coote⁶⁴ for British; Riefler, Gallman⁶⁵ and Cumming for U.S.

Hägglöf and Prytz stated categorically that Sweden will terminate the transit to and from both Norway and Finland of German military personnel and military supplies. They emphasized that the moment for such action must be determined by Sweden in the light of the military situation at the time and in this connection they emphasized the importance of adequate oil supplies to ensure full use of Swedish military forces in resisting German attack which might follow Swedish action.

Hägglöf readily agreed to our proposal that German military personnel be defined to include members of civilian organizations auxiliary to the German Armed Forces such as the Todt organization.

He was firm in maintaining Swedish legal obligations to permit transit of non-military supplies and gave no indication that we have any possibility of obtaining agreement to our proposal, which we will continue to press, that oil be added to the Swedish statutory list of military supplies transit of which is subject to license (see Swedish regulation of 1935 based on League of Nations definition of war material).

Discussion of possibility of instituting more rigid controls over transit traffic pending this termination were inconclusive. During discussion of Boheman's informal suggestion that quotas might be suspended if Sweden did not terminate transit traffic within a reasonable period it developed that neither Prytz nor Hägglöf were informed of Boheman's conversations with Ministers Johnson and Mallet on this point.

After further discussion it was agreed that we should draft a formula to be gone over in detail with the Foreign Office tomorrow and presented to the Swedes on Thursday morning. A separate telegram is being sent on this point.⁶⁶

WINANT

⁶³ Apparently Christopher F. A. Warner, Counselor of the British Foreign Office.

⁶⁴ Apparently Edward Osborne Coote of the British Foreign Office.

⁶⁵ Waldemar J. Gallman, First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

⁶⁶ Telegram No. 3446, May 19, 1943, noon, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom; not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/8491 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1943—11 p. m.

3183. Your 3430, May 18 and 3445, May 19.

1. Department and BEW consider it undesirable to relate the termination of the transit traffic to specific supplies of petroleum on hand in Sweden at any given moment. Consequently, we do not approve of putting forward the formula outlined in your 3430.

2. In the event, however, that the Swedes insist upon including as a part of any declaration on the subject a reference to the necessity of having petroleum supplies to resist an attack, we would have no objection.

3. Our suggestion is that we attempt to have the Swedes make a declaration that they will terminate the transit traffic when the military position of Sweden is favorable. This would of course be coupled by the definite acceptance by the Swedes that if the traffic is not terminated by, say, October first, we would be free to suspend basic rations in accordance with Boheman's informal proposal.

4. We note from your 3445 that the Swedes are firm in maintaining legal obligations to permit transit of non-military supplies. We trust, however, that you will continue to press for the proposed ceiling on this traffic not to exceed the present rate of non-military supplies which we understand is about 133,000 tons a year. This undertaking should of course be included, if possible, in the declaration to be obtained from the Swedes with respect to the transit of military personnel and military supplies.

5. We are glad to note from your 3445 that you are also continuing to press for inclusion of oil in the definition of military traffic.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8454 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1943—7 p. m.

3225. Your 3372, May 15, and your 3338, May 13. In connection with the statements made by Hägglöf, it is suggested that you point out the following at an appropriate time in the negotiations:

1. When the statistical mission was in Stockholm and asked about Sweden's commitments for exports to enemy Europe they do not seem to have been told of any promise to export to Germany certain quantities of paper and wood pulp on condition that during the first half

of the year Germany delivered 2 million tons of coke and coal. In any case, Hägglöf does not indicate that the promised deliveries of paper and wood pulp would exceed the ceilings proposed. With regard to iron ore, there may now be no provision limiting deliveries in the agreement with Germany but we are proposing that the Swedes restrict such deliveries on their own initiative. Presumably this would not violate any agreement made with Germany. With regard to other commodities, Hägglöf does not show that the exports allegedly promised to Germany would exceed the ceilings we propose, and where they do the Swedish Government should be able by intervention with the private firms to have them take the onus of refusing orders. We understand that this already has been done in some cases on the excuse that Swedish rearmament requires the increased use of plant facilities. Even if Hägglöf's statements about commitments to enemy Europe are confirmed by his "detailed statistics" we believe there is some suspicion that these commitments may be exaggerated by him since they were not mentioned in Stockholm and since with regard to some of them the export and import quotas would appear to be price agreements rather than guarantees of delivery.

Moreover, Hägglöf might be reminded that whatever agreements have been made by Sweden which violate the present war trade agreement cannot be made the basis for the objection that we are trying to upset Sweden's treaty obligations.

In view of the above, we are unable to accept the proposition made by Hägglöf whereby there would be no reduction in exports during the last half of this year.

2. With regard to your views as to the best bargain attainable, we believe that the agreement you outline could be approved here subject to the following comments:

a. There should be a specific provision for a reduction in Swedish exports of iron ore along the lines of your original formula and this should apply to the current year.

b. The reduction of 20 to 25 percent in total Swedish exports during the second half of this year as compared with the same period in 1942 might be satisfactory if an individual rubric basis were used and the most important commodity exports were adequately reduced. Do you propose to accomplish this reduction on the basis of the ceilings determined by reference to 1938 exports as you originally outlined or are you suggesting a different formula? It will be difficult here to obtain acceptance of a 6 month 20 to 25 percent reduction (which on an annual basis for 1943 will be a 10 to 12 percent reduction) unless it can be shown that items such as prefabricated houses, ball bearings, machinery, etc., are very drastically reduced, as they were by your original formula.

c. The exception made for Finland in the case of credits might be satisfactory for the current year, but we should like to limit credits in 1944 to those growing out of the triangular arrangements with

Denmark. If this is impossible, it might be possible to accept credits to Finland in 1944 to no greater extent than have already been granted in 1943. You should not press for these concessions at the expense of others of value of more interest to us.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8575 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, May 28, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received May 28—3: 50 p. m.]

1700. In discussing German traffic across Sweden yesterday Söderblom said strictly confidentially that Germans had been told some time ago specifically that should there be an invasion of Norway by United Nations, permission for traffic both for personnel and matériel would automatically be cancelled. Subsequently, he did not say when, Germans had been told that cancellation of traffic in future did not necessarily depend upon an invasion of Norway by United Nations. He stated categorically, however, that Germany had not been told as has been rumored here that Sweden had a definite intention even though at an indefinite date of stopping transit traffic. Foreign Minister in his address on foreign affairs in recent secret session of Riksdag said that Government was as anxious as press and public to stop transit traffic but that Government must be permitted to choose time and circumstances.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/8586 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 29, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 30—1: 40 a. m.]

3697. 1. It seems to us at this time that existing Swedish commitments make it most unlikely that we will be able to obtain a specific limitation on 1943 iron ore exports from Sweden, although the overall limitation to be placed by value on all Swedish exports to enemy Europe during 1943 may result in some decrease in iron ore exports.

2. The Swedes have offered, however, a general commitment to exert every effort within that portion of Swedish exports not covered by existing commitments to bring about as great a reduction as possible in 1943 trade with enemy Europe. They have also suggested two other possibilities which because of their nature should be treated with the greatest secrecy.

(a). If Soviet or other United Nations air and submarine activity in Baltic waters during the forthcoming months can be stepped up to an extent which would give the Swedish Government reason to consider Baltic waters dangerous to Swedish shipping, the Swedes might require all Swedish shipping in those waters to voyage in convoy through Swedish territorial waters, instead of through the open waters of the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic sea. The institution of compulsory convoy under Swedish naval escort would, the Swedes assert, furnish the Swedish Government an opportunity to slow down the movement of Swedish ore vessels by various military measures and thus indirectly bring about some reduction in iron ore exports.

(b). If United Nations naval and air action should bring about appreciable losses to vessels now engaged in the carrying trade between Sweden and enemy Europe, the Swedes believe that the shortage of tonnage available to the enemy would lead the Germans to press for the release of Swedish tonnage which is now laid up in Swedish ports and which is suitable for the Baltic trade. The Swedes suggest accordingly, that they enter into a commitment with us not to replace with Swedish tonnage any tonnage now engaged in trade between Sweden and enemy Europe which may be lost.

3. Above-mentioned suggestions are being studied by MEW which may also consult the Admiralty. We would appreciate your comments.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8627 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 4, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received June 4—1: 14 p. m.]

3805. For Department and Stone, BEW, from Riefler, Canfield and Cumming. At policy committee meeting June 3rd the following tentative compromise, broadly outlined, on our principal demands to the Swedes was reached:

Regarding 1943 exports to enemy Europe Hägglöf, in addition to limitations reported in our telegram 3768, June 2,⁶⁷ agreed to keep exports within group 18 to the value of such exports in 1942. He also agreed to limitations on exports in the last 6 months of 1943 to the extent of five twelfths of the value of exports in 1942 on such rubrics as 221, 438, 450, 457. On wood pulps for the current year he agreed to an overall limitation of 425,000 tons of which rayon pulp would comprise 250,000 tons. With regard to certain other rubrics like 552: 1 and 2, 523 and 524, we understand there will be a limitation to existing commitments which provide for exports of specific quantities. (This latter limitation will have to be confirmed.)

⁶⁷ Not printed.

Regarding 1944, Hägglöf agreed to an overall value limitation on exports to enemy Europe of 700 million kronor and a limitation on groups 6, 9, 10, 15, 16A, 17B, 18 to 75 percent of the value of the exports within said groups in 1942. Other groups are either relatively unimportant or substantially covered by list A or other export prohibitions.

Regarding rubrics and combinations of rubrics, Hägglöf agreed for 1944 to most of the limitations we had proposed as a compromise on key commodities.

[Here follows proposed limitations by value on a list of commodities identified by rubric number.]

Aside from Swedish concessions already reported, a generally satisfactory agreement can be expected regarding prohibition of exports of arms, ammunition, ships and other means of transport, additions to list A, processing, barter and metal clearing, inverted procedure, abolition of list B, consignee control on shipments to Argentine, and credits with the exception of Finland.

Regarding Finland, Swedes will limit credits for the last half of 1943 to 12,000,000 kronor, plus Treasury bills amounting to 8,000,000 kronor, of which 50% are guaranteed. (Acceptance by Swedes of Finnish Treasury bills in above amount is required by commitments already entered into.) As from January 1, 1944, the limit upon all new credits to Finland will be 15,000,000 kronor. No new tripartite arrangements involving Denmark and Finland will be entered into.

As to iron ore, although the Swedes state that existing commitments prevent them from agreeing to a definite limitation for 1943 we have already reported in Embassy's 3697 of May 29 regarding two possible courses of action proposed by the Swedish delegation which, as a practical matter, should bring about a reduction in the quantities of Swedish iron ore received by enemy Europe during 1943. Because of the secrecy which must be observed with regard to these proposals, we consider it unwise to repeat them in this telegram.

For 1944 the Swedish delegation has finally agreed to the ratio of not more than 2 tons of iron ore exported to 1 ton of coal or coke imported, and to an upper limit of 7,500,000 tons.

Swedes are willing to accept principles that general agreement will be binding, whether or not Gothenburg traffic remains open, and that proper adjustments in ceilings shall be made if any country in enemy Europe ceases to be enemy or enemy-occupied territory.

Hägglöf hopes that the general lines of an agreement as set forth above will be confirmed by his Government, but has firmly stated that in agreeing to some of the foregoing points, even though *ad referendum*, he has stretched his instructions almost to the breaking point. He has also emphasized that above limitations on Swedish ex-

ports will cause unemployment and other forms of economic dislocation.

We feel that with due regard to existing Swedish commitments which have been thoroughly discussed, and to the general difficulties inherent in a negotiation of the kind, we have obtained substantial concessions and have arrived at the basis for an agreement possibly more binding and comprehensive than any agreement yet concluded with a neutral.

There are, of course, still points to be pressed, but on the other hand policy committee has not yet discussed basic rations in any detail. With regard to basic rations, we expect that we shall have to take a generous attitude and, subject to your approval, meet the Swedes as far as possible.

Further discussions on transit and agreement on this question are held up until instructions are received from Washington regarding Swedish request for permission to pick up 120,000 tons of oil between January 1st and October 1st, and regarding Swedish request for an extra tanker. We hope that everything possible can be done to make the answer on these points a favorable one, in view of the concessions offered by the Swedes and of their general attitude of cooperation.

We will telegraph in greater detail shortly regarding tentative compromise arrangements with the Swedes covering all our demands. May we point out that to press a number of new points of detail from now on, after the exhaustive discussions which have taken place with the Swedes, would be bound to create difficulties and possibly jeopardize final acceptance of the points already generally agreed upon. [Riefler, Canfield, and Cumming.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8657 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 9, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received 11: 59 p. m.]

3918. Personal [for the Secretary]. Embassy is sending an airgram amplifying the outline of a tentative agreement with the Swedes transmitted in Embassy's No. 3805 of June 4, and is also telegraphing Swedes basic rations requests together with an indication of the importance the Swedish delegation attach to various items, and a possible basis for a compromise.

In connection with the above-mentioned communications, I have reviewed the progress of the negotiations to date with Riefler, Can-

field and Cumming. I have satisfied myself that the concessions offered by the Swedish delegation are really substantial, and probably represent the maximum attainable without bringing the negotiations to a standstill, and that, even with regard to trade in 1943, the Swedes have given us concessions, for political reasons, beyond those which might, from their point of view, be justified solely by the supply advantages to be derived from basic rations. I am equally convinced that our delegation have pressed the Swedes very hard on many occasions for further export limitations in 1943. It would be unwise, from the point of view of retaining advantages so far gained, to attempt to insist upon this point further.

Our negotiators attach the most importance to the value limitations on total Swedish exports to enemy Europe which are greater than they appear to be because Swedish prices are already higher than in 1942 and show a further tendency to rise, to the credit provisions, and to the limitations on the important groups and on most of the key rubrics after January 1, 1944. On the other hand, the limitations on rubrics in 1943 are less effective than I would wish, particularly in the case of iron ore, even when there is taken into account the extent to which Sweden is bound by previously entered into trade commitments for this year.

As to basic rations, the Swedish delegation is, as might be expected, pressing insistently and has intimated that unless its requests are given sympathetic consideration, the delegation may be unable to obtain approval of the Stockholm authorities to the concessions the delegation has offered. In this connection, I am inclined to accept, up to a point, Hägglöf's view that the proposed agreement will intensify shortages in Sweden and will cause economic dislocation.

I am aware that the Department is pressing for an early solution of the question of oil supplies for Sweden, but I venture to recall to the Department that any settlement in London of the transit traffic question must await Washington's decision on the oil matter.

After taking into account all the factors which are within my knowledge, I am satisfied that the proposed agreement is the best attainable at this time and recommend its acceptance. The Swedish delegation is most anxious to leave for Sweden as soon as possible because of the uncertainties of air travel between the United Kingdom and Sweden at this time of year and the urgent necessity of preparing for the German negotiations scheduled for the latter part of June or early July. Furthermore, the Swedish delegation have reiterated that their principal motive in coming to an agreement with the UK and US is that of settling promptly the principal questions relating to their overseas supplies and of obtaining supplies promptly before

October 1 when, they agreed, the Gothenburg traffic may be closed. Undue delay in settling the principal questions relating to supplies for Sweden from overseas may impel the Swedish Government to withdraw or at least modify concessions offered us by the Swedish delegates in London.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8593 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1943—9 p. m.

3709. Your 3745, June 1,⁶⁸ and other telegrams relating to oil for Sweden. We are in a position to authorize you to agree on behalf of this Government to the Swedes importing between January 1 and October 1, 1943, a total of 120,000 tons of petroleum products exclusively for the use of the Swedish armed forces, subject to our approval of the final terms of the Swedish undertaking on the transit traffic. Please cable proposed text.

When the occasion arises, you should inform the Swedes that this total of 120,000 tons represents the full quota for 1943. The balance of the petroleum products to be lifted under this quota must, of course, be carried in Swedish tankers and lifted from the Caribbean and Gulf areas.

This arrangement would carry with it our permission for the *Julius* to make the self-compensating voyage.

The final agreement will be predicated upon the following conditions: (1) a general agreement will be reached on the other matters under negotiation with the Swedes, (2) the Swedes will expressly reaffirm that these petroleum products will be reserved for and used exclusively by the Swedish armed forces, and (3) satisfactory agreement will be reached with the Swedes along the lines suggested by Von Shilling⁶⁹ with respect to control measures in Sweden permitting at the minimum American inspection of all Gothenburg ships which intend to off load petroleum products in Sweden.

(For your information, the authorization for the quota of 120,000 tons was given on the express condition "that competent supervision of such petroleum products gives us reasonable assurance that they are not used for the benefit of the Axis powers.")

HULL.

⁶⁸ Not printed.

⁶⁹ Franz von Shilling, Jr., Attaché of Legation in Sweden.

[Draft documents for a war trade agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden were agreed upon by the negotiators for the three countries in London. Copies of these documents were handed to the Swedish delegation at a final meeting on June 19. They were transmitted to the Department of State as enclosures to despatch No. 9667, June 21, 1943 (not printed). For texts finally accepted, see enclosures to despatch No. 11348, September 24, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, page 805.]

740.00112 European War 1939/8728 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 21, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received June 21—10:06 a. m.]

4093. Department's 3709, June 15, 9 p. m.

1. Following is summary of text of proposed Swedish declaration regarding transit traffic as agreed upon by Swedish, British and American negotiators subject to approval by their respective Governments:

Sweden undertakes to terminate before October 1st transit across Sweden by air, internal waterways or land of Axis military personnel and semi-military forces such as Todt Organization and of Axis war supplies. Sweden agrees simultaneously to limit to 120,000 tons per annum transit of all other goods passing from Germany or associated countries and occupied territories to either Finland or Norway. Up to August 1st Swedish Government has the right to inform the United Kingdom and United States Governments that foregoing measures cannot be carried through on October 1st, if Swedish Government considers that changes in the war situation have appreciably increased the risks involved in terminating transit traffic. In such event Sweden, United States and United Kingdom will jointly reconsider termination date and if agreement is not reached, United States and United Kingdom have the right to discontinue permitting Sweden to import basic rations, including oil supplies, through the blockade. In case of such discontinuance the three Governments will discuss the resulting situation and its bearing on the British, American and Swedish declarations agreed upon in London. Sweden affirms that passage of German personnel and war supplies through Falsterbo Canal is already forbidden and agrees to institute strict inspection of all German-controlled vessels passing through the canal whose port of origin or destination is not a Swedish port.

Finally, Sweden undertakes that Swedish naval vessels shall nowhere escort ships carrying German military personnel or war supplies.

2. Department will note that the undertaking with reference to the transit of non-military supplies across Sweden after October 1st is so phrased that the total traffic—Denmark through Sweden to Norway or Finland, Norway through Sweden to Norway [*Germany?*], Norway through Sweden to Finland, and Germany through Sweden to Norway or Finland—is limited to 120,000 tons per annum although the previous limits of approximately 200,000 tons for total transit traffic, military and non-military combined, applied solely to traffic from Denmark and Germany through Sweden to Norway or Finland. It is our impression that Hägglöf may not have been aware of this difference when he finally agreed to the figure of 120,000 tons. It is possible, consequently, that Stockholm will reopen this issue.

3. Annexed to draft declaration is a list of war supplies to be added to the present Swedish list. We have pressed vigorously for the definite inclusion of petroleum supplies in the revised list but have only succeeded in obtaining their tentative inclusion in the face of Hägglöf's assertion that he is under specific instructions not to accept this point. He made us a counter-offer to limit oil transits to present volume until August 1st when subject would be rediscussed, but we declined to negotiate on this basis. We feel that the Swedish Government may well renew this issue when it receives the full text of the draft transit traffic declaration.

For your information, according to the Swedes, the transit of oil from Germany through Sweden to Norway and Finland averaged 150 tons per month during the period November 1942–April 1943 and transit from Norway to Norway [*Germany?*] through Sweden averaged 950 tons per month during the period January–April 1943.

4. Arrangements for supply of oil to Sweden are covered by an exchange of letters (texts of which have been agreed upon subject to approval in Washington and Stockholm) under which United States agrees (a) that 120,000 tons of petroleum products be made available in the Caribbean and Gulf areas for shipment to Sweden in Swedish tankers in time for arrival between January 1st and October 1, 1943; (b) that tanker *Julius* be permitted to make one self-compensating voyage; and (c) that petroleum products be added to the list of basic rations and that the ration be 30,000 tons per quarter subject to the understanding that the basic ration for the four quarters of 1943 shall be made available for shipment before October 1, 1943.

Swedish reply to the foregoing letter will contain acceptance of the conditions laid down in the Department's 3709 of June 15. Inclusion of the oil quota in the basic rations makes the oil an additional and most important sanction for all of the commitments Swedes are assuming under their economic declaration.

740.00112 European War 1939/8801 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, July 1, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 7 : 32 p. m.]

2027. Swedish officials concerned in studying texts of draft documents for Anglo-American-Swedish trade agreement profess themselves privately to be greatly disturbed about formula covering transit question and limitation to 120,000 tons of goods not on list. They are particularly upset by use of expression that "Swedish Government undertakes". Reasons are those which I have reported to Department in many previous telegrams that Swedish Government has for internal political reasons as well as because of prospective difficulties with Germany thought it essential that action taken by Sweden to curtail or stop transit traffic should appear to be a unilateral act of Swedish Government and not result of bargaining with or pressure from Allied Powers.

There are a number of other points familiar to Department and American negotiators which give Government concern but matter is still under concentrated study and no formal reactions have been received so far. Officials in favor of agreement state that if Government gives favorable decision, which now appears possible, it will be entirely on grounds of policy as it is considered that agreement imposes much greater obligations on Sweden than it confers benefits. Changes of phraseology are to be requested.

Repeated to London as my No. 336 for Riefler, Cumming and Canfield.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/8827 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, July 5, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received July 6—9 : 03 a. m.]

2076. In a short conversation this morning with Hägglöf he intimated definitely that Swedes will not communicate their decision on draft documents for Anglo-American-Swedish Trade Agreement until they have received some indication of our own views. Question of form of Swedish declaration covering transit traffic referred to in my 2027, July 1, 6 p. m., is still causing Government difficulty. Hägglöf reiterated that objection is to expression that "Swedish Government undertakes". He said objection is to form and not to substance as Swedish Government has already made its mind up to stop traffic. Greatest difficulty now he said is our demand that oil and oil products be included in prohibition by Swedish Government of material in

transit. Government apparently would find it extremely difficult to press this point with Germans and wants to stick to 193 [1935?] definition of war materials.⁷⁰ Hägglöf intimated that several members of Government would prefer to find another occasion for excluding oil which would be more convenient from Swedish point of view in negotiations with Germans.

Repeated to London as our 345.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/8801 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1943—midnight.

4089. It does not seem that any action is required by us on the information in the first paragraph of Stockholm's 2027 July 1, (its 336 to you) but in order that you may be in a position to conclude agreement if question is formally raised by the Swedes we furnish you at this time our views.

We feel that the Swedes tend to be splitting hairs on this question. However, if the principle is clearly maintained that the Swedes formally inform us of their intention to stop the traffic under the conditions already agreed upon, we would accept any reasonable modification of the already proposed phraseology with a view to making it clearer the Swedes' action would be unilateral.

Repeated to Stockholm as our no. 750.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8817 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)

[Extract]

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1943—9 p. m.

4104. Your 4393, 5th.⁷¹

Recognizing the importance of winding up the negotiations as soon as possible and as you have already received our views and desiderata on all important points covered by the negotiations, we think it now

⁷⁰ Reference not clear ; see footnote 73, p. 786.

⁷¹ Not printed.

feasible to authorize you to agree without further reference to us to such further modifications in the proposed agreement as you deem reasonable and which do not materially modify any principles already agreed upon. This authority is given to avoid unnecessary delay in concluding the agreement.

Repeated to Stockholm as Department's no. 755.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8877: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, July 13, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

2184. This afternoon Boheman informed Mallet and me that instructions would be telegraphed this afternoon to Swedish Minister, London, for communication to American and British authorities of Swedish Government's reply regarding London trade agreement proposals. He wished to inform Mallet and me at same time of purport of these instructions and said that Minister Boström was likewise being informed but not for communication to Department. Following is paraphrase of text of *aide-mémoire* which it is said Prytz will present to American Embassy and MEW:

Draft agreement submitted by delegates who recently met in London has been carefully examined by Swedish Government for application of proposed Swedish declaration concerning transit traffic is that Swedish Government should conclude an agreement with one belligerent party concerning abolition of an undertaking toward other belligerent party. Swedish Government cannot possibly proceed in this manner. Within nearest future Swedish Government will, however, denounce transit agreements now in force with Germany.

Swedish Government are prepared to consider definitely a contractual regulation of other questions covered by declarations after transit through Sweden of military personnel and war material has ceased. Swedish Government have, however, intention to direct their foreign financial and commercial policy beginning at once in accordance with rules which will correspond to principles laid down in London declarations.

Royal Government venture to express their confidence that American and British Governments will also apply principles of declarations.

See immediately following telegram.⁷²

Repeated to London as my 376.

JOHNSON

⁷² *Infra.*

740.00112 European War 1939/8880 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, July 13, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received July 14—4:30 a. m.]

2185. When Boheman gave Mallet and me this afternoon text of *aide-mémoire* which Swedish Minister London is to give American Embassy on [and] BEW he made a number of oral statements which he said were purposely in that form and requested that they be transmitted to our Governments:

1. It is Swedish intention to inform Germans within a few weeks, which Boheman said meant literally that and suggested it might be 3 weeks, that all traffic in military personnel and in war materials must be terminated. War materials are those which are included in terms of Swedish-German transit agreement and in conformity with Geneva list of 1935.⁷³ Boheman stated that it is intention of Swedish Government, in short time remaining before this announcement is made to Germans, to increase their military preparations gradually all over the country, these preparations to be spread out in an endeavor to attract as little attention as possible and to be completed by time announcement is made to Germans. In this connection Boheman stated that during trade negotiations in Stockholm with Germans which have just terminated, Germans were advised that transit question would soon be taken up.

In regard to transit of oil to which we and British attach greatest importance, Boheman commented that this situation is difficult for Sweden as Sweden has nothing to invoke in bringing matter up with Germans. It is Swedish Government's intention however to make every possible endeavor to stop oil shipments altogether by October 1. He commented that amount is nothing in comparison with German shipments by sea to Narvik, 160,000 tons on that traffic and ships do not go to Narvik empty. Most other items on our extended war materials list not included in official Swedish list, which is basis of Swedish-German transit agreement, Boheman stated are already in practice prohibited and fully 80% will be stopped altogether at same time as transit agreement is denounced to Germans. Remaining items will be stopped as soon as possible.

In regard to reduction of German non-war material shipments to Finland and Norway to 120,000 tons Boheman states that practical

⁷³ Reference is uncertain: it may be to list in Arms Traffic Convention, signed at Geneva, June 17, 1925. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1925, vol. i, p. 61. This convention was ratified by the United States, June 21, 1935, with a reservation, and did not come into effect; for correspondence, see *ibid.*, 1935, vol. i, pp. 453 ff.

situation is somewhat different to that of item mentioned above. He referred to fact that when he was in London during last October and November he had undertaken to reduce this traffic to 200,000 tons, that is 100 [100,000] to Finland and one [100,000] to Norway, and that this undertaking had been kept; that explanation given to Germans at time was lack of railway capacity. Now however with denunciation of traffic in war materials it will be extremely difficult to say to Germans that railway capacity is reduced to 120,000 tons. Swedish Government cannot therefore give any definite undertaking on this point but will make every possible endeavor to diminish it.

Items in London draft declaration regarding (1) Falsterbo Canal and (2) escort of ships are fully agreed to by Swedish Government.

2. War trade.

Swedes in accordance with declaration given in London have already refused any new credit to Germany (see my 2126, July 8, 8 p. m., and 2127, July 9, 10 a. m.⁷⁴). Likewise in accordance with spirit of declaration they have considerably diminished their trade with Denmark and have sent home with empty hands Bulgarian delegation which was recently here with offers very tempting for Sweden. Negotiations with Finland now going on for trade agreement for second half 1943 will be concluded in accordance with London declaration. Definite steps have been taken to stop entirely repair of German cars and Axis ships. These measures should be fully effective as soon as work on ships now on hand is completed. Principles set forth in London declarations will also be followed in principle in trade negotiations for 1944.

3. Boheman pointed out that all foregoing represent radical changes in direction of Swedish trade policy since April of 1940. This change Swedish Government does not wish to confirm in a formal agreement before complicated transit question has been liquidated. He said that decision to terminate traffic at an earlier date than that proposed in London declaration might seem to be to Sweden's disadvantage in that it will give rise at least to danger of earlier stopping Gothenburg traffic. Swedish Government has taken all this into consideration but prefers to run risk of such losses and to terminate traffic entirely as a unilateral act rather than as result of a formal agreement which Swedish Government according to Boheman considers in some degree humiliating.

Swedish Government he said would greatly welcome it if steps could be taken for an immediate constitution of joint standing committee on a trilateral basis so that Allied Governments might be

⁷⁴ Neither printed.

informed through their own sources of Sweden's action and assure themselves that carrying out of Swedish policy was in accord with London declaration. In reply to a question from me Boheman said he did not consider fact that United States was not a party to Anglo-Swedish war trade agreement would be any impediment to American representation and remarked that our representation could be easily effected by an exchange of notes.

4. Boheman said finally there were two special matters which he wanted to mention, (1) the fishing boats; he said Swedish authorities have made thorough study of whole situation and as result Government is determined not to prevent remainder of these boats from leaving. Swedish Government is convinced these boats are genuine fishing boats and information in British Admiralty to contrary is wrong. In order to show their good faith they are entirely willing that Captain Denham, British Naval Attaché and some other representative (Townsend, representative of Lloyd's at Gothenburg was suggested) together with an expert from London personally examine fishing boats. He said, however, that Government's decision would not be altered by result of that examination. They are convinced that Captain Denham's theory is entirely wrong and in effect reject entire British thesis on these boats as unfounded in fact. He also said that an American representative would be welcome if he desired to go. (2) Regarding inspection of ships bringing oil to Sweden under agreement, he said Swedish Government had no objection to Petroleum Attaché carrying out any inspection he desired and remarked that *Saturnus* had already arrived and that Petroleum Attaché could make inspection when he wished.

5. Boheman expressed hope of Swedish Government that American and British Governments would realize very far extent to which Swedes had gone in endeavoring to meet their views and felt confident that they would recognize Sweden's desire to live up fully to principles of London declarations. He likewise expressed formally on behalf of Swedish Government their deep appreciation of consideration, kindness, and helpfulness of American and British officials in London who had conducted negotiations leading to agreement. All members of Swedish Delegation have expressed privately to me their appreciation for attitude they encountered in London on part of American and British representatives. They were impressed by their ability as well as their good faith and personal friendliness in these difficult negotiations.

Repeated to London as my 377.

740.00112 European War 1939/8898 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, July 15, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received July 15—9:15 p. m.]

4617. The following has been sent to Stockholm, 205, July 15, 10 p. m.

Reference your 2184 and 2185, July 13, to Department, repeated to London as your 376 and 377.

1. Prytz was received at the Foreign Office this afternoon to present communications which were the subject of the telegrams referred to above. Representatives of Embassy and MEW were present.

2. Sir Orme Sargent made following comments which had previously been agreed upon between Foreign Office, MEW and Embassy: British and American Governments welcome Swedish decision to denounce transit agreements; desire however information regarding precise date on which cessation of transit traffic will take place; welcome Swedish acceptance of Anglo-American proposals regarding escorts and Falsterbo Canal traffic; note Swedish intention regarding transit of oil and additions to list of Axis war supplies but desire to know whether in fact transit of all these commodities will be definitely terminated before October 1st; desire to know whether Swedish intention to endeavor to diminish nonwar material transits means that the value of such transits will be limited to 120,000 tons per annum before October 1st; assume that since the Swedish communications raise no other specific points the texts of the draft declarations and letters drawn up in London, as subsequently supplemented and amended in Mr. Riefler's letter to Prytz of July 9,⁷⁵ are accepted by the Swedish Government and that as soon as transit traffic is closed draft letters and declarations will be signed; desire to know whether in the meantime Sweden would agree that all three parties should act in all particulars as though above-mentioned documents were already in force; note omission of mention of trawlers and desire to know whether, if the Germans close the Göteborg traffic before delivery is completed, Swedish Government in retaliation would withhold delivery of the balance of trawlers or, alternatively, would the Swedish Government in such case be prepared to requisition the trawlers for their own use; note with regret that Swedish communications do not mention conclusion of charters to the War Shipping Administration of the free Swedish ships which are already long overdue and ought

⁷⁵ Mr. Riefler's letter not found in Department files.

to be completed immediately; and stress that we desire to receive at once Swedish replies on all above points.

3. Prytz agreed to telegraph foregoing to his Government tonight and added that he had already noted omission of charter question and had telegraphed yesterday, urging that the necessary steps for conclusion of the matter be expedited.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8936 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 19, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received 11:25 p. m.]

4705. For Department and Stone OEW ⁷⁶ from Riefler. Prytz arranged an interview this afternoon at Foot's office which I attended, at which he presented informally the *aide-mémoire*, set out below, which the Swedish Government will present to us tomorrow at the Foreign Office in response to our *aide-mémoire* of July 15, described in Embassy's 4617 July 15, 10 p. m.

The Swedish *aide-mémoire*, as you will see, represents a considerable advance over that presented last week ⁷⁷ but is still very unsatisfactory in certain respects. Prytz acknowledged that the absence of a clear and unequivocal reply from the Swedish Government was unsatisfactory from our point of view, but pointed out that the Swedish Government on its side was not asking a specific commitment from us with respect to basic rations. He emphasized that the problem was likely to be short lived, and also that, as soon as the transit traffic had in fact stopped, the Swedish Government would sign a commercial agreement with us. He pointed out that this interim period would be very short and asked our forbearance during it in spite of the difficulties.

Aide-mémoire presented by Prytz is as follows:

1. Noted.
2. The Swedish Government cannot state an exact date, as they must have liberty to negotiate. It can only, however, be a matter of a few weeks.
3. Noted.
4. Negotiations with the object of stopping the transit of oil and other commodities in the extended war materials list regarding which uncertainty exists will be started at the same time as those regarding transit of war materials and personnel. The result of same will be

⁷⁶ Office of Economic Warfare, successor agency of the Board of Economic Warfare.

⁷⁷ See telegram No. 2184, July 13, 8 p. m., from the Minister in Sweden, p. 785.

known and applied simultaneously with the cessation of general transit facilities i.e. within a few weeks. In no circumstances will any increase of oil transit be permitted.

5. Whilst no fixed ceiling can for the moment be stated, the volume of general transit will under all circumstances be reduced below the earlier level.

6 and 7. Referring to the *aide-mémoire* submitted at last meeting, the Swedish Government is not willing to give a formal undertaking regarding future signature of an agreement which would, in practice, mean the conclusion of an agreement now. It repeats its intention of signing an agreement on the general basis of the declarations and letters agreed upon in London, when transit has ceased. Specifically it accepts the additions to the A-list and states that it sees no difficulties with regard to the other export limiting provisions of this declaration which are all being respected since 1st July.

8. The Government have informed the Swedish shipping committee that they have no objection to an immediate conclusion of a new charter agreement.

9. It is not possible to discuss now on a hypothetical basis the question of the Swedish Government's reaction to a possible German threat against the Göteborg traffic. Any retaliatory action must be a matter for the Swedish Government. End *aide-mémoire*.

We are planning at the meeting at the Foreign Office tomorrow to ask the Swedish Government to define what is meant by the phrase "general transit" in the answer to question 5. If this means that the total transit of German traffic across Sweden will be reduced below the levels hitherto obtaining, it is unsatisfactory because Germany would still have an opportunity to increase the actual flow of non-military traffic. If, on other hand, the phrase "general transit" means Sweden will reduce the transit of general non-military commodities, our objectives will have been gained.

With reference to the answer to questions 6 and 7, we plan to ask the Swedish Government to specify what specific parts of the draft declarations and letters present difficulties to them and concerning which they may ask amendments.

Prytz said that he had informed the Swedish shipping representative here to proceed immediately to the conclusion of the ship charter with us. I have requested Nottman⁷⁸ to get in touch with him and complete the agreement as rapidly as possible.

In our discussion, Foot and I both emphasized the difficulties that the Swedish answer raised for us. Prytz was told that the Swedish reply came very near to giving us what we desired, but not quite to the point where we could proceed to implement the negotiations in a satisfactory manner. Foot also raised specifically the problem of the letter on Norwegian relief and asked whether the Swedish Govern-

⁷⁸ Presumably reference is to Arthur Notman, member of the American Mission for Economic Affairs.

ment saw any reason why this problem could not be worked upon in advance of the termination of the transit traffic. Prytz stated that he saw personally no reason and agreed to cable his Government asking whether it would be ready to receive the letter on relief immediately. [Riefler.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8943 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 20, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received July 21—1:10 a. m.]

4722. The meeting at the Foreign Office with Prytz referred to in our 4705, July 19, 10 p. m., has been postponed to Wednesday July 21. We have had several conferences today between MEW, Foreign Office and Embassy on the strategy to be followed at that meeting. We have now agreed that, as Prytz formally presents *aide-mémoire* from the Swedish Government relayed to you in reference telegram, we will question him orally on following points:

1. The meaning of the word "negotiations" with respect to the transit traffic in the *aide-mémoire*. We shall state that it had been the understanding of the British and American Governments that the Swedes planned to stop the transit traffic as a unilateral act simply announcing the date without preliminary negotiations. If they are now undertaking to negotiate the stoppage of the transit traffic and the commodities to which such stoppage will apply, does this not mean that some of the economic concessions made to us in the draft agreements may be jeopardized.

2. We plan to ask for a clearer definition of the phrase "general transit" as stated in yesterday's reference telegram.

3. We shall comment with reference to the Swedish answer to question 6 and 7 that the reply leaves us completely uncertain as to what parts of the text of the draft declarations and letters are acceptable to them and what parts they may wish to amend.

After making these verbal comments on specific phrasing of the *aide-mémoire*, we shall tell the Swedes that we think the answer as a whole does not constitute a real answer from the Swedish Government, either to the letters which the British and American Governments conveyed to them on July 9 containing the terms on which they would be prepared to sign the agreement with the Swedes, or to the very specific questions asked of the Swedes on July 15 as described in Embassy's 4617, July 15, 10 p. m. We shall request Prytz, therefore, to ask his Government to submit a new reply indicating (a) whether it is the intention of the Swedish Government to observe from now onwards

all the provisions without exception contained in the declarations and letters agreed upon in London (except [*except*] such as specifically refer to the manner of closing the transit traffic), (b) if this is not the intention of the Swedish Government, what are the provisions which the Swedish Government will be prepared to accept as they now stand and what are the provisions which they desire to amend, (c) what will be the nature of such amendments.

The above procedure was formulated on our part after receiving your 4364, July 19, 9 p. m.⁷⁹ We await anxiously your reactions to the Swedish reply and to the questions we are asking.

It was not possible to charter the Swedish ships today because the Swedish shipping representatives had not yet received word from Stockholm that they could proceed. They stated that they were expecting the word at any moment.

Both the Foreign Office and MEW here are contemplating the possible necessity of stopping navicerts and export licenses for Sweden if the new Swedish reply is still unsatisfactory. We have hesitated to adopt this procedure because we are not sure that it will be wise to use a club of this kind at the present delicate phase of the situation in Stockholm over stopping the transit traffic. In any case we have decided that it would be unwise to stop navicerts prior to the chartering of the Swedish ships to the WSA⁸⁰ unless we were convinced that such charter was being delayed by the Swedes as a tactical device. We would appreciate it, however, if the Department and OEW would make the necessary preliminary preparation so that this sanction could be invoked smoothly and quickly if it should appear tactically wise to use it.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9001 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, July 30, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 8:49 p. m.]

2367. I learned from Söderblom today in strictest confidence that Swedish Government has this week informed German Government both through Legation here and through Swedish Legation in Berlin that Swedish Government can no longer permit transit traffic of troops and material to and from Norway. No specific date for cessation of traffic was set.

When this information was given to a representative of German Legation here at Foreign Office, German representative made no com-

⁷⁹ Not printed; it stated that the Department would await Swedish reply before taking any position on the new situation (740.00112 European War 1939/8921).

⁸⁰ War Shipping Administration.

ment other than to say that it was a matter of most serious import and must naturally be referred directly to attention of Fuehrer. Söderblom says there are three possible reactions: (1) Early bombing and attack on Sweden, (2) sharp reprisals and blockade, and (3) Germans will accept it quietly to avoid as much notoriety as possible as matter of prestige. Söderblom while profoundly hopeful there will be no attack on Sweden, more particularly a bombing attack, does not feel sure that there will not be. From reasonable point of view third of alternatives would be best for Germans' own interests. As Hitler is not a reasonable person however, he may out of spite take some violent action. If he does not Söderblom is disposed to feel that third alternative is most likely.

It is probable that Foreign Minister will have press conference on Monday, August 2nd, and give background to press but not for publication for a week or two. Foreign Office is particularly anxious that nothing leak out about this before publication. In addition to informing this Legation Söderblom has informed British Chargé d'Affaires in sense of first paragraph of this telegram.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/9008 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 31, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 4 : 39 p. m.]

5001. For Department and Stone and Canfield OEW. Reference Embassy's 4959, July 29, 9 p. m., and Embassy's 5002, July 31.⁸¹ There follows for your approval text agreed upon between Embassy, MEW and Foreign Office of *aide-mémoire* to be presented to Swedish Minister. For comment on this document see Embassy's 5002.

1. His Majesty's Government and the United States Government are deeply concerned at the position which has arisen in the matter of the agreement *ad referendum* recently concluded in London with representatives of the Royal Swedish Government, as they are convinced that a prompt settlement on these questions would contribute to the improvement of relations generally between Sweden and Great Britain and the USA.

2. They attach the greatest importance, as the Swedish Government is aware, to the speedy implementation of the declaration, annexes and letters (hereinafter referred to as the economic agreement) drawn up in London. The decision of His Majesty's Government and the United States Government with reference to this agreement was communicated to the Swedish Minister in London on 9th, July. After a

⁸¹ Neither printed.

lapse of more than blank weeks since the Swedish delegation returned to Stockholm the two Governments remain without any precise information as to the intentions of the Swedish Government.

3. Although the Swedish Government have so far refused to give His Majesty's Government and the United States Government the assurances they have asked for with respect to the economic agreement, they have explained this refusal solely on political grounds which will be removed when the transit of troops and war materials has ceased. At the same time, they have informed His Majesty's Government and the United States Government that they have taken every step in their power to put into force the stipulations contained in the agreement. Further, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed His Majesty's Minister in Stockholm that he has in mind at the present no amendments to the economic agreement. His Majesty's Government and the United States Government therefore consider themselves justified in assuming that the agreement which the Swedish Government will be ready to sign will be the same in all material particulars as the documents drafted in London, as amended in Mr. Riefler's letter of July 9.

4. By stopping the transit of Axis troops and war material, Sweden will merely be resuming her obligations as a neutral. If consequently such action should be delayed it could not be said that Sweden had made any effort to restore herself to a normal neutral attitude or to show herself ready adequately to readjust her attitude as between the two belligerent parties, notwithstanding the fact that the war situation has radically changed even since the London negotiations.

5. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government and the United States Government interpret the recent assurances and explanations of the Swedish Government as justifying them in assuming:

(a) That the final termination of the transit of Axis troops and war materials will take effect within a very short time from now.

(b) That the negotiations with the German Government are intended by the Swedish Government to result in the stoppage of the transit of oil and other war materials not already covered by existing Swedish legislation, and in the limitation of the transit of non-war materials to its present annual figure; and that the result of these negotiations will be announced and applied simultaneously with the termination of the transit of Axis troops and war materials.

(c) That in these negotiations with the German Government the Swedish Government will make no compensatory concessions to Germany.

(d) That in any event the Swedish Government will not permit an increase in the transit of oil above the present annual figure.

6. On the basis of the assumptions in paragraphs 3 and 5 above, His Majesty's Government and the United States Government intend to continue to carry out their obligations as though the economic agreement had been signed and the transit question settled. If, unfortunately, these assumptions should prove unjustified the position

would then be that the Swedish Government would have accepted the benefits conferred upon them by the economic agreement without in any way indicating that they were not prepared to fulfill their own undertakings. In this eventuality the effect upon the general relations of Sweden with Great Britain and the United States of America could not but be of an extremely serious nature.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8999 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1943—midnight.

4629. Repeated to Stockholm as our No. 839. Please discuss the following with the British:

I. Having now received word that the Swedes have actually informed the Germans the transit traffic can no longer be permitted (Stockholm's 2367, July 30 to us) we deem it necessary to develop as soon as possible a definite position vis-à-vis the present status of the London negotiations (your 4959, July 29⁸²).

II. We recognize that the Swedes are now actively dealing with a matter—the stopping of the transit traffic—which they deem rightly or wrongly of crucial importance to the physical safety of Sweden and that until they have found a solution to this problem no economic or political threats on our part are likely to have any decisively favorable effect; and hence that there is nothing to be gained in trying to force them into an economic agreement which we are confident they won't actually sign before they feel reasonably satisfied that the Germans are not going to attack them over the transit traffic affair.

III. We believe the Swedes feel as we do that on a showdown the Germans will not attack but will either (a) make sharp economic reprisals possibly by cutting off the Göteborg traffic or (b) accept the Swedish action quietly. As the stopping of the Göteborg traffic is a distinct possibility and in the event of which the Swedes would be prevented almost entirely from obtaining the economic benefits of the London declarations and would thus become more dependent economically upon trade with the Axis, it would not seem unlikely that, in the absence of some early action by us having the effect to the greatest possible degree of morally binding them to the provisions of those declarations, the Swedes may, to be free to trade with the Axis, take the position that they had unilaterally undertaken to put the declarations into effect without awaiting formal signature but

⁸² Not printed.

that we by our failure to take corresponding action relieved them of any binding obligation to continue their undertakings.

IV. Accordingly we feel the proposed declaration by the United States and United Kingdom Governments mentioned in last paragraph your 4959, July 29, should contain a statement to the effect that upon the basis of our understanding that the Swedes will fully live up as from now on to all the London declarations, et cetera, and will adopt no course of action which would have the effect of preventing full compliance on their part with the terms thereof, we for our part will do likewise; but that, if before formally signing the declarations at a later date the Swedes ask for amendments other than in form or if they unduly delay signing the declarations, we desire to put them on notice that we may also ask for substantial amendments which, it is fully anticipated, would result on balance in our position becoming less favorable to Sweden than the declarations, et cetera, as they now stand.

HULL

740.00111 European War 1939/713: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, August 6, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received August 7—4: 27 p. m.]

2457. Boheman asked me to see him this afternoon to convey following information which he felt would be of interest to Department:

When broaching with Germans Swedish decision to stop German transit traffic Swedes endeavored to include transit of oil but on this point met with stubborn resistance from Germans. Boheman said that although it had been made clear to Germans that Sweden in any case would stop transit traffic, they desired if possible to do so in agreement with Germans. It became evident that if oil were insisted upon their action could not be taken by agreement with Germans. It was therefore decided to drop oil and following declaration was made to Germans—that Sweden reserved right to take up at a later time question of stopping oil traffic and that in any case it must stop definitely by October 1. Boheman pointed out that this was date which had been previously indicated to us as objective to which his Government was working but that notice had been given to Germans in categorical form that oil traffic must cease at least by that date. In refusing to include oil in present agreement which was subject of joint communiqué reported in my 2441, August 5, 7 p. m.,⁸³ Germans had stated that if Sweden took unilateral action

⁸³ Not printed.

about oil they would have to take necessary counter-measures. Boheman said this could only have meant probable stoppage of Göteborg traffic and certainly stoppage of all Rumanian oil transited through Germany. He does not feel that this latter would have caused Sweden very much inconvenience as it is not likely that much oil will be coming from Rumania if Allies keep up their present rate of destruction of Rumanian oil fields. He said that his Government was not in least disturbed by prospect of having transit for oil from Rumania stopped by Germans. They did feel it important, however, to effect cessation of traffic by joint agreement with Germany and he believes that by having done so they have saved Göteborg traffic. He also expressed an opinion, which he said was a purely personal feeling on his part, that judging from way Swedish notification was handled in Germany Hitler is no longer functioning. He doubts that matter was even put up to him.

Foreign Office has been subject of much favorable comment in today's press for its skillful handling of this question with Germany which has effected result desired without any damage to Sweden's own position.

Boheman especially requested that information regarding Sweden's announcement to Germans that oil traffic must cease by October 1, be treated with utmost secrecy. He is still critical of premature leakages in London regarding Swedish intentions to cut off transit traffic and reports in this morning's press from London to effect that "official circles are querying what Sweden has done about oil transits". These leakages of information in London can do no possible good, are embarrassing for Sweden and have been resented here.

During our conversation, I took occasion to mention to Boheman report in irresponsible Communist paper *Arbetaren* of July 10 (my telegram 2207, July 15⁸⁴) regarding ordinary civilian visa traffic between Germany and Norway. Boheman characterized story as wholesale fabrication. He said that Germans had been explicitly told during recent negotiation for stopping transit traffic that there could be no increase whatever in visa travel between Germany and Norway as result of curtailment military traffic. He did not know exactly how many of these visa cases there are but thought there were not more than 100 a day including passages in both directions. Sweden has always, he said, in regard to this individual visa travel insisted with Germans that each case must be decided on an individual basis. There have been no en bloc grantings of these visas and Swedish consuls have instructions in this sense. War Department may be interested in this paragraph as Colonel Waddell⁸⁵ received this morn-

⁸⁴ Not printed.

⁸⁵ Col. Hugh B. Waddell, Military Attaché in Sweden.

ing an inquiry from General Strong⁸⁶ regarding report in my 2207, July 15.

Repeated to London as my 433.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/9043 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 6, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received August 6—4:50 p. m.]

5165. For Department and Stone and Canfield OEW from Riefler. Reference Department's 4694, August 3, 9 p. m., and Embassy's 5104, August 5, 7 p. m.⁸⁷ The text of the *aide-mémoire* under discussion in reference telegrams is no longer relevant in view of the formal announcement from Stockholm of impending stoppage of transit traffic. Foreign Office, MEW and Embassy all feel that the best procedure now would be for Foot and Riefler to present a simple *aide-mémoire* to Prytz stating that we now expect the Swedes to sign the economic agreement in accordance with the drafts previously worked out. Should the Swedes fail to come to terms, or should they offer substantial amendments, it is suggested a more serious attitude should be taken, including a very direct message from a higher level, probably from the Foreign Secretary and Ambassador Winant, and possibly revocation of navicerts or diversion of ships at the Faroes. None of us feel at present that these pressures will be necessary since the Swedes seem to be living up in all particulars to the spirit of the draft declarations.

Foreign Office, MEW and Embassy have agreed (subject to Department concurrence) on the following text of the *aide-mémoire* to be presented to Prytz by Foot and Riefler. Department and OEW undoubtedly understand the urgency of the situation. We would like to present the *aide-mémoire* as early next week as possible.

[Here follows text which, with some changes later suggested by the Department, is substantially the same as the text submitted on August 9; see telegram No. 5232, August 9, 11 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, printed on page 800.]

[Riefler]
HULL

⁸⁶ Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department.

⁸⁷ Neither printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/9043 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1943—midnight.

4787. Your 5165, August 6, 9 p. m. Revised *aide-mémoire* is approved. Our understanding, however, is that Swedish Government has consistently maintained the position that it could not sign the economic agreement until transit traffic had ceased, not as would be implied from the first sentence of paragraph numbered 2 of your draft *aide-mémoire* immediately after the public announcement that the transit traffic would be stopped. Accordingly, we suggest that the word "now" in the first sentence of paragraph 2 be deleted and the words "very shortly after August 20" be added to this sentence. Correspondingly, word "now" in last sentence of paragraph 2 should also be deleted.

We hope that the British will agree to this amendment and that *aide-mémoire* can be delivered to the Swedes at the earliest possible moment.

We think it inadvisable to attempt at this time to define what position we will adopt with respect to future developments.

We would be interested to know the reasons for omitting from the revised *aide-mémoire* the sense of the first sentence of paragraph 6 of your original draft.⁸⁸ As indicated in our 4629, July 31, we attached considerable importance to that point.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/9062 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, August 9, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received August 9—9:42 p. m.]

5232. For Department, Stone and Canfield OEW from Riefler. Reference Department's 4787, August 7, midnight.

1. Department's suggestions given in reference telegram were considered highly constructive by all parties in London and incorporated in the *aide-mémoire* which was presented to Prytz this afternoon. Prytz seemed highly pleased and did not indicate that we were incorrect in our assumptions. You will note that the first paragraph of the *aide-mémoire* has been changed slightly in conformity with the latest information received here from our missions in Stockholm.

2. The *aide-mémoire* follows:

⁸⁸ See telegram No. 5001, July 31, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 794.

His Majesty's Government and the United States Government have learnt with satisfaction of the Swedish Government's announcement that the transit traffic through Sweden of German war materials and troops on leave will cease finally on August 15th and August 20th, respectively. They are also glad to learn that the transit of oil will be stopped not later than October 1st. They expect to learn shortly that the transit of other war materials not already covered by existing Swedish legislation is also being stopped and that the transit of non-war materials will be limited to its present annual figure. On the basis of the discussions that have taken place, they assume that this announcement in fact covers all Axis war materials and service personnel, including auxiliary and semi-military forces.

His Majesty's Government and the United States Government understand from recent Swedish communications that the Swedish Government will be ready to sign an economic agreement shortly after August 20. In view of the action of the Swedish Government in putting into force the stipulations contained in the economic agreement drafted in London and of the statement of the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Minister in Stockholm on July 24 that he had in mind no amendments to that agreement. His Majesty's Government and the United States Government confidently assume that the agreement which the Swedish Government will be ready to sign shortly after August 20 will be the same in all material particulars as the documents drafted in London, as amended in Mr. Riefler's letter of July 9, to the Swedish Minister in London. In view of this assumption, His Majesty's Government and the United States Government intend to continue to carry out their obligations as though the economic agreement had been signed.

[Riefler]
WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9205 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 1, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received September 2—6 : 45 a. m.]

5771. For Department and Stone and Canfield, OEW, from Riefler. As stated in Embassy's 5750 of August 31, 11 p. m.,⁸⁹ the Swedish reply to Riefler's letter of July 9 was presented at MEW this morning. It consisted of a note and a memorandum. The Swedish delegation also gave Foot and Riefler a redraft of the Swedish declaration incorporating both their amendments and those set forth in letter of July 9. In the note, the Swedish Government stated :

1. That it was now prepared to put the Swedish draft declaration and various letters into effect as amended by Riefler's letter of July 9, provided that the declarations of the United States and the United Kingdom were fulfilled as drafted.

⁸⁹ Not printed.

2. That, while making the above-mentioned statement, the Swedish Government added the following reservation:

"In so far as these statements concern Sweden's relations with the other Nordic countries they are to be regarded as the expression of the Swedish Government's intentions as the situation is now gauged. In the event of the political position of any of the Nordic countries being essentially changed the Swedish Government must, however, for reasons of principle, reserve their right to liberty of action for the protection of common Nordic interests arising out of the new developments. At the same time the Swedish Government declare themselves prepared to give all possible consideration to the contents of the declaration, even if such developments as cannot now be foreseen occur."

3. That experience in application of the draft Swedish declaration since July 1 has prompted the Swedish Government to suggest certain modifications or reservations which are set forth in a memorandum of September 1st. Due to the technical character of these reservations and modifications, it is the suggestion of the Swedish Government that discussion of them take place before tripartite joint standing commission which Swedish Government believes should be established as soon as possible.

4. That should the American and British Governments agree, the note presented today with the replies thereto will be considered as putting into effect the documents mentioned below: (a) Swedish declaration and four annexes; (b) United Kingdom declaration and two annexes; (c) United States declaration and two annexes; (d) letters concerning: (1) ships; (2) drugs; (3) oil (three letters); (4) Norwegian relief; (5) statistics; (6) machinery and railway trucks.

It should be noted that the latter of these letters is the one previously described as the 3-point letter. For alterations, see last paragraph of memorandum.

Embassy's comment follows in an additional telegram, and memorandum is being transmitted in Embassy's clear telegram 5770, 1st.⁹⁰ Pertinent sections of amended draft Swedish declaration will likewise be telegraphed. [Riefler.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9292 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1943.

5637. For Economic Warfare Division. Reference Embassy's 5770, 5771 and 5772 of September 1, 5831 of September 3 and your 6066, September 13.⁹¹ For your information, Department and OEW are

⁹⁰ Not printed.

⁹¹ Telegrams Nos. 5770, 5772, 5831, and 6066 not printed.

anxious to facilitate conclusion of the agreement with Sweden as rapidly as possible. Therefore, we suggest that no amendments should be made to the agreement now, but that it be signed as it stands. The questions raised by the Swedish memorandum of September 1 can be left without prejudice to subsequent discussion in the Joint Standing Commission. We suggest that you discuss with MEW presentation of a note along the following lines:

The U.S. Government and HM Government take note of the Swedish Government's memorandum of September 1⁹² expressing its willingness to conclude the agreement drafted in London, as amended by Mr. Riefler's letter of July 9 and as supplemented by the declaration made regarding Sweden's relations with other Nordic countries.

With reference to the observations made by the Swedish Government in its memorandum of September 1 on several provisions of the Agreement, the U.S. Government and HM Government feel that it would be more practicable to have the Agreement signed in its present form, leaving the points raised therein for consideration by the Joint Standing Commission at an early meeting. However, in order that the Swedish Government may be apprised in advance of the views of the U.S. Government and HM Government on these points, the following observations are made:

1. That the ceiling established for exports of commodities in group 15 is not to be exceeded (Comment: We agree with you that a firm stand should be taken with the Swedes on this point. You might indicate to them that the present ceiling of 220 million kronor is substantially in excess of 1942 exports and that this additional leeway was agreed to by us to take care of both existing commitments and of price increases. We cannot, therefore, agree to a further increase.)

2. That discussions will be permitted in the Joint Standing Commission for interpretation of the Swedish commitments regarding gold acquisition, provided it is understood that no modification will be made of the undertaking which will in any way violate the commitment whereby Swedish exports to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories are to be paid for without credit or gold transfers except those specifically permitted in the agreement.

3. That where payment for Swedish exports to Denmark and Finland is to be made from the German or other clearings, the case will be brought in advance before the Joint Standing Commission for approval. It should be understood that permission for such payment cannot be granted if it would involve credits or gold transfers not permitted in the agreement.

4. That full details will be given to the Joint Standing Commission regarding the Swedish shipbuilding agreement with Germany for 1941, 1942, and 1943; and that our assumption is correct that no vessels will be delivered to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories under this agreement subsequent to December 31, 1943, except those to which Germany is entitled by virtue of her performance of these agreements before December 31, 1943. It is also understood that no extension of this agreement will be made enabling its operation after December 31, 1943.

⁹² Not printed.

5. That the export of bearings from Sweden to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories shall be limited by the separate rubrics indicated in the draft agreement, except that a margin of not more than 10 percent may be allowed in each rubric provided that the total value remains within the total limitation for the three rubrics.

6. That if no agreement can be reached on negotiated sales of Swedish stocks in accordance with Section 4 (Paragraph 2) of the U.K. and U.S. declaration, the Swedish Government will be free to dispose of such goods only if they are located in territories outside of control of HM Government or the U.S. Government (Comment: It might be pointed out in this connection that the U.S. Government cannot give up its undoubted right to requisition, as provided by pertinent laws and regulations, but this Government hopes that the right would have to be exercised only in exceptional cases. The Swedes should also be reminded that price control measures established by the U.S. Government, in a long run benefit the Swedish Government by enabling them to make their purchases at a stabilized low price level.)

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/9361 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 23, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received September 23—8: 45 p. m.]

6379. For Department and Stone and Canfield, OEW. Reference Department's 5637, September 15.

1. At 12: 30 p. m. on September 23, the agreement with Sweden was initialed at MEW. Agreement was put into effect by a note based wholly on covering letter prepared originally for Sir Orme Sargent's signature.

2. Text of agreement was substantially that of draft of June 19 as amended by Riefler's letter of July 9; with exception of minor alterations and acceptance of one change in section 11 of Swedish declaration, there were no amendments.

3. Embassy and MEW believed it entirely advisable to accept Swedish reservation regarding export of trawlers inasmuch as acceptance of this amendment to section 11 would greatly strengthen our stand regarding the inadmissibility of export of producer gas aggregates. Agreement as signed included all amendments in Riefler's letter of July 9. Annexes were as reported to Department. Commitments calling for exports of copper and copper alloys wrought and unwrought have not yet been stated. In annex 3 of Swedish declaration they and the commitment for export of furfural (ex rubric 540: 2) were represented by interrogation points. The same treatment is given in annex 2 to rubric 532 resin soap or glue as the Swedish

Government desires that the limitation on the export on this item be discussed in the Joint Standing Commission.

4. Simultaneous with initialing of note, memorandum which follows regarding export of producer gas aggregates was presented to Swedes:

"In order to avoid any misunderstanding, His Majesty's Government and the U.S. Government desire to inform the Swedish Government that they have given careful consideration to the possibility of allowing exceptions to the prohibitions of export laid down in the Swedish declaration in addition to the exceptions specified in that declaration, and annexes thereto. His Majesty's Government and the U.S. Government do not exclude the possibility of making exceptions in certain cases. They wish, however, to make clear that they cannot agree to any such exceptions in the case of the following means of transport, the export of which is prohibited by paragraph 11 of the Swedish declaration, viz., producer gas aggregates (tariff number 1804 : 1), railway carriages, et cetera, (tariff numbers 1890-3), railway and tramway material (tariff numbers 1895-1906), automobile and chassis, (tariff numbers 1907-8, 1911), bicycles, (tariff number 1917)."

Oral comment similar to that which American and British Ministers were instructed to make in Stockholm was made by Riefler.

5. At the same time there was a discussion of the serious situation brought about by the detention of the three tankers by the Germans. (Swedes informed Embassy today that the *Falsterbohns* was probably also to be added to the number of tankers detained.)

6. Note as initialed and declarations, etc., will be transmitted by air mail.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9419

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

No. 11348

LONDON, September 24, 1943.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram No. 6379, September 23, 9 p. m., and to transmit under cover of this despatch an original initialled copy of the note giving effect to the War Trade Agreement between the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. There is attached to this note the final texts of the various declarations and annexes which comprise the Agreement.

The note was initialled for the American Government by Mr. Winfield W. Riefler, Special Assistant to the Ambassador, with rank of Minister; for the Government of the United Kingdom by Lord Selborne, PC. Minister of Economic Warfare, and for the Royal Swedish

Government by Mr. Bjorn Gustaf Prytz, the Swedish Minister in London.

Additional copies of the declarations and annexes thereto will be sent by airmail as soon as received.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
 JAMES W. RIDDLEBERGER
First Secretary of Embassy

[Enclosure—Note Verbale]

Agreement Between the American, British, and Swedish Governments

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the United States Government agree to the proposal of the Swedish Government that the Swedish Note of September 1st⁹⁴ and the present reply thereto should be considered as confirmation of the entry into force of the following documents:

(a) Declaration by His Majesty's Government and two annexes. The texts of this Declaration⁹⁵ and annexes⁹⁶ are attached to the present *Note Verbale*.

(b) Declaration by the Government of the United States and two annexes.⁹⁶ The text of this Declaration is attached to the present *Note Verbale*. The two annexes are identical with those annexed to the Declaration by His Majesty's Government.

(c) Declaration by the Royal Swedish Government and four annexes.⁹⁶ The texts of this Declaration and annexes are attached to the present *Note Verbale*.

(d) Exchanges of letters⁹⁷ concerning

- (1) Machinery and railway trucks.
- (2) Norwegian Relief.
- (3) Statistics.
- (4) Oil (three letters).
- (5) Drugs.
- (6) Ships.

2. It is perhaps appropriate to recall here that War Trade arrangements between His Majesty's Government and the Royal Swedish Government were initiated in 1939 with the conclusion of the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of that year and have been continued on the basis of that Agreement, as subsequently amended and modified from time to time. The entry of the United States into the war made necessary a re-examination of that document in consultation with the

⁹⁴ See telegram No. 5771, September 1, 8 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 801.

⁹⁵ This Declaration is the same, *mutatis mutandis*, as the Declaration by the Government of the United States, printed as subenclosure 1, *infra*.

⁹⁶ Annexes not printed; they consisted of detailed lists of commodities and quantities.

⁹⁷ Not printed.

United States Government and the Swedish Government. The documents specified under (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph are the outcome of such re-examination and represent the policies and measures which His Majesty's Government and the United States Government are prepared to make effective from now onwards and which will remain in force until the end of 1944. His Majesty's Government and the United States Government are entering into the obligations in the above mentioned documents on the specific understanding that the satisfactory conclusion reached in the recent shipping negotiations will result in the immediate charter to the United States War Shipping Administration of certain Swedish vessels. The validity of the British and American Declarations and related documents depend of course on due effect being given to the Swedish Declaration and related documents specified under (c) of the preceding paragraph.

3. The policies and measures set forth in the above mentioned inter-related declarations and accompanying documents are based on the existing Anglo-Swedish War Trade arrangements, which are specifically recognised as remaining in full force and effect and binding on the signatories thereto.

LONDON, September 23, 1943.

[Subenclosure 1]

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

I. The United States Government regard the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of December, 1939, as amended and modified by agreements made in London in December 1941, including the special instructions to the Joint Standing Commission, and by the Swedish Declaration of today's date, as remaining in full force and effect.

II. (1) Within the limitations of the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement as amended and modified, the United States Government will do its utmost to ensure that goods of the types and in the quantities and subject to the conditions specified in Annex I to this Declaration, hereinafter called "basic rations," shall actually be made available for importation into Sweden directly or indirectly by sea or by air, and where the source of a ration is stated to be neutral territory, the United States Government will extend all facilities open to it. If, however, for reasons beyond its control the goods in question cannot be obtained from an indicated neutral territory, the United States Government will do its utmost to offer an alternative source of supply in consultation with the Swedish Government. It is impossible to give an unconditional undertaking to make the goods available,

since the supply position is liable materially to fluctuate in consequence of the exigencies of the war, but everything possible will be done by the United States Government to see that these supplies are available.

(2) If the supply situation in regard to scarce commodities whether specified in Annex I or not, should materially improve, the United States Government will be ready to examine with the Swedish Government whether any increase in or additions to the basic rations as fixed in Annex I will be possible.

(3) If the quantities actually made available during any basic period mentioned in Annex I should prove to be substantially below the basic rations, the United States Government will be ready to discuss with the Swedish Government the situation thus created and its possible bearing on the Declaration of the Swedish Government of today's date.

(4) In cases where no purchasing arrangements are specified in Annex I the United States Government will inform the Swedish Government of the purchasing arrangements which it wishes to be observed.

III. (1) If the Gothenburg traffic is suspended by Germany, the United States Government will not object to the continuance by the Swedish Government of purchase and storage for future shipment of any commodity specified in Annex I to this Declaration to a total amount of either the quarterly basic ration or one quarter of the annual basic ration. The United States Government will be ready to discuss with the Swedish Government the question of any further Swedish purchases for storage.

(2) If, however, owing to the exceptional shortage of any individual commodity in the basic rations it is inadvisable to tie up in storage the amount indicated above, the United States Government will make arrangements acceptable to the Swedish Government to assure the immediate availability of supplies of the commodity in question for shipment to Sweden, in the event of the re-opening of the Gothenburg traffic. The conclusion of these arrangements will not be regarded as a ground for invoking section II paragraph 3 of this Declaration.

IV. (1) The United States Government understands that the Swedish Government will give information with respect to all purchases of goods enumerated in the list of basic rations or in previous British Schedules of Rations which are stored outside continental Europe or in Portugal for Swedish account.

(2) The United States Government understands further that in so far as these stocks are not needed for the fulfilment of the undertaking under Section II above or where a one-time shipment in full or in part cannot be agreed upon, the Swedish Government will upon

request arrange for the sale of the goods either to the appropriate agency of the United States Government or to the appropriate agency of His Britannic Majesty's Government, provided that the appropriate agency of the purchasing Government is prepared to pay for such goods to the full amount and in the currency originally paid by the Swedish owner, plus such storage and other carrying charges as may in the meantime have been incurred by the owner.

V. The number of Swedish ships nominated for and engaged in the Gothenburg traffic which are allowed to pass the Anglo-American controls will be limited to six per month, provided however that the United States Government will be prepared favourably to consider any application for a temporary increase, so long as the balance between eastward and westward bound ships is strictly observed, and the shipping arrangements of the United States Government are not interfered with.

VI. There will be no objection, subject to the provisions set out in Annex II, to the replacement of Swedish ships lost in the Gothenburg traffic in case the Swedish Government should deem such replacement necessary by the use of Swedish ships outside the Baltic on the understanding that the Swedish Government agree to exercise their right after consultation with the United States Government and His Britannic Majesty's Government.

VII. Navicert quotas, within which basic rations will operate, will remain in existence, on the principles previously established. The navicert quotas will indicate the quantities of goods to the import of which there is normally no blockade objection, although supply considerations must govern the quantities actually authorised for import into Sweden from overseas.

JUNE 30, 1943.

[Subenclosure 2]

DECLARATION BY THE ROYAL SWEDISH GOVERNMENT

I. The Royal Swedish Government regard the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of December 1939 as amended and modified by agreement made in London in December 1941, including the special instructions to the Joint Standing Commission, as remaining in full force and effect except as amended and modified in the following paragraphs.

II. (i) The Swedish Government will grant no further credits, direct or indirect, or extensions of credits already granted to Germany or associated countries and occupied territories, subject to the exception stated below. Guarantees of risk will be given by the Swedish Government only if they cover a warranty of transfer on clearing and payment of Swedish exports and do not exceed a thirty-day period.

(ii) In the case of Finland the Swedish Government reserve their right to allow extensions of the credits already granted, and in accordance with previous agreements to guarantee Finnish Treasury two or three year bills up to a nominal amount of 8 million kronor. In addition the Swedish Government reserve their right to grant new credits to Finland from the present date till the end of 1943 up to a limit of 8 million kronor. During 1944 new credits granted by the Swedish Government to Finland shall not exceed 10 million kronor.

(iii) The Swedish Government will not, as from the present date, enter into any further tripartite trade agreements affecting Finland. III. The Swedish Government will not permit any reduction in the average price level of Swedish exports to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories, nor in the average price level of any group or any rubric specifically mentioned in Annex II, nor any increase in the average price level of goods imported from Germany and associated countries and occupied territories without corresponding increase in average prices of Swedish exports fully compensating the higher prices of imports.

IV. (i) Whenever possible until the end of 1943, the Swedish Government will, within the framework of existing obligations, take measures to reduce Swedish exports to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories and wherever possible within the framework of existing agreements take every step to limit such exports as far as possible.

(ii) New Commitments undertaken by the Swedish Government regarding 1943 and 1944 will be negotiated in accordance with the above principles.

(iii) In consequence of the Swedish refusal to grant further credits to Germany, and of Swedish insistence on the repayment by Germany of earlier credits amounting to 41.6 million kronor falling due in 1943, German imports of goods from Sweden in 1943 will be strictly kept within the limits of Germany's capacity to export goods and Germany's export of gold to Sweden. Swedish acquisitions of gold from Germany hereafter will be limited to gold belonging to the Reichsbank before September 1939 and will not exceed (a) 41 million kronor which the Sveriges Riksbank is committed to accept under the existing Agreement with the German Reichsbank; and (b) gold to pay the services on Swedish holdings of German securities.

(iv) The Swedish Government will reduce Swedish exports of goods in 1943 to all countries associated with or occupied by Germany, as compared with 1942 by not less than an amount equal to 130 million kronor, plus any Swedish net acquisitions of gold from Germany and associated countries and occupied territories in 1943. No gold will be

accepted by Sweden which was not the property of the Central Bank of the exporting country before September 1939.

(v) The above-mentioned reductions will include

(a) A reduction in exports to Finland from approximately 80 million kronor in 1942 to approximately 80 million kronor in 1943.

(b) A reduction in exports to Denmark from approximately 110 million kronor in 1942 to approximately 70 million kronor in 1943.

(c) A reduction in exports to Italy from approximately 120 million kronor in 1942 to approximately 80 million kronor in 1943.

(d) A reduction in exports to Belgium and the Netherlands from approximately 42 million kronor in 1942 to approximately 28 million kronor in 1943.

(vi) As regards the remaining countries associated with or occupied by Germany or Italy the Swedish Government will, as stated above, take every step within the framework of existing Agreements to limit exports to these countries as far as possible.

(vii) Provided that German exports to Sweden are no greater in value in 1943 than in 1942 the above limitations will result in a reduction of the total value of Swedish exports to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories in 1943 to an amount not exceeding 860 million kronor.

V. The export from Sweden of certain commodities to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories shall be limited for 1943 as laid down in Annex I to this Declaration.

VI. As from January 1st, 1944:

(a) The export of iron ore from Sweden shall be limited to a maximum of 7.5 million tons annually in the proportion of not more than two tons of ore for every ton of coal or coke delivered from Germany and associated countries and occupied territories.

(b) The export of all ores from Sweden except iron ore, zinc ore and pyrites shall be prohibited. Exports of pyrites to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories shall, however, be limited to a maximum of 50,000 tons per annum in return for at least an equal amount of sulphur and/or pyrites from Norway. Similarly, exports of zinc ore to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories shall be limited to a maximum of 68,000 tons per annum in return for not less than 50% of the metal content of the zinc ore export.

(c) The export from Sweden of ferro-alloys shall be prohibited with the exception of ferro-silicon, exports of which shall be limited to a value of 5.3 million kronor annually.

(d) The export from Sweden of certain commodities shall be limited as laid down in Annex II of this Declaration.

VII. (i) The Swedish Government agree that the total value of Swedish exports to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories in 1944 shall not exceed 700 million kronor.

(ii) The total value of Swedish exports to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories in the first 6 months of 1944 shall generally bear the same relation to the total value of Swedish exports for the year 1944 as existed on the average during the corresponding periods of the five years 1938-1942.

VIII. Additions as specified in Annex III to this Declaration shall be made to List A attached to the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of December 1939.

IX. (i) The export from Sweden to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories of commodities specified in List B attached to the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of December 1939 shall not be permitted if they contain by value more than 12½% of "restricted commodities" inscribed on List A attached to the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of December 1939.

Notwithstanding this prohibition it is agreed that:

(a) Spare parts for machinery and apparatus already delivered and covered by List B, and insulated wires covered by rubric number 1873 may be exported up to the value of 500,000 kronor for the remainder of the year 1943 and of 1 million kronor annually thereafter.

(b) Existing Swedish commitments in 1943 for the export of other products specified in List B up to a total value of two million kronor may be carried out.

(c) The articles enumerated in List B may be exported to countries other than Germany and associated countries and occupied territories, even if they contain more than 12½% by value of restricted commodities.

(ii) The export to Poland of telephones and telephone equipment if containing more than 12½% by value of restricted commodities, shall be prohibited as from the present date.

X. When granting licences in respect of exports to neutral countries in Europe, the Swedish Government will make the condition that the goods will not be re-exported or used in the manufacture of goods to be exported.

XI. (i) The Swedish Government will prohibit the export of arms and ammunition, ships and other means of transport to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories. A broad definition shall be given to the term "means of transport" which shall include sleighs, skis, producer gas apparatus, locomotives, etc. An exception to this general prohibition will be made in the case of vessels now under construction in Sweden for German account, subject to the condition that no such vessel shall be delivered until Germany has fulfilled her correlated obligations regarding supply of ships plates for vessels now under construction or to be constructed in Sweden for Swedish account. These correlated obligations consist of delivery of 50,000 tons of ships' plates annually during 1941, 1942 and 1943 by Germany for construction of Swedish ships plus delivery of plates needed for

construction of ships for German account. Another exception to the above mentioned general prohibition will be made with regard to certain fishing vessels built in Sweden for German account and for which export licences have been promised.

(ii) Existing contracts with Finland up to a value of 1,910,218 kronor for the delivery of arms and ammunition, may be fulfilled provided that during any six months period the value of such exports to Finland is less than that of corresponding imports from Finland.

XII. (i) No vessel in the service of Germany and associated countries and occupied territories shall be repaired in Sweden, unless such repairs are in respect of damage incurred by such vessels (a) off the Swedish coast and salvaged by Swedish vessels or (b) sailing to or from a Swedish port.

(ii) A prohibition of repairs in Sweden shall also apply to all vehicles and other means of transport in the service of Germany and associated countries and occupied territories.

XIII. The Swedish Government will not allow any increase in the number of Swedish ships now engaged in the carriage of goods to and from Sweden and ports in Germany and associated countries and occupied territories or plying between ports in Germany and associated countries and occupied territories, or the replacement of any such ship lost, sunk, damaged or withdrawn.

XIV. (i) Each individual transaction involving the export from Sweden in exchange for war material, of metals and minerals or other commodities the export of which from Sweden is prohibited under List A of the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of 1939 as amended, will in future provide for the return to Sweden in the war material of the same amount of the metals, minerals or commodities in question.

(ii) Applications for the export from Sweden in exchange for war material of metals and minerals or other commodities the export of which from Sweden is prohibited under List A of the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of 1939 as amended, will be referred to his Britannic Majesty's Government in the U.K. and to the United States Government for approval. An exception will be made for war material ordered by Sweden before June 1st 1943, and involving the export from Sweden of metals and minerals or other commodities the export of which from Sweden is prohibited under List A of the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of 1939 as amended provided that:

(a) the war material contains the same amount of the prohibited metals, minerals or other commodities as have been or will be exported from Sweden in exchange, except in the case of certain war material already ordered in Italy to a value not exceeding 15 million kronor;

(b) full particulars of such orders and exports are given to the Joint Standing Commission.

XV. Applications for the export from Sweden, in exchange for materials other than war material, of commodities the export of which from Sweden is prohibited under List A of the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of 1939 as amended, shall be referred for approval in each individual case to His Britannic Majesty's Government and the United States Government in accordance with the arrangements made in 1941 with His Britannic Majesty's Government. This provision shall apply equally to materials exported from Sweden for processing and return with the exception of tin and copper, in which two cases the previous approval of His Britannic Majesty's Government and the United States Government will not be required.

The Swedish Government undertake that :

(a) the total amount of tin and copper exported from Sweden for processing and return in any period of 6 months shall not exceed 150 tons of tin and 600 tons of copper.

(b) tin and copper exported for this purpose will be returned to Sweden in full, less inevitable wastage involved by processing.

(c) full particulars of these transactions will be furnished to the Joint Standing Commission.

(d) the Swedish Government propose to export to Germany such balances of tin and copper respectively as may be found due to Germany after striking a balance in the Metal Clearing every six months. Full information in regard to these transactions will be made available to the Joint Standing Commission.

XVI. (i) Until such time as Sweden will be able to export freely to all countries in Latin America on an equal basis, the Swedish Government will limit Swedish exports to Argentina to paper, wood pulp for paper making, and rayon pulp and other commodities to be agreed upon, and only to such consignees as are approved in each instance by His Britannic Majesty's Government and the United States Government, subject to the proviso that if the Argentine Government should take retaliatory action in the matter of exports to Sweden His Britannic Majesty's Government and the United States Government will do their utmost to make the commodities which are involved available from elsewhere. Failing this, the two Governments will consult with the Swedish Government in order to reconsider the Swedish undertaking as regards limitation of exports to the specific commodities set forth above or later agreed upon with a view to re-establishing Swedish imports from the Argentine.

(ii) This undertaking shall not enter into effect until October 1st, 1943, except that from the present date the Swedish Government will not allow exports to firms or individuals in the Argentine inscribed on lists which will be communicated to them from time to time.

XVII. The Swedish Government agree to the establishment of a system under which applications for navicerts and export licences for the commodities listed in Annex IV shall be made in the first instance in

Sweden, so as to enable the British and American Legations in Stockholm to satisfy themselves that these particular goods will not be utilised contrary to the interests of the two Governments. Under this new procedure applications will be made by the intending Swedish importers to the Swedish Government and the information contained in the applications will be communicated to the British and American Legations.

XVIII. Arrangements shall be made for checking all shipments of petroleum products arriving in Sweden through the Anglo-American blockade.

XIX. The Swedish Government agree that the United States Government shall have equal representation with themselves and with His Britannic Majesty's Government on the Joint Standing Commission both in Stockholm and in London and that a Joint Standing Commission of similar composition and similar duties to the Commissions in Stockholm and London shall be appointed in Washington .

XX. Except where otherwise specified the provisions of the present Declaration shall come into effect on July 1st, 1943.

XXI. (i) In the preceding paragraphs the term "Germany and associated countries and occupied territories" is intended to mean Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Finland, Italy, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Occupied U.S.S.R.

(ii) If during 1943 or 1944 one or more of these countries should withdraw from their association with Germany or be liberated from German control, the foregoing provisions will require amendment, more especially as regards a proportionate reduction of Swedish exports to Germany and the remaining associated countries and occupied territories so that the remaining countries will not benefit from such withdrawal. In that contingency the British and American members of the Joint Standing Commission will arrange for a meeting of the Commission and will propose the necessary amendments.

30 JUNE, 1943.

EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO OBTAIN REDUCTION BY SWEDEN OF IRON ORE EXPORTS TO GERMANY

740.00112 European War 1939/9288 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1943—11 p. m.

6673. On the basis of previous telegrams from our Legation in Stockholm (Stockholm's 2883, September 10; 3039, September 22;

3379, October 18, and 3405, October 20, repeated to you as the Legation's 551, 568, 661, and 672.⁹⁸), OEW⁹⁹ is very much disturbed by volume of Swedish iron ore shipments in September which is more than double the amount we had been led to expect.

It is felt that Swedes should be told that while we appreciate their recent efforts to reduce exports, we must remind them of our strong disapproval of exports in excess of last year's amount and of their firm obligation under the War Trade Agreement¹ not to permit exports beyond 9.9 million tons, in view of the fact that 8.2 million tons of ore have been shipped through September 30. Since the figure 9.9 conforms to the Fitzmaurice formula on normal trade and represents a level not thus far exceeded by shipments in any year of the war, OEW believes most strongly that no ceiling figure in excess of it should be recognized. We suggest that you discuss urgently presentation to the Swedes of a warning along these lines in collaboration with MEW.²

OEW believes that consideration will have to be given to positive measures designed to protect our interests unless the Swedes give a satisfactory reply to the warning. Sent to London, repeated to Stockholm.

STETTINIUS

103.917/4711 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 12, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received November 12—8: 58 p. m.]

7898. For Department and Stone,³ FEA. Reference Department's 6673, October 25, 11 p. m. MEW proposes that both British and American Governments instruct their Ministers in Stockholm that they should go to Swedish Foreign Office and enter a very strong protest against high level of iron ore exports maintained during October (approximately 690,000 tons) and warn them that total exports for this year must be kept within ceiling established under original Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of 1939 (i.e., 9.9 million

⁹⁸ None printed.

⁹⁹ Office of Economic Warfare, Foreign Economic Administration.

¹ Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of December 7, 1939; text not printed, but for substance, see W. N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade*, vol. I, in the British civil series *History of the Second World War* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), p. 141. See also correspondence leading to the War Trade Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden signed September 23, 1943, pp. 739 ff.

² British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

³ William T. Stone, Director, Special Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration.

tons). In addition Swedes should be told that even this figure is so large we are extremely dissatisfied.

Mallet⁴ is being instructed in this sense by British. It is hoped Johnson⁵ will receive similar instructions.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9621 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 13, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 9:37 p. m.]

7930. Personal for Secretary, Under Secretary⁶ and Stone, FEA, from Riefler.⁷ Reference Department's 6734, October 27, midnight, and Embassy's 7595, November 2.⁸ There follows the substance of a memorandum given Embassy on most recent Anglo-American and British activity to assure that Germans do not make up for losses in production of bearings brought about by our air raids through purchases in neutral countries. Inasmuch as Swedish Government actively abetted preemptive contracts in Sweden, Department and FEA will thoroughly understand why this report must be given minimum distribution in Washington, and be treated with utmost secrecy. Embassy is giving copies of report to Military Attaché⁹ and G-2 ETOUSA.¹⁰ Memorandum follows:

Ministry of Economic Warfare has attached during last 2 years greatest importance to German ball-bearing supplies being reduced, for which destruction of Schweinfurt is first essential step. It became apparent this summer that Eighth Air Force would carry out such a raid, and then steps were taken in order to make certain that enemy could not replace losses by placing in Switzerland and Sweden additional orders. During May and June this year a Swedish trade delegation was in London to negotiate with American Embassy and MEW.¹¹ Notwithstanding strong pressure, this delegation refused to agree to undertakings which would restrict during 1943 exports to Axis countries of ball and roller bearings. For 1944, however, they have agreed to accept following restrictions on exports to all Axis countries:

⁴ V. A. L. Mallet, British Minister in Sweden.

⁵ Herschel V. Johnson, American Minister in Sweden.

⁶ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

⁷ Winfield W. Riefler, Special Assistant for Economic Warfare to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, with the rank of Minister.

⁸ Neither printed.

⁹ Brig. Gen. Paul E. Peabody.

¹⁰ Intelligence Organization, European Theater of Operations, United States Army.

¹¹ See pp. 755-781, *passim*.

(Title) Limitation to [of?] Ball and Roller Bearing Exports to all Axis Europe including Italy.

Read in three columns. Commodities; 1944 limitation; 1942 exports (all figures in thousands of Swedish crowns). Ball bearings, 19,689; 31,062; roller bearings, 9,338; 20,550; balls and rollers, 241; 343.

It was necessary to deal directly with SKF¹² inasmuch as Swedish delegation was reluctant to agree to accept restrictions to be imposed by the Government during 1943. Such an arrangement became urgent subsequent to raids on Stuttgart during spring by RAF,¹³ which resulted in local ball-bearing factories of SKF (Norund), being damaged. At that time London learned that endeavors were being made by Germans to place additional orders with SKF in Sweden. British orders, therefore, had to be placed with minimum delay. Because in June weather over North Sea was perfect, and because German fighters would with virtual certainty shoot down ordinary civilian aircraft, two experts on ball bearings, who were sent to Sweden for this purpose, were flown there in mosquitos bomb racks. Never before had passengers traveled that way. The experts were successful in placing orders worth 1,000,000 pounds sterling while there. This sum is in addition to large orders SKF had previously received from British Government. Due to very large reserve manufacturing capacity which Swedes have, a manoeuvre of this order could not possibly have tied up standard type ball-bearing production, therefore, purchases by British were concentrated in preempting smaller bearings of type used in aero engines, instruments and aircraft controls, and on as large a possible range of special heavy types used in aero engines (e.g., spherical bearings for aero crankshafts) and tanks. MEW is satisfied that Germans cannot possibly appreciably increase purchases of types of this order before late summer next year. In fact subsequent to Schweinfurt's first raid, when Germans attempted to make such purchases, somewhat bitter complaints came from SKF for firm found itself compelled to refuse orders from Germany which were offered at a considerably higher price range than those which had been accepted from British by them.

In Switzerland output of ball and roller bearings is smaller to quite some extent than production in Sweden. Anglo-American-Swiss agreement for 1943,¹⁴ however, restricts Swiss steel ball and roller bearing export for rest of this year in following manner: between August 1 and December 31 to Germany to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ % of 42 exports by value that is Swiss francs 2,367,000; to other Axis countries between July 1 and December 31, 1943, (allowance yet to be made for Italy), to 50% of exports in 1942 that is Swiss francs 682,000. It is our expectation that Government of Switzerland will accept agreement of similar nature covering 1944 with this difference, that American and British negotiators will do their utmost to achieve limitations of a more drastic nature.

¹² Aktiebolaget Svenska Kullagerfabriken, a major Swedish ball and roller bearing corporation with holdings in a number of countries; its main offices are located in Gothenburg, Sweden.

¹³ British Royal Air Force.

¹⁴ For text of Anglo-American-Swiss War Trade Agreement, effected by an exchange of letters dated December 19, 1943, see pp. 888-892.

Subsequent to first, not very successful, Schweinfurt raid in middle August, it is learned that Germans made during September repeated attempts to place bearing orders with leading firm in Switzerland (SRO in Zurich), and that these orders were essentially for aircraft industry requirements. Swiss company has refused all of these orders.

Swiss-Swedish supplies taken together represented approximately 71½% of German Europe's total requirements in the past, according to estimates made in London. *End of memorandum.*

In an annex to memorandum, MEW states that examination of a provisional nature of result of October 15 Schweinfurt raid shows: That UKF Werk 1 sustained heavy damage in stores and assembly shops. UKF Werk 2 all departments sustained very heavy damage; Kengelfischer subsidiary buildings, but not main producing shops, sustained considerable damage.

It is concluded here on rough computation that whole Axis Europe lost approximately 1 month's supply of ball bearings, because of production delays arising from this. Should decision be taken that Schweinfurt works should be dispersed, a larger loss will be sustained. On assumption that loss is spread over period of 6 months the result will be during such a period approximately 15% to 20% reduction in ball-bearing supplies of Axis. Since then there has been an extension of attack to Italy to two Riv (Fiat) factories. Evidence subsequent to Schweinfurt attacks points to enemy's more intensive utilization of these plants and that attempt may be made to cover approximately one-twentieth of total Axis requirements there. It is believed in London that attacks in Italy have been successful, although details of damage have not yet been received here. [Riefler.]

WINANT

103.917/4711 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1943—midnight.

7367. From Department and Stone, FEA. Reference your 7898 of Nov. 12 and Stockholm's 3539, Oct. 29¹⁵ repeated to you as the Legation's 713. Department, FEA and the military authorities are most disturbed about the very high level of iron ore shipments in 1943. Department and FEA thoroughly agree with the Embassy and MEW as to the desirability of making immediate representations to the Swedes regarding this matter. However, we would prefer to have a joint memorandum along the lines set forth below presented to the Swedes. Even if Mallet has already made representations we believe the joint memorandum should nevertheless be presented.

¹⁵ Latter not printed.

Although we may not be able to prevent exports in 1943 from reaching the level mentioned by Hägglöf¹⁶ we fear that protest is futile unless accompanied by a request for positive remedial action on the part of the Swedes. We should attempt at least to reduce the harmful effects of the high and unexpected rate of export in 1943 by insisting on a low figure for the first quarter of 1944. Therefore, while leaving to you and MEW the exact wording we believe the following points should be strongly emphasized in the communication to the Swedes:

1. The United States and the United Kingdom Governments even before the signing of the new agreement¹⁷ fulfilled their obligations in full, even in cases where the supply sacrifice involved was substantially greater than had been anticipated during the negotiations.

2. The Swedish Government in Section IV of the new war trade agreement undertakes to take measures to reduce Swedish exports to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories until the end of 1943 wherever possible within the framework of existing obligations.

3. The United States and the United Kingdom are at a loss to reconcile exports of iron ore in 1943 at the level forecast by Mr. Hägglöf with the commitment cited above in Section IV of the Swedish Declaration or with the spirit of the agreements reached in London. Swedish exports of iron ore to Germany and associated countries and occupied territories averaged 9,116,000 tons during the 3 years, 1940-41-42. If Mr. Hägglöf's forecast proves correct, and shipments of 8,893,000 tons during the first 10 months of 1943 give every reason to anticipate that it will, Swedish shipments of iron ore for 1943 will be at a very substantially higher rate than during any war year.

4. The two governments are most concerned regarding the greatly increased shipments this year since they tend to nullify the reduction which the ceiling agreed to for 1944 was expected to achieve. As a result of the discussions in London the Allied Governments assumed that Swedish iron ore exports in 1943 would not exceed the 1942 level of 8.6 million tons. Thus one of the most important benefits which we obtain in the new agreement to compensate for our supply sacrifices is being undermined.

5. The United States and the United Kingdom Governments appreciate the action taken which resulted in the recent reduction of shipments from Northern Baltic ports. They wish, however, that it

¹⁶ Gunnar Hägglöf, head of the Economic Division, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs; he served as Chairman of the Swedish Trade Delegation in London.

¹⁷ On September 23, 1943, the War Trade Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden was initiated in London; for texts, see enclosures to despatch No. 11348, September 24, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, pp. 806, 807, and 809.

might have been possible for the Swedish Government to develop an equally successful method of similarly limiting shipments from southern Baltic ports.

6. The United States and the United Kingdom have always understood from statements made by the Swedish authorities that the Swedish Government has made no specific commitment to Germany on iron ore exports other than a price agreement. The text of the German-Swedish War Trade Agreement for 1943¹⁸ presented to the United States and the United Kingdom negotiators in London confirms this and indicates that Swedish coal imports are tied to Swedish exports of wood products rather than of iron ore.

7. In view of all the above circumstances the United States and the United Kingdom Governments urgently request assurances that:

(a) The Swedish Government will make every effort to keep shipments of iron ore during the full year 1943 as far below the ceiling limit of 9.9 million tons provided in the old Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement as is possible at this late date;

(b) The Swedish Government will not permit shipments of iron ore during the first quarter of 1944 to exceed 488,000 tons and that no more than 200,000 tons will be shipped in any one month. (This proposed first quarter ceiling is based on the average of first quarter shipments in 1941 and 1942, the last climatically normal war years. We cannot include figures for the first quarter of 1943 in the average as we consider 1943 shipments abnormal.)

It might also be pointed out that the proposal outlined above is in the nature of an application of the provision of the new war trade agreement limiting exports in the first half of 1944 to the ratio of previous years.

If you and MEW concur in the above suggested procedure, please telegraph to Stockholm the agreed wording for the memorandum, requesting the Legation (unless it has strong views to the contrary) to join with the British Legation in presenting it to the Foreign Office, also repeating to Stockholm your 7898 of November 12.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/9629 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1943—5 p. m.

1278. Embassy in London has been instructed by Department and FEA to repeat its telegram 7898, November 12 to Department to you together with our reply.¹⁹ These communications outline proposed

¹⁸ Signed on December 19, 1942.

¹⁹ Telegrams No. 7898, November 12, 9 p. m., and No. 7367, November 20, midnight, pp. 816 and 819, respectively.

joint protest by you and British colleague on high iron ore export rate during 1943. Unless you see most important reasons making action unwise you are requested to deliver the proposed memorandum to the Swedes as soon as the text from London is received and parallel instructions have been received by the British Minister. Your action in this matter should be reported.

Reference your 3539 of October 29 and 3733 of November 16.²⁰

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/9726 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, December 1, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 8:59 p. m.]

3900. Mallet and I have just seen Mr. Boheman²¹ and delivered to him a joint memorandum embodying substance of statement agreed between our Embassy and London and Ministry of Economic Warfare embodied in London's 335, November 25, 8 p. m. (London's 8244, November 25 to Department).²² Boheman said that memorandum would be submitted to Government and that his following comments could be taken as an expression only of his personal views.

He made general observation that Swedish Government had agreed to figure of 9,900,000 tons of iron ore export to Germany for 1943 and that it would live up to this agreement, necessary measures having been taken to that end. He admitted that figures up to present were alarmingly near ceiling point. Only specific comment he made was on point 3 of our joint request for assurances. He regards this in nature of a "new demand", remarking that Sweden had agreed to figure of 7,000,000 tons iron ore export for 1944 and that this obligation would be met. I pointed out that this proposed ceiling for first quarter of 1944 was based on average for first quarter of shipments in 1941 and 1942 but Boheman would not admit that we had any right or ground for making this demand, his stand being that we have only right to demand that Sweden live up to expressed terms of her trade agreement.

Regarding high figure of export of iron ore already reached for 1943 which we told him had greatly disturbed both Washington and London, he said that Swedes likewise were concerned about it. He said that reasons for heavy pile-up were (1) failure of Allies and specifically of British to interfere with German shipments from

²⁰ Neither printed.

²¹ Erik C. Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

²² Not printed, but see telegram No. 7367, November 20, midnight, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 819.

Narvik (he remarked parenthetically that British at London had told Swedish authorities they would "take care of Narvik"), (2) no disturbances in Baltic such as had occurred last year and had impeded iron ore traffic, (3) unusually mild weather resulting in no freezing in Baltic.

I had impression that Boheman and Swedish Government fully realize nature of the iron negotiations under war trade agreement to restrict iron ore shipments as much as possible under specified ceilings. Boheman was emphatic, however, in saying that his Government had every intention of meeting its obligations in this respect both this year and next and that we are not justified in now putting forward a new condition before there has been actual breach of agreement. Among measures which his Government has taken to impede shipment of iron ore he mentioned railway repairs at Lulea which he said had in effect reduced volume. He mentioned twice Allied failure to handle Narvik situation which he said was beyond control of Sweden.

My 790 to London repeats this telegram.

JOHNSON

SWITZERLAND

WAR TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND SWITZERLAND¹

740.00112 European War 1939/7769 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 3, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 8:10 p. m.]

799. Legation's 440 [448] (57 to London) January 20.² At the Mixed Commission meeting on January 29, the Swiss delegates claimed emphatically that they had compromised their economic relations with Germany and possibly with serious effects to be expected on Swiss economy through their demand that Germany give formal acceptance to a reduction in Swiss exports which we consider undesirable. They added that they had gained the impression during the London negotiations that our negotiators were not only interested in securing actual reduction but that it was desired that Switzerland should demonstrate for political reasons its independence from the Axis by obtaining this concession from Germany.

Although since the breakdown of negotiations on January 15 there had been no noticeable alteration in Swiss-German trade, the Swiss fear a slowing down of imports especially of coal and possibly of steel. The Swiss argued that some recognition by the American and British Governments of the position they have taken vis-à-vis Germany was now called for and suggested that we should consider restoring the suspended quotas and mentioned particularly fodder. They maintained that a decline in essential imports from Germany would automatically lead to a reduction in undesirable exports.

Also as the suspended quotas were fixed quarterly we would be in a position periodically to suspend these quotas again if we were not satisfied that the reasonable expectation of a reduction in undesirable exports had been realized. The Swiss appear to be anxious to learn the reaction of Washington and London to this suggestion before deciding upon the date of the return of the Swiss delegates to London but which in any case will be delayed pending a clarification of the Swiss-German situation.

¹ For previous correspondence regarding the trade agreement negotiations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 376 ff.

² Not printed.

Furthermore, the Swiss pointed out that their formal acceptance of the specific reduction on individual ceiling bases without prior agreement by the Germans to a reduction in undesirable exports would be extremely difficult since the political factors must be insidious.

The Swiss also stressed that they could not remain indefinitely in the present state [of] uncertainty in their relations with Germany and that any concession from us at this time would greatly strengthen their hand when negotiations with Germany are resumed.

Repeated to London.

HARRISON

740.00112 European War 1939/7770 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 4, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received 12:45 p. m.]

805. In sequence to Legation's 799 (101 to London) February 3. At this Mixed Commission meeting the Swiss raised the following points with regard to compensation agreement:³ They are aware of the importance of ordering raw materials under this agreement and will telegraph Washington and London with reference thereto immediately. They outlined their position as follows: They can arrange for prompt shipment of 1,097,000 francs worth of oats they have already purchased in Buenos Aires, toluol, rubber and copper which are Swiss-owned but of which only the copper has been requisitioned by the United States authorities and has not yet been paid for by the latter. The only item of the priority products which the Swiss do not now own is the seven tons of nickel which they value at 42,000 francs but for which they are placing an order at once.

The Swiss expressed the hope that we would accelerate our orders under the compensation agreement in view of the uncertainty as to the German reactions following breakdown in their negotiations. They expressed fear that under present conditions the Germans would not grant facilities for more than the provisionally accorded one-fourth of the Berlin protocol figures (see Legation's 999 [9] to London, January 6⁴).

They stated that they are convinced that the items not utilized in part or in whole could not be carried forward nor could their value be transferred to other items. On the basis of this supposition, the Swiss have calculated that we and the British will be able to receive about

³ For exchange of letters which constituted the compensation agreement, see telegram No. 7117, December 15, 1942, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom. *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 401.

⁴ Sent to the Department as telegram No. 99, not printed.

833,000 francs worth of products as against the compensation figure of 2,500,000 francs. The Swiss asked that this situation be brought again to the attention of Washington and London because if our combined original requirements should not be available now in their entirety they consider that Washington and London might wish to place orders for those goods for which the Germans have granted quotas but for which neither the British nor ourselves have so far shown any interest as they were not included in the proposed purchases under the compensation agreement (see items 753, 754, and 6; other than special types; [apparent omission], 928/936).

Repeated to London.

HARRISON

740.00112 European War 1939/7769: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1943—6 p. m.

395. Reference your 799, February 3. At a meeting at the Department attended by representatives of the Board of Economic Warfare and the British Embassy the present position and attitude of the Swiss was discussed. The stiffening of the Swiss attitude vis-à-vis Germany is encouraging and deserves recognition by American and British Governments. For your confidential information the Department suggested to our negotiators in London that this recognition might take the form of granting a special quota for the shipment of from five to six thousand tons of raw cotton. For over a year the Swiss have received no cotton and the Swiss Legation here has indicated that the granting of such a quota might have a beneficent effect on negotiations out of all proportion to its importance from the blockade point of view. It is our opinion that such a special quota should be in cotton rather than fodder, because fodder has a direct bearing on Swiss exports to the enemy. We also suggested that if a satisfactory War Trade Agreement is signed our negotiators might desire to offer the Swiss basic rations which would involve definite supply commitments. Under the present form of the proposed War Trade Agreement we are under an obligation to use our best efforts to supply the Swiss with commodities for which quotas may be granted and as control of materials by supply authorities grows in scope our commitment for all practical purposes may amount to a grant of basic rations. These suggestions were posed for the consideration of the Economic Warfare Division and the Ministry of Economic Warfare and are not to be construed as offers at this time.

Until these suggestions have been considered in London they should not be communicated to the Swiss, but you can assure the Swiss that

our appreciation of their attitude towards the Germans will be clothed in substance.

HULL

654.6231/262 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

BERN, April 9, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received April 10—9 : 38 p. m.]

2258. My 2220, April 8 (199 to London).⁵ Commercial Attaché⁶ and his British colleague⁷ called upon Dr. Hotz⁸ and Professor Keller⁹ at the latter's request on April 9.

Hotz opened by confirming that the Federal Council was sending a delegation led by himself, Dr. Homberger and Mr. Kohli to Berlin on April 12 to negotiate a new trade agreement. He then repeated what Sulzer¹⁰ had told me, namely, that the arrangement now made with the Germans would liquidate outstanding obligations on both sides under agreement of July 1941.¹¹ During the last 3 months January through March German coal deliveries had been roughly one-third less than the 150,000 tons per month provided for in that agreement. Total arrears under the old agreement amount to roughly 950,000 tons from which deliveries for the first 3 months of this year amounting to 300,000 would be deducted. This leaves a balance of 650,000 tons which the Germans propose to liquidate over a period of about 4 months. Arrears would similarly be made up by the Germans with respect to iron and petroleum products. In return the Swiss would apply the outstanding balance of the "credit" amounting to about 280,000,000 francs to the payment of goods ordered by the Germans prior to January 15, 1943.

Turning to the question of the forthcoming negotiations Hotz stated that from the Swiss point of view the pivotal point in the negotiations in Berlin would be the obtention of coal supplies through the Axis counter-blockade.

On the main points of the negotiations his instructions from the Federal Council which he disclosed in the strictest confidence are as

⁵ *Post*, p. 900.

⁶ Daniel J. Reagan.

⁷ John G. Lomax.

⁸ Jean Hotz, Director of the Division of Commerce, Swiss Department of Public Economy.

⁹ Paul V. Keller, Swiss Delegate in charge of trade agreements.

¹⁰ Hans Sulzer of the Swiss Trade Delegation.

¹¹ Concerning this agreement, see W. N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade*, vol. 1, in the British civil series *History of the Second World War* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), pp. 587-588.

follows: First, to insist that undesirable exports on orders placed after January 15 shall be limited by quotas based upon the exports of 1942 with reductions in the sense desired by our negotiators at London; second, to press for improvement in the operation and continuance of the Berlin protocol. (Germans have now given an assurance that they will grant *Geleitscheine*¹² for the first month's *tranche* without delay and that the German Legation would now be able to issue these documents without reference to Berlin. Swiss would also propose the carrying forward of any unused portions of quotas from 1 month's *tranche* to another under the protocol; third, no future advances by way of credits would be made into [to] the clearing. Credit facilities would only be given in proportion to the quantity of coal and coal products delivered monthly.

Credit authorizations based on a figure of 170 francs per ton and Swiss would endeavor to keep to the lowest possible figure which Hotz indicated would result in a credit very appreciably lower than that of the 1941 agreement. Hotz stressed that this feature should be kept most secret. The new credit would come into effect if and when monthly coal deliveries exceed the 150,000 tons of arrears under the old agreement. Swiss hope to be able to manage that a part of the new credit would be used to facilitate normal peacetime exports even in such materials as embroidery.

Swiss instructions also included a demand for an air service as I reported in my telegram under reference which if conceded they did not expect would be allowed for more than diplomatic mail although they would ask for postal facilities. They excluded the possibility of passengers being allowed.

The Swiss envisaged that the agreement would remain in force until the completion of the delivery of 1,800,000 tons of coal and coal products (over and above the arrears previously referred to) for they estimate that this will take a year.

Hotz and Keller emphasized on political grounds the absolute necessity under which the Swiss found themselves to arrive at an agreement with the Germans to obtain coal their most vital requirement and to secure some freedom for their foreign trade through the counter-blockade. They stated that they hoped the Swiss position could be presented to you in a sympathetic light and that you would give weight to their assurances that they would make every effort in the course of the coming negotiations to secure a satisfactory reduction in undesirable exports.

Commercial Attaché and his British colleague expressed their personal view that you would probably not regard the situation with favor. They emphasized that the crucial point in the London negotiations had been our requirement of a reduction in undesirable exports.

¹² Licenses or guarantees of safe conduct.

The effect of the arrangement to liquidate the agreement of 1941 coupled with any arrangement under a new agreement would be a substantial rise in undesirable exports as Sulzer had admitted to me and probably to the end of this year if not longer. At this stage of the war it could only create a bad impression whatever the cause might be that such a rise should take place. This impression would be even worse if as a result of the negotiations for a future agreement a substantial reduction in undesirable exports was not achieved.

However, for the Department's background Commercial Attaché and his British colleague are not surprised or too concerned over the arrangement for liquidating the past arrears which had already been indicated by Hotz (see 6th paragraph of my telegram No. 448, January 20—57 to London¹³). They consider, however, that it is of the utmost importance that the Swiss should be deterred by fear of unfavorable reaction on our side from making concessions to the Germans in the course of the coming negotiations. They recommend that a warning in this sense should be conveyed to the Swiss Ministers in Washington and London.¹⁴ I agree.

They are satisfied with the frankness with which Hotz and Keller stated their case and disclosed (for the first time) the instructions which they had received from the Federal Council for the conduct of the negotiations. They have also the impression that the Swiss will not fail this time to keep us informed of these negotiations insofar as our interests may be affected. It is significant that Keller stated that the Swiss had already paid heavily for the agreement of 1941 owing to the British reaction in cutting quotas. It may be added that they are certainly not anxious to enter into an agreement which might provoke further retaliatory measures on our part.

Repeated to London.

HARRISON

740.00112 European War 1939/8268 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 22, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received 10:22 p. m.]

2525. My British colleague¹⁵ has shown me the exchange of telegrams between his Government in London and British Embassy in Washington beginning former's 1522, April 16, to Washington the latest of which was London's 1572, April 20, and series from Wash-

¹³ Not printed.

¹⁴ Charles Bruggmann and Walter Thurnheer, respectively.

¹⁵ Clifford John Norton.

ington beginning with its 1384, April 17, the latest of which was its 1399, April 19.

As I read these telegrams the proposed plan to revoke all export licenses [and] navicerts in near future and to hold up all new applications is intended principally: (1) To cause Swiss to break their existing "liquidation" agreement with Germany as a means of further reducing undesirable exports to Germany or at least maintaining them at their recent lower level; and (2) to bring pressure to bear upon Swiss to stiffen them in their current negotiations at Berlin.

With regard to (1) it is my considered opinion that Swiss will not be induced to break this agreement by reason of application of measure proposed, and objective of reducing undesirable exports immediately will therefore not be achieved because of Switzerland's inescapable dependency upon Germany for coal, oil and other essential raw materials, seeds, fertilizers, et cetera.

With regard to (2) it is my belief that the threat to take severe action against Switzerland in event that Swiss negotiators are unable to obtain approximately the objectives laid down by Federal Council (my 2258, April 10 [9], 288 to London) would be more effective in stiffening their efforts than would be immediate application of sanctions envisaged. Undoubtedly Germans would learn of such sanctions immediately and could and would exploit Switzerland's weakened position to impose an agreement which might be far less favorable to our interests than one within framework of Federal Council's instructions which limit for proposed agreement of 1 year a Swiss quota credit to Germany (proportioned to German coal deliveries) to one-eighth of open credit of 850,000,000 francs accorded under 1941 agreement.

I believe we should confine ourselves for present to a joint expression of our dissatisfaction in strong but general terms and not except perhaps in oral explanation go into specific details of exact measures of retaliation which we have in mind pending some indication of German reaction to present Swiss position which should be forthcoming shortly.

HARRISON

740.00112 European War 1939/8268 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1943—1 p. m.

978. Reference your 2258, April 10 [9], and 2525, April 22. Your views have been most carefully considered. The recent turn in Swiss

affairs has been discussed here with the Board of Economic Warfare, the British and in particular with Mr. Riefler, the head of the Economic Warfare Division of our Embassy in London. All agree with the statement in your 2258 that the Swiss must be deterred by fear of unfavorable action on our side from making concessions to the Germans in the course of the negotiations in Berlin.

I believe that the following course of action will meet your views. This proposed action has been agreed upon between the British and ourselves in Washington and has been approved in London. If you also approve, I request you to present a close paraphrase of the following note to the Swiss Government. Your British colleague will be requested to present an approximately identical note and I request that you collaborate with him in its presentation and to the end that the text of the two notes shall be approximately identical.

“The Government of the United States appreciates the frankness shown by the Swiss Government as to its intentions with reference to the negotiations now taking place in Berlin between the Swiss and German Governments. The Government of the United States must express, however, in the most explicit terms, its profound concern over the course of action which the Swiss Government apparently intends to take in these negotiations. It will be recalled that during recent months the representatives of the United States and British Governments have called to the attention of the Swiss Government their unwillingness to assist, by facilitating imports into Switzerland, the economic contribution made by Switzerland to the Axis. During the recent negotiations which have taken place in London the Swiss representatives have indicated their willingness to consider the establishment of a formula which would result in an effective reduction in exports from Switzerland to the Axis of arms, munitions, and machinery. It now appears, however, that the Swiss Government, during the current negotiations in Berlin, is about to permit a situation to be created whereby there is every reason to expect that there will be a substantial rise in exports of the above undesirable items, from Switzerland to Germany. The Government of the United States finds itself constrained to express its great concern over this proposed action of the Swiss Government. Moreover it finds it difficult to understand how such action, which will tend directly to strengthen the military potential of the Axis and thereby prolong the war, can be regarded as consistent with the interests of Switzerland. Consequently the Government of the United States is forced to inform the Swiss Government that it has been compelled reluctantly to reconsider its attitude with respect to facilities for imports to Switzerland pending a satisfactory clarification of the Swiss attitude with respect to the Berlin negotiations.”

In presenting this note to the Swiss you are requested to inform them orally as follows:

1. As a result of the reconsideration of our attitude towards Swiss imports we shall, pending a satisfactory clarification of the Swiss attitude, suspend for the present and subject to consideration of special cases, all navicerts and export licenses covering imports into Switzerland. It is not intended that this suspension should apply to existing navicerts or export licenses in respect of goods shipped within a period of 14 days from the date of presentation of the note; nor would it apply to shipments under the Compensation Agreement nor to special shipments of medical products and other goods intended for specific humanitarian purposes.

2. Pending the desired clarification of the Swiss attitude we regard ourselves as free to give consideration to other measures that we might take for our own protection. For your information and such use as you may wish to make of it, the other measures referred to might take the form of, as examples, a resumption of pressure on industrial firms and a reduction of the permitted enemy content of Swiss exports.

3. It is the earnest hope of this Government that the desired clarification of the Swiss position will be obtained at the earliest possible moment so that a resumption of facilities for imports into Switzerland may take place.

You will observe that this course of action does not specify any particular measure which we require the Swiss to take and does not necessarily involve more than a temporary policy on our part. Our primary objective is to secure a reduction in undesirable Swiss exports to the enemy but it is our intention to maintain as flexible a position as possible and to leave the Swiss free to choose their own means of bringing about the results desired by us. We desire to leave the Swiss in no doubt as to the concern we feel at the steps they appear likely to take, but equally we do not intend to commit ourselves, other than temporarily, to any definite future course of action until we have a clear view of the Swiss attitude.

The note also appears to meet your suggestion that it be general in terms and leave you to explain orally the steps we propose to take. The BEW,¹⁶ the British and Mr. Riefler strongly advise immediate and definite action since they believe that this, rather than a general threat, is essential if we are to convince the Swiss that we are in earnest and give them the necessary incentive immediately to modify their proposals. You will appreciate that the effect of air attacks and the manpower shortage in Germany will make the Swiss contribution of arms, munitions and machinery of greater importance than ever to the Axis and we feel that we should take every possible step to prevent an increase in their contribution.

¹⁶ Board of Economic Warfare.

I hope that the action now suggested will meet with your approval but if it does not, please wire urgently. The fact that the Swiss German negotiations have been in progress for over a week makes it essential that we should take action with the least possible delay.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8318 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 29, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received 9 : 23 p. m.]

2645. Reference your 978, April 27, 1 p. m.

1. Yesterday evening my British colleague showed me a telegram he had received from his Government advising him that the Swiss Minister in London had requested an interview with the Foreign Secretary,¹⁷ that he should suspend action on the note pending further instructions and request me to do likewise.

2. If the proposal to impose sanctions is intended to demonstrate to the Swiss our displeasure caused by their decision to comply with the German proposal that both parties liquidate the 1941 agreement which will probably result in a near term rise in undesirable exports such action will undoubtedly have the desired result. On the other hand it would not in my opinion serve to strengthen but would rather weaken the hands of the Swiss in negotiating a new trade agreement. It was for this reason that I recommended in the last paragraph of my 2255 [2525]¹⁸ that we preferably confine ourselves to a strong warning of what the Swiss might expect in certain eventualities and refrain from implying sanctions at this juncture.

3. As now worded the note appears to anticipate that the current negotiations in Berlin will result in an increase of undesirable exports from Switzerland to Germany. This assumption may not be warranted in the light of assurances which I have received regarding the instructions which were given by the Federal Council to the Swiss delegates and appear to approximate the desiderata of our negotiators in London. As these negotiations according to our information relate solely to the negotiation of a new trade agreement to take the place of the 1941 agreement I beg to suggest the desirability of omitting in the proposed note to the Swiss Government the emphasis on the outcome of these negotiations and rather to express our concern over the situation which the Swiss have permitted to arise by their concurrence in the liquidation of the 1941 agreement.

HARRISON

¹⁷ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁸ Dated April 22, 10 p. m., p. 829.

740.00112 European War 1939/8318 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1943—3 p. m.

1089. Reference your 2645, April 29, and 2722, April [May] 3.¹⁹ While latter telegram seems more optimistic respecting forthcoming Swiss-German negotiations, it is still the firm conviction here that a general warning is inadequate to meet the situation. The note contained in Department's 978 of April 26 [27], however, has been re-studied in the light of your telegram, and it is believed that the revised phraseology which follows, will to a large extent meet your suggestions:

"The Government of the United States appreciates the frankness shown by the Swiss Government as to its intentions with reference to the negotiations now taking place between the Swiss and German Governments. The Government of the United States must express, however, in most explicit terms, its profound concern over the course of action which the Swiss Government has apparently taken in liquidating the 1941 agreement which, when coupled with the negotiations of a new agreement, will have the result of increasing rather than reducing the amount of undesirable exports to Germany. It will be recalled that during recent months the representatives of the United States and British Governments have called to the attention of the Swiss Government their unwillingness to assist, by facilitating imports into Switzerland, the economic contribution made by Switzerland to the Axis. During the recent negotiations which have taken place in London the Swiss representatives have indicated their willingness to consider the establishment of a formula which would result in an effective reduction in exports from Switzerland to the Axis of arms, munitions, and machinery. It now appears, however, that the Swiss Government as a result of the liquidation of the 1941 agreement and the negotiations for a new agreement will permit a situation to be created whereby there is every reason to expect that there will be a substantial rise in exports of undesirable items from Switzerland to Germany. The Government of the United States finds itself constrained to express its great concern over this situation. Moreover it finds it difficult to understand how such action, which will tend directly to strengthen the military potential of the Axis and thereby prolong the war, can be regarded as consistent with the interests of Switzerland. Consequently, the Government of the United States is forced to inform the Swiss Government that it is compelled reluctantly to reconsider its attitude with respect to facilities for imports to Switzerland pending a satisfactory clarification of the Swiss trade policy toward Germany."

The presentation of the note is being held up pending the outcome of conference between Swiss Minister in London with British Foreign Secretary which may change the situation. Department will wire you further if suggested course of action is changed.

HULL

¹⁹ Latter not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/8268 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*²⁰

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1943—noon.

1154. Your 2722, May 3; 2788, May 6; 2839, May 8,²¹ and Department's 1089, May 6; Department's 978, April 27.

1. Since Swiss-German negotiations have now been resumed in Bern, Department, Board of Economic Warfare and the British believe immediate action should be taken and unless you have strong objections, you are requested to present the note contained in Department's 1089 of May 6 as revised herein as soon as your British colleague is authorized to present a similar one or advises you that a similar communication will be presented to the Swiss Minister in London.

2. The note as revised follows:

[Here follows revised note; it differs only in that it refers to Swiss course of action "reviving credits under the 1941 agreement" rather than "liquidating the 1941 agreement".]

3. The oral statements accompanying the note remain the same as those contained in Department's 978 of April 27 except that you should impress upon the Swiss that we are most interested (a) that there will be an adequate and effective restriction on the total volume of their undesirable exports resulting in an immediate reduction no matter what formula is used by the Swiss. It is a matter of indifference to us whether this result is achieved by including the exports under the extended 1941 agreement within the lower quotas proposed for the new agreement or by making the quotas in the new agreement so low as to achieve an immediate total reduction in undesirable exports, and (b) that no new credits will be granted by the Swiss to Germany whether based on coal deliveries or not.

4. If you have strong objections to the course suggested, please telegraph urgently giving full reasons.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8481 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 17, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 6:54 p. m.]

3015. Department's 1154, May 14, and my 2875 (337 to London) May 10.²²

²⁰ Repeated on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as telegram No. 3073.

²¹ None printed.

²² Latter not printed.

1. My British colleague has shown me MEW's²³ telegram 2330, May 15, repeated to Washington.

2. As will be noted this last instruction from London differs from Department's instruction contained in its telegram under reference mainly in the following features:

1. It suggests omitting the revocation of the validity of existing navicerts or export licenses in respect to goods which are not shipped in 14 days from date of notes' presentation.

2. It states that though our final policy must depend on outcome of Swiss-German negotiations we should be prepared to raise the embargo provisionally if the Swiss agree to grant no new credits (whereas Department's instruction adds "whether based on coal deliveries or not") and provided they give assurance that pending final decision on limitation and reduction of undesirable exports such exports will at any rate be kept below average 1942 levels; latter provision appears to vary from (a) in penultimate paragraph of Department's telegram under reference in that specifying reduction from average of 1942 it suggests through use of "levels" reduction for each item and not "total volume" as in (a) and does not specify that this reduction shall be "immediate".

3. Insofar as instructions received by my British colleague differ to extent outlined above from those contained in Department's telegram under reference, I shall await Department's instructions as to which formula Department wishes to be employed. My British colleague deems it essential that our statements to Swiss should be identical. In this I concur.

4. I wish to express my appreciation of opportunity offered by Department to give my views in this matter. It is my understanding that our purpose is to obtain substantial reduction in undesirable exports to Axis. We are indifferent as to means by which this is to be obtained. Consequently it would appear to be preferable not to impose specific conditions but rather to leave it to Swiss to meet our demands. They are now in midst of negotiations with Germans. They have given every indication of standing to their guns. If we now impose sanctions, I fear that this will create a situation which can be used by Germans to our disadvantage as pointed out in penultimate paragraph of my 2525, April 12th [22nd].

Both my British colleague and I still feel that it would be preferable to follow a procedure along lines indicated in my 2788 of May 6.²⁴ Such procedure would I believe ensure us a more flexible position in which we would retain initiative and serve our purpose.

Repeated to London.

HARRISON

²³ British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

²⁴ Not printed; the procedure suggested was that a communication to the Swiss in the form of a *note verbale* should be made in either Washington, London, or Bern regarding views of the United States and the United Kingdom on exports to the Axis countries from Switzerland (740.00112 European War 1939/8375).

740.00112 European War 1939/8481 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1943—10 a. m.

1223. Reference Department's 1154, May 14 and your 3015, May 17. We have carefully reviewed our proposed action in the light of your telegram. British Embassy here has suggested slight changes in instructions to your British colleague which would make it possible for your statement and the statement of your British colleague to be identical:

1. We agree with the British suggestion that in our statement accompanying the note you may omit the revocation of the validity of existing navicerts or export licenses in respect to goods which are not shipped within 14 days from the date of presentation of the note. Referring to Department's 978, April 27, paragraph number 1, second sentence will then read "It is not intended that this suspension should apply to existing navicerts or export licenses; nor would it apply to shipments, etc."

2. We do not agree that at the presentation of the note the Swiss should be told that we would be prepared to reopen Swiss import facilities if the Swiss agree to grant no new credits to Germany and assure us that pending final decision on undesirable exports, such exports will be kept below average 1942 levels. To tell the Swiss this at the outset, in our opinion, places a limit on what we may expect from the Swiss in finally meeting our desires at the conclusion of the Swiss-German negotiations. It seems to us unlikely that the Swiss would have the incentive to press for anything more favorable to us in the negotiations than that which was necessary to restore their import facilities. Thus, at the end of the negotiations we would be faced with a *fait accompli* and the contemplated sanctions would become impractical. British Embassy here agrees with this view, has wired to London to this effect and by now your British colleague may have received additional instructions.

It is thus now contemplated that in presenting the note your oral statement will be along the lines suggested in Department's 978 of April 27 as amended in this telegram (dropping out the 14-day provision) and emphasizing (a) and (b) of paragraph number 3 of Department's 1154 of May 14. You may add that we will always be ready to consider and weigh any assurances which the Swiss may desire to put forward respecting credits and undesirable exports with a view to lifting the sanctions during the Swiss-German negotiations or as long as we are convinced that our desires are being met.

It may be that this procedure will result in the Swiss giving us better assurances than the ones proposed by the British as a condition

for temporarily lifting the sanctions. In any case it will give us a chance to weigh these assurances and make sure that real steps are being taken to meet our desires as opposed to vague promises of future action.

3. The discrepancies between the British instructions and your instructions pointed out by you in paragraph number 2 of 3015 of May 17 result from the fact that the British were referring to conditions which should be met to lift the sanctions temporarily and, since these conditions are not now to be stated at the outset, they become irrelevant. For your information, however, phrase "whether based on coal deliveries or not" was merely inserted for emphasis. It is obvious that if Germany is denied all further credits, credits based on coal deliveries would be included. The use of the term "immediate" in relation to reduction of undesirable exports is meant to indicate merely that positive steps should be taken now as distinguished from vague promises of future action. We do not intend to be unreasonable if we are satisfied that the Swiss are in fact in the process of meeting our desires. The reduction in undesirable exports should of course provide for reduction in those items to which we attach great importance.

4. Since the Swiss-German negotiations have now been progressing for many weeks we deem it of the utmost importance that the proposed action be taken as soon as possible and we hope that you will be able to agree with your British colleague on details and phraseology, using your own judgment and discretion in the solution of any inconsistencies.

5. We appreciate the views which you have expressed. We believe the course of action which we have now finally decided upon reconciles your views with the views of the Department, the Board of Economic Warfare and the British to the extent possible and, if we are satisfied that the Swiss are taking definite steps to meet our desires, resulting in a temporary lifting of the sanctions, we will then be in the position of threatening to reimpose sanctions pending the outcome of the Swiss-German negotiations. If this stage is reached the situation will coincide with that originally suggested by you.

6. The term "embargo" has crept into recent telegrams. We presume that this term has been used for convenience to express a complicated situation. The sanctions envisaged do not constitute an "embargo" and we do not believe it wise to use that term in your conversation with the Swiss.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8524 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 22, 1943.

[Received May 22—5:19 p. m.]

3537. For Department and BEW.

(1) Swiss Minister here presented on May 20 a memorandum to MEW respecting the compensation deal and stated that *Geleitscheine* had already been issued in a total of 188,000 Swiss francs but as MEW had agreed to issue navicerts for 2000 tons of oats the balance was slightly in our favor. The Minister then expressed the hope that this would not prevent the compensation deal from working smoothly and that it would be kept separate from other issues between the Allies and Switzerland. Foot²⁵ of MEW replied that this would require consideration in consultation with the Americans but his initial reaction was that the compensation deal should be kept entirely separate from other matters and that it might well continue even if otherwise agreement was not reached.

(2) Foot continued in stating that there was one difficulty arising from the compensation deal. In order to get it under way it was agreed late in 1942 to refrain for a time from putting further pressure on firms manufacturing arms and machinery. We had now kept this self-denying rule for a much longer time than was originally envisaged and the position therefore was that we had denied ourselves one method available to us to reduce objectionable exports while receiving no satisfactory assurance from the Swiss Government. We could not accept this situation much longer and unless arrangements were made for the reduction in the immediate future of undesirable exports we should be obliged to resume pressure irrespective of its effect on the compensation deal.

(3) In response to the Swiss Minister's inquiry respecting the delivery of the notes in Bern, he was told that while their delivery had been deferred pending his interviews with Eden, the notes would now probably be delivered but their contents would not come as a surprise to the Swiss Government. Foot emphasized that our attitude towards Switzerland was no different from that adopted for other neutral countries. It was realized that in the early stages of the war the Axis possessed a powerful sanction in that it could invade with an apparently invincible army. Now, however, while this danger might not be entirely removed it seemed improbable that Germany would wish to

²⁵ Dingle Foot, Parliamentary Secretary of British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

add to its enemies or its military commitments. Moreover, as the German war potential declined the value of the contributions made by neutral countries was becoming relatively and rapidly greater. In these circumstances, the British Government felt itself justified in expecting the neutrals to make a substantial reduction in their assistance to the Axis war effort and it would be most unfortunate if the Swiss Government chose this moment to increase its assistance to the enemy.

(4) The Swiss Minister then called attention to a paragraph of his memorandum on the compensation deal in which it is suggested that new items might be included and that the Swiss Government, without giving a definite assurance, would be prepared to try to include supply facilities for fuses if desired by the Allies. He stated that if the Allies obtained Swiss fuses there would be fewer left for the Germans. Foot replied that this did not necessarily follow inasmuch as it might simply result in an increased output. If, however, we could by purchases reduce deliveries to the enemy we would be deeply interested.

(5) The Swiss Minister then called attention to certain cargoes of sugar, copra and tobacco now awaiting shipment in vessels scheduled to sail about May 25.

(7) [(6)] Swiss Minister's remarks as reported above cover stance [*substance*] of his memorandum which follows by air mail.²⁶

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8542 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 24, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 24—9:41 p. m.]

3576. For Department and BEW. MEW has consulted Embassy with respect to possible German pressure on Switzerland for a transit of troops and military material. In order to forestall such action, it was provisionally agreed that a communication, either verbal or in writing, should be addressed to the Swiss Government along the following lines:

"It is obvious that, as the result of recent developments in the Mediterranean theatre, the use of the Swiss Railways has become of greater importance than ever to the Axis, and is likely to become more important still. It would not be surprising if the Germans were to subject the Swiss Government to pressure to allow troops and military stores

²⁶ Despatch No. 9277, May 26, 1943, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, not printed.

to be carried. In these circumstances, the British and United States Governments feel justified in asking the Swiss Government for a fresh assurance that such demands will be rejected. They were glad to observe the recent report that a truck which was found to contain military supplies was returned to Germany. There is however, reason to believe that the Axis are attempting to send military stores via Switzerland. They wish therefore to be informed as to what steps the Swiss authorities are taking to inspect all consignments from Germany to Italy and vice versa, and in particular what check is kept over the contents of sealed wagons. As regards the definition of military stores, they wish to point out that any oil despatched through Switzerland must, in present circumstances, be certainly intended for military use. They therefore ask for an assurance that the Swiss Government are not permitting, and will not permit, the carriage of any oil whatsoever."

MEW is taking up this question urgently with the Foreign Office and has requested the Embassy to obtain as soon as possible the views of the American Government. Please instruct urgently if you concur in action proposed and if so the manner in which you desire the approach to be made to the Swiss Government.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8542 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1943—9 p. m.

3372. Your 3576, May 24. We fully concur as to the desirability of obtaining formal commitment from the Swiss regarding Axis use of rail facilities in Switzerland. In our opinion, however, the Swiss should be asked to limit the volume of general Axis traffic to recent average levels as well as to continue to refuse transport of troops and military stores. We should also like the Swiss to furnish us with complete monthly statistics on Axis traffic over their rail lines, if possible.

American Legation at Bern has recently been informed by Swiss officials that the list of contraband materials used by the Swiss exceeds in strictness and comprehension the list embodied in the Hague treaties and that a careful inspection is made at the border to prevent evasion according to the same officials. However we agree that it would be desirable to have the Swiss make a more decisive and detailed statement on these matters.

It is suggested that the British and ourselves make representations simultaneously to the Swiss in Washington and London in order to keep this question entirely separate from other issues under negotiation. Accordingly, if the British Government agrees, please inform

us when they propose to inform the Swiss Minister in London in order that we may deliver a memorandum to the Legation here at the same time.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8564 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 27, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 9:04 p. m.]

3242. In accordance with Department's instructions in its 1223, May 22, I handed Mr. Pilet-Golaz²⁷ yesterday evening the revised note contained in Department's 1154, May 14, and presented the oral statement contained in Department's 978, April 27, as amended by Department's 1223. Immediately prior to my call, my British colleague also handed Mr. Pilet a note and gave him an oral statement which with unimportant changes in phraseology are identic with ours.

Mr. Pilet informed me that my communications would be laid before the Federal Council at their next meeting tomorrow. He then made following comments.

With regard to implementation of 1941 agreement, Switzerland, he said, invariably complied to the full with her obligations. While he had himself expected an increase in shipments to Germany during May and June of this year he believed that from that time on deliveries of undesirable exports would diminish. He had no doubt of outcome of present conflict and had envisaged a situation which with establishment of a second front, especially in France, would mean that Switzerland would be effectively cut off from contact with the west. He foresaw a period of from 6 to 8 months when Switzerland would have to live on its own fat. Perhaps that time might come this autumn. He had hoped for time in which to accumulate sufficient reserves. He regretted this sudden blow. If there had to be restrictions it would have been preferable if they had been imposed progressively. The Germans would learn of our action and he feared that they might in reply discontinue permission for the transit and exchange of goods with Sweden, Denmark, Slovakia, Hungary, and Rumania which was so important for Switzerland. Or they might no longer permit sea-borne traffic between Portugal and Genoa.

Mr. Pilet saw great difficulty in meeting our demand for no new credits. Switzerland had to have coal. She could only get it from Germany. Unlike Sweden, she had no raw material to offer in exchange. It was preferable for Switzerland to grant credits and

²⁷ Marcel Pilet-Golaz, Chief of the Swiss Federal Political Department.

thereby maintain her factories working and her people employed rather than to use the same money for payment of a dole with its attendant ill effect on morale. If no coal credits were granted, Germans might well arbitrarily increase greatly the price of coal and assume a take it or leave it attitude. In this alternative he saw no practical advantage and it would exclude later repayment of a credit, however tenuous that might be.

Mr. Pilet also stated that outcome of present negotiations with Germans was very uncertain. Germans had taken objection to the steps that had recently been taken by Swiss with a view to cutting down their deliveries to Germany (see my 3041, May 18²⁸).

Mr. Pilet described present situation of Switzerland as that of small country being slowly strangulated and pointed to fact that Axis counter-blockade was in a position to deny to Switzerland the receipt of goods which we might permit through Allied blockade. He also mentioned German complaints respecting the intelligence facilities which we enjoy in Switzerland and remarked that in taking our present decision these and other important factors had perhaps been overlooked.

Lastly, Mr. Pilet emphasized that all he had now said was to be considered solely as an expression of his personal views and that the Government's reply would be made in due course.²⁹

HARRISON

740.00112 European War 1939/8590: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 31, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 31—8:30 p. m.]

3714. Department's 3372, May 27, 9 p. m., and Embassy's 3659, May 28, 5 p. m.³⁰

1. If agreeable to Department and BEW, Embassy and MEW would prefer to leave substance of representations to be made to Swiss respecting German use of Swiss railways in general form presented in Embassy's 3576 of May 24. The wording therein used was worked out by MEW in collaboration with Embassy after lengthy consideration of the possible advantage to be gained by requesting an overall limitation on movements of Axis transit traffic to average recent level and also for statistics of traffic movement.

²⁸ Not printed.

²⁹ See telegram No. 4172 bis, July 14, 9 p. m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 854.

³⁰ Latter not printed.

2. The strategy behind the present text is to ask the Swiss for nothing that is not within what may be requested of a neutral. It does not give the Swiss an opening consequently for requesting a *quid pro quo* or for claiming favors as a result of compliance with our demands. The Swiss may argue that this is not strictly true with respect to oil (which is not usually classified among military supplies) but we feel that we may be able to prevail on this point. Should we ask the Swiss for traffic statistics or to place an overall limit on transit of nonmilitary supplies through Switzerland, they might assume that by granting this favor they could escape in some measure our current pressure on them to reduce exports of undesirable items to Germany. If the reduction in the exports of these items is not satisfactory to us, we will then be free to make these requests with respect to transit traffic.

3. It is the present opinion here that it might not be to our current interest in any event to press for the above limitation on transit of nonmilitary traffic to Italy. If this limitation were obtained, its chief effect would probably be to reduce the current rate of coal deliveries to Italy as a portion of the coal now moving is not destined for current consumption in Italy but is rather to build up reserve stocks for next winter. If we expect the status of Italy to change by next winter, the existence of these coal stocks in Italy may prove a decided asset to the United Nations.

4. A decision with respect to this matter is expected from the War Cabinet today.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8631 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 5, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received June 5—5:20 p. m.]

3838. Embassy's telegram No. 3714, May 31, 12 midnight. The War Cabinet has at length approved the idea of a proposed parallel approach of our two Governments to the Swiss with regard to the railway transit traffic and the following is the text of the memorandum which the Foreign Office plans to present to the Swiss Minister here:

“As a result of recent developments in the Mediterranean theatre of war, the use of the Swiss Railways has come of greater importance than ever to the Axis Powers and is likely to increase in importance with future developments. It would not be surprising if the German Government were to press the Swiss Government to grant permission to pass troops and military stores through Switzerland. His Majesty's Government have no doubt that the Swiss Government would reject

any such request, and they would be glad to receive an assurance to this effect from the Swiss Government.

His Majesty's Government have been glad to learn from His Majesty's Minister at Bern of the assurance recently given to him by M. Pilet-Golaz that the Swiss customs had always had instructions to exercise the right of examination of traffic, even of sealed waggons passing through Switzerland; that the examination had not shown any important irregularities and that the vigilance of the Swiss authorities would not be relaxed.

This does not, however, diminish the desire of His Majesty's Government to obtain assurances from the Swiss Government that any future requests from the Axis Powers inconsistent with Swiss neutrality will be rejected. As regards the definition of military stores His Majesty's Government wish to point out that any oil despatched through Switzerland must in present circumstances certainly be intended for military use. His Majesty's Government would therefore be glad of an assurance that the Swiss Government are not permitting and will not permit the carriage of any oil whatsoever through Swiss territory."

The Foreign Office suggests Thursday, June 10, as a date for our parallel action and would appreciate receiving the concurrence of the Department and BEW.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8631 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1943.

3596. Your 3714, May 21 [31], and 3838, June 5. In view of your statement in 3714, May 31, Department and BEW agree that substance of communication to be delivered to the Swiss may take the form stated in your 3838, June 5.

We will be prepared to take parallel action here on June 10.³¹

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8676b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1943—8 p. m.

3614. For Riefler. British Embassy has informed the Department that the British permanent Under Secretary of State³² handed memo-

³¹Text of the memorandum presented to the Swiss Legation on June 10 was substantially the same, *mutatis mutandis*, as that quoted in telegram No. 3838, *supra*.

³²Sir Alexander Cadogan.

randum to Swiss Minister³³ emphasizing grave view British Government takes of Swiss proposed grant of fresh credits to Germany. British Government puts itself on record that it reserves the right to refuse to recognize any credits granted during the war as a legitimate charge against Axis assets and that in any case British Government will regard such credits as ranking below all allied claims.

British Embassy informs us that the terms of this memorandum had Riefler's approval. Department is inclined to favor parallel action here but before taking a decision would appreciate receiving complete copy of memorandum, detailed comments, and advice. Does the principle apply to other neutrals and, if so, is it proposed to make similar statements to them?

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8691d : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1943—8 p. m.

3708. Swiss Legation has presented a memorandum dated June 11³⁴ to the effect that Swiss Legation in London recently approached British authorities to inquire whether it would be acceptable to MEW and American delegation to reopen suspended negotiations. The Swiss state that the Federal Council has taken a decision to reopen the London negotiations as soon as possible with delegation consisting of Sulzer and Keller and that they are prepared to submit proposals concerning export restrictions including quotas for undesirable exports groups 3 and 4 and for dairy products. The Swiss expressed disappointment with the London reception of this proposal and state that American and British Governments intend to set down in writing the conditions which alone will permit reopening of negotiations. They say that such a step would not be acceptable if the contents of the hoped for negotiations should thereby be anticipated. The Swiss specifically point out that some new credits will have to be given Germany in order to reach an agreement enabling Switzerland to obtain necessary raw materials and they suggest that if they meet us on quotas, further credits would be of small significance. If a general agreement is reached, the Swiss are willing to conclude the financial arrangements. The memorandum concludes with the expression of hope that upon further consideration the proposed visit of the Swiss delegation will be agreeable.

³³ See telegram No. 4021, June 16, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 847.

³⁴ Not found in Department files.

British Embassy informs Department that on June 9 after discussion with Riefler, British Parliamentary Secretary sent a letter to the Swiss Minister doubting the utility of reopening negotiations unless the Swiss were prepared to inform us in advance as to the subjects they regard as open to discussion.

We have not received your views or those of Riefler on the present status of Swiss relations but our preliminary views follow:

1. We think the Swiss must be under a misapprehension when they state that London intends to impose written conditions to reopening of negotiations. It would seem to us sufficient if the Swiss came to London prepared to meet our desires in principle leaving to the negotiations the precise form of commitment.

2. The memorandum presented in Washington being subsequent to the approaches by the Swiss in London, may to some extent meet London's conditions for reopening the negotiations. The Washington memorandum specifically refers to quotas on undesirable exports and to dairy products.

3. If really satisfactory quotas are obtained for undesirable exports, an absolute prohibition of all credits may not necessarily be a *sine qua non* to a satisfactory solution. This question would have to be examined in the light of concrete proposals.

4. On principle it seems wise to attempt to obtain an agreement with the Swiss before they conclude negotiations with the Germans.

5. To refuse to meet the Swiss may discourage them to the point where they despair of reaching any agreement with us. This would weaken their desire to resist German demands.

6. It seems to us that the Washington memorandum at least provides a basis for reopening the negotiations although amplification and clarification may be desirable. We urgently request your views and those of MEW and Riefler.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8698 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 16, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received June 16—5:05 p. m.]

4021. Your 3614 of June 10. Riefler was under the impression that you had been informed of the memorandum. The text was as follows:

“The Swiss Government are already aware of the grave view which His Majesty's Government take of the Swiss Government's proposal that fresh credits should be granted to Germany.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding over the position of any such credits in the post-war settlement, His Majesty's Government feel that it is right to put on record that they must of course reserve the right to refuse to treat any credits granted during the war as in any way a legitimate charge on Axis assets, and that in any case they would regard such credits as ranking below all Allied claims against the Axis countries. Moreover His Majesty's Government would in no circumstances facilitate the collection of such debts due to neutral countries by Germany."

There was no time to clear the message with Washington because it was desired to deliver it to the Swiss before the arrival of the German delegation in Bern. It has not yet been decided whether or not to use the same memorandum in connection with other European neutrals.

We will advise you of developments.

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8733 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 21, 1943.

[Received June 21—2:15 p. m.]

4109. For Department and BEW from Riefler. The Swiss Minister called on Foot and me this afternoon to leave with each of us a copy of the following memorandum in response to the letters quoted in Embassy's A-452 of June 10, 9 a. m.³⁵

1. In response to Mr. Foot's desire for additional data as to the nature of the Swiss proposals for a continuation of last year's trade discussions, Monsieur Thurnheer is now in a position to give the following information.

2. In regard to dairy produce the Swiss Government would be prepared to suspend exports to all Axis countries under the following tariff items: Ex-19 milk powder, 91, 92, 98a-99c with the exception of exports in the small frontier traffic, through the International Red Cross Committee as well as gift parcels to Swiss citizens abroad.

In regard to cattle for breeding, exports under tariff items 137a, 138a, b, 139b, 140 and 142 could be limited to 5500 heads for 1943, of which not more than 3000 to Germany.

3. As regards machinery, the Swiss Government is prepared to reduce as from July 1, 1943, exports under the following tariff items to 80% of the weight exported in 1942 to Germany for each individual item:

811/813, 1083, 1084, 948a, 753/756, 747, 914h, 937.

Exports during the second half year of 1943 would be limited to 40% of the export weight in 1942.

³⁵ Not printed.

4. The Swiss Government would be prepared to introduce as per August 1, 1943, additional restrictions on exports of certain machinery under Group III. For these positions further clarification as well as discussions in London would seem to be required. This is based on the assumption that exports for goods which are of no war material will be largely facilitated.

5. Furthermore, the Swiss Government is prepared to introduce forthwith certain other export restrictions which had been discussed with the Ministry of Economic Warfare last year, for instance for textiles, provided that new imports will be granted for these industries. In this respect verbal discussions seem likewise necessary.

6. The Swiss Government is prepared to bring to a conclusion the finance agreement which had been prepared in the course of 1942 with the Treasury and the Bank of England.

7. The Swiss Government is prepared to offer additional supplies to the Allies in Switzerland within the framework of the compensation deal.

These proposals are considered as a sufficient basis for further discussions in view of a new trade agreement with corresponding blockade facilities.

Dated June 21, 1943."

I told the Minister we would have to study the tariff items enumerated above before we could form an idea of their significance, but that we would do this immediately.

Comment will follow in separate telegram.³⁶ [Riefler.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8755 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 24, 1943.

[Received June 24—3:42 p. m.]

4181. For Department and BEW from Riefler.

1. Monday³⁷ when the Swiss Minister handed me the memorandum quoted in Embassy's 4109 of June 21, I told him we would have to examine the exact meaning of the reductions named therein before any final answer could be made but on its face the memorandum looked promising. He said he wanted to give an answer to Bern as quickly as possible. I replied that I hoped it would be possible to give one by Monday June 28 by which time I hoped to have received instructions from Washington.

2. The Swiss Minister said that the absence of any mention of credit in the memorandum or in his instructions might possibly mean that credit of some kind might have to be given Germany by the Swiss

³⁶ *Infra.*

³⁷ June 21.

Government. However, no information one way or the other on this point had come to him.

3. Leaving aside cattle and dairy products for the present, closer statistical examination of the remaining tariff numbers in the memorandum quoted in Embassy's 4109 of June 21, indicates that the Swiss have substantially met our demands in so far as these particular tariff items are concerned. MEW and ourselves consequently are inclined to inform the Swiss that if they undertake as of July 1, 1943, to carry out the terms of the memorandum with respect to these particular tariff items namely: 811 to 813 arms and parts; 1083 explosives; 1084 small arms ammunition; 948a gasometers and certain other fine mechanical apparatus (including fuses); 733 to 756 precision instruments; 747 tools for watchmaking; 914h aircraft and parts; 937 astronomical, geodetical (*sic*) and mathematical apparatus; and if they will also undertake as of July 1, 1943, to apply the same formula to the following additional items: 809a1/a3 steel ball and roller bearings; MDY dynamo-electric machines; M6 machine tools of all kinds; M9 other machinery n.e.s.; 956a/f magnetos of all kinds; 935d/936d chronometers, repeaters, et cetera, and 954a radio equipment, we on our side will immediately reopen the blockade quotas which were closed in April (mostly food). The Swiss offer with respect to 948a, gasometers and fuses, will require clarification to make sure that the 20 per cent reduction applies to fuses separately.

4. We would at the same time inform the Swiss that we would be pleased thereafter to resume the London discussions looking (a) towards a new war trade agreement and (b) towards a settlement on other outstanding economic warfare questions. For this purpose we would welcome the return of Dr. Sulzer and Dr. Keller to London. We are now engaged in preparing a list of the subjects which we would like to discuss with the Swiss delegates on their return and we would be prepared to send this list as soon as we had heard that the Swiss had given the undertaking referred to above.

5. Please inform me before Monday June 28 if possible whether you agree and whether we may reply to the Swiss in this sense. [Riefler.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/8953

The Swiss Legation to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

With regard to the State Department's memorandum of June 10th, 1943,³⁸ it is brought in remembrance that, on August 31st, 1939, the

³⁸ See footnote 31, p. 845.

Swiss Federal Council has solemnly proclaimed Switzerland's neutrality in the actual conflict. This declaration, the text of which is hereto attached,³⁹ gives a true interpretation of Switzerland's traditional policy. It has been observed loyally and represents an undertaking to be met. Accordingly, the Swiss Federal Council has never considered the possibility to grant permission to pass foreign troops or foreign military stores through the country. The through-traffic is vigilantly watched and no events occurred which would have necessitated an intervention or a protest from the Swiss side. There are no indications present permitting the assumption that the Axis powers are pondering on a request to pass troops or military stores through Switzerland. The Swiss Federal Council is certain that Germany and Italy are convinced that such a request would be turned down as inconsistent with Switzerland's neutrality which these countries have promised to respect.

The Swiss Government will further pursue the course indicated by the engagements entered upon and consistent with the will of the Swiss people. As for the transit through Switzerland, the Swiss Government is resolved to observe conscientiously the rules of the Law of Nations, as well as the International Conventions and to take care that it is handled in conformity with Switzerland's policy of neutrality.

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1943.

740.00112 European War 1939/8755 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1943.

3988. Your 4181, June 24. For Riefler.

1. Department and BEW agree that the Swiss proposals constitute an adequate basis for resuming negotiations in London on the war trade agreement.

2. According to our information, the Swiss in making these proposals did not request the lifting of the ban on import facilities preliminarily to the resumption of negotiations of the war trade agreement in London. If we now lift this ban it may deprive us of one of our principal bargaining points in the London negotiations. On the other hand there are distinct advantages in getting a definite commitment from the Swiss before they reach an agreement with the Germans. If you feel that such a commitment cannot be obtained without offering to lift the ban on import facilities, Department and BEW approve your suggested course of action.

³⁹ Not printed.

3. If under all the circumstances you consider it desirable to offer to lift the ban, it should be made clear to the Swiss that we will expect them to meet our position more adequately in the London negotiations. The Swiss should not get the impression that their present proposals are acceptable to us as final commitments. The proposed reductions of undesirable exports by "weight" do not appear to produce as advantageous results as the various formulae proposed by us last year. The credit arrangement discussed in Bern's 3750 June 23⁴⁰ (repeated to London) is objectionable in that the Government's guarantee in effect merely substitutes the credit of the Swiss Government for the credit of German coal exporters. Without such a guarantee Swiss firms would probably not risk large advances.

4. The Department desires to send a representative to assist in negotiations when these are resumed in London and therefore as much advance notice as possible of probable date would be appreciated.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8806 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 2, 1943.

[Received July 2—12:15 p. m.]

4341. For Department and BEW from Riefler. In accordance with your telegram 3988 of June 30 I have agreed with MEW to the following instructions which are now being sent to the British Minister in Bern.⁴¹

Begin draft instructions:

1. We have now considered with the Americans the proposals contained in the Swiss memorandum,⁴² which we regard as a considerable advance on anything the Swiss have so far offered. We observe, however, that while it is proposed to suspend exports of dairy produce and reduce exports of cattle to all Axis-controlled territory, it is proposed to reduce exports of arms and machinery to Germany alone.

2. The Swiss proposals are only put forward as a basis for negotiation, and we have no assurance that even the limitations now operating will continue. It is important that we should secure continuing guarantees on exports of arms and machinery immediately, whereas other outstanding matters can await discussion in London. Please therefore inform the Swiss Government that we hope they will agree to put the following provisions into effect as from 1st July.

⁴⁰ Not printed.

⁴¹ Memorandum based on these instructions was transmitted to the Swiss Government by the British Legation on July 5.

⁴² See telegram No. 4109, June 21, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 848.

1st. The proposed reduction of exports for the last 6 months of this year to 40 percent of the 1942 exports to apply to each individual tariff item in group 3.

2d. Radio equipment (954a) to be transferred from group 2 to group 3, and also to be subject to the same reduction.

3d. Item 948a (gasometers, et cetera) to be split up and the same reduction to apply specifically to fuses.

4th. Group 4 to be subject to itemized reduction as proposed by the Swiss.

5th. All these reductions to apply to the whole of Axis Europe and not to Germany alone.

6th. All above limitations to be by value as well as by weight. The Swiss would guarantee that total exports to Axis Europe during the last half of 1943 should not in the case of any one of the tariff items involved exceed 40 percent either by weight or value of the corresponding total exports in 1942.

3. If the Swiss are prepared forthwith to meet us on these points we will at once lift the ban on food imports thus ensuring the Swiss their food quotas for third and fourth quarters of 1943. This will mean that Swiss intransigence which led to suspension of navicerts, et cetera, in April will have cost them only the unused balance of the second quarter's quotas.

4. Thereafter we would welcome return of delegation to London to discuss other outstanding matters. These would *inter alia* include Swiss proposals regarding exports of cattle and dairy produce, the further reduction of arms and machinery exports in 1944, the imposition of a ceiling on group 2, and credits. You should emphasize that the offer stated above does not mean that we acquiesce in the granting of further credits or renewal of past credits to the enemy. In particular you should make it clear that the form of credits which it is now intended to extend to the enemy in your telegram number 8373, paragraph 6 (of 26th June) is no less objectionable to us than the form previously contemplated.

5. We realize that the above demands go somewhat further than the Swiss seem prepared to go from your telegram, particularly in regard to M6, on which we place great importance. But if they meet us they will be able to start shipments of food at once, whereas the procedure envisaged by the Swiss Government (even if we decided to accept it) would involve at the very least the continued loss of shipping facilities for several weeks.

6. Please address communication to Swiss Government accordingly and inform your American colleague who will, we hope, be instructed to associate himself with your communication. *End draft British instructions.*

Swiss Minister here is being informed of the substance of above.

No doubt you will wish to instruct the American Minister at Bern to associate himself with this reply to the Swiss proposals covered by Department's 3988, June 30.

Not repeated to Bern except above instructions by British.
[Riefler.]

740.00112 European War 1939/8806 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1943—6 p. m.

1596. Department and BEW authorize you to join with your British colleague in replying to the Swiss proposals for reduction of undesirable exports and for resumption of London negotiations in accordance with the instructions sent by MEW to Bern. However, we are suggesting to London that in paragraph 4 the words "in 1944" should be eliminated so as to give us greater latitude in seeking a further immediate reduction of undesirable exports as a condition to the reopening of the industrial materials quotas.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8889 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 14, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received July 15—2:53 a. m.]

4172, bis. In sequence to my 4139 (510 to London) July 13.⁴³ Following is text in translation of an *aide-mémoire* handed simultaneously to my British colleague and myself this evening by Federal Councillor Stampfli:⁴⁴

(*Begin aide-mémoire*) Federal Department Public Economy has honor to reply as follows to the memorandum which Legation of Great Britain transmitted to it under date July 5, 1943.⁴⁵

1. Since interruption of negotiations occurred at London in December 1942, Swiss Government has endeavored to take into account to greatest possible extent observations formulated in British and American notes of May 26, 1943.⁴⁶ In present circumstances placing into effect of the measures envisaged encounters particularly grave difficulties which can only be overcome by stages.

It was Swiss Government's view that it would have been of common interest to permit Messrs. Sulzer and Keller to develop in London itself the import and scope of these measures. It can only regret that Governments of Great Britain and United States have not thought it possible to accept immediate renewal of these negotiations.

2. In order to assure British and American Governments of its firm intention to take into account point of view expressed in notes of May 26, Swiss Government has put into force from July 1, 1943, as was foreseen from Swiss memorandum of June 18 [21?],⁴⁷ the quota control of exports to Germany of following products: 811/813

⁴³ Not printed.

⁴⁴ Walter Stampfli, Chief of the Swiss Department of Public Economy.

⁴⁵ See footnote 41, p. 852.

⁴⁶ See telegram No. 3242, May 27, 8 p. m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 842.

⁴⁷ See telegram No. 4109, June 21, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 848.

finished arms and their parts; 1083/84 explosive materials and munitions; 948a gas meters, etc. (Fuses); 753/56 precision tools for metal working; 914h airplanes and parts; 937 astronomical, geodetic and mathematical instruments and apparatuses. Under this quota control by Swiss tariff positions the exportation of these products may not exceed in value during the second semester of the year 1943, 40% of the corresponding exports destined to Germany during year 1942.

3. Although it would have preferred first to have entered into relation with competent authorities in London before taking other measures the Swiss Government is in position to make known at once its intention to limit also from August 1, 1943, to 80% of value of exports of 1942, exports to Germany of the products mentioned under following customs tariff numbers: 809a.1-3 ball bearings; M6 machine tools; 935d and 936d chronographs. It is disposed to transfer to group 3 and place under quota also beginning with the same date the products included under 954a (radio apparatus).

As a result of this quota control by customs tariff positions exportations of these products destined to Germany may not during 5 last months of current year exceed in value 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ % of the corresponding exports of year 1942.

Moreover request expressed in British memorandum of July 5 and which calls for separation (specification) of fuses under tariff item 948a will be accorded.

4. By measures indicated under paragraphs 2 and 3 following numbers under groups 3 and 4 will be subjected as far as exports to Germany are concerned to the restrictions suggested by British and American Governments: 811/13 finished arms and their spare parts; 1083/84 explosive materials and munitions; 948a gas meters etc. (Fuses); 753/56 precision tools for metal working; 914h airplanes and parts; 937, astronomical, geodetic and mathematical instruments and apparatus; 809a.1-3 ball bearings; M6 machine tools; 935d and 936d chronographs; and 954a radio apparatus.

Swiss Government is firmly decided to maintain these quotas in force. Nevertheless it hopes that British and American Governments will be good enough to resume without delay the delivery of navicerts for foodstuffs and this at least within limits of quotas accorded until now.

5. Swiss Government is disposed to put into force immediately with regard to all Axis countries export prohibition envisaged in Swiss memorandum of June 18 for the dairy products included in following customs tariff numbers: EX 19 powdered milk, 91 fresh milk, 92 condensed milk, 98a/t, 99c cheese, as well as quota envisaged for numbers 137a, 138a/b, 139, 140, 142a breeding cattle, if at the same time the British and American Governments open sufficient quotas and deliver navicerts for importation into Switzerland of feedstuffs (oats, barley, corn, oil cake). These restrictions will be maintained so long as navicerts will be granted for importation into Switzerland of these feedstuffs.

6. The imposition of quotas for the other customs positions included in group 3 as well as the export of war material and machinery to Axis countries other than Germany which is most important destinee, raises many questions both of a technical and economic nature which should without fail be discussed orally. Taking into

account the measures already applied and those for which entry into effect is envisaged Swiss Government hopes that British and American Governments will be disposed to resume negotiations without delay for purpose of discussing these questions and certain problems which have already been subject of previous negotiations. July 10, 1943. (*End aide-mémoire*).

Repeated to London.

HARRISON

740.00112 European War 1939/8895 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 15, 1943.

[Received July 15—7:20 a. m.]

4590. For Department and BEW from Riefler. Reference Embassy's airgram A-650 of July 12.⁴⁸

The Swiss Minister in London has written the following letter to Mr. Dingle Foot as Parliamentary Secretary of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, as of July 13, 1943, giving the Swiss Government's response to the message quoted in Embassy's telegram 4341 of July 2, 1943:

"By letter of July 3d, you had been good enough to advise us as to the reply which His Majesty's Government and the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy intended to convey to the Swiss Government, in regard to the Swiss proposals for a resumption of trade discussions in London, as contained in M. Thurnheer's memorandum of June 21st, 1943.⁴⁹

I am now in receipt of a cable from Bern, stating that the British reply was communicated by His Majesty's Minister in Bern to M. Stampfli, head of the Department of Public Economy, on July 6th. I am further informed that M. Stampfli was to receive His Majesty's Minister on the 12th instant, and to convey to Mr. Norton the Swiss Federal Council's reply in the following sense:

1. The Swiss Government have already put into effect, as from July 1st, 1943, the following restrictions on exports to Germany: Exports under tariff items 811/13, 1083, 1084, 948a, 753/56, 914h and 937 for the second half year of 1943 to be reduced under each position to 40% of the value of total exports in 1942.

2. In addition, the Swiss Government are resolved to put into effect as from August 1st, 1943, the following restrictions on exports to Germany: Exports under tariff items 809a1/a3, M.6, 935d and 936d for the remaining 5 months of 1943 not to exceed, for each position, 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ % of the value of total exports in 1942.

⁴⁸ Not printed.

⁴⁹ See telegram No. 4109, June 21, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 848.

(Contrary to the information in M. Thurnheer's memorandum of June 21st, the above restrictions have thus been placed on a basis of value, instead of a basis of weight; in view of the general increase in prices, this modification constitutes an improvement on Bern's previous proposal.)

3. The Swiss Government are prepared to limit as from August 1st, 1943, exports to Germany of radio equipment under tariff item 954a, to $33\frac{1}{3}\%$ of the value of exports in 1942.

4. The Swiss Government are prepared to itemize fuses under tariff item 948a, as desired.

5. The Swiss Government are prepared to keep the above restrictions on exports to Germany in force for as long as the Allies will allow imports of foodstuffs into Switzerland in the same quantities at least as before the suspension of quotas.

6. The Swiss Government renew their offer in regard to dairy produce and cattle already mentioned in M. Thurnheer's memorandum of June 21st, under article II. The Swiss Government are prepared forthwith to put these prohibitions and restrictions into effect, provided the Allies are prepared simultaneously to open satisfactory import quotas for fodder.

7. As to the other questions, such as the remaining tariff items under group 3 (including tariff item 947), the restrictions of exports to Axis countries other than Germany, etc., the Swiss Federal Council are of opinion that a satisfactory result could hardly be reached by a further exchange of correspondence. They also feel that their concessions so far show clearly their actual desire to meet the Allied desiderata as far as possible and that the time should now have come for the return of the Swiss Trade Delegation to London.

On the other hand, the Legation has been advised that the negotiations with the German Delegation which have been going on in Bern for a number of weeks, are continuing, especially in regard to further export restrictions on group 3 and the limitation of new credits to a minimum. These negotiations are, however, raising a number of difficult questions, which would seem to require a close contact with London. For this reason also, the Swiss authorities think that it would be in the interest of all parties concerned if discussions in London could be resumed at the earliest possible moment. It is indeed felt that the presence of the Swiss Trade Delegation here should greatly assist in securing the fullest possible coordination with the negotiations in Bern.

The Legation has, therefore, been instructed to call your special attention on this point.

As your letter of July 3rd mentions that the instructions which had been cabled to Bern, were likewise given on behalf of the Economic Warfare Division of the U.S. Embassy, I take the liberty of enclosing a copy of the present letter, in case you should wish to pass it on to Minister Riefler."

We find this letter difficult to evaluate. On the face of it, it looks as though the Swiss had tried to meet us. At the same time it is full of possibilities for subterfuge if subterfuge were being sought.

These and our other reactions to this letter are embodied in the following self-explanatory message from MEW to the British Legation, Bern, drafted with my collaboration after studying the Swiss Minister's letter and being sent simultaneously with this telegram:

"1. Swiss Legation here has now communicated terms of Swiss reply which was due also to be handed to you on 12th July. While this apparently represents a step forward, we and the Americans observe the following loopholes, which might enable the Swiss to deprive us of any substantial benefit:

a. The proposed concessions refer only to Germany while other Axis countries are specifically excluded. Obviously this might mean that deliveries to the Axis as a whole were not reduced at all. In particular, a situation might soon arise in which certain deliveries to Italy would be more objectionable even than deliveries to Germany.

b. There is no safeguard against the undervaluing of objectionable exports so that there might be no reduction, or even an increase, in the weight of such exports.

c. Watchmakers tools and possibly other machinery could be exported to the Axis, together with skilled labor, thus making good the reduction in actual exports from Switzerland of fuses and other products.

2. For these reasons we cannot regard the Swiss offer as satisfactory, and should much prefer the acceptance of proposals contained in my reference telegram. We are, however, prepared to reconsider our attitude if the Swiss will give us forthwith the following assurances:

a. That they have not arranged and will not permit any fresh development which might deprive us of the benefit of their proposed concessions (e.g., export of watchmakers' tools).

b. That during the last 6 months of 1943 exports to Europe other than Germany of the items under discussion will not exceed 50% of 1942 exports.

c. That exports to the whole of Axis Europe under the 3 items in group 3 that are not covered by the offer to reduce shall not exceed 50% of the 1942 exports.

d. That the proposals already made regarding exports to Germany of these machinery items shall be put into effect forthwith.

e. That the limitation to 40% of 1942 shall apply to watchmakers' tools (item 747) as originally proposed in the Swiss Minister's memorandum of 21st June.

f. That there will be no reduction in price of any of the articles covered by these proposals.

3. If the Swiss are prepared to accept these terms we will recommend to our respective Governments that half the food quotas should be resumed, and that the delegation shall be received in London to discuss the other outstanding matters. You should, however, make it clear to the Swiss Government that this will involve reconsideration both in London and in Washington (the American Embassy

has not had time to obtain reactions of U.S. Government and we may wish to develop some points made here), and must, therefore, in any event involve a further delay in the resumption of navicerts. It would, therefore, be considerably to their advantage to accept our original proposals.

4. Please report action taken so that we can return similar reply here."

I should appreciate your views. [Riefler.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9035 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 5, 1943.

[Received August 5—3:42 p. m.]

5105. For Department and OEW⁵⁰ from Riefler. The Swiss Minister in London has handed Foot and me the following memorandum containing the Swiss Government's reply to the message quoted in the last part of my 4590 of July 15th:

Memorandum.

1. Upon receipt of Mr. Foot's letter of July 19, 1943, containing the British observations to the Swiss proposals for a resumption of trade discussions with Switzerland, M. Thurnheer had not failed to communicate with his Government on the subject.

2. M. Thurnheer has now been advised that the Swiss Government's answer to the above British note has been communicated by the head of the Federal Department of Public Economy to His Majesty's Minister in Berne, on July 30, 1943.

3. M. Thurnheer takes pleasure in enclosing herewith an English translation of the gist of the Swiss note referred to under paragraph 2, based on the communication received from Berne in this connection. In case of any discrepancy with the text or the translation received by Mr. Foot from His Majesty's Legation in Berne, M. Thurnheer remains at Mr. Foot's full disposal for a closer comparison, and if necessary for enquiries in Berne.

4. On the basis of a preliminary survey, M. Thurnheer feels that the Swiss authorities have indeed endeavoured to meet the British wishes to the fullest possible degree. He would thus be grateful to Mr. Foot for an early examination and consultation with the U.S. authorities, with a view to enabling if possible the Swiss Delegation to return to London at an early date.

3d August 1943.

Translation.

The Federal Department of Public Economy have the honour to reply as follows to the memorandum of the British Legation dated

⁵⁰ Office of Economic Warfare, successor agency of the Board of Economic Warfare.

17th July, 1943, by which His Majesty's Government's point of view with regard to the Swiss proposals of 10th July 1943, had been conveyed.

1. It is correct that the proposals formulated by Switzerland prior to the reopening of negotiations in London did not deal with exports to Axis countries other than Germany. The Swiss Government very much regret that this omission should have given rise to some hesitations as to their real intentions in the mind of His Majesty's Government and thus delayed the reopening of discussions. In fact, the Swiss Government have never intended to evade the export restrictions to Germany by increasing deliveries to the other Axis countries.

2. The following proposals underline the Swiss Government's desire to satisfy the demands of His Majesty's and the American Governments, as formulated in the memorandum of 17th July, 1943.

I. The Swiss Government will naturally not take any measure likely to frustrate His Majesty's and the U.S. Governments of the advantages which have been conceded to them in the matter of export restrictions.

II. For the second half year of 1943, the Swiss Government are prepared to limit to 50% of the export value of 1942 supplies to Axis countries other than Germany (*a*) of manufactures under Swiss customs tariff items 753/56, 809a1-a3, M6, 914h, 935d, 936d, 937, 948a and 954a. This means for each tariff item a global quota embracing the whole of these countries. (*b*) Of manufactures under Swiss customs tariff items 811/813, 1083 and 1084. Each of the Axis countries will be allocated a global quota for the whole of the above items. (*c*) As regards Germany, the Swiss Government confirm their previous proposals. (*d*) Should any serious inconveniences result from the rigid application of these restrictions for the Axis countries other than Germany, the Swiss Government reserve the right to inform the British and American Governments thereof during the course of the prospected discussions.

III. (*a*) The Swiss Government are prepared to reduce during the second half year of 1943 to 50% of the export value of 1942, exports of manufactures under Swiss customs tariff items M9 and 956a-f. This means a global quota, applying to the whole of the Axis countries. (*b*) The export of manufactures under tariff item MDY is of capital importance to ensure occupation for the workers. In the present circumstances unemployment would entail the gravest consequences from the social point of view, as well as from the political point of view. The Swiss Government are nevertheless prepared to fix for the second half year 1943 a ceiling of 11,000,000 francs for exports of these manufactures to the whole of the Axis countries, whereof not more than 7,000,000 to Germany.

IV. The Swiss Government confirm: (*a*) That as from July 1, 1943, exports to Germany under tariff items 811/813, 1083/1084, 948a, 753/56, 914h and 937a have for the second half year 1943, been reduced to 40% of values of exports in 1942; (*b*) that exports to Germany under tariff items 809a1-a3, M6, 935d, 936d and 954a will as from August 1, 1943, and for the remaining 5 months of 1943 be reduced to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ % of values of exports in 1942.

V. The Swiss Government are prepared, according to the desire expressed by His Majesty's Government, to introduce a quota in respect of exports of watchmakers' tools of tariff item 747. A global quota, equal to 50% of values of exports in 1942 will be applied to all Axis countries.

VI. The Swiss Government will take all appropriate measures to prevent that an unjustified reduction in price could falsify the quota value, and thereby entail an increase in quantities and pieces exported.

3. The Swiss Government take this opportunity to confirm to His Majesty's and the U.S. Governments that in their opinion the offer for a reduction of exports of dairy produce to all Axis countries should have had as counterpart the authorisation to import into Switzerland fodder, especially oats destined for the Swiss Army.

4. The Swiss Government sincerely trust that these new proposals will allow the British and American Governments to authorise anew the supply of foodstuffs to Switzerland, and to fix an early date for the reopening of discussions in London.

Berne, 30th July 1943."

Begin proposal. The Swiss reply substantially accepts our proposal cited above. If you approve, Foot and I would, therefore, propose that we convey to the Swiss Minister here a reply embodying substantially the following points:

1. We intend to restore half food quotas from now on, provided that (a) the Swiss observe the restrictions on exports of arms and machinery to which they have now agreed; (b) that no further difficulties are raised over supplies to the two missions of Swiss francs; (c) that the Swiss Government will not increase in any way its contribution to the Axis war effort, (e.g., by increasing the number of vehicles repaired).

2. Adjustments will need to be made for any country or area dropping out of the war.

3. We also propose to inform the Swiss that we intend to resume pressure on arms and machinery firms.

4. We shall be prepared forthwith to grant navicerts for a further consignment of oats for Swiss Army use, even in advance of the Swiss obtaining corresponding *Geleitscheine*.

5. These arrangements will be subject to termination when the Swiss frontier is open. At that point the Allies will expect to enter into further commercial arrangements with Switzerland, with a view to more considerable reductions in Swiss trade with the Axis.

As regards any existing commitments which Switzerland may have with Germany limiting the range or volume of Swiss exports to the outside world, we shall then expect the Swiss Government to resume its freedom of action.

6. We are willing in principle to receive the Trade Delegation in London, but we think its return had better be deferred for a few days until the present military and political situation becomes clearer. The Delegation should in any case be prepared to discuss the new arrangements to be made when the Swiss frontier is open. *End proposal.*

Please telegraph prompt instructions embodying the views of the Department and OEW. [Riefler.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9035: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1943.

4943. For Economic Warfare Division. Your 5105, August 5. Department and Office of Economic Warfare agree that Swiss reply is substantially satisfactory. However, we agree with the points made by the Legation in Bern in its cable of August 2⁵¹ that the formulae suggested for tariff items MDY, M9, 956a/f, 811/13, 1083 and 1084 are not thoroughly satisfactory.

Nevertheless, we agree in principle with the reply which you and Foot propose to convey to the Swiss Minister, but would like to suggest the following changes if you are in accord:

1. We might state that we assume that in mentioning tariff items M9 and 956a/f together the Swiss did not mean they would amalgamate the ceilings so as to make exports of these materials interchangeable.

2. You should make clear what is meant by reopening of half of the food quotas. Is it your intention to select half of the quotas to be restored or all of the quotas at half their regular level? We suggest the latter unless you have strong reasons for preferring the other.

3. The offer to make oats available should now be made conditional upon Swiss performance of their offer on dairy products. In this case we would be merely accepting a proposal made by the Swiss on their own initiative.

4. It should be made clear that our acceptance of these terms is not to be taken as meaning that we are satisfied with the results. It should be understood by the Swiss that all of these points are subject to further review in the London negotiations.

5. We think it important to make clear that Point 1(b) in your proposed reply regarding the supplies of Swiss francs is not a new demand on our part but merely a requirement that recent difficulties experienced by the British will not be allowed to recur. Our confusion on this point arises because of the difference in wording in your 5105 and the wording of paragraph 2(b) in MEW's 3123 to the British Embassy in Washington.

6. We cannot see the reason for specifically mentioning our intention to resume pressure on arms and machinery firms particularly since we have not yet before us for consideration Bern's reply to our telegram of Aug. 7⁵² requesting their views. It does not appear that we are obliged to inform the Swiss of our intention in this regard and

⁵¹ Telegram No. 4672, not printed.

⁵² Telegram No. 1894, not printed.

even should it be desirable at a later date it might be unnecessarily irritating to mention this at present. The concession to refrain from pressure was made previously only to enable the Swiss to obtain necessary German cooperation in providing export facilities under the compensation agreement. By announcing in the present context our intention to resume pressure we confront the Swiss before their return to London with a disagreeable prospect which the Germans may utilize to advantage in their negotiations with the Swiss.

7. In our opinion, it seems inadvisable to give the Swiss so uncertain an answer on the return of their trade delegation to London. If it is your intention to take advantage of the improving situation in the Mediterranean to increase our bargaining power, it would seem that since the Swiss will be in London for some time, their arrival a few days earlier would not prevent us from capitalizing on the favorable turn of events. We suggest, therefore, that your point 6 be modified to acquiesce in the return of the delegation immediately.

Report action. Repeat to Berne together with the substance of that portion of your 5105 beginning with the words "Begin Proposal".

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/9129 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 17, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received August 18—9:25 a. m.]

5402. For Department and OEW from Riefler. In accordance with your 4943, August 14, Foot and I are handing a memorandum as follows to the Swiss Minister in London this afternoon:

"1. His Majesty's Government and the United States Government have now considered the Swiss Government's latest proposals, of which M. Thurnheer handed a translation to Mr. Foot on 3rd August.⁵⁸

2. The proposals now put forward by the Swiss Government fall considerably short of those suggested by the two Governments in Mr. Foot's letter of 3rd July. Nevertheless the two Governments are prepared immediately to reopen the food quotas at one-half of what they would otherwise have been, on the following understandings:

(I) The limitations on Swiss exports of arms and machinery to all European Axis and occupied countries as proposed in the Swiss memorandum of 30 July 1943, will be observed from now on.

(II) Adjustments in these limitations will be made in respect of any country or area in Axis Europe dropping out of the war.

(III) The Swiss Government will not allow any further difficulty to arise in making available to His Majesty's Government

⁵⁸ See telegram No. 5105, August 5, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 859.

reasonable amounts of Swiss francs for current requirements pending resumption of negotiations with His Majesty's Treasury.

3. On these understandings the two Governments will be willing to receive the Swiss trade delegation and to resume the negotiations which were broken off in December 1942. They intend within a few days to put forward a list of subjects, which they would wish to see included in the agenda of such negotiations, and they hope that the delegation will come with the instructions to enable them to deal with these subjects.

4. As has already been pointed out to His Excellency the Swiss Minister in London, the two Governments regard these proposed arrangements with reference to Swiss exports as appropriate only during the present circumstances. If, as the result of the withdrawal of Italy from the war or of any other cause, the Swiss frontier is open and Switzerland is again free from Axis restraint on her trade with the outside world, they will expect the Swiss Government to enter into further commercial arrangements, involving *inter alia* a more considerable reduction in Swiss trade with Germany and German-occupied or -controlled Europe."

In line with your 4943, this memorandum makes no mention of our intention to resume listing pressure. Department's 4943 has been repeated to Bern with suggestion that Legation resume listing pressure if it agrees with you, as we do, that no formal notice of resumption is needed, especially since MEW informed British Legation Bern simultaneously with its oral advice to Swiss Legation in June that we no longer felt obliged to continue our temporary cessation of pressure in view of the unsatisfactory delays in execution of compensation agreement.

We urgently desire to resume listing because present stage of war leaves more to be gained by quick denial of Swiss facilities to enemy than by maintaining our own lines of Swiss supply across Italian territory. Although we do not feel bound to inform the Swiss of our intention to resume listing pressure, we considered it tactically wise to do so prior to the return of the Swiss Delegation to London. This can, however, be treated separately.

We all agree that Swiss meant the contrary of your suggestion numbered 1, which is therefore omitted from the foregoing memorandum to the Swiss, since it would merely delay resumption of the negotiations to raise it. In any case items 956a/f and M9 are of small weight and value and were apparently lumped intentionally by the Swiss in view of the difficulty of regulating machinery not specified elsewhere. Enemy Resources Department has no substantial objection to this lumping.

Our memorandum does not mention oats. Making them conditional upon Swiss performance of their offering regarding dairy products would involve half of the whole fodder quota of 81,000 tons per quarter, which we wanted to reserve for negotiation in London. Without giving away the fodder quota, we were willing to grant the Swiss

the 4,000 tons of oats requested for exclusive use of Swiss Army as an advance on the compensation deal where it would displace metals provided for therein. We do not anticipate that dairy produce exports will increase. Your comment would be appreciated.

Repeated to Bern. [Riefler.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9149 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 22, 1943.

[Received August 22—6:15 a. m.]

5518. From Riefler for Department and Stone OEW. The Swiss Minister in London has today handed Foot and me a memorandum as follows in response to our memorandum cited in my No. 5402 of August 17, 9 p. m.:

“(1) M. Thurnheer had not failed to communicate and to recommend to his Government the contents of the memorandum which was handed to him by Mr. Foot and Minister Riefler on August 17, 1943, in regard to the resumption of blockade facilities for foodstuffs and the return of the Swiss Trade Delegation to London.

(2) M. Thurnheer is now in receipt of a cable from Bern containing the Swiss Government's acceptance to the above memorandum, together with the following undertakings:

a. Add paragraph 2 (I) of the Allied note: Limitations on Swiss exports to other Axis countries, as proposed in paragraph 2, II *a* and *b* of the Swiss proposals of July 30, are being enforced forthwith with retroactive effect as from July 1st, 1943, M. Thurnheer begs leave to add that restrictions on exports to Germany have already been enforced as from July 1st and August 1st, respectively, as already announced previously.

b. Add paragraph 2 (II) of Allied note. The Swiss Government are in agreement with this provision.

c. Add paragraph 3 (III) of the Allied note: In regard to Swiss franc facilities, measures have already been taken by the Swiss authorities, of which His Majesty's Legation and the Bank of England have been informed. The Swiss Government are prepared to grant further similar facilities; it being however expected that these sums will be brought into account in the projected financial arrangement.

(3) On this basis, the Swiss Government take it that import facilities will again be granted as proposed by the Allied note. In this connection Bern are raising the question as to a quota for fodder, as a counterpart to the proposed prohibitions and restrictions on Swiss exports on daily produce and cattle.

(4) Bern will be glad to receive the list of agenda which, according to the Allied memorandum, is now being prepared by His Majesty's and the U. S. Governments. Bern will then make the necessary

preparations for a speedy return of the delegation for discussions in London.

(5) M. Thurnheer is glad to see that these discussions have now led to a positive result; he wishes to take this opportunity to express to Mr. Foot and Minister Riefler his sincere thanks for the kindness shown to him in this connection."

The foregoing memorandum has reached us almost simultaneously with news of the unfortunate and unexpected developments described in telegrams 5049 and 5056 of August 18 from Bern to the Department⁵⁴ repeated here. In view of these developments see my following telegram No. 5519⁵⁵ on tactics to be pursued. Meanwhile I quote as follows a memorandum we had drawn up listing subjects for the proposed agenda on which I should appreciate your comment:

"His Majesty's Government and the U. S. Government wish to see the following subjects included in the agenda for the forthcoming negotiations with the Swiss trade delegation:

[Here follows text of proposed agenda, not printed. For revised agenda, see telegram No. 6048, September 11, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, printed on page 872.]

[Riefler]
WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 22, 1943.

[Received August 22—7:25 a. m.]

5519. From Riefler for Department and OEW. Swiss acceptance of British offer reported in Embassy's immediately preceding telegram No. 5518⁵⁶ arrived shortly after our receipt of Bern's 5049 and 5056 of August 18.⁵⁷ In spite of this apparent flagrant violation of good faith MEW and Embassy do not feel that it would be in our interest to denounce the agreement since (a) the objectionable exports have already taken place, and (b) at last we have secured a ceiling on further exports of these objectionable items to the Axis. We propose consequently to implement the agreement by (1) issuing navicerts and (2) going forward with preparations to receive a Swiss delegation. We propose to interpret our navicert commitment narrowly.

2. We feel, however, that the Swiss actions cannot be accepted without a very strong reaction. I have collaborated with Foot in the

⁵⁴ Neither printed; they cited data on increase of Swiss exports to Germany (740.00112 European War 1939/9126, 9127).

⁵⁵ *Infra.*

⁵⁶ *Supra.*

⁵⁷ Neither printed.

drafting of the letter that appears at the end of this telegram. It was signed by Foot and delivered to the Swiss Minister today. Please telegraph urgently authority to associate myself with this letter.

3. Now that we have a ceiling on export of undesirable items, we propose to proceed with a very active listing policy, since there will be much less danger of this turning facilities over to Axis. The threat of postwar blacklisting (Department's A-775 June 3⁵⁸) will greatly increase effectiveness of this weapon. This is now undergoing final clearance at Foreign Office. You should hear further from us on this matter shortly.

4. The letter from Foot to Thurnheer follows:

"Your Government can have no illusions as to the way we must regard the figures of Swiss exports which we have just received. Ever since the trade delegation arrived in London we have made it perfectly clear that we attached the highest importance to a substantial reduction in these forms of export. We have frequently been assured that the Swiss authorities intend to meet our wishes to the best of their ability. In spite of this, at a time when our armies are commencing the invasion of Axis Europe, we are faced with a sudden marked increase in Swiss assistance to Germany and her satellites. We can hardly regard this as evidence of a desire on the part of your Government to contribute to the liberation of Europe.

It is true that these increases do not technically rule out the reductions which your Government has recently proposed. But they must have been well aware that to permit this sudden expansion at this state of the war was in fact a most valuable form of assistance to our enemies. The timing of these increases, namely in June and July, left us in ignorance of their existence when we were considering the latest offers put forward by the Swiss Government.

As a result total exports under group II have increased from 3108.9 metric tons (value 23,453,200 Swiss francs) in the first quarter to 3906.7 metric tons (value 32,012,000 Swiss francs) in the second quarter. Under group III the corresponding increases are from 2748.5 tons (value 64,490,400 Swiss francs) to 4361.5 tons (value 81,129,000 Swiss francs). For those items recorded in pieces there has been an increase from 30,364 to 35,480 pieces. I would draw your particular attention [apparent omission]:

	<i>First Quarter</i>		<i>Second Quarter</i>	
	<i>Metric Tons</i>	<i>1000 Swiss Francs</i>	<i>Metric Tons</i>	<i>1000 Swiss Francs</i>
Gas and petrol driven motors . . .	739.0	3,983.7	910.4	5,915.5
Dynamo electric machines . . .	287.2	2,695.4	1,225.7	9,798.4
Machine tools of all kinds . . .	1,567.2	20,171.3	2,209.1	28,409.9
Radio equipment . . .	13.4	1,349.2	21.0	2,655.5

⁵⁸ Not printed.

For the month of July the increases are even more startling in respect of certain items. Steel ball and roller bearings have increased from 1,100,000 Swiss francs to 2,700,000 Swiss francs as compared with the previous month. Machine tools of all kinds have gone up from 11,465,000 Swiss francs to 19,136,000, other machinery N. E. S. from 1,202,000 to 2,115,000. There is also a substantial increase in exports of radio equipment.

Moreover, these July figures to which I have referred are not only a considerable increase on those for June, but are also very much higher than the monthly average for 1942.

You will also appreciate that three of these items, namely steel ball and roller bearings, machine tools of all kinds and radio equipment are items in respect of which your Government has promised to impose an export quota as from 1st August. The benefit which we expected to obtain from this concession is largely nullified by the very substantial exports in July. For example, steel ball and roller bearings supplied to Germany were to be kept down to 2,367,000 Swiss francs from August to December, but the July exports amounted to 2,700,000 Swiss francs. The same observations apply to machine tools and radio equipment.

As regards other machinery not elsewhere specified, magnetos and dynamo electric machines (in respect of all of which items the reductions were to run from 1st July) it is true that the figures are within the agreed export quotas. But we are deprived to a considerable extent of the benefit of these arrangements because so high a proportion of the total has been crowded into the month of July.

These increases are the more surprising in view of the assurances which we have received from the Swiss Government. At our interview on 21st June you stated that your Government wished to point out (1) that the extent of their resistance to German demands was shown by the fact that they had not yet made a fresh treaty and (2) that during the whole of this year exports had been below the corresponding figure for 1942, both in weight and in value. On 30th July the Federal Department of Public Economy delivered a memorandum to the British Legation, of which the translation which you supplied us in London contains the following statement: 'The Swiss Government will naturally not take any measures likely to frustrate His Majesty's and the United States Governments of the advantages which have been conceded to them in the matter of export restrictions.' They also expressed regret that their omission in their former proposals to refer to Axis countries other than Germany should have given rise to some hesitation as to their real intentions in the mind of His Majesty's Government and thus delayed the reopening of discussions. Finally, they expressed the hope that these new proposals would allow the British and American Governments to authorize a new supply of foodstuffs to Switzerland and to fix an early date for the reopening of discussions in London.

You will therefore readily understand the astonishment with which we received these statistics. It certainly does not make it easier for us to enter into an agreement if such agreement is not to be carried out in the spirit as well as in the letter. I shall be grateful, therefore,

if you will transmit these observations to your Government, and will furnish me with their comments as soon as possible."

[Riefler]
WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9150 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1943—midnight.

5249. Your 5519 August 22. For Riefler. Since Foot's letter has already been delivered and since Swiss are transmitting their explanation through Swiss Minister in London, the Department believes it is not now appropriate for you to associate yourself in a formal way with Foot's letter. If you think it advisable, in order to maintain a united front with the British, you may informally indicate to the Swiss that this Government also is greatly concerned with the increase in exports of undesirable items to the Axis during June and July. For your information Foot's letter contains somewhat more severe language than the Department would have used.

The Department will be interested in receiving complete Swiss explanation, together with your comments and those of MEW. It is hoped that then an agreed joint reply can be made.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/9234 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, September 3, 1943.

[Received September 3—4: 55 p. m.]

5833. From Riefler for Department and OEW. The Swiss Minister has now replied as follows to the letter quoted in my 5519 of August 22 about the recent increase in Swiss exports of arms and machinery to the Axis mentioned in the Department's telegram 5249 of August 28, midnight.

"London, 1st September, 1943.

Dear Mr. Foot. Upon receipt of your letter of August 21st, in regard to Swiss exports during June and July last, I had not failed to inform the Swiss authorities of the contents of your communication, as well as of your desire to receive Bern's comments in this matter. I am now in receipt of the following observations, which have apparently also been put before His Majesty's and the United States representatives in the Commission Mixte, at a meeting held on August 25th.

1. From Bern's explanations it would appear that the increases in June and July are at least partly due to a combination of technical reasons connected with the provisional clearing arrangements now in operation. As a matter of fact, the provisional arrangements which had been made when negotiations with Germany for a new war trade agreement broke down early this year, were for the time being limited to July 31st, so that the temporary facilities for so-called 'old contracts' applied only to goods actually despatched before July 31st. The knowledge of this, may thus have been leading certain exporters to hasten the delivery of contracts while facilities remained technically available. The Swiss authorities were therefore, to some extent at least, faced with consequences which it was difficult to foresee, resulting from the short term nature of these arrangements, which in turn are a consequence of the complications arising from the necessity of negotiating at the same time with both groups of belligerents.

2. As to the more general aspects of the situation, Bern are again drawing attention to our continued dependence on imports from Germany, as well as on the physical German control both of our imports and our exports. Through the above provisional arrangements, it has been possible to secure continued German supplies of coal, iron and potash, and to obtain important facilities in our exports to third countries. Both these achievements are of great importance to Switzerland, for the supply position as well as for the maintenance of employment. It is for these reasons that export restrictions could only be introduced gradually, and that it would have been difficult to take measures anticipating the actual enforcement of restrictions. Bern further point out that the restrictions which have now been put into force, were not taken without serious risks of reaction on the part of Germany.

3. Bern also beg to refer to the information given in April last (our memoranda of April 15th and 29th, 1943) on the liquidation of the old trade agreement as a counterpart to the resumption of the German coal deliveries, and on the possibility of certain temporary increases in Swiss exports to Germany. These prospects then led on the Allied part to the suspension of facilities as from the middle of April. However, contrary to the expectation at that time, exports to all Axis countries, as well as to Germany alone, actually remained until June below the monthly average of 1942. On the other hand, the following figures on exports from August 1st to August 23rd clearly show the effect of the restrictions which are now in force.

(Read in three columns separated by commas, first the Swiss tariff item, second July 1943, and third August 1st to 23rd, exports in millions of Swiss francs.) 809a1-a3, 2, .3; MDY, 2.7, .3; M6, 16.8, 1.3; 948a, 4.9, 1.5.

Bern also wish to confirm that exports in July resulted almost exclusively from contracts placed before January 15th, 1943. This applies particularly to ball bearings (tariff item 809a1-a3).

4. As to group 11, where there has so far been no undertaking of definite restrictions, Bern refer to the peace time character of these manufactures. Exports under this group are considered of

great importance for the maintenance of occupation, especially in view of the unavoidable effects of the restrictions now operating in other sectors. In this connection, attention is also drawn to the fact that a large majority of the Swiss industry refused to a very considerable extent German offers for war contracts, thus limiting themselves to their peace time activity. Thus, the Axis countries have had at no time the full advantage of Swiss productive capacity.

5. Finally, Bern are stressing the far-reaching effects of the restrictions enforced as from July 1st and August 1st respectively, which will mean a considerable slowing up in the execution of German orders. For a number of articles, such as radio equipment, ball bearings, etc., the effects will be particularly marked, in view of the heavy amount of orders placed.

While bringing the above to your knowledge, I remain of course at your entire disposal should any verbal discussion of the matter be desired. As you will easily understand, I am naturally most anxious to hear from you as to the further course in regard to the return of our Trade Delegation to London.

Believe me, dear Mr. Foot, yours sincerely, M. Thurnheer. [”]

[Riefler]
WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9228 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 3, 1943—4 p. m.
[Received September 3—2:45 p. m.]

5834. From Riefler for Department and OEW. Reference Embassy's 5833 of September 3.

1. Foot and I saw the Swiss Minister this afternoon to discuss informally with him the Swiss reply in reference cable. We expressed our continued dissatisfaction with the fact that Swiss exports of arms, munitions and high priority machinery had risen so sharply in June and July. We asked the Minister to ascertain from his Government more details on paragraph 5 of his letter quoted in reference telegram.

2. Foot stated that despite our disappointment, we were prepared to go forward with our part of the agreement and that navicerts for one-half quotas would be available, at least for the time being. We both stressed, however, that our two Governments would be seriously concerned if we were deprived of the benefits of the agreement or if these benefits were offset by increased aid given to the German war effort in other directions not specifically covered by the text of the agreement.

3. We informed the Swiss Minister that we hoped to have an agenda for the forthcoming negotiations ready for discussion with him sometime next week. [Riefler.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9291 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 11, 1943.

[Received September 11—6:45 p. m.]

6048. For Department and OEW from Riefler. Reference 6047, September 11.⁵⁹ In accordance with your 5316 of August 31 and my 5890 of September 6,⁶⁰ the Parliamentary Secretary of MEW and I have agreed upon the following list of matters which we wish to see included in the agenda for the proposed Swiss war trade negotiations, but we propose to hand this list to Thurnheer, the Swiss Minister in London, only after clarification of the question raised at end of penultimate paragraph number 4 in Embassy's 6047 of September 11, 8 p. m.

"His Majesty's Government and the United States Government wish to see the following subjects included in the agenda for the forthcoming negotiations with the Swiss Trade Delegation :

1. The cessation of credits to Axis countries.
2. The operation of the provisional agreement already concluded whereby the Swiss Government has given certain undertakings regarding exports of arms and machinery. Under this heading they would wish to discuss the efficacy of the administrative procedures by which it is to be enforced and the adjustments to be made in respect of any country or part of a country now associated with the Axis, which falls out of the war or is occupied by troops of the United Nations, and also the way in which the contemplated productions of Swiss exports are to be spaced over the remaining months of 1943.
3. Further reductions of Swiss exports of arms and machinery.
4. The control of the processing and repairing trade.
5. Exports of cattle and dairy produce.
6. The use of the Swiss railways by the Axis including, in particular, carriage of oil.
7. The elimination of trade or attempts to trade with Japan.
8. The future operation of the compensation agreement.
9. The permitted enemy content in Swiss exports.
10. The coordination of Swiss and purchases of the United Nations in areas not directly under Anglo-American control.
11. The new arrangements which we shall require to be made regarding trade between Switzerland and the outside world and the

⁵⁹ Not printed.

⁶⁰ Neither printed.

further reductions in Swiss trade with the Axis when the Swiss frontier is again open.

12. The further evacuation into Switzerland of children from Axis countries and the provision to be made for such children."

[Riefler]
WINANT

854.24/88 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1943.

5800. Swiss Minister argues that the revival of pressure on Swiss firms is a breach of our undertaking under compensation agreement. He refers to your letter of December 14, 1942 (enclosure 3 to despatch 6834 of December 21) ⁶¹ wherein you "confirm our verbal declaration made during the discussions that the British and American representatives in Switzerland will for the time being refrain from new approaches, such as those hitherto made, to Swiss firms in the metallurgical and watch industries." Since the letter refers to verbal declaration, Department urgently requests your views on the extent to which we are now committed to refrain from new approaches, in view of the fact that compensation agreement is still continuing.

HULL

854.24/170 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, September 23, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received September 23—12:50 p. m.]

6358. For Department and OEW from Riefler. The verbal declaration questioned in the Department's 5800 of 21st was merely that "the British and American representatives in Switzerland will, for the time being, refrain from new approaches such as those hitherto made to Swiss firms in the metallurgical and watch industries". As we pointed out, both orally and in writing, in the letter mentioned in the Department's 5800 we agreed so to refrain only "for the time being".

⁶¹ Despatch No. 6834 not printed, but for texts of letters exchanged on December 14, 1942, which constituted the compensation agreement, see telegram No. 7117, December 15, 1942, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 401.

We feel that we have never been committed to refrain from that pressure longer than it seemed to our advantage to do so. See Embassy's telegram 5402, August 17, 9 p. m., to you.

We realize that the Germans could if they wished use the renewal of pressure as ground to terminate the issue of *Geleitscheine* to implement the compensation agreement. We felt, however, that if they should do this the disadvantages in supply to us would not now be outweighed by the advantages of restricting Swiss exports to the Axis as a result of resuming our listing at this juncture.

The Swiss Minister's argument mentioned in Department's 5800 has been repeated in a memorandum which the Swiss Minister in London has filed with MEW.⁶² Contrary to his usual practice, the Swiss Minister failed to give me a copy of his memorandum for MEW. This probably indicates that the Swiss are preparing to fight hard against our resumption of listing and feel they will get farther by making direct representation in Washington rather than through this Embassy in London. It is an indication that they are more sensitive now to listing than to our other Economic Warfare measures. Has the Department yet reached a decision on Embassy's 5845, September 3.⁶³ [Riefler.]

WINANT

854.24/172 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 27, 1943.

[Received September 27—9:07 p. m.]

6493. For Department and OEW. With further reference to the Department's 5800 of September 21 and Embassy's reply 6358 of September 23, 2 p. m., following is text of the memorandum dated September 20, left by the Swiss Minister in London with Foot of MEW protesting against resumption of black list pressure in Switzerland.

"M. Thurnheer is in receipt of a cable from Bern, according to which direct approaches by His Majesty's and the United States Consular representatives with important Swiss firms, especially in the machine industry, would have shown a considerable increase of late. In some of these cases, the firms were asked for an immediate reply, in certain instances within a time limit of a few hours only, and given to understand that they would be placed on the Statutory List unless they are willing to enter into individual restrictions regarding their exports to

⁶² See *infra*.

⁶³ Not printed.

Germany. Also, the reductions which these firms are asked to adopt would go considerably beyond the restrictions recently stipulated through official channels.

2. Bern feel that such measures could hardly be reconciled with the agreement of August 17, 1943,⁶⁴ which now provides for definite restrictions to be enforced by Switzerland on her exports to the Axis countries. In view of these arrangements, to which Switzerland will strictly adhere, Bern are of opinion that autonomous measures for individual restrictions could thus be dispensed with. In this connection Bern also refer to the exchange of letters with the Swiss Trade Delegation of December 14th, 1942, on the same subject.

3. M. Thurnheer has thus been instructed to bring the above to the attention of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and he would be very grateful if the Ministry of Economic Warfare would kindly let him know their views on this matter."

Foot is replying to this memorandum in the following letter to the Swiss Minister :

"I have given careful consideration to the memorandum dated the 20th September, in which Your Excellency was so good as to set out the observations of the Swiss Government regarding direct approaches to important firms in Switzerland by His Majesty's and the United States Consular representatives.

(2) I of course recognise that the Agreement of August 17th, 1943, provides definite restrictions to be imposed by the Swiss Government on exports to Germany and German-occupied or -controlled territories. H. M. Government have, however, never accepted the contention that the conclusion of such an agreement precludes approaches to individual firms. They certainly could not accept it at the present stage of the war when, as was pointed out in Mr. Foot's letter to you of 21st August,⁶⁵ trade with neutral countries is of relatively greater importance to the Axis war effort than ever before. At the present time, when the British and United States Armies are already engaged in the liberation of Europe, and when further and even more considerable military operations are in prospect, H.M. Government feel bound to adopt every legitimate measure in order to diminish the flow of supplies from neutral countries to Germany and her associates. Moreover, the agreement of August 17th is only valid until 31st December, whereas the undertakings given by individual firms are intended to continue in force until the end of the war.

(3) It is also material to point out that although the agreement of August 17th provides for considerable reductions in Swiss exports to the Axis in the later months of 1943, the benefit of this agreement to the United Nations was substantially offset by the extraordinary rise in such exports during the second quarter of 1943, and in the month of July.

⁶⁴ See telegram No. 5402, August 17, 9 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 863.

⁶⁵ See telegram No. 5519, August 22, 1943, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 866.

(4) As regards the exchange of letters of 14th December 1942, the letter addressed to Dr. Sulzer and signed by Mr. Riefler and Mr. Foot contains an undertaking that, in order to facilitate the compensation agreement in its early stages, the British and American representatives in Switzerland would for the time being refrain from new approaches, such as those hitherto made to Swiss firms in the watch and metallurgical industries. As was fully understood at the time by all parties, the period then contemplated was certainly not longer than 3 or 4 months. In fact, this period of immunity has lasted for 8 months, during which time it is clear that many of the firms which were not bound by undertakings took advantage of the situation substantially to increase their deliveries to the Axis."

WINANT

854.24/172 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1943—7 p. m.

6120. Your 6358, September 23, and your 6493, September 27. As indicated in our 5800, September 21, the Swiss Minister orally raised with us the points stated by Thurnheer in his memorandum to Foot. Department and OEW agree with position taken by Foot in his memorandum to Thurnheer quoted in your 6493, September 27, and Department is orally taking this position with the Swiss Minister here.

We observe that contrary to his usual practice, Swiss Minister in London failed to give you a copy of his memorandum to Foot and that this probably indicates that the Swiss are attempting to draw Washington directly into the controversy by separate representations here. This double approach of the Swiss (here and in London) tends to confusion and delay and in this instance deprived us of an opportunity to discuss Foot's memorandum in advance of its delivery. While we approve the position taken by Foot, and assume that you agree, a joint reply approved by the Department would seem to be preferable. We plan to impress upon the Swiss Minister that the forthcoming negotiations will be centered in London.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/9687a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1943.

6129. For Economic Warfare Division. In view of the military developments affecting the Swiss negotiations, and also the imme-

diate danger that the Swiss may at any moment agree to grant the Germans additional credits in the form of an export guarantee scheme, Department and Office of Economic Warfare have reviewed our bargaining position and wish to present the following views for consideration by you and the Ministry of Economic Warfare:

1. Although we have felt that it would be unwise to negotiate by cable and considered it desirable to postpone further discussions until the Swiss Delegation arrived in London, the credit question is of such primary importance and so fundamental to the entire negotiations that we believe it is of vital importance to obtain assurances immediately that the Swiss will not commit themselves on this export guarantee scheme or any other further credits to the enemy, in as much as this should be one of the major points for discussion with them in London during October. The Swiss should be asked to give us this assurance within, say, 10 days. We understand that it was your intention to couple the invitation to the Swiss with a protest against any further credits, but we should like to suggest that this protest not be couched in language which would indicate that it is merely made for the record. In fact, we think it should be pointed out to the Swiss that unless they assure us that additional credits will not be granted until we have had a proper opportunity of discussion, it will greatly prejudice any discussions in London. If the Swiss do commit themselves with the Germans on additional credits, it would seem to be virtually impossible for us to obtain adequate reductions in the undesirable exports for 1944. If at this stage of the war the Swiss are willing to defy our wishes to the extent of instituting an export credit guarantee system, they will not be likely to come to terms on other significant issues on the agenda. It might be pointed out to the Swiss in this connection that the greater the credits they grant to Germany the smaller the goods imports which they will receive from Germany. The Swiss have continually attempted to justify their previous concessions to Germany on the ground that it was necessary for them to maintain imports from Germany. Thus they are injuring their own interests in making it possible for Germany to make further reductions in deliveries of coal, etc. Reduced imports from Germany cannot be replaced by shipments through the blockade unless we are willing to make great sacrifices. We should not be inclined to make such sacrifices in the face of credit concessions granted by Switzerland to our enemy. However, care should be taken not to give the Swiss the impression that if they refuse additional credits to Germany we shall cease our efforts to obtain limitations on undesirable exports. For your information we regard proper ceilings on exports of undesirable items in 1944 as our major objective, and, if a choice had to be made, as more important than a favorable solution of the credit question. But we feel that the credit issue is so immediate that it should be squarely faced and, if possible, settled at once.

2. If the Swiss answer on credits is unsatisfactory we need not formally recall our invitation for their delegation to come to London, but we should be careful not to allow them to prolong the negotiations

by endless discussions on technical or minor points. In this connection we feel that it would be the best strategy to confront the Swiss Delegation upon their arrival with a full text of a proposed agreement, at least on the major points which must be a condition precedent to any further discussions on relatively minor topics. These major points are agreement on credits and agreement on reduction of exports of undesirable items in 1944 as well as the spacing of exports under the existing agreement for 1943. It is our view that the Swiss should be told that while we are prepared to make supply sacrifices on their behalf, and while there are other matters on which we should like to request their agreement in the course of discussion, we would see no point in going into any of these other matters until we have at least an agreement in principle on these two major issues of immediate importance. Moreover, we should point out that because of the swift development of events we cannot permit the discussions on these points to be prolonged and that therefore we must insist that an agreement be reached on these major issues during October. If such an agreement cannot be reached to our satisfaction within that time, it is doubtful whether we would wish to discuss any of the other points or indeed discuss further any supply program for Switzerland.

3. We are sending you by air mail despatch a draft of a proposed Swiss Declaration and a proposed United Kingdom-United States Declaration which could constitute the basis of an acceptable agreement.⁶⁸ Although it might be necessary for us to make concessions on a number of points, we have tried to formulate the terms of these declarations in such a way as to indicate to the Swiss that our demands are reasonable and realistic.

4. With regard to the Swiss policy on transit of war materials and military personnel, we feel that this objective, while undoubtedly of the highest priority, could best be pursued through immediate discussions in Bern. We had assumed that the recent Swiss reply on this matter was satisfactory and that the only outstanding questions related to the prohibition of petroleum transits and possibly more precise assurances that adequate inspection would be guaranteed. In any case, since these questions are so urgent, would it not be best to take them up in Bern immediately outside of the economic negotiations and in advance of the arrival of the Delegation in London? We believe that our discussions on this topic should be confined to those questions on which the Swiss reply was not adequate. It may unnecessarily irritate the Swiss to ask them to give us any reiteration of or formal understanding on their general policy prohibiting such military traffic, since this may indicate a lack of trust on our part and also imply that the Swiss action would be a concession to us rather than an assertion of their neutral duties.

We should like to have your views and those of the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the points raised in this telegram and also in the accompanying despatch proposing the text of an agreement.

HULL

⁶⁸ Despatch No. 3261, October 13, 1943, and enclosures not printed.

103.917/3794 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 15, 1943.

[Received October 15—11:59 p. m.]

7089. For Department and OEW from Riefler. Reference Embassy's 6990 of October 13⁶⁷ and your 6129, October 4th. Foot is sending to the Swiss Minister in London the following letter dated October 14th drafted with my collaboration:

"My Dear Minister,

We have now studied the two memoranda with which you furnished me, dated respectively the 30th September and 12th October. As regards the earlier memorandum, we observe with some surprise the contention that the very considerable deliveries to the Axis in the second quarter of this year and in the month of July followed inevitably from the arrangements entered into in 1941. During our long negotiations last year your trade delegation expressed on a number of occasions their confident expectation that exports of arms and machinery would fall during 1943, although they were unwilling to commit themselves to specific reductions item by item.

On the subject of credits, the attitude of the British and United States Governments has already been made clear. At the end of the war there will be many claims on the defeated Axis Powers, who will be required to make good, so far as they can, the damage which they have inflicted on so many countries. Debts owing to neutral states as a result of credits or advances given during the war will at best rank below all such claims. In addition I must emphasize that, if your Government were to commit themselves to further credits to our enemies, which inevitably would facilitate Swiss export trade to them, this would seriously prejudice the proposed further trade negotiations between the representatives of Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

As regards these negotiations, I have already handed to you a list of subjects which we wish to see included in the agenda. At our interview on 30th September I expressed some doubt as to whether the present was the most convenient time for resuming our economic negotiations, since the shape of things is changing so very rapidly, and the Allied advance in Italy is likely, sooner or later, to produce an entirely new situation. If, however, your Government wishes to send a trade delegation back to London we shall be glad to receive it. I would like to repeat once again that, in our opinion, the delegation should come prepared to deal not only with the present position but with the position that will arise when the Swiss frontier is again open, and Switzerland is able to trade freely with the outside world. In the meantime it is obviously important that your Government should refrain from entering into any commitments which would in any way tie their hands when this stage is reached. We should wel-

⁶⁷ Not printed.

come an assurance that they will do nothing of the sort pending the arrival of the delegation.

Your Excellency's memorandum of 30th September sets out the position regarding credits, but does not inform us as to the remainder of your recent agreement with Germany. We should be grateful for this information.

I now pass to your memorandum of 12th October, and to your letter of 13th October, in which you reiterate your Government's view that we are not entitled to exert pressure on individual firms, since the agreement of 17th August.⁶⁸ As regards the latter document, I do not think there is anything I can usefully add to Lord Selborne's⁶⁹ letter of 27th September, pointing out that we do not regard approaches to firms as being in any way inconsistent with an agreement between our Government for the limitation of exports to the Axis. We are, indeed, familiar with the contentions that once a war trade agreement is signed, involving the limitation of a neutral country's exports to our enemies, we ought not to object to the transactions of individual firms, provided that such limitations are not infringed. I must make it clear that his Majesty's Government has never been prepared to accept this contention as sound. If a neutral firm takes advantage of the war situation to increase its sales to Germany or her satellites, it is in effect choosing to assist the German war effort, and thereby helping to postpone the eventual liberation of Europe, an event which is as much in the interest of the neutral European countries as it is in that of the United Nations. In our opinion such a firm has no genuine cause for complaint if it finds itself placed upon the Statutory and Proclaimed Lists, and thereby prevented from trading with the British Empire and the United States, and with other countries overseas.

Your memorandum of 12th October proposes that we should discontinue direct approaches, such as have recently been made, and refrain from placing firms already approached on the Statutory List in return for a further limitation of Swiss exports of the more important machinery items to Axis countries other than Germany, and the continuance of restrictions on exports to Germany until the end of the war. I am sure you will appreciate that, as a belligerent country, we must judge such an offer by the test of probable results. I am sorry to say that, judged by this test, your Government's offer is not one which we can entertain. Under the agreement of 17th August it is already settled that adjustments shall be made in respect of any country or area dropping out of the war. This in fact occurred when the Italian Government signed an armistice on 3rd September.⁷⁰ Apart from the deliveries due to Italy, the figures in your memorandum represent only a very modest reduction during the remainder of the present year. We do not rule out the possibility of an agreement being arrived at whereby the Swiss Government would impose further restrictions on objectionable exports to Germany and the rest

⁶⁸ See telegrams No. 5402, August 17, and No. 5518, August 22, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, pp. 863 and 865, respectively.

⁶⁹ British Minister of Economic Warfare.

⁷⁰ For text of the Italian Armistice signed September 3, 1943, but not announced until September 8, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604*, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2740; for correspondence on this subject, see pp. 314 ff.

of Axis Europe, in return for a cessation of pressure on individual firms producing arms and machinery. But obviously such an arrangement would only be justifiable from our point of view if the proposed further reduction were calculated to produce a more satisfactory result than the method of approaches to individual firms.

Your memorandum further expresses the expectation that the Allies will agree to maintain the import quotas as granted in the agreement of August 17th for the time being, in the present quantities at least. I confirm that this is our intention, provided, of course, that the restrictions set out in the agreement are maintained in full force.

I have shown this letter to Mr. Riefler, who asks me to say that he agrees with it."

[Riefler]
WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9425 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1943—midnight.

6479. For EWD.⁷¹ Department and OEW have considered Bern's 6162, October 2,⁷² (815 to you) and full text of memorandum mentioned therein handed us by Swiss Legation here. We believe extension of additional credit by Swiss after our attitude on that subject had been clearly stated to them and also their indication in the memorandum that in 1944 they merely intend to retain present ceilings on undesirable exports require a firm and immediate response. We therefore suggest that you discuss immediately with the Foreign Office and MEW the advisability of presenting to the Swiss a joint communication along the following lines:

"For many months the Government of Great Britain and the United States had been endeavoring to negotiate an economic agreement with the Swiss Government. The aim of the two Governments in this regard has been to effect a reduction in Swiss economic assistance to their enemies. In return for achievement of this aim the two Governments have been prepared to make substantial concessions to the Swiss in the field of supplies, et cetera, and to give sympathetic consideration to the effect which the achievement of their aims would have on Swiss internal economy.

The two Governments have felt it advantageous and fair to the Swiss Government to inform it early of their aims in these matters in order that the Swiss Government might be guided accordingly in any economic negotiations undertaken by it with the Axis and associated countries, thus placing the Swiss Government in a position of being able to negotiate with the British and United States Governments on

⁷¹ Economic Warfare Division of the Embassy in London.

⁷² Not printed.

the economic objectives which the latter would hope to achieve in any negotiations with the Swiss Government. The Governments of Great Britain and the United States have frequently expressed to the Swiss Government the importance which they attach to the question of Swiss credits to Germany and associated and occupied countries; this notwithstanding the Swiss Government has continued to grant new credits of considerable magnitude to their enemies. It is now revealed that on October 1 an agreement was concluded with the German Government under which Swiss exporters are to receive until December 1, 1943 a new and enlarged credit guarantee on their exports to Germany which added to the credit facilities already granted will promote German [*Swiss?*] economic assistance to their enemies, thus defeating one of the primary aims of the British and United States Governments.

The explanations which have been given by the Swiss Government as to the reason for the new credits to Germany are far from satisfactory from the point of view of the British and United States Governments. It is therefore considered most important that the Swiss come immediately to London to commence the negotiations and that they be prepared without delay to conclude a satisfactory agreement.

Meanwhile, in view of recent Swiss concessions to the enemy, the British and United States Governments are prompted to adopt such measures of control over Swiss imports and exports and such action against Swiss firms dealing with their enemies as will best protect their interests. The British and United States Governments are inclined to withhold taking such action only if:

1. The Swiss Government is prepared to open negotiations with the British and United States Governments in London by November 1, 1943;
2. Agreements are promptly reached during the negotiations which will satisfactorily limit the export to Germany and to associated and occupied territories of undesirable exports;
3. All credits to Germany or to countries associated with or occupied by her, no matter when such credits may have been granted, shall become inoperative on December 1, 1943, and that no new credits, or extensions of previous credits will be granted to Germany or to associated or occupied countries;
4. No commitments for the export to Germany and associated and occupied territories of arms and machinery in 1944 will be made until the Swiss have received the views of the British and United States Governments in the London negotiations."

If agreement is reached in London on this course of action, it is felt that the two Legations in Bern should be asked by you for their comments thereon before delivery of the communication to the Swiss. As time is of the essence, we leave to you the question of phraseology and form of the proposed communication. We would appreciate your reaction by return cable.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/9425 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1943.

6687. For EWD. Department has as yet received no comment from you on its no. 6479 of October 16, midnight. Your 7089 of October 15 gives text of note sent by Foot to Swiss Minister, which indicates to the Swiss that resumption of economic negotiations in London might not be desirable at the present time, whereas we feel that it is to our advantage that there be a satisfactory agreement come to within the next few weeks if that is possible and, if not, that we proceed to the full use of retaliatory measures at our disposal.

We feel that this is the moment for a strong stand to be taken with the Swiss in accordance with our reference telegram and that we should avoid any further discussions with them except within the framework of negotiations.

STEMINIUS

740.00112 European War 1939/9507 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 27, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received 9:04 p. m.]

7438. For Department and OEW from Riefler. Reference Department's 6479, October 16, midnight, and 6687, October 26.

1. Reference telegrams are very much appreciated. They indicate firm backing in Department and FEA⁷³ for the strong stand we have been taking with the Swiss. We assume that hesitancy indicated in Department's 5249, August 28 midnight, no longer exists and that Washington and London are now agreed on necessity of strong line (a) to reduce further Swiss exports of arms, ammunition and high priority machinery to Axis, and (b) as a means to this end the elimination of Swiss credits to the enemy.

2. The problem raised by your telegram here is wholly one of tactics. There seems to be a basic difference in view between London (both men and ourselves [*sic*]) and Washington on the prospect of quick results from negotiations with the Swiss in London. You seem to feel that Swiss negotiators if once they were here could be forced to current quick concessions. We feel that, once they are in London, they will be able to interpose innumerable delays in the negotiations

⁷³ Foreign Economic Administration, into which the Office of Economic Warfare was consolidated on September 25, 1943.

(at which they are past masters) unless we succeed in forcing in [*the*] Swiss Government into a spirit of compromise before the delegation is despatched. It is for this reason that in July we insisted that Swiss impose immediately ceilings on high priority exports for the remainder of 1943 before we would consider receiving their delegation here. These tactics were successful and we secured ceilings in August. The increased exports which preceded the ceilings, however, and subsequently renewal of credits have convinced us that the Swiss Government is not yet in a mood to make real further concessions to our demands. It is consequently planning on negotiations as a delaying tactic. We have therefore instituted a very vigorous pressure campaign on individual Swiss firms, particularly the large and most powerful ones. We have felt that we can affect the attitude of the Swiss Government more quickly through these firms at the moment than by threats to use our wider economic sanctions. The reaction of the Swiss to this campaign has seemed to indicate that we have judged the situation correctly and that we have brought direct pressure to bear on the political forces within Switzerland that have dominated the Swiss Government's attitude. The Swiss Government is showing extreme anxiety to stop the pressure campaign. It has not yet, however, offered us concessions sufficient to warrant our relieving the pressure. We are convinced that if we could succeed in inducing the leading industrialists of Switzerland to sign undertakings that the Swiss Government as such would become more amenable to our demands. It is also possible that these leading firms will force the Swiss Government to offer substantial concessions in order to induce us to refrain from further pressure.

3. The above considerations have ruled our tactics during the past month and were in full swing on October 18 when your cable 6479 arrived. All of the demands suggested in your cable with the single exception of the immediate despatch of the economic delegation to London had already been put to the Swiss forcibly and were being reiterated almost daily either in London or in Bern in connection with the numerous exchanges brought about by the pressure campaign. It came at a moment when we were expecting hourly definite acceptance or rejection by Sulzer Brothers of our demand for an undertaking. The tactic of reversing our stand vis-à-vis the immediate despatch of a delegation suggested in your cable was not at the moment acceptable to MEW because it would obviously be affected by the nature of Sulzer Brothers reply. The intervening period has been tense with attention concentrated upon the Sulzer Brothers case, as reported in my 7200, October 19, 9 p. m.⁷⁴ Last Friday, October 22, the

⁷⁴ Not printed; it reported that the Swiss Minister in the United Kingdom was endeavoring to get the United States and United Kingdom delegates to relax their demand on the Sulzer Brothers firm for blacklist undertakings (740.00112 European War 1939/9486).

reply was handed to the British Mission in Bern consisting of a refusal on the part of Sulzer Brothers to sign an undertaking so "humiliating" in character, and also of a communication from the Swiss Foreign Office to the British Minister in Bern earnestly requesting us not to pursue our pressure campaign on the large firms then under consideration until we received a new offer of ceilings which they were preparing and which would be ready in a fortnight.

4. MEW and EWD over the weekend have been considering the tactics to be pursued in response to this new situation and this official Swiss request and have finally secured agreement from all parties that we will not delay action in the case of Sulzer Brothers. The name will appear on the list on October 30 and the Swiss Government is now being informed of this decision. It has also been decided to inform the Swiss Government that we will defer listing the other firms mentioned by the Swiss Government for the fortnight that has been requested. This will enable us to examine the offer the Swiss propose to make, and does not represent a real concession on our part since the names of the firms concerned would not in any case be published for another month. We are proposing finally to tell the Swiss Government that their proposal must be concrete and must give us a reduction in the ceilings for 1944 substantially below the ceiling now in effect for the last half of 1943. The figure we have in mind is a 40% reduction from 1942 levels.

5. At the same time the British Government is asking its Minister in Bern to comment in conjunction with his American colleague on the advisability of asking the Swiss Government whether they would be prepared to receive Foot and Riefler in the immediate future by aeroplane for the purpose of arriving at a quick agreement on the question of withholding further pressure on individual firms in return for substantial and quick concessions with respect to ceilings on high priority exports in 1944. This plan which is under serious consideration here in London appears to some of us to offer much better promise of the quick results desired by all than negotiations in London. It is under consideration here and has not yet been accepted. In the event that (a) our Ministers in Bern comment favorably upon the plan (b) that agreement is reached here to adopt it and (c) that the Swiss Government acquiesces, we would achieve a reopening of direct communication with Switzerland and personal contact with our Missions in Bern as well as quick results in our campaign for further ceilings on Swiss exports. It is not contemplated that Foot and Riefler would remain long in Bern or negotiate on the full agenda that has been prepared for the forthcoming economic negotiations in London. It is contemplated rather that they would seek an immediate and firm agreement on our most important demand—limitation of Swiss exports of high priority goods to the enemy.

Subsequently the Swiss negotiators would come to London and broad discussions on the whole agenda would proceed as already planned.

6. Should the response from the Missions in Bern be unfavorable we will take up once more the tactics suggested in your 6479, October 16, for a joint note to the Swiss Government along the lines suggested.

7. We have not yet received the draft declarations sent as an accompaniment to your 6129 of October 4. [Riefler.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9499 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1943—10 p. m.

6717. For your information, the Swiss Minister called yesterday to protest against the continued pressure on Swiss firms. He stated that the Germans would have to counter this action by other economic warfare measures, thus making Switzerland an economic warfare battleground. He said that if the pressure continued, it might be necessary for his Government to enact legislation prohibiting Swiss firms from giving any undertakings which would limit exports. He stated that if such action were taken by his Government, he hoped that we would understand the motivating reasons.

He was advised that this procedure was one of the measures considered necessary to attain our objectives in limiting Swiss economic aid to Germany, and that we would find it extremely difficult to modify the procedure unless a satisfactory overall agreement is promptly negotiated.

In foregoing connection see Bern Legation's 6651, October 24, to us ⁷⁶ sent to you as Bern's 910. Sent to London, repeated to Bern as Department's No. 2636.

STETTINIUS

740.00112 European War 1939/9608 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 12, 1943.

[Received November 12—5 : 28 p. m.]

7892. For Department, FEA from Riefler. The Swiss proposals referred to in my 7815, November 10,⁷⁶ have now been received in the

⁷⁶ Not printed.

form of a memorandum dated November 12 from the Swiss Minister in London as follows:

"In regard to the resumption of trade discussions in London, M. Thurnheer has just received from the competent Swiss authorities the following communications:

1. The new Swiss proposals cover all items under the groups for which a ceiling has been fixed, and apply to all Axis countries. Important reductions are foreseen for the main items and in particular for: Arms and ammunition, fuses, aeroplane parts, ball bearings, machine tools, precision tools and radio equipment. For other items smaller reductions or a stabilization on the basic value of 1942 are proposed. For a small group of peace-time products, special quotas will be required in order to safeguard Swiss economic interests.

2. The above substantial reductions will result in a decrease of exports to the Axis countries, especially to Germany, during the first half year 1944 of about 90 million Swiss francs as compared with exports during 1942, and of 80 million as compared with exports during the second half year of 1943.

3. In order to avoid a sudden increase in exports towards the end of 1943, similar to what occurred in July last, the proposals further contain maximum values for exports during the fourth quarter 1943, for the most important items which as yet are not subject to a quota.

4. As various parts of the above proposals will require further explanations, and Swiss desiderata are to be put forward, the Swiss authorities welcome the opportunity of direct verbal contacts with the Allied representatives. Prof. Keller will therefore leave immediately with the new proposals. As a beginning, Prof. Keller's instructions will cover items 2, 3, 5 and 8 of the British list of September 30, and his stay in London will thus, in Bern's opinion, be of a short duration only. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that Prof. Keller's presence will afford an opportunity for a preparatory examination of other questions, thereby paving the way for further negotiations of a more comprehensive nature."

[Riefler]
WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 19, 1943.

[Received November 19—8 p. m.]

8087. For Department and FEA from Riefler. Reference my 7892, November 12th, Keller arrived in London and last night handed Foot and me a memorandum dated November 18 describing the Swiss Government's new proposals. Please inform British Embassy, Washington, and give it copy of the text on behalf of MEW. EWD and MEW will hold a policy meeting on it tomorrow and our comments

will follow as soon as we have had an opportunity to study it. Text is as follows:

“Swiss Legation London. Swiss proposals of November 18, 1943.

Pursuant to previous communications through the intermediary of the Swiss Legation (in particular to memorandum of November 12, 1943), the Swiss Government wish to make the following proposals in respect of Swiss exports to Germany and other European Axis countries:

[Here follows schedule of proposed limitation on exports to Germany for the first half of 1944, with additional limitations on exports for the fourth quarter of 1943 to those already in effect.]

Part III. The exports to European Axis countries especially to Germany will thus show in the first half year of 1944 a decrease of about 90 million Swiss francs against one half of total exports in 1942.

Part IV. The Swiss Government have set up the proposals hereabove notwithstanding their being fully aware that serious difficulties in the Swiss economic life will have to be faced as a consequence of their enforcement. These proposals are therefore submitted in the expectation that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government would accept to meet the Swiss Government on the following points:

Subsection 1, cessation of direct approaches to Swiss firms aimed at limitations in their exports to Axis countries, other than those agreed between the respective governments.

Deletion of the firm of Sulzer Brothers from the ‘statutory list’, and the ‘proclaimed list’ (should the firm meanwhile have been included therein).

Subsection 2, reinstatement of the full food quotas as they existed up to April 1943 and reopening of a satisfactory quota for fodder. November 18, 1943.”

[Riefler]
WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/9883

The Parliamentary Secretary of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare (Foot) and the Head of the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom (Riefler) to the Swiss Delegate in Charge of Trade Agreements at London (Keller) ⁷⁷

LONDON, December 19, 1943.

DEAR PROFESSOR KELLER: His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the United States Government have considered the proposals contained in the Swiss Government's memorandum dated November 18th, 1943,⁷⁸ which, as modified and clarified in subsequent correspondence and conversations, may be summarized as follows:

(1) The Swiss Government agrees to limit the export to Axis Europe during the first six months of 1944 of the goods as specified

⁷⁷ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his despatch No. 12903, December 22, 1943; received January 4, 1944.

⁷⁸ See *supra*.

item by item in Annex 1. hereto.⁷⁹ It is agreed that wherever the expression "Axis Europe" is used in this letter it is intended to comprise the whole of continental Europe, other than Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and that part of European U.S.S.R. which is not occupied by the enemies of H.M.G. and/or U.S.G.

(2) The goods listed in Annex 1. may be exported to Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Turkey, but the Swiss Government will take appropriate measures to ensure that such goods will not be re-exported in any form to Axis Europe.

(3) The undertakings now given by the Swiss Government shall remain in force until the signature of Armistice terms with Germany. Until then the limitations on Swiss exports shall be reviewed at least every six months in order to consider which of those exports shall be further reduced. In this connection particular attention shall be given to the reduction of the special fixed quotas listed in Annex 1. as intended to liquidate existing contracts. In addition, should the Swiss frontier at any time be freed so that trade with the outside world is no longer subject to German control, the Swiss Government will immediately confer with H.M.G. and the U.S.G. with a view to meeting the new situation.

(4) The Swiss Government agree that they will confer with H.M.G. and the U.S.G. before arriving at any general agreement for the resumption of trade with Italy, and meanwhile will permit no exports of goods listed in Annex 1. to Italian territory without the prior approval of the Mixed Commission.

(5) If during the period of hostilities in Europe any territory in Axis Europe should withdraw from its association with Germany or be liberated from German control, the Swiss Government (a) will confer with H.M.G., and the U.S.G. before arriving at any general agreement for the resumption or continuation of trade with such territory, and meanwhile will permit no exports of goods listed in Annex 1. to such territory without the prior approval of the Mixed Commission and (b) will reduce Swiss exports to Axis Europe other than Germany of each global quota listed in Annex 1. by the same percentage as Swiss exports to such territory bore to the exports to the whole of Axis Europe other than Germany during the preceding six months.

(6) The Swiss Government will not permit, except as mentioned below, any reduction in the price level of Swiss exports to Axis Europe, nor in the price level of any group or any tariff item specifically mentioned in Annex 1. nor any increase in the price level of goods imported from Axis Europe without a corresponding increase in prices of Swiss exports fully compensating the higher prices of imports. If a decrease in the price level of Swiss exports is justified by economic considerations, the Swiss Government will reduce the export quotas listed in Annex 1. by a percentage equal to such reduction in the price level.

(7) The Swiss Government will not permit the whole or any part of the export quotas listed in Annex 1. which have been assigned to any particular Swiss exporter and have not been exhausted to be transferred in whole or in part to any other Swiss exporter or exporters in such a way that the effect of individual undertakings to H.M.G. and/or the U.S.G. is nullified or diminished, nor will the

⁷⁹ Annexes not printed.

Swiss Government permit the transfer of quotas from one manufacturer to another so as to result in concentration upon any particular article of manufacture.

(8) The Swiss Government enter into the following agreement in respect of the processing, improvement and repair trades in Switzerland.

Processing (Trafic de Transformation actif)

(a) From January 1st, 1944, processing under all tariff items listed in Annex 1. will be suspended. No new permits have been issued since July 1st, 1943, under these items and all permits issued before that date will lapse on December 31st, 1943.

(b) Under tariff items not listed in Annex 1. processing will be allowed, but exports will be limited to a value not exceeding 6 million francs (of which not more than 3 million Swiss francs in the first quarter of 1944).

(c) Quarterly statistics of this trade will be supplied in future.

Improvement Trade (Trafic de Perfectionnement actif)

Exports will be limited as follows:

(a) Under all tariff items in Groups 11, 12 and 13 of the Swiss customs tariff item by item to one half of the values of these exports in 1942.

(b) There shall be no material alteration in the composition of the exports covered by the individual tariff items under (a) above.

(c) Quarterly statistics of this trade will be supplied in future.

Repair Trade (Trafic de Reparation actif).

Exports will be limited as follows:

(a) The repair of vehicles or other war equipment for the account of Axis Europe will not be permitted in Switzerland. This undertaking does not apply to articles of Swiss manufacture which can only be repaired in Switzerland, the repair of which will be limited in the first half of 1944 to one half of the values of such repairs in 1942.

(b) i. For tariff items covered by Annex 1. item by item, to one half of the values of these exports in 1942.

ii. For tariff items not covered by Annex 1. to a value not exceeding 0.8 billion Swiss francs (of which not more than 0.4 million Swiss francs for the first quarter of 1944) to Axis Europe as a whole.

(c) It is recognised that the completion of repairs of goods already in Switzerland on December 31st, 1943, may make it impossible to observe the limitations in (b) i and ii above during the first few months of 1944. Should there be any objectionable excess from this cause H.M.G. and U.S.G. will confer with the Swiss Government in order to effect an adjustment over the remainder of the first half of 1944.

(d) Monthly statistics of this trade will be supplied in future subdivided under headings (b) i and (b) ii above.

(9) The question of exports by the International Red Cross or by any other humanitarian organisation will be considered at the same time as the rest of the agenda of September 30th, 1943, but in the meantime the Swiss Government will not authorise exports of Swiss produce by such organisations without the prior consent of the Mixed

Commission. This undertaking does not apply to goods admitted through allied controls into Switzerland for re-export.

(10) The Swiss Government agree to co-ordinate all Swiss purchases for goods covered by blockade quotas and/or allocations with purchases made by or on behalf of the United Nations if so requested by H.M.G. and/or the U.S.G.

2. For their part H.M.G. in the U.K. and the U.S.G. agree:—

(a) that while this Agreement remains in force Swiss firms in the metallurgical industry which are not at this date on the Statutory List or Proclaimed List and have not yet entered into agreements with or given undertakings to H.M.G. and/or the U.S.G. shall not be listed or threatened with listing on the ground that such firms export to Axis Europe goods affected by and within the limits provided by this Agreement. H.M.G. and the U.S.G. reserve the right to obtain undertakings from or to list these firms for other reasons, but before listing or threatening to list firms in the metallurgical industry for exporting to Axis Europe goods not covered by this Agreement, H.M.G. and the U.S.G. will request the Swiss Government to fix a ceiling on the export of such goods. They will not, however, request the Swiss Government to introduce such export ceilings so as to have effect before July 1st, 1944, on goods normally manufactured by the metallurgical industry, and not covered by Annex 1. hereto, provided that exports of such goods to Axis Europe during the first half of 1944 are not in character or volume abnormal. The Swiss Government agree not to approach firms who have already entered into any such agreements or given any such undertakings with a view to preventing the observance of such agreements or undertakings.

(b) to delist Sulzer Brothers upon receiving from the Swiss Government on behalf of Sulzer Brothers an undertaking satisfactory to H.M.G. and the U.S.G.

(c) to restore full food and tobacco quotas and/or allocations from January 1st, 1944 (see Annex 2).

(d) to open a quota for fodder, and to examine other needs of Swiss agriculture. (see Annex 2)

3. H.M.G. and the U.S.G. understand that the Swiss Government are prepared to enter into negotiations with them in January 1944 regarding the outstanding items of the agenda of September 30th, 1943.

4. On learning that this letter accurately sets forth the intentions of the Swiss Government and the undertakings which they agree to give, H.M.G. and the U.S.G. will be ready to regard the Swiss memorandum of November 18th, 1943, and this reply, as constituting a formal and binding agreement between the three Governments.

Yours sincerely,

DINGLE FOOT

WINFIELD W. RIEFLER

740.00112 European War 1939/9883

*The Swiss Delegate in Charge of Trade Agreements at London (Keller) to the Parliamentary Secretary of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare (Foot) and the Head of the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom (Riefler)*⁸⁰

LONDON, December 19, 1943.

DEAR MR. FOOT AND MR. RIEFLER: I thank you for your letter of to-day concerning the proposals contained in the Swiss Government's memorandum dated November 18th, 1943, and wish to confirm that your communication accurately sets forth the intentions of the Swiss Government and the undertakings which they agree to give. I further confirm that your letter together with the present acknowledgment will be regarded by the Swiss Government as constituting a formal and binding agreement between our three Governments.

Yours sincerely,

PAUL KELLER

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SWITZERLAND CONCERNING SUPPLYING SWISS NEED FOR ARMY SUPPLIES IN ADDITION TO THOSE PROVIDED BY COMPENSATION AGREEMENT⁸¹

854.24/95 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 5, 1943—noon.

[Received March 6—11 a. m.]

1592. For Department and Board of Economic Warfare.

1. On the first of March the Swiss Minister here⁸² informed Dingle Foot⁸³ of Ministry of Economic Warfare that according to his information the American Government was now inclined to take a "milder view" of Switzerland than heretofore and to regard more sympathetically the claims of the Swiss Army. The Minister then handed over a list of supplies urgently required for the army which are oats, wool, leather and or hides, glycerine, castor oil, tinsplate, chrome, molybdenum, manganese, these latter either pure or in ferro alloys, stellite, steel plates, iron plates, bicycle chains. The Minister said no quanti-

⁸⁰ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his despatch No. 12903, December 22, 1943; received January 4, 1944.

⁸¹ For exchange of letters which constituted the compensation agreement of December 14, 1942, see telegram No. 7117, December 15, 1942, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 401.

⁸² Walter Thurnheer.

⁸³ Parliamentary Secretary of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

ties were mentioned as he understood how difficult it would be to obtain allocations for some of these products.

2. Foot replied that we had always made a distinction between the needs of the army and other requirements and for that reason navicerts or export licenses for both rubber and toluol have been issued without waiting for *Geleitscheine*⁸⁴ of equivalent value. The Minister's list would receive immediate consideration but Foot pointed out that some of the commodities mentioned, for example chrome, were covered by the compensation deal while others such as oats, wool and leather had been the subject of controversy during the recent negotiations; we had refused to let thru textiles and feeds unless the Swiss either forbade the export of cattle, dairy produce, and clothing or unless they made a progressive reduction in their machinery exports to the enemy. As neither of our requests had as yet been granted it would be difficult for us before reopening the negotiations to permit importation of the precise quantities which has been in issue. Furthermore, it would be difficult for us to continue to ship under the compensation deal while we were receiving no Swiss exports in return.

3. The Swiss Minister replied that he understood the difficulties but in respect of oats he thought his Government could guarantee that these would be fed only to horses actually serving with the army. His information was that the army horses had not the strength to pull the loads. Foot replied that if this request were granted we should need some figures if not of the actual number of horses with the army at least the quantity of oats desired and for how long a period. The Minister replied that the best course would be for his Military Attaché⁸⁵ to obtain figures from the General of the Swiss Army⁸⁶ and meanwhile he would tentatively suggest the import of 10,000 tons of oats.

4. Foot stated that in respect of the other commodities we should demand some indication of the amounts as we could not approach either the supply departments or the CRMB⁸⁷ without such figures. He thought that bicycle chains would not be easily obtainable either in Britain or the United States and was surprised to learn that they were not manufactured in Switzerland. The Minister said the same thought had occurred to him and that he would enquire whether it would not be satisfactory if we were to permit the import of the raw materials.

5. Foot then enquired when the delegation might be expected back in London. The Minister had no information on this but said the delay

⁸⁴ Licenses or guarantees of safe conduct.

⁸⁵ Capt. Charles Schlegel.

⁸⁶ Gen. Henri Guisan.

⁸⁷ Combined Raw Materials Board.

might be a result of Reller's [*Keller's?*] illness.⁸⁸ The Minister said that the delay need not trouble us as we were allowing nothing to pass thru the blockade. Foot answered that he must correct this impression and said that our principal endeavor in the negotiations had been to obtain a limitation in the export of machinery to the Axis. This was a matter to which we attached the greatest importance and in the meanwhile as the price to be paid for the compensation deal we were prevented from exercising further pressure on machinery firms although the deal itself had not yet begun to operate in our favor. In these circumstances the continued delay was certainly not to our advantage.

6. In his memorandum requesting the commodities the Minister said that "the Board of Economic Warfare might favor such imports in the present circumstances." We should be interested to learn whether the statement of the Minister accurately reflects such information as may have been given to the Swiss Legation in Washington. While the policy of giving certain support to the Swiss Army is well understood here the Embassy must observe that this Swiss approach has the appearance of an effort to obtain under the guise of army needs certain commodities which were refused in the negotiations for the reason that the Swiss were willing [*unwilling?*] to make us equivalent concessions. We should be interested to have your comments on this proposal before Ministry of Economic Warfare makes any more definite policy to the Swiss Minister.

MATTHEWS

854.24/96 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 11, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received 9:40 a. m.]

1616. At the last Mixed Commission meeting, the Swiss delegates asked the Commercial Attaché⁸⁹ and the British Commercial Secretary⁹⁰ to support the request made through the Swiss Legations in Washington and London for facilities to import certain products urgently needed for the army. They stated that the details have already been transmitted to you. The quantities have not been based on a fixed period but on immediate needs. They stated that London's first reaction was that this list is "rather long".

Hotz⁹¹ asked that we give our support initially to the request for

⁸⁸ Presumably reference is to Prof. Paul Keller, Swiss Delegate in charge of trade agreements.

⁸⁹ Daniel J. Reagan.

⁹⁰ John G. Lomax.

⁹¹ Jean Hotz, Director of the Division of Commerce, Swiss Department of Public Economy.

10,000 tons of oats (said to be sufficient for 2 months requirements). The army horses are now being fed on a daily mixture containing only one kilo of oats and other feedstuffs largely feed cellulose.

Hotz expresses the hope that the request for the other items would be treated liberally as this list had been transmitted at the request of the Swiss General Staff and which asked for our support for these essential army needs. The Swiss delegates stated that if it were unavailable these importations might be counted against the compensation deal but expresses the hope that some latitude might be accorded as at least part of the imports under the deal are intended for civilian requirements.

At my request my Military Attaché⁹² has discussed with the competent supply office of the Swiss Army the question of priority in this list of critical materials and the latter has indicated as of first urgency the following items: 10,000 tons of oats, 200 tons rubber, 240,000 toluol. This officer requested that the remainder of the list be considered as all urgently needed material and that if priority had to be given he would prefer that the priority would be half of the amounts requested of each article. (This officer reports that the bicycle chains [are] en route.)

My Military Attaché fully supports this request. He has been assured that any control desired will be offered to him and considers that it would strengthen his hand with the Swiss if deliveries can be started without necessarily incorporating these purchases into the compensation deal.

In view of the critical period through which the Swiss are now passing, I strongly support this recommendation of my Military Attaché as I consider that it is vitally important that we should help stress the Swiss Army's position by means of these critical supplies. I hope that this Swiss request may be given the most generous consideration and be filled as promptly as possible in view of the increasing supply difficulties.

Repeated to London.

HARRISON

854.24/106

*Memorandum by the Parliamentary Secretary of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare (Foot) to the Head of the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom (Riefler)*⁹³

The Swiss Minister called this morning and handed me the three attached memoranda,⁹⁴ dealing respectively with supplies required

⁹² Brig. Gen. B. R. Legge.

⁹³ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in the United Kingdom in his despatch No. 8258, March 22; received April 9.

⁹⁴ None printed.

by the Army, the issue of *Geleitscheine* under the Compensation Deal, and Swiss imports of fats.

As regards the first memorandum, (marked 'A') I said that we fully understood the desirability of strengthening the Swiss Army. But most of the materials for which he was asking were now extremely scarce, and the claims of the Swiss Army had to be balanced against other claims which were no less urgent. The supply authorities had originally agreed to the release of certain of these materials in the expectation that they would obtain some return under the Compensation Deal. But the matter wore rather a different aspect if, in fact, we were to receive nothing in exchange. I asked whether, if rubber, toluol, nickel and chrome (to take only four examples) were released, the Swiss Government would count that as part of the Compensation Deal. M. Thurnheer promised to make enquiries on this point. I said that our original intention, when the Compensation Deal was drawn up, was to release such commodities for export to Switzerland as and when we obtained delivery of the compensating Swiss exports. We had, however, agreed to allow 50 tons of rubber and 50 tons of toluol in advance of Swiss deliveries. If we now received in return a consignment of Swiss manufactures, I thought that the British and American Governments might consider some further release in advance of fresh Swiss deliveries, though I could not promise that such an arrangement would be approved.

As regards the third memorandum, the Minister dwelt on the inconvenience to the Swiss of having to switch their purchases from the Argentine to Portuguese Colonies and then finding further difficulties placed in their way. He wondered whether this was due to a political reason, namely the desire of the United Nations to put pressure on the Argentine. I said that while it was common knowledge that the Argentine Government were not exactly the blue-eyed boys of the United Nations, these changes were, I believed, due to supply rather than political reasons. Even if the Minister had not raised the subject himself, I had been intending to write him a letter on the subject of fats, and I hoped to dispatch this within a day or two.

DINGLE FOOT

15 MARCH, 1943.

854.24/105

The Swiss Legation to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

Through the breakdown of German-Swiss negotiations for a new trade agreement and through the resulting delay in the conclusion of Switzerland's negotiations in London the supplying of the Swiss

Army with essential materials is greatly jeopardized. At the same time the military situation is such as to require of the Swiss Army a high degree of preparedness. Such preparedness can only be achieved if the import of urgently needed supplies is facilitated by the authorities of the United States and of Great Britain. It may also be mentioned that such facilities should be granted whilst the supply routes to Switzerland are still open.

In view of these considerations and out of a desire to strengthen the Swiss Army as far as is feasible, the Swiss Government herewith submits an immediate program⁹⁵ which would cover the lowest army requirements for the current year.

Although the quantities indicated lie partly far below the actual annual requirements of the Swiss army, no additional requests would be submitted for the army during the current year, if the quantities listed are authorized. At the same time the Swiss authorities would be prepared to distribute the shipments over the next three quarters, so that only a third of the requested amounts would have to be authorized at one time. An exception to this proposal is only the case of oats for which, in view of Switzerland's extremely serious supply situation, further applications will have to be submitted in the course of this year.

The Swiss military authorities are prepared to justify in detail their army program to the American and British military attachés and to offer every guaranty for the exclusive use of such supplies by the Swiss Army.

The Swiss military authorities would store all such raw materials in the "Réduit National" (army warehouses) until such time as they would be needed for manufacture. In this way every possible control would be exercised over the use of these materials.

It is hoped that the American authorities will be anxious to assist the Swiss Army in its desire to maintain that standard of military preparedness and efficiency which is essential for the defense of Switzerland.

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1943.

854.24/95 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1943—10 p. m.

721. The following telegram has been sent to London:

"1. Swiss Minister's statement that 'American Government was now inclined to take a "milder view" of Switzerland than heretofore

⁹⁵ Not printed.

and to regard more sympathetically the claims of the Swiss Army' is generally correct. The basis for such a statement is that we informed the Swiss Legation of our appreciation of Swiss resistance to current German demands and gave it tangible form by offering an advance shipment of 50 tons of toluol and 50 tons of rubber for the Swiss Army under the Compensation Agreement without waiting for *Geleitscheine*. Legation in Bern expressed similar appreciation to Swiss Government. As evidenced by Compensation Agreement, there is a tendency here to treat more sympathetically requirements for Swiss Army than for Swiss industry generally. Types of iron and steel to be agreed upon and oats are available under Compensation Agreement, but we have given no indication that the other items referred to in your telegram⁹⁶ will be supplied.

"2. Eight thousand tons of oats are available under the Compensation Agreement in accordance with enclosure 5 to your despatch number 6834 of December 21 (Foot's letter to Sulzer, dated December 14).⁹⁷ If additional quantities of oats are required, we would want the statistics supporting the request.

"3. We agree with you that the delay in the return of the Swiss delegation to London operates against our interest.

"4. Our sympathetic attitude toward the Swiss Army should not operate as a means of obtaining commodities of no interest to the Army refused in the War Trade negotiations for the reason that the Swiss were not willing to make appropriate concessions."

We assume that in considering possible concessions to the Swiss Army, you will be in a position to verify (1) the Army's actual requirements, and (2) That the ultimate destination of any increased supplies which may be contemplated will be the Swiss Army.

HULL

854.24/96 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) ⁹⁸

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1943—9 p. m.

740. Your 1616, March 11. The requests of the Swiss for commodities cannot be commented on at this time inasmuch as any such proposal from the Swiss Legation here has not been received by us. However, the last sentence of paragraph 3 of your cable to the effect "that civilian requirements are to be taken care of by at least part of the imports under the compensation agreement," is a matter of concern. We refer you to paragraph 2 of the letter to Dr. Sulzer of December 14, 1942 signed by Foot and Riefler which is an essential part

⁹⁶ Telegram No. 1592, March 5, noon, p. 892.

⁹⁷ Despatch not printed; for Mr. Foot's letter to Hans Sulzer, head of the Swiss Delegation in London, see telegram No. 7117, December 15, 1942, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 401.

⁹⁸ Repeated on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as telegram No. 1861, with the following introductory sentence: "The following telegram has been sent to Bern".

of the agreement in this connection. It is there stated that the goods to be supplied by the United Kingdom and the United States "are destined for the exclusive use of the Swiss military authorities".

Board of Economic Warfare desires information of any change, as is indicated by your cable, which has been made in the original agreement. London has received substance of this message.

HULL

854.24/104a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1943—midnight.

2125. Legation of Switzerland in a recent memorandum has requested following supplies during 1943 for Swiss Army in addition to raw materials covered by Compensation Agreement. Metric tons except where indicated otherwise: oats 10,000; cotton 4,000; wool 3,000; hides and skins 2,000; copper 500; nickel 30; rubber 200; toluol 200; glycerine 200; castor oil 200; tinplate 1,000; steelsheets and billets 1,000; steelplate 500; ironsheets (decapped) 300; bicycle chains 6; stellite 900 lbs.; chromium 70; molybdenum 50; and manganese 50. The last three items would be suitable pure or in ferrous compounds.

The Swiss argue that through breakdown of German-Swiss negotiations and resulting delay the conclusion of London negotiations on new War Trade Agreement,⁹⁹ supplies to the Army are greatly jeopardized; that present situation requires high degree of preparedness and supplies should be granted while the routes to Switzerland are still open. Swiss are prepared to offer guarantees that material will be used exclusively for the Army and are willing to distribute the materials over the next three quarters.

In support of their request the Swiss claim that exports of arms and ammunition to the Axis have declined as measured by Swiss francs as follows: arms and components thereof for December 1942 14,700,000., January 1943 9,400,000., February 1943 6,200,000.; ammunition for same periods 9,200,000., 9,400,000., 5,600,000.

Department requests your views and those of Ministry of Economic Warfare with particular reference to the following:

1. Your comments on the apparent decline in exports of arms and ammunition to the Axis.
2. Blockade considerations involved in granting the Swiss requests and relation and effect on negotiations for the new War Trade Agreement.

⁹⁹ For correspondence on the negotiations for the Anglo-American-Swiss War Trade Agreement, effected by exchange of letters, December 19, 1943, see pp. 824 ff.

3. Is it impractical for Swiss to resume negotiations in London before they reach an agreement with Germany?

4. Military views in London concerning desirability of supporting the Swiss Army in this manner at the present time.

HULL

854.6231/261 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 8, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received April 8—9: 42 p. m.]

2220. Dr. Sulzer told me and my British colleague¹ this afternoon on behalf of Federal Councilor Stampfli² that the Germans had now undertaken to fulfill their obligations with respect to coal deliveries (of which they are in arrears of 1,000,000 tons) under the terms of the Swiss-German commercial agreement of July 1941.³ The Swiss had therefore no choice but to fulfill their obligations and consequently the Germans would deliver 150,000 tons of coal monthly from today until arrears have been filled, while the Swiss would guarantee exports contracted for prior to January 16, 1943, up to a total value of 350,000,000 Swiss francs, the unused balance of the original 850,000,000 credit in the clearing granted by Switzerland (see sixth paragraph of my 448, January 20—57 to London—and my 1481, March 4—191 to London⁴). Sulzer regretted that investigation showed that instead of the reduction in undesirable exports recently indicated there would be undoubtedly a substantial increase in such exports until orders placed prior to January 16, 1943, had been delivered. We both expressed the opinion that this would undoubtedly prove most disappointing to our respective Governments.

Sulzer also said Hotz will leave for Berlin with a delegation next Monday to negotiate a new agreement in which it will be his main efforts to reduce undesirable exports, maintain deliveries of coal, fertilizers, seed potatoes and *Geleitscheine* as well as establish an air service [development?]. Hotz will furnish additional information tomorrow. The Swiss Minister in London has been advised.

Reporting further.

Repeated to London.

HARRISON

¹ Clifford John Norton.

² Walter Stampfli, head of the Swiss Department of Public Economy.

³ Concerning this agreement, see W. N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade*, vol. 1, in the British civil series *History of the Second World War* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), pp. 587-588.

⁴ Neither printed.

854.24/105

*The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff
to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1943.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY: The Swiss Legation has submitted a program of supply for the Swiss Army with a request that Switzerland be permitted to import through the blockade from this country and other sources in this hemisphere the quantities of supplies necessary to meet the annual minimum requirements of the Swiss Army. The list of commodities desired is attached. The Swiss Legation has assured us that if the supplies are authorized, the Swiss authorities will be prepared to distribute the shipments over the next three quarters so that only a third of the requested amounts (except the oats) would have to be authorized at one time. The oats, rubber and toluol are understood to be most urgently needed. It is contended that the situation in Europe requires that the Swiss Army be maintained in a high degree of preparedness. The Swiss authorities offer every guarantee that the supplies requested will be used exclusively by the Swiss Army. I am informed that the American Military Attaché at Bern is satisfied that the supplies requested are, in fact, solely for the use of the Swiss Army, and General Guisan, Commander in Chief of the Swiss Army, has given assurances that any control which the Attaché desires will be established for this purpose.

As you know, a "compensation agreement" has been reached with the Swiss whereby certain critical materials for the Swiss Army will be exchanged for essential Swiss manufactures. The quantities now requested by the Swiss are in addition to and, in certain items, an increase over the quantities established in the agreement. Our Minister at Bern and his Military Attaché recommended that we fill the Swiss Army needs as promptly as possible without awaiting full compensatory exports to the United States under the agreement. Developments in the military situation with respect to Europe will put an increasing strain upon the Axis partners. They will, in turn, make greater demands of the neutrals which, in the case of Switzerland, may include passage of troops. The Swiss have assured us that any such demands will be refused and that the country will resist with its full strength any attempt to violate Swiss neutrality.

In my opinion it is in our vital interests that the Swiss Army be maintained at the highest possible standard of military preparedness and efficiency. While supply routes to Switzerland are still open, advantage should be taken to bring the Swiss Army up to the level essential for the defense of Switzerland, regardless of any present or pending agreement of a compensatory nature. The opinion of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff is, of course, paramount. I shall be grateful if you will inform me of their views and, if they accord with mine, if you will issue the necessary directives to the other interested agencies of this Government.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

[Annex]

*List of Commodities Required By the
Swiss Army During 1943*

Oats	10,000 m. tons
Cotton	4,000 m. tons
Wool	3,000 m. tons
Hides and Skins	2,000 m. tons
Copper	500 m. tons
Nickel	30 m. tons
Rubber	200 m. tons
Toluol	200 m. tons
Glycerine	200 m. tons
Castor Oil	200 m. tons
Tinplate	1,000 m. tons
Chromium	70 m. tons*
Molybdenum	50 m. tons*
Manganese	50 m. tons*
Steelsheets and Billets	1,000 m. tons
Steelplate	500 m. tons
Ironsheets (decapped)	300 m. tons
Bicycle Chains	6 m. tons
Stellite	900 lbs.

*These three items would be suitable pure or in ferrous compounds. [Footnote in the original.]

MARCH 22, 1943.

854.24/134

*Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy, to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered your letter of April 14, 1943 with regard to supplies for the Swiss Army.

Complete information as to the quantity of materials now going to Switzerland from this country or from other United Nations is

not available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since Switzerland lies so completely within the military and economic orbit of Germany, any materials sent them are considered as contributing indirectly to the Axis war efforts.

It is believed that materials now going to Switzerland should be sufficient to maintain our existing military intelligence activities and to continue our diplomatic representation in enemy countries through the Swiss.

From a military viewpoint, it is considered inadvisable that this government agree to Swiss requests for additional materials.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U.S. Navy

854.24/107: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1943—midnight.

2842. From Stone,⁶ Board of Economic Warfare. Reference Bern's 2273, April 10,⁷ repeated to London and MEW⁸ telegram to British Embassy, April 24. With regard to Swiss Army's request for oats, Department, BEW and the British Embassy agree that we should keep this transaction within the framework of the Compensation Deal and that no special concession should be made at this moment except insofar as the Swiss are now entitled to oats under Compensation Deal and subject to the conditions therein stated.

Therefore, it is suggested that we make it clear to Swiss Army authorities that we would allow the export of 2,000 tons of oats from the Argentine for shipment at the end of May, a shipment to which the Swiss are entitled under the Compensation Deal and for which they have requested the approval of BEW. Subject to your satisfaction that sufficient *Geleitscheine* have been granted to permit the Swiss to qualify for this amount, above approval is given. We would allow further shipments up to eight to ten thousand tons in all under the Compensation Deal as further *Geleitscheine* become available.

Army authorities, however, should be told that we would be prepared to allow an immediate export of oats above the 2,000 tons as an advance against future *Geleitscheine* if we could be satisfactorily assured as to the Swiss attitude in Berlin negotiations.

⁶ William T. Stone, Assistant Director in charge of Economic Warfare Analysis, Board of Economic Warfare.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

If the Swiss felt that they would like to have the iron and steel under the present Compensation arrangement in addition to the oats, and if we were able to come to a satisfactory agreement on additional exports from Switzerland in return, Riefler also suggests that we might consider taking this occasion to introduce the idea of expanding the Compensation Deal to cover oats above 2,000 tons. [Stone.]

HULL

854.24/171 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 25, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received September 25—8:42 p. m.]

6455. From Riefler for Department and OEW.⁹

1. Following are my views regarding the Swiss request for additional supplies for the Swiss Army quoted in my telegram 6247 of September 18.¹⁰ MEW is communicating its similar views to British Embassy Washington simultaneously.

2. It is important to support the Swiss Army, to maintain their friendship for us in the councils of Switzerland, as well as to maintain their will and ability to resist German demands for military concessions. We appreciate that the goods now requested may not be available for actual use by the Swiss Army for a considerable period but we feel, nevertheless, that a genuine gesture of support from us would be useful. Tactically, it is important to make the gesture now when we are showing our displeasure with the action of Swiss officials in the economic field, by resuming pressure on a very heavy scale.

3. It would be desirable consequently to permit such of these supplies as we can spare to go to Switzerland for the exclusive use of the Swiss Army. Ordinarily we would recommend that they go as part of the compensation agreement in return for an equivalent value of Swiss exports to us. At the present time, however, it would be undesirable to delay such supplies as we may make available for the Swiss Army by the interminable complications that have so far attended executions of the compensation agreement. I would, therefore, recommend that we tell the Swiss that we would regard such supply assistance as our own supply position permits, to provide the Swiss Army with these supplies from overseas, as an advance under the compensation agreement to be balanced later by an equivalent value of essential Swiss goods for our use.

⁹ Office of Economic Warfare, successor agency of the Board of Economic Warfare.

¹⁰ Not printed.

Follidt [*sic*] must recognize of course that we may actually get no counterpart for these supplies other than the stiffening of the Swiss Army, especially if the Germans refuse to issue *Geleitscheine* from now on, following our resumption of blacklisting pressure in Switzerland.

The actual list of materials desired by the Swiss Army is covered by my telegram 1592 of March 5, noon, and despatch 8258 of March 22, 1943.¹¹ It is rather extensive. It will be reduced, however, by the transport facilities open to the Swiss (they say they could only move 25,000 tons a month by the overland route from losbon [*Lisbon?*], Bilbao and Barcelona) and by our supply position. OEW can therefore use this original list as a starting point for drawing up a smaller list of goods that would suit our supply situation.

We would, however, not want the Swiss to get the impression that we were just offering them supplies on the assumption they will not be able to move them. We would want them to know that we really do want to support the Swiss Army, provided suitable safeguards can be worked out to prevent the Germans from seizing these supplies en route. [Riefler.]

WINANT

854.24/186: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1943.

7694. The question of basic rations for Switzerland has had careful consideration here. As a result, we now wish to propose that our negotiators avoid offering formal assurances as to supply similar to those given the Swedes,¹² unless there is specific demand for them by the Swiss. The reasons for this proposal are that there has been considerable opposition in some quarters here to the concept of basic rations in general. Also, since the Swiss have not yet requested basic rations, we would prefer to retain a somewhat more flexible system for making supplies available. In some instances it has proved extremely difficult to fulfill the letter of our supply commitments to Sweden at the stipulated time. Therefore, an attempt should be made to avoid, if possible, any form of "guarantee".

The proposed schedule of basic rations including the proposed quantities, sources and remarks should be used as a basis for the negotiations with the Swiss on supply. If assurances as to supplies

¹¹ Latter not printed.

¹² For correspondence concerning the War Trade Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, see pp. 739 ff.

are not specifically requested then the proposed schedule could be given in the form of quotas with the understanding that the Allies would look with sympathy on Swiss procurement within its limits.

We have now received MEW's savingram number 1187 of October 30¹³ which suggests numerous alterations in the original MEW proposed list of basic rations for Switzerland. We wish to suggest several more changes in the MEW schedule as it stands at present. We propose to liberalize several of the rations and suggest a few new rations which is believed will offer a particular inducement to the Swiss.

Our proposed increases are based on the assumption that the Swiss will agree in a large part and in all relevant cases, to the restrictions on Swiss exports to the enemy proposed in our suggested A, B, and C lists. We believe that if the Swiss are offered fairly liberal rations of commodities, for example, textile raw materials, which are not in tight supply, the proposed restrictions on their export to the enemy of similar or derived goods will be more palatable to them. If, on the other hand, the Swiss refuse to accept our new restrictions on their exports, then the proposed increases should be withheld where necessary.

In some cases where the goods, such as mercury, originate in the Iberian Peninsula, we have suggested a ration on the grounds that the Swiss are able to import and have imported without authorization from the Allies. We consider it important to attempt to establish some control in the case of these commodities.

Another suggestion which we wish to put forward is that imports into Switzerland under certain of the proposed basic rations be made "subject to satisfactory assurances as to use". The rations which we suggest be made subject to this condition are: castor oil, vegetable waxes, animal and insect waxes, iodine and iodine salts, mercury, casein, carbon black, prepared paints, rubber, asbestos, tin, and gum arabic. Such assurances would be required in the case of materials which enter into a variety of industrial processes or manufactures and which might therefore be of direct benefit to the enemy. The assurances which we would desire in these cases would be that the goods were to be used to the greatest possible extent for military, medical, or other essential purposes exclusively in Switzerland. It should not be difficult to obtain satisfactory information regarding the ultimate use and users of these commodities especially if the "inverted procedure" is placed in effect for all shipments into Switzerland under the blockade quota schedule.

¹³ Not found in Department files.

In several places in the schedule we have inserted, for reasons relative to the supply situation, the phrase "through U.S. or U.K. supply authorities".

Our suggested changes in MEW's schedule as it now stands are as follows:

[Here follow suggested changes for a long list of products.]

We hope that the Embassy and MEW will take into account the suggestions contained above in negotiating with the Swiss regarding supplies. The rations proposed by MEW, and as corrected in some cases by us, have been cleared informally with the various supply officials involved. The schedule of rations has not been cleared in any formal or preliminary way with the Combined Boards as we feel, after our experience in the case of the Swedish negotiations, that it would be better to clear it finally once the Swiss demands have been made known and discussed in London between you and M.E.W.

HULL

854.24/186 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 10, 1943.

[Received December 10—6:07 p. m.]

8607. For Department and FEA¹⁴ from Riefler and Lovitt.¹⁵ Reference your 7694, December 4. With respect to type of assurances of supply to avoid any form of "guarantee" and at the same time meet Keller's request for assurances, we are proposing to the Swiss the following letter:

"With reference to our memorandum of blank and our agreement to restore quotas and allocations as on the attached list, we wish to assure you that HMG and the USG do not intend to withhold navicerts or export licenses covering importation into Switzerland of the quantities agreed to so long as the agreement remains in force.

With regard to those commodities for which there is a blockade quota, it is understood that we shall give sympathetic consideration to any case or cases which the Swiss Government may submit for reconsideration of the amounts at present agreed upon.

With regard to those commodities which are now, or become in the future, subject to allocation on account of their being in short supply or for some other reason, and where the source of such allocation is stated to be neutral territory, HMG and the USG will extend all

¹⁴ Foreign Economic Administration: established by Executive Order 9380 September 25, 1943. Among others it assumed the functions exercised previously by the Office of Economic Warfare.

¹⁵ John V. Lovitt, Department representative in war trade negotiations with the Swiss in London.

facilities open to them. If, however, for reasons beyond their control, the goods cannot be obtained from an indicated neutral territory, HMG and the USG will endeavor to offer an alternative source of supply. It is impossible to give an unconditional undertaking to make goods available from United Nations territory since the supply position is liable materially to fluctuate in consequence of the exigencies of the war, but everything possible will be done to see that a fair share of these supplies is made available. Further, if the supply situation in regard to scarce commodities should materially improve, HMG and the USG will be ready to examine whether any increase in or addition to the allocations will be possible.

It is understood, as stated in the agreement mentioned above, that the Swiss Government when so requested will coordinate Swiss purchases of goods covered by quotas or allocations with those of the United Nations."

As a result of further discussion with Keller, some changes in the text of the letter may be necessary. "Basic rations" have not been suggested by us. We will telegraph you the food, tobacco and fodder quotas we propose to open at this time, as soon as they have been fully cleared here. In the meantime, there appears to be some difficulty with fats and oils. MEW state carryover from 1943 is 10,400 tons (and not 9,100 tons as stated in reference telegram). Can you check figures? MEW has suggested the substitution of cocoa beans from West Africa for linseed, which would be more acceptable to the Swiss, particularly if they are permitted to retain residue in the form of cocoa powder. Suggest you obtain copy of MEW telegram to Embassy for particulars. [Riefler and Lovitt.]

BUCKNELL

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(See Volume III, pages 406-771.)

VATICAN

APPEALS OF THE VATICAN TO THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS THAT THEY REFRAIN FROM BOMBING ROME¹

*Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII, to the President*²

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1943.

The following is a memorandum for the President and the Secretary which I have received from the Apostolic Delegate:³

"The Apostolic Delegate has recently received a communication from His Eminence Cardinal Maglione, Secretary of State, Vatican City, relative to the immunity of the city of Rome from aerial bombardment. As already stated in the memorandum of December 15th,⁴ the Government of Italy, on December 13th, gave oral but, nevertheless, official assurance to the Holy See that the Supreme Command and the General Staff of the Armed Forces together with the Premier were about to leave Rome.

"Now, Cardinal Maglione communicates the information that on December 20th, at the request of the Holy See, the Italian Government gave an official statement in writing to the effect that the Premier with the rest of the Supreme Command was moving away from Rome. The statement also declares that, besides the Supreme Command, Dependent Offices of the Italian Army and Navy and the Military Headquarters of the German Army and Navy there are actually being transferred from Rome. The Secretary of State notes that he has already informed the Chargé des Affaires of the United States⁵ about the written statement.

"The Archbishop of London,^{5a} as well as the Apostolic Delegate in England,⁶ have spoken to the Prime Minister of England⁷ about the question of possible bombardment of Rome, giving the reasons why it should be avoided.

"His Eminence adds that from conversations he had with the Minister of England to the Holy See⁸ he got the impression that the

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 791-800.

² Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Mr. Taylor was in the United States at this time.

³ Archbishop Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate at Washington.

⁴ Memorandum from the Papal Cardinal Secretary of State to the Apostolic Delegate, not printed. Paraphrased copies were transmitted through Mr. Taylor to the President and to the Department.

⁵ Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to Mr. Taylor.

^{5a} Presumably reference is to Arthur Cardinal Hinsley, Archbishop of Westminster.

⁶ Msgr. William Godfrey.

⁷ Winston S. Churchill.

⁸ Francis D. G. Osborne.

British Government was of the opinion that the Holy See was not acting to avoid the bombardment of Rome entirely of her own volition but that the Italian Government was behind all the activity done for this purpose. To correct this opinion the Cardinal spoke to the Minister of England to the Holy See, and likewise notified the Apostolic Delegate in England, telling them substantially the following: 'The movement to avert the bombardment of Rome was started exclusively and totally by the Holy See. The Holy See has stated again and again that, should Rome be bombed, she would be compelled to protest because Rome is a Holy City, the Diocese of the Supreme Pontiff and the Center of the Catholic World. The Holy See is certain that the reasons she offers for non-bombardment are valid and of great moment. Spontaneously, therefore, she called to the attention of the Italian Government the fact that the English Government has frequently indicated that the city of Rome is a military objective. As a consequence of this the Italian Government, first orally on December 13th, then in writing on December 20th, assured the Holy See that the Military Commands were leaving the city. In fact, their departure is under way.'

The Secretary of State requests that all these matters be treated with the utmost secrecy."

MYRON TAYLOR

740.0011 European War 1939/26946 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, January 5, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 8:25 p. m.]

59. From Tittmann. No. 218, December 30. My 205, December 8.⁹

1. I had a 40-minute conversation with the Pope this morning at the customary New Year audience. The Paternal [*Holy*] Father seemed to me to be in better [health?] and spirits than at any time since I have known him.

2. After asking me to convey his greetings to the President and to Mr. Myron Taylor, he immediately brought up the subject of the bombing of Rome which he said had come to the forefront because of the more or less official threats that had been made recently over the BBC.¹⁰ He said that as a matter of fact he did not himself feel in the least apprehensive because he could not imagine that the Allies would ever do such a thing when there was so little to gain and so much to lose thereby. He made it clear that if Rome were bombed he would be obliged to make a solemn and public protest and added that he was certain that the combined effect of the bombing and protest on Catholics throughout the world could only be hurtful to the cause of the Allies. He mentioned particularly in this connection opinion in Latin America.

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ British Broadcasting Company.

He informed me that he had now received confirmation in writing of the verbal assurances already given by the Italian Government that the military objectives cited in my previous telegrams would be removed from Rome and that this fact had been telegraphed to Apostolic Delegate in Washington for the information of our Government. The Pope added that he was very appreciative of the recent efforts of Mr. Taylor in Washington to make clear the position of the Holy See in this matter.

I told the Pope that I had received no indication from my Government as to what attitude we had adopted but that I supposed the British and ourselves would be obliged to reserve the right to bomb Rome if and when the military situation made this imperative. He replied that such a reservation was, of course, comprehensible but only in theory. The Pope did not bring up the subject of bombing of civilian populations.

With regard to his Christmas message ¹¹ the Pope gave me impression that he was sincere in believing that he had spoken therein clearly enough to satisfy all those who had been insisting in the past that he utter some word of condemnation of the Nazi atrocities and he seemed surprised when I told him that I thought there were some who did not share his belief. He said that he thought that it was plain to everyone that he was referring to the Poles, Jews and hostages when he declared that hundreds of thousands of persons had been killed or tortured through no fault of their own, sometimes only because of their race or nationality. He explained that when talking of atrocities he could not name the Nazis without at the same time mentioning the Bolsheviks and this he thought might not be wholly pleasing to the Allies. He stated that he "feared" that there was foundation for the atrocity reports of the Allies but led me to believe that he felt that there had been some exaggeration for purpose of propaganda. Taken as a whole he thought his message should be welcomed by the American people and I agreed with [him].

The Pope seemed pleased when I told him how much I appreciated being present with my family at his private midnight mass Christmas Eve which was attended only by Diplomatic Corps. I said I was impressed by this demonstration above the havoc of war of the brotherhood of man when friend and foe alike were seen to kneel together at the altar in order to receive Holy Communion from the hands of the Universal Father. The Germans, however, were conspicuous by their absence and I could see that their lack of cooperation in this instance had affected the Holy Father. He was inclined to attribute the absence to fear on their part that they might incur displeasure of the more extreme Nazi leaders had they attended.

¹¹ For text, see the *New York Times*, December 25, 1942, p. 1.

The Pope maintained his usual reserve with regard to the progress of the war but this time did not dwell upon the military might of Germany as he did in all previous conversations with me. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/27189

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On December 26th you were good enough to write me a letter¹² quoting from your memorandum of our earlier conversation on the subject of the bombardment of Rome.¹³ I reported your views to London and have now heard that they have, somewhat reluctantly, decided to abandon their idea of arranging for the demilitarization of Rome by agreement with the Italian Government.

Their main reason for this decision was no doubt the attitude of the United States Government as reported by you, and the undesirability of acting alone in the matter. But other reasons influencing them in this decision were a recommendation by His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See that it would be well to keep the Italian Government and the Vatican guessing about our policy, and also that some time ago the Egyptian Government were promised that Rome would be bombed if the Italians bombed Cairo, and that as His Majesty's Government had opposed all attempts by the Egyptian Government to arrange for Cairo to be recognised as an open town, it might be difficult, if Rome were so recognised, to refuse to make similar arrangements for Cairo, which would be militarily inconvenient.

His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See has been therefore instructed to say nothing further to the Vatican unless again approached. If it is necessary for him to say anything, he is instructed to reply that he has received no instructions and does not expect to receive any, since he assumes that His Majesty's Government retain full liberty of military action in regard to Rome.

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

740.0011 European War 1939/27161 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, January 15, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 2:44 p. m.]

328. From Tittmann. No. 11, January 12. My telegram number 213, December 25.¹⁴

¹² Not printed.

¹³ Dated December 21, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 797.

¹⁴ See telegram No. 6198, December 29, 1942, from the Minister in Switzerland, *ibid.*, p. 800.

1. I am told that the Roman population is becoming increasingly convinced that some sort of an agreement has been concluded whereby the city of Rome will not be bombed. Accordingly many people who had left the city in anticipation of air raids are now said to be returning.

2. It seems to be a fact—at least it has not been denied so far by the Vatican—that at the instance of the Pope, the Portuguese Government recently appealed to the British Government not to bomb Rome. The appeal is said to have been made simultaneously by the Portuguese Ambassador in London¹⁵ and by Salazar¹⁶ to the British Ambassador in Lisbon.¹⁷ My British colleague tells me that the Pope did the same thing once before—in 1940 I believe—to the distinct annoyance of the British Government. When questioned regarding the possible bombing of Rome, I shall continue to say that I have received no instructions from my Government on the subject but that I suppose that we must be reserving our right to do so should the military situation make such action imperative. Please inform me whether this answer meets with the approval of the Department. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/27161 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1943—7 p. m.

193. For Tittmann. Your 11, January 12.¹⁸ A reply along the lines suggested by you meets with the Department's approval should you be questioned concerning the possible bombardment of Rome. For your information this subject has had the active attention of the President and ourselves. Mr. Taylor has discussed the matter with the Apostolic Delegate who has undoubtedly communicated these conversations to the Vatican.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/28342 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 5, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 5:20 p. m.]

1510. From Tittmann. No. 39, March 1. Reference to my telegram No. 11, January 12. The Cardinal Secretary of State, under

¹⁵ Armindo Rodrigues de Sttau Monteiro.

¹⁶ Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs and of War.

¹⁷ Sir Ronald Campbell.

¹⁸ See *supra*.

date of February 28, has sent me officially a copy of a note of the same date which he has addressed to the British Minister to the Holy See regarding the question of possible bombing of Rome. In his covering communication to me Cardinal states that he believes it "opportune" to bring the note to my attention. The text of the note, which is too long to telegraph in full will be forwarded in the next pouch.¹⁹ In summary it explains that owing to British statements of a threatening nature, both official and unofficial, the Secretariat of State feels duty-bound once again to insist upon the very serious grounds for sparing Rome from bombardment. It points out that the city is the center of Catholicism with all the machinery for the spiritual government of the Catholic world and the Episcopal See of the Supreme Pontiff and that it contains many religious and cultural movements [*monuments*] which are held in particular veneration not only by Catholics but also by the entire Christian world. It observes that the Vatican City itself would have little chance of escaping damage in a bombardment no matter what precautions might be taken to avoid it.

The note then recalls the assurances given by the Italian Government to the Holy See with regard to military objectives in Rome and in conclusion warns that if Rome should be bombed the Holy See would be forced to make a public protest to the Catholic world.

Since the same ground was covered by the Holy See in a previous communication to the British Government last December and since it does not appear that there have been any additional threats since then Osborne is at a loss to account for this fresh appeal and warning since my telegram. In his report to London he is suggesting that it may be just possible that Archbishop Spellman²⁰ brought with him from the United States assurances that Rome would not be bombed by the Americans and that the Vatican consequently feels that this would be an occasion to attempt to reinsure itself in London.

I myself know of no such assurances. The Archbishop did not raise the question in the course of a conversation and I said nothing to him about it. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/28342

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs
(Atherton) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 8, 1943.

MR. WELLES: We are inclined to believe that the reasons for this most recent communication from the Vatican to the British Govern-

¹⁹ Despatch No. 159, March 3, 1943, not printed.

²⁰ Francis J. Spellman, Archbishop of New York.

ment with respect to the bombardment of Rome are those given in the note itself, that is, various statements of a "threatening" nature, both official and unofficial, which have come out of the British Isles on this question. Mr. Tittmann believes that there have been no additional "threats" from the British since last December. However, on January 20 Mr. Eden²¹ stated in the House of Commons: "I agree with the Prime Minister that we have as much right to bomb Rome as the Italians had to bomb London. We shall not hesitate to do so to the best of our ability and as heavily as possible if the course of the war should render such bombing convenient and helpful." Furthermore, digests of British public opinion during recent weeks have shown a continuing interest in the possible bombardment of Rome with the sentiment of the people preponderantly in favor of bombing.

So far as is known there have been no official expressions of opinion in this country on the question one way or another and very little independent comment in the press or radio. This would tend to explain why it was not felt necessary to address a communication to us similar to that sent the British.

We do not know whether, in his recent discussions with the Pope, Archbishop Spellman may have given some indications of a reassuring nature to the Pope concerning the bombardment of Rome. It is only natural that this should occur to the British Minister when he and not Tittmann received the recent warning.

R[AY] A[THERTON]

740.0011 European War 1939/29832a

Pope Pius XII to President Roosevelt

Almost four years have now passed since, in the name of God the Father of all and with the utmost earnestness at Our command, We appealed (August 24, 1939) to the responsible leaders of peoples to hold back the threatening avalanche of international strife and to settle their differences in the calm, serene atmosphere of mutual understanding. Nothing was to be lost by peace; everything might be lost by war. And when the awful powers of destruction broke loose and swept over a large part of Europe, though Our Apostolic Office places Us above and beyond all participation in armed conflicts, We did not fail to do what We could to keep out of the war nations not yet involved and to mitigate as far as possible for millions of innocent men, women and children, defenceless against the circumstances in which they have to live, the sorrows and sufferings that would inevitably follow

²¹ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

along the constantly widening swath of desolation and death cut by the machines of modern warfare.

The succeeding years unfortunately have seen heart-rending tragedies increase and multiply; yet We have not for that reason, as Our conscience bears witness, given over Our hopes and Our efforts in behalf of the afflicted members of the great human family everywhere. And as the episcopal See of the Popes is Rome, from where through these long centuries they have ruled the flock entrusted to them by the divine Shepherd of souls, it is natural that amid all the vicissitudes of their complex and chequered history the faithful of Italy should feel themselves bound by more than ordinary ties to this Holy See, and have learned to look to it for protection and comfort especially in hours of crisis.

In such an hour today their pleading voices reach Us carried on their steady confidence that they will not go unanswered. Fathers and mothers, old and young every day are appealing for Our help; and We, whose paternal heart beats in unison with the sufferings and sorrows of all mankind, cannot but respond with the deepest feelings of Our soul to such insistent prayers, lest the poor and humble shall have placed their confidence in Us in vain.

And so very sincerely and confidentially We address Ourselves to Your Excellency, sure that no one will recognize more clearly than the Chief Executive of the great American nation the voice of humanity that speaks in these appeals made to Us, and the affection of a father that inspires Our response. The assurance given to Us in 1941 by Your Excellency's esteemed Ambassador Mr. Myron Taylor and spontaneously repeated by him in 1942 that "America has no hatred of the Italian people" gives Us confidence that they will be treated with consideration and understanding; and if they have had to mourn the untimely death of dear ones, they will yet in their present circumstances be spared as far as possible further pain and devastation, and their many treasured shrines of Religion and Art—precious heritage not of one people but of all human and Christian civilization—will be saved from irreparable ruin. This is a hope and prayer very dear to Our paternal heart, and We have thought that its realization could not be more effectively ensured than by expressing it very simply to Your Excellency.

With heartfelt prayer We beg God's blessings on Your Excellency and the people of the United States.

From the VATICAN, May 19, 1943.

PIUS PP. XII

740.0011 European War 1939/29643

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1943.

The Apostolic Delegate called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Delegate handed me the memorandum attached herewith which has to do with the possible bombing of the city of Rome. The Delegate added that the views of the Holy See with regard to this question were already so thoroughly known that he did not feel it necessary to say anything further with reference to this communication.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

[Annex]

MEMORANDUM

In view of the discussion in the House of Commons last week in which it was stated on behalf of the Government that the Allies would not hesitate to bomb the city of Rome if that became necessary or useful for the conduct of the war, His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, has directed the Apostolic Delegate in Washington to inform the Government of the United States that the Holy See reaffirms its often expressed attitude regarding such sad eventuality. The Holy See ardently hopes that such bombardment will not occur, and repeats that the Holy Father would be constrained to express vehement protest against such action.

The Holy See has already manifested the grave reasons for which Rome should be saved from the horrors of aerial attack, and for its part has urged and obtained the removal of Axis military objectives from the Eternal City.

In presenting this matter again to the Department of State, the Apostolic Delegate begs to recall the specific remarks of his memorandum of December 4, 1942,²² which was submitted to the Honorable Mr. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State.

740.0011 European War 1939/30167

The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII

No. 492/42

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1943.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In reply to a recent communication to the Holy See, the contents of which are known to you, His Eminence, the

²² Not printed.

Cardinal Secretary of State, requests that I bring to your attention the following points that you in turn may communicate them directly to the President.

1. In his paternal solicitude for the welfare of all peoples the Holy Father recommends anew to the President of the United States of America the fate of the Italian people.

2. His Holiness has been saddened by the news that the possibility of the bombardment of Rome has not been excluded. In such an hypothesis, which he hopes will never occur, the Holy Father, as he has said before, will be constrained to protest. The many weighty reasons for avoiding this bombardment have already been given, among them the grave danger to Vatican City and its wonderful religious and art treasures, that exists in the event of aerial bombing of Rome. Those effecting such a bombardment will be held responsible by Catholics the world over and by the judgment of history.

With assurance [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea

740.0011 European War 1939/29832a

President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1943.

YOUR HOLINESS: The communication of May 19, 1943 from Your Holiness setting forth in eloquent language the deep feelings of emotion with which Your Holiness views the devastating effects of war on Italy strikes a very responsive chord in my heart. No one appreciates more than I the ceaseless efforts of Your Holiness to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and subsequently to limit its contagion. Your Holiness is familiar with the repeated efforts which were made in 1940 by this Government, and by many elements within the United States to deter the Chief of the Italian Government from plunging his country and countrymen into a ruinous war whose outcome, I reminded him even at that time, could only prove disastrous.

The sympathetic response of Your Holiness to the many appeals of the Italian people on behalf of their country is understood and appreciated by me. May I say that Americans are among those who value most the religious shrines and the historical monuments of Italy. However, my countrymen are likewise united in their determination to win the war which has been thrust upon them and for which the present government of Italy must share its full responsibility. My

countrymen and I deplore the loss of life on both sides which must result and the destruction of property and resources.

Attacks against Italy are limited, to the extent humanly possible, to military objectives. We have not and will not make warfare on civilians or against nonmilitary objectives. In the event it should be found militarily necessary for Allied planes to operate over Rome our aviators are thoroughly informed as to the location of the Vatican and have been specifically instructed to prevent bombs from falling within the Vatican City. This may be an opportune time to warn Your Holiness that I have no reason to feel assured that Axis planes would not make an opportunity to bomb Vatican City with the purpose of charging Allied planes with the outrages they themselves had committed.

My country has no choice but to prosecute the war with all force against the enemy until every resistance has been overcome. Your Holiness will understand, I am confident, that in this struggle for human liberty no exception can be made to the full prosecution of the war against any legitimate military enemy objective. Any other course would only delay the fulfillment of that desire in which Your Holiness and the governments and peoples of the United Nations—and I believe the people of Italy likewise—are joined—the return of peace on earth.

Believe me [etc.]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.0011 European War 1939/30168

The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII

No. 492/42

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. TAYLOR: I have been directed by His Eminence, Cardinal Maglione, Secretary of State, to return once again on the subject of the bombardment of Rome.

In these days the British Minister to the Vatican, on urgent and personal instructions from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has informed His Eminence that in case military necessity demands the bombardment of Rome, all Allied pilots would be instructed to spare the Vatican City. This message intended for the Holy Father adds that the British Government does not exclude the possibility that the Axis powers will deliberately bombard the Vatican City State, with the purpose of having the responsibility for such action cast upon the Allies.

His Eminence repeated to the Minister of His Britannic Majesty all the reasons already explained and in virtue of which Rome should be spared from aerial attack, indicating that it is not a question merely of Vatican City but of the entire city of Rome, the Episcopal See of the Holy Father.

His Eminence was obliged to repeat also that in the event that the city of Rome is bombarded the Holy Father will voice his open protest to the world. In this regard he again insisted on the enormous responsibility of the Allies in the event that they decide to bombard the city. Not only would such military action arouse the resentment of the whole world, and particularly of Catholics, but in its long range consequences it would become a cause of profound political embarrassment.

In conclusion His Eminence directs me to communicate the foregoing to the Government of the United States, and suggests that the surest way of avoiding an attack on Vatican City by the Axis powers with the consequent recriminations against the Allies would be to leave the city of Rome free from all aerial attack.

If I may be permitted to add a word to the authoritative instructions received from His Eminence, it must be in appreciation to Your Excellency for the comprehension which you and the Government of the United States have shown in the question of the immunity of Rome from aerial bombardment. I well realize that if Rome has thus far been spared from aerial attack by the Allies it is due to the consideration given to the unique religious, historical and artistic importance of the City.

In these last few weeks the Allied policy in regard to Rome has solidified, and military necessity has become the determining factor. In the war which is being waged so strenuously and with such sacrifices I am sure that there are higher necessities than those of military character, and that to spare the sacred City of Rome would effectively symbolize the ideals contained in the Allied war program.

Since the beginning of this question the Holy Father directly and through His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, has patiently and quietly pleaded through diplomatic channels in order that Rome might be spared; the August Pontiff has shown his understanding of the Allied objectives while maintaining the traditional impartiality of the Holy See which has children in all nations. I trust that the Allied Governments, even in terms of military necessity, have fully evaluated the import of a solemn and public protest made by the Holy Father, if Rome should unfortunately become the target of Allied bombers.

It is a well founded fear that if all or part of Rome is laid waste by Allied military forces there will arise not only in Europe and in

Latin America but everywhere a troublesome division of spirits, and most certainly a deep seated antagonism.

Please accept [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII*²³

No. 492/42

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1943.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In further reference to the question of the immunity of the city of Rome from aerial attack, I have just received a communication from His Eminence Cardinal Maglione, Secretary of State to His Holiness.

His Eminence now informs me that the Holy See presented additional Notes to the Italian Government on February 28th and May 22nd, with the purpose of obtaining the removal from Rome and the immediate vicinity of all military objectives.

In response to these communications the Italian Ambassador to the Vatican, by order of his Government, presented a Note on June 9th, outlining the steps taken for the demilitarization of Rome.

In accordance with its Note of December 20, 1942, to the Cardinal Secretary of State, the Italian Government has been effecting the removal from Rome of the Military Commands, and has in fact transferred the Supreme Command and the General Staffs of the Army, Navy and Air Forces.

The Supreme Command and the General Staffs are now in rural districts. At present the only military offices remaining in Rome are the local military office, the historical military office, and other offices of financial and administrative character. However these too are in the process of being removed from the City.

Similar steps have been taken in regard to the German offices of liaison, which have either already followed the respective Italian Commands or are about to do so.

The removal from Rome of these military objectives is being carried out not only in response to the plea of the Holy See for the demilitarization of the City, but also as a part of the process of decentralization which constitutes a necessary phase of the national defense. It is clear however that the local garrison, necessary for the protection and security of the civilian population, must remain in the City.

His Eminence has directed me to make known the sad and dangerous situation in which the Holy See now finds itself. In fact, on several

²³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

occasions and from various sources, including some newspapers, the Holy See has already been reproached for harboring within the walls of the Vatican the representatives of the United States and of other powers hostile to the Axis.

In the event of a bombardment of Rome there would be considerable probability of an incited or spontaneous uprising of the people, and it would be difficult if not impossible for the Holy See to guarantee the security of the Vatican itself and of the Allied diplomatic personnel. Wheresoever the responsibility of such violence might lie, it will readily be conceded that the Holy See does not dispose of adequate means for preventing it.

His Eminence has taken full cognizance of the possibility that Vatican City State itself may be bombed, either accidentally or deliberately, by one or other of the contending forces. He is obliged however to reassert that in the calm judgment of posterity the full responsibility would fall on the Allies if they give occasion for such a tragic disaster by bombing any part of the City of Rome.

I shall be most grateful if Your Excellency will present the contents of this Note to your Government, and I foster hope that due consideration will be given to the precarious situation that would result for the Holy See if Rome is made the objective of aerial raids.

With the assurances [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI

740.0011 European War 1939/30168

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1943.

I think it is worthwhile to get word to Monsignor Cicognani in very polite language:

(a) That we fully realize all that the Pope has said about Rome as a whole and that we have no desire to destroy any church property or historic monuments.

(b) That, nevertheless, because war is war we must recognize that Rome is the center of the Italian Government and is of definite use to that government in conducting the war against us. This applies also to the fact that many Germans help to run Italy, with German staffs located in Rome itself.

(c) Therefore, in order to be fair and equally just to both sides, we suggest that the Vatican try to have Rome declared an open city i.e. that all military installations, activities and personnel of Italy be removed from Rome, together with the use of all railroad facilities in and about Rome for military purposes. This, of course, would require the cooperative consent of the British, but I agree with Myron that it is worthwhile discussing.

What do you think?

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to President Roosevelt*²⁴

No. 492/42

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1943.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have just received Your Excellency's communication²⁵ containing a response to the message from His Holiness which was forwarded by me in a letter of June 15th.²⁶ In the name of the Holy Father I wish to express deepest gratitude for the consideration which has been given to this appeal.

With hope and firm confidence I have always noted in the pronouncements of Your Excellency the resolve to give the Italian people an opportunity to choose the kind of government based on democratic principles which they may wish to establish, and I have not failed to call it to the attention of the Holy See. It is my conviction that the Holy Father will be gratified to learn of the hope that is fostered by Your Excellency for the restoration of Italy as a respected member of the European family of nations.

In regard to the possibility of bombardment of Rome, the Holy See has been informed of the efforts made by the Government of the United States to reduce this possibility to a minimum. In this regard nevertheless I recently received a communication from His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, and in a letter to Mr. Myron C. Taylor, under date of June 28th, I had the honor to present further considerations of His Eminence on the demilitarization of Rome, and on the precarious situation facing the Vatican now, and especially in the event of a bombardment of Rome.

I am confident that the pleas of the Holy Father will continue to meet with the benevolent consideration of [on] the part of Your Excellency and of the Allied Governments, and it shall be my duty to inform His Holiness of your courteous letter directed to me.

With the assurances [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea

740.0011 European War 1939/30003 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 2, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received July 3—8: 24 a. m.]

3921. From Tittmann. No. 107, June 29.

1. A personal and most secret telegram from Eden (received here June 23 but dated London June 20) has been received by my British

²⁴ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

²⁵ President Roosevelt's message of June 29; for text, see airgram A-3, July 19, 6 p. m., to Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, p. 930.

²⁶ *Ante*, p. 918.

colleague. In it he was instructed to see that the Pope was informed at once that should bombing of Rome become necessary for military reasons Allied pilots would be given specific orders to prevent bombs from any of their planes from falling on Vatican City. Eden asked [added], however, he had no reason to feel confident Axis would not take opportunity to bomb Vatican at same time and endeavor to charge Allies with the outrage. Through Cardinal Secretary of State this message was delivered to the Pope immediately.

Cardinal Secretary of State appears to regard this message as serving notice that Allies do in fact intend bomb Rome. He has told my British colleague and myself that he has already received assurances from Italians that Axis had no intention of bombing Vatican and he expected same assurances from Germans. Cardinal also told me he had informed Apostolic Delegates Washington and London of contents Eden message and had instructed them to remind State Department and Foreign Office that surest way to spare Vatican would be simply to avoid bombing Rome.

2. On June 26 Cardinal Maglione told me he and the Pope had been discussing possibility that Allied bombardment of Rome might provoke popular uprising against diplomats residing Vatican City whom large sections of Roman population, he pointed out, [regard?] already as "NVRN [*nest?*] of spies". The Holy See, which had never wanted diplomats in Vatican in first place, would not, he said, be in a position to give them adequate protection if such an uprising occurred.

I replied that I felt confident that if in opinion of Allies war could be shortened and perhaps thousands of lives saved by bombing Rome they would not be deterred therefrom out of consideration for safety of a few diplomats.

Cardinal told me that at first opportunity he intended to speak along same lines to my British colleague. If and when he does, Osborne's reply will be that, (1) without knowledge and consent of Italian Government such an uprising could not occur, (2) grave discredit would be reflected on Italian Government and on Holy See by such an uprising, (3) it would serve to allay hesitation of Allies to subject Rome to further and more severe bombing and forewarning should be given other diplomats in Vatican City as well as ourselves so that their wives and children may be sent away in time. The Pope when Osborne saw him June 28 did not raise question and it seems possible it may be dropped after my reply to the Cardinal. My own impression is the Cardinal could not have been speaking from conviction and consequently I suspect he was trying out general pressure on me to see effect it would have. British colleague and I agree it can almost be excluded that popular reaction to Allied bombing of obviously mili-

tary objectives in Rome would take form of spontaneous rioting against diplomats Vatican City.

3. I understand His Holiness although greatly upset by Eden message still refuses in spite of it to believe Allies will bomb Rome. It also appears that he has received intimation from Washington that Rome might be spared if declared "open city" but that he does not think reaction of Italians to such a proposition could or would be favorable.

4. Eden's message, the talk in international press and on radio about bombing Rome, insistence of British press on existence within city of important military objectives together with invitation to declare Rome "open city" are somewhat mystifying. If I could be kept informed of developments whenever practicable I should appreciate it. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/30070a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1943—1 a. m.

1621. For Tittmann. The following message from the President to His Holiness the Pope has been handed to the Apostolic Delegate with the request that it be transmitted to the Vatican with all possible despatch:

"Your Holiness:

"By the time this message reaches Your Holiness a landing in force by American and British troops will have taken place on Italian soil. The soldiers of the United Nations have come to rid Italy of Fascism and all its unhappy symbols, and to drive out the Nazi oppressors who are infesting her soil.

"There is no need for me to reaffirm that respect for religious beliefs and for the free exercise of religious worship is fundamental to our ideas. Churches and religious institutions will, to the extent that it is within our power, be spared the devastations of war during the struggle ahead. Throughout the period of operations the neutral status of Vatican City as well as of the Papal domains throughout Italy will be respected.

"I look forward, as does Your Holiness, to that bright day when the peace of God returns to the world. We are convinced that this will occur only when the forces of evil which now hold vast areas of Europe and Asia enslaved have been utterly destroyed. On that day we will joyfully turn our energies from the grim duties of war to the fruitful tasks of reconstruction. In common with all other nations and forces imbued with the spirit of good will toward men, and with

the help of Almighty God, we will turn our hearts and our minds to the exacting task of building a just and enduring peace on earth.

“(Signed) Roosevelt”

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/30108 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 12, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 2:49 p. m.]

4110. From Tittmann. No. 116, July 7. My 107, June 29.²⁷ The British Minister under instructions has informed Vatican that there is no thought of asking the Italian Government to declare Rome an “open city” in return for Allied assurances that it would not be bombed and that press and radio reports to the contrary are without foundation. Osborne has been further instructed to refrain from holding out any encouragement to the Vatican along these lines.

I assume that we are working closely with the British in this matter. If such be the case it occurs that the information I am sending regarding the instruction received from London by my British colleague and the Vatican’s reaction thereto may already be known in the Department through more direct channels and that my reports may therefore constitute unnecessary duplication. Please let me know if the Department desires me to continue reporting as I have been doing in the past. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII*²⁸

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1943.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In accordance with the instructions which I have just received from the Cardinal Secretary of State, I have the honor to write to you that His Holiness Pope Pius has taken note of the message which the President of the United States of America recently had transmitted to Him through me by radio. His Holiness expresses profound gratitude to the President for having given assurances that respect will be shown to religion, to churches and religious institutions and to the City of the Vatican by the allied authorities and forces, although He is unable to conceal His regret at finding

²⁷ See telegram No. 3921, July 2, 9 p. m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 924.

²⁸ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

in the President's message no indication of an explicit intention to avoid bombing the Eternal City. In this regard, therefore, He presents anew the recommendations which He made on other occasions. Moreover, His Eminence informs me that the Holy Father is sending a letter in response to His Excellency the President, by diplomatic courier.

Will your Excellency be so good as to convey the foregoing message to the President, together with my respectful greetings.

With the assurance [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea

740.0011 European War 1939/30172 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 15, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 8:19 p. m.]

4186. Repeating Tittmann's 117, July 12.

1. The radio on the evening of July 10 carried a summary of what is described as a message from the President to the Pope. The message has been received with much enthusiasm by all United Nations sympathizers here who praise especially its timeliness.

For the moment, however, Vatican appears to be somewhat puzzled and uncomfortable. I am not entirely certain but I suspect that when I saw Monsignor Montini²⁹ this morning Vatican had not yet received officially the full text of the message although the Apostolic Delegate in Washington appears to have telegraphed the gist thereof. Monsignor Montini told me that the Vatican welcomed the President's reaffirmation of our policy of freedom of worship as well as his assurances regarding churches, the Vatican City and the Papal Domains but he seemed to have some hesitation as to the correctness of the procedure in making public a message to the Pope from a chief of state without prior consultation with Holy See. He said that he preferred to withhold further comment until he had been able to study the official text in full and had spoken with the Cardinal Secretary of State who had been absent for weekend and would not be returning until this evening.

2. Monsignor Montini said that the Pope had sent a communication presumably about the bombing of Rome to the President some 2 months ago through the Apostolic Delegate in Washington. The latter had reported that he had received the President's reply which

²⁹ Giovanni Battista Montini, Papal Under Secretary of State.

had been consigned to the State Department on June 17 for transmission to Lisbon by our courier for delivery to the nunciature there. The Holy See had not yet received the reply and so far there was no indication that it had even arrived in Lisbon. Monsignor Montini wondered whether the reply might not perhaps be able to throw some light on the message.

3. It would be helpful if in the future I could receive promptly the text of important public pronouncements having to do with the Holy See by telegram in clear direct to the Vatican City. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/30171 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 15, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 7: 33 p. m.]

4187. From Tittmann. No. 118, July 13. My 107, June 29, paragraph 2.³⁰ My impression is that the Holy See, in spite of the communications recently received from London, is less apprehensive now about bombing of Rome than before.

1. Eden's reply to Msgr. Godfrey³¹ in London regarding Papal appeal not to bomb Rome has been repeated to Vatican by British Minister. This included statement to effect that if it became necessary for military reasons to bomb Rome and the Pope protested such a protest would not be "accepted". [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/30108 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1943—4 p. m.

1670. For Tittmann. Your 116, July 7.³² While the British Embassy informs the Department from time to time of instructions to its Minister to the Holy See, there is no particular liaison which provides complete exchange of information between our two Governments on questions relating to the Vatican. Consequently, you should continue to report information of interest obtained from your British colleague.

Department is replying to your 107, June 29, by airgram.³³

HULL

³⁰ See telegram No. 3921, July 2, 9 p. m. from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 924.

³¹ Msgr. William Godfrey, Apostolic Delegate to Great Britain.

³² See telegram No. 4110, July 12, 2 p. m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 927.

³³ *Infra*.

740.0011 European War 1939/30003 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1943—6 p. m.

A-3. Your 107, June 29. The following messages have been sent by the President to the Pope and the Apostolic Delegate on June 15 [16] and June 29, respectively :

[Here follows letter of June 16, printed on page 919.]

“My dear Archbishop :

The Secretary of State has shown me your letter of June 15 containing a further communication from His Holiness concerning the position of Italy in the present unhappy conflict.

His Holiness again expresses his concern over the fate of the Italian people. Unfortunately, the government of Italy for a period of twenty years has glorified the use of force and has used it ruthlessly against the Greeks, the Ethiopians, the Albanians—to mention only a few of the victims of Fascist aggression. The people of Italy have been made the instrument of this pagan policy. When the Italians are liberated from Fascist domination and are free once more to demonstrate their innate good judgment, they will be given an opportunity to choose the kind of government based on democratic principles that they may wish to establish. It is my intention, and in that I am joined by the people of the United States, that Italy will be restored to nationhood after the defeat of Fascism and will take her place as a respected member of the European family of nations.

I have noted the observations of His Holiness with respect to the possibility of the bombardment of Rome. As in the past careful consideration has been given to the expressions of opinion of His Holiness. I recently reassured His Holiness with respect to the bombing of Vatican City. I trust His Holiness will understand that should the conduct of the war require it, recognized military objectives in and around Rome cannot be ignored. There is no intention to attack or damage non-military objectives or the historic and art treasures of Rome.”

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/30230 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 19, 1943—10 p. m.
[Received July 19—5: 10 p. m.]

4285. From Tittmann. No. 120, July 15. Department's 1621, July 10 to Bern, and my 117, July 12.³⁴

(1) Department's telegram with text of President's message was received here during the afternoon July 13 and the text was delivered immediately to the Cardinal Secretary of State.

³⁴ For telegram No. 117, see telegram No. 4186, July 15, 2 p. m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 928.

(2) Monsignor Montini informed me on that day that the Vatican was very glad to have the official English text from me since the version they had received by telegram from the Apostolic Delegate in Washington was a translation of the message which furthermore had been garbled in transmission.

(3) He would like to be able to report further on the reaction of the Holy See to the message after the Pope and his collaborators have been able to study the official English text. Meanwhile the dominant note in the Secretariat of State regarding the message is perhaps best expressed in Monsignor Montini's words in reply to a question by the Polish Ambassador "the Vatican maintains its serenity".

(4) United Nations representatives here continue to be most enthusiastic. They point out that the Pope although he may be experiencing some uneasiness because of the implications in the first paragraph of the message cannot [but?] be gratified by the obvious intent of the President to show him regard and to strengthen the position of papacy at a critical moment. Some even see in the message a call to the Italian people to rally round the Pope as their spokesman. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/31203

Pope Pius XII to President Roosevelt

Our Secretary of State acknowledged at once by telegram the receipt of Your Excellency's message of the tenth instant, and he expressed Our grateful appreciation of the assurances given that "the neutral status of the Vatican City as well as of the Papal domains throughout Italy will be respected" during the military operations ahead.

The neutrality of the Holy See strikes its roots deep in the very nature of Our apostolic ministry, which places Us above any armed conflict between nations. Yet it is this same God-given mission to safeguard and defend the eternal, spiritual interests of all men redeemed by Christ that makes Us the more sensible of human pain and sorrow. The war continues to multiply these sufferings a hundred-fold for so many millions of peace-loving, innocent men and women that Our paternal heart can find no rest except in constant, increasing efforts to dry the tears of aging mother, of widow and orphaned children, and to hold back by every means at Our disposal the mounting flood that threatens to bury completely beneath its raging waters once fair lands of Europe and Asia.

Moved by this strong, insistent love for humankind We cannot but take this occasion of the message which Your Excellency has kindly addressed to Us to repeat an appeal made by Us more than once in these past few years. It is a prayer that everywhere, as far as humanly possible, the civil populations be spared the horrors of war; that the homes of God's poor be not laid in ashes; that the little ones and youth, a nation's hope, be preserved from all harm—how Our heart bleeds when We hear of helpless children made victims of cruel war; that churches dedicated to the worship of God and monuments that enshrine the memory and masterpieces of human genius be protected from destruction. We repeat this appeal unwilling to yield to any thought of its hopelessness, although almost daily We must continue to deplore the evils against which We pray. And now even in Rome, parent of western civilization and for well nigh two thousand years centre of the Catholic world, to which millions, one may risk the assertion, hundreds of millions of men throughout the world have recently been turning their anxious gaze, We have had to witness the harrowing scene of death leaping from the skies and stalking pitilessly through unsuspecting homes striking down women and children; and in person We have visited and with sorrow contemplated the gaping ruins of that ancient and priceless Papal basilica of St. Laurence, one of the most treasured and loved sanctuaries of Romans, especially close to the heart of all Supreme Pontiffs, and visited with devotion by pilgrims from all countries of the world.

God knows how much We have suffered from the first days of the war for the lot of all those cities that have been exposed to aerial bombardments, especially for those that have been bombed not for a day, but for weeks and months without respite. But since divine Providence has placed Us head over the Catholic Church and Bishop of this city so rich in sacred shrines and hallowed, immortal memories, We feel it Our duty to voice a particular prayer and hope that all may recognize that a city, whose every district, in some districts every street has its irreplaceable monuments of faith or art and Christian culture, cannot be attacked without inflicting an incomparable loss on the patrimony of Religion and Civilization.

Meanwhile the war proceeds at a quickened pace; and as the peoples of the world are being told to prepare themselves for increasingly destructive battles that will drain the life-blood of many thousands of the armed forces and, to Our grief be it said, of civilians, Our own soul makes ready for a more grievous ordeal of sorrow and anxiety. But it is with no diminished hope and confidence that in this very hour We call on God, Our sole stay and comfort, to hasten the dawn of that day when His peace will erect the glorious temple builded of living stones, the nations of the earth, wherein all members of the

vast human family will find tranquility, security in Justice, and freedom and inspiration to worship their Creator and to love their fellowmen. It is the day, as Your Excellency says, longed for by all men of good will. But not all realize that that temple will stand and endure only if set on the foundation of Christian, more than mere human charity, not alloyed with vindictive passion or any elements of hate. Such charity the divine Redeemer of mankind proclaimed as His commandment, illustrated by His example and sealed with His blood. Through it men can once again be united as loved and loving children of their divine Father in heaven.

We avail Ourselves of this occasion to renew Our good wishes, while We pray God to protect Your Person and the people of the United States.

From the VATICAN, July 20, 1943.

PIUS PP. XII

740.0011 European War 1939/30253 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, July 21, 1943.

[Received July 21—3:07 p. m.]

1894. I have received following telegram from Archbishop of Toledo who is Primate of Spain:³⁵

"I beg you to transmit to His Excellency the President of the United States the deep emotion of the Spanish Catholic Episcopacy and people over the bombardment of Rome,³⁶ asking that a repetition which might endanger sacred places and venerated monuments be avoided."

Please inform me promptly what reply I should make.

HAYES

740.0011 European War 1939/30253 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1943—8 p. m.

1582. Your 1894, 21st. You may refer to the message contained in Radio Bulletin 169, July 16 and to the President's statement contained in Radio Bulletin 175, July 23.³⁷ No assurance can be furnished of

³⁵ Archbishop Enrique Pla y Deniel.

³⁶ On July 19 certain military objectives at Rome had been bombed by American planes.

³⁷ Radio Bulletin No. 169 quotes text of the joint message of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the people of Italy on July 16, 1943; for text, see p. 330. The President's statement in Radio Bulletin No. 175 was to the effect that the United States in order to save American and British lives would take what steps were necessary to prevent Axis traffic through Rome from operating.

course that there will be no repetition inasmuch as decision in this regard must depend upon military necessity and upon Italian action. The responsibility clearly rests with Italy and it may be pointed out that the Axis has exhibited no compunction over a period of years about the destruction carried out wantonly by its forces, of Christian shrines in a number of countries. It is not recalled incidentally that the Spanish Episcopacy ever protested against the unchristian acts that have characterized Axis warfare. Our bombing of Rome, made necessary by the Italian Government, was carried out with great care to inflict as little damage as possible on cultural monuments and church property, and it may be remarked that from this as well as from the military standpoint the raid was remarkably successful.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/30402: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 27, 1943—midnight.

[Received July 28—10:57 a. m.]

4512. From Tittmann. No. 127, July 22.

1. Although accurate detailed information regarding results bombing by American airplanes July 19 of railroad yards and other military objectives periphery of Rome is difficult obtain, I have general impression they are excellent.

2. Loss civilian lives and damage done to civilian property (mostly of poorer classes) in neighborhood military objectives is to be regretted but it would appear Italian authorities are largely at fault for not anticipating attack and providing for evacuation beforehand of families living in area. Basilica of San Lorenzo outside the walls (this incidentally is not mentioned as Vatican property in the Lateran Treaty³⁸) which was partially destroyed and Verano Cemetery which was apparently hit lie almost equi-distant between two railway yards connected by main line tracks running alongside cemetery. Furthermore, there happened to be concentration streetcars in square outside Basilica at moment of raid. Other civilian property damaged was in vicinity of obvious military objectives such as Regia Aeronautica and building which houses German headquarters.

3. Fascist propaganda which is extremely violent and abusive is exploiting raid to utmost to impress world opinion and to stiffen Italian resistance. Much is made of the pretense that raid constitutes outrage against Pope and Christianity and usual atrocity story that civilian population machine gunned is going rounds. It has been

³⁸ For text of the Lateran Treaty between Italy and the Holy See, signed February 11, 1929, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxxx, p. 791.

pointed out to me that in reality many Fascists are shedding "crocodile tears". In their hearts they are rejoicing that Papacy has after all proved itself unable protect Rome since loss prestige which they believe Pope will suffer as result will tend to strengthen their own political position with masses. The Germans as well, I understand, have been quick to recognize propaganda possibilities for them.

4. Consternation and confusion among Roman population evident and I have been told that because of relatively large number civilian casualties reported (over 700 so far according to official figures) there is now some popular feeling in Rome against British and Americans in particular and foreigners in general. Loss of cherished illusion that Rome would never be bombed is perhaps contributing factor to this state of mind. There are other reports that here and there among crowds in bombed areas imprecation against regime and monarchy could be heard. On the whole I should say that Romans may be counted on to show comprehension in long run provided bombs are reserved in future for military objectives. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/30403 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 28, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received July 28—11:47 a. m.]

4514. From Tittmann. No. 128, July 23. My 127 July 22.³⁹

1. Both my British colleague and myself have made it a point to avoid visiting Secretariat of State after raid fearing our presence there might be misinterpreted as desire on our part to condole with Vatican. I am therefore unable for moment to report first hand Vatican reaction.

2. I understand there has been and still is considerable indignation among subordinate Vatican officials and for a time menacing rumors were current that Osborne and I would be summoned by Holy Father and presented with solemn protest. Envisaging this possibility we had number arguments ready which we hoped might cause Pope to reconsider his action and which we still may use if necessary. However, it now appears that responsible Vatican officials are taking more realistic view of matter and that no Pontifical protest is contemplated. There seems to be no doubt that these officials are themselves convinced of existence military objectives in Rome and of *bona fides* of our aviators in endeavoring avoid civilian damage.

3. Several hours after all clear had sounded His Holiness in his capacity of Bishop of Rome with Mgr. Montini as sole attendant

³⁹ See *supra*.

proceeded by automobile to devastated quarters city mingled with faithful there discharging his pastoral duties just as any other Bishop would have done. Objective account of Pope's ministrations was given in *Osservatore Romano* next day. July 22 *Osservatore Romano* published letter dated July 20 from Pope to Cardinal Vicar of Rome on subject of bombardment, full English text of which I am told has been cabled to Washington by NCWC news service⁴⁰ correspondent here. This evening's edition of official Vatican organ makes no mention whatever of raid.

4. As regards Pope's letter to Cardinal Vicar which has taken place of threatened protest, I understand from authoritative Vatican source that it is purely Roman and not universal in character. According to custom a letter of this nature [(a)] is written by the Pontiff as Bishop of Rome whenever catastrophe occurs in Rome; (b) it should not be regarded as protest but as Pope's voice raised in defense of sacred character of Rome and security of its citizens; (c) it recalls that Pope has always condemned without discrimination all bombings of civilian populations; (d) it expresses desire of Holy Father that bombing civilian populations, cultural monuments may cease; (e) it states that Pope had hoped find more comprehension on part of belligerents of his effort to protect Rome. This would imply that Italian Government must share responsibility for raid.

5. It is of course regrettable that Pope did not raise his voice clearly in some such manner as this when civilians and cultural monuments of other countries were being bombed by Germans in early stages war and it can be argued that although letter to Cardinal Vicar may not be technically a protest, it now seems rather too pointed. Some feel his visit in person to devastated areas was enough gesture and that to have written letter as well was gratuitous. However, it must be remembered Pius XII is not only Italian but also Roman and that for many months, one of his chief preoccupations has been possibility Rome might be bombed. My own feeling is that on whole he has thus far acted with dignity and measure under trying circumstances.

6. With exception of Brazilian Ambassador⁴¹ and Uruguayan Chargé d'Affaires⁴² both of whom show complete comprehension, my Latin American colleagues appear somewhat upset by raid. I am told that this may be attributed to their Catholic susceptibilities but here I should stress that I have never met a more devout Catholic than the Brazilian Ambassador. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

⁴⁰ Presumably National Catholic Welfare Conference news service.

⁴¹ Hildebrando Pompeu Pinto Accioly.

⁴² G. A. Rey Alvarez.

740.0011 European War 1939/30468 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 31, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 9:01 p. m.]

4615. From Tittmann. No. 130, July 26. My 128, July 23.⁴³

1. I saw Cardinal Secretary of State July 24. I found him entirely reasonable but very unhappy indeed about raid on Rome. I said I regretted loss civilian lives and fact that Basilica San Lorenzo had been damaged but added that it had been necessary for us to prevent war material from being used against our troops in Sicily and that I thought Italian authorities were at fault for not evacuating civilian population from neighborhood such obvious military objectives as freight yards.

2. Referring to Pope's letter to Cardinal Vicar of Rome, he said it should be regarded as a lament, (the Pope he described as "extremely sad") meant for ears of both belligerents and not as protest. I said I understood this but that I thought it unfortunate that letter seemed to lend itself rather readily to Axis propaganda.

3. Cardinal confirmed that Basilica San Lorenzo is Vatican property. It is a pontifical and patriarchal Basilica ranking fifth among such edifices and while not listed in Lateran Treaty it has nevertheless always been regarded by Italian Government as enjoying extraterritoriality. Incidentally it seems to be generally agreed San Lorenzo can be repaired, high altar and other vital parts remaining intact.

4. Cardinal reminded me British had at one time asserted if Athens (with its cultural monuments) or Cairo (with its Moslem shrines) were bombed by Axis, British would immediately retaliate on Rome. Since Axis had refrained from bombing Athens and Cairo he thought Allies or at least British were under indirect obligation not to bomb Rome. I pointed out I had understood British assertions were made *ad hoc* and could not be regarded as general undertaking by Allies not to bomb Rome if military situation required it. It would be helpful if Department could give me some indication of our position in this matter.

5. In conclusion Cardinal said raid had proved thesis always upheld by Holy See, namely, that in spite of all good will in world on part of attacking air forces it is impossible to bomb military objectives in Rome without damaging Vatican property or cultural monuments at same time. I replied I thought answer to this was that military objectives should be removed from city which could not serve God of Peace and God of War at same time.

⁴³ See *supra*.

6. I saw Monsignor Montini this morning and repeated to him that I regretted loss of life and damage to Basilica. He indicated Vatican felt hurt because Osborne and myself had not expressed these sentiments to Cardinal immediately after raid instead of waiting several days. I explained we had refrained from appearing at Secretariat of State earlier in order to avoid embarrassment. I pointed out in support of my explanation that Axis propaganda had in fact precipitately announced that I had been to see him immediately after raid with implication he had protested to me and that Vatican radio had been obliged to broadcast a denial. Axis propaganda I thought would have had even freer play if our presence at Secretariat of State had been noted. Monsignor Montini replied he understood but intimated we might nevertheless have sent a personal word to Holy Father.

7. Vatican radio in its German broadcast on night of July 24 stated in reply to Axis propaganda that:

- (a) Pope had not sent personal protest to President.
- (b) American Chargé d'Affaires had not been summoned to Secretariat of State.
- (c) Pope did not say in his letter to Cardinal Vicar that Basilica San Lorenzo had been completely demolished.
- (d) Pope did not question good faith of our aviators in their efforts to spare Vatican property.

Mgr. Montini said above statements while not official correctly reflected authoritative Vatican thought.

8. It has been represented to me that Pope was desparating [*desperately hoping?*] Rome would not be bombed during war since it would have meant so much to his prestige afterwards if it could be said that city had been spared out of respect for Common Father. There seems to be no doubt but that he is bitterly disappointed, especially since opinion in Vatican appears to be that bombing was not actually necessary to bring about collapse of Italy. I venture to suggest that in view of rather heavy loss of civilian life (I understand well over 1000) the damage to Basilica and Pope's sentiments as described above, consideration be given to appropriateness of sending some word of understanding to Holy Father from Washington. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/31287

The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

No. 492/42

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES: His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, has just informed me that, continuing its previous efforts to

spare Rome the destruction occasioned by aerial bombardment, the Holy See has made representations to the present military government of Italy in order to have Rome recognized as an open city.

Subsequently to these representations, the new Italian government advised the Cardinal Secretary in writing, on July 31st, that it has decided to declare Rome an open city. It has furthermore requested His Eminence to ascertain the essential conditions which will be imposed by the Allies before the aforesaid declaration will be accepted. I shall be honored to transmit the reply of the United States government to this inquiry.

With sentiments of esteem [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁴⁴

LONDON, 4 August 1943.

403. Former Naval Person to President.

1. Your number 342.⁴⁵ War Cabinet have now given most careful consideration to proposals to make Rome an open city on the conditions specified. We are sure that the effect on public opinion here would be most unfortunate. What will the Russians say? It would be taken as a proof that we were going to make a patched-up peace with the King⁴⁶ and Badoglio⁴⁷ and had abandoned the principle of unconditional surrender. It would be taken all over the world and throughout Italy as a success for the new Italian Government who would have rescued Rome from all further danger. No doubt their greatest hope is to have Italy recognized as a neutral area, and Rome would seem to be a first instalment. Considering that Badoglio, according to all our information and especially the most secret, is giving repeated assurances to Germany and Japan that they mean to carry on the war and be faithful to their engagements, and that they are even repeating this kind of statements on the radio, we do not think they should be given the slightest encouragement. Although in the interval it would be convenient to secure the conditions proposed for Rome, this advantage in our opinion is far outweighed by the political misunderstanding which would arise among our own people and the stimulus given to a hostile Italian Government.

⁴⁴ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁴⁵ Not printed. It read: "I think we would be in a difficult position if we were to turn down the plea to make Rome an open city. I have just received from Washington the proposed conditions and given my approval in principle but I think we must be very sure of the inspection if the terms are accepted by Italy." (Copy of this message obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.)

⁴⁶ Victor Emmanuel III of Italy.

⁴⁷ Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government.

2. We hope that in a few months Rome will be in our hands, and we shall need to use its facilities for the northward advance. If Rome has been declared an open city by us, it will be practically impossible for us to take away its status when we want to use it and its communications and airfields. The British Chiefs of Staff say these "open city" conditions, applied to us, would paralyze the whole further campaign; and certainly the Germans would threaten Rome with bombardment if they were altered or broken. We think this a great danger.

3. In these circumstances would it not be better for us to talk the matter over when we meet? In the interest of putting the maximum political and military pressure on the Italian people and Government as well as for strictly military reasons we are most reluctant to interrupt such bombing of the marshalling yards, etc, as Eisenhower⁴⁸ evidently thought desirable; but if you so desire it must be postponed until you and I have met.

4. Your number 343.⁴⁹ On this ground also I am so glad that we are going to meet. Pressure is growing from all quarters in this country, from the Dominions, particularly from Canada, and from several of the United Nations Governments with which we are in touch to "recognize" the French National Committee. Macmillan⁵⁰ reports that he and Murphy⁵¹ are agreed in favouring this and that extreme bitterness and resentment will be caused among all classes of Frenchmen by continued refusal. In accordance with your wishes however we shall take no step pending our meeting to which I am keenly looking forward for reasons far removed from all this tiresome business.

PRIME

740.0011 European War 1939/31288

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani)

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1943.

MY DEAR ARCHBISHOP CICOGNANI: I have received this morning your letter of August 7⁵² in which you inform me that you have just received from His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State a radiogram urgently requesting a definitive reply to his previous message advising of the decision of the new Italian Government to declare Rome an open city. You add that you will be grateful for anything

⁴⁸ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces in North Africa.

⁴⁹ Dated August 3, p. 182.

⁵⁰ Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident, Allied Headquarters in North Africa.

⁵¹ Robert D. Murphy, United States Political Adviser on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa.

⁵² Not printed.

that I can do to expedite the securing of the desired response so that you may be in a position to report such reply to the Cardinal Secretary of State.

As I informed Your Excellency in my letter of August 4,⁵³ the message under reference was immediately submitted by me to the highest authorities of the Government of the United States. The matter is receiving their fullest consideration.

In the meantime I am instructed by the President to state that, in accordance with the accepted principles of international law and of pertinent international agreements, there is nothing to prevent the Italian Government from undertaking unilaterally to declare Rome an open city.

With the assurances [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

740.0011 European War 1939/31290

The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

No. 492/42

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES: Allow me to thank you most kindly for your esteemed communication of August 8th with reference to the proposed declaration of Rome as an open city. The contents of your message were immediately transmitted to the Cardinal Secretary of State. I shall be honored to present any further considerations on this matter which His Eminence may eventually transmit.

Assuring you of my deep appreciation of your prompt reply to my letter of August 7th, and with sentiments of high personal regard [etc.]

A. G. COGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea

740.0011 European War 1939/31058

*The Cardinal Secretary of State (Maglione) to Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII*⁵⁴

[Translation]

No. 5066/43

VATICAN CITY, August 15, 1943.

MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: You are well aware of the extent to which the Holy See endeavored to have the sacred character of Rome re-

⁵³ Not printed.

⁵⁴ Transmitted to the Department by Mr. Tittmann in his despatch No. 229, August 19; received September 9.

spected by both belligerent parties and to have the Eternal City spared from air attacks.

It is not necessary to repeat the arguments advanced so many times both orally and in writing, namely: that Rome is the city sacred to Catholicism and the seat of the Supreme Pontiff and of His diocese; that the soil of Rome—aside from being rich in historical monuments unique in the world—is as though covered with sacred temples, renowned basilicas, precious relics, pontifical or international institutions dependent upon the Holy See.

Unfortunately, as you are aware, these reasons, however serious and convincing in themselves, were left unheeded and one had thus the painful surprise of seeing those very Nations which had acquired in the eyes of civilization the merit of wishing to see Athens and Cairo spared from air bombardment, take the initiative in bombing Rome in whose favor militate certainly no less pressing reasons than those adduced for the two above named cities.

The first raid on July 19 caused—as is known—very considerable damage to the patriarchal Basilica of San Lorenzo fuori le Mura; the second raid, which occurred on the 13th instant, destroyed one church and damaged another; nor is it difficult to foresee that by continuing in this manner the danger of very serious and irreparable ruin will be unavoidable.

As you well know, as a result of the prompt intercession of the Holy See, the new Italian Government had decided to declare and to render Rome an open city and to this end suitable negotiations were begun with the Allied Governments through the agency of the Holy See. While the reply from His British Majesty's Government is still awaited, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United States, in a Note dated August 8, communicated to the Apostolic Delegate in Washington for the information of the Holy See, that the question had been taken under the most earnest consideration by the highest United States authorities, and he concluded by stating that in the meantime he was authorized by the President of the Republic to make known that in conformity with the principles of international law and international treaties, nothing prevented the Italian Government from proceeding unilaterally to declare Rome an open city. In view of the foregoing, you are in a position to judge whether repetitions of the bombings of the Eternal City are opportune while these negotiations are pending. If it should be desired to justify them on grounds of so-called war exigencies, it would be easy to rejoin first of all that it would appear that the consideration of military objectives (which do not seem to be of great importance in Rome) should not prevail over the very serious superior reasons of religion, civilization and humanity so often reiterated by the Holy

See; and secondly that the repetition of deadly bombardments over Rome, and over so many other Italian cities with even greater intensity—because of the exasperation it is causing among the masses—far from shortening the war is keeping peace away, thus rendering impossible the friendly understanding and collaboration among the peoples which alone can be a guaranty of common tranquillity.

You have undoubtedly noted that once again on this occasion the Holy Father made haste, as Bishop of Rome, to carry, although with an anguished heart, comfort by his presence and by his word among his diocesans. And you will permit me to lament the fact that he, who during the present tremendous conflict has been and is the merciful consoler in every kind of suffering (without distinction of nationality or religious faith) could not have been spared the pain of witnessing his diocese and his children that are nearest to him so grievously tried.

As you well know, last night the Italian Government—to which I felt it my duty to communicate the reply of the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs of the United States—made public the fact that it declares Rome, the center of Catholicism, an open city and that the “necessary measures are being taken, according to international law”. Since it appears that matters are now well advanced, the Holy See would be grateful if further negotiations could take place with the greatest possible speed in order that the desired agreement on so serious a question may be reached as soon as possible. The Holy See does not doubt that in the meantime any sort of fresh bombardment of Rome will be avoided.

I take this opportunity [etc.]

L. CARDINAL MAGLIONE

740.0011 European War 1939/31291

The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

No. 492/42

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES: Immediately upon receipt of your esteemed communication of August 8th, informing me of the reply of the United States Government to the request for information on the conditions for declaring Rome an open city, I advised the Cardinal Secretary of State of the contents of your message.

His Eminence now advises me of notification from the Italian Government, as of Saturday evening, August 14th, that Rome has been officially declared an open city, and that the government authorities are taking the necessary measures, conformably to the provisions of international law, to make this declaration effective.

The Holy See would be grateful if further discussion of the conditions to be imposed by the Allies were expedited as promptly as possible.

In the meantime, it has every confidence that the Eternal City will not be subjected to further bombardment.

Assuring you [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea

740.0011 European War 1939/31032

The Apostolic Delegation at Washington to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 244/43

In the light of possible imminent developments in the Italian war situation, the Holy See cannot but be preoccupied with the grave consequences of such developments on the Church at large. These preoccupations are greatly heightened by the determination, public expressed, that through wholesale bloodshed and destruction, even if this were to lead eventually to national chaos and anarchy, Italy must be forced out of the war.

Were these sad possibilities to be realized, the restricted territorial extent of Vatican City could not possibly prevent it from feeling most acutely the grave consequences of such a military campaign. Vatican City would inevitably become involved in, and perhaps even engulfed by, any serious disorders which might arise.

The noble and spiritual ideals which have assertedly been embodied in the Allied cause would appear to dictate that every precaution should be taken and every measure employed which might safeguard spiritual values and enhance their worth in the eyes of all men. On this point the Holy See recalls with satisfaction and hope the letter of the President of the United States to His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, on July 9, 1943.⁵⁵ It cannot be denied that the religious sensibilities of millions of Catholics throughout the world would be sorely wounded by injuries, although unintended, which might be inflicted on Vatican City and, consequently, on the Holy See.

Were the Vatican to be cut off or hindered in its communication with the outside world, the nations at large would thus be deprived of one of their most potent sources of inspiration and guidance. Catholics in particular would suffer greatly from lack of contact with their Spiritual Head, and this would most assuredly make itself felt in other fields of activity.

⁵⁵ See telegram No. 1621, July 10, 1 a. m., to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 926.

An additional important consideration is found in the fact that at the present time the Vatican City serves as headquarters for all the resident diplomatic representatives of the Allied nations accredited to the Holy See.

For these reasons, His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State has asked that every precaution be taken to avoid creating a situation of chaos in Italy, which would make it most difficult, not to say impossible, for the Holy See to continue as the center of government for the Catholic Church.

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1943.

740.0011 European War 1939/31032

The Apostolic Delegation at Washington to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 244/43

The Holy See respectfully offers the following considerations with reference to the avowed intention of the Allies to make Italy feel unrestrainedly the full brunt of the war in every quarter:

1) Slaughter and destruction, especially when carried out on a large scale, contribute little or nothing to the establishment of genuine peace. These elements of warfare irritate and embitter the civilian population, with the effect of inciting the populace to blind hate against those who punish it by depriving it of everything which it holds most dear.

2) The destruction and damaging of churches, charitable institutions, and artistic monuments, even when this destruction is not intended, as well as the ruining of civilian homes etc., are doing much harm to the Allied cause. They are actually diminishing the prestige of the United States; which has always been regarded by the Italian people as a nation nurturing great respect for religion, art, and culture. If, unfortunately, at the present time, the passion for war beclouds the clear vision of good judgment, it cannot be denied that, years hence, the American people itself will be the first to deplore and condemn such actions.

3) A consideration of paramount importance is to be found in the favorable reaction of such a war policy in the interests of Communism. Under the influence of the bitterness engendered by the dread results of war, the people fall an easy prey to Communism, which is ever ready to avail itself of all means afforded by any event of public importance, especially by those of a calamitous nature.

Communism is already making noteworthy progress as the result of war.

The recent demonstrations accompanying the fall of Fascism are sufficient evidence that the Communists are well organized in Italy, and that *they have at their disposal both financial means and arms.*

Information reaching the Holy See also shows that Communism is making continual progress also in Germany.

These facts are a clear warning of the grave peril that Europe will find itself overrun with Communism immediately on the cessation of hostilities.

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1943.

740.0011 European War 1939/31293

The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 492/42

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES: Subsequently to my communication of some days ago with reference to the declaration of Rome as an open city, I am instructed by the Cardinal Secretary of State to inquire further if an official reply will be forthcoming from the United States government, in reply to the previous communication from the Holy See embodying the decision of the new Italian government.

His Eminence advises me explicitly that the present government of Italy is animated with serious intentions in effecting the changes required for the recognition of Rome as an open city, conformably to the provisions of international law.

I shall be most grateful if you can put me in a position to make to His Eminence the desired response, for which the Holy See is anxiously waiting.

With sentiments of esteem [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea

740.0011 European War 1939/31032

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1943.

The Apostolic Delegate called to see me this morning at his request in order to discuss the two communications from him which I received last night, copies of which are attached herewith.⁵⁶

I told the Delegate that the memorandum from the Holy See which contained the expression of the Vatican's opinion with regard to the undesirability of continued bombing by the United Nations of Italian

⁵⁶ The two documents dated August 20, *supra*.

territory had been immediately communicated by myself to the President for his information.

I stated that with regard to the other communication from the Delegate in which a further request was made for some reply to the communication from the Vatican regarding the declaration by the Italian Government that Rome was an open city, I could merely state that the matter was still under immediate consideration by the highest authorities of this Government and that as soon as a reply could be given the Delegate would, of course, be informed.

The Delegate spoke at considerable length about the present state of mind of the Italian people and of his fear that their traditional friendship and sympathy for the American people might be prejudiced if attacks from the air upon Italian cities were continued. I told him that of course the answer to this question lay within the power of the Italian Government and that the terms offered the Italian Government were unconditional surrender which involved an honorable capitulation. As soon as the Italian Government found its way or as soon as the Italian people were able to persuade the Italian Government to find the way to the acceptance of these terms, the conditions to which the Archbishop referred would of course cease. Archbishop Cicognani said that of course he realized this and that he believed there was a unanimous desire on the part of the Italian people for immediate peace and that he had interpreted the radio address of the King of Italy yesterday as implying that the Italian Government was now ready to accept the terms offered. He concluded by saying that both the Holy Father and he himself were available at any time if they could be of any service in the present tragic situation.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 European War 1939/31665

The Apostolic Delegation at Washington to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The Apostolic Delegate has been informed by the Cardinal Secretary of State that the Italian government has taken the following steps to make effective its declaration of August 14, 1943, on the status of Rome as an open city :

- 1) The defense installations of the city of Rome have been dismantled.
- 2) Orders have been issued that anti-aircraft batteries are not to operate, nor are fighter planes to go into action over the city of Rome.
- 3) The Italian and German High Commands are leaving the city, and their complete removal will be effected within a short time.
- 4) Active troops are being withdrawn and there will remain in the city only a garrison of Italian troops charged with the main-

tenance of public order. This garrison of troops will be equipped with arms adequate for the purpose of their presence.

5) The railway system of Rome will in the future not be used for purposes of military transportation, for the marshaling of trains, or for loading or unloading troops etc. The railway system of Rome will be reduced to a mere transit line, and its facilities will not be employed for the making up or breaking up of military trains. The railroad yards of Rome will not be made a depot for military trains. For all purposes of military transportation, the railway system in and around the zone affected by the declaration of Rome as an open city will be put into the status of a simple line of passage.

6) All necessary steps are being taken to effect the transfer beyond the city limits of all military establishments, and of all factories used for the production of arms and munitions.

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1943.

740.0011 European War 1939/31665

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to
President Roosevelt*

[WASHINGTON,] October 7, 1943.

We have been informed by the British Embassy that the question of recognizing the "open city" status of Rome is again under active consideration.

We believe that a military campaign for the possession of Rome, with the unavoidable destruction by bombing and shelling which would be required to dislodge the Germans, would affect adversely public opinion, not only in this country, but in Christian countries throughout the world, particularly Central and South America. Aside from the religious significance of the city, the historical importance of its monuments to the Western World make it highly desirable that we avoid the responsibility for destroying large sections of Rome while liberating it from the Germans. Consequently, we believe that serious consideration should be given to this public attitude on the subject whenever it may arise for decision.

STETTINIUS

740.0011 European War 1939/31621

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Secretary
of State*

No. 244/43

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. HULL: The Cardinal Secretary of State has just informed me that he has presented to the representatives of Germany,

Great Britain, and the United States a *note verbale* of the following tenor:

In the various phases of this present sad world conflict, the Holy See has had frequent occasions to intervene with the belligerent powers on behalf of Rome, not only for its immense artistic and historical value, but especially because it is the See of the Sovereign Pontiff and the center of the Catholic world. Since at the present time the war appears to be coming nearer to Rome, which has already been declared an open city by the Italian government, the Holy See feels itself obliged to renew to the belligerent powers the most lively and insistent recommendation that every effort be exerted to avoid making Rome a battlefield. Such a step, while inflicting incalculable loss on human and Christian civilization, would draw forth, both now and in future, the reproach of all right-minded men.

His Eminence instructs me to bring immediately to the attention of the Government of the United States the contents of this *note verbale*.

With sentiments of esteem [etc.]

A. G. CIOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea

740.0011 European War 1939/31665

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to
President Roosevelt*

[WASHINGTON,] October 16, 1943.

With reference to your memorandum of October 13, 1943,⁵⁷ the present status of the question of Rome as an open city is as follows:

1. My memorandum of October 7 to you set forth the political considerations involved in the almost certain destruction of large areas of Rome if the Germans make us fight for its possession. A copy of my memorandum is attached⁵⁸ for reference.

2. A telegram from General Eisenhower, dated October 1, containing his views⁵⁹ for transmission to you has been received by the War Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, it is assumed, has been brought to your attention.

Do you consider that, in the light of General Eisenhower's views, we could inform the Vatican of our willingness to recognize Rome as an open city within the conditions established by the Italian Government in August which granted transit privileges through Rome to military personnel and matériel? Our recognition of an "open city"

⁵⁷ Not printed.

⁵⁸ *Ante*, p. 948.

⁵⁹ Telegram not found in Department files; for Eisenhower's views, see *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. II (by W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate), pp. 463-465.

status would, of course, depend upon German willingness to accord recognition under similar circumstances.

A copy of the Apostolic Delegate's memorandum of August 26 [25], transmitting the steps contemplated at that time by the Italian Government to implement its unilateral declaration of August 14, is also enclosed⁶⁰ for reference. You will note that the Italian proposals provide, as above stated, for a transit line through Rome for all purposes of military transportation.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

740.0011 European War 1939/31711 : Telegram

*Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII, to the Secretary of State*⁶¹

[VATICAN CITY,] October 19, 1943.

No. 198. I had audience today with the Pope whom I had not seen since last year. He appeared to me serene and in good health but, of course, anxious with regard to the turn Military developments may take in connection with Rome. He said he hoped that the Allied troops might find it possible to circumvent Rome and thus oblige the Germans to retire without subjecting the city to havoc due to combat. I reminded him that the President had said that the Germans alone would be responsible for any destruction wrought in Rome. The Pope did not bring up the subject of "Open City".

2. The Pope also seemed preoccupied that, in the absence of sufficient police protection, irresponsible elements (he said it is known that little Communist bands are stationed in the environs of Rome at the present time) might commit violence in the City during the period between the German evacuation and arrival of the Allies. He also expressed apprehension regarding the food situation. He hoped that these two points would be given consideration by the Allies and necessary measures taken by them in time. The Pope said that so far the Germans had respected the Vatican City and the Holy See's property in Rome and that the German General Officer Commanding in Rome seemed well-disposed towards the Vatican. He added, however, that he was feeling restrictions due to the "abnormal situation".

The Pope asked me to convey his greetings to the President and to Mr. Myron Taylor.

⁶⁰ *Ante*, p. 947.

⁶¹ This message was transmitted to the Department by the British representative at the Vatican through the British Embassy in Washington; received in the Department October 25.

740.0011 European War 1939/31770 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, October 29, 1943—midnight.
[Received October 30—2: 30 a. m.]

6785. This is Tittmann's 202, October 25.

1. On September 10 the Dean of Diplomatic Corps, who is the Brazilian Ambassador,⁶² was called to Secretariat of State and told that with imminent occupation of Rome by Germans situation of Vatican City had become "serious" and it was intimated to him precautionary measures should be taken by the several Diplomatic Missions resident in Vatican City to prevent their archives from falling into hands of Germans. This information was immediately conveyed by Brazilian Ambassador to his colleagues. At a meeting of Diplomatic Corps on September 14 the intimation from Vatican was confirmed and it was agreed by all to take precautionary measures suggested. At same meeting it was unanimously decided that if the Pope should be forcibly removed by Germans not only would the diplomats protest against the violence perpetrated but would also ask that they be allowed to accompany His Holiness. This latter decision was conveyed in writing by Brazilian Ambassador to Cardinal Secretary of State on September 17 and on September 29 a formal note of appreciation was received. It is known that the Pope has resolved not to move from Vatican unless physically forced to do so.

2. The anxiety displayed by Holy See with regard to possible violation of Vatican City neutrality during first days of German occupation of Rome would appear to have been progressively allayed to such an extent that at present moment atmosphere in Vatican can be described as optimistic. Vatican seems to be convinced Germans realize they would have more to lose by removing the Pope than by allowing him to remain here even though he may fall eventually under exclusive influence of Allies and to feel that for time being only danger is that a sudden outburst of anger against the church on part of Hitler himself might overrule the wiser counsels of those who have the long-term interests of Germany at heart. The consideration with which Germans have so far treated Holy See has contributed to creation of this sensation of relative security.

On other hand there are others, but apparently a minority, who persist in believing that Germans cannot afford to allow the Pope and the power of Catholic Church to escape from under their influence and that in the end they will take action accordingly. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

⁶² Hildebrando Pompeu Pinto Accioly.

[For press release of November 9, 1943, regarding dropping of bombs on Vatican territory from an unidentified airplane, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 13, 1943, page 319.]

740.0011 European War 1939/32296 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 10, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 6:51 p. m.]

7736. (This is Tittmann's 228, December 1.) I believe that it is correct to say that the Vatican now looks upon the idea of Rome as an open city as purely a military question and is not interested in any way in the various projects of a political nature that have been advanced recently in the Rome press which is German controlled. According to the Vatican, therefore, open city would appear to mean simply this:

(1) Steps should be taken to prevent Rome from becoming a battlefield either through agreement between belligerent parties or through Allied strategy. In practice this would mean that before the arrival of the Allies the Germans would withdraw.

(2) During the interval between the withdrawal of the Germans and the arrival of the Allies the latter would provide police protection for the city.

(3) The Allies should provide food supplies for the population during the interval and thereafter.

On a number of occasions I have pointed out to the Vatican that it is our desire if possible to prevent destruction in Rome. I understood that Holy See has been officially assured by the Germans that this is equally their desire. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 EW 1939/32556½ : Telegram

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces in North Africa (Eisenhower)

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1943.

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, Fan 311, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The following views of the governments of the United States and United Kingdom as to the treatment to be accorded the Vatican City State and Vatican property are transmitted for your guidance:

A. The Vatican City State should be treated as an independent neutral state entitled to the normal rights of a neutral.

B. The Allied forces must take every precaution to avoid violating the territory of the Vatican City as defined in article 3 A.D. Annex 1 of the Lateran Treaty of the February 11th, 1929.

C. Allied troops must also avoid a number of other churches and buildings in Rome, which are situated outside the boundaries of the Vatican City but are the property of the Holy See. These properties are defined in Articles 13-16 and Annexes 2 and 3 of the Lateran Treaty. They are not part of the Vatican City and, strictly speaking, have no international status as neutral territory. But under the Lateran Treaty these properties are entitled to full diplomatic immunity and must therefore be treated in exactly the same way as the Vatican City itself, after the assault upon Rome. While every precaution to avoid violating the *territory* of the Vatican City during the assault upon Rome must be taken, the diplomatic immunity of Vatican properties located in Rome should not be allowed to interfere with military operations, artillery fire, bombing, et cetera, during the assault. A complete list of these properties will be transmitted to you.

D. In order to insure that the neutrality of the Vatican City State is respected pickets should be posted at its boundaries by agreement with the Vatican authorities. Pickets should also be posted at the entrances to all the buildings described in C above and all troops should be warned that these properties, although lying outside the Vatican City, belong to the Holy See and are to be accorded the same immunities as the Vatican City itself after the period of assault. Arrangements should also be made with the Vatican for these buildings to be clearly marked so that they are easily identifiable by Allied troops.

**EXTENSION TO NORTH AFRICA OF THE VATICAN INFORMATION
SERVICE REGARDING PRISONERS OF WAR**

740.00114 European War 1939/3136 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers
(Wiley)*

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1943—6 p.m.

372. For Murphy.⁶³ There follow the pertinent portions of telegram no. 28, February 16, from Tittmann⁶⁴ at the Vatican which was repeated to the Department by Bern as its 1159, February 19, 1 p. m.

⁶³ Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa.

⁶⁴ Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII.

"I understand from Monsignor Montini⁶⁵ that Mr. Myron Taylor and Archbishop Spellman⁶⁶ have been asked by Holy See to support if possible and expedite its proposal to organize with the assistance of the White Fathers a welfare information service for prisoners of war and civilians in French North Africa similar to services which the Holy See has established elsewhere. According to the proposal Holy See would nominate as its correspondent in French North Africa a White Father of Maison Carrée to be designated by the superior general of the society. The correspondent thus selected would organize the service in a manner similar to that already in operation elsewhere by the other representatives of the Holy See and arrange for the compilation of the messages in conformity with the requirements of the local military authorities. Such messages would be duly submitted for censorship and would be forwarded to the Vatican by the fastest route.

Messages from the Vatican would be transmitted in the same way and would be subject to the same conditions of censorship.

I would like to submit the following considerations in favor of acceptance by us of this or a similar proposal.

(1) It would be good propaganda. In thus manifesting our good will to cooperate with the Vatican in a charitable work that is particularly dear to the Holy Father himself we would enhance our reputation especially in Catholic countries for humane dealing.

(2) It would mean reciprocation of services rendered here on behalf of American prisoners of war and internees. The information office seems to be doing a good job in this respect and I understand that in many instances the first news of American prisoners of war in Italian hands received by their families came through Vatican channels.

(3) It would clear up any doubts that may exist at the Vatican regarding the attitude of the Red Cross. Whether well founded or not the conviction is prevalent in Vatican circles that the difficulties encountered so far by the information office in establishing channels in certain areas for the exchange of welfare information must be laid to fear of competition on the part of the Red Cross. In fact it has been persuaded that the time may come when the Holy Father will be obliged to explain openly to anxious families that he is unable to obtain the information desired owing to the attitude of the Red Cross toward his charity.

The Holy See of course has my note suggesting that the subject be taken up with International Red Cross Committee the text of which was transmitted with Department's telegram No. 405, February 10, 1942, to Bern.⁶⁷ I am not certain what efforts if any were made in accordance with this suggestion but apparently the International Committee is unable to furnish the information office with duplicates of their lists."

The Department's telegram no. 405 of February 10 to Bern transmitted with background comment the text of a note to be presented

⁶⁵ Giovanni Battista Montini, Papal Under Secretary of State.

⁶⁶ Francis J. Spellman, Archbishop of New York.

⁶⁷ Not printed.

by Tittmann at the Vatican stating that the American Government had established in accordance with Article 77 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention⁶⁸ in the Office of the Provost Marshal General, United States War Department, a Prisoners of War Information Bureau, with a section for civilian internees, which exchanges information with corresponding bureaus in enemy countries through the Protecting Powers and through the central information agency for prisoners of war established by the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva in accordance with Article 79 of the Convention. The Department suggested in this note and in its accompanying comment upon it that the Vatican should not attempt to duplicate the activity undertaken officially under the Convention by the Protecting Powers and the International Committee of the Red Cross but should endeavor to supplement this activity particularly with reference to civilians and refugees in belligerent territories who do not come directly within the scope of the information bureau activities provided for in the Geneva Convention. It was further suggested that the Vatican discuss with the International Red Cross Committee the possibility of cooperation by the Vatican and Red Cross Committees' information bureaus. The American Minister in Bern⁶⁹ and Tittmann were requested to support any discussions that might be initiated looking toward the organization of such cooperation.

The Department is inclined to the view that the lists of prisoners of war and civilians in an analogous status held by the American authorities in North Africa should continue to be transmitted by these authorities to the Prisoners of War Information Bureau in our War Department and forwarded as provided in the Geneva Convention through the International Red Cross Committee Information Bureau at Geneva and the Protecting Powers to the information bureaus in the appropriate enemy countries, but it perceives no objection to the extension to North Africa of the Vatican information service primarily with a view to the exchange of information regarding persons not in the hands of the American authorities. In view, however, of the matters of high policy involved the Department desires, before coming to a decision with regard to this question, to receive the opinion of the appropriate military authorities in North Africa and requests that you bring this matter to the personal attention of Generals Eisenhower⁷⁰ and Giraud⁷¹ and ascertain their opinions with regard to it. Please forward the substance of these opinions to the Department by telegraph with your comment.

⁶⁸ Signed July 27, 1929, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. 1, pp. 336, 354.

⁶⁹ Leland Harrison.

⁷⁰ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa.

⁷¹ Gen. Henri Giraud, High Commissioner in French North Africa.

Pending receipt of your reply, the Department has instructed Tittmann to inform the Vatican that this matter is receiving careful consideration and that a reply will be sent to him as soon as the responsible agencies have been consulted.

WELLES

740.00114 European War 1939/3352 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, April 8, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received April 9—1:23 a. m.]

587. From Murphy. Your 372, March 2, 6 p. m. I have discussed with General Eisenhower and General Giraud the question of the extension to North Africa of Vatican information service primarily with a view to the exchange of information regarding persons not in the hands of the American authorities. Both authorize me to state that they are fully in accord with the suggestion and will welcome the inauguration in this theatre of the proposed information service.

During his stay in Algiers I also discussed this matter at considerable length with Archbishop Spellman and with other local church and civil authorities. I am confident that the service will be well received and will perform a necessary and useful function. [Murphy.]

WILEY

740.00114 European War 1939/3513 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 5, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received May 5—1:47 p. m.]

792. From Murphy. Reference my 587, April 8, 10 p. m. Supplementing General Giraud's oral approval of the Vatican information service a note has now been received from the High Command stating that Monseigneur Boyermas, unofficial representative of the French Red Cross in Madrid, has been requested to convey the High Command's approval of the proposed service to the Vatican through the medium of the Papal Nuncio at Madrid. [Murphy.]

WILEY

740.00114 European War 1939/3614 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, May 26, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

968. From Murphy. Reference Department's 372, March 2, 6 p. m., my 578 [587], April 8, 10 p. m. and 792, May 5, 9 p. m. Archbishop

Spellman telegraphed me from Istanbul May 15 that the Vatican informs him difficulties continue concerning reception of information about prisoners of war taken in Algeria and Tunisia. He proposed that General Eisenhower furnish carbon copies of lists given to Red Cross, to the Apostolic Delegate at Cairo asking British to favor him use of telegraph facilities from there to Vatican. Archbishop added that Vatican continues to telegraph the names of American prisoners in Italy and Japan.

I discussed the matter with General Eisenhower who recalled that the War Department has declined to permit him to release names to anyone, requiring that all transmissions of names of prisoners be made by Washington in the manner provided by the Geneva Convention.

The Archbishop of Tunis has submitted to the Army here for transmission through the Vatican a list of names which he has gathered of prisoners of war taken by Allied forces in Tunisia together with a number of personal messages from prisoners on Vatican forms. General Eisenhower is submitting to the War Department the question of whether these properly can be transmitted except through Washington and after the official lists of prisoners have been transmitted under the Geneva Convention procedure.

These two incidents appear to make desirable early decision on the whole question of operation of the Vatican Information Service in this area, defining precisely the scope of its activity.

Pending your advice I am merely acknowledging Archbishop Spellman's telegram and informing him the matter is being referred to Washington for consideration. [Murphy.]

WILEY

740.00114 European War 1939/3614: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1943—8 p. m.

1122. Your 968, May 26, 9 a. m. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have decided that the Vatican Information Service may extend its activities to and function in North Africa subject to the following conditions:

"1. That the activities of the Vatican Information Service shall apply only to persons not in the hands of American authorities and shall be confined exclusively to persons who do not come within the scope of activities of the Information Bureau, established in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, in the Office of the Provost Marshal General of the United States Army at Washington.

2. That the Vatican Information Service in North Africa shall operate under such regulations as may be established by the American authorities in that area.

3. That all communications handled by the Vatican Information Service to and from the North African Area shall be subject to censorship by the American authorities."

The Department understands that appropriate instructions have been sent to General Eisenhower by the War Department.

HULL

740.00114 European War 1939/4107

The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

No. 53/43

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES: In further reference to your esteemed communication of June 12th,⁷² regarding the functioning of the Vatican Information Service in North Africa, I have been directed to express the gratitude of the Holy See and of the Holy Father personally for the concessions made for the establishment of the Vatican Service in that area.

His Holiness is nonetheless reluctant to believe that the plan outlined represents the maximum facilitations that the United States Government can permit, since a fuller development of such humanitarian services would be more conformable to the known charitable attitude of the United States Government and to its repeated manifestations of friendly deference to the desires of the Holy See. A broader development of the Information Service in the North African territory would redound to the moral advantage of the United States itself and would undoubtedly produce a beneficial effect among the thousands of persons who would be assisted and comforted by further facilitations granted to the Holy See in this work.

It is pointed out that up to the present the lists of prisoners of war in American hands have been reaching Europe only after considerable delay, and this retarding of such vital news has increased the anxiety of thousands of families, and has already been detrimental to the prestige of the United States. This delay undoubtedly arises from the fact that the lists are compiled and transmitted only after the arrival of the prisoners in their respective American prison camps. If some method were devised for communication immediately after capture the humanitarian purposes of such service would seem better served.

His Eminence Cardinal Maglione⁷³ has taken due cognizance of the fact that the United States Government, in conformity to Article 77 of the Geneva Convention transmits to the protecting Powers and

⁷² Not printed.

⁷³ Luigi Cardinal Maglione, Papal Secretary of State.

to the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva, lists of enemy prisoners of war. He is obliged to note that according to Article 78 of the same Convention other organizations and associations are permitted to function, so that the work determined in Article 77 would not seem to be the exclusive prerogative or task of only one or the other of such organizations.

On the other hand the Holy See, in faithful fulfilment of its charitable and religious purposes, feels that it must use its every force to correspond to the innumerable requests that reach it directly from the families of victims of the war. As for the strain on the telegraphic facilities of the United States, you are no doubt aware that Mackay Radio maintains direct contact with Vatican City, and we are prepared to file our messages with the broadcasting station directly, rather than through local telegraphic offices, thus obviating the need for any overland messages which might burden the country's telegraphic network.

The Holy See has been successful both with the Italian Government and with the Japanese Government in obtaining the lists of American prisoners, and many of these have been sent out from the Vatican by radiogram. I know from the experience of this office that they have brought untold consolation to many families and relatives.

For the effecting of such service the Holy See had to overcome various obstacles and it now fervently hopes that the Government of the United States will reconsider its previously expressed viewpoint and permit the sending of lists of prisoners by radiogram. In this of course the Holy See is prepared to submit all such messages to full requirements of United States censorship.

In communicating the foregoing, I wish to express my gratitude for the kind consideration and attention which you have given to this matter in the past.

With the assurances [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI

740.00114 European War 1939/4378

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to your letter to the Secretary of War, 25 August,⁷⁴ concerning a revision of the policy now governing the functions of the Vatican Information Service in North Africa.

⁷⁴ Not printed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reconsidered the decision rendered on 30 May 1943⁷⁵ on this subject and agree that some revision of the existing policies is desirable. Accordingly, the present policy is revised in order that the Vatican Information Service may extend its activities to Italian prisoners of war in the hands of American authorities. General Eisenhower is being informed that he is authorized to furnish the Vatican Information Service with rosters of prisoners of war on a delayed basis, and to permit the transmission of welfare messages for Italian prisoners of war and persons of equivalent status in American custody. The term "delayed basis" will be interpreted to mean that lists of prisoners of war will not be delivered to the Vatican Information Service until sufficient time has elapsed after delivery of lists to the Protecting Power and International Red Cross to enable the Protecting Power and International Red Cross to transmit same to the proper enemy agencies and the latter has had sufficient time to inform the next of kin of the prisoner.

The means of communication by which the Vatican Information Service maintains contact between the Vatican and North Africa is an administrative matter and must remain subject to the decisions of the Theater Commander.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Admiral, U.S. Navy

Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

740.00114 European War 1939/4194

The Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani)

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1943.

MY DEAR ARCHBISHOP CICOGNANI: I refer to Secretary Hull's letter of August 26⁷⁶ and previous correspondence concerning the functioning of the Vatican Information Service in North Africa and Sicily, and the opening of channels of correspondence between bishops of Sicily and the Holy See.

We have now received the decision of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to these questions, and am happy to inform you that they have re-considered their decision of May 30, 1943. They have consequently revised to a certain extent the conditions affecting

⁷⁵ See telegram No. 1122, June 12, 8 p. m., to the Consul General at Algiers, p. 957.

⁷⁶ Not printed.

the functioning of the Vatican Information Service in North Africa which were communicated to you in June last. The Service may now extend its activities to Italian prisoners of war in the hands of American authorities. General Eisenhower has been informed that he is authorized to furnish the Vatican Information Service with rosters of prisoners of war on a delayed basis, and to permit the transmission of welfare messages for Italian prisoners of war and persons of equivalent status in American custody.

With respect to the methods of communication between the Vatican Information Service and Vatican City, and the bishops in Sicily and the Holy See, they are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be an administrative matter which, subject to the exigencies of war, must be determined by the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean theater. The Department has been informed that General Eisenhower concurs that postal and telegraphic communication may be maintained between the Holy See and the Cardinal Archbishop in Sicily via Algiers. Direct radio communication, however, cannot be permitted at this time. Family news service and messages from prisoners of war under the auspices of the Vatican Information Service are now being addressed by the Archbishop of Palermo to the Holy See via Algiers. Details of the methods of communication which are permitted by the Commander-in-Chief, and which may vary from time to time with the developments of the campaign in Italy, can be worked out in North Africa and Sicily between the representatives of the Holy See and representatives of General Eisenhower.

Yours very sincerely,

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

YUGOSLAVIA

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING DISUNITY AMONG YUGOSLAV RESISTANCE FORCES¹

860H.01/436

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to
the Secretary of State*

No. 38

LONDON, January 2, 1942 [1943].

[Received January 19.]

SIR: Supplementing my despatch Yugoslav Series No. 37, December 28, 1942,² I have the honor to report that in the background of the present Cabinet crisis there has been an increasing conflict of opinion over the past few months regarding the Government's attitude towards civil strife in Yugoslavia. The Croat, Slovene, and Serb-Democratic elements hold that the Government should have at the outset given General Mihailović³ a clear political directive: the necessity of consolidating the forces of resistance. Furthermore, they believe, and claim they have reason to believe, that Foreign Minister Nincić, as the spokesman for the Pan-Serb element, sent the General instructions in April and again in September of the current year, through Ankara, to pursue the Pan-Serb line of policy. Although Nincić stoutly denies this, one of my informants (Croat) states that Nincić recently, when taken unawares by an accusation on this score, attempted to defend any action he might have taken in the past along these lines, on grounds that it was to prevent extermination of the Serbs by the Ustashi.⁴ (Under present circumstances it would be difficult to ascertain the actual facts as to the stated grounds for this accusation).

At any rate it is interesting to note that throughout the present crisis, the elements which favor a consolidation of the forces of resistance have gained ground; that their collective voice has become more than hitherto effective.

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 801-841. For additional documentation regarding situation in Yugoslavia in 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, index, p. 932.

² *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 836.

³ Gen. Draža Mihailović, Yugoslav Minister for Defense.

⁴ A Fascist Croatian society of which Ante Pavelich was the leader.

As regards the British Government's attitude towards General Mihailović's position, a Croat member of the Cabinet informs me that Mr. Churchill⁵ was recently afforded an opportunity to voice his Government's concern to King Peter.⁶ It seems that the King handed Mr. Churchill a confidential memorandum stating that General Mihailović had at his disposal a potential force of 200,000 * upon whom he could count to join in a general uprising at the proper moment; that the General was now in urgent need of 30,000 suits of clothes and 30,000 pairs of boots. Mr. Churchill, according to my informant, took occasion to emphasize to the King his Government's view as to the importance of uniting the resistance forces, adding that he did not want to place his Government in a position of supplying arms to Mihailović to conduct a civil conflict.

In this connection a Croat member of the Government informs me in strictest confidence that the following reports received from Yugoslavia concerning the activities of General Mihailović's "Lieutenants" are largely responsible for the British Government's concern in the matter: (a) that General Blas Djukanović (the "Quisling" of Montenegro) was the main liaison between Mihailović and the Italians, resulting in groups of Mihailović's forces raiding through the Croatian Littoral and through Dalmatia and Herzegovina; (b) that Mihailović's "Lieutenants" were cooperating with the Italian military authorities in forming battalions to fight the Croats who were engaged in fighting the Italians and the Partisans; Jevdjević (former leader of the pro-Fascist organization in Bosnia and Belgrade) and Colonel Mihić (General Staff Officer) were operating at Abbazia; Birčanin (former President of "National Defence", "Narodna Odbrana") was operating at Split; Grdjić (Secretary General of "Narodna Odbrana") was living at Divisional Headquarters at Mostar.

In disclosing the foregoing information, my informant said that Foreign Minister Nincić, when confronted with this report, had stoutly defended General Mihailović on the grounds that he was not aware of these activities on part of his "Lieutenants". While my informant was willing to allow for this possibility, he held that these reports bore ample proof as to how mistaken the Government had been in not having given General Mihailović a clear directive; that conditions such as reported were all the more reason why a strong clear political directive should be sent the General at the earliest moment. My in-

⁵ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

⁶ King Peter II of Yugoslavia, residing with Yugoslav Government in Exile at London.

* King Peter recently told me that his reports indicate that General Mihailović may be expected to serve as the pivot for an eventual general uprising in the Balkans; that the General had already established contacts with the "Patriots" in Albania, with the "Agrarians" in Bulgaria, also with certain forces in Rumania. [Footnote in the original.]

formant went on to say that underlying his and his other Croat and Slovene associates' concern over the implications of General Mihailović's reported cooperation with the Italians was their recollection of the former close ties between both Foreign Minister Nincić and Minister of Justice Gavrilović and the late M. Pasić (former Foreign Minister who had signed the Pact with Mussolini in about 1924⁸). When M. Pasić had been Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during the last war, Gavrilović had been his Chief of Cabinet and Nincić his "right hand man". At that time M. Pasić had directed a policy envisaging close ties between the Serbs, Italians and Hungarians with a view to offsetting the Croats and Slovenes. My informant was, moreover, aware that when Nincić was in New York some months ago, he had significantly called on Sforza,⁹ who had served as Italian Minister to Serbia about 1917-1918, and who, as a result of the strong friendship which had grown up between himself and M. Pasić, had written a book on the latter. My informant subsequently learned that Sforza told Nincić that he now favored a Yugoslav policy, emphasizing that the application of Pasić's former policy now would only result in bringing the Germans on to the Adriatic. While Sforza had thus given Nincić no encouragement, it was not comforting to feel that Nincić was still harking back to the policy of his former chief. These thoughts in the mind of my informant and his associates had therefore made them apprehensive lest Mihailović's reported cooperation with the Italians reflected a practical application of Pasić's policy as perhaps directed by Nincić.

In concluding his remarks, my informant gave me the most recent information as to the activities of the various resistance groups in Yugoslavia. I have accordingly blocked out this information on the attached chart.¹⁰

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860H.01/431 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 4, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received January 4—6:50 p. m.]

1. Yugoslav Series. My 9, December 23, midnight¹⁰ and your 4, December 30, 6 p. m.¹¹ Reorganization of Yugoslav Cabinet an-

⁸ Apparently reference is to the Treaty of Friendship and Cordial Cooperation between Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, signed at Rome January 12, 1924; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxx, p. 683.

⁹ Count Carlo Sforza, anti-Fascist leader.

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 838.

nounced last night involves retirement of two Ministers here namely Nintchitch and Markovitch and of all four Ministers resident in New York namely, Jevtitch, Snoj, Kosanovitch and Cubrilovitch [*Gavrilo-vitch*].

All political parties continue to be represented, each party except the Croats having lost one Minister.

The difficulty in agreeing on a successor for Nintchitch has proved insuperable. The majority wanted Grol, a member of the Serb Democratic Party and a moderate, to succeed him as Foreign Minister but the Pan-Serb elements could not be reconciled to his appointment. Prime Minister Jovanovitch has therefore been obliged to take over the Foreign Ministry for the time being.

This stage of the Cabinet reorganization has thus failed in its principal objective, namely, to bring the Cabinet's character more into line with the policy outlined by King Peter on December 1.¹²

[BIDDLE]

860H.01/432 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 4, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 11:20 p. m.]

2. Yugoslav Series. My 1, January 4, 7 p. m. On December 31 I discussed with Prime Minister Jovanovitch the points given in your 4 of December 30,¹³ and again today. He assured me he understood our point of view and was in accord with the main points. As regards Fotitch¹⁴ he would at an early date show me the directive as to the political line he should henceforth pursue.

Concerning the retiring Ministers Resident in New York he would shortly issue instructions (a) for Ban Subasich and Duchić to come here for consultations; and (b) for assigning Kosanovitch to some South American post. He thought Duchić would probably also eventually be assigned to a South American post. Meanwhile he earnestly hoped we might help the Government here by giving them friendly counsel to comply with their Government's instructions. He was apprehensive lest they refuse to comply. Yevtitch would probably be assigned to some post in the Information Center in New York.

Jovanovitch added that while he intended eventually to make the center responsible to the Embassy in Washington in reality as well as

¹² See telegram Yugoslav Series No. 8, December 2, 1942, from the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 831.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 838.

¹⁴ Constantin Fotitch, Yugoslav Ambassador in the United States.

in theory, he felt that Fotitch's retention together with the withdrawal of the Ministers in New York would appear in the eyes of the Croat and Slovene and Serb democrat elements such a victory for Fotitch that it would only provoke their further ire and opposition in other matters of pressing nature, were he to make this move at this point.

As regards Mihailović's activities, Jovanović said that one should consider his campaign in the light of its three phases: The first phase consisting of Croat action against the Serbs; the second phase consisting of Serb counter-offensive against the Croats (during which time Duchić made his press attacks); the third and present phase consisting of the attack by Communist-led groups against the Serbs led by Mihailović, together with Communist propaganda against all Mihailović stood for.

As regards formulating and sending a political directive to Mihailović, Jovanović said he understood the British and Russians were now in conversations looking towards a formula for coordination of the resistance forces in Yugoslavia. He was hopeful of constructive results and would keep me posted.

[BIDDLE]

860H.01/437

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

No. 40

LONDON, January 5, 1943.

[Received January 22.]

SIR: Supplementing my despatches Yugoslav Series No. 37, December 28, 1942,¹⁵ and No. 38, January 2, 1943, and my cables No. 1 and 2, January 4, 7 p. m., I have the honor to report that in lengthy conversation with Yugoslav Prime Minister Jovanović today, he referred to his previous promise to show me a copy of his instructions to Ambassador Fotić. He said he had not had time to formulate them, and would therefore welcome my giving some suggestions as to what he should include in his directive. In response, I told him that I considered that the most important point to stress, both for the Government here and for the Embassy in the United States, was the establishment of unity. I felt confident that this was his Government's aim, and I felt that it would therefore be appropriate that he emphasize to Fotić the necessity of doing everything possible to bring about unity of thought and action amongst the Yugoslav refugees in the United States, as well as among the American citizens of Yugo-

¹⁵ *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. III, p. 836.

slav descent and origin. With this as a basic policy, it would be well to instruct Ambassador Fotić to emphasize to the aforementioned elements the sincerity which motivated King Peter's declaration of December 1.¹⁶ At the same time, Fotić would do well to point out that the Government was earnestly bent upon working out a formula for the practical application of this policy. Furthermore, I felt that the Embassy in Washington should be told that its connection with *Srbobran* and other "trouble-making" organs of the Yugoslav-language-press was no longer desirable in the eyes of the Yugoslav Government. I emphasized that he should "put teeth" in his instructions, otherwise they might possibly not be heeded as strictly as the situation demanded.

The Prime Minister stated he was in accord with my proposals; that if he succeeded in bringing Fotić and others to sever their connections with the aforementioned press, he earnestly hoped that the Communist and other opposition* press in the United States could in turn be brought to refrain from further attacks against the Government and General Mihailović.† In response, I pointed out that we had a free press; that I considered that the best way to overcome the opposition of the so-called Communist press would be sincere and vigorous efforts on his Government's part to bring about unity amongst the Yugoslavs both at home and abroad. Even the first tangible signs of earnest endeavours in this direction would undoubtedly reflect themselves in favorable comment, and in a softening of the tone of the attack. At any rate, I would communicate to my Government his stated hopes in the matter.

Turning thereupon to Yugoslav resistance inside Yugoslavia, I said I had the impression that his Government would also be bending its efforts towards formulating a political directive to General Mihailović envisaging the coordination of action between the various Yugoslav forces of resistance. The Prime Minister said that he and his associates were in search of just such a formula, but that it was extremely difficult to find one which might be applied effectively in Yugoslavia.

¹⁶ See telegram No. 8, December 2, 1942, from the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 831.

*I am aware that the Prime Minister had in mind *Slobodna Rec*, *Free Expression*, which I understand is both Communist inspired and controlled; that it follows the *Daily Worker* line of policy in addition to playing up the "Liberal" point of view; in other words that it is a "Front" paper. I also understand that its Pan-Slav line in recent months was successful in focussing favorable light on "big brother Russia"; that while such a line is inconsistent with communist policy, the editors of the *Daily Worker* found it tactically useful to farm it out to *Slobodna Rec* as a means of capturing the eye and imagination of that organ's readers. In other words, the Pan-Slavic idea was employed as a "shoe horn" for the presentation of the real communist line to the leaders. [Footnote in the original.]

†In this connection, the Prime Minister said he earnestly hoped that our Government might find it possible to "soft-pedal" the press now engaged in attacking the Government and the General. [Footnote in the original.]

It was indeed a difficult problem. It was out of the question to suppose that Mihailović would "knuckle under" the orders of the Communist leaders of the Partisan groups, and it was likewise improbable that the latter would "knuckle under" the General's orders. Besides, the Communist leaders, during the early part of their participation in resistance against the Axis powers, had, upon the seizure of certain villages, attempted to set up local Soviets. This for Mihailović and his followers was a "bitter pill". How to find some common ground of understanding looking towards unity of action was far from easy. Did I have any ideas? In response, I suggested that it might be possible to send the General a directive whereby he would initiate conversations with the Communist leaders looking towards an arrangement whereby (a) the Mihailović forces and the Partisans would cease fighting each other; (b) they would coordinate their efforts in their respective theatres of operation against the common enemy. As far as their political differences were concerned, I added, it might be best, in the interests of the state as a whole, to leave these to be "ironed out" after the common enemy was driven out.

As regards the appointment of a successor to Foreign Minister Nincić, I am aware that when the question arose, and Minister Grol's name was brought forward for consideration, Minister Trifunović¹⁷ promptly stated that if Grol were appointed he would resign. Minister Gavrilović¹⁸ (Serb Radical Party) thereupon let it be known that Trifunović's withdrawal would make it necessary for him likewise to withdraw. At the same time he indicated to his colleagues that the Serb parties would bring collective pressure upon Prime Minister Jovanović himself to withdraw. This led to a series of conferences between the Prime Minister and Trifunović and Grol, wherein Jovanović tried to bring about some form of compromise between the latter two. At the last of these conferences, Minister Grol stated that, if the representatives of the Agrarian and Radical parties both withdrew, he would find himself, as representative of the only purely Serb party, in too weak a position vis-à-vis the other Yugoslav parties† to conduct an effective policy. He would therefore have to withdraw if the Radical and Agrarian Party representatives withdrew. It was as a result of this statement that Jovanović decided to take the portfolio provisionally.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

¹⁷ Miloš Trifunović, Yugoslav Minister of Education.

¹⁸ Milan Gavrilović, Minister of Justice.

†He had in mind the Croats and Slovenes. While Grol believes in a Yugoslav State and accordingly plays ball with the Croats and Slovenes to a greater extent than his fellow Serbs, he does not want to find himself alone against them in event he finds himself opposed to them on any given issue. [Footnote in the original.]

860H.00/1435

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary
of State*

No. 7031

LONDON, January 5, 1943.

[Received January 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to state that, according to a Foreign Office official, one of the most disturbing problems confronting the British in their relations with the smaller Allied Powers is the situation of General Mihailović. The Department is aware of the assistance that the British have been able to render the General by dropping necessary supplies to him in the Yugoslav mountains where he is conducting his operations. Such tangible support coincides with active political support, as he is the titular Yugoslav Minister of War.

A discordant note has, however, been thrown into this relationship by the increasing activities of certain guerrilla groups, or partisans, which have come into prominence in the last six months. These partisans are mostly located along the Dalmatian coast and in Croatia; and they appear to be small bands with local leadership who at first confined themselves to attacks on General Mihailović. Lately, however, they have also been sabotaging and attacking the Nazis and Italians. (There are enclosed extracts¹⁹ from an article in the *Observer* of January 3, 1943, giving further information concerning Mihailović and the guerrilla groups.) There seems to be no really prominent leader of these groups, but they are numerous enough to warrant the attention and concern of the Yugoslav, British, and Soviet Governments.

Naturally the Yugoslav Government is hostile to the partisans because of their attacks on Mihailović. Similarly, the British have, of necessity, to accord full backing to Mihailović as he is an actual member of the Yugoslav Government now in London.

On the other hand, the Soviet Government has seen fit, said the Foreign Office official, to give encouragement to the partisan groups, as evidenced by various radio messages from Moscow. These broadcasts also have attacked Mihailović. It is interesting to note that the partisan bands are, according to this official, approximately 70% Communist in character.

He points out that the Soviet's support of the partisans is not only a source of deep embarrassment to the British Government, but also is not a good augury for the future. If the Soviet Government is trying to capitalize on the local Yugoslav situation to foment Communist disturbances at this time, it indicates further activities along these lines in the future as well as possibilities of additional chaos in the Balkan peninsula at the conclusion of the war. The British Gov-

¹⁹ Not reprinted.

ernment has directly approached the Soviet Embassy in London regarding Soviet support of the partisans and the attacks on Mihailović. The Soviets claim that they have no direct influence or communication with the partisans, which may in effect be true, but nevertheless messages must reach the partisans from the Moscow radio stations.

Another contributing factor to this embarrassing situation is the attitude taken by the London *Daily Worker* towards Mihailović. In its issue of December 29, 1942, this paper stated in part:

"His [M. Ninčić, former Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs] ²⁰ departure, however, would not necessarily mean a serious new approach to the military problems which must be tackled if Mihailovich's attitude is to be prevented from any longer weakening the resistance of the Yugoslavs to the invaders on the wide partisan battlefronts in Yugoslavia itself."

The Foreign Office official stated that, regardless of other circumstances, the British Government would of course continue its support of General Mihailović.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:

W. J. GALLMAN

First Secretary of Embassy

860H.00/1421/7

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 7, 1943.

The Ambassador of Yugoslavia called to see me at his request.

The Ambassador referred to his conversation with Secretary Hull which took place at the suggestion of the White House some ten days ago,²¹ and inquired whether any decision had as yet been reached by this Government with regard to the issuance of some official statement regarding General Mihailovich. He said that he had received two further messages from his Government, one of them directly from the King, requesting him to see the President personally in order that the President might be informed of the very great importance which the King and the members of his Cabinet attached to the official statement desired from this Government. The Ambassador said however that, in view of the fact that the White House had referred him to the Department of State, he did not wish again to request an interview with the President on this subject.

²⁰ Brackets appear in the original despatch.

²¹ See memorandum by the Secretary of State, December 28, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 836.

I told the Ambassador that I was aware of his conversation with the Secretary of State but that I would have to inform myself as to what final decision might have been reached with regard to the matter. I said that, as the Ambassador knew, my own belief was that the best way of indicating the belief of this Government that General Mihailovich was rendering a service of outstanding military value to the United Nations was for General Eisenhower²² to send some message to General Mihailovich similar to that sent to the latter recently by General Alexander,²³ which message could be made public. I said it was my belief that a suggestion of this kind had been made to the Chief of Staff²⁴ but that I was not informed of any reply that might have been received.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

860H.01/439

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle)
to the Secretary of State*

No. 42

LONDON, January 12, 1943.

[Received February 1.]

SIR: Supplementing my despatch Yugoslav Series No. 40, January 5, 1943, I have the honor herein to report that in this morning's conversation with Prime Minister Jovanović he handed me a copy of the instructions he is about to send Ambassador Fotić (see copies attached²⁵). In handing this to me he said that he had endeavoured to pursue, in effect, the line which I had previously suggested to him.

He went on to say that he had already sent instructions to Minister Ducić to be prepared to proceed to a new post in the foreign field; he was at the moment turning over in his mind the question of assigning Ducić to Lisbon. As regards Ban Subasić, King Peter, he said, had just sent him an invitation to come here for consultations in connection with Croatian matters. Kosanović would probably be assigned to a diplomatic post in South America. He was, moreover, considering inviting Snoj here for consultations.

In response to my question concerning the Information Centre in New York, the Prime Minister said he now had under consideration

²² Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, North Africa.

²³ Gen. Sir Harold Alexander, Commander in Chief of the British Forces in the Middle East.

²⁴ Presumably reference is to the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Gen. George C. Marshall.

²⁵ Not printed. The Yugoslav diplomatic representatives were warned regarding separatist tendencies and instructed to play an active part in the propagation of the ideas and interests of Yugoslavia as a whole.

the shifting of its functions back to the Press Attaché's office at the Embassy.

As regards the question of a political directive to General Mihailović, envisaging the coordination of action between the forces of resistance in Yugoslavia, I asked the Prime Minister whether he and his associates had made any progress in this connection since my last meeting with him. He replied that they had devoted much thought to the question; that they had taken into consideration my previous informal suggestion of a possible basis for an agreement between Mihailović and the Partisan leaders: (a) to cease fighting one another; (b) to coordinate their respective plans of action against the common enemy; (c) to conduct their respective campaigns in their respective theatres of operation; and (d) to declare an armistice with each other in any given areas where their respective forces are at grips with one another. He thought this suggestion was interesting; it seemed to be the most practical approach in the matter. He wanted me to know, however, that since I had last seen him he had received reports from inside Yugoslavia very definitely indicating a marked "swing-over" of Partisan followers to Mihailović. Moreover, it appeared that this had been the case in many sections. Were these reports correct, it would seem that the most serious clashes between the Partisan and Mihailović forces were now taking place in the Montenegro area. This was an interesting turn in developments and bore watching, in light of its potential bearing on the course of the whole civil conflict.

As regards the question of appointing a successor to the portfolio of Foreign Minister, made vacant by Minister Nincić's withdrawal, this matter, the Prime Minister said, was still being thrashed out. He had made it very clear to his associates that in accepting the portfolio, he had done so only provisionally.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860H.01/445

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to
the Secretary of State*

No. 46

LONDON, February 11, 1943.

[Received February 15.]

SIR: Supplementing my despatch Yugoslav Series No. 45, February 1, 1943,²⁶ I have the honor herein to report the following substance of a further conversation with Yugoslav Vice Prime Minister Krek (Slovene) concerning reported Russian aspirations in the Danubian Basin.

²⁶ Not printed.

Krek said that through secret channels he had very recently received a report which indicated that Moscow's post-war plan vis-à-vis the Danubian Basin envisaged, in part, a Soviet Union of Southern Slav States, including Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia. In order of preference Moscow aimed at bringing Bulgaria and Macedonia under Soviet control. Next in order were Serbia and Montenegro, because of their eastern culture, the orthodox church, Russian traditions, and their historic high regard of Russia (Russian liberation of these two countries from the Turks in the Balkan wars). Croatia and Slovenia, Krek continued, came within the scope of Moscow's consideration on this score, in case Moscow succeeded in sovietizing the Danubian Basin.

He went on to say that his reports showed that Sovietization of the Danubian Basin was now being pressed for by the Comintern as far as Yugoslavia was concerned. The "Partisans" Underground Press, of which he had received copies, declared, in effect, that the "Partisans" were communists who had to continue fighting to protect the USSR interests against western Europe; that they saw their future with Soviet Russia.

In connection with Vice Prime Minister Krek's disclosures, Polish Political Intelligence informs me that on January 15, 1943 at 7.55 pm a broadcasting station calling itself "Kościuszko Wireless Station", probably in Tashkent, Soviet Union, made, in effect, the following broadcast:

"On the Yugoslav territory freed from the enemy occupation a National Assembly has met in which all classes of the population and all nationalities of Yugoslavia were represented. Dr. Ivan Rybar, former president of the Yugoslav National Assembly of 1920, was elected President and his deputies were: Dr. Rozherakh(?) and ex-Senator Pavlović, Officer, representatives of the intelligentsia and of the workmen also were elected to the board of the assembly. The Assembly adopted a resolution in which it called upon the Yugoslav nation to unite in the struggle against the occupants.

Thus, while the Yugoslav Government in exile calls upon their people to adopt a waiting attitude and ascribes successes in the struggle against the occupants to their War Minister Mihailović, who as is known is collaborating with the occupants, the National Assembly is doing everything possible to strike a mortal blow at them. The Executive Committee of the Assembly is the first Yugoslav Government formed on territory freed from the Fascist yoke."

In disclosing the above information to me, my informant from Polish Political Intelligence stated that the broadcast went on to describe the "Presidium" and the representatives of the workers. He said that reference to this broadcast was subsequently made in the *Daily Worker* published in London.

In discussing this information with the Yugoslav authorities, I found that Vice Prime Minister Krnjević (Croat) was more familiar than his associates with this situation. He said that so far they were not in a position to render a very clear explanation. It was very likely that a meeting of some sort was held somewhere in Yugoslavia, more than likely at Bjhac; that the meeting had had a purely communist character. Krnjević had long known Dr. Ivan Rybář, former President of the Yugoslav National Assembly of 1920. He has also known his son. The father was a Croat, Leftist-minded, and pro-Yugoslavia, as a state. He had followed the popular front idea for unity in Yugoslavia. His son was also Leftist-minded but of the Radical turn. Whether it was the father or son who headed what had been described as the "Constitutional Assembly" (of about 50 representatives) at Bjhac, he was not certain. In any case Bjhac was located in the midst of a mixed population consisting of Serbs, Croats and Mussulmen, which meant a religious combination of Orthodox, Roman Catholics and Moslems. He was not inclined to attach much importance to this political move other than to ascribe it to the Comintern as a further indication of its objectives in Yugoslavia. What was important, he said, was the fact that the publication of the news was a forecast of things to come if the future development of events was favorable to the Soviet plans in the Balkans and elsewhere.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

760H.61/62

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

No. 17

LONDON, February 24, 1943.

[Received March 17.]

SIR: I have the honor herein to report the following substance of my very recent conversation with Prime Minister Jovanović concerning Yugoslav-Russian relations.

Referring to the recent wave of articles in the press concerning Moscow's views on General Mihailović's activities, Prime Minister Jovanović said that he had had several very recent conversations with Russian Ambassador Bogomolov.²⁷ The latter had made it a point to emphasize that what had been said in the press had in no way affected the Russian Government's attitude towards the Yugoslav Govern-

²⁷ Alexander Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile at London.

ment; that he hoped that the latter would treat the Note of August 1942 referring to certain evidence as to Mihailović's collaboration with the Axis more in the light of an observation than as a matter bearing on relations between the Yugoslav and Russian Governments. Bogomolov had gone on to reiterate what he had stated on former occasions; that his Government was disinclined to respond to the Yugoslav Government's request that it intervene in the civil conflict within Yugoslavia; that it appeal to the partisans to desist from further opposition to general Mihailović's forces.

In reciting the foregoing, the Prime Minister did not attempt to suppress an amused smile. He added that there "you have an example of modern Russian diplomacy". It had become clear to him lately, he concluded, that Moscow was bent upon discrediting the Governments of occupied countries, particularly in the "Middle Zone" area, not only with their respective populations, but also in the eyes of Washington and London. An interesting observation on the trend of Yugoslav-British and Yugoslav-Russian relations was that during the period of tense relations between the Yugoslav and British Governments concerning difficulties with the Yugoslav forces in the Cairo area, the Russian Government had gone out of its way to be nice to his Government. Now, while Moscow was attacking Mihailović in the press, the British Government had been especially cordial to his Government. To his mind, the fact that British officers were cooperating with Mihailović indicated ample proof that Mihailović possessed considerably more strength and better prospects than the Russians would like to have the world think. He still felt that the Russians were highly suspicious of British interests in the Balkans in general, and in Yugoslavia particularly. At this point he reminded me of Bogomolov's recent and already reported remark, that if the Yugoslav Government was unable to communicate directly with Mihailović and had to depend on sending and receiving messages through the British, the Yugoslav Government could hardly be certain either as to the contents of these messages or as to conditions in Yugoslavia itself.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860H.61/61 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 24, 1943—midnight.

[Received February 25—4:28 a. m.]

1397. In view of reports circulating in London that rather irritated exchanges between the Soviet and Yugoslav Governments are con-

tinuing on the thorny question of Mihailovitch versus the Partisans, I inquired at the Foreign Office today as to the present situation. The Foreign Office feels that fundamentally the difference between the Soviet and Yugoslav Governments is largely one of "post-war ideology" and is consequently difficult to solve. The British have from the beginning supported Mihailovitch as he was the first one in Yugoslavia to take up arms against the Axis and he is Minister of War in the Yugoslav Government. The amount of practical aid given him, the Foreign Office admits, has unfortunately not been great because of the difficulties of getting supplies in by air and the uncertainty of the identity of their eventual recipients. The British have likewise furnished Mihailovitch money and I was told in confidence that there are two British liaison officers with him at the present time. The Foreign Office will continue to support Mihailovitch but they feel that the time has come likewise to get into touch with the Partisans. There are apparently various scattered groups of the latter, some but not all of whom "are under Communist influence" and these seem to be mostly located in Herzegovina. Whenever the British discuss the attitude of the Partisans and their position to Mihailovitch with Soviet representatives, the Foreign Office tells me, the Russians always deny any knowledge of or contact with the Partisan groups in question. This contention, the Foreign Office says, is absurd: The Russians must be in touch with them and are obviously giving them full support on the Moscow radio in the hope of having a post-war regime in Yugoslavia which will be entirely sympathetic to Russia. The Soviet for its part claims that Mihailovitch is not fighting the Axis but is merely using the arms given him to fight the Partisans, and further that he is collaborating with German and Italian units. The British have found (in reports from their liaison officers) that Mihailovitch has at no time been in touch with the Germans though apparently in one instance his forces and Italians were simultaneously attacking the Partisans. However, for the moment the situation is relatively quiet and they think Mihailovitch is quite properly conserving his meagre resources for a more opportune time rather than conducting any large scale attack against Axis occupying forces at this moment.

As indicated, however, the British have reached the conclusion that the time has come to get in contact with the Partisans. They are fearful, however, of arousing Russia's suspicions as to British long view intentions. Clark Kerr²⁸ has therefore been instructed to approach the Moscow Government with the suggestion that the British in pursuit of their "policy of supporting any group which is willing to fight the Axis," (it was put to me in that form which seems to be somewhat inconsistent with their attitude toward the Darlan High Commis-

²⁸ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

sariat ²⁹) would like to establish contact with the Partisans: That he is to make it clear that they have no thought to influence those groups in any post-war ideological sense. This proposed approach I was asked to keep in strict confidence since the Yugoslav Government has not yet been informed. "There is no use presenting a bitter pill if in the end they are not going to have to swallow it", I was told, indicating that should the Russians raise objections the British may desist from their purpose. The Foreign Office emphasized that in any event there is no thought of withdrawing British support from Mihailovitch and his gallant army.

MATTHEWS

760H.61/2-2543

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1943.

The Yugoslav Ambassador called to see me this morning in order to say good-by before he leaves for London next week. The Ambassador handed me the memorandum attached herewith.³⁰ I told the Ambassador I was glad to receive this message which seemed to me gratifying since it indicated a better atmosphere between the Soviet Government and his own Government and a desire on the part of the Soviet Government to avoid further difficulties of the kind which had occurred during the past six months in connection with General Mihailovich.

The Ambassador inquired about the President's statement to the press the day before yesterday regarding the holding of a United Nations meeting on the world food problem. I gave the Ambassador the general line of the President's decision in this regard.

The Ambassador inquired further with regard to our policy towards the Vatican and the present policy of the Turkish Government. I made it clear that Archbishop Spellman's³¹ visit to the Vatican was in no sense official and that recent reports from Turkey seemed to indicate no deviation from the policy which the Turkish Government had announced after the recent visit of Mr. Churchill.³²

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

²⁹ Adm. Jean François Darlan was French High Commissioner in North Africa at the time of his assassination on December 24, 1942.

³⁰ *Infra.*

³¹ Francis J. Spellman, Archbishop of New York.

³² Mr. Churchill visited Turkey in January following the Casablanca Conference.

760H.61/2-2543

The Yugoslav Embassy to the Department of State

The Yugoslav Prime Minister Mr. Slobodan Yovanovich had a conversation on February 20, 1943, with the Soviet Ambassador Mr. Bogomolov, regarding the newspaper campaign against General Mihailovich.

The Soviet Ambassador renewed his earlier statements that the Soviet government considers the struggle between the Chetniks and the Partisans a purely Yugoslav internal affair in which it does not wish to get involved. However, the Soviet government welcomes anyone who rises to fight against the Axis. Its relations with the Yugoslav government remain unaltered.

The Yugoslav Prime Minister expressed the wish of the Yugoslav government to maintain best relations with the Soviet government, adding that at the present time every dissension, no matter how small, might prove useful to the aims of German propaganda.

The British Ambassador to Moscow was instructed by his government to attempt the negotiation of an agreement between the Partisans and General Mihailovich.

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1943.

860H.00/14623

The Delegate of the Yugoslav Government for the Near and Middle East (Djonovich) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

MR. SECRETARY: Permit me to thank you most sincerely for the kind hospitality shown me during my visit, made on the recommendation of our Ambassador and my friend, Mr. Fotitch. I am very pleased that you accepted my proposal to put down in writing the main points of my conversation with you regarding the conditions in our country and the help which should be given to our gallant fighters.

This help is needed not only to gain an early victory but also to assure peace after the Nazi collapse. In Europe, and especially in Yugoslavia, so much evil and unhappiness has accumulated that serious peril and anarchy threaten the Balkans and Europe after the war. What I will bring out to you is received mainly from the daily telegraph reports of General Mihailovich, from our agents in Turkey and from our men who succeeded to flee the country. The following is an outlook on conditions in Yugoslavia:

1. The country is ruined economically. The Germans took everything that could be taken. Factories and even work-shops which

do not work for the army were removed, especially those in Serbia. Food is taken from the farmer, even the minimum needed for everyday life. All the towns in the country are practically starving. In Serbia, the Germans do not permit the import of foodstuffs to the larger cities as a means of punishment. On the other hand, the farmer, even when he has something to sell, does not willingly take it to the market because the Germans confiscate everything and in exchange give money which is useless since nothing can be bought for it. In Serbia especially, the cities are supplied only by way of the black market and bartering. In exchange for food the people are giving their furniture, linens, clothing and shoes, in as much as they have them.

People everywhere are suffering, especially in those parts of the country where German and Italian punitive expeditions pass through. Almost everything there is ruined or looted. The remaining population is starving and dying of hunger, sickness or cold. The region of the Dinara mountains: Dalmatia, Bosnia, Hercegovina and Montenegro, where cereals have always been lacking, 4,000 to 6,000 wagons of wheat and flour had been sent to this region every year. This import of wheat is now discontinued, and the people are therefore suffering from hunger. Besides, Chetnik troops and other fighters have fled into these mountainous regions where they are waging a fierce struggle against the enemy, thereby making the position of the population even more precarious as regards food. The results are: sickness and starvation. According to reliable reports from Montenegro, there were several hundred deaths due to starvation in the month of December only.

2. The insecurity of civilians has come to paroxysm. A human life is not worth more than a bullet wherever a Serb lives. For the past four months, the Germans have been killing everyone who is against them or against Quisling Nedich. Those suspected as Mihailovich's sympathizers who are not slaughtered are sent to Germany to forced labor. There are some instances where higher Quisling officials have been executed for being unreliable. For instance, Nedich's county sheriff, Kalabich, was shot in Požarevac, charged with cooperating with General Mihailovich. According to our data, over 120,000 people were killed in Serbia up to the present time. In 1941 and 1942 about 20,000 people were killed in Belgrade alone. On the Catholic Christmas-Eve and Christmas Day of 1942, 1,300 people were executed, accused of being in the organization of General Mihailovich. In Belgrade, during December 1942 and January 1943, approximately 100 to 150 persons were executed. This massacring of innocent people is continuing mainly because of the fear of a revolt in Serbia due to the Allied victories in Libya and Russia.

In Vovvodina, occupied by the Hungarians, more than 80,000 Serbs have been killed up to the present.

After the uprising of 1941, the Italians have annihilated about 30,000 persons in Montenegro and southern Hercegovina.

The Albanians, instigated by their Quislings and Italian occupational authorities, killed over 20,000 Serbs in Kossovo and Sandžak.

However, the Serbian population in those parts occupied by the Croats suffered the most. In Bosnia, Croatia and Srem, 600,000 to 700,000 Serbs were slaughtered in the most inhuman way. In Srem, 30,000 persons were killed only at the end of 1942. Men, women and children were slaughtered like beasts by means of guns, knives, axes and dull weapons. Serbs in the "Independent State of Croatia" have been deprived of all civil rights and considered outlaws. Everybody has a right to kill them. One of my close relatives writes: "Everything here is fantastically expensive, only a human life is worth nothing".

Slovenians have also suffered under the Italians during 1942. Many tens of thousands were killed or taken to concentration camps. Not even one-third of the 150,000 Slovenes under German occupation remained at home. Many fled to Serbia, some to Croatia but the majority was sent to Germany to forced labor.

According to our data, about one million Serbs, men, women and children were killed by the enemies up to now, mainly because they did not wish to bow to them but took arms to fight. The number of people, victims of sickness, hunger, cold and other misfortunes, cannot as yet be estimated. In any case, that number is neither small nor insignificant. At least one-hundred thousand Slovenes have suffered.

3. The largest and only fully military organized forces in Yugoslavia are those of General Mihailovich. Their total strength is over 100,000 men operating in the whole country except in pre-war Croatia. There are a few Croats in the General's army, which can be noted from General Mihailovich's telegram, No. 982, 983, 984 and 985, herewith enclosed.³³ As a whole, the Croats do not take active part in the struggle against the invaders, but are struggling as much as possible against us and our Allies. The organizing of national forces in the whole country, particularly among the Serbs, has already been carried out. Thus, the armed forces of General Mihailovich can be increased two or three-fold when the deciding moment comes. It will depend on the arms which will be sent to them.

Besides the forces of General Mihailovich, the Communists are taking part in the struggle. There are not very many of them, according to reliable reports from the country as they number about

³³ Not printed.

4,000. Their only aim is to help Soviet Russia and to bring Bolshevism to our country; Yugoslavia is to be included in the Soviet Union. Their atrocities committed over the population which did not want to join them incited the people against them and they were chased out of Serbia, Montenegro and Hercegovina. The rest of their shattered detachments had dispersed to the forest regions of Bosnia and Dalmatia. Now they are pressed back in Kapela in the Dinara mountains. Their end is near for the people there do not tolerate them because of their atrocities. They possess a radio station over which they mystify the Russian Communists and through them other leftists in Anglo-Saxon countries. They speak of fighting which they did not carry on, of the strength of their forces which they do not have, of assemblies which were not held, and of governments which do not exist (Bihać).

At present the forces of General Mihailovich are grouped as follows: 30,000 men in the mountain regions of Montenegro, a part of Sandžak and southern Hercegovina; 25,000 men in the Dinaric Alps and vicinity of Lika, Dalmatia and eastern Bosnia; 10,000 divided into two groups in the mountain regions of western Serbia; and a little less than 10,000 men divided into two groups in the mountain regions of eastern Serbia. In South Serbia his forces also number several thousand men in the mountains from the Vardar river to the Albanian frontier. Forces connected with General Mihailovich in Eastern Bosnia and Slovenia number also some tens of thousands of men. In any case, that is the only real military force in the country which [is] tying up thirty-six Axis divisions in Yugoslavia. Therefore, lately, a real hunt is being led in all of Yugoslavia to discover and shoot the men of General Mihailovich, against whom the German occupational authorities and the native Quislings have issued a proclamation, threatening the complete extermination of the people if they join his organization or support him in any way. In addition to those military organized groups of General Mihailovich, at least 80% of all adults in Serbia and Montenegro are organized on a military basis.

4. The perspective of the future appears as follows: If General Mihailovich and his organization are not helped sufficiently and in time, the worst results can be expected. The people who like and respect him can become despondent. The field would then be open for disorder and complete anarchy, not only in Yugoslavia but in all the Balkan states. On the other hand, if the Allies render sufficient aid to General Mihailovich and his forces, they will represent a great force which could give considerable help toward an Allied victory, particularly enough strength to preserve order and prevent anarchy until Allied forces reach Central Europe. Help should be given in

arms, clothing, shoes, food and medical supplies. All that can be dropped by parachutes from planes coming from airfields in Syria, Libya and North Africa, in the spring and summer. Special attention should be given first to the sending of concentrated foodstuffs and medical supplies, then clothing, shoes and arms. From spring to the middle of summer the greatest need will be in food, medicines and clothing. American help, particularly if several American officers would parachute into General Mihailovich's headquarters, would have a great moral effect on the whole population. The prestige of America comes first in our country. Great hope is placed in America and her coming to our aid would make the people feel that the end of the war is not far off.

In order that the things to be dropped reach the hands of those intended for, it is necessary to make contacts immediately by radio with the staff of General Mihailovich. Since certain preparations have been made previously, that could be easily carried out. In that way General Mihailovich would designate places with light signs where everything that is being sent can be dropped by parachute.

Invaluable moral support should be given through a broadcasting station organized by Americans somewhere in North Africa. In that case, I would be able to place the needed well-trained personnel from Cairo at the disposal of the Americans. In [*It*] would be desirable in any case to have our people know that the Americans have organized a station from which they will speak to them.

5. It would be of great importance if the present negative campaign could be done away with. I think that it is completely inopportune and incomprehensible to our people to attack General Mihailovich and praise the Communist-Partisans. We do not believe that the policy of the Anglo-Saxon people is in favor of them, that Bolshevism win in Yugoslavia and that Yugoslavia and with her all the Balkans be encompassed in the Soviet Union. However, we know the road to Moscow and guides are not needed. But, neither the great masses of our people nor we alone want that road. Therefore, it is not necessary that it be pointed out to us. I think that is much more timely to help General Mihailovich, the democratic forces in our country, by means of propaganda as well as arms, and in that way save Yugoslavia and the Balkans from a possible social revolution after the collapse of Nazism. The campaign against the democratic forces in our country as well as Europe, and the promoting of Communism is probably desired by the followers of the Third International, and likewise by various Quislings and Fascists who believe that under such colors they could find protection against the punishment for the crimes and brutalities committed, and never by the people who struggle for righteousness and freedom. Communism is a dic-

tatorship of the proletariat and the suppression of freedom of mind and thought. All our people, especially the Serbs, do not want any kind or anyone's dictatorship whether it be by rightists or leftists. We suffered a long time from personal regimes and certainly not little responsibility lies with them for losing our country, and that so quickly. Besides, up to now we have been ruthlessly ruined several times by dictatorial countries.

6. I think it is opportune here to mention the accusations directed against General Mihailovich by some people. That is, that he is in favor of dictatorship, for Greater Serbia and that he cooperates with the enemy. Such accusations are a cruel way of mocking a hero and his fighters. He is fighting under the worst conditions against dictators and for freedom, against separatism and for Yugoslavia. He is mostly accused for dictatorial desires and Greater Serbianism by those whose ideology is either Nazi or proletarian dictatorship, and by others who are pure separatists like Croats of the Pavelich kind. These accusations are accepted among our emigrants by people who are misinformed or by Communists and their followers, or by Croats who think they can free their countrymen of the responsibility for crimes committed in Yugoslavia if they distort the facts and accuse General Mihailovich and his men of cooperating with the enemy, of being in favor of dictatorship and Greater Serbia and against the Croats.

Such accusations, though unfounded, are disclaimed by General Mihailovich in statements and facts,—statements in which he reports that he and the Yugoslav Army under his command are fighting for freedom and democracy, for the unity of Yugoslavia and for a better society, more just and human than the one we had. General Mihailovich has rallied several younger politicians in his staff: Serbs, Slovenes and Croats; likewise several very prominent university professors and writers. These men, well-known, educated and confirmed democrats, lead the political activities among our people as much as conditions permit. General Mihailovich and his men represent that spirit which overthrew the dictatorial regime on March 27, 1941, and accepted war with Germany instead of the shameless Tripartite Pact³⁴ which led us to the camp of the enemies of freedom and democracy.

7. If the Allies give serious help to General Mihailovich, I am confident that it will be possible to change the situation in Bulgaria in favor of the Allies. General Mihailovich is already in contact with representatives of the Bulgarian Peasant Party whose leader Mr. Georgi Dimitrov is in the Middle East with officers of the Officers' League of Damjan Velcev. Aims in this direction, if aided by America in addition to the English, could establish favorable conditions which

³⁴ Signed at Berlin by Japan, Germany, and Italy, September 27, 1940; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 386.

would facilitate an eventual invasion of the Balkans. Therefore, help to General Mihailovich imposes itself from the viewpoint of warfare and the future stabilization in the Balkans and in Central Europe.

I have the honor to enclose herewith three telegrams of General Mihailovich which I received by way of London.³⁵

Please accept [etc.]

YOVAN DJONOVICH

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1943.

760H.61/63 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 23, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received March 24—1:15 a. m.]

2041. I inquired of Sargent³⁶ this morning whether Clark Kerr had gotten anywhere in his discussions at Moscow relative to British approach to the Partisans in Yugoslavia (my telegram No. 1397, February 24, midnight). He replied immediately that the British Ambassador had gotten nowhere. The Russians blandly took the line that they had no contact whatsoever with the Partisans and were giving them neither material nor any other support nor even encouragement on the radio. The Soviets made it clear, he said, that they would not cooperate in any way with any British initiative to help the Partisans (who, incidentally, the British prefer to call patriots). In reply to my further question, Sir Orme said that having made the approach to the Russians the British now feel they can go ahead on their own and establish such contact with the Partisans which, he added, is now [*not*] however easy to do. He went on to say that as a matter of fact such recent fighting against the Axis as has gone on in Yugoslavia has been entirely the work of the Partisans, both the Communist group and the Croat group. Mihailovitch, he said, has frankly admitted that he has maintained contact with the Italians, that he is getting supplies from them and that he intends to conserve his strength and meager resources until the moment of an Axis collapse approaches. He says, according to Sargent, that he expects thereby at the moment Italian withdrawal to acquire all their supplies and to establish and maintain order throughout Yugoslavia; he argues that if he does not do so there will be either complete chaos or the bitterest civil war. It is unfortunate, Sargent said, that the Yugoslavs have no strong man here. The intra-governmental quarrels are such, he pointed out, that they have still not been able to

³⁵ None printed.

³⁶ Sir Orme Sargent, British Deputy Under Secretary of State.

appoint an Ambassador to the British Government. He said, when I asked if there were any likelihood of the Yugoslav Government being transplanted to Cairo as has been done with the Greeks, that it was far too fragile: It would probably fall to pieces en route.

I referred to reports one hears from time to time that the Soviets would see with reluctance the establishment of their much-demanded second front in the Balkans. Sargent said that he felt sure in his own mind that the Russians would not enjoy the prospect of Allied operations in that particular area though they had, he said, never given any intimation to that effect.

MATTHEWS

811.761/140

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1943.

Dr. Rybář³⁷ came in to see me at his request. He said he wanted to find out why the Censor in New York had made certain deletions from the broadcasts by the representative of the Yugoslav Information Service. He presented me the attached memorandum,³⁸ noting that the underlined passages were passages required to be stricken out by the Censor. He thought that the effect of this was to prevent the Yugoslav broadcaster from setting out the nationalist Yugoslav view. This left the way open to the so-called Partisans, supported by the Communists.

I said I would have to look into the matter since this was entirely new to me. I noted that the first statement that Yugoslavia was the only firm stronghold in the Balkans would probably not be liked by the Greeks. As regards King Boris,³⁹ it was quite possible that the Censor had thought this amounted to a commitment to dethrone King Boris, of which the Censor knew nothing. But these were merely casual observations at first reading.

Dr. Rybář then said that frankly they had been worried by the fact that there seemed to be a growing desire to favor the Partisans on the part of this Government. He said that Americans of Yugoslav ancestry had occasionally applied for jobs and in a number of cases were asked whether they favored the Yugoslav National Government or the Partisans. When they said they favored the existing Yugoslav Government, they had been promptly rebuked by their interviewers, and told that the Partisan side was obviously the better

³⁷ Vladimir Rybář, Yugoslav Chargé.

³⁸ Not printed.

³⁹ King of Bulgaria.

one. He wanted to know whether our Government was changing its policy.

I said our Government had not changed its policy. We had not intervened in internal Yugoslav matters. What we hoped for was complete unity in fighting the Axis. The division was regrettable. We had hoped that this might be composed so that unity could be restored. I hoped Dr. Rybář would give me a memorandum of the incidents to which he referred—which he said he would do in confidence.

Dr. Rybář then asked whether I could give him any information about conversations with Sir Anthony Eden⁴⁰ as affecting Yugoslavia. I said I could not; and that up-to-date I understood that no questions affecting Yugoslavia had been discussed. We were primarily talking over matters as between the British and the United States.

Dr. Rybář said that Russia necessarily came into this matter. (He was obviously fishing to know whether we were entering into an agreement with the British in respect of Russian claims.)

I said that, as Dr. Rybář knew, Russia had stated her policy. She had asked for the pre-1941 lines and had said she expected to stop there.

Dr. Rybář said they had unofficially, through Communist propaganda, asked for "friendly governments" in neighboring states. He thought this meant establishing puppet governments and that these governments could only be safe if [i]f there was actual incorporation of the territory into Russia. He said that this, in fact, meant that Russia would take over the entire Balkan area clear to the Adriatic Sea, and this would have the gravest effects on the Mediterranean. I made no comment except to say that the United States Government had stated its policy in the Atlantic Charter⁴¹ and that I had heard of no change.

Dr. Rybář spoke a little passionately of the people who are now attempting to divide Yugoslavia. I said that, as his Embassy knew, we had done what we could to avoid divisions. Among other things, I myself felt that an unhappy situation had grown up, as apparently groups of Croats and Slovenes had seemed to feel that they were being subordinated to the greater Serbian movement; and that in my own feeling, the greatest hope for Yugoslavia lay in working out a situation in which all of these groups could strike hands together and join in expelling the Axis from their territory.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

⁴⁰ British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; he arrived in Washington March 12, 1943, for discussions with U.S. officials.

⁴¹ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367.

860H.01/458 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to
the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 30, 1943—midnight.

[Received March 31—3:18 a. m.]

3. Yugoslav Series. British Foreign Office informs me it is today handing note to Yugoslav Government to the following effect: (a) That the British Government was seriously disturbed over developments in Yugoslav affairs and increasingly concerned regarding the future, unless measures were adopted to bring about a greater degree of unity among the resistance elements within Yugoslavia, the Croats, Slovenes and Serbs, and among Yugoslav circles abroad in general, the Government in particular; (b) that as regards the situation inside Yugoslavia, the British Government felt obliged to inform the Yugoslav Government (1) of certain views recently expressed in a speech by General Mihailović, and to suggest that the Yugoslav Government take the necessary steps at once, to inform the General of his Government's views, and to instruct him to adopt a line more in accord with the attitude both of his own and the British Government; and (2) that unless Mihailović were prepared to revise his policy vis-à-vis the Italians and his compatriots now resisting the enemy, the British Government might find it necessary to revise its present policy of favoring Mihailović to the exclusion of other resistance elements in Yugoslavia.

In connection with the foregoing, the note draws attention to the British Government's recent report from Colonel Bailey, British liaison officer to General Mihailović, to effect (a) that a virtual state of civil war continued between the forces of Mihailović and other resistance elements, that in this conflict Mihailović had associated himself, directly or indirectly, with the Italian occupying forces, that this association had been confirmed by the General himself in an address he had delivered at a local gathering on February 28 (which, on the whole, amounted to a tirade against the western democracies and the Partisans).

The note goes on to summarize the General's speech, of which the following are the main points: (a) That the Serbs were now completely friendless; that the British to suit their own strategic purposes, were pressing them to engage in operations without any intention of helping them, either now or in the future; that the British were trying to purchase Serb blood at the cost of a trivial supply of munitions, that he needed no further contact with the western democracies, whose sole aim was to win the war at the expense of others; (b) that King Peter and his Government were not guests, but virtually prisoners of the

British, who were shamelessly violating Yugoslav sovereignty by conducting negotiations on internal Yugoslav problems directly with Moscow; (c) that the hypocritical and anti-Yugoslav activities of the Partisans was a satisfaction for the Allies' lust for fraud; however, nothing the Allies could do or threaten, could divert the Serbs from their vowed and sacred duty of annihilating the Partisans; (d) that as long as the Italians comprised his only adequate source of help generally, nothing the Allies could do would force him to alter his attitude towards them (in this connection see page 2 of my despatch Yugoslav series No. 38, January 2, 1943⁴²); (e) that his enemies were the Ustashi, the Partisans, the Croats and the Moslems; that when he had dealt with these, he would turn to the Germans and the Italians.

I understand that, while the British Government has no intention to deviate from its past 2 years' policy of supporting Mihailović in his conflict against the Axis, and of rendering him every possible material help, it feels that the General should be brought to a sense of reality and "pulled up" as a result of his recent outburst. Besides, it feels it could never justify to British public opinion or to Britain's other Allies its continued backing of a movement, whose leader declared publicly that their enemies were his Allies and that his enemies were not the German and Italian invaders, but his fellow Yugoslavs. Should information concerning this declaration reach Soviet ears, Moscow and the Communist press abroad may, to my mind, be expected to exploit it vis-à-vis the Yugoslav Government in light of Mihailović's position as War Minister, and even as pressure on London to withdraw whatever support Moscow may suspect London is rendering the General.

I furthermore understand that the note is motivated by the hope that it may serve to bring the Yugoslav Government to face squarely the necessity for a greater degree of unity of thought and action. The conflict in the Cabinet has now resolved itself into an intra-Serb affair between two conceptions of the Serb extremists; the pro-Yugoslav and the pan-Serb.

[BIDDLE]

860H.20/101

The Yugoslav Chargé (Rybář) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1943.

DEAR MR. ASSISTANT SECRETARY: During the conversation I had with you at the State Department two weeks ago, you had expressed

⁴² See paragraph beginning, "In this connection", p. 963.

the desire to have some facts concerning the activities of General Draža Mihajlovich and his army, as well as the position of the so-called Partisans.

I am pleased, therefore, to send to you enclosed a condensed exposition based on facts and documents which the Yugoslav Embassy has received and which it considers as trustworthy.

Believe me [etc.]

DR. VLADIMIR RYBÁŘ

[Enclosure]

The Yugoslav Embassy to the Department of State

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1943.

The following account of the nature and extent of guerrilla activities in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia is based on facts and documents which the Yugoslav Embassy after careful consideration regards as trustworthy. The Yugoslav Embassy will be pleased to cite the source of any statement made.

The Origin of the Chetniks

Guerrilla warfare began in Yugoslavia immediately after the country was overrun and dismembered by the Axis powers in 1941. The invaders did not succeed in completely disarming the Yugoslav Army; parts of it escaped with equipment to the inaccessible mountainous regions of central Serbia and Montenegro. American and foreign correspondents, who withdrew as the German invaders advanced, have stated that they were eye-witnesses of the orderly retreat of entire detachments of the Yugoslav Army into the mountains. These Yugoslav soldiers were the first who waged guerrilla war and by the summer of 1941 their activities were well-developed.

Ever since then, patriotic Yugoslavs, singly and in groups have been joining these army detachments, combining with them to form "Chetas". The new recruits were either men anxious to continue the struggle against the Axis or refugees from Axis persecution. For example, all those who succeeded in escaping the massacres in Bosnia and Hercegovina joined the "Chetas" in Serbia, those who escaped persecutions at the hands of Germans and Italians in Slovenia joined the "Chetas" in Slovenia, and finally those in central Croatia who fled from the regime of the Ustasis joined the groups in northern Bosnia. These groups of northern Bosnia are composed of patriotic Croats and also of Serbs from Serbian settlements which are dotted like islands throughout Croatia. The most recent reports received tell of a large organization of guerrilla groups in Dalmatia organized on the "Chetas" basis, which, after fighting the enemy independently for some time, have now joined the central command of General Mihailovich.

The Rise of General Mihailovich

These guerrilla bands, composed of soldiers who refused to recognize defeat, and of embittered and desperate men whose families had been killed and whose homes had been destroyed, would not have been able to hold out for very long even in their natural mountain fortresses, and would have finally been wiped out by the enemy if a systematic organization of the various independent groups into a united whole had not been undertaken.

It is difficult to say whether Draža Mihailovich, then a Colonel, was the first who attempted this task. If there were others who tried and failed, it only proves how difficult the task was. In any case, it was Mihailovich whose personality and military qualities finally brought together the various scattered and independent guerrilla groups into a nation-wide organization and changed their sporadic and uncoordinated resistance into a true national campaign against the Axis invaders and their satellites.

Mihailovich made use of two means to achieve this end; first, his organizing genius which enabled him to create the military structure most suited for the type of warfare in which his forces engaged, and secondly, his ability to weld together men who had joined the guerrilla bands for many different reasons under the inspiration of a common ideal. The realization that they are fighting against the enemy of their national independence, that they are fighting to regain their freedom and to secure a better future for their country now unites them all under the banner of General Mihailovich, whether on the battlefields of Serbia, of Bosnia, or Slovenia.

His Objectives

General Mihailovich told his men from the very first that he would lead them in a war for the liberation not only of some particular section of the country but the whole of Yugoslavia and all her people. Skill and patience were needed even to win general acceptance of this apparently obvious goal. It must be remembered that the first "Chetas" were composed almost exclusively of Serbs and that the Serbian masses were at that time strongly influenced by the crimes committed by the Ustashis in Bosnia. Some Serbian people had been so shocked by these crimes that they believed that as a historical consequence the union of the Serbs and Croats could never be renewed. Colonel Mihailovich, however, predicted from the start that historical circumstances and practical necessity, combined with the healing influence of time, would remedy this condition and that means would be found to prevent anything similar happening again in a freed and reconstructed Yugoslavia. In holding this view, he was far in advance of prevailing public opinion.

His Political Position

General Mihailovich was well-known for his liberal outlook but did not wish his struggle to be bound to the narrow formula of any political group. He therefore consulted prominent party leaders as patriots, not as politicians and took care to make it perfectly plain that, for his part, he had no political ambitions and that his conduct was governed solely by his duty as a soldier and his loyalty to his King. By his loyalty to the King, he identified his cause with the prevailing sentiment felt for a family which is historically first in the nation and from which has sprung many a national hero. The people of Yugoslavia are more attached to the Royal Family as a national symbol than to even monarchy as a form of government. The wide extent to which the Chetnik leaders now share this popular feeling for the King can be gauged by the fact that the right-hand man and principal aide of General Mihailovich is the author Dragisha Vasich, who formerly occupied an important position in the republican party.

The views which General Mihailovich holds about social and economic future of the country which he and his fighting followers are fighting to liberate can best be judged from the following telegram:

“From the very beginning my men and I are fighting for a free, democratic and reconstructed Yugoslavia against the spirit of the past. Constructive forces of people are assembled in the ranks of my army. The idealistic aim of the army, besides national freedom, is that the regimes in Yugoslavia be inspired and led by great ideas. We emphasized that the social policy was negative and inconsistent in Yugoslavia. Aware of the new spirit of the times we started the struggle for social and national freedom. I endeavor to be the most faithful interpreter of the feelings of the people who are with me and am personally the most bitter opponent of dictatorship of any kind.

I organized a Central National Committee in August, 1941, whose task was to investigate all political errors of earlier regimes. The Committee completed its task and started to study all problems whose decisions represent the prerequisites for improving the social order in Yugoslavia. The Committee is composed of men from all parts of the country—Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.”

Even the opponents of General Mihailovich have never doubted the integrity of his past conduct, his modesty, the firmness of his convictions nor the progressive nature of his opinions.

How the Chetniks Operate

Due to his personal qualities, General Mihailovich was able to create a very intricate organization in the face of an extremely efficient German system of occupation. His organization is of so detailed a nature that it is able to supply, feed and keep in touch with its fighting groups even in the most remote geographical regions of Yugoslavia. It is

undoubtedly the most perfect organization of its kind ever to exist in the Balkans and one which has flourished under almost unbelievable circumstances. It has maintained its existence through two difficult years, cut off from contact with the outside world, assailed by powerful enemies savagely determined to crush it, and with scarcely any help in arms or food from the Allies. Under these adverse conditions Mihailovich's warriors have engaged in skirmishes with the enemy, carried on various military activities, conducted acts of sabotage, and even when necessary, shifted their main strength from one region to another without destroying its effectiveness or unity. At present, there are Chetnik forces in Dalmatia, southern Serbia, Slovenia, Banat and Montenegro, all under the leadership of General Mihailovich. The approximate number of fighters at his disposal is 100,000 and he can assemble hundreds of thousands at the opportune moment.

Aid From Neighboring Nations

General Mihailovich recognized that Yugoslavia could only prosper in the future as a member of an international community which he believed would have more vitality and cohesion if its members had been associated from the start in the fight for freedom. He therefore tried to find elements in neighboring countries who would join immediately in the struggle against the Axis. His efforts in this respect brought a response from Roumanians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Albanians while he also established contacts with the Poles and Czechs. The Yugoslav headquarters in Cairo is assisting in this task and in many ways is working under the direct instructions of the General.

The Background of the Rival Partisan Movement

Meanwhile, how could it happen, as has been reported, that in Yugoslavia the forces of General Mihailovich clashed with other national groups who were also fighting against the Axis, while abroad General Mihailovich was condemned as a traitor by a section of allied public opinion at the very time the Axis press was acknowledging him as its principal enemy?

To understand this situation it is important to distinguish the various factors involved.

General Mihailovich undertook to organize guerrilla forces in every part of the country but he could not do this everywhere at the same time. Circumstances compelled isolated groups to organize on their own, often for no other reason than that they were unable to get in touch with General Mihailovich.

This was especially true of the guerrilla forces in northwestern Bosnia and Croatia. These guerrillas, who were ordinary peasants or small town folk, accepted the leadership of better educated men

from the larger cities; men who came in most cases from the ranks of the young left-wing intelligentsia.

Communism Not Widespread

In Yugoslavia, as in many other European countries during the years immediately preceding the war, a part of the youth of the cities was very much impressed by Marxism and the Soviet Union. The nation is not divided in groups among whom some have inherited social privileges since it has no nobility. Almost the entire population of the cities is descended from peasant stock and therefore maintain their ties with the place of their birth or ancestry. The great mass of peasants, however, never provided a favorable ground for the growth of socialist ideas due to their attachment to the soil and the equitable distribution of farmlands (far-reaching agrarian reforms were instituted after the first World War). The city proletariat and industrial and trade labor groups, who form an insignificant part of the population, was Communistic only in spots, and where Communism was present it was frequently linked with Pan-Slavic sentiment. Social legislation in Yugoslavia, though it was only inaugurated twenty years ago was of a most liberal character. It therefore followed that political movements in Yugoslavia were usually animated by other causes than a desire for social change. In Slovenia, political life revolved around a large clerical party; in Croatia, a political organization of peasants drew its inspiration from Croat national consciousness, while in the Serbian regions politics was bound up with national history and those forces in the country which had brought about national and constitutional freedom in the course of a century.

Despite the political upheavals which took place in Europe in the past twenty years and the rise of personal government in many countries, the people of Yugoslavia of all classes were fundamentally democratic both in their convictions and ways of life. However, in certain regions, due to highly complex causes, the people in fact at times showed a livelier disposition for political struggle which had very little to do with real Communistic belief. This happened at times in Montenegro, the district of Užice, and Belgrade itself, where the temperament of the inhabitants is more dynamic, volatile and prone to violent expression in face of discontent than elsewhere in the country.

Partisan Failure To Establish a Central Organization

Whenever the people of the country districts became embittered for any reason, the leftist intellectuals from the cities endeavored to make capital out of their discontent. Something of this kind happened in the case of the guerrilla groups in Croatia proper. These

groups were composed of nationally-conscious Croats, fleeing from the regimes of traitors; Serbs, fleeing from fanatical Croat Ustashis, and Jews who fled from Axis persecutions. In spite of their diverse and even conflicting background, they were brought together under the slogans of revolutionary socialism.

The very fact that in three places and on three separate occasions in the course of two years, unsuccessful attempts were made to form central Partisan organizations, proves that the Partisan movement did not meet with the same response from the people at large as did that of General Mihailovich. Attempts were made to create central Partisan organizations in Užice, Montenegro, and in Bihać, in that order. In each instance the Partisans held their general assemblies, adopted resolutions and fought unceasingly against all opposition. But the people of each region in turn abandoned the Partisans, although these same people held and still hold their Russian kinsmen in warmest affection. These attempts were made moreover in regions where the peasants are, more than anywhere else, sympathetic towards Communism and glad to fight under the red banner. They fought, as the gray book of Pavelich's government states, at one and the same time for Stalin and King Peter. As long as the Partisan leaders encouraged loyalty to both the King and their Russian ally, they were supported by the people, but no sooner did they try to impose Communism than the people would very clearly demonstrate that they had no use for imported revolution.

Outside Aspect of Partisan Chetnik Controversy

The tolerance and cooperation between the Partisans and Chetniks which once existed has now disappeared and has been replaced by bitterness and animosity. This situation will either eventually be smoothed out by the good will and consultations of the Allied governments or, in course of time, will disappear of its own accord and cease to be of importance. However, there is a possibility that if not carefully handled it might leave a deep imprint on the future of the country.

The solution of this problem depends only in part on the people of Yugoslavia themselves. It depends just as much upon the ability of other members of the United Nations to bring the outside influential forces into harmony as part of their program for a better and just world order.

This conflict assumes an entirely different aspect inside and outside Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia the people judge the facts for themselves and act according to the real situation. It is only when seized upon and made an issue outside Yugoslavia—and here again much depends upon how correctly it is interpreted—that it can lead to a fatal mis-

understanding by the Allies regarding the war efforts of the Yugoslav people, and adversely affect the opinion of the Yugoslav people about the understanding the Allies have of their situation.

General Mihailovich's Difficult Position

In Yugoslavia, General Mihailovich from the start welcomed all groups which showed a desire to join him. If any particular group wished to remain autonomous he was perfectly agreeable because he considered the all important fact to be that it was fighting against the common enemy. As soon as conflict arose between the Partisans and his own forces, General Mihailovich informed the Yugoslav Government in London and requested intervention in order to end it. He likewise informed the Government that people in many parts of the country had begged him to protect them from the new wave of terrorism. When the intervention of the Yugoslav Government did not bring any immediate results, it appears that General Mihailovich felt compelled to take necessary action, otherwise he risked losing his authority both over his own fighting men and with the general population, a development which would have hampered further resistance by the people of Yugoslavia.

Guerrillas under Communist leadership and forces led by Yugoslav patriots have come into conflict. But you never found the Communist population of one region fighting their neighbors who declined to accept Communism, nor have there been any instances in which one group liquidated the other.

False Charges That General Mihailovich Cooperated With the Axis

The radio station "Free Yugoslavia" and the Communist newspapers in America accuse General Mihailovich of cooperating with the Italian occupational forces in his struggle against the Ustasis and Partisans. It is difficult to imagine that General Mihailovich, who, by his initiative and personal sacrifice placed himself at the head of a national movement for the liberation of Yugoslavia, would do anything that might cause his integrity to be questioned and himself to be regarded as a traitor by his people. Some observers, apparently wishing to defend General Mihailovich have argued that should such accusations prove to be true, the conditions in Yugoslavia rightfully justify General Mihailovich's cooperation with the enemy since guerrilla warfare is conducted on an entirely different plane from ordinary warfare (for example, see article of Mr. Seton-Watson in the *London Spectator* of February 26, 1943). However, it must be emphasized most strongly that such contact and cooperation never existed and that General Mihailovich has notified his government several times that his enemies would use every possible means to discredit his reputation. Therefore, he informed his government that under no circum-

stances will he compromise with the enemy, especially not with the Germans and Italians, and will fight till final victory. In his last telegram General Mihailovich declares those accusations to be preposterous. The telegram states:

“The forces under my command are not permitted to cooperate in any way with the Italians and occupiers. The liberation of the people and the resurrection of our Fatherland are the only aims of our struggle.”

The above telegram was received in January, 1943 and the following telegram from General Mihailovich was received in March, 1943:

“By all means disclaim all false accusations and present the real situation to the American public about which I have already sent ample proof. I will send detailed material of our activities in individual parts of Yugoslavia.”

Who Leads the Partisans

The names of the principal Partisan leaders were unknown in pre-war Yugoslavia. Tito⁴³ and Nagy,⁴⁴ two names frequently mentioned, are from all appearances partly or completely foreign. Other names are doubtful. The name of Ribar is mentioned the most, under the presumption that he might be the former first President of the Yugoslav Parliament. Ribar was always considered to be a politician with moderately liberal ideas but more than ten years ago he retired from political life due to old age and illness. His son, between twenty and thirty years of age, took an active part, however, in Communist activities among the Belgrade youth. Kosta Popovich, another Partisan leader, was a Communist who was arraigned, prior to the German invasion, on a charge of translating a French pamphlet on how to commit sabotage in the army in case of war. Bora Markovich, who has been presented as one of the most prominent leaders of the Partisan guerrillas, has informed the Embassy at the same time that he is a prisoner of war in Italy. There is reason for believing that one of the objectives of the Partisan leaders is to prepare the people of Yugoslavia to take their place as a component part of a revolutionary Europe after the war.

False Views of the Conflict

Abroad, this conflict of General Mihailovich and the Partisans has been interpreted in many different ways: 1. As a Serbo-Croatian conflict; 2. As Serbian imperialism; 3. As a counterpart of the Spanish civil war, with reactionary elements suppressing the liberals; 4. As an obstacle to the organization of Europe and the world on social-

⁴³ Josip Broz-Tito, Yugoslav officer, military leader of the Partisans.

⁴⁴ Presumably Imre Nagy, Hungarian political leader and Member of the Hungarian Communist Party.

revolutionary lines. Amid such confusing interpretations it is natural that the commander of the Chetniks should be presented as: a Serbian nationalist, an imperialist, a reactionary and a Fascist.

The explanation of the conflict as a clash between Serbs and Croats can be recognized as false not only from various proclamations dealing with the struggle issued by General Mihailovich, but also from the fact that Mihailovich has the full support of the Yugoslav Government in London which contains Croat ministers within its ranks and from the fact that in Yugoslavia itself he is supported by the Slovenian and Croat-Dalmatian guerrillas.

Yugoslavia and the Future

As regards the problem of social reforms and internal changes, General Mihailovich believes that as long as the country is under enemy occupation the people are not in a position to choose freely and democratically the kind of life they desire. If the people of Yugoslavia are to become part of a Europe organized on international revolutionary lines, a possibility which is not dismissed, they should do so of their own accord when they have regained their liberty. The people of Yugoslavia now fighting the Axis took up arms in order that they might freely pursue their own way of life in the future, and they have no wish to see a new way of life imposed upon them while they are still struggling against their oppressors.

Many Centers of Resistance

The guerrilla warfare waged by the Yugoslav Army for the past year and a half has been conducted from different points. Last autumn the fighting which was carried on in Serbia resulted in 10,000 Germans being killed, but the Serbian population paid in blood for this result. According to General Mihailovich's report, 78,000 persons were killed by the German punitive expeditionary force. More than 120 villages were burned and razed to the ground while the towns of Šabac, Gornji Milanovac, Rudnik, Kraljevo, Užice and Čačak were bombed by Stuka dive-bombers. The well-known massacre of Kragujevac where high-school students between the ages of 15 and 18 were executed in addition to approximately 6,000 men from Kragujevac and the vicinity belongs to this period. In spite of all misfortunes the people did not falter and are continuing the struggle against the forces of occupation while the men of the Yugoslav Army have withdrawn to the mountains of Sandžak and Montenegro.

In the Spring of last year fighting was carried on in Montenegro against the Italians, and later shifted to Hercegovina, eastern Bosnia and then to western Bosnia. This fighting resulted in the withdrawal of Italian garrisons to towns, the migration of Germans from Bosnia and Hercegovina, while several thousand Italians, Germans and

Ustasis were annihilated. Many Serbs from Montenegro and Hercegovina were killed in this fighting.

At the same time there was fighting in Vojvodina against the Hungarians who tried by every means in their power to exterminate the Serbian population north of the Sava and Danube rivers. According to the report of General Mihailovich the result of this fighting was that several thousand Hungarians were killed though the innocent Serb population paid a heavy price with over 30,000 men, women and children dead. Fighting was likewise carried on in Slovenia against Germans and Italians who forced entire sections of the Slovenian population to leave their homes and brought in their own colonists to settle there. This fighting then spread also to the south around Mount Velebit and northern Dalmatia where the Italians had devastated several villages killing many thousand people. According to the latest reports the fighting is being carried on simultaneously as far west as Dalmatia and central Bosnia and likewise in the south of Serbia (Vranja region).

Aiding the North African Campaign

When the Allies began their offensive in North Africa, General Mihailovich saw how important from the Axis point of view were their lines of communication through Yugoslavia to Salonika. The Germans used this route to bring reinforcements in material and men to North Africa. In October and November, units of General Mihailovich's forces cut important communications in Yugoslavia and the result was that two more German divisions had to be sent to Yugoslavia while the German minority in Yugoslavia was mobilized and sent to the valley of western Morava. These two German divisions were in addition to the 17 Italian, 7 Bulgarian, 4 Hungarian, 4 Ustashi and 5 German divisions. These Axis troops performed mopping up operations in Serbia in November and the beginning of December, killing several thousand innocent people especially in Kopaonik and the district of Trstenik. In all villages and towns of Serbia mass arrests of the followers of General Mihailovich were made and over 2,000 persons have already been killed in different places. In the village of Jajinci near Belgrade 1,000 of the most prominent Serbs were shot on a charge of being followers of General Mihailovich. In Belgrade itself about 27,000 people from Belgrade and vicinity were executed as Mihailovich's sympathizers.

In spite of all these sacrifices, the morale of the forces of the Yugoslav Army under the command of Draža Mihailovich and that of the civilian population is very high.

A "Second Front" Which Already Exists

The Balkans, with Yugoslavia occupying a central position is the part of Europe where people are fighting against Hitler's "new order"

with weapons in their hands and it is this struggle which keeps 30 Axis divisions constantly tied up in Yugoslavia. General Mihailovich's forces are ready for the right moment when the Allies will join their action against the common enemy.

860H.01/471

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

No. 54

[LONDON,] April 17, 1943.

[Received May 5.]

SIR: Referring to my Cable Yugoslav Series No. 3, March 30, midnight, I have the honor to report the following developments in connection with the Yugoslav Government's receipt of the British Government's Note of March 30, 1943:

Yugoslav Government's Reaction to British Note.

As regards the Yugoslav Government's reaction thereto, preliminary confusion, irritation soon gave way to a more reasonable view of the problems involved. Premier Jovanović wrote a letter to the British Government in response to the aforementioned note, and enclosed a directive addressed to General Mihailović in clear, strong language.

Yugoslav Government's Letter and Enclosed Directive to Mihailović in Response to British Note.

In his letter Jovanović assured the British Government that his Government shared its concern over General Mihailović's recently reported address. He, moreover, requested that the directive be transmitted to the General through the usual British channels of communication.*

Referring to the British note's further expression of concern over the lack of unity in the Yugoslav Cabinet, Jovanović stated that while this was for him equally a source of regret, this condition reflected, in part, difficulties not unlike those experienced by other exiled Governments based on a coalition; in part, the political growing-pains of a comparatively young nation, composed of varied elements, seeking to adjust their differences with a view to improving

*Premier Jovanović subsequently remarked to me that moments like this brought to light the importance of direct communication between his Government and the General. As it was now, he could only hope that, knowing that this as other messages had been transmitted through British communication channels, Mihailović would not treat it as a British Foreign Office directive in the name of the Yugoslav Government. [Footnote in the original.]

the basis for future collaboration—and in part, the highly sensitive, disturbed state of exiled mentality.

Main Points of Directive.

The following are the main points of the aforementioned directive to General Mihailović:

(a) he was to conduct his policy vis-à-vis the Italians and other Yugoslav resistance forces in such manner as not to subject himself to reproaches either from the British or Yugoslav Government;

(b) as regards his recently reported speech, the British Government's concern was engaged particularly by his statement concerning help from the Italians, and that his main enemies were the Partisans, the Croats, the Ustachi and the Moslems;

(c) unless the General were prepared to revise his policy vis-à-vis the Italians and his fellow-countrymen in other resistance groups, the British Government might feel obliged to revise its present policy of favoring the General to the exclusion of other resistance movements in Yugoslavia;

(d) as regards British supplies, difficulties of transportation and other factors, whereof the General was aware, had hitherto prevented the British from more fully supplying his needs. However, it was hoped that an early improvement in the Middle East situation would reflect itself in increased supplies to the General.

British Government's Reaction to Letter and Directive

In connection with the foregoing, I understand from my British colleague that his Government found the tone and substance both of the letter and directive satisfactory; that it now awaits with interest a response to the latter from General Mihailović.

Yugoslav Government's Previous Interrogation of Mihailović Re: Cooperation with Italians.

Of connected bearing, the Yugoslav Government had, several weeks previous to the despatch of the afore-described directive, sent a message to the General, asking him whether it was true:

(a) that last year Jevdjević had concluded some form of agreement with the Italians;

(b) that he, General Mihailović, had subsequently visited the Italian General Negri; and

(c) that Jevdjević's Chetniks, protected by the Italians, were annihilating Croat settlements in Dalmatia.

Mihailović's Denial

About the time of the despatch of its recent directive, the Yugoslav Government received from the General a denial of reports which had been appearing in the Communist and Communist-inspired Press abroad (copies of a translation of the text of which are attached hereto⁴⁵), that he was collaborating with the Italians; that Jevdjević

⁴⁵ Not printed.

had come to any sort of agreement with the Italians. In this connection, the General stated that Jevdjević had no command and, therefore, had not the means of annihilating the Croat settlements. As regards the General's alleged visit to Mostar, and conversations with Italian General Negri, the General stated: "I** did not go to Mostar at the time mentioned, nor at any time during the war. I** have had no meetings with Italians, nor with Italian generals. The Italians, as well as the Germans, have, on several occasions, attempted to arrange such meetings but they never took place, for I** always refused them with supreme contempt. The Germans made another attempt a few days ago, and I will send a separate report about this.["]

Personal Observations

In preliminary examination of this part of General Mihailović's denial, I found it difficult to reconcile it with confidential disclosures by a Croat member of the Government, concerning the activities of certain of the General's "lieutenants'" activities upon which I reported in my Despatch Yugoslav Series No. 38, January 2, 1943 (see Page 2, paragraph 3 thereof⁴⁶).

Therefore, I re-examined the General's denial against the background of these disclosures. As a result, the question raised itself in my mind as to whether, in denying the aforementioned allegations in the first person, he might not conceivably have naively hoped thus to sweep aside the question of cooperation by his "lieutenants" with the Italians.

Background for Interrogation of the General: Reports re: contact between his "lieutenants" and Italians.

It may be recalled that in my aforementioned Despatch No. 38, January 2, 1943, I reported that my Croat informant stated that then recent reports from "inside" Yugoslavia definitely indicated:

(a) that General Blas Djukanović ("the Quisling of Montenegro") was the main liaison officer between Mihailović and the Italians;

(b) that Mihailović's "lieutenants" were cooperating with the Italian military authorities, in forming battalions to fight the Croats: that Jevdjević (former leader of the pro-Fascist organisation in Bosnia and Belgrade) and Colonel Mihić (General Staff Officer) were operating at Abbazia; Birčanin (former president of National Defence "Narodna Odbrana") was operating at Split; Grdjić (Secretary General of "Narodna Odbrana") was living at Divisional Headquarters at Mostar.

Further Reports Re: Chetnik-Italian Cooperation.

Later, my same informant told me that Colonel Bailey, British

**It is worth considering, to my mind, as to whether the General might not have resorted to the use of the first person pronoun in a naive attempt to sweep aside the question of his "lieutenants'" connections with the Italians. [Footnote in the original.]

⁴⁶ Paragraph beginning "In disclosing the foregoing", p. 963.

liaison officer with General Mihailović, had established the fact that in mid-January, some of Mihailović's Chetnik detachments had been transported in Italian motor trucks to a certain scene of battle between the Italian forces and the Partisans; that, in this case, the Chetniks were helping the Italians in part payment for arms.

Further Main Points in Mihailović's Denial: Denouncement of "worthless movement" (Partisans) through whose promoters the Soviet Union hoped to achieve its ends without breaking its pledge of non-interference in Yugoslav internal affairs.

To revert to the main points of General Mihailović's aforementioned denial, he went on to state that the object behind the aforementioned allegations was clear. Notwithstanding the Soviet Union's oft-repeated pledge not to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, it had secretly done everything possible to destroy the "National Movement", and to strengthen a "worthless movement" which had been condemned, once and for all, by the people. *The latter movement was promoted by foreign adventurers, through whom the Soviet Union hoped to achieve her ends without breaking her pledge of non-interference.* The truth was that it was the agents of the Gestapo and the Communists, who had held meetings and concluded agreements, on the strength of which their present collaboration flourished "at our expense". "In our difficult fight . . .⁴⁷ it seems that our Allies side with our enemies, and that we are left to our own devices. But, in spite of everything, we still remain indomitably loyal to our Allies and to the interests of our own people . . ."⁴⁷

Re: The General's Military Situation.

As regards his military situation, the General stated that his Allies should understand it. The Yugoslav army had been left to shift for itself. Without air support or supplies from the Allies, it was necessary to employ special tactics. He could not attack all his external and internal enemies at the same time. Moreover, he had to adopt his method of fighting to the particular conditions prevailing in any given area. Besides the "Quisling" formations, there were the invaders: Italians, Germans, Bulgarians and Hungarians as well as the Ustashi. He could not attack them all simultaneously; he had to offer firm and speedy resistance, but was obliged to attack his enemies one by one, in such conditions as were favorable. This was one of the fundamental principles of warfare.

Immediately following the Yugoslav Government's receipt of the aforementioned denial from General Mihailović, a report was received from the "Central National Committee" attached to General

⁴⁷ Omission indicated in the original despatch.

Mihailović. (Copies of this report, which deals with the Communist campaign against the General are attached hereto⁴⁸).

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860H.01/484

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 29, 1943.

The Yugoslav Ambassador called to see me upon my return to Washington. The Ambassador had returned from his trip to London during my absence from the city.

The Ambassador seemed decidedly optimistic with regard to his trip to London and gave me to understand that his own situation had been greatly strengthened thereby.

He said that the position of his Government in London was anomalous in as much as the new Prime Minister, Mr. Yovanovitch had never as yet had any conversation with Mr. Churchill and his government was not represented at the British Foreign Office by any ambassador in view of the fact that the Serbian and Croatian elements in the government had not been able to agree upon any individual acceptable to both elements as ambassador. He further said that he was sorry to feel that most of the chief figures in the government were "old and tired".

The Ambassador said that he had several urgent messages to convey to the President from the King of Yugoslavia and hoped that the President would receive him next week in order that he might deliver these messages. Among the matters he desired to take up in this conversation with the President was, first, the fact that the concentrated foods and vitamins which the President had promised would be shipped to the forces of General Mihailovitch had safely reached Cairo but had been in storage there for a long time past and there was no evidence that the British authorities had the slightest intention of making them available to General Mihailovitch. He further desired to request most urgently that American officers be designated as attachés to General Mihailovitch, both in order that we might know through them the true state of affairs in Serbia and in order that the sole contact of General Mihailovitch with the outside world should not be only through the group of British officers attached to him. The Ambassador emphasized the very bad relations existing between General Mihailovitch and these British officers, the recent violent dispute which had flared up between them, and the fact that General Mihailovitch was unable even to communicate with his own Government except

⁴⁸ Not printed.

through British channels. The result of this situation was that neither Mihailovitch nor the Yugoslav Government knew whether all the cables sent from either source reached their destination or whether the text thereof was not censored by the British when it suited their own purposes.

The Ambassador also indicated the concern of the Yugoslav Government at certain recent developments in London. He said that they had learned from conversations of the members of the British Government that the British Government was apparently opposed to the reconstitution of Yugoslavia and apparently favored the splitting up of the component parts of Yugoslavia into separate entities all of which were to form part of a Danubian federation. The Ambassador said that he believed that the Croat-Serb difficulties could probably be ironed out and that it was the considered opinion of all of the present elements in the Yugoslav Government in London that Yugoslavia must be reconstituted but under a different form of government. What they had determined to achieve was the creation of a new Yugoslavia which would be in fact a crown union with complete local autonomy granted to the Slovenes and the Croats as well as to the Serbs, the three separate units being bound together solely in that which related to national defense and foreign relations.

In conclusion the Ambassador gave me to understand that he had now been granted sufficient authority so as to be able to cope with the individuals and elements of a quasi-official character which had been operating in the past in the United States with the consent of the Yugoslav Government and which had proved so disruptive a force from the standpoint of unifying the various factions within Yugoslavia.

The Ambassador seemed to feel that relations with the Soviet Union were improving rather than deteriorating and that some means would be found whereby the forces of General Mihailovitch and the so-called Partisans would be obliged to cooperate in the general war effort.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

860H.00/1477½

Memorandum by Mr. Cavendish W. Cannon of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] May 1, 1943.

THE MIHAJLOVIĆ-PARTISAN PROBLEM IN YUGOSLAVIA

The European Division has tried to examine all accounts from whatever source, of the Mihajlović-Partisan dispute in Yugoslavia. The situation now appears to be about as follows:

1. Mihajlović certainly has been conserving his forces, limiting his activity to occasional acts of sabotage which, however, are usually

very effective, because planned and executed with professional skill. He probably has only a few thousand men actually in the field, but could call in perhaps 300,000 when the time comes for a major operation. It is this strategy of delay, with a view to integrating his operations in general United Nations strategy, which is at the root of most of the criticism against him. He is particularly unpopular with elements everywhere who are urging the "second front."

2. There is no evidence whatever that Mihajlović has acted in collusion with the *Germans*. There may have been some minor traffic—which may, however, be a kind of fifth-column work—with the *puppet regime* (Neditch) in Belgrade. He has not refuted very satisfactorily the charges of his relations with the *Italians*. He certainly has received some supplies and equipment from them, probably in exchange for prisoners, and has not been fighting against them. That he has actually participated with them in actions against the Partisans appears doubtful.

3. At times his men have certainly fought against the *Partisans*. His defense is that this was in those regions where the more lawless elements were ravaging the countryside and he acted to "free the peasantry from this scourge." We understand that he has been admonished against this by his Government, and it seems to be a fact that lately there have been no important clashes between Mihajlović and the Partisans.

4. There was undoubtedly great exaggeration of Mihajlović's achievements, and this propaganda, built up by the Government in exile for purposes of its own prestige, is partly responsible for the attacks made by the opponents of that regime. At the same time, it is equally true that the advocates of the Partisans have also been guilty of gross exaggeration.

5. The British have a liaison mission with Mihajlović. These officers have sometimes quarrelled with him, and we can suppose that their reports have not been entirely objective. Consequently, the British policy has wavered. A few weeks ago the British let us know that they intended to establish liaison also with the Partisans, but as of the end of last week the British Embassy here understood that this project had again been abandoned. British policy is understood to be still to support Mihajlović, but to distribute their encouragement to all "patriots". They seem not to have had much if any success in effecting a reconciliation between the two factions.

6. The Soviet authorities still deny any actual help to or leadership of the Partisans. They reaffirm that they do not concern themselves with the internal affairs of other states. Nevertheless we can now accept as probably true the report that they recently revived, by a communication to the Yugoslav Government in London, the charges they made last August against Mihajlović.

7. Recent press reports indicate that there may be basis for the reports brought from London by Ambassador Fotitch to the effect that Partisan activity is declining. Mr. Fotitch says that the people are rallying to Mihajlović; it is more reasonable to assume that the campaigns of the Germans, the Croatian Ustachis and, to a lesser degree, the Italians, against the Partisans have been much more effective than last year.

8. The Yugoslav Government under British pressure, was supposed to have taken steps to coordinate the two (or more) systems of resistance, thus giving some recognition to the Partisans. We judge from Mr. Fotitch's remarks that this was *not* done.

9. The Partisan "government" at Bihac seems to have collapsed, if indeed it ever amounted to more than a temporary committee for political planning. At the same time the character of Partisan activity in some regions seems to have shifted to comprise a rather broad national front. Perhaps it never was correct to label the Partisans as "communists" in general, though there is evidence that in the early days some Soviets were set up.

10. Mihajlović has in his organization a committee for political planning. Not much is known about it. His critics may say that it is to serve as a link between the Government in exile and the people at home. It seems, however, to have been Mihajlović's own idea, for advice in his military operations and as a counterweight to the political character of much of the Partisans' activity. It has announced no "program".

11. Only small amounts of supplies from the British are getting through to Mihajlović. The British still control his communications. In periods of tension between the British Foreign Office and the Yugoslav Government the Yugoslavs complain that they are not permitted to communicate directly with Mihajlović, and suggest that some of their messages, and his in reply, do not get through, and others may be "mutilated" in transmission. This is one of the chief Yugoslav grievances at the present time.

701.60H11/305

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 11, 1943.

The Ambassador of Yugoslavia called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador expressed deep appreciation for the opportunity which the President had given him of talking with him last week. He told me that he had urgently submitted, in the name of the King

of Yugoslavia, the request to the President that American Army officers be detailed as attachés to General Mihailovich at his headquarters in Montenegro. He said that the President had asked whether the Ambassador had discussed this with Lord Halifax⁴⁹ and, when Mr. Fotitch had replied that he had not, the President had made a memorandum of the point and had said that he would take the matter up.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

860H.01/478 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 14, 1943—2 p. m.
[Received May 14—1:20 p. m.]

3341. We inquired of Sir Orme Sargent⁵⁰ this afternoon whether there had been any further developments with regard to the Yugoslav situation since Ambassador Biddle's telegram No. 3, March 30, midnight, Yugoslav Series. (The Foreign Office had indicated, incidentally, that this question had been taken up through Ambassador Biddle rather than this Mission through error.) Sargent said that unfortunately little progress had been made, that Mihailović had replied in vague general terms and had given no indication either of closer cooperation with the Allies and severance of his relations with the Italians or of his willingness to try to come to terms with Partisans and other Yugoslav groups at present engaged in fighting the Axis. Furthermore, it was often difficult for Colonel Bailey⁵¹ to see the General. Sargent went on to say that Mihailović's obvious reply to any British pressure would have been to the effect that the British had furnished but negligible material aid and that until they could prove of real assistance they could hardly protest at his methods of fending for himself. Now, however, additional airplanes are being made available to supply Yugoslav resistance forces and consequently the British are in a position to offer him something tangible. With this in mind the following note was addressed to Yovanovitch on May 7:

"His Majesty's Government have now seen the reply which General Mihailović has addressed to your telegram DVK 33, of which a copy was enclosed in your note of the 6th April to Mr. Churchill. They are glad to note that the General expresses himself so strongly against the Axis but in order that there should be no further cause for mis-

⁴⁹ British Ambassador.

⁵⁰ British Deputy Under Secretary of State.

⁵¹ British liaison officer with General Mihailović in Yugoslavia.

understanding between His Majesty's Government and the General they feel they must ask you to transmit to him the following communication from them.

“(Begins)

(1) His Majesty's Government hope shortly to be in a position to send General Mihailović material support on a more considerable scale than in the past. Before, however, they can make any progress in the direction either of working out plans for cooperation with him or for supplying him with more material, His Majesty's Government must be satisfied that there is complete understanding with him on the following points.

(a) The primary object of General Mihailović's movement must be resistance to the Axis. For this purpose it is obviously necessary that he should concentrate upon building up an organization which can give the maximum aid to the Allied cause and not allow himself to be distracted from this by any internal differences. His enemies are the Axis and if there are elements of resistance with whom he cannot cooperate he must try and avoid conflict with them.

(b) There must be the closest and most constant collaboration between General Mihailović and the British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, through Colonel Bailey, who has been entrusted with the task of representing the British Command and of acting as interpreter of its views and intentions with General Mihailović's general staff. Coordination of plans must be made through him. His Majesty's Government attach particular importance to this point.

(c) All collaboration must now cease with the Italians; nor must there be any contact or collaboration with General Nedić⁶² himself. Any derogation from this principle could only be agreed to after consultation with the British Commander-in-Chief through Colonel Bailey and with the approval of the British and Yugoslav Governments.

(d) Special efforts must be made to cooperate with guerrilla groups in Croatia and Slovenia against the Axis and in any case no operations must be undertaken against the Croats or Slovenes other than against those actively cooperating with the Axis. Assistance should be given to any British officers who may be delegated to contact Croat and Slovene groups with the idea of unifying all Yugoslav resistance.

(e) The difficulty of suddenly interrupting the struggle with the Partisans as distinct from Croat and Slovene guerrillas is appreciated, but Allied action could not be expected to meet with full or prompt success in a territory where civil war is raging between forces which are both opposed to the Axis. Every effort must, therefore, be made by all concerned to reach a peaceful settlement with the Partisans and in any case no operations against them should be carried out by General Mihailović except in self defence.

(f) General Mihailović should undertake as soon as possible discussions on the ways and means of carrying out the above policy with Colonel Bailey, to whom a copy of this communication is being telegraphed and who is receiving appropriate instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and from His Majesty's Government. These discussions should have as their object the working out of details of an agreed program of resistance and should also cover the planning of the number and locations of the other British Missions under Colonel Bailey's authority which will have to be established as soon as possible in order to help organize the resistance movement as a whole in Yugoslavia.

(2) British Military Command is primarily concerned with the contribution which resistance movements in occupied countries can reasonably be expected to make to the prosecution of the war. Provided therefore that General Mihailović accepts the understanding set out in paragraph (1) above, and is prepared to make his contribution to the common cause on the lines laid down therein, his movement will receive the maximum moral and material support which His Majesty's Government can make available for it. In that case His Majesty's Government would propose to strengthen Colonel Bailey's Mission by the addition of further British Military, Air Force and Naval officers. His Majesty's Government are also prepared to send to General Mihailović a number of Yugoslav officers in accordance with the arrangements already discussed between them and the Yugoslav Government as soon as General Mihailović has given his consent. (Ends)”

⁶² Gen. Milan Nedić, Yugoslav officer, Premier of a puppet regime set up by Germany in Serbia.

We inquired whether the Russians have shown any further interest in British intimations that they were prepared to establish contact with Partisan groups (Embassy's telegram No. 2041, March 23, 10 p. m.) and were told that nothing further has happened. The Russian attitude is negative: They have shown no opposition to such a move.

As to the Partisans, Sargent remarked that while some of the leaders "might be Communists" he could not believe that the vast majority of their followers were not solely interested in freeing their country.

He also said as indicated above that the British feel the time has come when some British officers, and American officers if we so desire, should be sent to Yugoslavia to endeavor to organize resistance on a more effective scale.

While we were there Acting Prime Minister Attlee telephoned Sargent to find out if there had as yet been any reaction from Mihailović to the above note and to indicate that the matter is one of some urgency.

WINANT

860E.01/478

*Memorandum by Mr. Cavendish W. Cannon of the Division of European Affairs*⁵³

[WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1943.

London's telegram 3341 of May 14 reports recent developments in the Mihajlović-Partisan controversy in Yugoslavia.

The British have decided that, since they are now making available additional airplanes to deliver supplies to Yugoslav guerrillas, they could now take a stronger line in insisting on clarifying the Mihajlović situation. Accordingly on May 7 the British Government sent a note to the Yugoslav Government covering a communication to be sent to General Mihajlović. This sets forth in firm language the terms on which cooperation with Mihajlović will be based. A summary of it is attached.⁵⁴

Sir Orme Sargent took this opportunity to say that the British feel that the time has come when some British officers, and American officers if this Government so desires, should be sent to Yugoslavia to try to organize resistance on a more effective scale.

⁵³ Addressed to the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton), to the Political Adviser (Dunn), and to the Under Secretary of State (Welles).

⁵⁴ Not printed.

In comment on this suggestion Eu⁵⁵ would observe that it did not favor sending American officers to Yugoslavia when the proposition was made a week or so ago by the Yugoslav Ambassador. The situation under the British proposal would now be rather different, however. Mr. Fotitch had wanted to have American officers attached to General Mihajlović while the dispute between Mihajlović and the British mission was still unsettled. This would have involved us in that controversy, and would also have exposed us to charges of complicity in Mihajlović's alleged traffic with the Axis and in his civil strife with other factions in Yugoslavia.

The terms which the British have set before Mihajlović, however, ought to clarify his situation to the point that if we are to establish contact with him we would know to what degree his operations are for local political purposes, and his acceptance of these terms would go far to dispose of the charges that he is trafficking with the enemy.

It is recommended nevertheless, that before agreeing to send American officers into Yugoslavia we examine General Mihajlović's eventual reply to the British message. He is showing no alacrity in responding. He will have grasped that in effect the British proposition means that Colonel Bailey would have the upperhand. This will be distasteful to Mihajlović. Bailey is not an army man (before the war he was an engineer of one of the mining companies in Yugoslavia, and doubtless a British Intelligence officer) and is a rather difficult person to deal with. He has been in intermittent conflict with Mihajlović since his mission was established. American officers would presumably also be subordinate to him, and in a doubly difficult position if Mihajlović should involve them in the disputes.

The British Foreign Office said that the Russians showed no opposition when informed of the British plan to establish contact with the Partisan groups. This by no means justifies the conclusion that the Russians would view with favor a joint British-American mission with Mihajlović. It is to be expected that the Russians will either continue supporting the Partisans or seek a unity under Partisan leadership.

All of these considerations suggest caution in sending American officers into Yugoslavia at this time. On the other hand, if we expect to exert an American influence in that region there would be such definite advantages in having some representation in whatever planning is being done on the ground that it is worthwhile examining with the War Department the technical problems involved.

C. W. CANNON

⁵⁵ Division of European Affairs.

860H.00/1495

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to
the Secretary of State*

No. 71

LONDON, June 10, 1943.

[Received June 18.]

SIR: Supplementing my despatch Yugoslav Series No. 69, June 8, 1943,⁵⁶ I have the honor herein to report that Dr. Krek (Slovene), Vice Premier, states that he has made repeated efforts to unite the Partisans with the other organized forces and underground movements in his country in one common fight against the occupying forces.

The following, he said, was the answer he had received :

"The fight of our partisans is not directed against the occupying forces, but is a communist revolution provoked by the Communists with the aid of Italian Communists and blinded Slovenes. Their national watchwords are propaganda to deceive the people. They want to take over powers and are against the Yugoslav Government. Almost the whole district is against them, and also in Ljubljana they are already in a minority."

Dr. Krek went on to say that the leadership of the Partisans was against King Peter, the Yugoslav Government, General Mihailović and Yugoslavia. Their program was a Soviet regime, their flag was red, and their emblem the sickle and hammer. He and his friends could not visualise a cooperation with these persons, but they would do their utmost. The Partisans work everywhere together with the Italian communists. They themselves announced in the Littoral that an Italian communist was a member of the leading committee of the Partisans. He thereupon quoted the two following additional messages from "home":

"The communists who are an insignificant minority amongst Slovenes, are so much linked up with the Italian and German communists, that a common organisation with them would be rather damaging. They do not fight against the occupier. We ask you not to hurt the feelings of our people by the B.B.C.⁵⁷ emissions. If you cannot tell our partisans they are murderers, then at least, do not call their victims murderers. This causes depression and distrust towards London."

"At the conference with all the parties represented in the Zavesa, the following decision has been agreed: the Communists besides accepting the principle of a unified Slovenia in a Federated Yugoslavia must also stop killing Slovenes, burning down houses and looting. They must exclude from their ranks all murderers. Only then can discussions on a unified collaboration against the occupier be possible. From our experience we doubt whether they will do this without explicit instructions from Moscow."

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

⁵⁶ Not printed.

⁵⁷ British Broadcasting Company.

860H.01/518

The Yugoslav Embassy to the Department of State

The Royal Yugoslav Embassy has been instructed by the Yugoslav Government in London to publish the declaration which was unanimously adopted by the Yugoslav Cabinet. After the adoption of the declaration by all the groups represented in the Yugoslav Government, the personal question was raised about the Prime Minister, Mr. Jovanović, against which Mr. Krnjević, vice-president of the Council, and Mr. Šutej, Minister of Finance (two Croat members of the Government) have taken stand. This action opened the present crisis of the Yugoslav Government. The declaration reads as follows:

“Everything seems to indicate that we are entering, if not the final, at least the decisive phase of this war. This compels us to establish clearly and precisely our war aims and to state emphatically the general outlines of our policy. Conversations have already taken place between our Government and the British Government to synchronize the activity of our guerillas with military action of the Allies in the Balkans. It would not however appear sufficient to coordinate the military activity; what is needed is to develop the coordination of our political activity by bringing Yugoslav war aims within the framework of the policy of our great Allies.

Our war aims are determined by all that has happened. After the enslavement and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia no Yugoslav Government could have but one policy: the liberation of Yugoslavia and the reestablishment of its unity as a State. This is a vital necessity for all Yugoslavs and this is what is required by the principles of international justice for the realisation of which the United Nations are fighting. The Yugoslav Government has left its native land because it wanted to fight the enemy to the end and because it wanted to maintain its solidarity with the western democracies. By this very fact it clearly set forth its war aims and the essential lines of its policy.

Despite all differences of opinion we are convinced that we all realize at present, as we did already two years ago, that a Yugoslav line of policy is the only possible one. In carrying out this Yugoslav policy we best serve the real interests of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. True, after the experience of the last twenty odd years, many people consider that it is not possible to restore Yugoslavia on the basis of the complete ethnic unity of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. But, if experience has demonstrated that there exist a Serb nationalism, a Croat nationalism and a Slovene nationalism, which have to be taken into account, it does not follow that it would be necessary to dismember Yugoslavia in order to establish in its place a Serb state, a Croat state and a Slovene state. Twenty-five years ago the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes, each struggling for their respective liberties, realized that they would not achieve them except by uniting their forces. Today this is even more evident than it was twenty-five years ago. We are entering the era of great political and economic units, the era of unions and blocks. If the plan of our enemies to separate the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from one another should

succeed, each of them would no doubt find themselves drawn into community with one or several other states. It is equally certain that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would in such a community, or in such communities, find less favorable conditions for their individual national development than they have found in Yugoslavia, which although not constituting the expression of their complete ethnic unity is nevertheless that of their great ethnic similarity. The following formula was once used by a Serb: A powerful Serbia in a powerful Yugoslavia, which means that there can be neither a powerful Serbia without a powerful Yugoslavia nor a powerful Yugoslavia without a powerful Serbia. This same formula might equally well be used in respect of Croatia and Slovenia.

The more the decisive phase of the war approaches the more we have to emphasize these basic ideas when addressing ourselves to our Allies or to our people. We must however bear in mind the following facts: During its long course the present war has changed its character in respect of all the United Nations as compared with the early stages. This war is no longer merely a defensive war against the Axis; it is a war for a new order which would on the one hand secure for the peoples the necessary guarantees that there would be no wars any more—i.e. international peace—and on the other hand that there would be no economic crises nor unemployment any more—i.e. social peace. In order to be able to count upon a total aid of her Allies Yugoslavia should demonstrate that she desires and is capable of a collaboration with them for the establishment of such a new order. To this end she must, like the other United Nations, thoroughly revise her institutions in the spirit of a rejuvenated democracy. The people must however themselves decide upon this revision of their institutions. Anyhow from the present course of events it would appear justifiable to assume that the era of centralism has passed and that the future inclines towards a more or less federal solution which would permit the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to collaborate with each other in the realization of their common political aims without renouncing however their ethnic individuality. Such an organization would most conform to the democratic ideology as conceived at present by the United Nations.

Finally it should be mentioned that Yugoslavia did not enter the war in a spirit of conquest. But the Atlantic Charter gives her the right to ask that all the regions which have a purely Yugoslav character and which are today under foreign and hostile dominion should revert to her.

The restoration of a Yugoslavia greater and stronger and organized in a more democratic spirit, these are the war aims which every Yugoslav Government must have in view. These aims have been set forth on several occasions in declarations of the King and of the Government. They have particularly been stressed in the King's speech delivered on the first of December 1942.⁵⁸ But today as we enter the decisive phase of the war it is our duty to emphasize anew these aims as a common idea around which all the Serbs, all the Croats and all the Slovenes must unite in these historic days."

⁵⁸ See telegram Yugoslav Series No. 8, December 2, 1942, from the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 831.

This declaration has been endorsed by all the groups in the Yugoslav Government and can therefore be considered as an evidence of the agreement between the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes upon the basic problems of Yugoslav state policy.—Jovanović, Yugoslav Foreign Minister.

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1943.

860H.00/1506

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1943.

The Yugoslav Ambassador came in to see me, at his request.

He referred to an official broadcast made to Yugoslavia through the facilities of the Office of War Information. It was reported in a Croatian paper of June 16th. It was an appeal to Croats to get up and fight against the Axis; it did not mention Yugoslavia; it wound up with the phrase: "Hail to Croatia". The Ambassador pointed out that in the Croatian translation this read: "Hail to free Croatia",—"free" having the sense of something close to "independent".

I asked whether the burden of his complaint was that Yugoslavia was not mentioned. He said he did have that in mind; but he also was worried about the "free Croatia" at the end. He further said that Butkovich had been accused of being pro-Fascist; that he had sued for libel; that the libel case had been dismissed. I observed that that did not mean very much, but I said we would consider the matter.

He then brought up the publicity resulting from Elmer Davis's⁵⁹ letter to a Mr. Werleinisch, which accused the *Srbobran* of misconduct. He produced a newspaper which he said was Communist (and I believe is under Communist influence) which on the basis of Elmer Davis's letter was campaigning for delegates to the convention of the principal Serb society. These delegates, he insisted, were Communist. The paper campaigned for them on the ground that they were "Roosevelt delegates".

I said that, as he knew, we had been concerned about the violence of Yugoslav controversies for a long time. These were American newspapers, printed by and for American citizens. The Department had steadily deplored attempts to involve American citizens in controversies based on foreign political disputes; and this new controversy merely indicated why we had not been happy about foreign

⁵⁹ Director, Office of War Information.

influence exerted on Americans of European extraction, and in a foreign language.

Finally, the Ambassador spoke of the bishop of the Serbian orthodox church, and said that Cannon had indicated that they were dissatisfied with his activities. He wondered whether I could give him any facts. I said I did not have any definite instances in mind; but we had been distinctly worried about a Serbian orthodox bishop undertaking to influence Serbian orthodox churches in the United States at the same time that he was assigned to and supported by a foreign government. This was not a healthy situation.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

860H.01/487: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 30, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received June 30—6:12 p. m.]

4304. We were orally but officially informed by the Foreign Office today that after careful and thorough consideration on the part of the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet a modification in British policy with respect to Yugoslavia has been decided upon. The reply to the British Government's communication with regard to the policies and activities of General Mihailovitch (Embassy's telegrams No. 3341, May 14, 2 p. m., No. 3456, May 19, 8 p. m., and 3785, June 3, 8 p. m.⁶⁰) was received and while it was not entirely clear in all particulars (owing in part to difficulties of communication) it was considered generally satisfactory. On the other hand, reports received from British officers in contact with various Partisan groups have convinced the British that the latter are sufficiently important, active and well organized to furnish effective resistance to the Axis and that they are in fact fighting. The British have consequently now decided to give them material aid on a fairly substantial scale. They will continue also to help Mihailovitch on the specific understanding that no arms or supplies furnished him shall be employed for any other purpose than fighting the Axis. Through their representatives on the spot the British feel that they will be in a position soon to know whether this condition is violated and whether Mihailovitch continues to play with the Italians and fight the Partisans. (The Foreign Office indicates that in their opinion Mihailovitch has in fact considerable strength among the Serbs and in the areas more or less

⁶⁰ Telegrams Nos. 3456 and 3785 not printed.

under his control.) Hitherto, British military supplies brought in by air, have amounted to roughly 10 tons per month; for the British have reached the conclusion that by distributing small arms, munitions, sabotage materials, etc., in the proper places and larger quantities, the returns in increased resistance to the Axis forces will be well worthwhile. The total number of British liaison officers now stationed with various groups in Yugoslavia so far is only 11 and while there was some doubt as to how those parachuting in without previous notice to the Partisan groups would be received they were apparently given enthusiastic welcome.

The British are likewise informing the Russian Government through Moscow their new policy of giving military aid to the Partisans and of the material step-up in the monthly total of help given all Yugoslav groups. The Foreign Office is also about to inform the Yugoslav Government, some elements of which it fears will not be enthusiastic over the decision to help the Partisans.

The possibility of transferring the Yugoslav Government to the Near East is under discussion.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/30057

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

No. 75

LONDON, July 2, 1943.

[Received July 8.]

SIR: I have the honor to forward the attached copies of a translation of the text of a message which King Peter broadcast to his people on June 28, 1943.⁶¹

In general the speech may be characterized as a bid for the friendship of the western allies and Russia alike, and an appeal to his people to have faith in their allies and to close their ranks for the struggle for a post-war "democratic and socially just new commonwealth of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes", as well as a declaration that notwithstanding his Serb background, he as their King has no intention of imposing Pan-Serb rule over non-Serb populations.

The following are the main points:

(a) The King said in effect that together with her great Allies, Yugoslavia would surely win. He knew that his people wanted to hear more from the free world about the future, but he counselled them

⁶¹ Not printed.

to be patient. Moreover, appealing to them not to let themselves be carried away by enemy propaganda, he urged them to have faith in their Allies—Britons, Americans and Russians—who would help them with all their power to restore their Yugoslav union, and a better life for the whole population.

(b) The King assured his people that he would make it possible “for the whole of the people”, when free, to settle their fate according to democratic principles.

(c) The King said that for this reason he wished there to be no differences among his people. For himself, all were equal who desired a true national union of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The internal form of this union would be decided by the true representatives of the people “in our liberated fatherland”.

(d) In what might be characterized as a close-the-ranks rallying call, the King expressed his admiration for all those national fighters—without consideration “of under what temporary name they may be fighting” who had recently so successfully thrown back a fresh German offensive against their invincible Yugoslavia.

In handing me a copy of this address, King Peter said he thought he had made at least several points which would engage Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov’s⁶² interest, in fact it would be interesting to ascertain the latter’s reaction to this message to the Yugoslav people. If I were going to see the Ambassador during the course of that day he would greatly appreciate my drawing his attention to the broadcast.

It so happened that I had a previously arranged appointment with Bogomolov in the latter part of that same day. During our conversation I had mentioned the King’s broadcast, and drew the Ambassador’s attention to several of the main points. Expressing unfeigned surprise and interest, he remarked that this new attitude marked a considerable and welcome advance in the King’s regard for the guerilla forces. Furthermore, he expressed himself as being favorably impressed with the King’s assurances to the people that it was for them to settle their own fate in accordance with the principles of democracy, and that the internal form of the equal union of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would be decided by the true representatives of the people. Moreover, the Ambassador immediately sent for a copy of the broadcast, stating he was looking forward to studying it further.

It was accordingly interesting to note in the following morning’s *Daily Worker* an article entitled “King’s praise of Slav fighters, a welcome change”, which in general expressed approval of the King’s utterances.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

⁶² Alexander Bogomolov, Soviet Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile at London.

860H.00/1512

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The situation with regard to Yugoslavia has recently changed as a result of the following developments:—

(a) The greater part of the Montenegrin Chetniks have been defeated and disarmed as the result of the recent German offensive and General Mihailović has, in consequence, withdrawn eastwards into [apparent omission], where he is reorganizing his forces.

(b) The British authorities concerned have succeeded in establishing contact with the Partisans at their general headquarters in Bosnia and also in Croatia and Slovenia.

It is clear (a) that the Partisans are now the most formidable anti-Axis element in Yugoslavia outside Serbia, and (b) that in spite of the defeat of the Montenegrin Chetniks, the organization of General Mihailović is still the chief resistance organization in Serbia, where there are no appreciable number of Partisans.

His Majesty's Government have now decided to extend their support for the future to all elements of resistance in Yugoslavia, irrespective of political colour. Their policy is therefore:—

(1) To continue to support General Mihailović provided that he accepts their conditions.

(2) To supply forthwith with war material the Croatian guerillas and communist Partisans. Those Partisans operating in close proximity to the forces of General Mihailović will, however, first be required to give an assurance to the British liaison officers that no operations will be carried out against General Mihailović except in self-defence.

(3) To continue efforts to unify all resistance movements throughout Yugoslavia. For this purpose British liaison officers are being instructed to arrange if possible a non-aggression agreement between General Mihailović and the Partisans.

(4) To bring British radio propaganda into line with this new policy and to extend publicity to all groups fighting the Axis as soon as General Mihailović and the Partisans have given the assurances for which they have been asked.

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1943.

760H.6515/6

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

No. 78

LONDON, July 28, 1943.

[Received August 4.]

SIR: At the request of the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Milan Grol, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a

note of July 26, 1943⁶³ in which Dr. Grol sets forth the Yugoslav Government's territorial claims against Italy and request that certain measures be taken respecting those areas in any eventual Armistice Agreement that may be made.

I summarise below the principal features of the note. Dr. Grol states that the Yugoslav Government is convinced that the victory of the United Nations will result not only in the future restoration of the independence and the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia but also in the liberation and reunion of Yugoslavs within the boundary of their national State.

He adds that when the opportunity arises, the Yugoslav Government will submit for the consideration of the United States Government, its views concerning those territorial questions in which vital Yugoslav interests are involved.

For the time being, however, the Yugoslav Government, in view of developments in the Mediterranean, feels obliged to present its claims against the Kingdom of Italy.

After an extended retrospect of the considerations which have determined Yugoslav-Italian frontiers in the past, and after a survey of the ethnic, economic and strategic considerations involved, Dr. Grol asserts that all this clearly demonstrates that every trace of Italian domination should be entirely and finally eliminated from the West coast of the Balkan Peninsula, including all the islands, which ethnically belongs exclusively to Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania, and that Italian rule should be restricted to the purely Italian ethnic areas. He adds that the Greek Government is in full agreement with the Yugoslav Government that Italy must be made to withdraw entirely from the Balkans.

Claiming that the natural geographic and economic frontiers between Italy and Yugoslavia coincide almost entirely with the ethnic frontiers, Dr. Grol states that, in the opinion of the Yugoslav Government, the boundary between the two countries should be established as follows: from Pontafel (Pontebba) towards the south, along the former Austro-Italian frontier to Mount Kanin, where it would turn towards the west in order to include the region inhabited by the Resian (Venetian) Slovenes. North of Krmin (Cormons) this new boundary would again reach the former Austro-Italian frontier and, in general, follow it down to the coast. Wherever it should prove necessary to resort to local corrections of the proposed line for economic, communicational or topographic reasons, the Yugoslav Government trusts that these corrections would not be made at the expense of Yugoslav interests.

⁶³ Not printed.

In conclusion, Dr. Grol states that the Yugoslav Government considers it of the highest importance that any eventual Armistice Agreement with Italy should contain a clause providing for the immediate evacuation by all the Italian military and civil authorities of all the territories east of the proposed boundary line and that these should without delay be handed over to Yugoslav or, in their absence, provisionally to allied authorities, as the Italian attitude toward the Yugoslav population both before and during the present war does not provide any guarantee for the maintenance of order or for the just treatment of the Yugoslav population in these parts.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

860H.01/508: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1943—8 p. m.

3. Yugoslav Series. Your 15 August 4 midnight.⁶⁴ Ambassador Fotitch's relations with this Government have been perfectly correct and he has handled to the complete satisfaction of this Government all the technical business of the Yugoslav Government with the various agencies concerned with the prosecution of the war.

The criticism of him which has been voiced in the public press relates to his alleged support of one faction in the Serb-Croat controversy which is, however, essentially a dispute among American citizens of Yugoslav origin who, on either side, may or may not be representative of the Yugoslav people for whom they would speak.

There have recently been indications that Mr. Fotitch has been urging moderation and conciliation with leaders of the disputing factions. The Department has felt moreover that upon the formulation and effective implementation of a definite policy by the Yugoslav Government itself, he would be guided by appropriate instructions.

The Department questions whether his replacement would offer a better prospect for solidarity particularly if his successor should be an official popularly identified with the leadership of either of the major Yugoslav national groups.

We also have in mind the advantages of continuity in the service at Washington of representatives of governments in exile. While it is not true, as occasionally suggested in the press, that we would make

⁶⁴ Not printed; in it Ambassador Biddle reported that the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs had inquired as to the reaction of the United States Government should Ambassador Fotitch be transferred to some other post (860H.01/508).

this a primary consideration, we would deplore a situation in which in wartime the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington might become an object of political rivalries among the Yugoslav leaders in exile.

HULL

860H.01/534 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 15, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received September 15—12: 30 p. m.]

23. Yugoslav Series. King Peter yesterday left London for Cairo accompanied by the members of his Government.

They expect to arrive in about a fortnight, and the Government will thereafter be established in Cairo instead of in London.

[BIDDLE]

740.0011 European War 1939/31694

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] October 16, 1943.

The Yugoslav Ambassador came in to see me, at his request.

His real purpose was to protest against the unfair picture of Yugoslav fighting which was being presented in the American press. He implied that there was a directive binding on the Office of War Information to do this.

He pointed out that while there were great flights of publicity regarding the activities of the partisans, the communiqués of General Mikhailovitch were unnoticed. It was even intimated that these communiqués were manufactured by Fotitch.

I told him that we were quite aware that they were not manufactured in the Embassy but did proceed from Yugoslavia. I said I would find out whether there was any directive of the kind to which he objected.

The Ambassador said that, put in a nutshell, his complaint was this. The Serbs under Mikhailovitch had first made the revolution and stood against the Germans. For two years they had been fighting under incredible difficulty. They were still doing so. Now, their communiqués were not printed, their motives were impugned, and the fruit of their resistance and victory might well be their own death.

This, the Ambassador said, was because the Serbs at least did not want to be an international citadel of anti-Fascism and an outpost of

left wing ideology. They wanted their own country, and to be let alone in it, and to lead their agrarian peasant life.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

860H.01/572 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 8, 1943.

[Received December 8—10:05 p. m.]

8549. Question was asked in House of Commons today concerning attitude of British Government toward Yugoslav Government in Cairo and committees said to have been set up in Yugoslavia by Partisan General Tito. Mr. Richard Law, Minister of State, answered that he had no information beyond that appearing in press to effect that two committees, one with status of a temporary government, had been set up under General Tito. He added that he was not yet in a position to say what would be the relationship of these bodies "with King Peter and his Government, recognized by His Majesty's Government as the legitimate Yugoslav Government, and now established in Cairo". Asked if British Government "still supported General Mihailovitch", Mr. Law said that "our policy is to support all forces in Yugoslavia who are resisting the Germans". He added that, "as things are, we are supporting the Partisan forces and giving them more support than General Mihailovitch for the simple reason that the resistance of the Partisan forces to the Germans is very much greater". A Member of House of Commons asked if Mr. Law realized this situation might present British Government with first opportunity to carry into effect principles it had enunciated of recognizing Governments in liberated territories duly chosen by the people liberated. Press states that Mr. Law replied that inquirer was mistaken in saying situation gave an opportunity now; but that it would certainly give an opportunity when territory was liberated, and that British policy "had always been to allow territories when they are liberated to choose their own form of Government".

Only recent editorial on Yugoslav dissensions appears in today's *Manchester Guardian*. It speaks of action of Yugoslav Government in Cairo in condemning formation of committees by Partisans, and declare that Government "will do itself no good in Yugoslavia if it condemns the men who have carried on this heroic warfare at home". Editorial asserts: "The people of Yugoslavia have good reason to know what these men have done for them. The Allies could hardly disown the forces whose importance to the common effort has been

recognized publicly by the Allied Commander-in-Chief." Reference is to recent statements by Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, commanding British forces in Middle East.

BUCKNELL

860H.01/573 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)*⁶⁵
to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, December 8, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 6:48 p. m.]

124. Greek Series. I have not yet been given the opportunity of presenting my Yugoslav credentials but yesterday I had another long talk with the Premier Mr. Puritch and expect the ceremony this week.

Puritch said that he saw Mr. Eden yesterday morning and asked for the latter's first reactions on the announced formation of a Partisan government in Yugoslavia. Mr. Eden, he said, was "sweet, nobody could be sweeter" but told him that the British policy would be to continue to recognize the Government and at the same time to continue to support the Partisans. He was exceedingly critical and sceptical on the subject of the British so-called intelligence reports, military and otherwise, from Yugoslavia, particularly as to the exploits of the Partisans and the numbers of their adherents. He said their widely publicized actions cannot be responsible for keeping more than two or three German divisions in the country over and above what would be necessary there in any case. Regarding their setting up of a government he said that in a sense this should prove a good thing since it was demonstrated clearly that the movement is not merely patriotic but essentially political as he has always charged. He described the movement as the "bastard child" of the Russian controlled Tiflis radio calling itself "Free Yugoslavia" and the BBC and complained that the birth of this bastard had been facilitated by the British refusal to allow the recognized Government to have direct communication with its people.

In other ways also he spoke bitterly of the British complaining of their lack of cooperation and consultation with his Government. "I can't declare war on the British Empire and so I must swallow it." He said that Yugoslavia has survived many internal troubles and therefore he is not worried about her fate so far as her own action is concerned. "Our main trouble comes from our Allies." He said he feels most strongly that Allied support to Communist bands will in the

⁶⁵ On November 12, 1943, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Lincoln MacVeagh as American Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile in Egypt.

absence of Allied military enterprise in the Balkans, end in driving the conservative elements of the population into the arms of the Germans for protection.

[MACVEAGH]

860H.01/578a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1943—6 p. m.

7759. For Bucknell. Algiers has suggested the following as a directive on Yugoslavia. OWI⁶⁶ proposed using it in the Central Directive and the Joint Chiefs of Staff independently submitted it to the Department for the same purpose:

"We should present news regarding Tito's government factually, but avoid any speculation as to the relations between that government and the King.

"We should henceforth refer to the Partisan forces as the 'Yugoslav Army of National Liberation.'"

The Department could not approve this directive and returned it in the following form to OWI and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for use:

"Pending further advice we must not refer to Tito's 'government' as such. No recognition has been accorded it by the Allied governments. Avoid any speculation as to the relations between Tito's group and the Yugoslav Government-in-exile. Until further notice emphasize Yugoslav patriot activities throughout Yugoslavia without mentioning the 'Partisans' by name. Refrain from reporting conflicts between rival Yugoslav groups."

HULL

860H.002/251 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, December 12, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 5:30 p. m.]

Greek 129. I had a talk last night with the British Ambassador to Yugoslavia Stevenson who said that King Peter was informed by Mr. Churchill yesterday that the British Government may very soon request the dismissal of Mihailovitch from the Yugoslav Cabinet. Stevenson was much exercised over this and his failure to see Mr. Churchill before the King and prevent a disclosure which he feels to be premature. He said, however, that there can be no doubt of at

⁶⁶ Office of War Information.

least passive aid having been given to the Germans by Mihailovitch in the way of not impeding German troop movements when this was possible.

Stevenson strongly emphasized the practical military value of support in political consequences, said that Tito would undoubtedly invoke the Atlantic Charter when the question of the regime arises after liberation. In connection with Russia's interests he said he had asked the new Soviet Ambassador ⁶⁷ what his Government's attitude is toward the King and he replied "Its attitude is shown by the fact that I am accredited to him".

Finally Stevenson said that both the necessity and the difficulty of getting supplies to Tito are becoming critical as German forces are closing in on his headquarters from nearly every side and communications are open only from Tory routes. "May have to take to the woods."

MACVEAGH

860H.01/578: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 14, 1943.

[Received December 15—9:40 a. m.]

2217. The press today publishes following announcement of the Information Bureau of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

"Concerning events in Yugoslavia.

As is now known, at the end of November three [*there*] took place on the territory of Yugoslavia liberated by the Partisans, the second meeting of the anti-Fascist which [*vetch*] of Yugoslavia composed of the representatives of all regions of the country. This meeting adopted a resolution concerning the transformation of the anti-Fascist vetch into a supreme legislative and executive organ and created as a temporary government of Yugoslavia a National Committee of Liberation. Representatives of all the peoples of Yugoslavia and all social elements and parties carrying on the struggle for the national liberation of Yugoslavia make up the reelected presidium of the anti-Fascist vetch and also of the National Committee of Liberation. Dr. Evan [*Ivan*] Ribář, an outstanding political figure of Yugoslavia, was reelected President of the Presidium of the anti-Fascist vetch and the Commander in Chief of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army; Joseph Broz-Tito, who was given the title of Marshal, was chosen head of the National Committee of Liberation. The meeting established the principle of federation for the organization of Yugoslavia.

These events in Yugoslavia, which have already met with a sympathetic response in England and the United States, are regarded by

⁶⁷ Nikolai Vasilievich Novikov.

the Government of the USSR favorable facts which will facilitate the further successful struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia against Hitlerite Germany. They testify also to the real success of the new leaders of Yugoslavia in the manner of the unification of all the national forces of Yugoslavia.

From the same point of view the activity of the Chetniks of General Mihailović is likewise viewed in the Soviet Union. This activity, according to available information, up to the present has not facilitated but has rather brought harm to the cause of the struggle of the Yugoslav people against the German invaders and therefore could not fail to be received unfavorably in the USSR.

The Soviet Government, considering it essential to receive more detailed information in regard to all Yugoslav events and concerning the Partisan organizations, has decided to send to Yugoslavia a Soviet Military Mission as the British Government has done previously."

HARRIMAN

860H.01/579: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 14, 1943—midnight.

[Received December 15—10:25 a. m.]

2226. The Yugoslav Ambassador Simić informs me that he has virtually no communication with his Government. The Government does however meet his expenses from funds that it controls in the United States. The Ambassador is very critical of his Government which he describes as being composed of functionaries who represent no one but themselves.

The Ambassador has in the past also been critical of Mihailović for his inactivity and for his attitude toward the Partisans but he now states that much of the blame for Mihailović's failure should be attributed to the Yugoslav Government which constantly instructed him to conserve his strength and not to take action against the Germans. The Ambassador feels that Mihailović has been badly treated by the Allies and is especially critical of the British who he says interfered with communications between Mihailović and the Yugoslav Government. He does not believe that Mihailović now has any important support. He estimates the strength of the Partisans to be about 200,000.

Simić attached great importance to the formation of the Free Yugoslav Committee and Government under Tito. He stressed the representative nature of the Government and the Parliament that had created it. He stated that he had received no indication of the attitude of the Soviet Government toward this development (this was prior to the announcement by the Soviet Government that it was sending a mili-

tary mission to Yugoslavia). Simić said that he had not himself had any communication with the Tito government.

Simić gives a 15-minute broadcast in Serbian from the Moscow radio once a week. He states that his text has never been censored. He has received reports that his broadcasts are clearly heard in Yugoslavia and that they are greatly appreciated. He has agreed to furnish us with the texts of these broadcasts and I shall report any significant statements to the Department. The broadcasts take the form of a commentary on world news, in the course of which he urges the need for unity among the various groups in Yugoslavia.

The following statements of the Ambassador regarding the position [*composition*] of the new Government may be of interest to the Department in checking information received from other sources. The Parliament consists of 216 members of whom 146 were able to attend the first meeting. To expedite the carrying on of its work the Parliament created a committee or presidium which consists of 23 Serbians, 20 Croats, 10 Slovenes, 4 Montenegrins and 3 Macedonians.

Tito is the head of the Government (presumably the National Committee) and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces with the title of Marshal. Simić admits that Tito is a Communist.

The President of the Presidium of the Parliament is Ribář, a Serb who was editor of the largest newspaper in Belgrade.

Three Deputies for Tito have been named of whom one, Montchapiady [*Moshe Pijade?*], is a Communist. Simić said he knew him personally and thinks highly of his ability. He spent 14 years in penal servitude for having written Communistic articles. Simić described him as possessing an extraordinary intellect. While in prison he mastered Chinese, translated *Das Kapital* into Serbian and gave a university course of instruction to a group of his fellow prisoners. He speaks seven languages fluently. The other two Deputies are Avgustinchik, a Croat artist from Zagreb and Russe, a Slovene who is not known to Simić.

Simić states that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Smodlaka, is a Croat who was formerly Yugoslav Minister to the Vatican and prior to that was stationed in Berlin. He was a member of the Yugoslav Committee in London during the last war. The Minister of the Interior, Zochevich, is an Orthodox priest.

While the Ambassador did not indicate what position he would take with respect to the new Government he made it clear that the movement has his full sympathy and that in his opinion the Cairo Government will have little influence upon future developments in Yugoslavia. He expressed great satisfaction with the statements made by Secretary Hull and Richard Law to the effect that the

American and British Governments would help any group actively opposing the Germans.⁶⁸

HARRIMAN

860H.01/580: Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, December 16, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received December 17—1 p. m.]

5. Yugoslav Series. I secured yesterday from Ambassador Stevenson a copy of his telegram to the Foreign Office reporting Mr. Churchill's talk with King Peter (see my telegram No. 4, Yugoslav series [*Greek 129?*] of December 12, 11 a. m.) and also a subsequent talk with Mr. Puritch. I believe the Department may be interested in this telegram in connection with my No. 124, Greek Series, December 8, 1 p. m., and as background to messages now being prepared in this Embassy. I am therefore paraphrasing it as follows, forwarding the original text by airgram:

"During the course of an audience with King Peter on December 10 Mr. Churchill told him how much he was impressed by the Partisan movement's significance and strength. At the same time he informed King Peter that the British Government possesses evidence which is irrefutable to the effect that Michailovitch has been collaborating with the enemy and he gave King Peter a warning that the desirability of eliminating Michail[ovitch] from the Cabinet might be suggested to him in the fairly near future by the British Government.

"Mr. Churchill saw the Yugoslav Prime Minister that same evening and after repeating to him his impressions regarding the Partisans informed him of the British Government's intention both to continue and to increase as much as possible British military support to their movement. He then told the Prime Minister of the evidence we possess concerning Michail[ovitch]'s collaboration with the enemy and told him that the British Government's decision in these circumstances might be to cease supporting him.

"The Prime Minister reacted with a strong protest refusing to accept Mr. Churchill's allegations concerning the collaboration by Michail[ovitch] and saying that the British Government would assume a terrible responsibility should it withdraw its support from him since the country would then be subjected to a bloodthirsty regime of communism which the Yugoslav peasantry would resist desperately thus causing a long and destructive civil war. He besought the British Government to think this decision over very carefully in the light of its possible results which he said would be a matter of life

⁶⁸ For statement of Secretary Hull and that of Richard Law, British Minister of State, see *New York Times*, December 9, 1943, p. 11, and December 11, 1943, p. 9, respectively.

and death to Yugoslavia though doubtless of small importance to Great Britain as a great power involved in a war of world-wide dimensions.

[“]Claiming that the rise of the party’s power had been due to British publicity organs and institutions and accusing the British Government of putting a muzzle on his own Government and preventing it from talking with its people, he added an appealing description of his country’s suffering which he said involved losses exceeding those of the United States and Great Britain put together.

“Pointing out that the armed forces of the Partisans now number more than 200,000 men, that they are containing about 14 divisions of the Germans and that they are fighting strongly and with success against the enemy while Michailovitch remains inactive, Mr. Churchill said that though the latter’s reasons for such inaction might seem good to him it is obviously to the advantage of the common cause that every assistance that can be spared at present should be withheld from the forces which are not fighting and given to those which are. In this connection he also pointed out the great disparity between the numbers of Partisans and the Chetniks and said this proves a similar disparity in the appeal made to the Yugoslav people by the respective movements.

“The Yugoslav Prime Minister replied that he could not accept such a high estimate of the Partisan forces or that they are containing so many divisions of the enemy and stated that the reason for the presence of all these enemy divisions in the northwestern and western parts of the country is the resistance of the whole people of Yugoslavia encouraged by Michail[ovitch]’s forces. He recalled that Michail[ovitch] himself had made the statement that the whole Yugoslav people would rise up to help the Allied troops once they set foot in the Balkans but that the savageness of the reprisals of the Germans was something to which he could not expose the civil population in the meantime should it engage now in destroying communications and other sabotage.

“To the remark that the danger of reprisals was something which was not bothering the Partisans, Mr. Puritch answered that so long as the ideas of Moscow triumphed what might happen to the people did not concern the Communists. Finally the interview was closed by Mr. Churchill with regrets that he could not see eye to eye with Mr. Puritch though he was happy to have been able to learn his ideas. He said that the Ambassador would communicate the British decision to Mr. Puritch in due course.”

[MACVEAGH]

860H.01/581 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, December 16, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received December 20—10 : 42 a. m.]

6. [Yugoslav Series.] British Ambassador Stevenson has made available to me copies of two telegrams, the first dated December 7,

from the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy at Washington, and repeated to Cairo, and the second dated December 12 from Ambassador Stevenson to the British Foreign Office regarding a proposed change in the British policy toward General Mihailovitch. The text of these messages is being transmitted to the Department by airgram.⁶⁹

In its message to Washington the Foreign Office states that it has under reconsideration its whole policy toward resistance movements in Yugoslavia as a result of a report from the British liaison officer with the Partisans,⁷⁰ a copy of which has been sent to the Embassy in Washington for transmission to the State Department⁷¹ and also as a result of other reports from liaison officers with Mihailovitch. On the basis of this information which is given in detail the British Foreign Office is considering the possibility of suggesting to King Peter that Mihailovitch be summoned to Cairo and replaced by a commander who would cooperate with the Partisans.

If Mihailovitch's subordinate leaders would follow such a new commander, it might be hoped that his removal would not only contribute considerably to the military effort of the Allies but also achieve unity without necessarily sacrificing the King, toward whom Tito's attitude is at present noncommittal. The message concludes that no action should be taken pending further advice concerning the matter at which time the State Department should be asked whether it agrees.

In his message of December 12, Ambassador Stevenson reports that he has orally informed the Middle East Defense Council of Mr. Churchill's conversations with the King and the Yugoslav Prime Minister (see my 5, December 16, 10 a. m.) and has advised the Council that a plan of action will be proposed to it shortly. The plan for which he seeks the approval of the Foreign Office before formal submission to the Council is that:

1. If Mihailovitch successfully carries out an operation reported to the Foreign Office in a previous telegram, consideration should be given to the question of continuing to support him militarily but his removal from the Cabinet in any case should be sought.

2. If he does not carry out this operation, the British Ambassador should be authorized to hand the Yugoslav Prime Minister a note the draft text of which is quoted and is in substance that:

Mihailovitch has for sometime declined to cooperate with the Commander-in-Chief Middle East in undertaking operations against the enemy and the British Government is therefore withdrawing its military missions from his forces and ceasing to send him supplies and money.

⁶⁹ Airgram No. 1, December 17, 1943, 10 a. m., not printed.

⁷⁰ Brig. Fitzroy Hew MacLean, head of the British Military Mission to the Yugoslav Partisans.

⁷¹ Not found in Department files.

3. The Ambassador should at same time advise King Peter and urge him to eliminate Mihailovitch from the Government and as Commander-in-Chief simultaneously ordering forces under Mihailovitch's command to cooperate with the Partisans.

4. Commander-in-Chief Middle East should advise Tito of the decision and inform him that the King orders him to collaborate with the Cetniks against the enemy and

5. An intensive propaganda campaign should be undertaken toward cooperation between Partisans and Cetniks.

The message concludes that the American Ambassador is being kept fully informed and urges that the American Government's "agreement and support" for this change of policy be obtained and also that the Soviet Government be fully advised and its support secured for the action contemplated with Tito.

In furnishing me these messages Ambassador Stevenson said that if he is authorized to hand Prime Minister Povitch [*Puritch?*] the note mentioned in paragraph 2 above he is convinced the latter will resign since he and his supporters regard Mihailovitch "not as a man but as a symbol of Serbian resistance". Stevenson anticipates that the new government then to be formed would be headed by Cubrilovitch⁷² with Jukitch⁷³ (see my 2, December 9, 8 p. m.⁷⁴) as Minister for Foreign Affairs and that it would not be unfavorably disposed to attempting in some sort of at least practical *rapprochement* with the Partisans.

MACVEAGH

860H.01/582 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, December 18, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received December 21—1:42 a. m.]

7. [Yugoslav Series.] I would request the Department to read the following in connection with my Nos. 4, 5, and 6, Yugosl[lav] Series.⁷⁵

The Yugoslav Prime Minister summoned me this morning and requested me to telegraph urgently as follows: He has been informed by the British Ambassador that he may expect shortly joint pressure from the British and American Governments to remove General Mikhailovitch from the Cabinet on the basis of his collaboration with

⁷² Presumably Branko Cubrilović, former Minister of Agriculture.

⁷³ Ilija Jukić, former Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁷⁴ Not printed.

⁷⁵ No. 4 is presumably Greek Series No. 129, December 12, 11 a. m., p. 1024; No. 5, December 16, 10 a. m., is printed on p. 1028, and No. 6, *supra*.

the Germans. The Ambassador, he said, could show him no proofs of this collaboration but alleged that documents had been secured showing that certain Chetniks were in German pay.

In the Prime Minister's opinion the results of the removal of Mikhailovitch would be (1) that the Allies would lose the support not only of all the Serbian people but also of all non-Communist Slavs and come into conflict with them; (2) that such people would be driven to side with the Germans and thus the war in the Balkans would not be shortened but lengthened; (3) that the present Yugos[lav] Government would be forced to resign in which eventuality he sees no "decent" government which could take its place and the Allied policy to restore the Yugos[lav] monarchy would be compromised; [(4)] that a scandal would be created and the action widely considered as a betrayal of an ally with unfortunate repercussions in other occupied countries; and finally; (5) that it would be contrary to the Atlantic Charter and amount to delivering an Allied nation into the hands of international Bolshevism.

The Prime Minister requested me to add that he has given the above views to the British Ambassador in a "private conversation" and that the latter promised to bring them immediately to his Government's attention. He concluded by saying that what he understands from press reports to be the present American attitude, namely, that the United States recognizes the Government of Yugoslavia but will continue to give military support to all elements engaged in fighting the enemy, is acceptable to him but that the present British proposals are fantastic and dangerous in the extreme.

Aside from the question as to whether the British Ambassador has not gone rather far at this juncture in mentioning the United States, the Department may well wish to consider very carefully any proposals involving a change in our attitude at the present time though doubtless a straddling policy covering the military and political situations may be difficult to maintain indefinitely. I believe that the only likely successful way to crystallize the situations in Yugoslavia and Greece as between genuinely patriotic and other elements would be the constitution of an Allied front somewhere in the Balkans but that while this solution is not adopted to take sides between political warring groups within the countries contains very definite possibilities of future embarrassment.

Any official advices or confidential background as to its views which the Department may be able to afford me at this time will be appreciated.

MACVEAGH

860H.01/583 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, December 18, 1943—10 p. m.
[Received December 21—1:47 a. m.]

8. Yugoslav Series. In a declaration described in advance as "an important announcement" broadcast yesterday by the "Free Yugoslavia" radio station, the anti-Fascist Council for National Liberation, after reviewing accomplishments of Partisans during last 2 years, states that "on the eve of final expulsion of occupants from the country, people of Yugoslavia demand justifiably creation of a state organization which would guarantee equality to all peoples of Yugoslavia" and "peoples of Yugoslavia expect from Allies and all their friends recognition not only of their fight against occupants but also their free democratic will and cessation of support to treacherous Yugoslav Government and clique around it" accusing Mihailovitch of "systematically" stirring up fratricidal strife for which Government, of which he is agent, bears responsibility. Declaration continues by denouncing King and monarchy under whose banner "greatest treasons and most atrocious crimes are being committed against people" as a result of which people "want measures taken regarding King and monarchy which accord with people's fight for liberation".

It concludes with expressions of friendship for Soviet, Great Britain and U.S., and announcement of five decisions of anti-Fascist Council in substance as follows:

(1) Anti-Fascist Council is to be transformed into a supreme legislative and executive body for Yugoslavia as the highest and sole representative of sovereignty of peoples of country. Council is to form a Yugoslav National Committee of Liberation "with all amenities of a people's government" through which council will exercise its executive functions.

(2) The Government in exile must be deprived of all rights of representation and government of Yugoslavia including right to represent Yugoslavia abroad.

(3) International treaties and obligations signed by Government in exile on behalf of Yugoslavia will be checked, corrected or re-signed and future treaties and obligations signed by exiled Government will not be recognized.

(4) Yugoslavia is to be built on "democratic and federative principle as a state community of equal peoples".

Special decrees covering foregoing four decisions will be issued under date of November 29, 1943.

Text of broadcast as received in Cairo will be transmitted by airgram.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Airgram No. 2, December 20, 1943, 11 a. m., not printed.

Commenting on this development the British Ambassador while reserving opinion as to its ultimate effect on his proposals now being considered in London as regards British policy toward Yugoslavia (see my Nos. 4, 5, and 6, Yugoslavia Series) expressed view that appearance of declaration at this time may make it appear that the Partisans are forcing Britain's hand and thus "complicate matters".

MACVEAGH

860H.01/587 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, December 20, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received December 22—12: 45 p. m.]

12. [Yugoslav Series.] Ambassador Stevenson informs me that he has heard from the Foreign Office that his plan reported in my No. 6, December 16, 7 p. m., is now up for Cabinet's consideration. Meanwhile, however, in view of the decisions of the Yugoslav anti-Fascist Council summarized in my No. 8 of December 18, 10 p. m., which appear to reveal the Partisan movement as definitely revolutionary, he has today telegraphed London a new plan more closely in accord with the attitude which I understand to be that of the Department to date.

In this new telegram he suggests that the United States of America and Soviet Governments be approached with a view to adopting a common attitude based on (1) the prime necessity of using to best advantage all the means available to obtain a speedy victory; (2) the need to postpone political issues of all kinds until after the country has been liberated; (3) the need to unify and concentrate all resistance being offered to the enemy; and [(4)] the necessity of allowing the people of Yugoslavia without foreign interference, to settle their own affairs.

In keeping with the above the Ambassador is withdrawing his suggestion to the Foreign Office that pressure should be placed upon the King to change the composition of the Yugoslav Government though he feels that the new situation need not affect the purely military decision as regards Mikhailovitch.

He has promised to supply me with a copy of this telegram together with a copy of the decisions of the anti-Fascist Council which he has just been able to secure from the military. It appears that this last mentioned document was brought out by one of the Partisan officers now here engaged in military discussions with the British. The Ambassador tells me that the broadcast summarized in my No. 8 above referred to has been prevented by the censorship from appearing in the press here and has not appeared in England either so far.

MACVEAGH

860H.01/592 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, December 23, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received December 27—10:20 a. m.]

14. [Yugoslav Series.] Following text of communication dated December 21, 1943, from Yugoslav Prime Minister is transmitted at Mr. Puritch's request:

"I shall be very grateful to you if you would be so good as to communicate the following to the Government of the United States of America:

"The Royal Yugoslav Government have the honor to transmit herewith the declaration issued on November 29 by the 'anti-Fascist council of Yugoslavia' and broadcast by the radio station 'free Yugoslavia' on December 18, 1943, which appears to be in complete discordance with the public and official statements made by the British and American responsible statesmen in connection with the military aid given to the Partisans.

"The Royal Yugoslav Government feel themselves obliged to point out the incoherence of the adopted policy to support in every possible way a revolutionary movement which claims to be 'this supreme and the only representative of the sovereignty of the Yugoslav peoples and is trying to impose—by the force of the arms received, too—to the whole of Yugoslav territories a definite social and political organization. No military reason seems to be sufficient to justify to [the] support afforded to such a movement both in materials and moral backing by all available means of'."

The declaration referred to summarized in my telegram No. 8 of December 18, 10 p. m., and transmitted in full in my A-2, December 20, 11 a. m.⁷⁷

MACVEAGH

860H.01/589 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, December 23, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received December 23—5:50 p. m.]

8926. The Embassy this morning asked the Foreign Office for the latest Yugoslav developments. With reference to the Embassy's 8542, December 8, 9 p. m.,⁷⁸ the Foreign Office said that its previous exploration of the idea of persuading King Peter to get rid of Mihailović is now defunct as a result of Tito's recent declaration. Eden had not

⁷⁷ Latter not printed.⁷⁸ Not printed.

approved the idea prior to Tito's statements and consequently it is not believed that the British Embassy in Washington conveyed the details of the suggested action to the Department. The most recent declaration of Tito, in which he is alleged to have attacked the monarchy, has been considerably garbled in the newspaper accounts. Foreign Office states that Tito had not categorically said that the monarchy must be ousted but that in his statement there was included a sentence to the effect that "in so far as the monarchy is concerned, measures must be taken to coincide with the requirements of the country". The Foreign Office does not think this is a final closing of the door on King Peter. At the present time it is endeavoring to ascertain exactly what Tito means. If the British surmise is correct that Tito will still play ball with the King under certain circumstances, the Foreign Office says that the main objective will be to get the King and Tito together. If, on the other hand, Tito flatly refuses to have anything to do with the King, the Foreign Office says that "we will have to play along under the existing circumstances".

Foreign Office is of the opinion that ultimately it may be necessary to have concerted action between the United States, Great Britain and the USSR so that Tito may be persuaded to cooperate with the King, as, the Foreign Office said, "the King resisted the Germans and, although ill-advised, he has done his best and we cannot throw him overboard".

WINANT

860H.002/251

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1943—9 p. m.

8141. The Department has received a telegram from Cairo stating that the Yugoslav Prime Minister has advised the American Ambassador as follows:

"He has been informed by the British Ambassador that he may shortly expect joint pressure from the British and American Governments to remove General Mihailovitch from the Cabinet on the basis of his collaboration with the Germans."

The Department has not thus far been consulted by the British Government with regard to the Yugoslav situation nor has it instructed Ambassador MacVeagh to approach the Yugoslav Government in the sense allegedly stated by the British Ambassador. The British Embassy in Washington likewise has no knowledge of any British-American consultations in this respect. The Department is therefore at a loss to understand the basis for Ambassador Stevenson's

alleged reference to American pressure, if indeed he was correctly quoted, and desires that you endeavor to ascertain from the Foreign Office whether he did in fact mention the possibility of American action to the Yugoslav Prime Minister.

Repeated to Cairo.

HULL

860H.01/675

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government, whose aim has been while continuing to recognise the Yugoslav Government in Cairo, to work for the unity of all elements determined to fight against the enemy in the restoration of Yugoslav independence, has been gravely concerned with the recent polemics between the Partisans and the Yugoslav Government.

On December 14th a memorandum on recent developments in Yugoslavia was handed to the Soviet Ambassador when he called on Sir Alexander Cadogan.⁷⁹ A summary of the contents of this memorandum was given to the State Department on December 21st.⁸⁰

The memorandum began by referring to report by Partisan radio station "Free Yugoslavia" of establishment of Supreme Legislative Committee and Executive National Committee and then stated that His Majesty's Government understand the need for these administrative methods but do not consider that this development need affect their present policy towards Yugoslavia nor their present relations with the Partisan movement. They have for some time recognised that the Partisans are a considerable military force and therefore entitled to their full military support. During recent months they have been sending them assistance and propose to continue doing so, increasing its quantity to the fullest extent feasible. For the rest, they hope that in the interests of Yugoslavia unity it may be possible for General Tito, on the one hand, and the King and the Yugoslav Government on the other, to find a basis for collaboration together, in the common task of freeing Yugoslavia and thus enabling the people to pronounce freely on the form of Government which they desire to live under after the war. Memorandum concluded by asking whether Soviet Government shares these views.

On December 20th the Soviet Ambassador called on Mr. Eden and handed him a message (Annex A)⁸⁰ from the Soviet Government replying to Mr. Eden's memorandum of December 13th. An account

⁷⁹ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁰ Not printed.

of Mr. Eden's conversation with the Soviet Ambassador is attached (Annex B).⁸¹

Instructions were sent on December 23rd to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow to see M. Molotov⁸² and tell him that Mr. Eden was most gratified to receive from the Soviet Ambassador on December 20th message which he brought him from the Soviet Government about Yugoslavia. Mr. Eden much appreciates the readiness of the Soviet Government to do everything in their power to help to find a compromise between the various parties.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to say that His Majesty's Government are examining the situation and Mr. Eden hopes shortly to give to the Soviet Government the view of His Majesty's Government. In the meanwhile the head of the British Mission with the Partisans, who is at present in Egypt, has been instructed to return to Yugoslavia and to examine the whole situation with Marshal Tito with a view to ascertaining what basis there is for unifying all forces of resistance both in and outside Yugoslavia and of bringing together contending parties.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in conclusion was to say that Mr. Eden would be grateful for any suggestions which the Soviet Government might have in mind for achieving this object.

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1943.

860H.00/1496 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1943—7 p. m.

3. [Yugoslav Series.] Your Yugos[lav Series] 7.⁸³ With reference to the final paragraph of your telegram you may find the following statement which was made available to the press on December 9 (to be used entirely as background and not attributed to any official of this government) of interest:

"The Yugoslav people have demonstrated to the whole world their determination to regain their independence and to drive the Axis forces from their country. With inhuman cunning the Nazis strove to divide this people against itself, by partitioning its territory, by establishing conflicting authorities maintained by violence and terror, and by incitement to the lowest passions of civil strife.

It is natural that in repelling an enemy operating with every method of violence and deception, the organizers of Yugoslav resist-

⁸¹ Not printed.

⁸² Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

⁸³ Dated December 18, 7 p. m., p. 1031.

ance should also seek to utilize every regional advantage, every social group, and every skillful and daring leader. Whatever their differences may be, their ultimate purpose is to drive out the enemy and to restore the institutions of free government.

The King and the Government of Yugoslavia, now temporarily established at Cairo, are recognized by all the United Nations as the authority conducting Yugoslavia's participation in the general conduct of the war. Within the country resistance movements under diverse leadership have grown into forces of undoubted military value. In the circumstances it is natural that political factors should also play a part. It is our intention to assist in every possible way the resistance of the Yugoslav people, and to deal with the resistance forces from the point of view of their military effectiveness, without, during the fighting, entering into discussions of political differences which may have arisen among them, and which tend to divert the national energies from the main objective of expelling the Nazis from their country. In line with our consistent policy we consider that political arrangements are primarily a matter for the future choice of the Yugoslav people.

Meanwhile every means is being utilized to obtain factual and objective information on all aspects of the situation in Yugoslavia, for use in the prosecution of the war."

HULL

860H.01/603 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, December 31, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 7:50 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series 18. Continuing his policy of keeping me informed of developments Ambassador Stevenson has now shown me further exchanges of telegrams between himself and the Foreign Office following his telegram summarized in my No. 12 Yugoslav Series of December 20, 9 p. m.

As a result of these exchanges, and against his carefully reasoned and most earnest advice, the Foreign Office has now instructed him to put into execution a new plan as follows (paraphrased from Foreign Office telegram 144 of December 23, 1943): (1) Brigadier MacLean (the Liaison Officer mentioned in the second paragraph of my number 6 Yugoslav Series of December 16, 7 p. m.) AK to go immediately to Tito's headquarters and urge Tito to make no further polemical statements; (2) he is also to inform the Partisan leader that in the view of His Majesty's Government Yugoslavia's own interests and those of the common war effort must suffer unless relations can be established between the King and the Partisans; and (3) he is to say in this connection that His Majesty's Government

would be in favor of having the King go to Yugoslavia in order to establish contact with Tito and the Partisans.

In reply the Ambassador, while continuing to protest, has submitted a brief to the Foreign Office for approval containing the textual orders in above sense which he proposes to issue to the Brigadier whom he has already sent to Yugoslavia to await final instructions there.

This brief contains the points numbered above but adds the proposal that the Brigadier should also inform Tito that it remains the British Government's policy to accord all military support in its power to the Partisan movement.

From perusal of the lengthy message of the Foreign Office in this matter it would appear that it is by no means entirely satisfied with its own plan but simply regards it as all things considered something which "ought to be tried" and probably the best thing to do in the circumstances. The Ambassador on the other hand definitely feels it is bound to fail and in so doing to increase the Partisans' arrogance and presumption. He has strongly advised that the Russians should be approached in advance of any such move and if possible associated with it and he has admitted to me that the King has not been consulted! In this last connection I talked with the Prime Minister this afternoon and he appeared wholly innocent of any idea that a plan might exist which would involve the King's going to Yugoslavia at this time. He said B[ritish] A[m]bassador thought such a thing might be done later when the Germans are defeated or withdraw from the Balkans but now "it is too early".

MACVEAGH

860H.01/608 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, December 31, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received January 3, 1944—8:51 a. m.]

19. [Yugoslav Series.] I am informed by the Yugoslav Prime Minister that the Russian reaction to his proposals for a Yugoslav-Soviet agreement (see my telegram No. 16 [126?], Greek Series, December 8, 6 [8?] p. m.⁸⁴) has been to express interest in general but to point out that it would first be advisable for the Yugoslav Government to compose the factional differences now existing within the country. Both Mr. Puritch and the British Ambassador have made the comment to me that this may be interpreted as a hint to the government to secure a *rapprochement* with the Partisans. Meanwhile a request from

⁸⁴ Not printed.

Mihailovich that the British mediate between him and Tito has been turned down by the British Foreign Office as "death bed repentance," its telegram in this connection which I have seen adding that it sees no reason why a move toward a *rapprochement* cannot be made by Mihailovich direct. The Ambassador thinks that two Serbian officers who he tells me recently took an unauthorized flight from Bari in a South African plane in order to join Mihailovich may have carried a message from the King or his Government advising the War Minister to make some move of this sort but he also commented to me that while some of the subordinate Chetniks might possibly do this it is an impossibility for Mihailovich personally since "they would cut his throat".

Mihailovich has not yet carried out the assignment referred to in my No. 6, Yugoslav Series, December 16, 7 p. m., and the deadline was December 29. But he continues to make promises in this connection and at the instance of Brigadier Armstrong, liaison officer at his headquarters, NHO [*who?*] appears to be as pro-Mihailovich as MacLean is anti. The British are giving him a few weeks additional grace before coming to any open decision affecting his status. Their practical assistance to him, however, is now virtually nil.

MACVEAGH

ARRANGEMENT FOR SERVICE OF A GROUP OF YUGOSLAV AVIATORS
AS A UNIT WITH THE UNITED STATES ARMY AIR FORCE

811.22760H/6-2843

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1943.

The Yugoslav Ambassador ⁸⁵ called to see me this afternoon at his request.

The Ambassador stated that the group of 40-odd Yugoslav aviators who had been undergoing training by this Government and who were now stationed at Salinas, California, would probably complete their training at the end of next month. He said the idea originally had been to have this unit serve as a Yugoslav unit integrated into the American Expeditionary Forces in the Middle East. Recently, the Ambassador said, he had had word that the United States Army authorities were thinking of giving these men commissions in the United States Army so that they would serve as American aviators. The Ambassador expressed the very earnest hope that this latter alternative would not be followed. He said it was in the highest degree important, from the standpoint of morale in Yugoslavia, that this

⁸⁵ Constantin Fotitch.

unit, which would be the first Yugoslav unit which could serve with completely modern equipment and with full modern training, should serve as a Yugoslav unit and not be completely obliterated within the American Army. He said that such gestures as those which the President had so generously carried out to the Norwegians,⁸⁶ to the Dutch and to the Greeks by transferring to them naval vessels flying a flag of those occupied countries could not, of course, be carried out in the case of Yugoslavia, and that the nearest to this would be the permitting by this Government of this aviation unit to serve as a Yugoslav flying unit.

I said I would be very glad to take the matter up with the appropriate authorities and let the Ambassador know what the final decision might be.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

811.22760H/7-2843

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1943.

The Yugoslav Ambassador came in to see me, at his request.

He mentioned to me a point he had already made to Mr. Cannon.⁸⁷ Forty Yugoslav aviators have been in training here to serve in flight units. They finish their training on August 10th. The liaison officer of O.S.S.⁸⁸ (Mr. Kimbel) came to the Ambassador with a letter from General Donovan⁸⁹ offering commissions in the American Army to these men. The Ambassador said they appreciated the compliment of being offered commissions; but that the whole intent of the arrangement was that these men should serve as a Yugoslav unit, though of course under the American command.

I said I noted that Mr. Cannon already had the matter in hand, though I would be glad to follow up.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

811.22760H/8-343

The Yugoslav Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

According to the information of the War Department, the Yugoslav aviators who have been in training in the United States since

⁸⁶ For correspondence regarding replacement by the United States of ships lost by Norway in the United Nations efforts, see pp. 481 ff.

⁸⁷ Cavendish W. Cannon of the Division of European Affairs.

⁸⁸ Office of Strategic Services.

⁸⁹ William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

November 1942, are to complete their training on August 10, 1943. It would be to the general interest of the Allies, particularly the Yugoslavs, if this group of aviators would participate in active combat as soon as possible.

The Yugoslav Government would be grateful to the United States Government if those aviators, upon completion of their training, could be used in a special Yugoslav unit as part of the American Air Forces in the Middle East as it was outlined in a letter of the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Brig. General L. S. Kuter, of August, 1942.

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1943.

811.22760H/8-1143

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1943.

The Ambassador of Yugoslavia called upon me this morning at his request. The Ambassador spoke again at great length of his urgent desire to have 42 Yugoslav aviators whose instruction in the United States is now nearing completion to serve as a Yugoslav unit in the American air forces. He said that Colonel Donovan had informed him that General Arnold⁹⁰ had decided that while these aviators would be permitted to serve together as a unit and to wear Yugoslav insignia, they would nevertheless be forced to take commissions as American officers. The Ambassador spoke very strongly against this and said that from the psychological point of view this would destroy the effect which he had been hopeful might be created, namely, Yugoslav officers actually serving in our own air forces.

I told him that it seemed to me that the question was probably one of administrative discipline of which our own War Department authorities would have to be the sole judges but that I would ask again that the matter be looked into in order to ascertain whether the Ambassador's requests could be granted.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

811.22760H/8-1143

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European
Affairs (Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1943.

MR. WELLES: After his conversation with you this morning⁹¹ Mr. Fotitch called in Eu⁹² and in the course of his conversation again referred to the matter of the Yugoslav aviators.

⁹⁰ Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

⁹¹ See memorandum *supra*.

⁹² Division of European Affairs.

He thinks there will be some very real difficulty about separating these men from the Yugoslav army in order that they might legally accept commissions in the United States Army. He naturally has still more in mind the political import of having a "Yugoslav unit." He also feels that if we are to oblige those officers to accept commissions in our army it would not be in accordance with the understanding reached a year ago, before the arrangements were made to bring these fliers to the United States for training. An excerpt from Mr. Fotitch's memorandum for Colonel Donovan, dated August 11, 1942, which, Mr. Fotitch says, was the basis of this understanding, is attached.⁹³

It has occurred to Eu that in conversations with the War Department we might suggest a formula by which these officers could be considered as on detached duty from the Yugoslav army and attached to the United States army; they would be subject to American regulations and discipline; have American equipment and even American uniforms, if necessary; but retain their respective ranks in their own army.

The practical inconveniences of all this are apparent. It surely was recognized from the beginning, however, that it was primarily a *political* and psychological project, and that the expense and trouble of transporting and training this handful of men could never at any time have been justified as a purely military transaction.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

811.22760H/8-1443

The Yugoslav Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The instruction of the Yugoslav aviators in the United States coming to its completion, the War Department has suggested that these aviators should be tendered commissions in the American Air Force. It was further suggested that they be incorporated with the Ninth Air Force in the Middle East, operating as far as possible as a Yugoslav unit and having on their uniforms and on their planes the identification of Yugoslavia.

While having no objections to the proposed utilization of these aviators as part of the American Air Force in the Middle East, the Ambassador and the Military Attaché feel bound to express their

⁹³ Not printed.

observations as to the suggestion that the Yugoslav aviators should accept commissions in the American Army.

I. This fact in itself may be very flattering for our aviators but the psychological and moral effect in the occupied country as well as in our Forces in the Middle East may be quite different. It may even leave the impression that by abandoning the Yugoslav Army to accept commissions in the American Army there are doubts about the revival of Yugoslavia. On the other hand the awareness of the fact by the Yugoslav people that a part of the free Yugoslav Army is again fighting with the great Allies would be of exceptional importance and value from a point of view of morale and would also serve to deepen even more the sentiments that the Yugoslavs have toward the great American nation. This would also remain as an evidence that the Allies generously and wholeheartedly prepared this part of the Yugoslav Army to be the first link with the fighting units of our Army which remained in the country.

II. There would also be legal difficulties in carrying out the proposal for the commissions since it would require a formal discharge by royal decree from the Yugoslav Army of all these men and the authorization for them to transfer to the American Army.

III. Such a procedure would be subject to the voluntary decision of all the men to accept commissions in the American Army. The Government has no legal right to influence the men to serve in the forces of an Allied Army because it is a personal constitutional right and duty of every Yugoslav citizen to serve in the Yugoslav Army.

IV. Of the 42 men, 32 belong in the active service of the Regular Yugoslav Army, the other ten are reserves. All of them have acquired certain rights (promotions, pensions, etc.) which they will lose by their discharge from the active list in the Yugoslav Army. For all these reasons, even if our airmen would feel flattered and honored by this proposal, as they must be, but knowing their personal sentiments and scruples we presume that they will not be inclined to accept the commissions in the United States Army.

V. In the very first discussions held during the visit of His Majesty King Peter II of Yugoslavia to the United States and in all subsequent conversations, it was presumed, on our part, that our aviators would remain officers of the Yugoslav Army and after completion of their training would form a part of the American Air Force under American Command as a special Yugoslav unit.

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1943.

811.22760H/8-1443

Memorandum by the Liaison Officer (Wilson) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1943.

MR. WELLES: Referring to your memorandum of August 3, 1943 relative to Mr. Fotitch's call concerning the Yugoslav aviators,⁹⁴ I am informed by Colonel Goodfellow of the O.S.S., to which agency the formation of a Yugoslav aviation unit was originally referred by the President, that Colonel Donovan is personally taking up this matter with the President and Admiral Leahy⁹⁵ with a view to complying with the Yugoslav request.

Meantime, Colonel Goodfellow, who is aware of the Department's interest in this matter, has been in touch with General Arnold's office with a view to bringing about a modification of the War Department's stand as expressed in the attached letter of July 5, 1943,⁹⁶ from General Marshall⁹⁷ to Admiral Leahy and in a subsequent similar letter dated July 26 addressed to Colonel Donovan by General Arnold.⁹⁸ It was agreed by General Arnold's office that the War Department would reconsider its position upon receipt of a communication from Colonel Goodfellow fully explaining the reasons for Mr. Fotitch's attitude. Colonel Goodfellow, who has been in frequent touch with the Ambassador, is to see him again today and will then submit the desired data which, he believes, together with Colonel Donovan's *démarche* will result in a satisfactory settlement of this question.

In view of this situation and as Colonel Goodfellow has undertaken to keep me fully posted on future developments, I shall not take any further steps at this time in the absence of contrary instructions from you.

If [It] would be appreciated if the attached file is returned to U-L.⁹⁹

ORME WILSON

⁹⁴ Memorandum not printed; Mr. Welles suggested that Mr. Wilson take up the matter of Yugoslav aviators with the War Department (811.22760H/8-343).

⁹⁵ Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

⁹⁶ Not attached to file copy.

⁹⁷ Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

⁹⁸ Not found in Department files.

⁹⁹ Under Secretary's Office, Liaison.

811.22760H/8-1643

Memorandum by the Assistant Liaison Officer (Key)

[WASHINGTON,] August 16, 1943.

Upon receipt of the attached memorandum¹ I telephoned Colonel Goodfellow of the O.S.S. (Executive 6100) with a view to ascertaining whether there had been any developments since I had spoken to him on August 13.

Colonel Goodfellow informed me that he, likewise, had received a copy of the memorandum, and on the basis thereof had addressed a communication to General Arnold's office expressing the hope that means would be found of complying with the Ambassador's requests. The letter also mentioned that General Bonner Fellers, an expert on the Middle East, whence the Yugoslav aviators would operate, was in favor of permitting the aviators to remain as officers of the Yugoslav Army and that, because of political considerations, the Under Secretary of State likewise had expressed the hope that the War Department could meet the Ambassador's wishes.

Colonel Goodfellow stated that he was about to go off on a leave but that he would instruct his secretary, Miss Dockery, to inform me as soon as a reply had been received from General Arnold's office.

DAVID McK. KEY

811.22760H/10-243

Memorandum by the Assistant Liaison Officer (Key)²

[WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1943.

In further reference to the Yugoslav aviators, Colonel Goodfellow of the O.S.S. informed me of the receipt by him of an invitation from the Yugoslav Ambassador to attend a dinner which is to be held at the Embassy on Wednesday October 6 to celebrate the "presentation" of a flight of heavy bombers to the "Yugoslav Army". At once upon receipt of this invitation Colonel Goodfellow got in touch with General Arnold's office in order to ascertain what this was about. He was informed that General Arnold had recommended to the Munitions Assignment Committee (Air) that a flight of heavy bombers be assigned to the Yugoslav aviators to fly across the ocean in order to join up with General Eisenhower under whose orders they will operate.

I gathered that the Yugoslav aviators and the Ambassador are fully satisfied with this arrangement. The phraseology used in the

¹ Not attached to file copy.

² Addressed to the Liaison Officer (Wilson) and to Mr. Cannon of the Division of European Affairs.

Ambassador's invitation suggests the possibility, however, that he may be under a misapprehension as to the exact nature of this transaction, for, according to Colonel Goodfellow, these planes will be under the operational control of General Eisenhower and not of the Yugoslav Army and furthermore, the planes are being assigned to the use of the Yugoslav aviators rather than being "presented".

DAVID MCK. KEY

[A Yugoslav detachment was activated at Bolling Field on October 6, 1943, and assigned four B-24 Liberator bombers. The planes were flown by their Yugoslav crews to Cairo, Egypt, where the planes were officially accepted by King Peter II. The detachment was under the command of the United States Army Air Force for purposes of administration, supply, operations, and combat activities. It was attached to a B-24 squadron of the 15th American Air Corps, where it operated as an integral part of the squadron, feeding, living, and flying together with the American crews. The squadron participated in air raids over Greece, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Bulgaria. In August 1945, eleven of the fourteen remaining members of the detachment by directive of President Truman were either commissioned or enlisted in the Army of the United States. See House Report No. 419, 80th Congress, 1st Session.]

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¹ In indexing persons the intention has been to include all references to persons of significance for an understanding of the record, with the following exceptions: (1) The name of the Secretary of State or the Acting Secretary of State appearing as the signer of outgoing instructions unless there is a clear indication of the Secretary's or Acting Secretary's personal interest; (2) the name of an American officer in charge of a mission appearing as the signer of reports to the Department of State, except for personal items; (3) the names of persons to whom documents are addressed.

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